[ G.R. No. 203585.
July 29, 2013 ]
MILACABOVERDETANTANO AND ROSELLER CABOVERDE,
PETITIONERS, VS. DOMINALDA ESPINACABOVERDE, EVE
CABOVERDE-YU, FE CABOVERDE-LABRADOR, AND JOSEPHINE E.
CABOVERDE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
The Case
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 are the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA) rendered on June 25, 2012 and September 21, 2012, respectively,
in CA-G.R. SP. No. 03834, which effectively affirmed the Resolutions dated February 8,
2010 and July 19, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sindangan, Zamboanga del
Norte, Branch 11, in Civil Case No. S-760, approving respondent Dorninalda Espina-
Caboverde's application for receivership and appointing the receivers over the disputed
properties.
The Facts
Petitioners Mila Caboverde Tantano (Mila) and Roseller Caboverde (Roseller) are
children of respondent Dorninalda Espina-Caboverde (Dominalda) and siblings of other
respondents in this case, namely: Eve Caboverde-Yu (Eve), Fe Caboverde-Labrador (Fe),
and Josephine E. Caboverde (Josephine).
Petitioners and their siblings, Ferdinand, Jeanny and Laluna, are the registered owners
and in possession of certain parcels of land, identified as Lots 2, 3 and 4 located at
Bantayan, Sindangan and Poblacion, Sindangan in Zamboanga del Norte, having
purchased them from their parents, Maximo and Dominalda Caboverde.[1]
The present controversy started when on March 7, 2005, respondents Eve and Fe filed a
complaint before the RTC of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte where they prayed for the
annulment of the Deed of Sale purportedly transferring Lots 2, 3 and 4 from their parents
Maximo and Dominalda in favor of petitioners Mila and Roseller and their other siblings,
Jeanny, Laluna and Ferdinand. Docketed as Civil Case No. S-760, the case was raffled to
Branch 11 of the court.
In their verified Answer, the defendants therein, including Maximo and Dominalda,
posited the validity and due execution of the contested Deed of Sale.
During the pendency of Civil Case No. S-760, Maximo died. On May 30, 2007, Eve and
Fe filed an Amended Complaint with Maximo substituted by his eight (8) children and
his wife Dominalda. The Amended Complaint reproduced the allegations in the original
complaint but added eight (8) more real properties of the Caboverde estate in the original
list.
As encouraged by the RTC, the parties executed a Partial Settlement Agreement (PSA)
where they fixed the sharing of the uncontroverted properties among themselves, in
particular, the adverted additional eight (8) parcels of land including their respective
products and improvements. Under the PSA, Dominalda’s daughter, Josephine, shall be
appointed as Administrator. The PSA provided that Dominalda shall be entitled to
receive a share of one-half (1/2) of the net income derived from the uncontroverted
properties. The PSA also provided that Josephine shall have special authority, among
others, to provide for the medicine of her mother.
The parties submitted the PSA to the court on or about March 10, 2008 for approval.[2]
Before the RTC could act on the PSA, Dominalda, who, despite being impleaded in the
case as defendant, filed a Motion to Intervene separately in the case. Mainly, she claimed
that the verified Answer which she filed with her co-defendants contained several
material averments which were not representative of the true events and facts of the case.
This document, she added, was never explained to her or even read to her when it was
presented to her for her signature.
On May 12, 2008, Dominalda filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Answer,
attaching her Amended Answer where she contradicted the contents of the aforesaid
verified Answer by declaring that there never was a sale of the three (3) contested parcels
of land in favor of Ferdinand, Mila, Laluna, Jeanny and Roseller and that she and her
husband never received any consideration from them. She made it clear that they
intended to divide all their properties equally among all their children without favor. In
sum, Dominalda prayed that the reliefs asked for in the Amended Complaint be granted
with the modification that her conjugal share and share as intestate heir of Maximo over
the contested properties be recognized.[3]
The RTC would later issue a Resolution granting the Motion to Admit Amended Answer.
[4]
On May 13, 2008, the court approved the PSA, leaving three (3) contested properties,
Lots 2, 3, and 4, for further proceedings in the main case.
Fearing that the contested properties would be squandered, Dominalda filed with the
RTC on July 15, 2008 a Verified Urgent Petition/Application to place the controverted
Lots 2, 3 and 4 under receivership. Mainly, she claimed that while she had a legal interest
in the controverted properties and their produce, she could not enjoy them, since the
income derived was solely appropriated by petitioner Mila in connivance with her
selected kin. She alleged that she immediately needs her legal share in the income of
these properties for her daily sustenance and medical expenses. Also, she insisted that
unless a receiver is appointed by the court, the income or produce from these properties is
in grave danger of being totally dissipated, lost and entirely spent solely by Mila and
some of her selected kin. Paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the Verified Urgent
Petition/Application for Receivership[5] (Application for Receivership) capture
Dominalda’s angst and apprehensions:
5. That all the income of Lot Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are collected by Mila Tantano, thru her
collector Melinda Bajalla, and solely appropriated by Mila Tantano and her selected kins,
presumably with Roseller E. Caboverde, Ferdinand E. Caboverde, Jeanny Caboverde and
Laluna Caboverde, for their personal use and benefit;
6. That defendant Dominalda Espina Caboverde, who is now sickly, in dire need of
constant medication or medical attention, not to mention the check-ups, vitamins and
other basic needs for daily sustenance, yet despite the fact that she is the conjugal owner
of the said land, could not even enjoy the proceeds or income as these are all appropriated
solely by Mila Tantano in connivance with some of her selected kins;
7. That unless a receiver is appointed by the court, the income or produce from these
lands, are in grave danger of being totally dissipated, lost and entirely spent solely by
Mila Tantano in connivance with some of her selected kins, to the great damage and
prejudice of defendant Dominalda Espina Caboverde, hence, there is no other most
feasible, convenient, practicable and easy way to get, collect, preserve, administer and
dispose of the legal share or interest of defendant Dominalda Espina Caboverde except
the appointment of a receiver x x x;
xxxx
9. That insofar as the defendant Dominalda Espina Caboverde is concerned, time is of the
utmost essence. She immediately needs her legal share and legal interest over the income
and produce of these lands so that she can provide and pay for her vitamins, medicines,
constant regular medical check-up and daily sustenance in life. To grant her share and
interest after she may have passed away would render everything that she had worked for
to naught and waste, akin to the saying “aanhin pa ang damo kung patay na ang
kabayo.”
On August 27, 2009, the court heard the Application for Receivership and persuaded the
parties to discuss among themselves and agree on how to address the immediate needs of
their mother.[6]
On October 9, 2009, petitioners and their siblings filed a Manifestation formally
expressing their concurrence to the proposal for receivership on the condition, inter alia,
that Mila be appointed the receiver, and that, after getting the 2/10 share of Dominalda
from the income of the three (3) parcels of land, the remainder shall be divided only by
and among Mila, Roseller, Ferdinand, Laluna and Jeanny. The court, however, expressed
its aversion to a party to the action acting as receiver and accordingly asked the parties to
nominate neutral persons.[7]
On February 8, 2010, the trial court issued a Resolution granting Dominalda’s application
for receivership over Lot Nos. 2, 3 and 4. The Resolution reads:
As regards the second motion, the Court notes the urgency of placing Lot 2 situated at
Bantayan, covered by TCT No. 46307; Lot 3 situated at Poblacion, covered by TCT No.
T-8140 and Lot 4 also situated at Poblacion covered by TCT No. T-8140, all of
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte under receivership as defendant Dominalda Espina
Caboverde (the old and sickly mother of the rest of the parties) who claims to be the
owner of the one-half portion of the properties under litigation as her conjugal share and
a portion of the estate of her deceased husband Maximo, is in dire need for her
medication and daily sustenance. As agreed by the parties, Dominalda Espina Caboverde
shall be given 2/10 shares of the net monthly income and products of the said properties.
[8]
In the same Resolution, the trial court again noted that Mila, the nominee of petitioners,
could not discharge the duties of a receiver, she being a party in the case.[9] Thus,
Dominalda nominated her husband’s relative, Annabelle Saldia, while Eve nominated a
former barangay kagawad, Jesus Tan.[10]
Petitioners thereafter moved for reconsideration raising the arguments that the concerns
raised by Dominalda in her Application for Receivership are not grounds for placing the
properties in the hands of a receiver and that she failed to prove her claim that the income
she has been receiving is insufficient to support her medication and medical needs. By
Resolution[11] of July 19, 2010, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration and at
the same time appointed Annabelle Saldia as the receiver for Dominalda and Jesus Tan as
the receiver for Eve. The trial court stated:
As to the issue of receivership, the Court stands by its ruling in granting the same, there
being no cogent reason to overturn it. As intimated by the movant-defendant Dominalda
Caboverde, Lots 2, 3 and 4 sought to be under receivership are not among those lots
covered by the adverted Partial Amicable Settlement. To the mind of the Court, the
fulfilment or non-fulfilment of the terms and conditions laid therein nonetheless have no
bearing on these three lots. Further, as correctly pointed out by her, there is possibility
that these Lots 2, 3, and 4, of which the applicant has interest, but are in possession of
other defendants who are the ones enjoying the natural and civil fruits thereof which
might be in the danger of being lost, removed or materially injured. Under this precarious
condition, they must be under receivership, pursuant to Sec. 1 (a) of Rule 59. Also, the
purpose of the receivership is to procure money from the proceeds of these properties to
spend for medicines and other needs of the movant defendant Dominalda Caboverde who
is old and sickly. This circumstance falls within the purview of Sec. 1(d), that
is, “Whenever in other cases it appears that the appointment of a receiver is the most
convenient and feasible means of preserving, administering, or disposing of the property
in litigation.”
Both Annabelle Saldia and Jesus Tan then took their respective oaths of office and filed a
motion to fix and approve bond which was approved by the trial court over petitioners’
opposition.
Undaunted, petitioners filed an Urgent Precautionary Motion to Stay Assumption of
Receivers dated August 9, 2010 reiterating what they stated in their motion for
reconsideration and expressing the view that the grant of receivership is not warranted
under the circumstances and is not consistent with applicable rules and jurisprudence.
The RTC, on the postulate that the motion partakes of the nature of a second motion for
reconsideration, thus, a prohibited pleading, denied it via a Resolution dated October 7,
2011 where it likewise fixed the receiver’s bond at PhP 100,000 each. The RTC stated:
[1] The appointed receivers, JESUS A. TAN and ANNABELLE DIAMANTE-SALDIA,
are considered duly appointed by this Court, not only because their appointments were
made upon their proper nomination from the parties in this case, but because their
appointments have been duly upheld by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 24
May 2011 denying the herein defendants’ (petitioners therein) application for a writ of
preliminary injunction against the 8 February 2010 Resolution of this Court placing the
properties (Lots 2, 3 and 4) under receivership by the said JESUS A. TAN and
ANNABELLE DIAMANTE-SALDIA, and Resolution dated 29 July 2011 denying the
herein defendants’ (petitioners therein) motion for reconsideration of the 24 May
2011 Resolution, both, for lack of merit. In its latter Resolution, the Court of Appeals
states:
A writ of preliminary injunction, as an ancillary or preventive remedy, may only be
resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests and for no other
purpose during the pendency of the principal action. But before a writ of preliminary
injunction may be issued, there must be a clear showing that there exists a right to be
protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the said
right and will cause irreparable injury.
Unfortunately, petitioners failed to show that the acts of the receivers in this case are
inimical to their rights as owners of the property. They also failed to show that the non-
issuance of the writ of injunction will cause them irreparable injury. The court- appointed
receivers merely performed their duties as administrators of the disputed lots. It must be
stressed that the trial court specifically appointed these receivers to preserve the
properties and its proceeds to avoid any prejudice to the parties until the main case is
resolved, Hence, there is no urgent need to issue the injunction.
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court RESOLVES, as it is hereby
RESOLVED, that:
1. The defendants’ “Urgent Precautionary Motion to Stay Assumption of Receivers” be
DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, it being patently a second motion for
reconsideration, a prohibited pleading, the same is hereby ordered EXPUNGED from the
records;
2. The “Motion to Fix the Bond, Acceptance and Approval of the Oath of Office, and
Bond of the Receiver” of defendant Dominalda Espina Caboverde, be GRANTED with
the receivers’ bond set and fixed at ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(PhP100,000.00) each.[12]
It should be stated at this juncture that after filing their Urgent Precautionary Motion to
Stay Assumption of Receivers but before the RTC could rule on it, petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA dated September 29, 2010 seeking to declare null and
void the February 8, 2010 Resolution of the RTC granting the Application for
Receivership and its July 19, 2010 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioners and appointing the receivers nominated by respondents. The petition
was anchored on two grounds, namely: (1) non-compliance with the substantial
requirements under Section 2, Rule 59 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure because the
trial court appointed a receiver without requiring the applicant to file a bond; and (2) lack
of factual or legal basis to place the properties under receivership because the applicant
presented support and medication as grounds in her application which are not valid
grounds for receivership under the rules.
On June 25, 2012, the CA rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition on the
strength of the following premises and ratiocination:
Petitioners harp on the fact that the court a quo failed to require Dominalda to post a
bond prior to the issuance of the order appointing a receiver, in violation of Section 2,
Rule 59 of the Rules of court which provides that:
SEC. 2. Bond on appointment of receiver.-- Before issuing the order appointing a
receiver the court shall require the applicant to file a bond executed to the party against
whom the application is presented, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that
the applicant will pay such party all damages he may sustain by reason of the
appointment of such receiver in case the applicant shall have procured such appointment
without sufficient cause; and the court may, in its discretion, at any time after the
appointment, require an additional bond as further security for such damages.
The Manifestation dated September 30, 2009 filed by petitioners wherein “they formally
manifest[ed] their concurrence” to the settlement on the application for receivership
estops them from questioning the sufficiency of the cause for the appointment of the
receiver since they themselves agreed to have the properties placed under receivership
albeit on the condition that the same be placed under the administration of Mila. Thus,
the filing of the bond by Dominalda for this purpose becomes unnecessary.
It must be emphasized that the bond filed by the applicant for receivership answers only
for all damages that the adverse party may sustain by reason of the appointment of such
receiver in case the applicant shall have procured such appointment without sufficient
cause; it does not answer for damages suffered by reason of the failure of the receiver to
discharge his duties faithfully or to obey the orders of the court, inasmuch as such
damages are covered by the bond of the receiver.
As to the second ground, petitioners insist that there is no justification for placing the
properties under receivership since there was neither allegation nor proof that the said
properties, not the fruits thereof, were in danger of being lost or materially injured. They
believe that the public respondent went out of line when he granted the application for
receivership for the purpose of procuring money for the medications and basic needs of
Dominalda despite the income she’s supposed to receive under the Partial Settlement
Agreement.
The court a quo has the discretion to decide whether or not the appointment of a receiver
is necessary. In this case, the public respondent took into consideration that the applicant
is already an octogenarian who may not live up to the day when this conflict will be
finally settled. Thus, We find that he did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he granted the application for receivership based on
Section 1(d) of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court.
A final note, a petition for certiorari may be availed of only when there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case,
petitioners may still avail of the remedy provided in Section 3, Rule 59 of the said Rule
where they can seek for the discharge of the receiver.
FOR REASONS STATED, the petition for certiorari is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was also denied by the CA on September 21,
2012.[14]
Hence, the instant petition, petitioners effectively praying that the approval of respondent
Dominalda’s application for receivership and necessarily the concomitant appointment of
receivers be revoked.
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues in their petition:
(1) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the
appointment of a receiver despite clear showing that the reasons advanced by the
applicant are not any of those enumerated by the rules; and
(2) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the
Resolution of the RTC and ruling that the receivership bond is not required prior to
appointment despite clear dictates of the rules.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit.
We have repeatedly held that receivership is a harsh remedy to be granted with utmost
circumspection and only in extreme situations. The doctrinal pronouncement in Velasco
& Co. v. Gochico & Co is instructive:
The power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one and should be exercised with extreme
caution and only under circumstances requiring summary relief or where the court is
satisfied that there is imminent danger of loss, lest the injury thereby caused be far greater
than the injury sought to be averted. The court should consider the consequences to all of
the parties and the power should not be exercised when it is likely to produce irreparable
injustice or injury to private rights or the facts demonstrate that the appointment will
injure the interests of others whose rights are entitled to as much consideration from the
court as those of the complainant.[15]
To recall, the RTC approved the application for receivership on the stated rationale that
receivership was the most convenient and feasible means to preserve and administer the
disputed properties. As a corollary, the RTC, agreeing with the applicant Dominalda, held
that placing the disputed properties under receivership would ensure that she would
receive her share in the income which she supposedly needed in order to pay for her
vitamins, medicines, her regular check-ups and daily sustenance. Considering that, as the
CA put it, the applicant was already an octogenarian who may not live up to the day
when the conflict will be finally settled, the RTC did not act with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it granted the application for
receivership since it was justified under Sec. 1(d), Rule 59 of the Rules of Court, which
states:
Section 1. Appointment of a receiver. – Upon a verified application, one or more
receivers of the property subject of the action or proceeding may be appointed by the
court where the action is pending, or by the Court of Appeals or by the Supreme Court, or
a member thereof, in the following cases:
xxxx
(d) Whenever in other cases it appears that the appointment of a receiver is the most
convenient and feasible means of preserving, administering, or disposing of the
property in litigation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, Sec. 1(d) above is couched in general terms and broad in scope, encompassing
instances not covered by the other grounds enumerated under the said section.
[16]
However, in granting applications for receivership on the basis of this section, courts
must remain mindful of the basic principle that receivership may be granted only when
the circumstances so demand, either because the property sought to be placed in the
hands of a receiver is in danger of being lost or because they run the risk of being
impaired,[17] and that being a drastic and harsh remedy, receivership must be granted only
when there is a clear showing of necessity for it in order to save the plaintiff from grave
and immediate loss or damage.[18]
Before appointing a receiver, courts should consider: (1) whether or not the injury
resulting from such appointment would probably be greater than the injury ensuing if the
status quo is left undisturbed; and (2) whether or not the appointment will imperil the
interest of others whose rights deserve as much a consideration from the court as those of
the person requesting for receivership.[19]
Moreover, this Court has consistently ruled that where the effect of the appointment of a
receiver is to take real estate out of the possession of the defendant before the final
adjudication of the rights of the parties, the appointment should be made only in extreme
cases.[20]
After carefully considering the foregoing principles and the facts and circumstances of
this case, We find that the grant of Dominalda’s Application for Receivership has no leg
to stand on for reasons discussed below.
First, Dominalda’s alleged need for income to defray her medical expenses and support is
not a valid justification for the appointment of a receiver. The approval of an application
for receivership merely on this ground is not only unwarranted but also an arbitrary
exercise of discretion because financial need and like reasons are not found in Sec. 1 of
Rule 59 which prescribes specific grounds or reasons for granting receivership. The
RTC’s insistence that the approval of the receivership is justified under Sec. 1(d) of Rule
59, which seems to be a catch-all provision, is far from convincing. To be clear, even in
cases falling under such provision, it is essential that there is a clear showing that there is
imminent danger that the properties sought to be placed under receivership will be lost,
wasted or injured.
Second, there is no clear showing that the disputed properties are in danger of being lost
or materially impaired and that placing them under receivership is most convenient and
feasible means to preserve, administer or dispose of them.
Based on the allegations in her application, it appears that Dominalda sought receivership
mainly because she considers this the best remedy to ensure that she would receive her
share in the income of the disputed properties. Much emphasis has been placed on the
fact that she needed this income for her medical expenses and daily sustenance. But it can
be gleaned from her application that, aside from her bare assertion that petitioner Mila
solely appropriated the fruits and rentals earned from the disputed properties in
connivance with some of her siblings, Dominalda has not presented or alleged anything
else to prove that the disputed properties were in danger of being wasted or materially
injured and that the appointment of a receiver was the most convenient and feasible
means to preserve their integrity.
Further, there is nothing in the RTC’s February 8 and July 19, 2010 Resolutions that says
why the disputed properties might be in danger of being lost, removed or materially
injured while in the hands of the defendants a quo. Neither did the RTC explain the
reasons which compelled it to have them placed under receivership. The RTC simply
declared that placing the disputed properties under receivership was urgent and merely
anchored its approval on the fact that Dominalda was an elderly in need of funds for her
medication and sustenance. The RTC plainly concluded that since the purpose of the
receivership is to procure money from the proceeds of these properties to spend for
medicines and other needs of the Dominalda, who is old and sickly, this
circumstance falls within the purview of Sec. 1(d), that is, “Whenever in other cases
it appears that the appointment of a receiver is the most convenient and feasible
means of preserving, administering, or disposing of the property in litigation.”
Verily, the RTC’s purported determination that the appointment of a receiver is the most
convenient and feasible means of preserving, administering or disposing of the properties
is nothing but a hollow conclusion drawn from inexistent factual considerations.
Third, placing the disputed properties under receivership is not necessary to save
Dominalda from grave and immediate loss or irremediable damage. Contrary to her
assertions, Dominalda is assured of receiving income under the PSA approved by the
RTC providing that she was entitled to receive a share of one-half (1/2) of the net income
derived from the uncontroverted properties. Pursuant to the PSA, Josephine, the daughter
of Dominalda, was appointed by the court as administrator of the eight (8) uncontested
lots with special authority to provide for the medicine of her mother. Thus, it was
patently erroneous for the RTC to grant the Application for Receivership in order to
ensure Dominalda of income to support herself because precisely, the PSA already
provided for that. It cannot be over-emphasized that the parties in Civil Case No. S-760
were willing to make arrangements to ensure that Dominalda was provided with
sufficient income. In fact, the RTC, in its February 8, 2010 Resolution granting the
Application for Receivership, noted the agreement of the parties that “Dominalda
Espina Caboverde shall be given 2/10 shares of the net monthly income and
products of said properties.”[21]
Finally, it must be noted that the defendants in Civil Case No. S-760 are the registered
owners of the disputed properties that were in their possession. In cases such as this, it is
settled jurisprudence that the appointment should be made only in extreme cases and on a
clear showing of necessity in order to save the plaintiff from grave and irremediable loss
or damage.[22]
This Court has held that a receiver should not be appointed to deprive a party who is in
possession of the property in litigation, just as a writ of preliminary injunction should not
be issued to transfer property in litigation from the possession of one party to another
where the legal title is in dispute and the party having possession asserts ownership in
himself, except in a very clear case of evident usurpation.[23]
Furthermore, this Court has declared that the appointment of a receiver is not proper
when the rights of the parties, one of whom is in possession of the property, depend on
the determination of their respective claims to the title of such property[24] unless such
property is in danger of being materially injured or lost, as by the prospective foreclosure
of a mortgage on it or its portions are being occupied by third persons claiming adverse
title.[25]
It must be underscored that in this case, Dominalda’s claim to the disputed properties and
her share in the properties’ income and produce is at best speculative precisely because
the ownership of the disputed properties is yet to be determined in Civil Case No. S-760.
Also, except for Dominalda’s claim that she has an interest in the disputed properties,
Dominalda has no relation to their produce or income.
By placing the disputed properties and their income under receivership, it is as if the
applicant has obtained indirectly what she could not obtain directly, which is to deprive
the other parties of the possession of the property until the controversy between them in
the main case is finally settled.[26] This Court cannot countenance this arrangement.
To reiterate, the RTC’s approval of the application for receivership and the deprivation of
petitioners of possession over the disputed properties would be justified only if
compelling reasons exist. Unfortunately, no such reasons were alleged, much less proved
in this case.
In any event, Dominalda’s rights may be amply protected during the pendency of Civil
Case No. S-760 by causing her adverse claim to be annotated on the certificates of title
covering the disputed properties.[27]
As regards the issue of whether or not the CA was correct in ruling that a bond was not
required prior to the appointment of the receivers in this case, We rule in the negative.
Respondents Eve and Fe claim that there are sufficient grounds for the appointment of
receivers in this case and that in fact, petitioners agreed with them on the existence of
these grounds when they acquiesced to Dominalda’s Application for Receivership. Thus,
respondents insist that where there is sufficient cause to appoint a receiver, there is no
need for an applicant’s bond because under Sec. 2 of Rule 59, the very purpose of the
bond is to answer for all damages that may be sustained by a party by reason of the
appointment of a receiver in case the applicant shall have procured such
appointment without sufficient cause. Thus, they further argue that what is needed is the
receiver’s bond which was already fixed and approved by the RTC.[28] Also, the CA
found that there was no need for Dominalda to file a bond considering that petitioners
filed a Manifestation where they formally consented to the receivership. Hence, it was as
if petitioners agreed that there was sufficient cause to place the disputed properties under
receivership; thus, the CA declared that petitioners were estopped from challenging the
sufficiency of such cause.
The foregoing arguments are misplaced. Sec. 2 of Rule 59 is very clear in that before
issuing the order appointing a receiver the court shall require the applicant to file a bond
executed to the party against whom the application is presented. The use of the word
“shall” denotes its mandatory nature; thus, the consent of the other party, or as in this
case, the consent of petitioners, is of no moment. Hence, the filing of an applicant’s bond
is required at all times. On the other hand, the requirement of a receiver’s bond rests upon
the discretion of the court. Sec. 2 of Rule 59 clearly states that the court may, in its
discretion, at any time after the appointment, require an additional bond as further
security for such damages.
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing considerations, this petition is GRANTED. The
assailed CA June 25, 2012 Decision and September 21, 2012 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP
No. 03834 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolutions dated February 8,
2010 and July 19, 2010 of the RTC, Branch 11 in Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in
Civil Case No. S-760, approving respondent Dominalda Espina-Caboverde’s application
for receivership and appointing the receivers over the disputed properties are
likewise SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
