Relevancy of Character — Answer Style Notes with Case Law

Relevancy of Character — Elaborated Answer with Case Law

The law of evidence places significant restrictions on the admissibility of character evidence.

Character, in its legal sense, refers to the combination of mental, moral and social qualities of an

individual. Courts remain cautious in admitting such evidence because it can easily prejudice the

mind of the judge or jury. A person might be convicted not for what they have done, but for what

they are perceived to be. Further, character is an ambiguous concept: people reveal different

traits in different contexts, making it unreliable as proof of specific conduct. Therefore, trials are

expected to concentrate on concrete facts in issue rather than general moral judgments.

Character is understood as comprising both reputation and disposition. Reputation is the

estimation of a person in the eyes of the community, while disposition refers to their inherent

qualities and tendencies. Courts prefer reputation as it can be proved by testimony of community

opinion, whereas disposition is inward and speculative. In *Ram Ranjan Roy v. Emperor* (1915

Calcutta), the court stressed that character evidence must be limited to reputation and not to

rumours. The distinction between rumour and reputation is critical. Rumour is an unverified

report and is inadmissible, while reputation reflects a settled community opinion and is

admissible when the law makes character relevant. The Privy Council in *Subramaniam v.

Public Prosecutor* (1956) underlined the danger of relying on hearsay and stressed that reliable

reputation evidence is permissible, not mere gossip.

English law has historically restricted the meaning of character to reputation only. In *R v
Rowton* (1865) 169 ER 1497, the court ruled that character evidence must be confined to

general reputation and not personal opinions or particular acts. This rule was based on policy

reasons: to prevent prejudice, avoid surprise to the other party, and keep the focus on actual facts

rather than moral assessments of an accused or litigant.

In civil cases, Section 46 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (corresponding to Section 52 of

the Indian Evidence Act) lays down the general rule that the character of a party is irrelevant.

The rationale is that civil liability should be determined on the basis of rights and obligations, not

on moral worthiness. For instance, if A sues B to recover a loan, the issue is whether the loan

was taken and repaid; whether B is generally honest or dishonest is irrelevant. Similarly, in a

landlord-tenant dispute about non-payment of rent, the tenant’s character is not to be taken into

account. In *Premananda Dutt v. Emperor* (AIR 1930 Calcutta 85), the court emphasised that

civil disputes must be resolved on facts in issue and not on the character of parties.

However, there are important exceptions. When character itself is a fact in issue, it becomes

relevant. This occurs in cases where the law makes relief conditional on character or conduct.

For example, in divorce proceedings, the conduct of the spouse is a matter in issue. In custody

disputes, the moral character of the parent is directly relevant. In Hindu family law, the

entitlement of a widow to maintenance may depend upon her conduct. Thus, where rights and

liabilities are intertwined with character, evidence about character becomes admissible. The

Madras High Court in *Gopal Naidu v. Emperor* (1935) recognised that when character is

central, it is admissible.

Another important civil exception arises under Section 50 of the BSA (corresponding to Section

55 of the IEA), which provides that character is relevant where it directly affects damages. In

defamation cases, for instance, the plaintiff’s reputation is crucial in assessing damages. If the

plaintiff enjoyed a high reputation, defamation causes greater injury, and damages are higher.

Conversely, if the plaintiff had a poor reputation, damages may be reduced. The English case
*Scott v. Sampson* (1882) established that in actions for defamation, general reputation is

admissible to determine damages. Similarly, in matrimonial cases involving adultery or breach of

promise to marry, character evidence becomes relevant. The Calcutta High Court in *Bose v.

Biswas* (AIR 1935 Cal 702) acknowledged that the plaintiff’s character must be considered

when assessing damages for defamation.

In criminal proceedings, the law takes a different approach. Section 47 of the BSA (Section 53 of

the IEA) permits the accused to adduce evidence of good character. This is based on the

principle that a person of good reputation is less likely to have committed the offence. Evidence

of good character can create reasonable doubt and, if convicted, may mitigate the sentence.

However, proof of good character is confined to general reputation, not specific good acts. The

English case of *R v Rowton* (1865) clarified that specific acts are not admissible; only general

reputation is. The Supreme Court of India in *Bhagwan Singh v. State of Punjab* (AIR 1952 SC

214) held that good character evidence, though relevant, cannot by itself outweigh strong

prosecution evidence. It can only add weight to a reasonable doubt. Similarly, in *R v Vye*

[1993] 1 WLR 471, the English Court of Appeal held that good character has a dual effect: it

enhances the credibility of the accused and reduces the likelihood of propensity towards crime.

The accused may prove good character either by leading defence witnesses who testify to

reputation or by eliciting such testimony during cross-examination of prosecution witnesses. In

practice, good character evidence may tilt the scales where the prosecution case is weak, but it

cannot by itself justify acquittal if the evidence of guilt is clear.

As regards the prosecution, Sections 48 and 49 of the BSA (Sections 54 of the IEA) restrict the

use of bad character evidence. The rule is that the prosecution cannot use the accused’s bad

character to prove guilt. Guilt must be established by facts in issue and relevant facts connected

with the offence, not by showing that the accused is a person of bad character. This prevents

unfair prejudice.

There are, however, exceptions. First, if the accused himself adduces evidence of good character,

the prosecution is permitted to rebut it by showing bad character. This principle is recognised in

Indian law and was applied in *State of Maharashtra v. Sainath* (AIR 1966 Bom 43). Secondly,

when character itself is directly in issue, such as in proceedings concerning habitual offenders or

sexual offences where the law makes propensity relevant, bad character may be admissible. In

*R v Winfield* (1939), the English court recognised this exception. Thirdly, previous

convictions may be proved, not to establish guilt of the current charge, but where the law

provides enhanced punishment for repeat offenders. In *Makin v. Attorney-General for New

South Wales* (1894 AC 57), the Privy Council reaffirmed the general exclusionary rule but

admitted prior acts where directly relevant. In India, *K.G. Premshankar v. Inspector of Police*

(2002) 8 SCC 87 confirmed that prior convictions are admissible for sentencing and

enhancement purposes.
The exception relating to damages in civil cases deserves emphasis. Section 50 BSA and Section

55 IEA provide that character is relevant where damages are in issue. This typically arises in

cases of defamation, adultery, breach of promise to marry, or divorce-related claims. In such

cases, the extent of harm depends largely on the character and reputation of the parties. If the

plaintiff has always enjoyed an honourable reputation, the defamatory statement causes greater

injury to social standing and therefore justifies higher damages. On the other hand, if the plaintiff

already had a questionable character, the injury is less and damages are reduced. In *Scott v.

Sampson* (1882), the court held that general reputation is admissible to assess damages in

defamation cases. Likewise, in *Bose v. Biswas* (1935 Calcutta), the court considered the

plaintiff’s character when awarding damages.

Therefore, while civil law generally excludes character, it becomes highly relevant when

damages are to be assessed. This exception reflects the practical reality that injury to reputation

depends on the baseline reputation of the person concerned.

In practical terms, courts treat character evidence with caution. Even when logically relevant, it

may be excluded if it is more prejudicial than probative. Reputation witnesses do not narrate

specific stories; they simply state the general reputation of the accused or party in their

community, such as “he is known as an honest man.” This safeguards against trials being

derailed into inquiries about every act of a person’s life.

The distinction between disposition and reputation also shapes admissibility. Disposition is

inward and speculative, while reputation is outward and provable. Hence, courts usually allow

reputation evidence but rarely accept evidence aimed at proving disposition. Furthermore, the

law filters out rumour by requiring witnesses to testify about established community views, not

hearsay or gossip. Cross-examination strategies also differ: the defence may use good character

evidence to create doubt, while the prosecution may rebut if the accused raises the issue. But

neither side should turn the trial into a referendum on life history. The ultimate focus must

always remain on facts in issue.

Several cases illustrate these principles. In *R v Rowton* (1865), it was held that specific acts

cannot be used to prove character, only general reputation. In *Scott v Sampson* (1882), it was

affirmed that reputation is admissible in defamation to affect damages. In *Makin v Attorney-

General for NSW* (1894), the Privy Council set out the general rule against bad character

evidence with limited exceptions. In India, *Bhagwan Singh v State of Punjab* (1952 SC) held

that good character, though relevant, is not decisive. The Calcutta case of *Premananda Dutt v

Emperor* (1930) confirmed that civil cases generally exclude character evidence. In *K.G.

Premshankar v Inspector of Police* (2002 SC), prior convictions were considered relevant for

enhanced sentencing. In *R v Vye* (1993), English law confirmed the dual effect of good

character. And in *Bose v Biswas* (1935 Cal), character was factored into the assessment of

damages in defamation.

These authorities together provide a comprehensive understanding of when and how character

evidence may be admitted in both civil and criminal contexts, and they remain central to any

exam discussion on this topic.

In conclusion, the relevancy of character under the Indian Evidence Act and the Bharatiya

Sakshya Adhiniyam reflects a careful balance between logic and fairness. In civil cases,

character is generally irrelevant, except when it is itself a fact in issue or when damages depend

upon it. In criminal cases, the accused is permitted to adduce good character evidence to

strengthen their defence, but the prosecution cannot rely on bad character unless the accused first

raises the issue, or unless bad character itself is a fact in issue, or for proving prior convictions

when the law prescribes enhanced punishment. The distinction between reputation and rumour is

critical: only the former is admissible. The case law from both India and England — such as *R

v Rowton*, *Scott v Sampson*, *Makin v AG NSW*, *Bhagwan Singh*, *Premananda Dutt*,

*K.G. Premshankar*, *R v Vye* and *Bose v Biswas* — illustrates the practical application of

these principles.

Thus, character evidence occupies a unique position in the law of evidence. It is often tempting

to assume that a person’s moral standing predicts their actions, but the law resists this

temptation, allowing character to be considered only within well-defined boundaries. For exam

purposes, it is important to frame answers by explaining the general rules, the exceptions, and the

leading cases that justify those exceptions. This structured approach ensures a comprehensive

and well-rounded answer on the relevancy of character.