Agenda:

Evaluating the implications of 4th Generation Warfare on the

existing disarmament frameworks amidst modern day conflicts.
Letter from the Executive Board
Dear Delegates,
We are very pleased to welcome you to the simulation of the UNGA: DISEC at
Meridian MUN 2025. It is an honour to serve as your Executive Board for the
duration of the conference. This Background Guide is designed to give you an
insight into the case at hand, so we hope this acts as only a catalyst for
furthering your research and not limited to just this guide. Please refer to it
carefully. Remember, a thorough understanding of the problem is the first step
to solving it.

Do understand that this Background Guide is in no way exhaustive and is only

meant to provide you with enough background information to establish a
platform for beginning the research. Delegates are highly recommended to do a
good amount of research beyond what is covered in the Guide. The guide cannot
be used as proof during the committee proceedings under any circumstances.

We understand that MUN conferences can be an overwhelming experience for

first-timers but it must be noted that our aspirations from the delegates are not
how experienced or articulate they are. Rather, we want to see how one
manages the balance to respect disparities and differences of opinion and work
around this while extending their foreign policy to present comprehensive
solutions without compromising on their self-interests and initiate consensus
building.

New ideas are by their very nature disruptive, but far less disruptive than a
world set against the backdrop of stereotypes and regional instability due to
which reform is essential in policy making and conflict resolution. At any point
during your research, do not hesitate to contact the Executive Board Members
for clarifications or in case you need help in any other aspect. We look forward
to a fruitful discussion and an enriching experience with all of you.

Best regards,
Eswar Chava Sriram Kalluri
Chairperson Vice Chairperson
 Important Points to Remember

A few aspects that delegates should keep in mind while preparing:

1. Procedure: The purpose of putting in procedural rules in any committee is

to ensure a more organized and efficient debate. The committee will follow
the UNA-USA Rules of Procedure. Although the Executive Board shall be fairly
strict with the Rules of Procedure, the discussion of the agenda will be the
main priority. So, delegates are advised not to restrict their statements due to
hesitation regarding procedure.

2. Foreign Policy: Following the foreign policy of one’s country is the most
important aspect of a Model UN Conference. This is what essentially
differentiates a Model UN from other debating formats. To violate one’s
foreign policy without adequate reason is one of the worst mistakes a delegate
can make.

3. Role of the Executive Board: The Executive Board is appointed to facilitate

debate. The committee shall decide the direction and flow of debate. The
delegates are the ones who constitute the committee and hence must be
uninhibited while presenting their opinions/stance on any issue. However, the
Executive Board may put forward questions and/or ask for clarifications at all
points of time to further debate and test participants.

4. Nature of Source/Evidence: This Background Guide is meant solely for

research purposes and must not be cited as evidence to substantiate
statements made during the conference. Evidence or proof for substantiating
statements made during formal debate is acceptable from the following
sources:
a. United Nations: Documents and findings by the United Nations or any
related UN body is held as a credible proof to support a claim or argument.
Multilateral Organizations: Documents from international organizations like
OIC, NATO, SAARC, BRICS, EU, ASEAN, the International Court of Justice, etc.
may also be presented as credible sources of information.
b. Government Reports: These reports can be used in a similar way as the State
Operated News Agencies reports and can, in all circumstances, be denied by
another country.

c. News Sources:
1. Reuters: Any Reuters article that clearly makes mention of the fact or is in
contradiction of the fact being stated by a delegate in council.

2. State operated News Agencies: These reports can be used in the support of
or against the State that owns the News Agency. These reports, if credible or
substantial enough, can be used in support of or against any country as such
but in that situation, may be denied by any other country in the council. Some
examples are – RIA Novosti (Russian Federation), Xinhua News Agency (People’s
Republic of China), etc.

***Please Note: Reports from NGOs working with UNESCO, UNICEF and other
UN bodies will be accepted. Under no circumstances will sources like
Wikipedia, or newspapers like the Guardian, Times of India, etc. be accepted.
However, notwithstanding the criteria for acceptance of sources and evidence,
delegates are still free to quote/cite from any source as they deem fit as a part
of their statements

Guidelines
· Read the entirety of the background guide in the order it was written. Make
sure to highlight the names of specific treaties, documents, resolutions,
conventions, international bodies, events and any other specific incidents so
that you can get back to them later and do a lot more thorough research.

· Understand some of the basic details regarding the country that you've been
allotted whether this be the capital, current affairs regarding geopolitical
situation, political hierarchy etc. While not strictly necessary, you never know
when this can turn out to be handy. Geography Now's A - Z Country List has
been a particularly helpful resource for this.
· Use a search engine of your choice to create as many tabs as possible for
the highlighted terms from your background guide. Wikipedia or a YouTube
video act as a great way to get a brief summary of the incidents at hand but
such sources (especially Wikipedia articles) cannot be used in committee as
sources.

· Delve into deeper research regarding the particular position of your

allocation with the agenda at hand. Try searching for the voting stances of
your allocation in related conventions and understanding the reasons for
voting as so. UN Press Releases are also a helpful source for this matter.

· Find the website for the foreign ministry of the country you have been
assigned alongside the "Permanent Mission of COUNTRY to the United
Nations" website and search for a key term relating to the agenda, this
should often give you statements from recent press conferences or UN
committee sessions that can act as valuable sources of information in
forming a position.

· Keep a handy copy of the Charter of the United Nations, whether as a .pdf
file extension or a physical copy works. This contains the founding
principles of the United Nations and contains articles that lay out the
mandate of the six bodies that the United Nations is primarily divided into.
Spend some additional time researching the specific mandate and functions
of the committee that you have been assigned.

· The Executive Board may ask for the source of a statement that a delegate
makes in committee either during a Point of Order circumstance or if said
statement stands to be of interest to the Executive Board. Therefore, it is
recommended that delegates keep track of their sources when making /
disputing a claim and also ensure their validity. Please do remember that
while you as a delegate are allowed to cite any source you wish during
committee.
 Hierarchy of evidence
Evidence can be presented from a wide variety of sources, but not all
sources are treated as equal. Here’s the hierarchy in which evidence is
categorised:

Tier 1: Includes any publication, statement, resolution, or document

released by any of the Nations’ official organs or committees; any
publication, statement, or document released by a UN member state in its
own capacity. The evidence falling in this tier is considered most reliable
during the simulation.

Tier 2: Includes: any news article published by any official media source
that is owned and controlled by a UN member state. E.g.: Xinhua News
(China), Prasar Bharti (India), BBC (United Kingdom) etcetera. The evidence
falling in this tier is considered sufficiently reliable in case no other
evidence from any Tier 1 source is available on that particular fact, event,
or situation.

Tier 3: Includes: any publication from news sources of international repute

such as Reuters, The New York Times, Agence-France Presse, etcetera. The
evidence falling under this tier is considered the least reliable for the
purposes of this simulation. Yet, if no better source is available in a certain
scenario, it may be considered.

Foreign Policy and Foreign Relations

Foreign policy, in simple terms, is what your country aims to achieve in
regard to the issue at hand or in general with its relations with other
countries.

1. What role must foreign policy play in your research?

Understanding the foreign policy of your country must be a checkbox that
you tick off at the very beginning of your research.

Your foreign policy should dictate everything from the arguments you make,
the reasoning you give for making those arguments, and the actions you take
in the Council.

2. Where do I look to find foreign policy?

Most of the time, foreign policy is not explicitly stated. It must be inferred
from the actions and statements issued by the country. Reading the meeting
records from previous meetings of UNSC (or any other UN body where your
country might have spoken on the issue) is a great place to start. If such
records are unavailable, look for statements from your country’s Foreign
Ministry (or equivalent like Ministry of External Affairs, Ministry for Foreign
Affairs etcetera) and top leadership (PM, Pres., Secretary of State, Defence
Minister).

Foreign Relations on the other hand refers to the diplomatic ties that one
country has with another and considers elements such as the mutual
presence of embassies, consulates, ambassadors & diplomatic dialogue. More
often than not, foreign policy is what will be of your primary concern during
the MUN, but it is important to also consider any extremities in your allotted
country's foreign relations.
 Introduction to the committee

The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is one of the six

organs of the United Nations (UN) and the primary policy making
and representative organ of the United Nations where all of the
193 members of the UN are represented in the General Assembly.
The Disarmament and International Security Committee is the
first committee under the General Assembly that deals with
disarmament, global challenges and threats to world peace.

The six committees of the United Nations General Assembly

being:
· First Committee - Disarmament & International Security,

· Second Committee - Economic & Financial Council,

·Third Committee - Social, Humanitarian & Cultural Issues,

·Fourth Committee - Special Political & Decolonization

Committee,

· Fifth Committee - Administrative & Budgetary, &

· Sixth Committee - Legal.

 Mandate
The Disarmament and International Security Committee is mandated to
address the nuclear, chemical, biological, conventional, etc. weapon
proliferation and to deal with the issues threatening international security
and peace.

DISEC makes recommendations to the UNGA regarding the resolutions and

establishes principles and international cooperation between states to
maintain global security. It considers all disarmament and international
security matters within the scope of the Charter or relating to the powers
and functions of any other organ of the United Nations; the general
principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and
security, as well as principles governing disarmament and the regulation of
armaments; promotion of cooperative arrangements and measures aimed
at strengthening stability through lower levels of armaments.

DISEC works closely with other UN bodies and agencies like the United
Nations Office on Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). The First Committee sessions are structured into
three distinctive stages:
1. General debate,

2. Thematic discussions, &

3. Action on Drafts.
Introduction: Fourth-Generation Warfare in Perspective
The term fourth-generation warfare came into use among military strategists and
planners in the late 1980s as a way to characterize the dynamics and future
direction of warfare. This community postulated the evolution of warfare in
several distinct phases. The first generation of modern (post-Westphalian) war
was dominated by mass manpower and culminated in the Napoleonic Wars.
Firepower characterized the second generation, which culminated in World War I.
The third generation was dominated by maneuvering as developed by the
Germans in World War II. The fourth generation has evolved in ways that take
advantage of the political, social, economic, and technical changes since World
War II. It makes use of the advantages those changes offer an unconventional
enemy.

The Generations
Thomas X. Hammes, a retired Marine Corps colonel and one of the principal
proponents of the idea, writes:

The first generation of modern war was dominated by massed manpower and
culminated in the Napoleonic Wars. The second generation, which was quickly
adopted by the world's major powers, was dominated by firepower and ended in
World War I. In relatively short order, during World War II the Germans introduced
third-generation warfare, characterized by maneuver…[fourth-generation warfare
is an] evolved form of insurgency [that] uses all available networks political,
economic, social, military—to convince the enemy's decision makers that their
strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.

On the other hand, Lind, arguably the person who first outlined the concept and
who is among its most prominent proponents, describes these generations in the
following terms:
● First Generation: Mid-17th to early 20th century. Characterized by a battlefield
of order (i.e., line and column tactics), which created a bureaucratic military
culture of order. This began to break down with the development of industrial-age
armies, as the military culture of order clashed with the increasingly disorderly
battlefield, leading to a period of often bloody confusion.

● Second Generation: Early to mid-20th century. During World War I, a firepower-

and-attrition model of warfare was developed, most notably by the French, which
relied on centralized decision-making within a controlling hierarchy, which
produced decisive results while preserving the military culture of order.

● Third Generation: Mid- to late 20th Century. Known as “maneuver warfare” or

“blitzkrieg,” like Second-Generation Warfare, this developed out of World War I,
but was not fully realized until the early German campaigns of World War II, and
was then picked up by other powers. Third-Generation Warfare was characterized
by great operational mobility, with decision-making pushed down to the lowest
levels, and great operational flexibility. Attrition was less important than rapid,
decisive maneuver to encircle enemy forces; an innovation made possible by the
development of the internal combustion engine and radio.

● Fourth Generation: Mid-20th century to the present. In response to the

overwhelming capability of the modern conventional military force, weaker
opponents began resorting to alternative ways of waging war, such as insurgency,
“terrorism,” and other forms of “asymmetric” conflict. The argument made by
Lind, Hammes, and others is that with the rise of these new Fourth-Generation
forms of conflict, the state monopoly on the organized use of force, which has
existed since 1648, has been broken. Wars can now be fought by many other
entities sects, political parties, criminal cartels, “super-empowered individuals,”
and conventional armies, muscle-bound by their culture of order, are helpless to
respond.

Although everyone may not agree completely with him, John Robb, a former Air
Force officer, journalist, and businessman, and another prominent advocate of
4GW, has a neat summary of what he views as the critical factors favoring this
new way of war:
● Global: Modern technologies and economic integration enable global
operations by small actors.

● Pervasive: The decline of nation-state warfare has forced all open

conflict into the 4GW mold.

● Granularity: The numbers of extremely small yet viable groups, with a

broad variety of reasons for conflict, are growing.

● Vulnerability: Open societies and economies offer many vulnerabilities

and targets of opportunity, while allowing the free movement of
individuals.

● Technology: New technologies including but not limited to automatic

weapons, cell phones, the Internet, GPS, chemical/biological weapons
have dramatically increased the capability of small groups of warriors.

● Media: Global media saturation potentially provides an extraordinary

propaganda reach and lends itself to facile manipulation of public opinion.

●Networked: New organizational models made possible by improvements

in technology are much better at learning, adapting, surviving, and acting.

All of the proponents of 4GW argue that its principal objective is not the
destruction of the enemy's forces, but of his will to continue the fight. As
Robb states it:

Victory … is won in the moral sphere. The aim of 4GW is to destroy the
moral bonds that allow the organic whole to exist—cohesion.
Proponents of 4GW often argue that the “Clausewitzian Trinity” of
warmaking, the ties among government, people, and armed forces, which
prevailed during the first three generations, is no longer valid. Marginalized
during the first three generations of modern war, the “non-state actors”
such as tribes, sects, criminals, corporations, and more are once again able
to engage in war. Thus, to some extent, 4GW is a return to the pre-
Westphalian politico-military environment, and, given this “decline of the
state,” there “can be no purely military solution to Fourth Generation
threats.” Some critical elements of 4GW are that:

● There is no distinction between “war” and “peace,” or “lawful” and

“unlawful” activity in the conduct of conflict.

● Distinctions between “civilian” and “military,” or “combatant” and “non-

combatant” have no real meaning.

● The “front” and the “rear” are the same.

● Asymmetric approaches are the default mode of combat.

Characteristics of 4GW

1. Social Characteristics

● A return to a world of cultures, not merely states, in conflict, manifested

in the decline of the state and the rise of alternate, often cultural, primary
loyalties all over the world, including in the Western world.

● A decrease in harmony in society. Paradoxically, 4GW has greater success

in open societies. The globalized world is its ideal environment. At the same
time, 4GW promises to impede globalization, as societies erect defensive
barriers to protect themselves from attacks by Fourth Generation warriors.
2. Political Characteristics

● The loss of the state's monopoly on war and on the first loyalty of its
citizens gives a fillip to 4GW. At the same time, 4GW uses the responsibility
that the state continues to have for its citizens to develop a strategy where,
by making its citizens targets for terror, it can force the state to conform to
the desired behavior.

● The rise of non-state entities that command the primary loyalty of people
based upon highlighted differences. These entities may be gangs, religions,
races and ethnic groups within races, localities, tribes, business enterprises,
and ideologies. The variety is almost limitless.

● The predominant role of propaganda and psychological pressure is to

change the minds of political policymakers. Propaganda is directed at the
target as well as those who can exert psychological pressure on the target.

3. Military Characteristics

● A war waged by what appear to be irregular armies on one or both sides.

The deployment of these armies can be independent of borders or political
geography.

● The primary target of military action is to defeat the will of the people and
take over control of their political system.

● Terrorism is a favored tactic to defeat the will of the people.

● For the weaker side, the preferred terrain for operations is the urban
jungle. This complex terrain provides cover from the superior technology of
one side, while also providing means of modern communication and access
to media and instant audiences. It is ideally suited to 4GW.

● Military operations are small-scale, preferably with higher spectacular

value. The aim is to wear down the opponent rather than annihilate him or
physically force his surrender
Terrorism
Terrorism There is no internationally recognized definition of terrorism yet,
which is why many states have different definitions, but it basically describes
the use of violence and threats to create fear and chaos, often for political or
religious goals. The goal of the Violent Non-State Actors is mostly to send a
message and change governmental structures but sometimes they also just
want to attack or criticize certain cultures.

Psychological warfare
Psychological warfare refers to an aspect of a war or conflict, where one side
tries to change the moral attitude, beliefs, behavior, emotions, and thoughts
mainly by the use of media. Everything can be the target of psychological
warfare, states as well as individuals, but they also may use psychological
warfare themselves. It can also be used in non-conflict situations in order to
achieve certain political or economic changes or advantages and can
therefore be used not only by states but also by individuals or non-state
actors. This is why psychological warfare is often very subtle and cannot be
recognized as war. The goals of psychological warfare can be very different; it
may be used to lower the enemy’s morale and motivation but also to influence
elections.

Guerilla warfare
The term is used for conflicts in which small groups of irregular forces, which
may include military forces as well as normal civilians, use hit-and-run tactics
to win against a larger, less mobile army with regular soldiers that occupy their
territory. These groups can be part of a greater organization or act
individually. They often use the element of surprise to ambush the enemies in
order to inflict great damage but retreat fast to lessen their own casualties. If
done right, it is a very effective tactic against big military forces but often
leads to great losses.
Non-state actors
Non-state actors (NSA) are groups and organizations that are big and strong
enough to have an influence on world politics and cause changes. They do
not belong to any state though they may work together. Examples of NSAs
are NGOs, religious groups, multinational corporations as well as violent non-
state actors (VNSA). VNSAs play a crucial role in the 4GW. They use illegal
violence, such as terrorism, to reach their goals. But VNSAs should not only
be seen as terrorist groups, they can also be warlords, gangs, or militias.

Low-intensity conflicts
Low-intensity conflicts (LIC) describe conflicts in which military forces are
selectively used and have certain restrictions. It includes objectives such as
peacekeeping, antiterrorism as well as assistance to other countries.
Because of these restrictions, LICs cause fewer casualties and destruction
than a war. LICs can include 4GW as sometimes state forces fight against
(violent) NSAs.

Center of Gravity
The center of gravity (CoG) was first used by a Prussian military officer and is
described as the element, object, or ideology which provides the physical
and mental strength to fight for one’s goals. The US military tries to reduce
all aspects to one CoG and has defined the friendly CoG as the element
which motivates the own people to fight whereas the enemy CoG is the
obstacle that is in the way of the army achieving its objective.

International Action and Tactics used in 4GW

The theory of fourth-generation warfare can be traced to the 1980s work of
William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightingale, Captain John F.Schmitt, Colonel
Joseph W. Sutton, and Lieutenant Col Gary I. Wilson in the Marine Corps
Gazette.
The primary tenet is a return to the world of cultures, and not necessarily that of specific
states in conflict. This ultimately leads to a crisis for countries like the United States, in
determining the legitimacy of the state. In some cases, when counter-insurgencies are led by
foreign troops, it makes the state’s crisis of legitimacy much worse. The fourth generation of
warfare creates a “new class of international force”- the non-state actor.

With the state losing its monopoly on war, the road is paved for groups such as Al-Qaeda,
Boko Haram, Hamas, and Hezbollah to exercise great influence. The violent nonstate actors
(VNSAs) are able to act with great mobility, as they are not concerned with protecting their
territory, but rather are primarily interested in spreading their respective ideologies.
Because of the methods involved in fourth-generation warfare, some experts say that
traditional superpowers are actually at a disadvantage on operational, strategic, mental and
even moral levels. There is a heightened emphasis on concurrent actions within both the
opponent’s physical and societal entities, coupled with the blurring of distinctions between
military members and civilians.

Additionally, elements that gave superpowers advantages in past generations, such as large
headquarters for troops and fixed communication sites, have become obsolete, and even
detrimental, to the needs of fourth-generation battle. These features create too great of a
risk to the total functionality of the mission within the scope of these warfare developments.
Guerrilla warfare of any kind prevents the possibility of striking an opponent’s headquarters,
forcing countries to rethink previously successful wartime strategies. Former superpowers,
however, have struggled with this new system, most notably the US and France in Vietnam,
and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

With fourth-generation warfare, the key is to “apply force to an enemy without giving him a
point at which to carry out a decisive counter-strike.” This viewpoint is radically different
from the traditional approaches of major European powers and the United States, forcing
these states to adopt new war philosophies and defend against evolving types of combat.

The development of technology is both an asset and a liability in fourth-generation warfare.

Advancements in robotics, artificial intelligence, and drones allow for more developed war
tactics, potentially leaving enemies crippled. However, these weapons have had challenges
in combat, as they are easy to counter and are often too complex. Because of the precision
that today’s technology allows, especially from remote locations, target selection has
become much more important to isolate the enemy.

A key to success in fourth-generation warfare could be “losing to win.” The

West has been at the center of warfare for centuries because the rest of the
world has been forced to adopt their strategies to fight effectively. Recently, a
monumental shift has taken place. Terrorism is much more about where and
when to execute an attack while utilizing relatively little firepower.
Terrorists have been successful in the past by attempting to collapse target
states from within, using a state’s freedom and openness against itself to wage
an ideological battle.

Major powers have faced challenges when occupying territories in which much
of the population resist occupation. This was most notably seen in the United
States’ involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is widely believed that the US
inadvertently created a breeding ground for terrorists and opened the door
for fourth-generation warfare by establishing a declining, relatively weak
Afghani state. To be successful, many experts say that superpowers must learn
to fight “battles of encirclement,” by having an infantry that can move farther
and faster on foot than the enemies.

Another strategy is attempting to assimilate into local cultures to preserve the

current state, notably attempted in the US conflicts with Iraq and Afghanistan.
Subnational groups are in a particularly interesting position, as they can either
be enemies or allies to established powers within a region. They can
demonstrate allegiance to whichever party appeases them, thus putting them
in a position of flexibility and dangerous ambiguity. Furthermore, terrorist
groups deemphasize the power of order to help improve their speed and
flexibility in attack.

Case Study: Sri Lanka

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), commonly known as the Tamil
Tigers, were a separatist militant organization fighting for an independent
homeland for Sri Lanka’s Tamil minority in northern Sri Lanka. Velupillai
Prabhakaran founded the group in 1972 and by the late 1980s was the dominant
Tamil militant group in Sri Lanka. After a number of failed negotiations, the Sri
Lankan government declared an all-out offensive against the LTTE in 2006. By
May 2009, government forces had defeated the LTTE and killed Prabhakaran. An
estimated 70,000 people were killed during the conflict between the LTTE and
the Sri Lankan government.
The LTTE is recognized for having carried out a number of high-profile
assassinations, including the assassination of Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe
Premadasa in 1993 and the former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991.
The LTTE consisted of a highly developed military wing and a secondary political
wing. The military wing had a naval group, an airborne unit, an intelligence wing,
and even a specialized suicide terrorist unit. The group was also notorious for its
use of women and children in combat.

The LTTE was largely supported by the Tamil diaspora overseas; although in the
1980s, the LTTE received supplies and training from the Indian Intelligence
services. The LTTE was suspected of having links with a number of Islamist
groups, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines and
the Taliban in Afghanistan; these links, however, were largely restricted to arms
transfers and other commercial activities. The LTTE also earned a portion of
their annual $200-300 million revenue from taxation and extortion in LTTE-
controlled areas in northern and eastern Sri Lanka.

The LTTE was disbanded in 2009 after their military defeat by the Sri Lankan
government and some 6,000 LTTE members were rehabilitated and re-
integrated into society. The Sri Lankan government stated in 2011 that the
international network of the LTTE was still searching to revive the organization.

The LTTE is organized hierarchically under the leadership of the group's founder,
Prabhakaran. The LTTE maintains army, navy, and air capabilities, but is most
well-known for its use of suicide operations by a small, special armed group
called the Black Tigers. The Black Tigers use traditional land and sea tactics, as
well as guerrilla warfare and targeted bombings and assassinations, particularly
in the northern and eastern areas of Sri Lanka. They are one of the first
organizations to utilize suicide attacks on a large scale. For example, former
Indian leader Rajeev Gandhi was assassinated in 1991 by a female suicide
bomber from the LTTE. According to Jane’s Intelligence Review, the LTTE carried
out 168 suicide attacks between 1980-2000
LTTE attacks targeted individuals and groups who did not support their
overarching goal of attaining an independent Tamil state, which included the
Sri Lankan military, Sri Lankan and Indian politicians, police, and sometimes
various civilian populations. The LTTE also targeted Sri Lankan Tamil
politicians who did not support the LTTE and their goals, as well as other rival
Tamil militant groups in Sri Lanka. Some of the group’s most controversial
suicide attacks include the assassinations of former Indian Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi, and former Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa. The
majority of LTTE victims were Sinhalese Buddhists. The LTTE also attacked
symbols of national importance to the Sri Lankan state, such as the Sri Lankan
Central Bank and the country’s world trade center

One of the LTTE’s primary tactics was to create front organizations and
gangs to project its influence, procure funds from these overseas Sri
Lankan Tamil diaspora communities, and then use these funds to purchase
arms.

The LTTE also adopted guerilla tactics that were initially very effective
against the Sri Lankan government. LTTE forces would often ambush
government troops and attack in “waves,” meaning here that the LTTE
would first swarm the enemy and then engage in suicide bombings, which
would often confuse and scare Sri Lankan government forces.

Analysis of the 4GW

It is important to note that terrorism and terrorist groups are not defining
elements, or characteristics of, fourth-generation warfare. Instead, many
cases of fourth-generation warfare in the modern era include terrorist groups
as insurgents. When considering the situation and dealings of fourth-
generation warfare, it is not limited to terrorist operations; issues of terrorism
have been at the forefront of the transition.
To properly deal with issues associated with fourth-generation warfare, and to
dominate the actual battle, significant costs that were not relevant in the past
have become pertinent in the present. Spending has included reinforcing cyber
security to protect vital infrastructure, diplomacy, foreign assistance, strategic
communications, and other instruments of national security. Successful
insurgents recognize the notion that the political or economic paralysis of a nation
can have broader-reaching effects than those of a more direct attack. For
example, security instability has a direct effect on the ability to receive loans to
help develop the nation. Even a threat could impact the financial health of a
nation, as evidenced by Muqtada al-Sadr’s militia in southern Iraq, which
specifically targeted oil production infrastructure.

This was also seen in Nigeria, with rebels threatening future attacks on the oil
industry to disrupt the nation’s oil output; the intent was to cripple the Nigerian
economy, thus placing the government in a compromised state. With the onset of
globalization, the potential effects of a simple attack could have devastating, far-
reaching consequences. A particular challenge, especially in regard to this body, is
that geographical sovereignty is not a contingent factor in fourth-generation
warfare. Therefore, it is incredibly difficult for world powers to establish control
over military situations and provide guidance and standards in their operations.

Although there has been an increase in activity from the United Nations, the
European Union, and the Organization of American States, these organizations
have very limited capabilities to effectively counter subnational extremist groups.
Furthermore, globalization has weakened the ability of states to act as fully
separate and sovereign entities. As the world has become increasingly
interconnected, many of these subnational groups have expanded to become
transnational groups. When the operations of counter-groups extend over
multiple borders, organizational attack strategies become much more difficult.

A different type of force is needed in the fourth generation. There needs to be less
of an emphasis on order and more of an emphasis on mobility. In order to have
flexibility to make quick, reactionary decisions, units should not be at the mercy of
decision-makers. A major issue for troops in nations like the United States is
resistance to changing strategies and tactics due to prior successes. Other groups
are less hampered by convention, allowing them to be innovative and speedy in
their battle tactics
The Vietnam War is one major example of a superpower like the United States
failing to fully adopt the innovative tactics of guerrilla warfare, and suffering
major political repercussions as a result. Having to adjust to the new military
tactics of their opponents, the US struggled to achieve clearly defined “wins” in
battle. Leaders in Vietnam reached out to popular groups within the US, such as
Vietnam Veterans Against the War and international charities, to try to spur a
shift in American public opinion. Vietnam also used the media and other
international networks to turn the Tet Offensive into a strategic move that
would ultimately force the United States to withdraw troops. Leaders in
Vietnam understood that political and public support could tip the balance of
the war in their favor.

Fourth-generation warfare has opened the door for dramatic shifts in political
thought and has contributed to interrupting the political balance in various
regions. Additionally, although many means of fourth-generation warfare are
supported or created by non-military technology, new techniques have still
resulted in numerous casualties. Due to the magnitude of these consequences,
fourth-generation warfare should be monitored and, potentially, regulated.

Case Study: Vietnam War

Vietnam War (1954–75), is a protracted conflict that pitted the communist
government of North Vietnam and its allies in South Vietnam, known as the Viet
Cong, against the government of South Vietnam and its principal ally, the
United States. Called the “American War” in Vietnam, the war was also part of a
larger regional conflict and a manifestation of the Cold War between the United
States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies.

At the heart of the conflict was the desire of North Vietnam, which had
defeated the French colonial administration of Vietnam in 1954, to unify the
entire country under a single communist regime modelled after those of the
Soviet Union and China. The South Vietnamese government, on the other hand,
fought to preserve a Vietnam more closely aligned with the West. U.S. military
advisers, present in small numbers throughout the 1950s, were introduced on a
large scale beginning in 1961, and active combat units were introduced in 1965.
By 1969 more than 500,000 U.S. military personnel were stationed in Vietnam.
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union and China poured weapons, supplies, and advisers
into the North, which in turn provided support, political direction, and regular
combat troops for the campaign in the South.
The costs and casualties of the growing war proved too much for the United
States to bear, and U.S. combat units were withdrawn by 1973. In 1975 South
Vietnam fell to a full-scale invasion by the North.

Vietnam emerged from the war as a potent military power within Southeast Asia,
but its agriculture, business, and industry were disrupted, large parts of its
countryside were scarred by bombs and defoliation and laced with land mines,
and its cities and towns were heavily damaged. A mass exodus in 1975 of people
loyal to the South Vietnamese cause was followed by another wave in 1978 of
“boat people,” refugees fleeing the economic restructuring imposed by the
communist regime. Meanwhile, the United States, its military demoralized and its
civilian electorate deeply divided, began a process of coming to terms with
defeat in what had been its longest and most controversial war. The two
countries finally resumed formal diplomatic relations in 1995.

Engaged in a war that many viewed as having no way to win, U.S. leaders lost the
American public's support for the war. The Vietnam War is one major example of
a superpower like the United States failing to fully adapt the innovative tactics of
guerrilla warfare, and suffering major political repercussions as a result.

Having to adjust to the new military tactics of their opponents, the US struggled
to achieve clearly defined “wins” in battle. Leaders in Vietnam reached out to
popular groups within the US, such as Vietnam Veterans against the War and
international charities, to try to spur a shift in American public opinion. Vietnam
also used the media and other international networks to turn the Tet Offensive
into a strategic move that would ultimately force the United States to withdraw
troops. Leaders in Vietnam understood that political and public support could
tip the balance of the war in their favour
 Impact on Disarmament Frameworks
Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), characterized by blurred lines between
combatants and civilians, decentralization of force, and the use of asymmetric
and non-kinetic tactics, poses fundamental challenges to the architecture of
traditional disarmament frameworks. Treaties such as the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and
Conventional Arms Control regimes like the Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe (CFE) Treaty were negotiated with state actors in mind, assuming
hierarchical command structures, identifiable armed forces, and verifiable
stockpiles. In contrast, 4GW actors often operate as networked cells, lack
formal territorial control, and can exploit dual-use technologies such as
commercial drones, cyber tools, and 3D-printed components making them
difficult to detect and regulate under existing verification regimes.

+These frameworks also largely depend on state reporting, inspections, and

sovereign compliance, creating a gap when violent non-state actors (VNSAs)
function entirely outside treaty participation yet acquire advanced capabilities.
Legally, instruments like the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions
extend certain humanitarian law obligations to non-state actors in armed
conflict, but there is no equivalent universal legal framework obligating them to
comply with disarmament norms. Enforcement mechanisms under existing
treaties target states, not individuals or decentralized groups, meaning that
violations by VNSAs are often addressed indirectly through sanctions on state
sponsors or through Security Council resolutions, an approach that is politically
contentious and procedurally slow.

4GW tactics exploit the “grey zone” of attribution: cyber sabotage of arms
verification systems, use of civilian infrastructure for weapons assembly, and
proxy warfare all allow actors to deny direct responsibility, undermining the
trust and transparency on which arms control depends. Without adapting these
frameworks to account for decentralization, anonymity, and technological
proliferation, the credibility of disarmament regimes risks erosion. Future
mechanisms may require hybrid legal models that bridge international
humanitarian law, counterterrorism frameworks, and arms control treaties,
ensuring accountability for all actors regardless of state status.
 Relevant Legal Instruments

International Law
The body of law that is the International Humanitarian Law is commonly separated
into two branches: Geneva Law and Hague Law. The former regulates protection of
people that are affected by armed conflict, whereas the latter regulates means
and methods in warfare, such as the use of certain weapons and conduct of
hostilities.

Geneva Convention
Since Geneva Convention I, several treaties within the area of IHL have been
adopted. GC I was revised in 1906, 1929, and 1949, each time updated with a new
convention expanding the scope of IHL. Although now comprising four
conventions, the whole set is commonly referred to as “the Geneva Convention”.
GC I deals with the protection of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field;
GC II sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea; GC III prisoners of
war; and, as a response to the devastating effects of World War II (WW II), GC IV the
protection of civilians. The GC has been almost universally ratified, and is
considered to have passed into customary international law in its entirety. The
only practical implication of the rules having become customary is thus when a
new state has come into existence and is involved in an armed conflict without
having had the time to ratify the conventions.

Hague Law
The term Hague Law is commonly used as a generic name for treaties governing
means and methods of warfare. The core of the Hague Law is the Hague
Conventions (HC) of 1899 and 1907, which governs the conduct of hostilities on
land, at sea, and in air. The HC have in large parts been recognized as customary
international law, and most provisions are thus binding on all states. The cardinal
principles deriving from the HC are that (a) parties do not have an unlimited choice
of means and methods in armed conflicts, (b) the causing of superfluous and
unnecessary suffering is prohibited, and (c) the only legitimate object of war is to
overpower or weaken enemy forces in order to get in control of territory or to
enforce a political will, not to kill as many as possible.
 Use of Irregular and Asymmetric WeaponrY
Irregular and asymmetric weaponry can be weapons, arms, tactics or any
kind of devices which are employed by non-traditional actors, or sometimes
in non-traditional ways by parties looking to offset/defeat rivals of far
higher military capabilities.

Irregular Weaponry:
Irregular weaponry can be defined as any arms or devices that deviate from
the stand and conventional weapons used for military purposes or state-
manufactured tools. These are often repurposed from civilian technology
and infrastructure to meet the special demands of irregular warfare. Some
examples can be homemade mortars, weaponization of commercial drones,
etc.

Asymmetric Weaponry and Asymmetric Warfare:

These are tols and methods used to exploit the chinks in the armour of
stronger adversaries through shrewd, unconventional attacks. These
attacks are often designed to avoid direct military confrontation. Examples
can include cyber warfare, ambushes and anonymous public defamation.

Historical and Current Examples:

Iraq War (2003 - 2011)

During the course of the Iraq war, many reports and first hand accounts
confirmed the usage of IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) by insurgents
which were explosive devices made with crude infrastructure and
craftsmanship from used artillery shells, fertilizers (for their nitrate
content) and cell phones antenna triggers.

These devices were cheap and easy to make and extremely hard to detect
as they passed for everyday objects. Their effects were devastating
physically and also psychologically.
 To read more about IEDs:
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/prep_ied_fact_sheet.pdf

Syrian Civil War (2011 - present)

The heavy weaponisation of commercial drones, especially by prominent rebel

groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has made the Syrian civil war much more
brutal and bloody. HTS, an Islamist rebel group which was fighting for survival
after relentless assaults by the Russia-backed The Assad regime now operates as
a polished military force fighting from its stronghold in the Idlib province.

The locally developed Shaheen drones have emerged as a pivotal element in

HTS’s arsenal. These fibre-reinforced drones, equipped with live-streaming
cameras, enable precision attacks on high-value targets, such as Syrian military
installations and vehicles. As told to the Middle-East Eye, Lieutenant Colonel
Hassan Abdul Ghani described their impact, stating that a Shaheen drone
recently struck a high-level meeting of Syrian Republican Guards.

Rebel leaders credit the drones with reducing casualties among their fighters
while destabilising regime forces.

While Syria’s prolonged war has ensured an abundance of weaponry, HTS’s

investment in homegrown production has given it an edge. The group
manufactures drones, guided missiles, and mortar shells in makeshift workshops
using 3D printers and other accessible technologies. Researchers reported
similar tactics used in conflicts in Azerbaijan, Ukraine, etc.

What Is Cyber Warfare?

Cyber warfare is usually defined as a cyber attack or series of attacks that target
a country. It has the potential to wreak havoc on government and civilian
infrastructure and disrupt critical systems, resulting in damage to the state and
even loss of life.
There is, however, a debate among cyber security experts as to what kind of
activity constitutes cyber warfare. The US Department of Defense (DoD)
recognizes the threat to national security posed by the malicious use of the
Internet but doesn’t provide a clearer definition of cyber warfare. Some consider
cyber warfare to be a cyber attack that can result in death.
Cyber warfare typically involves a nation-state perpetrating cyber attacks on
another, but in some cases, the attacks are carried out by terrorist organizations
or non-state actors seeking to further the goal of a hostile nation. There are
several examples of alleged cyber warfare in recent history, but there is no
universal, formal, definition for how a cyber attack may constitute an act of war.

Some of the main types of cyber attacks can be classified as :

1. Espionage
2. Sabotage
3. Denial-of-Service attacks (DOS Attacks)
4. Electrical Power Grid Attacks
5. Propaganda Attacks
6. Economic Disruption
7. Surprise Attacks

Examples of Cyber Warfare by Cybercrime groups and

militias
Fancy Bear - A Russian Cybercrime Group

CrowdStrike claims that the Russian organized cybercrime group Fancy Bear
targeted Ukrainian rocket forces and artillery between 2014 and 2016. The
malware was spread via an infected Android application used by the D-30
Howitzer artillery unit to manage targeting data.

Ukrainian officers made wide use of the app, which contained the X-Agent
spyware. This is considered to be a highly successful attack, resulting in the
destruction of over 80% of Ukraine’s D-30 Howitzers.

Electronic Warfare
Electronic Warfare (EW) refers to the strategic use of the electromagnetic
spectrum to gain an advantage over adversaries, either by attacking their
systems or defending against electronic threats. Unlike traditional forms of
warfare, EW operates invisibly, disrupting an enemy’s critical operations
without direct physical confrontation.
As modern military systems increasingly rely on electronic communications
and sensors, EW has become an essential element of contemporary military
strategy.

EW enables forces to exploit enemy electromagnetic emissions, disrupt

communications, and jam navigational systems. By blocking or interfering with
key signals, EW can impair the enemy's ability to coordinate, navigate, or even
communicate. EW also involves intercepting enemy transmissions to gather
intelligence on their plans and movements, providing vital insights into enemy
operations. This disruption can cause confusion and chaos on the battlefield,
making it a highly effective yet often unseen form of warfare.

EW is highly adaptable and can be deployed in various domains, including land,

sea, air, and space. Since nearly all modern military technology incorporates
wireless communication and electronic systems, the role of EW has expanded
dramatically. Today, it is a cornerstone of military defense and offensive
strategies for nations across the globe.

Historical Context and Real World Examples of

Electronic Warfare
Electronic Warfare (EW) has evolved significantly since its inception. Early forms
of EW appeared during World War I with radio signal interception, but it was
during World War II that radar jamming and signal intelligence became central to
military operations. The Cold War saw further advancements, with both sides
developing sophisticated radar and communication countermeasures. Modern
EW incorporates advanced digital technologies and integrates with cyber
warfare, reflecting the growing importance of electronic systems in military
operations.

Operation Orchard by Israel (2007)

A notable real-world example is Israel’s 2007 Operation Orchard. During this

covert airstrike on a Syrian nuclear facility, Israeli jets employed advanced EW
tactics to neutralize Syrian air defenses. By jamming and disrupting radar and
missile systems, Israeli forces effectively rendered Syria’s air defenses useless,
allowing the mission to proceed undetected. This operation highlighted the
critical role of EW in modern warfare, showcasing how it can disable enemy
defenses and ensure mission success.
 Weaponization of information (disinformation
campaigns and media manipulation)
Weaponisation of Social Media

Weaponization of social media refers to the use of social media platforms such
as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, WhatsApp, Telegram, YouTube etc to spread
propaganda, misinformation, disinformation, fake news, deep fakes, manipulate
public opinion, and influence political outcomes. Weaponization of social media
platforms is a growing concern because of its potential to undermine democratic
processes, erode trust in institutions, promote extremist ideologies and
exacerbate social and political polarization.

Instances of widespread social media weaponization:

● 2016 and 2020 US Presidential Election: The US Presidential election in 2016

and 2020 was a turning point in the weaponization of social media platforms with
false information and propaganda being spread on social media platforms such
as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube etc. Russian operatives were found to have
used social media platforms to spread false information and sow discord among
American voters.

● Brexit Referendum: The 2016 Brexit referendum in the UK was also influenced
by social media manipulation. False information and propaganda were spread on
social media platforms such as Facebook, which allowed political advertising to
be targeted to specific demographics.

● Indian Elections: In recent years, social media has played a significant role in
Indian elections, with political parties using social media platforms to target
specific demographics with tailored messaging. False information and
propaganda have also been spread on social media platforms in an attempt to
influence public opinion.
Weaponization of social media can have serious consequences for democratic
processes, social cohesion, and human rights. Social media can be used to
manipulate public opinion and to promote extremist ideologies, and to take steps
to combat the spread of disinformation and hate speech. This includes efforts to
improve media literacy, strengthen democratic institutions, and promote civil
discourse. The weaponization of social media poses a significant threat to
individuals, society, politics, economics, national security, and global stability.

Disinformation Campaigns

Disinformation campaigns—the deliberate creation, amplification, and

weaponization of misleading or false content—are central to 4GW, undermining
trust in institutions, polarizing populations, and influencing political outcomes.

Private military companies and their unregulated arsenals

Private Military and Security Companies have become big business, and very
global. No one truly knows the extent of this market or how many billions of
dollars flow around in it, but it is a well known and a well established fact that the
demand for them and their business is booming. Many of these mercenary
groups, who work mainly for profit, outclass local militaries and local militias.

The Middle East is awash in mercenaries. Kurdistan is a haven for soldiers of

fortune looking for work with the Kurdish militia, oil companies defending their oil
fields, or those who want terrorists dead. Some are just adventure seekers, while
others are American veterans who found civilian life meaningless. The capital of
Kurdistan, Irbil, has become an unofficial marketplace of mercenary services
today.

The UAE discreetly dispatched hundreds of special mercenary forces to fight that
Houthis, backed by Iran, in Yemen. Many of these soldiers hailed from Latin
America, from countries such as El Salvador, Chile, Colombia and Panama. There
were battle hardened soldiers who were veterans of the drug wars and cartel wars
in Latin America and brought about a new frontier of tactics to the wars in the
middle east.
These soldiers were also much cheaper than American or British mercenaries.
Allegedly, African mercenaries are also fighting in Yemen for Saudi Arabia and
come from countries like Sudan, Chad, and Eritrea. Private force has proved a
useful option for wealthy Arab nations, particularly Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the
Emirates, that want to wage war but do not have an aggressive military. Their
mercenaries have fought in Yemen, Syria, and Libya in recent years.

Turning profit motive into a war strategy, Syria rewards mercenaries who seize
territory from terrorists with oil and mining rights. At least two Russian
companies have received contracts under this policy: Evro Polis and
Stroytransgaz. These oil and mining firms then hired mercenaries to do the dirty
work. For example, Evro Polis employed the Wagner Group to capture oil fields
from the so-called Islamic State (IS) in central Syria, which it did. Reports show
there are about 2,500 Russia-bought mercenaries in Syria. Russia also uses
them in Ukraine, and the Ukrainians fight back with their own mercenaries. The
war is awash in Russian, Chechen, French, Spanish, Swedish, and Serbian
mercenaries, fighting for both sides in eastern Ukraine’s bloody conflict.

Mercenaries were a constant in the Ukraine conflict. Companies like the Wagner
Group conducted a wide range of secret missions, all denied by the Russian
government. Ukrainian oligarchs hired mercenaries, too, but not for the
country’s sake. Billionaire Igor Kolomoisky employed private warriors to capture
the headquarters of oil company UkrTransNafta in order to protect his financial
assets.

Nigeria secretly hired mercenaries to solve a big problem: Boko Haram. This
Islamic terrorist group fights to carve out a caliphate in Nigeria, and the
Nigerian army fights back, its methods no better. There is a saying in Africa:
When elephants fight, the grass gets trampled. Tens of thousands of people
were killed, and 2.3 million more were displaced from their homes. Boko Haram
abducted 276 schoolgirls for “wives,” many of whom were never seen again.
International outrage was swift but impotent.

That’s when the Nigerian government secretly turned to mercenaries to fight

Boko Haram. These were not the lone gunmen of B-grade movies, but a real
private army. They arrived with special forces teams and Mi-24 Hind helicopter
gunships—flying tanks. Conducting search and destroy missions, they drove out
Boko Haram in a few weeks.
The Nigerian military could not achieve this task in 6 years. Some wonder if we
should hire mercenaries to hunt and kill terrorists in the Middle East, given the
slow progress of national armies and United Nations (UN) absenteeism.

Use of PMCs by Humanitarian Organizations

If terrorists can hire mercenaries, why not humanitarians? Nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) such as CARE, Save the Children, CARITAS, and World
Vision are increasingly turning to the private sector to protect their people,
property, and interests in conflict zones. Large military companies like Aegis
Defense Services and Triple Canopy advertise their services to NGOs, and
NGO trade associations like the European Interagency Security Forum and
InterAction provide members with guidelines for hiring them. Some think the
UN should augment its thinning peacekeeping missions with certified private
military companies. The option of private peacekeepers versus none at all,
which is the condition in many parts of the world today, is a Hobson’s choice.
What’s to stop a millionaire from buying a humanitarian intervention in the
future? Stopping atrocities would leave quite the legacy. Actress Mia Farrow
considered hiring Blackwater to end the genocide in Darfur in 2008.

Multinational corporations are the biggest new clients of mercenaries,

especially the extractive industries. Companies working in dangerous places
are tired of relying on corrupt or inept security forces provided to them by
host governments, and they are turning to private forces. For example, mining
giant Freeport-McMoRan employed Triple Canopy to protect its vast mine in
Papua, Indonesia, where there is an insurgency. The China National Petroleum
Corporation contracts DeWe Security to safeguard its assets in the middle of
South Sudan’s civil war. Someday ExxonMobil or Google may hire an army, too

There are mercenaries on the sea as well, similar to privateers 2 centuries ago.
International shipping lines hire them to protect their ships traveling through
pirate waters in the Gulf of Aden, Strait of Malacca, and Gulf of Guinea. Here’s
how it works. Armed contractors sit on “arsenal ships” in pirate waters and
chopper to a client freighter or tanker when called. Once aboard, they act as
“embarked security,” hardening the ship with razor wire and protecting it with
high-caliber firepower.
After the ship passes through pirate waters, the team returns to its arsenal
ship and awaits the next client. The industry is based in London, and seeks
legitimacy through ISO 28007 certification.5 Some would like to see true
privateers: private naval vessels that could hunt and kill pirates. Americans
will be pleased to know that Congress is authorized to hire privateers under
Article 1, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution, and this could prove more
efficient than sending Arleigh Burke–class destroyers after pirate zodiacs.
Private force is manifesting everywhere. After 150 years underground, the
market for force is returning in just a few decades and is growing at an
alarming rate. In military strategy, there are five domains of war: land, sea,
air, space, and cyber. In less than 20 years, private force has proliferated
among every domain except space, but that too may change. Space is
already privatized with companies like SpaceX, and it is possible that private
armed satellites may one day orbit the Earth. Worse things are to come. In
just 10 years, the market for force has moved beyond Blackwater in Iraq and
become more lethal. Mercenaries are appearing everywhere, and no longer
just in the fringe. Contract warfare has become a new way of warfare,
resurrected by the United States and imitated by others. The rise of
mercenaries is producing a new kind of threat—private war—that threatens
chaos. It is literally the marketization of war, where military force is bought
and sold like any other commodity. It is an ancient form of armed conflict
that modern militaries have forgotten how to fight. Should this trend
develop, the super-rich could become superpowers, leading to wars without
states. In such a world, states would be mere prizes to be won rather than
agents of their own destiny. This has the potential to upend international
relations as we know it

PMC Arsenals and Weapons

A second emerging issue concerns the role of PMSCs in arms procurement
and transfer activities. The arms trade network has changed and PMSCs
possess an increasing capacity to procure arms and facilitate weapons
transfers to states and non-state clients.
While many states have legal, regulatory, and contractual provisions in place
regarding PMSCs involvement in the ‘sub-delegation’ of the acquisition of arms
and weapons that follows tracing, recording, and ‘end-certification’ processes,
some do not. PMSCs involvement in arms procurement risks undermining existing
arms control regimes and oversight mechanisms, the majority of which are State-
focused, as well as falling outside of them (see Petersohn, Nebolsina, Patel and
Jha and A/HRC/57/45).

Instruments such as the Firearms Protocol, Arms Trade Treaty, and the
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons do not recognize the possibility of PMSCs engaging in weapons
transfers. Similarly, the Montreux Document ‘best practices’ and the ICoCA ‘Code
of Conduct’ – neither of which are legally binding instruments – place the
responsibility of arms acquisition and transfer on contracting, home and
territorial states.

In conflict and/or weak governance settings, PMSCs have engaged in acquisitions

and transfers on behalf of States that do not follow established procedures of
registration and end-user certification. This entails the use of brokers,
intermediaries, and the fabrication of documentation. PMSCs have also acquired
weapons via state ‘re-routing’ (i.e. the diversion of a legal state-state transfer, that
is re-routed onto the PMSC for use, sale, transfer). This complicates the
traceability, end-user verification process, and control over arms transfers. These
practices have been flagged as creating heightened risks of diversion to
sanctioned armed groups, in violation of UN Security Council arms embargoes.Of
particular concern is the growing nexus between PMSCs and “grey and black
markets, networks and financing”.

Emerging technologies, such as uncrewed aerial systems and 3D printed weapons

‘ghost guns’, represent a new frontier not only in weapons development and
manufacturing, but also in the expanding operational capabilities and commercial
activities of PMSCs. PMSCs have been connected to the supply and sale of such
additive components as a means of self-funding, raising concerns about PMCSs
connections to illicit networks, their ability to raise illicit funds, and the circulation
of unmarked, unverified weapon components and technologies. Moreover, the
increasing availability of dual-use technologies — applicable for both civilian and
military purposes — further complicates oversight, blurring the line between
legitimate trade and unauthorized proliferation, and challenging existing export
control regimes (see Bromley & Holtom).
PMSCs are also increasingly engaged in utilizing digital tools and cyber-
technologies for surveillance, intelligence gathering, operational planning and
targeting in conflict and non-conflict situations. This growing reliance on cyber-
enabled services is likely to persist and expand, yet currently unfolds within a
largely unregulated international legal framework. In some cases, PMSCs have
even been implicated in the development and operation of offensive cyber
capabilities, raising significant concerns under international law governing cyber
operations.

AI in autonomous weapons: Legal and ethical questions

LAWS or Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems are loosely defined as “weapons

that can select and engage targets without human intervention,” although
governments ultimately decide what they consider autonomous based on degree
of independence or the complexity of the AI’s intelligence. For example, the
United States defines autonomous weapon systems as “a weapon system that,
once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a
human operator”. This includes human-supervised autonomous weapon systems
that are designed to allow human operators to override operation of the weapon
system, but can select and engage targets without further human input after
activation.” Human involvement is limited to activating the device. Thus, any
autonomous weapon system is one with the independence to select, aim and fire
at a target.

In other words, autonomous weapons systems can determine who is a threat, and
whether or not coercive action should be taken against that threat. Both
intelligence and independence are important in determining the level of
autonomy, although it can be argued that independence is the defining factor. A
machine may be programmed to fulfill complex tasks and consider a plethora of
variables, but without independence to act, it cannot execute its programming.
Challenges Posed by Lethal Autonomous Weapons
Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems pose profound challenges that
demand consideration and decisive action from the global community. One
of the most pressing concerns is the potential for LAWS to operate without
human control, raising ethical questions about accountability and the
ability to adhere to international humanitarian law. Allowing machines to
make life-or-death decisions on the battlefield without human oversight
raises profound moral dilemmas and uncertainties about the
consequences of delegating such critical decisions to autonomous
systems.

Another significant challenge is the risk of proliferation and escalation as

technology advances and LAWS become more accessible, there is a
genuine fear that these systems could fall into the hands of non-state
actors or be used in ways that lead to an escalation of conflicts. This could
result in increased instability and a heightened risk of harm to civilians,
underscoring the urgent need for robust regulations and safeguards.

The absence of clear legal frameworks and regulations governing the use of
LAWS further complicates the issue. While international humanitarian law
provides guidelines for the conduct of armed conflict, it may not
adequately address the unique challenges posed by autonomous weapons.
There is a crucial need for new international agreements and mechanisms
to ensure that LAWS are developed, deployed, and used in a manner that
complies with international law and ethical standards.

Moreover, there are deep concerns about the impact of LAWS on human
dignity and the principles of humanity. The development and deployment
of LAWS raise fundamental questions about the role of humans in warfare
and the ethical implications of delegating lethal decision-making to
machines. There is a genuine fear that LAWS could be used to target
civilians or engage in disproportionate attacks, leading to egregious
violations of international humanitarian law and an erosion of the
principles of humanity that underpin the laws of war.
 Weaponization of Artificial Intelligence

Artificial Intelligence is rapidly changing many sectors, including defence and

security, where its potential for weaponization poses significant risks and
opportunities. One of the most prominent ways AI is being weaponized is
through the development of Autonomous Weapons Systems. These systems can
select and engage targets without human intervention, ranging from drones and
unmanned vehicles to automated defence systems and lethal autonomous
robots. AWS promises faster decision-making in combat and the reduction of
human casualties by removing human operators from dangerous situations. For
instance, AI-equipped drones can carry out surveillance and strike missions with
precision, minimising the need for human pilots. However, the deployment of
these systems raises significant ethical and legal questions about accountability
and compliance with international humanitarian laws.

Advanced algorithms can process vast amounts of data from sources like
satellite imagery, social media, and communication networks to identify
potential threats and monitor adversaries. AI-powered surveillance systems can
track movements, recognize faces, and analyse behaviour patterns, providing
military and intelligence agencies with valuable insights. While this can help
prevent terrorist attacks and improve national security, it also poses privacy
concerns and the potential for misuse by authoritarian regimes to control
populations.

Machine learning algorithms can analyse vast datasets to predict enemy

movements, optimise resource allocation, and develop tactical plans, enhancing
decision-making processes and improving the efficiency of military operations.
AI can simulate various combat scenarios to help military planners evaluate
different strategies and outcomes, and by processing real-time data, AI systems
provide commanders with up-to-date information, enabling more informed
decisions on the battlefield. However, reliance on AI for strategic decisions raises
concerns about the potential for errors and the loss of human judgement in
critical situations.

AI systems can perpetuate and amplify biases present in training data, leading to
unfair outcomes in areas like targeting and threat assessment. The extensive
data collection required for AI systems raises privacy concerns, and as AI
systems become more autonomous, questions about human control and
decision-making become more pressing.
The rapid advancement of AI in weaponization requires careful management to
balance innovation with ethical considerations, ensuring that AI development
benefits humanity while addressing its potential risks and challenges. In the realm
of international security, AI offers both strategic advantages and potential risks,
making it crucial for global security organisations to establish proper frameworks
for its development and use.

Compliance with the International Law

Asymmetry between parties to armed conflicts is as old as warfare itself. However,
what have come to change in recent years are the means and methods used by
weaker non-state actors to such conflicts. The world has witnessed how civilians
become increasingly involved in hostilities, both as participants and as innocent
by-standers. The question is therefore how states should respond to hostile acts
carried out by more or less organized civilians in a way that does not jeopardize
the protection of those that take no direct part in hostilities, or have ceased to do
so.

Three specific challenges in contemporary IHL can be lined out: the fact that most
armed conflicts today are non-international in character whereas most rules
pertaining to armed conflict governs international armed conflicts means that
regulation becomes unclear due to diverse interpretation. Further, when non-
state adversaries use means and methods not in line with IHL, it leads to a
downward reciprocal spiral where reprisals become an unwelcomed element of
warfare. Lastly, when warfare is taking place in urban environments rather than on
traditional battlefields, the risk is apparent that innocents will be affected by
hostilities, as those who participate in the conflict blend in with the civilian
population and use civilian objects as a cover for operations.

It is today perhaps more important than ever that IHL serves as protection in
armed conflicts. We see insurgencies and terrorist attacks getting more and more
common, leading to devastating effects for those affected. New instruments
governing these types of conflicts in more detail would certainly be helpful, but
since it is a very long way to go before such instruments would see daylight, it
would be a helpful first step if states could start agreeing upon fundamental
definitions and unite against the increased violence directed towards innocent
civilians.
 Conclusion

No competent strategist believes that we can ever eliminate attacks against

civilians and non-combatants. These are frequent enough in conventional wars,
and not all of these casualties are accidental: recall the London Blitz, the fire
bombings of Hamburg and Dresden, and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. National governments, even those of democracies, will deliberately
target civilian populations when they convince themselves that such actions are
needed to win the war, or shorten it, or just reduce the number of friendly
casualties. It is also difficult, especially in the early stages, to tell insurgent or 4GW
activity from ordinary crime, and there is a tendency for authoritarian
governments to delude themselves that the violence is coming from criminals or
gangs long after it has evolved into something much more serious. Good 4GW
organizations encourage this as long as possible, since it forestalls effective
countermeasures.

Although “terrorism,” that is, seemingly gratuitous violence against civilians and
noncombatants, is a common technique for 4GW groups, it is only that, one
technique. We must stay focused on much larger objectives: Who is attacking us?
Why? Who supports them? Why? How do we want the issues finally solved? The key
point being that to win against “terrorism,” we need to reduce its effects to the
point where we can concentrate on the larger goal of winning a fourth-generation
war.

As the lines between conventional and unconventional combat blur under the
influence of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), existing disarmament frameworks
face unprecedented stress. The diffusion of battlefield power to non-state actors,
the integration of cyber warfare, autonomous systems, and hybrid strategies, and
the exploitation of legal and normative grey zones challenge traditional arms
control and verification mechanisms. The delegates must focus on identifying gaps
where current treaties, norms, and verification regimes fail to address 4GW
dynamics, particularly the use of proxy forces, weaponized information, and dual-
use technologies. They should prioritize discussions on the adaptation of existing
frameworks such as the NPT, BTWC, CCW, and cyber-related norms to account for
these evolving threats, while also exploring cooperative measures amongst the
entire world.
 QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION MUST ANSWER (QARMA)

1. Which existing disarmament treaties, conventions, and frameworks are most

impacted by the tactics and technologies associated with 4GW?

2. What mechanisms can be introduced to address the use of proxy forces and
non-state actors in ways that undermine disarmament obligations?

3. How can DISEC encourage the regulation or control of dual-use technologies

that are increasingly relevant in 4GW scenarios such as drones, cyber tools,
autonomous weapons?

4. What verification and compliance mechanisms can be adapted or developed

to detect and deter 4GW tactics that bypass traditional arms control
monitoring?

5. How can the proliferation of low-cost, high-impact weapons to VNSAs be

tracked and reduced?

6. How should disarmament frameworks assign responsibility for violations

committed by VNSAs, particularly those backed by state sponsors?

7. What resources should be used to aid countries with limited cyber

capabilities during times of attack? Should developed nations be required to
help out nations with limited cyber capabilities?

8. Should small, portable, and improvised weapons such as drones, IEDs and
loitering munitions be incorporated into arms control monitoring frameworks?