The Global Public Relations Handbook

In this third edition, The Global Public Relations Handbook: Theory, Research, and Prac-
tice offers state-of-the-art discussions of the global public relations industry, blending
research-based theory with practice, and presented in essays from both academics and
practitioners.
This edition’s 28 essays in three sections take into account changes in the global
communication landscape especially in the last ten years. The first section contains
essays that provide conceptual linkages between public relations and international
political systems, economic systems and levels of development, societal culture, differ-
ent media systems including digital media, and activism. Essays in the second section
discuss the communication of various global actors such as corporations (including
family-owned enterprises), non-profits, governments (and public sector enterprises),
global public relations agencies, IGOs such as the European Union and NATO and
“informal” organizations such as hactivist groups, terrorists, and failed states. The
third section discusses key global communication issues such as climate change, char-
acter assassination as a communication tool, internal communication, risk and crisis
communication, public affairs, and public diplomacy.
This will be an essential resource for students and researchers of public relations,
strategic communication, and international communication.

Krishnamurthy Sriramesh, PhD, is Professor of Public Relations and Director of the

Professional Masters in Corporate Communication program at the College of Media,
Communication, and Information, University of Colorado, Boulder. His award win-
ning teaching and research experience spans five continents covering topics such as
culture and public relations, globalization and public relations, Corporate Social
Responsibility, and Public Relations for Development.

Dejan Verčič, PhD, is Professor, Head of Department of Communication and Head of the
Centre for Marketing and Public Relations at the University of Ljubljana, and Partner and
Knowledge Director in the strategic communication company Stratkom d.o.o., Slovenia.
His research focuses on digitalization, globalization, and strategic communication.
The Global Public Relations
Handbook
Theory, Research, and Practice

Third Edition

Edited by
Krishnamurthy Sriramesh and Dejan Verčič
Third edition published 2020
by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017

and by Routledge
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Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2020 Taylor & Francis

The right of the Krishnamurthy Sriramesh and Dejan Verčič to be identified as

the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual
chapters, has been asserted in accordance with Sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or

utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
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Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered

trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent
to infringe.

First edition published by Routledge 2003

Sixth edition published by Routledge 2009

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A catalog record has been requested for this book

ISBN: 978-1-138-04314-5 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-367-37013-8 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-315-17329-0 (ebk)

Typeset in Times New Roman

by Swales & Willis, Exeter, Devon, UK
Krishnamurthy Sriramesh dedicates this volume to his parents and to the
students and colleagues from whom he has learnt so much over the years
 Contents

Foreword xi
Richard Edelman, CEO Edelman
Preface xiii
Margery Kraus, Founder and Executive Chairman,
APCO Worldwide
Acknowledgments xv

Introduction xvi
Krishnamurthy Sriramesh
Contributor Biographies xxi

I Conceptual Foundations of Global Public

Relations 1

1 Comparative Political Systems and Public Relations: An

Overview 3
Laura D. Young and James A. McCann
2 The Intersection of Political and Economic Systems in Global
Public Relations Practice 14
Sandra Duhé, Jolene Fisher, and Krishnamurthy Sriramesh
3 Culture: The “Silent” Language is also the “Neglected”
Language 28
Krishnamurthy Sriramesh

vii
viii CONTENTS

4 The Media, International, Transnational and Global Public

Relations 39
Dejan Verčič and Krishnamurthy Sriramesh

5 The Nexus between Activism and Public Relations 51

Ganga S. Dhanesh and Krishnamurthy Sriramesh

II Current Key Global Players 63

6 Leading an Ethical Industry: Local and Global Professional

Public Relations Associations 65
Margalit Toledano and David McKie
7 The Development and Challenges of Global Public Relations
Agencies 73
Donald K. Wright
8 State Capture and the Demise of Bell Pottinger: Misusing
Public Relations to Shape Future Kakistocracies? 84
Ronel Rensburg
9 Exploring the Complexity of Global Strategic Communication
Practice in Government: The Case of the Canadian Federal
Government 99
Fraser Likely
10 Global Public Sector and Political Communication 111
Vilma Luoma-aho, María-José Canel, and Karen Sanders
11 The European Union and Its Public Relations: Context,
Actions, and Challenges of a Supranational Polity 120
Chiara Valentini
12 NATO and Its Communication in the 21st Century 131
Barbora Maronkova
13 A New Public Relations for Corporations in the World of
Hyper-Globalization 139
Takashi Inoue
14 Powerful Families, Powerful Influences: Family-owned Enter-
prises and Public Relations in Asia 149
Ganga S. Dhanesh and Flora Hung-Baesecke
15 The Global Public Relations Strategies of the “Hacktivist”
Group Anonymous 162
Kara Alaimo
CONTENTS ix

16 Terrorism and Global Public Relations 170

Jesper Falkheimer
17 The Global Public Relations of Failed States 178
Greg Simons
III Current Issues Relevant to Global Public
Relations 193

18 Internal Communication with a Global Perspective 195

Ana Tkalac Verčič
19 Global Interdependence and Risks: Management and
Communication 205
Robert L. Heath
20 Global Crisis Communication 217
W. Timothy Coombs and An-Sofie Claeys
21 The Management and Practice of Public Affairs in a Global
Context 226
Craig S. Fleisher
22 Linking Public Relations and Public Diplomacy: Creating a New
Cadre of Public and Corporate Diplomats 235
Roger Hayes
23 Public Relations and the Concept of ‘Nations within Nations’:
The Case of Bullfighting in Multicultural Spain 246
Jordi Xifra and Krishnamurthy Sriramesh
24 Climate Change Imperatives for Global Public Relations: Who
Pays and Who Cares? 258
Judy Motion
25 Character Assassination and Reputation Management in the
Context of Mediated Complexity 268
Sergei A. Samoilenko
26 Crowdfunding: From Global Financial Crisis to Global
Financial Communication 283
Mai Anh Doan and David McKie
27 Public Relations, Political Communication and Agenda
Setting: The Rise of the Micro-Propaganda Machine 293
Thomas Stoeckle and Jonathan Albright
x CONTENTS

28 The Role of Public Relations in the Global Battle for Hearts

and Minds: From (Liberal) “Democracy Promotion” to the Pro-
motion of “Illiberal Democracy” 309
Ryszard Ławniczak

Index 322
 Foreword

The past two decades have seen a progressive destruction of trust in the institutions
of business, government, and media, a consequence of the Great Recession, fears
about immigration, the threat to jobs posed by globalization and automation, and the
plague of fake news. The result is three trends – disinformation, disruption, and dis-
trust – that now pose serious challenges to our world.
Edelman Trust Barometer research shows that people have redirected their trust to
more local sources, with “My Employer” emerging as the most trusted institution.
People now expect the businesses they work for to take action on pressing societal
issues and their CEOs to stand up and speak out. Consumers tell us that they will
buy or boycott a brand based on its stand on the issues they care about.
This is a time for the PR industry to lead. We must recognize that our new role is
not agent, but principal; not advocate, but educator. We must help business address,
in word and deed, issues such as automation, climate change, and inequality. We
must help build a well-informed populace so that, in this era of rapid change, people
can make better decisions for their lives and make their voices heard.
At a time when we need reliable information the most, mainstream media is being
disrupted. Financial pressures have cut the number of local reporters in half in the
United States in recent years. Our research has shown that trust in social media is
low, and people also have deep concern about false information being used as
a weapon.
In this weakened media climate, we must Go Direct to the end-user with high-
quality information. Every organization, public and private, should have a news oper-
ation that speaks to stakeholders through its owned and social channels, and through
its leaders and employees. The aim is to supplement mainstream journalism, which
should still be the primary means of objective fact-gathering and dissemination.
We must be ready to fight for the truth and pledge ourselves to a high ethical
standard. As my father, Dan Edelman, our founder, said in a speech a decade ago,
“All of us in PR must bring to the office the sense of morality and live by it
every day.” We must be the bridge to diverse stakeholders. We must move businesses
from operating only in their self-interest to acting in the larger interests of society.

xi
xii FOREWORD

The Global Public Relations Handbook: Theory, Research, and Practice is premium
fuel for our new mission. The expert insights offered in these pages will inform, illu-
minate, and inspire you to roll up your sleeves and get to work. Consider this book
an indispensable guide to helping build a more secure, more knowledgeable, and
more trusting world.
GO DIRECT
Richard Edelman
President and CEO
Edelman, New York
 Preface

Over the past few decades, we’ve seen the field of public relations emerge as an aca-
demic discipline that is foundational to society. This change is due to the dedication,
scholarship, and practical approach of professors such as Krishnamurthy Sriramesh
and Dejan Verčič. Together, they’ve equipped practitioners and students with tangible
lessons that demonstrate the true complex and multicultural environment in which we
work.
The Global Public Relations Handbook: Theory, Research and Practice lives its
name. These essays focus on the impact of the elements affecting our industry such as
political and economic systems, societal, and organizational cultures, and media. For
the first time, this edition offers insight on, and from, a full range of global PR play-
ers, including associations, agencies, governments, and non-formal activist organiza-
tions, giving us the tools to navigate this multi-faceted environment in which we
operate. Each chapter is a stand-out highlight of the diversity that makes us our
strongest, from case studies around the worlds to the essay authors with a vast array
of experiences.
No matter where we are, practitioners of our industry must understand the
current and ever-changing issues that cut across all sectors, especially global risk
and crisis. We can’t face these challenges without an ability to work together and
see from multiple points of view. By including deeper dives into the impact of
communications outside of the typical business scope, such as the hacktivist
group “anonymous,” this edition reminds each of us that our industry must not
operate in a bubble, or be solely reactive. To reach our full potential, and to do
this profession justice, we need to be out in front of the key issues on the table,
and that’s just what The Global Public Relations Handbook succeeds so well in
doing
My dream has always been to have a place where clients come when they can’t
afford to fail. That takes people who are not just passionate but also determined to
always do the best for their clients, seeing creative solutions, and bringing new ideas
by taking advantage of every angle possible. Thanks to Sriramesh and Dejan, we’re

xiii
xiv PREFACE

arming both our current and future practitioners to be the trailblazers of innovative
communication that unites our world.
Margery Kraus
Founder and Executive Chairman
APCO Worldwide, Washington, D.C.
 Acknowledgments

A book of this magnitude would not have been possible without the varied help we
have received from various sources. Family comes first. Krishnamurthy Sriramesh
would like to thank his family and particularly his mother who has been very patient
with him while he continued to neglect her to work on this, and many other, projects.
Dejan Verčič would like to thank his wife Ana, daughter Marta, and son Matija for
making his life perfect.
Next, both of us would like to thank the many students and colleagues we have
had the pleasure of collaborating with, and learning from, over the past close to three
decades! Third, we would like to thank the contributors to this edition as well as the
previous two editions. They have brought varied perspectives and experiences – both
as scholars and practitioners – enriching the three volumes. We would like to thank
Richard Edelman for writing the Foreword and Margery Kraus for writing the Pref-
ace to this book helping underscore the need for academics and practitioners to
collaborate.
We sadly remember four contributors who are no longer physically with us. Ronel
Rensburg who had contributed to all three editions passed away after finishing Chap-
ter 8 of this edition. We lost Chris Skinner, who had been a steadfast advocate for
this series, a couple of years ago. Stefan Wehmeier, coauthor of the chapter on Ger-
many in the first two editions passed away last year. Adela Rogojinaru, a contributor
to the second edition, passed away in 2014. They shall be remembered not just for
their chapter contributions but also for the camaraderie and sense of community they
shared with all of us. We hope they are smiling at the release of this edition.
We would also like to thank our research collaborators from various parts of the
world who have engaged with us on various research projects helping enrich our own
knowledge while also expanding the body of knowledge. Finally, we would like thank
Routledge (Taylor and Francis) for being patient with us and publishing this volume.
In particular, we would like to recognize Felisa Salvago-Keyes for helping bring this
book to fruition.
Krishnamurthy Sriramesh
Dejan Verčič

xv
 Introduction
Krishnamurthy Sriramesh

When the first edition of this book was conceptualized at the turn of the millennium,
much of the world was enthusiastically celebrating this era of globalization that had
begun in the 1990s. In my introduction to the first edition, I had stated that globaliza-
tion had contributed to increasing the importance of public relations and it was
essential for our field to take up the challenge of building relationships across cultures
by broadening its horizons both conceptually and in practice – the primary impetus
for The Global Public Relations Handbook: Theory, Research, and Practice. Further,
I had noted that two principal drivers had contributed to the current era of globaliza-
tion: the onset of information and communication technologies (ICTs also popularly
referred to as “new” technology) and the formation of trading blocs such as NAFTA
(signed in 1992), the European Union (EU) (via the Maastricht treaty in 1992), the
World Trade Organization (created in 1995) that replaced GATT (General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade), and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation established in
1989) as an extension of ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations).
As for technology, when the first edition was being written, Windows Messenger
(an integrated version of MSN Messenger) had just been released. The year 2003,
when first edition was published, also saw the onset of the earliest social networking
and the launch of Myspace, Skype, and LinkedIn. At the turn of the millennium, it
was mostly the developed West that was celebrating and was most enthusiastic about
the prospects of globalization eying “new and emerging markets” principally in Asia
and Latin America. As for trading blocks, when the first edition was under produc-
tion, China was welcomed into the World Trade Organization (WTO), after lengthy
negotiations, in December 2001. Within a few years of the dawn of the new millen-
nium, globalization had brought significant changes to the “world order” (at least in
economics and trade) as eloquently described by Thomas Friedman in his 2005 book
The World is Flat. Four years later, coinciding with the publication of the second edi-
tion of The Global Public Relations Handbook, the world saw the formation of BRIC
by the four leading emerging markets – Brazil, Russia, India, and China – with South
Africa joining the group in 2010 to form BRICS.

xvi
INTRODUCTION xvii

As the third edition goes to print, we encounter a world that has changed signifi-
cantly in multiple ways vis-à-vis globalization. The anti-globalization movement that
arguably began with protests at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle in 1999
was initially limited to developing nations, trade unions, farm workers, student
groups, etc. Those voices were either stifled or ignored. Opposition to globalization is
now evident not just from the developing world but also from developed nations. The
US elected a president who campaigned on a nationalist agenda decrying free trade
and immigration. He has tried his best to upend free trade by imposing tariffs and
trying to renegotiate trade deals such as NAFTA. In Europe, after bringing down
two Prime Ministers, Brexit is a distinct possibility even if no one seems to know in
June 2019 how it may be operationalized by whoever becomes the next Prime Minis-
ter of the UK. In continental Europe, the May 2019 EU elections saw a surge by par-
ties that campaigned on nationalism even if their “wave” was not as big as some had
predicted. Three of the BRICS countries – India, Russia, and China – have formed
an alliance to counter the tariffs imposed by the US and plan on inviting other mem-
bers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to join them at the June, 2019
meeting of the group in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Interestingly, it is now China that is
leading the charge calling for free trade and decrying the tariffs imposed by the US!
Further, in June 2019, President Trump threatened trade tariffs on Mexico if it did
not actively prevent migrants from Central America moving across its land to enter
the US and seek asylum. So, the first of the two factors I had discussed in the first
edition – free trade and trading blocs – are not as solid now as they seemed then.
As for technology, digital media – once hailed as purveyors of democracy – have
proven to be anything but as evident in the confirmed interference by Russia in the
2016 US elections. The lack of any journalistic “gatekeeping,” offered by traditional
mass media channels, has been shown to have led to the rampant dissemination of
“fake news” and disinformation. Further, it is now evident that the big technology
corporations have violated the privacy of users repeatedly without their informed con-
sent in their eagerness to monetize the Big Data they amass with each
passing second. Most users of this technology do not really understand it and have
unwittingly given up privacy for marginal convenience. Citizens cede the power of
regulating such corporate activities to their elected representatives in government.
But, given the literacy gap vis-à-vis ICTs, government leaders seem to be clueless as
was evident when then US Senator Orrin Hatch asked Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg
during a Congressional testimony in April 2018 the following question: “So, how do
you sustain a business model in which users don’t pay for your service?” drawing
a smirk and the response: “Senator, we run ads.” It should be noted that video clips
of the testimony show that the Senator was reading his questions from a script and
this was not an off-the-cuff remark. In June 2019, the US Congress and the Justice
Department have opened regulatory scrutiny of four tech giants Alphabet (parent of
Google), Amazon, Apple, and Facebook. There is even talk of how big and powerful
these tech giants have become and whether they should be broken up much like
AT&T and the Bell system was in the 1980s. Chinese tech giant Huawei has been
accused of espionage and is at the center of the contentious trade negotiations
between the US and China. Clearly, the world had not anticipated the divergence of
this era of globalization on the two significant fronts of trade and technology. But
there are other inter-related forces at play such as distribution of wealth leading to
chasms between the haves and have-nots, the absence of the rule of law, terrorism,
drugs, and other nefarious activities, etc. that have contributed to mass migration
xviii INTRODUCTION

into the developing countries of Europe and the US thereby contributing also to
nationalism. Public relations scholarship has yet to extend its focus to these import-
ant aspects of the global society.
These shifts in the functioning and perception of, and reaction to, globalization in
the first two decades of the new millennium form the backdrop of this third edition
and have been reflected in the contents of the third edition. The most important take-
away from this edition is the recognition that an interplay of various concepts, players,
and issues is evident in global public relations. The five variables presented in Part
I provide the conceptual foundation on how political ideology forms the foundation
for economic development and infrastructure, societal and organizational culture,
media systems (including ICTs and social media), and activism, while noting that
each of these five variables in turn influences the others. While this conceptual frame-
work remains the same as the first two editions, all these chapters have been rewritten
and updated to reflect the changed world as described above. This conceptual founda-
tion in turn influences the players of global public relations (Part II) and the issues
(Part III) relevant to global public relations, while players and issues also influence
each other.
The three major types of organizations – governments, non-profits (including
IGOs) and corporations – are typically thought of when we discuss public relations
and global public relations even though as I have previously stated, public relations
scholarship has focused almost exclusively on corporations to its detriment ignoring
the other two organizational types. This edition focuses on various aspects of the
activities of these three types of organizations. More importantly, given the brief his-
tory of this era of globalization, this edition recognizes that public relations is not
being practiced only by these three types of formal organizations an outlook evident
in the previous two editions. For example, we have to recognize that terrorist groups
have been some of the more effective practitioners of global public relations even if
the goals of such communication are reprehensible. Further, a blend of activism (dis-
cussed in all three editions of this volume) and new technology (including social
media) gives us non-formal activists such as Anonymous, also discussed in this
edition.
In the introduction to the first edition, I had also discussed “common problems
uniting this world” as a third factor that had contributed to cross-cultural communi-
cation. We therefore decided to create an entire section on “current issues” to discuss
at least some of the key issues that face the world today including terrorism. Climate
change, global financial crises, and rogue (failed) states – such as North Korea – are
three of the problems that are very critical to the survival of world and world order
as we know it and so have been discussed in this volume along with others such as
global risk communication, global crisis communication, crowdsourcing (for informa-
tion and resources), and global public affairs. Our field has not adequately addressed
organizational culture and internal communication as highlighted by the chapter on
internal communication. Digital technology has also diversified political communica-
tion making it much more nuanced as a “micro propaganda machine” and agenda
setter as described in the chapter on the topic. Character assassination is an age-old
strategy used especially in political communication, but quite neglected by public rela-
tions scholarship until recently, as described in the chapter on the topic. As described
in all three editions of this book, culture has not been given its due importance by
public relations scholars. The notion of strong cultural bonds keeping people of
INTRODUCTION xix

a “nation” coalesced while being part of another cultural “nation” is highlighted in

the chapter on the ban on bullfighting in Catalonia in Spain.
This edition also highlights that Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are key to
the economies of most countries in the world but are given scant attention by public
relations scholarship as are family-owned enterprises – that can be SMEs as well as
large corporations. For that reason, this edition includes a chapter on family-owned
enterprises that are quite popular in Asia. Corporations are not neglected as evident
in the chapter on hyper-globalization and its effects on corporations. The chapters on
the Canadian Federal Government and Bell Pottinger’s involvement in global public
relations for a “kakistocracy” provide us with two contrasting case studies in the use
of transnational public relations in the government sector. Practitioners of public dip-
lomacy – mostly on behalf of governments – use public relations much more than
they admit to, as discussed in the chapter on the subject that also blends use of
public diplomacy by corporations. This volume also focuses on public sector enter-
prises and their use of global public relations – another area neglected by mainstream
public relations scholarship. Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have played
a key role globally throughout history but most recently since the formation of the
United Nations. They could not have performed their significant activities without the
use of global public relations – having been engaged in it even before the onset of
this era of globalization. The chapter on the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) provide us with insights into the complexity of communica-
tion in such organizations. Public relations agencies do play a key role in global
public relations representing corporations, governments, and non-profits. For that
reason, I thank Richard Edelman and Margery Kraus, heading two of the largest
public relations agencies in the world, for writing the Foreword and Preface for this
book. Part II begins with a discussion of global public relations agencies blended
with ethics.
In a major departure from the first two editions, this edition does not present coun-
try-specific chapters that sought to describe public relations practices of countries in
various regions of the world while also trying to link such practice to the five vari-
ables described in Part I. Several factors led to the decision not to include country-
specific chapters. First, a review of scholarship emanating from around the world over
the past three decades informs the discerning observer that there is a paucity of
empirical research linking public relations in a country with all five variables dis-
cussed in Part I. We may have a small set of studies that discuss one or the other of
the “environmental” variables – principally culture. The other variables have not been
empirically studied linked with public relations. The breadth of concepts to be covered
prohibits most researchers from attempting to study all the five variables in a single
study. As global public relations research has at least a history of two decades, basing
country-specific chapters either almost entirely on conceptual discussion or anecdotal
evidence was deemed not to be helpful in advancing the field. The solution would be
for networks of researchers to form collaborative teams and study countries of
a region using the five variables but that would require a lot of coordination that is
not evident currently. Second, because of the need to reduce ethnocentricity, we had
to obtain country-specific chapters based on current empirical evidence from all con-
tinents (on all the five variables described in Part I), which we deemed did not cur-
rently exist.
Looking to the future, I hope that as global public relations scholarship matures,
collaborative research efforts will generate the needed empirical evidence on all five
xx INTRODUCTION

variables from different continents that will make including country-specific chapters
in the fourth edition a reality! Clearly such information has immense practical value
as well to the profession and so it behooves scholars to embark on such studies as
another way of bridging the scholarship-practice divide. It is for this reason that we
made earnest efforts in this edition to blend authorship of the chapters from both
scholars and practitioners. Finally, I hope young scholars of public relations will
embark on comprehensive research projects that assess public relations from various
dimensions: public relations as a dependent variable affected by the five variables dis-
cussed in Part I, public relations as an independent variable that has an impact on
those five variables signifying the society-at-large and public relations itself as
a culture reflecting how public relations practice is distinct from allied disciplines
such as journalism, advertising, marketing, human resource management, etc.
 Contributor Biographies

Editors

Krishnamurthy Sriramesh is Professor of Public Relations and Director of the Master of

Corporate Communication program at the University of Colorado, Boulder. His exten-
sive teaching experience includes teaching public relations at ten universities in Asia, Aus-
tralasia, Europe, and North America. His teaching has been recognized with several
awards including Teacher of the Year at the University of Florida and Charles
W. Redding Teaching Award at Purdue University. His research program covers topics
such as strategic public relations, global public relations, corporate social responsibility,
and public relations for development. He has received a number of research awards
including the prestigious Pathfinder Award from the Institute of Public Relations in 2004
“for original scholarly research contributing to the public relations body of knowledge.”
He has also received the 2003 PRIDE award from the National Communication Associ-
ation (NCA) and the Golden Gator Award (for research) at the University of Florida.
He was appointed University Faculty Scholar at Purdue University (2012–2017) as well
as Faculty Fellow at Purdue Institute for Civic Communication (PICC) and was a Page
Legacy Scholar of the Arthur W. Page Society in 2016. He has consulted with non-profits
such as International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA) based in Nigeria and the
Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP). He was a member of the Independent Advisory
Committee for Humidtropics – a three-continent agriculture research project for four
years. He has co-edited several books and published over 90 research articles and book
chapters in addition to presenting over 100 conference papers, seminars, and presenta-
tions in over 30 countries. He had served as the Assistant Editor of Public Relations
Review (for over 10 years) and Associate Editor of the Journal of Communication Man-
agement (for over 14 years). He is a member of the editorial board of several journals
including Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, Management Communication
Quarterly, Public Relations Review, Journal of Communication Management, and Public
Relations Journal. He was on the Editorial Board of the Digital Review of Asia-Pacific

xxi
xxii CONTRIBUTOR BIOGRAPHIES

(DirAP), Journal of Communication, Journal of Public Relations Research, and

the second edition of the Encyclopedia of Public Relations.
Dejan Verčič is Professor, Head of Department of Communication and Head of the
Centre for Marketing and Public Relations at the University of Ljubljana, and Part-
ner and Knowledge Director in the strategic communication company Stratkom
d.o.o., Slovenia. He received his PhD from the London School of Economics and Polit-
ical Science, UK, and he was Fulbright Scholar at San Diego State University, USA,
Visiting Professor at the University of Lugano (Switzerland) and Visiting Scholar at
Ca’ Foscari University of Venice (Italy). He has published 15 books and his most
recent are The Global Public Relations Handbook (2003, 2009 and 2019), The Future
Directions of Strategic Communication (2019), Experiencing Public Relations (2018),
Communication Excellence (2017), and Culture and Public Relations (2012). His art-
icles have been published in American Behavioural Scientist, Corporate Communication,
European Journal of Public Health, International Journal of Strategic Communication,
Journal of Communication Management, Journal of Marketing Communications, Journal
of Public Relations Research, and Public Relations Review among others. Prof. Verčič is
former President of the European Public Relations Education and Research Associ-
ation (EUPRERA) and a recipient of the Pathfinder Award, the highest academic
honor bestowed by the Institute for Public Relations (IPR) in New York. In 1991
he was the founding director of the Slovenian national news agency (STA). Since
1994 he has organized an annual International Public Relations Research Symposium –
BledCom. His research focuses on digitalization, globalization, and strategic communica-
tion. Dr. Verčič is a regular speaker at universities, academic, and professional meetings
around the world. So far, he has lectured in 37 countries.

Contributors

Kara Alaimo (PhD) is Assistant Professor of Public Relations at Hofstra University,

USA, and author of Pitch, Tweet, or Engage on the Street: How to Practice Global
Public Relations and Strategic Communication (Routledge, 2017), which explains how
to adapt public relations strategies for different countries and cultures. Her research
interests include international and political public relations. She previously served as
a communicator in the administration of US president Barack Obama and the
United Nations. She contributes to CNN Opinion and Bloomberg Opinion and has
published in journals including the International Journal of Communication, Journal
of Communication Management, Journal of Public Affairs, Social Media & Society,
and Case Studies in Strategic Communication.
Jonathan Albright (PhD) is a Research Scholar at Columbia University’s School of
Journalism and Director of the Digital Forensics Initiative at the Tow Center for
Digital Journalism, USA. He was previously an Assistant Professor of media analytics
at Elon University, and a 2017–2018 Faculty Associate at Harvard’s Berkman Klein
Center for Internet and Society. His research focuses on socially mediated news
events, misinformation and propaganda, and platform data accountability. Investigating
media ecosystems through mixed-methods computational social science and visual data
analytics, his work explores the critical interface between emergent social structures and
networked media technologies.
CONTRIBUTOR BIOGRAPHIES xxiii

María-José Canel (PhD) is a full Professor in Political Communication and Public

Sector Communication, at the University Complutense Madrid, Spain. Winner of the
Victory Award in 2016 (Washington DC), she is a leading scholar on public sector
communication (journals: Political Communication, European Journal of Communication,
International Journal Press/Politics, Public Relations Review), and has published in differ-
ent countries (Spain, USA, UK, Italy, Poland, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Argentina).
She has a public sector practitioner background and experience in training public
sector communicators. She has published nine books, and titles include Public Sector
Communication, Government Communication, Political Scandals in Britain and in Spain.
An-Sofie Claeys (PhD) is Associate Professor in Communication Sciences at the
University of Leuven, Belgium. She received the 2015 Young Scholar Award from
the Netherlands-Flanders Communication Association. Her research on crisis communi-
cation has appeared in journals such as Journal of Communication, Communication
Theory, Communication Research, Public Relations Review, and Journal of Public Rela-
tions Research.
W. Timothy Coombs (PhD) holds the Abell Endowed Professorship in Liberal Arts in
the Department of Communication at Texas A&M University, USA. His primary area
of research is crisis communication and he is the creator of Situational Crisis Communi-
cation Theory. He is the current editor for Corporation Communication: An International
Journal. His research has appeared in Management Communication Quarterly, Public
Relations Review, Corporate Reputation Review, Journal of Public Relations Research,
Journal of Communication Management, Business Horizons, and the Journal of Business
Communication. Dr Coombs has lectured and consulted on crisis communication in
China, South Korea, Estonia, Sweden, Denmark, Indonesia, Belgium, and the UK.
Dr Coombs has worked with a variety of consultancies, corporations, and governments.
He is currently on the FDA’s Risk Communication Advisory Committee.
Ganga S. Dhanesh (PhD) is Assistant Dean of Research and Graduate Studies, at the
College of Communication and Media Sciences, Zayed University, United Arab Emirates.
She has had experience in corporate and non-profit organizations prior to joining aca-
demia. She has published in the areas of corporate social responsibility, internal relations,
crisis communication, social media, and strategic communication in books and journals
such as Journal of Public Relations Research, Public Relations Review, Public Relations
Inquiry, Management Communication Quarterly, Journal of International Management,
and Journal of Communication Management. She currently serves as Associate Editor for
Journal of Communication Management and is on the editorial board of Public Relations
Journal. Her work on CSR in India won the Bob Heath Top Paper Award at the annual
conference of the ICA, 2012 and her paper on CSR in the Journal of Communication
Management won the Outstanding Paper Award 2013.
Mai Anh Doan (PhD) is an Assistant Professor at the University of the Fraser Valley
in British Columbia, Canada. Her research interests include public relations, financial
communication, the democratization of finance, equality, as well as intercultural stud-
ies and international education. Mai Anh started her career as a journalist and
worked as Public Relations Manager for multi-nationals. After gathering practitioner
experience, she moved to university teaching for RMIT in Vietnam and leading cor-
porate training with an emphasis on communication and public relations. She got her
Masters of Arts in Communication Management from the University of Technology,
Sydney and her PhD from the University of Waikato, New Zealand, where she also
xxiv CONTRIBUTOR BIOGRAPHIES

taught. Mai Anh has published book chapters and encyclopedia entries, as well as
articles in Public Relations Review and other communication journals.
Sandra Duhé (PhD, MBA) is Associate Professor, Director of Public Relations and Stra-
tegic Communication, and Chair of the Division of Corporate Communication and
Public Affairs at Southern Methodist University in Dallas, Texas, USA. She brings to the
academy extensive experience as a public affairs manager for three international energy
companies in financial communication, media relations, crisis and risk communication,
brand management, and community outreach. Her research and commentary focus on
how political, social, and economic factors influence the relationship-building process
between organizations and their publics and have been published in leading journals,
texts, and online venues. She is the editor of three editions of New Media and Public Rela-
tions (Peter Lang), the author of a forthcoming business text for communicators (Routle-
dge), Educator Vice Chair for the Commission on Public Relations Education, and
a member of the PRSA College of Fellows and the Arthur W. Page Society.
Jesper Falkheimer (PhD) is Professor in the Department of Strategic Communication,
Lund University, Sweden. His research interests are strategic communication in gen-
eral, and more specific, crisis communication, terrorism, communication management
and place branding. For several years he has combined research with university man-
agement positions and is currently Executive Director for the Division for Research,
Collaboration, and Innovation at Lund University, after six years as Rector for
Campus Helsingborg. He is Editor-in-Chief for Journal of Communication Manage-
ment and Honorary Professor at Hong Kong Polytechnic University. He is also an
executive board member of several boards, including one of the major communication
agencies in Sweden. He is co-editor (main editors Robert Heath and Winni Johans-
sen) for the International Encyclopedia of Strategic Communication (2018, Wiley) and
published the text-book Strategic Communication: An Introduction with Mats Heide
in 2018 (Routedge).
Jolene Fisher (PhD) is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Advertising,
Public Relations and Media Design at the University of Colorado Boulder, USA.
Through rigorous qualitative methods and development of critical theory, Fisher’s
research explores the intersections of new media, gender, and strategic communication
for development and social change. Her current work investigates the production and
use of digital games as social change tools; the use of organizational transparency for
relationship building; and the use of strategic communication pedagogy to build com-
munities of action on university campuses. Fisher received her doctorate from the
University of Oregon.
Craig S. Fleisher (PhD) is the Chief Learning Officer at Aurora WDC, a professional
services firm in Madison, Wisconsin. An IABC life member and former President of
international and national professional associations, he has held academic positions
as Dean, MBA Director, Endowed University Research Chair and/or Full Professor
at the Universities of Windsor, Calgary, Coastal Georgia, Sydney, Tampere, Wilfrid
Laurier, and New Brunswick. Author/editor of 14 books including the Handbook of
Public Affairs (2005), Assessing, Managing and Maximizing Public Affairs Perform-
ance (1997), SAGE Handbook of International Corporate and Public Affairs (2017)
and 160+ scholarly articles, he is Associate Editor of the Journal of Public Affairs
(Wiley) and served/-es on the Editorial Boards of the Asia Pacific Public Relations
Journal, Business & Society, Interest Groups & Advocacy, and South African Journal
CONTRIBUTOR BIOGRAPHIES xxv

of Information Management, among others. His doctorate is from the University of

Pittsburgh.
Roger Hayes (DBA, ME/IPRA, FCIPR) is a leading international public relations pro-
fessional with 40 years of experience in trade associations, corporations, consultancies,
and governments. He is considered one of the forerunners of the international corporate
affairs role, including at Ford and Thorn-EMI. He worked for Burson- Marsteller during
the early days of international expansion of the field. He began his career as a Reuters
Correspondent in Paris. Having served in various roles at APCOWORLDWIDE in
London, Johannesburg, and Delhi for 13 years, Roger is now based part-time in London,
also teaching public and corporate diplomacy for one semester as Associate Professor at
LKY School of Public Policy, NUS, Singapore. He is also an adviser to the MARPE
group of European Universities developing public, corporate, and civic diplomacy
courses under an ERASMUS programme. He has published Reframing the Leadership
Landscape: Creating a Culture of Collaboration (with Dr. Reginald Watts) by Routledge
in 2015.
Robert L. Heath (PhD) is Professor Emeritus at the University of Houston, USA. He
is the author or editor of 23 books, including handbooks and master collections, and
266 articles in major journals, chapters in leading edited books, and encyclopedia
entries. In addition to strategic issues management, he has written on rhetorical
theory, social movements, communication theory, public relations, organizational
communication, crisis communication, risk communication, terrorism, corporate
social responsibility, investor relations, engagement, public interest, and reputation
management. His most recent books are the International Encyclopedia of Strategic
Communication and the Handbook of Organizational Rhetoric and Communication.
Flora Hung-Baesecke (PhD) teaches at Massey University (Albany) in New Zealand.
She is the Vice Chair and will be the Chair (2019–2021) of the Public Relations Division
in International Communication Association. Flora is on the editorial boards of Journal
of Public Relations Research, Public Relations Review (from May, 2019), International
Journal of Strategic Communication, Communication Research Reports, and Public Rela-
tions Journal. She has won several awards at international conferences. Her research
interests include organization-public relationships, CSR, social media, strategic manage-
ment, and crisis management. Flora is the 2015–2017 Arthur W. Page Legacy Scholar
awarded by the Arthur W. Page Center at Penn State University. She is a member of the
Arthur W. Page Society, the Secretary General for Overseas Affairs in Public Relations
Society of China, a member of the Academic Committee in China International Public
Relations Association, and is on the advisory board of International Public Relations
Research Conference.
Takashi Inoue (PhD) is the Chief Executive Officer of Inoue Public Relations,
founded 1970 in Tokyo, and Visiting Professor at Kyoto University’s Graduate School
of Management, and the Communications University of China. One of the first public
relations professionals in Japan to focus on high-technology, he helped Intel and Apple
in the PC Market, and then others in the telecommunications, financial, automotive,
pharmaceutical, and aerospace sectors. In the 1980s he was active in United States-
Japan trade-related issues, notably helping avert possible crisis situations in the telecom-
munications, semiconductor, and automotive industries. In 1997 his company became
the first Asian firm to win the International Public Relations Association’s top award,
the Golden World Award for Excellence in Public Relations, and in 2015 they won the
xxvi CONTRIBUTOR BIOGRAPHIES

Golden World Award for their work helping the company Concur change Japanese
regulations for an innovative new product. He is the author of Public Relations in
Hyper-globalization: Essential Relationship Management – A Japan Perspective.
Ryszard Ławniczak (PhD) is full Professor at Warsaw University of Technology, and
until the end of 2012 the Head of the Department of Economic Journalism and
Public Relations. University of Economics, Poznan, Poland. He was Visiting Professor
at the University of Melbourne (1991) and California State University, Fresno (1984,
1991). He also served as the economic advisor to the president of the Republic of
Poland (1997–2005), and as a consultant to the Polish premier (1994–1997). In 2003
he was awarded the Royal Norwegian Order of Merit by H.M. King Harald V of
Norway. He coined the concept of transitional public relations and promotes the
econo-centric approach in public relations. He published the first two Polish public
relations books in English. In 2007 Ławniczak was mentioned among the 50 leading
academic experts in the field of communication in Europe. He has lectured or pre-
sented papers in research centers and policy institutes of over 20 different countries.
Fraser Likely (MA) is an APR, Fellow and Life Member of the Canadian Public
Relations Society (CPRS), as well as a Fellow of the Association of Measurement
and Evaluation of Communication (AMEC) and Emeritus Member of the Institute
for Public Relations Measurement and Evaluation Commission (IPR M&E). Fraser is
an Adjunct Professor in the University of Ottawa’s Communication Faculty. His
research publications include topics related to measurement and evaluation frame-
works and maturity models as well as the history and state of public relations in
Canada. He received the Public Relations Society of America’s Jackson, Jackson and
Wagner Behavioral Science Prize in 2018 for his research. He is President of Fraser
Likely PR/Communication Performance, providing coaching and counsel to Chief
Communication Officers (CCOs) on their department’s performance, value, and stra-
tegic contribution to their organization’s strategic management processes.
Vilma Luoma-aho (PhD) is full Professor of Corporate Communication, and Vice
Dean of Research at University of Jyväskylä, School of Business and Economics,
Finland. She currently leads major research projects related to young people and
social media as well as strategic communication in the public sector. She has pub-
lished widely in interdisciplinary journals ranging from Business History to Computers
in Human Behaviour, and her latest co-authored book, Public Sector Communication –
Closing Gaps between Citizens and Public Organizations (2019) deals with measuring
intangible assets in the public sector, and she is currently in the process of editing the
Handbook of Public Sector Communication (2020). She has a public sector practitioner
background, and has helped develop public sector communication in Finland, Spain,
and the European Commission.
Barbora Maronkova is Director of the NATO Information and Documentation Centre,
Kyiv, Ukraine. She joined NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division in Brussels, Belgium in
2006 as program coordinator to oversee projects aimed at raising awareness and pro-
mote NATO in a number of NATO member states. In September 2010, she became the
program manager responsible for designing, planning, and implementing public diplo-
macy campaigns in the Western Balkans. In 2016, she joined the NATO Press and
Media Section as a planning coordinator and Acting Head of the section. On March 1,
2017, she took over as the head of the NATO Information and Documentation Centre
in Kyiv, Ukraine. In 2003, she established and headed a Slovak based NGO Centre for
CONTRIBUTOR BIOGRAPHIES xxvii

European and North Atlantic Affairs to contribute to public and academic debate
on Slovakia’s membership of the EU and NATO. A graduate of the University of
Economics of Bratislava, Slovak Republic, Barbora is an alumna of the CPD
Summer Institute and holds a Public Affairs diploma from the Chartered Institute
for Public Relations in the UK. She was a non-resident Research Fellow with the
USC Center on Public Diplomacy from 2015 to 2017.
James A. McCann (PhD) is a Professor of Political Science at Purdue University in
West Lafayette, Indiana, USA. He conducts research on public opinion, electoral pro-
cesses, participation, and representation in the United States and cross-nationally. His
work has appeared in many scholarly journals, including the American Political Sci-
ence Review, the Journal of Politics, and the British Journal of Political Science. His
research has been supported by the National Science Foundation, the Russell Sage
Foundation, and the Carnegie Corporation of New York.
David McKie (PhD) teaches Strategic Communication and Leadership and has
authored/co-authored six books, over 40 book chapters, 60 refereed journal articles,
and countless conference papers on: Action learning and research; change and lead-
ership; complexity theory, creativity and innovation, emotional intelligence, futures;
interdisciplinarity, strategic communication, and threshold concepts. For Corporate
and Executive Education at Waikato Management School, he teaches the MBA
Leadership paper and provides corporate training. He is passionate about delivering edu-
cation with outcomes and has supervised over 15 PhDs to successful completion and
been a PhD external supervisor for universities from Australasia to Europe and the UK.
He is also CEO of RAM (Results by Action Management) International Consulting and
has experience working as a change, leadership, and strategic communication consultant
in the private and public sectors internationally.
Judy Motion (PhD) is Professor of Communication in the Environmental Humanities
group at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia. Judy’s most recent
research focuses on public discourse, sense making, and change in relation to environ-
mental issues and controversies. Past research has included discourse and identity in
organizational change, power and resistance in the implementation of new technologies
and the influence of public relations on policy formation. Her latest book, Social Media
and Public Relations: Fake Friends and Powerful Public, co-authored with Robert
L. Heath and Shirley Leitch, was awarded the Outstanding Book Award in 2016 by the
National Communication Association, USA. Judy’s research has been published in
a wide range of journals including Public Relations Review, Public Understanding of Sci-
ence, Political Communication, Discourse Studies, Organization Studies, Media, Culture
and Society, Higher Education Research and Development, Management Communication
Quarterly, Journal of Business Research, and the European Journal of Marketing.
Ronel Rensburg (PhD) was Professor at the University of Pretoria, South Africa, with
a demonstrated history of working in the higher education industry. She was skilled
in Corporate Communication and Reputation Management, Intercultural Communi-
cation, Public Speaking, Research Design, Lecturing, and Higher Education Leader-
ship. This strong education professional graduated from University of South Africa
(Unisa). She was a fellow of PRISA and one of the highest NRF-rated researchers in
Communication Management/Public Relations in South Africa. Her latest research
focused on communication and reputation management during disruption, corrup-
tion, and state capture.
xxviii CONTRIBUTOR BIOGRAPHIES

Sergei A. Samoilenko is an instructor in the Department of Communication at

George Mason University. Sergei’s research focuses on issues in crisis communication,
reputation management, and post-Soviet studies. Samoilenko is a founding member
of CARP, the Research Lab for Character Assassination and Reputation Politics. He
is the co-editor of Routledge Handbook of Character Assassination and Reputation
Management and Deception, Fake News, and Misinformation Online.
Karen Sanders (PhD) is full Professor of Politics and Communication and Dean of
Research for St Mary’s University, UK. She is co-editor of the Routledge Companion
to Journalism Ethics (forthcoming 2020) and member of an international group of
scholars researching populist communication. Karen has a special interest in under-
standing and fostering respectful, effective communication in high-risk organizations
and has run training courses on these subjects for hospitals, charities, banks, and uni-
versities. She has published widely in interdisciplinary journals including the European
Journal of Communication, the Public Relations Review, and the International Journal
of Press and Politics. She has authored key texts such as Ethics and Journalism (Sage)
and Communicating Politics in the 21st Century (Palgrave Macmilllan).
Greg Simons (PhD) is currently a Researcher at the Institute for Russian and Eurasian
Studies (IRES) at Uppsala University, Leading Researcher in Media and Communica-
tion at the Business Technology Institute at Turiba University and a Lecturer at the
Department of Communication Science at Turiba University in Riga, Latvia. He is on
the Senior Editorial Board of the Journal for Political Marketing. His research interests
include: changing political dynamics and relationships, mass media, public diplomacy,
political marketing, crisis management communications, media and armed conflict, and
the Russian Orthodox Church. He also researches the relationships and connections
between information, politics, and armed conflict more broadly, such as the GWOT
and Arab Spring. Simons is the author/editor of numerous refereed articles, chapters,
and books.
Thomas Stoeckle is a doctoral candidate at Bournemouth University’s Faculty of Media
and Communication. Originally from Germany, he has lived and worked in the UK since
2000, pursuing a career in media intelligence, most recently at Lexis Nexis. His doc-
toral research seeks to compare the British and German media systems and public
spheres with regard to European themes over the last 30 years. As a lecturer, he
teaches PR & ethics, communication measurement and planning, communication
psychology, and the history of PR and communication at various universities. He
is the founder and co-host of a podcast on data, marketing and communication,
TheSmallDataForum (www.smalldataforum.com).
Ana Tkalac Verčič (PhD) is a full Professor of Marketing Communications and
Public Relations at the Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Zagreb,
Croatia. She is a former Fulbright scholar and a recipient of the Chartered Insti-
tute of Public Relations diploma. Ana Tkalac Verčič has authored, co-authored
and edited numerous books including Public Relations Metrics: Research and
Evaluation (with B. van Ruler and D. Verčič) and is the author of the first Croatian
public relations textbook. She has published more than a 100 papers in various
academic journals and serves in various editorial boards such as International Jour-
nal of Strategic Communication, Journal of Public Relations Research and Public
Relations Review. Throughout her career, Professor Tkalac Verčič has received
numerous awards, most recently, GrandPRx, the award for the development of
CONTRIBUTOR BIOGRAPHIES xxix

public relations as a profession. She is currently the president of the Croatian

Public Relations Association.
Margalit Toledano (PhD, APR, Fellow PRSA, PRINZ) lectures in Management
Communication and Public Relations at the University of Waikato, New Zealand.
Inducted into the College of Fellows of the Public Relations Society of America
(PRSA) in 2007 and into the Public Relations Institute of New Zealand (PRINZ) in
2012, she practiced PR for over 20 years and served as President of the Israeli Public
Relations Association 1993–1996. Her academic work has appeared in leading PR
journals, and Routledge published both her co-authored book, Public Relations and
Nation Building: Influencing Israel (2013) and her co-edited book, International Public
Relations: Perspectives from Deeply Divided Societies (2017) that won the 2017
National Communication Association’s PRIDE Book Award. Dr. Toledano’s research
focuses on issues of professional ethics, dialogue and dialogue facilitation, public rela-
tions history, the impact of social media on professional communicators, social mar-
keting as well as topics related to legal communication.
Chiara Valentini (PhD) is Professor of Corporate Communication at Jyväskylä Univer-
sity School of Business and Economics (JSBE), Finland. Prior to join JSBE she worked
as Associate Professor of Corporate Communication at Aarhus University, Denmark,
for almost ten years, and has consulted organizations and public institutions of several
countries, including the Italian Representation of the European Commission in Rome,
Italy, and the European Movement International Secretariat in Brussels, Belgium. Her
research interest focuses on strategic public relations, public and government communica-
tion, and crisis communication in the digital environment. Her work has appeared in sev-
eral international peer-reviewed journals, such as Public Relations Review, Corporate
Communication: An International Journal, International Journal of Strategic Communica-
tion, International Journal of Press/Politics to name a few. She is the editor of the Hand-
book of Public Relations (de Gruyter Mouton, forthcoming) and currently working on
a project on new technologies and strategic communication.
Donald K. Wright (PhD) is the Harold Burson Professor and Chair in Public Relations
at Boston University’s College of Communication. He is one of the world’s most pub-
lished public relations scholars and is an internationally known professor, author,
speaker, researcher, strategist, and advisor. Professor Wright has worked full-time in cor-
porate, agency, and university public relations. He has served 28 years on the Board of
Trustees of the Institute for Public Relations, spent 24 years as a Trustee of the Arthur
W. Page Society, and is a past president of the International Public Relations Association.
His awards include the Distinguished Service Award from the Page Society and the Path-
finder Award for research excellence from IPR. His PhD degree is from the University of
Minnesota. Professor Wright is a Research Fellow of IPR, an accredited member of
PRSA, a PRSA Fellow, an IPRA Fellow, and an IPRA Member Emeritus.
Jordi Xifra (PhD) is Professor at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF), Barcelona, in
which he teaches History of Propaganda and Public Relations, and Public Diplomacy
and Strategic Communication. He is the director of MSc Strategic Communication and
Public Relations (joint degree UPF-University of Stirling). His research focuses on the
intellectual history of public relations history and the intersection between public rela-
tions and film studies. He has published more than 15 books on public relations and
public affairs in Spain and South America, some chapters in international books, and
his articles have been accepted for publication in Public Relations Review, Journal of
xxx CONTRIBUTOR BIOGRAPHIES

Public Relations Research, and American Behavioral Scientist, between others. He

founded Public Relations Inquiry and he is the current director of Centro Buñuel
Calanda, the public foundation that works to preserve and promote the figure and
work of Spanish filmmaker Luis Buñuel.
Laura D. Young (PhD) is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Georgia Gwinnett
College, Georgia, USA. She specializes in security studies with an emphasis on the
impact crises, especially those related to the environment, have on domestic and inter-
national society. She has published on a variety of topics, including a forthcoming book
on the role the environment played in the formation of states in the pre-modern era.
 PART

I
Conceptual Foundations of Global
Public Relations
 CHAPTER

1
Comparative Political Systems and Public
Relations
An Overview

By Laura D. Young
James A. McCann

INTRODUCTION

The government’s ability to communicate with the public and also control the infor-
mation the public receives is necessary to influence public opinion and, thus, the
policy agenda. Regardless of whether a country is democratic or authoritarian, lead-
ers in all regime types find ways to control the flow of information. The level of con-
trol, however, is dependent upon the structure of the government, and, specifically,
the amount of open versus closed access points that exist within a system. How firms
and organizations communicate is also dependent on the environment in which they
function. Globalization has made this task even more challenging as public relations
practitioners are no longer confined to communicating with domestic audiences only.
As discussed in Part I of this volume, because a nation’s political system, among
other variables, influences the practice of public relations, it is necessary to under-
stand these differences in order to adopt effective communication strategies, whether
in the private, corporate, nonprofit, or governmental sector.
Democracies and authoritarian regimes differ when it comes to the flow of informa-
tion. Democracies, while still maintaining some control over communications, are
much more open than authoritarian regimes. Different factors, though, determine at
what level democracies as well as authoritarian regimes will engage in open access to
information. New democracies, especially those whose histories are tied to regimes
whose transparency was noticeably low, will struggle to engage in open communica-
tion practices while mature democracies have the ability to control the flow of

3
4 LAURA D. YOUNG AND JAMES A. MCCANN

information to protect the government’s interests in much the same way as authoritar-
ian regimes. Cultural differences also matter, including, but not limited to, the level of
civil liberties, the amount of legal constraints, the collective identity of individuals,
and even the political landscape. These differences shape the way communication
flows within society, presenting different challenges for public relations practitioners.
This chapter attempts to draw comparisons between different regime types and
explains the challenges faced by public relations in each. This chapter is intended to serve
as a guide for a reader familiar with public relations literature but new to the field of
comparative political systems. The chapter, therefore, begins with a broad overview in the
differences between democracies and authoritarian regimes before turning a more specific
focus on variations among democracies. The final section of the chapter discusses some
of the advancements in the literature on comparative politics and public relations before
concluding with thoughts on how practitioners of public relations can utilize the lessons
of comparativists when it comes to conducting more effective communication in all
societies.

DEMOCRACIES VERSUS AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

Political regimes are defined as “the norms and rules regarding individual freedoms
and collective equality, the locus of power, and the use of that power” within society
(O’Neil, Fields, & Share, 2006, p. 5). Political regimes differ with regard to the level
of freedom, equality, and the distribution of power. Democracies have higher levels of
individual freedom with less centralized loci of power than autocracies. Autocracies,
on the other hand, care less about the overall public good compared to democracies,
placing more emphasis on maintaining control of power. These differences create very
different policy outcomes and, as a result, marked differences with regard to the over-
all way in which society, the economy, and the policymaking process function.
The flow of communication within democracies and autocracies also differs.
Regimes vary with regard to the open and closed access points available for private
citizens and public organizations to access information. These differences are not
coincidental, but are necessary for each type of government to maintain legitimacy
and control over society. Democracies enjoy freer access to information with much
less government control than authoritarian regimes. In fact, information transparency
is important for facilitating trust in democratic regimes (Linz and Stepan, 1997;
Rockman, 1997), while the control of information is vital to authoritarian govern-
ments (Taubman, 2007; see also Byman, 2010).
Democracies get their authority, and thus legitimacy, from the will of the people,
and are therefore more likely to adopt open systems. Open systems allow for more
participation by individuals in society and are, consequently, more likely to continu-
ally take in new information from those individuals. In short, open systems allow pol-
icymakers to hear and respond to signals from the public, “transform that
information, and give information back” to the public (Shockley-Zalabak, 1999,
p. 43). The more open the system the more likely the government will establish pol-
icies that protect the basic rights and freedoms of individuals to access information.
This approach allows leaders to anticipate and detect changes that may affect the gov-
ernment’s or an organization’s relationship with citizens. This, what can be seen as,
two-way symmetrical communication helps strengthen relationships between organiza-
tions and the public sector and leads to better policy and legislation (Eller, 2016).
1. COMPARATIVE POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND PR 5

Communication is, thus, important and plays a key role in open systems, though it
becomes less important in democracies that have less open access points available.
Democracies also rely on transparency for increasing legitimacy. Beaumont argues that
“achieving a democratic government and increasing citizen confidence in that government”
relies, in part, on the openness of the government (Beaumont, 1999, p. 49). Freedom of the
press, open court procedures and government hearings, and the participation of citizen
organizations and NGOs in the policymaking process are all elements found in democra-
cies which aid in the flow of information, making communication much easier. The more
restrictions placed on these elements, the more difficult to engage in public relations at all
levels.
Closed systems, on the other hand, lack input from citizens and other aspects of
society. This makes it more difficult for everyone to benefit from policies because the
flow of information is limited. Yet, these same restrictions can benefit some members
of society, particularly those vital to upholding the legitimacy of the ruling elite
(Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2005). Because it stymies access to information,
closed systems are less appealing in democracies (Walton, D’Andrea, Taylor, Carle-
ton, & Young, n.d.), but preferable in authoritarian regimes which rely little on citizen
input and are much more restrictive. These types of regimes benefit from a closed
system specifically because it makes it easier to reduce the flow of information, and,
thus, transparency in society. This control allows leaders to manipulate public opin-
ion, make communication among all sectors of society more difficult, and, thus,
retain their hold on power (Kalathil and Taylor, 2001).
China’s control of the media and other types of communications that flow through
its borders is so extensive it has been called “unprecedented in recorded world his-
tory.” The benefit of this kind of control allows the Chinese government to suppress
any kind of collective action, thereby protecting the government from any kind of
potential domestic threat to their power (King, Pan, & Roberts, 2013, p. 326). China
can also suppress any kind of opposition against the government or even control
information that may impact aspects of the economy (Bueno de Mesquita & Downs,
2005; Zhao, 2008). North Korea also practices almost total suppression of its media,
earning it a score of 96 out of 100 on Freedom House’s annual Report on Press Free-
dom. News outlets are all state-owned and the government has unlimited ability to
censor the flow of all communications, including access to foreign news and even the
internet, within its borders. Like China, North Korea’s strict control over the flow of
information reduces the influence external actors can have on its citizens, the govern-
ment, organizations, and policies, thereby helping the leader retain his power with
little worry of opposition voices rising up against him (Freedom House, DC, 2016).1
Legal constraints impose limitations on the ability of agencies to communicate fully
and openly in all types of governments, including democracies. Obviously, legal con-
straints are greater in autocracies ranging from restrictions on the press to complete
government control over all information within its borders. Ethical and legal con-
straints range within democracies, too, though. These differences can vary in copy-
right laws, professional codes of conduct, and freedom of information with regard to
the press. For example, in the United States 18 USC § 1913 prohibits lobbying by
government officials and spending public funds on advertising. This law does not
interfere with normal communication activities, though some argue it creates tensions
between what is considered public communication vis-à-vis advertising (Liu & Horsley,
2007, p. 379). Regardless, being able to maneuver the different legal hurdles in each
country is essential for successful public relations.
6 LAURA D. YOUNG AND JAMES A. MCCANN

Understanding how and why information is controlled in different regime types is

necessary to create effective strategies for engaging in public relations and other
forms of communication at all levels of society. The conditions in democracies and
autocracies outlined above pose different challenges for public relations depending on
regime type. Regardless of whether it is a private corporation or an NGO, organiza-
tions have greater access to information and more control over the content of that
information in democracies compared to autocracies. Engaging with the public or
other organizations in autocracies can be met with roadblocks as these regimes
attempt to control the flow of information to the benefit of their own personal
agenda. Public relations therefore must find ways to overcome these hurdles in order
to achieve success in more restrictive countries.

COMPARING VARIATIONS AMONG DEMOCRACIES

While obvious differences exist between democracies and autocracies, differences

regarding the flow of information are also apparent when comparing democratic
regimes. Specifically, the political landscape in democracies is different, with culture
and historical events shaping the attitude of governments and citizens. Longevity also
matters, with new democracies experiencing issues regarding trust and legitimacy
when it comes to information transparency. These differences present unique land-
scapes within which public relations must learn to operate.
First, democracies differ regarding how centralized or decentralized the decision-
making power is in the country. Decentralized governments distribute power among
several units, giving significant authority to local and state governments to establish
their own laws. Centralized governments, on the other hand, concentrate power and
decision-making in a single unit, with little to no control or input from local govern-
ments. Decentralized governments, thus, have more open access points which allows
for the freer flow of information between the public and political elites as well as
within the government itself. This allows organizations, the public, and the govern-
ment to gain access to and control the flow of information at various levels. Central-
ized governments, conversely, have fewer open access points with more restrictions.
The flow of information from citizens and organizations to the government’s deci-
sion-making body depends on the government’s level of centralization. Since local
authorities have the capacity to enact policy change in decentralized systems, the dis-
tribution of information takes place at various lower levels of government. This lower
level of focus allows citizens and organizations to target a variety of leaders, while
gaining access to leaders they otherwise would not have access to in more centralized
systems. In centralized systems, though, decision-making power rests overwhelmingly
with the central government, taking control away from local authorities. Information
must be distributed with a national focus to gain attention from those officials that
matter. Centralized systems, thus, increase the burden on communication because the
level at which it must reach increases, but also because the tactics that must be used
at this higher level must differ from those found in decentralized systems.
Thus, if an organization wants to influence the policy outcome of renewable energy
in the United States, for example, there are various avenues it can take. While lobby-
ing members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in D.C. is important,
because power is decentralized and states have control over their own policy agendas,
much more progress has been made at the state level than the federal level with
regard to influencing energy policies (Rabe, 2004). This success is due to the open
1. COMPARATIVE POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND PR 7

access points that exist within decentralized systems which give individuals and organ-
izations the ability to communicate with leaders directly, albeit at a much lower level
of authority. Because these leaders still have power to change policy within their state
or locality, however, the impact is not inconsequential. In fact, when it comes to pro-
gress in energy policy, states took an early lead, surpassing the efforts of the federal
government. This success is thanks in large part to the decentralized nature of the
political system in the United States which vests states with significant power over
policy decisions in this area (Rabe, 2004).
Conversely, the more centralized a government is, the fewer there are open access
points. This means individuals also have fewer avenues to access the policymaking
process. Moreover, because decisions are made at the top, and not at the local level,
policy change is more difficult, making the burden of communicating interests much
more difficult as well. “Power distance” (Hofstede, 1980) as a variable has been stud-
ied by several public relations scholars (see eg. Sriramesh, 1992, 1996) to discuss this
difference in the distribution of power within a country.
The anti-nuclear movement which took place in the United States and France in
the 1970s provides another example. France is a centralized government leaving all
decisions with regard to the progress of nuclear energy in the country limited to a few
decision makers. The ability to communicate with those leaders by private citizens is
limited as a result. Protests were the main tool citizens had to communicate their
interests to the government because of the nature of the political landscape. The US,
by contrast, has one of the most decentralized governments in the world. When the
anti-nuclear movement started in the US, protests were part of the arsenal used to
sway public opinion and the policy agenda. Ralph Nader, however, also started an
aggressive lobbying campaign which targeted public opinion as well as elected officials
at all levels of the government. These tactics were much more effective than the pro-
test-driven tactics employed in France, and, as a result, the US halted construction
on new nuclear power plants. France, on the other hand, aggressively pursued nuclear
energy making it one of the world’s leading nuclear energy producers (Tourraine,
Hegedus, Dubet, & Wieviorka, 1983). The ability of activists in the US to communi-
cate with the general public and officials at various levels within the government pro-
duced much more effective results than those activists attempting to sway
policymakers in a system like France’s where open access points are much more
limited, making communication between the public and the government much more
difficult.
As the above examples show, understanding how power is distributed in a society is
key for understanding to whom and how communication must be targeted (see also
Hofstede, 1980, 1991). But, power distance is not the only difference among democra-
cies. There also exists a difference in the level of information transparency between
new and more mature democracies. One of the reasons for the lag in transparency in
new democracies, especially in places like Eastern Europe, could actually be a result
of the lack of transparency in the existing culture of post-communist (authoritarian)
societies which Western models of democracy cannot overcome (Linden & Cernock,
2002). Countries affected by authoritarian pasts require strategies that overcome these
cultural biases. These strategies must focus on increasing communication in society
with specific emphasis placed on generating more public input in the process. As the
perception of transparency increases, so, too, does the trust in governments and
organizations in society (Oswald, 2010).
8 LAURA D. YOUNG AND JAMES A. MCCANN

A second reason for the difference in new and mature democracies is due to the
capacity of the state. The legal and political structure necessary for promoting com-
munication among organizations is weak in new democracies compared to mature
ones. The rule of law and protection of civil liberties, like freedom of the press, for
example, can be significantly weaker in emerging verses well-established democracies
(Sriramesh & Verčič, 2009). The lack of institutions to support the flow of informa-
tion can seriously impact a new democracy’s legitimacy. It is recognized that extend-
ing basic freedoms, particularly the role of information, is actually beneficial for
increasing the legitimacy of these burgeoning states (Diamond & Morlino, 2004). In
addition, without these institutions it can be difficult for communication within soci-
ety to take place.

While in established democracies citizens acquire their political knowledge over a long
period of time, usually without making a particular effort to learn about political issues,
citizens in new democracies have to cope with a large range of hitherto unknown institu-
tions and procedures. (Voltmer, 2006)

It is necessary, therefore, for public relations to consider the unique challenges faced
by new democracies, and help the public navigate the changing landscape in order to
strengthen the flow of communication in society.
The political landscape found within a democracy also matters. Political differen-
tiation in the media is very evident in Europe, for example, when compared to the
US. This difference is attributed to the partisan nature of politics found in the US
compared to other European countries, like Italy or Germany. Moreover, Euro-
peans see “the media as a social institution for which the state [has] a positive
responsibility” with emphasis on government subsidies to promote pluralism. Euro-
peans also have heavy regulations regarding communications during elections, have
banned paid political advertising, and have granted “free air time to political par-
ties instead” (Hallin, 2005, p. 3; see also Cain, Egan, & Fabbrin, 2003). These dif-
ferences have a significant impact on the influence the media in particular can have
on the political landscape since the US has much less control over the media than
its European counterparts. In fact, the US interprets the First Amendment to
mean limited state involvement in the media. As a result, the US has few laws to
prosecute individuals who distribute false or misleading news stories. Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) guidelines prevent the “holders of broadcast
licenses from broadcasting false information concerning a crime or a catastrophe if
the licensee knows the information is false and … knows beforehand broadcasting
the information will case substantial ‘public harm’” (FCC, n.d.). 18 USC § 1038 –
False Information and Hoaxes applies when homicide or attempted homicide is
involved only. This leniency can create issues with regard to unchecked media bias
and the distribution of false information, creating a “primarily local, monopoly
press” which limits the flow of information due to the deep partisanship which it
creates (Hallin, 2005, p. 3). The introduction of the internet exacerbates this prob-
lem since the US has almost no restrictions on the flow of information in this
medium. The accusations fake news played a role in the 2016 election of Donald
Trump in the US is a good example (Parkinson, 2016).
In addition to the above factors, many other variables can impact public relations
such as social stratification and the nature of personal relationships described by the
1. COMPARATIVE POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND PR 9

personal influence model (Sriramesh, 1992). Economic development matters, too. For
example,

People in individualistic societies are generally expected to take care of themselves … but
little personal responsibility extends to the broader society, except that which is required
by law or by other provisions. In collectivist societies … individual comfort and achieve-
ment are subjugated to

the needs of the society as a whole. “Not surprisingly, economic development appears
to be a predictor of this metric. Those nations more economically developed tend to
be more individualistic and poorer nations tend to be more collectivist” (Freitag &
Stokes, 2009, p. 59). Understanding the difference in these viewpoints is essential for
understanding how to frame discussions and policies.
It is incumbent upon public relations practitioners to take note of these differences
in order to learn how to engage effectively. For example, “Because public relations
efforts often rely heavily on mass media, planning those efforts based on mispercep-
tions about how media function could do worse than simply render your plan inef-
fective – it could result in severe damage to reputation and credibility” (Freitag &
Stokes, 2009, p. 72). In short, understanding the environment in which one operates
is crucial for the success of public relations.

COMPARING OTHER POLITICAL SYSTEMS

Theocracies are a form of government where religion dominates society and political
system. Religious clerics lead the state and religion forms the foundation for political
institutions and laws. Most theocracies are oligarchic with the rule of many being
overseen by just a few people. Because of the reliance on strict adherence to holy
books, theocracies are authoritarian systems and therefore have little to no open
access points. In fact, communication is stifled through restrictions on freedom of
speech and the press. In addition, the rule of law is often non-existent as all authority
comes from divine beings. These conditions make public relations particularly difficult
as the means for distributing information is highly controlled.
Like theocracies, military dictatorships are authoritarian in nature, but differ from
civilian dictatorship regarding their motivations for seizing power and the way in
which they organize their rule. Though most military dictatorships are authoritarian,
they can vary significantly regarding their control over aspects of public relations. In
fact, some military dictatorships may even gradually return control to civilian organ-
izations while still retaining executive political power. Pakistan, for example, despite
being a military dictatorship has relaxed some control and allowed citizen participa-
tion in and control over some aspects of society. In addition, leaders are paying more
attention to public opinion and have “recognised the importance/need for moulding
the public opinion through public relations/publicity” (Naveed, 2013, p. 2).
Corporatism is a method through which society is organized into major interest groups
with policy negotiations taking place between these groups and the state. Both democratic
and authoritarian regimes have corporatist systems. Those which rely on heavier state con-
trol and place more restrictions on individuals wishing to take part in the system are less
democratic, and are thus less transparent and make communication among all groups in
society more difficult. In addition to the level of control and restrictions, corporatist sys-
tems can also vary with some relying more on collective collaboration while others focus
10 LAURA D. YOUNG AND JAMES A. MCCANN

on individualistic competition. The different levels of collaboration and competition “have

a significant effect on how governments and government agencies interact with their pub-
lics.” In corporatist systems where individualist competition prevails, like the US for
example, “[G]overnment agencies … do not need to practice strategic public relations
because they expect activist groups to come to them for services” (Somerville & Aroussi,
2016, p. 42). In addition, collaboration typically takes place among the most powerful
interest groups leaving many others, especially the public, out of the negotiation process.
Singapore, for example, has a more authoritarian form of corporatism, though less so than
the Philippines or Indonesia, wherein the government and interest groups are more inter-
twined with less public input. According to Stephen Milne, “The trade unions, in particu-
lar, are closely linked with the government … [and] the NTUC (National Trades Union
Congress) includes virtually all the unions.” Leaders of the NTUC “are in constant touch
and consultation with the” People’s Action Party and government leaders. In addition, its
top leaders often “serve as Members of Parliament and/or on various government boards.
The leaders are to some extent interchangeable” and power is much more centralized
(1983, p. 177). As a result, input from individuals is limited and communication is more
difficult.
On the other hand, in places like Canada and Norway where collective collabor-
ation is high, according to Somerville and Aroussi, “the agency must engage in envir-
onmental scanning and other forms of strategic public relations to identify groups
with whom it has a responsibility to interact.” Rather than the most powerful interest
groups dominating the negotiations, the interest of all “groups, the government and
society at large” are represented (2016, p. 43). These types of systems are also referred
to as “social corporatism” or “social democratic corporatism.” In Germany, for
example, the state is much more decentralized and, according to Fuchs and Koch,
focuses on maintaining “a balance in business-labor relations.” It takes on the role as
an “economic manager” guaranteeing “a framework for the nearly all-encompassing
reality of collective bargaining” and operates in a model of concerted action between
the national and local levels (1990, pp. 4–8). This model allows for much more input
from individuals at all levels of society, and not just from elites. As a result, informa-
tion is much more transparent and communication among all levels is more likely.
Monarchies, on the other hand, are countries ruled by a king or queen. The ruler typic-
ally inherits their crown because of birth. The power of a monarch can vary considerably,
with some holding only symbolic power to absolute monarchies where the ruler has
supreme control. Constitutional monarchies lie somewhere in between with the ruler main-
taining partial or restricted control over the government. The type of monarchy in place
will determine the environment in which public relations must operate. Absolute monarch-
ies can be as restrictive as authoritarian regimes, with little to no open access points and
heavy restrictions on free speech and the press. Even constitutional monarchs, however,
may be just as restrictive as absolute monarchs. Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Swazi-
land, for example, all have constitutional monarchs, but the monarch still exercises consid-
erable political control and has more power than any other entity in the country.
The variation in open and closed access points in the above examples highlights an
important problem: Public relations practitioners must pay attention to more than just
the type of political system that defines a country and look deeper to understand at what
level society can interact with the government and how much control the government
exerts over society. Even when political systems are the same, as with monarchies for
example, the environment in which public relations must operate can vary considerably,
thus changing the strategies one must adopt to be successful in different countries.
1. COMPARATIVE POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND PR 11

CONCLUSION

Public relations has a broad “scope that incorporates management responsibilities for
long-term planning, allocation of limited resources, and evaluation”. In addition, public
relations practitioners “function as advocates for the organizations they represent” (Freitag
& Stokes, 2009, p. 5). Comparative public relations should thus focus on developing new
practices “specifically for varied sociocultural settings around the world” (Culbertson,
1996, p. 2).
To carry out these duties successfully, it is necessary to understand how the flow of
communication takes place in different regime types, cultures, and when other factors
are present or absent. Furthermore, understanding government constraints on com-
munication can help create strategies for dealing with those controls. Some argue
these limitations “can be changed through negotiation, lobbying, and issue advertis-
ing.” This requires “public relations practitioners [to] use their contacts and skills to
deal with … and minimize the harmful effects of legal constraints” (Mortensen, 1996,
p. 312).
As described in detail in Part I of this volume, because cultures (broadly defined)
vary from country to country, it is important that practitioners of public relations
pay close attention to these differences considering that the political culture affects,
and is affected by, the other cultures described in the section. In fact, “the practi-
tioner’s credibility and cultural sensitivity frequently decide the success or failure” of
public relations. Understanding how the public views themselves can help organiza-
tions stay informed so they can act proactively to manage their reputation (Morten-
sen, 1996, p. 312). In short, “public relations practitioners today are increasingly
likely to find themselves in international and cross-cultural environments and must be
prepared to lead their organizations and clients through these challenges” (Freitag &
Stokes, 2009, p. 21). Thus, cultural metrics are particularly useful for public relations
practitioners. Understanding where a country sits on a communication spectrum, for
example, can help tease out the central tendencies that exist among different popula-
tions offering better insights on what strategies are required.
The field of comparative political communication offers promise for understanding
the differences that exist among countries, their structures, and the impact these dif-
ferences have on public relations. First introduced by Jay Blumler and Michael Gure-
vitch in 1975, the field attempts to bring together studies on communications and
comparative analysis to determine the way different government structures impact
communication in their societies. Before this approach was introduced, attempts to
understand the different modes of communication were limited to theories which were
extrapolated to different societies without taking into consideration the distinctions
that may exist. The field has advanced significantly since then, moving away from
individual country analysis to large-N comparative studies to make transnational
comparisons regarding the communication that takes place within societies. Compara-
tive political communication is, thus, beneficial because it enriches our knowledge
regarding effective communication strategies in societies where communication struc-
tures may fluctuate (Esser, 2013). Public relations practitioners should focus on this
approach in order to ensure success.
In sum, globalization has led to an increased need for public relations practitioners
to familiarize themselves with different political systems and the variations that exist
within them. Without understanding these distinctions, successful communication is
more difficult since strategies must be adopted not only for different regime types, but
12 LAURA D. YOUNG AND JAMES A. MCCANN

even among countries who share a similar political system. These differences shape
the way communication flows within society, presenting different challenges for public
relations practitioners making a comparative approach to public relations a necessary
tool for successful communication.

NOTE
1 Secrecy and non-disclosure are necessary for democracies, too; though, too many restrictions can hurt
the government’s legitimacy (Sunstein 1986).

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 CHAPTER

2
The Intersection of Political and
Economic Systems in Global Public
Relations Practice
Sandra Duhé
Jolene Fisher
Krishnamurthy Sriramesh

In an address delivered to the Foundation for Public Relations Research and Educa-
tion, then-president and CEO Carl Sloane (1987) of management consulting firm
Temple, Baker, and Sloane was prescient in his remarks regarding the interplay of
social, political, and economic forces in public relations practice. The two previous
volumes of this book, and this volume, have followed a similar conceptual approach
in keeping with the relevance of environmental variables to public relations practice.
The perspective we provide here is one in which public relations practitioners stand in
the midst of these intersecting and inescapable forces that impact both their decision-
making and programmatic outcomes. Those who function in what we term a higher
order of the practice focus on the essential but unpredictable milieu of two-way com-
munication, negotiation, and alliance-building (see also Grunig, 1992), frequently
involving terrains and cultures outside of their familiar homelands.
Global public relations practitioners represent voices of the majority, the minority,
the powerful, and the oppressed, although what Sriramesh and Verčič (2004) argued
more than 13 years ago still rings true today. Public relations resources are dispropor-
tionately dedicated to corporate self-interests, where they are most readily afforded and
implemented. Regardless of the type of organizational practice, whether corporate,
non-profit, or governmental; formally established or grassroots; functioning under
a roof or entirely online; and driven by profits, advocacy, or outrage, we maintain what
we had proposed in the previous edition of this volume. The intersection of political
and economic systems unavoidably affects and directs the public relations process in

14
2. INTERSECTION OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 15

unique and identifiable ways (Duhé & Sriramesh, 2009). We had introduced a political
economy framework for public relations as the study of:

the inherent tensions, unintended consequences, and inevitable influences economic

and political activities concurrently impart to society, as opposed to the study of eco-
nomics, political science, or sociology, which examines these respective dimensions uni-
laterally. (Duhé & Sriramesh, 2009, p. 24)

In that earlier work, we had compared classical, Marxian, neoclassical, and

Keynesian theories of political economy; differentiated market-oriented capitalism,
collective capitalism, and social market capitalism; and presented political economy
research recommendations – all within a first-time public relations framework to aid
interdisciplinary study of global practices across cultures (see also, Sriramesh &
Duhé, 2009). In this chapter, we add to Young and McCann’s observations on com-
parative political systems to expand our discussion of the influence of the intersection
of politics and economics on public relations with particular emphasis on their global
nature. In addition, we discuss level of development as a key ingredient of political
economy, which leads us to presenting development communication as a key area
where public relations practice has contributed in the past even if scholarship in the
field has not fully explained it.
As outlined in the introduction to this book, and affirmed in the previous two
editions of this book, public relations is inherently interdisciplinary. There is grow-
ing support in the literature for a broader view of public relations that incorporates
political, economic, and sociological perspectives along the lines of the call for
“the dire need for multiculturalism” outlined in Sriramesh (2002). A number of
scholars, particularly those outside the U.S., have taken issue with, and offered
alternatives to, the overwhelmingly corporate, or managerial, perspective of public
relations presented both in practice and scholarship (cf. Holtzhausen & Voto, 2002;
L’Etang, 2013; L’Etang, McKie, Snow, & Xifra, 2016; McKie, 2001; Moloney,
2002; Roper, 2005; Sriramesh, 2002). Elmer (2007) was critical of the field’s narrow
placement within a capitalist context and its primary concern with organizational
support, even when “profits” are not measured in financial terms alone. Such
a view, he argued, disregards the interpenetration of economics, culture, and politics
(see also Smart, 2003) that is essential to a more complex public relations inquiry. It
follows, then, that maintaining “the comforting illusion that controlling complex per-
suasive techniques along these lines is possible” renders public relations, in Elmer’s
(2007) view, as a discipline “ill-equipped to deal with the consequences of the market
economy, far less the consequences of globalization” (p. 364).
We examine the complexities and the potentials of public relations that flow from
interacting political and economic environs in which the practice necessarily functions.
We begin our analysis by briefly visiting the political and economic roots of public rela-
tions before more thoroughly examining contemporary views of the practice in light of
the 2008 financial crisis. This global upheaval of markets sparked doubt in long-
standing models of economic thinking, the outcomes of which a limited number of
scholars have examined through the lens of public relations. In this essay, we also dis-
cuss the intersection of political economy with the level of economic development that
helps us link public relations to social development and thereby social good. We con-
clude in much the same way these authors have by delineating and encouraging further
investigation into the political and economic complexities that are inherent to global
16 SANDRA DUHÉ ET AL.

public relations practice and to public relations’ role in national and social develop-
ment. A combination of these three helps us identify PR4D – Public Relations for
Development – as a focus for public relations and global public relations.

POLITICS AND PUBLIC RELATIONS

The Commentariolum Petitionis is estimated to be the first publication written on pol-

itical campaigning, dating back to 64 BC for a consul election in Rome (Strömbäck
& Kiousis, 2013). Quintus Tullius Cicero wrote the pamphlet as an instructional
document for his brother Marcus who was seeking the highest office in the Republic
at the time. In the document, Quintus highlighted public support, persuasive skill,
relationship cultivation, networking among influentials, and generation of goodwill as
necessary conditions for being elected. Fast forwarding many millennia to other polit-
ical purposes, Cutlip (1976) extolled the use of public relations tactics by Sam Adams
in the American revolution, which Toledano (2005) later contrasted with the use of
public relations practices in the Zionist revolution leading to the formation of the
state of Israel. These accounts of political campaigning practices find a home in con-
temporary public relations practice (Grunig & Grunig, 1992), but yet have historic
political grounding and vary in application depending on which part of the world
they take place (Toledano, 2005). Strömbäck and Kiousis (2011) defined present-day
political public relations as:

the management process by which an organization or individual actor for political pur-
poses, through purposeful communication and action, seeks to influence and to estab-
lish, build, and maintain beneficial relationships and reputations with its key publics to
help support its mission and achieve its goals. (p. 8)

The authors noted four points of distinction that make public relations specifically pol-
itical. It (a) is: expressly organized for political purposes, including not only parties and
candidates, but also businesses and interest groups; (b) involves the inseparable combin-
ation of communication and action; (c) equally privileges relationships and reputations;
and (d) relies on an application model that is situation dependent. In other words, polit-
ical public relations is more descriptive than prescriptive (Strömbäck & Kiousis, 2013).
Strömbäck and Kiousis (2013) further differentiated political from corporate prac-
tice in that political public relations: (a) relates to the common good; (b) involves
a greater number (and complexity) of stakeholders; (c) is subjected to higher levels of
transparency and regulatory restrictions; (d) centers on the main currency of ideas
and power (as opposed to money); (e) produces winners and losers; (f) is less able to
control messaging because of greater dependence on the news media; (g) experiences
higher levels of conflict; (h) faces an interest by media and/or opposing parties to
manufacture crises; (i) relies much more heavily on volunteer forces; and (j) has meas-
urable outcomes related to votes rather than sales or financial measures.
Political public relations scholarship is of growing interest, particularly in the con-
text of digital media. Duhé (2015) found that among a selection of public relations
journals, the number of studies that had government and political application has
taken a significant surge in recent years, ranging in focus from elections in the U.S.
(Adams & McCorkindale, 2013) and Sweden (Karlsson, Clerwall, & Buskqvist, 2013),
to blog sites used for diplomacy (Zhong & Lu, 2013), to government-led tourism pro-
motion in Mexico and Brazil (de Moya & Jain, 2013), alongside many others.
2. INTERSECTION OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 17

For political economy purposes, however, perhaps the most obvious and compli-
cated mix of public relations and politics is found in the democratization process,
which overtly and additionally engages economic and cultural variables. The various
accounts of democratization efforts in the prior volume (Sriramesh & Verčič, 2009b)
made clear how nascent, centrally controlled governments and economies are more
apt to be subjected to the propagandist tactics associated with the press-agentry
model (see also, Grunig & Grunig, 1992; Sriramesh & Verčič, 2009a). Furthermore,
only a pluralist society that values political, economic, and press freedom is more
likely to employ the public information and two-way models of public relations.
Several scholars have examined the role of public relations in political, transitional,
and democratization initiatives (cf. Ławniczak, 2001; Molleda & Moreno, 2006;
Skoko, 2004; White & Imre, 2013), thus further expanding the field’s analysis beyond
a strictly managerial approach. Whitehead (1999) skillfully used the analogy of
a theatrical production to describe the democratization process, or, in his words, “the
confusing multiplicity of events that take place in the interval between the fall of an
authoritarian government and the emergence of a democratic successor” (para. 1).
The implications of this genuinely dramatic occurrence for public relations practice
are worth enumerating here.
The process of democratization is ripe for coalition building, mutual understanding,
and public dialogue – all components of the normative two-way symmetrical model of
public relations (Grunig & Grunig, 1992) – depending on the will and intent of state
leaders who essentially are, using Whitehead’s (1999) phrasing, “crafting institutions”
(para. 5). The irrefutable struggle for power in a variety of political contexts has been
examined by public relations scholars (cf. Goran & Hakan, 2014; Motion, 2005; Rice &
Somerville, 2013). Similarly, Whitehead (1999) recognized shifts in a long-standing bal-
ance of power as central to the democratizing process. Regime changes naturally lead to
the surfacing of underlying conflicts. Whereas incremental changes can be implemented
under the radar, so to speak, “systematic changes at the national level must be publicized
and forcefully advocated to overcome all the resistance, inertia, and skepticism that
would otherwise stymie them” (Whitehead, 1999, para. 9, emphasis added).
Although Whitehead (1999) was not writing from a public relations perspective, his
use of terminology inexplicably points to the technical functions of public relations.
Other concepts tied to public relations in his writings of the drama of democratiza-
tion include: (a) marginalized publics who are compelled to get involved in the pro-
cess; (b) persuasive messages that capture public imagination and compel movement
toward a new future that is preferable to a denounced past; (c) political leadership
who must inspire a new path with not only rhetoric, but also images, distractions,
intuition, and an ear for the musicality of language; (d) a long-term commitment to
swaying a variety of stakeholders; (e) two-way flows of communication between the
rulers and the ruled, and, increasingly; (f) the inability to ignore or disregard publics;
or (g) to cease anticipating their reactions to a variety of stimuli. Though politics and
public relations are closely tied, politics is but one part of the political economy per-
spective. Thus, we continue our discussion by examining economic ties to public rela-
tions research and practice.

ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC RELATIONS

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, Ławniczak (2009) observed that much of public
relations history comprises the pursuit of corporate and economic interests alongside
18 SANDRA DUHÉ ET AL.

the public relations tactics needed to offset the hostility, and gain favorability, associ-
ated with those efforts. He questioned how public relations’ support of neoliberal eco-
nomic policies that favor markets free from excessive regulation contributed to the
downfall of financial, banking, and housing markets felt around the globe (see also his
chapter later in this volume). In turn, Ławniczak (2009) highlighted concerns about the
related lack of financial, business, and economic knowledge among public relations stu-
dents and practitioners that can contribute to such devastating outcomes (see also,
Duhé, 2013).
Similar to our earlier observations (Duhé & Sriramesh, 2009), Ławniczak (2009)
noted that although political economy began in the eighteenth century as a holistic,
multidisciplinary view of the economy, the dawning of the classical school of econom-
ics in the nineteenth century brought what he referred to as the beginning of
a “reductionist legacy” (p. 347) that emphasized economic over political and/or social
considerations. Calling for a return to a political economy mindset in public relations,
he wrote: “For the current crisis, it is necessary to restore a broader framework for
understanding the complex national, and international, interactions between eco-
nomic, political, and social dimensions” (p. 347).
Critical public relations scholarship, much of which is cited herein, likewise
argues for a broader perspective of public relations practice that goes beyond
a singular economic focus on the profitable interests of an organization (see also
Ławniczak, 2009). Public relations’ link with economic pursuits is well documented
in its U.S.-based history, yet Ławniczak (2009) observed that any reference to “eco-
nomic context” in both public relations research and pedagogy has been restricted
to managerial economics, or the use of economic perspectives strictly to inform
organizational decision-making. For example, Cenja, Mandea, Croitoru, and Ciucã
(2011) explained how public relations reduces transaction costs, has value similar
to advertising, and enhances competitive advantage for profit-seeking firms, yet
also stressed the macroeconomic importance of public relations activities generating
trust and social welfare
McKie and Ławniczak (2009) went as far to suggest that public relations as a field
of inquiry take an introspective cue from economists. Specifically, they urged that as
economists bring into question a century of classical thinking that led to the 2008
downfall, so, too, should public relations scholars follow suit and revisit their guiding
principles by “reorienting their science to deal with real life problems” (p. 336). In the
next section, we address some topics of recent rethinking in economics and their rele-
vance for public relations.

IS RATIONAL CHOICE STILL RATIONAL?

In its most basic form, rational choice theory asserts individual economic actors,
when informed about the choices available in a given situation, will reliably and con-
sistently maximize their self-interest (whether pleasure or profit), based on rational
calculations (“Rational choice theory,” 2017). Much of economic theory is based on
this premise. Related to rational choice is the notion that social phenomena are
driven by individual decision-making. That is, there is a presumption that an examin-
ation of the thinking of individuals can explain the behavior of the whole. The field
of behavioral economics, however, takes issue with the tenets of rational choice and
studies why individuals are often quite irrational in their decision-making. Stress,
emotion, and a lack of information can lead to irrationality.
2. INTERSECTION OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 19

Counter to the assumption of “perfect information” present in most economic

models, reality dictates that information is often partial, distorted, unavailable, and/or
too voluminous and thus overwhelming for those who need it for decision-making.
Economist and Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon’s recognition of these information
imperfections led to his groundbreaking work in what he called “bounded rationality”
based on the notion that decisions can satisfy even if they just suffice (Herbert
Simon, 2009). In Simon’s (2009) view, individuals are unlikely to have access to all
information required, and, even if they did, they wouldn’t have the cognitive capacity
to process it all.
Public relations is a social institution that alleviates informational asymmetries.
Included in such public relations activities would be concerted efforts toward estab-
lishing a firm’s reputation for quality to ensure repeat sales. The underlying logic is
thus: Hidden defects lead to the devaluing of a market. When consumers become
distrustful of the quality associated with some product, they withdraw their partici-
pation in that market, as do the higher quality producers who grow weary of being
associated with low quality practices. What remains, then, are low quality produ-
cers and a sub-optimal allocation of societal resources. Nobel Laureate Economist
George Akerlof (1970) studied the used car market and made references to this
inefficient outcome as adverse selection. Akerlof, along with fellow economists
Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz, won the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics for
their combined analysis of markets with asymmetric information, concluding that
imbalances of information between parties to a transaction can lead to adverse
selection and work against efficiencies in competitive markets (“Markets with
Asymmetric Information,” 2001).
The question of whether rational choice is still rational depends, then, in great part
on the availability and quality of information flows in a given context. Stress and
emotion may contribute to irrational choice-making, but closer examination would
reveal that stress and emotion originate from informational inputs. Whether these
information sources are plentiful and accurate, or heavily restricted and propagandis-
tic, speaks to the relevancy of public relations decision-making on both the originat-
ing and the receiving end. Political economy is innately linked to national
development as the majority of countries of the world are still deemed developing
economies/markets. So, we next link the level of economic development with public
relations.

THE LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC RELATIONS

The United Nations (UN), through the United Nations Department of Economic
and Social Affairs, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and
the five United Nations regional commissions, puts forth an annual report titled
World Economic Situation and Prospects (WESP). Within the report, the UN places
every country into one of three economic categories: developed economies, economies
in transition, and developing economies. The criteria used to categorize countries is
based primarily on per capita gross national income (GNI), however some parts of
the analysis make a further distinction between fuel exporters and fuel importers to
add additional nuance to the depiction of economies in transition and developing
economies. The general purpose of the WESP report is to paint a picture of economic
conditions in a given country, as well as to highlight global economic trends and
potential risks.
20 SANDRA DUHÉ ET AL.

The 2019 report makes clear that although overall global economic growth has
remained fairly steady, “economic progress has been highly uneven across regions”
and “several large developing countries saw a decline in per capita income in 2018”
(United Nations, 2019). While the global economy as a whole is predicted to expand,
a focus on macro-level economic gains belies important details within nation states.
For instance, economic growth tends to be concentrated in urban areas and often
does not spread equitably to women and minority groups (United Nations, 2019).
Thus, even within the context of a developing economy, the regional, community, and
individual-level economic picture varies substantially. The report also points to
a number of risks, including global trade disputes and increasing climate related dis-
ruptions, that could make existing development challenges greater while adding new
obstacles to contend with. While we have already discussed the implications of polit-
ical and economic systems on the practice of global public relations in this chapter,
the context of a developing economy adds additional complexity wherein both mater-
ial and ideological challenges must be considered. Addressing these challenges is
necessary to generating effective public relations practice. It is also important to
achieving the goals of international development, as the theories and practice of
public relations have much to offer the development field. Although it is not currently
addressed in the academic literature, overlaps already exist between these fields. Creat-
ing a direct link between the two is worthy of consideration as it both creates an
opportunity for the broadening of public relations, and supports the work of inter-
national development. As global inequality grows, achieving development related
goals is a necessary task.
The concept of international development is generally used to denote a field of prac-
tice, or industry, that began in the 1940s. While the original catalyst for international
development was the reconstruction of war-torn Europe, generating economic growth
in newly decolonized nations soon became the primary focus. Although economic
growth has remained a dominant focus, “development” has always been a contested
concept with a variety of competing meanings imbued upon it (Escobar, 1994; Fer-
guson, 1994; Melkote, 2003; Melkote & Steeves, 2015; Nederveen Pieterse, 1998; Sen,
1999). Most would agree that the term “development” speaks to an intentional process
meant to improve quality-of-life and create beneficial change (Melkote & Steeves,
2015). Consensus, however, around what “beneficial change” looks like, who is in the
best position to enact it, how it should be carried out, and for whom, is much harder to
come by (Fair & Shah, 1997; Parpart, Rai, & Staudt, 2002; Wilkins & Mody, 2001).
Within the field of development, the theory and practice of development communication
(devcom for short), refers to a process of strategic intervention toward directed social
change (Melkote, 2010; Melkote & Steeves, 2015; Wilkins & Mody, 2001). Key communi-
cation functions utilized in devcom – information dissemination, education, behavior
change, relationship building, media advocacy, and issue framing, among other things –
will look familiar to those in the field of public relations (Melkote, 2003). And, like public
relations, devcom is used by a variety of organizations to achieve very different, and some-
times competing, goals. Historically, the dominant approach to development has been one
based on the theory of modernization, which prioritizes capitalist economic development,
promotes rationality and objectivity in individuals, and emphasizes technology acquisition
and industrialization (Lerner, 1958; McClelland, 1967; Melkote, 2010; Rogers, 1976). The
modernization framework prioritizes national and regional economic growth as the cata-
lyst for increasing quality-of-life for individuals and communities, encouraging democra-
tization, and supporting infrastructure development (Melkote, 2003). To achieve the goals
2. INTERSECTION OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 21

of modernization, linear communication methods have historically been emphasized, utiliz-

ing information sharing through mass media channels and asymmetrical relationship build-
ing that prioritizes outside expertise over local knowledge.
But parallel alternative approaches to this development framework have always
existed, and long-standing critiques of the dominant paradigm have called for more
culturally contextual programs that take into account the roles of gender, the environ-
ment, religion, and indigenous knowledge in creating sustainable development solu-
tions (Boserup, 1970; Cornwall, Harrison & Whitehead, 2008; Mohanty, Russo &
Torres, 1991; Spivak, 1988). An approach that values cultural contextual variables is
at the heart of the framework of this book also and has previously been advanced as
a “dire need” for public relations practice and scholarship (Sriramesh, 2002). Whether
feminist, environmental, theological and/or grassroots in nature, alternative
approaches to modernization work to disrupt the hierarchical structure of a Western-
based, ethnocentric development model and push for a move beyond economic-
focused definitions of change (Melkote, 2003; Melkote & Steeves, 2015). Importantly,
development scholars have pushed not just for a different type of development, but
for the dissolution of the project of international development altogether, arguing that
as a practice it continues a history of colonialism and supports an established global
North/South power divide (Chakraborty, 2000; Escobar, 1994; Ferguson, 1994;
McEwan, 2009; Mohanty, 1998; Shome & Hedge, 2010; Spivak, 1988). Broadly
speaking, however, approaches to development outside of the modernization frame-
work focus on generating individual and community-level empowerment, rather than
macro-level economic growth. In efforts to build equity, social justice, and individual
capacities, empowerment-based models of development prioritize two-way, participa-
tory communication approaches meant to build symmetrical relationships (Melkote,
2003). We see parallels between this approach from development communication
scholars and the long-discussed notion of two-way symmetrical communication (that
evolved into the mixed-motives model) in public relations (see for example L. Grunig,
J. Grunig, & Dozier, 2002).
Not unlike public relations, which is often inaccurately perceived as operating only
in the service of corporate interests, the field of international development struggles
with tensions between mainstream conceptualizations of development predicated on
a Western standard of economic growth and calls for a more holistic view of the
nature of development, its goals and potentialities. Recently, the field has seen a shift
towards a neoliberal approach to development, which has allowed for growing
involvement by global corporations in shaping goals and outcomes for the developing
world (Calkin, 2015; Essex, 2013). But critical scholars have pushed back against this
turn, arguing that a neoliberal approach to development brings problematic outcomes
for marginalized groups (Alvarez, 1999; Cornwall, 2014; Kabeer, 2015; Karim, 2011;
Wilson, 2015). Because the actors invested in the project of development are varied,
so too are the goals, scale, and communicative functions seen in development projects.
Large bilateral and multilateral institutions like the World Bank and the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) have long played a dominant
role in shaping the direction of the field, as have global and local NGOs and grass-
roots organizations. But the fundamentals of public relations, defined as “the strategic
communication that different types of organizations use for establishing and maintain-
ing symbiotic relationships with relevant publics many of whom are increasingly
becoming culturally diverse” (Sriramesh, 2009) have been used by development com-
munication practitioners quite extensively even if they do not acknowledge the role of
22 SANDRA DUHÉ ET AL.

public relations in what they do. In public relations and development communication,
there is a call for practitioners to engage in work that questions and addresses the
role of unequal power relations. Bringing public relations more clearly into the work
of international development can help achieve this goal in both fields.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

We see a confluence of the three areas discussed in this chapter – political system,
economic system, and level of development – as being of significant relevance to
global public relations. Considering that most of the countries of the world are con-
sidered developing countries, the relevance of public relations for development
(PR4D) is more apparent now than at any time in history. It is a tragedy that discus-
sions of public relations have not been aligned with development commensurate with
ground realities. Overlooking this key role for public relations has also affected the
reputation of the field of public relations.
We contend that public relations has erroneously been seen as a dissimilar, and
even oppositional framework to development communication (devcom) because of
the long-standing mischaracterization of public relations as a tool for serving corpor-
ate interests. This mischaracterization has severely affected the reputation of the
entire field of public relations as “flacks” or “hired guns” that advance selfish inter-
ests of corporations. For instance, public relations has not embraced social marketing,
much to its detriment, the same way that devcom has embraced social marketing,
which uses “science-based social marketing strategies to promote social causes”
(Melkote & Steeves, 2015, p. 143). There is general agreement that the social market-
ing approach “is about influencing behavior, that it utilizes a systematic planning pro-
cess and applies traditional marketing principles and techniques, and that its intent is
to deliver a positive benefit to society” (Kotler & Lee, 2008, p. 8). Audience research,
strategic planning, informational campaigns, relationship building, media relations,
issue framing, and advocacy are all necessary to achieving the work of devcom. And
they are all fundamental to the theoretical and practical work of public relations.
And yet, the devcom field has worked to distance itself from public relations even
though in practice public relations practitioners often engage in communication for
development. For instance, in 2006, the Rome Consensus at the World Congress on
Communication for Development stated:

Communication for Development is a social process based on dialogue using a broad

range of tools and methods. It is also about seeking change at different levels including
listening, building trust, sharing knowledge and skills, building policies, debating and
learning for sustained and meaningful change. It is not public relations or corporate com-
munication. (emphasis added)

Care is taken to explicitly state that devom is not public relations, perhaps in part
because the description given by the Rome Consensus could easily be mistaken for
a description of public relations. In response to this statement, Servaes (2007) argued
that, in fact, within the field of development, “major aspects of many projects and
programmes currently being promoted and implemented are nothing but ‘public rela-
tions or corporate communication’ wrapped in participatory diffusion rhetoric” (p.
490). Servaes argues for a focus on a development framework of multiplicity, which
emphasizes participatory models that stress “the importance of cultural identity of
2. INTERSECTION OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 23

local communities and of democratization and participation at all levels … ” (2007,

p. 488). Further, Servaes (2009) explicitly states that public relations has a role to
play in devcom approaches meant to change attitudes, and in describing behavioral
change and advocacy approaches, he outlines what are clearly public relations efforts.
The resistance to identifying the nexus between public relations and devcom, then,
is not due to a lack of overlap in practice. Rather, it seems to come from the misiden-
tification of what public relations stands for – a manipulative activity on behalf of
corporate interests. When positioned only as a corporate function, it is clear that
public relations is unable to truly serve the interests of a participatory, sustainable
approach to development and social good. But, we argue that when we expand the
definition of public relations to reflect its true state, the overlaps, the sharing of theor-
ies and practice, and the opportunities for growth in each field that can come from
building this connection are undeniable. Others have already begun to make this link.
Given its “expertise at relationship building,” Taylor argues that public relations is an
effective tool for democracy building and beneficial to the “development of society”
(2000, p. 1). While her research considered the role of public relations, and specifically
the function of media relations for building public acceptance for democracy in the con-
text of Bosnia, the implications of this research illuminate the possibilities of using public
relations in other developing regions. Taylor (2000) argues that “public relations can
serve as an important tool for NGOs to achieve their mission” (p. 11), but “research
shows that not-for-profit organizations often lack the expertise and sophistication in
their public relations efforts that is necessary for maximizing their impact” (p. 6). Thus,
greater understanding of the practice of public relations is needed for NGOs and other
not-for-profit organizations to effectively do the work of social and political development.
These types of organizations, of course, make up a large segment of development actors.
Pamment (2015) describes devcom and the field of public diplomacy as “estranged sib-
lings” that have “much to learn from each other” (p. 188). Grunig (1993) and Signitzer
and Coombs (1992) have argued that the fields of public diplomacy and public relations
should also be understood as sharing conceptual overlaps that both profit from. In his
chapter in this volume on the subject, Roger Hayes makes a strong case for the overlap
between the two fields. If indeed we should understand public relations and public diplo-
macy as conceptually connected fields, and if public diplomacy and devcom are
“estranged siblings” (Pamment, 2015, p. 188), then it stands to reason that we should
consider the shared intellectual positioning of public relations and devcom as well.
We have also seen a growth of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programs,
which is a field fundamentally tied to public relations, used to support development
oriented goals in the context of developing economies (Aya Pastrana & Sriramesh,
2014; Popa, 2015). In these instances, public relations looks much like the archetypal
image often attributed to it, as CSR serves a corporate (albeit socially focused) func-
tion. However, the role of CSR in development is deserving of further exploration. As
we witness the not unproblematic growth of corporations taking on the mantel of
development actor, an analysis of CSR programs in developing contexts becomes
especially relevant (Munshi & Kurian, 2005).
Perhaps most important to consider in our discussion of the similarities between
devcom and public relations is a statement by Servaes. Servaes (2007) articulates that, in
contrast to dominant modernization frameworks of development, the driving idea:

in alternative, more culturally oriented versions (multiplicity) is that there is no universal

development model that leads to sustainability at all levels of society and the world, that
24 SANDRA DUHÉ ET AL.

development is an integral, multidimensional and dialectic process that can differ from
society to society, community to community, context to context (p. 485). (emphasis in
original)

When taken alongside a holistic understanding of public relations that includes

a focus on culture as broadly defined in this book, the relationship between the fields
of political economy, level of development, and public relations is clarified – much to
the benefit of the field of public relations. It is our hope that, going forward, this rela-
tionship can be made stronger as we see great possibilities for both fields when they
are in communication with one another. Given the extent to which public relations is
involved in various aspects of development communication, it behooves scholars of
public relations to claim their rightful place as purveyors of social good – by helping
build societies and nations through communication for development. And given the
important and pressing goals of development, it would be regrettable if devcom were
to not take advantage of the knowledge created within public relations simply because
of a misidentification of the field.

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 CHAPTER

3
Culture
The “Silent” Language is also the “Neglected”
Language

Krishnamurthy Sriramesh

Culture – so central to all human interactions – is arguably the most neglected

concept in public relations literature. This chapter focuses on the concept of
culture as defined by anthropologists, while noting that the chapter in the previous
edition also discussed organizational culture and public relations. The famous
anthropologist Edward T. Hall (1973, 1990) referred to culture as the silent
language stating: “There is no experience independent of culture against which
culture can be measured” (p. 187). He also succinctly described the interrelation-
ship between culture and communication observing that communication is culture
and culture is communication. Those of us in communication have often
complained that communication is not valued as a “value add” and therefore is
neglected by senior managers. Further, there is the normal tendency to believe
that all humans have been communicating since birth and so relegate public rela-
tions to an expendable technical function with little if any strategic role. It is
ironic that our field, which has defined as its core purpose managing communica-
tion to build relationships has consistently neglected culture – arguably the single
most important influencer of both communication and relationships!
This neglect is even more surprising because the need for cross-cultural public
relations has grown exponentially in the 21st century owing to this era of global-
ization (Sriramesh, 2010). A decade ago I had wondered “whether there is such
a thing as domestic public relations anymore because of the international outreach
of organizations of all sizes and types as a result of the recent spurt in globaliza-
tion” (Sriramesh, 2009, p. xxv). The interconnectedness of the world is evident in

28
3. CULTURE 29

many recent examples including the struggle the UK has experienced over the last
three years (since the June 2016 referendum) to sever its ties with the European
Union – Brexit. The core theme of this essay is that by neglecting culture, our
field has lost the opportunity to position itself as a critical function in society
with a social role that extends far beyond the erroneous popular notion that
public relations is fundamentally a function by corporations and for corporations.
Almost 30 years ago, we had hoped that culture would earn its rightful face as
a key construct in public relations scholarship: “To communicate to [with] their pub-
lics in a global marketplace, public relations practitioners will have to sensitize them-
selves to the cultural heterogeneity of their audiences … The result will be the growth
of a culturally richer profession” (Sriramesh & White, 1992, p. 611). More than
a decade later, I had summed up the state of affairs: “Sadly, culture has yet to be
integrated into the body of knowledge … Much of the literature and scholarship in
our area continues to be ethnocentric” (Sriramesh, 2006, p. 507).
Almost 15 years from that statement, public relations scholarship has yet to
embrace culture to the extent that its importance warrants on account of globaliza-
tion that has made this world such a cultural melting pot that breaking up trade alli-
ances (whether it is NAFTA or Brexit) are much harder than expected. In order to
explicate the relationship between culture and public relations, this essay expands on
the three dimensions I had offered in the only book so far on the topic of culture and
public relations (Sriramesh, 2012) thereby providing food for thought on the very
identity of the public relations professional.

CULTURE AS AN ANTECEDENT FOR PUBLIC RELATIONS

When viewed as an antecedent for public relations, culture is the “environment” in

which public relations is practiced. That means different cultural environments spawn
different types of public relations practices. One can also deduce that different cul-
tural environments require different public relations strategies and techniques for
effective communication. In this instance, culture becomes the independent variable
that determines the nature of public relations – the dependent variable. Almost all of
the studies in our field have only addressed this first dimension (eg. Kim, 2003; Rhee,
1999; Sriramesh, 1992; Sriramesh & Takasaki, 1999).
Many of these studies have used Hofstede’s (1980, 1984, 2001) dimensions of
culture: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity – femininity, individu-
alism – collectivism, and long-term orientation to describe public relations prac-
tices in different countries (mostly in Asia). The first of the studies that assessed
culture as an “environment” for public relations practice was an analysis of
south Indian organizations using personal interviews (Sriramesh, 1988). I had
noted that prior to this study, there was no mention of culture’s impact on
public relations including in the first body of knowledge study conducted by the
Public Relations Society of America (PRSA) in 1988. As a follow-up to the 1988
study, I conducted an ethnographic analysis of 18 south Indian organizations
(Sriramesh, 1992), was perhaps the first study to empirically link societal culture
with public relations. Because of the malleability of the culture concept and the
complexity of studying it, I had only used the power distance dimension pre-
scribed by Hofstede. The Excellence project addressed both societal and
organizational culture first conceptually (Sriramesh & White, 1992; Sriramesh,
30 KRISHNAMURTHY SRIRAMESH

Grunig, & Buffington, 1992) and then empirically (Dozier, Grunig, & Grunig,
1995, Sriramesh, Grunig, & Dozier, 1996).
In one of the few non-Asian studies on the culture–public relations nexus, Verčič,
Grunig, and Gruing (1996) linked public relations with the first four dimensions that
Hofstede identified. The interviewees in their study could not agree on whether
a certain cultural idiosyncracy was really Slovenian. Vasquez and Taylor (1994) sur-
veyed 134 members of a Mid-western city’s PRSA chapter to link the first four of
Hofstede’s dimensions with the four models of public relations and found a low per-
ception of power distance among their respondents: “American practitioners in this
study were not working under heavily controlled or authoritative management” (p.
443). However, the authors were perplexed that their respondents predominantly
favored the one-way models in spite of the low power distance. This confirms our
observation that authoritarian organizational cultures can exist in egalitarian societal
cultures and that public relations practitioners rarely set communication policies (Srir-
amesh, Grunig, & Buffington, 1992; Sriramesh, Grunig, & Dozier, 1996).
Kim (2003) studied a multinational corporation in South Korea in an attempt to
link Confucian Dynamism (Hofstede’s fifth cultural dimension) with public relations.
The author concluded that in communicating with domestic publics, the corporation
used the personal influence model (to be reviewed later in this essay) and attempted
to use the two-way models to communicate with international stakeholders. Rhee
(1999) is probably the only scholar thus far to have attempted to link all five of Hof-
stede’s dimensions with public relations concluding that “[A]lthough conceptually
affiliated with high power distance … Confucianism may not be detrimental to
achieving excellence in public relations” (p. 185).
The over-reliance on Hofstede’s dimensions has to be recognized as a lacuna in
public relations scholarship given that the author himself had explicitly stated that
these dimensions do not describe culture in its entirety. Hofstede studied cultural
dimensions that were common across many of the cultures he studied. Cultural idio-
syncracies that are unique to a culture often have the most influence on communica-
tion and thereby public relations (Sriramesh, 2012). For example, Guanxi – a cultural
dimension specific to Chinese culture – is one such unique cultural dimension that
has garnered the most attention from public relations scholars (eg. Aw, Tan, & Tan,
2002; Huang, 2001; Hung, 2004; Kipnis, 1996; Tan, 2000). In our study (Sriramesh &
Takasaki, 1999) we linked the concepts of wa, amae, tatamae, honne – unique to Jap-
anese culture – with Japanese public relations practice. It is worth noting that other
concepts unique to Japanese culture such as katachi de hairu (entering self-fulfilment
through the rules) or the importance of the business card (meishi) to bring credibility
to interpersonal communication have yet to be explored. Needless to say, there is
a dire need for studies that identify cultural dimensions that are unique not only to
Asia but to societies in other regions of the world as well.

The Lewis Model of Cultural Types

Cross-cultural consultant Richard Lewis (Hammerich & Lewis, 2013) offered another
practically useful way of classifying culture stating that most societies are either
Multi-Active, Linear-Active, or Reactive, or some combination of the three. He stated
that multi-active cultures are known for showing more passion and emotion. People
of these cultures tend to be more talkative, impulsive, people-oriented, and multi-
taskers. They tend to prefer conversations to written communication and tend to pay
3. CULTURE 31

less attention to rules, schedules, and punctuality. The author gave the example of
Hispanic America, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Chile as good examples of multi-
active cultures. People of linear-active cultures are generally seen to be calm and in
control. They tend to be more organized, results-oriented, law abiding, and confron-
tational but polite. They prefer to base their communication on hard facts and are
more direct in their communication. They are confident that excellence brings success.
Examples are Germany, Switzerland, with the US and UK coming close to being
fully so. Reactive cultures are typified by their focus on being courteous and good
listeners, responding after reflection, paying attention to nonverbal cues and commu-
nication. They are the least confrontational and keep their promises. Vietnam was
placed by the author as the most typical with Japan and China coming close. Other
countries were plotted by the author along the continuum with the three types form-
ing the tips of a triangle. Although this model has been popular with practitioners,
one does not find any public relations studies that have used this model to measure
societal culture. One obvious explanation is that the Lewis Model does not offer the
kinds of tools to measure culture quantitatively that Hofstede did making Hofstede’s
dimensions of culture easier to replicate.
Several other dimensions of culture have not been addressed empirically by public
relations literature such as time orientation and high and low-context (Hall, 1976,
1990); universalism vs. particularism, specific vs. diffuse, and achievement vs. ascrip-
tion (Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 2000); mastery-harmony-subjugation to
nature; past-present-future orientation; and belief of human nature as being good
versus bad (Triandis, 1982). Over-reliance on Hofstede’s cultural dimensions has cer-
tainly hurt the field in many ways including broadening its horizons. This brief review
also reveals that public relations scholarship has barely explored the role of culture as
an “antecedent” for public relations practice even though almost all of the work
exploring the culture–public relations nexus has been in this genre of research.

THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC RELATIONS ON CULTURE

A second way of viewing the public relations–culture nexus is when public relations is
the independent variable that has an impact on culture the dependent variable. Being
a communication function, public relations acts as an agent for acculturation in soci-
eties and organizations and is often criticized for its “hegemonic” role. However, one
cannot find empirical or conceptual studies that have analyzed the ways in which
public relations activities affect culture – whether societal or organizational. We
should have taken the cue from an allied field such as mass communication that has
studied media effects on society for decades. That stream of research has benefited
both scholarship and practice in mass communication and media. Neglecting to
empirically assess how public relations practice has affected society has certainly hurt
the field in significant ways. For example, this neglect has contributed to the errone-
ous popular notion that public relations is fundamentally a corporate activity and as
a result it propagates corporate hegemony within and across national borders – espe-
cially in developing countries. Such corporate hegemony also can translate into cul-
tural hegemony.
One should contrast that notion with the many information and developmental
campaigns by Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) and non-profits especially in
the vast developing world that have used public relations strategies and techniques
with significant positive impact on societies. Public relations literature is vastly silent
32 KRISHNAMURTHY SRIRAMESH

on such laudable efforts around the world by neglecting to analyze those efforts
empirically and draw lessons for public relations practice. As we have discussed in
Chapter 2, public relations literature has ceded that worthy field of research almost
entirely to scholars in development communication. Our neglect has thus contributed
to the popular notion of public relations practitioners as paid publicists for corporate
interests. Beginning in the 1980s, public relations scholarship has tried hard to distin-
guish itself from the field of marketing, which is the primary function of corporations.
It is intriguing, however, that we did not focus on the “other” marketing – social mar-
keting, which involves the use of marketing techniques for socially worthy ideas and
causes.
Social marketing is typified in the statement of psychologist Gerhard Wiebe (1951)
who asked the question: “Why can’t you sell brotherhood and rational thinking like
you sell soap?” (p. 679). In essence, he advocated the use of communication to motiv-
ate socially desirable behaviors, distinct from marketing a product or service. Wiebe
proposed five “factors” as influencing the success of “mass persuasion” campaigns
aimed at “motivating” socially acceptable “behavior”: the force; the direction; the
mechanism; the adequacy and compatibility; the distance (p. 681). After discussing
four case studies of radio and television campaigns, the author concluded that mass
media can “produce forceful motivation” among audience members aimed at social
good. Even the popular author of marketing Philip Kotler has hailed social marketing
as a tool that can be used against “the myriad social problems … [such as] illiteracy,
drug and alcohol abuse, teenage pregnancy, the spread of AIDS, and poor nutrition”
(Kotler & Roberto, 1989, p. 3). It is interesting if not ironic that Kotler, who is most
identified with marketing (for corporate interests), also made the transition into more
socially-conscious marketing. However, public relations continues to neglect aligning
with social marketing, which would have been the logical way for our field to break
free from “corporate shackles” and instead accurately reflect the reality that public
relations has been used by non-profits and governments for doing social good includ-
ing through information campaigns.
Public relations literature has stayed clear of social marketing probably because of its
aversion to marketing. For example, Grunig and Grunig (1991, 1998) provided
a thoughtful case for why the Excellence study had consistently tried to distinguish
public relations from marketing. Whereas one does not disagree with the need to distin-
guish product/service marketing from public relations for many valid reasons, there is
no escaping the fact that social marketing – which is distinct from product marketing –
should not have been ignored by public relations scholars. An exception is McKie and
Toledano (2008) who advocated that public relations literature embrace social market-
ing. Distinguishing it from Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), McKie identified
non-profits and governments as the primary users of social marketing, thereby signaling
one of the ways by which our field can break free from its “corporate” identity.
The relevance of social marketing to this essay on culture lies in the fact that
a field needs to reflect on its core function and purpose in society. If public relations
scholarship had done a better job of reflecting on the field’s impact on culture in
a holistic fashion, we would have discovered that indeed public relations greatly affects
societal culture through motivational campaigns that help build communities, soci-
eties, and nations. Empirical evidence in support of this reality would have aided in
improving the reputation of our field – a dire necessity.
When it comes to the impact of public relations on culture, another area ignored by
public relations scholarship is cultural diplomacy, a subsidiary of public diplomacy. For
3. CULTURE 33

example, Trent (2016a) stated: “Since the mid-20th century, cultural diplomacy through
public-private partnerships (PPPs), has been generating lasting people-to-people rela-
tionships” (p. 193). The author also stated:

Conducting public diplomacy to respond to global demands for human rights, food
security, and environmental justice in the face of domestic politics that today are so ideo-
logically polarized is challenging. However, as long as the United States continues to
stand for social justice and democratic self-government for all, the role of public diplo-
macy will be not only to listen to, understand, and influence global publics in the name of
U.S. interests, but also to promote relationships with them that are generated by the cre-
ative tension of a heartfelt and reasoned communication approach. (p. 5, emphasis added)

The link between public diplomacy and public relations is evident in the italicised
words in this description – especially relationship building which we define as a core
function for public relations. Adopting the notion of helping an organization engage
in a “heartfelt and reasoned communication approach” in order to “listen, under-
stand, and influence global publics” (who are also obviously culturally diverse)
should be the goal of public relations in the 21st century. Anthropologist Albro (2016)
discussed the use of “transnational applied cultural networks” for diplomacy stating:

The relatively recent turn to the pursuit of so-called collaborative diplomacy tends to
emphasize trust-building through cooperation around shared objectives and values, and,
when carried out by government, often encourages more interagency partnerships in pro-
jecting the U.S. image abroad… many geopolitical problems are interconnected and
cross-cutting in nature, and so require multiple partners if they are to be effectively
addressed. (p. 125)

The field of public relations has so far focused very narrowly on the concept of trust
in relationships – principally focused at the level of the organization and seeing which
“types” of organizations are trusted over others. Viewing relationships from a cultural
perspective extends the horizons of our field by incorporating cooperation, shared
objectives, and values, that are not limited at the level of the organization but also at
the individual level (discussed in the next section). This would be aligned with Albro’s
(2016) “transnational applied cultural networks” that help extend public diplomacy
from promoting “one’s own community or national cultural identity” to “facilitating
relationships of collaborative storytelling and the co-creation of cultural knowledge”
(p. 126). The author concluded that “[T]ransnational applied cultural networks can
create new opportunities for public dialogue” (127). Even though the public relations
scholarship has been wrestling with the notion of symmetry and thus dialogue for
almost 50 years, interestingly there is no mention of public relations in this essay,
which is a commentary of how our field has limited its conceptual boundaries by not
integrating these fields into scholarship. This state of affairs is also a reflection of
how poorly we in public relations have positioned ourselves in relation to the society
at large based on reflection of the identity of public relations as a field and the values
espoused by individual practitioners.
Frame and Ihlen (2018) offer us another example of how public relations affects
culture in their discussion of the “cultural appropriation debate” where the cultural
codes and traditions of one group are “illegitimately” appropriated by members from
outside the cultural group for profit. The authors cite the criticisms levelled against
34 KRISHNAMURTHY SRIRAMESH

pop stars such as Taylor Swift, Miley Cyrus, and Katy Perry for “using braids or
mimicking what are seen as Afro-American dance codes” (p. 153). The authors offer
wise caution to public relations professionals in terms of cultural hegemony:

For public relations professionals, it is thus essential to tread the fine line between refer-
ring to cultures and social categories in order to construct meaningful messages which
appeal to familiar categories, and reinforcing the underlying social stereotypes… Public
relations professionals should be held professionally and socially accountable for the
implicit cultural models and beliefs underlying the materials they produce. (p. 154)

One can reasonably conclude, then, that by not reflecting on and empirically evalu-
ating the impact of public relations on culture – both societal and organizational – we
have essentially ceded the moral high ground to other communication-oriented discip-
lines that often look down upon public relations as mere “spin doctoring.”

PUBLIC RELATIONS AS A CULTURE

The idea here is that public relations should be viewed as a culture in itself. In other
words, have we really addressed what distinguishes public relations from practitioners
of allied communication disciplines such as advertising, marketing, and even journal-
ism? The activities, rites, rituals, and standing of public relations are distinct from
these other communicative disciplines. For most people, within and outside the field,
public relations is a “business” function that should help improve “the bottom line”
of corporations. This erroneous perspective is not informed by empirical evidence but
is mostly a result of conjecture and hearsay – one that continues to get perpetuated
because scholars have not really focused on this third dimension of the culture –
public relations nexus.
Not portraying the use of public relations by governments and non-profit entities
(including IGOs) has severely hurt the reputation of the field as one replete with
“hired guns” to do the bidding almost exclusively of corporate self-interests including
engaging in various unethical practices that seek to help the already powerful in soci-
ety (as explicated, among others, in Chapter 8 of this volume). Not enough attention
has been paid by scholarship to the fact that public relations has been used for more
altruistic activities such as building societies and nations or improving the livelihood
of people. This neglect has placed public relations in the unenvious position of being
seen as “spin masters” rather than the more accurate depiction of a different culture
of the field – one that is more socially responsible and not just a tool of corporate
hegemony.
One sees time and time again that corporations are the least trusted organizations
in society (along with some governments) and with good reason. They have a track
record of exploiting society and especially the vulnerable in society. Aligning the field
almost exclusively with corporate communication, has resulted in public relations
being viewed as an exploitive culture rather than an enabling one. It is time for the
field to begin to recalibrate itself and more correctly reflect its activities including
non-profit public relations. As long as the popular belief is that public relations is
predominantly “corporate activity,” the field’s reputation will continue to suffer. This
discussion essentially induces us to reflect on the identity of public relations itself.
Sriramesh (2012) could not discern any studies that have assessed the “identity” of
public relations practitioners and what makes public relations distinct from allied
3. CULTURE 35

communication disciplines such as advertising or marketing. It is interesting to note

that many in public relations still prefer to call it a practice as opposed to
a profession, further reflecting on the identity crisis.
In addition to the “institutional” level of identity discussed above (a meso level ana-
lysis), we should also discern the culture at the micro level looking at the culture of
individual practitioners. After all, individuals make up organizations and so the char-
acteristics of organizations are nothing but a reflection of the individuals that make
up an organization. It is this micro – individual level of analysis that helps us identify
public relations as a culture. However, studies that address public relations as
a culture are sparse. The use of personal influence (Grunig, Grunig, Sriramesh,
Huang, & Lyra, 1995; Sriramesh, 1992; Sriramesh, Grunig, & Dozier, 1996) in public
relations has been discussed but that discussion has not specifically addressed public
relations as a culture. Interpersonal trust building, a key to building relationships, has
not been discussed much at all by public relations scholars. Trust has almost exclu-
sively been discussed at the meso – organizational – level by public relations scholars
even though much of organizational trust depends on the actions of individuals. The
cultural idiosyncracies of individual practitioners plays a significant role in every
aspect of trust building including communication.
Similarly, the notion of corporate social responsibility (CSR) has generally dis-
cussed CSR activities or organizations paying very little, if any, attention to how it
is the individuals within organizations – such as decision makers and those who
have to implement those decisions – who actually set the tone and direction of an
organization’s orientation to CSR and thereby the organization’s role in society.
CSR discussions are generally divested from discussions of religion and spirituality,
both of which play significant roles even in societies that profess secularism. CSR
is driven not only by laws and regulations but also by moral codes that individuals
within organizations espouse. Therefore, when one recognizes that it is individuals
that make up an organization – while conceding that different individuals within
an organization have differential levels of power to influence organizational cul-
ture – we begin to see the importance of viewing public relations as a culture not
only at the meso level of it as a profession but also at the micro level of individual
practitioners.
Providing empirical evidence of public relations as a culture also helps us identify
the link between public relations and organizational culture. In the previous edition
of the book, we have discussed the link between societal and organizational culture
(Sriramesh, 2009). The role of the public relations practitioner in fostering organiza-
tional culture is as yet unexplored. References to the use of public relations in organ-
izational culture has primarily focused on viewing public relations as a tool for
internal communication. The role of the public relations practitioner’s own cultural
values is often ignored in these discussions. Given that most public relations programs
around the world, and public relations literature – especially text books – constantly
focus on the “corporate” side of public relations activity, it is safe to assume that the
typical public relations practitioner is schooled in the ways of business enterprises. It
appears that we simply assume that such unidimensional training also prepares stu-
dents to successfully contribute to governments (including IGOs) and non-profits.
Such an assumption would be erroneous considering that the vision and mission of
these two types of organizations is so different from that of corporations. Further,
many an undergraduate student still seems to think that “corporate” public relations
is the more lucrative and meaningful career option when in fact non-profits and
36 KRISHNAMURTHY SRIRAMESH

governments around the world are using public relations more than corporations and
for more varied purposes. Therefore, public relations scholarship is doing a disservice
to both employers and future professionals (students of public relations) by not iden-
tifying public relations as a culture and thereby clearly delineating the contributions
that the field – and every individual practitioner who is a part of the field – can make
to diverse organizational types.

CONCLUSION

Taking a cue from Edward T. Hall’s reference to culture as the silent language and his
statement about the reciprocity between culture and communication – culture is com-
munication and communication is culture – this essay contends that whereas commu-
nication is neglected by many organizational senior managers, for their part public
relations practitioners have in turn neglected culture’s impact on the practice that sees
itself as at the center of using communication to build and manage relationships.
Extending the conceptualization in Sriramesh (2009) and Sriramesh (2012), this essay
has discussed the three ways in which the link between culture and public relations
can be understood. First, culture is the environment for public relations practice,
which suggests that different cultural environments result in different variations in
public relations practice. Almost all the literature in public relations has been
restricted to studying this relationship. The second way in which we can discern the
culture–public relations nexus is on the impact of public relations on culture. Few
studies in public relations have discussed this relationship. Not paying attention to
this relationship has contributed to public relations being perceived merely as
a corporate function ignoring its more altruistic communication manifestations that
help social good. A third relationship is of public relations itself as a culture – distinct
from other allied communication disciplines. This self-reflective perspective also has
not been studied by public relations scholarship resulting in public relations being
misinterpreted by most in communication and outside of it. Neglecting culture has
therefore hurt public relations in multiple ways.

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 CHAPTER

4
The Media, International, Transnational
and Global Public Relations

Dejan Verčič
Krishnamurthy Sriramesh

The world became a global village in the 20th century (McLuhan & Fiore, 1967)
due to the emergence and growth of mass media (both print and broadcast media).
The dawn of the 21st century saw new, digital media (primarily enabled by the
Internet, social networks and mobile smartphones) that turned the global village
into a global living room where digital media connect everyone across the globe. We
also live in media (Deuze, 2012). In this new transplanetary reality, globalisation
has moved one step further into what Sholte (2008) labelled “globalism”. Transpla-
netary relations are one aspect of globalism. The other one is supraterritoriality,
where communication can extend everywhere across the planet at the same time
(transworld simultaneity) and in no time across devices and platforms (transworld
instanteneity). While “globalization” was “defined as the intensification of world-
wide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings
are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (Giddens, 1991,
p. 64), due to the Internet, social and mobile communication we are now inter-
twined into a “network society” (Castells, 2010). In a world in which not only
social, but for ever more people also personal lives are mediatised (mediated by
media)1, public relations “today has a diversified mix of media at its disposal. It has
to work with the increased numbers of touchpoints with all kinds of publics. For
communication professionals this is mediatisation in overdrive, or without hyper-
bole – hypermediatisation!” (Tench, Verčič, Zerfass, Moreno, & Verhoeven, 2017,
p. 27; see also Verhoeven, Zerfass, Verčič, Rench, & Moreno, 2018)
40 DEJAN VERČIČ AND KRISHNAMURTHY SRIRAMESH

Not every human is integrated equally into this globalised mediated system, but
everyone is affected by it, albeit differently. In that respect definitely “Globalization
seems to be the hallmark of the 21st century” (Sriramesh, 2008, p. 409).

FROM MEDIA TO MEDIATIZATION

The 20th century has been a century of mass production and mass consumption.
Mass media and public relations were instrumental in linking the two (Bernays,
1923). Working on and with the media has always been the most practiced and visible
part of public relations (Swerling, Thorson, & Tenderich, 2014; Zerfass, Verhoeven,
Tench, Moreno, & Verčič, 2011). In their textbook, Broom and Sha (2013) noted:
“Knowing about the media – knowing how to work with each medium, create con-
tent for each, address each medium’s audiences, adhere to specific style requirements,
and meet the deadlines of each – is a major part of many practitioners’ jobs” (p.
250). Cameron, Sallot, and Curtin (1997) noted that since the 1960s, more than 150
studies have examined some aspect of the relationship between journalists and public
relations practitioners, and in general found that between 25 percent to 80 percent of
news content is influenced by the “information subsidies” given by public relations
practitioners. But the social roles of both journalists and public relations practitioners
had changed by the end of the 20th century. While in the US there was no public
relations as understood today at the beginning of the 20th century, newspapers had
already achieved widespread adoption. However, by the middle of the 20th century,
one could already discern a parity between the numbers of journalists and public rela-
tions practitioners. By the end of the 20th century, there were five public relations
practitioners to one journalist in the US. That is, “from providers of information sub-
sidies (Gandy, 1982), public relations is fast transforming into media producer and
creator of news and stories” (Verčič & Tkalac Verčič, 2016).
As the 21st century arrived, political, economic, social and technological changes
completely reconfigured what was for a century understood as a (mass) media system.
With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 (which physically separated West Berlin from
the rest of Berlin and East Germany but also symbolically divided the whole world
between communism and capitalism) and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991,
many people believed that, as Fukuyama worded it in a speech transformed into an
article in 1989 and in a book in 1992, the world has reached “The End of History”
(Fukuyama, 1989, 1992): liberal institutions – representative government, free markets
and consumerist culture, including liberal media – have surpassed all alternatives. It
took only fifteen years for his colleague Kagan (2008) to declare “The End of The
End of History.”
The notion of “the end of history” and of universalization of liberal (Western) values
had an important impact on the international media system: as long as there was “Cold
War” going on between East and West, all countries controlled for transborder (trans-
national and international) communication: mass communication from East to West and
vice versa was seen as propaganda, illegitimate and often illegal on the recipient side. The
idea of universal appeal of the liberal institutions opened a way for deregulation and liber-
alization of media systems in the West: radio and television broadcasting that was largely
government owned and/or regulated was open for private initiative. New technology
lowered costs of media production and distribution. Today, with a smartphone and the
Internet, one can produce and distribute a television program practically for free. The
same goes for magazines and other print media produced as, and distributed via, websites.
4. INTERNATIONAL, TRANSNATIONAL AND GLOBAL PR 41

Another important factor for the transformation of the media system is the dissolution of
what Western modernity considered to be essential for the conceptualization of human
rights and the rule of law: the notion of privacy. When individuals agreed (willingly and
unwillingly) to allow media companies (and governments) to sell their personal data,
a whole new media economy emerged: social media (e.g. Facebook, Instagram, Twitter).
And with them a new media eco-system developed (which is financed by selling the per-
sonal data of social media users, what they view, where they are, what they buy, to third
parties, commercial and political).
Traditionally, Western media systems were defined by editorial (journalist) and
advertising decisions. The second were based on money (advertisers buy media time
and space), the first on public interest (variously defined). The new 21st century
media system is structured differently and it is composed of four types of media:

• P – paid,
• E – earned,
• S – social,
• O – owned.

The PESO (paid, earned, social and owned) model was introduced by Dietrich
(2014) and immediately gained popularity for its heuristic value. Paid media consist
of communication that can be bought in contemporary media from classical adver-
tising to brand journalism and native advertising (Verčič & Tkalac Verčič, 2016;
Zerfass, Verčič, & Wiesenberg, 2016). Earned media are the endorsements of third
parties, from journalists to social media influencers. Social media has emerged as
a whole new form of communication that recombines word of mouth, earned publi-
city, paid posts, etc. Finally, owned media are probably the oldest type of mass
media (which started as official gazettes published by political and administrative
authorities to make their decisions known to their subjects), which, because of
technological changes, became accessible to everybody. The most widely-circulated
magazine in the world today is a monthly publication of Jehovah’s Witnesses, The
Watchtower, with 42 million copies printed in over one hundred languages (Jeho-
vah’s Witnesses, s.a.).
These political, economic, social and technological changes are forcing us to re-
think what media are. We believe that we should view them not as tools, but as
processes along the lines of Silverstone (1999, p. 13) who refers to media “as
a process of mediation.” This led Zerfass, Verčič, & Wiesenberg (2016) to propose
the concept of strategic mediatization that “blurs what used to be constitutive bor-
ders between advertising (paid publicity) and media relations (earned publicity),
mass media, and other noncore media organizations, who are creating content
either as sources or multipliers.” (p. 502) As we noted earlier, public relations is
transforming from being a provider of information subsidies (its traditional role)
into a media producer and creator of news and stories. We also see transform-
ations occurring on the media side. What used to be considered professional jour-
nalism is, in the new realities of globalised media work, turning into everything
else. In their report on the globalization of China’s media reported in The Guard-
ian newspaper, journalists Lim & Bergin (2018) remarked: “The vanishing thin line
between China’s journalism, propaganda work, influence projection and intelli-
gence-gathering is a concern to Washington.”
42 DEJAN VERČIČ AND KRISHNAMURTHY SRIRAMESH

INTERNATIONAL, TRANSNATIONAL AND GLOBAL MEDIA RELATIONS

Small organizations in large countries may still be able to operate on local or national
levels, while this is not the case for small countries and large organizations. In
Europe, over 90 percent of senior public relations practitioners (often called “Chief
Communication Officers”) work internationally on a daily basis: “with nearly quarter
of them dealing with 20 countries or more” (Verčič, Zerfass, & Wiesenberg, 2015,
p. 787). Unfortunately, this reality is not reflected in research. In their review of aca-
demic articles on international public relations published between 2006 and 2011,
Jain, De Moya & Molleda (2014) found that 77 percent of the 200 journal articles
were concerned with domestic public relations practice in a region/nation other than
the US (which also shows that public relations research is still US-centric), while only
18 percent had cross-county analyses and 5 percent dealt with global issues or organ-
izations. From a media relations point of view, this spawns questions about how to
practice media relations in different countries around the world, how to practice
media relations across borders, and how to practice global media relations.
Instrumental for international media relations (as the practice of media relations in
a country other than one’s home) are theories of media systems and international
comparisons of media use (Rössler, 2008). The normative theories of mass media sys-
tems and their relevance to international public relations was previously reviewed by
Sriramesh and Verčič (2009). Those normative theories were based on the Cold War
ideological divisions and in toward the latter part of their conceptualization, ended
up dividing the media around the world into autonomous, i.e. “free” (Western and
Social Responsibility media systems), and ancillary, i.e. not “free” (Authoritarian,
Communist, and Developmental media systems). With the fall of the “Soviet bloc,”
many of the “developing” (i.e. non-Western) countries catching-up with the “devel-
oped” (i.e. Western) world, and the onset of ICTs and social media, the relevance of
the normative theories of the media discussed between the 1950s and late 1980s is
vastly diminished even if some parts continue to resonate (eg. the developmental
media theory or the social responsibility theory). We believe that the current environ-
ment demands that we use new lenses to describe, and analyse, media systems around
the world.
There are several organizations monitoring freedom of the press and of the new
media (on the Internet), and the most known among them, The Freedom House,
clusters countries into three groups: those with free, partly free and not free press and
the Internet (https://freedomhouse.org) – in 2017, 31 percent of countries had free, 36
partly free and 33 percent not free press (with “press” here standing for traditional
mass media, TV, radio and print), 20 percent of the assessed countries had free, 33
partly free and 34 percent not free use of the Internet. Practitioners should be aware
of difference in freedom, regulation and control in their own and any new country
into which they would like to develop media relations.
While normative theories of the media help us understand differences primarily
with regard to how governments regulate media, media use approach helps us study
factors influencing audience or publics’ media consumption. In the previous edition,
we (Sriramesh & Verčič, 2009) had referred to this as “media diffusion.” Rössler
(2008) lists several of them, including the system of government, societal culture and
communication style, infrastructure for distribution, individual prosperity (including
media literacy), digitalization and mobility. Use of different types of media is very
much country specific. While in the US or Europe 95 percent and more households
4. INTERNATIONAL, TRANSNATIONAL AND GLOBAL PR 43

own at least one TV set, only 44 percent of households in India are equipped with
a TV apparatus. This is only part of the picture. Television today can be broadcast
terrestrially, via satellites, via a cable or over the Internet. It can have a linear pro-
gram (as most traditional TV stations), or non-linear (pull) programs (like TV series
or movies on a provider such as Netflix). A household can access one or just
a couple, or one hundred programs or more; national, regional, or international/
global. Similar differences can be observed for every single medium. It is interesting
to note, however, that as we move to newer and mobile media, Asia takes primacy. In
2017, of more than five billion mobile users, over four billion were in Asia-Pacific
(Kemp, 2018).
While international media relations is concerned with the comparative operation of
media relations between countries, transnational media relations deals with how to use
media to conduct media relations from one to another country (or among several of
them). Many countries, particularly those with partially free and non-free mass media
and the Internet, limit or prohibit access of foreign media into their territory. In 2017,
of seven and a half billion people living on our planet, more than five billion were
mobile telephone users, over four billion used the Internet, and more than three billion
used social media (Kemp, 2018). Many countries have banned or blocked different
social media, like Facebook in China, or LinkedIn in Russia. But even more countries
block trans-border media as a measure of combating terrorist propaganda (Simons,
2018), political disinformation (Barret, Wadhwa, & Bauman-Pauly, 2018; European
Commission, 2018) and fake news (Bernal, 2018). Even technology companies can do
and have done, this for governments. For example, Twitter has suspended 1.2 million
accounts on suspicion of aiding terrorist causes (Reisinger, 2018). Given this reality, it
is important to note that the definition of what counts as “terrorism,” or “disinforma-
tion” or “fake news” is a political decision and [a]ccording to international law, there
are no universal definitions of either “extremism” or “terrorism” and there is “the
temptation to misuse the national security argument to a pretext to silence dissenting
voices and to restrict freedom of expression at large” (OSCE, 2018). This is not unlike
the description of media control by authoritarian, communist, or even the developmen-
tal media systems described by the normative theories of the media. We don’t claim
that there is not terrorist propaganda, disinformation and fake news in the media, just
that practitioners should be wary that these terms are used variously around the world
by different actors. For example, what one may describe as a “terrorist” may be
a “freedom fighter” to someone else. In the end, the person who has more power and
agency in a society may get to define such terms.
Although many countries impose limits on transborder media, we are witnessing
the emergence of a truly global communication. When monthly active users are com-
pared with the population of countries, we see some interesting patterns: with
1.8 billion users, Facebook was the largest community in the world in 2016, followed
by China (1.4 population), India (1.3 billion), WhatsApp (1.2 billion), Instagram
(600 million), USA (about 320 million), Twitter, SnapChat, and Indonesia
(300 million each), Brazil (200 million), Pakistan (200 million) … (Taylor, 2016).
While we may be entering an era of post-truth, post-fact and post democracy (Noth-
haft, 2018),

[t]he distinctive characteristics of the Internet and the rapid growth of social media have
enabled a social world where images and image-based narratives travel freely across
44 DEJAN VERČIČ AND KRISHNAMURTHY SRIRAMESH

linguistic, national and cultural borders, leading to the creation of nouveau global pub-
lics acclimatized to a culture of visual rhetoric. (Dhanesh, 2018, p. 123)

Globalism, although contested by many, is a reality, in particularly in crisis communi-

cation (Coombs, 2017; Downing, 2017; Jin, Austin, Guidry, & Parrish, 2017).
Recognition of the globality of media relations got an exceptional expression when
Denmark established the Office of Denmark’s Tech Ambassador, who represents his
country not in another country or an international organization, but in relations with
the largest tech and media companies around the world. The minister’s mandate is
explained on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2018): “The
Office of the Danish Tech Ambassador has a global mandate and a physical presence
across three time zones in Silicon Walley, Copenhagen and Beijing – transcending
borders and regions and rethinking diplomacy.”
With the tech industry, primarily media and communications companies that have
more members/users than the population of the largest countries and boast market
capitalization larger than the GDP of the majority of countries of the world, we dis-
cern a complete overhaul of the topology of the world. Global media relations is
here, both as an opportunity and a threat: “It demands more work in a more complex
environment” (Verčič, 2009, p. 804).

PUBLIC RELATIONS AND THE MEDIA IN THE 21ST CENTURY

In the first edition of the Global Public Relations Handbook, Sriramesh had proposed
an approach to understanding media environments around the world especially as far
as global public relations is concerned (Sriramesh, 1999). He had advocated
a framework of three factors (media control, media diffusion, and media access),
which should help the international/transnational/global public relations professional
in designing appropriate media relations strategies depending on the part of the world
where they need to operate. At its core, those three factors were intended to help the
global public relations professional understand the media environment in a country
and thus “localize” media relations approaches to suit that environment. That frame-
work was also proposed with the hope of helping researcher study the nexus between
media environments and effective public relations practices across different countries.
We now present those three factors aligning them to the new media realities discussed
above.

MEDIA CONTROL

Around the world, media content reflects the preferences of elites who have social
capital such as the government and politicians or capitalists. Therefore, effective
media relations is not possible unless the global public relations practitioner under-
stands who controls media in a particular country or society. It is important to
observe at the outset, that media ownership does not imply media control although it
surely helps mainly because in different parts of the world media owners also may be
involved in other enterprises including politics. In capitalistic economies usually there
is also political pluralism and some amount of editorial freedom whereas in develop-
ing economies media may be privately owned but their content may be heavily influ-
enced by political interests. In many countries the government may exercise overt and
covert control over media content either by owning media or by ensuring the privately
4. INTERNATIONAL, TRANSNATIONAL AND GLOBAL PR 45

owned media succumb to government will. This is done in various ways. For example,
economic and legal systems are under government control in most countries of the
world. The European Commission has for years accused the government of Macedo-
nia for using government advertising as a tool “to undermine editorial independence”
(Cvetanoski, 2015). The Freedom House lists Russia and China as “having established
near-complete control over domestic media,” and Turkey, Ethiopia and Venezuela for
using “political or social unrest as a pretext to crack down further on independent or
opposition-oriented outlets.” Several countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle
East and Asia have been reported for extending “restrictive laws to online speech, or
simply shut down telecommunications services at crucial moments” (Dunham, 2018).
Editorial freedom appears to be directly proportional to the level of economic
development of a country. Lack of resources often force media in developing coun-
tries to succumb to the will of political elites and the government. After studying the
relationship between press freedom and social development in 134 nations, Weaver,
Buddenbaum, & Fair (1985) remarked that “the stronger the media are economically,
the less likely [able] the government is to control these media” (p. 113). Advertise-
ments, which form a large source of advertising revenue (and a means of survival) for
private media in many developing countries, are still used by governments to maintain
control over broadcast and print media. Other forms of censorship including legal
harassment abound in many regions of the world as also personal dangers including
kidnapping and worse. Further, it is also not uncommon for political rulers of devel-
oping nations to own their own media outlets (usually print media) and use them for
controlling public opinion with the sole purpose of maintaining the status quo – their
hold over the reigns of power. It is clear that in many developing nations, economic
independence is a mirage for most media outlets.
In several editions of his book, Bagdikian (2004) discussed the concentration
of media ownership in a few corporations. Based on their owners’ revenue from
advertising (which reflects their reach), the largest media owners in 2017 were:

1. Alphabet
2. Facebook
3. Comcast
4. Baidu
5. The Walt Disney Company
6. 21st Century Fox
7. CBS Corporation
8. iHeartMedia Inc
9. Microsoft
10. Bartelsmann
11. Viacom
12. Time Warner
13. Yahoo
14. Tencent
15. Hearst
16. Advance Publications
17. JCDecaux
18. News Corporation
19. Grupo Globo
20. CCTV
46 DEJAN VERČIČ AND KRISHNAMURTHY SRIRAMESH

21. Verizon
22. Mediaset
23. Discovery Communications
24. TEGNA
25. ITV
26. ProSiebenSat.1 Group
27. Sinclair Broadcasting Gropu
28. Exel Springer
29. Scripps Networks Interactive
30. Twitter

It is worth noting that 20 of these largest media of the world are based in the US. Of
the rest, China and Germany have three each (China: Baidu, Tencent and CCTV;
Germany: Bartelsmann, ProSiebenSat1.1 and Axel Springer) while four countries
have one each (France: JCDecaux, Brazil: Grupo Globo, Italy: Mediaset, UK: ITV).
As “Google and Facebook together accounted for 20 percent of global advertising
expenditure across all media in 2016,” (Zenith, 2017) they may currently be the lar-
gest controllers of media in the world. Facebook employs around 15,000 people who
decide about, and execute “the rules, hashing out what the site’s two billion users
should be allowed to say”. Facebook calls these people “moderators,” but effectively
they are digital censors, and The New York Times calls them “an unseen branch of
government” (Fisher, 2018) – a global government that often relies on Google Trans-
late tool to decide what can be published in an unknown language on the other side
of the planet.

MEDIA DIFFUSION

In the first edition of this book and elsewhere, Sriramesh had used the term “media
outreach” to refer to the extent to which the media permeate a given society. In
the second edition he renamed it as “media diffusion,” for greater clarity. Practicing
public relations globally requires that practitioners understand the extent of media
diffusion in the countries of their choice so that they are disseminating their messages
to the right audience. Media diffusion is all about the audience. Who consumes which
media in a given country is a vital piece of information that aids the strategic commu-
nication of every practitioner.
Media diffusion is affected by the level of illiteracy and poverty in a society.
West & Fair (1993) studied the use of what they termed (before the advent of the
Internet of course) “modern,” “popular,” and “traditional” media in Africa and
highlighted the pitfalls of the improper use of indigenous African media (or “trad-
itional” media) for developmental activities. For example, the authors cautioned
that it would be inappropriate to use Mozambique’ s paiva genre of song for
“transmission of messages originating in an authority external to the very commu-
nity that maintains them” because historically the songs are “suited to empower-
ment of the oppressed vis-a-vis authority” (p. 101). It also would be important for
the international public relations practitioner to be cautious in using the Makonde
and Makua genre of African sculpture, which is a medium of ridiculing officials
(Isaacman & Isaacman, 1983, p. 69, cited in West and Fair) and therefore, may be
inappropriate for many information campaigns.
4. INTERNATIONAL, TRANSNATIONAL AND GLOBAL PR 47

MEDIA ACCESS

The flip side of media diffusion is media access. Whereas media diffusion refers to the
extent of dispersion of the mass media in a society thereby giving the practitioner an
idea of whether the intended audience uses a particular medium, media access denotes
the extent to which the citizenry of a society can use the mass media to disseminate
their messages. Media access does not remain constant across societies. Sriramesh &
Takasaki (1998), reporting on the nature of Japanese public relations, identified press
clubs as interlocutors between the media and other publics, including corporations who
might want to gain access to the media thereby limiting access to the media in Japan.
A savvy international public relations practitioner will recognize that just as an
organization’s access to the media is critical, so is the extent to which the media are
accessible to those who frequently challenge organizations, such as activists. The gate-
keeping function exercised by traditional media (print and broadcast media) has been
greatly reduced with the onset of ICTs and social media in the past two decades.
Whereas this may seem like “democratization” because it takes away the “control” of
a few media editors/gatekeepers, it also can be dangerous not to have such control
over media content as was evident in the US presidential elections of 2016 and
beyond. Thus, the Internet, social and mobile media are reconfiguring ways in which
we think about media access.
As Castells (2007) observed, the Internet and wireless communication networks are
enabling mass self-communication, “self-generated in content, self-directed in emission,
and self-selected in reception by many that communicate with many” (p. 248) At the
time of its emergence and democratization of its use, there was a great expectation that
the Internet and information-communication technology will democratise social and
global communication. The Cluetrain Manifesto (Levine, Locke, Searls, & Weinberger,
2000) voiced that excitement with the starting thesis: “Markets are conversations” (see
also Verčič, Tkalac Verčič, & Sriramesh, 2015). As we have shown in this chapter, that
expectation has not been fulfilled, and the Internet is developing from enabler of free
communication to an instrument of social (economic and political) control. As any
other technology in human history, it has two sides, a positive and a negative one.

CONCLUSION

The media, paid, earned, social and owned are critical to strategic global public rela-
tions. By analyzing who controls the media, how much access various segments of the
population have to the media (including the blurring of the gatekeeping function),
and finally the extent of media outreach, media relations managers will be better able
to strategize their public relations approaches in different countries and around the
world. They will be able to discern the nature of challenge they can expect from the
media and other sources as well as device strategies of identifying key media (and
other) stakeholders who can influence effective media relations. The onset and expo-
nential growth of digital, social, mobile and wearable media with emerging augmented
and virtual reality media and artificial intelligence is altering the terrain for global
public relations practice. But issues such as the Digital Divide pose interesting
avenues for research in how these “new” media contribute to the information sharing
dynamics in a society. As we are learn more about these media and their use and
abuse around the world, hopefully we are becoming better equipped to both practice
and research media relations practices around the world.
48 DEJAN VERČIČ AND KRISHNAMURTHY SRIRAMESH

NOTE
1 For “Blurring the lines between personal and organizational identity” see Bonewits Feldner and Tusinski
Berg (2017)

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 CHAPTER

5
The Nexus between Activism and
Public Relations

Ganga S. Dhanesh
Krishnamurthy Sriramesh

When mighty Amazon announced in February 2019 that it was not going to set up
its second mega headquarters in New York after all (despite a US $3 billion package of
tax and other incentives promised by the Governor of New York and the Mayor of
New York City), the power of grassroots activism was seen as a key factor that forced
the corporate giant into the decision. Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY)
claimed victory tweeting: “Today was the day a group of dedicated, everyday
New Yorkers and their neighbours defeated Amazon’s corporate greed, its worker
exploitation, and the power of the richest man in the world” (Ocasio-Cortez, 2019). Her
elation appeared at odds with several polls that showed popular support for
Amazon’s second headquarters in New York that touted to bring over 40,000 high
paying jobs to the area. The power of activist opposition was acknowledged by Amazon
in its statement announcing its decision not to proceed with its previous plans taken after
over two years of research and negotiations with at least 20 cities. Opposition to
Amazon’s second mega headquarters was indicative of the pushback big tech companies
have faced at the hands of activists lately. The likes of Facebook have been hauled before
a sceptical Congress and their practices challenged in public by policymakers who hith-
erto had given them a free rein mostly because of vocal activist pressure.
In February 2018, high school students turned into activists after a 19-year old gunned
down 17 students and staff at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland,
Florida. They organized the March For Our Lives movement to rally for stricter gun
control laws, targeting the NRA and NRA-backed politicians. Subsequently, for the first
time since 2000, the NRA was viewed more negatively with public support falling to

51
52 GANGA S. DHANESH AND KRISHNAMURTHY SRIRAMESH

37 percent. Delta Airlines, Hertz and MetLife cut ties with the NRA and Dick’s Sporting
Goods announced that it would stop carrying assault weapons (www.time.com).
On the other side of the world, the South Korean government was heavily criticized
for its handling of the 2015 Middle-East respiratory syndrome (MERS) outbreak in
South Korea, which fueled public anxiety and negatively affected the nation’s econ-
omy, with local businesses reporting a sharp decrease in sales and tourism. As
a result, the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice, the oldest NGO in South
Korea, filed a class action suit against the government, representing victims and their
families.
These examples clearly indicate that perceptions of activists as troublemakers and
rabble-rousers have given way to viewing them as relevant stakeholders with enor-
mous power to influence the political economy of most countries but certainly the
more pluralistic environments. There is a plethora of publics, individually or jointly
fighting for equality, justice, peace, religious freedom, economic opportunity, or polit-
ical ideology across the world, employing radical, moderate, or peaceful strategies.
Their targets could be individuals or organizations including governments, companies,
and NGOs. Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and social media
have played a major role in magnifying activism and diffusing it around the world as
was seen in the #Metoo movement against sexual harassment that began in
October 2017.
Public relations scholarship and education have begun to acknowledge the chan-
ging representations of activists and activism ever since the earliest versions of Excel-
lence theory positioned them as threats external to the organization that have to be
managed (Brooks et al., 2018; Mules, 2018). This chapter builds on the chapter on
activism and public relations in the previous edition (Kim and Sriramesh, 2009), by
updating literature on activism and public relations published between 2009 and
2019, mapping the major areas of research during this decade, and offering directions
for future research. Prior to the review of literature, the chapter will start with a brief
review of the theoretical framework on activism and public relations offered by Kim
and Sriramesh (2009).

ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES AND ACTIVISM

After reviewing various definitions of activism (Browne, 1998; Burstein, 1998; Diani,
1992; Grunig, 1992; Mintzberg, 1983; Tarrow, 1994; Wright, 1996) we had defined
activism as:

The coordinated effort of a group that organizes voluntarily in an effort to solve prob-
lems that threaten the common interest of members of the group. In the process of
problem solving, core members of the group attract other social constituents or publics,
create and maintain a shared collective identity among members for the time being,
and mobilize resources and power to influence the problem-causing entity’s decision or
action through communicative action such as education, negotiation, persuasion, pres-
sure tactics, or force. (Kim & Sriramesh, 2009, p. 82)

Further, Kim and Sriramesh (2009) had identified two dimensions of activism: con-
frontational intensity and breadth of issue spectrum. Confrontational intensity refers
to the depth or fierceness of activism and can be measured using indicators such as
the use and frequency of violent action, and the number of mobilized participants. In
5. THE NEXUS BETWEEN ACTIVISM AND PUBLIC RELATIONS 53

the case of Amazon’s decision in scrapping its plans for HQ2 in New York, oppos-
ition by activists was intense enough to force Amazon to even go against the wishes
of its own government supporters such as New York Governor Andrew Como and
New York Mayor Bill de Blasio. This was also true of the activism spawned primarily
by the high school students of Parkland, Florida as well. The breadth of activism is
the variety of issues that activists seek to pursue. Kim and Sriramesh (2009) had pos-
ited that the political, economic, cultural, media, and organizational environments
influence both these dimensions and had offered a conceptual model that mapped the
effects of socio-cultural environmental variables on the extent of activism. Further, they
had proposed a conceptual model that mapped the effects of socio-environmental factors
(as antecedents) on the extent of activism (societal consequence), which in turn plays
a role in the adoption of the generic principles of global public relations in specific soci-
eties (consequence on public relations). In essence, the authors had clarified that although
viewed as a separate environmental variable, activism indeed is also affected by the other
four variables discussed in other chapters in this section (Figure 5.1).
Kim and Sriramesh (2009) had concluded that chapter with a call for research on
(a) socio-cultural environmental variables that could foster activism in a country, (b)
the extent of activism in the country including the history and frequency of activism,
the nature and diversity of issues addressed by activists, and the tactics employed by
activists, and (c) the relationship between activism and public relations approaches
including the types of organizations targeted by activists, organizational responses to
activism such as the use of the mixed-motives and personal influence models, building

Political Context
Higher Liberal-Pluralism

Economic Context
+

Higher Economic Prosperity

Media Context + Extent of

Open Receiver Systems &
Open Message Systems Activism

+
+ +
Cultural Context
More Collectivistic;
+

More Masculine;
High Uncertainty Avoidance;
Low Power Distance; Depth of Issues Breadth of Issues
Low Long-Term Commitment (Conflict Intensity) (Issue Spectrum)

Organizational
Context
High Ecological Concentration;
Stronger and Broader
Indigenous Organizations

Antecedent Consequence

FIG 5.1 Source: Kim and Sriramesh (2009).

54 GANGA S. DHANESH AND KRISHNAMURTHY SRIRAMESH

a symmetrical system of internal communication and strong corporate culture, and

level of ethical consciousness and perceived need for social responsibility. Summariz-
ing the research questions for future research we had also offered the following
proposition:

A society whose socio-cultural environmental factors are more conducive to fostering

greater levels of activism is more likely to necessitate 1) involvement of public relations
in the strategic management process, 2) use of the two-way models (or mixed-motive)
approach, 3) presence of a symmetrical internal communication system, 4) higher levels
of ethical consciousness and social responsibility, and 5) higher levels of knowledge
among practitioners for mixed-motive and strategic approaches in responding to activism
(Kim & Sriramesh, 2009, p. 94).

We will next review the literature that has been generated on activism and public rela-
tions as a way of analyzing the body of knowledge since that call almost a decade
ago to see how much of what we had hoped has come to bear and then offer some
thoughts on how scholars can expand the body of knowledge vis-à-vis the relation-
ship between activism and public relations.

LITERATURE ON ACTIVISM AND PUBLIC RELATIONS FROM 2009–2019

Public relations and activism have been strange bedfellows for a long time, with the
literature reflecting reluctant transformations in the uneasy relationship. Scholarship
on the public relations – activism nexus can be categorized into three, somewhat
overlapping, groups. First, situated within the paradigm of Excellence theory, activ-
ism and activist publics were considered a necessary external threat that helped keep
organizations more responsive to society and therefore excellent public relations
practice (as a symmetrical function) had a role in helping organizations manage
that relationship (Dozier & Lauzen, 2000). Second, scholars who have adopted
a more critical approach have considered activism as a role that the public relations
practitioners adopt within their organizations, actively managing their boundary
spanning role as organizational agents as also activists (Dozier & Lauzen, 2000;
Holtzhausen 2011; Holtzhausen & Voto, 2002). Finally, scholars have examined the
variety of public relations strategies adopted by activist organizations to have their
voice heard in the public sphere, while demanding social change (e.g., Brooks et al.,
2018; Kang, Kim & Cha, 2018).
In one of the most recent studies, Mules (2018) noted that public relations theorizing
on activism has been changing from an issues and crisis perspective to a more emanci-
patory perspective, considering activists and their typically disruptive strategies not just
as a problem to be managed by the target organization but as valid and highly creative.
Coombs & Holladay (2012) noted how discussions of activism, persuasion/advocacy,
and power have “to become part of the discussion in the dominant paradigm” (p. 884).
Indeed, a thorough and exhaustive review of literature on public relations and activism
published since the previous edition of this volume revealed that public relations schol-
arship on activism has been healthy, exploring diverse perspectives and strands of
research building on previous foundations from the Excellence theory, rhetorical and
critical perspectives, etc. We summarize these into three categories:
5. THE NEXUS BETWEEN ACTIVISM AND PUBLIC RELATIONS 55

1. Theoretical frameworks examining activism including the cultural-economic

model based on the circuit of culture framework (Ciszek, 2015; 2016a, 2017a;
Curtin, 2016; Han & Zhang, 2009); postmodernism (Benecke & Oksiutycz,
2015; Ciszek, 2016; Dhanesh, 2013; Holtzhausen, 2011); Bourdieu’s thoughts
on activism (Wolf, 2018); postcolonialism (Sejrup, 2014); and economic rent-
seeking from public choice theory (Thompson, 2016).
2. Activist strategies studying various strategies employed by activist organiza-
tions, companies, individuals, and publics (Allagui, 2017; Brooks et al., 2018;
Fisher, 2018; Toledano, 2016; Weaver, 2010); the effectiveness of activist strat-
egies (Jahng et al., 2014; Stokes & Rubin, 2009); and antecedents of activism
(Kang, Kim & Cha, 2018).
3. Digital activism that focus on studies ranging from earlier research on website-
based activism (Sommerfeldt, 2011; Sommerfeldt et al., 2012; Yang & Taylor,
2010) to later ones on social media-enabled activism (Ciszek, 2016; Maiorescu,
2017; Stokes & Atkins-Sayre, 2018; Veil et al., 2015)

A handful of studies has also examined activism involving specific stakeholders or

areas of practice such as internal activism (Curtin, 2016; Dhanesh, 2013; Holtzhau-
sen, 2011; Maiorescu, 2017); political activism (Toledano, 2016; Toledano, 2018);
investor activism (Thompson, 2018; Uysal, 2013; Uysal, 2014) and ethnic advocacy
and activism (DeMoya & Bravo, 2016). Most of these studies have employed case
studies of specific instances of activism to make their cases. We invite your attention
to chapters later in this volume such as the one on bullfighting in Catalonia (the con-
cept of nations within nations) and the case of Bell Pottinger in South Africa where
different types of activism were evident. The following section will elaborate on the
major findings from these three main categories.

Theoretical Frameworks

Since 2009, no single dominant theoretical framework has been used to examine
activism and public relations. A few studies continue to explore specific tenets of
excellence theory, especially the effectiveness of the models of public relations. For
instance, Kang, Kim, and Cha (2018) examined the role of dialogic communication in
triggering activism, while Maiorescu (2017) found that IBM’s union unsuccessfully
engaged in an informative and one-way communication style over social media plat-
forms, intended to increase employee engagement in activism.
Another set of studies has proposed and examined activism using the cultural-
economic model based on the circuit of culture framework. Han and Zhang (2009)
adopted it to analyze a public activist campaign against Starbucks in the Forbidden
City and illustrated the role of culture in international public relations within an
Internet-based media context, and highlighted the role of new media, specifically
blogs, in China and its impact on international public relations practice. Later,
Ciszek (2015) proposed the cultural-economic model as a way to examine scholar-
ship of activism and public relations, particularly how activism and public relations
need not always be positioned as being antagonistic. Curtin (2016) expanded the
basic precepts of the cultural-economic model to offer a more nuanced understand-
ing of the relationship between public relations and activism. Applying the cul-
tural-economic model as a critical theoretical framework, Ciszek (2017a) examined
56 GANGA S. DHANESH AND KRISHNAMURTHY SRIRAMESH

articulations of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) activism, specific-

ally LGBT youth outreach. More recently we used the conceptual framework pre-
sented in Part I of this volume to analyze the crisis of reputation that Nestle India
faced as a result of activism against its popular Maggi instant noodles brand (Dha-
nesh & Sriramesh, 2018). This set of studies that integrates understandings of cul-
tural production, consumption, and representation of activism acknowledges the
role that culture plays in spawning, and responding to, activism (Kim & Sriramesh,
2009).
In addition to the cultural-economic model, another set of studies has employed
principles of postmodernism to examine activism and public relations. In the post-
modernist view, concepts such as disruption and dissensus versus collaboration
and consensus are explored. Holtzhausen and Voto advanced this perspective as
far back as 2002 and recent research has added to this approach by empirically
examining public relations practitioners as organizational activists. For instance,
Dhanesh (2013) examined the conceptualization of the postmodern public relations
practitioner as an organizational activist in the context of community relations
and corporate social responsibility (CSR) in India and found that practitioners
appeared to be dancing a delicate dialectic as organizational activists and agents
at the same time. Ciszek (2016) analyzed user-generated comments to posts on
Chick-fil-A’s Facebook page, exploring the concept of dissensus including various
dissenting perspectives and expressions of dissensus, and proposed dissensus as an
area for development in activist and social media research. Benecke and Oksiutycz
(2015) employed the postmodernist worldview of public relations activists as
change agents to examine the role of public relations in South African society,
specifically by studying the principles and methods used by Primedia Broadcasting
South Africa’s LeadSA initiative to start and facilitate social dialogue and to con-
tribute to social change. Allagui (2017) employed a postmodernist perspective to
discuss the extra-organizational activism of public relations manifested in corpor-
ate campaigns for social good in the Middle East. As these examples indicate, the
postmodernist perspective has been applied to examine activism and public rela-
tions in various non-Euro American contexts, thus adding to the body of know-
ledge on how specific local conditions affect the application of global principles
and strategies of public relations, a goal that the Handbook of Global Public
Relations champions.
Beyond the excellence theory, the cultural-economic model, and postmodernism
there have only been scattered attempts by a few scholars to examine other diverse
theoretical frameworks to study activism and public relations. These attempts include
Wolf (2018)’s challenge of the functionalist paradigm of excellence theory, proposing
an alternative approach to the scholarship of activist public relations based on the
ideas of the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. Continuing this line of critical scholarship,
Sejrup (2014), based on theoretical insights from Spivak, Guha, and others analyzed
mass-mediated projections of relationships between public relations practitioners in
the shape of activist groups and organizations, and subaltern stakeholders for whom
they act as public representatives. Finally, in the context of activist investor relations,
Thompson (2016) explored the relationship between the concept of economic rent-
seeking from public choice theory and the practice, institutions and outcomes of
activist public relations and argued that activist public relations could be theorized as
a practice that seeks to extract rents in the form of benefits from the political arena
as a result of persuasive activity.
5. THE NEXUS BETWEEN ACTIVISM AND PUBLIC RELATIONS 57

The above review makes clear to us that scholars who have examined the link
between activism and public relations have run the gamut between the functionalist,
interpretive, and critical theoretical perspectives. In addition to proposing and apply-
ing various theoretical frameworks to study activism and public relations,
a substantial body of scholarship has focused on examining the various strategies
employed by activists and their target organizations/publics.

Activist Strategies

Within this broad area, most studies have examined the different types of strategies
employed by activist organizations or individuals in order to attain their goals. Most
of the work in this strand of research tends to examine the role and effectiveness of
the various models of public relations ranging from one-way asymmetrical to mixed-
motive models, including the examination of conflict management strategies.
For instance, employing the contingency theory of conflict management, and the
conflict resolution strategies posited under the mixed-motive model, Fisher (2018)
examined strategies of student activists and institutional responses ranging from pure
advocacy to pure accommodation and found that both parties employed advocacy
strategies, with only institutions moving along the continuum from advocacy to pure
accommodation. Similarly, acknowledging the role of negotiation in the relationship
between activists and other entities (Kim & Sriramesh, 2009), Brooks et al. (2018)
examined some of the public relations methods employed by a successful prosocial
NGO to engage its publics through activism and negotiation. Toledano (2016)
explored activist public relations in the background of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
and demonstrated how practitioners may use advocacy, persuasive strategy and facili-
tation of genuine dialogues simultaneously and ethically to achieve organizational
goals, and to seek social change. Stokes and Rubin (2009) employed rhetorical criti-
cism to demonstrate how activists employed asymmetrical strategies of values advo-
cacy and inoculation to win public support against deceptive, probably harmful,
organizations, challenging the more collaborative slant of the two-way symmetrical or
mixed-motive models.
Apart from examining strategies of negotiation and advocacy, Weaver (2010), based
on Bakhtin’s theorizing of the carnivalesque, argued that carnivalesque protest com-
prises a genre of activist public relations, which can disrupt dominant discourses on
controversial issues. Employing a case study of the New Zealand group Mothers
Against Genetic Engineering, Weaver (2010) demonstrated how the asymmetrical
communication strategy of carnivalesque protest could create new spaces for public
dialogue about social issues through promoting community relationships and influen-
cing public opinion through emotions. Further, the study argued that carnivalesque
protest challenges the idea that collaboration should be a core professional value of
public relations practice.
In one of the very few studies to employ a survey to examine the effectiveness of
activist strategies, Jahng et al. (2014) examined publics’ evaluations of activists’ com-
munication strategies (specifically protests, humiliation, and terrorism) and found that
participants evaluated activists’ strategies of protest more positively compared to
strategies of humiliation and terrorism. When protest strategies were used, the more
likely the participants were to spread the information of activists via social media and
had greater intention to donate to activists.
58 GANGA S. DHANESH AND KRISHNAMURTHY SRIRAMESH

Although Kim and Sriramesh (2009) theorizing of the relationship between activ-
ism and public relations positioned activism as a trigger for organizational responses,
including the models of public relations employed, Kang, Kim, and Cha (2018) exam-
ined the reverse relationship. They proposed and tested a conceptual model that
explains how citizens’ perceptions of dialogic communication by their government
during a crisis might affect their intentions to engage in activism against the govern-
ment. The study found that dialogic government communication could reduce citi-
zens’ distrust against the government and the citizens’ uncertainty about the
pandemic crisis. Without dialogic communication mitigating distrust in the govern-
ment, citizens could experience anger, anxiety, and cynicism, which in turn could
encourage citizens to engage in activism against the government, through attending
rallies, signing online and offline petitions, and sending letters or emails to public offi-
cials to voice their dissenting opinions.
The above set of studies examining various strategies employed by activists to fur-
ther their goals adds to Kim and Sriramesh’s (2009) call for more research into the
relationship between activism and the public relations approaches employed, by both
activists and the targeted organizations. Continuing the study of activist strategies,
but in the specific domain of online spaces, is the last main category of research on
digital activism.

Digital Activism

As previously stated, digital activism has been on the ascendency in the past few
years – especially after the popularity of social media – leveraging on the lack of
“gatekeepers” to filter out information and thus providing media access to a wide
range of individuals and groups. Scholarship on digital activism ranges from earlier
studies on website-based activism (Sommerfeldt, 2011; Sommerfeldt et al., 2012; Yang
& Taylor, 2010) to the more recent studies of social media-enabled activism (Ciszek,
2016; Maiorescu, 2017; Stokes & Atkins-Sayre, 2018; Veil et al., 2015). In one of the
earlier studies, Seo et al. (2009) examined how transnational NGOs based in the
United States make use of new media tools, specifically websites, blogs, podcasts, and
wikis, in their public relations activities and found that promoting the organization’s
image and fund-raising were the two most important functions of new media for the
NGOs. Similarly, Han and Zhang (2009) analyzed a public activist campaign against
Starbucks in the Forbidden City in the context of Internet-based media, and high-
lighted the role of blogs in China and its impact on activism and international public
relations practice. Focusing on the use of websites, Yang and Taylor (2010) examined
the relationship-building functions of Chinese ENGOs’ websites and found that
although they provide information to members, the public, and the media these
organizations do not focus on organizing their publics to participate in environmental
social movements. Sommerfeldt (2011) examined activist group websites to study how
activists engage in resource mobilization online and found that website features
asking visitors to donate, join the organization, and links to other activist groups
were the most commonly used. Further, Sommerfeldt et al. (2012) examined why
activist organizations do not integrate dialogic features into their websites and found
that according to practitioners, website communication is most effective when tied to
issue-specific events and addresses the needs of existing and highly involved publics.
Practitioners also considered websites as passive communication tools that must be
supported with traditional public relations practices. More recently, Veil et al. (2015)
5. THE NEXUS BETWEEN ACTIVISM AND PUBLIC RELATIONS 59

examined strategies of online activism and demonstrated how traditional activist

strategies have been adapted for the online environment. The authors proposed hoax
as a strategy to trigger action and demonstrated the effectiveness of social media
hijacking as a tactic. They also debunked claims of the lack of effectiveness of “slack-
tivism” and highlighted the need for collaborative relationships between activist groups,
and the need for proactive issues management. Stokes and Atkins-Sayre (2018) exam-
ined the use of digital technologies by activists. Specifically the authors discussed how
strategic, message-level digital activism can contribute to societal change and proposed
the idea of “rhetorical fracturing, or quickly using digital media to puncture a target’s
narrative, to create messages that challenge an opponent’s legitimacy to cultivate public
opinion, thereby pressuring corporate policy change” (p.149).
These studies on digital activism demonstrate how activists have leveraged the
changing nature of digital affordances and especially the absence of the gatekeeping
function that was evident in traditional print and broadcast media. From the use of
relatively passive websites devoid of dialogic features for disseminating issue-specific
information to involved publics and requesting members of the public to join and
donate, activist organizations now draw on the affordances of social media to engage
in tactics such as social media hijacking and rhetorical fracturing.

FUTURE RESEARCH AND CONCLUSION

The review of literature on activism and public relations from 2009 to 2019 has
revealed a strong, diverse, and vibrant growth in the literature, examining the topic
using multiple theoretical perspectives, specifically examining strategies employed by
activists, with an increased focus on examining digital activism, and activism in spe-
cific areas such as internal activism and financial activism. However, some areas of
research highlighted in the previous edition of this book have not been adequately
studied. In the previous edition, Kim and Sriramesh (2009) had called for research on
(a) socio-cultural environmental variables that could foster activism in a society, (b)
the extent of activism in a country including the history and frequency of activism,
the nature and diversity of issues addressed by activists, and the tactics employed by
activists, and (c) the relationship between activism and public relations approaches
including the types of organizations targeted by activists, organizational responses to
activism such as the use of the mixed-motives and personal influence models, building
a symmetrical system of internal communication and strong corporate culture, and
level of ethical consciousness and perceived need for social responsibility.
Although research has considered culturally grounded theoretical frameworks to
examine activism (e.g., Ciszek, 2015; 2016, 2017a; Curtin, 2016; Han & Zhang, 2009)
much more research is needed on other socio-cultural environmental variables such as
the level of economic development, the media environment, and political factors that
could foster activism in a country. In addition, not many studies have focused on the
extent of activism in a country analyzing the history and frequency of activist move-
ments. Although studies have increasingly examined strategies employed by activists
(Allagui, 2017; Brooks et al., 2018; Fisher, 2018; Toledano, 2016; Weaver, 2010), more
research is required on organizational responses to activism and the factors that
affect these responses.
Further, although there is a growing body of research on digital activism (e.g.,
Ciszek, 2016; Maiorescu, 2017; Sommerfeldt, 2011; Sommerfeldt et al., 2012; Stokes
& Atkins-Sayre, 2018; Veil et al., 2015; Yang & Taylor, 2010), there needs to be more
60 GANGA S. DHANESH AND KRISHNAMURTHY SRIRAMESH

studies on the ways in which digital environments interact with activism, producing
newer embodiments of online behavior such as hacktivism, slacktivism, and clickvit-
ism. Although other fields of research have examined these concepts, studies within
public relations on these emergent topics are rare. Similarly, except for Thompson
(2018) very few studies have examined the intersection of activism and the social
responsibilities of organizations. With the increasing shift in examining activism from
an externally-orientated issues and crisis management perspective to an emancipatory
force for social good (Brooks et al., 2018; Mules, 2018), and with the conceptualization
of corporate social responsibility as shared social responsibility among corporations,
governments and civil society it will be intriguing to examine the dialectical interplays
between activism and corporate social responsibility.
We believe that the framework of the five environmental variables discussed in this
volume can, and should, be applied to several genres of research. For example, per-
haps for the first time, we applied this framework (including the relevance of activism)
to crisis communication when we analyzed the reputational crisis that Nestle India
encountered when its popular Maggi instant noodles brand was targeted for being
contaminated and laced with lead and MSG (Dhanesh & Sriramesh, 2018). In our
view, such explications help expand the body of research in domains such as crisis
communication by going beyond familiar approaches by also bringing a global per-
spective to such discussions.
To summarize, this chapter has briefly reviewed the conceptual model of the effect
of socio-cultural environmental variables on the adoption of generic principles of
global public relations proposed by Kim and Sriramesh (2009) in the previous edition
of the Global Public Relations Handbook; analyzed three key streams of research on
activism and public relations that occurred between 2009 and 2019; and identified
future areas of research.

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 PART

II
Current Key Global Players
 CHAPTER

6
Leading an Ethical Industry
Local and Global Professional Public Relations
Associations

Margalit Toledano
David McKie

INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the industry’s ethical challenges and the power of associations
to lead a global and ethical industry as a timely and important topic. It is well-timed
given the complexity emerging from the increasingly global contemporary digital com-
munication environment (e.g., the worldwide proliferation of social media and the
new professional associations that provide services to new subgroups of content man-
agers); it is important as it also concerns the reputation of the industry. After identi-
fying obstacles and the associations’ potential to deal with them, the chapter draws
from literature on the sociology of the professions and ethical leadership, to examine
the role of public relations associations and suggests new directions. While
a comprehensive global study is beyond the scope of this research, the chapter is
grounded in a study of the websites of 16 public relations national, and three regional
and international, associations. It uses the websites’ content to highlight the weak-
nesses inherent in voluntary associations and their inability to enforce their codes of
ethics. Finally, building on these findings, the chapter concludes with new strategies
designed to empower professional PR associations to lead more effectively to a more
ethical industry.

65
66 MARGALIT TOLEDANO AND DAVID MCKIE

WIDENING THE CONTEXT: PROFESSIONALIZATION, PROFESSIONAL

ASSOCIATIONS, AND CODES OF ETHICS

Academic writing on public relations associations and ethics, even when looking his-
torically (e.g., Fitzpatrick, 2002), tends to restrict their range to public relations litera-
ture without considering developments in other fields. Literature on sociology, for
example, offers broad definitions for public relations professions, professionalization,
and professional associations, which provide a context for examining public relations
as in Siegrist’s (2001) relevant observation that professions in general “are character-
ized by special functions and structures, motives, representations, forms of knowledge,
and sociocultural style” and that professionalization “refers to processes affecting the
social and symbolic construction of occupation and status” (p. 12154). Siegrist (2001)
goes on to observe how professions in general follow a quest for prestige and develop
specific organizations (i. e., professional associations) for “collective integration, self-
administration, self-control, and for the representation of their interests” (p. 12155).
The sociology of professions also studies the “patterns of organization, types of work,
and social status” (Abbott, 2001, p. 12166).
Sociologists, however, differ in their appreciation of the role of associations in the
development of a profession. In line with most public relations literature (c.f., Pieczka
& L’Etang, 2001), prominent early sociologists of the profession situated the profes-
sional association as central to the definition of a profession as illustrated in this later
paraphrase of their belief that:

Professions begin with the establishment of professional associations that have member-
ship rules to exclude the unqualified. Second, they … assert their monopoly, and, most
importantly, … give themselves a label capable of legislative restriction. Third, they set
up a code of ethics to assert their social utility, to further regulate the incompetent, and
to reduce internal competition. Fourth, they agitate politically to obtain legal recogni-
tion, aiming at first to limit the professional title and later to criminalize unlicensed work
in their jurisdiction. (Abbott, 1988, p. 11)

Abbott (1988) himself does not see the professional association as central to the def-
inition of a profession, and Freidson (2001) takes a more centrist path in relation to
the role played by professional associations in the development of a profession. On
the one hand, he follows Abbott by claiming that “the importance of associations for
the establishment of professionalism has been greatly exaggerated by theorists and
that they are not essential for the initiation of institutions of professionalism” (Freid-
son, 2001, p. 146). On the other hand, he acknowledges the association as “the gen-
eric mode of formal organization for professions and, for that matter, any occupation
that has congealed into a ‘community’ and seeks control over its own work” (p. 146).
An association, in exchange for membership dues, usually provides services and bene-
fits to members that often include a code of ethics or conduct. According to Abbott
(1983) “nearly all professions have some kind of formal ethical code” (p. 857). Such
codes aim to ensure the quality of professional practice (Janosik, Carpenter, &
Creamer, 2006), to set standards for acceptable professional behaviour, and to pro-
mote the profession and its members’ status and reputation.
Public relations industry bodies in most countries have established codes of ethics
for the same purpose but don’t have a universal system for enforcing the code’s
6. LEADING AN ETHICAL INDUSTRY 67

principles on members. According to Macnamara (2012), the fact that membership in

public relations association is voluntary makes the enforcement of codes impossible:

Other than in the United Kingdom, where the CIPR [Chartered Institute of Public Rela-
tions) has gained a Royal power that affords regulatory powers, PR institutes and associ-
ations have no power to enforce codes. Without regulatory powers, PR industry bodies
attempting to censure practitioners for unethical behaviour can be liable for defamation
or damage. (p. 428)

Another obstacle for public relations associations is the fact that “a substantial
number of practitioners are not members of industry bodies … which puts them
beyond even the voluntary codes adopted by PR industry bodies” (Macnamara, 2012,
p. 438). This weakness is not exclusive to public relations professional associations.
Abbott (1983) observed that “large areas of professional function are served by ‘ethic-
ally questionable’ practitioners” and so “Informal enforcement of ethics among such
peripheral groups seems impossible” so that only “effective competition (driving them
out of business) or monopolistic licensure (including them in the zone of formal
enforcement) seems effective” (p. 862). This raises large questions. Can public rela-
tions associations expel unethical members and use their case as an example for
unacceptable practice? Or, should these associations promote the idea of licensing and
be scrutinized by a state authority to gain legislative power over unethical members?
These questions will be discussed later in this chapter.

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CODES

In an early study of new legal challenges for professional associations in countries

joining the European Union, Evetts (1995) identified the trend of international profes-
sional associations “becoming key players in the dynamics of European single market
regulations” (p. 763). As globalization expanded, so did the need to analyse “the pro-
cess of internationalization of professional life” (Abbott, 2001, p. 12168). The Inter-
national Public Relations Association (IPRA), was established in 1955 “to raise
standards of public relations practice worldwide and improve the quality of PR prac-
titioners” (www.ipra.org). In 1961, IPRA adopted a Code of Ethics, which was
updated in 1965, 2007, and 2011, and which recommended principles of ethical con-
duct to public relations practitioners around the world.
The new millennium saw the formation of a new international body, the Global
Alliance for Public Relations and Communication Management (GA), aiming

to unify all the national PR professional associations, raise professional standards all
over the world, share knowledge for the benefit of its members and be the global voice
for public relations in the public interest…. The Alliance works to enhance the collabora-
tive professionalism of the industry among its constituents around the world. (www.globa
lalliancepr.org/who-we-are/)

The GA’s code of ethics, adopted in 2003, was ratified by all its member organizations
in a declaration of support that served to certify the organization’s adherence to the
code’s principles. Nevertheless, two important questions remain. Have the inter-
national codes of ethics put forth by such associations increased shared ethical values
68 MARGALIT TOLEDANO AND DAVID MCKIE

across the world? Have national associations internalized generic ethical values
intended to fit public relations practitioners globally?
Taylor and Yang (2015) research sought answers to these questions by examining
the code of ethics of 41 professional public relations associations and used Centric
Resonance Analysis to assess the main concepts, their influence, and their interrela-
tionships. They asked if there was “a core of foundational ethical values or themes
that occur in every nation or are there localized cultural values that reflect the unique
contexts in nations or regions?” (p. 544). Other recent cross national comparative
studies indicate significant links between the sociocultural environment and public
relations practitioners’ perceptions and attitudes towards ethical use of social media
(Sebastião, Zulato, & Belo Santos, 2017; Toledano & Avidar, 2016). Taylor and
Yang’s (2015) findings suggest that “global values that will influence organizational
relationships with publics are emerging in professional communication practice” (p.
543). However, the authors did not investigate the implementation of the codes of
ethics and so important questions remain: Are public relations associations worldwide
enforcing the code on unethical members and, if so, how? Can the publication of
a code of ethics satisfy the need for ethical guidance and for enforcement of its prin-
ciples? Did national associations, in a search for prestige with no sincere effort to edu-
cate members about the implications of each ethical values on day-to-day practice,
just copy the international ethical values? Or did local associations’ members go
through ethical training and internalize these values? We conducted a research study
that was a modest attempt to provide empirical answers to these questions.
The research analysed 19 websites of public relations professional associations and
online information about their codes of ethics, disciplinary procedures, ethics committees,
publications of the ethics committee decisions, ethical training activities, and the avail-
ability of ethical materials and ethical cases online. Our selection was restricted to web-
sites that were accessible in English. Accordingly, our sample was small and not
representative but did include 16 national associations spread across the world (five Euro-
pean countries, four African, three Asian, two North American, and two Pacific nations),
two international associations, and one regional association. Our aim was to provide
a benchmark “snapshot” at a point in time and to use the simple analysis of the associ-
ations’ online content to provide indicative data about the issue of ethical leadership.
We found that all the selected associations published a Code of Ethics on their
website and India and Kenya proclaimed upfront that their code was inspired by the
IPRA code. Five established associations provided evidence on ethical training online
activities: the Public Relations Society of America (PRSA), the Public Relations Insti-
tute of Australia (PRIA), The Pubblic Relations Institute of New Zealand (PRINZ),
the Chartered Institute of Public Relations in the UK (CIPR), and the Austrian
Public Relations association (PRVA). Six other associations – the two international
associations IPRA and Global Alliance, as well as the US (PRSA), the UK (CIPR),
and the Australian and New Zealand associations – provided online resources, case
studies, videos and other educational materials about ethics and emphasised ethical
training. Significantly, for this chapter, nine associations reported on their websites
about disciplinary procedures that an ethics committee could use to deal with uneth-
ical members. The Canadian Public Relations Society (CPRS) describes a formal pro-
cedure where members who are judged by the ethics committee and found unethical
might be subject to formal expression of disapproval, suspension of privileges, or
expulsion from CPRS. The UK’s CIPR has a Professional Standards Panel and an
Appeals Panel to deal with ethical breaches. Australia, New Zealand, Ireland,
6. LEADING AN ETHICAL INDUSTRY 69

Uganda, Singapore, Kenya, and Zambia have established procedures to deal with
complaints from members or members’ clients about ethical issues.

Inherent Ethical Challenges

Part of the public relations industry’s bad reputation comes from practitioners using
manipulative, deceptive, and irresponsible tactics to achieve the goals of the organizations
they serve. Public relations scholars (e.g., Bowen, 2013; Coombs & Holladay, 2014;
L’Etang, 2011) have contended that ethical practice is a core challenge for the profession
and Macnamara (2012) openly acknowledges how “the PR industry has struggled to
come to grips with the issue of ethics” (p. 428). Public relations practitioners are often
torn between their roles as advocates for the organizations they serve, their responsibil-
ities towards the organization’s stakeholders, and their duty to society at large. This, as
Coombs and Holladay (2014) point out, is a structural tension: “While the codes of
ethics suggest that practitioners should consider the interests of society as a whole, obli-
gations to clients are mentioned more frequently than obligations to the public interest”
(p. 49). They go on to point out the reality “that the practitioners work for the client”
who “pays the practitioners salary” and, as a result, it “may be unrealistic to expect PR
professionals to disregard ‘who pays the bill’ in favor of the public interest” (p. 49).
Tensions inherent in the profession surface today in scholarly debates as well as in
industry codes of conduct. Taylor and Yang (2015) found the following six major
themes that dominated the content of the 41 public relations codes of ethics analysed:
“(1) professionalism, (2) advocacy, (3) moral standards, (4) clients’ interests, (5) expert-
ise, and (6) relationships” (p. 543). They conclude that “across the world, public rela-
tions associations recognise the dual-responsibility for the profession to serve both
clients and society/public’s interests” (p. 553). Most codes of ethics require public
relations practitioners to commit to such values as honesty, integrity, transparency
and at the same time commit to confidentiality in protecting the confidences of pre-
sent and former clients and employers. In the UK, the CIPR explains this profes-
sional ethical value as follows:

Safeguarding confidences, e.g. of present and former clients and employers. Never using
confidential and ‘insider’ information to the disadvantage or prejudice of others, e.g. cli-
ents and employers, or to self-advantage of any kind. Not disclosing confidential infor-
mation unless specific permission has been granted or if required or covered by law.
(CIPR Code of Conduct. www.cipr.co.uk/sites/default/files/Appendix%20A%20-%20Code
%20of%20Conduct%20-%20Updated%20June%202012.pdf)

The contradiction between these values is fundamental and so practitioners are not
clearly guided by the industry’s codes of ethics. It is not surprising therefore, that in
the competitive environment of the PR industry, many chose unethical practices while
ignoring the code of ethics that can’t be enforced anyway.

Enforcement

Our study of 19 public relations professional associations’ websites, showed that half of
the sample reported on disciplinary mechanisms to enforce the code of ethics with an
ethics committee. The fact that the other half did not report on any enforcement system,
indicates the confusion around PR ethics and the weakness of the associations. IPRA
70 MARGALIT TOLEDANO AND DAVID MCKIE

explained that as an international association it had no intention to police individual

members. In addition, associations that enact disciplinary measures and even publish the
ethics committee decisions might expose themselves to legal claims by punished members
whose professional reputation, their major asset, has been tarnished by the association.
Macnamara (2012) draws from experience to demonstrate this point: “in Australia, at
least one senior PRIA official has been successfully taken to court for making censuring
statements against a practitioner accused of unethical practice” (p. 428). A similar case in
Israel in 2005 was settled out of court and the unethical member was compensated by
a significant sum of money that the local public relations association struggled to pay. As
mentioned above – the lack of legal status to enforce the code of ethics as well as the fact
that too many practitioners choose not to join a public relations association, cripple the
associations’ ability to lead an ethical industry.

Professional Training and Licensing

Based on its over 40 years of experience in enforcing its code of ethics and acting as
a court judging few complaints from the industry in the US, the PRSA decided in the
new millennium to change its strategy from enforcement to inspiration: “PRSA’s judi-
cial system simply was not practical for a body that had no legal authority over its
members” (Fitzpatrick, 2002). Among many challenges involved in the effort to enforce
the codes of ethics, PRSA identified the experiences of many other associations that
“when members were notified that they were being investigated, many simply resigned
rather than go through the judicial process, continuing to practice but outside PRSA’s
reach” (Fitzpatrick, 2002). Thus, they replaced enforcement with a new-found focus of
helping practitioners learn about ethics and how to avoid unethical behaviour with the
help of online resources, case studies, webinars, and ethics quizzes.
Providing professional training is indeed a major role of associations in general and
should be a core service for public relations associations whose members function in
a very dynamic communication environment. However, not many public relations
associations provide an ongoing training in ethics (e.g., only six out of the 19 public
relations associations studied for this chapter provided ethical resources). The code of
ethics by itself is not leading an ethical industry if it is not followed by consistent
efforts to train and to provide resources to confused practitioners. A survey of mem-
bers of the Public Relations Institute of New Zealand (PRINZ) found in 2016 that
“despite strong commitment to professional ethics only 13% of the surveyed members
said that they used the PRINZ Code of Ethics to guide them in the ethical aspect of
their jobs” (PRINZ Insight survey 2016).
In the absence of enforceable codes of ethics and the effective training programs, the
question of licensing keeps returning to the industry’s agenda. In reality, only the Brazil-
ian government requires professionals who wish to join the public relations industry to
complete a certain amount of academic training. In the rest of the world, any require-
ment by a government authority to limit the entry to the profession would be considered
obstruction of the freedom of speech and freedom of occupation. Democracy should
allow any organisation to employ professionals to represent their interests and to partici-
pate in public discussions in the media to ensure the organisation’s position is heard. No
public relations professional association would welcome government control of its mem-
bers. The Brazil experience demonstrates that licensing is also not an effective way to
ensure an ethical industry. The military dictatorship regulated the profession there in
1976 for its own interest in the use of political propaganda and violent censorship.
6. LEADING AN ETHICAL INDUSTRY 71

However, to avoid the regime’s requirements, public relations was practiced in Brazil
under different titles (e.g., corporate communication) (Nassar & Furlanetto, 2012).

TOWARD ETHICAL FUTURES: STRATEGIES AND A CONCLUSION

Despite difficulties, as Lord Carter of Barnes (2011) put in the parallel context of eth-
ical leadership in business in general, “It is not an Impossible Dream” (Carter, 2011,
p. xii). One practical idea that might empower public relations associations to discip-
line members is simple and easy to add to existing procedures but, to the best of our
knowledge, remains untried. Public relations associations usually require members to
sign a pledge to uphold the code of ethics as part of their application to join. This
offers members a distinctive point of differentiation from non-members, who are not
committed to an ethical code, and thus might not be trusted or respected by potential
clients or societies who value ethics. Currently, many public relations practitioners
succeed without becoming members or committing to the code of ethics, which is the
crux of the problem. However, what if the practitioners who join a public relations
association would add a signed acceptance of the association’s right to judge com-
plaints against them and to publish the decision about their cases? Such recognition
might give legal protection to public relations associations against potential liability
and defamation cases. Although a small innovation, the change might enable the
associations to lead an ethical industry with some legal power without any resort to
government intervention.
Drawing again from the sociology of the professions, what Johnson (1993) called
professional, or “collective altruism or service orientation” (p. 514), could also inspire
another way forward. It would involve associations functioning as manifestations of
collectives with pro-social goals so that the profession’s “collective altruism … is
observable … the client is protected, the community is served, and practitioner privil-
eges are ultimately justified by colleague-imposed codes of conduct” (Johnson, 1993,
p. 514). Other strategies worth trying can be found in the small but growing literature
on ethical leadership for leaders. Millar and Poole’s (2011) collection, Ethical Leader-
ship: Global Challenges and Perspectives, for example, provides an array of methods
(e.g., the GLOBE Leadership Project), diverse geographies and perceptions (inclusive
leadership in Nicaragua and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Confucian and
Chinese folk wisdom), and challenges (dealing with corporate psychopaths). That col-
lection alone illuminates first world and third world issues and suggests how to con-
nect the two productively. It can usefully be supplemented with Johnson’s (2018) more
communication-centered work, especially his sections on “Meeting the Ethical Chal-
lenges of Leadership in a Global Society” (pp. 372–413); on making ethical choices in
culturally diverse settings; and on tools for ethical climate-building.
In conclusion, this chapter makes a case for further empowering professional
associations as key leaders in establishing ethical public relations futures. It evalu-
ates the role and effectiveness of public relations codes of ethics and identifies self-
contradicting values in PR codes worldwide. While examining the many ways in
which that task is daunting, especially because public relations itself requires nei-
ther legal approval nor compulsory membership, the chapter suggests ways for-
ward. It concludes that associations acting for altruistic causes might gain more
respect, have more impact on the industry and, in better fulfilling their responsibil-
ity for ethical leadership, help restore the reputation of public relations as
a practice and industry.
72 MARGALIT TOLEDANO AND DAVID MCKIE

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 CHAPTER

7
The Development and Challenges of
Global Public Relations Agencies

Donald K. Wright

INTRODUCTION

As noted communications scholar Culbertson (2009) has explained, prior to the

1980s, development of the public relations industry took place mainly in North Amer-
ica and Europe. Others have pointed out most of the early literature about inter-
national public relations consisted of articles designed to help American and other
Western practitioners be successful abroad (Cutlip, 1994, 1995; Wouters, 1991).
Cutlip’s (1994, 1995) books about public relations history that total more than
a thousand pages have fewer than a dozen of them mention anything about public
relations practiced outside of the U.S. Sriramesh (2004) notes a solid increase in the
study of international public relations as globalization became a reality with the
beginning of the 21st century. Freitag and Stokes (2009) indicate that when public
relations is practiced in international settings it frequently is combined with related
disciplines such as marketing and advertising. Verčič, J. Grunig and L. Grunig (1993)
note that when public relations is practiced in international settings it is influenced by
factors such as culture and politics.
Leaf (2012), a long-time Burson-Marsteller executive who held many international
assignments, explained it this way, “people in different countries can differ dramatically
in their attitudes and reactions to everyday events and situations. What we communicate
and how we communicate has to be adjusted similarly if we are to be effective” (p. 7).
Molleda (2009) notes many organizations “virtually and physically interact and commu-
nicate with … audiences outside their own country of origin to build a dynamic set of
relationships” (p. 1). Sharpe and Pritchard (2004) suggest this leads to greater inter-
dependence and interconnectivity among societies, various groups of people, and

73
74 DONALD K. WRIGHT

organizations worldwide and parallels the evolution of both the practice and the study
of public relations all over the world. Wilcox and Cameron (2012) estimate more than
three million people now practice public relations worldwide including an estimated
300,000 in the U.S. and 50,000 in the U.K. They also suggest the number of public rela-
tions agencies in the U.S. now is between 7,000 and 10,000.

ROLE OF THE PUBLIC RELATIONS AGENCY

As pointed out previously (Wright, 2013), most public relations services are provided
in one or two different ways. Sometimes they are delivered by public relations and
communications specialists employed full-time by an organization. At other times
they are provided through business entities formed by a group of communication
practitioners and popularly known as public relations “agencies” or “firms.” On some
occasions a combination of these is the rule.
Public relations agencies have enjoyed considerable success during the past 75
years. While much of this success has surfaced in the U.S., a good portion of it
during recent decades has come from operations in other parts of the world. Accord-
ing to PR Week (2017), considered by many to be the world’s leading public relations
trade journal, the world’s ten largest public relations agencies generated $5 billion in
global revenues during 2016. Seven of these Top 10 firms were headquartered in the
U.S. with the other three agencies based in France, the U.K., and China. These agen-
cies also contribute considerably to job creation for public relations practitioners with
nearly 45,000 people being employed by the 30 largest global public relations agencies
(PR Week, 2017).
According to Cutlip and Center (1971), the forerunner of today’s public relations
agency was the Publicity Bureau founded in Boston in 1900 by George V.S. Michaelis,
Herbert Small, and Thomas O. Marvin. The success of this early firm led to the estab-
lishment of others such as Parker & Lee in 1905 headed by George Parker and noted
public relations practitioner Ivy Lee. During World War I, when U.S. governmental
propaganda was directed by George Creel and the Committee on Public Information,
a number of soon-to-be noted public relations people were trained for the industry.
This included the noted Edward L. Bernays and Carl Byoir who at the war’s end
formed Carl Byoir and Associates which was one of the nation’s major public relations
agencies for several decades.
The Publicity Bureau was highly successful for several years performing work focused
mainly on publicity and press-agentry, much of it with three major clients: AT&T, Har-
vard University, and America’s railroads. The firm would soon lose several major
accounts and some of its best employees moved on to other endeavors (Cutlip, 1994).
Several other successful agencies would open for business during the next 25 years but
few of them survived after their principals retired. The main exceptions to this trend
were Ketchum, Hill & Knowlton, and Carl Byoir & Associates. Ketchum, founded as
an advertising agency by George Ketchum in Pittsburgh in 1923, later moved into
public relations and remains one of the world’s largest and most successful agencies. Hill
& Knowlton was founded in 1927 and remains one of the worldʼs largest and most suc-
cessful public relations firms. Carl Byoir & Associates was founded in 1930 and remains
one of the best known and most highly-respected names in the public relations industry.
Byoir died 1957 and the firm continued to function profitably and successfully for two
decades before it became part of Hill & Knowlton.
7. DEVELOPMENT AND CHALLENGES OF GLOBAL PR AGENCIES 75

INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION

Cutlip (1994) and Leaf (2012) have pointed out that public relations agencies based in
the U.S. have experienced greater success expanding into other countries than firms
headquartered elsewhere. A noted exception would be Eric White & Associates.
While the American firms Hill & Knowlton and Burson-Marsteller were taking
their initial steps exploring expansion into Europe, the Australian-based Eric White &
Associates was opening offices in London, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore. The
founder of this firm, Eric White was the public relations officer of the Australian Lib-
eral Party and previously had served as press secretary to Sir Robert Menzies the
former Prime Minister of Australia. White’s agency changed its name to Associated
Management Services Limited in 1971 and later merged with Hill & Knowlton in
1974 (Brown, 1989; Dwyer, 1961).

GLOBAL ASPIRATIONS OF MAJOR PR AGENCIES

As Burson explains (2017, p. 175), with the exception of Eric White & Associates,
“For three decades, Burson-Marsteller and Hill & Knowlton were the only inter-
national public relations firms.” That’s why we are profiling the global expansions of
both agencies in this chapter. Branching out into the global arena created large finan-
cial risks for both of these firms. It’s a well-known fact that Hill & Knowlton’s over-
seas operations lost money for nearly a decade and Burson-Marsteller also struggled
financially during the first years it operated offices outside of the U.S.

International Growth of Hill & Knowlton

Hill & Knowlton (H&K) was founded in Cleveland by John Hill and Don Knowlton
in 1927. It sold to the advertising group J. Walter Thompson (JWT) for US$
28 million in 1980. JWT was later sold to WPP for US$ 585 million in 1987. The two
most thorough sources detailing the global expansion of this company are John Hill’s
(1963) book, The making of a public relations man, and Miller’s (1999) detailed his-
tory of Hill & Knowlton, The voice of business: Hill & Knowlton and postwar public
relations. Miller, a highly-respected public relations historian, has been critical of gaps
in the historical literature of the public relations indicating, “If the literature on
public relations history is incomplete, the story of its emigration from the United
States is even less well documented, both in completeness and in accuracy” (Miller,
1999, p. 151).
In some ways the global expansion of H&K was initiated by accident growing out
of international communication needs expressed by U.S.-based clients such as Procter
& Gamble, Texaco, and Standard Oil of Ohio during the early 1950s. International
growth also was facilitated thanks to considerable interest in a public relations audit
system the agency developed about this time. Miller claims H&K had established an
office in Bogotá, Colombia, in 1949 in connection with client work promoting Colom-
bian trade and tourism in North America. H&K established its first European office
in Paris in 1954. Loet Velmans, who would later become head of the agency’s global
operations and eventually rise to become H&K’s CEO, managed this Paris office.
As H&K’s European operations grew under Velmans’ leadership, the agency estab-
lished consulting agreements with a number of practitioners from various parts of
Europe, many with impressive credentials. Essentially, these PR people worked on
76 DONALD K. WRIGHT

their own accounts in addition to handling H&K assignments. All of this apparently
came with, “An awareness of cultural differences (that) produced a more broad-
minded international hiring policy than otherwise prevailed” (Miller, 1999, p. 165).
H&K’s business operations in Europe would soon expand into Germany, Switzerland,
and the U.K. By 1960 H&K was doing business in 30 countries outside of the
U.S. and an international coordinating office was established in Geneva but later
move to London. For a number of years, H&K would continue to be the most dom-
inant global public relations firm, some suggesting it represented a model that other
agencies would follow as they explored the global public relations market. Today
H&K operates 87 offices in various parts of the world.

Global Expansion of Burson-Marsteller

Burson-Marsteller (B-M) was formed in 1953 by Harold Burson and Bill Marsteller,
sold to advertising agency Young & Rubican in 1979, and became part of WPP in
2000. The global expansion of B-M has been thoroughly addressed by Burson (2004,
2017) and Leaf (2012), in Burson’s two self-authored books The business of persua-
sion: Harold Burson on public relations and e pluribus unum: The making of Burson-
Marsteller and through Heath’s book, The art of perception: Memoirs of a life in PR.
After considerable discussion about the benefits of opening an office in London
(where everyone spoke English) or Switzerland (for tax reasons), B-M opened its first
overseas office in Geneva in March of 1961. Once the decision had been made to
base the office in Switzerland, a major reason favoring Geneva was because H&K
had an office there without any competition.
A good number of the clients of the B-M Geneva office were well-known U.S. companies
operating in Switzerland where they could take advantage of significant tax breaks. How-
ever, when the U.S. Congress passed the Tax Equalization Bill of 1962, which taxed corpor-
ate income earned outside the U.S. at the normal U.S. rate, many of these clients moved
their European headquarters to Brussels. That’s the major reason B-M transferred almost
half of its European staff from Geneva to Brussels in 1965. About this time, they also
moved Robert Leaf from New York to Brussels. Leaf headed the B-M Brussels office for
three years and then became manager of all B-M European operations. Once the firm
expanded into Asia, Leaf took on the title of International CEO.
As overseas business continued to grow for B-M the agency turned to small agen-
cies in the U.K., France, Belgium, Germany, Spain, and Italy to fulfill its needs. Fre-
quently, in situations where this method of operating yielded business success, these
agencies would later merge with B-M. In the early 1970s B-M initiated its original
work within the Soviet Union by doing three-year’s worth of work for the Soviet
state advertising agency. Several years later the agency expanded into Asia beginning
with a joint venture and an office in Tokyo followed shortly by offices in Hong Kong,
Singapore, and Kuala Lumpur. The Hong Kong office was particularly important
because it paved the way for B-M’s later development in Beijing and other parts of
China.
The B-M global expansion would continue with the establishment of offices in
South America in the mid-1970s, opening operations in Australia (both Sydney and
Melbourne) in 1980, and developing offices in India, the Middle East, and Africa
during the 1980s and 1990s. Today B-M has 77 offices around the world.
7. DEVELOPMENT AND CHALLENGES OF GLOBAL PR AGENCIES 77

Other Elements of Global Expansion

Although John Hill, Harold Burson and their PR firms played a larger role than most
in the global development of the public relations industry, others made significant con-
tributions. Today all of the world’s major public relations firms have an international
presence and a global reach. Shortly after Hill & Knowlton and Burson-Marsteller
expanded overseas, Edelman (then known as Daniel J. Edelman, Inc.) established inter-
national operations beginning in London with assistance from well-known inter-
national practitioner Michael Morley.
During this time, international expansion also took place in the Asia-Pacific region
with Tokyo-based Taiji Kohara. According to Morley (2009), Kohara founded Inter-
national Public Relations (IPR), a network of PR firms that had offices in 43 coun-
tries in Asia and the Pacific. Later this network would be acquired by Shandwick and
today is part of Weber Shandwick, the PR agency second in size to Edelman.
As Morley (2009) also notes, one of the UK’s most accomplished communications
executives was Tim Traverse-Healy who built Infoplan into a major operation and
went on to become an early pioneer in international public relations. A contemporary
of Traverse-Healy was Jacques Coup de Frejac long recognized as one of the most
influential French PR practitioners. Traverse-Healy and Coup de Frejac were both
instrumental in the founding and development of the International Public Relations
Association (IPRA) which began in 1955 and provided training, development, and
networking opportunities for those who worked in more than one country throughout
the public relations industry.
Although IPRA did have members who were employed in corporate and govern-
mental public relations they were outnumbered by those who worked with public rela-
tions firms and/or served as communication consultants. Other noted leaders during
IPRA’s initial years were Sir Tom Fife Clark, John A. Keyser, Dennis Buckle, and
Sam Black (the UK); Jean Choppin de Janvry (France); Albert Oeckl (Germany);
Göran Sjöberg (Sweden); J. Carroll Bateman, Ed Lipscomb, and Robert L. Bliss
(USA); Charles van der Straten Waillet (Belgium); Manos B. Pavlidis (Greece); Roy
Sanada (Japan); Anand Akerkar (India); Alain Modoux (Switzerland); Mahmoud El
Gohary (Egypt); Betûl Mardin (Turkey); Michael Barzilay (Israel); and Anne van der
Meiden (Netherlands). At one point IPRA enjoyed a strong global impact and more
than 1,000 members representing more than 100 countries, but today it is only
a fraction of that size and influence.

Global Holding Companies

As we have noted previously (Wright, 1997, 1998, 2013), until the mid-1970s virtually
all of the major public relations firms operated as independent agencies many of
them partnered with advertising agencies. However, since then several publicly traded
global holding companies have purchased a large number of these public relations
agencies not only in the U.S. but also around the world. The two largest of these con-
glomerates are the WPP Group and the Omnicom Group.
Omnicom has annual revenue of close to US$15 billion and includes top-ten public
relations agencies Fleishman-Hillard and Ketchum. WPP has annual revenue of more
than US$10 billion and includes top-ten public relations firms Burson-Marsteller and
Hill & Knowlton. Other major holding companies and their major public relations firms
include Publicis Groupe (MSL Group, formerly Manning Selvage Lee), and Interpublic
78 DONALD K. WRIGHT

(Financial Relations Board, Golin, and Weber Shandwick). Edelman, the world’s largest
public relations agency, continues to operate independently.

THE WORLD’S LEADING GLOBAL PR AGENCIES

As Tables 7.1 and 7.2 indicate, as of 2017, Edelman is the world’s largest public rela-
tions agency with 5,903 global employees (2,625 in the U.S.) and global revenue of
nearly US$875 million. Weber Shandwick is the second largest with 4,700 global
employees (2,860 in the U.S.) and worldwide revenue of US$808 million. Both of
these firms are headquartered in the U.S.; Edelman in Chicago and Weber Shandwick
in New York.
Unlike most of the other Top 20 global agencies that are owned by major holding
companies, Edelman remains independent in terms of ownership and currently operates
76 global offices with 19 in the U.S. This includes 500 employees based in the U.K. and
1,352 working in Asia. Richard Edelman, son of the late founder, Daniel J. Edelman, is
the CEO. In 2011, Edelman became the world’s first $600 Million public relations
agency.
As Table 7.2 shows, although Weber Shandwick has more U.S.-based employees
than Edelman, it still trails in U.S. revenue with $459 million to Edelman’s
$532 million. Weber Shandwick has 76 global offices with 22 in the U.S. and is owned
by the Interpublic Group that is part of Constituency Management Group. The firm
was formed in 2001 via a merger between Weber Group, founded in 1987, and Shand-
wick International, created in 1974. Its CEO is Andy Polansky.

TABLE 7.1
PR Week Global Agency Rankings 2017

Rank Agency Name Headquarters Employees Global Revenue 2016 (US$)

1 Edelman USA 5,903 $874,814,426

2 Weber Shandwick USA 4,700 $808,000,000
3 FleishmanHillard USA 2,800 $590,000,000
4 Ketchum USA 2,635 $540,000,000
5 MSL Group France 3,133 $498,000,000
6 Burson-Marsteller USA 2,700 $450,000,000
7 Hill+Knowlton Strategies USA 2,750 $390,000,000
8 Ogilvy USA 2,703 $375,000,000
9 Brunswick U.K. 895 $276,522,000
10 BlueFocus China 2,440 $271,018,736
11 Cohn & Wolfe USA 1,405 $218,000,000
12 Golin USA 1,500 $202,000,000
13 MCI Group Germany 996 $195,276,941
14 FTI Consulting USA 647 $191,184,000
15 ICF/ICF Olson USA 912 $155,566,678
16 Porter Novelli USA 720 $151,500,000
17 Sunny Side Up Japan 336 $124,999,999
18 W2O Group USA 472 $122,715,000
19 APCO Worldwide USA 672 $120,622,100
20 Vector Japan 589 $106,000,000

Source: “Agency Business Report,” (2017). PR Week, May, p. 68.

7. DEVELOPMENT AND CHALLENGES OF GLOBAL PR AGENCIES 79

TABLE 7.2
PR Week U.S. Agency Rankings 2017

Rank Agency Name Headquarters U.S.-Based U.S. Revenue 2016

Employees

1 Edelman Chicago 2,625 $532,900,000

2 Weber Shandwick New York 2,860 $459,000,000
3 FleishmanHillard St. Louis 1,750 $440,000,000
4 Ketchum New York 1,675 $360,000,000
5 Burson-Marsteller New York 930 $232,000,000
6 MSL Group Paris 565 $175,000,000
7 Hill+Knowlton Strategies New York 660 $152,000,000
8 IFC/IFC Olson Fairfax, VA 686 $131,707,108
9 Golin Chicago 725 $126,000,000
10 Ogilvy New York 472 $125,000,000
11 W2O Group San Francisco 432 $113,511,155
12 Porter Novelli New York 510 $110,000,000
13 Brunswick London 254 $109,117,750
14 Cohn & Wolfe New York 670 $103,000,000
15 WE Communications Bellevue, WA 477 $83,787,000
16 inVentive Health PR Group New York 277 $77,150,000
17 FTI Consulting New York 260 $76,500,000
18 Finn Partners New York 448 $73,217,440
19 APCO Worldwide Washington, DC 249 $66,474,900
20 PMK-BNC Los Angeles 271 $64,000,000

Source: “Agency Business Report,” (2017). PR Week, May, p. 62.

As Barrett (2017) and others have noted, much of the phenomenal international
and domestic success Edelman and Weber Shandwick have enjoyed in recent years
can be attributed to the leadership of Richard Edelman at Edelman and to Andy
Polansky of Weber Shandwick.
Following a considerable global revenue drop of more than $200 million, Fleish-
manHillard and Ketchum, two other U.S.-based agencies, occupy third and fourth
place when the world’s major public relations firms are compared according to global
revenues. FleishmanHillard, based in St. Louis had global revenues of $590 million in
2016, including $440 million in US revenue. FleishmanHillard’s President and CEO is
John Saunders and ownership is through the Omnicom Group a part of Diversified
Agency Services. FleishmanHillard has 83 global offices (37 in the U.S.) and 2,800
global employees (1,750 in the U.S.). This firm has 250 employees in London and 500
in Asia.
Ketchum, another Omnicom Group agency, is headquartered in New York with
2,635 global employees (1,735 in the U.S.). This employee pool includes 220 in
London and 90 in Asia. Ketchum’s 2016 global revenue was $540 million
($360 million in the U.S.). The firm has 76 global offices (30 in the U.S.). Rob Flah-
erty is the CEO. Ketchum has enjoyed phenomenal international and domestic
growth during the past decade, much of it coming between 2000 and 2012 when Ray
Kotcher was CEO (Sudhaman, 2016).
These four American-based public relations firms are the four largest in both the
nation and the world based upon 2016 revenue. Fifth on the global revenue list is MSL
Group that is based in Paris, France, and is owned by Publicis Groupe. Guillaume
80 DONALD K. WRIGHT

Herbette is MSL’s global CEO and Ron Guirguis is CEO for the U.S. MSL has 117
offices worldwide and 15 offices in the U.S. Global revenue for 2016 was $480 million
($175 million coming from the U.S.). MSL Group has 3,133 global employees with 565
based in the U.S. This firm has 207 employees based in London and 1,325 based in
Asia.
Burson-Marsteller and Hill & Knowlton (operating today as Hill + Knowlton
Strategies), the two firms who pioneered European expansion by U.S.-based public
relations agencies, wound up sixth and seventh on the global revenue list and fifth
and seventh when only U.S. revenue was counted. Both are headquartered in
New York and owned by WPP. Burson-Marsteller has 77 offices around the world
with 13 in the U.S. Its 2016 global revenue was $450 million ($232 million in the
U.S.). This agency has 2,700 global employees and 930 from the U.S. It has 120
employees in London and 850 in Asia. The CEO and Worldwide Chair is Don Baer.
Mike Fernandez is U.S. CEO and Margaret Key is the CEO for Asia-Pacific. Harold
Burson, who turned 96 years old in 2017, now has the title of Founder and Chairman
and remains somewhat active in the firm continuing to occupy his corner office most
weekdays.
Hill + Knowlton Strategies boasts 2016 global revenue of $390 million ($152 million
in the U.S.). This agency reports having 2,750 global employees (660 in the U.S.) with
87 offices throughout the world and 12 in the U.S. Hill + Knowlton has 310 employees
based in London and 610 working in Asia. Jack Martin is Global Executive Chairman
and CEO while Beth Balsam is U.S. President and CEO.
Ogilvy, a WPP firm based in New York, placed eighth in terms of global revenue
of $375 million but only wound up tenth on the U.S. list with $125 million. Ogilvy
has 2,703 employees around the world with 472 in the U.S. The agency has 86 global
offices and nine in the U.S. Ogilvy has 264 employees based in London and 1,365 in
Asia. Stuart Smith is Global CEO for Public Relations while John Seifert is World-
wide Chairman and CEO.
Two agencies headquartered outside of the U.S. represent the ninth and tenth lar-
gest public relations firms based upon 2016 revenue. Brunswick Partners, headquar-
tered in London, U.K., placed ninth with nearly $277 million in global revenue while
BlueFocus, based in Beijing, China, was tenth with $271 million. Brunswick Partners
claims to have 895 worldwide employees including 24 offices in 14 different countries.
Brunswick has 271 employees based in the U.S. and that function of the firm gener-
ated revenues of $109 million during 2016. Susan Gilchrest is CEO. Blue Focus (also
known as Citizen Relations in some markets) has 2,440 employees. Although most of
the BlueFocus business is based in China the firm is in the process of expanding its
North American operations out of U.S. headquarters that are based in the Silicon
Valley of California.
Cohn & Wolfe, based in New York, and Golin, headquartered in Chicago, placed
11th and 12th in terms of global revenue in 2016. Cohn & Wolfe generated
$218 million and Golin had $202 million. Cohn & Wolfe, owned by WPP, has 1,405
employees working in 58 offices throughout the world. This includes 13 U.S. offices
with $103 million in 2016 U.S. revenue. Donna Imperato is CEO. Golin, owned by the
Interpublic Group, claims 53 global offices with nine in the U.S. It has 1,500 employees
around the world and 725 in the U.S. where 2016 revenue generated was $126 million.
Cohn & Wolf and Golin have relatively equal headcounts in the U.K. and Asia and
both agencies generated more than $22 million in each of these markets in 2016. Golin
made considerable senior leadership transition news recently when Fred Cook, who
7. DEVELOPMENT AND CHALLENGES OF GLOBAL PR AGENCIES 81

had been Chairman and CEO, relinquished the CEO’s title. He was replaced by three
“co-CEOs” with Gary Rudnick being based in Chicago and having responsibility for
the Americas plus finance, human resources, and client management; Matt Neal based
in New York and responsible for the firm’s vision, looking after new products, thought
leadership, and agency reputation; and John Hughes, based in Asia, being responsible
for international operations, global expansion, practices, and partnerships.
MCI Group, based in Germany, and 15th in 2016 global revenue at $195 million,
was one of three additional agencies based outside of the U.S. who scored in the
international Top 20. The other two were Japan based agencies Sunny Side Up and
Vector. Sunny Side Up was 15th with $125 million in global revenue while Victor
placed 20th with $106 million. The American-based firms rounding out the Top 20
global list were FTI Consulting in 14th place, ICF/ICF Olson at 15th, Porter
Novelli in 16th place, W2O Group at 18th place, and APCO Worldwide finishing
19th.
FTI Consulting is a business and management consulting firm based in Washing-
ton, DC, with sizable public relations operations. It has 647 public relations employ-
ees and generated $191 million in 2016 global PR revenue. Steve Gunby is the CEO.
ICF/ICF Olson, based in Fairfax, Virginia, just outside of Washington, DC, has
grown considerably during the past two years. The firm claims 912 employees world-
wide and had $155 million in 2016 revenue. It has 62 offices throughout the U.S. and
eight offices in other parts of the world. Principals of this agency are Kris Tremaine,
Senior Vice President and division leader of ICF/ICF Olson and Bryan Specht, Presi-
dent of Olson Engage.
Porter Novelli at 16th, W20 Group at 18th, and APCO Worldwide at 19th round out
the remaining American-based agencies in the global Top 20. Under the leadership of
CEO Brad MacAfee, New York-based Omnicom Group firm Porter Novelli has 720
employees, 35 offices throughout the world and reported 2016 global revenue of
$151 million. W2O is headquartered in San Francisco, has 13 offices throughout the world,
472 employees, and 2016 global revenue of $123 million. Jim Weiss is CEO. APCO World-
wide is headquartered in Washington, DC, has 672 global employees, and had 2016 rev-
enue of $121 million. The firm has 31 offices throughout the world with six in the U.S.
Margery Kraus is Founder and Executive Chairman while Brad Staples is CEO.

THE CHANGING NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC RELATIONS

Studies conducted each year since 2007 by the European Association of Communi-
cation Directors (EACD) and the European Public Relations Education and
Research Association (EUPRERA) have explored current practices and future devel-
opments of public relations in 50 European countries (European Communication
Monitor, 2017). Although public relations in the U.S. and elsewhere used to focus
only on what to say and how to say it, this systematic analysis of the growth and
development of public relations practice in Europe continues to show evidence that
the role of public relations is expanding to the point where each year more public
relations people are being asked to help organizations decide what to do and how
to do it in addition to what to say and how to say it. Unfortunately, however, stud-
ies such as this EUPRERA research continue to point out that many senior man-
agers are not aware of the full range of organizational contributions that public
relations functions can deliver. Indeed, results of the 2017 report indicate, “Top
managers are perceived to be more interested in the traditional (publicity) function
82 DONALD K. WRIGHT

of the department and seem to doubt a role for (public relations) in the strategic
development of the organization” (p. 91).
Meanwhile, Richard Edelman, CEO of the agency that bears his name, has pointed
out for the past three years that Edelman has decided “to go beyond the narrow box
of PR” in the services it offers (p.30).
Steve Barrett, Editor of PR Week in the U.S. claims, “the bigger story is that PR is
becoming one cog in a wheel of wider services, as the big agency holding companies
crunch vertical disciplines together and go to market with more holistic and horizon-
tal offers” (p.4). Barrett also notes that as Edelman and Weber Shandwick, the
world’s two largest public relations agencies in terms of revenue, continue with oper-
ational models not built around agency groups or particular markets, both of these
firms enjoy positions “significantly more than $200 million ahead of the number three
player in the global market” (p.4). Needless-to-say the current state of public relations
agencies is extremely healthy today not only in the U.S. and Europe but all over the
world.

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 CHAPTER

8
State Capture and the Demise
of Bell Pottinger
Misusing Public Relations to Shape Future
Kakistocracies?

Ronel Rensburg

INTRODUCTION

The word kakistocracy hails from the Greek words kakistos (κάκιστος – worst) and
kratos (κράτος – rule), with a literal meaning of “government by the worst people.”
Power abuse by governments and individual leaders across the world are presently ram-
pant. Disconcerting for the practice of public relations is the employment thereof to
encourage kakistocrats around the world. The Bell Pottinger incident in South Africa is
a demonstration of public relations counsel for the abuse of power in state capture. The
episode, lasting almost two years, saw the demise of the Bell Pottinger public relations
agency, the resignation of the president of South Africa Jacob Zuma, and ensuing
investigations of other companies and individuals. It weaves a condemnatory tale about
how one of the United Kingdom’s best-known public relations agencies caused its own
destruction through an irresponsible campaign that was conceived to stoke racial div-
ision in South Africa. The first part of this chapter unpacks the Bell Pottinger public
relations scandal and its global consequences. The second part considers the lessons
that surfaced from the scandal for the future direction of public relations.

THE SHAPING OF FUTURE KAKISTOCRACIES

The earliest usage of the word kakistocracy dates back to the 17th century, in a sermon
preached at the Publique Fast the ninth day of August at St. Maries (Gosnold, 1644). Eng-
lish author Thomas Love Peacock later used the term in his 1829 novel The misfortunes of

84
8. STATE CAPTURE AND THE DEMISE OF BELL POTTINGER 85

Elphin in which he describes that kakistocracy represents the opposite of aristocracy (Pea-
cock, 1829). American poet James Russell Lowell used the term in 1876 by writing:

What fills me with doubt and dismay is the degradation of the moral tone. Is it or is it not
a result of Democracy? Is ours a ‘government of the people by the people for the people,’
or a Kakistocracy rather, for the benefit of knaves at the cost of fools? (Fiske, 2011)

The term recaptured recognition during the 2016 US presidential election by critics of
Donald Trump when they argued that the United States was in danger of becoming
a kakistocracy. One of the prominent notions of kakistocracy is reputation laundering,
which comprises a web of interrelated practices that go beyond the economic realm to
encompass various social-networking and political techniques. These practices include
running aggressive image-crafting public relations campaigns and transnational alli-
ances (Cooley, Heathershaw & Sharman, 2018).
Kakistocracies are skulking all over and they are exploiting the persuasive powers
of the public relations industry to advocate their cause. Bell Pottinger’s public rela-
tions counsel for the agents of state capture in South Africa is but one example and
its aftermaths are cautioning the public relations industry on a global scale. The Bell
Pottinger agency, on behalf of business acquaintances of scandal-beset then South
African President Jacob Zuma, had pursued a racially acrimonious public relations
campaign to deflect attention away from President Zuma and state capture attempts.

PART ONE: STATE CAPTURE IN SOUTH AFRICA, BELL POTTINGER

AND THE GUPTAS

The leading actors in the state capture ignominy in South Africa are Bell Pottinger
(the now defunct global public relations agency that was based in London and its
exponents); the Guptas (a rich South African family with Indian origins); the South
African government (headed by South Africa’s former president, Jacob Zuma); and
the whistleblowers (the #GuptaLeaks, politicians, journalists, academics, and other
individuals that broke the story).

State Capture in South Africa

State capture is the actions of individuals or groups – both in the public and private
sectors – that are manipulating the formation of laws, regulations, decrees and other
government policies to their own personal advantage (Sutch, in Martin & Solomon,
2018). In South Africa it involved a business family, the Guptas, who had benefited
from close ties to President Jacob Zuma, and who had maneuvered themselves into
a position where they brandished control over state-owned companies and the latter’s
procurement budgets. In so doing they diverted large sums into their own pockets
and by association, those of President Jacob Zuma and his family.
The unfolding events were disclosed by one of the biggest scoops in the history of
South African journalism. In 2017, investigative journalists obtained a trove of emails
and documents from the core of the Gupta business empire (Report, 20171). The subse-
quent revelations, dubbed the #GuptaLeaks, appear to confirm the state capture
assumption that investigative journalists have reconnoitered for years. The #Gupta-
Leaks source mainly consisted of the following news sources: News24, Daily Maverick,
86 RONEL RENSBURG

amaBhungane, Finance: Uncovered and OpenUp (Why you should care about the
#GuptaLeaks [an international view], 9 Augustus, 2017).
The leaks exposed a multinational money laundering machine, dubbed the Dubai
Laundromat in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), into which the Guptas funneled cash
that originated from state contracts in South Africa. The #GuptaLeaks have exposed
how inducements were facilitated to the Guptas by foreign companies throughout the
world. The leaks have further revealed how the Guptas slurped cash out of state-
funded rural development programs in South Africa and sent it to Dubai. Multi-
national auditing firm KPMG waived the transactions through allowing the Guptas to
also claim millions in tax-deductible expenses. (KPMG is one of many companies
involved in the scandal and is being investigated). The leaks also disclosed that the
Guptas acquired a £19 million mansion in an exclusive Dubai neighborhood intended
for Zuma’s use – possibly as a kickback.

The Bell Pottinger Public Relations Agency

Bell Pottinger, a London public relations agency co-founded by Lord Timothy Bell and
Piers Pottinger in 1987, quickly became famous being credited with the launch of the
career of former UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Lord Bell left the agency in
2016 to set up his own business named Sans Frontieres and took many of the agency’s
geopolitical staff with him. The remaining Bell Pottinger employees focused on finan-
cial public relations and shareholder communication for companies. Its ownership was
independent with eight offices and a headcount of 266 people around the world, 201 in
the UK. The agency’s revenue was £34.8m (globally) and £27.9m (in the UK). It has
worked on behalf of a range of major corporations across a host of sectors, including
Airbus, HSCB and Coca-Cola The agency was also no stranger to controversy as some
of its past clients included Syria’s first lady Asma al-Assad, Belarusian dictator Alexan-
der Lukashenko, and the Pinochet Foundation, as well as celebrities accused of loath-
some crimes and in need of public relations counsel (like the Olympic runner Oscar
Pistorius directly after his murder charge) (Cameron, 2017).
According to James Henderson, Bell Pottinger’s CEO at the time of the scandal,
the agency had always been known for its political advice and counsel in capital mar-
kets, but was predominantly recognized for its consumer-facing campaigns. Some of
the accounts Henderson claimed to have had are (cf Cameron, 2017):
• The Singapore government, public transport provider SMRT, and one of the
world’s largest commodity traders, Noble Group.
• Aldar Properties, Abu Dhabi’s largest real estate company and the Saudi Stock
Exchange.
• Amazon and Hitachi Capital in the UK.
• Cyprus-born entrepreneur and investor Touker Suleyman and advised Aviva,
Emirates National Oil Company, and Johnson Press.
• On the geopolitical side, the Nigerian elections and including lobbying work in
the UK on behalf of Russian energy company Gazprom.
• A South African investment bank, Investec.
• Richemont, a luxury-goods company held by Johann Rupert.
• The South African Tourism Board.
• Oakbay Investments, the holding company of the Guptas.
8. STATE CAPTURE AND THE DEMISE OF BELL POTTINGER 87

• Accounts of Duduzane Zuma, son of President Jacob Zuma. It is now

common knowledge that the account included wider South African govern-
ment and business involvement.

The Guptas

Three of the main players were the brothers Ajay, Rajesh and Atul (part of a wider
Gupta kinfolk) from India who came to South Africa when apartheid ended in the
early 1990s and assembled a sprawling, multibillion-dollar business empire in South
Africa. They owned Oakbay Investments and had earned outrageous sums of money
by leveraging their friendship with South African President Jacob Zuma. They
secured lucrative contracts in the field of armaments, mining, and railways through
intimidating officials to twist regulations to their will. The key connection was
Zuma’s son, Duduzane, whom the Gupta brothers coached for a role as a director –
and billionaire shareholder – in the family’s business empire.
The Gupta’s ascended to notoriety in 2013 when they persuaded a range of govern-
ment departments to bend the law, allowing them to land a planeload of 217 guests
from India at the high-security South African Air Force base at Waterkloof near Pre-
toria for the wedding of Vega Gupta to Aakash Jahajgarhia. The South African
“wedding of the millennium” was designed to showcase the family’s wealth and influ-
ence in their adopted homeland. Their Indian guests were taken to the expansive Sun
City leisure complex by a VIP-convoy normally employed for government dignitaries.
There the guests interacted with prominent South African politicians and business
people. An inquiry, held in response to the public outrage about multiple breaches of
national security and protocol, found that “Number One” (a reference to President
Jacob Zuma) had extensively obliged the Guptas.
The Guptas were able to influence state procurement through Zuma-appointed offi-
cials in key positions on decision-making committees. The Gupta empire benefited in
many ways: The cash was derived either directly from contracts with state-owned
companies won by Gupta-held businesses, or from “success fees” solicited from
global companies wanting to do business with South Africa. These included inter alia
a Swiss construction company, two German IT giants, a multinational management
consultancy, a Chinese state outfit, and the accounting firm, KPMG. The ultimate
aspiration of the Guptas was to capture the South African state.

Bell Pottinger and the Guptas

Considerable evidence that the Guptas had long been the power behind the degraded
President Jacob Zuma came to light when Zuma fired South Africa’s esteemed finance
minister Pravin Gordhan and replaced him with close Gupta-associate Malisi Gigaba.
At the time Gordhan was embroiled in a legal battle with the Guptas whom he
accused of stealing billions from South African state resources.
As the throttlehold of the Guptas gained attention, the family’s endeavors
demanded astounding public relations maneuvers. They sought an imaginative
diversion that would draw attention away from them and their state capture deal-
ings, onto their many enemies through an ingenious plan that included public rela-
tions campaigns. Through their Oakbay Investments the Guptas hired Bell
Pottinger in 2016 at a price of £100,000 a month to burnish their reputation. Bell
88 RONEL RENSBURG

Pottinger was given an assignment that sounded benevolent at its face: enticing
grass-roots political activism to further the cause of poor black people in South
Africa. But Bell Pottinger signed a client that in due course would entomb it in
disgrace and by the following year (July 2017), Bell Pottinger was enmeshed in an
international quagmire.
In television reports, editorials, and public rallies, Bell Pottinger stood accused of
setting off racial tensions through a furtive campaign built on Twitter bots, hate-filled
articles on websites, and social media platforms, as well as drafting confrontational
political speeches for the partisans of Zuma and the Guptas. All contents were push-
ing a ruinous narrative: whites in South Africa had seized resources and wealth while
they deprived blacks of education and jobs. There is evidence in the #GuptaLeaks
that Bell Pottinger was also requested to develop and execute a campaign to besmirch
a number of leading academics, journalists and business figures in South Africa,
including prominent businessman Johann Rupert of Remgro. The central message for
this campaign was propagated with a combustible phrase, “white monopoly capital”
(WMC). Ironically, Rupert directs Richemont, which has been a longstanding client
of Bell Pottinger at the time the latter took on the Gupta account.

Bell Pottinger’s Brief, Mandate and Public Relations Campaign Strategy

Bell Pottinger’s brief and mandate was to create a campaign to deflect public atten-
tion away from state capture in South Africa by the Guptas, President Zuma, and his
advisors and onto fake issues. Bell Pottinger concocted a strategy based on stirring
up racial friction through attacking big business as the specific reason for South Afri-
ca’s economic sluggishness and consequent rising unemployment (which is amongst
the highest in the world). The complete scope of Bell Pottinger’s work for the Guptas
is still being investigated, but it includes devising and executing the “white monopoly
capital” (WMC) campaign through enlisting the support of a number of pliable
South African journalists, academics and researchers; and through a destructive
social media campaign. The social media campaign targeted the judiciary, high profile
journalists, and academics that began suspecting and questioning Zuma and the
Guptas. The phrase “radical economic transformation” was also repeated by numer-
ous politicians in their speeches. How was the campaign conceptualized?

The Creative Campaign Concept: Crafting a Treacherous Narrative

Bell Pottinger had a division dedicated to political propaganda and appointed Vic-
toria Geoghegan, who was part of James Henderson’s revenue-generating finance
team for more than a decade, to oversee its undertakings in South Africa. Bell Pottin-
ger described Geoghegan as a specialist in creative and innovative tactics for modern
communication campaigns. The agency claimed that Geoghegan’s close client relation-
ships, professional handling of complex issues, and strong leadership skills made her
the ultimate person for a leadership job at their agency. Geoghegan took instructions
from President Zuma’s son, Duduzane Zuma. After the campaign brief, she emailed
Duduzane that Bell Pottinger was keen to build a long-term partnership with him.
Attached to this email was a document titled “Reflections on meeting and next steps”
in which Geoghegan set out how she had pondered on their exchanges that resulted
in a better grasp of the focus of the campaign. It read (abridged):
8. STATE CAPTURE AND THE DEMISE OF BELL POTTINGER 89

1994 was a seminal year in South Africa’s history. The peaceful handover of power
raised the hopes of many, and the expectation of imminent political AND economic
enfranchisement was justified. The reality is that whilst political freedom has been
attained there is a feeling that expectations of economic empowerment have not been
met, with the wealth of South Africa sitting within a small grouping…This feeling is
widespread and has been expressed to us in emotive language using phrases such as ‘eco-
nomic apartheid’ and ‘economic emancipation’. Furthermore, given that a lot of current
criticism (for almost all of South Africa’s ills) is directed at President Zuma, and indirectly at
the ANC, there is a need to explain in clear, unambiguous language that it is vital ‘economic
emancipation’ is addressed. The people of South Africa need to be told that their dissatisfac-
tion is being heard and that concrete actions are being, or will be taken to address them…
the message we wish to disseminate is not one that can be sold overnight. For this campaign
to be believed and to achieve credibility there will need to be discipline, continuity and con-
sistency over a period, ideally running up to the 2017 elections and beyond. The key to any
political messaging is repetition and we will need to use every media channel that we can, to
let our message take seed and to grow. (#Guptaleaks, 2017).

Geoghegan provided ideas for the way forward, suggesting that the tactics were not
exhaustive and would over time be developed into a more comprehensive public rela-
tions strategy:

• Create a non-party political narrative around the existence of economic apart-

heid and the vital need for more economic emancipation. This narrative
should appeal to both potential third-party advocates in the business and aca-
demic communities and the grass-roots population.
• Provide assistance and advice on the setting up of a vehicle (the “entity”) to be
the public face of the narrative.
• Whilst the narrative/vehicle is intended to be political party-agnostic, it will
create opportunities for political commentary and participation.
• Bell Pottinger packaged the narrative into speeches, press releases, website con-
tent, videos/broadcast content, slogans, and any other material required.
• The initial project drew on the strengths of both Bell Pottinger and the South
African teams – Bell Pottinger’s strategic messaging skills, experience, inter-
national reach, and overall brand and credibility, complemented by the South
African team’s access to domestic media outlets, digital capabilities, and its in-
country network.
• Utilize compelling research, case studies and data which illustrated that apart-
heid still existed, and that there was a need for inclusive growth. Bell Pottinger
was to analyze the data (for example: power generation, ports) and create fact-
sheets and easily understood collateral for wider dissemination.
• Engaging media both nationally and internationally. This was to reach the all-
important South African audience, but achieve international endorsement
which would add credibility to the narrative and provide feedback to the
South African media as well.
• It was critical that the narrative grabbed the attention of the grass-roots popu-
lation who must identify with it, connect with it, and feel united by it. In order
to reach this audience, the Bell Pottinger and South African teams sought to
strategize the appropriate engagement tools, be this radio, social media, and/or
slogans, for example #endeconomicapartheid, #growthforall.
90 RONEL RENSBURG

Geoghegan wrote: “Lord Bell will be available for strategic counsel as and when
required. We will also have in reserve other divisions (digital, crisis communications)
should we need a wider skillset” (#Guptaleaks, 2017).On 20 January 2016, Duduzane
Zuma responded to Geoghegan:

I am quite happy and enthused by your understanding of what needs to be done and the
time frames in which we need to do it in. I have to reiterate that, which you correctly
put it, this ‘journey’ is not primarily one to affect the outcome of the elections but to
turn the tide of our country’s trajectory in the long term. (#Guptaleaks, 2017).

He added that Geoghegan should forward the invoice to him and also asked for dir-
ections on another campaign he appears to have been working on that included dis-
persing critical information in a short period of time. He further stated: “require
assistance whether it be in the designing and creating a hard hitting message along
the lines of the #EconomicEmancipation or whatever it is” (Scorpio, Daily Maver-
ick’s investigative unit, 2017).
Bell Pottinger’s work for the Guptas was not widely known until November 2016,
when a video interview of Ajay Gupta, arranged by the Bell Pottinger agency, leaked
to the South African media. The content of the interview was largely trivial, but pro-
vided proof that one of the UK’s most famous public relations agencies was counsel-
ing the Guptas. An anti-Zuma demonstration in South Africa included anti-Bell
Pottinger billboards. One showed a photograph of Geoghegan with blood dripping
from her lips and the words “Gupta’s Girl” over her head. A demonstration in front
of Bell Pottinger’s offices in London followed.

The Campaign Rollout and Fallout

The campaign became a narrative that was shaped, created and relentlessly pushed
on all media platforms available including The New Age newspaper and the Gupta-
owned ANN7 television channel in South Africa. Funded trolls and bots ceaselessly
besieged anyone who challenged this narrative or posed questions about the Gupta’s
transactions in South Africa. Bell Pottinger further usurped power from the faction-
ridden ANC-government, directing its economic policy in public through manufac-
tured slogans and discourse. More than 100 fake Twitter accounts were created, all
of them retweeting content from other Twitter accounts with names like @economy-
capture. Popular hashtags included #WhiteMonopolyCapital and #RespectGuptas.
The campaign involved some 220,000 tweets. As the campaign spread, leaders of
groups like the ANC Youth League gave seditious speeches condemning the “con-
trol” that rich whites had on the South African economy. Leaked emails later
showed that the groups received media training, and in some cases funds, from
Oakbay Investments (Report 2017).
New and radical groups like Black First Land First (BLF)2 – a Geoghegan concep-
tion – sprang up, holding public rallies to fulminate against whites and their land
ownership. In a related and covert campaign, the Guptas were cast as compassionate
people eager to help the exploited people of South Africa. On 19 March 2017, the
South African newspapers alleged that Bell Pottinger was behind a social media strat-
egy, using fake bloggers, commentators and Twitter users, in an attempt to influence
public opinion and sow racial division in South Africa, as well as targeting media
and personalities that were opposed to the Gupta family. The aim of the campaign
8. STATE CAPTURE AND THE DEMISE OF BELL POTTINGER 91

was to portray the Gupta family as victims of a conspiracy involving “white monop-
oly capital” (WMC) to deflect accusations and evidence of their client’s involvement
in corruption and state capture and to suggest that WMC is actively blocking trans-
formation in South Africa.
The former minister of finance, Trevor Manuel stated:

… the term ‘White Monopoly Capital’ was conjured up by Bell Pottinger on behalf of
the Guptas, and filtered into the political discourse to serve their agenda. Since then
I have become aware of the specificity of the facts…the term was developed by Bell
Pottinger’s Victoria Geoghegan, who in an email to Duduzane Zuma styled ‘White
Monopoly Capital’ as a narrative and filtered it into the discourse via Collen Maine,
Andile Mngxitama and Mzwanele Manyi. The idea of ‘White Monopoly Capital’
(WMC) is a ruse to draw attention away from our pressing policy priorities. (Manuel,
2017).

In April 2017, Bell Pottinger canceled its deal with the Guptas, citing the increasing
social media attacks on their staff and their business as the reason. On 6 July 2017
Bell Pottinger CEO James Henderson issued an apology and announced that the firm
had dismissed the lead partner involved in the Oakbay portfolio and suspended other
employees so that the agency could determine their precise roles in the event. The
lead partner Victoria Geoghegan was dismissed for “inappropriate and offensive”
work for Oakbay. Neither this “unequivocal and absolute apology,” nor Henderson’s
resignation in September 2017 alleviated the situation . South African companies –
ironically some of whom can be considered as “white monopoly capital” – Richemont
of Johann Rupert and Investec Bank – terminated their contracts with Bell Pottinger,
as did the South African Tourism Board.
South Africa’s official opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA) formally
complained about Bell Pottinger’s actions to two UK public relations bodies, the
Public Relations and Communication Association (PRCA) and the Chartered Insti-
tute of Public Relations (CIPR). The PRCA blacklisted Bell Pottinger, finding its con-
duct unethical. The blacklisting was supported by professional associations
worldwide, including the Public Relations and Communication Management Institute
of Southern Africa (PRISA). More international clients, including HSBC, Clydesdale
Bank, TalkTalk, and Carillion ditched Bell Pottinger. Chime, the agency’s second lar-
gest shareholder, abandoned its 27% stake in the agency. Bell Pottinger suffered
£8 million worth of client losses in 48 hours prompting massive layoffs. On 12 Septem-
ber 2017 Bell Pottinger collapsed into administration and its actions were widely con-
demned, including in the British Parliament and by the British High Commissioner
to South Africa. Foremost among the complaints against the company was its action
of running a racially divisive campaign that has also damaged British relations with
South Africa (Czarnecki, 2017).
Companies linked to the Guptas – directly or indirectly – began to deal with the
consequences of the scandal including ongoing investigations into their business prac-
tices. The South African Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) is
pursuing criminal complaints that emerged from an investigation into state contracts
and the Gupta-Zuma liaison, which also have ensnared companies like KPMG, SAP,
McKinsey, and the Bank of Baroda, to mention just a few. The list of companies is
growing.
92 RONEL RENSBURG

PART TWO: LESSONS FROM THE BELL POTTINGER BATTLEFIELD

The Bell Pottinger tale offers us many lessons that are fundamental for the welfare of
public relations practice and discipline, as well as for others. They reprimand all
doubters of the strategic fabric of public relations and ought to convert most public
relations agnostics that may still exist. Some of these lessons are optimistic and pro-
gressive, but there are also severe warnings. Clearly, Bell Pottinger was not an inno-
cent bystander in this affair. What do these lessons reveal?

Client Briefs to Agencies Warrant Careful Scrutiny

Clients usually brief agencies thoroughly regarding what is expected of them, and
surely the Bell Pottinger exponents expected that they had to promote the reputations
of the Guptas and President Jacob Zuma. It became important for South Africans to
know the identities of the players that sat down with the agency and gave them their
instructions, as Bell Pottinger clearly did not come up with all the ideas exclusively.
The concepts and narratives that Bell Pottinger conceived, were clearly in response to
a directive from their clients. This could only mean that the original brief that they
were given was meant to destabilize the South African economy, political environ-
ment, and society. However, an eventual campaign product depends largely on the
creativity of the agency team (Moerdyk, 2017).
It is rare for any public relations agency to turn down a client or to not accept
a brief – specifically when a large fee is on offer. Agencies do not always meticulously
probe from whom the brief comes and what the true intentions are. The consequences
of the South African account were destructive and the mutilation that Bell Pottinger
caused might never fully be grasped. The outcomes of the campaign have created
renewed racial tensions in South Arica and these are now continuing. One such out-
come is the Black First Land First (BLF) movement and its calls to seize land with-
out compensation in South Africa. Although land redistribution is a reality in South
Africa, the aggressiveness of the BLF message has been an incidental, even if danger-
ous, result of Bell Pottinger’s campaign to create social divisions. This case tells us
that public relations has the power to build, or destroy, societal harmony.

Sometimes an Apology Is Not Good Enough

Bell Pottinger was probably hoping that the outrage and media attention would dwin-
dle after the campaign fallout, but the controversy did not and the agency’s apology
was perceived merely as another “spin” in an attempt to put the scandal behind them.
Loss of credibility destroys the standing of any communicator. Pressure was kept up on
the agency to divulge who gave the brief and what the brief entailed. The rashness of
the initial brief and eventual campaign was accentuated when it became common
knowledge that the actors in the South African government deemed it fit to take their
brief overseas, to the UK, and hire a foreign public relations agency. The concealment
of the brief and campaign from South African public relations talent and knowledge-
able agencies, added a further layer to the deviousness of the affair (Mulaudzi, 2017).
Bell Pottinger’s apology was not accepted. Nor was the idea of Bell Pottinger
making recompense by inter alia donating money to the Nelson Mandela Foundation.
This gesture was interpreted as a means of evading the dire position of the agency.
Lord Tim Bell himself stated in an interview that the media has an “addiction to
8. STATE CAPTURE AND THE DEMISE OF BELL POTTINGER 93

apologies” and that he never advises his clients to apologize (Smith, 2018). The Bell
Pottinger incident is an example that in specific catastrophes caused through public
relations deeds, apologies are found wanting.

“Spin for the Dark Arts” – Strategic Value Taken Too Far?

For decades, public relations scholarship has prescribed that the communication func-
tion should be part of the dominant coalition, treated as a strategic function, escape
the perception of being spin, have a place at the table of corporate boards, etc. The
irony is that in the Bell Pottinger case the public relations function was accorded
these to the “extreme.” At the same time the strategy was so reprehensible, that an
agency tumbled, the president of a country resigned, the country faced renewed racial
divisions that could last a long time, and public relations stood exposed as “spin for
the dark arts.” As South African brand reputation expert, Solly Moeng explained:

Bell Pottinger came close to the edge … Racism is a weak point for South Africans, it’s
the one point that could ignite South Africa. And Bell Pottinger should have known
that … This is an abuse of our weaknesses in our country. (Plaut, 2017)

Francis Ingham, director general of the PRCA said in an interview that he has never
seen anything equal to it. “The work was on a completely new scale of awfulness”
(Van Zyl, 2017). The Bell Pottinger campaign in South Africa will go down in the
global public relations chronicles as Goebbelesque – but with more advanced technol-
ogy and power tools at play.

Playing One Clients’ Public Relations Strategies and Communication Intelligence

off Against Another

Bell Pottinger had numerous South African accounts on board. Richemont, a luxury-
goods company (with Johan Rupert as Chairman), was a Bell Pottinger client for
many years. So too was Investec Bank and the South African Tourism Board. Dudu-
zane Zuma and the Gupta’s Oakbay Investments were relatively new clients for the
agency. Notwithstanding that Richemont was a longstanding client, Bell Pottinger
used the company as part of the “white monopoly capital” (WMC) narrative in the
campaign on behalf of Duduzane Zuma and the Guptas. Simultaneously, other teams
at Bell Pottinger worked on reputation-repair messages for the WMC-clients (inter
alia Richemont and Investec Bank) to “counteract” negative WMC-perceptions
(Report, 2017). In so doing, Bell Pottinger committed the ultimate transgression in
public relations practice and ethics – playing its own clients against each other.

Generating Narratives to Lure Attention Away from Nefarious Activities

Bell Pottinger created an unyielding campaign with the main objective of luring attention
away from the real issue – state capture by the Guptas and Jacob Zuma. South Africa’s
then minister of finance Pravin Gordhan said in an interview with the Sunday Times:

Bell Pottinger’s apology uses ‘white monopoly capital’ as a narrative to cover a vast array of
nefarious activities at the behest of‚ and in collaboration with‚ the ‘Gupta syndicate’… The
minor admissions made vindicate what we’ve been saying for almost two years – that the
94 RONEL RENSBURG

attacks on institutions such as the national treasury‚ and on individuals and their families
was designed to malign them and create a distraction from the activities of the ‘syndicate’.

Gordhan added that

Bell Pottinger stood accused of collaborating in a systematic plan to capture the South
African state as shown by both the studies by the academics and stated in the report by
the South African Council of Churches. They went beyond image management or what-
ever they thought they were doing. You don’t just cook up things or help to create fake
twitter accounts and start labelling people. If you are just a PR agency‚ you don’t get
involved in that. (Skiti, 2017)

The creation of narratives is powerful, but power restraint in public relations is for-
midable. The craftsmanship displayed by the constructors of the South African cam-
paign had its own form of brilliance. Creating narratives that can change hearts and
minds is very compelling. However, there is supremacy in grasping the boundaries of
a given brief and situation. This was a brilliant communication strategy and it
achieved its ultimate campaign objectives. But the value of this textbook public rela-
tions strategy will not be remembered for its genius, but for its lack of restraint and
the tatters it left behind.

Exploiting Public Relations in Political Discourse in Foreign Countries

After succeeding tainted Zuma as president of South Africa on 15 February 2018,

Cyril Ramaphosa remarked that everyone must be concerned that a foreign public
relations agency had been able to effectively poison the political discourse and social
rubric of South Africa to advance narrow interests. “It says much about our lack of
political cohesion and ideological clarity that Bell Pottinger was able to manipulate
some of our own political concepts to fuel confusion and division amongst us” (Eye-
witness News, 2017). Julius Malema, leader of the Economic Freedom Fighters
(EFF), called for the Gupta family to leave South Africa: “Not only have they looted
our coffers, they have done so whilst using a propaganda campaign relying on uneth-
ical means. They have rendered our public discourse toxic with fake news. They do
not deserve to be in our midst …” (Cameron, 2017).

Tarnishing Country Reputations and Diplomatic Relations

The Bell Pottinger scandal has illuminated that reputation laundering is a profitable
business for public relations agencies. London is home to a cluster of public relations
agencies catering to foreign governments, raising questions about it becoming the
global capital of reputation laundering. Bell Pottinger inaugurated the “public rela-
tions template” for this rewarding niche and in the process sullied the reputations of
individuals, businesses, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the UAE, and India. The
threat to diplomatic relations between countries also came to the fore. It became
a public relations scandal of significance on a global scale.
Bell Pottinger’s creation of parallel political power structures also devalued the
British political establishment. Lord Peter Hain (former fierce anti-apartheid activist)
stated that only when Bell Pottinger’s lies and fake news in South Africa became well-
reported by the South African media and other pursuers did the British media and
8. STATE CAPTURE AND THE DEMISE OF BELL POTTINGER 95

FIG 8.1 Two British Polluters by Zapiro (available at www.zapiro.com) (Sunday Times, 9 July 2017).

politicians take into account the existence of state capture and corruption and the
possible involvement of British companies (Van der Westhuizen, 2018).

Everybody Is Entitled to Representation and Public Relations Counsel

Any individual, company or political party is entitled to hire public relations agencies
and other communication consultancies to assist with campaigns, messaging, and
reputation counsel. However, representation does not grant permission for manipula-
tion. When foreign private interests (like the Guptas) use public relations counsel to
make millions from the societal and political turmoil they create, it creates a black
eye for public relations practice.

Beyond Ethics and Morality

The debate surrounding public relations ethics is not new. Public relations ethics
should be an arduous and perpetual deliberation. The Bell Pottinger saga displays
numerous lessons in ethics and morality. As a profession, public relations must sus-
tain and develop itself and be profitable. However, the Bell Pottinger scandal high-
lighted that there remains a necessity in bridging the discordance between profit and
virtue. Lord Bell remarked in an interview (Smith, 2018) that morality is a job for
priests, not public relations men [sic]. He maintained that Bell Pottinger merely did
what their clients requested of them. He also contended that he was not sure if public
relations agencies ever considered the morality aspect of their work, because capital
always seems to be far more important than morality!
The South African campaign itself progressed into a failure, morally and profes-
sionally. It lacked intercultural sensitivity, as well as responsible leadership and chose
agency billings over ethical behavior – seeking profit at the cost of virtue. But no
business exists in a vacuum and all public relations agencies operate in reality. It is
likely that in the real world, profit will seldom lose. Bell Pottinger’s brand of global
reputation laundering, hauling commercial and business interests into the politics of
sovereign countries, might become a new mode of economic mercenary activity in an
attempt to destabilize democracy (Pegg and Wright, 2011). The alleged use of social
media by Russia to influence the 2016 presidential elections in the United States tells
us that such acts are not isolated or random.
96 RONEL RENSBURG

The Reputation of Public Relations as a Practice and Domain

The Bell Pottinger saga left many shattered reputations in its wake, but it incalculably
marred the reputation of public relations itself. For an agency that specialized in
crisis and reputation management, Bell Pottinger failed to manage its own crisis and
reputation when these where most needed. This was a public relations campaign that
reached its strategic objectives – however nefarious they were. It exhibited strategic
initiatives, achieved the goals of the client’s brief, created awareness, offered informa-
tion, changed perceptions, fashioned new narratives and became a perfect example of
“strategic.” However, in achieving them, Bell Pottinger crafted its own demise, almost
rekindled the race war in South Africa, and gave public relations a black eye.

CONCLUSION

The influence in state capture may be through various institutions of the state,
including parliament, government departments, state-owned entities and in some
cases the judiciary, or through a corrupt electoral process. One of the factors
that distinguishes state capture from corruption is that, while in cases of corrup-
tion the result (of policy or regulatory decision) is uncertain, in state capture the
outcome is known and is highly likely to benefit those that attempt to, or have
been able to, capture the state. In the case of South Africa it was the president,
certain senior officials in government and directors in some of the state-owned
entities that were allegedly captured. But corruption also entered into the fold.
In this instance, it is claimed that the players were the agents used by the
Guptas to manipulate decisions in favor of the Gupta business empire. The cap-
tors used a well-known public relations company, Bell Pottinger, to give voice
and provide vehicles to their endeavors.
The Gupta family and its close association with President Zuma and his family has
been highlighted and has been a source of great discontent and subject of public
debate in South Africa. Evidently, the family systematically benefited from former
President Zuma’s stay in power in which its own private interests have significantly
influenced the state’s decision-making processes. The extent of the family’s involve-
ment is still being investigated in South Africa. So is the contribution of well-known
and established companies like KPMG.
Bell Pottinger’s eventual demise was triggered by revelations of its public relations
work (equated to “propaganda work”) for the Gupta family, which had been intended
to drive inter alia the so-called “white monopoly capital” (WMC) narrative in South
Africa as a way of deflecting attention from the maleficent capture of state institutions
by President Zuma’s associates. Bell Pottinger had labeled the attacks on the Gupta
family as motivated by white monopoly capital as opposed to widespread concerns
for probity. The state capture scandal decimated Bell Pottinger’s own reputation, lead-
ing to the company’s dramatic ruin and eventual downfall.
Professionals and scholars have struggled for a long time to secure the strategic
value of public relations and communication management within organizations. This
was before Bell Pottinger succeeded in demonstrating how very strategic and powerful
public relations can be. The incident that unfolded in South Africa, leaves scholars
and practitioners with some existential questions: Has public relations – after this
exceptional validation of how strategic its operations can be – caused its own
8. STATE CAPTURE AND THE DEMISE OF BELL POTTINGER 97

reputational disgrace? Will this lead to its eventual ruin? And where does the practice
now move from this abuse of power to restore its ethos?
In his analogy of communication as a nation state (Peters, 1986), avowed that com-
munication’s legitimacy rests in its power rather than its academic value. The Bell
Pottinger case elucidated that public relations retains immense power. It also became
a bleak indicator that public relations – when ill-used and manipulated – can become
a contrivance in future kakistocracies.

NOTES
1 This “strictly confidential” report has recently been released.
2 This movement is currently developing further in South Africa.

REFERENCES

#Guptaleaks. (2017). Why you should read the #GuptaLeaks. www.gupta-leaks.com/a-collaborativeinvestiga

tionintostatecapture/. Accessed 28 February 2018.
Cameron, J. (2017, July). Dummy’s guide: Bell Pottinger - Gupta London agency, creator of WMC. BizNews.
Cooley, A., Heathershaw, J. & Sharman, J. C. (2018, January). Laundering cash, whitewashing reputations.
Journal of Democracy, 29 (1): 39–53.
Czarnecki, S. (2017, November 01). Timeline of a crisis: The fall of Bell Pottinger. prweek.com.
Eyewitness News. (2017, July 12). ANC deputy president Cyril Ramaphosa speaking at the SACP’s 14th
National Congress in Boksburg on 12 July 2017. http://ewn.co.za/2017/07/12/watch-live-cyril-ramaphosa-
addresses-sacp-congress. Accessed 30 July 2017.
Fiske, R. H. (2011). The Best Words. Portland and Oregon: Marion Street Press.
Gosnold, P. (1644). A sermon preached at the Publique Fast the ninth day of August before the honorable mem-
bers of the two Houses of Parliament there assembled … and published by Authority. (U. o. Archive, Ed.).
Accessed10 August 2017.
Manuel, T. (2017, June 6). Fikile, do you remember the tears you shed over the Guptas? Daily Maverick.
www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2017-06-09-fikile-do-you-remember-the-tears-you-shed-over-the-
guptas/#.WrJMKpNub-Y. Accessed 7 July 2018.
Martin, M. E. & Solomon, H. (2018). Understanding the phenomenon of “State Capture” in South Africa.
Southern African Peace and Security Studies, 5 (1): 21–34.
Moerdyk, C. (2017, July 7). Who briefed Bell Pottinger and what did it say? Huffington Post. www.huffington
post.co.za/chris-moerdyk/who-gave-bell-pottinger-their-brief-and-what-was-in-the-brief_a_23020668/.
Accessed 7 July 2017.
Mulaudzi, S. (2017, July 7). South Africans do not care about Bell Pottinger’s apology - it is not enough.
Huffington Post. www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/07/07/south-africans-do-not-care-about-bell-pottingers-
apology-it_a_23020435/. Accessed 7 July 2017.
Peacock, Thomas Love. (1829). The Misfortunes of Elphin. London: Thomas, Hookham and Old
Bond Street.
Pegg, D. & Wright, O. (2011, December 8). Wikipedia founder attacks Bell Pottinger for ‘ethical blindness’
The ‘dark arts’. The Independent UK. www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/wikipedia-founder-
attacks-bell-pottinger-for-ethical-blindness-6273836.html. Accessed 7 September 2017.
Peters, J. (1986). Institutional sources of intellectual poverty in communication research. Communication
Research, 13: 527–559.
Plaut, M. (2017, December). A crushing defeat for the “dark arts”. British Journalism Review, 28 (4): 37–42.
Report. (2017). BellPottinger PR support for the Gupta family. Strictly Private and Confidential Report.
24 January 2017.
Scorpio, Daily Maverick Investigative Unit. (2017). www.dailymaverick.co.za/section/scorpio/#.WrI_hpNub-Y.
Accessed 31 January 2018.
98 RONEL RENSBURG

Skiti, S. (2017, July 13). South Africa needs full disclosure on ‘Gupta syndicate’ - Pravin Gordhan fires
salvo at PR firm. Sunday Times. www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-07-13-exclusive-south-africa-needs-
full-disclosure-on-gupta-syndicate-pravin-gordhan-fires-salvo-at-pr-firm/. Accessed 30 July 2018.
Smith, B. (2018, March 2). Podcast with Lord Tim Bell. Prmoment. www.prmoment.com/category/watch-
and-listen/pr-life-stories-the-prmoment-podcast-with-lord-tim-bell. Accessed July 2018.
Van der Westhuizen, G. (2018, February 24). Beeld Newspaper. ‘n Lord se stryd teen korrupsie. Naspers.
Van Zyl, G. (2017, September 5). Bell Pottinger’s Gupta work the most unethical I’ve ever seen – PRCA DG.
Biznews.
 CHAPTER

9
Exploring the Complexity of Global
Strategic Communication Practice
in Government
The Case of the Canadian Federal Government

Fraser Likely

INTRODUCTION

The concept of strategic communication is defined as the “purposeful use of commu-

nication by an organization to fulfill its mission” (Hallahan, Holtzhausen, Van Ruler,
Verčič, & Sriramesh 2007, p. 3). The key concepts within that statement are “purpose-
ful use” and “fulfill its mission.” Purposeful use suggests a formal and planned organ-
ization and control of communication through stages of conceptualization,
development, approval and execution. Fulfill its mission then suggests that that com-
munication directly furthers the objectives found within overall purpose statements
and strategic management plans.
This chapter examines the strategic communication practices that the Government of
Canada (GOC) employs in developing its purposeful use of communication to further its
international mission. It answers the call for “descriptive accounts of public relations
practices from individual countries” (Sriramesh & Verčič, 2009, p.3), in this case examin-
ing the communication practices that further Canadian federal government positioning
within an overall global context. This examination attempts to provide considerable
depth to this descriptive account, given a dearth of literature on government communica-
tion practices. Indeed, national level government communication practices, particularly
concerning the complexity of the government communication function, remain largely
un-researched (Gelders, Bouckaert, & van Ruler, 2007; Lee, 2008; Likely, Rudolf, &
Valin, 2012; Liu, & Levenshus, 2010; Vos, & Westerhoudt, 2008). In particular, research
is sparse on the interplay between the practice of communication at a government’s polit-
ical level and that practiced by its permanent public service (Lee, Likely, & Valin, 2016).

99
100 FRASER LIKELY

THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT

Canada is a constitutional monarchy, with the Queen of the United Kingdom as its
titular head being represented in Canada by a Canadian citizen as Governor General
(GG). Second, Canada is a decentralized federation with a division of national and
provincial legislative powers, roles and responsibilities explicit in the country’s consti-
tution. Third, Canada is a parliamentary democracy with an elected lower house and
an appointed upper house. The political party with the most seats and balance of
power in an elected House of Commons is asked by the Governor General to form
the executive branch of government with its leader becoming Prime Minister (PM).
The executive branch consists of the Governor General, the Prime Minister and the
Ministers that the Prime Minister appoints to Cabinet. Each Minister is assigned
a portfolio by the PM, within which are responsibilities for one or more government
departments. These departments are staffed by non-partisan, professional, civilian,
public sector employees and led by a Deputy Minister.
The executive branch of the federal government is recognized as having authority
over international relations, although this power has been devolved upon it and it is
not conferred under any constitutional provision. Canada shares the British tradition
where the Crown has the prerogative which, in Canada, is exercised by the federal
executive branch of government as the Queen’s representative. Within the Cabinet, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs is assigned the lead for the majority of the government’s
international initiatives – although Prime Ministers themselves have traditionally
taken an active role in international affairs. It is worth noting that various provinces
have acquired responsibility in the foreign domain, be it in international organizations
or with their own trade offices. The federal government department overseeing most
of Canada’s international governmental activity is branded as Global Affairs Canada
(the legal name of the department is the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and
Development). That department leads in policy and program areas such as inter-
national human rights, international security, promoting trade and opening new mar-
kets, foreign direct investment in Canada, humanitarian assistance, development aid,
assistance to Canadians travelling and working abroad, international students study-
ing in Canada and passport and documentation authentication. Global Affairs works
closely with other government departments (OGDs) such as Immigration, Refugees
and Citizenship Canada and National Defense.

CANADIAN INTERNATIONALISM

The opportunities to communicate about “global affairs” inside and outside its borders
are endless as the country belongs to, and participates in, various international organ-
izations, institutions and agreements. In recent years, Canada has made military contri-
butions to international missions in Afghanistan, Haiti, Libya, Syria/Iraq and Ukraine
as well as anti-piracy maritime efforts off the Horn of Africa. As far as foreign aid is
concerned, Canada funds over 3,500 international development projects, maintaining
250 offices in 160 countries. As a trading nation, Canada relies heavily on exports and
imports to sustain its GDP. Today, exports and imports represent about 65 per cent of
Canada’s economic output – one of the highest ratios among the G7 countries and
almost twice that of the United States. Canada has signed scores of trading agreements
of varying degrees of significance such as the recently renegotiated North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Canada-European Comprehensive Economic and
9. GLOBAL STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION PRACTICE 101

Trade Agreement (CETA), the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-
Pacific Partnership (CPATPP), and the Canada-Barbados Foreign Investment Promo-
tion and Protection Agreement. Canada is the second largest trading partner for the
US, and is also the number one export market for 35 US states. At the same time,
Canada is beginning a process of negotiation to complete a comprehensive trade deal
with China. Canada is a world leader in mining and the extractive industries, in agricul-
tural and forest products and in energy development and has exported its companies
and citizens to other countries, where production practices may have different stand-
ards – sometimes leading to conflict. Approximately 300–400,000 immigrants are admit-
ted to Canada each year, the majority from Asia or Africa. Beyond immigration,
Canada brings in thousands of refugees annually, with over 40,000 in 2016 – the major-
ity being refugees from Syria. To provide its global affairs assistance abroad, Canada
maintains embassies, high commissions and consular offices in 270 locations in 180 for-
eign countries.
Be it for diplomacy, trade, military use, foreign aid, immigration, refugee migration
or Canada’s position within international institutions, federal government communi-
cation comes with its complexities. These subjects have their various stakeholders and
publics, within and without Canada, and these stakeholders have their positions and
communication channels and products. Seldom is there consensus on any subject,
allowing for clear direction and action, particularly in Canada’s parliamentary and
federated political process. Therefore, understanding Canada’s role and influence in
global affairs and its use of purposeful communication inside and outside of Canada
necessitates a broader consideration of other factors. In particular, this purposeful use
of communication in a government communication context requires an understanding
of the different layers of communication practice. Canadian federal government com-
munication includes communication from the political level, communication from the
departmental communication branch level within the public service and communica-
tion from a department’s front-line public service-public interface level. Success at
each of these layers is important to the government fulfilling its mission. This chapter
will focus on the first two, leaving discussion of government-public purposeful com-
munication at the office door, through call centres, web sites or social media comment
boxes or via public meetings, consultations and lobbying.

STANDARDS AFFECTING PURPOSEFUL USE IN THE CANADIAN

GOVERNMENT’S COMMUNICATIONS POLICY

This section describes the overarching policy standard that governs all Canadian gov-
ernment communication. The Canadian government’s first pan government Commu-
nications Policy was approved by the Cabinet of the day in 1987, following a major
management review of the communication function across government (Canada,
1988). Subsequently, the government’s Communications Policy was re-worked in 2002
(with minor revisions in 2006) and in 2016. Each iteration brought greater prescrip-
tive detail – with some important exceptions – especially to the government’s commit-
ment to communicating with citizens and with expectations for principles of good
communication management by various government actors. Each policy followed
a similar format: purpose statement; objectives or principles; policy statements; and
communication functions covered by the Policy (i.e. media relations; advertising;
internal communication; sponsorships; e-communication; citizen engagement; public
opinion research; etc.). How the function was to be managed, particularly regarding
102 FRASER LIKELY

the assignment of roles, responsibilities and accountabilities, was included either as

a separate section within the policy or as a second but supporting document,
Three overarching policy statements framed the 1988 Policy:

• To provide information to the public about its policies, programs and services
that is accurate, complete, objective, timely, relevant and understandable;
• To take into account the concerns and views of the public in establishing prior-
ities, developing policies and implementing programs; and
• To ensure that the government is visible, accessible and answerable to the
public that it serves.

Both the 2002/2006 Policy and the 2016 Policy included ten such policy statements,
expanding on the aspirational notions around government-public communication.
Table 9.1 describes some of the more important changes to these policy statements
over the three policy cycles.
Each of these three policies explicates the government actors covered by the policy
requirements. In 1987, this included the Minister, the deputy head or departmental
Deputy Minister, the head of communications, communications staff and program
and policy advisors in various government departments. The Minister was also given
responsibility for defining the communication responsibilities of ministerial staff. Staff
in a Minister’s office are also known as “exempt” staff. That is, they are not public
servants and are exempt from the legal and regulative requirements under which
public servants must work, such as the hiring process under the Public Service
Employment Act. Exempt staff are partisan and their work security is dependent on
the four-year election cycle and thus the election or re-election of their political party
to power and then the support of a Minister (Brodie, 2012).
The same actors are listed in the 2002 Policy, with the addition of functional spe-
cialists: analysts; researchers; human resource officers; access to information and priv-
acy coordinators; marketing specialists; information technologists; webmasters;
graphic artists; librarians, receptionists and; call-centre staff. The 2016 Policy, a much
shorter document, does not explicitly include any of the ministerial staff, program,
policy and functional specialists listed in 2002 but does provide two additional actors:
public servants as spokespersons; and public servants as subject matter experts.
Each policy document was a creature of its time (Likely, Rudolf, & Valin, 2012).
The first policy was an attempt to find consensus on expectations around government
communication with Canadians, and it accomplished that goal. The two subsequent
policies both strengthened the original policy statements concerning communication
to and with the public and were more explicit in how the policy was to be adminis-
trated. The 1987 Policy tried to spell out some basic management requirements for
the communication function, to provide the function with a higher degree of legitim-
acy. It was only partially successful in doing that (Devereaux Ferguson & Johansen,
2005). Rather than being clear on the precise authorities held by a head of communi-
cation, the policy spoke of the concept of “shared responsibility.” Its implementation
across government was hit or miss, with only some heads reporting directly to the
department head and being given full authority over the function. While the second
policy in 2002 was slightly expansive on the expectations concerning communication
to and with Canadians, it was the prescriptive tone regarding the management of
communication that set it apart from both the 1987 and 2016 policies. It was much
more detailed and it set clear objectives for authorities, roles, responsibilities and
 TABLE 9.1
Canadian Government Communication Policy Evolution

1987 2002/2006 2016

Encouraged dialogue Explicit: Took into account the concerns and views of the public More explicit: Enshrined listening. Considered the views and
interests of the public
Touched on official languages Explicit: Enshrined the right of the public to communicate with More Explicit: Enshrined citizen engagement. “… Reach and
the GOC in either language engage with Canadians effectively and efficiently in the official lan-
guage of their choice”
Provided information that is accurate, Provided the public with timely, accurate, clear, objective and Explicit: Enshrined non-partisanship. “Information is objective,
complete, objective, timely, relevant and complete information factual, non-partisan, clear, and written in plain language”
understandable
Touched on the role of ministers Explicit: Supported ministers as the government’s primary More Explicit: Enshrined the public service role. “Providing
spokespersons impartial advice and support to their minister, who is the princi-
pal spokesperson for the department”
Silent on new technology Explicit: Emphasized technological innovation and use of new More Explicit: Enshrined digital and social media primacy. Using
media digital media and platforms as the “primary means to connect and
interact with the public”
Reactive approach to media relations Explicit: Required proactive media relations More Explicit: Enshrined multi-channel importance. “Uses
a variety of media and platforms to maximize reach, including
seeking innovative ways to use technology”
Referred to alternative formats Explicit: Reinforced the need for multiple formats More Explicit: Enshrined the importance of social media. “In
order to have an effective and open dialogue with an increasingly
diverse Canadian public, the government uses innovative digital
tools and online platforms”
Silent about communicating risk Explicit: Institutions must anticipate and assess potential risks More Explicit: Enshrined a communications branch’s role in risk
management. “Integrating communications into their depart-
ment’s emergency preparedness and crisis management planning”
Encouraged co-operation between com- Explicit: Required collaboration within, between and among More Explicit: Enshrined integrative role for communication.
munication and other functions departments and agencies “Communications within and across departments are well coord-
inated and integrated into all government operations”
Designated a senior official (referred to Explicit: “The head of communications is the senior official des- Less Explicit: Depreciated the role of head of communication.
hereafter as head of communications) ignated to support the deputy head” … “Heads of communica- Designated a senior official (any senior official) as head of com-
to support the deputy head tions are members of senior management and report directly to munications to manage communications
the deputy head”
104 FRASER LIKELY

accountabilities. Heads of communication didn’t want a second failure and given the
times – following a period of government cost-cutting and retrenchment when com-
munication budgets were slashed and staffs decimated – they fought for a policy that
gave them clear authority over the full communication function in any department.
From 2002 to almost 2010, the communication head was queen of her functional
domain, with a policy to back her up as she added employees and repatriated small
communication outposts that had developed in policy, program and operations
branches (Frappier, & Likely, 2005; Likely, 2004; Redmond, & Likely, 2002a, 2002b). It
was a period of expansion, as all three governments in that timeframe greatly increased
program spending. But, the 2016 Policy did not re-affirm the authority of the commu-
nication head. Gone was reference to directly reporting to the departmental deputy
minister as was the reference to authority and accountability for the whole of the com-
munication function. The replacement was simply a list of roles and responsibilities
that the head was expected to perform. The power that the head held by virtue of the
2002 Policy evaporated. The 2016 Policy assigned this authority to the head of
a central agency, the Privy Council Office (PCO). The PCO is the Prime Minister’s own
public service department, and works to support the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)
agenda and initiatives. The PCO provides the Prime Minister with direct communica-
tion support. This change was symptomatic of greater functional changes in that across
government the department and the department’s minister were being subsumed by
a more authoritative PCO and in particular a more powerful PMO. Power was central-
ized in these two offices, especially that relating to government communication.
What was added to the policy in 2016, both with regard to communication with Can-
adians and to the management of the function was reference to the concept of non-
partisanship. Communication would be non-partisan and the communication function
would act in a non-partisan manner. This reference was deemed necessary, given this cen-
tralization of communication and the closeness with which the PCO was involved with
the machinations of the PMO. The 2016 Policy also reflected its time, a time following
government scandal and of increasing influence and control held by the exempt commu-
nication staff in ministers’ offices and notably in the PMO in the day-to-day communica-
tion efforts of the communication function (Kozolanka, 2006). This policy also reflected
a more centralized approach to the entire government communication, whether through
the PMO or through the central agency, the PCO, Communications and Consultation.
This centralization, within the overall communication function in support to overall
organizational centralization, is supported by current research. Research by Moss,
Likely, Sriramesh and Ferrari (2017) demonstrates that communication functions, being
situational dependent, adapt their structures to meet current circumstances. Indeed, flexi-
bility appears to be the key, with communication functions continually assessing and
then adopting structures that allow it to best support organizational clients and centres
of authority. As noted, this last policy did not refer explicitly to exempt, ministerial com-
munication staff. Neither did it refer to front-line communicators, such as those tasked
with dealing directly with the public in-person, on the telephone, or electronically.

STRUCTURE AND ROLES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

COMMUNICATION FUNCTION

This section will explore how each “layer” works and works together in furthering
a government’s purposeful use of communication. It is within the Minister’s authority
to appoint exempt staff to work in the Minister’s Office (MINO). As noted, these
9. GLOBAL STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION PRACTICE 105

staff are “exempt” from the formal appointment and employment policies of the
Public Service of Canada. Those that are communication staff appointments may
have a stronger political background than extensive communication experience, the
opposite typically of communication staff in the department. A Minister may appoint
a Director of Communications (who would report to the Minister’s Chief of Staff),
a Press Secretary and if warranted, one or more Special Assistants-Communications.
If a Minister has regional responsibilities, Regional Communications Advisors and
Regional Press Secretaries may be appointed as well. In more recent practice as
another example of centralization, exempt communication staff are either “placed” in
a minister’s office by the Prime Minister’s Office or are approved by the PMO, thus
allowing the Minister limited latitude in selection. Indeed, in the last decade, a more
matrixed reporting relationship has developed, with the MINO’s Director of Commu-
nications and Press Secretary seemingly developing stronger solid line compared to
dotted line, functional reporting arrangements.
Policy requirements state that exempt staff may ask public servants for information
and advice, relay the Minister’s directions and be kept current when communication
decisions are taken and operations conducted. But, there is to be a clear division
between the roles of exempt communication staff, who give the Minister equivalent pro-
fessional, though also partisan, advice, and those of departmental communication staff
(Canada, 2011). Supposedly, exempt staff are not to give direction on responsibilities
that are clearly within a public servant’s operational communication responsibility,
although evidence would suggest that advice is given on the quality and approval of
communication content and messaging, choice of products and selection of channels/
media. The fact that the framers of the 2016 GOC Communications Policy felt the
need, in the third iteration of the Policy, to continually emphasize the concept of “non-
partisan” tells us that what was a grey area with an imprecise line had been crossed
either too often and/or too far. In relaying the Minister’s direction regarding the need
for communication products (such as media releases, announcements, tours, events,
meetings, videos, advertisements, photo ops, blog posts, web site posts, tweets, etc.),
which are developed by the communication branch of the department, expectations
around messaging, supporting content, language, look and feel are part of the directive.
Approval of a department’s draft products rests in the MINO, with the Director of
Communications. Traditionally, from the department’s communication branch perspec-
tive, these products are seen as “informational” and not promotional – in that they
don’t promote the political party nor the government per se. In addition, they “inform”
on decisions taken (policies, budgets, legislation, regulations, grants and contributions),
not on political or governmental promises made and not yet adopted (for reference to
communicating policy information in other countries, see Gelders, Bouckaert, & van
Ruler, 2007; Gelders, De Cock, Roe, & Neijens, 2006; Gelders, & Ihlen, 2010). A fine
line for which there are many examples of it being potentially erased.
Depending on the size of the department, the communication branch could have
between twenty and four hundred communication professionals. Typically, the com-
munication head manages executives who lead such sectors as media relations/issues
management, strategic advisors (working with internal client functions), web, social
media, internal communication, and branch management. Depending on the size of
the branch, specialty sub-functions may include social marketing, stakeholder out-
reach and consultations, planning, research and performance measurement, work-
load/workflow tasking and approval tracking, and learning/training. The creation of
communication products within the branch involves the injection of subject matter
106 FRASER LIKELY

expertise housed in policy, program or operations branches as well as an extended

approval process that involves many senior departmental executives.
Once a product is approved in the department, it goes to the Minister’s Office – and
then to the Privy Council Office, Communications and Consultation (PCO, C&C). In
the times of the first two communication policies, PCO, C&C employed approximately
a dozen employees. Besides a couple of communication management and consultation
specialists, the majority were assigned accounts. Each was given a number of depart-
ment communication branches to which they provided product advice if requested but
spent most of the time identifying potential risk and tracking pan government commu-
nication initiatives. Today, PCO, C&C is led by an Assistant Secretary of Cabinet,
Communications and Consultation. Sections reporting to the Assistant Secretary are:
Integration (consultations and public engagement; public opinion research; web pub-
lishing); the Prime Minister’s Digital Operations (PMweb and design; social media and
multi-media monitoring and analysis); Operations (advertising, marketing, editorial
analysis and approval); Strategic Communications (departmental communication
branch product approvals; pan government strategic communication integration); and
Media Centre (traditional media monitoring and analysis). The Assistant Secretary
leads a communication group of well over one hundred professionals. The products of
each and every departmental communication branch are subject to their approval, for
as the 2016 Policy states, they provide: “leadership, challenge, strategic direction, and
coordination of departmental and horizontal communications and consultations activ-
ities” (Canada, 2016). PCO, C&C vets, as Marland found:

sensitive issue; PCO discretion; horizontal issue [e.g., a whole of government matter that
touches multiple departments]; specific item in the Speech from the Throne; specific item
in the mandate letter; international meetings; over $10M; federal/provincial/territorial;
legislations and House of Commons activities; budgetary measures. (2017a).

The same communication product that is approved in the MINO is then forwarded
to the Prime Minister’s Office, Communications (PMO, C) in a parallel process.
Approximately fifty professionals work in communication roles, including media rela-
tions and the press secretary, speechwriting, issues management and PM tours and
strategic communication integration. As journalist Chris Hall reported: “…each
member of the communications team has unique responsibilities. From coordinating
regional media outreach, to working with communications staff in specific depart-
ments. They have beats, not unlike reporters at national news organizations….” (Hall,
2009). When PMO, C agrees, having input from PCO, C&C, MINO and sometimes
directly from the departmental communication branch, to a staged announcement, an
event, a media release, a social media post, whatever the product, it proceeds. At this
point, decisions have been taken on who will say what, where, when and how. Unless
it is a pan government product with multiple departments and other Ministers
involved, the individual department communication branch is now “greenlighted.”
The process involved to arrive at PMO, C approval requires distinct documenta-
tion, dependent on the product. Recent research underlines the complexities involved:

Among the collected materials were forms used for processing inquiries from the media,
such as media ‘lines’ and notes for communications opportunities. We also collected
media relations strategy templates such as announcement plans, video project proposals,
event planning checklists, and key message templates. Also in the set of documents were
9. GLOBAL STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION PRACTICE 107

communications calendars and rollout plans, including plans for using social media.
These internal instruments illustrate that there are many moving parts to be aligned
when the government prepares to make a public announcement. (Marland, 2017a)

GLOBAL AFFAIRS COMMUNICATION

Global Affairs is the amalgamation of three previously distinct departments: Foreign

Affairs; International Trade; and the Canadian International Development Agency.
Various functions including communication merged into a Public Affairs branch under
a single head of communication. The head leads six sections: Branch Management;
Digital Communications (creative, graphics, marketing; advertising; French and English
writing and editing; web; e-communication; travel and consular communication); Stra-
tegic Communications (advisory support for Foreign Affairs clients; media relations;
media spokespersons; media analysis; public opinion research; social media); Develop-
ment (advisory support for Development clients; speechwriting); Trade (advisory sup-
port for Trade clients); and Public Diplomacy (advisory support for Public Diplomacy
clients). In total, the head of communication leads over 150 branch employees.
While the departments have merged, there continue to be three Ministers – of For-
eign Affairs, International Trade, and International Development and La Francopho-
nie – though now under the lead of the Minister of Foreign Affairs who was also
given direct responsibility for the re-negotiation of NAFTA (Canada, 2017). Each has
an exempt status Director of Communications and one or two Press Secretaries. As
a result, the department’s Head of Communication must support all three, but separ-
ately. Interestingly, the Head, at the level of Assistant Deputy Minister, has not trad-
itionally been a communication professional. The department cycles its diplomats
through functional and back office positions between diplomatic assignments. Thus,
every two years or so, a new Head of Communication is appointed, often with limited
government strategic communication experience. For an inexperienced Head of Com-
munication, it is easier to learn to play a communication support or operational role
than a strategic role. That said, the rapid turnover of communication heads over the
past two decades suggests that even the learning needed to enact an operational role
may well be incomplete by the time the head is moved to another posting. Certainly,
the head is dependent on the technical capabilities found in the communication
branch as well as the competencies of the branch middle managers. Without
a tactically strong, experienced and talented staff, the head could not support the
PMO, PCO and Minister’s Office communication triumvirate, given the speed and
quality at which government reponse is needed around fast-breaking global issues.
Heads have vast diplomatic but no formal communication expertise. Given the cen-
tralization of communication within the PMO and the PCO, and given the promin-
ence a Minister of Foreign Affairs assumes by virtue of high profile international
issues (recently including the re-negotiation of NAFTA, disagreements with Saudi
Arabia on Saudi Arabian human rights, and Russian expansionism in the Baltic) and
thus the responsibilities the Minister’s exempt communication staff must shoulder, the
department’s communication branch is limited typically to a support and not
a strategic role. For the most part, that role only involves the responsibility for the
production of communication products as well as the management of the usual multi-
stage approval process prior to dissemination. Due to the rotation of communications
heads, it is probably best that the function be limited to a supporting role.
108 FRASER LIKELY

Recent Global Affairs media releases demonstrate the variety of issues for which
each Minister has responsibility. For example, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was
fully involved personally in NAFTA negotiations meeting continually in Ottawa,
Washington and Mexico City with her American and Mexican counterparts, has
implemented sanctions against Myanmar, held meetings on the North Korea crisis
including hosting a summit in Vancouver with the American Secretary of State,
worked on combatting the Russian destabilizing activities in the Ukraine, announced
support for the re-building of Iraq and worked on trade disputes with the United
States notably the announcement of various trade sanctions imposed by the President
on Canada. The Minister of International Trade is involved with the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, announced measures to ensure Canadian companies operating abroad
apply ethical business conduct, and advised Canadian business on negotiating trade
barriers. The Minister of Development’s involvement includes issues such as the food
crisis in sub-Saharan Africa, support for Haiti, the United Nations Development Pro-
gram, West African health initiatives, youth internships and female genital mutilation.
The Prime Minister, himself, has had recent involvement in global affairs and inter-
national issues, including visits to China, the United States, India, the World Eco-
nomic Forum in Davos and the ASEAN Summit in the Philippines, and preparations
for Canada’s 2018 presidency of the G7. The communication products tasked, con-
ceptualized, developed and approved for the Prime Minister’s and the three Minister’s
involvement in global strategic communication would have worked their way through
the Global Affairs Public Affairs Branch, the MINOs’ Communications, PCO, C&C
and PMO, C.

CONCLUSION

Sriramesh and Verčič wrote about linking environmental variables to public relations
practice and stated that the primary variable was a country’s political system (Srira-
mesh, & Verčič, 2009, p. 5). This chapter has examined that linkage within the Can-
adian Federal Government – as an integral part of the political system of the
country. It draws on previous research that argued that while a GOC communication
branch could be managed strategically, the influences of the exempt, political commu-
nication layer in a Minister’s Office, and that of the central agencies of PMO and
PCO were too dominant to suggest that the branch itself was an important part of
the strategic management process. Strategic communication decisions were taken else-
where (Likely, 2009; Likely, Rudolf, & Valin, 2012). Ensuring that these decisions are
informational and non-partisan is a process wrought with difficulty and easy for
a line to be crossed (e.g. Toronto Star, 2008, May 26; Winnipeg Free Press, 2006, Sep-
tember 17; Amend, & Barney, 2016; Marland, 2017b; Esselment, 2014). As Marland,
Lewis and Flanagan summarized: “The politicization of government communications
requires intense control. … As the center of government manages unified messages,
government communications become difficult to differentiate from party communica-
tions, absent the party logo” (2017, p. 1).
The complexities inherent in Canada’s governing processes suggests that strategic
communication – “the purposeful use of communication by an organization to fulfill
its mission” (Hallahan, Holtzhausen, Van Ruler, Verčič, & Sriramesh, 2007, p. 3) – is
the prerogative of the political party elected by citizens. That “purposeful use” could
become partisan due to the complexity of the communication function and the lack
of a distinct line between the central communication groups and the strength of the
9. GLOBAL STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION PRACTICE 109

resources at their disposal, regardless of the statements in the GOC Communications

Policy. That same complexity affects strategic communication in a global affairs con-
text. Of course, the generic scenario considered here was one of proactive, planned
strategic communication. Should the communication be reactive – in response to
issues or crises – then the inherent complexity is pressurized by the shortage of time
and the lack of complete intelligence. In the global arena, a nation’s global strategic
communication is more than less affected by actions of another nation, of man-made
or natural disasters and of international institutions and thus is mainly reactive.

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 CHAPTER

10
Global Public Sector and Political
Communication

Vilma Luoma-aho
María-José Canel
Karen Sanders

How nations and city states ensure that their citizens get adequate services, infra-
structure and safety is, in most parts of the world, a task for the public sector. Also
referred to as authority, governmental, and public administration organizations,
public sector and political organizations exist to work together to serve current
public needs as well as to collect from citizens the resources required for this task
via taxes and fees, for example. The degree to which a public sector organization
serves citizens depends on the societal setting, and the responsibilities of public
sector organizations range from providing a wide range of universal services
(Nordic Welfare states) to providing some general societal goods based on needs
(most countries).
Though each public sector and political organization is a product of its own
time and environment, there seem to be certain trends that unite them globally.
Such trends include the austerity of the public sector, new and social media, novel
forms of citizen activism and engagement as well as greater diverse citizens and
audience fragmentation (Thomas, 2013; Vertovec, 2007). The public relations
industry-based Edelman Trust Barometer notes that trust in government has
reduced globally (Edelman & Singer, 2015), but this is no different from other sec-
tors, because businesses and NGOs are also experiencing a downturn in trust glo-
bally. Most citizens around the world now feel that the public sector system is not
working for them, and we are witnessing a unique emergence of populism and far
right movements across the globe (Aalberg, Esser, Reinemann, Strömbäck, & de
Vreese, 2017).

111
112 VILMA LUOMA-AHO ET AL.

To battle these challenges, an emerging trend in governments from different coun-

tries has been to establish units to allocate functions related to managing their most
valuable assets: the intangibles of citizen trust and organizational legitimacy. For
instance, there is the Office of Public Engagement created in the US by the Obama
administration, and there are similar offices for the federal government of Canada
and the government of the United Kingdom. The Edelman Trust Barometer 2017
suggests that to fix the trust challenge, public sector and political organizations must
increasingly engage their citizens while also addressing their fears. This means chan-
ging from the traditional modes of one-way information provision to listening and
dialogue (Macnamara, 2016), and strengthening the intangible assets that the organ-
izations are built on, such as trust and legitimacy.
For public sector organizations, change is becoming the status quo. Public admin-
istrators and employees are learning to deal not only with changes in citizen needs
but also with the continuous pressure placed on them to develop, measure, and
improve their services and organizations. Citizen engagement and public sector
employee engagement are among the recent trends in the context of attempts to
make organizations more approachable and citizen friendly. Efficiency remains the
key word for public sector change, and many of the “drivers of change in the public
sector fit into the NPM tendency to create more effective and efficient public organ-
izations” (Kuipers et al., 2014, 15).
This chapter seeks to address public sector and political communication globally,
representing the first of the three societal sectors often differentiated by their func-
tions and type (public, private, NGOs). The public sector and politics deal with gov-
ernance of public resources for the benefit of society at large, be it in a more or less
democratic environment. Both political and public sector organizations have trad-
itionally been blamed for several societal ills including inefficiency, bureaucracy, serv-
ing their own needs above those of others, and corruption. Despite their central task
in society, partly due to the complex setting, short-term election cycles, diverse stake-
holders, and slightly negative sector reputation, many communication efforts of
public and political organizations fail.
Communication is proving to be vital for public sector organizations as their
impact is seldom clearly visible to outsiders (Sanders & Canel, 2013). Though com-
munication alone cannot solve the many sector-related challenges, this chapter ana-
lyzes public and political communication and reflects how public and political
organizations could better utilize communication to improve their functions.

WHOM DO THEY SERVE?

Traditionally public sector organizations and political communication have viewed

citizens mostly as passive entities who need to be spurred into action and engage-
ment when needed (such as elections, outreaches, community collaboration, cam-
paigns). Whether public sector and political communication serve citizens, voters,
beneficiaries, customers or stakeholders has long been debated in the field (Gar-
nett, Marlowe, & Pandey, 2008; Gelders & Ihlen, 2010; Glenny, 2008). Even the
use of the word “citizen” is controversial, as many individuals living within
national borders may not have citizenship let alone legal residency. As the title
changes, so do citizen expectations: the newer roles emphasize exchange. For
example, payment (whether through taxes or other fees), accompanies an expect-
ation that the quality of service should be higher (Thijs & Staes, 2008). Moreover,
10. GLOBAL PUBLIC SECTOR AND POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 113

as public services continue to be developed and service design becomes more

common, citizens also become producers and co-creators in the context of public
sector services. As a result, more emphasis is placed on the nature of engagement
between citizen and organization (Bowden et al., 2016).
As traditional mass communication has become increasingly outdated (Castells,
2009), public and political organizations are now challenged to reach individual
citizens and voters within their cultural bubbles (Sloterdijk, 2011). Individual
citizen communication bubbles let in the communication that citizens actively
choose for themselves, and instead of pre-tailored mass media content, streams
and feeds that citizens self-select from an array of potential messages is pre-
ferred. Moreover, as citizens are able to communicate their needs and experiences
online in real time and to massive audiences, individual experiences gain in
importance, and citizens and NGOs as “experience experts” are beginning to
overtake traditional forms of authorities. Hence, public and political organiza-
tions are no longer the only authorities in the discussions where opinions are
formed, but represent merely one voice among others (Tirkkonen & Luoma-aho,
2011a; Luoma-aho & Vos, 2010).
With these changes in the nature of society and citizens, there is an urgent need for
the public sector to shift from a “culture of control” to a citizen-centered culture of
engagement (Bourgon, 2011, 1–414).

HOW IS COMMUNICATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR DIFFERENT?

There are several traits of public sector and political organizations that differ from
the operation logic of private businesses and non-governmental organizations
(Wæraas & Byrkjeflot, 2012, 186–206). First, the environment is political and
often contested between differing viewpoints so that its communication is chal-
lenged by conflicting aims. Public sector resources are more scarce than those of
private companies. In addition, public sector structures are more complex, diverse
and often harbor uncertainty about objectives and decision-making criteria
(Luoma-aho & Canel, 2016), making communication outcomes unpredictable des-
pite clear procedures and guidelines. In the public sector, there is less market com-
petition, and hence authorities have less room to tailor messages to desired
publics. There are also fewer incentives to be citizen or customer friendly. More-
over, public sector organizations in Western democracies are more subject to
public scrutiny and required to be transparent and accountable to the different
constituencies, making all their communication strategies visible. Public sector
organizations range from purely political institutions with elected, changing leader-
ship to permanent, neutral and order -type public agencies. In this book, public
relations is understood as “strategic communication that different types of organ-
izations use for establishing and maintaining symbiotic relationships with relevant
publics many of whom are increasingly becoming culturally diverse.” Building on
this, we suggest:

public sector communication is strategically planned communication between organiza-

tions and their stakeholders, enabling public sector functions, within their specific cul-
tural/political settings, with the purpose of building and maintaining the public good.
(Canel & Luoma-aho, in press)
114 VILMA LUOMA-AHO ET AL.

Respectively,

The field of political communication is concerned with communication and its role in
political processes, systems and institutions … [and] is an area of practice and study
related to the human activity of communicating about politics. Politics here is understood
as a human activity engaged in by groups where there are diverse interests conciliated by
a settled order. (Sanders, 2009, 19)

Both public sector and political communication can be understood to contribute

to the quality of democracy and societal resilience (Sanders & Canel, 2013).
There is an urgent need for authorities and politicians “to know how to interact
with the public” (Thomas, 2013, 786). The demand for better communication
stems from several sources, including citizens’ comparisons between the private
sector services and public standards of service (Thijs & Staes, 2008). This has
introduced the idea of citizen engagement, which for authoritarian societies may
take more negative forms ranging from coercion to invading privacy of citizens
in the name of public safety. Engaging citizens is a central aim of western demo-
cratic public and political organizations today, and we can see an overall attitude
change for organizations from holding power over to holding power with citizens
(Thomas, 2013). Public sector and political organizations remain fragile if they
do not understand the citizens and their new communication needs (Bourgon,
2011, 2009).

POLITICAL OR NON-POLITICAL?

Not all public sector communication is political in nature. In its broadest sense, the
political is irredeemably public in nature and is characterized by action, dialectic, and
rhetoric directed towards the attainment or conciliation of diverse ends. In a narrower
sense, the term political refers to involvement in party politics or politics in general,
understood as the process of achieving and then exercising power.
The political nature of public sector organizations can be seen as a continuum ran-
ging from political to non-political communication. In the extreme political communi-
cation end of the continuum, communication is related to clearly set political aims
that change with a change in political rulers. In the non-political neutral and order
type organizations- end of the continuum, communication is about maintaining the
public good that only partly reflect the political changes and trends. Most public
sector organizations, however, represent something in between the two extreme, as
most often the leadership of the organizations may be political but much of the per-
sonnel (bureaucrats) may be more permanent. Figure 10.1 displays the continuum.

TRUST IN POLITICIANS, TRUST IN AUTHORITIES

Despite the fact that citizens can elect their own politicians, there is some Nordic evi-
dence that supports the notion that citizens find it easier to trust non-elected author-
ities of public sector organizations and institutions than elected politicians (Kumlin &
Rothstein, 2005, 339–365). Trust has to do with a willingness to grant somebody
a discretional margin to do something. It is a “leap of faith” in which the irreducible
uncertainty and vulnerability are suspended (Van de Walle & Six, 2014, 4). Trust in
the public sector has been defined as
10. GLOBAL PUBLIC SECTOR AND POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 115

FIG. 10.1 The political–non-political continuum of public sector communication.

The willingness, within the context of uncertainty, to grant discretion to the other party
(an organization, a leader, a citizen, and so forth) in the use of public resources for the
provision of public services, from which a certain compliance, or at least a reduction in
the desire to control, emerges. (Canel & Luoma-aho, 2019, p. 227)

Of course, a key question is on what foundations is this trust built? For instance,
Scammell understands that, in what refers to trust in politics, it derives from politi-
cians’ competence and probity. These are based on perceptions, experiences, effective
expectations management, an understanding of citizens’ needs and perceptions and
the promotion of citizens’ efficacy and participation. (see Scammell, 2014). What cre-
ates trust in politicians and authorities, how to look at the object (is it trust in gov-
ernment? In public administration? In public services?), and the role that
communication might play in building trust are issues that feature high on the
research agenda.

CITIZENS ARE FROM VENUS, PUBLIC AUTHORITIES, AND POLITICIANS

ARE FROM MARS?

Like weather on the planet Venus, the citizens adapt to societal and technological
changes quicker than organizations and institutions, which is apparent in the public
sector and political communication literature. To the extent that public sector organ-
izations and public services are principally led by politicians within an increasingly
mediated environment, political communication research helps to address different
political constraints on public sector communication. Some scholars have tried to
establish boundaries between political/propaganda communication and the more apol-
itical/nonpartisan communication undertaken by civil servants when providing public
services (Gelders & Ihlen, 2010; Glenny, 2008).
Looking at the communication undertaken by civil servants in Australia, Glenny
(2008) takes what she calls a “bureaucracy perspective” to distinguish communication
activities that serve the purpose of governing of the nation from those which promote
a political party and/or politician in order to win electoral support. A related issue is
116 VILMA LUOMA-AHO ET AL.

that of how citizens ought to be included in public sector communication. In relation

to this question, an analysis by Heinze, Schneider, and Ferié (2013) of the use of
direct communication instruments by German governments, in which they note that
most research centers on the exchange between mass media and government without
systematically including citizens, also contains a call for a form of communication
that helps to foster a greater proximity to citizens.
Sanders and Canel conclude that while political communication research has quite
rightly highlighted the political purposes of government communication, concepts
offered by other research disciplines complement this view by suggesting avenues of
study directed at what they see as the civic purposes of government communication:
“Building long-term relationships, mutual understanding and citizen engagement
become part of what is understood to be government communication and under-
standing how they are helped and hindered then becomes part of the research
agenda” (Canel & Sanders, 2014, 101). The assessment of public sector performance
differs from the assessment of private sector goods and services. In the public sector,
assessments need to include, in addition to the operational objective of “doing things
right,” the more existential and often-political question of “doing the right things”
(Thijs & Staes, 2008, 9). The communication between authorities, politicians, and citi-
zens online is not without challenges. Lack of common viewpoints as well as the legal
constraints that guide all authority communication online were noted as challenges to
interaction (Tirkkonen & Luoma-Aho, 2014).
The expression “public sector communication” has seldom been used, and until
1992 no book had dealt specifically with the topic by that name (Graber, 1992). Over-
all, the longest list of works falls under the term “government communication.”
Under the level of “government,” few studies refer to government information man-
agement or to government public relations, and there is also only one term (“govern-
ment reputation”) that deals specifically with intangible assets. All sources agree,
however, that engaging citizens will provide several benefits to both public sector and
political organizations.

TOWARD MORE ENGAGING PUBLIC SECTOR AND POLITICAL

COMMUNICATION

Citizen engagement has emerged as the new trend for public sector organizations, as
citizens demand that public sector organizations should be more responsive to their
needs and demands (Thijs & Staes, 2008, 8). Engagement as a “vehicle for co-
production, co-creation and co-innovation of public goods” (Bourgon, 2009, 320) is the
current ideal for most public sector organizations globally. There are clear advantages
to engagement, as it has been proven to foster citizenship values, enhance accountabil-
ity, improve trust in government, maintain legitimacy, and help to achieve better deci-
sions and to build consensus (Yang & Pandey, 2011; see also Coursey, Yang, & Pandey,
2012; Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015). However, there is also a negative side to engage-
ment: governmental citizen involvement efforts are costly; involving citizens is not
always associated with a better quality of services; and citizens are not equally inter-
ested and qualified to take part in public deliberation (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015).
Serving a diverse public is a challenge for many public sector organizations (Thomas,
2013). As service design becomes more popular in the business sector (Whicher &
Cawood, 2013), citizens are starting to expect a similar level of service delivery from
10. GLOBAL PUBLIC SECTOR AND POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 117

public sector organizations, challenging the previously often one-way consultation style
of public sector communication.
The successes of the alleged “post-truth politics” of Brexit, Donald Trump’s
2016 presidential campaign, and the failure by Teresa May’s Tories to even win
a majority in the 2017 UK elections let alone increase their lead took most polit-
ical communication experts by surprise. Shortly after Hillary Clinton’s defeat, the
Democrat communication strategist Stanley Greenberg wrote an article titled
“Why did pollsters like me fail to predict Trump’s victory?” (The Guardian,
16 November, 2016). In an analysis of the British Conservative Party’s 2017 cam-
paign, a distinguished British journalist wrote about the communication failure of
the communicators (Parris, 2017) whose simplistic campaign tactics could not dis-
guise the shortcomings of their political clients.
These examples demonstrate the difficulty of considering political communication
engagement of citizens without thinking about by what means citizens are engaged
and for what purpose. Trump’s tweets, with their mixture of forthrightness, irrever-
ence, or downright rudeness, have certainly engaged the attention of the media and
a certain segment of the public but it could be argued that they are also contributing
to a coarsening of public discourse. More engaging political communication should
perhaps be considered in the context of how it promotes a number of connected out-
comes including the participation, effective learning, emotional investment (the sense
that politics and issues matter) and increased sense of efficacy (the feeling that
I matter) of citizens.

CONCLUSIONS

Public sector and political communication play a vital role in global settings as
they enable both the success and failure of nations in the society full of communi-
cation. In undertaking the endeavor of moving from a culture of control to
a culture of dialogue, of shifting the attitude of holding power over to holding
power with citizens, certainly communication can be of help. Joint efforts of
scholars and practitioners are required to address the challenges ahead, among
which, the following can be mentioned. At a theory level, research is needed to
better understand what a fruitful interaction is, and to explore the role communica-
tion plays in building intangible value that can enable both social and economic
growth in society. In more practical terms, research is needed to find the structures
and processes that help citizen engagement actually happens: how should citizens’
feedback be searched, received, processed, and responded to? How can listening be
built in to the political and public sector processes? The ultimate issue is how com-
munication can help bringing trust and legitimacy to the core of governance of
public and political organizations globally and enable a better dialogue between
citizen and the organizations that govern them.

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 CHAPTER

11
The European Union and Its
Public Relations
Context, Actions, and Challenges
of a Supranational Polity

Chiara Valentini

INTRODUCTION

Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be
built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.
Robert Schuman, The Schuman Declaration, 9 May 1950

The European Union (EU) is the most advanced regional political and economic
entity in the world. Since its inception the EU has been presented with questions con-
cerning nation building issues, specifically how to create a European polity that could
contribute to peacemaking, economic growth, and empowering civil society. Funda-
mentally the EU is a socially and politically constructed project of integration among
European nation-states to reduce fragmentation, instability, and the pursuit of unilat-
eral, destructive policies. It is less of a traditional nation-state but more than
a traditional international organization (Valentini, 2008). It is a union of independent
nation-states, who have relinquished part of their national powers in return for repre-
sentation within EU institutions. In many respects, the political status of the EU is
unique, as it is a supranational polity that functions in some policy areas as
a federation since its power is above member states’ legislation, and in other policy
areas as a confederation of independent states, similar to an intergovernmental organ-
ization, because it can provide some guidelines but decisions and agreements reached
are not enforceable, and member states are free to decide whether and to what extent
to follow them (Valentini, 2008, 2013). Since the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the EU

120
11. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS PUBLIC RELATIONS 121

has gained increasing power in enacting new legislation in Europe, and has become
a key player in international and trade relations. Thus, it serves as an interesting case
for discussing global public relations because of the complexity of conceptualizing,
developing, and implementing strategic communications by a sui generis organization
that constantly faces the need “for establishing symbiotic relationships with relevant
publics, many of whom are culturally diverse” (Sriramesh & Verčič, 2009, p. xxxiv).
This chapter presents and discusses the context, actions, and challenges faced by
the EU in communicating to and with its diverse publics. It starts by offering a short
review of the context as well as actions undertaken since its inception. This review
makes no claim of completeness as it is primarily meant to offer an understanding of
the environment and organizational settings that fundamentally impact the way
global public relations is conducted by the EU institutions. The chapter concludes by
addressing global public relations challenges in relation to the EU.

THE CONTEXT: ORIGIN, STRUCTURE, AND ORGANIZING

To understand the context of global public relations in relation to the EU, one must
start from its environment, its origins, structure, and organization. Along the descrip-
tion presented in Part I of this volume, Valentini (2017) defines an environment as
“an arrangement of political, economic, social, and cultural factors existing in a given
context that have an impact on organizational processes and structures” (p. 839) as
well as the “large variety of stakeholders and how these interact and act upon organ-
izations” (p. 839). The form of communication chosen for interacting with the envir-
onment is determined by the organizational settings as much as cultural and
institutional requirements, which, in the case of the EU, are quite complex and
multilayered.
The EU was established in 1992 with the Maastricht Treaty, but was preceded by
the European Economic Community (EEC), which dates back to post World War II
when securing long-lasting peace and reconciliation in the devastated European con-
tinent became an important priority for European leaders. Creating a community of
countries with common political and economic goals paved the way to the creation of
a more formalized supranational structure of peaceful national collaborations. The
European Economic Community was established in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome
and had as its primary goal the creation of a common economic market among six
nation-states – Belgium, France, West Germany,1 Italy, Luxembourg, and the Nether-
lands. Through the years, the EEC brought political stability and increased economic
growth to the six-founding countries. After the formation of the EU, the six expanded
to the current 28. Yet, it is expected that in the coming years, one member state, the
United Kingdom will leave the EU as a result of the referendum in the summer of
2016.2 The EU has also increased its competences to cover a wide range of policy
areas beyond economic ones, including social and cultural policies, agriculture, fisher-
ies, the environment, consumer protection, transport, energy, security, and justice, and
many others.
Today, the EU comprises diverse supranational, independent institutions with legis-
lative, executive, and judiciary powers including the European Commission, the Euro-
pean Parliament, the Council of the European Union also known as the Council of
Ministers, the Court of Justice, the Court of Auditors, and financial institutions such
as the European Central Bank and the European Investment Bank (Nugent, 2010).
The EU also operates through intergovernmental negotiated decisions by the member
122 CHIARA VALENTINI

states that gather together, for instance, in the European Council. The European
Council has no legislative powers, but acts as a body that issues guidelines to the
European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of the European
Union, which are the main policy-making institutions (Valentini, 2013). The Euro-
pean Commission has executive powers and so drafts and proposes legislation based
on its own initiative, but also on the suggestions made by the European Council, the
European Parliament, the Council of the European Union or by other external polit-
ical actors. The European Commission comprises a President and 27 commissioners
who are responsible for one or more policy areas. The European Commission is also
responsible for monitoring that EU legislation, once adopted, is implemented
(Nugent, 2010). The European Parliament and the Council of the EU have legislative
powers and are both involved in the approval of EU legislation. The European Parlia-
ment is the only institution whose members are directly elected by European citizens.
It comprises a President and 751 members across seven political groups representing
the left, central, and right political positions. The Council of the EU represents the
executive governments of the EU’s member states and comprises a Presidency and
a council of ministers (one per member state) that changes ministerial composition
according to the policy area under discussion (Nugent, 2010).
From an organizational point of view, EU institutions can be considered public
sector organizations operating in an international context (Valentini, 2008). Similar to
public sector organizations, they have a political nature and are subjected to complex
and unstable environments. They are expected to fulfill legal and formal requirements,
and thus tend to have less autonomy than other types of organizations and more
rigid procedures. Their objectives are broad and they serve many diverse publics (Fre-
driksson & Pallas, 2016; Gelders, Bouckaert, & van Ruler, 2007). Similar to public
sector organizations “they are affected by the same forces, low management relation-
ships with different publics, transparency and accountability of information versus
security and high versus low public involvement” (Valentini, 2008, p. 56). They differ
from public sector organizations of nation-states because EU institutions are not
comparable in terms of power and public acceptance with national institutions nor
they can be wholly considered outsiders, distinct from the national ones, seeking to
promote their national interests in other countries (Valentini, 2008).
The supranational nature of the EU makes communication to and with publics
even more important. For political institutions such as the European Commission,
the European Parliament, and the Council of the European Union, communication is
the means through which legislative drafts are shared and discussed and negotiated
among political actors and relevant publics. Historically, communication has also
been an important instrument for seeking public support so to be able to increase the
EU supranational political power through legislative integration. For administrative
institutions such as the European Central Bank, the Court of Justice, and the Court
of Auditors, communication is an instrument to handle the relationships between
these institutions and its diverse sets of publics.

THE ACTIONS: THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATION IN FOSTERING

THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROJECT

Within the EU context, communication has been essential to further develop the
European Economic Community into a more integrated community first and later
a union of member states. It has served the purpose of creating an institutional
11. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS PUBLIC RELATIONS 123

legitimacy that was not there when the head of states of the six-founding nation-
states signed the Treaty of Rome in 1957 (Valentini & Nesti, 2010). Specifically, com-
munication has, and still does, serve four fundamental functions for the EU: First, it
increases public knowledge on policies and thus enhance electoral
participation; second, it allows for more public participation in policy-formulation
and decision-making by giving information about issues at stakes, positions, and pro-
cedures; third it promotes the accountability of political representatives; and lastly it
enhances political responsiveness by improving political actors’ knowledge of citizens’
preferences (Valentini & Nesti, 2010, pp. 6–7).
It is important to note that, at the very beginning of the European integration pro-
ject, European leaders were not concerned about engaging, and had very limited
interested in informing, the general public. Thus, communication was a sporadic
activity, and not necessarily strategic. The main purpose of EU communications was
to notify key influential publics from the academic, political, and economic elites
about the agreements and progress made in the economic integration with the intent
to eventually influence the opinions of the general public. These key elite publics,
often referred to as “multipliers,” were considered the “communication bridges”
between EU citizens and the EU institutions, as they were chosen because of their
“highly-developed communication skills that enabled them to influence those who
came in contact with them, directly or indirectly” (Terra, 2010, p. 50). Communica-
tions were, however, scarce and not strategically oriented. Those multipliers had their
own discretion in deciding what to share about the EU and in which manner based
on what they considered relevant for their audiences. After two decades of political
work to produce EU legislation that integrates new policy areas and a general recog-
nition that most EU citizens did not show either interest or sufficient knowledge to
understand the new political developments in the European Community, in the early
1970s the community developed a specific information policy with concrete communi-
cation objectives. The EU information policy was essentially a political document on
how the EU and its institutions should keep the citizens informed. Yet, this informa-
tion policy has been described as a bureaucratic form of arcane policy – a policy
whose main aim was to passively provide access to EU information (Brüggemann,
2005). Its implementation showed the very nature of how the EU understood its role
of public communicator. Communication was limited in scope and quantity, fulfilled
mostly basic transparency and accountability requirements, and yet did so through
a language that was not easily comprehended by those outside the political environ-
ment. Public relations initiatives were almost nonexistent.
A first change of communication approach was visible during the first half of the
1980s with a new information and communication policy. EU political leaders’ con-
cern about how the EU was represented in the news had increased and there was
a need for professional advice to cope with media scandals, blame games, and the
general mediatization of news and information (Esser & Strömbäck, 2014; Hood,
2011). The new policy sought to increase EU visibility and relevance among the news
media and EU citizens through more professionalized communication by dropping
bureaucratic, fact-based, and administrative communications for a more accessible,
receiver-centered one. Public relations activities of EU institutions were part of the
implementation of the EU information and communication policy, supporting the
promotion of European values and identity through diverse campaigns and cultural
initiatives targeting EU citizens. During this period, symbolic communications
(Grunig, 1993) were important instruments for developing a shared appreciation of
124 CHIARA VALENTINI

the European integration project among the culturally diverse EU publics. Public rela-
tions was mostly asymmetrical and information driven and was not aimed at increas-
ing dialogue with relevant publics or engage citizens in political debates in the
different policy-formulation stages. EU public relations activities were, thus, primarily
focused on the image and reputation management of political leaders and EU
institutions.
During the 1990s, the EU experienced an important political crisis when French
and Danish citizens rejected via national referenda the ratification of the Maastricht
Treaty that had created the EU. Additionally, some institutional scandals and the
constant low support of, and knowledge about, the EU among EU citizens triggered
a substantial shift in the communication approach of the EU institutions including
their choice of public relations activities. First, there has been an increasing profes-
sionalization of communication through hiring more public relations and communica-
tion experts across a number of institutions and units. Until then most
communication activities were performed by civil servants with no specific communi-
cation training or education, whose approach to communication was mostly limited
to documenting EU political discussions and activities. Second, a new communication
strategy in a new communication policy was proposed in early 2000 that aimed at
increasing the engagement of specific public groups with the European integration
project through dialogue-oriented initiatives (Valentini & Nesti, 2010). In particular,
the new communication policy sought to increase the participation of national civil
society organizations in the development and dissemination of specific EU contents,
but also in organizing educational and issue specific events at local levels where citi-
zens could meet and discuss political matters. In recent years, EU institutions have
also tried to leverage the interactive nature of the Internet to find alternative channels
to communicate to and with citizens.

EU PUBLIC RELATIONS TODAY: COMMUNICATIONS TO RATHER

THAN WITH PUBLICS

Public relations activities in public sector organizations are very diverse and are often
disguised under the general activities that take place in government communication.
Essentially, the function of public relations in the EU is the strategic management of
information and communication activities directed to specific publics, either internal
or external to the institutions, by providing information, raising awareness, and influ-
encing public attitudes or even behavior towards specific issues and policies. For the
most EU communication has been characterized by a public information model
(Grunig & Jaatinen, 1999), which helps the EU meet transparency, accountability,
and legal requirements of keeping their constituents informed about their actions, but
it is a model that has minimal contributions toward increasing EU institutions’ public
engagement.
Public relations activities at the EU level are not as centralized as one may expect.
Each EU institution has its own communication professionals in charge of diverse
internal and external communications. In some EU institutions, communication is
centralized in a specific unit. For instance, in the European Commission, a specific
unit called Directorate General (DG) for Communication is in charge of all communi-
cations and public relations activities of this institution and of more general EU-wide
campaigns. In other EU institutions communication is performed in decentralized
units specifically dedicated to certain policy areas. These communication specialists
11. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS PUBLIC RELATIONS 125

represent the bulk of government communication officers in charge of institutional

and/or unit specific communications whose main function is to help public under-
standing of the EU policies and increasing awareness of the political decision makers’
roles and the functioning of the institutions (Laursen & Valentini, 2013). Coordin-
ation among EU institutions on what to communicate, how to communicate, and in
which circumstances to communicate is not systematic, even though general guide-
lines for EU communication exists (Valentini, 2013).
The EU has primarily targeted the news media and civil society as key multipliers
and disseminators of their activities with the intent of wining the hearts and minds of
EU citizens by convincing them of the value of a supranational polity and showing
that the very essence of the EU is meeting the democratic expectations of its EU con-
stituents in providing a stable, democratic, and free society. Reaching out to EU citi-
zens directly or via these multipliers, however, has not been so effective. The complex
institutional and political nature of the EU, coupled with its multicultural environ-
ment, makes building relationships with key publics an extra difficult task for public
relations professionals. According to Valentini and Laursen (2012), one of the major
problems in EU relations with its public is that the EU has focused predominantly on
political information and political communication rather than on communicating
with EU citizens through increasing opportunities for political dialogues. The latter
would assume communications oriented at encouraging EU citizens participation to
political debates, discussion on policy-formulation and voting.
Other studies (e.g. Anderson & McLeod, 2004; Laursen, 2013) have shown that
this problem is partly related to institutional constraints and the general understand-
ing of communication in public sector organizations that must promote a culture of
impartiality, neutrality, and transparency and, at the same time, secure smooth and
rapid political negotiations of legislative acts which often are possible if a certain
level of secrecy among those involved is maintained. Because political actors are
highly concerned about their public image, they tend to avoid overexposing them-
selves, their positions, and negotiation tactics before an institutional agreement is
reached. Thus, secrecy increases these political actor’s maneuvering power in different
EU policy-making stages (Laursen, 2013; Laursen & Valentini, 2013), but reduces
public scrutiny of these political actors’ behaviors and hampers opportunities for
public engagement in open political discussions.
A further problem with the EU capacity of reaching out to the general public is
essentially the limited ability of speaking with one voice when it comes to internal –
the Union – matters. Paradoxically, EU institutions have shown on several occasions
to compete against each other than cooperate for media attention (Martins, Lecheler,
& de Vreese, 2011). This is particularly evident among the main policy-making insti-
tutions because these institutions have different political interests in communicating
their role to the news media, and in their specific political agenda (Valentini & Laur-
sen, 2012), even within their own institutional settings (Laursen & Valentini, 2013). It
is important to note that the European Commission, the European Parliament, and
the Council of the European Union have a great interest in showing to their publics
that each of them is a legitimate political actor promoting the Union interests by
showing the contribution of own specific political actions. Yet, given the highly polit-
ical nature of these institutions, their political agenda, and positions in relation to
diverse issues may diverge. Because of this long and sometimes strenuous negotiations
across institutions, but even among single member states in the case of the Council of
the European Union and/or among political parties in the case of the European
126 CHIARA VALENTINI

Parliament, may occur. In these institutions, most of the public relations activities are
performed by communication professionals in the form of political public relations
and political marketing. In this function, communication professionals work either at
a party level, or as personal political communication advisors, and/or spokespersons,
taking care of the image of specific EU political parties or representatives, such as the
presidents of the three policy-making institutions. The goal is to frame political dis-
cussions into discourses and ideas that reinforce the particular institution or party or
political leader’s image. But this can result in presenting the EU to its publics through
many different and possibly conflicting views.
As a consequence, the multi-vocality of EU has not facilitated, but it has hindered
the public understanding of the main issues and questions that are at stake in the
political agenda. The recent vote by a majority of UK citizens to leave the EU in
a public referendum is an illustrative example of the deficient knowledge of the value
of being part of the EU and the limited knowledge of the UK citizens of the implica-
tions of such a decision (Galbraith, 2017; Koch, 2017).
Overall, the big problem of EU information and communication policy is the lack
of a clear coordination and alignment in what should be communicated among the
different EU official sources. This has impaired public appreciation of the EU and the
significant work of its institutions as actual instruments for advancing EU society and
supporting policies that address very real European but also global problems.

CURRENT CHALLENGES

As extensively described in Part I of this volume, the nature of public relations prac-
ticed in a country is influenced by five major environmental variables. Detecting, ana-
lyzing, and finally using these factors for public relations planning is, however, a big
challenge in the case of the EU because it is not a country but a supranational polity
characterized by a multicultural environment and a diverse range of political, eco-
nomic, social, legal, and media systems.
The first major setback in setting up a public relations strategy for the EU is fun-
damentally its supranational polity nature and the management of public relations in
a hybrid political system in which national political systems still play a key role.
What is the best strategy to address key public concerns when the EU should repre-
sent the position of the entire Union but national political systems and priorities
diverge widely among member states? The EU comprises member states from Western
and liberal countries but also many former Soviet bloc countries, whose historical
roots are still evident in their governing approach. An illustrative example is the 2017
uprising by the general public in Romania after their government passed an emer-
gency degree that weakened anti-corruption legislation and offered potential amnesty
for those convicted of corruption (Fishwick, 2017, February 6). This shows that hege-
monic actions perpetuated by political leaders in the EU are still occurring despite
the impetus of the EU in fostering democracy and democratic practices. Even among
member states with similar political systems, public relations activities may be hin-
dered by differences in political, social, and economic priorities. So, the socialist polit-
ical agenda of Nordic countries which typically expect more public sector spending
and social caring often clashes with those liberal, capitalist EU countries that want
more liberalization. In this environment of political differences, not only do political
discussions and negotiations within the EU institutions become more difficult, but the
11. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS PUBLIC RELATIONS 127

strategic communications of those issues, and managing EU political responses and

subsequent legislation become a public relations challenge.
Similarly, EU public relations aimed at increasing public support and appreciation
for the EU work in advancing EU society and supporting policies that address very
real European problems is thwarted by the very legal nature of the supranational
polity and its effective powers in regulating EU society across different policy areas.
Even though most of the EU countries have a similar legal system, that is based on
civil law (excluding Ireland and the UK which are based on common law), a number
of differences that are closely linked to the political and economic developments of
each member states still exist. Harmonization of legislation across EU countries has
been, and still is, happening. Yet, delays, alterations, and even non-compliance with
supranational policies have occurred because member states still retain the possibility
to decide when, to what extent, and how to conform to the approved EU laws in
many policy areas (Börzel, Hofmann, Panke, & Sprungk, 2010; Mbaye, 2001). These
affect the general expectations and opinions of EU citizens, who are often not aware
that the lack of, or limited implementation of an EU law is often imputable to their
national governments and not to an EU negligence (Thiel, 2008).
Culture is also a complex element in EU public relations. Working for an EU institution
has boosted a common organizational culture to increase the support for the European
integration project among EU officials and civil servants who come from all over Europe
and thus have very different motivational interests in working for the EU while also bring
their own cultural and national differences to their work in the EU. Even among corres-
pondents of large national news media, who are typically based in Brussels where most EU
institutions are located, an EU cultural assimilation has been seen. Such acculturalization
dissolves, in parts, journalists’ differences based on nationality and media systems and
makes EU news coverage less biased (Spanier, 2010). Yet, a complete cultural assimilation
among the average EU citizen has not yet occurred. Recent public surveys show indications
that feelings of being European have slightly decreased in the last years, but still two out
three citizens of EU countries feel European (Eurobarometer, 2017, 2019).
For a supranational organization as the EU, news media are traditionally a top pri-
ority in communication activities. EU media relations have been quite challenging on
different levels, mostly because of the diversity in EU media systems and media agen-
das. The problem is not simply a linguistic one, that can be solved with translations,
but rather on what is considered newsworthy, from a national point of view. Historic-
ally the EU institutions have targeted elite transnational news media such as the
Financial Times and The European Voice which are typically pro-European affairs
hoping for a spin-off effect in national, regional, and even local media outlets. How-
ever, research (Laursen & Valentini, 2013; Spanier, 2010; Thiel, 2008) has shown that
only highly educated and EU concerned publics consume these transnational media,
and that these elite news media do not reach average EU citizens who prefer to get
information from local, regional, or national news outlets and in their own language.
But local, regional, and national news outlets offer limited coverage of EU topics and
when they do, they often take on a cynical approach towards the EU and downplay
the EU position for the national one (Gleissner & de Vreese, 2005; Trenz, 2008;
Valentini, 2013). In part, this is because national news media find it more newsworthy
to cover the position of their national institutions and political actors and these have
no interest in linking the supranational level with the national electorate, nor commu-
nicating the EU because it is not considered rewarding or advantageous to gain polit-
ical voting (Pollak & Slominski, 2014). Thus, the average EU citizen is exposed to
128 CHIARA VALENTINI

less EU news and this tends to more negative than the information that those elite
publics who access transnational news media receive on EU activities. The increasing
professionalization of communication specialists in the EU institutions of the last ten
years has partially addressed this problem. More public relations professionals from
diverse member states have been hired to communicate with national journalists not
only in the local language but according to the news value and specific news interests
of the member state. This glocal approach in handling media relations has paid back
to the EU in terms of more visibility and better news coverage. However, it is not
without problems. Besides technical issues such as the time lag that is caused by
translating EU communications in 23 official EU languages, there is a constant
unease in the communication outcomes. Even if the EU communication professionals
today come from diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds, conveying a specific
meaning when communicating to EU publics may not happen, since the receivers of
those communications “have many different political and cultural communication
contexts in which they receive and understand a message” (Spanier, 2010, p. 200).

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has outlined and discussed the complex nature of the EU public relations as
an illustrative example of global public relations efforts of a supranational polity. The
European integration process is never over as new political, social, and economic chal-
lenges continuously emerge forcing the EU and its member states in enacting new pol-
icies, laws, regulations, and relationships. Within this scenario, public relations and
communication activities play a key role in fostering mutual and beneficial relationships
between the EU institutions and nation-states, their citizens and other key publics, as
well as international relations between the EU and non-EU countries. Yet, as this chapter
has outlined, complex organizations such as the European Union requires a transversal
approach in planning global public relations. An approach that takes into consideration
the interplay of the different infrastructural variables (politics, economics and activism)
with the environmental ones (culture and media). Within the EU context, measures of
ethnic, linguistic, and cultural diversity have effects on policy outcomes, redistribution,
and the provision of public goods and these, in turn, affect how communication is stra-
tegically conceptualized and managed to effectively creating symbiotic relations among
the EU institutions and their relevant publics.

NOTES
1 It is important to note that at the beginning of the European integration project, only West Germany was
part of the European Economic Community. At the end of World War II, Germany was split into two
blocks, the West under control of the Allies and the East under the Soviets. West Germany was fundamen-
tally a capitalist economy and saw in the European integration project a way to draw economic prosperity
and political legitimacy, hence its interest in joining the group of western European countries in the Euro-
pean Economic Community. Germany was only reunified in 1990. The reunification extended the Euro-
pean Community membership to the East block as well as other international agreements that West
Germany made in the early decades. For a detailed discussion on Germany, post-war political changes
and the EU, see Anderson, 1999.
2 In June 2016, UK citizens had the opportunity to vote to remain or leave the supranational union, after
a long political discussion on the role of UK in the EU. Different arguments were presented for the pros
and cons of the UK membership. A majority of citizens who voted decided to leave after more than
forty years of membership – the UK joined the European Community in 1973. The political, economic
11. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS PUBLIC RELATIONS 129

and social consequences of this decision are still unclear. For more information on the UK historical
relations with the EU and the implications of their departure, see Galbraith, 2017; Koch, 2017; Mac-
Shane, 2015.

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 CHAPTER

12
NATO and Its Communication
in the 21st Century

Barbora Maronkova

NATO AND ITS COMMUNICATION IN 21ST CENTURY

NATO is a political-military organization of 29 sovereign nations that has, for over

69 years, withstood decades of security challenges and continues to provide for peace
and security of its territory and populations. An Alliance, based on values such as
democracy, rule of law, human rights has to adhere to the highest principles of our
free world. One of them is accountability to its over 930 million citizens spread across
the Atlantic Ocean from Alaska to the Baltic and the Black Sea. Therefore, how the
Alliance communicates with the world matters – both to its citizens and for its cred-
ibility and transparency.
The founding members of NATO understood the importance of informing public
opinion. On 18 May 1950, the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s highest decision-
making body, issued a resolution in which it committed itself to: “Promote and
coordinate public information in furtherance of the objectives of the Treaty while
leaving responsibility for national programs to each country.” In August 1950,
a modest NATO Information Service was set up. The Three Wise Men report, issued
in 1956 at the height of the Suez Crisis, enhanced the non-military aspects of cooper-
ation and coordination amongst the Alliance leading to greater political consultation.
It urged for greater cooperation in economic, scientific, cultural areas as well as infor-
mation fields. The article 15 of the Report highlighted the following:

It has also become increasingly realized since the Treaty was signed that security is today
far more than a military matter. The strengthening of political consultation and eco-
nomic cooperation, the development of resources, progress in education and public

131
132 BARBORA MARONKOVA

understanding, all these can be as important, or even more important, for the protection
of the security of a nation, or an alliance, as the building of a battleship or the equipping
of an army. (NATO, 2008)

The report provides detailed recommendations on how to improve NATO’s public

information through cultural projects, foreign exchanges, seminars to teachers, distri-
bution of educational materials in schools, fellowships, and academic chairs as well as
tours for journalists, etc. According to the report, the important task of explaining
and reporting NATO activities rested primarily with national information services.
The promotion of information about, and public understanding of NATO and the
Atlantic Community should, in fact, be a joint endeavor by the organization and its
members. Sixty nine years later – years that witnessed major technological and com-
munication revolutions – the tools and functions might have changed, but the key
principles remain.
In 2003, the merger of NATO Office of Information and Press with the Science for
Peace Program saw the creation of the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. It has
undergone a series of structural changes since then to better adapt to the new com-
munication environment and the needs of the Alliance. The role of the Public Diplo-
macy Division is to communicate and to develop programs to help raise awareness
and understanding of the Alliance and Alliance-related issues and, ultimately, to
foster support for, and trust in, the organization. The North Atlantic Council and
NATO Secretary General provide overall direction to NATO’s communication and
public diplomacy derived from political decisions. NATO works in committees com-
posed of its member states since all decisions are taken by consensus. NATO’s Com-
mittee on Public Diplomacy acts as an advisory body to the Council in areas of
communication, public engagement, and media.
As a political-military organization, NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division cooperates
with the military arm of the Alliance, through the International Military Staff at
NATO Headquarters and its two strategic military commands – the Supreme Allied
Command Transformation (ACT) and Supreme Allied Command Operations (ACO).
This structure allows for closer coordination of NATO’s communication between its
member states together with the political and military components of the Alliance.
The Secretary General of NATO acts as the main spokesperson for the Alliance and
is the Head of its strategic communications. The Assistant Secretary General for
Public Diplomacy manages and coordinates NATO’s daily strategic communication
posture on his behalf.
Today, the NATO Public Diplomacy Division stands on three key pillars – the
press office, people-to-people engagements, and digital communication. The Division
develops annual strategic planning through its Annual Communications Strategy in
which it sets out clear objectives for its communication in support of key political
priorities of the Alliance. It defines its key target audiences and develops strategies
of implementation using its tools and communication channels. The emergence of
new technologies and the plurality of voices together with an ever-changing security
environment led to the build-up of NATO’s strategic communication that is today
firmly attached to the political consultation, military activities, and communication
efforts of the Alliance. Every era brings new challenges to which NATO responds
by taking corresponding political decisions that require proactive and transparent
communication efforts.
12. NATO AND ITS COMMUNICATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 133

Evolution of NATO’s Public Diplomacy and Communication in the Modern Era

• The first decade after the end of Cold War

The focus in the first decades of 21st century was on pursuing NATO’s reputation
and relevance in the new security environment following the end of the Cold War, the
first enlargement of the Alliance towards the former Warsaw Pact countries and the
years of bloody wars in the former Yugoslavia. The role of public diplomacy towards
both “old member states” and new aspiring member states, as well as towards dozens
of new NATO partners across the globe resulted in stronger outreach efforts toward
these audiences.
The enlargement period of the Alliance to Central and Eastern Europe in the last
decade of the 20th century brought about the need to increase public awareness and
understanding of NATO in these countries. Some of the aspirants such as Slovakia,
Slovenia, Bulgaria, and others faced a lukewarm embrace of a potential membership
from its citizens. For example, the level of public support in Slovakia for NATO
membership reached around 37% in 1996, increased to 58% in 1997 but fell dramatic-
ally to 30% during the 1999 NATO air-campaign in Serbia. Whilst NATO doesn’t
have a prescribed level of public support necessary for joining NATO, a favorable
support for NATO membership by majority of its citizens is an important indicator
when assessing the readiness to join. Strong public diplomacy campaigns, led by indi-
vidual countries and supported by the NATO Public Diplomacy Division, have
brought new experiences and expanded its role in managing its public diplomacy
programs.
NATO established a network of NATO Contact Point Embassies across its partner
countries in which embassies of NATO member states act as focal points of informa-
tion on NATO. Today, NATO works with over thirty Contact Point Embassies around
the world. The opening of new relationships and forging new partnerships with NATO
in countries of the former Soviet Union required active public diplomacy outreach to
address decades of anti-NATO Soviet propaganda. According to research by Vasil
Sikharudze, NATO Manfred Woerner fellow (2001–2003), in addition to the old stereo-
types, the coverage and public discussion of NATO in the nineties in Russia was dom-
inated by the ongoing Balkan Wars in which NATO was portrayed as an instrument of
the United States. Enlargement into Central Europe and particularly including the
Baltic countries was met with suspicion in Moscow. In Ukraine, the majority of citizens
(47%) did not consider a discussion about NATO as their priority, citing international
standing and formulation of relations with Russia as their key concerns.
In light of the signature of two important political agreements in 1997 – the
NATO-Russia Founding Acting and the NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership,
NATO decided to open public information offices in Moscow and Kyiv. Their role
was defined by former NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana as the following:

To provide information on NATO affairs in order to satisfy a very great thirst for infor-
mation on the Alliance. It is important, therefore, that NATO becomes fully transparent
and understood. The need for good, accurate information about NATO is therefore
greater than ever. (NATO, 1997)

• Entering the 21st century

The 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September and the sub-
sequent launch of NATO’s operation in Afghanistan led to a new era for NATO –
134 BARBORA MARONKOVA

managing a grand coalition of contributing nations in a different cultural environ-

ment, expansion of its cooperative security in forging new partnerships across the
globe on the sidelines of emergence of a new digital age. Necessity brings opportun-
ities – when during the NATO operation ISAF in Afghanistan stakeholders com-
plained about lack of media coverage and media outlets responded by citing financial
constraints and hard access, NATO developed its own capability – the NATO TV
Channel. Creating an internal team of experienced video-journalists who could embed
with ISAF troops and provide first-hand reporting from Afghanistan, supplementing
the missing imagery and feeding it to the broadcasters free of charge, proved to be an
excellent project. Today, NATO TV Channel changed its focus from Afghanistan to
other stories, following NATO troops into exercises, portraying NATO’s naval mis-
sions and highlighting its cooperation with partner nations. This era was also charac-
terized by the emergence of social media.
As Philip Seib from the USC Annenberg School of Communication and Jour-
nalism argued in a video blog for NATO in 2012, social media offer intriguing
ways to deliver messages to publics that may have been inaccessible in the past.
For an international organization keen to use its soft power, such as NATO,
developing its own social media capabilities ensures that its soft power will con-
tinue to be relevant. A decade later, social media became an integral part of the
daily work of the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. Facebook, Twitter, Insta-
gram, and other social media platforms are important tools in getting NATO’s
message out to its diverse audiences and facilitate two-way communications.
During the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, an additional task emerged – that of
a synchronized communication that goes hand in hand with decision-making.
As a result, NATO adopted in 2009 its definition of strategic communications. It
is a coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communication activities and cap-
abilities in support of alliance policies, operations, and activities in order to
advance NATO’s aims. These activities and capabilities include five disciplines:
public diplomacy, public affairs, military public affairs, psychological operations,
and information operations.

• The era of disinformation and propaganda

The Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine in the early winter of 2013, followed by Rus-
sia’s support of separatists in Eastern Ukraine and its illegitimate and illegal annex-
ation of Crimea, were accompanied by widespread state-sponsored propaganda
against Ukraine and NATO Allies. In unleashing hybrid warfare tactics and using
propaganda and disinformation, Russia prompted NATO to undertake the biggest
reinforcements of its collective defence since the Cold War. In the face of such coord-
inated disinformation campaign, NATO’s communication challenge was not only to
debunk the propaganda, but also to communicate to its citizens the values on which
the Alliance stands. Judy Dempsey from Carnegie Europe framed the problem very
eloquently in October 2017: “NATO needs to explain to a wider public that Russia’s
aim is to break the transatlantic bonds between Europe and the United States and
undermine Europe’s democratic institutions by supporting populist, anti–European
Union and anti-NATO movements.”
The former NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow stated at the
NATO Public Diplomacy Forum in Brussels in February 2015:
12. NATO AND ITS COMMUNICATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 135

We must continue to rebut Russian propaganda: not by engaging in tit-for-tat, but by

deconstructing propaganda, debunking Moscow’s false historical narrative, by exposing
the reality of Russia’s actions, and by restating the international rules it is breaking.
We must also continue to tell a compelling story about who we are, what we do, and
why we do it. And we must stand united in our actions, because actions will always
speak louder than words. (NATO, 2015)

NATO’s Multifaceted Response to the New Security Environment in Europe

NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division adopted a multifaceted approach towards these

challenges by taking steps to ensure its citizens of NATO continued value as
a security provider, by proactively communicating the important political decisions
taken as a result of Russia’s new assertive behavior, deconstruct Russia’s propaganda,
and strengthen its support for Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and other partners
exposed to Russian hybrid warfare actions. The individual actions undertaken by
NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division in each of the cases are described in further
details below.

Communicating to NATO’s Citizens

Russian propaganda is aimed at undermining the democratic principles of NATO
Allies and the transatlantic bond. The political decisions taken at subsequent NATO
Summits in 2014 and 2016 such as the reinforcement of its defense capabilities, the
decision for the deployment of Allied troops to Poland and the Baltics, strengthening
of NATO’s maritime posture in Baltic and Black Sea and the need for increased
defense spending were accompanied by strong and proactive communications.
NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division used the entirety of its toolbox of people-to-
people engagement, press engagement, and digital presence to reach out to its citizens.
A new approach to communication – through a British government communication
model of OASIS campaigns – was adopted in early 2017. The campaign is defined as
a planned sequence of communications and interactions that leads to a defined, meas-
urable outcome by identifying clear measurable objectives, target audiences, strategy,
and implementation followed by evaluation. The first campaign – #WEARENATO –
launched on 23 May 2017 aims to improve understanding of the organization and its
values among citizens of member countries. The Assistant Secretary General for
Public Diplomacy, Ambassador Tacan Ildem, commented on this enhanced communi-
cation effort for PR Weekly: “Our continued success depends on our citizens under-
standing the essential role that NATO plays in our security, on which our prosperity
is based. We will remain fully transparent and proactive in explaining our essential
work to the outside world” (Ildem, 2017). The campaign integrates various forms of
NATO’s public diplomacy and communication activities as well as PR elements
including digital, mass media, advertising and sponsored events encompassed in
a toolkit that can be tailored to each member state needs and languages.

Communicating Political Decisions and Military Deployments in Allied Nations

By implementing the biggest reinforcements of its collective defense since the end of
the Cold War, NATO had to step its defence spending and strengthen its defense
136 BARBORA MARONKOVA

posture through military deployments, conduct of military exercises and setting up of

new NATO Force Integration Units and two new multifunctional operational head-
quarters across Central and Eastern Europe. Strategic communications that was ori-
ginally developed for NATO’s operations and missions, had to be adapted and
reinforced in order to ensure smooth coordination between the political and military
structures of NATO and variety of member states. Creating a strong network of
NATO’s strategic communication professionals became an important priority. Stra-
tegic communication and crisis communication became an integral part in planning
of NATO’s exercises and military deployments. Daily engagement with journalists
across all NATO members is an important part of the communication efforts.
The Public Diplomacy Division’s Press and Media office provides regular on the
record and background briefings to media on topics varying from NATO’s defence
planning and logistics to relations with Russia together with regular press conferences
and press appearances by the NATO Secretary General, the NATO Deputy Secretary
General, and NATO’s highest military commanders. Press tours of NATO exercises
are also organized to offer a first-hand experience to journalists. NATO’s Public Dip-
lomacy Division also pursues a very active public engagement program with civil soci-
ety. NATO’s officials speak at high level security conferences – from NATO Secretary
General’s public appearances at the Davos World Economic Forum and the Munich
Security Conference to other platforms known to the world security community –
Halifax Security Conference, Brussels Forum, Globsec, the Riga conference, and
many others.
Both press and public appearances allow NATO to proactively push out its mes-
sages and engage with audiences.

Debunking Russian Propaganda

NATO is targeted by false news, fake social media posts, and trolls almost on a daily
basis. Examples are plenty from a fake phone call of the NATO Secretary General to
the Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko on 3 February 2017, distorted headlines
from the interview of the NATO Secretary General on Rossya 1 on 24 April 2017
“NATO Prepares for War” to false information claiming that NATO is amassing
3,600 tanks at Russian border. In a consistent drive to fight propaganda with facts,
NATO engages daily on air, print, and social media. In the early days of Russia’s
aggressive actions against Ukraine, NATO created a platform on its website, called
“Setting the record straight.” It collects and showcases relevant facts and figures that
counter false claims about NATO. In addition, a myth-busting factsheet was pro-
duced displaying the most frequent Russian myths about NATO and debunking them
with correct and verifiable information. The factsheet became so popular amongst
NATO visitors and journalists that short video clips with then-Deputy Secretary Gen-
eral Alexander Vershbow were produced debunking the five biggest Russian myths on
NATO. Social media is another area where NATO can strike back against disinfor-
mation. NATO officials such as the NATO Spokesperson are very active on Twitter,
often rebutting real-time false information about NATO and pushing for corrections
of wrong media reporting and misleading headlines. Despite the numerous challenges
facing NATO’s cooperation with Russia, NATO keeps its Information Office open in
Moscow. It facilitates public diplomacy projects and provides a platform for civil soci-
ety dialogue. It organizes visits by Russian academics and students to NATO HQ and
engages with Russian media.
12. NATO AND ITS COMMUNICATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 137

Cooperation with Partners

NATO acknowledges that it cannot fight disinformation alone. It needs partners in
this endeavor such as individual member states, active grass-root activists, and non-
governmental organizations and other international organizations for example, the
European Union. Cooperation in the area of hybrid warfare and strategic communi-
cations between NATO and the EU was reinforced by the adoption of a series of
measures of joint cooperation in December 2016 following the NATO Summit in
Warsaw. The independent NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in
Riga, Latvia acts as a training and analytical hub to the Alliance on wide-ranging
topics on strategic communication, disinformation, and propaganda. NATO also
joined the European Center of Excellence on Countering Hybrid Warfare that opened
in 2017 in Helsinki, Finland together with the European Union. NATO provides
assistance to partner countries that are particularly affected by Russian hybrid war-
fare and disinformation such as Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. It provides plat-
forms enabling practical exchanges in information and best practices in countering
Russian propaganda such as the Hybrid Warfare Platform project between NATO
and Ukraine, the yearly NATO Georgia Public Diplomacy Forum and press tours of
journalists to NATO events. NATO, through its offices in Ukraine and Georgia, is
actively assisting the local authorities in establishing their own strategic communica-
tion governmental systems.

CONCLUSION

In the constantly changing fast paced world, NATO remains a key pillar of the post-
Second World War international order. In its public diplomacy and communication
efforts, it engages on a daily basis with hundreds of pundits, journalists, students, and
experts across the Alliance and the world at-large. NATO’s Public Diplomacy Div-
ision strives to be ahead of new public diplomacy and communication developments.
Through gatherings of experts in public diplomacy forums, social media forums,
annual public affairs, and strategic communication conferences, it brings together
expertise that serves to improve its communication posture. It continues to evolve and
adapt – ten years ago, it started to build up its digital presence. Five years ago, the
NATO Public Diplomacy Division launched its new measurement and evaluation
program and two years ago, it sought a new, integrated communication model to
sharpen its approach and focus. Whilst there can always be room for improvement,
the constant search for new and modern techniques for how to reach its audiences
and deliver its message pushes the Division to innovate. As Mark Twain once fam-
ously said: “The difference between the right word and the almost right word is the
difference between lightning and a lightning bug” (Good Reads). If NATO wants to
succeed in remaining relevant to its citizens, continue generating public support for
its actions and safeguard its key values in face of fake news and propaganda, it needs
to find the right words.

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 CHAPTER

13
A New Public Relations for Corporations
in the World of Hyper-Globalization

Takashi Inoue

EMERGING HYPER-GLOBALIZATION

The word “globalization” often appears in news articles, titles of lectures, and ordin-
ary conversation but does it adequately explain the dramatic changes occurring
around us today? I believe not. The world we now live in has gone beyond “globaliza-
tion” to a world of “hyper-globalization” that changes not only the fundamental real-
ities for which corporations must operate, but brings deep sociological change,
affecting how we behave, and how we understand our world. This has profound con-
sequences for corporations and their use of public relations.
The high level of international trade and deep economic integration that started at
the end of the 20th century is only one force bringing about profound transformation.
While economists have started to use “hyper-globalization” to explain the great surge
in international business, here it is used to describe the new environment coming into
being by what I call the three forces of hyper-globalization. As hyper-globalization
continues to accelerate, skillful use of public relations suited for this new environment
will determine the most successful global leaders and their corporations.

THREE FORCES OF HYPER-GLOBALIZATION

Hyper-globalization is not just the same environment of the late 20th century only
with far more cross-border business, but rather it is a new and very different environ-
ment. It is a world where a corporation’s stakeholders are now globalized. It is one

139
140 TAKASHI INOUE

where your stakeholders not only receive messages from your company, but where
they use social media to communicate back to the company and to even participate
in the shaping of its products and services. It is an environment where a reality-show
TV host, non-politician, was elected president of the United States in 2016. The
mainstream media must now compete with non-journalist influencers using social
media. It is not surprising that the term “fake news” has suddenly appeared and
become widely used. However, all of these things are what we can see happening
around us, but the new technologies, such as the Internet of Things (IoT), big data,
and artificial intelligence (AI), which are still in the early stages of development, have
the promise of creating yet unseen, extensive, rapid, and explosive change that will
further effect both business and society.
We are all impacted by this new environment. We start our day checking the Inter-
net for news, reading, and sending email. We do so from a smartphone made by
a global manufacturer that creates its products, using design centers in one country,
engineering in another, manufacturing in various possible locations, and with compo-
nents sourced from a global supply chain. We communicate via social media with
friends, family, colleagues, and business partners located globally with the understand-
ing that distance in an Internet connected world is no longer a barrier to communica-
tion. As we travel from place to place our smartphone generates information about
our location and movements, and when we arrive at work, our Internet browser
records our movements in cyber-space. If we purchase items at a store or online, we
contribute to the creation of big data, which will be mined and analyzed to under-
stand and influence buying behavior.
This very different world is being driven as shown in Figure 13.1 by three forces of
hyper-globalization: (1) Economic force, (2) Human communication via the Internet
force, and (3) Technological disruptive force. Corporations must understand these
forces and apply the power of public relations to skillfully navigate in these very chal-
lenging times.

Economic Force

As a word “globalization” is actually relatively new. Harvard Business School’s

Pankaj Ghemawat found in his research that it was only at the end of the 19th cen-
tury that the word “global” came to be used to mean “world scale.” Not until the
1940s did the word “globalizing” begin to appear. Surprisingly, it took another

FIG 13.1 Takashi Inoue’s three force of hyper-globalization. Source: Takashi Inoue (2018), Public
Relations in Hyper-Globalization, p.12
13. A NEW PUBLIC RELATIONS IN HYPER-GLOBALIZATION 141

decade until the word “globalization” first appeared in 1951. Using the catalog list-
ings of the U.S. Library of Congress, Ghemawat found that in the 1990s the library
listings still only showed fewer than 50 new titles being added annually that were
related to “globalization.” However, he found that during 2002 through 2008 the
number had jumped to more than 1100 new titles per year, related to “globalization”
(Ghemawat, n.d., p. 1).
Economist Jagdish Bhagwati in his classic book, In Defense of Globalization,
describes what he calls “economic globalization” as a positive force that results in the
“integration of national economies into the international economy through trade,
direct foreign investment by corporations and multinationals, short-term capital flows,
international flows of workers and humanity generally, and flows of technology”
(Bhagwati, 2004, p. 3). In other words, in today’s hyper-globalization, corporations
are locating the various functions of product design, development, and manufacturing
globally, resulting in a world of high economic integration.
In 2013 economists Arvind Subramanian and Martin Kessler started to use the term
hyper-globalization to describe the high degree of economic integration and high
volume of international trade that began at the end of the 20th century and that has
continued into this new century. They described four stages of globalization, starting
with the Industrial Revolution. In the first stage from 1870 to 1914 world trade flows
as a share of GDP jumped to 16% from the 9% level that had existed during the older
agrarian economy. However, in the second stage from 1914 through 1945 world trade
flows collapsed to 5.5% due to the rise of widespread trade protectionism and the First
and Second World Wars. The third stage began after the Second World War, where
global trading gradually returned to the level of the first stage. We are currently in the
fourth stage, which Subramanian and Kessler call the stage of “hyper-globalization,”
that began in the 1990s with the establishment of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) that began in 1995 (Subramanian & Kessler, 2013, p. 4).

Human Communication via the Internet Force

Looking beyond economics, we can see that a second force of hyper-globalization

involves globalized communications. Back in the 1960s Marshal McLuhan first
coined the term the “global village” (McLuhan, 1962, p. 40). Some 30 years before
the widespread use of the Internet, McLuhan argued that electronic communications,
especially television, were bringing the events of the entire world into everyone’s
living rooms, and thereby making events that are taking place in far-off cultures and
places seem like local events.
Today the Internet has greatly expanded many times over from that simpler “global
village” of the 1960s. In the 21st century, the Internet has become an integral part of
our daily lives, especially with the rise and proliferation of social media. While it was
only in 2006 that Facebook became available to the public, by the end of 2017 it had
1.4 billion active monthly users; and Twitter, the online news and social networking ser-
vice that also started in 2006, by the end of 2017 had 330 million active monthly users
globally (Statista.com., 2017). With Facebook reaching close to 2 billion active users
the term the “global village” has a far wider and deeper meaning. Yet, McLuhan’s
main point remains true that electronic communication is fundamentally changing how
we perceive our world, and how we behave in it. The Internet and social media from
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, WhatsApp, WeChat, QZone, and so many more, has
142 TAKASHI INOUE

created a new reality. We as individuals and corporations are no longer the same. In
many ways hyper-globalization can be thought of as the “new global village.”

Technological Disruptive Force

In addition to economic trade flows and deep economic integration across national
borders, and global digital communications of the Internet and social media, there is
also the collection of technologies currently emerging, as previously noted, such as
IoT, big data, and AI. This 3rd force of hyper-globalization can perhaps be best char-
acterized by the word “Singularity.” Futurist, computer scientist, inventor, and
author, Raymond Kurzweil is a leading proponent of the “transhumanism” movement
and has written and spoken extensively about Singularity. He sees a future in which
both the hardware and software of computers will be developed to emulate human
intelligence. But more than that, we will “merge with our technology” and our scien-
tists will “operate 1,000 times faster than contemporary humans (because the infor-
mation processing in their primarily nonbiological brains is faster)” (Kurzweil, 2005,
pp. 35–40)
In Kurzweil’s future world computers start to acquire human-like intelligence
resulting in profound changes to the point where “we won’t experience 100 years of
progress in the 21st century – it will be more like 20,000 years of progress” (Kurzweil,
2001). He sees this being reached by the year 2045, although many others in the AI
field think it will not likely happen until the next century. Not surprisingly, Kurzweil
as a futurist looks forward to such a world, and he and others can describe how
many things will be so much with Singularity. However, if one could go back in time
to the start of the Industrial Revolution and talk to the famous writer of science fic-
tion of that time, Jules Verne, and ask him about the future, he might explain all the
wonderful ways that the new technologies of his time would transform the old agrar-
ian society into the modern industrial world. Yet, he probably would not predict the
tens of millions of deaths that would occur in the 20th century’s two world wars.
Today global terror has become all too familiar, and the threat of war seems to be on
the increase. The point is that the 21st century will certainly experience massive
changes for both the better and the worse. Public relations as the activity of stake-
holder relationship management offers to provide the skill needed by corporations to
contribute to the increase of the good and decrease of the bad effects to be found in
this world of hyper-globalization.

PUBLIC RELATIONS SUITED FOR HYPER-GLOBALIZATION

The kind of public relations for this world of hyper-globalization is the activity by
which an organization achieves its goals and objectives along the shortest path
through a continuous strategic stakeholder relationship management process of sym-
metrical two-way communications, self-correction, and ethics that seeks wide mutual
benefit. Corporations will likely face a higher probability of becoming overwhelmed
by a crisis in a world of instant communications, alternative-media, and fake news.
The world of hyper-globalization that is emerging presents us with both new threats
and opportunities. In the future the more successful businesses will need to use a new
type of public relations for the 21st century that is focused on relationship manage-
ment, and that puts ethics at the center of its activities. It is proposed here that such
a new public relations will allow businesses to more consistently achieve objectives
13. A NEW PUBLIC RELATIONS IN HYPER-GLOBALIZATION 143

through continuous self-correction and ethics as they endeavor to adjust to what will
likely be very rapid, dynamic, disruptive, and continuous change.

Relationship Management Rather Than Communication Management

Perhaps the central insight of public relations is that organizations succeed by not
just producing goods or services that customers want, but succeed by motivating,
inspiring, and collaborating in positive ways with its many publics as stakeholders. Or
more simply, public relations helps businesses achieve goals through stakeholder rela-
tionship management. This has always been true, but in hyper-globalization it is far
more difficult and far more important.
For example, a company needs to attract and retain talent, who will be part of
employee stakeholders, but they also need to motivate and inspire them to design,
and build the next generation of new, innovative, superior products and services.
There are the company’s suppliers and the entire supply chain and the dealers and
sales and marketing professional that as stakeholders need to become an inspired
part of the company’s efforts. Because a company does all of this within the rubric of
societies, where its customers and business operations are located, it must obtain per-
mission and cooperation from governments. Public relations provides the expertise to
manage all these many relationships, without which a company cannot efficiently and
consistently accomplish its goals.
Public relations has long been explained as the process of communicating with spe-
cific target publics. Moreover, scholars such as Grunig and Hunt have documented
that effective public relations involves two-way symmetrical communications with
a company’s publics that includes the utilization of feedback, for which they write:
“Citizens speak up, often forcing organizations to make changes the citizens demand”
(Grunig & Hunt, 1984, pp. 8–10). The company uses public relations to send the
“right” messages to the “right” publics to influence them in ways favorable to the
company, but at the same time it needs to listen to what those publics communicate
back and then to respond accordingly.
Effective public relations communicates with words, images, and symbols to
build powerful brands and create strong corporate reputations that attract and
retain customers. In the most successful cases, brands make those customers into
enthusiastic fans that even come to identify to a certain extent who they are in
terms of the company’s products that they buy and use. In this way public rela-
tions activities can be described as communication management, but the central
point to be realized is that the end objective of those public relations activities is
managing a company’s relationships with its many stakeholders for the purpose of
achieving its goals.
Carlos Ghosn, Chairman of Renault-Nissan until he was recently fired amid ethics
questions, explained the link between achieving corporate goals, stakeholder relation-
ship management, and public relations:

If you look at the companies who are struggling, it is not always because the vision is
wrong, it is because they have not been able to clearly articulate that vision to motivate
and connect to employees, customers, suppliers, and shareholders, and so on. So there is
a clear imperative for global leaders to understand, value, and build their public relations
skills. (Ghosn, 2017, p. 200)
144 TAKASHI INOUE

The Self-Correction Model

Having helped a number of large corporations during times of crisis, the author devel-
oped the Self-Correction Model (SCM), by which a corporation can place ethics at
the center of everything it does (Inoue, 2002, pp. 24–27). The idea of self-correction
can seem obvious, but when you look at the continuous incidents of corporate scan-
dals that take place, it should be clear that it really is not accorded any importance.
The purpose of the SCM is to make clear the workings of an ethics based system of
self-correction that a company can embed into its activities. While public relations is
stakeholder relationship management, in order to survive hyper-globalization, public
relations for the 21st century must also be ethical. This is because in this new environ-
ment, when a crisis occurs, responses must be made very quickly, almost in real-time.
The company with an ethics based self-correction function at its core will be more
able to take a proactive stance, demonstrating to its stakeholders that it is putting
ethics and the interests of the public ahead of its own, which is the key to surviving
a crisis. The SCM model has three elements: ethics, symmetrical two-way communica-
tion, and self-correction based on human free-will.

Ethics
The first element, ethics, can be thought of as behavior based on moral actions.
Going back to ancient Greek philosophers, such as Aristotle, ethics has been defined
as the habit of moral virtue. Shimazu Tadayoshi (1493–1568) in 16th century Japan,
during the SENGOKU waring states period, was a feudal lord of Satsuma, which was
one of four regional powers behind the Meiji Restoration and is now Kagoshima Pre-
fecture, wrote in retirement his own version of the classic Japanese poem the IROHA
UTA, “that conveyed Confucian moral principals in an easily comprehensible
manner” (Hall, 1991, p. 399). While his poem reflects his Buddhist beliefs, he may
have also been influenced by Christianity, since his son, Shimazu Takahisa
(1514–1571), as the domain lord had welcomed St. Francis Xavier to Japan in 1549.
In our times ethics has come to be thought of in terms Jeremy Bentham’s “utilitarian-
ism” of seeking the “greatest good” for the greatest number of people, and Immanuel
Kant’s deontology view of ethics as a duty to help the poor and weak (Inoue,
2018, p. 16).
To explain this more simply, we can say that “ethics” can be thought of as pursuing
happiness by doing what is good rather than evil. For a company, ethics can be
thought of as a constant guide, like the lighthouse on the coast, guiding ships to
safety away from the rocky shore. While philosophers can argue endlessly about the
precise meaning of the word “ethics,” when an unexpected event occurs putting the
company in a crisis, organizational stakeholders will know without any philosophical
debate, if you have acted ethically or not. Stakeholders are human beings and can be
thought of as having an internal ethical compass. If a corporation builds ethics into
its very DNA, it is more likely to avoid scandals and make the right decisions more
often than not. When a crisis does occur, its stakeholders are likely to stick by
a company that is able to make non-superficial self-correction base on ethics to get
the business back on track. A company that has a strong ethical sense, where ethics is
at the core of everything that it does, will be able to survive a crisis and at times even
come out ahead. In contrast, a company that has ignored making a conscious
13. A NEW PUBLIC RELATIONS IN HYPER-GLOBALIZATION 145

decision to build ethics into its activities will likely not be able to suddenly start
acting ethically when a crisis occurs.
This becomes very clear during crisis management. Crisis Management depends
heavily on communication with the media and through the media to a company’s
stakeholders. In a crisis, where everything happens fast with little time for reflection,
where you have to respond before enough facts are known, no amount of skillful
media relations nor carefully crafted press releases will substitute for ethical behavior.
The lack of ethics will come through very clearly to your stakeholders, which includes
the company’s employees. Stakeholders will quickly judge unfavorably a company that
is trying to cover-up unethical behavior, and management that is more concerned
about its own survival than about doing the right thing for its stakeholders.

Symmetrical Two-Way Communication

The second element is “symmetrical two-way communication,” which provides the
communication and feedback necessary for relationship management. It also provides
the information needed by the third element of self-correction. For the SCM to func-
tion within a company requires the free-flow of information, which can often be
blocked by a company’s organization hierarchical structure. It can also be blocked by
top-management that actively prevents and discourages criticism. This is particularly
a problem for cultures where the awareness of hierarchies is strongly felt throughout
the culture, such as in Japan. It can result from senior executives that have struggled
their entire careers to make it into the top positions and are too concerned with pro-
tecting themselves from criticism. For this reason it is important to maintain Democ-
racy from the nation state down to individual companies as the best way to ensure
that the free-flow of symmetrical two-way communication is valued and actively
protected.

Self-Correction Based on Free-Will

Central to understanding self-correction and its part in the SCM is the need to recog-
nize that God has given human beings free-will. We are free to do what is ethical, but
also free to ignore ethics and pursue self-interest at the expense of the greater good.
We are able to make self-correction, because as human beings we have a sense of self-
awareness that comes from a thought process called “meta-cognition” in philosophy
and physiology, and which enables us to make judgements in terms of right and
wrong. Unlike the understanding given by other scholars in which mere “adjust-
ments” are made in response to stimuli, the concept of meta-cognition is central to
the working of the SCM. A corporation can be said to truly have a self-correction
function, when the individuals themselves, who make up the corporation, conduct all
their business activities ethically.
Moreover, self-correction is a continuous process of making many corrections both
small and large throughout the organization, and not just in times of crisis. Just as
change for an individual only ends with death, so for an organization self-correction
is a never ending process of sustainable growth. Very successful organizations will use
self-correction guided by ethics to adjust to changes in the surrounding environment
to achieve goals and to improve stakeholder relationships by making meaningful cor-
rections leading to change that transforms the company.
146 TAKASHI INOUE

Integration of the Three Elements of the Self-Correction Model

Ethics provides the moral guidepost that determines the “right direction.” Symmet-
rical two-way communications provides the data to determine deviation from the
right direction. Self-correction is the activity of returning to the right direction. In
this way, the SCM works to establish in the company effective stakeholder relation-
ship management, which is to say public relations, in which its activities are grounded
in ethics and uses symmetrical two-way communications to make continuous self-
corrections that result in a win-win outcome for both the company and its stake-
holders. Regardless of the extent to which “Singularity” turns out to be true or not
true, it is without question that we must be prepared for much more rapid and exten-
sive change. While this makes it vital that companies have executives with the public
relations skill needed for relationship management with globalized stakeholders, it
also requires executives to embed ethics into the corporation.
The origins of the model can be traced back to the work of Walter B. Cannon in
the 1930s. Cannon advanced the concept of homeostasis, which is the auto-regulation
in living organisms, as a model for how human beings adjust to changes in society
(Cannon, 1932/1959, pp. 213–228). Norbert Wiener, added the element of information
feedback to further explain self-control in response to changes in the external world.
The author has illustrated the Cannon and Wiener’s concept of homeostasis with
feedback in Figure 13.2 (Inoue, 2015, p. 259).
However, the SCM replaces “self-adjustment” with “self-correction” in recognition of
our unique ability as human beings to freely choose, unlike other creatures that have
no choice but to react to changes in the environment. We can choose to be ethical or
to ignore ethics and just follow self-interest. It is for this reason that a company must
do more than simply use the word “ethics” in its mission statement, but must actively
embed a functioning self-correction system. It must recognize the many forces working

FIG 13.2 Cannon-Wiener Self Adjustment Model

Source: 2015 Takashi Inoue, Public Relations: Relationship Management, 2nd Edition, p. 259.
13. A NEW PUBLIC RELATIONS IN HYPER-GLOBALIZATION 147

against the free-flow of two-say communications and against our choosing self-
correction following the ethical path. With that understanding, the company can then
build a system that actively works to keep ethics at the center of all its activities.
Although the idea of self-correction is common place in so many things, for
a company to avoid scandal and to survive a crisis a functioning system of self-
correction needs to be explicitly stated and concretely implemented. The SCM pro-
vides the fundamental understanding needed. The outside events that put a company
in crisis require a response or “counter corrective action.” Those responses can then
be plotted on the X/Y graph shown in Figure 13.3, thereby making clear the nature
of the self-correction process.
The analysis used evaluates responses as either a “proactive” or “reactive” stance.
When the ethical sense is strong, self-correction becomes proactive, because there is
a desire to change the “self” in recognition of having been wrong. Without ethics, the
response is only passive due to outside forces. Reponses are plotted along the X axis.
The far left is labeled “reactive” and the far the right “proactive.” Then the content
of the response is evaluated for the degree of change. Two extremes of the Y axis are
“superficial” or “substantial” change. Substantial change is plotted above the X axis,
while superficial change is plotted below.
At the onset of a crisis, especially if it is first reported in the press before the com-
pany on its own can announce its occurrence, the stance taken will likely be “react-
ive” and the content “superficial.” However, the subsequent responses will begin to
differ depending on how strong the ethical sense and commitment to self-correction is
functioning within the company. When the ethical sense is strong, the company’s
responses will begin to be more proactive, as it reflects on the nature and causes of
the crisis, and will also gradually become more substantial, finally ending up in the
upper right quadrant, when the crisis is resolved. In contrast, the company lacking
a strong commitment to ethics will remain more or less in the lower left quadrant
with responses that continue to be reactive and superficial, and crisis resolution leaves
the company greatly weakened and with relations with stakeholders damaged, espe-
cially customers, employees, and investors. In extreme cases resolution is followed by
the dissolution of the company.

FIG 13.3 Four Evaluation Areas of Self-correction

Source: 2015 Takashi Inoue, Public Relations: Relationship Management, 2nd Edition, p. 266.
148 TAKASHI INOUE

Conclusion

In the 21st century, corporations face a new environment of ever-increasing economic

integration of global business, where human communication via the Internet and
social media is instantaneous, global, truly two-way, blurring sociocultural differences,
and where the pace of change from disruptive new technologies will accelerate and
lead us to a coming world of Singularity. Leaders of corporations must look with
wide open eyes at this radically new environment of hyper-globalization.
Realizing corporate strategies always requires communicating your vision to stake-
holders, especially employees, investors, and customers, but this new environment
only makes that task more challenging and more vital as these same stakeholders
become globalized. To survive and prosper the most successful corporations will rec-
ognize that their success depends on getting goals and objectives accomplished
through stakeholder relationship management with globalized stakeholders. Moreover,
they will understand how this new environment makes it absolutely essential to
embed a continuous self-correction function centered on ethics, as the best way to
both prevent and survive a crisis. In other words, as hyper-globalization brings unpre-
cedented rapid change, the most successful corporations will gain competitive business
advantages by applying public relations guided by ethical self-correction.
Given the many global crisis points today in places such as Hong Kong, North
Korea, Venezuela, Iran, Syria, and the many yet to come, if we are to avoid repeating
a tragedy like the Second World War, corporations must be responsible to society
through public relations to maintain world peace. Future research should document
best practices of successfully embedding a self-correction function based on ethics, and
how it then allows a corporation to more consistently achieve goals and also make
a more meaningful contribution to sustainability of society for future generations.

REFERENCES

Anon, 2017. Statista.com. [Online] Available at: www.statista.com/statistics/ [Accessed 12 February 2018].
Bhagwati, J., (2004). In Defense of Globalization. New York City: Oxford University Press, Inc.
Cannon, W., (1932/1959). Jintai no eichi (The Wisdom of the Body). New York: W. W. Norton & Co (Sogensha).
Ghemawat, P., n.d. Globalization of Markets. Globalization Note Series.
Ghosn, C., (2017). Responses to Questionnaire for the book “Public Relations for Hyper-Globalization: Essen-
tial Relationship Management - A Japan Perspective”. Yokohama: s.n.
Grunig, J. E. & Hunt, T., (1984). Managing Public Relations. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston.
Hall, J. W., (1991). The Cambridge History of Japan. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Inoue, T., (2002). The Need for Two-Way Communications and Self-Correction. IPRA FrontLine, November,
11, pp. 24–27.
Inoue, T., (2015). Paburikku Rireshionzu: rireshonshippu manejimento (Public Relations: Relationship Man-
agement). 2nd ed. Tokyo: Nippon Hyoron Sha.
Inoue, T., (2018). Public Relations in Hyper-globalization: Essential Relationship Management – A Japan Per-
spective. London: Routledge.
Kurzweil, R., 2001. The Law of Accelerating Returns. [Online] Available at: www.kurzweilai.net/the-law-of-
accelerating-returns [Accessed 28 November 2017].
Kurzweil, R., (2005). The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology. s.l.: Viking.
McLuhan, M., (1962). The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man. Toronto: University of
Toronto Press.
Subramanian, A. & Kessler, M., (2013). The Hyperglobalization of Trade and Its Future. Washington, DC:
Peterson Institute of International Economics.
 CHAPTER

14
Powerful Families, Powerful Influences
Family-owned Enterprises and Public Relations in Asia

Ganga S. Dhanesh
Flora Hung-Baesecke

Before the multinational corporation, there was family business. Before the
Industrial Revolution, there was family business. Before the enlightenment of
Greece and the empire of Rome, there was family business. Is there any institu-
tion that is more enduring or universal than family members working together
to earn their daily bread?
- William T. O’Hara, Centuries of Success, 2004, p. xvii

The phrase “family business” often suggests mom-and-pop stores, small to midsized
companies, operating with a local focus. However, this description fails to capture the
powerful influences wielded by large family-owned/-controlled enterprises such as
Samsung in South Korea, Tata Group in India, and Wal-Mart in the USA. Members
of the Global Family Business index, created by the Center for Family Business at
the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland, account for a combined US$6.5 trillion in
annual sales, enough to qualify as the third-largest economy in the world after the
U.S. and China, and employ around 21 million people, averaging 42,000 people per
company.
Definitions of family-owned enterprises vary. To qualify for the Global Family
Index, a privately held firm must have a family that controls more than 50percent of
the voting rights. For a publicly listed firm, the family should hold at least 32percent
of the voting rights. Credit Suisse defined large family-owned companies as publicly
traded companies with market capitalization of at least US$1 billion, and family-owned
stakes of at least 20percent. This chapter has adopted the definition of family-owned

149
150 GANGA S. DHANESH AND FLORA HUNG-BAESECKE

enterprises as those where the family owns a significant share and can influence import-
ant decisions (Bjornberg, Elstrodt, & Pandit, 2014).
In the global universe of family-run businesses, Asian enterprises have consistently
made their mark. In Credit Suisse’s Global Family 900, a list of the 920 largest
family-owned companies in the world across 35 countries, more than 64percent were
from Asia. Eight out of the top 21 companies were from Asia, specifically India,
Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The Family 500 Index has 14 Asian
companies in the top 100, from India, China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and
Hong Kong. Some of the oldest family-run businesses are found in Japan, tracing
back their lineage to over 40 generations (O’Hara, 2004). While the top 50 of Asia’s
richest families have firm roots in Asia, their conglomerates have worldwide presence,
and collectively they are worth around US$519 billion (Blankfeld, 2016).
Many of these family-controlled businesses play a crucial role in the development
of their countries. For instance, Samsung, a family-controlled conglomerate, contrib-
utes to over 20percent of South Korea’s GDP (Park, Li, & Lien, 2015). These enter-
prises exert strong influences not only on the economic environment of nations, but
also on social, political, and media environments. In India, the Tata family exempli-
fies social responsibility leadership, being deeply involved with nation building since
the late 19th century. They ushered in industrialization in India by pioneering its tex-
tiles, steel, energy, and hospitality sectors and set up research and educational institu-
tions (Dhanesh, 2015a). They established India’s first steel plant in 1907, the Indian
Institute of Science in 1911 and India’s first airline in 1932. Bjornberg et al. (2014)
attributed the success of family-owned businesses in emerging markets to multiple
enablers such as deep understanding of their contexts of operation, considerable influ-
ence with regulators based on a long history of personal relationships, greater
accountability based on the family’s reputation, commitment to social causes, long-
term orientation, and family values that influence day-to-day operations.
The diverse and strong influences exerted by family-owned enterprises and the enablers
that drive them have implications for the practice of public relations. The global public
relations framework described in Section I of this volume posits that public relations
practice across the world is influenced by political, economic, media, societal and activist
cultures in which firms are embedded (Sriramesh & Verčič, 2009). Despite the potent
influence of family-owned enterprises and the specific characteristics that drive their suc-
cess, public relations research has not yet focused on the role and characteristics of
family-owned enterprises in shaping public relations practice. In addition, scholars have
called for more research on non-Euro-American contexts (Sriramesh, 2009) of public
relations practice. This chapter answers that call by focusing on family-owned enterprises,
especially in Asia, a continent that is home to more than half the world’s population and
contributes to almost one-third of global GDP (ADB, 2017).
However, Asia is diverse and there are similarities and differences among businesses
in terms of contribution to and impact on the societies they are located in. In this
chapter, we offer a broad overview of family businesses in Asia, drawing examples
from six countries that most often feature on lists of top family-owned businesses in
Asia – India, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China.

INDIA

Seventeen of Asia’s 50 Richest Families hail from India (Blankfeld, 2016). Family
businesses have played an important role in nation building, employment generation,
14. POWERFUL FAMILIES, POWERFUL INFLUENCES 151

and wealth creation in India. A PricewaterhouseCoopers (2016) study on family busi-

nesses found a strong sense of pride in family business leaders in India, many of who
reported their businesses as making a strong and positive contribution to society. For
these businesses, economic aspects were just as important as ethics, socially respon-
sible business practices and the welfare of the community (Dhanesh, 2015b; PwC,
2016).
The influence of family-owned enterprises on the social, political, and economic
environment in India can be traced to as far back as the early days of industrializa-
tion (1850 to 1914), when newly-rich business families set up trusts and institutions
such as schools, colleges, hospitals, and museums. Examples include the Gujarati and
Parsi business communities of Bombay led by Jamshetji Jejeebhoy, Jamshedji Tata,
and Sir Dinshaw Petit. The Tata Group’s investments in industries such as steel, air-
lines, chemicals, textiles, power, and hotels helped to set the foundation of the fledg-
ling Indian economy. Some of these family-owned firms were also pioneers in social
responsibility leadership as far back as the early days of industrialization, particularly
in employee and community relations. Tata Steel introduced eight-hour working days
in 1912, long before it became mandatory in other countries. The planned Tata town-
ships built around its industrial facilities, also exemplify the Group’s focus on
employee well-being and community building.
Spurred by open hostility from the British, Indian business families such as the
Birlas even played a role in supporting India’s nationalist movement for independence
from British rule (Sundar, 2000). Not only did these family-run enterprises contribute
generously to the freedom struggle, but they also contributed to various social and
cultural causes associated with the nationalist movement, such as the emancipation of
untouchables and rural development. After independence, several businesses helped
set up institutions for higher education and scientific and technical research and art
academies.
Family-owned enterprises in India have been seen as socially responsible because of
both moral and economic imperatives. They are often driven by the vision of the
founder and the desire to do the right thing as well as ensuring the longevity of
the firm, the creation of goodwill in society, and enhanced relationships with employ-
ees. They are committed to the long-term and that commitment is evident in the
investments they make in local communities and the infrastructure of the country.
The apparent dialectic between moral and economic drivers has been explained using
the ancient Indian notion of dharma, a pluralistic notion which incorporates both
a sense of duty and consequences arising from commissions and omissions in dischar-
ging that duty (Dhanesh, 2015b).
While family-owned businesses in India have played an important role in nation
building, their expanding circle of influence has stoked trouble as well. When India’s
largest company, Reliance Industries Ltd., owned by the Ambani family, announced
that it was taking over one of India’s largest media companies – Network 18 Media
and Investments Ltd, that included TV channels (CNBC TV18, CNN-IBN, CNN
Awaz), websites (firstpost.com, moneycontrol.com), magazines (Forbes India) and
entertainment channels (Colors, MTV and Homeshop Entertainment) among other
businesses – it caused a furor raising questions on corporatization of media, diversity
and plurality of opinion, and suppression of dissenting and divergent views (Rajago-
pal, 2017).
A thorough review of the literature revealed that except for a handful of studies on
public relations in India (Bardhan, 2003; Bardhan & Sriramesh, 2006; Patwardhan &
152 GANGA S. DHANESH AND FLORA HUNG-BAESECKE

Bardhan, 2014; Sriramesh, 1992, 1996; Vilanilam, 2011) there is hardly any literature
on public relations practices in family-controlled businesses in India. However, tracing
the history of public relations practice in India revealed that the House of Tatas in
Bombay set up the first public relations department in the private sector in 1943 and
the Tatas offered the first course in public relations in 1958 (Sriramesh, 1996). The
Tatas have been credited with demonstrating industry leadership, particularly in com-
munity and employee relations as far back as the early part of the 20th century, even
before the concept of CSR became popular in the rest of the world. More generally,
media relations has been equated with public relations and image-building, implying
the prevalence of the press agentry, public information and asymmetrical models
(Bardhan, 2003; Bardhan & Sriramesh, 2006; Sriramesh, 2000). However, the personal
influence model, predicated on close relationships between practitioners and influen-
tial individuals in the media and the government, was the most popular model (Srira-
mesh, 2000). More recently, the practice has been moving toward greater
glocalization, professionalization and adoption of multiple models of public relations
(Patwardhan & Bardhan, 2014).

SOUTH KOREA

The power and influence of family-owned businesses in economic and political envir-
onments is evident in South Korea as well. The country’s economic scene has been
dominated by groupings of diversified conglomerates called chaebols, usually con-
trolled by a wealthy family. Examples include Samsung, LG, Hyundai Motor, and the
SK group. The recent drama of bribery and corruption that has led to the impeach-
ment of the president and the indictment of companies such as Samsung demon-
strates the close connections between family-run businesses and the government.
A glance back at history shows the rise to power of chaebols in South Korea. The
government, in a bid to rebuild the country after the Korean War and eager to solicit
help from the private sector, extended unstinted support including tax breaks and
other economic incentives to the chaebols. The chaebols flourished, helping trigger
a strong economic recovery for the nation. Although strong government leadership
and sound economic planning drove Korea’s economic recovery, the efforts of the
chaebols were considered the real catalysts for economic development (Yoo & Lee,
1987). However, deep collusion between the government and the chaebols led to alle-
gations of undue political influence, bribery, and corruption scandals, eventually gen-
erating public distrust of the powerful chaebols (Kotch, 2004).
The recent episode of bribery and corruption that led to the impeachment of the
former South Korean President Park Geun-hye in March 2017 and the indictment of
companies such as Samsung demonstrates the close connections between family-run
businesses and the government. Park was accused of colluding with her friend, Choi
to pressure conglomerates, including electronics giant Samsung, for millions of dollars
in donations to two non-profit foundations Choi controlled in return for business
favors including government support for a major restructuring of Samsung. After
losing her presidential immunity in March 2017, Park was charged with bribery, abus-
ing state power, and leaking state secrets. Samsung’s head, Lee Jae-Yong, was jailed
for five years in August 2017. The corruption drama has fueled numerous mass pro-
tests in South Korea, stirring deep discontent against the close collusion among the
government, the political elite, and family-run conglomerates that dominate South
Korea’s economy (BBC, 2017). The scandal has also provoked closer scrutiny of non-
14. POWERFUL FAMILIES, POWERFUL INFLUENCES 153

profit foundations run by business conglomerates. South Korea’s competition author-

ity, the Korea Fair Trade Commission, has initiated a probe into whether founding
families use charity as a cover to maintain power without paying billions of dollars in
taxes (Kim, Lee, & Einhorn, 2017).
Although there is hardly any literature on public relations specifically in family-
owned firms in South Korea, literature refers to public relations practices in chaebols,
which are predominantly family-controlled and hence, fits in with the focus of this
chapter. The term hong-bo refers to public relations and means disseminating infor-
mation widely. Public relations in South Korea is also equated with publicity and
media relations, often employed to counter backlash against the wrongdoings of the
chaebols and their collusion with the government (Kim, 2009; Lee, 2013; Park, 2001).
Reflecting this focus on media relations, the models of public relations practiced in
South Korea are predominantly press agentry and public information (Park, 2003;
Yoo & Jo, 2014) enacted through the personal influence model (Lee, 2013; Sriramesh,
Kim, & Takasaki, 1999). In a more recent study, Shin, Lee, Park, and Kim (2014)
found that social media and internal communication are two of the recent issues that
public relations leaders are most concerned about.

JAPAN

While the examples offered from India and South Korea illustrate the complex interplay
of positive and negative impacts of family-owned businesses in India and South Korea,
Japan presents a different story, of extreme longevity of firms. Family businesses in Japan
have defied the well-known adage that family-owned businesses would not outlast three
generations. Some Japanese family-owned businesses have thrived for over 40 generations.
Japan has seven out of the 10 oldest companies globally and the highest concentration of
old family businesses by GDP, population, and landmass (Schwartz & Bergfeld, 2017).
Before World War II, the Japanese economy revolved around zaibatsus – a set of family
businesses operating under the umbrella of family-owned holding companies (Amann,
Jaussaud, & Martinez, 2012). The four major zaibatsus were Mitsubishi, Sumitomo,
Yasuda, and Mitsui. Although after World War II, the zaibatsus were dissolved under
American occupation, the matrix model of family-owned businesses did not die out.
Instead, the current economic landscape in Japan is dominated by the kieretsu,
a network of large multi-industry conglomerates such as Sumitomo, Mitsui, or Mitsu-
bishi, whose roots can be traced to pre-war holdings run by single families or clans.
Among the reasons for the success of Japanese family-run businesses, one of the most
important has been the family system that foregrounds family values, especially seniority
and social relations where trust is privileged over achievements. Values of family culture
such as diligence, frugality, obedience, and protection of firm reputation dictate employee
behavior further reinforcing the impact of culture as described in Part I of this volume.
Some of these values also reflect a sense of social responsibility in the reconstruction of
the society and economy in the post-war period (Goydke, 2016). Japan’s family busi-
nesses value the retention of family ownership and preservation of the business and its
traditions for forthcoming generations. According to a KPMG Global Family Business
Survey, 80percent of firms had a family member CEO, three out of five were 100percent
family-owned, and the remaining companies were more than 50percent family owned
(Kurata, 2014).
Although there are a handful of studies on public relations in Japan (Cooper-
Chen & Tanaka, 2007; Inoue, 2003; Sriramesh & Takasaki, 1999; Takano, 2013;
154 GANGA S. DHANESH AND FLORA HUNG-BAESECKE

Watson & Sallot, 2001; Yamamura, Ikari, & Kenmochi, 2013), there is hardly any
scholarly work on public relations practices in family-run firms in Japan. However,
since family firms dominate the economic landscape of Japan, the findings of these
studies would reflect practices in family-owned firms as well. In Japan, the term
used for public relations is kouhou, which means to “widely notify” indicating the
focus on models of one-way dissemination of information (Watson & Sallot, 2001;
Yamamura et al., 2013). The predominance of this model also implies close con-
nections with the media, strengthened through the practice of the kisha press club
system (Cooper-Chen & Tanaka, 2007; Inoue, 2003) wherein practitioners cultivate
relationships with journalists who belong to the relevant kisha club, foregrounding
the prevalence of the personal influence model (Sriramesh & Takasaki, 1999).
Yamamura et al. (2013) noted that in the early part of the 20th century, companies
adopted paternalistic employee management practices such as lifetime employment
and provision of employee welfare including schools for workers. Entrepreneurs in
the Meiji era (1868–1912) made contributions to society by building universities,
museums, and hospitals. However, after the Allied Forces imported the modern
practice of public relations into Japan following World War II, it soon became
equated with publicity and consumer relations. In the 1970s public relations prac-
tices revolved around battling criticism surrounding the rising tide of consumerism
and industrial pollution. In the early 1990s, corporate scandals and crises forced
companies to switch from reactive crisis management to more proactive forms of
corporate social responsibility. The concept of kyosei, or a “spirit of cooperation”
often drives CSR in Japan where companies and individuals work together for the
common good. It also continues to be closely associated with the well-being of
employees (Witt & Redding, 2012).

FAMILY-OWNED ENTERPRISES AND CONFUCIAN VALUES IN CHINA,

HONG KONG, AND TAIWAN

In this section, we will start by discussing the common characteristics of family-owned

enterprises in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan followed by a discussion of local/regional
differences within the area. Historically, this region, including the Chinese family-owned
businesses, was greatly influenced by the teachings of Confucius (Yan & Sorenson, 2004).
Studies also demonstrated that Confucian values contributed to the economic achieve-
ments in these three regions (Kirkbridge & Tang, 1992; Richter, 2002).

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Greenhalgh (1994) posited that Taiwan’s economic miracle and prosperity were a result
of economic policies, and Taiwanese family-owned enterprises. Taiwan was Japan’s
colony for 50 years (1895 to 1945) before the Chinese Nationalists took Taiwan at the
end of the World War II and it became “Free China,” in contrast with China, which
came under a communist regime. In the 1950s, with the economic support from the US
government, Taiwan opened its market to foreign enterprises. At the same time, the Chin-
ese Nationalists reformed the economy and encouraged each family to participate in the
nation’s effort in enhancing the economy in Taiwan. Over the years, some family-owned
enterprises grew and expanded into international conglomerates.
In Hong Kong, besides being the world’s freest economy, Chinese family-owned
enterprises are also a major cornerstone of the economic development in this
14. POWERFUL FAMILIES, POWERFUL INFLUENCES 155

former British colony (Shapiro, Gedajlovic, & Erdener, 2003). Fukuyama (1995)
contended that these enterprises are the major economic players in Hong Kong,
and more than 50percent of the total capitalization of the Hong Kong stock
market is in the control of 10 families. Most of the family enterprises are in the
manufacturing industry (with their factories in China), and real-estate development
(Shapiro et al., 2003).
China started adopting the market economy in the late 1970s. Since then, market activ-
ities can be seen in the country’s state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, where
up to 80 to 90percent of the latter are mostly family owned (Yan & Sorenson, 2004).

CULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE FAMILY-OWNED ENTERPRISES

We start this section by summarizing research relevant to the topic. We will then dis-
cuss how family-owned enterprises have developed in these countries.
Yan and Sorenson (2004) summarized the major themes related to how family-
owned enterprises in the PRC (the Peopleʼs Republic of China) react to the business
environment: collective, family, and interpersonal values. In appreciating collective
values, being in harmony with others in the society is considered important. Family
values suggest that the family is the prototype of all social organizations, and a basic
unit in a society. Junior members show respect to senior members and senior mem-
bers carry the responsibility for junior members. For interpersonal values, whether
a relationship is hierarchical (differences in status or seniority) or among friends,
building trust, collaboration, and reciprocity are the important principles. As a result,
economic activities are built upon collaboration instead of competition.
Shapiro et al. (2003) saw Chinese family-owned enterprises as unique business insti-
tutions that reflect Confucian values, institutional structures, and authority. Tan and
Fock (2001) contended the Chinese family business was the combination of the family
social system and the economic system in which it operates. A unique feature of
Chinese family enterprises is familism, even if these strong family ties in business
come at the expense of other relationships in the society. Fukuyama (1995) and
others contended that with strong family ties in business operations, family members
were usually preferred and favored in decisions on promotion, appointment, recruit-
ment, and succession plans. A negative effect in a tight family-controlled enterprise is
the distrust towards non-family members (Fukuyama, 1995). Tan and Fock (2001)
contended that, given this distrust, the management style in such cases tended to be
conservative and highly controlled inside the enterprise. The emphasis on familism in
the Chinese family-owned enterprises also manifests itself in their reliance on human
and social capital and networks (Shapiro, Gedajlovic, & Erdener, 2003).
In addition to familism, another characteristic of Chinese family-owned enterprises
is authoritarianism, which emphasizes the status of senior people in an organization
(Tan & Fock, 2001). This phenomenon can be explained by the peculiar interpersonal
relationships in a Chinese society. Scholars have discussed Wu Lun (the Five Cardinal
Relations), which describe relationships in a Chinese society. The five cardinal rela-
tions are “the relationships between sovereign and subordinate, father and son, elder
brother and younger brother, spouse and spouse, and friend and friend” (Huang,
2000, p. 224). These relationships also govern the hierarchy in a society.
Hence, the management in a family enterprise expects respect for senior management
and devotion to work. In addition, from the standpoint of Confucian ethics, hard work
is encouraged as it is expected to bring wealth and prosperity for the future.
156 GANGA S. DHANESH AND FLORA HUNG-BAESECKE

Following the discussion above, a Chinese family-owned enterprise is conventional

in management, distrusts outside members, and has a centralized power structure
inside the company. In addition, the members can be highly motivated because it is
family business and they have it in their hands to ensure the company’s success. We
now turn to describe the development of family-owned enterprises in this region.

Taiwan

According to statistics, the top 10 family-owned enterprises controlled 13 of this

region’s financial and business conglomerates, with a combined market value of more
than NT$6 trillion (about US$198 billion), about 25.7percent of Taiwan’s stock mar-
ket’s total value (Huang & Chang, 2010). Similar to the situation in Korea and
Japan, these conglomerates are important players in finance, basic infrastructure,
food, clothing, transportation, entertainment, etc. As a result, a large portion of the
daily expenses by members of the public in Taiwan flows to these conglomerates.
With so much control over market activities in Taiwan, the potential negative con-
sequences are similar to what happened in Korea, such as high-profile bribery scan-
dals, involving money and political power (Huang & Chang, 2010). Yet, the family
ownership of the conglomerates in Taiwan does not necessarily imply negative corpor-
ate developments. Jiang and Peng (2011) studied family-owned enterprises in several
Asian countries and their research showed interesting findings: when the CEO of the
enterprise is from the family, the company usually has good performance. Further-
more, when the family has control of the corporate ownership and the CEO is from
the family, there was found to be positive corporate performance in Taiwan. These
findings can be seen in action in conglomerates such as Foxconn, Evergreen, and
Formosa.
Ellsworth (2002) contended that the influence of familism in Taiwan is stronger
than that in Korea. A notable characteristic of this influence in Taiwan is the exten-
sion of this concept to the society at large as the Taiwanese companies considered
they had responsibilities to the society.
The economic development and the rise of family-owned enterprises in the 1970s
created economic miracles for Taiwan (Amsden & Chu, 2003). Yu et al. (2015) indi-
cated the necessity for Taiwanese conglomerates to engage in CSR activities. In this
era of globalization, these family-owned conglomerates face pressure and expectations
on corporate performances when they go global. Consequently, to convince the global
community and markets that these conglomerates are socially responsible and good
corporate citizens, participating in CSR initiatives such as environmental protection is
considered significant. In addition, being able to engage in CSR activities reinforced
the affective perception of socio-emotional wealth, meaning “the collective perception
of family members toward a business founded and controlled by the family” (Yu,
Ding, & Chung, 2015, p. 384).

Hong Kong

According to Credit Suisse, among the top family-owned business in the world, two
are from Hong Kong: Sun Hung Kai Properties and CK Hutchison Holdings. Des-
pite the influence of the British colonial period, these family-owned enterprises in
Hong Kong are still under the influence of Confucianism, and social interactions in
business are conducted via interpersonal relationships or within family networks
14. POWERFUL FAMILIES, POWERFUL INFLUENCES 157

(Shapiro, Gedajlovic, & Erdener, 2003). Kraar (1996) articulated the context of devel-
oping business relationships with these family-owned enterprises, “For a new partner-
ship, a personal reference from a respected member of the Chinese business
community is worth more than any amount of money you could throw on the table”
(p. 92).

China

By 2009, in China, family business had become an important and growing private
economy and accounted for 60percent of China’s GDP (Cai, Luo, & Wan, 2012). The
business model of family-owned enterprises is relatively new to China. Similar to
other family-owned enterprises in the region, being loyal to family and continuing the
family heritage are considered essential to family-owned enterprises in China. In add-
ition to this common characteristic, in the specific context of China, maintaining
good relationships with the party and the government for ensuring good corporate
reputation is also essential for these companies (Hofman, Moon, & Yu, 2017).
The stock market in China was originally intended for large state-owned enterprises
only. It wasn’t until 2004 that “the Small and Medium Enterprise Board” was estab-
lished at the Shenzhen Stock Market that the number of private enterprises listed on
the stock markets started to increase. Up to 2007, there were 420 family enterprises
listed on the stock market. Similar to other emerging markets, the ownership struc-
ture is concentrated with family CEOs being commonly appointed in the companies.
An interesting research finding also illustrated that family CEOs are positively related
to the company’s performance (Cai et al., 2012), a similar phenomenon to the one
found in Taiwan (Jiang & Peng, 2011).
Lin (2010) contended that the business practices of family enterprises in China
reflected certain expectations on their responsibilities towards the society. Even
though Confucianism highly values familism, the idea of profit-seeking by business is
greatly discouraged. Hence, Ruskola (2000) posited that, to not highlight the true
nature of business behaviors, family enterprises used the rhetoric of family kinship
extension to gain recognition from the government. Moreover, with the current legal
requirements in China, it is expected of corporations to extend their responsibilities
not only to their families but also to a larger social community. This is a concept
similar to the modern CSR view – corporations should not only be accountable to
the shareholders but also to the stakeholders (Lin, 2010).

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC RELATIONS PRACTICE

AND RESEARCH

Research has confirmed that family-owned enterprises outperform non-family-owned

enterprises in Asia. These companies have also contributed to the economic growth
of several Asian countries. Even though there are extensive studies done on how
public relations contributes to organizational effectiveness, no research has been done
yet on incorporating the unique characteristics of family-owned enterprises in Asia
into the body of knowledge in public relations research. With the discussions on
family-owned enterprises in Asia, we elaborate the implications for public relations
research and practice in the following ways.
Examples discussed earlier reveal the multiple contradictions that are unleashed
when the influence of these corporations extend far beyond the economic realm.
158 GANGA S. DHANESH AND FLORA HUNG-BAESECKE

Often called upon to help in national freedom movements as in the case of India;
and build nations following economic or political crises as in the case of South
Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, these enterprises have contributed to nation building
through employment generation and economic recovery. Driven variously by the
vision of founders, a deep commitment to the long term, family values, and care for
the welfare of employees and local communities, these family-owned enterprises have
often entered the social realm through socially responsible initiatives aimed at
strengthening national infrastructures. Just as Confucianism has been used to explain
the characteristics of family-owned enterprises in the region, in India, the ancient con-
cept of dharma has been employed to address the complex interplay of moral and
economic imperatives that drive the involvement of companies beyond the economic
realm. However, dancing a delicate dialectic, the influences of these powerful firms
often spillover into less desirable areas such as the corporatization of media, and
close nexus between government and businesses, as seen from the examples in India
and South Korea.
The characteristics of family-owned enterprises in the area can be summarized
by the following key words: familism, Confucian values, a strong work ethic, dis-
trust of non-family members, authoritarianism, and importance of interpersonal
relationships (Guanxi), which is commonly seen in Asia. These characteristics can
become hurdles when these enterprises go global. For example, transparency in
corporate governance and ethical conduct are expected by the government and
various publics. A centralized power structure in corporations, which only favors
family members, may discourage innovation and corporate talent development.
Even though research has shown that family CEOs do have a positive influence on
corporate performance, public relations can contribute by reminding senior man-
agement of the values of diversity and inclusion and transparency in business
conduct.
The value and benefits of building interpersonal relationships in business can
enhance trust and collaborations for family-owned enterprises. This kind of interper-
sonal relationships was first identified by Sriramesh in his research on South India.
Called “personal influence model,” it was widely used in depicting the specific cultural
context of public relations in Asia (e.g., J. Grunig, L. Grunig, Sriramesh, Huang, &
Lyra, 1995; Sriramesh, 1991, 1992, 2000; Sriramesh et al., 1999). The personal influ-
ence model of public relations refers to public relations practitioners’ developing per-
sonal relationships with key journalists, government officers, politicians, or activist
groups that could influence the effectiveness of an organization’s public relations
efforts. The model does not only apply to Chinese societies. This kind of public rela-
tions practices can also be seen in Korea where personal influence could be adopted
to manipulate media stories (Jo & Shim, 2004), and Japan where public relations
practitioners used personal influence for favor-granting and favor-gaining (Sriramesh
et al., 1999).
However, such personal relationships in the Asian context still nowadays may lead
to the impression of corporations bypassing required legal and regulatory procedures.
This applies even more when corporations establish close ties with government offi-
cials. What public relations can contribute to ease this concern is to remind corporate
management of a proper code of conduct and government regulations such as to
ensure ethical behavior and corporate reputation.
The collectivist nature of the Chinese societies and teachings from Confucianism
demand corporations to become good corporate citizens and contribute to society.
14. POWERFUL FAMILIES, POWERFUL INFLUENCES 159

Public relations can help family-owned enterprises in their CSR contributions by

encouraging them to extend the scope of responsibilities to only on family members
but different stakeholders around the organization. At the same time, public relations
can constantly communicate with stakeholders on their CSR efforts to develop favor-
able reputation for family-owned enterprises.
To conclude, this chapter has highlighted the importance of studying the role
and characteristics of family-owned enterprises and their implications on the prac-
tice of public relations. It has also triggered some broad questions for future study.
What do close connections between government and business imply for public rela-
tions practitioners as the ethical conscience keepers of the organizations they repre-
sent? How can practitioners traverse the multiple dialectical contradictions
unleashed when corporations, essentially economic creations, enter spaces of nation
building and governance? How can practitioners navigate the complexities of
a corporatized media environment, especially while representing divergent, or mar-
ginalized voices? How can practitioners manage the tensions between deeply
entrenched cultural and family values while navigating the complexities of
a globalized environment?

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 CHAPTER

15
The Global Public Relations Strategies
of the “Hacktivist” Group Anonymous

Kara Alaimo

Much has been written about best public relations practices for advancing pro-social
causes globally (Alaimo, 2017). However, the public relations literature has until now
been silent on the strategies of Anonymous, a group of global hackers that has cap-
tured the world’s attention since 2008. This chapter analyzes the group’s public rela-
tions strategies, to identify what other groups can learn from them about best global
public relations practices on the Internet, the reputational threats posed by inter-
national cyber criminals, and how to respond to them.
Since 2008, Anonymous, a global group of hackers, has maintained a high profile
on traditional and social media worldwide through its attacks on prominent targets
including governments, corporations, and terrorists. The group’s first major claim to
fame was its Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) assault on the Church of Scientol-
ogy – an attack that overwhelmed the Church’s website so that it went offline.
Anonymous has now achieved such notoriety that Islamic terrorists are jealous.
Coleman (2014, p. 15) reported that the resident anthropologist for the Canadian
Security Intelligence Service – Canada’s version of the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) – told her that “jihadists … were impressed by the level of media
attention Anonymous attained.”
Members of the group are known as “Anons.” As Olson (2012, p. 7) explained,
Anons are “often dubbed hactivists – hackers with an activist message. From what
anyone could tell, they believed all information should be free, and they might just
hit your website if you disagreed.”

162
15. GLOBAL PR STRATEGIES OF ANONYMOUS 163

According to a former member, the group does not have specifically defined goals,
however it seeks to fight censorship and government control and promote free speech.
Although some of its members have been arrested for fraud, hacking, and cyber-
stalking, Anonymous has attracted sympathizers and fans for its attacks on unsavory
targets such as terrorist organizations (Sands, 2016). As Herwig (2011) observed,

Anonymous has not only gained a sizeable collection of adversaries and critics – includ-
ing government agencies, IT security companies and digital rights advocacies who criti-
cise its methods – it has also won scores of secret and not so secret admirers, especially
among the highly social media literate, digital creative class. The reputation of its mem-
bers as defenders of truth and seekers of knowledge, digital avengers who cannot be lied
to because they will hijack the emails of those who try, seems to strike a chord with
many.

As such, Anons have become known as part of what is now called “‘the fifth estate’: the
hackers, leakers, independent journalists, and bloggers who serve the critical role that
once fell to ‘the fourth estate,’ the mainstream media” (Coleman, 2014, p. 84). Coleman
(2014, p. 129) described the group’s 2010 attack on companies including Visa, Master-
Card, and PayPal in retaliation for the companies’ decisions to cut off services to Wiki-
Leaks as “the first large-scale, populist, full-bodied online protest.”
However, some Anons have less principled motivations. Coleman (2014, p. 19) noted
that before “Anonymous unexpectedly sprouted an activist sensibility, the brand had
been used exclusively for what, in Internet parlance, is known as ‘trolling’: the targeting
of people and organizations, the desecration of reputations, and the spreading of humili-
ating information.” And when some Anons wanted to violate the group’s principles of
targeting those who impede free expression and not attacking mainstream media organ-
izations, they simply formed another group – called LulzSec – to attack people online
with no motivation other than generating laughs (Olson, 2012, p. 244).
Interestingly, Anonymous maintains its prominence by employing many traditional
public relations strategies, including attaching itself to causes that are already high
profile; aiding reporters; using humor and hyperbole; and promoting engagement
(Coleman, 2014; Olson, 2012). However, because members of the group are, quite lit-
erally, anonymous, the group lacks a coherent brand identity. Yet even this shortcom-
ing also redounds as an advantage to Anonymous, by cultivating a reputation for
unpredictability that keeps observers wondering what the group might do next.
The next section will discuss some of the group’s major public relations strategies,
before considering their effects on other organizations.

ATTACHING ITSELF TO CAUSES THAT ARE ALREADY HIGH PROFILE

One of the major strategies that Anonymous uses to generate publicity is attaching
itself to causes that are already dominating media coverage. For example, in the year
2015, the group took on the terrorists who staged the massacre at the Paris offices of
the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, the Ku Klux Klan, the terrorist organization
known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and U.S. presidential candidate
Donald Trump – stories which topped international headlines. Mastroianni (2015)
noted that, even if the group “didn’t produce much in the way of tangible outcomes”
and made missteps, its high-profile targets gave the group “a year full of headlines and
trending hashtags.”
164 KARA ALAIMO

The group has also benefited from what according to The Economist (2013) inter-
net aficionados call the Streisand Effect. Named after the American singer and actress
Barbra Streisand, the Streisand Effect describes how efforts to suppress a juicy piece
of online information can backfire and end up making things worse for the would-be
censor. For example, the Church of Scientology was angered by the public release of
a video in which actor Tom Cruise discussed Scientology. In the video, “Cruise raved
about the principle and merit of being a Scientologist in an incoherent and egotistic
way,” saying things such as, “we are the authorities on getting people off drugs. We
are the authorities on the mind. We are the authorities on improving conditions.”
(Huang, 2015, p. 11). As Huang (2015, p. 20) noted, “to Scientology’s dismay, the
more it attempted to criticize Anonymous and suppress the Tom Cruise interview
video, the more viral the video was spread.”

AID AND PROTECTION TO THE TRADITIONAL MEDIA

Another reason for Anonymous’ high profile is that it has helped itself by helping the
media. The group has released dramatic, well-timed press releases, YouTube videos
and other social media content (Coleman, 2014, p. 184; Olson, 2012, p. 71). As Olson
(2012, p. 410) observed, “Anons could grab headlines by simply tweeting a threat.”
Coleman (2014, pp. 181–182) also argued that the group attained positive media
coverage by giving exclusive access to sympathetic reporters. “There was
a confederacy of about half a dozen outsiders given extra access in exchange for func-
tioning as Anonymous media mouthpieces,” she wrote, naming Steve Ragan of the
Tech Herald, Parmy Olson of Forbes, Quinn Noton of Wired, Amber Lyon of CNN,
and filmmaker Brian Knappenberger as among the group. “Most [Anons] worked
with journalists as respectfully and transparently as the clandestine nature of
Anonymous allowed … to gain publicity for their causes … but they also sought,
whenever possible, to carefully manage their own image.” The group’s rules also insist
upon the protection of the media. Olson (2012, p. 7) explained that one of the
group’s few decrees is “don’t attack the media, since they could be purveyors of
a message.”
Despite the ban on hacking media organizations, Anons did attack the website of
Gawker after the site called hackers mass bullies (Olson, 2012, p. 151). The rule
against hacking the mainstream media has also turned out to be flimsy in other ways.
When Anons discovered in 2011 that they could hack Fox News but it was a media
organization and “had not done anything egregious lately,” Anonymous members
simply created a new spin-off group to conduct the operation, which they called Lulz-
Sec (Coleman, 2014, p. 248). As Olson (2012, p. 248) explained, their motivation for
attacking Fox was simply “shits and giggles.” LulzSec went on to hack the website of
PBS NewsHour, posting an elaborate fake story about the late actor and rapper
Tupac Shakur which claimed, “Tupac Found Alive in New Zealand.” (Olson, 2012,
pp. 259–261). Anons not acting under the auspices of the group also helped hack the
website of Britain’s The News of the World in 2011, posting a false story claiming
that its owner, Rupert Murdoch, had died. The headline proclaimed, “Media Moguls
Body Discovered” in his garden (Olson, 2012, p. 353).
And when journalists don’t cooperate, the group can be vicious. As Coleman
(2014, p. 186) reported, they have also “often tore [sic] or trolled journalists to
pieces.” The group has also consistently lied to the media. One Anon falsely claimed
to be a neighbor of Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the former head of the International
15. GLOBAL PR STRATEGIES OF ANONYMOUS 165

Monetary fund who was accused of rape, and provided commentary about Strauss-
Kahn that was reported in hundreds of newspapers (Coleman, 2014, p. 29). Likewise,
in 2010, Anonymous claimed that the reason it attacked the Motion Picture Associ-
ation of America (MPAA) was because the MPAA had hired the Indian company
Aiplex to attack sites on which copyrighted material is shared. Coleman (2014, p. 99)
noted that Anonymous managed, using propaganda material alone, to convince the
media (and many of its own members!) that the MPAA had hired Aiplex; there is no
evidence to support this claim. Instead it is now widely believed that Aiplex had been
hired by the Bollywood movie industry. And yet on September 20, 2010, scores of
reputable news outlets, including Reuters, published statements in the following vein,
despite flimsy – nonexistent, really – evidence: “MPAA.org and the Web site of
Aiplex Software, a company the MPAA hired to target sites where piracy was ram-
pant, were incapacitated for much of the day, according to the piracy blog
TorrentFreak.”
Duping reporters was an organic part of Anonymous culture:

‘Lying to the press’ was common in Anonymous, for understandable reasons. Here was
a network of people borne out of a culture of messing with others, a paranoid world
whose inhabitants never asked each other personal questions and habitually lied about
their real lives to protect themselves. It was also part of Anonymous culture to make up
random, outrageous statements. If, for instance, someone was about to leave his or her
computer for a few minutes to get coffee, he or she might say, ʻBrb, FBI at the door.ʼ
Not only was there a sense of a higher purpose to Anonymous that made it seem okay
to inflate figures and lie to the media; Anons were also part of a secret institution that
no one in the real world understood anyway. … Anons particularly disliked journalists …
asking, ʻSo who are you attacking next?ʼ or pushing for a quick quote. A few would first
exaggerate, saying that there were tens of thousands of people attacking a site. At one
point an Anon told a magazine reporter that Anonymous had ʻcoloniesʼ all over the
world and a physical headquarters, and that its name was based on a real man named
Anonymous. … ʻSo who is Anonymous?ʼ a reporter asked about the supposed man. …
ʻHe’s this guy,ʼ the Anonymous supporter said. ʻHe lives in our headquarters in West
Philadelphia.ʼ That was actually an Internet meme: tell an elaborate story, then catch the
person out by quoting the introductory rap to the sitcom The Fresh Prince of Bel Air.
(Olson, 2012, pp. 122–123)

HUMOR

As the above example also tells us, one of the major characteristics of Anonymous
content is the use of humor. For example, the group declared December 11, 2015
“Troll ISIS Day,” calling on social media users around the world to create and share
content mocking the terrorist organization. One of the group’s posts on Twitter fea-
tured an image of rubber ducks dressed as Islamic State terrorists and called the
group “#Daeshbags” – a play on Daesh, the Arabic acronym for the name of the
Islamic State (Mastroianni, 2015). Another featured a terrorist hitting a piñata (Lid-
gett, 2015). Coleman explained that “terrorists – ISIS – are seen as one of the most
humorless of organizations on planet Earth.” On the other hand, she said, “Anonym-
ous, who are all into humor, are using their offensive brand of humor to make that
point that terrorists don’t have a shred of humor” (Lidgett, 2015). Indeed, a key
166 KARA ALAIMO

tactic utilized by Anonymous has been what the group refers to in internet slang as
“lulz.” Lulz was a variation of the term lol – “laugh out loud” – which had for years
been tagged onto the end of lighthearted statements … A more recent addition to
web parlance, lulz took that sentiment further and essentially meant entertainment at
someone else’s expense (Olson, 2012, p. 14).
For example, when the group attacked the Church of Scientology, it engineered
search engines so that “evil cult” popped up when people looked up the Church online
(Mastroianni, 2015). It also ordered pizza and escorts – for which the group didn’t
pay – to arrive at Scientology churches (Huang, 2015, p. 15). These tactics are nothing
if not funny. Olson (2012, p. 187) explained the formula. A key Anon who used the
pseudonym Topiary eventually learned there was a fine line between success and failure
when it came to the public side of Anonymous. “There had to be humor, so a meme or
two, but definitely not too many,” he later remembered. “There had to be something
inexplicable – a kind of what-the-fuck-am-I-seeing.jpg, so Batman attacking a shark
with a light saber.” Finally, there had to be something blatantly obvious to pick on.

HYPERBOLE

The group has also used hyperbole, especially in response to criticism. For example,
after Fox News referred to the group as “the Internet Hate Machine” in a segment,
Anonymous appropriated the name and uploaded a YouTube video proclaiming:

We are the face of chaos and the harbingers of judgment. We laugh at the face of tra-
gedy. We mock those in pain. We ruin the lives of others simply because we can …
A man takes out his aggression on a cat, we laugh. Hundreds die in a plane crash, we
laugh. We are the embodiment of humanity with no remorse, no caring, no love, and no
sense of morality. (Coleman, 2014, pp. 1–2)

Similarly, after the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) reported that Anonymous
could target the country’s power grid, one Anon joked, “that’s right, we’re definitely
taking down the power grid. We’ll know we’ve succeeded when all the equipment we
use to mount our campaign is rendered completely useless” (Coleman, 2014, p. 14).

PROMOTING ENGAGEMENT

While members of Anonymous may operate underground, they use popular social
media sites such as YouTube and Facebook to spread their messages to the masses
and attract the attention of traditional media organizations (Huang, 2015, p. 23).
Coleman (2014, p. 6) noted that Anonymous’ publicity videos “have become
a vernacular institution unto themselves.” Their social media content promotes
engagement, or participation in their cause. For example, Troll ISIS Day gave the
group’s audience a specific call to action, asking people around the world to join in
attacking the Islamic State online. As Anonymous posted on the Internet, “do not
think you have to be a part of Anonymous, anyone can do this and does not require
any special skills” (Mastroianni, 2015).
Similarly, when the group attacked the Church of Scientology, it invited others to
get involved, recommending that they “document the demonstration. … posting
images and videos of your heroic actions all over the Internet is bound to generate
win, exhorting other Anonymous to follow your glorious example” (Huang, 2015,
15. GLOBAL PR STRATEGIES OF ANONYMOUS 167

p. 28). The initiative was organized on a public wiki, so anyone who wanted to get
involved could change anything on the page (Schultz, 2008).
Anonymous has also practiced two-way communication by soliciting and responding
to feedback. Grunig and White (1992) explained that two-way symmetrical communi-
cation, which is practiced by excellent public relations practitioners, requires that
organizations engage in genuine dialogue with their audiences and be open to changing
as a result of their conversations. As Schultz (2008) noted in his analysis of the group’s
campaign against the Church of Scientology, organizers and communicators adapted
and listened to their audience; feedback shaped the movement. You can see a clear shift
in Anonymous’ direction in response to audience members’ comments in late January.
Had Anonymous simply continued on as it began (i.e. through illegal harassment), it is
unlikely that the group would have gained much/any worldwide support.

LACK OF CONTROL OF BRAND IDENTITY

Herwig (2011) argued that “Anonymous, the collective identity, is older than
Anonymous, the hacktvist group – more to the point, I propose that the hacktivist
group can be understood as an application of Anonymous, the collective identity.”
Herwig noted that the actual identity “Anonymous” started on 4chan.org, where the
name of all authors of posts automatically showed up as “Anonymous” – a user
interface policy called “forced anonymity.”
Coleman (2014, p. 16) contended that the group has “become the quintessential
anti-brand brand, assuming various configurations and meanings, even as it has also
become the popular face of unrest around the globe.” Huang’s (2015, p. iii) study of
media coverage of Anonymous and the group’s social media posts found that
“Anonymous commits itself to building a distinguishable brand identity as a defender
of freedom of speech.” Huang (2015, p. 3) reported that “Anonymous’s attempt at
building its brand identity is to fan media frenzy and engage in social media to make
its logo, slogans, and manifesto identifiable in the politics of the Internet.”
Most of its announcements use the tagline “We Are Anonymous. We Are
A Legion. We Do Not Forgive. We Do Not Forget. Expect Us.” Offline protestors
have worn Guy Fawkes masks, borrowed from the British novel and later Hollywood
movie V for Vendetta which Herwig (2011) noted “is now widely recognised as Anon-
ymous’s iconic look.” Herwig argued that “Anonymous’s appearance with masks is
not coincidental. The collective identity itself serves as a mask, allowing the bearer to
do and say things that would otherwise be out of bounds.”
Coleman (2014, p. 75) noted that the mask also “functions as an eternal beacon,
broadcasting the symbolic value of equality.” Coleman (2014, p. 271) explained that
Hollywood and Madison Avenue typically try to appropriate countercultural forces to
harness their cache for profit. In the case of the mask, however, “Anonymous has
taken a symbol popularized by Hollywood and made it revolutionary. It is a prime
example of counter-commodification, a rare occurrence.” Anonymous’ distinctive
iconography also features headless men wearing black suits (Coleman, 2014, p. 5).
The group’s Twitter page describes Anonymous as “this headless hydra.” Huang
(2015, p. 5) explained, in Greek mythology, a hydra is a many-headed serpent whose
heads grow again as they are cut off, killed by Hercules eventually. But a “headless
hydra” is a snake with no head to be chopped off, no vulnerability to be exploited.
Thus, by likening Anonymous to a “headless hydra,” it implies that there are no lead-
ers in Anonymous to be singled out, either for lionization or discredit.
168 KARA ALAIMO

Coleman (2014, p. 17) argued that “the group’s bold, Hollywood-style aesthetics
strike a familiar chord in the society of spectacle.” As one Anon told her, “I am the
master of the spectacle. This is my art, ma’am” (2014, p. 20). However, because mem-
bers of the group need to literally stay anonymous in order to maintain the group’s
identity and avoid prosecution, Anonymous ultimately forfeits control over its brand
identity. As Huang (2015, p. 2) reported, with no leaders and spokespeople in the pic-
ture, the media, especially the Western mainstream media, has played a vital role in
consuming and (re)shaping Anonymous’s public image. The media portrayal of
Anonymous oscillates from a group of juvenile pranksters to digital vigilantes, or
even a horde of cyber criminals or terrorists. Without revealing member identities, the
group can do little to counter these depictions.
Similarly, Huang (2015, p. 24) noted that when Anonymous was accused of hacking
epilepsy support forums to insert flashing animations which could cause seizures in
people who have the disease, the group denied the charges but “it was hard to change
the mainstream media’s narratives. After all, how could a leaderless, non-membership
and decentralized collective disassociate itself from some shadowy operations?” Cole-
man (2014, p. 69) noted that the incident left “a dark statin on the name Anonymous.”
Another public relations challenge for Anonymous is that, as Gregg Housh, a former
member of the group, explained, anyone who wishes to use the group’s name to advance
any cause can do so. “The act of saying you are, means you are,” he said. “That’s how
little control anyone has over the brand” (Sands, 2016). It also means that members of
the group often disagree on actions taken by other members. “I don’t think you’ll be able
to find an Anon that won’t be upset about at least one op [operation],” Housh said
(Sands, 2016). As Keller (2013) observed, “the group’s hazy message, with no spokesmen,
leaders, or firm political plans to provide steady direction, isn’t helped by an ideology
that veers between extreme left, extreme right and mainstream concerns.”
Although this lack of control over its identity is clearly a downfall of the group, it
can also work to its advantage in another sense. Cyberwarfare expert David Gewirtz
has noted that Anonymous is remarkable for its unpredictability. From a strategic
perspective, he said, this is a disadvantage because “they tend to knee-jerk reactions
that might have unintended consequences” (Cohen, 2015). However, from a public
relations perspective, the group’s capriciousness serves as another element of its mys-
tery, generating suspense that makes the group all the more fascinating to follow.

PUBLIC RELATIONS CHALLENGES TO OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

Many of the tactics used by Anonymous – such as practicing two-way communica-

tion, promoting engagement, and creating spectacles with dramatic content that rap-
idly goes viral – can inform the cyber strategies of other global public relations
practitioners who work to advance more mainstream causes. However, the willingness
of other hackers to attack organizations just for lulz poses a threat to every person
and organization on the Internet today.
A report by Acunetix (2011) found that web hacks impose the following costs on
corporations:

• Loss of customer confidence, trust, and reputation with the consequent harm
to brand equity and consequent effects on revenue and profitability;
• Possible loss of the ability to accept certain payment instruments e.g. Visa,
Mastercard
15. GLOBAL PR STRATEGIES OF ANONYMOUS 169

• Negative impact on revenues and profits arising from any falsified transactions
and from employee downtime;
• Website downtime which is in effect the closure of one of the most important
sales channels for an e-business;
• The expenditure involved in repairing the damage done and building contin-
gency plans for securing compromised websites and web applications; and,
• Legal battles and related implications from Web application attacks and lax
security measures including fines and damages to be paid to victims.

Organizations should begin preparing their responses to such potential attacks yester-
day. Software such as firebell, created by the global communications firm Weber
Shandwick, allows organizations to view faux social media posts that opponents
might use to attack, practice responding to them in real time, and see how simulated
actors such as reporters and social media users react. That’s just one way that organ-
izations can begin making plans and practicing their responses to the world in case
they become the next targets of Anonymous.

REFERENCES

Acunetix (2011). Web hacking: Is your data really safe? Retrieved from www.acunetix.com/websitesecurity/
web-hacking/
Alaimo, K. (2017). Pitch, tweet, or engage on the street: How to practice global public relations and strategic
communication. New York, NY: Routledge.
Cohen, P. (2015, November 16). Anonymous hackers’ group declares war on ISIS. CBS News. Retrieved from
www.cbsnews.com/news/anonymous-hackers-declare-war-on-isis/
Coleman, G. E. (2014). Hacker, hoaxer, whistleblower, spy: The many faces of Anonymous. New York, NY:
Verso.
The Economist (2013, April 16). What is the Streisand effect? Retrieved from www.economist.com/blogs/
economist-explains/2013/04/economist-explains-what-streisand-effect
Grunig, J. E., & White, J. (1992). The effect of worldviews on public relations theory and practice. In
J. E. Grunig (Ed.), Excellence in public relations and communication management (pp. 31–64). Hillsdale,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Herwig, J. (2011, May 11). Anonymous: Peering behind the mask. The Guardian. Retrieved from www.the
guardian.com/technology/2011/may/11/anonymous-behind-the-mask
Huang, J. (2015). Values and symbolism in Anonymous’s brand identity (Master’s dissertation). Retrieved
from https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/69ed/732e4eadd08418008cc3b24a70e4c040dad0.pdf
Keller, A. (2013, November 7). Dozens (yes, dozens) show up for Anonymous’ million-mask march. News-
week. Retrieved from www.newsweek.com/dozens-yes-dozens-show-anonymous-million-mask-march-
2810
Lidgett, A. (2015, December 12). Troll ISIS Day: Measuring the effectiveness of Anonymous’ campaign
against the Islamic State. International Business Times. Retrieved from www.ibtimes.com/troll-isis-day-
measuring-effectiveness-anonymous-campaign-against-islamic-state-2223168
Mastroianni, B. (2015, December 31). 2015 was a huge year for Anonymous hackers. CBS News. Retrieved
from www.cbsnews.com/news/anonymous-hackers-isis-donald-trump-2015/
Olson, P. (2012). We are Anonymous: Inside the hacker world of LulzSec, Anonymous, and the global cyber
insurgency. New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company.
Sands, G. (2016, March 19). What to know about the worldwide hacker group ‘Anonymous’. ABC News.
Retrieved from http://abcnews.go.com/US/worldwide-hacker-group-anonymous/story?id=37761302
Schultz, D. (2008, February 18). Anonymous vs. Scientology: A case study of digital media. Mediashift.
Retrieved from http://mediashift.org/2008/02/anonymous-vs-scientology-a-case-study-of-digital-media005/
 CHAPTER

16
Terrorism and Global Public Relations

Jesper Falkheimer

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is a historical and contemporary phenomenon that may be analyzed from dif-
ferent perspectives. This chapter seeks to describe and reflect upon terrorism as a global
public relations process and issue. This may sound strange but it is indeed legitimate if
we accept that terrorism as acts of violence were never “just ends unto themselves; rather,
they were and are part of a larger process of communicating a message and generating
a desired response” (Tuman, 2010, p. 31). In this context, terrorist acts are strategic com-
municative acts using persuasive means of communication to reach a collective political,
religious, social, or ideological mission. Viewing terrorism as communication is not new
and has been put forward before, e.g. by Schmid and Graaf (1982, pp.14–15): “terrorism
can best be understood as a violent communication strategy.” Contemporary terrorism
(Neumann, 2009) has effects at different levels. First and foremost, terror attacks affect
victims all over the world. Second, terrorism affects public opinion, public attitudes, and
behavior, the level of trust in governments, national and international political legislation,
and so forth. Public relations strategies and activities are used by terrorists as well as gov-
ernments, trying to counteract recruitment and the possible negative consequences at dif-
ferent levels. Today, terrorism is global and transnational and there is an increasing need
to develop effective contra-terror public relations strategies to counter the professional-
ization of communication by terrorists.
The exposure and publicity that follows terror attacks are crucial for terrorists. The
intended communicative effects – creating horror, uncertainty, undermining democracy,
and increasing political polarization – may even be at the very core of terrorism. Terrorist

170
16. TERRORISM AND GLOBAL PUBLIC RELATIONS 171

attacks are usually planned to get a message through (Richards, 2004), have high news
value, follows the media logic, and have political, opinion and societal effects (Crijns,
Cauberghe, Hudders, 2017). Terrorists’ penchant for publicity has been emphasized for
decades. The then Prime Minister of the U.K., Margaret Thatcher, concluded in a speech
in 1985 that “we must try to find ways to starve the terrorist and the hijacker of the
oxygen of publicity on which they depend.”1 This may be even more complicated today
than in 1985 due to the increased speed of information and digital media evolution as
well as changes in the traditional media system. Terror attacks quickly become media
events attracting global interest; the live coverage of terrorist attacks may be positive
since citizens get informed faster, but may also achieve the terroristsʼ target of getting
attention and creating horror. Terrorist groups may also communicate directly with their
peers and potential recruits through new media technologies, and plan their attacks in
a way that maximize the attention at a global scale.
Public relations is of course not only about publicity and media relations, despite
journalists tendency to “view PR as solely focused on influencing journalists and
gaining media publicity” (Macnamara, 2016, p. 133). If one equates terrorism com-
munication with publicity, terrorism does not have a lot in common with modern
public relations, but with simple propaganda. However, Picard (1989) emphazizes that
the goals of terrorism are not only publicity, and that terroristsʼ communication strat-
egies are significantly more sophisticated:

Labeling perpetrators of terrorism as seekers or publicity for their own sake is simplistic
and ignores their very significant efforts to direct news coverage to present their cause in
favorable ways and to disassociate groups from acts that will bring significant negative
responses to the cause. (ibid., p. 14).

Later studies reinforces that terrorists in contemporary society plan and conduct
(unethical) public relations activities strategically and in a well thought out manner
(e.g. Richards, 2004; Falkheimer, 2016). Daesh, or the IS, is a well-known example of
a terrorist group that has developed professional media strategies to gain their
purposes.
This chapter reflects upon global terrorism and public relations from different
approaches based on earlier research and secondary data. In the first section, defin-
itions and the evolution of terrorism is described. Selected research about terrorism
with relevance for public relations is presented, in addition to a short recap of the
communication history of terrorism. Secondary data from the Global Terrorism Data-
base is also used to highlight a global framework. The following section is devoted to
understanding how terrorism relates to public relations. Public relations researchers
seldom focus on terrorism or contra-terrorism but there are earlier research worth
relating too. In the last sections of the chapter some final conclusions are made,
partly supposed to increase interest for further research about terrorism and public
relations, which is of high societal relevance.

TERRORISM – A SHORT HISTORY OF A DEBATED CONCEPT

Terrorist acts with political, religious, or ideological motives have a longer history
than the concept of terrorism. Archaeologists have found artifacts outside Mosul in
modern day Iraq showing how Assurnasirpal II, king of Assyria 883–859 BC, exer-
cised terror against civilians during their conquests (Matusitz, 2013). During the 1st
172 JESPER FALKHEIMER

century AD Jewish fundamentalists, called Zealots, practiced terror in their battle

against the Roman empire and its allies. The Zealots became notorious for stabbing
people to death in public places and thereby creating exposure and horror. The
Muslim group Islamilites, later called Assassins, practiced terror in the 11th century
in a similar manner to the Zealots, killing people with daggers in public places, often
during religious weekends to get maximum attention. Despite these historical
examples the term terrorism does not occur until the end of the French Revolution in
the 18th century. The Revolutionary Jacobins and its leader Maximillian Robespierre
then introduced le régime de la terror with public trials, executions, and persecutions
in pursuit of the ideas of the revolution.
As a concept, terrorism is very hard to define. The reasons behind this are sev-
eral. One reason is that terrorism is also a political rhetorical concept, aiming to
create political effects in conflicts. Terrorists obviously name themselves other
things, such as freedom fighters, jihadists, or nationalists. In non-democratic states
terrorism is sometimes used as a label to dehumanize political opponents. Another
reason is that terrorism as a concept has vague boundaries: when does terrorism
turn into guerilla warfare or war? A third reason is that terrorism seems to be con-
nected to time and place: “If, for instance, an act of political violence occurs at
a significant distance (geographically, or psychologically) from the observer, the
tendency is to give it a more neutral or benign name” (Weinberg, Pedahzur, &
Hirch-Hoefler, 2012, p. 76).
There are three basic forms of terrorism (Tuman, 2010): state terrorism (when
authoritarian states use political violence), national or domestic terrorism (targeting
the state) and transnational terrorism (based in global networks, targeting states,
international institutions, or movements). There is no need for going further into the
definitional debates here. Instead we can lean on one of the established definitions:

Terrorism is the systematic use of coercive intimidation usually, though not exclusively,
to service political ends. It is used to create and exploit a climate of fear among a wider
group than the immediate victims of the violence, often to publicize a cause, as well as to
coerce a target into acceding to terrorist aims. (Ranstorp & Wilkinson, 2005, pp. 3–4)

From a contemporary perspective the terrorist attacks in the United States on Sep-
tember 11, 2001 were the beginning of a new world security era. The Cold War
between the superpowers Soviet Union and the USA had been over for a decade. But
the moment when the four hijacked aircrafts flew into the World Trade Center in
New York, the Pentagon in Arlington County and crashed outside Shanksville, Penn-
sylvania, a new security paradigm was established. The new paradigm is characterized
by asymmetric warfare between transnational terrorist networks and governments in
several countries over the world. Neumann (2009) defines this “new terrorism” as
characterized by transnational networks, based in fundamentalist religious ideologies
and using even more brutal methods than before. Islamist fundamentalist terrorism is
crucial for the establishment of this new global paradigm:

in that its aim was sustained opposition to the entire “Western” economic, cultural, and
belief system, with no negotiable end to their campaigns, and whole populations seen as
legitimate targets. Attacks, and the possibility of attacks, are supposed to change enemy
policy by means other than the traditional method of battlefield superiority. One of their
aims is to convince public opinion that the price for supporting a particular policy is too
16. TERRORISM AND GLOBAL PUBLIC RELATIONS 173

high, as well attracting support from potential sympathisers following retaliation for the
initial attack. Conflicts are fought worldwide in a complex arena across the whole spec-
trum of political, social, economic, and military networks, and involve a mix of national,
international, transnational, and subnational actors, motivated not only by politics or
ideology, but also profit.2

Since 2001 a number of spectacular and tragic terrorist attacks, often associated with
Islamist fundamentalist groups and since 2014 especially with the Daesh (also called
IS), have taken place. On October 12, 2002, an Islamic terrorist group conducted
a bomb attack at nightclubs and at the US Consulate on Indonesian island of Bali,
with 202 deaths as a consequence. Between 23 and 26 October 2002, Chechen separ-
atists held over 800 people hostage at the Dubrovka Theatre in Moscow. When Rus-
sian special forces stormed the theater and injected gas, all of the separatists were
killed as well as over a hundred of the hostages. On March 11, 2004 (911 days after
the September 2001 attacks), Islamist terrorists conducted several bombings at
Madrid train stations that killed 191 people. The same year, between 1 and 3 Septem-
ber 2004, Chechen separatists and Islamist terrorists took over a school in Beslan,
a town in North Ossetia in the south Russia. The hostage situation dissolved when
Russian security forces ended up in a shoot-out with the terrorists, killing probably
31 terrorists (the number of deaths in Beslan are not confirmed3). At least 338 people
were killed, many of them school children. The following year, July 7, 2005, an
Islamic terrorist attack was conducted on underground trains and a bus in London
with 52 deaths. Between 26 and 28 November 2008, a number of Islamist terrorist
attacks in India were carried out, including a major attack on a hotel in Mumbai all
leading to the killing of 175 people. On July 22, 2011, a right wing extremist engaged
in two attacks in Norway: a bombing in the government area in Oslo with eight
deaths, and a massacre on the island of Utöya, seat of the Labor Party Youth associ-
ation AUF’s annual summer camp, with 68 deaths. On April 15, 2013, homemade
bombs were used at the Boston Marathon finish in the US to injure several and kill
three. The attacks were followed by an intense pursuit of the two terrorists, connected
to Islamic fundamentalism and Chechen separatism.
The attacks in Norway and Boston differed from the patterns of earlier terrorist
attacks as they were planned and executed by individual terrorists with unclear ties to
terrorist networks. They were motivated by internet propaganda and followed open
instructions on how to develop bombs and so forth. The lone terrorists with no clear
connection to formal terrorism cells or networks have become an increased threat.
Some of the more recent attacks, e.g. the attacks in Paris, France 13 and 14 of
November 2015 (killing 130 persons) and the attacks in Brussels, Belgium March 22
in 2016 (killing 35 persons), were coordinated group attacks. But there are also sev-
eral examples of attacks that seem to be more random, carried out by one individual.
One example is the attack with a truck in Nice, France, July 14, 2016 (killing 84 per-
sons) and the attack in Stockholm, Sweden, April 7, 2017 (killing 4 persons). The
terror attacks mentioned above all got massive exposure in Western media and soci-
eties, but they are not representative of terrorism at a global scale.

TERRORISM: GLOBAL INCIDENTS AND TRENDS

The horrible terrorist attacks mentioned earlier may imply that terrorism is a contemporary
phenomenon and that terrorist attacks are predominantly executed in the Western world.
174 JESPER FALKHEIMER

But terrorism is not, as already acknowledged, a new phenomenon and terror attacks take
place to a greater extent in other parts of the world than in the United States and Europe.
It is a fact that the number of terror attacks has increased strongly worldwide since
2010. The open source data base the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), based at the
University of Maryland in the US, contains a register of terrorist events since 1970,
with the latest open statistics from 2015. The database includes domestic, trans-
national, and international terrorism events. A terror attack is defined as a violent act
aimed at attaining a political, social, economic, or religious goal. The database shows
some relevant patterns from a global perspective. The number of incidents and casual-
ties is at a low level in the Western Europe and the US, especially when one compares
to the situation in the 1970s and in other parts of the world. The worldwide increase
in terror incidents and casualties mainly refers to a startling wave of attacks in the
Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia during the last decade.
Still, the European and US public opinion rates the risk for terrorism very high.
According to a public opinion survey by the European Commission, Directorate-
General for Communication (2015),4 terrorism is viewed by the European citizens as
the most important security challenge. Fewer citizens find economic and financial
crises or the climate change to be high security risks. The data is from 2015 and since
then there have been several terrorist attacks in Europe, so the assumption is that the
perceived risk has probably increased. The attacks in Europe have also direct effects
on public opinion in the US, which may not be a surprise. The US public opinion
does not differ very much from the European public opinion. A Gallup (2016) survey
of the public risk perception in the US shows that terrorism has become one of the
main perceived risks since 2014. Twice as many US respondents rate terror attacks in
their own country as a critical risk compared to the climate change. All together US
citizens rate terrorism (cyber terrorism and international terrorism) and the develop-
ment of nuclear weapons in Iran as the major threats.5

PUBLIC RELATIONS AND TERRORISM

As terrorism, public relations is a debated concept with many definitions. Tradition-

ally researchers focus on how public relation is or may be practiced in corporate or
public organizations in liberal-democratic systems. Theories and models are often
normative and based on a belief that public relations may be based in an ethical rea-
soning. Following the logic of Grunigs et al (e.g. 1984) fundamental research on
public relations practice, one may relate non-ethical public relations to history. The
press agentry or publicity model defines this form of public relations, which is sup-
posed to be uni-directional, manipulative, and only focused on persuasion. This defin-
ition is actually very close to how propaganda is defined, as: “the deliberate,
systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour
to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (Jowett &
O’Donnell, 2012, p. 7). Or in other words propaganda is biased, ideological, simpli-
fied, exaggerated, and totally avoiding argumentative exchange or interaction (O
´Shaughnessy, 1996).
The field of terrorism and public relations may be viewed as a Pandoraʼs box –
opening it up may mean that all kinds of evils fly out. Holbrook (2014), one of few
terrorism researchers that has put public relations in center of interest, concludes
that: “A more profitable approach, therefore, combines some elements and conceptu-
alisations of propaganda into a wider framework of PR initiatives that is relevant to
16. TERRORISM AND GLOBAL PUBLIC RELATIONS 175

the context of terrorism” (p. 145). As always, it depends on which perspective you
take. One may analyze public relations and terrorism from four different perspectives:
(1) How terrorists use public relations (then defined similar to propaganda) to reach
their goals; (2) How democratic states or governmental organizations use public rela-
tions as contra-terrorism strategies; (3) How the public opinion responds, reacts and
makes sense of terrorism in a communicative sense; (4) The role of media and terror-
ism (for terrorists, governmental organizations and the media audience).
There are examples of earlier research about terrorism and public relations6 but all
together this field is rather under-researched, at least when compared to closely
related areas such as media studies (e.g. Falkheimer & Olsson, 2014). Some
researchers connect terrorism to crisis communication, such as Canel and Sanders
(2010, p. 450) analyzing the terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005).
Media scholars and political scientists sometimes enter public relations-oriented
issues. One example is a study of the relationship between the attacks of September 11,
2001 in the US and media, where Norris, Kern and Just (2003, p. 3) conclude that
the media should be seen as a double-edged sword. Media coverage can benefit terror-
ists by giving them exposure, spreading their political messages, and accidentally
encouraging further attacks and networks. But the media coverage of terror attacks
may also lead to the states and governments strengthening their position and increas-
ing their ability to impose controversial sanctions and implement new legislation with-
out debate, which may be democratically problematic.
Following the 9/11 attacks, the debate on terrorism as public relations has been
intensified (e.g. Holbrook, 2014; Richards, 2004; Somerville & Purcell 2011). This
research relates to terrorists communication strategies as well as the governmental
“war on terror” (launched by then US President Bush) creating increased polarization
as a basis for war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and with global geo-political conse-
quences. The first steps towards the professionalization of terroristsʼ public relations
occurred in the 1970s when the German RAF, Rote Armee Fraktion, systematically
began to evaluate the media coverage of their attacks (Rothenberger, 2014). Richards
(2004, p. 171) researched the 9/11 terroristsʼ public relations strategies and concluded
that the timing of the two attacks on the World Trade Center in New York was
adapted to the media conditions to ensure that there would be plenty of cameras cap-
able of catching the second attack. Tuman (2010) believes that terrorism should be
seen as rhetorical communication with several target groups. Falkheimer (2016), ana-
lyzing the communication strategies of Daesh (IS), concludes that the social media
strategies are professional and follows the same logics and trends as major corpor-
ations do.
In a recent study of public perceptions of terrorism in Belgium, conducted before
the attacks in Brussels 2015, Crijns, Cauberghe and Hudders (2017) found that the
role of the traditional media as information providers is still crucial, that communica-
tion managers need to adapt to different public risk involvement levels, that the
Prime Minister has a core role as primary communicator for creating trust, and that
the governmental public relations “have to strive for communication that reflects reli-
ability, experience and honesty” (p. 231).

CONCLUSIONS

Public relations and terrorism is an under-researched area. Considering the

increased number of terrorist attacks, especially outside the Western world, the
176 JESPER FALKHEIMER

professionalization of terroristsʼ communication strategies and activities, the strong

effects on issues of high relevance for global public relations, such as trust, legit-
imacy, and public opinion, there is a need for more research about terrorism and
public relations. Research about terrorism and public relations may focus on the
terroristsʼ strategies and activities but may also be directed towards governmental
efforts to use public relations to counteract the terroristsʼ targets. There are some
research efforts focusing terrorism in the Western part of the world, but there is
a lack of studies that are directed towards the nations and regions in the world
where most terrorism attacks occur.

NOTES
1 www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106096
2 http://oecdinsights.org/2016/09/11/the-new-terrorism/
3 http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/09/world/europe/beslan-school-siege-fast-facts/index.html
4 Special Euro Barometer 432 (2015). Europeans’ attitudes towards security, Survey co-ordinated by the
European Commission, Directorate-General for Communication, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/arch
ives/ebs/ebs_432_en.pdf
5 www.gallup.com/poll/189161/americans-cite-cyberterrorism-among-top-three-threats.aspx
6 This includes both public relations and strategic communication, but I do not go into definitional dis-
cussions about differences between these two concepts here.

REFERENCES

Canel, M. J. & Sanders, K. (2010). Crisis Communication and Terrorist Attacks: Framing a Response to the
2004 Madrid Bombing and 2005 London Bombing. In Coombs, T. & Holladay, S. (Eds.) The Handbook
of Crisis Communication (pp. 449–466). West Sussex: Blackwell.
Crijns, H., Cauberghe, V. & Hudders, L. (2017). Terrorism Threat in Belgium: The Resilience of Belgian Citi-
zens and the Protection of Governmental Reputation by Means of Communication. Public Relations
Review, 43, pp. 219–234.
Falkheimer, J. (2016). Digital Media and New Terrorism. In Coombs, T., Falkheimer, J., Heide, M. &
Young, P. (Eds.) Strategic Communication, Social Media and Democracy: The Challenge of the Digital Nat-
urals (pp. 143–152). London: Routledge.
Falkheimer, J. & Olsson, E-K. (2014). Depoliticizing Terror: The News Framing of the Norway Terror
Attacks 22nd of July 2011. Media, War and Conflict, 8(1), pp. 70–85.
Gallup. (2016). https://news.gallup.com/poll/189161/americans-cite-cyberterrorism-among-top-three-threats.aspx
Grunig, J. E. & Hunt, T. (1984). Managing Public Relations. Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Holbrook, D. (2014). Approaching Terrorist Public Relations Initatives. Public Relations Inquiry, 3(2),
pp. 141–162.
Jowett, G. & O’Donnell, V. (2012). Propaganda and Persuasion (5th edition). Los Angeles, CA: Sage.
Macnamara, J. (2016). The Continuing Convergence of Journalism and PR: New Insights for Ethical Practice
From a Three-Country Study of Senior Practitioners. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 93(1),
pp. 118–141.
Matusitz, J. (2013). Terrorism and Communication: A Critical Introduction. Los Angeles: Sage.
Neumann, P. R. (2009). Old and New Terrorism. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Norris, P., Kern, M. & Just, M. (2003). Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government, and the Public.
New York: Routledge.
O´Shaughnessy, N. (1996). Social Propaganda and Social Marketing. European Journal of Marketing,
30(10–11), pp. 62–75.
Picard, R. G. (1989). Press Relations of Terrorist Organizations. Public Relations Review, 15(4), pp. 12–23.
Ranstorp, M. & Wilkinson, P. (2005). Introduction. Terrorism and Political Violence, 17(1–2), pp. 3–8.
Richards, B. (2004). Terrorism and Public Relations. Public Relations Review, 30(2), pp. 169–176.
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Rothenberger, L. (2014). Terrorism as Strategic Communication. In Holtzhausen, D. & Zerfass, A (Eds.) The
Routledge Handbook of Strategic Communication (pp. 481–496). London: Routledge.
Schmid, A. P. & Graaf, J. de. (1982). Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News
Media. London: Sage.
Somerville, I. & Purcell, A. (2011). A history of Republican Public Relations in Northern Ireland from
‘Bloody Sunday’ to the Good Friday Agreement. Journal of Communication Management, 15(3), pp.
192–209.
Tuman, J. (2010). Communicating Terror: The Rhetorical Dimensions of Terrorism (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage.
Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A. & Hirch-Hoefler, S. (2012). The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism. In
Horgan, J. & Braddock, K. (Eds.) Terrorism Studies: A Reader (pp. 76–90). London: Routledge.
 CHAPTER

17
The Global Public Relations of Failed
States

Greg Simons

States engage in global public relations for a multitude of reasons and motivations. In
this chapter, global public relations is discussed in the context of a failed state’s com-
munication with different foreign publics in order to meet a particular goal or object-
ive. As such, it forms the intersection of public relations and public diplomacy.
Global public relations may in general be a popular and somewhat common theme,
where the emphasis often is on the powerful countries (such as the United States,
France, the United Kingdom, China), but what is less common is the global public
relations of other, lesser known or weaker, states (Freitag & Quesinberry Stokes,
2009).
Given this lack of literature about the global public relations of less powerful
states, this chapter explores the global public relations of failed states. There are
a number of central questions that need to be posed in order to better visualize how
and why global public relations campaigns are organized. What are the goals and
objectives of a failed state when they engage in global public relations? How do they
operationalize the programme?
This chapter will initially engage in understanding global public relations. As this is
about countries making use of global public relations, the connections to public dip-
lomacy will also be explored. The topic will then shift to defining and explaining
failed states, which will be the basis for understanding the possible motivations for
them to use global public relations. Zimbabwe and North Korea will be used as two
examples to illustrate how this communication looks in practice and why it takes

178
17. THE GLOBAL PUBLIC RELATIONS OF FAILED STATES 179

place (in terms of strategic state goals). The results reveal a very diverse approaches
and reasons for communicating.

WHERE GLOBAL PR AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY MEET

In an era of globalization and mediatization, individual countries become much more

accessible and observed by global media and publics. They are compared and contrasted
with other countries in terms of their level of development, attractiveness, and policies that
influence the construction of a national image, together with the perception and emotions
of stakeholders that are created (Buhmann & Ingenhoff, 2015, p. 62). This has created an
increasingly crowded marketplace of countries that have been vying and competing for
attention by communicating to world publics that has rapidly increased with the end of the
Cold War (Wang, 2006, p. 94). In terms of understanding global public relations, it is
necessary to understand where the communicating entity is physically located and with
which publics it must build relationships. This book defines the term Public Relations as
the strategic communication that different types of organizations use for establishing and
maintaining symbiotic relationships with relevant publics many of whom are increasingly
becoming culturally diverse. Communicators seek to pre-emptively have their voices heard
(i.e. their interests) in cross-national settings (including in conflicts) through the cultivation
of open lines of communication between them and global publics (to governments, business
community, general public, and other groups, and individuals).
As the demand and practice of public relations goes global, attempts have been made
to understand and predict the process and its effects. The first section of this book has
discussed the conceptual underpinnings of global public relations practice and scholar-
ship and those are relevant to this chapter as well. Sriramesh (2010) contends that the
21st century is typified by the process of globalization, which has increased the import-
ance and diversity of public relations (because of cross-national and cross-cultural
aspects) that is conceived and practiced. At the same time, globalization has highlighted
what he refers to as being the extreme ethnocentricity that currently exists in public rela-
tions practice and scholarship. This ethnocentricity also refers to the assumed identity of
public relations, which is often perceived as being a form of communication that was
conceived in the United States in the 20th century. However, it has been contended that
public relations has a much longer and more diverse history as indicated, for example, in
the Asian context (Sriramesh, 2004). These contentions posit that using a one-size-fits all
approach in practice and research will lead to disastrous results. When researching and
analyzing public relations within a global public relations setting, there is a need to take
a more nuanced and considered approach appreciating the diversity that is the hallmark
of a global analysis of any phenomenon.
Within the sphere of global public relations, there are four functions that are of
particular relevance to this chapter: 1) National identity and promotion; 2) managing
corporate reputation; 3) crisis communication; and 4) communicating locally (Freitag
& Quesinberry Stokes, 2009, pp. 97–99). With respect to this particular chapter, the
function of interest is national identity and promotion. Within critical modernism,
a certain dialectical tension exists, which is “the relationship between the traditionally
modernist values of public relations and the possibility of critical modernism that
questions the underlying assumptions of these very modernist values with the goal of
illuminating the ideological biases of modernism” (Pal & Dutta, 2008, p. 173). This
could be, for example, invoking the rights of a marginal state to “defend” itself
against Western “colonialism” or military aggression. Thereby, the communications
180 GREG SIMONS

are aimed at revealing the existing contours of power, but at the same time attempting
to create the opportunity of the communicator to step outside those contours.
Sriramesh and Verčič stated that “the critical relationship between the mass media
and public relations cannot be overstated” (2001, p. 111). Furthermore, Sriramesh
(2010) proposed a framework of three factors that help us understand media culture
in a society – media control that refers not only to media ownership but more import-
antly to the extent of editorial freedom in a particular media system; media access
that measures the level of access to mass media by various segments of a society; and
media outreach that refers to the level of diffusion of mass media in a particular soci-
ety – media use and consumption by different segments of society. Access to the mass
media – the ability to influence media content – whether directly or indirectly, is
a crucial aspect in getting the message to the intended audiences.
Mass media are understood as being instrumental in the social construction of reality.
Two basic approaches to this research have been identified: the first focuses on the social
construction of reality being a key aspect of the relationship between culture and society;
and the next addresses the social construction of reality as a product of media effect
(Adoni & Mane, 1984, p. 323). The second aspect is of interest and relevance to this
chapter, especially the intended construction of a symbolic and subjective reality (Adoni
& Mane, 1984, p. 332; Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, Sasson, 1992). Because this chapter
focuses on the public relations activities of failed states, a theoretical connection does
exist with public diplomacy through the practice of foreign policy (L’Etang, 2009; Sign-
itzer & Coombs, 1992). But firstly, what is public diplomacy?
A concise definition of function and intent is “public diplomacy [ … ] deals with the influ-
ence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses
dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy” (Jowett & O’Donnell
2012, p. 287). In spite of a relative infancy in research that links public relations and public
diplomacy, it has been noted that “the two disciplines share similar philosophical and prac-
tical dimensions.” Furthermore, those connections were particularly evident on “the topic
of strategy with the government as a pivotal actor in conducting international public rela-
tions or engaging in political and socio-economic strategy, or designing messages aimed at
improving a country’s image or engaging in brand or reputation strategies” (Vanc & Fitzpa-
trick, 2016, p. 436). It has been argued that on a functional level “PR is part of the practice
of diplomacy responsible for international communications and media relations as well as
cultural diplomacy, which aims to enhance personal relationships between representatives
of the host and target countries” (L’Etang, 2009, p. 608).
A term that unites the practices of global public relations and public diplomacy is
the notion of negative public relations. Before defining the nature of this concept, it is
necessary to state that this operates at two different levels. One of those informational
levels is an externally imposed negative brand and/or reputation upon an entity, where
emphasis is placed upon negative political, economic, and social factors. This impos-
ition may be beyond the control of the entity being targeted as outside actors are
driving and controlling those information flows. The other informational level is
a consciously self-projected negative brand and/or reputation by an entity that directs
those communications in order to attain an advantage in international relations.
Negative public relations is a communicational mechanism that is intended to
create relationships of fear and/or uncertainty between the target public and the com-
municator. If externally imposed, it could be used to try and restrict the operational
and policy choices of the target country, but making them less attractive and reducing
the possibility of empathy with the country in question and its leadership. At the
17. THE GLOBAL PUBLIC RELATIONS OF FAILED STATES 181

same time, increasing the operational and policy choices of the communicator. This
can be observed within the context of recent regime change operations (Simons &
Chifu, 2017). When the negative public relations communications are self-projected, it
can be an indicator of a defensive posture by the communicator. The intention is to
create information flows that seem to elevate the perceived levels of uncertainty and
risk, thereby enabling pathos through cultivating a sense of fear.1 This is contingent
upon the intended audience “believing” a negative event scenario, which creates
a negative relationship with the target audience based on a desire for aversion, which
can be used as a means of leverage and bargaining by a state otherwise has little or
nothing to bargain with.

WHAT IS A FAILED STATE?

An important first step when discussing the issue of failed and fragile states is the contro-
versial nature of even the idea, let alone the definition. For those that accept the notion
and existence of failed states there are some associated characteristics of the state that
involves the disintegration of a political body to the very point where basic conditions for
citizens and the responsibilities of a sovereign government no longer function as they
ideally should. This can include the inability of the state to provide public services and
the state’s inability to interact with other states as a fully functioning member of the
international community (Cojanu & Popescu, 2007; Newman, 2009; Rotberg, 2003).2
There is a negative stigma associated with being labeled a failed state. From
a reputational perspective it can carry risks in attracting foreign investment, tourism, and
while deterring security threats. Taking the above mentioned aspects into account, the
following definition of a failed or failing state seems cogent to this chapter:

A state in which the government is incapable of exercising its major functions, defending
borders, or making key decisions. (Shiraev & Zubok, 2016, p. 155)

A number of different failed states have been identified, often signaled by a spectacular
disintegration and collapse. Some of those that have gained recent media attention
include Afghanistan, Congo, Haiti, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Somalia (Cojanu
& Popescu, 2007; Newman, 2009, p. 427).3 However, there is no firm consensus on
a definition of the term “failed state” and there are criticisms concerning the very validity
of such a label.
What are the objections and criticisms of the term “failed state” and its connota-
tions? There is the issue of a lack of consensus on an exact and concise definition of
the concept of “failed state” (Nay, 2013), which renders it vulnerable to being used
arbitrarily (Call, 2008; Luke & Ó Tuathail, 1997), in a sensationalist manner or even
as a “Western myth.”4 Others have been more critical of the term, referring to it as
an enabling mechanism for military intervention by Western states in other countries
(Nay, 2013, pp. 331–332; Verhoeven, 2009). Yet another set of critiques argues that
there is an over-generalization in some cases of failed states, such as the turbulent
area of North-West Pakistan where there is little government control versus the situ-
ation in the rest of the country (Lieven, 2011, pp. 19–21). While keeping these criti-
cisms in mind, and assuming that a failed state does exist, it does present a number
of problems and obstacles to overcome for such a state in an ever increasingly
crowded global marketplace of state’s seeking attention through their global commu-
nications. Now to turn to the topic of applying how and why failed states employ
182 GREG SIMONS

global public relations campaigns, using the two country examples of Zimbabwe and
North Korea.
There are a number of reasons for choosing these two countries in particular, both
of which, to some extent are controversial. Given that there are various other coun-
tries that are associated with being failed states, such as Afghanistan, or Somalia or
even Iraq, why this choice? The motivation is several fold. Certainly there are aspects
of North Korea and Zimbabwe that fit the failed state criteria, such as their inability
or limited ability to ensure a fair and equitable standard of living for their citizens in
the borders of the respective countries. A second point is the issue concerning the
quality of governance (for example corruption capacity to deliver services to the
public or authoritarianism), the safety and security of individual citizens (freedom of
expression and the equitable application of rule of law), and the economic problems
encountered by both of the countries perhaps exacerbated by international sanctions.
However, both countries have governments that are in control of decision making,
but this also means that they also possess the will and means for engaging in global
public relations.

THE PUBLIC RELATIONS OF TWO FAILED/FAILING STATES: ZIMBABWE AND

NORTH KOREA

This chapter discusses Zimbabwe’s and North Korea’s use of global public relations
in order to meet state-directed goals and objectives. An initial point to be noted is
that the international reputation of both contries are inextricably linked with the
image and reputation of their leaders, Robert Mugabe and Kim Jong-un, respectively.
Robert Mugabe rose to power in Zimbabwe after the process of decolonization in
1980 and he continues to rule the country at 93 years of age. He uses nationalism
and coercion as a means to retain political power. For example, he modified Donald
Trump’s slogan “America for Americans” to “Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans.”5 Kim
Jong-Un is more secretive as his birth date is understood to be somewhere from
1982–1984. He is often compared to his grandfather the Great Leader Kim Il Sung,
the first leader of North Korea. When his father Kim Jong-Il died in 2011, Kim
Jong-Un was declared the national leader and inherited the world’s fourth largest
military.6
According to Reporters Without Borders 2017 index, Zimbabwe is ranked 128
and North Korea 180 (last place) in the Press Freedom ranking.7 Freedom
House’s Freedom of the Press 2017 rate Zimbabwe as being 74/100 (not free)8 and
North Korea at 98/100 (not free).9 These rankings are indicative of an extreme
lack of freedom in the national media and information systems of the respective
countries. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2016 ranked
Zimbabwe at 154th place and North Korea at 174th place (out of 176).10 Such
a situation has negative effects on the population, the functioning of the state and
economy. According to The Economist’s Intelligence Unit, the Democracy Index of
2016 put Zimbabwe at 140th place and North Korea in last place at 167.11 These
results are indicative of an unfree and non-democratic society in both cases,
according to these international indices.
Zimbabwe is a failed state using the definition adopted by this essay (Francios &
Sud, 2006, p. 160) and North Korea is considered as being a failed/failing state (Call,
2008, p. 1491). North Korea is a country that has been called a failed state by some,
17. THE GLOBAL PUBLIC RELATIONS OF FAILED STATES 183

but others do not classify as being one.12 At times, emotional, and not rational,
reasons are given to justify placing North Korea in the failed state category.

North Korea is the last Stalinist state, a one-man dictatorship that also joined the
nuclear club in 2006. Kim Jong-un, the youngest son of Kim Jong-il, was declared as his
father’s successor after the latter passed away. It is in essence a failed state trying to sup-
press its people. It could be called fascism in its worst form as there is no free opinion,
people are murdered in case someone speaks out against the “Great Leader,” citizens are
being watched at all times, everything is being censored and foreigners who enter the
country are closely monitored and cannot speak with locals about what is going on in
the country. Citizens are being told what to do, what to say and even what to wear at all
times.13

There is certainly an issue that exists between labeling a state as failing or failed and
an actual example, though there is certainly the aspect of reacting to a label regard-
less of whether it is factually true or not. Failed states, as any other states have defin-
ite reasons and motivations to communicate to the global public, they also face
a number of constraints and restraints in doing so (tangible resources and an image/
reputation ‘problemʼ).
There is a need to understand and recognize differences in assumptions of public
relations practice and theory. Failure to do so potentially produces a number of nega-
tive effects. 1) Reduces the chances of the public relations lens in successfully under-
standing “how organisations in other cultures use communication to adapt their
relationship with relevant publics.” 2) Limits the ability to use knowledge and practical
experience from other cultures to inform our understanding of the practice of public
relations (Botan, 1992, pp. 152–153). Such observations need to be kept in mind when
dealing with such subjects of study as failed states. “Mainstream” Western, especially
from the US and UK, practices and approaches are not the only manner of global
public relations practice as other actors are present and active, but using different
approaches and means to the problem of connecting with international publics.

Zimbabwe

One of the countries that provides a significant challenge for public relations practitioners is
Zimbabwe. It is a country that makes the international news headlines for all of the wrong
reasons – corruption, political violence including against any opposition to the status quo,
hyper-inflation, empty shop shelves, and a seemingly endless list of state challenges and
problems, which affects public perception and opinion of the country (Mugobo & Wake-
ham, 2014, p. 303). This is a country that is characterized as being on the verge of collapse
or in the process of collapsing.14 It has endured numerous natural and manmade disasters.
The country’s precarious situation means that it falls well within the stated criteria for deter-
mining a failed state.
Given the poor international image of the country and the general lack of resources
and capital to assist in developing it, a range of weaknesses and threats confront any
communicator from the very outset. Zimbabwe and Robert Mugabe were one of the
few potential clients that Lord Timothy Bell (formerly of the PR firm Bell Pottinger
Private) turned down a contract for bettering Zimbabwe’s image for being too
controversial.15 This was not the sole controversy for global public relations firms in
their dealings with the country. In 2008, the global marketing and advertising agency
184 GREG SIMONS

Young and Rubicam (Y&R) sold its stake in its Zimbabwean associate Imago Young
and Rubicam following the involvement of the local associate in the election cam-
paign of President Robert Mugabe.16 In general, there is a realization that the brand
image of Zimbabwe needs effective management, through global public relations cam-
paigns. In addition, the Zimbabwean government does not possess a monopoly on
communicating the image of the country as there are activist groups that also com-
municate internationally – usually portraying the country as a failed state.
In March 2009 the Zimbabwean government announced the need to communicate
a rebranding of the country in order to attract foreign investors and international
tourists as well as to retain qualified citizens (Hurombo, Muzondo, & Kaseke, 2014,
p. 61). These priorities were subsequently confirmed at a later stage too. At
a stakeholder’s consultative meeting on branding in Bulawayo, the senior principal
director in the Office of the President and Cabinet Ambassador Mary Mubi noted
that negative public attitude and perception had a bad effect on the Zimbabwean
image. “Why manage the country’s image? We cannot afford to be isolated, we are
a global player. That means countries are competing (to foster tourism, investment
and enhancing exports).”17 The communication logic is simple: a more positive coun-
try image and brand will enable to country to attract a more positive image that will
result in their ability to attract tourism, investment, and to boost trade. However, the
Zimbabwean government does not possess a monopoly on the country’s national
image.
In 2002 an initiative was launched by a group named Save Zimbabwe PR Team.
They approached a firm called Chelgate to launch a public relations campaign that
targeted government abuses. “They explained the need for an international PR cam-
paign addressing human rights abuses carried out by supporters of the ruling Zanu-
PF party in the country, and highlighting the plight of a population faced by
starvation.”18 The campaign sought to spread information, material, and messages
that sought to reduce any possible sense of legitimacy of Mugabe and his government
in order to build international pressure on him to step down from office. Such cam-
paigns tended to produce a counter-global public relations campaign that used the
narrative latent colonialism and the interference of foreign Western governments in
the affairs of the Zimbabwean state.19 This is an example of a defensive form of
global public relations that is intended to try and protect or deflect any potential
damage from an external global public relations campaign to weaken the incumbent
political regime. The government of Zimbabwe has been launching communication
campaigns with concrete goals and objectives, which were directed by the state too as
opposed to opposition and/or activist groups.
Between 2013–2014, a number of journal articles appeared on the topic of the gov-
ernment of Zimbabwe’s attempts to use global public relations as a means to re-
brand itself as a destination for tourism (Hurombo, Muzondo & Kaseke, 2014;
Mugobo & Wakeham, 2014; Ndlovu & Heath, 2013). Global public relations was
used for rebranding the country as a tourist destination. The slogan “Africa’s Para-
dise” was compromised through a starkly contrasting existing counter-narrative of
starvation and economic collapse that appeared in mass media content, which in
2011 was changed to “Zimbabwe: A World of Wonders” (Ndlovu & Heath, 2013,
p. 948). The existing negative narrative needed to be compromised before a new pro-
jected “reality” could stand a chance of success. This seems to be an attempt to re-
shape the perceived relational experience of the communication, the earlier slogan
17. THE GLOBAL PUBLIC RELATIONS OF FAILED STATES 185

was not sustainable owing to a significant gap in perception and expectation of the
word of the communication and the deed of experience in the country.
The motivations and potential rewards for the global public relations campaign to
re-brand Zimbabwe are clear, and there is much at stake:

In Zimbabwe, where tourism has been recognised as a tool for employment creation, pov-
erty reduction, and economic well-being, rebranding the destination should result in posi-
tive business growth and profitability. (Ndlovu & Heath, 2013, p. 954)

Such observations have been confirmed by other studies, which place great emphasis
on the need for weak or failed states to communicate effectively in the global arena in
order to try and overcome their tangible challenges and obstacles (Hurombo,
Muzondo & Kaseke, 2014; Mugobo & Wakeham, 2014). Emphasis and intention of
the communication is therefore oriented towards projecting and generating a positive
image in order to cultivate opportunities in a country that otherwise lacks potential.
But, “the destination needs to achieve acceptance from the international community,
based on changed economic and political conditions in the destination” (Ndlovu &
Heath, 2013, p. 954). The intention of the administration’s global public relations is
to project a more positive and attractive image of Zimbabwe as a country and
a destination, and it is rooted in the notion of a positive emotional attraction.
Chitiyo and Kibble (2014, pp. 18–20) noted that if Zimbabwe was to be successful
in attracting investment, careful attention needed to be paid to two key things. One
of those is nation brand, which is measured by external perceptions categories (such
as exports, tourism and immigration, investment, governance and people, and com-
petitive advantage). It also needs to adapt its business diplomacy to capitalize on any
competitive advantage it possesses. As to whether the communications have been
a success or not, it is a mixed bag. “Zimbabwe’s [nation brand] has improved signifi-
cantly since 2008 but remains low even among its peers and there is much work that
must be done to improve it and build local and external confidence” (Chitiyo &
Kibble, 2014, p. 20). Tourism has certainly been a success story after the near collapse
of the industry in 2009. Reports released by the Zimbabwean Tourism Authority
reveal a trend, with 40, 518 tourist arrivals in 2009 (Tourism Trends, 2009, p. 12) and
in 2015 there were 2, 056, 588 (Tourism Trends, 2015, p. 32). However, it has been
more difficult to attract Direct Foreign Investment, especially when Zimbabwe was
ranked 47th out of 52 African countries according to nation-brand competitiveness
by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation in 2013, by 2015 the ranking was 39th place (Mo
Ibrahim Foundation, 2015: 18). A long-term target of US$1 billion in Direct Foreign
Investment (FDI) has been set by the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-
Economic Transformation (ZimAsset).20 In 2015, Zimbabwe attracted
US$421.2 million, however this figure dropped to US$294.66 million in 2016. Some
of the critique that explains the decline in FDI referenced poor economic conditions,
worsening relations with the West, and governance as contributing factors.21 In spite
of the fact that Robert Mugabe has been toppled from power, Zimbabwe’s national
interests remain the same, with a focus on stimulating the economy through such pro-
grammes as increasing tourism and encouraging direct foreign investment. The next
country case uses a very different goals and global public relations strategy.
186 GREG SIMONS

North Korea

Understanding North Korea’s attempts at joining the nuclear weapons club can be
viewed as somewhat of a PR disaster, i.e. to create positive relationships with its
intended target audience. Is it possible to understand from another perspective and
point of view, whilst still using the PR lens to comprehend and explain the motivation
to create communicational relationships to influence the intended policy outcomes?
This notion contends that it is possible, although the logic and context need to be
understood, which requires thinking outside the commonly conceived and practiced
frameworks at times. North Korea not only delivers its communication in words, but
also as actions, to the global audience. Cho (2017) also challenges the popular view
that communication campaigns (although using the concept of nation branding) are
intended for generating purely positive images (propaganda), and also using North
Korea and its show of military strength and power as a case in point. Instead of
referring to “positive” images, Cho argues that the process is about “added value”
(2017, p. 2).22 The yardstick from which success is measured and conveyed is strength
and power. This was seen in the opening of a new residential block in Pyongyang in
the spring of 2017 by the North Korean Prime Minister Pak Pong-ju who declared
“the completion of this street is more powerful than 100 nuclear warheads.” The
intended message is that “North Korea still possesses economic power, despite inter-
national sanctions over its nuclear programme and the rising threat of military con-
flict with the US.”23 In general, North Korea has very little in terms of its ability to
bargain with or negotiate in order to influence stronger military powers that may be
hostile to it.
Therefore, the logic to gain access to and use of nuclear weapons became that of
a bargaining chip (Bradner, 2000), especially in the wake of the declaration by then
US President George W Bush of the Axis of Evil during his State of the Union
speech in 2002 that was soon followed by the US-led military operations to remove
the leaders of different countries, starting with Iraq in 2003, Libya in 2011, an
attempt was made Syria soon after and Cuba that has been a long-term target of
regime change. At later stages Cuba, Libya, and Syria were added to the list.24 The
Axis of Evil reference compelled China to issue a warning to the US not to pursue
“actions that it may come to regret and for which there will be consequences” (Wu,
2005, p. 40). After the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, China issued
a statement that called for a US withdrawal and a political settlement that took in to
account Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.25 This seems to be symptomatic of
a wider and long lasting war of words and threats between the US and North Korea
(Howard, 2004). Rather than being seen as an example of “failed diplomacy” (Pritch-
ard, 2007), from a North Korean perspective it could well be perceived as
a “triumph” in of negative global public relations.26
North Korea’s motivation and logic for communications seems to be an attempt at
camouflaging potential weaknesses (by distraction) and to reduce the likelihood of
possible threats to the regime (namely a US-led military attack and regime change).
There is a tendency for North Korea to portray its actions and intentions as being
defensive and in response to threats posed by the United States and its allies. When
the US aircraft carrier Carl Vinson was diverted when in the spring of 2017 in
response to North Korea’s nuclear tests, North Korean media (such as the state news
agency KCNA) carried this message, which was in turn carried by international
media. “This goes to prove that the US’s reckless moves for invading the DPRK have
17. THE GLOBAL PUBLIC RELATIONS OF FAILED STATES 187

reached a serious phase. [ … ] The DPRK is ready to react to any mode of war
desired by the US.”27 The themes of blame and “reckless actions” appear in many
public statements by North Korean officials in the media, such as threats of retali-
ation in the case of sanctions (characterized as being “reckless actions”),28 and the
US as the “culprit” – “if war erupts, no matter who caused the pre-emptive strike,
the United States will be held responsible.”29 This situation seems to allude to the
intersecting of public relations and public diplomacy.
There is a clear element of reactive global PR in North Korea, which is based on
the above analysis. When the US announced in April 2017 that it would send a fleet
to the area as a means of deterring any further North Korean “provocations,” the
rapid response was to test launch a missile, which actually failed on launch, thereby
undermining the credibility of the North Korean threat.30 Nuclear tests seem to be
used as a public relations exercise in the negotiation process of North Korea’s inter-
national relations interests and priorities, such as an attempt to trade halting nuclear
tests if the US and South Korea halt their joint military exercise.31 The timing of the
tests is not coincidental and has a strong element of political symbolism in it, such as
the launch of a missile in to the Sea of Japan at a time when US President Donald
Trump was preparing to meet his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping.32 The whole pro-
cess is played out publicly in the mass media outlets that is readily seen by the gen-
eral public and policy makers alike, where public opinion and perception can
potentially influence and potentially restrict policy options.
The credibility and effectiveness of the threat needs to be perceived as being real
and likely in order to induce fear and uncertainty as to the scale and cost of any pos-
sible war (Howard, 2004, p. 825). Hence there needs to be an element of believability
in the negative global PR message, which is supplied through media articles that con-
firm the threat as being real, such as in the Independent with the headline “Kim Jong
Un ‘Would Nuke Los Angeles’ if his Rule was Threatened, North Korean Defector
Reveals.”33 A long-term ally of North Korea, China has been steering a tricky path
between US pressure and their support for the country. The rising tensions that take
the form of a tit-for-tat exchange provoked a strong Chinese response from the Chin-
ese Foreign Minister – “If they let war break out on the peninsula, they must shoul-
der that historical culpability and pay the corresponding price for this.”34 The
reluctance of China to readily abandon their ally provides North Korea with some
more bargaining power in their international relations communications and choices.
Kim’s calling Trump “Dotard” versus Trump’s naming Kim as the “Rocket Man”35
exchanges between Kim Jong-Un and Donald Trump tend to validate the thesis that
this is good global negative PR as it puts North Korea at the center of world events
and gives them much more influence and leverage than would otherwise be the case.
Not to mention Trump is playing a losing rhetorical game by playing by their rules.
This is seen in the nature of public opinion and perception in South Korea, which
now begins to see the United States as being a significant security threat to their
country. 70 per cent of respondents in South Korea saw US power and influence as
being a major threat to the country,36 and this was before the war of words between
Trump and Kim heated up. After Trump threatened to “totally destroy” North Korea
in his debut address to the United Nations General Assembly,37 which some noted as
having “echos” of the Axis of Evil speech by George W Bush to Congress. Interest-
ing, there are some commentators that note the use of caution by North Korea in
their rhetoric as they leave themselves a way out of a situation of war that they
188 GREG SIMONS

cannot win,38 unlike Trump’s rhetoric that leaves him little room for compromise or
manourve.
The result was North Korea’s opportunity to characterize the United States as
a military aggressor39 and Trump as being “mentally deranged.”40 Another result is
Trump’s UN speech presented an opportunity for North Korea to broaden its mili-
tary options as a means of “self-defence,”41 whilst the US was forced to react to
events. At times the US message has become split, on the one hand referring to
North Korea’s war claim as absurd42 and US Defence Secretary Jim Mattis saying
that the US wanted a diplomatic end to the crisis in an attempt to tone down the
rhetoric.43 At the same time as Trump is threatening to destroy an entire country.
The net result is a greatly heightened sense of risk and fear created by the uncertainty
created by such emotional rhetoric.
A lot has happened in terms of the coercion, diplomacy, name calling used in the
indirect and direct communications between the main actors of North Korea’s global
public relations that makes use of nuclear weapons. The development of nuclear
weapons was initially a strategy of survivial by the North Korean leadership, through
deterring possible military attacks by the United States. The lesson of Iraq in 2003,
seemed to convince North Korea of the need to develop an operational arsenal or
face invasion and regime change. This situation has evolved, where North Korea
found it had the ability to become a global player that had the ability to bring
a superpower to the negotiating table in order to discuss “denuclearisation” of this
arsenal. A result is that, if North Korea gave up its nuclear arsenal it risks its state
security and global relevance, which is a massive sacrifice to make.

CONCLUSION

An apparent supposition of the current ethnocentric wisdom44 and convention exists

that communications attempts are intended to creat a positive relationship between
the messenger and the target audience. But, can the opposite be true, creating nega-
tive relationships based upon the projection of pathos (of fear, risk, and uncertainty)
and the appearance of hard power? A different logic is at play, but still based upon
attaining national goals and interests through the power of negative communications.
This is greatly influenced by the nature of the political regime, the culture and iden-
tity of the country that is communicating as well as the media system. Activism is
also an observable component at play here in these cases, both Mugabe and Kim
have used violence to decimate their opponents, which reinforces the negative relation-
ship with different stakeholders. An important aspect in carrying and delivering the
communication to the publics are mass media outlets.
Although the goals of the global public relations are different in the two case
studies presented, the similarity between them is that this is a deliberate and con-
scious attempt by both North Korea and Zimbabwe to have their official interests
and concerns relayed to international publics and challenge the standard inter-
national media narrative that transits a negative brand and reputation of the two
countries. In terms of the relevance and application of the three concepts under
media culture, both Zimbabwe and North Korea exercise strong domestic control
of media content. However, this restriction does not apply within the context of
international media for obvious reasons. This is more a question of media out-
reach, North Korea uses a dramatic use of words and deeds and Zimbabwe
attempts to go with an attractive brand approach, the content is then carried by
17. THE GLOBAL PUBLIC RELATIONS OF FAILED STATES 189

international media (the intention). Both countries have tried innovative means to
capture the attention and coverage of the international press and their own means
(through state news agencies, websites, or social media) to cultivate open lines of
communication. The result concerns the media access component, to create
a compelling story carried to a wide audience as possible. This message, if carried,
becomes available to foreign governments and publics alike. A carry on effect is to
influence global public attitudes on the formation and execution of their foreign
policy. This gives a clear connection between the global public relations of North
Korea and Zimbabwe and public diplomacy, which aims to influence the attitudes
of international publics on the formation and execution of foreign policy.
The nature and intent of the global public relations demonstrate great diversity in
approach and intent. When looking at the nature and likely outcome of Zimbabwe’s
communications, it appears to be an attempt by a country with many weaknesses and
threats to try and re-join the world community by offering and projecting a positive
message to the world public in order to attract. North Korea, on the other hand,
takes an entirely different approach and intent. Instead of trying to attract the global
publics, the attempt seems to be to repel them with messages of uncertainty and risk,
which is used as a bargaining chip in international relations. In other words this is an
attempt to remain isolated from the world community, the North Korean leader’s per-
sonal brand and image supports the image of uncertainty and risk.

NOTES
1 A sense of fear is enabled when two conditions are simultaneously met: 1) the fear that something bad
can happen, for example nuclear attack; and 2) that something negative can be personally experienced,
“my” country can be attacked with nuclear weapons.
2 Failed States. (n. d.). Global Policy Forum. Retrieved from www.globalpolicy.org/nations-a-states/failed-
states.html
3 Fragile States Index 2016. (n. d.). Fund For Peace. Retrieved from http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-
2016
4 Ross, E. (June 28, 2013). Failed States are a Western Myth. The Guardian. Retrieved from www.theguar
dian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/28/failed-states-western-myth-us-interests; Beehner, L. & Young,
J. (July 17, 2012). The Failure of the Failed States Index. World Policy Blog. Retrieved from www.
worldpolicy.org/blog/2012/07/17/failure-failed-states-index
5 Burke, J. (February 21, 2017). Robert Mugabe Marks 93rd Birthday With Praise for Donald Trump.
The Guardian. Retrieved from www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/21/robert-mugabe-93rd-birthday-
zimbabwe-president-donald-trump
6 Szoldra, P. & Bondarenko, V. (April 18, 2017). How North Korean Leader Kim Jong-Un, 33, Became
One of the World’s Scariest Dictators. Business Insider. Retrieved from www.businessinsider.com/kim-
jong-un-life-2016-9/#many-north-koreans-see-kim-jong-un-as-a-youthful-version-of-great-leader-kim-il-
sung-7
7 Index Details: Data of Press Freedom Ranking 2017. (n. d.). Reporters Without Borders. Retrieved
from https://rsf.org/en/ranking_table
8 Countries are ranked from 0 (best freedom) to 100 (worst freedom), according to indicators on the
legal, political and economic environment by Freedom House. For more information please see https://
freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press-2017-methodology. It should be noted that Freedom House is
an “NGO” funded by the United States Government. Zimbabwe Profile 2017, Freedom House,
Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/zimbabwe (accessed September 27,
2017).
9 North Korea Profile 2017, Freedom House, Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
press/2017/north-korea (accessed September 27, 2017).
10 Corruption Perception Index 2016. (January 25, 2017). Transparency International. Retrieved from
www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016
190 GREG SIMONS

11 Democracy Index 2016. (n. d.). Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from www.eiu.com/topic/democ
racy-index
12 Pearson, J. (December 11, 2011). Why North Korea is not and Should not be Regarded as,
a “Failed State”. CESRAN International. Retrieved from http://cesran.org/why-north-korea-is-not-
and-should-not-be-regarded-as-a-failed-state.html
13 Hatef. (April 18, 2012). North Korea: A failed state and the hegemony of the failed leaders. CNN Ire-
port. Retrieved from http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC-777898
14 Zimbabwe Country Profile. (August 10, 2016). BBC News. Retrieved from www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-14113249
15 Beckett, A. (December 9, 2013). Dodgy Regime? Unruly Protesters? Bell Pottinger Can Help. The
Guardian. Retrieved from www.theguardian.com/media/2013/dec/09/bell-pottinger-tim-bell-pr-interview;
Guma, L. (March 17, 2008). Zimbabwe: International PR Firm Turned Down Mugabe Contract. All
Africa. Retrieved from http://allafrica.com/stories/200803172031.html
16 Ndlela, D. (June 23, 2008). Zimbabwe: Global Ad Agency Dumping Firm Over Mugabe Campaign?.
Biz Community. Retrieved from www.bizcommunity.co.zw/Article/238/12/25708.html
17 Kazunga, O. (December 9, 2016). “Zimbabwe’s Brand Imaging Needs Proper Management to Lure
Investors”. Chronicle. Retrieved from www.chronicle.co.zw/zimbabwes-brand-imaging-needs-proper-man
agement-to-lure-investors/
18 Hill, A. (January 31, 2003). Campaigns: Zimbabwe is Targeted Over Govt Abuses – Media Relations.
PR Week. Retrieved from www.prweek.com/article/169526/campaigns-zimbabwe-targeted-govt-abuses—
media-relations
19 Ayinde. (March 15, 2007). U.S. and Britain are Fuelling Violence in Zimbabwe. Africa Speaks.
Retrieved from www.africaspeaks.com/articles/2007/1503.html
20 For more information on the strategy and economic blueprint refer to the following – www.theopc.gov.
zw/index.php/zim-asset.
21 FDI to Zimbabwe Down 30 per cent to US$295 Million in 2016. (January 31, 2017). The Financial
Gazette, Retrieved from www.financialgazette.co.zw/fdi-to-zimbabwe-down-30-percent-to-us295-million-
in-2016/ (accessed September 27, 2017).
22 This is connected to the nation building process where the state seeks to gain domestic political legitim-
acy or foreign political recognition.
23 Kaiman, J. (April 13, 2017). Why a North Korean Leader Called a Gleaming New Neighbourhood
“More Powerful Than 100 Nuclear Warheads”. LA Times. Retrieved from www.latimes.com/world/asia/
la-fg-north-korea-neighborhood-20170413-story.html
24 Gardner, F. (December 20, 2003). Who’s Who in the “Axis of Evil”. BBC News. Retrieved from http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/1988810.stm
25 China’s Position on the US War in Iraq. (March 26, 2003). Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic
of China to the UN. Retrieved from www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/regionalhot
spots/mideast/ylk/t537117.htm
26 “Negative” global PR is intended to reflect the intention to create and maintain a negative relationship
between the messenger and the intended target audience through the projection of negative emotions,
for example through the use of fear.
27 North Korea Vows Response to “Reckless” US Navy Move. (April 11, 2017). AFP in Space War.
Retrieved from www.spacewar.com/reports/North_Korea_vows_response_to_reckless_US_Navy_
move_999.html
28 Staff Writers. (April 4, 2017). North Korea Threatens to Hit Back Over Sanctions. AFP in Space War.
Retrieved from www.spacewar.com/reports/North_Korea_threatens_to_hit_back_over_sanctions_999.
html
29 Shim, E. (April 6, 2017). North Korea Issues Warning to “Culprit” United States. UPI. Retrieved from
www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2017/04/06/North-Korea-issues-warning-to-culprit-United-States/
8471491509755/
30 Sang-Hun, C., Sanger, D. & Broad, W. J. (April 15, 2017). North Korean Missile Launch Fails, and Show
of Strength Fizzles. The New York Times. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com/2017/04/15/world/asia/north-
korea-missiles-pyongyang-kim-jong-un.html?emc=edit_th_20170416&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49872781
31 Smith, D. (January 10, 2015). North Korea Will Suspend Nuclear Tests If US Calls Off South Korea
Military Drills. The Guardian. Retrieved from www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/10/north-korea-sus
pend-nuclear-us-military-drills-south-korea
32 Sevastopulo, D. & Jung-a, S. (April 5, 2017). North Korea Fires Missile as Trump and Xi Prepare to
Meet. Financial Times. Retrieved from www.ft.com/content/7d25f61c-1993-11e7-a53d-df09f373be87
17. THE GLOBAL PUBLIC RELATIONS OF FAILED STATES 191

33 Sharman, J. (January 25, 2017). Kim Jong Un “Would Nuke Los Angeles” if his Rule was Threatened, North
Korean Defector Reveals. Independent. Retrieved from www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/kim-jong-un-
nuke-los-angeles-north-korea-nuclear-weapons-icbm-missiles-defector-us-leader-a7545011.html
34 Mullany, G., Buckley, C. & Sanger, D. E. (April 14, 2017). China Warns of “Storm Clouds Gathering”
in US-North Korea Standoff. The New York Times. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com/2017/04/14/
world/asia/north-korea-china-nuclear.html?emc=edit_th_20170415&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49872781
35 Chaitin, D. (September 21, 2017). “Dotard” Goes Viral After Kim Jong Un Disses Trump, The Wash-
ington Examiner, Retrieved from www.washingtonexaminer.com/dotard-goes-viral-after-kim-jong-un-
disses-trump/article/2635246 (accessed September 22, 2017).
36 Poushter, J. & Manevich, D., Pew Research Centre. (August 1, 2017). Globally, People Point to ISIS
and Climate Change as Leading Security Threats, Retrieved from www.pewglobal.org/2017/08/01/glo
bally-people-point-to-isis-and-climate-change-as-leading-security-threats/ (accessed September 27, 2017).
37 Manson, K., Sevastopulo, D. & Harris, B. (September 19, 2017). Trump Threatens to “Totally Des-
troy” North Korea, Financial Times, Retrieved from www.ft.com/content/a3487cbc-9d3b-11e7-9a86-
4d5a475ba4c5 (accessed September 20, 2017).
38 Choe Sang-Hun. (September 26, 2017). Behind North Korea’s Bluster, Some See Caution, The New York
Times, Retrieved from www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/world/asia/north-korea-war-donald-trump.html?
emc=edit_th_20170927&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49872781 (accessed September 27, 2017).
39 Sevastopulo, D. & Manson, K. (September 25, 2017). North Korea Accuses Trump of Making Declar-
ation of War, Financial Times, Retrieved from www.ft.com/content/f43863bc-a20e-11e7-9e4f-
7f5e6a7c98a2 (accessed September 26, 2017).
40 Kaiman, J. (September 21, 2017). Kim Jong Un Says “Mentally Deranged” Trump will “Pay Dearly”
for Threat Against North Korea. LA Times. Retrieved from www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-north-korea-
kim-jong-un-trump-20170921-story.html (accessed September 22, 2017).
41 Gladstone, R. & Sanger, D. E. (September 25, 2017). North Korea Says it has the Right to Shoot
Down US Warplanes. The New York Times. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/world/asia/
trump-north-korea.html?mcubz=1&_r=0 (accessed September 26, 2017).
42 Staff Writers. (September 26, 2017). US Labels N. Korea “War” Claim Absurd, as Pyongyang Boosts
Defences, AFP in SpaceWar, Retrieved from www.spacedaily.com/reports/US_labels_N_Korea_war_clai
m_absurd_as_Pyongyang_boosts_defences_999.html (accessed September 27, 2017).
43 Staff Writers. (September 26, 2017). US Wants Diplomatic End to N. Korea Crisis: Mattis, AFP in
SpaceWar, Retrieved from www.spacedaily.com/reports/US_wants_diplomatic_end_to_N_Korea_crisis_
Mattis_999.html (accessed September 27, 2017).
44 “Ethnocentric wisdom” is in reference to the notion of a presumption of a standard “cookie cutter”
approach to PR, which is especially exemplified by the development of its theory and practice in the
US, and excluding or marginalising other “non-standard” practices and approaches.

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 Part

III
Current Issues Relevant to Global
Public Relations
 CHAPTER

18
Internal Communication with a Global
Perspective

Ana Tkalac Verčič

Internal communication is a multidisciplinary field of practice and study. Positioned

between public relations, human resource management, and marketing – it is simul-
taneously a part of various organizational functions while not being a part of any.
Scholars have mostly researched it by using organizational and managerial theories
(Thompkins, 1987), organizational communication (Goldhaber, 2002; Jablin & Putam,
1987; Jablin, Putnam, Roberts & Porter, 1987), organizational psychology (Drenth,
Thierry, de Wolff, 1998; Lowenberg & Conrad, 1998) and in recent years – public
relations (Men & Bowen, 2016; Ruck & Welch, 2012; Tkalac Verčič, Verčič & Srira-
mesh, 2012; Welch, 2012).
Today, the importance of internal communication is amplified by various changes
in the business environment such as globalization, deregulation, and economic crises.
Research shows an erosion of employee trust in organizational leadership all around
the world (Coats, 2005; Jiang & Probst, 2015; Tanner, 2011). Additionally, massive
employee reductions have greatly affected their level of loyalty towards their organiza-
tions (Tkalac Verčič, 2016). The concept of trusting your employers is becoming
a thing of the past. For internal communication, in the organization, this means an
increased need for sincere, two-way communication. High levels of differences in sal-
aries between average employees and top management bring further problems.
Finally, globalization, which has affected how organizations operate in different parts
of the world, means new challenges for internal communication (Erkkila, 2010). Glo-
balization in the marketplace means that internal communication in multicultural
organizations must respect employees’ cultural profiles and adapt the organizational

195
196 ANA TKALAC VERČIČ

messages to effectively communicate with the global employee base (Apud & Apud-
Martinez, 2008). As same authors state “Global organizations that are best able to
reconcile and leverage cultural differences will acquire noticeable advantages in the
marketplace” (para. 3). Additionally, technology which helps bridge geographical dis-
tances and connects markets and organizations brings new issues into the mix (Mitić,
Nikolić, Jankov, Vukonjanski & Terek, 2017). Even though internal communication
has gained importance as a discipline it has “yet to establish a clear raison d’etre.”
(Helsby, 2002, p. 3). To grow, the function needs to establish clearer links with busi-
ness objectives and have a stronger focus on strategy instead of tools (Helsby, 2002).

WHAT DOES INTERNAL COMMUNICATION MEAN?

Communication in organizations represents transfer of information, ideas, attitudes,

and emotions from one person to the other person or group, most often with the
intention of modifying behavior (Bahtijarević-Šiber & Sikavica, 2001). It involves dif-
ferent aspects of receiving and sharing information and in this respect, represents one
of the basic activities of organizational management, significant for organizational
success (George & Jones, 2006; Robbins & Judge, 2007). Communication is an
important element of communication effectiveness (Dickson, Rainey & Hargie, 2003;
Hargie & Tourish, 1993; Robson & Tourish, 2005; Ruck, Welch & Menara, 2017;
Tkalac Verčič, Verčič & Sriramesh, 2012).
Internal communication is repeatedly identified as a part of communication practice
that is growing in significance (Zerfass, Tench, Verhoeven, Verčič & Moreno, 2010;
Welch, 2012). It creates and maintains communication systems between employers
and employees. Communication with employees begins before they join the organiza-
tion and continues after they leave it. Even though the terms employee communica-
tion and internal communication are often used as synonyms, authors have
underlined the difference in scope of those two areas (Tkalac Verčič, Verčič & Srira-
mesh, 2012). Kalla (2005) describes internal communication as an integrated function
of four different disciplines: business communication, organizational communication,
management communication, and corporate communication: “Internal communica-
tion is defined as integrated internal communication, i.e. all formal and informal com-
munication taking place internally at all levels of an organisation” (p. 304). These
four disciplines include not only classical employee relations and the technical corpor-
ate communication function but also efficient knowledge sharing, the creation of
motivation and security, and the development of managersʼ communication skills and
capabilities (Friedl, 2009; Kalla, 2005).
According to Broom and Sha (2013), internal communication has four main pur-
poses. Primarily, it is used to acculturate employees and help them understand the
values of an organization. It is in-charge of helping employees be informed about all
the important news in the organization. Additionally, employee communication
should be used for listening and through that gaining a better understanding of its
employees. Finally, internal communication should be used for fostering interpersonal
communication among employees. Both globalization and new technologies drastic-
ally affect how all of these purposes occur.
Communication should be two-way so that employees can freely participate in the
exchange of information. A Delphi study of European internal communication experts
(Tkalac Verčič, Verčič & Sriramesh, 2012) showed that managers believe that internal
communication should motivate employees and, through this, create value for the
18. INTERNAL COMMUNICATION WITH A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 197

organization. We concluded that internal communication primarily includes an exchange

of information among organizational members in order to create understanding. Further,
we found that globalization has extended the boundaries of organizations beyond
national political borders and thus created a heterogeneous workforce that calls for cross-
cultural communication – a complex process. The definition of internal communication
needs to reflect this reality. Only when cross-cultural parameters of internal communica-
tion are set will it get the recognition as an independent domain that it seeks.

WITHIN WHICH ACADEMIC AREA (AND HOW) IS IT MEASURED?

Empirical research in applied communication shows that internal communication is

one of the five key responsibilities in public relations practice (Lurati, Aldyukhov,
Dixius & Reinhold, 2010; Swerling, Sen, Bonefeste & Rezvan, 2009; Zerfass, Tench,
Verhoeven, Verčič & Moreno, 2010). Internal communication is becoming one of the
most significant areas in corporate communications (Quirke, 2008; Smyth & Mounter,
2008; Wright, 2009). Internal communication experts agreed that management and
psychological theories were most useful in internal communication, with some of
them naming language studies, media studies, and marketing (Tkalac Verčič, Verčič &
Sriramesh, 2012). Most of the respondents stated that internal communication
belongs in communication studies but with a great influence of management and
human resource theories. The methodology of internal communication measurement
therefore stems mostly from these academic disciplines.
Organizations should monitor their internal communication since their success
depends on employees’ abilities to exchange information (Downs & Adrian, 2004). Even
though a lack of communication is not the only reason for organizational problems,
Hargie and Tourish (2002) underline that various organizational difficulties could be
avoided with better organizational communication policies. Globalization underlines this
problem with people from different cultures interacting and exchanging information in
ways not typical for their own culture. This makes it especially important to assess how
well people are communicating internally (Downs & Adrian, 2004).

THE OUTCOMES OF GOOD VERSUS BAD INTERNAL COMMUNICATION

Robson and Tourish (2005) claim there is significant evidence that connects internal com-
munication and a higher chance of organizational success. Hargie and Tourish (2002)
conclude that an increase in internal communication quality brings a series of useful
organizational outcomes. Quinn and Hargie (2004) agree that the key value of good
organizational communication is the relationships organizations have and through that it
is a part of organizational efficiency. Dickson et al. (2003) claim that there are numerous
studies which connect an improvement in communication practices and various positive
organizational outcomes. In their analysis Clampitt and Downs (1993) determine that
good internal communication leads to increased productivity, reduced absenteeism, led
to higher quality of services and products, increased the level of innovation, and resulted
in fewer strikes and thereby a reduction in total expenses for the organization.
Snyder and Morris (1984a) prove that two communication variables – the quality
of communication with superiors and exchange of information with peers – positively
correlated with some measures of total organizational success. On the other hand,
bad organizational communication led to a number of negative consequences. For
example, when people work in isolation or share only a minimum of information,
198 ANA TKALAC VERČIČ

positive change is slowed (Hargie & Tourish, 2002). Hargie and Tourish (2002) also
found that a lower quality of interdepartmental communication creates a feeling of
isolation and dissatisfaction and through that correlates with lower levels of involve-
ment in the process of decision making. This also means that insufficient information
exchange leads to insecurity and increases alienation.
According to Welch (2012), internal communication supports effectiveness with contri-
butions to internal relationships and with improving communication among employees
and senior managers. If successful, internal communication can promote awareness of
threats and opportunities and increase understanding. It can, however, also pose a threat
when communication is poor. As Hargie and Tourish (2002) conclude, the globally com-
petitive economic climate underlines the importance of organizations applying positive
communication policies which will in turn ensure significant competitive benefits.

WHERE DOES INTERNAL COMMUNICATION BELONG IN THE ORGANIZATION?

It seems there is a lot of confusion among top management when it comes to the
position that internal communication should have in the organization. Occasionally it
is perceived only as a messaging service. On the other hand, some see is it as key
change agent that can help organizations with various issues (Helsby, 2002). In organ-
izational practice, there are different versions of internal communication organiza-
tional positioning. Organizations are often confused on which function should “own”
internal communication (Helsby, 2002).
As in scholarship, numerous functions claim internal communication practice such
as human resource management, change management, organizational development,
marketing, management, corporate strategy, public relations, and corporate communi-
cations (Tkalac Verčič, 2016). The position of internal communication within an
organization is determined by the size of the organization, its culture, management
style, financial resources, employee characteristics, organizational expectations, and
changes in the organizational environment. The research by Helsby (2002) indicated
that internal communication is mostly located in communications departments, which
is the preference of most practitioners who believe “that the role can be both disad-
vantaged and under-exploited if it sits in either HR or marketing.” (p. 3). The internal
communication manager can report to the human resources manager, corporate com-
munications manager, or directly to the CEO. However, in practice, there are “few if
any directors of internal communication sitting alongside the other directors in the
boardroom” (Smith & Mounter, 2008, p. 13). Most internal communication practi-
tioners are not awarded management status and report to corporate communications
or (slightly less often) to human resource management.
According to some scholars of marketing, internal communication is a part of
a wider, internal marketing concept, since internal marketing covers all contacts with
internal stakeholders. However, in practice, this is rarely true. Often, internal commu-
nication departments are better informed about customers, than about employees.
Internal communication based on marketing principles should be the key to creating
strong psychological contracts between employees and their organizations and should
be responsible for promoting the brand to internal publics (Sinčić Ćorić & Pološki
Vokić, 2009). Our Delphi study (Tkalac Verčič, Verčič & Sriramesh, 2012) revealed
that European internal communication experts believed in the importance of strong
connections between internal communication departments with human resource man-
agement, marketing, and change management. However, internal communication
18. INTERNAL COMMUNICATION WITH A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 199

should be a part of corporate communication departments, positioned high enough in

the organizational structure, for best organizational results.

WHAT ARE THE KEY CHANNELS OF INTERNAL COMMUNICATION?

Valuable communication depends upon choosing an adequate message and sending it

in formats convenient to employees. Employees have expectations and these will influ-
ence how they evaluate internal communication (Cameron & McCollum, 1993;
Welch, 2012). During the last few years, the environment of internal communication
has significantly changed, mostly under the influence of new technologies. Modern
organizations use a range of channels to reach their internal audiences – from trad-
itional, face-to-face communication to printed publications, electronic media, and
social networks. All internal media – print, electronic, and face-to-face – can be
effective if the media used are considered acceptable and appropriate by employees
(Welch, 2011). Since channels vary in level of complexity, formality, cost, and cap-
acity, it is essential that the organization and its management consider the needs and
preferences of employees, resources, speed of data transfer, sender goals, and message
and receiver characteristics in choosing the best channels to reach internal publics.
Internal communication departments have to modify their communication media to
address messages in different cultures (Apud & Apud-Martinez, 2008). Key factors
for success in multicultural internal communication include professional cultural com-
petence, responsive and proactive circumstantial or environmental perspective, and
understanding of the internal communication media environment (Molleda, 2008).

NEXUS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AND EMPLOYEE

ENGAGEMENT, ORGANIZATIONAL REPUTATION AND EMPLOYER BRANDS

For organizations around the world, their attractiveness, profitability, and future oper-
ations depend on their willingness to put employees first and recognize them as the
most important stakeholders for organizational development (Aggerholm, Andersen
& Thomsen, 2011). This underlines the importance of concepts such as engagement,
reputation, and employer branding.
Engagement is frequently used as the umbrella term that encompasses organizational
efforts to involve stakeholders in organizational activities and decisions. It is also often
interchanged with involvement and dialogue (Lewis, Hamfel & Richardson, 2001).
Internal communication is the key part of organizational context in promoting employee
engagement (Bakker, Albrecht & Leiter, 2011). In public relations, the focus on relation-
ship management has led to using engagement as the new paradigm within which organ-
izations try to integrate, interact, and collaborate, with their stakeholders (Edelman,
2008; Taylor & Kent, 2014; Tkalac Verčič & Pološki Vokić, 2017). Open and effective
communication strategies played an important role in engagement (Welch, 2012).
Communication experts often use engagement as the measure with which they esti-
mate their stakeholder’s experiences in connection with cognitive and behavioral conse-
quences which can help the organization’s bottom line (Jiang, Luo & Kulemeka, 2016).
Engagement is most frequently linked with organizational behavior and studies focused
on employee engagement (Brodie, Hollebeek, Juric & Ilic, 2011; Tkalac Verčič &
Pološki Vokić, 2017). Even though Welch (2011) saw employee engagement being in the
domain of internal communication, the relationship between specific dimensions of
200 ANA TKALAC VERČIČ

internal communication satisfaction and employee engagement is rarely explored

(Tkalac Verčič & Pološki Vokić, 2017; Tkalac Verčič, Verčič & Sriramesh, 2012).
Internal communication has the biggest potential in transferring organizational values
to employees thus engaging them into accepting organizational goals (Bindl & Parker,
2010; Pugh & Dietz, 2008; Wiley, Kowske & Herman, 2010). In modern global organiza-
tions engaged employees represent a competitive advantage (Macey & Schneider, 2008).
Ruck and Welch (2012) have shown how employee engagement depends on robust
internal communication and how organizations which have better internal communica-
tion have a four times higher chance of having engaged employees. We explored this rela-
tionship further (Tkalac Verčič & Pološki Vokić, 2017) and found that internal
communication was one of the bases for employee engagement. Specifically, internal
communication satisfaction was significantly related to, and affected, the level of
employee engagement. So, it seems undeniable that internal communication can increase
engagement through enabling communication perceived as appropriate by employees.
This can only be accomplished with an insight into employee views (Welch, 2012).
When it comes to reputation, most authors agree that it is a combination of the
internal and external perceptions of an organization (Balmer & Gray, 1999; Cheney
& Christensen, 2001; Gummesson, 2002; Tkalac Verčič & Verčič, 2007). Corporate
reputation is important for corporate success (Kay, 2004, according to Martin, 2009).
Some authors believe that reputation is an aggregation of identity and image (Fom-
brun, 1996; Fombrun & van Riel, 1997). From this perspective communication dir-
ected toward internal publics is vital in reputation management (Ahmed & Rafiq,
2002; Tkalac Verčič & Verčič, 2007). The concept of employer brand is also closely
connected to reputation (Ruiz, García & Revilla, 2016), occasionally as a protector of
it (Burke, Martin & Cooper, 2011). Academic research aimed at exploring reputation
and employer brands shows a certain overlap on the conceptual, methodological, and
empirical level (Hendriks, 2016). Exploring the area of corporate reputation and
employer branding is a promising area for public relations research, particularly when
centered on internal communication. If public relations experts decide to claim the
area of reputation management, it is necessary for them to understand how strategic
policies and communications can shape the quality of the different factors that build
reputation (Tkalac Verčič & Sinčić Ćorić, 2018).

GLOBAL INTERNAL COMMUNICATION

Internal communication has additional challenges when examined from a cultural con-
text (Smith, 2013). We have strongly suggested a revised view of what constitutes an
organization (Tkalac Verčič, Verčič & Sriramesh, 2012). The view of the world as
a global village suggests that both boundaries and characteristics of organizations are
changing. This new order implies an increasingly cross-national and cross-cultural
internal communication department. This is why the discussion on the impact of culture
on internal communication is ever more important. New technologies add to this com-
plexity in which global communication has to be consistent internally and externally
(Gură u, 2008). Various structural decisions have an impact on the way internal commu-
nication is managed and coordinated (Neill & Jiang, 2017). On the other side, internal
communication departments across the world are quite similar. They all strive to commu-
nicate the organization’s culture, vision and mission to their employees, and facilitate
communication between management and employees by opening lines of communication
(Apud & Apud-Martinez, 2008). However, cultural differences do play a significant role
18. INTERNAL COMMUNICATION WITH A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 201

in how those internal communication departments are managed (Neill & Jiang, 2017),
since patterns in message coding, perception, and response types are culturally bound.
Cross-cultural awareness can be developed through expanding it from
a monocultural team to a cross-cultural internal communication council with repre-
sentatives from organizations key regions. This approach is more effective in multicul-
tural organizations through translating the message by meaning instead of translating
it by language (Apud & Apud-Martinez, 2008).
In an increasingly globalized world it is quite easy to make a mistake of inter-
acting and communicating with all cultures the same way (Sriramesh & Verčič,
2009). For instance, the role of language (Louhiala-Salminen & Kankaanranta,
2012) is vital for the functioning of an organization and its internal communica-
tion department. To successfully manage internal communication in different cul-
tural contexts it seems necessary to recognize cultural diversity without judging
it and to try and avoid cultural blindness which ignores differences among cul-
tural identities (Adler, 2002). But the relationship fostered by the internal com-
munication department should build a strong bond with all employees across
transnational environments (Neill & Jiang, 2017).

The key to effective cross-cultural internal communication is to develop cross-cultural com-

petence within the internal communication department, to make the team aware of the
effect of culture on their work and to ultimately develop knowledge and skills designed spe-
cifically for an internal multicultural communication team. (Apud & Apud-Martinez, 2008)

Understanding internal communication in an organization includes understanding its

culture (Broom & Sha, 2013). Sriramesh and Verčič state “communication influences
and is influenced by culture” (2009, p. 9). In the same way, internal communication is
inseparable from culture. Internal communication definitely has the potential to
spread to all parts of organizations. Its responsibility is increasing with the number of
messages employees have to process. It can only grow through building skills which
help in consulting the top management. Through this internal communication has an
opportunity to become a strategic business discipline (Helsby, 2002). However, it is
necessary for internal communication professionals to conquer the challenge of serv-
ing multifaceted communication needs in increasingly complex organizations and
among very diverse employees (Welch, 2012). “In a way, internal communication
departments can become the driver for harnessing the power of cultural synergy
within a global corporation” (Apud & Apud-Martinez, 2008).

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 CHAPTER

19
Global Interdependence and Risks
Management and Communication

Robert L. Heath

Risk management and communication are timeless aspects of human existence, and
therefore have become increasingly relevant to global interdependence. Groups’ (bands
and tribes) abilities to identify, avoid, or mitigate risks historically accounted for their
resilient survival and prosperity. The history of humans is one of dealing with each
other, as interests collide and relationships flounder over what constitutes risk and how
it should influence individual and collective behavior (Heath & McComas, 2015). His-
torically, survival has often depended on the ability to identify and respond strategically
to dangerous animals, climate effects, bacteria, and viruses. Some dangerous animals
were also a source of food, but killing them often required skill and teamwork. Because
of their biological nature and extended contact with children who lack sufficient risk
defenses, women were often at high risk. Changes in weather (climate even) could pro-
duce abundance or starvation. Travel, especially migration, could be dangerous because
bands and tribes encountered were not necessarily willing to share resources. Even if
a new group was welcomed, it could fall into a trap.
For these essential reasons, culture, as defined and discussed in the first part of this
volume, is risk-centric. Through cultural transmission, humans have used narratives
to hand survival lore on to subsequent generations. Elders told tales of great hunters,
great hunts, and skilled offensive and defensive strategies needed to be safe. Those
moves became part of the stories that offered instructional narratives for subsequent
generations to follow. Elders told tales of “others” to warn listeners about them or to
be alert to seek them as allies. Group narratives developed to specify which clans
could marry into which other clans so as to avoid inbreeding. Whether to create
ordered, normative behavior or explain existence, narratives have long accounted for

205
206 ROBERT L. HEATH

the unknown, the spiritual. Origin stories were not matters of fantasy or curiosity,
but of risk management. They were normative, and helped people to know as best
they could the forces of uncertainty. They addressed not only origin, but afterlife.
Stories described virtues useful for personal and group survival. Great heroes and
heroines served the group, but often asked for loyalty in return. Places such as reli-
gious centers (churches and temples) were set aside for cultural instruction.
This introduction based on details about early human existence sets up the discussion
of modern global risk interdependence because what was featured above (even in pre-
history) is not different in nature and purpose from today except in scope. As discussed
in the introduction to this volume and in Part I, humans are far more interdependent
and interpenetrating today than they were when they painted cave ceilings in what is
today’s northern Spain and southern France. As a band, they might stand threateningly
at the bank of their side of a river in prehistory to scare away intruders. Today, simi-
larly, the regime in North Korea says, “We will be taken seriously. We will test weapons.
We learned by example that shows of weakness and willingness to denuclearize lead to
regime change.” When immigrants entered the United States in the late nineteenth and
up to the mid-twentieth century at Ellis Island in New York, medical screening sorted
the healthy ones who were let into the country from the unhealthy who were sent back.
Books such as 1491 (Mann, 2011, see also, 2012) describe the cultures of indigenous
peoples in the Americas before they were interrupted and even destroyed by explorers
from Europe. However problematic global risk management and communication had
been before the great age of European exploration, it dramatically changed the dynam-
ics of global interdependence. Even before that sequence of events, there had been cen-
turies of regional contact, exploration, trade, disease exchanges, war, shared invention,
and utter destruction. As is demonstrated by trans-boundary terrorism, global trans-
mission of disease, or migration of organisms that harm food production (such as that
which affects banana production), risk is a global matter.
So, global issues of risk management and communication are timeless and relevant to
today. To help us understand these matters, this chapter draws on discussions of the nature
of risk management and communication that feature four major streams of risk analysis.
Using this discussion of risk, the chapter features risk management and communication as
public relations challenges and uses three risk cases to demonstrate the operant interpene-
trations of uncertainties, harms, interests, and well-being. Researchers over the past six
decades have developed and used these analytical means to investigate the dynamics and
dimensions of global risk in the attempt to help people to be safer and healthier.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE DYNAMICS AND DIMENSIONS OF RISK

Peoples are globally interdependent (interpenetrating) and variously at risk often by what
some do in the presence of others and to one another. As always, some risks are created
by others (e.g., terrorism); some are self-inflicted (e.g., substance abuse). Risk is always
about uncertainty, the predictability of risk manifestation, magnitude of harm (or bene-
fit), and the effect on those that are harmed. Risks are often asymmetrical. What benefits
some may harm others, or others may be blamed for harms that befall some. Risk assess-
ment is variously pragmatic and moral. What is done (by some or many) to understand
risk, mitigate risk, or amplify risk – that is a matter of pragmatic risk functionality. Is
risk evenly distributed across communities, do benefits balance or offset harms, and are
parties responsible for risks accommodative and engaged with others in ways that
advance fully functioning societies? That is the moral dimension.
19. GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE AND RISKS 207

On this latter point, analysis presented in this chapter reasons that the ability of
societies to understand, manage, and communicate about risk is indivisible from their
ability to function fully (Heath, 2006; Heath & O’Hair, 2009). The quality of commu-
nity, and society, is inseparable from individuals’ ability to address, mitigate, benefit
from, and engage one another over citizens’ right to safety, health, equal treatment
and benefit, and environmental quality (Heath & Palenchar, 2009). Such matters are
timeless discussions of science-based pragmatism, coupled to morality: Religion, spir-
ituality, and risk democracy.
Traditionally, discussions of risk management and communication acknowledge
how these matters are multi-dimensional, multi-layered, polyvocal, and multi-textual.
That principle is featured in the three cases below which analyze global interdepend-
ency and champion the need for collaborative engagement. To elaborate, many illus-
trations can be used to emphasize risk multi-dimensionality. Cancer treatment,
including surgery, can subject the human body to extreme exposure to toxic chemicals
and radiation which may heal or only prolong suffering. Many factors/dimensions
lead to and result from complex interactions in such diagnosis, treatment, and eti-
ology, as well as communication about such matters and the concomitant efforts to
make enlightened choices. And, the cause of the cancer can be exposure to harmful
substances (such as asbestos spikes, chemicals in tobacco, and viruses encountered
through sexual contact).
As such, risk management and communication address core issues regardless of the
kind of risk, conditions that foster or mitigate it, or contexts in which it occurs. One
issue centers on how safe is safe (Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs,
1978). That universal question demands that sound science and moral philosophy are
needed to determine the likelihood that a risk event will occur, under what conditions,
to affect what populations, and in what ways that satisfy or offend moral preferences.
Is driving 20 mph in a school zone (while not being distracted) sufficiently cautious
to keep from harming a child, for instance? If a population is assured that some
chemical or GMO will cause “acceptable” risks, how truly “acceptable is acceptable?”
That guideline presumes that absolute safety is unlikely and therefore sufficient (rela-
tive and precautionary) safety is the rule.
Of related interest is the question: How fair is safe (Rayner & Cantor, 1987)? The gist
of that question is complex, including the matter of whether the rewards of risk are
greater than the harms (e.g., motherhood and chemical manufacturing). Another per-
spective of fairness is whether some population is harmed by a risk or whether the stand-
ard of safety is skewed (biased) against a population by factors such as race, gender, age,
or income – or a combination of all. Some risks are naturally skewed in terms of fairness,
such as by gender or age. The young and the old are often more easily harmed than
other populations. Women incur risks of childbirth quite differently than men.
Before turning to the discussion of the four dominant streams of risk management and
communication theory, two points need to be made. The first is particularly relevant to
the past three decades of public relations and risk communication research. This point
grows out of, and refines, the preference for symmetrical, dialogic (rather than mono-
logic), two-way communication. Risk discourse is better when it is dialogic and two-way
or multi-way (multi-vocal, multi-textual). However, very effective risk communication can
be one-way, even prescriptive and threatening (including the imposition of law such as
requiring pet owners to vaccinate pets and quarantine sick ones). One-way communica-
tion, for instance, is best when residents are strategically told to evacuate or to shelter-in-
place as a hurricane or typhoon approaches. Community response efficacy depends on
208 ROBERT L. HEATH

people’s knowing what response to a risk’s manifestation is correct/preferred and what

signal triggers the preferred response (such as a siren, weather alert, or telephone/online
alert to shelter-in-place). When severe weather threatens, a city’s mayor may tell citizens to
evacuate and warn those who do not do so to write their social security or driver’s license
number on their arm so their body can be identified. If a chemical release occurs in
a community with major petrochemical facilities, local citizens are instructed to shelter-in-
place. In Australia, apps allow one swimmer (or bystander) to alert others virtually in real
time when a white shark has been spotted, for instance. All of this communication option
avoids having to debate what might be the best response when an event is upon us.
Second, the quality of risk communication is measured in many ways, but one of the
most important is the extent to which such communication increases (before, during, and
after an event) response efficacy. Response efficacy (a sense that knowing and doing the
right action to be safe) is likely to increase in direct proportion to expert efficacy (judg-
ment of experts), individual efficacy (knowing what to do and being able to do it), and
community efficacy (knowing how the community is supposed to respond and trusting
that will happen). Roberto et al. (2009) summarized insights into the extended parallel
process model which reasons that efficacy mitigates dysfunctional communication, assess-
ment, and response. Industries that create risks (and by extrapolation communities where
risks occur and from which they may benefit) gain legitimacy to the extent that risk gen-
erators are known to engage in reflective management, build trust, and use pre-crisis
communication to increase community response efficacy (Heath & Lee, 2016).
Relationships in risk management and communication are highly complex, multi-
dimensional, and multi-layered. One relationship factor identified by Kasperson (1992,
1988)) focuses on how a risk becomes amplified by media coverage, by what media and
reporters/commentators say, how much it is covered, and how it is cross-covered. Simi-
lar concerns exist when communicating across international borders or across cultures
(Kasperson, & Stallen, 1991). Borders and cultures bring up questions regarding
(safety/fairness) in regard to the levels of risk tolerance, the attitudes toward risk cost/
reward ratios, and which population are harmed or benefited. If people on one side of
a national border benefit from the industrial use of a river’s water, they may evaluate
the risk and communicate about it differently than people across the border who
happen to be downstream and may suffer contamination. Not only does the latter
group not enjoy any of the benefits that accrue to those upstream, but they may suffer
the harms. A classic example of this cost/reward imbalance occurred centuries ago;
bodies of plague victims often were placed in rivers, thereby passing the risk to citizens
living downstream. Cross-border conflict can lead to hostilities – or aligned interests
and coordinated decision making.
Risk management and communication relationships presuppose that how they are
modeled cannot be limited to a one-organization/one-public relationship. The modeled
relationship is better defined as multi-stakeholder and multi-stake-seeker. Stakes are
rewards and other resources that are held or sought as empowering. So, each organiza-
tion has many relationships – those with its stakeholders/stake-seekers (Ss). They in turn
have their own complex relationships, and so forth. It is best to presume multiple organ-
izations (Os). Thus, and this is imperative for global risk issues, the model is best stated
as OsSsRs: multiple organizations, with multiple stakeholders/seekers, with multiple rela-
tionships (Heath, 2013). This may be best explained in terms of the complex relationships
and global interdependencies of the World Health Organization.
By combing these factors, a model of risk governance can be imagined (Fra Paleo,
2015), which necessarily presumes a global perspective. Risks, their benefits and harms,
19. GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE AND RISKS 209

affect people with indifference to national/state boundaries. The key is to focus on inter-
ests, rather than borders, as interests can stop at, or cross, borders. If we assume that
stakeholding is related to interests, we can affirm that stakes (whether powerful or triv-
ial) can be, and are, employed as expressions of interests. Thus, in the case of Ebola,
people within communities and across boundaries had co-defined interests, stakes, and
competing as well as compatible approaches to risk governance. Cultures, communica-
tion, and risk management traditions, concerns, reflective management, and response
efficacy all come to the fore when interests collide and people collaborate in the face of
risk manifestation.
As organizational and textual layers, how well do the parties involved in the risk gov-
ernance of Ebola work together to minimize individual, group, national, and cross-
border risks? Is the governance effort to manage the issues related to the risks such
that communities work together or fight with one another? Do communication prac-
tices socially amplify risks, or set them in proper proportion based on sound science,
moral/cultural judgement regarding the dramaturgical relationship between risk bearers,
bearers’ advocates, generators, arbiters, and informers (Palmlund, 1992, 2009)?
One way to conceptually bring these dimensions of risk management and communi-
cation into perspective is to understand the cross-model implications of four approaches
to global interdependence.

FOUR PARADIGMS: STREAMS OF THE DISCIPLINE

With little direct coordination and without a single theoretical focus, four paradigms
emerged over recent decades to give scope and purpose to the study and implementa-
tion of risk management and communication. These discussions originated in response
to iconic events and key challenges, whether for instance the methyl isocyanate (MIC)
release in Bhopal, India, or the near disaster at the nuclear generating facility at Three
Mile Island in Pennsylvania, or at the Fukushima Daiichi facility. Even global impact
epidemics originate with local focus, and only become matters of global interest once
important populations or major countries/economies are threatened; SARS, Ebola,
AIDS, and malaria have long had global health implications as Zika is having today.
Such health problems occur at international and local levels. Locally, Zika is associated
with health experiences (standing water and no screens on windows) of poor people
but it also migrates on the wings of mosquitoes. Global risk occurs when local risks are
elevated by and become global risks.
Each of the dominant four research orientations is affected by key factors of one
another. The four are interdependent, but each features a unique set of variables and
concerns. Each is influenced by dialogic and discursive approaches to the co-creation
of meaning relevant to the principle of deliberative democracy. The overarching chal-
lenge is to build communication infrastructures that are sufficiently robust and collab-
orative to achieve maximal individual, expert, and community efficacy.

Psychodemographic Assessments/Preferences

This paradigm of risk studies grew out of psychological and sociological assessment
of the factors that affect individuals’ (or groups’) risk assessment and raise or lower
their risk tolerance. Typical of such research, Fischhoff et al. (1978; see also, Slovic,
1987) found that experts base their risk perspectives on science-based probabilities of
harm, even fatality, while lay people’s evaluations are based more on the perceived
210 ROBERT L. HEATH

characteristics of the hazard. One demographic characteristic is that women tend to

be less risk tolerant than men especially when a risk is based on exposure to
a technology (such as chemicals or radiation) and/or related to children’s health and
safety. Long lists of risk assessment factors came from such analysis, including the
perceived degree of control (personal or expert), the affected population (including
children, the elderly, and even animals), and whether the risk impact is slow in devel-
oping (such as cancer) or its onset is more rapid (such as exposure to a deadly virus
such as Ebola – four to six days).
This paradigm explains risk perception preferences, including fairness. As much as this
approach discusses biases as to what types of individuals think about risks, it also focuses
attention on how biased assessments confound risk management and communication. For
instance, elites often think that what affects them is serious, but what affects poor people,
and especially those that are poor and of color (for instance) is less serious. Recent events,
assessments, and mitigations in Flint, Michigan regarding lead levels in drinking water
demonstrate such dysfunctional bias. The Flint case resulted from decisions by Michigan
state officials. To save money, they switched city domestic water sources to the Flint River.
Previously, Flint’s water had come from Detroit which obtained it from Lake Huron. The
Flint River is notorious for its lack of cleanliness. The switch occurred in 2014, and by
2016, high levels of corrosiveness were detected by industrial facilities such as General
Motors (Flint River water is highly corrosive) and by public health officials. By a series of
official mistakes and misjudgments, citizens drank contaminated water. The water caused
lead in pipes to make its way to citizens. A local physician, Mona Hanna-Attisha dis-
covered elevated levels of lead, especially in children. Flint’s population believed it was not
well served by state officials because it is primarily poor and African-American.

Sound Science Paradigm

Medical and epidemiological research attempts to identify the root causes of risk occur-
rence, affected populations, conditions of amplification and mitigation, and such. The
mental models approach (MMA) presumes that sound science creates a decision plat-
form based on unbiased, scientific assessments of the causes, effects, and mitigations of
specific types of risk. Morgan et al. (2002) offered one of the most insightful explanations
of this paradigm. It starts with scientific assessment of a risk’s likelihood, and then
extends analysis to the cause, impact, and the most responsible response to risk. It uses
science to define the level of risk, the entities most likely to be benefited or harmed, and
what should be done, by whom, and in what way to mitigate and/or prevent risk or its
impact. The starting point for risk communication, according to this paradigm, is to seek
to understand what experts think and then to use facts and reasoning to move the assess-
ments of targeted populations to concur with judgments based on sound science.

Critical Risk Assessment and Communication Paradigm

Anthropologist Douglas (1992) noted that cultural biases affect risk assessment, manage-
ment, and communication not out of ignorance but as matters of personal empowerment.
By the dawn of the twenty-first century, Beck (1992) could argue that modern society
had become a risk society, especially addressing how people were increasingly exposed
to technical risks associated with capitalistic industry. Douglas, Beck and Rayner
(e.g., Tansey & Raymer, 2009) have argued that people’s perceptions and value judg-
ments cannot be slighted in the assessment, management, and communication of risk.
19. GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE AND RISKS 211

This critical perspective reasons that cultures change as people (especially elites) see
advantages to themselves and to society through dramatic changes, such as industrial-
ism. So, one culture argues that the benefits of industrialism are such that they justify
the risks, especially since those risks are born by lower income people, who may be
migrants and/or minorities such as people of color. Without rejecting the role of sci-
ence, the critical perspective seeks to peel back layers of accommodative culture to ask
whose science and whose interests are driving risk assessment, management, and com-
munication. Thus, for years (and even at times currently) miners in the USA were told
that companies did not compensate workers for health damage, bodily harm, or death
because they knew the risks when they agreed to join this dangerous work for pay.
Similarly, around the globe, workers in high-risk contexts are exploited, and even
enslaved to serve others’ economic benefits. As much as critics condemn such cultural
exploitation, it is predictable that cultures develop strategies to pay respect, even
homage, to workers who risk their health and lives to provide for their families and to
the economy. Soldiers are given medals. Mothers are given a day of honor. Hegemonies
twist and turn in strange ways as communities critically critique and adjust to risk.

INFRASTRUCTURAL RISK MANAGEMENT AND COMMUNICATION PARADIGM

This paradigm seeks to embrace and integrate the other paradigms. It champions the
role of discourse and places/arenas (physical and metaphorical) where assessment, man-
agement, and communication practices and obligations are discussed as matters of risk
governance (see Heath & O’Hair, 2009; McComas, 2014; Renn, 2009, 2014). Terms such
as transparency, authenticity, reflection, and respect become important to the viability of
infrastructures. This paradigm favors dialogic, discursive forces that lead to effective fact-
vetting and decision-making institutions and co-created meanings that arise from risk
democracy. In association, voices of various experts and policy makers along with indi-
vidual risk bearers must be brought together to create systems and forge shared perspec-
tives that appropriately assess, mitigate, and respond to risks that may be unevenly borne
throughout any community or larger society. This paradigm reasons that individual,
expert, and community efficacy are focal points for determining whether a community is
properly organized to plan and communicate about various risks in ways that make it
resilient. Public hearings are essential. Community input is imperative. This model pre-
sumes that experts, community leaders, and concerned citizens need places and means by
which to achieve wise assessments, policies, and actions regarding risks.
As much as it would seem that these four paradigms, based on substantial amounts of
research and theoretical investigation, could inform successful global risk management and
communication, they also point to the exact places, factors, and interests that lead to fail-
ure. To further explore those paradoxes, and to emphasize the multi-dimensionality, multi-
layeredness, polyvocal nature, and multi-textuality of risks, the next section focuses on
three trans-national cases: Climate Change, Public Health, and Chemical Risk Exposure.

THREE GLOBAL CASES: CLIMATE CHANGE, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND RISK

EXPOSURE

Climate Change

Discussions of climate change began by observation (expert and lay-public), data gather-
ing, and policy recommendation. That’s the process, but perception/assessment, culture,
212 ROBERT L. HEATH

interests, and infrastructures become supportive and confounding factors. Matters

regarding the nature, extent, causes, and impact of global warming are not only a matter
of scientific inquiry, but heavily connected to industrial processes and reputations, mar-
keting, politics (layered from global to community levels), and fraught with cultural
implications. Such implications become layered when companies (certainly industries)
have more wealth and power than countries and peoples who may contribute to, but also
suffer from, the greatest amount of climate change impact.
Texts of such matters become a tangle of scientific jargon and methodologies, data
gathering capabilities, credibility, concurrence, complex probabilistic analysis, and power/
knowledge influences. Competing texts can attribute climate change causes to developing
nations, sovereignty, profitability, and even cultural/religious interpretations. As such,
rising temperatures can be judged to be the result of CO2 (resulting from human activ-
ities), industrial/non-industrial sources, natural sources, related matters – such as defor-
estation, and even the will of God.
In the case of climate change, then, voices present texts based on science, that counter
science, and even denigrate it. Texts claim that conclusions (scientific and non-scientific)
regarding climate change are based on hoax, anti-industrial critiques, advocacy for alter-
native fuel (solar and natural gas versus coal), bad-science, agenda-science, and on and
on. Industrial interests claim that climate science kills jobs. Critics of science point out
that it is based on probabilistic assessment of data (which can be generated to prove
a point) rather than precise assessment of causality. Politically, the root cause is actions
by “others,” but the harms of mitigation fall on “us.” International trade is a key text
that leads to blame-placing and argument ground-shifting.
In the absence of overarching scientific and public policy (government and quasi-
governmental agencies) organizations, individual countries, and key members of the sci-
entific community have advocated the development of alliances as infrastructures. In lieu
of other global coordination on climate change, the United Nations seeks to exert leader-
ship direction and coordination. This action was a partial confirmation of the Kyoto
Protocol of 1997 which was partially enacted in 2005 to set emission limit standards. Fail-
ure to participate, agree, and meet the standards was governed more by national will
than penalties (stakes) for ignoring or flaunting the agreement.
Next, the Copenhagen Agreement called delegates to the 15th session of the Confer-
ence of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to
Paris in 2015. Merely participating in this discussion was challenged, and politicized.
Critics assured that the outcomes were not binding and did not commit participating
countries to specific actions. In Paris, 197 countries agreed to standards that could abate
greenhouse gases, such as holding the increase of average temperature to below 2 degree
C rise above pre-industrial levels. As of October 2017, 168 of the 197 signatories had rati-
fied the Paris protocol with the United States famously withdrawing from it under an
administration that avowedly is against globalization.
The integration of such layered efforts is limited by national (industry within and
across nations) pressures to appear more agreeable than is likely the case. Political wran-
gles occur within nations which invariably compromise global efforts to understand and
abate climate change. Large corporations, primarily those based on hydrocarbons, play
a vital role, and they are global in their presence and effect.
Of the paradigms noted above, all offer insights into the struggles of risk manage-
ment and communication on climate change. Science points out how interdependent
and layered events and processes add to global temperatures and CO2 totals and aver-
ages. As science wrestles with the multi-dimensionality of the factors that are alleged
19. GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE AND RISKS 213

to warm the climate, so too textuality is multi-dimensional and multi-layered. It is the

product of many voices in varying degrees of discord as to cause, effect, liability, and
corrective policy. Textuality offers a grand example of the challenges of risk govern-
ance which test the limits of language to parse the twists and turns of cause, effect,
and responsibility.
Global risk management and communication currently have no better example of the
discourse processes and normative functions of management and communication than
that of climate change. People within and across boundaries perceive and attribute the
nature of the problem and its causes differently. Rich nations see their economic pros-
perity to be in peril if harsh measures are agreed to and implemented. Rich countries
and global industries generate the most debate by contesting the accuracy of the data
and its probabilistic implications. Poor nations lack scientific data, power/knowledge
influence, but often have more moral discourse appeals. For instance, it is expected that
eleven low-lying islands in the South Pacific might disappear because of rising sea
levels. Also, coastal residents, many of whom depend on the seas, are likely to suffer
because of rising sea levels, as are many species and corals because of warming of
oceans. Critical assessments as well as scientific debates look for infrastructures of risk
governance, which are tentative at best and substantially fragile to the task of bringing
sound science to public policy.

Public Health (Bacteria and Virus)

In recent years, attention continues to focus on public health challenges such as mal-
aria, which are prehistoric. Risk harms disproportionately accrue to poor, darker
skinned humans, and to animals (such as chickens) on which they rely for sustenance.
At the global level, the World Health Organization is one of the key players, as are
several foundations, NGOs, and even nations that are not directly affected. However, in
such matters, industrial activity often gives rich nations incentives to do more for
public health in poor nations than simple charity would suggest. For instance, diseases
in Africa (Ebola, malaria, Marburg hemorrhagic fever), in rural China and other Asian
regions (SARS, swine flu, and avian flu), and elsewhere affect commercial processes.
For instance, employees and their families in the oil and gas industry are exposed as
they live in, and travel to and from, African nations. Respiratory diseases can travel
across the globe at the speed of jet flights and affect national and local public health
resources. A person who became infected with SARS at a wedding reception in
Hong Kong traveled to Canada, thereby infecting a new region. One irony of such risk
management responses is the fact that government officials (as Governor Christie did
when he quarantined a nurse who had worked with Ebola patients) and the general
population stigmatized Canadian health providers who worked with SARS patients and
then could not acquire childcare which was needed to allow them to work.
Many national health policy groups (such as the U.S. Centers for Disease Control,
Health Canada – Global Public Health Intelligence Network), foundations, and NGOs
monitor bacterial and viral infections, study them, develop containment protocols,
refine diagnostic techniques and protocols, and seek cures. As discussed above, some of
these diseases fit well into the perceptual/psychodemographic profile. They may dispro-
portionately harm children and older people. They even affect health workers which
leads to tensions regarding how those workers need to behave, whether they should be
quarantined, for instance, and what protocols and protective gear are needed for safe
contact with victims. Battles over Ebola quarantine protocols occurred in the US when
214 ROBERT L. HEATH

two health care workers became infected while attending patients. Some were required
to quarantine when they returned to the USA after providing medical care – a matter
that became a political hot potato when government officials differed with the medical
community on safety procedures.

Risk Exposure (toxic and Hazardous Chemical/Manufacturing Processes)

The modern era of chemical risk monitoring and management began with the MIC
release in Bhopal, India, in 1984. Union Carbide India Limited was a subsidiary of
the principal based in the USA. The reason for the release is contested ranging from
slack management and poor maintenance of storage facilities, poor training of local
staff about the risks in storing the toxic chemicals, to sabotage. Risk assessment
experts claimed that the manufacturing process used for holding manufactured MIC
prior to using it for canned pesticides was unsafe. Because that same process was
used in communities in Texas and West Virginia, a chemical exposure risk came
home to roost. Such events led activists to lobby for the Risk Management Plan
(RMP) which required chemical manufacturers (individual plants and clusters of
plants) to create and report worst case scenarios.
That led to the creation of the Responsible Care effort (first adopted in Canada,
then imported to the USA and now used across the globe by company members of
the trade association, American Chemistry Council) by which improved operating
and communication standards were developed and implemented to protect industry
from severe regulation and communities from exposure to harmful chemicals. Com-
munities had the right to know which chemicals were stored and transported near
residents. The chemical manufacturing industry developed material data safety sheets
(MSDS) that reported the name, nature, precautions, and exposure responses to spe-
cific chemicals. Such sheets were used locally and globally as a means for standardiz-
ing chemical warnings that could guide, for instance, emergency response efforts.
Shipments of chemical include such sheets. Each cargo vessel, for instance, is labeled
to alert emergency responders as to what chemicals were contained in it. Since these
sheets include handling and response protocols, emergency response teams anywhere
in the world can know how to respond in the safest manner. Such codes were placed
on trucks and train cars that transport chemicals so that first-responders could easily
identify the chemicals being hauled in the event of an accident, spill, or explosion.
MSDS’s have been communication battlegrounds if first-responders or citizens
allege that they were unclear or misleading. The industry worried that they could be
used in litigation as an a priori acknowledgement of responsibility. Activist groups
obtained MSDS forms and uncovered reports of chemicals manufactured in specific
locations. In the USA, they posted the chemicals by zip code; thus, concerned citizens
could use computers to learn about the chemicals that were manufactured, stored,
and transported in their communities.
Because most chemical manufacturing companies are headquartered and/or operate
in the USA, and in Europe, but also operate in the rest of the world, protocols devel-
oped in the USA spread across the globe. As these protocols developed in the USA,
they were applauded as risk democracy, communities’ right to know, ask questions,
and voice concerns. Nerdy engineers and safety experts of the U.S. Chemical Safety
and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) are charged with investigating fires, explo-
sions, and other releases of chemicals. Investigations are designed to identify and
remediate engineering, manufacturing, and operating flaws in the name of increased
19. GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE AND RISKS 215

safety. Reports by such investigative boards (replicated around the globe) are intended
to protect the safety and health of people and other living things.
Such boards are part of, and create, infrastructures where risks are investigated and
policies are improved. They apply sound science in their investigations, but are cogni-
zant of the psychodemographic sensitivities that are relevant to risk event mitigation.
For instance, they recognize the importance of community emergency response proto-
cols that educate children, parents, and school officials on shelter-in-place procedures.
Communities where chemical manufacturing occurs understands that zero risk man-
agement is unlikely so safety response protocols are needed. That judgment is sensi-
tive to the critical approach to risk assessment, management, and communication.
In such communities, public meetings are routinely scheduled and conducted in
ways that require plant facility managers and their safety experts to report on inci-
dents, note the root causes of such incidents, the corrective measures taken, and the
response protocols implemented. However cynical one may be, reflecting critical and
cultural approaches to risk management and communication, these citizen advisory
meetings are clearly implemented in the spirit of risk democracy and aligned-interest
risk governance.

CONCLUSIONS

Over the past 60 years (largely starting with worries about atomic energy and asbestos)
substantial amounts of sound science, critical judgment, sensitivity to lay publics’ idio-
syncratic assessment, and commitment to fully functioning risk communication infra-
structures have occurred. Such matters press into an unholy alliance, progress, profit,
safety, and critical hostility that calls for ever higher standards of corporate social
responsibility. During such battles, issues are debated to address how safe is safe, and
how fair is safe. Litigation, legislation, and regulation battles often demonstrate how
misaligned interests can be. But through reflective communication practices and man-
agement philosophies, safety remains important in a world that can seem troublingly
unsafe. That point, in this context, ignores other topics such as asymmetrical war, inva-
sion, terrorism, technologies, genetically modified organizations, drought, starvation,
and myriad other risks to public health.
As is often the case, matters of clarity, credibility and understanding are particu-
larly important criteria for the judgment of qualitatively better or inferior risk man-
agement and communication. However, outcomes are also vital sources of criteria.
Safety and well-being are two. Others include efficacy: individual, expert, community,
and response. Another criterion is resilience, the will and ability to recover from the
impact of a risk occurrence.

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 CHAPTER

20
Global Crisis Communication

W. Timothy Coombs
An-Sofie Claeys

INTRODUCTION

The past decades there has been an increasing interest within the field of public
relations in crisis communication. This research interest has led to the develop-
ment of theories such as Image Repair Theory (Benoit, 1995) and Situational
Crisis Communication Theory (Coombs, 2007). These theories have received broad
recognition and inspired a large amount of empirical studies worldwide (Avery,
Lariscy, Kim, & Hocke, 2010). However, most of the research that led to these
theories and resulted from them is rooted in the United States (Luoma-aho,
Moreno, & Verhoeven, 2017). Those studies that do apply these theories elsewhere
are usually situated in other Western cultures. Several researchers have therefore
argued that more research is needed to examine whether or not the crisis commu-
nication guidelines and strategies from these theories are applicable to non-
Western, for instance Asian, societies (e.g., Huang, Wu, & Cheng, 2016; Lee, 2004;
Lyu, 2012).
Given the need for more insight regarding the global effects of crises and crisis
communication, this chapter offers a brief review of crisis communication research in
the United States, Europe, and Asia. This allows us to examine how the research
domain has developed in each region and what differences in crisis communication
and the impact of crises have been established so far. Based on this overview, we can
conclude which elements need to be taken into account when attempting to apply
crisis communication theories globally. However, more research is needed because

217
218 W. TIMOTHY COOMBS AND AN-SOFIE CLAEYS

existing global crisis communication research sometimes lacks nuance. Therefore, we

will offer suggestions for both theory and practice with regard to global crisis
communication.

CRISIS COMMUNICATION IN THE U.S.

Crisis communication began to emerge as an identifiable sub-field of public relations

in the 1980s. This is when practitioners and academic researchers began writing and
talking about crisis communication consistently. The early writings were basically lists
of what to do and what not to do in a crisis. In the 1990s, theories for crisis commu-
nication began to emerge (Coombs, 2014). The U.S. crisis communication literature
has been dominated by Image Repair/Restoration Theory (IRT) and Situational
Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT). These theories serve as the guides for the
review of U.S. crisis communication research.
Both theories are organizational-centric in that they consider how managers in
organizations can, and should, use communication during a crisis. Furthermore, the
outcomes used to assess effectiveness are related to organizational concerns such as
reputation and purchase intention. IRT evolved primarily from work in rhetoric
mixed with research from account analysis. The list of crisis response strategies identi-
fied in IRT is still the most comprehensive and thoughtful in crisis communication.
IRT holds that communication is goal directed and a primary goal in a crisis is to
protect the organization’s reputation. Moreover, there is only a need to engage is
crisis communication when there is an unfavorable situation (crisis) and the organiza-
tion is held responsible for that situation (Benoit, 1995).
People often confuse being organizational-centric with a sender perspective but the
two are not isomorphic. IRT does have a sender perspective with a focus on manage-
ment communicating to stakeholders. IRT relies heavily upon rhetorical case studies
to identify how crisis response strategies were used and to speculate on the effects of
those crisis response strategies on the organization and its stakeholders (e.g., Brinson
& Benoit, 1999).
SCCT draws upon the crisis response strategies of IRT but is driven by Attribution
Theory, hence is a cognitive-based approach to crisis communication rather than
a rhetorical approach. SCCT is concerned with the cognitions and emotions gener-
ated by crisis situations and how crisis communication can both affect and be affected
by those cognitions and emotions. Attributions of crisis responsibility are the cogni-
tions at the core of SCCT. The amount of responsibility stakeholders attribute to an
organization affects stakeholder perceptions of the organization (reputation), behav-
iors toward the organization, affect toward the organization, and which crisis
response strategies should be most effective in that crisis situation (Coombs, 2007).
While centering on the organizational response, SCCT is guided by how stakeholders
(the receivers) are interpreting the crisis and crisis communication rather than being
focused on the sender’s perspective. For instance, SCCT holds that crises are a result
of stakeholder perceptions and the theory attempts to understand how stakeholders
react to crisis communication efforts.
SCCT’s cognitive orientation is the reason the research is predominantly experi-
mental. Various studies have sought to verify if key variables in SCCT are related as
identified in the theory (Coombs, 2007) and to establish cause and effect relationships
between crisis responses and stakeholder reactions (perceptions, behaviors, and affect)
(Ma & Zhan, 2016). SCCT holds that any crisis that creates victims, stakeholders
20. GLOBAL CRISIS COMMUNICATION 219

adversely affected by the crisis, must engage in instructing and adjusting information.
Instructing information tells stakeholders how to protect themselves physically from
a crisis while adjusting information helps people to cope psychologically with a crisis
(Sturges, 1994). Instructing information would include evacuation warnings, and
recall announcements. Adjusting information includes expression of sympathy, coun-
seling, corrective action to prevent a repeat of the crisis, details about the crisis itself,
and reimburse of expenses related to the crisis (Holladay, 2009). SCCT prescribes that
crises with low attributions of crisis responsibility require only instructing and adjust-
ing information while crises with high attributions of crisis responsibility would bene-
fit from the addition of an apology and/or compensation. The experimental studies
have generally supported the recommendations of SCCT (Ma & Zhan, 2016).
Researchers have critiqued both IRT and SCCT for ignoring culture (Dhanesh &
Sriramesh, in press). Both theories were developed in the U.S. to help account for
reputational concerns and crisis communication in a U.S. environment, hence culture
was not a part of their original conceptualization. The theories never sought to dis-
miss or deny culture. Moreover, both theories have recognized the value of adding
culture when people seek to apply the theories outside of the U.S. or similar contexts
(Coombs, 2014; Wen, Yu & Benoit, 2012). IRT and SCCT are national theories of
crisis communication that reflect their country of origin. Any national theory will
need adaptation and require the consideration of culture when people seek to use it
as an international theory of crisis communication.

CRISIS COMMUNICATION IN EUROPE

Because most crisis communication theories have originated in the U.S. (Luoma-aho
et al., 2017), several case studies have examined whether or not these theories can be
generalized to a European context. A number of case studies has, for instance, shown
that politicians confronted with sex-related scandals in the U.S. and Europe should
use different approaches in order to safeguard their reputation. While former U.S.
President Bill Clinton eventually managed to restore his reputation damage through
an emotional apology in the Lewinsky scandal, Dominique Strauss-Kahn could not
satisfy the French public with a similar response whereas Silvio Berlusconi’s defensive
reaction did seem to be sufficient for the Italian public (Garcia, 2011; Xifra, 2012).
These political case studies offer a first indication that the effectiveness of crisis com-
munication strategies varies across cultures (Xifra, 2012).
One explanation that has been offered is the dominant media system in the country
in which a crisis occurs. According to Garcia (2011), Italy belongs to the Mediterra-
nean Model where media are considered a means of ideological expression. In the
U.S., however, the media are part of the free market and journalists have a tradition
of investigative reporting techniques and an emphasis on scandal. Given the fact that
the media are often the ones to determine the way in which crises are framed (cf.
Coombs, 2007), the public’s perception of a crisis can strongly vary between cultures
with different media systems and traditions. A second element that may explain why
people from different countries will respond differently to crises and crisis communi-
cation are Hofstede’s (1985) cultural dimensions. People are considered to develop
a specific mentality during their childhood that is shaped by their culture (Garcia,
2011). This mentality is expressed through the dominant values of a culture, which
can differ in terms of uncertainty avoidance, power distance, collectivism and mascu-
linity (Hofstede, 1985).
220 W. TIMOTHY COOMBS AND AN-SOFIE CLAEYS

Italy belongs to the group of high-power distance cultures, whereas the U.S. are
characterized by low power distance (Garcia, 2011). The consequence is that scandals
involving persons in power are simply what is expected in countries like Italy. People
in the U.S. feel they have the right to challenge authority. Therefore mortification and
corrective action are more feasible in this context. The importance of power distance
and uncertainty avoidance was also stressed in a case study of the European Coca-
Cola crisis in 1999 (Taylor, 2000). The American company initially claimed that Bel-
gian school children that felt ill after drinking Coca Cola had been influenced by
mass hysteria. Even though the crisis indeed appeared to be a case of mass hysteria,
this corporate response backfired in European countries that score high on uncer-
tainty avoidance (i.e. Belgium, France, and Spain). These countries fear the unex-
pected, are low risk taking, and have a concern for safety and explicit rules. As such,
each of these countries reacted very strongly to the alleged tainting. In addition, the
initial lack of response by Coca-Cola’s CEO was perceived negatively by these nations
because in high-power distance nations people tend not to trust those in power.
Another case study compared Denmark to the Arab World (Gaither & Curtin, 2008).
When a Danish newspaper published cartoons of the prophet Muhammad in 2005,
Danish food company Arla Foods saw an end to its rapid growth in the Middle East.
Many of the crisis messages offered by Arla Foods to Arab consumers appeared inef-
fective. An explanation may be that the Arab World ranks higher in power distance
than Denmark and is more collectivist in nature.
Besides the role of the media and the cultural dimensions that determine the pub-
lic’s response to crises, other elements will also affect the impact of an international
crisis. These factors, however, may be more difficult to grasp or to predict. A study in
43 European countries has shown that there are many crisis situations and reactions
all over Europe and these differ greatly by region (Verhoeven, Tench, Zerfass,
Moreno, & Verčič, 2014). A comparison between Finland and Spain shows a number
of differences in how crises are perceived, which crises occur more or less frequently
and which reactions are offered in response to a crisis (Luoma-aho et al., 2017).
Explanations for these findings were sought in the trusting nature of Finns, the value
they attach to honesty, the amount of corruption in Spain, etc. This offers an indica-
tion that adapting crisis communication to specific countries may not be as easy as
simply estimating how each country scores in terms of uncertainty avoidance or
power distance. Specific background knowledge of a country, its habits, its current
affairs, and its past may be necessary to manage a crisis appropriately. This is consist-
ent with Sriramesh & Verčič (2009) advice to consider infrastructural ingredients for
understanding international public relations.

CRISIS COMMUNICATION IN ASIA

Even though non-Western cultures are no longer ignored in crisis communication

studies, research taking the West as a context and the U.S. in particular still domin-
ates the field (Lyu, 2012). A growing number of studies therefore examine crisis com-
munication in an Asian context in order to investigate how crisis communication
occurs and plays out in non-Western cultures (e.g., Dhanesh & Sriramesh, 2016;
Huang, Lin, & Su, 2005; Huang et al., 2016; Lee, 2004; Pang, Jin, & Ho, 2016; Zhou
& Shin, 2017). One of these studies illustrates two notable differences between
Hong Kong consumers and findings from research in a Western context (Lee, 2004).
First, Hong Kong consumers seem more accepting toward a no-comment response,
20. GLOBAL CRISIS COMMUNICATION 221

whereas no comment is considered not done in most Western crisis communication

guidelines. This is confirmed by a content analysis of 93 academic journal articles
about crisis communication in three Chinese societies (i.e. Mainland China,
Hong Kong, and Taiwan) which concludes that no comment is a strategy that is
often used in Asia, along with overall attempts to cover crises up (Huang et al.,
2016). Second, when comparing three rather accommodative strategies (i.e. apology,
compensation and corrective action), the compensation response had a more positive
effect on Hong Kong participants than the apology response. Asian consumers may con-
sider an apology too much as a routine and ritualistic behavior because it is commonly
used in their society.
A third interesting element in Asian crisis communication appears to be that justifi-
cation is a very popular strategy (Huang, 2006). Justification implies that although an
organization in crisis is indeed responsible for the event, the standards being used by
its accusers to evaluate the impact of the crisis are not appropriate. The frequent use
of justification in China has been related to the fact that Chinese culture is character-
ized by a high-contextual and indirect communication style (Huang et al., 2016). This
may also explain why Chinese organizations will be more inclined to use strategic
ambiguity in their crisis communication and why they will avoid the use of “extreme”
tactics such as attacking accusers or apologizing to the public. A survey of public
relations and public affairs managers from Taiwan additionally revealed the use of
a crisis communication strategy that has not been discussed in Western crisis commu-
nication studies, namely diversion (Huang et al, 2005). Diversion entails showing
regards while not apologizing, differentiating, and creating a new issue. The use of
this strategy is another indication that the use of strategic ambiguity is striking in an
Asian context.
The importance of strategic ambiguity is not surprising because Chinese people
emphasize interpersonal relationships and therefore might tend to avoid direct con-
frontation (Huang et al., 2005). A number of other explanations for why the effects
of crises and crisis communication might differ between Asian and Western soci-
eties have been discussed in the literature. With regard to Hofstede’s (1985) cultural
dimensions, the collectivistic nature of Asian societies is considered most crucial in
understanding how crisis communication affects these publics (Huang et al., 2016).
As a consequence, mainland China tends to take up the collective interest when
making decisions, especially when these concern the national government. While
these cultural dimensions have received fairly little attention in Asian crisis commu-
nication research, it seems worth exploring further. Besides the collectivist nature
of Asian countries as an explanation for differences with Western crisis communi-
cation, differences between specific Asian countries have also been found.
A different response to the melamine-tainted milk powder crisis offered by an
organization from mainland China and an organization from Taiwan has been
ascribed to the dominant media systems in Taiwan (Lyu, 2012). In their liberal
media system, the media are the watchdog for both corporations and the govern-
ment which appears to have stimulated a different response compared to that of
the company based in mainland China.
Besides the emphasis on interpersonal relationships, the dominant media systems,
and differences in cultural dimensions, a final element that can determine crisis com-
munication in Asia is the tradition of face-saving and face-giving. Face-saving is
related to notions of respect, reputation, dignity, and prestige and face-saving in front
of out-group members especially is extremely important in Chinese communities as
222 W. TIMOTHY COOMBS AND AN-SOFIE CLAEYS

well as other East Asian countries (Wen, Yu, Benoit, 2012). Attempts to save face for
oneself and giving face to others result in the tendency to cover up crisis situations
(Huang et al., 2016). This also explains why Chinese organizations will prefer correct-
ive action over mortification (Wen et al., 2012).

LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL CRISIS COMMUNICATION

Global crisis communication has emerged as an identifiable thread within crisis com-
munication research with various articles and highlighted by the publication of the
Handbook of International Crisis Communication. Research within this subdomain has
resulted in relevant findings for both theory and practice. When a multinational
organization is confronted with an international or global crisis, one single strategy
probably will not suffice for a cross-cultural audience. The difficulty then is to deter-
mine how the global crisis communication strategy of an organization should be
tailored to specific cultural backgrounds. Two elements to take into account could be
the dominant media systems that are at play and how each country scores in terms of
Hofstede’s (1985) cultural dimensions. However, an important conclusion from cross-
cultural crisis communication research should be that each region has its own history,
its own economic situation, its own habits, its own political background, and hence
requires its own approach. This is consistent with Sriramesh & Verčič (2009) point
that international public relations is shaped by such factors as the political system,
the economic system, societal culture, media systems, and activism. Dhanesh and Srir-
amesh (in press) have illustrated how these factors do affect international crisis com-
munication with their examination of how Nestlé India handled the Maggi noodle
crisis. The Dhanesh and Sriramesh study advances our understanding of how culture
does shape international crisis communication. And while countries in some regions
can be quite similar, such as the United States, others can have much variation, such
as in Europe and Asia. Therefore, it is crucial for organizations that operate at
a global level to realize that crisis communication needs to be carried out in close
consultation with national communication departments or national PR-agencies. Such
close collaboration can help establish the sensitivities in each country and its current
affairs (Zhu, Anagondahalli, & Zhang, 2017). The strong reaction of Belgian con-
sumers and politicians to the Coca-Cola crisis, for instance, cannot simply be reduced
to cultural dimensions. Belgian consumers’ fear and response were rooted in the fact
that Belgium had been confronted with an outbreak of the meat dioxin crisis only
a couple of weeks earlier.
In addition, despite interesting findings from existing research on global crisis com-
munication, the global crisis communication research overall lacks nuance. The focus
has been on the need for comparative studies and the often-repeated belief that crises
are becoming more global or perhaps international. Those are both useful points but
are broad rather than nuanced. Not all crises are international. In fact, most crises
are local. In the U.S., for example, there are over 300 food recalls per year and over
3,000 hazardous chemical releases. The vast majority are local crises—restricted to
the U.S. market or location. Sometimes in a food recall, it is a foreign company dis-
tributing in the U.S. but the crisis is still within the U.S. market. To be an inter-
national crisis, the crisis needs to be salient in multiple nations that have very
different cultures relative to crisis communication. BP’s Deep Horizon was inter-
national, Arla Foods coping with the Mohammed cartoons boycott was international,
and the disappearance of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 was international. Are these
20. GLOBAL CRISIS COMMUNICATION 223

typical crises or are these black swans? Focusing too much on black swans is prob-
lematic because we overlook what is needed to cope with white swans.
As noted earlier, IRT and SCCT are local theories. This does not mean, however,
that these theories do not apply outside the United States. On the contrary, Situ-
ational Crisis Communication Theory (Coombs, 2007) explains that an organizational
response should be guided by the public’s view of a crisis and resulting attributions of
responsibility. Companies should be aware that the public’s interpretation of a crisis
will differ between countries. So while a crisis might seem like a victim crisis in one
country, it can be considered a preventable crisis in another country. Therefore, while
that former country may be pleased with instructing, the latter will require a rebuild
strategy. As such, it is critical for various countries or distinct cultures to apply these
theories to their own local characteristics or even develop local theories. These local
theories must then address three points: what counts as a crisis, what attributions of
crisis responsibility do people make about crises, and how do people react to various
crisis response strategies. These three factors help us to understand how people make
sense of crises and crisis response strategies thereby providing the critical components
necessary to construct an effective crisis response. Understanding these three points
about crisis communication is consistent with Kent & Taylor (2007) recommendations
for international public relations including understanding how meaning is created
examining strategic considerations.
Mapping local theories provides two key assets. First, managers have insights
that can help tailor their crisis responses to local crises. Second, those interested in
international crises would have a foundation for comparing crisis communication
practices. We shall return to these two points shortly. Practitioners can draw upon
the local knowledge when there is a need to engage in crisis communication across
cultures. As public relations has shown, there is value in (1) understanding how the
local culture defines public relations (Sriramesh, 1992) and (2) tapping those
insights for international public relations efforts. The same holds true for crisis
communication. Local crisis communication theories/models should then be the
foundation for building international crisis communication theories/models. Local
theories/models can be built by adapting existing models and seeking unique
insights from specific cultural factors. As this chapter has noted, various researchers
have sought to adapt existing U.S.-based crisis communication theories to other
cultures. Such studies provide keen insights into the adaptions that is necessary.
An, Park, Cho, & Berger (2010), for example, showed how collectivism shaped
reactions to crisis response strategies that included firing employees. Others have
sought to locate specific cultural factors that influence crisis communication. Goby
& Nickerson (2015) revealed the role of religion in understanding crisis communica-
tion in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Falkheimer & Heide (2006) argued that
crisis communication needs to understand the culture as defined by the people in
the culture. Researchers need to understand the sense making of the stakeholders
involved in the crisis. They recommended using what they called a constructionist
ethnicity-based perspective (Falkheimer & Heide, 2006). Zhu et al. (2017) examined
how culture affects perceptions of crises and attributions of responsibility. As noted
early, we believe crisis sense making should be driven an understanding of the
crisis, attributions of crisis responsibility, and reactions to crisis response strategies.
This is one of several possible methods for locating the unique insights about spe-
cific cultural factors that could affect crisis communication.
224 W. TIMOTHY COOMBS AND AN-SOFIE CLAEYS

The local theories/models provide the foundation for the international theories/
models. Practitioners can use the local theories/model to guide their crisis communica-
tion. The practitioners could anticipate how they would need to adapt their crisis
messages to specific cultural contexts. The local theories/models can identify differ-
ences between crisis communication that can benefit researchers and practitioners.
Researchers could explore and elaborate on why the differences and similarities exist.
The local theories/model provide useful guidance and rationales for the comparative
research.

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 CHAPTER

21
The Management and Practice of Public
Affairs in a Global Context

Craig S. Fleisher

The management and practice of public affairs (PA) has been impacted greatly by
globalization, especially in the last two decades when technologies and digitization
have created cross-border issues for organizations to respond to in their external, non-
market, public policy, or sociopolitical environments. These issues are more complex,
raise levels of risk, create greater uncertainty, and can generate doubt (CRUD)
among senior executives and their organizations. Globalization compels new concerns,
controversies, orientations, and thinking among business, community and political
leaders in order for them all to constructively address and adapt to it (Lenn, 1996,
p. 436). Unlike the days before social media (SM), top managers no longer have the
luxuries of relative invisibility, distance, or time before their organizations address
them. Institutions and stakeholders also have been dramatically changed by globaliza-
tion, thus creating new and larger arenas within which dynamic and interactive
STEEP (social, technological, economic, ecological, and political) concerns need to
be solved (Fleisher, 2017, p. 24). Finally, because of path dependencies in cultures (as
broadly addressed in Part I of this volume), globalization increases the challenge of
generating actionable issue and stakeholder intelligence.
Public affairs (PA) refers to communication activities between an organization and
its public policy stakeholders about issues of mutual interest. Public policy refers to
institutions of public governance, officials who are responsible for developing or
enforcing public policy, processes whereby citizens of a nation state establish laws and
regulations, and the stake-seeking actors who aim to influence governance policies.
Among the most popular public affairs communication (PAC) activities are govern-
ment affairs/relations, issue management (and advertising), lobbying (including direct

226
21. MANAGEMENT AND PRACTICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS 227

and grassroots) and political actions, public advocacy, community relations and social
responsibility (CSR) initiatives. The fact that organizations and stakeholders have
related interests does not indicate that the interests will be equal in any sense, but
rather that their resolution can, and may, be competitively influenced by both parties
to a greater or lesser extent (Keim & Baysinger, 1988).
The management and practice of PA has become a critical skill that resides in the Board
of Directors and C-suites of organizations engaged in business-government-society work
across national boundaries (Harris & Fleisher, 2017, p. 1). As a long-time observer,
researcher, consultant and/or participant (i.e., activist) in the public affairs field in well over
two dozen different nations, I have examined organizational trends over three decades to
understand what drives practice, policy, and strategy development. There are many struc-
tural ways the field has changed dramatically from the 1960s when individuals first started
examining globalization and PA, and the pace of change caused by democraticization (Srir-
amesh & Verčič, 2003, p. xxiii) and digitization (Meli & Grefe, 2017, p. 181) appears to be
unrelenting for most PA practitioners and executives who operate in international, multi-
national, or global organizations (Harsanyi & Allen, 2017, p. 66).

A GLOBAL LENS TO UNDERSTAND PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Though public affairs practitioners and their organizational departments, functions,

or units have often responded reactively to globalization, there have been increasing
efforts by multinational organizations to improve communication with their stake-
holders. The framework applied in this chapter to consider globalization and public
affairs was originally developed by David Baron (1995) to describe an approach to
integrated market and nonmarket strategies. This approach was further augmented by
Bach & Allen (2010) and others including this author resulting in the IA-cubed
model, which recommends that analysts can understand the nonmarket environment
by answering a sequenced set of six questions – with the six factors, three starting
with the letter “A” and three with an “I” as follows:
1) What is the Issue?
2) Who are the Actors who care about and will be involved in trying to resolve
the issue?
3) What are the actor’s Interests?
4) In which Arena (-s) will actors aim to settle the issue?
5) What Information moves the issue in these arenas?
6) What Assets do the actors bring to the table that will help them prevail in
these arenas?

It is the complex, dynamic, and ongoing interaction of these factors that the PA pro-
fessional must address on a 365x24x7 basis.

THE GLOBAL NATURE OF PA ISSUES

Issues are defined as controversies or matters in question that occur between an organiza-
tion and its stakeholders. In PA work, these issues are typically directed at, or referred to,
public policy institutions, makers, or processes for their resolution. Issues have always
crossed borders rather easily, but today’s issues can do so at a pace not previously seen
due to advances in mobile telecommunication/videoconferencing, computerization,
228 CRAIG S. FLEISHER

digitization, the internet, and social media. Issues are generally thought to have life cycles,
and PA practitioners manage these over a period of time by applying unique communica-
tion strategies and tactics based on which phase of the life cycle the issue is moving, part
of the larger issues management roles they play (Mahon, 2017, p. 537).
There are typically no shortages of domestic and multinational issues that organiza-
tions must address, though different groups or industries will have unique arrays of
them at any point in time. Among the most prominent issues that PA communicators
address globally are:
1. Bilateral or multilateral trade: Who can trade with whom and on what terms?
2. Ecological/Sustainability/Climate change: How can physical resources, like
energy, water, forests, or air, be conserved, distributed, preserved, and protected?
3. Employment: Who can work where and under what conditions?
4. Human rights: Are citizens’ human rights being respected and protected?
5. Immigration/Emigration: Who can live where and under what conditions?
6. Information/Media: What should people know and be hearing about?
7. Property: Who has the rights of ownership of assets?
8. Security/Safety: How can citizens be kept from experiencing harm?
9. Welfare (economic, social): How well are citizens living?

These issues are often contentious, long-standing, hard to identify at their sources or
causes, and resist local efforts to resolve them. Many of them are better characterized
as “wicked” (Camillus, 2008, p. 98) matters, as opposed to conventional ones that are
more easily amenable to policy and other common sociopolitical solutions, because
they don’t have obvious answers, are difficult to resolve, and often sit outside the
responsibilities of any singular organization. Wicked issues are often the ones that
ultimately sway stakeholders and decide political elections. As such, those PA practi-
tioners who can “move the needle” on these issues are typically among the most crit-
ical employees in their organizations and communities.

ACTORS ON THE GLOBAL PA STAGE

On the global stage, there are unique actors in the form of global or transnational
movements and organizations that transcend the idea of any individual or single
nation-state. They are not primarily controlled or funded by the policy organs of any
particular government. These organizations are constantly trying to find a balance
between their aims and activities in multiple nations and deal with trade-offs between
being both global and local at the same time (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 2002) – often
known colloquially as the portmanteau of global and local – “glocal.” Operating glo-
cally is thought to have been coined by business persons in Japan and translated to
English back in the 1980s by Akio Morita, Sony Corporation’s founder. Being glocal
means that executives develop strategic direction on a global basis but allow for the
flexibility to adapt certain elements to localized needs.
These actors are ever-present in the global PA environment and include individuals
who work on behalf of:
1. Globally-focused organizations: These would include most United Nations
efforts and its organs such as the UN Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) or United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), International
21. MANAGEMENT AND PRACTICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS 229

Organization for Standardization (ISO), the World Health Organization

(WHO), or the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
2. Multinational trading groups such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, (COMESA), the
European Union (EU), Organization for American States (OAS), or OECD
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development).
3. Multilateral banking organizations: AfDB (African Development Bank), AsDB
(Asian Development Bank), Central American bank for Economic Integration
(CABEI), European Investment Bank (EIB), or World Bank.
4. Transnational or international cause-related non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) such as Amnesty International, the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions.
5. Transnational Foundations: Among the best funded of these foundations would
be the Al Maktoum Foundation, Azim Premji Foundation, Ford Foundation,
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Li Ka Shing Foundation, Rockefeller Foun-
dation, Garfield Weston Foundation, and Wellcome Trust.
6. Transnational Religions: Buddhists, Christians, Hindus, Jains, Jews, Muslims, or
Roman Catholics, Sikhs, Zoroastrians, etc.
7. Multinational corporations (MNCs) or enterprises (MNEs): Among the largest
of these are Amazon, Apple, General Electric, Nestle, Royal Dutch Shell,
Toyota, Vodaphone, Volkswagen, and Walmart.

Although these actors have their headquarters in one nation-state, their primary activ-
ities span many countries and are not centrally directed by a government or nationals
of any single country. Because of their transnational or global focus, they are often
powerful stakeholders in terms of influencing the activities of any individual nation.
Lastly, they often conduct PA activities on their own right with the intent on influen-
cing a country’s choices and behaviors in their particular areas of focus.

THE INTERESTS OF ACTORS AND ACTIVISTS

Actors in the global PA environment often have unique concerns about the issues
that concern them, causing them to make demands of public policy officials both in
respective nation-states and the transnational or global organizations that aim to pro-
vide governance. Interests nearly always go into the realm of ethics. As such, interests
expressed in PA matters in and across most nation-states involve questions of fairness,
principles, right and wrong, harms and benefits, and how they are to be distributed.
Actors take their ethical considerations to public policy makers (i.e., either elected
executives, lawmakers, regulators or judges/magistrates) for hearing and desired reso-
lutions in various arenas where these discussions and debates are supposed to occur
in most nation-states. At the point that the actors do formally take their interests into
the arenas to be heard by public policy makers, they cross the definitional line and
become activists, or those actors who have progressed from passive listeners to active
stake-seeking participants (Fassin, 2010, p. 39) in public policy processes.

THE ARENAS IN WHICH THE ISSUES ARE ADDRESSED

Actors and activists often take their interests to various transnational and global institu-
tions so that their voices can be heard and their demands may be formally made. These
230 CRAIG S. FLEISHER

arenas are where elected or appointed public policy makers ply their trades. They can
operate at several different levels of aggregation, ranging from global arenas in the most
macro sense, to local communities or townships on the micro-end. There are usually
some forms of executive leadership, legislative power, and judicial arenas in the majority
of nation-states. They are commonly represented in the following:
1. Executive branches/Cabinets: The organs that hold responsibility for public
leadership by executing and ensuring the administration and enforcement of
laws and public policies. The top officer in the executive branch is often known
as a president, prime minister, or premier. This arena can wield great power,
and because of this, it is often a target that activists seek to influence through
their behavior and communication activities.
2. Legislative Bodies such as Parliaments/Congresses/Assemblies: These are the
supreme legislative bodies in democratic societies that are typically comprised of
elected representatives who make laws for their citizens being duly elected to their
posts and usually also oversee governmental activities via the means of hearings
and related inquiries. They are often the primary focus of activist influence, and
lobbying activities are the most commonly used form of PA activity for trying to
influence them.
3. Judicial: These arenas are made up of courts, which can range from
supreme, Circuit/Regional, magistrates (local) and municipal levels or their
equivalents. Laws are interpreted and subsequently applied based on those
judgments within these arenas. Though not an arena that is typically viewed
to be susceptible to influence by PA practitioners or activists, there is evi-
dence that more policy than ever before is being decided by the courts and
that PA activities targeting judicial bodies can be effective in some cases
(Holcomb, 2017, p. 517).
4. Media (traditional and social): Though these are not direct bodies by which
policy is made, they can be critical in indirectly influencing what happens in
any of the other three arenas where public policy is formally developed, exe-
cuted, or administrated. It is in this arena where the traditional communication
activities done by public relations or corporate communication specialists is
most frequently and can best be applied for accomplishing PA purposes.

THE INFORMATION USED TO COMMUNICATE ABOUT PA MATTERS

Actors in the arenas who are working on issues try to achieve their objectives by com-
municating data and information that persuades lawmakers to see their interests as
being aligned with those of the larger society that is being impacted. Data and infor-
mation are typically exchanged, though not necessarily in equivalent measure,
between sides. It is often because of this selective sharing that having the right data
or information at the right time and the capability to deliver it can make a difference.
This set of circumstances demonstrates the importance of having intelligence that
guides the activists or the PA practitioners’ steps through the often-complex public
policy process. Intelligence can be even more important when addressing regulatory
matters because that is often the realm of experts and the organizations or activists
often have better data than the regulatory agencies and their experts.
21. MANAGEMENT AND PRACTICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS 231

THE ASSETS USED TO INFLUENCE POLICY

In a global economy, organizations seeking competitive advantage know they need to

address social, political and environmental issues as part of their strategy, and not
just focusing on business, commercial or profit-seeking elements as their aim (Bach &
Allen, 2010). There are no shortages of PA-specific tools and techniques that a PA
unit would be able to use in influencing their nonmarket environment (Showalter &
Fleisher, 2005). Assets in a global PA context would include those resources and cap-
abilities that enable and can be used by organizations to potentially influence the out-
comes of debates about issues held in public policy arenas. In the global practice of
PA, these can take on several prominent types:

1. Human: This includes all of those individuals who are active in trying to influ-
ence the evolution of issues. For most organizations, this would comprise their
staff members and employees whose main roles are in the PA communication
field, volunteer advocates (i.e., executives who advocate on behalf of their
organization, the grassroots, etc.), contracted and permanently employed
lobbyists, issue managers, compliance and regulatory specialists, and lawyers
who interact regularly with governmental officials.
2. Financial: Monies that are used on behalf of PA aims. In some countries –
both authoritarian and democratic, companies are allowed to exchange curren-
cies for influence. This can range in nature from the unethical and possibly
illegal ones (bribes) to the legal (political action committees or PACs).
3. Data and Information: As described earlier, having access to particular
ideas about how to resolve issues can be a critical asset used to influence
public policy. This asset can be particularly influential when trying to influ-
ence regulatory agendas, because they are amenable to the presence and
provision of specialist information that only limited numbers of stake-
holders are likely to have.
4. Reputation: An intangible asset, reputation refers to the collective judgments
of an organization based on assessments of financial, social and environmental
impacts attributed to the organization over time (FT.com/lexicon, 2017).
Organizations with stronger reputations or are held in higher esteem by public
policy officials are usually better positioned to competitively influence the out-
come of many issue resolutions and public policy debates.
5. Time: An increasingly scarce asset for any individuals involved in trying to
resolve complex public policy matters, this includes the number of hours, days,
weeks, or years spent in advocacy, lobbying, and before related PA negotiation
activities. One increasingly important strategic PA element is for a stake-
seeking organization being able to establish the definition of an issue debate, or
framing it (Sniderman & Theriault, 2004) early as a means of setting the “rules
of the game” or the playing field on which the issue’s resolution will be
played out.

TECHNICAL COMPETENCIES OF THE GLOBAL PA PRACTITIONER OR MANAGER

Individuals who hope to practice public affairs in a global context must exhibit certain
technical skills, knowledge, abilities and/or experiences (KSAEs) in order to perform
232 CRAIG S. FLEISHER

effectively. Though there are different levels of PA activity spanning the lower-level
technical, managerial and highest executive levels where PA practitioners work in
organizations, among the most prominent competences that have been noted by
researchers would be the following (Fleisher, 2003; Shaw, 2005):
Technical Competencies (Key behaviors):
1. Adaptability (Remains flexible and open to new ideas; Able to encourage
others to make desired changes; Thinks and acts effectively under pressure;
Persists towards solutions; Makes necessary adjustments to daily routines;
Identifies ways to incorporate new practices into existing ones).
2. Advisory Assistance (Able to manage multi-directionally – upwards, downwards,
horizontally; Assists colleagues to understand and execute PA communication aims;
Develops specifications to use in soliciting professional services from external pro-
viders; Generates advice with respect to ethical conflicts and how to resolve them;
Provides accurate and timely guidance; Seeks out and solicits information to solve
problems; Supports leadership by managing PA information and resources).
3. Awareness – external and organizational (Considers the organization’s goals
and resources in work efforts; Demonstrates understanding of the organiza-
tion’s functions and responsibilities; Identifies subject matter experts to respond
to external requests; Knows when and how to escalate issues for attention;
monitors and scans all media for developing and emerging issues; Identifies
opportunities based on unique sociopolitical and cultural needs; Demonstrates
good understanding of government processes and public policy institutions).
4. Collaboration (Identifies, organizes, facilitates, and/or sustains mutually benefi-
cial partnerships and alliances with internal and external activists and stake-
holders; Maintains positive, productive and professional relationships; Interacts
with others to share information and achieve goals; Works towards goals that
benefit the team, which includes contributing ideas and participating in team
activities appropriately; Fosters an environment that emphasizes knowledge
sharing and group participation; Facilitates ethical agreement by resolving dif-
ferences of opinions; Resolves conflicts, confrontations and disagreements posi-
tively and constructively; Identifies when to seek additional outside counsel;
Serves as a PA expert for other staff; Serves on committees – e.g., task forces,
working groups – to analyze and improve administrative processes and proced-
ures; Coordinates efforts with applicable stakeholders to ensure awareness,
share information, and provide updates until completion).
5. Communication (Asks the right, appropriate questions; Clearly and effectively
conveys ideas and information verbally and in writing; Actively listens and
summarizes or paraphrases what others have said to verify understanding;
Ensures that regular communication occurs based on the needs of the work,
the individual, management, or the situation; Uses analogies, case histories,
stories, visuals, and other techniques to tailor communications to specific audi-
ences; Identifies and uses effective communication channels and methods – e.g.,
presentations, electronic dissemination, social media – appropriately tailored to
the audiences; Utilizes skill in presenting information, analysis, ideas, and posi-
tions in a clear, succinct, accurate, convincing manner).
6. Data Gathering and Analysis (Scans for, monitors, analyzes and investigates up-
to-date information from various sources and formats; Analyzes data in order to
draw conclusions and identify cause and effect relationships to support
21. MANAGEMENT AND PRACTICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS 233

leadership decisions, recommend a course of action, or solve organizational

issues; Documents sources and validates accuracy of information to resolve
inconsistencies; Conducts ad hoc and standard analyses in response to customer
needs, incorporating knowledge of parallel, ongoing projects into analysis for
customers; Gathers, compiles, and interprets pertinent data using various data
collection techniques; trends in data that indicates issues, problems, or opportun-
ities, and determines if action is needed; Leverages external networks to ensure
all relevant information is integrated into analysis and interpretation of data;
Meets with others to understand their needs or concerns in order to ensure data,
analytics, and reporting are used appropriately; Seeks additional resources when
gaps and inconsistencies or variances in data are found).
7. Innovativeness (Identifies, organizes, facilitates, and/or sustains mutually benefi-
cial partnerships and alliances with internal and external stakeholders;
Achieves and maintains positive and productive relationships; Works with
others to share information and achieve goals, which includes contributing
ideas and participating in team activities appropriately; Fosters an environment
that emphasizes timely knowledge sharing and group participation; Knows
when to seek additional outside counsel; Serves as a PA subject matter expert
for other colleagues and staff; Coordinates efforts with applicable stakeholders
to ensure awareness, share information, and provide updates until completion).
8. Message Development and Delivery (Knowledge of the production, communi-
cation, and dissemination of information and ideas to inform via all pertinent
media; Analyzes information needs and develops plans and communications
deliverables to meet these needs; Plans evaluations, applies metrics, and con-
ducts research to measure the success of PA communication activities; Refines
communications plans based on the results of audience research and organiza-
tional priorities; Writes a variety of communications or both internal and more
prominently external audiences tailored to their having different levels of edu-
cation, interest, and points of view; Applies knowledge of computer-based
information systems and technologies, internet applications, and technologies
to plan, design, and evaluate web sites and pages).
9. Planning (Anticipates problems and mitigates risks; Assesses relative import-
ance of activities and assignments; Adjusts priorities when appropriate; Coord-
inates with others when problems or conflicts occur that might impact the
timely completion of work; Determines necessary sequence of activities and the
efficient level of resources needed to achieve goals, Implements or utilizes stra-
tegic plans on a daily basis; Uses available resources to get more done with less
without losing focus; Regularly provides work in status updates and negotiates
adjustments in timelines or scope of work as appropriate; Organizes work, sets
priorities, and determines resource requirements; Recognizes and addresses the
interdependences of activities and resources; Uses time effectively and prevents
irrelevant issues or distractions from interfering with work completion).

CONCLUSION

There are no shortages of issues for organizations to communicate about or negotiate

with governmental and public policy makers, and organizations in all sectors and
industries typically employ PA specialists to support their goals. This chapter
234 CRAIG S. FLEISHER

recommended and detailed an IA-cubed model for understanding the nature of inter-
actions that occurs in global public affairs. Managing and practicing public affairs in
a global context remains challenging and rewarding work for communicators who have
the appropriate competences. More positively, better aligned, controversy and harm-
reducing social and political outcomes will occur for society as a result of successful
global PA efforts.

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 CHAPTER

22
Linking Public Relations and Public
Diplomacy
Creating a New Cadre of Public and Corporate
Diplomats

Roger Hayes

INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

In the 1970s public relations agencies, mainly American, expanded their networks
beyond New York and London to different parts of the world. In doing so, they
helped the export of products and services, and the setting up of local plants by their
clients, initially in Europe and then gradually in other parts of the world from the
former Soviet Union to China. Consultants, mainly from government departments
and journalism, were tasked to generate “positive press coverage” without the benefit
of direct daily flights, mobile phones, or e-mails, let alone having expertise about
those markets and cultures. They were guided only by their experience of the US and
the UK and, with luck, help from a local person.
As this Handbook illustrates, now most countries have “full service” agencies, with
local and international professionals servicing clients, including in the last frontier –
the Middle East and Africa. They are asked to provide more than just “positive press
coverage.” It includes strategic communications, digital and traditional media rela-
tions, crisis and issue management, internal communications, public affairs, and stake-
holder research in a multi-cultural, multi-stakeholder, multi-platform world. But is
the profession, as such, doing enough to satisfy these demands?
In the last half-century, not least in the last decade and especially in the last two
years, public relations has been operating in an increasingly challenging and complex
environment, one of more regulation, empowered stakeholders, the decline of public
trust in institutions, eroding barriers between countries and institutions, an interdis-
ciplinary approach to concepts and fields of study, criticism of overly Western-centric

235
236 ROGER HAYES

interpretations, and the struggle to find the balance between self and societal interest.
Not only has there been a diffusion of power from governments to private and third
sector organizations but also a shift in the center of economic gravity from North
America and Europe, both east and south, particularly to China and India.

THE JOURNEY – ADDING TO THE BODY OF KNOWLEDGE BY “JOINING THE

DOTS”

There is thus an increasing need to join the dots between disciplines, adding to the
relatively immature theory and practice of public relations, where the demand is
greater than the quantity and quality of supply, especially in the still emerging mar-
kets of Asia, Latin America, and Africa, a world where, increasingly, there is cross-
fertilization between practitioners from different cultures, polities, and economies and
between public relations academics, but very little interchange between practitioners
and academics. This is needed to invest more in the balance of rigor with relevance.
One fruitful area of study has been the practical if insufficient theoretical overlap
between public relations and the even newer discipline of public diplomacy. In short
this means communication by a “home” government to connect with the citizens of
other countries to move “host” governments towards desired ends. Cull (2009) defined
public diplomacy by stating that it “deals with the influence of public attitudes on the
formation and execution of foreign policies, encompassing dimensions of international
relations beyond traditional diplomacy, namely the cultivation by governments of
public opinion in other countries.” According to him this involves one or more of
intelligence gathering, advocacy, cultural activities, educational exchanges, and inter-
national broadcasting. Corporate or business diplomacy has emerged as an important
subset of public diplomacy, which itself evolved from international relations and
public administration, whereas the corporate dimension has only recently come under
the microscope of business schools in a parallel path to public diplomacy and public
relations.
Further research, theoretical development, and increased exchanges between practi-
tioners and academics of a range of disciplines is needed to create a new cadre of
public and corporate diplomats. This can be achieved by integrating not just public
relations and its related fields of corporate social responsibility and public affairs, but
possibly embracing other ideas, such as sustainability, strategy, leadership, govern-
ance, and conflict resolution. This has implications for skills, training, and teaching,
as well as or recruitment.

CHANGE, CULTURE, CONNECTIVITY, COLLABORATION

In their analysis of the context in which public relations operates, Hayes and Watts
(2015, Introduction) warned:
Couple the collusion of global forces with the convergence of economics, politics and cul-
ture, there is no new normal. The new normal must be navigated, negotiated, networked
and a narrative built around it. There will be as much collaboration as competition,
requiring a greater need to listen, learn, link and lead.

This is characterized by the interaction of a variety of disciplines in a more integrated

way than hitherto, because senior management and policymakers are more concerned
with strategic actions and long-term delivery than process or tactics. In emerging
22. LINKING PUBLIC RELATIONS AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 237

countries in particular, where aspects of communication such as branding, affairs, cor-

porate social responsibility, crisis management, and employee engagement are seeing
exponential demand, the offerings are largely compartmentalized and tactical, unsup-
ported by much academic rigor and applied research. This is made worse by the
imposition of ethno-centric, Western-imposed experiences and methodologies on
often diverse and context-specific cultures (see, for example, Sriramesh, 2002).
As a result of this perspective and the shortfall between reality and aspiration, some
public relations research reviewing public diplomacy has been conducted to see if it can
shed light on how the public relations discipline can become more globally professional
by drawing on the strengths of both disciplines, plus that of corporate diplomacy. One
important attempt was the study of NATO’s communication analyzing the integration
of public diplomacy, public relations, and other communications functions designed to
project hard and soft power (Van Dyke and Verčič, 2009). The authors raised questions
about convergence and credibility that must be addressed in practice and theory:
“Unfortunately public relations scholars have been slow to study this convergence”
(Van Dyke and Verčič, 2009, pp. 838–839). This could make public relations more rele-
vant and credible in more parts of the world and to a whole variety of private, public,
and not-for-profit sector institutions (Hayes, 2012; MacNamara, 2011).
The founding fathers of the global public relations industry had the highest ideals.
They wanted nothing less than to use the discipline to help the world unite in the
aftermath of World War II. The guiding principles were truth, dialogue, and the
public interest (Traverse-Healy, 2014). Indeed, the International Code of Athens,
which was adopted by the International Public Relations Association in 1965, focused
on the fault line in the evolving profession between persuasion and manipulation, on
the one hand, and, on the other, a more dialogic approach balancing organizational
with societal interest, underpinned by values. An intense discussion has built up
around the convergence of public relations and public diplomacy, particularly in
terms of distinguishing public relations from propaganda. “The tender minded or soft
school of public diplomacy involving longer-term cultural objectives owed a lot to
public relations, despite the ʻpersuasion industriesʼ being blamed for ʻthe messʼ public
diplomacy was in” (Snow, 2009, p. 9). Snow argued that whereas traditional public
diplomacy is governments talking to global publics, new public diplomacy involves
the way both governments and other groups, such as companies, charities, and citi-
zens, influence public attitudes and opinions abroad that influence foreign policy
(Snow, 2009). James Grunig, who led the Excellence Project that formed the building
blocks of a significant section of scholarship, argued that the discipline needed to
identify its core values if it is to be respected rather than reviled. He argued for “a
form of public relations in which collaboration becomes the major idea and skill that
we offer organisations to help them rise above the wrangle in the marketplace”
(Grunig, 2000, p. 45). Many practitioners believe this to be overly idealistic when
working for some governments and companies, especially in some emerging countries.
Perhaps this is why journalists still refer to public relations dismissively as “spin” and
why some practitioners have downplayed the term public relations in favor of reputa-
tion management or strategic communications.

THE CULTURAL GLUE

The growing internationalization of the discipline resulting from globalization and the
growth of internet accessible, cross-frontier networks formed by NGOs, governments,
238 ROGER HAYES

and multinational corporations have been described as the “strategic communication

that different types of organization use for establishing and maintaining symbiotic
relationships with relevant publics, many of whom are increasingly becoming cultur-
ally diverse” (Sriramesh, 2010, p. xxxiv). As described in Part I of this book, culture
is defined broadly to include economic and political variables, levels of activism and
the media landscape, but it is the importance of culture that was the trigger for
public relations to take an interest in the separate discipline of public diplomacy.
Indeed, a Delphi study on the priorities of public relations research suggested the
relationship between these two disciplines was among the top ten issues, given the
importance of culture (Watson, 2007).
As long as public relations scholarship looks beyond its original theory and the
limited scope of the public relations literature, given the speed and democratization
of information, there is hope that the rapid international developments of the prac-
tice will lead to new cultural, political, and social insights. That is, broadening and
deepening the body of knowledge could make the profession more strategically rele-
vant and credible. Perhaps public diplomacy is the point of departure not only to
learn from each other but to link more closely to strategy, leadership, governance,
and sustainability, as well as international relations, conflict resolution, and peace
studies. These are key areas of concern for business leaders and policymakers, not
to mention the growing number of social investors and cause-related NGOs (Hayes
and Watts, 2015).
Universities and their centers for public diplomacy can increasingly provide the three
Cs of public diplomacy – crossroads, conversations, and culture – as they denote it:
Public diplomacy, that grand, hard to capture process by which societies and cultures
speak to each other beyond the narrow channels of formal, state to state diplomacy. …
Public diplomacy increasingly can and must accomplish what traditional governments
can no longer be expected to accomplish (or are no longer willing to fund) due to polit-
ical and economic realities. (USC Public Diplomacy, 2017)
If public diplomacy seeks to influence the behavior of foreign governments via
influencing their citizens, that is, shaping public opinion, then this is similar to
public relations. However, with diplomacy mixed in with the promotion of prod-
ucts and services, there is an even closer link to public relations, which plays
into the hands of those international relations scholars who still view public rela-
tions with suspicion. Snow (2009) suggested that relationships might be the best
predictor of actual future behavior, shifting the focus from a reactive to a more
dialogic stance, which parallels some thinking in public relations scholarship.
The term public diplomacy became an alternative to propaganda in the age of
Kennedy and Khrushchev (Cull, 2009). Indeed, Cull referred to the “new” public
diplomacy, drawing attention to its changing context and practice with the end
of the Cold War in 1989. This included a broader array of international actors,
the advent of digital technologies, and the growing assimilation of new tech-
niques drawn from marketing, such as branding and product public relations,
which can be deployed for governments wishing to promote tourism or attract
investment. City and nation branding is another type of initiative that sometimes
considers public diplomacy alongside exports, tourism and foreign direct invest-
ment, and which embraces communications skills.
22. LINKING PUBLIC RELATIONS AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 239

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN A DIGITAL, DIFFUSE, DIVERSE, AND DISRUPTIVE WORLD

In this four D’s world resulting from interdependence and interconnections, it has
become important to distinguish between hard or military power and soft power,
which is linked to culture, the power of attraction and ideas. The term, developed by
Joe Nye, is a key construct of public diplomacy.
The new public diplomacy is no longer confined to messaging or direct governmental
contacts with foreign publics serving foreign policy purposes. It is also about building
relationships with civil society actors in other countries and facilitating networks among
non-governmental parties at home and abroad. (Nye, 2005)
Nye refers to a new environment, a multi-stakeholder, multi-issue, and multi-media
landscape, which is all about building relationships and facilitating networks. The
trend has accelerated as more informal institutions became involved, with all kinds of
organizations developing public diplomacy policies of their own.
International relations theorist and commentator Anne-Marie Slaughter argues
that foreign policymakers still focus primarily on state-based foreign policy messaging
tools, “where states still exert power, but side by side with corporate, civic and crim-
inal actors in a web of networks” (Slaughter, 2017). In practice, newer forms of
public diplomacy and more sophisticated approaches to nation branding can improve
a country’s prosperity and foreign policy. But public relations theory does not appear
to support this, despite public diplomacy “being as much a communications phenom-
enon as a political one” (Zaharna, 2009, p. 86). Fletcher (2016), former UK ambassa-
dor to Lebanon (a position which required e-diplomacy skills, with e-mails replacing
the telegram as the main means of communication between diplomats in the host
country and the capital in the home country), contended that a public diplomat is “a
communicator and campaigner”. Corporate diplomacy has also been seen as
a potential contributor, especially in relation to corporate social responsibility in
public diplomacy outcomes. Key issues for research into the role of the private sector
are the “motives and intentionality” of corporate efforts as well as the “strategic
coordination” between corporations and home and host governments (White, 2015).
Of course, public relations scholars are increasingly researching public relations and
public diplomacy, which is encouraging. It has also been noted that “there is no
single discipline delivering public diplomacy’s intellectual agenda. However, public
relations can engage in the development of public diplomacy as a discipline” (Mac-
Namara, 2011). MacNamara conducted a comparative analysis of the concepts and
principles of public diplomacy and public relations as described by the Excellence
Theory. Similarities, as well as differences, were observed between the fields of prac-
tice, and several concepts of diplomacy were identified to improve public relations
that could inform public relations theory and practice (MacNamara, 2011).
Former UK diplomat Shaun Riordan, while alerting scholars and practitioners to
the dangers of overusing the term “diplomacy” to the extent that it confuses
a profession with a practice (terms such as cultural diplomacy, city diplomacy, and digi-
tal diplomacy), argued for a radical restructuring of diplomatic services, replacing hier-
archies with network structures and the creation of new forms of global governance
that incorporate NGOs and the private sector (Riordan, 2005). However, he conceded
the term business (or corporate) diplomacy, given that international companies are
increasingly dealing directly with foreign governments and publics, which impacts
domestic reputation. Incidentally, business diplomacy is viewed more as companies
240 ROGER HAYES

seeking commercial ends, while corporate diplomacy emphasizes more its social and
environmental responsibilities – corporate social responsibility (Kochar, 2013). But this
distinction deserves further research and debate by the public relations fraternity and
within other disciplines.
The problem is that business (or corporate) diplomacy has largely been researched
by management theorists developing ideas largely in parallel with international rela-
tions and certainly public relations. MacNamara underlined that:
corporate diplomacy would require corporations to engage in on-going dialogue with
publics guided by specific principles and with mechanisms in place to balance power,
amortise conflicts, facilitate negotiation and maintain relationships even in the face of
outright disagreement (2011).
This hypothesis implies a more formal, structured approach to public relations, public
affairs, and corporate social responsibility activities, together with an added diplo-
matic dimension, which different theorists describe in different ways.

CORPORATE DIPLOMACY: MORE STAKEHOLDERS, GREATER EXPECTATIONS

There has long been pressure from activists who have urged multinational corpor-
ations to do more. A few international companies have taken their responsibilities ser-
iously, spawning the popularity of corporate social responsibility, which is linked to
sustainability and characterized by the adoption of a longer-term view beyond the
quarterly earnings report. This phenomenon has been around since the 1980s as
a result of a number of corporate crises ranging from oil spillage to tax evasion, and
legitimacy issues, such as violating human rights along the supply chain and abusing
consumer data. Partly due to economic vicissitudes and the significance of the sus-
tainability brought to the fore by greater transparency and digital usage, there is no
place to hide and the scrutiny of corporations has intensified. Ironically, despite the
disruptive impact of technology, new applications such as blockchain have assisted
companies wishing to implement the traceability of sources, whether the use of forced
labor in fishing or deforestation in palm oil production.
Globalisation has changed the roles and relationships between multinational corpor-
ations, governments, NGOs, local pressure groups and society. To survive in today’s
international business landscape, multinational corporations need to create legitimacy by
interacting and building on positive relationships with all stakeholders. (Ruel, 2013)
As Ruel describes it, business diplomacy is different from lobbying or strategic political
activity (public affairs). It implies a holistic approach by international companies to
cope in the international arena. Representation, communication, and negotiation are
key in such an approach. As such, it is vital that whatever term is used, given the com-
plexities and interdependence between economics, politics, and society at an inter-
national level, companies develop their own business diplomacy competences. In
addition, multinational corporations have developed “representative mechanisms” to
manage complex global relations, requiring interaction with multi-lateral agencies,
NGOs, and national governments, not to mention the “standard setting” among vari-
ous industry sectors, often within the UN Sustainable Development Goals. “Because
companies have exacerbated environmental problems and caused conflict, they are
therefore key to fixing these problems as part of governance and sustainability mechan-
isms and reforms, requiring leadership and accountability” (Porter and Kramer, 2011).
22. LINKING PUBLIC RELATIONS AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 241

Doing business in today’s international environment requires multinational corpor-

ations to move away from one-sided shareholder models and instead become active
members of stakeholder networks.1 Corporate diplomacy is an emerging concept
within the management literature, but sometimes it takes a broader stakeholder pri-
macy approach.
Scholarship has focused on the communication processes and instrumental benefits associ-
ated with it-how managers negotiate stakeholder relations, an umbrella concept that encom-
passes scholarship from corporate social responsibility, International Relations, Diplomacy
and Peace Studies, in which multinational corporations address social issues and govern-
ance gaps, leading to wider societal benefits, beyond simply corporate public relations. (Wes-
termann-Behaylo, Rehbein, Fort, 2015)
These writers have also called on business executives to assume the role of “corporate
diplomats,” although in practice such roles are sometimes filled by former foreign ser-
vice diplomats. Whether such roles might include direct support for public diplomacy
efforts remains uncertain, given governments have neither the will nor often the
budgets to fulfill all public needs. This dichotomy plays to the wider debate surround-
ing the future of capitalism.
Corporate diplomacy entered the public relations practice lexicon in the early
2000s, and was deemed to occupy the space beyond public relations to public affairs.
“It’s thinking ahead … combined with astute networking and relationship building”
(Kraus, 2006), and the link was highlighted at the public relations World Congress in
Beijing in 2008. Ultimately successful corporate diplomacy depends on a very special
cadre of people, who have the experience, communication skills, and political savvy to
work successfully in the space where the goals of corporations, governments, and civil
society converge. “Corporations serve a diplomatic function because of their political
and cultural, as well as their technical and economic clout” (Grupp and Hayes, 2008,
p. 10). At the time Kraus explained that when multinational corporations begin to
play a role beyond just goods and services and emerging countries leverage economic
development, their power and scale is such that they need a diplomatic corps of their
own to “open the right doors, say the rights things, interpret local culture, as well as
the economic and political context” (Kraus, 2006). Despite public affairs being
a bridge between public relations and public diplomacy, and its subset corporate dip-
lomacy, the literature of public relations lacks the required knowledge base of how
multinational corporations operate in the international political and diplomatic
domain (Kochar, 2013).
One example of joining the dots relating to the role of business was research under-
taken in South Africa. The “Pretoria School of Thought” emphasized strategic as
opposed to tactical communications and the link with governance, leadership and sus-
tainability (De Beer, Rensburg, Steyn, 2013). Gregory and Willis (2013) also made the
connection between a more strategic role for heads of public relations, public affairs, and
corporate social responsibility inside corporations linked to governance, ethics, leader-
ship, corporate character, and relational capital, all requiring “contextual intelligence” (a
core skill of diplomats), especially in a networked, multi-stakeholder, global environment.
Yet “Despite being discussed for more than five years, corporate diplomacy has
received relatively little scholarly analysis, the concept mainly preached in professional
business texts, a handful of corporate papers, speeches, websites and blogs” (MacNa-
mara, 2011).
242 ROGER HAYES

A MORE HOLISTIC, STRATEGIC APPROACH IS NEEDED

Business diplomacy and corporate diplomacy remain unclearly defined, and are
mostly studied in business schools. Public diplomacy has fared better in recent times.
International relations, economics, business/management, public relations, public
affairs, and corporate social responsibility are all related topics. Even leadership, gov-
ernance, and conflict resolution/peace studies, although all linked to the social sci-
ences, are not yet viewed holistically. This is holding back the further development of
public relations, if the profession still wishes to call it that. (Public affairs is preferred
by governments and the profession in Europe; strategic communications or reputation
management by consultancies, heads of corporate affairs by multinational corpor-
ations or, sometimes, Chief Communication Officers (CCOs).)
This despite the fact that this topic plays into the wider debate around the legitim-
acy of capitalism, especially since the 2008 financial crisis, and the need to engage
stakeholders beyond customers and shareholders to employees, the wider community,
and even investors. Indeed, public relations and public affairs executives are often
viewed as “ambassadors” acting as “boundary spanners,” negotiating conflict and dif-
fering expectations among a variety of stakeholders. It is certainly true that this offers
an approach to geopolitics and non-commercial risk management based on the prac-
tices and mindsets of diplomats. Indeed, there are examples of former diplomats
being taken on by multinational corporations to handle at least the relationships with
foreign governments and corporate social responsibility efforts, even if they are not
called corporate diplomats!
Scholars and practitioners alike must conceptualize, theoretically develop and
practically expand the field, especially given the rising activism and expectations of
more stakeholders, even investors, urging companies to create not just economic,
but social value. The father of stakeholder theory, Freeman (1984), very early on
talked of “reconciling corporate social responsibility, sustainable development and
a stakeholder approach in a networked world, requiring navigational tools, a win-
win for shareholders and stakeholders.” If only he had been listened to then. Now
leaders and managers, with their advisers are beginning to formalize their environ-
mental, social, and governance practices, requiring new skills, competencies, experi-
ences, and teams.
What could help the global public relations and related profession is to learn from
the cultural sensitivity and geopolitical skills of diplomats, while public policy civil
servants, including diplomats, would do well to borrow from the communication,
media, and marketing knowledge of the private sector.
At the 2018 World Economic Forum at Davos, sometimes known as “the private
sector UN,” a call was made that business must work with other institutions to
reshape their operating environments and balance local community and employ-
ment contributions with global business imperatives (Schwab, 2018). It is significant
that at the same time, customers are boycotting brands they disapprove of (e.g.
guns in the US), some CEOs are becoming political activists (around climate
change), there are more employee whistleblowers (sexual harassment, gender equal-
ity) and companies are increasingly taking responsibility (often in consortium with
others in the sector) for the whole supply chain acting responsibly (e.g. child labor
in the cobalt industry).
Finally, both the practitioner and academic discourse to date has focused on West-
ern models of capitalism and governance, with capitalism in Asia far more state or
22. LINKING PUBLIC RELATIONS AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 243

family-based, often with a gap between legislation and rules enforcement. In this part
of the world, in particular, more research needs to be done on how public relations
and related disciplines can be better utilized to meet growing stakeholder expectations
(Florini, 2014).
The topic of corporate diplomacy, alongside public diplomacy, is a promising
avenue for further practitioner and scholarly attention, with its implications for
skills, recruitment and training/qualifications in public relations and associated
fields.

CREATING A NEW CADRE OF CORPORATE DIPLOMATS: IT’S STILL REPUTATION,

RELATIONSHIPS, AND RESPONSIBILITY

This will require CEOs and their advisers, including CCOs and heads of corporate
affairs, to instill a culture of life-long learning, multi-dimensional mindset, with its
implications for new structures, systems, and skills, not least a collaborative, “tri-
sectoral” approach embracing the private, public, and not-for-profit sector in inter-
national environments. From corporate communications and media relations to
public policy and risk management, social investment, listening, and dialogue intern-
ally and externally need to be aligned in a broad diplomatic function.
Joe Nye in his work on “soft power” wrote about the key skill of “contextual intel-
ligence,” perhaps the most important requirement in all those involved in this team
effort. This refers to an understanding of the history and culture of a country, and an
ability to analyse, frame, and position the players and situate them strategically. Inci-
dentally, it is unlikely that this function can ever be linked entirely to one individual.
As is often the case, it may work alongside strategic communications, internal com-
munications, public affairs, and corporate social responsibility. Usually “Command
and Control” works alongside a “Conversations and Collaboration” mindset, depend-
ing on the structure, culture, and motives of the organization, just as the traditional
state system coexists with the networked environment. Thus, the scope for studies and
experience needs to be widened. Corporations with a soft, diplomatic approach are
better able to manage external pressures and obtain a “licence to operate” than those
with combative attitudes (Ruel, 2013). Authentic communications can break through
the wall of mistrust. Consumers now view a business social purpose as a major
source of differentiation, which should involve employees. It is significant that the
report from the Global Public Relations Alliance on a capabilities framework (Global
Alliance, 2018) refers to businesses’ social purposes as a key skill, alongside leader-
ship, ethics, collaboration, and a cosmopolitan mindset. Educators could use this
framework to base the curriculum for educating the profession.
But the dots will need to be connected between disciplines and further research
undertaken to create a new theory that can be applied to practices, whether in the
Western world, emerging countries or differently organized Asian economies and pol-
ities. There is a dire need for a more dialogic and diplomatic approach to stakeholder
engagement involving a relational approach. Yet despite growing opportunities for
public relations as a result of new media, advising governments and public-sector
organizations as well as NGOs, a broader role for business, and complex issues
requiring reframing the narrative and engaging with a broader eco-system of stake-
holders, there remain challenges. The picture is uneven: public relations has a poor
reputation, seen as largely tactical and superficial. Above all, there exists a skills def-
icit, particularly in relation to the broader competencies and experiences needed. It is
244 ROGER HAYES

no longer enough to understand data, technology, and content, but the fact that, for
instance, hierarchical structures tend to be undermined by disruptive technologies or
that authoritarian capitalism and the internet may not be suited to one another
requires contextual intelligence.
Doing the right thing is complicated in today’s marketplace. Relationships with
stakeholders operating across and within countries, especially high context cultures,
remain a challenge. There are far more questions than answers concerning, especially,
culturally contingent aspects. Sometimes it seems as if business exists purely to enrich
the small elite, yet with its resources and expertise, relationships with stakeholders
can enrich the world. Reputation building simply for the purpose of securing higher
brand value could threaten the values and therefore the “character” of the organiza-
tion. As risk becomes more complex, transparency more radical and reputation more
costly, the mission of the corporate or public diplomat becomes more and more
relevant.
The task of organizations, whether multinational corporations, NGOs, govern-
ments, or multi-lateral agencies like the UN, is to reframe the narrative, raise the
bar higher, join the dots linking different disciplines, academics, and practitioners
meeting to share best practice and above all, acquiring new skills. So, as we look
ahead, the world is crying out for a new cadre of corporate and public
diplomats.

NOTE
1 A recent book, “Corporate Diplomacy: Building Reputation and Responsibility for Shareholder Value”
(Henisz, 2014), emphasizes shareholder value.

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 CHAPTER

23
Public Relations and the Concept of
‘Nations within Nations’
The Case of Bullfighting in Multicultural Spain

Jordi Xifra
Krishnamurthy Sriramesh

In October, 2017, the Catalan government (so-called Generalitat) held a referendum

on whether Catalonia should become an independent nation, which was passed by
the Parliament of Catalonia as the Law on the Referendum on Self-determination of
Catalonia. The referendum had been declared illegal by the Constitutional Court of
Spain the previous month after a request from the Spanish government, which
declared it a breach of the Spanish Constitution. Additionally, in early September the
High Court of Justice of Catalonia had issued orders to the police to try to prevent
the plebiscite, including the detention of various persons responsible for its prepar-
ation. Due to alleged irregularities during the voting process as well as to the use of
force by the National Police and Civil Guard, international observers invited by the
Generalitat declared that the referendum failed to meet the minimum international
standards for elections.
The referendum asked voters to respond with “Yes” or “No,” in response to the
question: “Do you want Catalonia to become an independent state in the form of
a republic?” The result was a resounding “yes” with 2,044,038 (92.01%) voting for
independence and 177,547 (7.99%) voting against on a turnout of 43.03%. The Cata-
lan government estimated that as many as 770,000 voters were unable to cast their
ballots as polling stations were closed because of police crackdowns. Defending the
vote, former Catalan leader Artur Mas stated: “We want to decide a new political
future. All nations have a right to do so and mature democracies respect that” (The
Guardian, November 10, 2014). This referendum, and the continuing political and
legal wrangling between Madrid (capital of Spain) and Barcelona (capital of Catalo-
nia) serves as the backdrop of this case study of the intersection of culture and public

246
23. PUBLIC RELATIONS AND THE CONCEPT OF NATIONS WITHIN NATIONS 247

relations. Whereas culture – as seen by the anthropologists – is very much central to

this chapter, we also discuss political culture (as manifested in issues management),
and activist culture thereby displaying one of the central notions of this book as out-
lined in Part I – the five variables discussed therein overlap to a great extent even
though they may be discussed individually as separate chapters.
The chapter on culture and public relations (in Part I) outlined three ways in which the
nexus between public relations and culture can be explored. Extending from that discus-
sion, this chapter discusses the notion of “nations within nations” where distinct cultural
groups that consider themselves as a homogenous entity and hence a “nation” (in this
case the autonomous region of Catalonia) may find themselves within the political bor-
ders of another nation (in this case Spain). In our view, Spain is a classic example of
nations within a nation as evident in the case we have selected for this analysis. The case
study of the ban on bullfighting in Catalonia is interesting to public relations scholars,
for several reasons. Was this ban a political or cultural victory? Was the ban a victory of
Catalan nationalism against the nation of Spain? Was this ban representative of the clash
between “tradition” (centuries old habit of bullfighting) and “modern” values (animal
rights activism)? We find in this case study the confluence of a number of cross-currents
such as the nationalism of the Catalan and their penchant for some sort of “independ-
ence” from the dominant Spanish culture, and the ways in which advocates of the ban
used issues management principles and activism to advance their cause. It is interesting
to note that the parliament of another Spanish autonomous region, the Canary Islands,
banned bullfighting in 1991 as a result of the initiative led by a deputy of the Spanish
conservative party, Partido Popular. But on the other hand, it is also true that parliament
did not ban Catalan fiestas in which, the bull is tortured but not killed.

BULLFIGHTING IN SPAIN AND CATALONIA

Spain would be the first country that comes to the mind of most people when the word
“bull fighting” is uttered. To appreciate the deep significance of bulls and bullfighting to
the Spanish self-image and culture, one needs to see the starkly black Osborne bull – also
known as “bullboards” (Block, 2007). Inaugurated in 1957 in Spain, these billboards
were originally only 13 feet high and cut from a single piece of wood – to advertise the
well-known Veterano Brandy. Today, ninety “Osborne bulls,” each supported by fifty-five
tons of scaffolding, function as prominent landmarks along highways throughout Spain.
In 1994, The Spanish government, declared the Osborne bull a part of the Spain’s
National Heritage (Brandes, 2009, p. 784) – a cultural heritage, we observe.
The origins of bullfighting in Spain can be traced to ancient Rome – Emperor Claudius
used it as a substitute for gladiatorial combat, which he had banned (albeit for a short
time). Bullfighting spread from Spain to its Central and South American colonies. It
spread to France in the 19th century (Abella, 1993). The Spanish introduced bullfighting
on foot around 1726. This type of fighting drew more attention from the crowds and thus
the modern corrida, or fight, began to take form, as riding noblemen were substituted by
commoners on foot and Spain came to be popularly known as the “home of bullfighting.”
In Catalonia, the earliest recorded bullfight took place in 1387, although, as else-
where in Spain, it was not until the early 19th century that bullfighting in the region
took its form as a modern spectator sport. By the early 20th century, bullfighting had
become one of the major entertainment attractions in Catalonia. The region still pre-
serves some of the oldest bullrings in Spain, such as the Plaça Clarà in Olot (built in
1859), and the bullring in Figueres (1894). A bullring built in 1897 in Girona was
248 JORDI XIFRA AND KRISHNAMURTHY SRIRAMESH

demolished in 2006 (Abella, 1993). The only operating bullring in Catalonia, La

Monumental in Barcelona, was closed after a finale of 17 fights were held in 2011.
This compares to 285 fights organized in the Community of Madrid (with a similar
population to Catalonia) during 2011. A ban on bullfighting in Catalonia was
approved by the Catalan Parliament on July 28, 2010, following a petition (or popu-
lar legislative initiative) organized by the Prou! Platform (Catalan for “Enough!”).
The petition attracted 180,000 signatures. The parliamentary vote was 68 votes for
and 55 against, with nine abstentions. The ban came into force on January 1, 2012.

CAMPAIGN FOR/AGAINST BULLFIGHTING: A CULTURAL AND POLITICAL

TUG-OF-WAR

Opposition to bullfighting is not new. Since its introduction in Spain, bullfighting has
been controversial and has met with criticism and even bans. Charles III of Spain,
influenced by the Count of Aranda, banned bullfighting in 1771. However, his sub-
jects ignored it and continued to enthusiastically support new bullfighters. Francisco
de Goya even had a collection of engravings on bullfighting. Charles IV of Spain
again banned bullfighting in 1805. After the Peninsular War (http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Peninsular_War – cite_note-2), throughout the 19th century, the Spanish Parlia-
ment frequently debated the ban. In 1877, the Marquis de San Carlos deputies pro-
posed another ban, which was rejected for fear of being too unpopular. Today, the
defenders of animal rights lead the charge against bullfighting.
However, the Catalan case is special. Portraying bullfighting as an element of the
dominant Spanish culture, some groups advocated for the ban to show Catalan cultural
nationalism. Although the then president of the Catalan government, Artur Mas,
stated that he didn’t believe that the Catalan ban was “a Catalan victory,” and the
Spanish government asked that the ban not be politicized, the conflict had nationalistic
overtones. In response to the ban in Catalonia, the Community of Madrid (headed by
Esperenza Aguirre, President of the conservative Spanish nationalist party) chose to
“reinforce the Feast of the Bulls,” initiating the process for declaring bullfighting “Bien
de Interés Cultural,” a category of the Spanish heritage register. In October 2011, the
Spanish Senate (with a Socialist majority supported by the Catalan nationalists)
rejected the conservative proposition to declare bullfighting as “Bien de Interés Cul-
tural.” After that, the conservative Partido Popular party filed an appeal before the
Constitutional Court against the Catalan law banning bullfights from 2012.
Meanwhile, in Catalonia, civil society in favor of bullfighting also was mobilized,
using the same resources that had been used by groups opposed to bullfighting. This
initiative received support from some conservative media. Of particular note was the
support received by the Spanish nationalist newspaper La Gaceta, which, on Octo-
ber 14, 2011, handed out a sheet to collect signatures with each copy of newspaper
(90,000 in total). With this brief description of the case, the next sections will review
three streams of literature that help us analyze the case of banning bullfighting in Cata-
lonia and linking them with public relations: culture, issues management, and activism.

SPANISH CULTURE: “NATIONS WITHIN A NATION”

According to Brandes (2009), bullfighting is more closely associated with Spanish

national identity than baseball is to that of the United States. Marvin (1988) con-
tended that the cultural significance of the bullfight is
23. PUBLIC RELATIONS AND THE CONCEPT OF NATIONS WITHIN NATIONS 249

suggested by its general popular image as something quintessentially Spanish, by the con-
siderable attention paid to it within Spain, and because of its status as an elaborate and
spectacular ritual drama which is staged as an essential part of many important celebra-
tions. (p. XV)

The author also observed that the torero, or bullfighter, has long been a heroic figure
occupying a special place in Spanish popular culture. Those observations concerning
the centrality of bulls and bullfighting to Spaniards, both historically and contempor-
aneously, are more than confirmed by the enormous number and variety of proverbs
that focus on bulls and the bullfight in general (Mitchell, 1991). It is this link to
Spanish culture that also makes bullfighting less acceptable to other cultures within –
the nations within what, to the rest of the world, is the country of Spain.
Spain is hardly the homogeneous nation contrary to the perception of outsiders
unfamiliar with the fact that Spain consists of three main “minority” nations: the
Catalans, the Basques, and the Galicians. Each of these cultures has its own language
(not dialect), cuisine, history, and culture and all three have tried mightily over the
centuries to maintain and increase their cultural uniqueness and political independ-
ence from Madrid – icon of the Spanish state. In addition, the influence of Islamic
culture in the Andalusian region allows us to approach to it as the fourth culture of
Spain. A brief description of each culture helps establish why we use the term “nations
within nations” in this chapter.

Catalonia

Catalonia is an autonomous region in the north-eastern corner of Spain with Bar-

celona as its capital. For hundreds of years before the unification of Spain in 1469,
Catalonia had its own empire in the Mediterranean controlling the Balearic
Islands, Sardinia, and Sicily. Catalonia was the center of the Industrial Revolution
in Spain and became the economic capital of the entire country, while political
power was based in Madrid. Because of their national pride and economic wealth,
the Catalans have had an often uneasy relationship with the central government
and the majority of people in the region have wanted more autonomy or even full
independence.
During the dictatorship of Franco (1938–1978) the Catalan language and culture
were severely oppressed. Teaching, and even speaking Catalan was illegal but this
only transformed the language into a political tool and it survived underground.
Today the Catalan language is taught in all schools in the region and even immi-
grants from other parts of Spain, Latin America, and Africa speak it. Catalan lan-
guage TV and radio, newspapers, and magazines, novels, plays, and poetry all help
keep the Catalan “nation” and culture alive and thriving. Apart from the region of
Catalonia, the language and its dialects are also spoken in Valencia, the Balearic
Islands, Andorra, and the North-west of Sardinia. It is the most widely spoken
“minority” language in Spain and the number of speakers is actually growing.
According to the government of Catalonia, more than 6 million people speak Catalan
in contrast with 4.5 million people who spoke it in 2007 (www20.gencat.cat/portal/
site/Llengcat?newLang=en_GB).
Over the past thirty years, the sources of opposition to bullfighting within Catalo-
nia have grown in parallel with the growth of separatist sentiments. Most Catalans
readily declared the bullfight to be a Castilian rather than pan-Spanish custom, and
250 JORDI XIFRA AND KRISHNAMURTHY SRIRAMESH

they believed that it should be permanently banned within Catalonia. They also
objected to public displays of the bull, a symbol of the hated Spanish state, which,
under Franco, attempted to obliterate their language and distinctive customs. Conse-
quently, one of the main objectives of Catalan nationalists has been to rid Catalonia
of the Osborne bull (described at the beginning of this paper), which they have done
successfully with the banning of bullfighting. We next offer a brief overview of the
three “minority” cultures (nations) of Spain to highlight the differences in cultures
within one political boundary.

Basque

The Basque Country is an autonomous region in north-central Spain with its own
unique culture and language. Its language Euskera is not related to any other existing
language in the world. No one knows the origin of Basques with one school of
thought proposing that they are the original inhabitants of Europe, pre-dating the
Celts and other tribes (Ayala, 1986). The Basques are traditionally a sea-faring
people and fishing was, and is, a very important part of the Basque culture and econ-
omy (Castells et al., 2008).
During Franco’s dictatorship Basque language and culture was also oppressed simi-
lar to Catalan. This oppression led to the creation of the group ETA which, sadly, is
what most people unfamiliar with Spain associate with the Basque Country today.
This terrorist organization was founded in the 1960s and became the most effective
terror organization in Europe. ETA – “Euskadi Ta Askatasuna” (Basque Homeland
and Freedom) – was formed mainly to win independence for the Basque Country
through political and military action (Castells et al., 2008). On October 20th, 2011,
ETA declared an “end to armed struggle” and renounced its campaign of terrorist
violence after more than half a century.

Galicia

Galicia is an autonomous region in the north-western corner of Spain. The Galicians are
a Celtic race, related to the Irish, the Scots, and the Welsh. Many aspects of Galician cul-
ture such as dance and music are very similar to Irish and Scottish culture (there is even
a Galician version of the famous Scottish bagpipe, the gaita) but the Galician language is
a Romance language that has descended from Latin (García-Cárcel, 2012). Galician, or
gallego, is almost identical to Portuguese and some people regard it as a Portuguese dia-
lect rather than a separate language.

Andalusia

Andalusia has a wide array of social customs, many of which have their roots in
Islamic traditions integrated into the area under Muslim rule. Each sub region in
Andalusia has its own unique customs that are closely tied to a combination Catholi-
cism and local folklore. Traditional dress in Andalusia tends to be colorful and
involves various head coverings confirming a Muslim past. Andalusia doesn’t have
a specific language with Andalusian Spanish being one of the most widely spoken
forms of Spanish in Spain, and because of emigration patterns has influenced Ameri-
can Spanish as well. Rather than a single dialect, it is a range of dialects sharing
some common features; among these is the retention of more Arabic words than
23. PUBLIC RELATIONS AND THE CONCEPT OF NATIONS WITHIN NATIONS 251

elsewhere in Spain, as well as some phonological differences compared with Standard

Spanish (Ayala, 1986).

Reactions from These Non-Dominant Cultures (Nations) to Bullfighting

Central as the symbol of the bull may be, the bullfight, and even bulls themselves, have
come under serious attack from several politically active segments of Spanish society.
From this perspective, some authors (e.g. Mitchell, 1991; Brandes, 2009) consider, first,
an ethno-nationalist opposition. In Catalonia, large, potentially ferocious bulls have
come to represent Castille, synonymous with the oft-despised Spanish centrist state. In
fact, rightist opponents of enhanced autonomy for linguistically and culturally distinct
regions such as Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia, have adopted the silhou-
ette of the Osborne bull in the countryside as their unifying symbol (Brandes, 2009).
Over the past thirty years, the sources of opposition to bullfighting within Catalonia
had grown parallel with the growth of separatist sentiments. Most Catalans readily
declared bullfighting to be a Castilian, rather than pan-Spanish custom, arguing that it
should be permanently banned in Catalonia. They also objected to public displays of
the bull, a symbol of the hated Spanish state. It is worth noting here that most of this
opposition is nationalistic rather than ethical – the mainstay of animal rights activists
opposed to bullfighting.

BULLFIGHTING AS ISSUES MANAGEMENT

In addition to analyzing the ban on bullfighting as a cultural issue, we have chosen

two other variables discussed in Part I – political system (in the form of issues man-
agement here) and activism – to link the case of Catalan ban on bullfighting to
public relations although several other streams of thought are equally relevant. Since
Howard Chase coined the term “issues management” in 1977, much of the literature
has focused on how issues management can help corporations respond more robustly
to their critics such as civil society but our case is not bound by that orientation.
Ewing (1987) stated that issues management “is about power” (p. 1) signifying how
important strategic communication can be to establish primacy in society. Heath
(2004) stated that issues management “…helps a variety of organizations serve stew-
ardship roles … [and that it is] a vital part of activism, issue-relevant nonprofits, and
government agencies.” Many themes discussed within issues management are relevant
to this case.
In 2003 Catalan separatists launched a campaign against the Osborne bull by ini-
tially painting some of the billboards in the colors and pattern of the Catalan flag.
They decorated other billboards with white, cloud-like marks, so that the bulls looked
like cows. Still unhappy with any remnant of this Castilian symbol in their midst,
they dismantled the structures by early December 2003 (Brandes, 2009). Having thus
made a statement about their intentions, Catalan nationalists then turned to the prac-
tice of bullfighting. They garnered a fair amount of popular support in this effort
from a variety of sources including animal rights activists who may not have had
Catalan nationalism as their focus. Clearly, the coalition against bullfighting had
myriad hues and not all were fighting for Catalan nationalism as indicated in a 2007
survey finding that about 81% of Catalans opposed bullfighting (Brandes, 2009). Sur-
veys showed that Catalans and Gallegos were the least interested in the sport and the
Andalusians the most. Given that bullfights are popularly known as the “fiesta
252 JORDI XIFRA AND KRISHNAMURTHY SRIRAMESH

nacional” – national festival (Marvin, 1988, p. 52), the opposition by Catalan separat-
ists was hardly surprising.
In December 2006, 37 towns and cities in Catalonia declared themselves “anti-
taurina” (against bullfighting). In 1997, motivated by a growing awareness that bullfights
might provoke emotional trauma, the Catalan Parliament declared that children under
the age of 14 could not attend these events because of their violence and gore (Brandes,
2009). Protests ensued and the following year the law was modified permitting 14-year
olds to witness bullfights if accompanied by adults. Apart from nationalist and political
groups, one of the most important allies for the cause against bullfighting were animal
rights advocates. One of the most active Spanish organizations in this campaign is the
Asociación Defensa Derechos Animal (ADDA). This group employed the internet effect-
ively in the struggle to outlaw bullfights. In June 2006, the internet was used to rally
youth to demonstrate against bullfights in front of Spanish Embassies located in at least
seventeen countries including the United States. To draw attention to their cause, the
demonstrators wore nothing but plastic bull horns and skimpy undergarments (Brandes,
2009). The web site www.latortura.es disseminated gory “videos of torture,” as it called
them – graphic close-up shots of bulls in agony. The nationalistic campaign also received
support from animal rights advocates throughout Europe – popularly known as “animal-
ists” (animalistas in Spain; animalistes in France and animalisti in Italy).
With this overview, we now use the issue life cycle offered by Crable and Vibbert
(1985) to discuss the anti-bullfighting campaign. Crable and Vibbert (1985) extended
this stream of research and offered what they called the “issues life cycle” consisting
of five phases (potential, imminent, current, critical, and dormant) and posited that
only issues that go through the first four phases result in legislative action resulting in
laws that regulate corporate activities. Even after an issue has resulted in public
policy, it does not die but only remains dormant until another set of activists invoke
it as an issue that needs to be resolved and try to advance it through the four stages
of the lifecycle seeking a solution that is more amenable to them. We will next assess
how the animal rights advocacy groups in Catalonia advanced the issue of bullfight-
ing through these phases of the life cycle (including the dormant phase) ensuring suc-
cess of their campaign.

Potential Status

The campaign was launched in August 2006 by the interest group Plataforma Prou!
(Stop!) – founded by a group of citizens who were disenchanted that Catalan politicians
did not heed the sentiments of the over 80% Catalonians who wanted to end bullfighting
in their land. The group began the campaign by setting up a website (www.prou.cat/)
that, among other things, helped collect the 50,000 signatures required to force the Par-
liament of Catalonia to discuss, and vote on, the issue.

Imminent Status

The interest group Plataforma Prou! had succeeded in getting a significant number of
Catalonians interested in the issue, thus proving that the “potential” of the issue had
been accepted by “others” thus moving the issue to imminent status. One of those
“others” was the separatist political party (in the government), Esquerra Republicana
de Catalunya, for whom bullfighting was a symbol of the dominant Spanish culture.
In parallel, Plataforma Prou! built alliances with others members of civil society, and
23. PUBLIC RELATIONS AND THE CONCEPT OF NATIONS WITHIN NATIONS 253

received the support of another political party created only for abolishing bullfighting
(Partido Animalista). In addition, some celebrities, specially from other regions of
Spain and from abroad (such as the British actor Ricky Gervais), stated their support
to the abolition of bullfighting through a video in Youtube1 cementing that the issue
had firmly moved into the imminent status.

Current Status

Crable and Vibbert (1985) stated that an issue is in the current status when it becomes
part of the social agenda. In this stage, the role of mass media is crucial. The anti-
bullfighting issue reached this status in November 11, 2008 when the popular initiative
(supported by 180,000 signatures) was admitted for discussion by the Catalan Parliament
and approved one year later (December 18, 2009) with groups representing the two sides
of the issue protesting in front of the Parliament building representing the dichotomiza-
tion of the issue: the Plataforma Promoció i Difusió de la Festa that favored continuation
of bullfighting in Catalonia, and a mix of members from different groups for animals’
rights. In addition, until the final decision of the Catalan Parliament in 2010, the
groups opposed to bullfighting held demonstrations in front of the Plaza de Toros
Monumental, then the only active bullring in Barcelona, to attract the attention of
international tourists – with great efficacy.
During the parliamentary debate, an animal rights group called Plataforma Prou!
was engaged in various issues management strategies. In particular, it made deft use
of media relations and its website with frequent updates – both of which were crucial
for the interest group with meager resources. Interestingly, the government didn’t take
a position on the issue and had no media relations activities. In fact, all political par-
ties permitted their members to vote based on their conscience – rather than issuing
a party-ling whip – saying they considered the issue a personal and emotional one,
not political. For this reason we can find some dissonance between emotions and pol-
itical convictions among Catalan politicians as illustrated in the statement of Josep-
Antoni Duran, the leader of the Catalan nationalist party Unió Democràtica that
considered the ban a national identity issue: “Banning full fighting is not a question
of national identity” (La Vanguardia, 3/4/2010)2; and Alicia Sánchez, the leader of
Catalan section of Spanish national and conservative party, Partido Popular (Popular
Party, today in the government) said: “I enjoy bullfighting and I am against the ban”
(La Vanguardia, 3/4/2010).3

Critical Status

The issue ascended to critical status in December 2009 when the Catalan Parliament
approved the onset of the legislative procedure that would lead to ban bullfighting in
the nation. The communication strategy of Plataforma Prou! was well planned to
ensure constant pressure on the parliament. It announced the support of different
celebrities such as Ricky Gervais, to the media. All the main newspapers of Spain
and Catalonia (El País, El Mundo, ABC, La Vanguardia, El Periódico) covered the
event. For its part, Plataforma Promoció i Difusió de la Festa presented the press
with a manifesto defending bullfighting and opposing its abolition. During this
period other actors used media relations and advocacy advertising strategies and tac-
tics to further dichotomize the issue. In June 2010, La Monumental de Barcelona
Funciones Taurinas, owner of the only bullring in Barcelona, began an advertising
254 JORDI XIFRA AND KRISHNAMURTHY SRIRAMESH

campaign on the headrests of Barcelona taxis promoting bullfighting.4 Three months

earlier, Pedro Balañá, the CEO of this company and the most prominent businessman
of Catalan entertainment industry declared in a press conference that attendance at
bullfighting spectacles had been growing since 2003.5
The most nationalistic tactics against the ban came from Spanish nationalist par-
ties, which tried to turn the issue into a political one rather than one about animal
cruelty. The March 2010 press conference of the President of the government of the
region of Madrid, Esperanza Aguirre, to announce her intention to include the his-
tory and tradition of bullfighting as a crucial part of Spanish cultural identity in sec-
ondary school curriculum received the most media attention. As one of the most
popular leaders of Partido Popular, Aguirre also organized a tour of different regions
governed by Partido Popular, as Valencia and Murcia, to build an alliance to protect
bullfighting stating: “Bullfighting is an art and deserve to be protected, such as monu-
ments or museums ( … ) Goya, Picasso, García Lorca ( … ) Hemingway and Orson
Welles, have considered bullfighting as an art” (La Vanguardia, 3/6/2010, p. 16).
Plataforma Prou! responded with its own media campaign against the efforts to
turn the issue6 into a nationalist discussion and continued its campaign for obtaining
support from celebrities including football players such as Carles Puyol (the leader of
Barcelona Football Club).7 Prou! also garnered the support of experts such as the
Humane Society Veterinarian Medical Association (HSVMA) that sent a letter to the
President of Catalan Parliament to urge the Parliament of Catalonia to disregard
statements that suggest that the bull does not suffer greatly during its time in the
ring.8 This argument was the paramount one used by supporters of bullfighting.
Activists also ensured that since the beginning of the legislative process to ban bull-
fighting in Catalonia, the Catalan parliamentarians received a steady flow of letters
and manifestoes favoring the abolition of bullfighting.9
Proponents of banning bullfighting were further buoyed when a group of 273 emi-
nent scientists from 16 countries sent a statement to the Catalonian Parliament
demanding the end of bullfighting:

the mistreatment of animals is a very serious and worrying issue that affect society and
the repercussions of which are very significant for the welfare of the people. It is increas-
ingly clear that a world that allows the abuse animals is a world less safe for humans.10

In contrast, the Catalan government remained silent with the Minister of Culture
only stating that the decision on this issue was a legislative one and that the Catalan
government would respect the parliament’s decision.11 This doesn’t mean that the
Catalan government did not experience nationalism from this issue. This answer is
a form of democratic legitimation of the decision. With this kind of justification, the
government endorses the issue to the parliament (democratically elected by people of
Catalonia). The same reason has been used in the claim for the independence from
September 2013. The use of this argument was a rhetorical tactic.
On July 28, 2010, the Parliament of Catalonia voted to ban bullfighting in the region
from July 2012. With this policy resolution, the issue entered the dormant status that
Crable and Vibbert had identified. Indeed, one of the claims of the supporters of ban-
ning bullfighting is to ban all the events in which animals are used. One of the most
traditional Catalan festivals is the correbous (“fire bull”), in which people run behind
bulls whose horns are lit with fire, as if they are torches. So, for the groups that defend
the rights of animals, the banning of correbous is the next goal.
23. PUBLIC RELATIONS AND THE CONCEPT OF NATIONS WITHIN NATIONS 255

However, the proponents of bullfighting did not remain dormant for long. Some provin-
cial chapters of the most important conservative party in Spain, the Partido Popular, have
tried to declare bullfighting as a cultural heritage in response to the ban. In March 2012,
the Federation of Bullfighting Organizations (Federación de Entidades Taurinas) presented
590,000 signatures to the House of Representatives to endorse another popular legislative
initiative to declare bullfighting “Bien de Interés Cultural” the Spanish equivalent of
UNESCO’s Masterpieces of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity12 so that
regions like Catalonia could not ban it.

Dormant Status

With the ban instituted by the autonomous government of Catalonia, the issue was not
put to rest – exactly as described by the life cycle of an issue. The Spanish government
deemed bullfighting as a “cultural heritage” and, much to the chagrin of the Catalonian
“nation,” the ban was ruled unconstitutional by the Spanish Supreme Court on Octo-
ber 5, 2016. In its ruling, the Supreme Court stated that “preservation of common cul-
tural heritage” was essential and that the Catalan Parliament had exceeded its
authority in instituting the ban. The key difference in perception here related to whose
cultural heritage and whether the term “common” was relevant given the differences in
culture between the “nations” within the Spanish nation. Needless to say, the decision
of the Spanish Supreme Court was received with outrage by most Catalans as reflected
by Neus Munte, spokeswoman for the Catalan government, who stated that the Cata-
lan government would “set to work immediately to ensure that the ruling has no prac-
tical effect” (The Guardian, October 20, 2016). That was in stark contrast to the glee at
the ruling expressed by ex-president of the Madrid region Esperanza Aguirre who
tweeted: “Bulls return to Catalonia. Millions of Spanish and international fans cele-
brate the decision.” The rage, and the battle, continue.

Activism

Issues management is closely linked to activism. Along with citizens and the government,
activists form the three-legged stool that is issues management. As described in the chap-
ter on activism (Part I), activists form the major force that threaten corporations thus
creating the need for corporations to engage in issues management. Currently there is
scant empirical evidence linking public relations with activism although two decades have
passed since L. Grunig (1992) offered conceptual links between public relations and
activism by defining activism as an effort by “a group of two or more individuals who
organize in order to influence another public or publics through action that may include
education, compromise, persuasion, pressure tactics, or force” (p. 504). Kim and Srir-
amesh (2009) discussed the conceptual linkages between socio-cultural factors and
activism and offered research questions and propositions to advance empirical
research linking these two key variables. The chapter on activism in this volume has
extended those discussions. We use the case study of the ban on bullfighting in the
Catalonian region of Spain to provide an example of the nexus between activism and
public relations.
Social movements in Spain have played an important role throughout its history,
but especially in the last three decades since the arrival of modern democracy after
Franco’s dictatorship. The country has seen many types of social movements rise and
this activist arousal has involved different social and worker groups and labor unions.
256 JORDI XIFRA AND KRISHNAMURTHY SRIRAMESH

The main reasons of activism were the recognition of civil rights, an outcome
achieved in 1978, when the Constitution was approved. After 1978, activism centres
around political activism aimed at obtaining greater recognition for political and
financial autonomy for regions such as the Basque Country and Catalonia. Although
the terrorist group ETA has not relinquished its arms (a ceasefire has been in place
since September, 2012), independence-oriented activism does exist and manifests itself
regularly in the streets of cities such as Bilbao and San Sebastián. In Catalonia, the
nationalist movement is represented by both the autonomous government and
important groups in civil society.
Animal rights groups were mobilized and lobbied for legislation to protect these
rights in different autonomous regions. Thus, the Parliaments of the regions of
Madrid, Murcia, Catalonia, and the Canary Islands approved this legislation. How-
ever, only the Canary Islands banned bullfighting in 1991. The civil platform against
bullfighting in Catalonia (Prou!), can be linked with Catalan nationalism, because
bulls are not specific to Catalan culture, as opposed to “dominant” Spanish culture,
along with flamenco (curiously, a sign of Andalusian culture).

CONCLUSION

The primary purpose of this chapter is to highlight that political boundaries that determine
what we call as “nation-states” often belie cultural boundaries. The notion of “nations
within nations” has been coined to emphasize that cultural distinctiveness often induces
populations to rebel in various ways to assert their uniqueness. We have used the ban (and
subsequent reversal) of bullfighting in Catalonia to discuss the impact of culture on public
relations by studying Spain as a nation containing nations – unique cultures – within what
we see as the nation of Spain with its distinct political boundary. The case also helps expli-
cate the impact of the political system (including the role of the judiciary) as well as activ-
ism on public opinion and public relations.
We have highlighted how the Franco regime imposed Spanish “culture” on these
unique nations that they accepted begrudgingly at the point of a gun. With the dawn of
democracy, nationalism has erupted – sometimes violently such as the actions of ETA –
but also legislatively as seen in the Catalonian ban on bullfighting. We have argued that
banning bullfighting is a political decision with cultural motives, because Catalan nation-
alism is a cultural nationalism that turns political when it is used as an argument and
ideology by national political parties. Importantly for public relations scholars, the cam-
paign to ban bullfighting in Catalonia had strong international allies such as animal
rights groups and international celebrities – helping immensely for media relations. This
case has also highlighted the usefulness of issues management to study how issues spawn
and develop into activism and then into successful social movements. Communication
has been key in all stages of the development of this issue to its final conclusion. Looking
to the future, we believe that more studies are needed from around the world that can
showcase the role of unique cultural idiosyncrasies in public relations thus expanding the
body of knowledge and making it less ethnocentric.

NOTES
1 www.youtube.com/watch?v=L_mPhAZYEyo
2 www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20100304/53897201411/duran-dice-que-prohibir-los-toros-no-es-identi
tario.html
23. PUBLIC RELATIONS AND THE CONCEPT OF NATIONS WITHIN NATIONS 257

3 www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20100304/53896635409/sanchez-camacho-asegura-que-disfruta-en-la-fiesta-
y-se-opone-a-su-prohibicion.html
4 www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20100616/53947449565/la-monumental-contrarresta-el-movimiento-antitaur
ino-con-una-campana-en-taxis.html
5 www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20100317/53897700925/balana-asegura-que-las-corridas-de-toros-ganan-pub
lico-en-catalunya-desde-2003.html
6 www.abc.es/agencias/noticia.asp?noticia=338981
7 www.prou.cat/n.php?id_noticia=30
8 www.prou.cat/n.php?id_noticia=34
9 www.prou.cat/n.php?id_noticia=36
10 www.prou.cat/n.php?id_noticia=36
11 http://hemeroteca.lavanguardia.com/preview/2010/07/25/pagina-16/81064365/pdf.html?search=toros
12 www.publico.es/espana/426814/590-000-firmas-para-declarar-los-toros-bien-cultural-en-catalunya

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Castells, L., Cajal, A., & Molina, F. (Eds.). (2008). El País Vasco y España: identidades, nacionalismos
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Ewing, R. P. (1987). Managing the new bottom line: issues management for senior executives. Homewood, IL:
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Heath, R. L. (2004). Issues management. In R. L. Heath (Ed.), Encyclopedia of public relations. Thousand
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Mitchell, T. (1991). Blood sport: A social history of Spanish bullfighting. Philadelphia, PA: University of Penn-
sylvania Press.
 CHAPTER

24
Climate Change Imperatives for Global
Public Relations
Who Pays and Who Cares?

Judy Motion

Failure to understand and address climate change will have significant ramifications for
the public relations profession. This chapter seeks to understand how a justice orienta-
tion for public relations may be deployed to shape climate change action. The scientific
consensus is that we are living and working in the Anthropocene age of human-induced
climate change (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2014). Yet, there
is a lack of clarity about the meaning of the term “climate change.” At a most basic
level, there can be a tendency to conflate the terms weather and climate. A simple dis-
tinction is that weather refers to “events” (Allen, 2003, p. 891) whereas climate refers to
weather “systems” (Egan and Mullin, 2016, p. 357) or “patterns.” Climate change sci-
ence is concerned with long-term pattern changes rather than daily or seasonal change
(Rocklöv, 2016). Australian environmental advocate and academic, Tim Flannery, sum-
marized climate change in this way: “our earth is warming, and will continue to warm
in proportion to the volume of fossil fuel we burn” (Flannery, 2015, p. 5). Discursively,
climate change has been very deliberately positioned as controversial and an ideological
predilection – something to be believed rather than understood. Public relations is
deployed to play both sides of the controversy: campaigns are designed to advocate for
climate change action or also to negate and deny climate change science.
As described in the first part of this volume, Sriramesh and Verčič (2009) identified
a level of activism as a significant infrastructural ingredient in international and global
public relations that provides provides both challenges and opportunities. Citizens, non-
government organizations, and nations engage in efforts to mitigate climate change that
may be broadly categorized as activism including opposition to fossil fuel extractivism,
acknowledgement of the anthropogenic nature of climate change, calls for a reduction

258
24. CLIMATE CHANGE IMPERATIVES 259

in CO2 emissions, and legal redress (Flannery, 2005, 2015; Rushbridger, 2015). As part
of the discursive contestation involved in climate change action, public relations is
expected to navigate and negotiate issues about liability and care. A range of justice
questions related to liability and care are embedded in advocacy campaigns for climate
change action including what is at stake, whose interests are being served, and who
wins and who loses? Public relations has tended to deploy Corporate Social Responsi-
bility (CSR) as a mechanism for addressing such questions and issues. Here, as
a counter to the dominance of CSR, an environmental justice approach is adopted to
examine the discursive shifts that ensue from positioning the environment at the center
of concerns. In particular, the concepts of guardianship and personhood are explored to
offer insights into the possibilities for global public relations initiatives to mitigate cli-
mate change action. The aim of this chapter is to shift the ideological focus to onto-
logical and epistemic concerns about climate change.

LIABILITY: WHO PAYS?

Asking the question, “who pays?” focuses attention on a range of fiduciary and finan-
cial responsibilities that may be commonly considered to be outside the parameters of
public relations. Yet, if public relations is to realize its role in contributing to a “fully
functioning society” (Heath, 2006, p. 94), then public relations, in its many forms, needs
to help nations, organizations, and citizens make sense of climate change and the asso-
ciated liabilities – obligations and responsibilities – for climate change. This involves
a discursive shift from ideological debates about believing in climate change to epistemic
engagement with what is known and what needs to be actioned. Public relations also
has an obligation to ensure that we understand “who pays” in terms of experiencing
the impacts of climate change – who or what will experience climate change first and
experience it most markedly?
Moral arguments have been disappointingly ineffective in mobilizing change in some gov-
ernment and corporate responses. Moving beyond moral pressure and expectations that
CSR will address climate change means that public relations has to be deployed to lobby
for climate change action in the form of treaties, regulations, and legal redress. Many past
attempts to agree upon a system of global climate governance stalled due to individual
nations prioritizing their own interests. However, on December 12, 2015, the Paris Climate
Change Conference adopted a new climate treaty. Known as the Paris Accord, or the Paris
Agreement, it marked a global commitment “to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas
emissions as soon as possible, making specific reference to the 2°C goal, and even an aspir-
ational reference to the 1.5°C goal” (Savaresi, 2016, p. 5). These ambitious goals included
mitigation, adaptation, and means of implementation such as capacity building, finance,
and technology transfer (Savaresi, 2016, p. 5). Notably, the Paris Agreement reversed the
justice principles of the earlier 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Among the reversals were such things
as removing equitable differentiations between the obligations of developed and developing
nations; self-determination by nations/states on how they intended to reduce their CO2
emissions; and the establishment of a framework to review progress rather than the previ-
ous approach of setting targets and a timetable to achieve them (Clémençon, 2016). The
risks and liabilities “associated with a global transition towards low-carbon societies”
(Savaresi, 2016, p. 8) were to be managed by individual nations. Although the provisions of
the Paris Agreement seem inadequate from a justice perspective – and potentially ineffec-
tual – the Agreement has been perceived to offer credence and legitimacy for climate
change action.
260 JUDY MOTION

Recently, the Paris Agreement has been destabilized by the Trump administration’s
announcement withdrawing the United States from the Paris Agreement. However, sev-
eral states including Hawaii and California have determined that they shall remain com-
mitted to the agreement and therefore liability remains a hotly contested issue to be
resolved by future global governance initiatives. Still, the role for public relations is
clear – at a political level it must support climate change mitigation treaties, regulations,
and policies while at a societal level it needs to support a low carbon way of life.

FROM CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO JUSTICE

Shifting our focus from a global governance perspective to corporate public relations
departments and consultancies helps us highlight a number of significant limitations to
the usual application of CSR to environmental issues such as climate change. Although
CSR is a useful tool for reminding corporations of their broader obligations to society
and the environment, it does not protect organizations or guarantee the advancement of
social and environmental justice. CSR is predicated on notions of a “collective environ-
mental conscience” (Allen, 2003), that, while essential, does not take into account the
risks of climate change liability including:

Operational Risk (disruption of company operations),

Insurance Risk (increased premiums and/or uninsurability),
Regulatory Risk (regulation of greenhouse emissions and ensuing compliance costs),
Shareholder Risk (shareholder activism and disruption)
Litigation Risk (costs resulting from “climate litigation”)
Capital Risk (inability to raise capital)
Competitive Risk (loss of economic opportunity) (Climate Action Network Australia
(CANA), 2003)

Although this list is indicative, it doesn’t specifically mention the presence of risk to
profitability but it does suggest disruption will be intense and far-ranging. From
a public relations perspective, we would also need to add, for example, governance
responsibilities, media relations, brand damage, and reputational risk as tools that can
help communicate environmental issues. Even though CSR has proved useful for public
relations professionals and their clients, organizations need to pay particular attention
to, and prioritize, climate risk and liabilities rather than hope that CSR will take care of
issues related to climate change. To be blunt, the complexities of climate change require
a more sophisticated mechanism than CSR for addressing such challenges. CSR is
predicated upon an approach in which risk and obligations are calculated by determin-
ing how to offset financial impacts with social and environmental good work.
A significant problem is that a key tenet of CSR is the need to keep its three pillars –
economic, social, and environmental obligations – in balance. However, according to
Ihlen and Roper (2014), the balance metaphor defines and justifies how sustainability
and sustainable development are operationalized in CSR. The authors argued that “bal-
ance” is a discursive strategy for ensuring that profitability is not subordinate to social
and environmental concerns. Thus, balance is not about an equal emphasis on each of
the three pillars; instead, it supports neo-liberal discourses deployed to defend the
status quo and ensure profitability is prioritized.
In a time of climate change, balance can no longer be the deciding principle. A damaged
or irreparable environment will eventually override financial and social considerations. For
24. CLIMATE CHANGE IMPERATIVES 261

organizations, timely responses will mean less financial risk and liability. A key responsibil-
ity for those in public relations, then, is to reconfigure the focus from a discourse of CSR to
justice practices. Such an undertaking requires mobilized global networks that prioritize cli-
mate justice and open up a new vocabulary for thinking through the ways in which environ-
mental and social issues are subordinated to economic concerns. In practice this means
a focus on vulnerabilities, adaptability, sustainability, protection, and preservation (Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014).
Scholarly understandings of environmental justice draw heavily upon the work of
Nancy Fraser (1998, 2001) who discusses social justice in terms of inequalities and
a broadening of political and cultural contestation. Fraser (2001) identified this contest-
ation as a struggle for equitable redistribution of resources, recognition of identity/
status, and participation. Framing social justice in this way makes it possible to prob-
lematize institutionalized patterns of cultural value, governance structures, and decision
making processes. Boundaries between various forms of justice are permeable and
dynamic; environmental justice claims have social and cultural dimensions; and environ-
mental concerns are generally subordinate to social concerns. Schlosberg (2013, p. 51)
offered a broad definition of environmental justice that encompasses multiple forms of
“environmental disadvantage,” not only human vulnerabilities related to the environ-
ment, but also for the natural world itself (Schlosberg, 2013, p. 51). Environmental just-
ice claims generally include attempts to preserve, protect, or reclaim space and place;
assertions of identity, culture or meaning; and struggles for inclusion, power, control, or
autonomy.
More recently, notions of care (de la Bellacasa, 2011) and attachment (Groves, 2015)
have been explored in relation to environmental justice and indicate the emergence of
affective considerations that are absent in considerations of CSR. The term “climate
justice” is more specific and describes how fairness and legality will be applied to the
predicament of humans. The problem with this definition is that by taking human
impacts as a starting point, impact on non-human or more than human entities are
neglected or rendered invisible. As discussed in the section on CSR above, the key
approaches to climate justice are distributive or “burden sharing justice” and corrective
or “harm avoidance justice” (Caney, 2014, pp. 125–126). However, Caney (2014, p. 141)
argues that these approaches fail to take into account what he terms the “Power/
Responsibility principle” in which those with power have a responsibility to protect
people from the existential threats posed by climate change. The emphasis shifts from
a focus on “responsibilities to reduce emissions and to engage in adaptation” to the
“explicitly political responsibilities that are needed if we are to avoid severe climatic
changes” (Caney, 2014, p. 147).
Pursuit of justice is most often driven by citizens and non-government organizations.
However, a challenge for those advocating action is that climate change has brought about
weather improvements and thus climate change is viewed positively. Egan and Mullin
(2016) state that that scientific emphasis on mean temperatures does not equate with how
people experience weather. Experiences of daily weather have been mostly positive and
therefore determine how people understand climate change (Egan and Mullin, 2016). This
finding has important implications for science communication – apocalyptic, dystopian
messages and future scenarios do not correspond to the public’s experiences of present per-
ceptions and conditions (Egan and Mullin, 2016). Although these findings apply to the
United States, it seems doubtful that widespread public pressure is likely to drive climate
change action. Instead, as we try to understand the implications for public relations, several
recent developments offer insights to help us understand what climate change will mean
262 JUDY MOTION

and how we may best care for our climate. These developments are notable because they
offer insights into alternative ontological and epistemic ways of thinking through climate
change action. In the following sections two instances of how care is instantiated are exam-
ined to contribute to the discursive repertoire of climate change action.

WHO CARES: PROTECTORS AND GUARDIANS

Climate change action is directed at preventing the extraction of fossil fuels and encour-
aging divestment from such industries. The campaign against the Dakota Access Pipe-
line (DAPL), a project run by the Dallas-based Energy Transfer Partners, that would
connect the North Dakota shale oil fields with the eastern pipeline networks in Illinois,
focused on arguments about climate change and potential toxic leaks into drinking
water. A range of national and international opponents including indigenous nations,
environmentalists and war veterans, united to protest the pipeline in 2016. The Standing
Rock Sioux tribe was at the center of the protests and sought to advance indigenous
sovereignty, land rights, and protect the environment.
A clear disjuncture between the ways the pipeline was promoted and and the issues
prioritized by particular publics was evident. In an online article/factsheet published by
Energy Transfer Partners that is titled “Dakota access pipeline facts” a claim was made
that DAPL “is the safest and most environmentally sensitive way to transport crude oil
from domestic wells to American consumers” and that it among the “most technologic-
ally advanced pipelines in the world” (Energy Transfer Partners, n.d.). The fact sheet
explained that approval involved review by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and regu-
lators in North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, and Illinois. Further facts are provided
such as the cost of the project ($3.8 billion), that the project “crosses almost entirely
private land, often already in use for other utility easements,” that “DAPL does not
[bold in original] cross the Standing Rock Sioux reservation,” and that “the United
States Army Corps of Engineers alone held 389 meetings with 55 tribes regarding the
Dakota Access project” (Energy Transfer Partners, n.d.). The fact sheet expressed
respect for the Standing Rock Sioux tribe concerns along with an intention to continue
to work with the tribe to address concerns. The factsheet then diverged from facts with
the following statements:

Recently, their interests have been overtaken by politically-motivated, anti-fossil fuel pro-
testers who are using this issue as a cover for their often violent and extremist efforts to
cause disruption. Their actions deny private property rights and freedoms to the landowners
who are near and adjacent to the Standing Rock Reservation and deny American citizens
and businesses the energy they need to produce jobs and build a vital and healthy economy.
The behavior by some of these extremist organizations is not only criminal but dangerous to
themselves and others, and we join with law enforcement and others in asking them to obey
the rule of law. We will continue to defend the rights we have been granted through proper
and legal venues, and the rights of Americans to reduce foreign dependence on fossil fuels to
power our economy and warm our homes. (Energy Transfer Partners, n.d.)

It is evident that the factsheet was also intended to persuade – the views expressed were
subjective and the language used was clearly emotive. Positioning theory (James, 2014;
Motion, 1997, 2000; Roper, 2005; Wise and James, 2013) offers public relations insights
into issues of representation and meaning that may be salient for thinking through climate
change action. Actors attempt to deliberately control how people understand an issue by
24. CLIMATE CHANGE IMPERATIVES 263

opening up or closing discursive possibilities or positions for opponents in order to achieve

a particular outcome (James, 2014; Motion, 1997). Within the excerpt quoted above three
discursive positions intersected – nationalism, capitalism, and justice – to justify DAPL as
exemplified by terms such as “freedom,” “rights,” “jobs,” and “economy” that served to
position DAPL as an economic justice issue. In contrast, protesters were positioned as pol-
itical, violent extreme, and criminal. The factsheet sidestepped denigrating the Sioux pro-
testers – and thus avoids claims of explicit racism – and opts, instead, to denigrate those
who support the Sioux. The implication, however, is that the Sioux are guilty by
association.
Within public controversies, issues of identity and recognition are mobilized to
explain and defend certain community positions or exemplify particular social relations
such as empathy and collective care. A significant feature of the justice discourse was
the Sioux tribe positioning and identification as “water protectors.” This descriptor
served as a mobilizing position that spanned multiple boundaries and opened up rights-
based claims. Indigenous ways of thinking about human relationships with nature
accentuated guardianship – responsibility and protection of the interests of water – and
enacted indigenous ways of understanding the world. Embedded in this approach is
a distinct ontological orientation that conveys a more intimate and spiritual affinity
with nature that carries particular obligations. The term “water protectors” functioned
as a deliberate rejection of the activist label and associated negative connotations. The
notion of protesters as water protectors was a mechanism for claiming symbolic power
and implicitly repositioning those who promoted DAPL as water wreckers and destroy-
ers. Justice discourses function as sense making narratives for inserting a diverse range
of values into governance processes. Protesters offered an alternative justice framing
raising concerns beyond safety and risk by invoking environmental justice claims com-
plemented by calls for indigenous sovereignty. These clashing justice discourses are indi-
cative of a contested moral order, particularly in relation to corporate neo-liberal
responses to climate change versus collective cultural values and responses.
The Standing Rock campaign attracted global media attention and support.
Although President Obama rejected a critical permit for the DAPL as one of his last
actions, President Trump ordered the resumption of the pipeline construction soon after
his inauguration (Levin, 2017). During completion of the pipeline three minor oil spills
occurred, confirming protesters’ claims and concerns (Rice, 2017). A federal judge ruled
in June 2017 that Energy Transfer Partners did not adequately consider the environmen-
tal impacts of a possible oil spill and ordered a review (Associated Press, 2017). The
outcome of the review was announced in December 2017; Energy Transfer Partners
were ordered to work with local tribes and the Army Corps of Engineers to develop
a coordinated response plan by April 1, 2018 (Volcovici, 2017). Although the pipeline
project was not shut down as protesters advocated, risk reduction and independent
oversight have been instigated. Like many controversies, the final resolution relied upon
legal interventions and judgements. This is a critical insight for public relations – not
only do we need to integrate climate change liabilities and an ethic of care, we also
need to consider the legal implications.
The concerns and attachments of a broader range of social actors need to be inte-
grated into decision making and their worldviews taken into account. Protection and
guardianship of the environment are fundamental to indigenous ways of thinking and
prioritizing care above other concerns – CSR fails to prioritize these ontological modes
of thought, sensitivity and responsibility. Yet, ontological dimensions of environmental
issues that incorporate alternative ways of making sense of reality and our engagement
264 JUDY MOTION

with the environment may increasingly offer more relevance and resonance for broader
publics. In the next section on personhood, the argument shifts beyond the discourses
of care and the moral arguments of guardianship to consider changing legal contexts
and conditions that influence the governance of climate change and related public rela-
tions practices.

PERSONHOOD: LIVING ENTITY STATUS

A legal ruling that has potential implications for climate change action is that the legal
rights accorded to a person are being granted to a non-human environmental entity. In
2017 the Whanganui River [Maori translation – Te Awa o Whanganui] in New Zealand
was recognized as a living entity with full legal rights and India accorded the Ganges
River and its tributary, the Yamuna River, living human status (Safi, 2017). Person-
hood, ascribing the rights of a person to an environmental entity, is predicated on the
value of rights-based claims along with an ethic of care that involves communities in
the governance and protection of the environment. Cultural, environmental, and spirit-
ual perspectives that evolve from community spaces and organizing have driven this ini-
tiative – primarily the activist work of indigenous people and environmentalists.
Although it is not yet clear what this legal development will mean in practice, legal rec-
ognition means that polluting or damaging such entities is the equivalent of harming
a person and may, therefore, accord communities greater power. From a public relations
perspective, this trend is a significant shift from current, deeply-compromised and com-
mercialized ways of thinking of the environment as a resource to be exploited.
The following case study of the Whanganui River offers insights into the notion of per-
sonhood and alternative ways of thinking about environmental entities. The Whanganui
River, located in the North Island of New Zealand, winds its way 290 kilometers west
from its source, Mount Tongariro, to the Tasman Sea. Today, the river connects remote
Maori settlements, farmland, and rural and coastal towns. The Whanganui River is mar-
keted as a tourism attraction – images of the river highlight drifting mist, deep gorges,
wild bush, calm serene waterways, and occasional navigational challenges of white water
rapids. For the indigenous people of New Zealand, the Maori, Whanganui River has
mythical and spiritual significance. The Maori proverb, Ko au te awa. Ko te awa ko au.
[English translation: I am the river. The river is me] reflects a worldview about a sacred
connection with nature that contrasts with many western discourses of mastery over
nature and undermines the nature – culture divide that sustains environmental exploit-
ation. For the Maori, the river is a living being with its own life force (mauri). Assertion
of that worldview has been litigated through the Treaty of Waitangi Tribunal,
a permanent commission of inquiry, that investigates and makes recommendations for
government to address Maori claims and grievances. In the longest running legal case in
New Zealand, traversing 140 years, a settlement was reached in 2012 that granted the
river legal identity with the rights, duties, and liabilities of a legal person. This settlement,
passed into law in March 2017, recognizes Maori kinship with the river rather than an
a more traditional ownership or management model. Oversight of the river’s legal rights
will be undertaken by a Maori and a government official.
A week after the New Zealand law, judges in India ruled that the Ganges and Yamuna
rivers and their tributaries would be “legal and living entities having the status of a legal
person with all corresponding rights, duties and liabilities” (Safi, 2017). Like the Whanga-
nui River, the Ganges has sacred significance. Yet, efforts to clean the polluted Ganges have
not succeeded. Legal custodians will now be responsible for conserving and protecting the
24. CLIMATE CHANGE IMPERATIVES 265

rivers and a management board will be established. The case arose from complaints that
state governments were not cooperating with federal efforts to establish a panel to protect
the Ganges (Safi, 2017). A lesson for public relations is that these justice initiatives may be
community or government driven. Environmental justice, in these instances, has moved
beyond notions of disadvantage to incorporate rights, duties, and responsibilities along
with an alternative mode of litigation. Personhood has important implications for thinking
through issues of liability and care in relation to climate change. Although, perhaps the sig-
nificance of this development is primarily symbolic, the threat of litigation may reduce
carbon emissions and environmental damage. Or perhaps climate will be accorded living
entity status. Climate is clearly a natural phenomenon but is it possible to argue that cli-
mate is an environmental entity that should be accorded human rights? We could, perhaps,
draw upon international precedence and borrow from the Japanese who have designated
the Nigoshide technique for creating milky white porcelain as an Important Intangible Cul-
tural Property (Saito, 2005). Could climate be designated an essential intangible environ-
mental entity with human rights? And if it were to be accorded human rights, how could
climate harm be measured and attributed? The challenge for public relations professionals
is to understand how this way of thinking and legislation will advance climate change
action and their role in bringing about such legislation. For activist communities, the chal-
lenge is to harness guardianship discourses and personhood litigation in ways that mean-
ingfully transform climate politics.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Finding ways to mitigate and address climate change is a complicated problem for public
relations. This chapter has introduced the notions of guardianship and personhood, as just-
ice-driven ways of thinking through issues of liability and care. It argues that a CSR approach
to climate change is deeply problematic when thinking in terms of liability. Although CSR is
seemingly a “balanced” approach, it is primarily about protecting profitability and therefore
climate change is narrowly conceived and ideologically invested. Environmental justice is
a more powerful, holistic mode of thinking through climate change. Environmental justice,
here, is not only about disadvantage – it is about reconfigured relationships with nature and
recognition of our connections with and emotional attachments to nature – a kinship/partner-
ship model. Conceived in this way, environmental justice is intertwined with social justice
involving recognition and redistribution of rights and participation in decision making. In
particular, climate change issues of liability and care point to a global mission for public rela-
tions in promoting shared responsibilities for the environment. Exploration of issues of
guardianship and water protection highlighted the positioning maneuvers, value of strong
global network of activists, awareness of risks, and the importance of continual pressure on
extractive industries as mechanisms for climate change action.
The personhood examples help us learn about valuing indigenous ways of thinking
and spiritual connections or emotional, empathetic connections with the environment.
For public relations theory, guardianship and personhood may help the field move
beyond ideologically invested models of mastery over nature, a resource-dominant view
of the environmental and a schismatic way of thinking about the relationship between
nature and culture. Repositioning climate change as an epistemic and ontological con-
cern reconfigures the role of global public relations – science, justice, and the emotional
and experiential dimensions drive climate change action. Practically, guardianship and
personhood offer a way of working through complicated or contested multi-layered gov-
ernance models for climate change action.
266 JUDY MOTION

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 CHAPTER

25
Character Assassination and Reputation
Management in the Context of Mediated
Complexity

Sergei A. Samoilenko

INTRODUCTION

In September, 2012, a YouTube trailer for the film Innocence of Muslims suddenly came to
prominence. The movie contained disjointed dialogue and sloppy editing, and was clearly
intended to offend Muslims by targeting the character and actions of Islam’s Prophet
Muhammad. It depicted Muhammad as a child of uncertain parentage, a pervert, and
a homosexual, and questioned the origin and validity of the Koran. This depiction reson-
ated with common stereotypes held in the Middle East that the West is anti-Muslim and
morally degraded. The movie release was supported by the infamous Florida pastor Terry
Jones who had been known for the long courted controversy of proposing International
Burn the Koran Day (Kleidosty, 2014). Symbolically, massive demonstrations against the
film broke out on September 11, 2012, the 11th anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on
the United States. Innocence of Muslims soon became a serious issue on the international
political agenda: violent protests took place in many Muslim nations and European
countries, resulting in the deaths of several people. The film became even more notorious
after Susan Rice, then U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, erroneously linked terror-
ist attacks on the U.S. consulate and CIA facility in Benghazi, Libya in September, 2012
to the global protests triggered by the movie. Opponents subsequently accused the
Obama administration of downplaying a terror attack for political reasons.
This incident is illustrative of how the world has become more complex. In today’s
global society, large events happen more often than in the past, mainly due to an
increased number of individual actions. As this example shows, multiple networked
groups and individual actors constantly incite the public to support their causes or

268
25. CHARACTER ASSASSINATION 269

mobilize against political regimes. Essentially, “we are in a period of fluctuations in

which individual action remains essential” (Prigogine, 1999, p. 138) and may have serious
consequences for the whole system (Gladwell, 2000; Prigogine & Stengers, 1997). Any
fluctuations in the social system are accompanied by increased entropy manifested via
the surge of offensive communication behavior (e.g., belligerent populist rhetoric, hate
speech, and public insults). These individual manifestations may subsequently disturb
social order and lead to new issues and conflicts. Clearly, “each bifurcation point has
beneficiaries and victims” (Prigogine, 1999, p. 136). The Innocence of Muslims is a case
study of an online character attack on a religious figure that resulted in some serious
reputational damage for the United States. A substandard YouTube video composed of
hate speech and stereotypical clichés, produced as a prank by an amateur producer, went
viral, fueling public outrage all over the world and causing a prominent scandal at the
highest level of U.S. and international politics.
A complex society is a risk society. In the context of globalization, most reputa-
tional risks result from structural transformations triggered by the development of
information technologies. The nature of political and corporate competition
implies that reputational crises stem from the actions of invested stakeholders.
New technological innovations also enable agents with malicious intent to cause
tangible reputational damage to their targets. Eventually, aggressors resort to vari-
ous defamation practices, known collectively as character assassination. “Character
assassination (CA) is the deliberate destruction of an individual’s reputation”
(Icks & Shiraev, 2014, p. 4). One example is a political “smear campaign,” which
is composed of various character attacks in the form of spoken insults, negative
campaign ads, caricatures, or materials containing misinformation. Broadly speak-
ing, this concept can be selectively applied to social groups and organizations,
especially when CA methods get used by strategic actors during contested (and
often adversarial) interpersonal, intergroup, and interstate interactions resulting in
reputational losses for various parties involved (Samoilenko et al., 2020). The
complex nature of highly mediated events often impedes public relations special-
ists from controlling for multiple reputational risks and responding to new emer-
gencies and crises. Few organizations and governments can keep up with the pace
of events while maintaining their immunity to the multiplicity of reputational
risks. As Dezenhall (2014) put it, many organizational leaders appear to have “a
glass jaw” when faced with a new character attack.
This chapter argues that character assassination (CA) is becoming a systemic
norm. Although CA appears to be as old as human civilization (Icks & Shiraev,
2014), academic research has done very little to interpret its nature, causes, and out-
comes in highly mediated and competitive contexts. This concept of character assas-
sination was originally addressed by political scientists (Davis, 1950; Shiraev, 2014),
and has been discussed only episodically in political communication and propaganda
studies (Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 2004; Schultz & Pancer, 1997). This chapter
intends to examine the functional characteristics of CA, rather than address its ethical
considerations. First, it explores the concept in the context of field competition. Next,
the issues of CA and reputation management are discussed under the conditions of
globalization and new communication technologies. Specifically, this chapter helps
address the emerging challenges that CA-related events pose to various publics.
Finally, the chapter discusses the prospects of locating the CA framework within the
literature on reputation management.
270 SERGEI A. SAMOILENKO

CHARACTER ASSASSINATION AS FIELD COMPETITION STRATEGY

In different societies, the relevant norms and values of social order require all mem-
bers to be regarded on the basis of their possession (or non-possession) of respected
status markers, such as appropriate education, professional affiliation, or hierarchical
position. All members of society are expected to uphold certain accepted norms of
appropriateness and credibility in order to continue participating in social inter-
actions. Most individuals are required to comply with public expectations across sev-
eral dimensions: the social dimension includes recognized norms of social interaction;
the expressive dimension refers to various forms of authenticity; and the functional
dimension deals with professional qualities and competencies. “The fulfillment of
expectations in open societies depends on trust, and this trust is based on reputation”
(Imhof, 2016 p. 175). Thus, reputation serves as the assurance of a social actor’s
intention to maintain the existing social order.
The social world has become more intersubjective and is now configured by mul-
tiple actors engaged in a continuous struggle for influence. The notion of field strug-
gles refers to multiple networks of relationships built and maintained by committed
actors intensely competing for resources, namely status and control of the social rules
(Bourdieu, 1991). Since the size and perceived significance of capital legitimizes their
power status, these contestants naturally attempt to accrue, preserve, or convert vari-
ous types of resources. The value of this capital is determined by wealth, rare qualifi-
cations, or powerful social networks. Some forms of capital, such as prestige, may
have merely symbolic influence. Symbolic capital is acquired through “a reputation
for competence and an image of respectability and honorability” (Bourdieu, 1984,
p. 291) and helps social actors publicly assert their power status.
The owners of valuable capital seek to preserve its value and resist attempts to sub-
vert it (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). These two goals cannot be achieved without
public support or approval. Typically, all members of society claim to possess the set
of socially approved personal qualities and competencies required to reproduce social
order. Eventually, they engage in face-to-face negotiations with each other to acquire
and maintain desired social identity and legitimacy (Goffman, 1959). In this sense,
face refers to “socially situated identities people claim or attribute to others” (Tracy,
1990, p. 210). In social interactions, actors tend to employ communication strategies
that allow them to appear credible to others. These impression management strategies
refer to various forms of strategic self-presentation (Jones & Pittman, 1982) that are
selected by individuals to create and maintain desired and appropriate face in relevant
contexts. Impression management is used to project social competence, induce compli-
ance, or construct and protect impression integrity (Metts, 2009). In everyday inter-
actions, individuals constantly make choices concerning their public image that are
consistent with approved social values and rules for social interaction.
In competitive contexts, all actors are compelled to constantly invest resources in
symbolic products and seek help from public relations or media professionals. The
notion of “impression management” can thus be applied to professional practices of
image or reputation management (Coombs & Holladay, 2006). Public relations spe-
cialists and political consultants help individuals and organizations improve their
reputation by zooming in on attractive personal characteristics while downplaying all
other facets of their identity. When someone’s face is threatened, there is a tendency
to counteract these threats with preventive facework. When the face is lost, an individ-
ual is motivated to restore it through corrective facework to avoid the feeling of
25. CHARACTER ASSASSINATION 271

discomfort over disrupting the social order (Metts, 2009). This helps build overall
social capital, a network of “institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance
and recognition” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 119).
In highly contested environments, individual and collective actors constantly seek to
reframe and impose their definition of reality on the public. The nature of competition
sometimes involves the use of deliberate strategies and tactics intended to challenge or
weaken the public image of other contestants. According to Cupach and Metts (1994,
p. 4), face threats occur “when someone’s desired identity is challenged.” Inevitably,
this face threat involves the public reevaluation of the individual’s character, including
the way this character was formerly perceived and judged by others. The term “charac-
ter” includes a moral dimension, attaching value judgments to a person’s behavior and
experience (Samoilenko et al., in press). Certainly, one’s perceived character must be
socially approved – and one’s reputation positive – before attacks can be made (Shiraev,
2014). Some prominent forms of symbolic capital, such as high social status or rank,
are associated with greater public expectations with regard to one’s demeanor. Predict-
ably, this symbolic capital tends to increase the probability of reputational risks for its
holders. As a matter of fact, higher reputation is associated with a greater probability
of public outrage during a reputational crisis due to disappointed hopes and expect-
ations (Imhof, 2016). For example, one traditional strategy to maintain a strong public
profile and high legitimacy is to court constant media attention. However, a high profile
is a double-edged sword. Prominent public figures become targets of character attacks
during electorate campaigns or other competitive selection procedures that provide favor-
able conditions for various attackers.
Essentially, character attacks indicate that the target holds high social status (an
important or esteemed social position), represents a competitive ideology, or sup-
ports a widespread cause. These attacks may take the form of character assassin-
ation campaigns that are preplanned, sustained, and strategically executed by their
producers (Icks et al., 2017; Icks & Shiraev, 2014; Samoilenko, 2016; Samoilenko
et al., 2018). The concept of “character assassination” refers to both the process
(e.g., a defamation campaign) and the outcome of this process (e.g., a damaged
reputation). An act of character assassination is represented by three main charac-
teristics: it targets an individual; it is intentional; and it is directed at the public.
Unlike ad hominem attacks, many CA assaults do not have to take place in the con-
text of a debate. They may involve covert operations composed of erasing from
memory (Icks & Shiraev, 2014) or strategic deception, such as rumors and conspiracy
theories (Samoilenko, 2017). A character assassination event is a multidimensional pro-
cess that is best examined based on five factors: the Attacker, the Target, the Medium,
the Audience, and the Context. This framework is closely examined in Samoilenko et al.
(2020).
In a tight race, a character attack may be sufficient to cause a substantial drop
in the polls, potentially securing a victory for the attacker’s chosen candidate. At
the societal level, the reputational damage incurred can lead to declining confi-
dence in leadership and an erosion of public trust (Imhof, 2016). Yet the out-
comes of CA efforts are most extensive and significant for the targets of these
attacks. Not only may this individual fall from grace and confront threats to his
or her social status, but the process of character assassination may eventually
lead to the “death” of the character. The damage sustained in an attack can last
a lifetime.
272 SERGEI A. SAMOILENKO

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF REPUTATION MANAGEMENT

Scholars argue that communication processes should no longer be studied within

national contexts alone (Wessler & Brüggemann, 2012). This volume (Part I) suggests
that contemporary public relations issues should be discussed in connection to struc-
tural changes produced by globalization and technological innovations. In addition,
this chapter addresses the effects of mediatized politics and declining trust in institu-
tions as critical issues of reputation management.

Globalization and New Technologies

The fabric of the social world today is constantly transformed through technological
innovations and media practices that eventually lead to deep mediatization (Couldry
& Hepp, 2017) or the continuous construction of the social reality by the media. In
the context of globalization, local communities became more susceptible to inter-
national scandals and reputational crises resulting from “the compression of the
world” and the heightened “consciousness of the world as a whole” (Robertson, 1992,
p. 8). Our national agendas and activities become influenced by the individual actions
of people in other countries. For instance, many of the fake news websites that
emerged during the 2016 U.S. election have been traced to a small city in Macedonia
where teenagers were producing sensationalist stories to earn cash from advertising
(Subramanian, 2017).
The course of events in complex systems is particularly affected by timing and the
speed of unfolding actions initiated on social media networks. The 24/7 news cycle
changed the concept of deadlines, and is itself progressively becoming a “Twitter
cycle” that requires constant news supply. It has also increased the sheer volume of
content needed to fill this space twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Rivera
and Karlsson (2017) go so far as to suggest that the 24/7 news cycle is a contributing
factor in the rise in CEO dismissals. The same can be said of celebrities’ shifting
status. In October 2017, it took Harvey Weinstein less than two weeks to fall from
being the most powerful Hollywood mogul to being fired from his own company,
rejected by his wife, and expelled from the Motion Picture Academy and the Produ-
cers Guild of America’s board of directors. The subsequent “Weinstein Effect” rippled
across the world as the “#MeToo” hashtag, originally created to denounce misogynic
behavior and sexual harassment, became a global movement (Cook & Simons, 2017).
Increased online visibility and transparency present additional problems for organ-
izations and their leaders. According to Aon’s 2017 Global Risk Management Survey,
“damage to brand and reputation” is the number one threat; the survey found that
public companies have an 80 percent chance of losing at least 20 percent of their
equity value due to some type of reputation issue. For a company to be highly
regarded, its CEO needs have a visible public profile (Weber Shandwick, 2015). At the
same time, higher visibility is associated with increased public scrutiny and, therefore,
the potential for additional reputational risks. The 2014 Deloitte Global Survey sug-
gests that staff’s online behavior poses the greatest risks to a company’s reputation.
Inappropriate tweets or videos with sensitive content may negatively impact the
CEO’s reputation and organizational image. In September 2017, after @tedcruz, the
official Twitter account of Senator Ted Cruz liked a pornographic tweet, the Texas
senator became the target of viral mockery online. His name began trending on Twit-
ter and was temporarily linked in the media to an explicit video. According to Cruz,
25. CHARACTER ASSASSINATION 273

the mishap was “an honest mistake” by a staff member who had accidentally hit the
wrong button (O’Keefe & Selk, 2017).
The Internet has become fertile ground for character attacks, incivility, and decep-
tion. Moreover, the anonymity offered by the Internet is routinely abused by users who
engage in unrestrained and manipulative practices, such as trolling, cyberbullying, and
harassment (Ambedkar, 2017). A nine-country study suggests that governments and
individuals are using propaganda on social media to manipulate public opinion
worldwide (Woolley & Howard, 2017). Users themselves may contribute to the dis-
tribution of falsehoods by sharing fabricated news, both knowingly and unknow-
ingly (Barthel, Mitchell, & Holcomb, 2016). Numerous online information sources
lead audiences to rely on heuristics and social cues to determine the credibility of
information. Rumors and conspiracy theories originating with anonymous sources
prove especially dangerous in contexts where “the original source is lost or no
longer responsible for verifying the proposition” (Walton, 1996, p. 196). For
instance, in mid-August, 2016, after watching an out-of-context video, far-right blog-
gers and influential conspiracy theorists spread rumors about Democratic presiden-
tial nominee Hillary Clinton’s health within their communities to such a degree that
the claims became a topic of discussion on Fox News, Jimmy Kimmel Live, and
NBC News, as well as at Donald Trump rallies (Cheadle, 2016).

Mediatization Issues

In 2017, the Mason CARP lab released a report stating that the media ecosystem has
significantly transformed in recent years, becoming extremely conducive to incivility
and CA practices (Icks et al., 2017). Different systemic issues (including declining
profitability, massive restructuring, and resource challenges) undermine the media’s
ability to cover basic news, much less undertake nonpartisan investigative journalism.
The decline in journalistic standards (e.g., independent interpretation of events) and
frequent media bias (e.g., high dependence on the government agenda – see Entman,
2004) have become more evident in recent years.
A primary concern is the increasing mediatization of society and culture (Hjarvard,
2008), or “the growing intrusion of media logic as an institutional rule into fields
where other rules of defining appropriate behavior prevailed” (Esser & Matthes, 2013,
p. 177). One critical impact of mediatization is that the production of news content
has become ever more dictated by commercial imperatives and consumers’ expect-
ations, rather than substantive policy issues. The logic of the media system, as dis-
cussed in Part I of this volume, also comes to substitute for the primary functions of
an institution. To take the example of the famous O. J. Simpson case, Thaler (1997)
argues that the media did not simply report the case, but were instrumental in creat-
ing a spectacle that hijacked American culture. The aforementioned 24/7 news cycle
also leads to the “tyranny of speed over accuracy” (Dezenhall, as cited in Icks et al.,
2017) that is displayed when additional fact-checking is sacrificed on the altar of the
drive to publish sensational content ahead of competitors.
Several studies (Esser, 2013; Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999)
address the effects of imposing a media market logic on a political news content. These
include: promoting sensational features of political events; focusing on conflict rather
than compromise; relying on emotions, polarization, and stereotyping in storytelling; pre-
senting political news from “soft news” angles and using “episodic framing:” and spot-
lighting fragments of the political discourse, packaged in catchy phrases and compelling
274 SERGEI A. SAMOILENKO

visuals. Entman (1989) defines the three main characteristics of all daily media coverage
arising from production biases: simplification, symbolization, and personalization. In
other words, elaborate narratives must be distilled down to familiar symbols, slogans,
and cognitive associations. Dramatic scripts, the stories and actions of archetypal charac-
ters (heroes and villains), should be easily recognized by any audience and relate to ordin-
ary people’s mental scripts and expectations.
The adoption of media logic by a political system produces a hybrid of mediatized
politics (politics overly dependent on the needs and rules of mass media). The personal-
ization of politics is evidenced by a political news content constructed around personal-
ities rather than institutions and social issues. Since the media format is limited to
presenting selected fragments of political life, media professionals tend to prioritize the
personal traits of political actors (Gilens, Vavreck, & Cohen, 2007). Clearly, the media
are likely to support those actors who fully embrace the media logic, including favoring
“politicians with telegenic image, popular rhetoric and marketable messages” (Esser,
2013, p. 172). Thus, the personal attributes of political actors become important criteria
in determining popular acceptance of their issues and policies. The media logic obligates
politicians to adapt to the soft news format and constantly participate in shaping news
coverage of daily events. As a result, issue politics are exploited by political performers
that have gained the prominance of celebrities (Esser & Matthes, 2013).
Another aspect of mediatization is the rise of negativity in political discourse. Fol-
lowing the Watergate scandal, American journalism moved toward a more confronta-
tional style of politics (Bai, 2014). “With malice toward all” (Moy & Pfau, 2000),
many contemporary journalists advance their careers through confrontainment. This
approach exploits the function of critical watchdog journalism according to
a commercial logic (Esser, 2013). Most popular opinion formats in mass media outlets
evidence a heavy dose of insulting language, name-calling, dramatic negative exagger-
ation, and mockery (Berry & Sobieraj, 2014; Prior, 2013; Sobieraj & Berry, 2011).
A recent analysis of news coverage during the 2016 general election concluded that
coverage of both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump was overwhelmingly negative in
tone and extremely light on policy (Patterson, 2016). Negativity is quite profitable in
times when Americans are polarized in their affective attachments toward partisan
groups (Iyengar & Westwood 2014; Mason, 2015) and more divided in terms of trait
perceptions of presidential candidates.
An overall dependence on sensational headlines and clickbait content made news
organizations vulnerable to disinformation and manipulation during the 2016 election
campaign. Marwick and Lewis (2017) argue that the mainstream media were suscep-
tible to manipulation from the far-right press due to a number of factors, including
a proclivity for sensationalism. This policy contributes to creating a media environ-
ment in which rumors, conspiracy theories, and character attacks on public figures
thrive. Arguably, the high dosage of emotional influence in news coverage normalizes
incivility and confrontational public discourse, thus making mediated CA campaigns
more acceptable (Maisel, 2012; Mutz & Reeves, 2005). Subsequently, continuous
exposure to negativity and uncivil behavior is associated with deepening distrust in
institutions, including the media themselves.

Institutional Crisis

One primary characteristic of today’s global society is the growing public distrust in demo-
cratic institutions (Raine & Perrin, 2019). Public trust in many traditional authorities, like
25. CHARACTER ASSASSINATION 275

political institutions and the media, fell from public grace. Surveys reveal that, “less
than one fifth of the general public believes business leaders and government officials
will tell the truth when confronted with a difficult issue” (Edelman, 2013). A 2017
study further found that two-thirds of Americans believe the mainstream press pub-
lishes fake news (Easley, 2017). This trend is alarming because it leads to increasing
political cynicism and decreasing political participation (Opdycke, Segura, & Vasquez,
2013). Indeed, “(dis)empowered citizen[ry]” appears on the list of main global risks
(World Economic Forum, 2016).
Under the conditions of “trust deficit,” there is a great demand for new voices to trust.
With influence being distributed away from traditional institutions, “peer-influenced
media now represents two of the top three most-used sources of news and information”
(Edelman, 2016). According to Prior (2013), ideologically one-sided activist media have
disproportionate political influence. The proliferation of media sources and the reemer-
gence of more partisan news outlets has reinforced “tribal divisions, while enhancing
a climate where facts are no longer driving the debate and deliberation” (Mann &
Ornstein, 2012, p. 67). Niche media facilitate people-to-people connections, but also
make individuals more vulnerable to misinformation that corresponds to their basic
worldview. Since the Internet favors simplicity over complexity, there are many
“experts” and opinion leaders who constantly produce content based on opinions
rather than facts and spread misinformation and conspiracy theories (Beauchamp,
2017; Marwick & Lewis, 2017). Scholars raise concerns about “the vulnerability of
democratic societies to fake news and the public’s limited ability to contain it” (Lazer
et al., 2017). In the U.S., political polarization is arguably leading to a “culture war”
between conservatives and progressives that is associated with confrontational
dynamics, incivility, and negativity (Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope, 2006; Layman, Carsey,
& Horowitz, 2006). Thus, media fragmentation creates more competing frames, driv-
ing the divergence of political attitudes to ideological extremes and thus further
undermining trust in institutions.
In the context of institutional legitimacy crisis, there are multiple opportunities
for charismatic leaders and populists (Pillai, 1996). The 2016 U.S. presidential elec-
tion was not only characterized by an increase in “nasty politics,” but also by the
rise of populist rhetoric. Populist politicians often use character attacks strategically
to shock the audience and steal the media spotlight (Jensen & Bang, 2017). For
example, between June 2015, when he declared his intention to stand for president,
and December 2016 just after he was elected, Donald Trump issued 289 insults via
Twitter (Lee & Quealy, 2019). This inflammatory rhetoric may have nothing to do
with character assassination, as it may not seek to cause reputational harm, but
merely to conjure political ratings, generate hype, and manipulate public opinion.
Herbst (2010) considers incivility a strategic tool that can be used by politicians in
electoral campaigns. The practice of incivility has negative consequences for civil
debate, which is a requirement for a well-functioning deliberative democracy. Studies
concur that negative emotions are directly related to judgment formation and distract
people from deliberating on the relevant campaign arguments (Esser & Matthes, 2013;
Kühne et al., 2011).
Another concern is the rise of popular comedians, who are increasingly
replacing the traditional press as primary opinion leaders. A report on the media
habits of Americans finds that many adult Internet users get their news from two
Comedy Central staples, The Daily Show and The Colbert Report (Mitchell et al.,
2014). Caricatures and negative portrayals of politicians play a significant role in
276 SERGEI A. SAMOILENKO

helping people form opinions. Studies demonstrate the correlation between watch-
ing late-night comedy and increased negativity and lower support for presidential
candidates (Baumgartner, Morris, & Walth, 2012; Morris, 2009). There is a belief
that comedians are sometimes better at breaking news than traditional journalists
because they are legally less vulnerable and are held to entirely different, non-
journalistic standards (Dockray, 2017). Indeed, they can be very powerful in their role
as whistleblowers or truth-tellers; recent events have demonstrated that comedians can
launch a series of reputational avalanches. For example, it was Hannibal Buress, an
American stand-up comedian, who “broke” the Bill Cosby story in 2014, even
though women had been speaking up for years. At the same time, scholars argue that
tabloid journalism and television entertainment have normalized personal ridicule and
serve as a breeding ground for unjustified personal attacks leading to character assassin-
ation (Lichter, Baumgartner, & Morris, 2015; Lichter, Farnsworth, & Canieso, 2017).

IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC RELATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

This chapter posits that character assassination as a social and cultural phenomenon
is becoming a systemic norm. Given the defining structural issues outlined in this
chapter, the current media environment has become highly vulnerable to character
assassination. A multidisciplinary scholarly approach is required to better understand
the complexity of CA phenomena. Many historical methods of character assassination
are still prevalent and frequently practiced (Samoilenko, 2016; Samoilenko et al.,
2017). Hence, CA campaigns should not only be discussed in terms of causes and
effects of human agency but also in relation to the irreversibility of processes in com-
plex social systems.
The systems approach is recommended to make sense of CA events in globalized
and fast-paced social systems. Dezenhall (2014) argues that reputational attacks are
becoming worse because of three main reasons: the speed with which information
can be shared; the volume of information; and the venom behind the allegations.
These factors may combine to create a “fiasco vortex,” a runaway crisis of snowball
effects that magnify destructive information and spread beyond the point of no
return. As previously mentioned, complex systems are known for non-linear dynam-
ics within their components that may vary from a high degree of stability to very
unstable behavior, depending on the context. When the dynamics within a complex
system are close to a tipping point (Gladwell, 2000), even relatively small changes in
initial conditions may cause far-reaching consequences. (This is known as the butter-
fly effect – see Lorenz, 1963). As the intensity of small perturbations and issues
increases, pressure may build up over time and then erupt suddenly, leading to
system breakdown. Any emergency or incident triggers a domino effect, where
myriad events occur in response to one small push. Subsequently, the situation
passes the threshold of “critical instability” and moves toward an acute crisis that
may take an unpredictable direction and even disintegrate into “chaos” (Prigogine &
Stengers, 1997). In some cases, the toxic media ecosystem makes it almost impos-
sible for most social and political actors to claim the right to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty.
In complex systems, the impact of negative information is specific to content and
context, and becomes substantial under some circumstances. There are a handful of
variables that affect who and what becomes a target, and which targets survive and
thrive. These include: the complexity of the case, the degree of harm, the target’s real
25. CHARACTER ASSASSINATION 277

and perceived vulnerability, the adversary’s degree of motivation, the availability of

invested constituents, and other factors (Icks et al., 2017). Such factors as the
public image and likability of victim and attacker often determine media reactions
to scandals. Charisma appears to make targets of attacks less prone to CA cam-
paigns (Seiffert-Brockmann, et al., 2018). Certain character traits and personal
values can also influence the outcome of CA attempts. Government agencies
should explore this knowledge to interrupt a chosen path of attack and influence
adversaries’ decisions and actions (Tinker, as cited in Icks et al., 2017). Future
studies should help us better understand the impact of social capital as
a safeguard in the various contexts of character assassination discussed above.
There is no consensus on how to best respond to character assassination, since it
comes in multiple shapes and forms. That being said, there are multiple factors that
determine the effectiveness of reputation management. This chapter contends that
the same logic can be attributed to the use of social media during reputational
crises. Dezenhall (2014) notes that social media are usually counterproductive as
defensive narrative devices. Social media are a vehicle of dispersion, an offensive
technology that is good for building awareness. Using social media to fight a crisis
usually makes it worse, because whoever owns the most negative information will
hijack the media agenda. For example, in April, 2014, an innocent tweet from the
New York City Police Department (NYPD) asking its followers to post pictures
that included NYPD officers sparked a torrent of criticism from the Internet. The
#MyNYPD hashtag was hijacked by a number of users, who produced hundreds of
photos that purported to show police brutality carried out by NYPD officers, leading
to national coverage of the Twitterstorm (Robbins, 2014). In crisis management,
social media should be used to gather insight about a topic, gauge the volume and
intensity of conversations about clients, and understand what users find newsworthy
(Icks et al., 2017). Continuously monitoring online conversations enables crisis man-
agers to stay updated about their progress and counter falsehoods when necessary.
Apologies and image repair strategies are popular solutions during crisis situ-
ations but have their limits. These limits depend on the nature of the crisis, the
truth of the allegations, and the power of invested stakeholders. According to
Johnson and Murphy (as cited in Icks et al., 2017; Johnson, 2018), image repair
strategies may help some nonprofits resurrect their image in the wake of
a financial scandal (for example, firing the CEO rebuilds some positive feelings
toward the scandalized nonprofit). However, in most cases, image repair strategies fail
to undo any of this damage, and in rare cases even seem to backfire. A response to
a reputational attack must be anchored in good judgment, and with consideration for
the consequences of responding, at what speed, in what proportion, and for what
duration.
Political actors’ impression management skills remain crucial under conditions of
public distrust in major institutions (Cornfield, 2017; Icks et al., 2017). As long as
public confidence in national institutions remains low across the Western world,
charismatic leaders will seem attractive. Political leaders who can establish greater
authenticity than their rivals are perceived as better political candidates. Generally,
media hype about some scandalous behavior may have little impact on the public.
According to Castells (2009, p. 254), “since politicians are considered to be gener-
ally unreliable by a majority of people, the disenchanted citizen must choose the
unreliable person who is most akin to her/his values and interests.” Indeed, people
often show support for political actors if they manage to show commonality of
278 SERGEI A. SAMOILENKO

interests with the voter (Lupia, 2013). A candidate who expresses concern about
the welfare of citizens might influence voters to judge him/her more positively
regardless of whether this candidate would actually implement the promised policies
(Teven, 2008). McCloskey (as cited in Icks et al., 2017) argues that Trump’s rhetoric
during the 2016 U.S. presidential election reflected a belief that character would not be
decisive in a presidential race any time soon. Trump’s strategy was therefore to abandon
character altogether and instead focus entirely on being authentic, even if that meant
being authentically terrible.
Traditionally, public relations operate from the communication management per-
spective, helping government authorities and corporations produce instrumental
knowledge to control and solve problems in the social system. The issues addressed
in this chapter suggest that more than ever before, professional communicators are
expected to assimilate into emerging online communities and become a valuable
resource for their members. Public relations need to become synergetic with their
communities of interest, listen to a collective pulse of various groups, and finds ways
to contribute to the welfare of their members.
Communication scholars can help society in many ways. First of all, we can
respond to increasing demand for constructive approaches to resolving the issues
of incivility, misinformation, and populist rhetoric in public discourse. There
should be more discussion on how to reincorporate ethical standards into civic
communication and media practices. Second, we should invest more heavily in sci-
ence and media literacy education in order to help the public develop critical
skills for analyzing the quality of mass media and popular culture. In other words,
we should study how to raise good information consumers, which likely involves
teaching people how to understand, analyze, evaluate, and produce media mes-
sages. Third, we should support and constantly test various fact-checking initia-
tives and platforms intended to determine the veracity and accuracy of political
and scientific publications. Essentially, we should study and test approaches that
neutralize the adverse effects of misinformation and protect individuals and profes-
sional communities against future CA attempts. “Image prepare,” a formulation
suggested by Compton (as cited in Icks et al., 2017), seems particularly promising
as a conceptual model for studying (and protecting against) character assassin-
ation. Pre-emptive inoculation and image prepare strategies should be considered
counter-strategies against character assassination.
The proposed framework provides multiple opportunities for academic scholar-
ship in an area that has yet to be addressed in sufficient depth. By studying the
impact of individual or collective character attacks, scholars should act “like doc-
tors studying a disease.” We must understand the disease to know how to counter-
act it and fight against it (Leonato, 2017). A multidisciplinary scholarly approach
is required to better understand the numerous variables that contribute to the com-
plex character assassination process (Icks et al., 2017; Samoilenko, in press).
Scholars have yet to understand how character assassination enables strategic
actors to attain their goals within the current media ecosystem. We need to exam-
ine hybrid campaigns composed of both CA and misinformation strategies as new
social phenomena of online communication. Future studies should particularly
address the cognitive and emotional impacts of memes, altered images, and video
materials on public reaction to CA campaigns.
25. CHARACTER ASSASSINATION 279

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 CHAPTER

26
Crowdfunding
From Global Financial Crisis to Global Financial
Communication

Mai Anh Doan

David McKie

That the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) is now part of public discourse just
through its GFC initials is one of many signs of the international financialization of
life. Moreover, as Shiller (2012) observes, the “part played by the new financial tech-
nologies … has become a matter of public as well as intellectual concern” (p. vii).
Despite these testaments to the ubiquity and importance of contemporary finance
and financial technologies (or fintech), public relations scholars give them little atten-
tion. Financial public relations, sometimes called financial communication, or loosely
covered by the more restricted term of investor relations, occupies a modest space in
the public relations literature. At the same time, technologies, while being one of the
most frequently researched topics in financial public relations, are often discussed at
surface level and limited to website study (Doan and McKie, 2017).
At the level of society, and in many different academic fields, discussions of how
technologies and social media are increasing, or could increase, democracy have taken
place. These range from citizen journalism through India’s iPaidaBribe.com, which
crowdsources evidence on government corruption, to healthcare, where consumers use
technology to manage health-linked behaviors and to rebalance power differences
between doctors and patients toward the latter. Yet the considerable potential of fin-
tech to open economically egalitarian pathways has received little attention. To
narrow that gap, this chapter considers two recent crowdfunding campaigns in New
Zealand and reviews equity crowdfunding (ECF) possibilities in China.
In looking at democratic potentials in fintech, it opens up how they might contribute
to improving the reputation of financial public relations in particular and public relations

283
284 MAI ANH DOAN AND DAVID MCKIE

in general. It argues that the lack of attention to fintech in public relations divides the
field from developing a range of desirable directions such as the suggestions by the then-
Director General of UNESCO in his foreword to the Global Public Relations Handbook
(Sriramesh and Verčič, 2009). In this foreword, Matsuura (2009) encouraged the discip-
line of public relations to use information and communication technologies to open up
venues for exchange and discussions, especially ones about democracy. The absence also
cuts fintech off from the trend of publics becoming more multinational and multicultural
(Sriramesh, 2009) at a time when contemporary financial markets keep expanding their
global reach.
Such trends pass relatively unnoticed in financial public relations, and so too do
key issues of the age, notably, public awareness of the growth of economic inequality
(Milanović, 2016; Piketty and Goldhammer, 2014; Stiglitz, 2013). This is neglect that
hides possible pathways for financial public relations scholarship and practice to take
the lead in fostering inclusions and decreasing inequality. This chapter suggests not
only how crowdfunding can increase and promote greater financial democracy, but
also illustrates how it can be an effective public relations tool for increasing financial
equality through opening opportunities. These approaches align with recommenda-
tions that public relations learn about building reputation from economics. For
example, even after the GFC, enough economists held to “a vision of a better world
based on increasing resources and allocating them justly and rationally” to ensure
that their “aspirations and successes have earned … reputational capital” (McKie,
2010, p. 92).
We contend that financial public relations offers economic openings to reduce
inequality and gather similar reputational capital by aligning with economics Nobel
Laureate Robert Shiller’s (2012) proposals for democratizing and humanizing finance
through financial innovation. We argue for expanding Shiller’s ideas through financial
public relations consciously adopting a more prosocial role to promote financial
equality across the globe. By focusing less on, say, mergers and acquisitions, and
more on educating ordinary investors, and people who want to invest, financial public
relations can contribute to a more economically equitable society. We ground this
argument, in recent studies of one financial innovation, crowdfunding, to highlight its
potential for democratizing financial access and widening ownership. At the same
time, we locate crowdfunding in relation to two other important coordinates: Srira-
mesh and Verčič (2009) global public relations framework, and the World Bank
(2013) crowdfunding investing ecosystem.

CROWDFUNDING AND DEMOCRACY

The World Bank (2013) usefully described crowdfunding as “an Internet-enabled way
for businesses or other organizations to raise money in the form of either donations
or investments from multiple individuals” (p. 8). As a fundraising method, crowd-
funding has been around for over a century (Freedman and Nutting, 2015), but con-
temporary crowdfunding powered by the Internet and technologies only emerged
about a decade ago and is growing at an exponential rate. Fleming and Sorenson
(2016) estimated that global crowdfunding reached over US$34 billion in 2015 from
less than one billion in 2009 and Turan (2015) observed that crowdfunding is often
considered a forerunner in financial innovation and a game changer in the financial
landscape. The World Bank’s (2013) report confirmed crowdfunding as “an
26. CROWDFUNDING 285

innovation in entrepreneurial finance that can fuel ‘the Rise of the Rest’ globally”
(p. 4) and so reduce inequalities internationally.
Shiller (2012) envisioned post-GFC finance as having the potential to democratize
finance. Crowdfunding opens opportunities for everyday investors who have small sav-
ings but are looking out for better returns (Srnicek, 2016). Heminway (2014) states
that these investors are diverse in their genders, social groups, economic classes,
motivation, and locations and so form a heterogeneous investment crowd. Because
funders “meet” fundraisers and their project directly on crowdfunding platforms with-
out having to go through another intermediary, they can reduce time, costs and the
potential bias (e.g., against small investors) of the middlemen (Mollick and Robb,
2016).
Benefit sharing schemes work slightly differently in crowdfunding. Other platform
businesses, particularly social media networks, are often criticized for self-interest. For
example, as Taylor (2014) observes, they benefit from user participation and invest-
ment while returning only temporary entertainment, reputation, and connections to
the users. ECF, on the contrary, involves explicit calculations of future benefits for
investors. ECF investors participate primarily for these financial rewards (Cholakova
and Clarysse, 2015; Ordanini Miceli, Pizzetti, & Parasuraman, 2011). Some compan-
ies give investors voting rights to take part in company operations. As such, investors,
the people who drive platform success, can receive tangible benefits from community
participation, expertise exchange, and financial returns.
On the other side of the equation, crowdfunding enables access to capital for
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) who often struggle to find capital for
their expansion (Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2013). By providing a fresh source
of funds, crowdfunding levels the investment playing field. Previously, SMEs could
either go to financial institutions such as banks, or to angel investors and venture
capitalists, or use what Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb (2011) call the 3F (i.e.,
family, friends, and fools). However, available funding from the 3F is often relatively
small (Belleflamme, Lambert, & Schwienbacher, 2010) and, since the 2008 GFC,
SMEs access to bank capital was limited by stricter lending requirements (Harrison,
2013b). ECF can help by bypassing the usual financial intermediaries and connect-
ing entrepreneurs directly to a wider public who might, as a group, hold substantial
accumulated capital. More SMEs are likely to take up this opportunity because
direct access to capital, and the reduction in time spent on preparing documentation
and meeting collateral or listing requirements also means lower capital acquisition
costs (Ibrahim, 2014).
At the broader societal level, online crowdfunding virtually eliminates geographic
distances between participants, and so can facilitate engagement and idea develop-
ment from different points on the globe (Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2015; Mol-
lick and Robb, 2016). Greater participation can also generate jobs, greater
productivity, and higher GDP (Best, Neiss, & Jones, 2012). While crowdfunding is
still concentrated in developed markets, the World Bank (2013) argues for developing
countries mobilizing existing resources to leapfrog ahead without going through the
same length of transitions as in developed nations.
Crowdfunding is not without potential downsides. Risks are pervasive. Invest-
ors in crowdfunding often have low financial literacy, and/or can display herd
behaviors, and/or do not have enough shareholder protection, and/or find it diffi-
cult to monitor business performance. The businesses involved are themselves
usually start-ups or early stage companies who, typically, have high failure rates,
286 MAI ANH DOAN AND DAVID MCKIE

provide limited exit options, and face information asymmetry. Even crowdfunding
platforms can be biased (Hu, 2015) and, according to Galuszka and Brzozowska
(2017), the democratizing impact of crowdfunding is limited. Langley and Ley-
shon (2017) similarly argue that the practice of crowdfunding might not be as
open and egalitarian as others claim. For crowdfunding to fully realize its poten-
tial, the World Bank (2013) suggests a crowdfunding investing ecosystem that
builds on economic regulations, entrepreneurial culture, community engagement,
and technology. To an extent, this ecology overlaps with the framework for
global public relations proposed by Sriramesh and Verčič (2009). The next sec-
tion will shift from considering crowdfunding’s theoretical possibilities to prac-
tical illustrations through actual campaigns before returning to these two
frameworks.

CROWDFUNDING INITIATIVES AND FINANCIAL PUBLIC RELATIONS

Democratizing Access

When a private beach in Awaroa in the South Island of New Zealand was adver-
tised for sale through tender in December 2015, two brothers-in-law in Christ-
church started a civic crowdfunding campaign to buy it back and gift it to the
people of New Zealand. Within 25 days, the campaign gathered contributions
from about 40,000 New Zealand individuals and institutions who, in concert,
raised NZ$2,278,171.09 (approximately US$1.5 million). Together with some
support from the New Zealand government and another charitable trust, the
campaign won the bid. The beach now has permanent access for the public,
including visitors to New Zealand (Givealittle Abel Tasman Beach, 2016).
This campaign illustrates crowdfunding being used as an effective tool for public
relations to contribute to a fully functioning society in two aspects: by mobilizing
resources and by efficient communication (Doan and Toledano, 2018). Unlike web-
sites whose main function is to disseminate information, crowdfunding platforms
are designed to help fundraisers succeed in fundraising. According to the cam-
paign initiators, the Givealittle platform shared the campaign’s egalitarian purpose
and “bent over backward” (Gard’ner & Major, personal communication, April 07,
2016) by providing additional technical and professional support. Moreover,
crowdfunding platforms, because of their legal status and business function, can,
and do, gather both financial and non-financial resources (Heminway, 2013).
Choudary (2015) identified how crowdfunding platforms rely on a strongly devel-
oped community or network of users to encourage interactions. In the Awaroa
beach case, Givealittle had a campaign page with an interactive Q&A section, and
an update tab as well as space for pledgers to leave comments. Information on the
platform page was easy to share with the campaign’s Facebook page. This helped
ensure message consistency while maximizing outreach. Since the platform has
already built a name for itself, the campaign organizers could leverage its reputa-
tion rather than developing a new website from scratch. This meant that the organ-
izers, as grassroot activists with limited resources, could focus on crafting
engagement and message strategy. Doan and Toledano (2018) found that high con-
sensus on a community cause – based on shared values and concerns among mem-
bers – along with positive and inclusive discourses running consistently throughout
the campaign, were among the main reasons for the campaign’s success.
26. CROWDFUNDING 287

Keeping Local (Jobs) in the Age of Globalization

Demonstrations against globalization are often instigated by anger at overseas organ-

izations reducing local employment. One recent record-breaking crowdfunding
response, again from New Zealand, shows its high social value. In early 2017, Mon-
delez, the multinational owner of the confectionary brands Cadbury and Trident,
decided to shut down its Cadbury chocolate factory in Dunedin as part of its global
cost-cutting exercise (Stock, 2017). A local city councilor teamed up with others to
launch an ECF campaign inviting the public to invest in the newly formed company,
Dunedin Manufacturing Holdings (DMH). DMH was to partner with a local artisan
chocolate factory, OCHO, to expand its operation and hire those made redundant by
the Cadbury factory shutdown. In just 30 hours, the campaign reached NZ$2 million,
also the maximum limit allowed for a crowdfunding (Financial Market Authority, n.
d.-a) in a year, with contributions from 3,570 investors (Anderson, 2017; Miller, 2017;
Roy, 2017a).
The Awaroa beach example was a civic crowdfunding campaign where people
contributed money for a greater cause without receiving specific individual rewards
in return. In contrast, the Dunedin chocolate campaign was an ECF venture where,
in addition to 20% discount on their OCHO purchase, investors would also receive
dividends should the company make a profit (Pledgeme, 2017), and have voting
rights that give them a say in how the company is managed (Anderson, 2017).
Since New Zealand does not yet have a secondary market for crowdfunded shares,
this means that investors are in for the long term and will be directly impacted by
company performance. However, the pragmatic benefits seemed to blend with
a more altruistic investor purposes of bonding with the community, “to keep jobs
local” (Roy, 2017a) and of maintaining chocolate-making as part of “a national
identity” (Roy, 2017b).
In both campaigns, support poured in not just from New Zealand but from
around the world. The global input testifies to the extensive reach of crowdfunding,
although, in ECF, national regulatory requirements still apply and have a bearing
on financial public relations. For instance, the New Zealand Financial Market
Authority (n.d.-b) only permits wholesale, or accredited, investors with prior experi-
ence to invest from overseas. Other countries also impose national restrictions for
external capital through crowdfunding. The US, for example, does not allow crowd-
funding investors to invest in foreign companies (Harrison, 2013a) and Canada does
not allow investment into non-Canadian ECF platforms (Alois, 2017). Financial
public relations needs both to communicate with, and to educate, investors about
these differences. In addition, it is crucial that financial public relations advocates
for the international dimension of rules (Shiller, 2012) act to further the egalitarian
prospects of crowdfunding.

Could China Lead the Way?

At present, different prospects occur in different parts of the globe. For example,
according to a recent Economist report: “By just about any measure of size, China is
the world’s leader in fintech” (“Chinese banks are not far removed”, 2017, p. 55).
Zhang et al. (2016) attribute the drivers of robust alternative finance in China to the
size of the national economy, the Internet user base of 668 million people, the mostly
unregulated market, and the participation of institutional ownership of platforms.
288 MAI ANH DOAN AND DAVID MCKIE

While the biggest segments of Chinese alternative finance market are various types
of lending (peer-to-peer consumer and business and real estate loans), ECF in
China is already a serious world player estimated to gain over half (US$50 billion)
of the World Bank’s (2013) developing world’s crowdfunding revenue, which is pro-
jected to be US$96 billion in 2025. Unlike in other countries where ECF is often
smaller than other types of crowdfunding, in China it is the mainstream crowdfund-
ing practice (Li, 2016). The research thinktank Nesta (2017) estimated that the
number of equity crowdfunding platforms in China skyrocketed from 32 in 2014 to
130 in 2015, with the total fundraised amount increasing fivefold in the same
period.
From a macro perspective, the Program of 13th five-year-plan for national eco-
nomic and social development, approved by the 12th National People’s Congress in
2015, has acknowledged crowdfunding as an important tool for promoting mass
entrepreneurship and innovation (Xu and Ge, 2017). In addition, in 2015, China’s
national gross savings were at US$5.3 trillion, accounting for 47.9% of GDP. This is
one of the highest savings rates in the world (World Bank, 2017) but there are limited
formal investment outlets for these monies. The official opening of ECF in China
could therefore create an effective investment tool for the public. From a micro per-
spective, individual funders already account for 86% of ECF in China and they are
highly Internet-savvy and growing fast (Zhang et al., 2016).
In terms of technology, Chiu, Ip, and Silverman (2012) found that many Chinese
social media platforms are more advanced (e.g., in containing many more interactive
features and having them earlier than their counterparts elsewhere). Renren and Sina
Weibo are excellent examples of social media networks with such features (Crampton,
2011). In terms of online behavior, Chinese participants prefer to access not only
company information, but also non-brand-related posts or activities that help increase
socialization between company and users, and among users (Men and Tsai, 2012). In
short, Chinese crowdfunding platforms are ideally positioned to take advantage of
their communities’ immersion in social networks for information. In addition, their
willingness to share information and help each other already feature strongly in their
collectivistic culture (Chu and Choi, 2011; Men and Tsai, 2012, 2013). Moreover, Li
(2016) found that because ECF in China is mostly done through syndication (i.e.,
investment groups with the leading investors), communities of investors already exist
formally. Platforms, through their financial public relations efforts, could activate
these communities to encourage members to discuss risks and risk management, and
to increase their knowledge of investment terms and processes, and, therefore, further
their participation in financial activities (Song, 2015; Van Rooij, Lusardi, & Alessie,
2011).

CROWDFUNDING, FINANCIAL PUBLIC RELATIONS, AND REPUTATIONAL

CAPITAL

As these cases suggest, the potential for more equitable finance has survived the GFC.
To maintain it at the global scale will require education and communication (Shiller,
2012). Financial public relations could undertake that task, and by doing so, contribute
to increasing the overall reputational capital of public relations in general. Financial
public relations, as a public relations specialization, fits with Sriramesh and Verčič’s
(2009) comprehensive conceptual framework but, as a general framework for global PR,
it did not cover issues specific to financial public relations and crowdfunding.
26. CROWDFUNDING 289

Accordingly, to explore these specifics, we augment it with the World Bank’s (2013)
crowdfunding investing ecology. While all four elements of this ecology – economic regu-
lations, entrepreneurial culture, community engagement and, technology – feature in the
Sriramesh and Verčič model, three important issues, for financial public relations in the
age of global finance, are absent.
First, as an interdisciplinary field joined by communication, finance, marketing, and
securities law compliance (NIRI, 2003), financial public relations is also subjected directly
to strict laws and regulations imposed by financial market authorities. These laws and
regulations are specific and beyond the legal structure and national boundary Sriramesh
and Verčič (2009) mentioned (e.g., the participation of overseas investors discussed
already). Contemporary financial public relations, while adhering to these requirements,
also needs to advocate for the internationalization of capital regulations to keep up with
the rapid socialization of global finance (Terry, Schwartz, & Sun, 2015).
Second, to make finance more accessible to everyone – whether it be wholesale/
accredited or first-time investors, start-ups, or not-for-profit organizations – partici-
pants need to understand both the benefits and risks. This is especially true for such
innovative products as crowdfunding. Traditionally, international efforts in increasing
financial literacy have had limited impact (OECD, 2016), but crowdfunding platforms
have the capacity to make financial education more collaborative. Already, forward-
looking and competitive platforms exceed the minimum legal requirements of check-
ing an ECF investor’s understanding of basic terms and risks, and minimal legal
requirements (e.g., displaying risk warning statements). They also mobilize interactive
communication functions to encourage dialogue and discussion (Wroldsen, 2013).
With these functions, members could draw from what Surowiecki (2004) calls the
wisdom of the crowd to spot suspicious information and/or to simply share relevant
general knowledge and investment knowledge, and/or to learn from each other.
Crowdfunding platforms that foster such initiatives already exist. In the UK, the plat-
forms Crowdcube and Seedrs have discussion forums and buttons to connect directly
with fundraisers; and in New Zealand, Snowball Effect provided a series of offline
investment talks around the country. Because the majority of equity crowdfunders are
first-time investors (Baeck, Collins, & Zhang, 2014), such support can build confi-
dence and increase competence in assessing investment opportunities and risks.
The third issue that financial public relations could influence concerns technology.
Our examples illustrated how crowdfunding as a fintech initiative drove society
towards being more inclusive, and achieving more egalitarian goals. As people
increasingly experience the impacts of big data, artificial intelligence, and the internet-
of-things, fintech public relations can help them to be aware “of fundamental infor-
mation about the workings of the system” (Shiller, 2012, p. 235) to fully participate.
Financial public relations could explain the underlying mechanisms of fintech, or
foreground power plays among participants, or advocate for greater platform
transparency.

CONCLUSION

The chapter situated financial public relations as an important area in its own right in
many areas of the world. It also identified a gap between financial public relations and
public relations in general as a divide restricting democratic and prosocial moves to
increase equality nationally and internationally. It used two campaigns to illustrate situ-
ations where some of the democratizing potential can be realized. It also highlighted the
290 MAI ANH DOAN AND DAVID MCKIE

importance of technology and the macro environment in boosting the impact of fintech in
ECF. The chapter ended by highlighting the following three areas for financial public rela-
tions futures: promoting cross-border capital flow through international laws and regula-
tions; increasing financial literacy through collaborative education; and examining
technologies underpinning fintech.

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 CHAPTER

27
Public Relations, Political Communication
and Agenda Setting
The Rise of the Micro-Propaganda Machine
Thomas Stoeckle
Jonathan Albright

“What is a fact? … The effort to state an absolute fact is simply an attempt to

give you my interpretation of the facts.”
Ivy Lee

“You’re saying it’s a falsehood and Sean Spicer, our press secretary, gave alterna-
tive facts to that.”
Kellyanne Conway

SETTING THE SCENE: BREXIT, TRUMP, POST TRUTH, FAKE NEWS & TRUST

On 3 March 2017, a joint declaration by The United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur
on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, took note of “the growing preva-
lence of disinformation (sometimes referred to as “false” or “fake news”1) and propa-
ganda in legacy and social media, fueled by both States and non-State actors, and the
various harms to which they may be a contributing factor or primary cause.”2 Such
arbiters of the English language as the Oxford Dictionaries and Collins Dictionary are

293
294 THOMAS STOECKLE AND JONATHAN ALBRIGHT

contributing to the same discourse – the former declaring “post truth” as the word (or
phrase) of the year 2016,3 and the latter announcing that “fake news” is their word (or
phrase) of the year 2017.4 Oxford Dictionaries defines post truth as “relating to or
denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public
opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief” (2016). Collins Dictionary defines
fake news as “false, often sensational, information disseminated under the guise of
news reporting.”
The political events of 2016 helped to bring these interrelated topics to the fore-
front of public attention (Castela, 2017). The outcomes of the United Kingdom Euro-
pean Union membership referendum (usually referred to as Brexit) on 23 June, and
the 2016 United States presidential election on 8 November, which saw Donald
J. Trump elected as the 45th President, can be seen as a transformational shift in the
relationship between politics, the media, and the public. Mark Thompson, the current
CEO of The New York Times Company (and a former Director-General of the BBC,
and Chief Executive of Channel 4 in the UK), discusses the impact of political, social
and technological change on political and public language in his essay Enough Said
(Thompson, 2016).5 Where honesty, authenticity, and truth are required to stimulate
constructive discourse, he finds spin, evasiveness, and dishonesty. In fact, instead of
authenticity, political discourse is marked by what he describes as authenticism (p.
152), a term closely related to populism:

For authenticists, what matters most is not argument, but story: their ‘truths’ are inex-
tricably bound up with the narratives they tell about their community. The facticity of
a given claim matters less than its fit with the narrative. If something feels true, then in
some sense it must be true. (p. 155)

In this chapter, we discuss the use and abuse of language – not least, the term fake
news – as it relates to recent events. We will argue for a clearer, more distinct defin-
ition of terms to form the base for further qualitative and quantitative exploration
(Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Levinson, 2017; Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017). We
explore the emergent challenges of online political propaganda and new technologies
in the wider context of political marketing, military information operations, and
public relations in historical perspective, and in examining the structural changes in
the media ecosystem that have contributed to the formation of a “micro-propaganda
machine” (Albright, 2016).
First and foremost, however, we discuss these issues as forms of mediated human
communication, with concepts of truth and trust as core ingredients (Anderson and
Rainie, 2017; Halff & Gregory, 2015). Trust is central to our understanding of socio-
cultural and psychological phenomena (Baumeister & Vohs, 2007; Markova & Gilles-
pie, 2007). It is also central to functional public relations. However, often, and
increasingly so, the public relations literature describes trust as being in short supply
(Fawkes, 2015; Phillips, 2015).6 Public relations, in a very practical sense and for the
purposes of this paper, is discussed in the context of what is seen by some as political
public relations, despite the “disconnect not only between practice and theory in pol-
itical public relations, but also between theory and research in public relations, polit-
ical science, political communication and political marketing” (Strömbäck and
Kiousis, 2013, p. 3). The cultural, political and indeed anthropological perspective
applied here (and in the vast majority of books and papers on public relations, or
pretty much any social scientific discipline) is that of WEIRD, that is, Western,
27. PR, POLITICS AND AGENDA SETTING 295

Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic societies (Henrich, Heine & Norenza-
yan, 2010). Whilst it can be argued that a Global Public Relations Handbook ought
to look at the world through a wider, more inclusive lens, for the purposes of this
chapter and its main focus – the modern challenges of political communication and
the evolution of public relations within a fragmenting and transforming media ecosys-
tem – the WEIRD angle is adequate. In our view, it parallels very closely with the
conceptual framework of this volume as described in Part I. It addresses recent, sali-
ent political events in Great Britain and in the United States in the context of fake
news and the erosion of concepts such as trust and truth, in communication that is
largely taking place in the English language. We will first focus our attention on the
history of the field, before discussing multi – and transdisciplinary concepts of con-
temporary public relations. This is followed by a review of the relationship between
public relations and agenda setting as a model of media effects. In examining the con-
tinuous transformation of the mediasphere, and the growing role of social media and
social platforms in the dissemination of news and information, we then address the
challenges of computational propaganda and what is increasingly seen as a global
information disorder (where military and civil information operations, i.e. the stra-
tegic use of purposive persuasive communication, increasingly converge). This new
and constantly evolving environment requires new concepts such as the dynamic rela-
tionship between aggregate flows and individual participation in mass communica-
tion, and agenda directing as a more fluid model to help explain the workings and
effects of participatory political communication and polarization. The chapter con-
cludes with thoughts about the evolution of public relations as part of the transform-
ational shifts in technology and society that we are presently experiencing.
Understanding the present in historical perspective
There are many ways in which to tell the history of public relations, and how the
history leads to the present. Our understanding of the present allows us to look to
the future in terms of how public relations will be taught and how it will be practiced.
One of the problems with the study of public relations history is that there is no
single history of its development globally, instead one encounters a number of differ-
ent and unrelated public relations histories often limited to cultural entities such as
“Western liberal societies,” single countries or regions (Butterick, 2011). In this chap-
ter, we will focus on the perspective that sees public relations as having evolved out of
propaganda (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012; Kunczik, 2009; Moloney, 2006; Willke,
1998).
The term propaganda originated in the Latin title of the Congregation for the
Propagation of the Faith (Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide), an institution
within the Catholic Church, founded by Pope Gregory XV in 1622 to promote mis-
sionary work in the New World, as well as in European countries where Protestantism
was gaining influence (Soules, 2015, p. 4f). The relationship between public relations
and propaganda has always been fraught. Scholars (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012; Kunc-
zik, 2009; Moloney, 2006; Willke, 1989; Grunig & Hunt, 1984) often associated the
birth of public relations with the work of the US Committee on Public Information
(CPI), set up by Woodrow Wilson in 1916 and led by George Creel. Edward Bernays,
widely credited as the ‘father of public relations’ for bringing social scientific inquiry
to the field (Grunig & Hunt, 1984; Tye, 1998), although he shares that honor with
Ivy Lee (see Du Plessis, 2000, p. 10; Grunig & Hunt, 1984), directed the CPI’s Latin
News Services and participated in the 1919 Peace Conference as a member of Woo-
drow Wilson’s peace commission (Ewen, 1996).
296 THOMAS STOECKLE AND JONATHAN ALBRIGHT

To understand the aforementioned political events of 2016, political public relations

and its related fields of practice and research, including political marketing and polit-
ical campaigning need to be seen in a temporal perspective. Strömbäck and Kiousis
(2011) state that “[w]hile political public relations as a concept and research field is
rather new, the practice of political public relations is probably as old as politics and
society itself” (p. 1). Walter Lippmann’s influential work on the limitations of democ-
racy and democratic government (1922) referred to “press agents, publicity agents …
publicity men” (p. 344). He quoted the then famous journalist Frank Irving Cobb,
who succeeded Joseph Pulitzer as editor of the New York World in 1904, to make the
case:

what I do know is that many of the direct channels to news have been closed and the
information for the public is first filtered through publicity agents. The great corporations
have them, the railroads have them, all the organizations of business and of social and
political activity have them, and they are the media through which news comes. Even
statesmen have them. (p. 344)

The field of psychology is also integral to public relations. Lippmann’s contemporary

Edward Bernays (a nephew of Sigmund Freud) saw public relations as an applied
social science, drawing on psychological and sociological theories that he had been
exposed to by his uncle as well as models and insights when he laid its foundations in
the first half of the 20th century (Botan & Hazleton, 2010; Grunig & Hunt, 1984;
St. John, Opdycke Lamme, & L’Etang, 2014). However, historically, the association
of public relations activities with propaganda, as evidenced in Bernays’ own work
(Bernays, 1923, 1928; also Lippmann, 1922)7, has led to psychology being associated
with purposeful and targeted persuasion and manipulation (Herman & Chomsky,
1988; Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012; Moloney, 2006), rather than contributing to a more
rounded understanding and explanation of human behavior and decision-making
(Edwards & Hodges, 2011; Perloff, 2017).

Concepts of Public Relations Today

Public relations comes in many shapes and guises. Moloney (2006) mentions a tally of
472 definitions as proof of its “terminological inexactitude” (p. 5). He then goes on to
offer this pragmatic, outcome-oriented definition: “PR is always persuasive, communi-
cative behaviour designed to win a margin of benefit in a pluralistic competition for
advantage” (p. 6). Since the publication of Grunig and Hunt’s Managing Public Rela-
tions (1984), and the research program popular as the Excellence Project, Excellence
Theory has become the leading paradigm in the theory and practice of public rela-
tions (Grunig & Grunig, 2008). In his paper on critiques of Grunig’s concept, Kenny
(2016) concludes that

As public relations evolves in synchrony with digital technologies and greater citizen
demands for equitable participation […] educators and professionals need to move
beyond the Excellence Theory in order to fulfil the present and future potential of the
public relations industry. (p. 88)

A recent review of the literature on public relations revealed few references to com-
munication theory (van Ruler, 2016). This indicates that in the literature on public
27. PR, POLITICS AND AGENDA SETTING 297

relations (and, it is assumed, also more generally in practice and academy), communi-
cation (as well as psychology) is usually treated as a given (Anderson, 1996; Toth &
Heath, 1992). This matters because the challenges engulfing public relations – con-
cerning its identity and legitimacy amid an evolving disruptive public and social med-
iasphere (Bardhan & Weaver, 2011; L’Etang, McKie, Snow, & Xifra, 2015;
Macnamara, 2013; Moloney, 2006; Motion, Heath & Leitch, 2015) cannot be
addressed adequately without robust theoretical models and clear definitions of
concepts.
There is great analytical potential in viewing the challenges and opportunities for
public relations and communications for organizations and society through the lens
of various scientific disciplines – psychology, sociology, anthropology, behavioral eco-
nomics, neurosciences (Bandura, 2001; Edwards & Hodges, 2011; Falk, 2012; Scha-
piro & Ambrose, 2015; Weber, 2015). As mentioned before, the connection between
psychology and public relations is not a novelty. The focus on public relations as
applied social psychology (White, 2000), with human communication, behavior, and
decision-making at its core (Harris, 2004; Kahneman, 2011), generates a continuous
view from the past to the present, toward the future. Whilst we consider disruptive
change through new media channels (Motion, Heath & Leitch, 2015), new technolo-
gies, artificial intelligence, machine-learning, and big data (Klewes, Popp & Rost-
Hein, 2017), we also recognize that methods of influence, persuasion, and social
engineering might have evolved (Davis, 2013; Matz, Kosinski, Nave, & Stillwell,
2017), but the social and psychological mechanisms are still more or less what they
were 100 years ago, when Edward Bernays worked for the Committee on Public
Information (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012).

From information subsidies to weaponized narratives: the symbiotic relationship

between agenda setting and public relations

When agenda-setting theory was first formulated and empirically tested, public rela-
tions activities did not feature as an influence on the media agenda. More generally,
when looking at how the news media influenced the public – not by telling them
what to think, but what to think about (Cohen, 1963, p. 13) – the research started
from the content of the news, not from the sources of the news (Macnamara, 1993).
When agenda setting is understood as “the transfer of salience from the media
agenda to the public agenda” (Carroll & McCombs, 2003, p. 36), and the main tenet
of public relations is understood as “the management of communication between an
organization and its publics through the media” (Grunig & Hunt, 1984, p. 6), then it
seems obvious that public relations plays a central and strategic role in the process of
setting public agendas through the media.
Agenda setting is concerned with the influence of the media on public opinion, and to
arrive at a broader, more holistic understanding of how agendas form, one needs to look
at the news media itself: who or what influences, who sets the media agenda? McCombs
and Shaw (1993), looking back over 25 years of agenda-setting research, addressed the
question: “who sets the public agenda” as leading the early stages of agenda-setting
research, whereas later, the focus shifted to “who sets the media agenda?” Besides vari-
ous analytical approaches that look at the sociology of news and factors that influence
the daily production of news, the authors point to the following research context:
298 THOMAS STOECKLE AND JONATHAN ALBRIGHT

Also relevant to the broad question of who sets the media agenda are Breed’s (1955) clas-
sic theory of news diffusion – an area now called intermedia agenda-setting, which has
been supplemented with new research on the role of public relations […] – and the trad-
ition of gatekeeping research in journalism – whose perspective has been transformed by
the theory of agenda setting. (McCombs & Shaw, 1993, p. 61)

Intermedia agenda setting, or agenda building, became the object of academic

research in the 1980s, when researchers began to look into the drivers of mass media
coverage (Ognyanova, 2013). This shift in focus from influence on the public agenda
to influence on the media agenda also introduced public relations into the research
mix. For a long time, intermedia agenda setting was seen as an extension of older
models of top down, opinion leader relationships where outlets such as the New York
Times and the Washington Post yield significant influence over its peers (Atwater,
Fico, & Pizante, 1987; Breed, 1955).
There has been a range of empirical studies investigating the transfer of sali-
ence – both on object level (first level agenda setting), and on attribute level
(second level agenda setting) through the provision of information from third
parties to the media, and then from the media to the public (De Moya, Kim &
Kiousis, 2010; Ragas, Kim & Kiousis, 2011; Sheafer & Weimann, 2005). This has
firmly brought the public relations function into the theoretical mix of agenda
setting, as a key factor influencing what the media reports on:

Agenda building has been a key theoretical backdrop for examining public relations con-
tributions to public opinion about issues, organizations, and people. (De Moya, Kim &
Kiousis, 2010, p. 7)

Structural changes, resulting in economic pressures on the news production process,

have created a type of journalism – fed by pre-packaged material, rather than
researched, investigated, systematically fact-checked news – which is often described
as “churnalism,” for example, by Jackson and Moloney (2015) who interviewed
public relations practitioners to examine the role of the information subsidy and edi-
torial subsidy (a more tailored, “page ready” version of a press release) in modern
media relations. The concept of the information subsidy – providing the media with
ready-made newsworthy information packages such as news releases – was formulated
by Oscar Gandy (1982). Its influence on news media was first empirically tested by
Judy VanSlyke Turk (1985). It has since become central to the idea of integrating
public relations into agenda building as a constituent part of agenda setting models:

Central to exploring agenda-building […] is the concept of “information subsidies,” such

as source-provided news releases, advertisements, speeches and related materials, which
attempt “to intentionally shape the news agenda by reducing journalists’ costs of gather-
ing information.” (Ragas, Kim & Kiousis, 2011, p. 258)

Intermedia agenda setting has value as a concept to explain how content forms and
flows between channels. In order to keep pace with emergent technologies, new chan-
nels, and new user behaviors (Vargo & Guo, 2016; Weimann & Brosius 2016), some
of its basic assumptions need to be revised. Harder, Sevenans, and Van Aelst (2017)
suggest questioning “one, that media agendas should be measured on an issue level;
27. PR, POLITICS AND AGENDA SETTING 299

two, that fixed time lags suffice to understand overlap in media content; and three,
that media can be considered homogeneous entities…” (p. 1).
The role of social media channels and platforms is increasingly becoming a focus
of agenda-setting studies and literature reviews (Skogerbø, Bruns, Quodling & Ingeb-
retsen, 2016). This raises an interesting question when it comes to the direction of
influence, and effects on participants in the agenda-setting process: Do social media
(re)introduce a more active role for the public? Neuman, Guggenheim, Mo Jang and
Bae (2014) discuss new concepts and ways to describe the dynamics of public atten-
tion in the context of the emergence and proliferation of social media channels and
platforms and conclude that “agenda setting … is not a one-way pattern from trad-
itional media to a mass audience, but rather a complex and dynamic interaction” (p.
193). McCombs himself discusses the idea of “reverse agenda-setting” (McCombs,
2004).
Reverse agenda setting is also present in Joseph Stiglitz’s analysis of the dynamics
between media and society from the perspective of media capture (Schiffrin, 2017):

cognitive capture by media can lead to cognitive capture by society. The media help
shape the views of the members of society, and if the media are captured, their reporting
can give rise to the acceptance of views within society that reflect those interests. (Stiglitz,
2017, p. 20)

The problem of machine generated content (as opposed to genuine news) is so far
largely seen as a problem of either content collection in the research process
(Neuman, Guggenheim, Mo Jang & Bae, 2014), or as a technical fact-checking prob-
lem (Ferrara, Varol, Davis, Menczer, & Flammini, 2016), rather than as a genuine
threat for the formation of informed public and political opinion in Western societies
(Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017).

Computational propaganda and global information disorder

The issues outlined here go beyond the role of public relations in society, beyond the
effects of fake news and online political propaganda, and even beyond the relation-
ship between politics, the media, and society. We are faced with a global information
disorder, characterized in a recent Council of Europe report as

information pollution at a global scale; a complex web of motivations for creating, dis-
seminating and consuming these ‘polluted’ messages; a myriad of content types and tech-
niques for amplifying content; innumerable platforms hosting and reproducing this
content; and breakneck speeds of communication between trusted peers. (Wardle &
Derakhshan, 2017, p. 4)

The authors quoted the EU East StratCom Task Force in outlining the Russian
approach to disinformation campaigns:

the dis-information campaign is a non-military measure for achieving political goals.

Russian authorities are explicit about this, for example through the infamous Gerasimov
doctrine and through statements by top Russian generals that the use of ‘false data’ and
‘destabilising propaganda’ are legitimate tools in their tool kit. (Wardle & Derakhshan,
2017, p. 34)
300 THOMAS STOECKLE AND JONATHAN ALBRIGHT

Framing the role of information as a strategic tool has a tradition going back to Sun
Tzu, who stated that the key to winning 100 battles is “to know your enemy and to
know yourself.” The history of public relations is closely interwoven with wartime
campaigns to specifically inform and disinform a target audience, both at home, and
on the side of the enemy. We previously mentioned the Creel Committee in the US,
and propaganda was and is a staple of military activities worldwide (Jowett & O’Don-
nell, 2012).
This kind of strategic disinformation campaign is therefore by no means a Russian
prerogative. Van Dyke and Verčič (2009) discuss the reversal of the separation
between propaganda, public relations and diplomacy in the West as part of the fight
against terrorism:

As planning for the war against terrorism matured, government public affairs specialists
and diplomats began working closely with military psychological operations (PsyOps)
specialists, who are sometimes perceived as the contemporary equivalent of World War
I and World War II era propagandists. Reversing 20th century efforts to separate propa-
ganda from public relations and diplomacy, Western nations and alliances began to inte-
grate these and other communication functions within programs like information
operations, perception management, and strategic communication. (p. 917)

In the age of global interconnectivity, big data and neural networks, information oper-
ations and psychological warfare have become an ever more central part of global mili-
tary planning and strategy (Nelson, 2013). In US military doctrine, information has
joined the classic four battlespaces of land, sea, air and space as a fifth dimension
(Kiyuna & Conyers, 2015). This is where we can observe a blending of military influ-
ence techniques with overt and covert purposive persuasive communication online.
A 2017 study by the Oxford Internet Institute Computational Propaganda Research
Project focused on political communication and the manipulation of public opinion
through computational propaganda in Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, Poland,
Russia, Taiwan, Ukraine, and the US found challenges to a free and fair flow of
information in all countries. The use of social media for the manipulation of public
opinion is widespread and systematic, the study concluded. Computational propa-
ganda here is defined as

the use of algorithms, automation, and human curation to purposefully distribute mis-
leading information over social media networks … Computational propaganda involves
learning from and mimicking real people so as to manipulate public opinion across
a diverse range of platforms and device networks. (Woolley & Howard, 2016, p. 6)

The challenge, then, is to develop a better systematic and methodological understand-

ing of the transformational changes in information and communication technology
and their effects on society, culture, politics as they pertain to public relations (under-
stood as a global field, however with largely local implications). The following section
will look at this in more detail.

AGGREGATE FLOWS, INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATION

To expand on the “theoretical mix” concept of propaganda, persuasion, and agenda set-
ting introduced in the previous section, the evolutionary changes in public information
27. PR, POLITICS AND AGENDA SETTING 301

systems occurring since the early days of mass communication and reception studies
must be taken into account. For example, Althaus and Tewksbury (2002) argue that
most agenda-setting research tends to compare “aggregate trends in the public agenda to
aggregate trends in the news agenda” through the “mass persuasion” and “natural his-
tory” approaches described by McCombs, Danielian, & Wanta (1995, p. 180). More spe-
cifically, as Bennett and Manheim (2006) maintain, the audience of the mass broadcast
era have evolved into a fragmented hybrid:

The combination of social isolation, communication channel fragmentation, and message

targeting technologies have produced a very different information recipient than the audi-
ence members of the Eisenhower era … they have gained greater command of their own
information environments, often participating in multiple, fluid social networks oriented
to self-expression. (p. 215)

Within the divergent and rapidly changing information ecosystem, Bennett and Man-
heim (2006) describe a broader shift towards the “decline of a social membership
society” in lieu of a “lifestyle network society.” Likewise, Couldry (2011) posits that
the rise of social-networking sites suggests “a new type of mediated center in which
the focus is not on central media institutions…but ourselves, our friends, and family,
and our horizontal social world” (p. 215). Front and center in this new news ecosys-
tem are networked individual members of “the people formerly known as the audi-
ence” (Rosen, 2006). More recently, however, persuasion strategies [micro]target
individuals through the application of “differentiated” data (Bennett & Manheim,
2006, p. 216) for the purposes of agenda setting, real-time debate framing. This form
of controversy seeding sets up the key mechanisms through which public relations
tactics, what Moloney refers to as “weak propaganda” (2006), or strategies employed
to ensure certain messages reach certain individuals at the desired time. While con-
temporary public relations strategies increasingly focus on reaching individuals
through online social networks, empirical studies of individual-level agenda setting
are less common than for the group level, likely due to what Althaus and Tewksbury
(2002) note as “few observable effects at the individual level” (p. 183).

AGENDA DIRECTING AND PARTICIPATORY TECHNO-POLITICS

The combination of communication channel fragmentation, participatory information

gathering, and differential data targeting for the purposes of selective information
exposure has implications for the notion of agenda setting. Not the least in that it
disrupts the pluralistic construct of the public the emerging media ecosystem intro-
duces a number of challenges for researchers and practitioners to consider when deal-
ing with conceptualizing how information circulates within the emerging mediascape.
For one, programmatic (i.e., automated) advertising and algorithmic delivery mechan-
isms mean that information exposure and media diets are often theorized and under-
stood at the aggregate level (e.g., “trending topics” and “viral stories”). Yet,
a complex amalgamation of data including consumer habits and preferences, life-
styles, locations, and other personal details collected about targeted individuals, as
well as from their friends, families, and co-workers.
The opaque tracking interfaces and algorithmic delivery systems helping to ensure
information reaches us, including our news, and the networked and groups we fre-
quent at different times and across different locales have become commonplace.
302 THOMAS STOECKLE AND JONATHAN ALBRIGHT

Bennett and Manheim (2006) describe emerging message-targeting technologies as

functioning to link “specific [information-related] cases with specific [personal and
group] attributes” (p. 216). It also helps to establish a groundwork by interpreting the
supply-side notion of Howard’s “computational propaganda,” including the push of
misinformation and false stories which spread online and through platforms such as
Twitter and Facebook during the 2016 U.S. election (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016). At the
center of this agenda-setting mechanism, Vargo et al. argue, is partisan media:

The online nature of emerging media may make it more attentive to all online informa-
tion, including fake news. Taken all together, online partisan and nonpartisan media were
closely intertwined with fake news websites, producing an extremely complicated and
uncertain online mediascape. (2017, p. 17)

Similarly, Daniel Kreiss (2012) “digital two-step flow” sets up a situation whereby
political content is produced with the intention of its target audience sharing such
information across a range of different tools and for multiple user motivations,
including politics. Returning to the idea of message propagation and “virality” pre-
sented earlier in this piece, Jenkins (2013) argues that information is not usually pas-
sively spread as part of a biological or “carrier-host” process. Rather, as Kreiss’
proposition argues, the more personal, relevant, affirming, and anger-provoking mes-
sages are designed, the better they will be received by certain audiences, who engage
with and and further (re)circulate the ideas and news across the network. Baldwin-
Philippi describes this process as more of a “controllable strategic device” rather than
a form of blind contagion (2015, p.70).
While micro-targeting and profiling individuals with collected data can help create
the right conditions for the rapid intra- and extra-group circulation of propaganda, in
the process of disseminating information Lippmann called the “world outside,” like
the press, platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram function as directional con-
duits of information for their users (Napoli & Caplan, 2017). Thus, given the time
spent deliberating on the importance of the press’ “attention-directing function,”
Althaus and Tewksbury consider “whether the nature of agenda setting by the news
media might change as the technologies of news dissemination adapt to the formats
of new communication media” (2002, p. 180). News and political messages, including
propaganda, might still be disseminated through a broadcast, or “top-down” model,
but the means whereby it enters users’ groups and social networks, and ends up at
their top-of-minds is markedly different than in the broadcast era.

THE AGENDA-DIRECTING MODEL AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION

By selecting the messages that are most likely to result in increased engagement, and
by serving promoted messages through algorithms giving them special placement and
presence in users’ feeds (as well as elsewhere online), while the press might influence
many of the people, issues, and events that are deserving of public attention, plat-
forms such as Facebook often decide who will get to see it in the end, and in what
contexts the messages will be received, interpreted, and circulated (e.g., political, emo-
tional, conversational). While McCombs and Shaw’s (1972) statement about the news
media playing a key role in setting the public agenda still holds true – the media not
necessarily telling us “what to think” but rather “what to think about,” an updated
hybrid model should be considered, as a breed of new intermediaries have emerged.
27. PR, POLITICS AND AGENDA SETTING 303

These platforms promote and demote information in real time; as metrics are input
into algorithms and subsequently processed, platforms don’t bring us our news (many
would argue this is still a dominant function of the traditional media), but they do
tend to bring us the news that we are likely to talk about and share. This is particu-
larly the case with political campaigns and politically-themed messaging, which Bald-
win-Phillipi (2015) describes as a “hybrid of a mass public and a networked
communication model that attempts to gain the widest audience for messages”
(p. 71).
Within the online media sphere, particularly for political blogs, there exists
a different definition of “widest possible audience” than for the mass media. For
instance, Mike Gruszczynski (2015) points to a number of studies (e.g., Robertson
et al., 2013; Baum and Groeling, 2008; Lawrence, Sides, and Farrell, 2010) that sug-
gest digital sources of news have less incentive “to carry an air of objectivity” because
they lack the constraints posed by professional journalistic norms and values, adver-
tiser relationships, and maintaining their subscription base, which is true for main-
stream print and broadcast media.

Because of the economy of information flows, individuals who seek out political informa-
tion online have no incentive to frequent news sources that cater to political moderation,
especially when any number of sources comporting to their beliefs litter the Internet.
(p. 115)

Moreover, Gruszczynski (2015) notes that political blogs’ “opinion-driven nature,

coupled with ideological proclivities” allows these smaller digital news sources to
“have more leeway to fixate on any number of controversies for extended periods of
time.”

CONCLUSION & OUTLOOK

In this chapter we have observed that the growing influence of online partisan media
on political communication and democratic decision-making in western societies
marks a new quality of propaganda (Vargo & Guo, 2016; Vargo, Guo, & Amazeen,
2018). We are currently experiencing a transformational shift in the relationship
between politics, the media, and the public. In our attempt to deal adequately with
what is generally labeled as the “fake news problem,” we distinguish between disinfor-
mation, misinformation, and malinformation in our mapping out the global informa-
tion disorder (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017). Rojecki and Meraz identify “factitious
informational blends” (or FIBs) as a new form of misinformation driving speculative
politics in the dynamics of information transmission and agenda setting (Rojecki &
Meraz, 2016). Their paper also highlights the fact that “the distinction between disin-
formation and propaganda on the basis of appeals to reason and emotion, respect-
ively, rests on the dubious claim that these human capacities do not interact” (p. 28).8
The dynamics between messages appealing to reason and those appealing to emo-
tion is a central theme of recent research into political public relations and agenda
setting. Concepts are evolving with the continued fragmentation of communication
channels and the disruptive and transformative role of social media platforms. The
hybrid model of mass communication and networked communication is supported by
concepts of intermedia agenda setting, agenda directing, and third-level agenda build-
ing (Kiousis & Ragas, 2015). The global disinformation challenge must also be seen
304 THOMAS STOECKLE AND JONATHAN ALBRIGHT

as a form information warfare, in the sense that influence techniques which have been
honed in a military context (Nelson, 2013) are now applied in non-military strategic
communication (Botan, 2017). Public relations in general, and political public rela-
tions in particular, has to continue to evolve as part of a wider evolution of society
and technology – both as a practice, and an academy. In order to remain relevant,
this paper proposes that something of a paradigm shift is required: toward more
interdisciplinarity, toward more evidence-based science, toward more integration of
micro (behavioral psychology) and macro (social psychology) perspectives (Botan,
2017). Brown (2015) calls this “The Public Relations of Everything”:
a reconceptualization of the field, away from the management of organizational com-
munication, and toward an integrated human science. For Brown, political public
relations is not a subdiscipline. On the contrary, “what is political about PR cannot
simply be siphoned off into the subdiscipline of public affairs. public relations is not
political in part but thoroughly – structurally, historically, continuingly” (p. XiX).

NOTES
1. Experts advise against the use of the term fake news, as it is both inadequate to describe the complex
underlying phenomena, and also misappropriated to label disagreeable news coverage in general
(Wardle and Derakhshan, 2017; Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017). Wardle & Derakhshan instead propose
the use of misinformation (inadvertent sharing of false information), disinformation (deliberate creation
and sharing of false information) and malinformation (truthful information intended to harm
2. Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and “Fake News”, Disinformation and Propaganda.
Retrieved from Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe: www.osce.org/fom/302796
3. www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/16/post-truth-named-2016-word-of-the-year-by-
oxford-dictionaries/
4. www.theguardian.com/books/2017/nov/02/fake-news-is-very-real-word-of-the-year-for-2017
5. Throughout this chapter, when language is mentioned, it generally refers to English – as the lingua
franca of the Internet, but also as the main language of Great Britain and the United States. The polit-
ical language that Mark Thompson refers to is thus usually also expressed in English. Correspondingly,
the cultural and political perspective is that of liberal Western societies.
6. The annual Edelman Trust Barometer study found a “Global Implosion of Trust in their 2017 study
(www.edelman.com/news/2017-edelman-trust-barometer-reveals-global-implosion/), and CEO Richard
Edelman, in a speech in October 2017, called for a new “PR Compact” and “collaborative journalism”
to regain trust through accountable, ethical behaviour (www.holmesreport.com/latest/article/to-restore-
trust-a-new-pr-compact-is-needed-richard-edelman-tells-national-press-club)
7. Accounts of PR history routinely state Lippmann’s influence in the work of Bernays (Ewen, 1996). Jan-
sen’s analysis of Bernays’ “calculated reversal of Lippmann’s argument” (2013) however shows that the
two men had very different views of propaganda. Lippmann was highly critical and sceptical of what he
described as the “manufacture of consent” (1922), whereas Bernays’ “engineering of consent” was an
endorsement of social engineering, with propaganda a necessary and expedient technique.
8. The Cartesian error of separating reason and emotion has long been challenged. Lisa Feldman Barrett’s
“theory of constructed emotion” (Feldman Barrett, 2017) is perhaps the most promising current con-
cept: away from preconceived ideas and mechanistic concepts, and toward a more dynamic, fluid model
of continuous construction of emotions based on social interactions. Her idea of an emotional climate
of a culture allows to link individual (brain) development with social-cultural development.

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 CHAPTER

28
The Role of Public Relations in the
Global Battle for Hearts and Minds
From (Liberal) “Democracy Promotion” to the
Promotion of “Illiberal Democracy”

Ryszard Ławniczak

The leading world powers – the United States, Great Britain, France, the Soviet
Union, Japan, and most recently Russia and China, have been resorting in peaceful
times to their public diplomacy and “soft power”: culture, investment, academia, for-
eign aid and, most recently, social media, and cyber space – to influence other coun-
tries in the world and to “win the battle of hearts and souls.” Particularly the
American leaders were strongly convinced that “the United States has a ʻmissionʼ to
spread democratic values and the liberal policies model abroad”(Sedaca & Bouchet,
2014, p. 5). That is why the “democracy promotion” program became the cornerstone
of the US foreign policy and since the end of the Cold War, democratic liberalism
has been the dominant model in national development. The topic falls within the
framework of social theory, among others in specific fields like comparative political
systems (Almond, 1956), comparative economic systems (Gregory & Stuart, 1989)
and in the public relations theory in concepts like public relations and promotion of
democracy (Taylor, 2000; Bardhan & Weaver, 2011), transitional public relations
(Ławniczak, 2016) and image restoration theory (Benoit, 1995).
This chapter argues that in different regions of the world public relations strategies
and instruments were, and continue to be, used to fulfill that “democracy promotion”
mission trying to impose a certain political and socio-economic model of democracy:
labeled as “liberal,” or more recently, also “illiberal.” However, the analysis of this
chapter is limited to the non-military “liberal democracy” promotion efforts on the
part of the U.S. administrations and other Western governments aimed at the former
socialist/communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. On
the other hand, it covers also the public diplomacy strategy and instruments used by

309
310 RYSZARD ŁAWNICZAK

some of those “societies in transition” (Mygind, 1994) to defend and promote their
own models of democracy, defined after Victor Orbán as “illiberal democracy.” This
study focuses mainly on the political transition based on the accepted definition of
“democracy promotion” as formulated in the Chatham House study (Sedaca & Bouchet,
2014, p. 3) as “the widest range of actions that one country with all the actors can take
to influence the political development (underlining added) of another towards greater
democratization.”

THE U.S. “DEMOCRACY PROMOTION” MISSION

Since the end of the WWII, different U.S. administrations have put forward the argu-
ment that democratization and market economy implanted in foreign countries will
increase the American security and help to achieve economic objectives. Among the
principal targets of this democracy promotion mission have been the so-called transi-
tional states, formerly part of the so-called “Soviet bloc” but also countries of Latin
America, the Arab and Islamic world, particularly since September 11, 2001.

The U.S. World Dominance Stage

“Democracy promotion” has been an important part of the Western liberal order
that has been nurtured and defended by the U.S. since WWII. It was designed to
secure U.S. power relations and domination in the world, obviously only comple-
mentary to the military hegemony. One should mention the two aspects of this con-
cept: the economic and the political one as it was based on the belief that
democracy can exist only in the market economy. Parallel to the efforts to implant
the market economy model, (see Ławniczak, 2001, 2005, 2016; Szondi, 2014; Tam-
pere, 2003; Wedel, 2000) the U.S. and the EU members states also rendered their
“democracy assistance” with the intent of imposing “a particular model of democ-
racy” (Sussman, 2010, pp. xv, XVIxvi).
The most efficient and influential institution of “democracy assistance” in the
former socialist/communist countries is NED (National Endowment for Democracy)
that was founded in 1983. It was designed as not a governmental but a semi-
autonomous, semi-private organization with the aim of channeling money, equipment,
political consultants, and other expertise to other countries in order “to strengthen
democratic electoral processes … through timely measures in cooperation with indigen-
ous democratic forces” (Sussman, 2010, p. 45; Damrosch, 1989, p. 19). NED supported
financially new non-communist politicians and leaders, their parties, and groups. The
International Foundation for Electoral Systems was among the providers of training
and technical assistance. Besides the NED assistance to “democracy promotion” also
the USAID initiated the Support for East European Democracy (SEED). Its primary
goal was “to promote democratic and free market transitions in the former communist
countries of Central and Eastern Europe.”
Poland, with its “Solidarity” labor movement and charismatic leader Lech Walesa,
was considered as the first communist country designed as a potential target for “regime
change.” Similar to Sussman (2010, p. 128), and according to Bernstein, the United
States providing the democracy assistance for Poland:

did all of the things there are done in countries where you want to destabilize
a communist government and strengthen resistance to that. We provided the supplies and
28. THE GLOBAL BATTLE FOR HEARTS AND MINDS 311

technical assistance in terms of clandestine newspapers, broadcasting, propaganda, money,

organizational help and advice. And working outward from Poland the same kind of
assistance was organized in the other communist countries of Europe. (Bernstein, 1992)

Bernstein was not quite precise as the same type of political support was also provided
for Russia and its former Asian republics. The final result of the U.S.-led Western
“democracy promotion” efforts was:
• imposition of a “set of economic and political prescriptions on developing and
post-Communist transitional countries.” (Barma & Ratner, 2006); and
• the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, as well as the “regime
changes” in Russia and most of the other post-socialist/communist countries
but only in the first stage of transition.

The victory of the Law and Justice party led by Jarosław Kaczyński in the Polish par-
liamentary elections in the autumns of 2006 and 2015, Victor Orbán’s party electoral
success in 2010, together with appointing V. Putin as acting President in 1999 have
encouraged a hypothesis that – just like in Peru (Freitag, 2004), campaigns promoting
liberal democracy and the neoliberal model of the market economy are in fact fruitful
only for some time. It simply confirmed the thesis that “Such global electioneering on
behalf of neoliberal capitalism is likely to lead to resistance in targeted countries as
they become wiser to these means of political manipulation, particularly by outside
forces” (Sussman, 2006, p. 14).

Backlash against the American-Style “democracy Promotion”: the Defense Stage

With the collapse of the Soviet Union 25 years ago, Francis Fukuyama proudly
announced “the end of history.” In his opinion, capitalism along with liberal democ-
racy had won. Fukuyama could not have been more wrong about “the end of his-
tory.” The beginning of the 21th century has proven that the era of competing
ideologies is far from being over. Not only because authoritarianism is quite success-
fully competing with liberalism and Islamist fundamentalism or because it is spread-
ing around the world. More importantly, the 2008/2009 global financial crisis, and the
“Occupy Wall Street” type of protests have proven that the marriage of free market
economics and liberal democracy is incapable of creating political and socio-
economic systems benefiting the majority.

The End of the U.S. Persuasion Power

In effect, the beginning of the 21st century has brought an end to the U.S. strategic
communication and public diplomacy persuasion power because:

1. “The American dream” is no longer appealing and the U.S. government lacks
credibility as a messenger and partner with key foreign audiences (Brown,
Green, Wang, 2017, pp. 11–12). The main reasons for that situation worth
mentioning are:
a) the consequences of “fake news” about “the weapons of mass destruction”
and the following: the invasion of Iraq, as well the and declaration of “War
on Terror” after 9/11 (Zaharna, 2014);
312 RYSZARD ŁAWNICZAK

b) the so-called “Saudi Effect”: the hypocrisy of the U.S. foreign policy, e.g. by
promoting democracy, and on the other hand supporting the Saudi govern-
ment, not necessarily the best example of democratic standards;
c) the consequences of the failed Arab spring;
d) the negative image effect of “the right to own guns;”
f) Donald Trump’s arrival to power which has tarnished the international
image of the U.S. (Pew Report, June 26, 2017).

2. The disapproval of the “Washington Consensus” prescriptions after the 2008/

2009 financial crisis manifesting themselves around the world (Rodrik, 2006).
According to the Pew Research Center report of November 2, 2009, (p. 1)

the initial widespread enthusiasm about these changes has dimmed in most of the
countries surveyed; in some, support for democracy and capitalism has diminished
markedly.

All the above mentioned factors, coupled with many other have led the prominent
scholar R.S. Zaharna to the conclusion that “International sentiment toward America
quickly went from outpouring of global sympathy and support immediately after the
9/11 attacks to a palpable wave of anti-Americanism” (Zaharna, 2014, p. 11). At the
micro level, the PR industry has tried to come to rescue of the “banksters” like Wells
Fargo, AIB and others (theJournal.ie, October 14, 2017), by immediately starting
image repair campaigns to defend the blemished reputation of the greedy financial
sector. For the image repair at the macro level, Zaharna suggested the new relational
approach to the US public diplomacy ( 2014, p. 184) “to create and sustain bridges
among hearts and minds.”

The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, and/or” Autocratic Governments around the World
No wonder that in line with the above mentioned decline of the persuasion power of
the American-type democracy and the market economy, one can observe the rise of
a concept of “illiberal democracy.” It has already been foretold in 1997 in the famous
and controversial article published by Fareed Zakaria in “Foreign Affairs” (Novem-
ber/December), and analysed more deeply by Rodrik and Mukand in their article
“Why Illiberal Democracies Are on the Rise?” published by Project Syndicate (2015).
As could be expected, from the very beginning this notion has been widely discussed
and often challenged by both theoretician and journalists and politicians (e.g. Atanas-
sow, 2017; Isaac, 2017; Bozóki, 2017; The New York Times, March 9, 2016).
The popularity of the notion of “illiberal democracy” is most closely linked to the
Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán who presented this concept in his already
famous speech in Tusnadfurdo (Baile Tusnad) on July 26, 2014. This notion is also
commonly associated with other well-known political leaders like Vladimir Putin in
Russia, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey, Xi Jinping of China, or Jarosław Kaczyński,
the leader of the ruling party in Poland. In his Tusnadfurdo speech Victor Orbán
stated among others, that:

The most popular topic in thinking today is trying to understand how systems that are not
Western, not liberal, not liberal democracies and perhaps not even democracies, can neverthe-
less make their nations successful. Today, the stars of international analyses are Singapore,
28. THE GLOBAL BATTLE FOR HEARTS AND MINDS 313

China, India, Turkey, Russia ….. We needed to state that a democracy is not necessarily liberal.
Just because something is not liberal, it still can be a democracy. Moreover, it could be and
needed to be expressed, that probably societies founded upon the principle of the liberal way
to organize a state will not be able to sustain their world-competitiveness in the following
years, and more likely they will suffer a setback, unless they will be able to substantially
reform themselves. ……in this sense the new state that we are constructing in Hungary is
a illiberal state, a non-liberal state. It does not reject the fundamental principles of liberalism
such as freedom… the central element of state organization, but instead includes a different,
special, national approach. (Website of Hungarian Government, July 30, 2014)

REVERSAL IN GLOBAL COMMITMENT TO (LIBERAL) DEMOCRACY: CAMPAIGNS

TO DEFEND AND PROMOTE “ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY”

It is obvious that the gradual appearance and the eventual strengthening of govern-
ments that undermine the principles of the generally applicable model liberal democ-
racy violated the global interests of the United States, the dominant European Union
countries, their international corporations, and financial institutions such as the IMF
or the World Bank. They initiated world campaigns to discredit such undemocratic/
autocratic regimes as the governments of China, Putin’s Russia, Turkey, and recently
V. Orbán’s Hungary or Poland.
On the other hand, in defense of their reforms and interests, the governments of these
countries were forced to apply their own strategies of public diplomacy. I define this type
of strategy as “home-grown transitional public relations,” to distinguish it from “foreign
imposed transitional public relations,” applied to introduce the liberal type democracy and
neoliberal model of market economy in the former socialist/communist countries (Ław-
niczak, 2016). Only after some time, when it turned out that such an alternative model of
“illiberal democracy,” contrary to the aforementioned mass criticism, became attractive
also to other countries (especially the developing ones), did the respective governments
the promotion stage of this model. The biggest paradox here seems to be the fact that
both at the stage of defending the model of “illiberal democracy” and in its promotion,
active participation of the best-known, globally operating Western PR agencies should be
noted (e.g. Ketchum, Burston Marsteller, Hill+Knowlton, FleishmanHillard Inc, Ogilvy
Public Relations, and Edelman. (South China Morning Post, Friday, April 22, 2016)).

The Defense Stage to Counter the Global Campaign of Discrediting the Illiberal/
Authoritarian Governments

The Inefficiency of the Russian Cultural Diplomacy

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the new socio-political system and the
post-1991 economic chaos coupled with the “contradictory image” of Boris Yeltsin
caused a persisting Russian identity crisis (Lebedenko, 2004). Opinion polls carried
out in the West revealed that Russia was primarily associated with vodka, the KGB,
mafia, and the Kalashnikov rifle . Such a negative perception by the international
community was considered to be a major hindrance not only to Russia’s closer inte-
gration with the West but also with major international organizations. This was argu-
ably a major foreign policy objective as well (Osipova, 2014). However, these attempts
have been largely ineffective in bringing about affection for or a widespread positive
314 RYSZARD ŁAWNICZAK

attitude towards Russia. They could not be effective because for a long time, Russia’s
public diplomacy practice emphasized mainly a cultural exchange/cultural diplomacy
approach rather than the American-style media diplomacy approach. This is largely
because Russian culture (ballet, music, literature) is highly developed while its media
is still not globally integrated. Landmarks in recent exchange and cultural diplomacy
have included among others events like the Bolshoi Theatre performances around the
world, promotion of world famous Russian literature and music, e.g. Dostoevsky,
Rachmaninoff, Pasternak (New York Times, January 21, 2007).
However that form of public diplomacy, designed rather to defend Russia’s image
abroad, was highly insufficient taking under consideration the Western domination of
global media. In the early 2000s, after Vladimir Putin came to power the “image problem”
turned into an “urgent” issue for the new President. The primary goal of Russian public
diplomacy became to project a more positive image of itself in the international community.

The Successful Hungarian “Home-Grown Transitional PR”

After winning the 2010 elections, Prime Minister V. Orbán questioned the liberal
socio-economic model prevailing in Hungary. In 2014, as already mentioned above,
he stated explicitly that “the new state that we are constructing in Hungary is an illib-
eral state, a non-liberal state.” In seeking to achieve such a model of development,
Orbán shocked the international financial markets and unnerved investors, as well as
European and international institutions, with the following radical steps:
• In the political sphere: changing the Constitution, and regaining controlover
the media through media reforms.
• In the economic sphere, introducing among others: controversial pension
changes; new taxes on banks and mostly foreign-owned businesses; renational-
ization (or de-privatization) of several companies; punitive corporate taxes on
foreign multinationals; an unorthodox, high-risk fiscal-recovery strategy
designed to force the International Monetary Fund out of Hungary’s business;
a declaration that he will not extend a 20 billion euro loan deal with the Euro-
pean Union and the International Monetary Fund and will no longer submit
its policies to oversight other than that of the EU.

Orbán had no doubts that the international financial circles and international organiza-
tions he offended with his radical economic policies would take revenge on both his country
and him personally. In fact, it did not take much time before the global campaign discredit-
ing Orbán’s reforms started. According to Schoeplin (2014), “the international media have
run a quite unbelievably vicious campaign against Hungary. Plausibly backed by
a sophisticated public relations operation” (p. 2). One could expect such reaction because
in the event that the radical reforms introduced by Victor Orbán’s Government succeeded,
they would encourage other countries to follow. Hence, for the reforms to succeed, the
change of the model of communication policy was also absolutely essential. The new
model sought liberation from foreign-imposed transitional public relations and the applica-
tion of a new variety – home-grown transitional public relations (Ławniczak, 2016).
It was recognized by the Orbán government that sound communication inwards
and outwards would be key to the success of its radical and unorthodox reforms
(Kaiser, 2010). The former involved explaining the basic concept, purpose, and bene-
fits flowing from them, in order to get public support for its implementation and to
28. THE GLOBAL BATTLE FOR HEARTS AND MINDS 315

win elections. For the latter, outwards, it meant strengthening the international com-
munication in defense of Hungary’s image and to promote the reasons, concepts and
rationality of the change, to encourage both foreign investors as well as expand inter-
national cooperation.
The communication strategy was based on the following guidelines:
• Inwards, constantly remind the voters that “this government is ‘different’ and
functions ‘differently’ to the previous government” (Kaiser, 2010, p. 120); Hun-
gary is now presented with a major opportunity which its voters have opened up
with their choice for change;
• Outwards, the Hungarian Government have adopted a two-pronged strategy of
communication: on the one hand, it stresses that in Hungary there is nothing
terrible happening with no totalitarianism or compromising of people’s rights;
on the other, the Government underlines its strong social mandate and its pol-
itical independence from other states.

The Defense Campaigns of the Chinese Public Diplomacy

In the early years of the 21st century the Western media and politicians were con-
fronted by the fact that “China is now emerging as both the world’s most dynamic
economy and its largest source of capital” (Financial Times, May 30, 2007). Having
accumulated official foreign exchange reserves of $1,202 billion by March 2007,
China can now afford a large scale public diplomacy (Aoyama, 2007) using its soft
power for its “charm offensive” (Kurlandtzick, 2007) which has two aims:

• the first, to improve its international image (defensive stage), and

• the second (concealed until the 19th Party Congress), to promote its “socialist
market economy” model as proven and effective for social and economic
success.

China has gone on public relations defensive campaigns primarily in the face of the
mounting international criticism of its handling of violent riots in Tibet and its subse-
quent crackdown, including the protests that have marred the international torch
relay leading up to the Beijing Olympics in August 2008. Among other steps under-
taken by official Chinese media, the Dalai Lama was blamed for orchestrating the
March 14, 2008 riots in Lhasa, and the unrest that followed in other ethnic Tibetan
areas, as part of a bid for independence and to spoil the Olympic Games.
In its efforts to improve its image abroad China has, among other steps, also engaged
international PR agencies (Hill+Knowlton, Ketchum, Ogilvy Public Relations, Fleish-
man-Hillard, and Edelman), as reported by the South China Morning (April 22, 2016).

From Defense to an Offensive: the Promotion Stage

At the beginning of the 21st century, as a result of the rising oil prices both Russia
and China have strengthened their economic potentials and positions in the global
economy. “In Putin’s mind, the United States attacked first in the information war.
Russia is now strong enough to retaliate” (Ignatius, 2017). On the other hand, the
economic potential and prestige of the United States suffered. In such circumstances,
316 RYSZARD ŁAWNICZAK

these major US competitors, together with smaller transition countries, joined the
defensive stage to the offensive stage: promotion of their own competitive model of
democracy and market economy – labeled by their Western opponents as the “illib-
eral democracy.”

The Spread of the Hungarian Illiberal “Disease”

At the end of December 2017, in contrast to 2010 when Hungary was in a state close
to bankruptcy, the economic situation is stable, and Hungary is experiencing the high-
est growth in the EU (www.tvn24.pl). As a result, politicians in Poland, Bulgaria,
Romania, Slovakia, and lately also the Czech Republic can see that Orbán’s experiment
is both economically and politically successful. They see no negative consequences in
weakening democratic institutions or going against liberal values, they regard Orbán as
a role model and are trying to adapt some of his policies. Hungary’s story has become
this way an East European story confirmed by headlines like: “More Hungary in East-
ern Europe” (openDemocracy, August 27, 2014); “Eastern Europe Marches Right”
(DEMOCRACY, December 11, 2017).
While observing this growing popularity of Orbán’s model of illiberal democracy,
one may conclude that Hungary has reached the stage of applying the soft power of
attraction for offensive purposes – promotion of an alternative to liberal democracy.
This happens not without sophisticated public diplomacy directed outwards. To com-
municate outwards, the following foreign communications tools are applied, to name
a few (Szily, 2013, p. 4):
• the Hungarian ambassadors “pen militant letters to the editor right away,
should they read articles critical of Hungary;”
• the “movement for the intellectual defense of the homeland” aiming at reacting
to any form of criticism of Hungary has been encouraged;
• Orbán himself as a charismatic leader and excellent communicator who
“shocked Europe with his outspoken defense of rigid policies” (Sounders,
2011, p. 2); and
• the actions of dynamic Communication Minister, Zoltan Kovacs who is very
efficient in defending his government reforms, including writing open letters to
the editors of FORBES, Financial Times, Washington Post, and other influen-
tial newspapers.

Russia Declares the Information War and the End of the U.S. Global Information
Domination
According to Professor J.S Nye, already in 2012 President Putin was aware that “soft
power is a complex of tools and methods to achieve foreign policy goals … without
the use of force, through information and other means of influence” (Nye, 2017). But
in Nye’s opinion he misunderstands soft power because the declared “information
warfare” goes well beyond soft power. Russia is not yet able to use it for offensive
purposes, as an instrument of “competitive attractiveness.” Instead, “Information
warfare can be used offensively to disempower rivals, and this could be considered
ʻnegative soft powerʼ. By attacking the values of others, one can reduce their attract-
iveness, and thus their relative soft power” (Nye, 2017).
28. THE GLOBAL BATTLE FOR HEARTS AND MINDS 317

Willy-nilly, Professor Nye is forced to admit that so far “Russian information warfare
has been somewhat successful in terms of disruption, but affecting the 2016 U.S. election
somewhat it has failed in terms of generating soft power” (Nye, 2017). It was confirmed
by Prime Minister Theresa May in her speech on November 13, 2017 when she stated
that “Russia repeatedly violated the airspace of several European countries, and mounted
a sustained campaign of cyberespionage and disruption. This has included meddling in
elections, hacking the Danish Ministry of Defense and the Bundestag, among many
others” (The Scotland Times, November 14, 2017).
The theoretical background of the new Russian offensive chaos theory of political
warfare is already known as “The Gerasimov Doctrine” published in February 2013.
According to Gerasimov, “the role of non-military means of achieving political and
strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have acceded to the power of
force of weapons in their effectiveness….All this is supplemented by military means
of a concealed character” (Mckew, 2017).
The “non-military means” applied by Russia in that guerrilla type of information
warfare embrace a whole range of actors and tools: troll farms, automatic bots, hack-
ers, social media, media leaks, and fake news and many others. However, there are
media outlets like the RT and Sputnik which are the major elements of the extremely
efficient Russian information warfare. According to the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI) in the declassified version of its report on Russia’s
interference in the U.S. 2016 presidential elections, the RT (Russia Today) has more
YouTube viewers than Al Jazeera English, BBC World, or CNN. It lags however
behind in Twitter and Facebook followers (Beauchamp, 2017).
With the beginning of 2016, beside the first Russian activities under the information
war banner, another important and historical moment is worth noticing: the official
declaration of the end of American global information domination. On February 4th,
2016, Andrey Krutskikh, senior adviser to President Putin announced that just like in
1948, a year before the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb ending the era of the
U.S. atomic monopoly “We are at the verge of having, something’ in the information
arena, which will allow us to talk to Americans as equals” (Ignatius, 2017). Very soon
this shocking truth could be confirmed by the U.S. intelligence report quoted above, as
well as quite sensational headlines in world media, like a November 19, 2014 article in
“BBC World Tonight” titled: “Is US monopoly on the use of soft power at the end?”.
It was followed in 2016 by equally sensational titles like: “America is Losing the Cyber
Information War” ; “U.S. losing ʻinformation warʼ to Russia,” (The Washington Free
Beacon, April 28, 2017). In spite of those rather alarming and pessimistic opinions, an
American expert on information warfare rather optimistically emphasizes in his analysis
that as for today, “The Russians know they can’t compete head-to-head with us – eco-
nomically, militarily, technologically – so they create new battlefields. They are not
aiming to become stronger than us, but to weaken us until we are equivalent” (Mckew,
2017).

The New Chinese Stage of Public Diplomacy after the 19th Congress of the CPC
The 19th Congress of the CPC should be treated as a milestone in the Chinese for-
eign policy strategy. It marked its basic shift, namely:

the abandonment of Deng Xiaoping low-profile foreign policy and emphasizing that
under Xi Jinping China strives now for a central role on the world stage. China’s growing
318 RYSZARD ŁAWNICZAK

power positions in world affairs allows today the Chinese leadership believe that their
country can serve as a model for other countries and as a leader in the effort to guarantee
global public goods. (Esteban, 2017)

In the opinion of the Guardian (Tuesday 24 October 2017), “Xi has pledged to lead
the world’s second largest economy into a ʻnew eraʼ of international power and influ-
ence.” This new era defined by Xi’s Thought of “Socialism with Chinese Characteris-
tics” had been written into the party charter.
An analysis of the documents of the 19th Congress lead to a conclusion that the
Chinese leadership is increasingly conscious that it is important for the country to
enjoy a positive image abroad. That is why the diplomatic and PR efforts have to be
redoubled to transmit the message that China is not a threat to anyone – which
should be interpreted as a historical shift from the defensive to the offensive public
diplomacy stage.
China perceives its soft power a little broader than the original concept – as any-
thing outside of military and security relations. In the Chinese approach it includes
not only popular culture and public diplomacy but also coercive economic and diplo-
matic ties such as aid and investment, as well as participation in multilateral
organizations.
The Chinese public diplomacy offensive, intensified after the 19th Congress, is first
of all directed towards developing countries of Africa, Latin America, Southeast and
Central Asia. In particular, the Chinese public diplomacy tries to underline that it is
now the leading export market for 32 countries, presenting concrete initiatives such as
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) or the One Belt and One Road Ini-
tiative. This way China demonstrates its readiness to contribute actively to the eco-
nomic development of other countries.
As for the other tools of the Chinese public diplomacy, the 19th party congress
confirmed that the spread of Chinese language and culture seems to be the
cornerstone of it together with promotion of Confucianism and the notion of the
Harmonious Society. By May 2014, 480 Confucius Institutes have been established
around the world with 1,000 more to be established by 2020 (Xinhua, October 2,
2006).
Along with the official contacts and visits, China communicates with the outside
world using also other tools of public diplomacy such as:

• staging of major international events like the Olympic Games in Beijing in

2008, or the Universal Exposition in Shanghai in 2010);
• launching intensive programs of educational exchange.

The launch of the so-called Cooperation Forums with different developing countries
seems a particularly useful tool for promoting Chinese “modes of development” or, in
other words, the model of the “Beijing Consensus.”
In its editorial published shortly after Xi’s closing address, the party’s official news
agency, Xinhua (October 24, 2017) proudly underlined that

China’s success proves that socialism can prevail and be a path for other developing coun-
tries to emulate and achieve modernization. China is now strong enough, willing, and able
to contribute more for mankind. The new world order cannot be just dominated by capit-
alism and the West, and the time will come for a change.
28. THE GLOBAL BATTLE FOR HEARTS AND MINDS 319

What the Chinese communist party official documents label as “socialism with Chin-
ese characteristics,” Western analysts (Barma & Ratner, 2006) classify as “illiberal
capitalism” but they must agree with the official tone of the 19th Congress that:

China’s leaders have, over the last quarter-century, developed a strategy of illiberal capital-
ism that has demonstrated its ability to achieve economic growth and poverty reduction
without causing significant fissures in authoritarian control. ….By demonstrating the via-
bility and achievements of an illiberal capitalist model for growth, China has become an
exporter of ideas to a developing world weary of democratic liberalism – and a financier
for those eager to play copycat.

The Western PR Industry in Service of “Illiberal Democracies”

As the two critical scholars observed, “Liberal public relations practice…leads to public
relations being used to build relationship with local power holders who do not necessarily
pursue or support principles of equity and democracy” (Bardhan & Weaver, 2011). This
quite paradoxical truth has been confirmed by Freedom House stating that:

For decades now, an expanding cadre of US political consultants, public relations special-
ists, and blue-chip law firms have been earning generous fees from many of the world’s
autocracies, dictatorships, and petrostates ….. In 2016, Reuters reported that five major
public relations firms had competed for a contract to improve China’s image abroad.
(Freedom House, Freedom at Issue Blog, of June 29, 2011; https://freedomhouse.org/blog/
flacks-autocrats-american-growth-industry)

Investigative journalists were able to provide a sufficient number of examples informing

the world public opinion that: “sister public relations (PR) firms, Ketchum in Washing-
ton DC and GPlus in Brussels … contracted to work for Peskov (Putin’s press spokes-
person) and the Kremlin media team;” “BGR Gabara was a key PR firm that.. worked
on Kazakhstan image;” “Tony Blair contacts enabled Kazakhstan to recruit high level
PR firms such as Portlands Communications as well as other numerous others from
around Europe;” US PR firm Qorvis’ work for China includes “real-time monitoring for
Twitter, Facebook forums, blogs and other social media in the English language” (Equal
Times, March 17, 2015). To help to restore its public image abroad, as well as persuade
the foreign investors not to withdraw from Hungary, the Orbán government appointed
two London PR and lobbying firms: Financial Dynamics – to handle financial communi-
cation; and Project Associates – to do PR on political issues (Bryant, 2011).

CONCLUSION

The main thesis of this study is as follows: the public relations purpose, in some
countries at least, has transformed from (liberal) democracy promotion to promotion
of “illiberal democracy.” Since the end of the Cold War the “democracy promotion”
program has become the cornerstone of the US foreign policy, and democratic liberal-
ism has become the dominant model for national development of most of the world’s
regions. The PR industry was, and still is, actively engaged in promoting the Ameri-
can version of liberal democracy and the market economy, according to Washington
Consensus prescriptions. Behind the scenes, PR agencies and consultants effectively
320 RYSZARD ŁAWNICZAK

assisted in using the American soft power, supported the assistance public diplomacy
programs of institutions like the USAID (United States Agency for International
Development) and NED (National Endowment for Democracy).
The victory of the Solidarity movement in Poland and the collapse of the Soviet Union
encouraged Francis Fukuyama to proclaim “the end of history.” In his opinion, capital-
ism, along with liberal democracy, had won. Fukuyama could not have been more wrong
because the beginning of the 21th century has proven that the era of competing ideolo-
gies is far from being over. It happens not only because authoritarianism is quite success-
fully competing with liberalism, but also Islamist fundamentalism is spreading around
the world. More importantly, the 2008/2009 global financial crisis, and among others the
failed Arab revolutions, provided enough arguments that the marriage of free market
economics and liberal democracy is incapable of creating a political and socio-economic
system benefiting the majority. In effect, new phenomena may be observed: the end of
the U.S. public diplomacy persuasion power and its strategic communication world dom-
inance, followed by the rise of “illiberal democracy.”
The governments of countries labeled authoritarian/non-democratic were forced to
defend, and at the later stage even promote their own model of “illiberal democracy.”
They used for this purpose their own version of “home-grown transitional public relations
and public diplomacy.” This chapter reveals two paradoxes: the first is that the United
States, from which modern public relations, Facebook, Twitter, and Google come, at this
stage seems to be losing the cyber information war and world communication dominance.
Secondly, Western agencies and PR consultants help the governments of “illiberal democ-
racy” to defend and even promote this hostile and competitive version of the political
system. Conclusion: it is not the ethical considerations that rule, but “money is the king.”

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 INDEX

Page numbers Figures are given in italics, Tables in bold, and notes as: [page no.]n[note number].

3F investors 285 rankings 2017 78–79

9/11 attacks see September 11, 2001 terror attacks role of 74
24/7 news cycle 272–273 world leaders 78–81
agenda directing 301–303
A agenda setting
propaganda and 293–308
Abbott, A. 66–67 public relations symbiosis 297–300
absolute monarchies 10 aggregate flows, propaganda 300–301
activism 51–62 Aguirre, Esperanza 254–255
bullfighting 247, 251–252 AI (Artificial Intelligence) 142
chemical risks 214 Akerlof, George 19
climate change 258, 265 Albro, R. 33
definition 52 algorithmic delivery mechanisms 301
environmental variables 52–54 Allagui, I. 56
issues management link 255–256 Allen, D. 227
literature on 54–59 the Alliance see North Atlantic Treaty Organization
“new” technology xviii Althaus, S. 301, 302
public affairs issues 229–230 altruism 71
strategies 55, 57–58 Amazon company, activist opposition 51, 53
theoretical frameworks 55–57, see also An, S.-K. 223
“hacktivism” ANC (African National Congress) 90
adaptability 232 Andalusia, Spain 249, 250–251
adjusting information 219 animal rights group campaigns 251, 253
advertising 41, 45 Anonymous group 162–169
advisory assistance 232 anti-globalization movement xvii
advocacy strategies 57 Arab World, crisis communication 220
Afghanistan, NATO in 133–134 Arabic languages, Andalusia 250–251
Africa, media diffusion 46, see also individual Artificial Intelligence (AI) 142
African nations Asia
African National Congress (ANC) 90 agencies operating in 76–77
agencies capitalism 242–243
Bell Pottinger case 86–87 crisis communication 220–222
client briefs 92 family-owned enterprises 149–161
development/challenges of 73–83 associations 65–72
“full service” agencies 235 blacklisting 91
international expansion 75–76 Codes of Ethics 66–69

322
323 INDEX

licensing 70–71 Brazilian associations 70–71

strategies 71 breadth of activism 53
Assurnasirpal II, king of Assyria 171 Brexit 29, 117, 293–300
asymmetric information 19 bribery scandals 152
Atkins-Sayre, W. 59 British Polluters cartoon 95
Atlantic Community see North Atlantic Treaty British rule, India 151
Organization Broom, G. M. 40, 196
Attribution Theory 218 Brown, R. E. 304
Australia Brzozowska, B. 286
political organizations 115 bullfighting 246–257
professional associations 68, 70 campaign for/against 248
authenticism/authenticity 277–278, 294 as issues management 251–256
authoritarian regimes/authoritarianism “bureaucracy perspective” 115
communication 3–6 Buress, Hannibal 276
comparisons 9–10 Burson, H. 75, 80
family-owned enterprises 155 Burson-Marsteller (B-M) agency 75, 76–78, 80
“illiberal democracy” 313–315 Bush, George W. 186–187
authorities business/corporate diplomacy 235–245
citizens’ relationship 115–116 the butterfly effect 276
trust in 114–115
autocracies 4, 312–313 C
awareness 232
Awaroa beach, New Zealand 286–287 CA see character assassination
Cameron, G. T. 40, 74
B Canadian Federal Government 99–110
Canadian Public Relations Society (CPRS) 68
B-M agency see Burson-Marsteller agency Canadian Security Intelligence Service 162
Bach, D. 227 Canel, M. J. 116
bacterial infection risks 213–214 Caney, S. 261
Bagdikian, B. H. 45 Cannon, Walter B. 146
“balance” strategy, climate change 260 Cannon-Weiner model 146, 146
Baldwin-Philippi, J. 302–303 capital
Balkan Wars 133 field competition 270–271
Baltic countries, NATO membership 133 for SMEs 285
banking organizations 229 capitalist economies 44, 242–243
Barcelona, Catalonia 246, 253–254 care issues, climate change 259, 261–264
Baron, David 227 carnivalesque protest 57
Barrett, Steve 79, 82 Castells, M. 47
Basque Country, Spain 249, 250 Catalonia
Beaumont, E. 5 bullfighting 247–248, 251–252, 253–256
Beck, U. 210–211 culture 249–250
behavioral economics 18 independence referendum 246–247
Bell Pottinger case 84–98 Center, A. H. 74
Bell, Timothy 86, 90, 92, 95, 183 Central Europe, NATO’s enlargement 133, 136
Benecke, D. R. 56 centralization
“beneficial change” concept 20 communication practice 104–105, 107
benefit sharing schemes 285 democracies 6, 7
Bennett, W. L. 301–302 EU communication 124
Bentham, Jeremy 144 chaebols, South Korea 152–153
Berlin Wall, fall in 1989 40 change agents 56
Berlusconi, Silvio 219 “character”, use of term 271
Bernays, Edward 295–297, 304n7 character assassination (CA)
Bernstein, C. 310–311 as field competition 270–271
Bhagwati, Jagdish 141 mediated complexity context 268–282
biases process and outcomes 271
risk perception 210 structural issues 272–276
safety standards 207 Charles III of Spain 248
bifurcation points 269 Chase, Howard 251
Black First Land First (BLF) 90, 92, 97n2 Chechan separatists 173
Blumler, Jay 11 chemical risk monitoring 214–215
borders, risk management 208–209 China
brand communication 143, 184–185, 199–200, communication control 5
238–239 crisis communication 220–221
brand identity, Anonymous group 167–168 crowdfunding initiatives 287–288
Brandes, S. 248 digital activism 58
INDEX 324

economic development 154–155 public sector 111–119

family-owned enterprises 154–158 risks 205–216
media control 46 Self-Correction Model 145–146
mediatization 41 structure and roles 104–107
North Korea and 186–187 terrorism as 170
public diplomacy 315, 317–319 variables 197
Chitiyo, K. 185 communication intelligence 93
Chiu, C. 288 communication management
Cho, E. J. R. 186 character assassination 278
Choudary, S. P. 286 relationship management and 143
Ciszek, E. L. 55–56 terrorism, public opinion of 175
citizen engagement, public sector 112–114, 116–117 communist countries, “democracy promotion”
citizen trust 310–311
in government 112 community response to risk 207–208, 215
public sector 114–115 comparative political systems 3–13
citizens competition
of NATO 135 corporatism 10
politicians’ relationship 115–116 field strategy 270–271
public sector serving 111–113, 116 complex, risk, uncertainty, and doubt (CRUD)
use of term 112 issues 226
city branding 238 complex society/systems 268–282
Clampitt, P. G. 197 computational propaganda 299–300, 302
classical school of economics 18 confidentiality 69
client briefs, agencies 92 conflict management 57
clients’ strategies, Bell Pottinger 93 confrontainment 274
climate change 211–213, 258–267 confrontational intensity, activism 52–53
“climate justice” 261 Confucianism 144, 154–155, 156–158, 318
Clinton, Bill 219 conspiracy theories 273
Clinton, Hillary 273–274 constitutional monarchies 10
closed access points, political systems 10 “constructed emotion” 304n8
closed systems 5 contextual intelligence 243, 244
Cobb, Frank Irving 296 Cook, Fred 80–81
Coca-Cola crisis 220, 222 Coombs, T. 54, 69
Codes of Ethics Copenhagen Agreement 212
enforcement 66–67, 69–70 corporate/business diplomacy!! 235–245
professional associations 66–71 holistic/strategic approach 242–245
cognitive-based approach, crisis communication 218 responsibility 243–244
Cold War 42, 133 stakeholder expectations 240–241
Coleman, G. E. 162–163, 165, 168 corporate practice
collaboration 9–10, 232, 236–237 culture 35–36
collective altruism 71 political practice difference 16
collective collaboration 9–10 corporate social responsibility (CSR) 23
collective identity, Anonymous group 167 activism interplay 56, 60
collectivist societies 221 climate change 259–263
comedians, news presentation 275–276 corporate diplomacy 240
Committee on Public Information (CPI), US 295 family-owned enterprises 154, 156, 159
communication individual practitioners 35
Anonymous group 167 corporations xviii–xix
convergence of types 237 Anonymous’ challenges to 168–169
crowdfunding 283–292 hyper-globalization 139–148
culture as 28, 36 marketing 32
European integration project 122–124 trust 34
failed/failing states 179–181, 184–186, 188 corporatism 9–10
governments 58, 99–110 corrective facework 271
internal 195–204 corruption 96, 152
via Internet 141–142 Cosby, Bill 276
micro-propaganda 293–308 Couldry, N. 301
narrative strategies 94 Council of the European Union 122, 125
NATO, 21st century 131–138 country reputations 94–95
operational role 107 country-specific studies xix–xx
political systems 3–13, 108 Coup de Frejac, Jacques 77
power of 97 CPI (Committee on Public Information, US) 295
products for 105–106, 108 CPRS (Canadian Public Relations Society) 68
public affairs 226–227, 230–232 Crable, R. C. 252–253
public diplomacy 236–238, 315–316 creative campaign concept 88–90
325 INDEX

credibility, public diplomacy 237 crowdfunding and 283–287

crisis communication 56, 60, 144, 147, 217–225 fintech 283–284
Asia 220–222 variations of 6–9
Europe 219–220 “democracy assistance” 310
United States 218–219, 222 “democracy promotion” 309–321
crisis management 96, 145, 274–276, 277 defensive stage 311–319
critical approaches, activism 54 offensive stage 315–319
critical modernism 179 Democratic Alliance (DA) party 91
critical public relations 18 democratization process, political economy 17
critical risk assessment 210–211 Denmark
cross-cultural communication 197, 201 crisis communication 220
crowdfunding 283–292 media diffusion 44
access to 286–287 devcom see development communication
democracy and 283–287 developing economies 44–45, 285
CRUD (complex, risk, uncertainty, and doubt) development communication (devcom) 20–24
issues 226 development concept 20–21, see also economic
Cruz, Ted 272–273 development
CSR see corporate social responsibility Dezenhall, E. 269, 276–277
Culbertson, H. M. 73 Dhanesh, G. S. 56, 222
Cull, N. 236, 238 dharma concept 151, 158
“cultural appropriation debate” 33–34 dialogic government communication 58
cultural bonds xviii–xix, 237–238 dialogue culture 117
cultural difference Dickson, D. 197
internal communication 200–201 dictatorships 9
nation-states 256 Dietrich, G. 41
political systems 4 digital activism 58–60
cultural diplomacy 32–33, 313–314 digital context, public diplomacy 239
cultural–economic model, activism 55–56 digital media xvii
culture 28–38 diplomacy, overuse of term 239, see also
bullfighting campaign 248 cultural diplomacy
communication as 28, 36 public diplomacy
of control/dialogue 117 diplomatic relations 94–95
crisis communication 219, 222–223 direct foreign investment (FDI) 185
definitions 238 discursive positions, climate change 263
EU public relations 127 disinformation
family-owned enterprises 155–157 agenda setting 299
globalization challenges 226 complex society 278
Hofstede’s dimensions 29–30, 219, 221–222 growing prevalence of 293
Lewis’ model of types 30–31 media diffusion 43
“nations within nations” concept 248–251 propaganda distinction 303
nature division 264 Russia 134–137
political systems 11 use of term 304n1
public diplomacy and 237–238 Doan, M. A. 286
public relations connection xx 28–38, 247, 256 Douglas, M. 210–211
risk communication 205, 208, 211 Downs, C. W. 197
Cupach, W. R. 271 Dubai Laundromat 86
Curtin, P. 55 Duhé, S. 16
Cutlip, S. M. 16, 73–75 Duran, Josep-Antoni 253

D E
DA (Democratic Alliance) party 91 earned media 41
Daesh see Islamic State terrorists East Germany, EEC membership 128n1
Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) project 262–263 Eastern Europe, NATO’s enlargement 133, 136
data communication 230–231 Ebola virus risks 209–210, 213–214
data gathering/analysis 232–233 ECF see equity crowdfunding
decentralization economic development
corporatism 10 democracies 9
democracies 6–7 family-owned enterprises 152, 154–155
EU communication 124–125 levels of 19–22
deep mediatization 272 economic force, hyper-globalization 140–141
defence reinforcements, NATO 135–136 economic inequality 284
Delphi study 198, 238 economic systems 14–27, 44–45
democracy Edelman agency 77–79, 82
communication 3–6, 145 Edelman, Richard xix 82
INDEX 326

Edelman Trust Barometer 111–112 F

EEC see European Economic Community
Egan, P. J. 261 face negotiation 270–271
Ellsworth, R. 156 face-saving tradition 221–222
Elmer, P. 15 Facebook 46, 141
embassies, NATO member states 133 “factitious informational blends” (FIBs) 303
emerging markets 236–237 failed/failing states 178–192
employee communication 195–204 fairness, safety and 207
employee engagement, international communication “fake news” 293–300
199–200 globalization 272
employer brands 199–200 hyper-globalization 140
energy policies, United States 6–7 institutional crisis 275
engagement, use of term 199, see also citizen engage- media diffusion 43
ment employee engagement stakeholder use of term 304n1
engagement false information 8
Entman, R. M. 274 familism 155–157
entropy 269 family-owned enterprises 149–161
environment, definition 121 cultural characteristics 155–157
environmental justice 259, 261, 265 definitions 149
environmental variables implications for public relations 157–159
activism 52–54, 60 FDI (direct foreign investment) 185
EU public relations 126 fear, sense of 181, 189n1
equity crowdfunding (ECF) 285, 287–289 federated political process, Canada 101
ETA see Euskadi Ta Askatasuna “fiasco vortex” 276
ethical codes 66–71 FIBs (“factitious informational blends”) 303
ethical industry leadership 65–72 field competition strategy 270–271
ethics field struggles 270
Bell Pottinger incident 95–96 financial communication 283–292
definition 144 financial crisis 283–292
interests’ relationship 229 financial public relations 283–292
public relations models 174 financial resources, public affairs 231
Self-Correction Model 144–148 financial technologies (fintech) 283–284, 289
ethnocentric wisdom 188, 191n44 Finland, crisis communication 220
ethnocentricity 179 fintech see financial technologies
EU see European Union Fischhoff, B. 209
EUPRERA (European Public Relations Education Fisher, M. T. 57
and Research Association) 81–82 Flannery, Tim 258
Europe Fleming, L. 284
agency operations 75–76, 80 Fletcher, T. 239
crisis communication 219–220 Flint River case 210
integration project 122–124 Fock, S. T. 155
media differentiation 8 foreign investment, failed/failing states 185
European Commission 122, 124, 125 foreign relations 94
European Council 122 Frame, A. 33–34
European Economic Community (EEC) 121, 128n1 France, nuclear energy policy 7
European Parliament 122, 125–126 Franco’s dictatorship 249–250, 256
European Public Relations Education and Research Fraser, Nancy 261
Association (EUPRERA) 81–82 free market economics 311
European Union (EU) 120–130 free press 42, 45
Brexit 29 free trade xvii
communication functions 123 free-will 145
NATO communications 134–137 Freedom House 182, 189n8
origin/structure/organization 121–122 Freeman, R. E. 242
public communication 124–126 Freidson, E. 66
public opinion on terrorism 174 Freitag, A. R. 73
security environment 135–137 French Revolution 172
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) 250, 256 Friedman, Thomas xvi
Evetts, J. 67 Fukuyama, F. 40, 155, 311, 320
Ewing, R. P. 251 “full service” agencies 235
Excellence theory 52, 54–56, 237, 239, 296 functional field competition strategy 270
exempt communication staff 102, 105, 107 functional societies 206–207
exports, Canada 100–101 functionalism and activism 56–57
expressive strategy 270 fundamentalist terrorism 172–173
externally imposed negative public relations 180–181 fundraising platforms 283–292
327 INDEX

G Gupta family 85–93, 96

Gurevitch, Michael 11
GA (Global Alliance for Public Relations and
Communication Management) 67 H
Galician region, Spain 249, 250
Galuszka, P. 286 H&K agency see Hill & Knowlton agency
Gandy, Oscar 298 “hacktivism” 162–169
Ganges River case study 264–265 Hain, Peter 94
Garcia, C. 219 Hall, Chris 106
Geoghegan, Victoria 88–91 Hall, Edward T. 28, 36
“The Gerasimov Doctrine” 317 Han, G. 55
Germany 46, 128n1 hard power 239
Gewirtz, David 168 Harder, R. 298–299
GFC (Global Financial Crisis, 2008) 283–292 Hargie, O. 197–198
Ghemawat, Pankaj 140–141 Hayes, Roger 23, 236
Ghosn, Carlos 143 hazardous manufacturing processes 214–215
Gigaba, Malisi 87 health risks 213–214
Glenny, L. 115 Heath, R. L. 251
Global Affairs Canada 100, 107–108 “hegemonic” role
global agencies organizations 34
development/challenges of 73–83 public relations 31
rankings 2017 78 Helsby, Nick 198
world leaders 78–81 Henderson, James 86–88, 91
Global Alliance for Public Relations and Herbst, S. 275
Communication Management (GA) 67 Hill & Knowlton (H&K) agency 74–76, 77, 80
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 283–292, 2008 Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 29–31, 219, 221–222
global holding companies 77–78 Holbrook, D. 174
global information disorder 299 holding companies 77–78
global information domination, US 316–317 holistic approach, corporate diplomacy 242–245
global interdependence, risks 205–216 Holladay, S. 54, 69
global professional associations 65–72 Holtzhausen, D. R. 56
Global Terrorism Database (GTD) 174 homeostasis concept 146
“global village” concept 141, 200 Hong Kong
global warming see climate change crisis communication 220–221
globalism 39, 44 economic development 154–155
globalization family-owned enterprises 156–157
CA/reputation management 272–273 Housh, Gregg 168
cultural challenges 226 HR (human resources) 198
definition 39 Huang, J. 164, 167
ethnocentricity 179 Hughes, John 81
local jobs retention 287 human assets, public affairs 231
public affairs approach 227 human communication see communication
use of term 139–141 human resources (HR) 198
globally-focused organizations 228–229 humor strategy, Anonymous group 165–166
glocal approach 128, 228 Hungary 312–316, 319
Goby, V. P. 223 Hunt, T. 143
GOC (Government of Canada) 99 hybrid warfare 134, 137
Golin agency 80–81 hyper-globalization 139–148
Google, advertising 46 hyperbole strategy 166
Gordhan, Pravin 87, 93–94
governance model, risk 208–209 I
Government of Canada (GOC) 99
government communication 58, 99–110, 116 IA-cubed model, public affairs 227
government organizations xviii ICTs see information and communication
culture 35–36 technologies
media control 44–45 “identity”
trust in 111 justice discourse 263
Greenhalgh, S. 154 of public relations 34–35
Gregory, A. 241 IGOs see intergovernmental organizations
Grunig, J. E. 30, 32, 73, 143, 167, 174, 237, 296 Ihlen, Ø. 33–34, 260
Grunig, L. A. 30, 32, 73, 255 “illiberal democracy” 309–321
Gruszczynski, M. 303 “image prepare” model 278
GTD (Global Terrorism Database) 174 image repair/restoration theory (IRT) 217–219, 223,
guardianship concept, climate change 259, 277, 312
262–265 imports, Canada 100
INDEX 328

impression management 270, 277 hyper-globalization 140–142

incivility strategy 275 media access 47
India usage in 2017 43
climate change action 264–265 interpersonal relationships, family-owned enterprises
family-owned enterprises 150–152, 153, 158 158
organizational culture 29 Interpublic holding company 77–78
indigenous concerns, climate change 262–264 investor relations 283–292
individual decision-making, rational choice theory IPR (International Public Relations) network 77
18 IPRA see International Public Relations Association
individual participation, propaganda 300–301 Iraq, US-led military operations 186, 188
individual practitioners, culture 35–36 IRT see image repair/restoration theory
individualist competition 10 Islamic State terrorists 165–166, 171, 173, 175
industrialization 150–151 Islamilites 172
information communication 105, 230–231 Islamist fundamentalist terrorism 172–173
information and communication technologies (ICTs) issues
xvi–xvii, 47, see also “new” technology definition 227
information policy, EU 123 in PA work 227–230
information subsidies 40, 41, 297–300 “issues life cycle” 252–255
information transparency see transparency issues management
“information war” 316–317 bullfighting case 247, 251–256
“informational” communication products 105 critical status 253–255
infrastructural risk management/communication 211 current status 253
Ingham, Francis 93 dormant status 255
The Innocence of Muslims film 268–269 imminent status 252–253
innovativeness 233 potential status 252–256
Inoue, Takashi 140 Italy, crisis communication 219–220
institutional crisis 274–276
“institutional identity” 35 J
instructing information 219
intelligence communication 230 Jackson, D. 298
interdependence of countries, risks and 205–216 Jahng, M. R. 57
interests Jain, R. 42
PA actors/activists 229 Japan, family-owned enterprises 153–154, 158
stakes as expression of 209 Jenkins, H. 302
intergovernmental negotiations, EU 121–122 Jewish fundamentalists 172
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) xix, 31–32 Jiang, W. 156
intermedia agenda setting 298 Johnson, C. E. 71
internal communication 195–204 Johnson, T. 277
channels 199 Jones, Terry 268
functions 198 journalism
good versus bad 197–198 agenda setting 298
measurement of 197 confrontainment 274
position in organization 198–199 decision-making 41
purposes 196 information subsidies 40
international activities, governments 100, 107 South Africa 85
International Code of Athens 237 judicial arenas, PA issues 230
international communication, employee engagement justice approach, climate change 259–263, 265
199–200 justification element, crisis communication 221
international crisis communication 222–224
international development project 21 K
international ethical codes 67–71
international expansion, agencies 75–76 Kagan, R. 40
international public relations kakistocracies 84–88, 97
changing nature of 81–82 Kang, M. 55, 58
media 39–50 Kant, Immanuel 144
International Public Relations Association (IPRA) Kasperson, R. E. 208
67–68, 77 Keller, A. 168
International Public Relations (IPR) network 77 Kenny, J. 296
internationalism, Canada 100–101 Kent, M. 223
Internet Kessler, Martin 141
bullfighting ban campaign 252 Ketchum agency 74, 79
character assassination 273, 275–276 Kibble, S. 185
free press and 42 Kim, H. 30, 52–54, 53, 58, 255
globalization 39 Kim Jong-un 182, 187
329 INDEX

Kiousis, S. 16, 296 malinformation 304n1

Kohara, Taiji 77 management
Korea 156, 158, see also North Korea South Korea conflict management 57
Kotler, Philip 32 crisis management 96, 145, 274–276, 277
kouhou concept 154 impression management 270, 277
Kovacs, Zoltan 316 public affairs 226–234
Kraus, Margery xix 241 risks 205–216, see also communication
Kreiss, Daniel 302 management issues management
Krutskikh, Andrey 317 relationship management
Kurzweil, Raymond 142 reputation management
kyosei concept 154 Manheim, J. 301–302
Kyoto Protocol 212 Manuel, Trevor 91
Maori culture 264
L market economies 155, 310–311
marketing 32, 198, see also social marketing
Langley, P. 286 markets, asymmetric information 19
language Marland, A. 108
choice of 304n5 Marvin, Garry 248–249
of “fake news” 294–295 Marwick, A. 274
internal communication 201 Mas, Artur 246, 248
Spanish regions 249–251 mass communication 113
Laursen, B. 125 mass media 40, 180, 253
Ławniczak, R. 17–18 Mastroianni, B. 163
laws see legislation material data safety sheets (MSDS) 214
Leaf, Robert 73, 75–76 Matsuura, K. 284
legal constraints, autocracies 5 Mattis, Jim 188
legal implications, climate change action 263–264 May, Theresa 317
legal status, professional associations 70 media 39–50
legal structure, democracies 8 21st century 44
legal systems 45 access to 47, 58, 180
legislation Anonymous group connection 163–165
bullfighting ban 254–255 Bell Pottinger incident 92–93, 94–95
EU 122, 127 bullfighting ban campaign 253–254
financial public relations 289 character assassination 277–278
legislative bodies, PA issues 230 control of 44–46, 180
Lewis’ model of cultural types 30–31 crisis communication 219
Lewis, R. 274 differentiation 8
Leyshon, A. 286 ethics 145
Li, J. 288 EU communication 125, 127–128
liability issues, climate change 259–260 family-owned 151–153
liberal democracy 309–321, see also democracy… hyper-globalization 140
liberal institutions, mediatization 40 NATO communications 134, 136
Libya, US-led military operations 186 North Korea 186–187
licensing professional associations 70–71 PA issues 230
Lin, L-W. 157 risk management 208
linear-active cultures 31 Russia 314
Lippmann, Walter 296, 302, 304n7 terrorist communication 171
living entity status 264–265 United States terror attacks 175, see also social
local crisis communication 222–224 media
local jobs, globalization threats 287 media agenda
local professional associations 65–72 influences on 297–298
lulz tactics 166 participatory techno-politics 301
LulzSec group 163–164 media capture 299
media diffusion 42, 46, 239–240
M media outreach 180, 188–189
mediated complexity, CA/reputation management
Maastricht Treaty 120–121, 124 268–282
McCombs, M. E. 297, 301, 302 mediatization 39–41, 272, 273–274
machine generated content 299 mediatized politics 274
McKie, D. 18, 32 mental models approach (MMA) 210
McLuhan, Marshal 141 Meraz, S. 303
Macnamara, J. 69–70, 239–240 meso level analysis, culture 35
Madrid, Spain 246, 249 message development/delivery, PA practitioners 233
Maiorescu, R. D. 55 message-targeting technologies 302
Malema, Julius 94 meta-cognition process 145
INDEX 330

“#MeToo” movement 272 national terrorism 172

Metts, S. 271 national theories, crisis communication 219
micro level analysis, culture 35 nationalism 248, 251–252, 254, 256
micro-propaganda 293–308 “nations within nations” concept 246–257
military activities NATO see North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO Allies 135–136 nature–culture divide 264
propaganda 300 NED (National Endowment for Democracy) 310
US-led 186 negative public relations 180–181, 190n26
military dictatorships 9 negativity, mediatization 274
military organizations 132, 136 negotiation strategies 57, 270
military power see hard power neoliberal economics 18, 21, 311
Millar, C. 71 Nestle India case 56, 60
Miller, K. S. 75 Neuman, W. R. 299
Milne, Stephen 10 Neumann, P. R. 172
Minister’s Office (MINO), Canada 104–106 “new” technology xvi, xviii, 272–273, see also
“minority” nations, Spain 249–251 information and communication
misinformation 303, 304n1 technologies
MMA (mental models approach) 210 New Zealand
MNCs/MNEs see multinational corporations/ climate change action 264
enterprises crowdfunding initiatives 286–287, 289
modernism 179 professional associations 68, 70
modernization process 20–21 news cycle, social media 272–273
Moeng, Solly 93 news media
Molleda, J. C. 73 agenda setting 297–298, 302–303
Moloney, K. 298, 301 comedians’ presenting 275–276
monarchies 10 dissemination 302
money laundering 86 EU communication 125, 127–128
morality 95–96 individual participation 301
Morgan, M. G. 210 mediatization 274
Morley, M. 77 “trust deficit” 275
Morris, J. H. 197 NGOs see non-governmental organizations
Moss, D 104 Nickerson, C. 223
MSDS (material data safety sheets) 214 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 58,
MSL Group 79–80 113, 229
Mugabe, Robert 182, 183–185 non-political communication 114, 115
Mukand, S. 312 non-profit organizations xviii–xix, 31–32, 35–36
Mules, P. 54 Nordic countries, EU membership 126
Mullin, M. 261 normative theories, media 42
multi-active cultures 30–31 norms, character assassination 269
multi-stake-seeker model 208 Norris, P. 175
multi-stakeholder model 208 North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 108
multiculturalism, Spain 246–257 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
multinational banking organizations 229 communication, 21st century 131–138
multinational corporations/enterprises (MNCs/ cooperation with partners 137
MNEs) 229, 240–241 public diplomacy, modern era 133–135
multinational trading groups 229 North Korea 5, 182–183, 186–189
multipliers, EU communication 123, 125 NRA (national rifle association) 51–52
Munte, Neus 255 nuclear energy policy, France 7
Muslim nations 268 nuclear weapons/tests 186–188
Muslim rule, Andalusia 250 Nye, J. S. 239, 243, 316–317

N O
NAFTA (North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement) 108 Oakbay Investments 87, 90–91, 93
narratives 88–90, 93–94, 205–206, 297–300 OASIS campaigns, NATO 135
nation branding 185, 238–239 Ocasio-Cortez, Alexandria 51
nation building 151, 158, 190n22 Oksiutycz, A. 56
nation-states Olson, P. 166
cultural difference 256 Omnicom Group 77, 79, 81
public sector 122 one-way risk communication 207
national borders 208–209 online activism 59–60, see also digital activism
National Endowment for Democracy (NED) 310 online media audience 303
national ethical codes 67–71 online training, associations 68
national health policy groups 213 open access points, political systems 6–7, 10
national rifle association (NRA) 51–52 open systems 4
331 INDEX

Orbán, Viktor 312–314, 316, 319 political organizations, communication 111–119

organizational activists 56 political polarization, agenda directing 302–303
organizational-centric theories 218 political public relations 16, 293–308
organizational culture 31, 35 political regimes, definition 4
organizations political systems
Anonymous’ challenges to 168–169 comparing 3–13
constituents of 200 economic systems intersection 14–27
globally-focused 228–229 Spanish regions 251, 256
internal communication 195–204 political transitions, “democracy promotion” 310
practice, types of 14 politicians 114–116
trust 33–34 politics
types xviii 14 media control 44–45
origin stories 206 mediatization 274
Osborne bulls 247, 250–251 South African discourse 94
owned media 41 Poole, E. 71
populist politicians 275, 294
P positioning theory, climate change 262–263
“post truth” 117, 293–300
PA see public affairs postmodernism 56
PAC (public affairs communication) 226–227 Pottinger, Piers 86
paid media 41 power
Pamment, J. 23 of communication 97
parallel process model, risk response 208 family-owned enterprises 149–161
Paris Accord/Agreement 212, 259–260 soft versus hard power 239, 243
Park Geun-hye, South Korean president 152 power distance 7, 30, 220
Parkland, Florida, school shooting 51–53 “Power/Responsibility principle” 261
participatory techno-politics 301–302 PR Week journal 74, 78–79
Partido Popular, Spain 254 PR4D see Public Relations for Development
PCO see Privy Council Office PRCA (Public Relations and Communication
PCO, C&C see Privy Council Office, Association) 91
Communication and Consultation press clubs 47, 154
Peacock, Thomas Love 84–85 press freedom 42, 45
Peng, M. W. 156 “Pretoria School of Thought” 241
personal influence model 30, 152, 158 preventive facework 270–271
personalization, mediatization 274 Prime Minister’s Office, Communications (PMO, C),
personhood concept, climate change 259, 264–265 Canada 106
persuasion 300–301 Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), Canada
persuasion power, US 311–312 104–105, 107
PESO (paid, earned, social and owned) model 41 PRINZ see Public Relations Institute of
Peters, J. 97 New Zealand
planning 233 Prior, M. 275
Plataforma Prou! group 252–254 Pritchard, R. J. 73–74
PMO see Prime Minister’s Office privacy, media 41
PMO, C (Prime Minister’s Office, private sector
Communications) 106 business diplomacy 242
Poland, “democracy promotion” 310–311 family-owned enterprises 149, 157
policy standards, Canada 101–105, 103 Privy Council Office, Communication and
political, use of term 114 Consultation (PCO, C&C), Canada 106
political activism 256 Privy Council Office (PCO), Canada 104, 107
political blogs 303 profession
political campaign, bullfighting ban 254 definition 66
political communication 3–13, 108 sociology of 66, 71
Canadian Government 101 professional associations 65–72, 91
citizen engagement 116–117 professionalization 66–67, 128, 175
EU institutions 126 propaganda
micro-propaganda 293–308 definition 174
non-political communication continuum 115 disinformation distinction 303
public sector 111–119 micro-level 293–308
political culture, Spain 248 origin of term 295
political decisions, NATO 135–136 psychology association 296
political development 310 public relations distinction 237
political economy 14–27 Russia 134–137
political leaders, authenticity 277–278 “protectors” concept, climate change
political–military organizations 132, 136 262–264
political–non-political communication continuum 115 protest strategies, activism 57
INDEX 332

PRSA (Public Relations Society of America) 70 R

psychodemographic assessments/preferences
209–210, 215 Ramaphosa, Cyril 94
psychology 296–297 rational choice theory 18–19
public affairs communication (PAC) 226–227 Rayner, S. 210–211
public affairs (PA) reactive cultures 31
assets influencing policy 231 reactive stance, self-correction 147
corporate diplomacy and 241 reality construction, mass media 180
global actors 228–229 regulations, financial public relations 289
issues 227–230 relationship-building 28
management/practice 226–234 relationship management 142–143, 146, 148, 243–244
practitioner/manager competencies 231–233 religious fundamentalist terrorism 172–173
strategic communication 242 religious matters, public affairs 229
public agendas, media 297 rent-seeking 56
public diplomacy reputation
Chinese policy 317–319 ethics and 69–70
definitions 180, 236 organizational 199–200
“democracy promotion” 309–310, 314 reputation laundering 85, 94–95
four Ds of 239–240 reputation management
persuasion power 311–312 Bell Pottinger 96
public relations overlap 23, 32–33, 179–181, 187, corporate diplomacy 243–244
235–245 mediated complexity context 268–282
three Cs of 238 public affairs 242
transitional public relations 313 structural issues 272–276
Public Diplomacy Division, NATO 132, 134–137 reputational assets 231
public engagement, NATO 136 reputational capital 284, 288–289
public health risks 213–214 reputational crisis, Nestle India 56, 60
public opinion, terrorism 174–175 resilience 215
public policy response efficacy, risk 207–208, 215
assets influencing 231 responsibility, climate change 261
institutions of 226 Responsible Care standards 214
public relations reverse agenda setting 299
agenda setting relationship 297–300 rhetorical communication 187–188, 218
antecedents 29–31 Rice, Susan 268
contemporary concepts 296–297 Riordan, Shaun 239
as culture 34–36, 247 risk
definitions 113, 174, 179, 296 dynamics/dimensions of 206–209
public relations–activism nexus 51–62, 255 exposure 214–215
Public Relations and Communication Association interdependence and 205–216
(PRCA) 91 risk assessment 206, 210–211
public relations counsel, entitlement to 95 risk communication 205–216
public relations–culture nexus 28–38, 256 criteria for 215
Public Relations for Development (PR4D) 16, 22 disciplinary streams 209–211
Public Relations Institute of New Zealand (PRINZ) quality of 208
68, 70 risk governance model 208–209
Public Relations Society of America risk management 205–216
(PRSA) 70 risk society 269
public sector Roberto, A. J. 208
citizens’ relationship 115–116 Robson, P. J. A. 197
EU institutions as 122 Rodrik, D. 312
political communication 111–119 Rojecki, A. 303
trust in 114–115 Romania, EU membership 126
public trust, institutional crisis 274–275 Rome Consensus 22
publicity, terrorism 171 Roper, J. 260
publics Rössler, P. 42
EU communications to 124–126 Rubin, D. 57
relationship management 143 Ruck, K. 200
Putin, Vladimir 314, 315–317 Rudnick, Gary 81
Ruel, H. J. M. 240
Q Rupert, Johann 88
Ruskola, T. 157
Quinn, D. 197 Russia
Quintus Tullius Cicero 16 cultural diplomacy 313–314
333 INDEX

“democracy promotion” 311, 313–315 Anonymous group 165–167

disinformation campaigns 299 Bell Pottinger’s campaign 88, 90–91
“information war” 316–317 character assassination 273, 277
NATO’s relationship 133–137 China 288
terrorist attacks 173 control 45–46
safety, risk management 207, 215 emergence of 41
ethical issues 95
S hyper-globalization 140, 141–142
NATO’s capabilities 134, 136
Sánchez, Alicia 253 PESO model 41
Sanders, K. 116 public affairs issues 230
Scammell, M. 115 timing and speed of 272
SCCT see Situational Crisis Communication Theory social movements, Spain 255–256
Schlosberg, D. 261 social psychology 297
Schoeplin, G. 314 social responsibility 151, see also corporate social
Schultz, D. 167 responsibility
science paradigm social, technological, economic, ecological, and
climate change 258 political (STEEP) concerns 226
risk communication 210 socialism, China 318–319
Scientology, attack on 162, 164, 166–167 societal culture 31
SCM see Self-Correction Model socio-cultural variables, activism 53–54
security environment, EU 135–137 sociology of professions 66, 71
security paradigm, terrorism 172 soft power 239, 243, 309, 316
Seib, Philip 134 Solana, Javier 133
“self-adjustment” model 146 Sommerfeldt, E. J. 58
Self-Correction Model (SCM) 144–145, 148 Sorenson, L. 155
evaluation areas 147 Sorenson, O. 284
integration of elements 146–147 sound science paradigm 210
self-presentation 270 South Africa
self-projected negative public relations 180, 181 corporate diplomacy 241
September 11, 2001 terror attacks 133, 172, 175 state capture 84–97
Serjup, J. 56 South Korea 52, 152–153, 158
Servaes, J. 22–24 Soviet Union
Sha, B.-L. 40, 196 dissolution 1991 40, 313
Shapiro, D. M. 155 former countries of 133
“shared responsibility” concept 102 Spain
Sharpe, M. L. 73–74 bullfighting 246–257
Shaw, D. L. 297, 302 crisis communication 220
Shiller, R. J. 283–285 spectacle, masters of 168
Shin, J-H. 153 “spin” 34, 92–93
Sholte, J. A. 39 Sriramesh, K.
Siegrist, H. 66 activism 52–54, 53, 58, 255
Sikharudze, Vasil 133 climate change 258
Silverstone, R. 41 crisis communication 222
Simon, Herbert 19 culture 34, 36
simplification, mediatization 274 family-owned enterprises 158
Simpson, O. J. 273 financial public relations 288–289
Singularity 142, 146 global agencies 73
Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) internal communication 201
217–219, 223 mass media 180
skew see biases media 44, 46–47
Slaughter, Anne-Marie 239 political systems 15, 108
Sloane, Carl 14 stakeholder engagement, public diplomacy 243
Slovakia, NATO membership 133 stakeholder ethics 144–145
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) xix, 285 stakeholder expectations, corporate diplomacy
“smear campaigns” 269 240–241
SMEs see small and medium-sized enterprises stakeholder network 241
Snow, N. 237–238 stakeholder relationship management 142–143, 146,
Snyder, R. A. 197 148, 244
social capital 271 stakeholder theory 242
social justice 261 stakes, risk management/communication 208–209
social marketing approach 22, 32 state capacity, communication 8
social media state capture 84–98
activism 58 state failure 178–192
agenda setting 299–300 state terrorism 172
INDEX 334

STEEP (social, technological, economic, ecological, STEEP concerns 226, see also “new” technology
and political) concerns 226 terror attack, definition 174
Stiglitz, J. E. 299 terrorism 170–177
Stokes, A. Q. 57, 59, 73 Anonymous attacks on 162–163, 165–166
strategic ambiguity 221 as communication 170
strategic approach, corporate diplomacy 242–245 debate over 171–173
strategic communication definitions 172
culture 238 disinformation campaigns 300
definition 99 global incidents 173–174
governments 99–110 history of 171–173
NATO 132, 134, 136–137 media diffusion 43
public affairs 242 Spanish regions 250, 256
purposeful use 99, 101–104 trends 173–174
strategic deception practices 278 in the US 133
strategic mediatization 41 Tewksbury, D. 301, 302
strategic value textuality 212–213
Bell Pottinger 96–97 Thaler, P. 273
“spin” 93 theocracies 9
Strauss-Kahn, Dominique 164–165, 219 Thompson, G. 56
Streisand Effect 164 Thompson, Mark 294
Strömbäck, J. 16, 296 Three Wise Men report 131
structural changes, CA/reputation management Toledano, M. 16, 32, 57, 286
272–276 Tourish, D. 197–198
structural tensions, ethical codes 69 tourism 184–185
Subramanian, Arvind 141 toxic manufacturing risks 214–215
substantial change concept 147 trade flows 141
superficial change concept 147 trading agreements 100–101
supranational polity, EU 120–130 trading blocs xvi, xvii
supraterritoriality 39 trading groups 229
Surowiecki, J. 289 “traditional” media 46–47, 164–165, 230, see also
sustainability, CSR and 240 media…
symbolic capital 270–271 training activities, associations 68, 70–71
symbolization, mediatization 274 transitional public relations 313, 314–315
symmetrical communication 21 transitional states 310
symmetrical two-way communication 145–146, 167, transnational foundations, public affairs 229
207 transnational public relations 39–50, 58
syndication 288 transnational terrorism 172
Syria, US-led military operations 186 transparency 5, 7, 272
systemic norms, character assassination 269 Traverse-Healy, Tim 77
Treaty of Rome, 1957 123
T Trent, D. L. 33
Trump, Donald 85, 117, 187, 260, 263, 274–275, 278,
Tadayoshi, Shimazu 144 293–300
Taiwan trust
economic development 154 in authorities 114–115
family-owned enterprises 156 cultural perspective 33, 34–35
Takahisa, Shimazu 144 employee communication 195
Takasaki, M. 47 in government 111–112
Tan, W-L. 155 institutional crisis 274–275
Tata Group, India 150–152 political communication 293–300
Taurinas, Funciones 253–254 in politicians 114–115
tax breaks, US agencies 76 “trust deficit” 275
Taylor, A. 285 truth, political communication 294–295
Taylor, M. 23, 30, 58, 68–69, 223 Tuman, J. 175
tech companies/industry xvii, 44 Turk, Judy VanSlyke 298
technical competencies, PA practitioner/manager Twitter 90, 141, 272, 275
231–233 two-way symmetrical communication 145–146,
techno-politics 301–302 167, 207
technological disruptive force 142 Tzu, Sun 300
technologies
financial public relations 289 U
fintech 283–284, 289
ICTs xvi–xvii 47 UK see United Kingdom
limitations of studies 283 Ukraine
message-targeting 302 NATO communications 137
335 INDEX

Russia’s relationship 133–134 #WEARENATO campaign 135

UN see United Nations weather–climate change distinction 258
United Kingdom (UK) Weaver, D. H. 45, 57
Bell Pottinger incident 84, 91 Weber Shandwick agency 78–79, 82
Brexit issues 29, 293–300 Weiner, Norbert 146
crowdfunding platforms 289 “Weinstein Effect” 272
diplomatic relations 94–95 WEIRD (Western, Industrialized, Rich, and
referendum on EU membership 29, 121, 126, Democratic) societies 294–295
128n2, 293–300 Welsh, M. 198–200
United Nations (UN) WESP (World Economic Situation and Prospects)
public affairs 228 report 19–20
WESP report 19–20 West Germany, EEC membership 128n1
United States (US) Western, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic
11th September attacks 133, 172, 175 (WEIRD) societies 294–295
agencies operating in 76, 78, 80–81 Western public relations, democracy 319
Canadian exports 101 Whanganui River case study 264
climate change issues 262 White, Eric 75
crisis communication 218–219, 222 White, J. 167
“democracy promotion” 309–313, 315–316 “white monopoly capital” (WMC) 88, 91, 93, 96
energy policies 6–7 Whitehead, L. 17
global information domination 316–317 wicked issues 228
institutional crisis 275 Wiebe, Gerhard 32
media 8, 46 Wiener, Norbert 146
NATO communications 134 Wilcox, D. L. 74
North Korea’s relationship with 186–188 Willis, P. 241
persuasion power 311–312 WMC see “white monopoly capital”
power distance 220 Woerner, Manfred 133
presidential election, 2016 293–300 Wolf, K. 56
public opinion on terrorism 174 women’s risk tolerance 210
risk exposure protocols 214–215 World Bank, crowdfunding 284–285, 289
state capture 85 World Economic Forum, Davos 242
World Economic Situation and Prospects (WESP)
V report 19–20
World War II, EEC formation 121
Valentini, C. 121, 125 WPP Group 77, 80
Van Dyke, M. A. 300
Vasquez, G. M. 30 X
Veil, S. R. 58–59
Velmans, Loet 75 Xi Jinping 317–318
Verčič , D.
agencies’ development 73 Y
climate change 258
crisis communication 222 Yamamura, K. 154
culture 30 Yamuna River case study 264–265
disinformation campaigns 300 Yan, J. 155
financial public relations 288–289 Yang, A. 58, 68–69
internal communication 201 Yeltsin, Boris 313
media 41, 180 Yugoslavia, former countries of 133
strategic communication 108
Verne, Jules 142 Z
Vershbow, Alexander 134–135
Vibbert, S. L. 252–253 Zaharna, R. S. 312
“virality”, message-targeting technologies 302 zaibatsus, Japan 153
visibility problem, reputation management 272 Zakaria, Fareed 312
voluntary ethical codes 67 Zapiro cartoon 95
Voto, R. 56 Zealots 172
Zerfass, A. 41
W Zhang, A. 55
Zhang, B. 287
W20 Group 81 Zhu, L. 223
war tactics 134, 137, 300 Zimbabwe 182, 183–185, 188–189
“water protectors” 263 Zuma, Duduzane 87–88, 90, 93
Watts, R. 236 Zuma, Jacob 85, 87, 92–94, 96
weaponized narratives 297–300