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Exhibits
Subcase A
Exhibit 1C-1 Activated National Guard personnel serving in Louisiana and Mississippi,
2005
Subcase A
Exhibit 3A-1 Map of Los Angeles Police Department Bureaus and South Central Los
Angeles
8
Exhibit 3A-2 Emergency Operations Organization chart, City of Los Angeles
Exhibit 3A-3 Organization of the Los Angeles Police Department
Subcase C
Part IV. Improving Performance: Dealing with Novelty and Cognitive Bias
Case 12: Security Preparations for the 1996 Centennial Olympic Games
Subcase A
9
Exhibit 12A-3 Map of the Atlanta Olympic ring
Subcase B
Exhibit 12C-1 Timeline of the 911 call (abridged transcript), July 28, 1996
Case 15: Security Planning for the 2004 Democratic National Convention
Subcase A
Exhibit C-1 Comparison of response modes for routine emergencies and crises
10
Preface
D evastating crisis events of massive size, which we refer to as landscape-scale disasters, have been occurring
with distressing regularity—notably the tsunami that hit South Asia at the end of 2004, thought to
have taken over 300,000 lives (more than two-thirds of them in the first hour, principally in one location);
Hurricane Katrina on the Gulf Coast of the United States; the earthquake in Pakistan in late 2005; Cyclone
Nargis in Myanmar; and the devastating snowfalls and Wenchuan earthquake, both in China in 2008.
Smaller-scale emergency events, like any number of serious transportation accidents or the 2008 Mumbai
terror attacks, directly affect a smaller number of people than do large natural disasters, but they nonetheless
create—indeed, are sometimes designed to create—high levels of fear and disruption. Such events frequently
dominate the headlines and force us to think about whether we as individuals and society as a whole are
prepared for disaster and ready to cope with the consequences. Perhaps because these events are so salient,
how effectively we handle them often becomes a defining characterization of both our values and our
competence.
What can we do in advance to prepare to respond to major emergency events? What forms of organization
are most likely to be helpful and effective? What approaches to training and equipping responders and
codifying procedures have the best chance of achieving productive results? What kinds of behavior are most
valuable and effective “in the moment”—that is, during rapidly unfolding, urgent, and high-consequence
events?
These are complex questions, and they yield no simple answers. A great many good treatments of
emergency management describe methods of organization, training, and response procedures. They range
from highly technical manuals focusing on specific kinds of events (such as wildland fires or floods) or on
specific forms of response (such as search and rescue following earthquakes) to broader treatments on how to
organize the response to a major event through more general approaches such as the incident management
system. In these works, readers will find descriptions of historical events, well-developed theories of how
responses should be designed and executed, and cogent advice about both preparation and response. In our
research and teaching about crisis management, we often use materials of this kind, and we are grateful to
have them. We find, however, that the descriptions of events provided in these treatments tend to be relatively
spare, so that they constitute illustrations rather than the central subject of the work. Given that these works
are principally concerned with developing more general frameworks, their use of compressed examples seems
fair enough—but it often leaves us wanting richer, more complete descriptions of the events to inform and
expand our thinking and make our teaching more salient. For students (and teachers) who never have
experienced disaster situations firsthand, it may be hard to identify with the conditions that prevail or the
11
challenges faced by those enmeshed in such events—and we find that deeper, more comprehensive
descriptions can help all of us get a more vivid sense of these dramatic circumstances.
On the other hand, we can also find quite detailed treatments of individual crisis events, with rich,
comprehensive descriptions of how the events unfolded, the sequence of both the damage and the emergency
response, and the flow of consequences emanating from the disaster. These accounts—written from first-
person or journalistic perspectives—frequently provide an excellent understanding of the evolution of the
events. But they typically do not illustrate or provide much data about the relationship between the emergency
organization structures and concepts of emergency management, on the one hand, and the performance and
effectiveness of the response, on the other.
This book—a case-based examination of crisis and emergency management—attempts to fill the gap
between these genres by providing detailed cases about specific emergency events in the context of discussions
about concepts, terminology, hypotheses, and theories about emergency management. In our teaching, we
find that the depth of the event descriptions in the cases we have included in this book bring these historical
events alive in the classroom, galvanizing both our own and our students’ interest. But we also find that we
need to put these cases in a teaching context in which we examine well-organized ideas about how
emergencies differ from one another, what kinds of responses are necessary, and how different forms of
organization and behaviors (or the lack thereof) contribute to successful (or less successful) performance and
results. In that way, we can draw more deeply on the rich material these cases provide to guide the work of
future emergency managers and, more broadly, to inform both their colleagues in government and the citizens
who support their efforts.
There are several ways that instructors and students can use the case studies presented in this book in a
classroom, but two are probably most common. First, the cases can be used as detailed illustrations of concepts
and theories that already have been presented to students to show how they play out in specific circumstances.
Most of the teaching in this approach then focuses on the abstract concepts, with some class time allocated to
explore how they are demonstrated or illustrated by the events of the associated cases. (This is sometimes
referred to as a “deductive” approach, where concepts are developed from first principles and then conclusions
are deduced or applied to illustrations.) In teaching the “wisdom of crowds” concept, for example, which can
be illustrated by the case describing the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Team B,
“CDC Develops Its ‘Team B’” (Case 11), the discussion will first focus on the theoretical underpinnings of
the “wisdom of crowds” idea. Once that has been fully developed as a concept, the discussion will turn to the
Team B case:“How does the CDC’s experience with Team B illustrate the advantages and the difficulties of a
‘wisdom of crowds’ approach?”
The alternative—which is the approach that we use in most of our teaching—is to begin by discussing the
case itself, drawing out its potential implications for the concepts and theories, which will be examined in
detail only after the event-based discussion. In this approach, the case is central to the discussion, but the ideas
are central to the learning. (This is sometimes referred to by case-based instructors as an “inductive” approach;
the ideas and commentary about the ideas emerge from the cases.) In the class session about the CDC and
Team B, the class focuses on the case without first concentrating on the concepts. An instructor may begin by
asking students to examine the sequence of devices used by the CDC at different times in different
12
circumstances. “How did the problems they were confronting differ from one another? Why did they use
different approaches to Team B in these different circumstances? How well did they work? For which kinds of
challenges is the Team B approach most likely to be useful?” Students can thus explore the issues in the case,
forming their own ideas and impressions about what worked and what did not. After working on the events in
the case, the class can turn back to the conceptual issues: “What does this tell us about the general idea of the
‘wisdom of crowds’ approach?” Collateral readings about the concepts may be assigned along with the case
study or can be introduced after the case has been discussed.
Using either approach, both the concepts and the case examples can be examined in detail. To aid this
process, we have provided some additional material. Introductions to each of the five sections of the book
highlight and succinctly develop the main analytic themes of the sections. Brief introductions to each case
study set up its key issues, and suggested discussion questions guide the students’ reading of each case. In
addition, lists of key actors and chronologies of the main events are presented at the end of each case for
student reference during and after reading.A concluding chapter summarizes the major themes of the book
and places them in the perspective of two modes of response, which we term routine emergencies and crisis
emergencies. Also, teaching notes and PowerPoint lecture slides created by the authors are available from CQ
Press to assist faculty in the classroom use of these case studies.
Perhaps the essential point: using a well-developed set of principles and a collection of detailed case
examples together, an instructor and class can produce a much richer, more complete, more interesting, and
ultimately more satisfying examination of the key features of crisis management and leadership. That was our
fundamental purpose in developing these cases for our own teaching and the primary reason for collecting
these cases to share with other faculty and their students. We hope that this book helps you understand the
nature of these critical events better and helps you figure out how better to prepare for and respond to those
that still lie in our collective future.
Acknowledgments
Early in our careers as faculty members teaching about public management and leadership, we became
intrigued by cases about crisis situations because they offered a degree of clarity about success and failure that
is unavailable in cases about more ordinary circumstances. Two decades later, in the late 1990s, we became
more focused on the management problems of effective emergency response. We began working together on
crisis management issues in 2001. Together we founded a Harvard Kennedy School research and teaching
program— Emergency Preparedness, Crisis Management, and Disaster Recovery. Today that program is
deeply involved in a number of executive education initiatives; a diverse set of research projects; advisory work
in several cities; and, most pertinent here, curriculum development.
As we look toward publication of this volume, we recognize with gratitude how many people and
institutions have provided support and encouragement as these case studies were written, tested in the
classroom, and revised. We can say—with no reservations whatsoever—that this book would never have been
produced without their involvement.
Perhaps our greatest debt is to the “sources”: the many officials, responders, journalists, and other
participants and observers who granted personal interviews to the case writers. Generous with their time and
13
patient in working with the researchers, these people were also, in most cases, very candid and helpful in
securing additional information. Almost to a person, they were motivated by a desire to help others learn from
their experiences and improve the emergency management system. All of us involved in producing this book
thank them for their willingness to participate.
We owe another enormous debt to the extremely talented case writers who researched and wrote these
studies. We commissioned each of these cases, helped define their scope and focus in concert with their
authors, and worked with the authors in revising drafts, but the case writers conducted their research and
writing very independently. The results on view in this book are attributable to these authors’ incredibly
dedicated work:
Howard Husock, now vice president of policy research at the Manhattan Institute and director of its
Social Entrepreneurship Initiative, was for many years the director of the Harvard Kennedy School Case
Study Program. His thoughtful advice and firm editorial hand are visible in most of the cases in this
volume, and he is the author of one of them.
Esther Scott is the editor at the case program.
Pamela Varley is a senior case writer.
Kirsten Lundberg, after her years at the case program, is now director of the Knight Case Studies
Initiative at the Columbia University School of Journalism.
Susan Rosegrant, also a longtime staff member at the case program, now teaches writing at the
University of Michigan’s Residential College and works at the university’s Institute for Social Research.
John Buntin, formerly at the case program, is now a staff writer for Governing magazine and a coauthor
of Governing States and Localities and author of the forthcoming L.A. Noir: The Struggle for the Soul of
America’s Most Seductive City.
David Tannenwald, a recent Harvard College graduate, wrote his case as an undergraduate research
assistant.
Jerry Williams, since retiring as national director of the Fire and Aviation Management Program at the
U.S. Forest Service, has conducted research on wildland fire policy.
Another indispensable partner was David Giles, a senior research associate in our Program on Emergency
Preparedness, Crisis Management, and Disaster Recovery. He helped us abridge longer versions of the cases,
perceptively provided editorial advice, and dealt with the multitude of tasks and relationships essential to
move from manuscript to published book. He is equally adept at creative intellectual work and the exacting
tasks of formalizing or creating footnotes and proofreading—all of which made a significant difference in the
quality of this volume. Throughout, too, he has worked on several separate research projects with energy,
intellectual vigor, and persistent good humor.
Others in the Program on Emergency Preparedness, Crisis Management, and Disaster Recovery have also
been valued colleagues: Doug Ahlers, Arrietta Chakos, David Tannenwald, Jerry Williams, Carolyn Wood,
and Tom Wooten.
Both Harvard Kennedy School and Harvard University as a whole are incredibly stimulating and highly
supportive environments for research and teaching. We have been fortunate indeed to spend our student days
14
and professional lives at this university. It is impossible to name every colleague who has contributed ideas or
asked searching questions on the matters at hand, but we especially wish to thank Doug Ahlers, Graham
Allison, Alan Altshuler, Max Bazerman, Robert Behn, Robert Blendon, Hannah Riley Bowles, Ashton
Carter, Jack Donahue, Amy Edmondson, David Ellwood, Richard Falkenrath, David Gergen, Richard
Hackman, Frank Hartmann, Philip Heymann, James Honan, Juliette Kayyem, David Luberoff, Leonard
Marcus, Judith McLaughlin, Matthew Meselson, Steven Miller, Joseph Nye, Tony Saich, Terry Scott, Jessica
Stern, Christopher Stone, Guy Stuart, and Peter Zimmerman.
We thank our close Chinese faculty colleagues as well, particularly Xue Lan and Peng Zongchao of
Tsinghua University, Zhong Kaibin of the China National School of Administration, and Zhang Qiang of
Beijing Normal University, who have been instrumental in launching our China Crisis Management research
and executive education program.
Our case study development took off during the four years that one of us (Howitt) directed the Executive
Session on Domestic Preparedness (ESDP), sponsored at Harvard by the Office of Justice Programs, U.S.
Department of Justice. He cofounded this program with Richard Falkenrath, who left Harvard to serve as a
senior director at the White House National Security Council, then deputy director of the Homeland Security
Council, and now deputy commissioner for counterterrorism of the New York City Police Department.
Falkenrath ignited Howitt’s interest in emergency preparedness and crisis management, for which Howitt is
very grateful. Juliette Kayyem, now Massachusetts deputy secretary of public safety and homeland security
adviser to the governor, was a challenging and congenial intellectual partner during the remaining three years
of the project. Other stimulating ESDP research and staff colleagues include Gregory Koblentz, Rebecca
Storo, Robyn Pangi, Kendall Hoyt, Kerry Fosher, Laura Donahue, Patricia Chang, and Gavin Cameron.
The practitioner members of ESDP—most senior officials in local, state, or federal government agencies—
were an incredible group to work with over four years. Among them, Thomas Antush, Joseph Barbera, Hank
Christen, Rebecca Denlinger, Peter LaPorte, Marcelle Layton, Paul Maniscalco, Gary McConnell, Andrew
Mitchell, Leslee Stein-Spencer, Darrel Stephens, Patrick Sullivan, Ralph Timperi, A. D. Vickery, and
Frances (Winslow) Edwards deserve special thanks. We’ve also had the privilege of working with seasoned
and dedicated practitioners in many other venues. Among these, we are particularly grateful to Christopher
Combs, Gary Margolis, Joseph Pfeifer, Marc Rounsaville, James Schwartz, and Jerry Williams.
Theodore C. Sorensen has repeatedly given the gift of his time as a guest faculty member in our
Leadership in Crises executive education program; he is inspiring as both a teacher and practitioner of crisis
management.
We have benefited tremendously from and gratefully acknowledge intellectual and institutional support
from several research centers at Harvard Kennedy School and especially from their faculty directors: Alan
Altshuler and Edward Glaeser of the Taubman Center for State and Local Government, Graham Allison of
the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Anthony Saich of the Ash Institute for Democratic
Governance and Innovation, and David Gergen of the Center for Public Leadership. Special thanks also go to
David Luberoff and Sandra Garron, our longtime colleagues at the Taubman Center.
We have thankfully worked with a dedicated and talented team at Harvard Kennedy School Executive
Education, including Jane Latcham, Christine Letts, Kristi Scafide, Maryellen Smyth, and Peter
15
Zimmerman. Extra special thanks goes to Annette Wilson, our coconspirator in so many training endeavors.
Likewise, we thank our colleagues in the Ash Institute/Asia Programs—Julian Chang, Jessica Eykholt, Laura
Ma, and Kathy O’Brien— and at Tsinghua University, Meng Bo. David Gergen, Leonard Marcus, and
Donna Kalikow have our sincere thanks for their support of case development as a component of the National
Preparedness Leadership Initiative. At the Harvard Kennedy School Case Study Program, we have had
consistent administrative support from Howard Husock, Mary Flaherty, Anne Drazen, and Leslie Adkins-
Shellie, as well as those staff writers already mentioned. Joseph Zolner at the Harvard Graduate School of
Education has provided invaluable backing in launching the Crisis Leadership in Higher Education program.
A number of teaching venues have provided us with the opportunity to test these cases and, in turn, get
ideas for future case development. Harvard Kennedy School attracts superb participants to its executive
education programs, mainly senior officials from federal, state, and local governments in the United States and
other countries, as well as individuals from nongovernmental organizations and business firms. Not passive
consumers of the case studies, these “students” have probed and commented vigorously in discussions inside
and outside the classroom. First and foremost, we have taught these cases in Leadership in Crises, our original
and most frequently offered program, and in the National Preparedness Leadership Initiative, sponsored at
Harvard by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. A new program, Crisis Leadership in
Higher Education, in collaboration with colleagues at the Harvard Graduate School of Education (HGSE),
debuts in 2009, following in the footsteps of earlier presentations in HGSE programs for university leaders.
Shorter modules on crisis management have been included in several other Harvard Kennedy School executive
education programs aimed mainly at officials from the United States, including the Senior Executives in State
and Local Government and the Leadership for State Health Officials programs. We have also taught these
cases in Harvard Kennedy School international executive education programs, including a one-week version of
Leadership in Crises for participants from South and Southeast Asia at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public
Policy at the National University of Singapore. With colleagues from Tsinghua University, we have taught
China Crisis Management in Beijing. Shorter modules on crisis management have also been included in
Harvard Kennedy School’s China’s Leaders in Development Program, the Leadership Enhancement and
Development Program for Hong Kong, the Beijing Executive Public Management Training Program, the
Taiwan Executive Leadership Program, and the Pakistan Executive Leadership Development Program.
Leonard has taught this material at the Australian–New Zealand School of Government and in two Harvard
Business School programs: the South Africa Senior Executive Program and the Senior Executive Program for
the Middle East. Howitt has taught a version of Leadership in Crises at the Cascade Center for Public
Service at the University of Washington, Seattle; one-day courses at annual meetings of the National
Conference of State Legislatures and the Conference of Minority Transportation Officials; and a graduate
course, Crisis Management and Emergency Preparedness, at the Harvard Extension School.
Overall, nearly 2,000 executive education participants and other students have read and discussed the cases
in this volume. Through discussion and criticism, they have helped us frame and refine our thinking about the
events depicted, develop more general ideas about the leadership and management processes of emergency
preparedness and response, and gain confidence in the value of our approach to the critical questions and
issues faced by practitioners of emergency management.
16
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Financial support for these case studies has come from the Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of
Justice; the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; the New England University Transportation
Center, a U.S. Department of Transportation program; the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation; and the
Taubman Center for State and Local Government at Harvard Kennedy School. We also acknowledge
financial support for related research from Dean David Ellwood’s Acting in Time project at Harvard Kennedy
School, which has informed our thinking for some of the analytic material in this book, and from the Harvard
China Fund, to launch our parallel research and teaching in China. We deeply appreciate the faith in our
work that such support indicates but proclaim with more than normal vehemence the usual disclaimer: These
case studies do not necessarily reflect the views of any of these funders or of Harvard University; any errors of
commission or omission are ours and ours alone.
The President and Fellows of Harvard College (the Harvard Corporation), which owns the original
copyrights to these cases, has graciously permitted us to seek their publication.
The following reviewers provided feedback on the proposal for this volume and helped shape its
development: John Donaldson, Liberty University; Herbert Gooch, California Lutheran University; Jamie
Mitchem, California University of Pennsylvania; Tim Murphy, Findlay University; Bill Newmann, Virginia
Commonwealth University; Bill Parle, Oklahoma State University; Scot Phelps, Metropolitan College of
New York; Eugene Rovai, University of California-Chico; Steven Stehr, Washington State University; and
Robert Whelan, University of New Orleans.
Our partners at CQ Press have been an extraordinary group to work with: supportive, extraordinarily
patient, persistent in pressing us to finish, and endlessly helpful in maneuvering through the myriad steps
remaining when we thought (and wished) we were almost there. Charisse Kiino has championed this book
from the beginning; Julie Nemer has edited our copy with painstaking intelligence; and Allison McKay and
Anne Stewart have been extraordinary in turning the manuscript into printed pages. To all of them, sincere
thanks!
Our children and grandchild—Mark, Alexandra, Molly, and Matt and Melissa Howitt and their daughter,
Allison; and Dana and Whitney Leonard—light up our lives even when the matters claiming our professional
attention are grim. Maryalice Sloan-Howitt and Kathryn Angell are our treasured life partners. With great
love, we dedicate this book to Maryalice and Kathy.
Finally, as academics who do not work in the trenches of emergency response, we want to express our
admiration, respect, and gratitude to the many thousands of men and women in the United States and around
the world who go to work every day willing to place themselves in harm’s way—and who, not infrequently,
directly insert themselves between us and the perils that would otherwise befall us. It is no exaggeration to say
that they provide a fundamental building block of civilization by standing ready to help others, even at the risk
of their own lives. That they deserve our thanks goes without saying. We hope to do more in this book by
calling attention to the substantive tasks of their profession, conveying the difficult challenges they face, and
showing the courage and skill they need to cope with those demands. It is a most fitting tribute, we feel, to
help a new generation begin thinking about how to make the emergency management profession and system
even better in the future.
17
Arnold M. Howitt and Herman B. “Dutch” Leonard
Cambridge, Massachusetts
January 2009
18
Part I Prepared for the Worst?
The Dilemmas of Crisis Management
I n the brief history of the twenty-first century, a number of searing events have focused attention on
society’s capacity to respond to emergencies—some naturally occurring, some the result of human agency.1
These include:
natural catastrophes such as the Asian tsunami in 2004, Hurricane Katrina in the United States in 2005,
the wildfires in Greece in 2007, and the Sichuan earthquake in China in 2008
outbreaks of new, threatening diseases such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003 and the
perceived threat of avian influenza
technology failures and industrial accidents such as mine cave-ins in the United States in 2006 and
regularly in China, and major transportation disasters such as the foundering of an Egyptian ferry in
stormy seas that took the lives of more than 1,000 people in 2006
terrorist attacks such as the fateful 9/11 assaults on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon,
the anthrax-laced letters that closely followed in 2001, the train bombings in Madrid in 2004, and the
London subway and bus bombings in 2005
Disasters—some more dire than these—have always plagued human society. But the scale, density, and
interconnectedness of modern life magnify the impact of present-day catastrophes. The relative ease of
modern transportation means that some potential emergencies—most notably, emergent infectious diseases or
terrorism—can travel very rapidly within a single country or across national boundaries, as SARS did from
China to other countries in Asia and then to Canada. Of course, those immediately in the path of a major
emergency are severely affected, but others linked by family or social ties or by connections to disrupted
economic networks experience the disaster indirectly. Many individuals who suffer no harm directly may
nonetheless live in fear that future catastrophes will affect their families; others empathically identify with the
pain of victims. Society, moreover, pays high monetary costs—through public budgets and charitable and
personal resources—in reconstructing damaged physical infrastructure, struggling to restore community
vitality, and rehabilitating disrupted lives.
Interconnectedness has also increased both the visibility and the potential political impact of modern
disasters. The near omnipresence of contemporary communications media means that we learn faster and in
greater detail about most disasters. Videos and photos are quickly flashed even from remote areas, and the
immediacy and visual impact of human tragedy seen on television or the Internet accentuate the emotional
effects. The effectiveness of response is also visible. In some cases, resourcefulness, heroism, and resilience are
prominent. In others, lack of preparedness, poor communications among emergency responders, and weak
19
coordination expand the consequences and increase the pain that catastrophe imposes on society. In the face
of disaster, elected leaders must increasingly explain why serious emergencies that might realistically have been
prevented occurred on their watch or why their jurisdictions failed to respond effectively to emergencies that
occurred through no fault of their own, while political rivals try to hold them accountable both for failures of
prevention and for how well response and recovery efforts were conducted.
Many people have come to see connections, too, among disaster types, noting important similarities in terms
of what society must do to get ready for and respond to major threats. In the United States, the idea of “all
hazards” emergency preparedness has been official doctrine for over half a century, but the reality at all levels
of government has fallen short of the ideal. Far more must be done to ensure that overall capacity is adequate;
that small and large jurisdictions are protected; and that different agencies and professional groups, as well as
different levels of government, collaborate in building response capabilities, work together in the event of
disaster, and coordinate action effectively under the stress of dangerous events.
To develop robust response capabilities we must see emergency preparedness as a distinctive problem of
public management that requires different approaches than other management tasks with which we tend to be
more familiar. Effective emergency management is not a matter of administering routine operations or service
delivery, where the key problem is matching the supply of service in time and space to a more or less
continuous, although varying, flow of demand from citizens or organizations. It is not project management,
where a unique capital facility or operational activity is conceived, planned, and executed on schedule. Nor is it
an overhead or staff function like budgeting, human resources, planning, or policy development that, on behalf
of senior executives or legislative overseers, supports, analyzes, and critiques operations.
Instead, emergency management demands different capabilities. It requires readiness, as near to
instantaneous as possible, for a wide range of contingencies that happen only episodically—or not at all—in a
particular place. Responders thus must plan for events whose precise nature (timing, type, location, and
specific requisites of response) can only be loosely predicted and for which prior training, experience, and drill
may not have been appropriate or adequate. The effort required by emergency conditions will certainly involve
those who think of themselves as emergency responders (for example, firefighters and law enforcement and
emergency medical personnel). But, under severe circumstances, it may also involve others whose normal
activities and professional identities do not center on disaster management. These may include, for example,
personnel in public health, transportation, public works, social services, and schools, as well as a variety of
private-sector entities. Ideally, all these individuals and the professions they represent will be ready for the
contributions they will need to—or could usefully—make in the event of catastrophe.
In the United States, elected officials and the public pay intense attention to emergency management mainly
when highly visible events are handled poorly and concerns are then raised about the adequacy of disaster
preparedness for future contingencies.
20
In 1992, quite notably, the massive destruction caused by Hurricane Andrew in Florida and the subsequent
weak performance of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) led to major reforms in FEMA’s
organization and leadership (and probably contributed to the defeat of George H. W. Bush in the presidential
election that immediately followed the storm). Nearly a decade later, the 9/11 terrorist attacks stimulated
renewed scrutiny of the adequacy of emergency management at all levels of government and led to the
reorganization of federal agencies into the Department of Homeland Security. During roughly the same
period, the appearance of West Nile virus in New York City in 1999, the threat of bioterrorism dramatized by
the anthrax attacks in 2001, and SARS in Asia and Canada in 2003 focused attention on the potential
widespread outbreak of an emergent infectious disease, concern that intensified in the next several years with
the possibility that A(H5N1) avian influenza might spark just such a pandemic. Yet it was nature’s fury in
Hurricane Katrina, which lashed the gulf coast in late August 2005, that most vividly exposed serious
weaknesses in U.S. emergency response capabilities.
A Bottom-Up System
Of course, not all emergencies pose challenges of the magnitude of a Hurricane Katrina, nor require an
extraordinary commitment of resources from every level of government. In the United States, as in most
countries, the initial—and usually major—responsibility for disaster response rests with local authorities. This
bottom-up system of emergency management has a long history and continues to make sense in most
circumstances. Because local governments are proximate to disaster sites and have at least some emergency
capacity, they can respond quickly to initial alerts. They have detailed knowledge of local conditions and, in
many cases, have agreements for mutual aid to secure additional help rapidly from nearby jurisdictions.
Aid from state or national sources is provided mainly when local capability is inadequate or has been
exhausted. State government may have important specialized resources and capabilities, but because its
resources may be farther away, it is usually less able to respond immediately (its resources may have to travel a
considerable distance to get to a disaster site). Federal government responders are likely to be even more
distant—hence, much slower to arrive on a significant scale—and lack both local knowledge and integration
with local and state responders. FEMA, with relatively few deployable staff, has historically played a much
larger role in pre-event planning and post-event recovery than in the management of a disaster-in-progress.
Other federal agencies have more operational resources but are generally deployed as backup.
Notwithstanding the reorganization of emergency response at the federal level as a consequence of the
establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, the bottom-up system remains the normal model of
disaster response.
Quite clearly, however, the normal model was inadequate to handle the results of an event of the scale of
Hurricane Katrina. It is thus worthwhile to look at a number of core challenges that figure in major disasters of
various types. These challenges tend to recur and thus are critical design parameters for the emergency
management system.
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Novelty and Effectively Improvising Necessary Responses
Emergency responders ready themselves for a wide range of urgent circumstances. These involve high stakes,
danger, and outcomes that are critically contingent on responders’ own effective action. Although quite
demanding, many of these situations can be regarded as routine emergencies, not because they are in some sense
“easy” but because the predictability of the general type of situation permits agencies to prepare in advance and
take advantage of lessons from prior experience. Such anticipatable events are routine for both the agencies
and individuals concerned. Response organizations develop contingency plans, train personnel, practice their
skills, and ready or stockpile necessary resources so that they are ready when such predictable challenges occur.
For example, when forecasters predict that hurricane winds will make landfall, emergency organizations in
areas where hurricanes are common launch a range of programmed actions to protect property, provide
temporary shelter and supplies, make rescues as needed, and provide emergency medical care and other
assistance. Public health agencies and medical care providers, similarly, have annual routines to get ready for
and deal with the problems of flu season. In a fast-moving routine emergency, individual responders can rely
on this preparation and on their own near-instantaneous recognition of complex patterns to size up cause and
effect and trigger swift implementation of the appropriate protective measures.
The capacity to treat a wide range of contingencies, including quite severe ones, as routine constitutes an
enormous source of strength for emergency response personnel and organizations. They have thought through
how to act. They are equipped. They have trained and practiced. Their leaders’ judgment has been honed by
experience. In moments when delay may literally make a difference of life or death, they don’t need to size up
the situation for an extended period, plan their response from scratch, assemble people and resources, and
divide up roles and responsibilities. Responders are ready, in multiple dimensions of the term.
But not all emergencies fit the mold. Katrina was not merely another hurricane; SARS was not just another
wave of influenza. Such crisis emergencies are distinguished from more common routine (although possibly very
severe) emergencies by significant elements of novelty. These novel features may result from threats never
before encountered (for example, an earthquake in an area that has not experienced one in recent memory or
an emergent infectious disease like avian flu); from a more familiar event occurring at an unprecedented scale,
outstripping available resources; or from a confluence of forces, which, although not new, in combination pose
unique challenges. Katrina was a crisis primarily because of its unusually large scale and the novel mixture of
challenges that it posed, not least the failure of the levees in New Orleans. SARS was novel not only because
it was caused by a new bug but also because its pattern of infectiousness departed from the norm. It should be
clearly noted, however, that novelty, from this perspective, is subjective. It is something new from the
perspective of the jurisdictions, organizations, and individuals involved in response and possibly—but not
necessarily—from the experience or point of view of other jurisdictions, organizations, or individuals. A severe
fire in a chemical plant may pose novel conditions to the firefighters confronting it, even though other fire
departments in other states may have previously encountered these conditions.
An important consequence flows from considering novelty to be the defining feature of a crisis. Because of
the novelty, predetermined emergency plans and response behavior that may function quite well in dealing
with routine emergencies are frequently grossly inadequate or even counterproductive. That proved true in
New Orleans, for example, in terms of evacuation planning, law enforcement, rescue activities, sheltering, and
22
provisions for the elderly and infirm. SARS defeated the normal precautions that hospitals take to prevent the
spread of respiratory infections, resulting in the contamination and shutdown of several hospitals in Toronto.
By contrast with routine emergencies, therefore, crises require quite different capabilities. In crises,
responders must first quickly diagnose the elements of novelty (for example, in New Orleans, the widespread
need for assisted evacuation, the likely consequences when the levees failed, and the unexpected use of the
convention center for sheltering immobile refugees). Then they need to improvise response measures adequate
to cope with the unanticipated dimensions of the emergency (for example, quickly procuring vehicles for
evacuation, making emergency repairs to the levees, and providing food and law and order in an unprepared
shelter). These measures, born of necessity, may be quite different from or exceed in scale anything responders
have done before. The responders must be creative and extremely adaptable to execute improvised tactics.
Equipping organizations to recognize the novelty in a crisis and improvise skillfully is thus a far different (and
far more difficult) matter than preparing them mainly to implement preset emergency plans.
Many crisis situations occur suddenly and are unavoidably noticeable as something novel: a major
earthquake, the landfall of a major hurricane, a bomb blast. But some forms of crisis do not arrive suddenly.
They fester and grow, arising from more ordinary circumstances that often mask their appearance. We term
such situations emergent crises—a special and especially difficult category. When SARS emerged in south
China in winter 2002–2003, it appeared first as a series of unexplained deaths in a region that has, annually,
many unexplained deaths. The famous 1979 nuclear accident at the Three Mile Island power plant in
Pennsylvania started as a simple pump failure, out of which spun an escalating series of failures and mistakes
until a major crisis was underway.
Emergent crises pose special challenges for responders in terms of recognizing novelty because they look
much like routine emergencies in their early stages, only later revealing their unusual characteristics. By then,
responders may well have committed to treating the situation as they would a routine emergency and could be
slow to see the new features that require different forms of response—so slow that the emergency may by then
be difficult to control.
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