Brioschi, Alessandro

Working Paper
Networks paving the way: Apprenticeship and
occupational mobility in early modern Genoa

QUCEH Working Paper Series, No. 25-08

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Suggested Citation: Brioschi, Alessandro (2025) : Networks paving the way: Apprenticeship and
occupational mobility in early modern Genoa, QUCEH Working Paper Series, No. 25-08, Queen's
University Centre for Economic History (QUCEH), Belfast

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NETWORKS PAVING THE WAY: APPRENTICESHIP AND

OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY IN EARLY MODERN GENOA

Alessandro Brioschi (Queen’s University Belfast)

Working Paper 25-08

QUEEN’S UNIVERSITY CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC HISTORY

Queen’s Business School
Queen’s University Belfast
185 Stranmillis Road
Belfast BT9 5EE

November 2025
 Networks Paving the Way: Apprenticeship and
Occupational Mobility in Early Modern Genoa*
Alessandro Brioschi„

November 2025

Abstract

This paper investigates how kinship and professional networks shaped labour market
outcomes in early modern Genoa. Using a newly constructed dataset of over 8,000
apprenticeship contracts (1450–1530), I examine the extent to which kinship ties with
masters or guild members influenced both entry into apprenticeship and the probabil-
ity of attaining mastership. Using a probabilistic record linkage strategy to reconstruct
career trajectories, I show that apprentices with kinship ties to insiders were signifi-
cantly more likely to become masters, received shorter contracts and enjoyed better
contractual and training conditions. These advantages persisted even during periods
of economic contraction, suggesting that apprenticeship functioned not only as an
open mechanism for human capital formation but also as a selective filter reinforcing
occupational stratification. The findings contribute to debates on the role of guilds
in pre-industrial labour markets, offering empirical support for the view that social
networks limited access to skilled work and upward mobility.

Keywords: Apprenticeship; Labour Markets; Guilds; Mastership; Social Networks;

Early Modern Italy.

JEL Codes: J62; J24; N33; N93.

*I am especially grateful to John Turner and Arcangelo Dimico for their invaluable comments and con-
tinued support. I also thank Guido Alfani, Francesco Ammannati, Andrea Caracausi, Chris Colvin, Elena
D’Agnese, Mattia Fochesato and William Quinn for their helpful suggestions. I extend my gratitude to
Edoardo Bonato for generously granting me access to his data. The paper also benefited from the comments
of participants at the LSE Graduate Economic History Seminar, the 2025 EHS Annual Conference, the 2024
Datini-ESTER Advanced Seminar, the 9th ASE Annual Meeting, the 1st ARiSe Annual Conference and
the TCD Research Meeting in Dublin.
„ Department of Economics, Queen’s University Belfast, and Centre for Economics, Policy and History.
Email: [email protected]
1 Introduction

In recent years, the connection between social structures and economic institutions has at-
tracted growing scholarly interest. A central concern has been the persistence of inequalities
and inefficiencies in labour markets, particularly in the earlier stages of professional careers,
when disparities in access to opportunities often entrench social hierarchies and worsen the
impact of inequalities (Chetty et al. 2014; Heckman et al. 2013; Kramarz and Skans 2014;
Oreopoulos 2011). In his Principles of Political Economy, John Stuart Mill (1849) argued
that before industrialization, occupational groups in Europe were “almost equivalent to a
hereditary distinction of caste”, with the majority of new trainees in a specific trade be-
ing tied through family or community networks to those already active in it. More recent
theoretical and empirical works in economics have explored the effects of social networks
on the professional trajectories of individuals, whether in early modern economies or in
contemporary developing contexts, where trade relations are often enforced more via so-
cial interactions rather than formal legal systems (Edwards and Ogilvie 2012; Jackson 2010;
Munshi 2014). Even in the modern United States, the presence of networks of strong ties has
been proven to be a determinant of better career opportunities among migrant communities
(Munshi 2003).
Apprenticeship, one of the commonest forms of organized learning in early modern Eu-
rope and an essential ingredient for the acquisition of human and occupational rights, offers
an important lens for examining these issues (De la Croix et al. 2018; Mokyr 2019). Human
capital theory suggests that educational and training institutions are major determinants
of lifetime outcomes on the microeconomic level and possible sources of opportunities for
upward social mobility (Epstein 1998; Mokyr 2019; North 1990). For unskilled youths, di-
rect training in a master’s workshop provided access to the fundamental knowledge of a
specific trade and to urban labour markets, without being constrained by family resources
or background (De la Croix et al. 2018; Mokyr 2019).
However, even though apprenticeship could solve imperfections in markets for skilled
training and thus foster investment in human capital, in practice, access to these opportu-
nities and the subsequent career prospects was deeply shaped by family ties and broader

1
economic circumstances (De Munck 2007; Farr 2000; Ogilvie 2019; Ogilvie 2020). Indeed,
securing entry into prestigious trades and obtaining better training opportunities was of-
ten dependent on the presence of family connections within the same labour market or even
within the same guilds (Ogilvie 2019, pp. 110–116). This network-based advantage extended
beyond the training period. At the end of their training terms, most apprentices aspired to
become masters themselves in their trade of choice and be able to open their workshops, but
only a few of them completed this professional pathway (Barahona and Nieto Sánchez 2019;
Schalk et al. 2017). The limited available evidence confirms that the process for attaining
mastership, even with geographic and occupational differences, was strongly mediated by
social networks and guild structures (Schalk et al. 2017; Wallis 2008).
In this paper, I explore the role of social and professional networks in shaping occupa-
tional trajectories in Genoa between the fifteenth and the sixteenth century. To do this, I
use a hand-collected sample of more than 8,000 apprenticeship contracts, which recorded
the names and family relations of every figure present at the moment of contract drafting
(i.e., apprentices, masters, guarantors). The study focuses on a critical stage in the career of
apprentices: becoming a master at the end of training. By analysing the interplay between
social connections, labour market structures, and broader changes in economic trends, I
test to what extent kinship and professional ties shaped the professional advancement of
apprentices in early modern Genoa. To identify apprentices who advanced to mastership, I
employ a probabilistic record-linkage algorithm that matches apprentices’ names with those
of masters in later contracts. I then test the effect of an apprentice’s kinship and profes-
sional ties on his likelihood of becoming a master in his trade to identify the key factors
that influenced the career progression from apprenticeship to mastership.
The results reveal a statistically significant effect of family ties with masters and guild
members on the likelihood of achieving mastership at the end of training. These ties shaped
multiple stages of an apprentice’s career, from the choice of trades to the negotiation of con-
tract terms, and their importance persisted even when controlling for geographic networks
and family background. Furthermore, while the economic crisis of the late fifteenth century
reduced career opportunities in the hardest-affected trades, I show that it did not alter the
centrality of social networks, despite an increase in the reliance by masters on apprenticeship

2
as a cheap source of labour.
My work provides three main contributions to the literature. First, by tracing appren-
tices’ career trajectories in this historical context, this paper contributes to debates on the
functioning of pre-industrial labour markets showing how networks of strong ties altered the
markets for skill formation and labour mobility. Building on previous contributions on the
subject, I show that southern European markets for apprenticeships were not fluid, accessi-
ble and merit-based as other markets for skills in early modern Europe (Leunig et al. 2011;
Zeev et al. 2017). Instead, I argue that networks of strong ties played a key role in facilitating
access to economic opportunities, thereby reinforcing social and economic inequalities.
Second, this paper contributes to the studies seeking to explore the role of guilds in
apprenticeship training and their responses to socio-economic transformations. Differently
from some other cases in pre-industrial Europe, in early modern Genoa, apprenticeship was
entirely run by guilds (Schalk 2019; Wallis 2019). Therefore, as argued by various scholars,
guilds were in a position to extract benefits for their members, rationing access to human
capital investment and redistributing resources to their members at the expense of the wider
economy, especially during periods of economic instability (Acemoglu et al. 2011; Caracausi
2017; Ogilvie 2019; Ogilvie 2020). This study, to the best of my knowledge, provides the
first micro-level empirical evidence for Italy on how guilds restricted access to professional
opportunities to those not linked with existing members.
Finally, this paper speaks to the wider interest in understanding the institution of ap-
prenticeship. Most of the works done on this topic have sought to study who was able to
access apprenticeship, how effective the training was, whether innovation was encouraged
and the flexibility of this system in case of premature terminations (De Munck 2007; Schalk
et al. 2017; Schalk 2019; Wallis 2019). This paper builds on the aforementioned works
but tries to explore the link between apprenticeship and occupational mobility. My results
challenge the notion of apprenticeship as a straightforward mechanism of upward mobility
in pre-industrial societies and suggest instead that in Italian labour markets, in absence
of social connections, it often functioned as a mechanism for controlling entry into urban
labour markets and securing low-cost labour.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents an overall picture of ap-

3
prenticeship in Genoa across the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and highlights the main
differences in rules and terms compared to other training systems across Europe. Section 3
introduces the dataset of apprenticeship contracts and the methodology used to reconstruct
professional careers. Section 4 assesses the possible drivers of professional outcomes in Genoa
by looking at the determinants of apprentices’ promotion to mastership. Section 5 discusses
the results given the recent literature on the topic. Section 6 provides brief conclusions.

2 Apprenticeship in Early Modern Genoa

Apprenticeship in Genoa grew alongside the rise of urbanisation in the fifteenth century.
Despite being on a declining economic trajectory at the start of the century, Genoa re-
mained, together with Venice, a major commercial and naval power in the Mediterranean.
To mitigate the economic consequences of the eastern trade decline following to the loss of
their colonies in the Mediterranean and Black Sea, the Genoese redirected their commercial
routes towards north-western Europe and Genoa was progressively converted into a proto-
industrial centre, especially in the textile sector (Casarino 2018; Lopez 1964). The growth of
local trades drove urbanisation, attracting hundreds of workers from the countryside. As a
result, from the second half of the fifteenth century, Genoa experienced a 19 per cent growth
in the urban population from 43,000 inhabitants in 1450 to 51,000 in 1525, largely driven
by the influx of migrants into the urban environment.1
Guilds in Genoa responded to the growth of new trades and labour supply by regulating
apprenticeship at the urban level and setting as standard a formal contract registration with
a master (Epstein 1996; Itzcovich 1979). Apprenticeship contracts were broadly uniform
across trades and required the master to host his apprentices and to teach them a given
occupation for the whole length of the contract. In principle, the formal drafting of contracts
benefited both parties. On one side, for apprentices and their families, it offered legal
protection with a ratified start and an agreed end of training. For guilds, it provided
a mechanism to monitor the number of apprentices hired by each master and to enforce
statutory limits on recruitment.2
1
According to Oddo and Zanini (2022), from 1450 to 1525, the city of Genoa constituted between 16%
and 18% of the Republic’s total population.
2
Genoese guilds had provisions that either constrained the recruitment of apprentices to one for each

4
 Sending a child for a training period in a workshop was a form of investment (Wallis
2008; Wallis 2019). For the apprentice, the advantages of undertaking this form of train-
ing were multiple: careful and complete on-the-job training, longer learning time, and the
inclusion into a network of practitioners, all skills that could become profitable throughout
a professional career (Casarino 1982; Ogilvie 2019). For a master too, training an appren-
tice was a form of investment (Gatti 1979). While some guilds in other European cities
charged formal apprenticeship fees, evidence for Genoa suggests fees were minimal or absent
in many trades. Masters’ incentives to train apprentices therefore depended primarily on
the expected return from apprentices’ labour: once the initial learning phase was complete,
each skilled apprentice worked at a below-market wage, long enough to cover the master’s
expenses in training (opportunity cost of time, materials, accommodation, and food).3 In
addition, apprenticeships allowed masters to cultivate skilled workers for the long term,
maintain control over trade knowledge, and secure labour for their workshops.
Guild statutes in Genoa typically set the length of training between four and eight years
but allowed some flexibility for guilds and masters (Gatti 1979). The duration depended
not only on the apprentice’s age and the nature of the profession he was going to learn, but
also on his family background. In this regard, Casarino (1982) notes that contract length
was often the outcome of negotiation processes, with those possessing stronger ties with the
master or the guild better placed to secure favourable terms.
Apprentices faced four main outcomes: (i) early departure during the apprenticeship
period; (ii) death before completing the term4 ; (iii) employment as a salaried journeyman,
either in Genoa or elsewhere; or (iv) achievement of mastership. The most recent contri-
butions on the topic show that the distribution across these outcomes, despite the presence
of some similarities, was substantially influenced by the economic and institutional frame-
work of the urban labour market in which apprentices had to operate. Schalk et al. (2017)
show that the percentage of apprentices who ultimately became masters was low across
master or at least specified a maximum limit on the numbers that could work simultaneously for one master.
3
Master’s obligations, apart from teaching the craft (docere artem bene et legaliter ), implied providing
the apprentice a remuneration in kind, commonly clothing and footwear. For a more detailed discussion of
master’s obligations, see Itzcovich (1979).
4
Ogilvie (2019, p. 407) highlighted that mortality among apprentices was not negligible. Estimates
for early modern London show that around 10 per cent of apprentices died during training and outcomes
elsewhere in Europe were similarly constrained.

5
Europe. This tendency seems to be confirmed also in the case of early modern Genoa.
In Genoa, apprentices could attain mastership after completing the statutory training pe-
riod and successfully passing a guild examination, which tested both technical competence
and knowledge of the trade (Casarino 1982). These requirements, combined with potential
guild-imposed limits on the number of masters, meant that only a small share of appren-
tices ultimately achieved mastership, even in trades with high apprenticeship fees as an
entry barrier.5
Apprentices in Genoa, as in many urban centres of early modern Italy, had strong in-
centives to achieve mastership due to the economic and social advantages it offered over
lower positions such as those of salaried journeyman. For journeymen, wages were relatively
stable but modest, as they were typically set by guild regulations or negotiated individually
with masters (Epstein 1991). Masters, by contrast, earned directly from their production,
supervised apprentices and journeymen, sold finished goods, and controlled workshop out-
put. Wage records from Italian cities suggest that journeymen in textiles and construction
earned 20-30 per cent less than their masters (Buscemi 2024; Caracausi 2010; Pullan 1964).
This substantial wage gap, along with the higher social standing associated with mastership,
made the achievement of mastership a critical step toward economic security.
The role of family connections on career advancement remains a subject of debate in the
literature, especially in cities like Genoa, where guilds exercised a strong control over the
urban labour market. Epstein and Prak (2008) emphasize the centrality of guilds in human
capital formation and downplay the role of families in shaping access to apprenticeship or
mastership. Similarly, De la Croix et al. (2018) argue that guilds offered an institutional
alternative to family-based training, encouraging skill transmission through formal struc-
tures rather than through kinship ties. By contrast, Ogilvie (2019) highlights that kinship
networks often reinforced guild monopolies, limiting labour market access for outsiders and
ultimately shaping training outcomes. Likewise, Farr (2000) notes that although masters’
sons did not always remain in the same trade, many new masters were still recruited from
established guild families, sometimes shifting between guilds within the same city.6
5
Gatti (1986) shows that only 5% of apprentices active in the craft of furrier in Genoa eventually became
masters at the completion of the apprenticeship.
6
Evidence from cities such as Milan, Antwerp, and Württemberg points to similar exclusive practices

6
 The available evidence for Genoa, though scarce, supports the latter view, revealing a
segmented market for skilled labour (Casarino et al. 1979; Massa 1970; Massa 1998). Only a
few trades, though, explicitly facilitated entry for masters’ sons,7 for example through statu-
tory exemptions from formal contract drafting.8 More generally, families played a prominent
role in guiding the choice of trade. Apprenticeship placement was strategic: individuals with
relatives already active in a trade benefited from asymmetric information and established
networks, which increased the likelihood of completing training and, ultimately, accessing
mastership (Mokyr 2019; Wallis 2025).
Building on the importance of social networks in the apprenticeship system, as appren-
tices often originated from distant rural areas and sought work in urban centres, there was
a significant cultural and geographic divide between labour supply and demand (Ghiara
1991). To bridge this gap, guarantors served as intermediaries, offering security to both
contracting parties. For masters, guarantors reduced the risk of misconduct or early aban-
donment. For apprentices, they ensured protection in an unfamiliar urban environment and
facilitated integration into the trade (Casarino 1982; Ghiara 1991). Guarantors in Genoa
were either individuals connected to the apprentice - through family ties or by virtue of
shared geographic origins - or were guild members familiar with both the rural and ur-
ban settings and operating as recruiting agents (Casarino 1982). Guild-affiliated guarantors
likely enhanced the apprentice’s credibility in the urban labour market, while kin-based
guarantors not member of the same guild primarily signalled trustworthiness but carried
less professional leverage.
The selection of the supervising master was another critical decision. Families in Genoa,
exploiting informal connections and intermediaries, could secure supervision by experienced
masters, especially when opportunities were limited or guild rules tightened.9 Such arrange-
ments to seek the supervision of experienced masters sometimes required accepting less
among early modern guilds across continental Europe (D’Amico 2000; De Munck 2007; Ogilvie 1997).
7
Barbers (according to their 1438 statute), caulkers (1438), and shoemakers (1424 and 1426).
8
Gatti (1979) and Casarino (2018) also highlight for the end of the 15th century the existence of intra-
trades agreements to prevent binding members’ relatives as apprentices and to reserve to master’s sons the
profession of the father. These agreements anyway did not rule out the necessity of completing a training
period as an apprentice with a colleague of the father or with the father himself.
9
Casarino (2018) highlights that there is limited evidence for Genoa that might confirm whether appren-
tices could select from a wide array of masters or whether the choice was constrained by the guilds and/or
the availability of masters.

7
individual attention during the training, as masters balanced multiple apprentices.
In this respect, from the 1470s onwards, Genoa entered a period of economic crisis, which
caused a setback for some of the major guilds in the city (Casarino 2018; Heers 1961). Highly
reliant on imported cereals and goods from its physically limited hinterland, the city started
to experience food shortages following the loss of its overseas colonies.10 Casarino (2018)
suggests that the effects of this economic crisis on Genoese trades mainly depended on their
degree of labour intensity and their dependency on Eastern Mediterranean markets. In
response to these economic pressures, Genoese guilds increasingly relied on apprenticeship
as a cheap source of labour,11 introducing longer minimum training periods and reinforcing
masters’ authority, especially over apprentices from outside the city. Especially in sectors
with a more complex work organization, new intermediate roles (“laboratores”) emerged,
reflecting a reduction in available opportunities for young apprentices at the end of training.
The Genoese apprenticeship system thus imposed uneven constraints. For guilds, ap-
prenticeships ensured a supply of relatively cheap labour, a desirable outcome, especially
for a city with limited local labour resources (Epstein 1991). For apprentices, however,
opportunities at the end of training were highly heterogeneous. Well-connected individuals,
especially sons of masters or those with strong guild or kin ties, could leverage networks
to secure entry into mastership or favourable positions. By contrast, outsiders and those
lacking family support often faced barriers to advancement, with apprenticeship functioning
less as a vehicle for technical skill transmission and more as a mechanism for regulating
access to skilled trades (Buscemi 2024; Ogilvie 2019). In this sense, what has sometimes
been described as a “bottleneck” in Genoa did not affect all apprentices equally: it restricted
upward mobility for weaker families and outsiders, while serving the interests of guilds and
established masters.
In sum, apprenticeship in early modern Genoa operated at the intersection of family
networks, guild authority and broader economic conditions. The prominent role of kinship
and professional ties underscores the importance of empirically testing their effects on career
trajectories. Considering both external economic factors and the specific structures of Ge-
10
ASCG, Fondo Brignole-Sale, 108-D-3
11
Bellavitis et al. (2019) suggest that in early modern Venice it is also possible that masters were using
apprenticeship as a form of cheap labour contract.

8
noese guilds is therefore essential to understanding apprenticeship outcomes and, ultimately,
how these factors influenced occupational mobility in early modern Genoa.

3 Data

3.1 Data sources

In this article, I use a dataset of 8,543 apprenticeship contracts (acordaciones famuli), which
record the names and relationships of individuals active in Genoa between 1451 and 1530.
The sample provides a broad view of recruitment patterns in one of early modern Italy’s
largest urban centres and allows the examination of training processes across several decades
and trades.12 To reconstruct professional careers, I link individuals across contracts using
a probabilistic record linkage procedure based on the Fellegi-Sunter model (Enamorado et
al. 2019; Fellegi and Sunter 1969). The linkage method matches individuals over time by
names (and their Jaro-Winkler distances), patronymics and year of appearance, with several
adjustments to improve matching accuracy.13
For the purposes of this study, I define becoming a master as the appearance of a former
apprentice as a supervising master in a subsequent contract. This definition captures the
moment at which an individual assumed responsibility for workshop training and provides
a consistent criterion for professional advancement.14
The matching procedure identifies 12,582 distinct individuals, 10,272 with a single ap-
pearance and 2,310 with at least two appearances. In demographic terms, the dataset is
sizeable: between 1468 and 1475, 2,325 apprentices were registered in Genoa, suggesting
that roughly 5 per cent of the city’s population of 45,00015 were engaged in apprentice-
ship.16 The near absence of female apprentices confirms the overwhelmingly male character
of guild training in early modern Italy, in contrast to the more inclusive patterns sometimes
12
See Appendix A.1 for further details on sources and database construction.
13
See Appendix A.4 for details of the matching technique employed.
14
This measure therefore might be interpreted as a lower bound, since some individuals may have attained
mastership without subsequently appearing in the records as supervising masters.
15
Oddo and Zanini (2022) estimates that in 1475, the city of Genoa had an urban population of about
45,000 inhabitants.
16
This share is higher than the 4% estimated for Utrecht in 1670 (Schalk 2019) but below the 6-8%
estimated for London in 1600 (Wallis 2019).

9
observed in private apprenticeship.17 At the same time, it also implies that the incidence of
apprentices is even higher when measured against the male segment of the Genoese popula-
tion. Demographically, this strengthens the representativeness of the dataset: the estimates
suggest that it captures a substantial share of the city’s male labour force and, by extension,
a significant portion of the urban labour market.
Despite its extensive coverage, the dataset has some clear limitations. First, it only
enables us to trace the professional trajectories for individuals who remained within Genoa’s
urban boundaries. For instance, it is not possible to observe whether an apprentice whose
contract is included in the dataset, after completing training in Genoa, continued his career
elsewhere. It would be incorrect to consider the Genoese professional system as a closed
system with no emigration to other areas of Northern Italy (Bezzina 2015; Casarino 1982).
However, Bezzina (2015) argues that starting from the fifteenth century, Genoese guilds were
worried about the weakening of the control exercised on their members and the diffusion of
specific knowledge and techniques and endeavoured to eliminate the possibility of moving
away from Genoa at the end of training. This consideration partially mitigates the fact
that, in the absence of evidence on emigrant apprentices, my dataset can only give a partial
perspective of the professional trajectories of apprentices trained in Genoa.
Second, apprenticeship contracts do not record the status of journeymen or other in-
termediate positions, even though a large share of apprentices never reached mastership
(Casarino 2018; Schalk et al. 2017). The analysis therefore captures an important but
partial set of professional trajectories within the broader spectrum of paths available to
apprentices in Genoa. Nevertheless, the evidence remains valuable for understanding the
conditions under which some apprentices achieved mastership, and by extension, the factors
shaping entry into journeymanship.

3.2 Temporal and occupational representativeness

The number of new apprentices hired each year in Genoa varied with the economic con-
ditions of the Republic (Figure 1). For example, the extensive hiring of new apprentices
between 1469 and 1474 aligns with the economic development of the Republic in the 1460s,
17
See Ogilvie (2019, pp. 232–306).

10
particularly in textile trades. Likewise, the economic contraction starting in the mid-1470s,
coupled with the loss of overseas colonies, may help explain the decline in the number of
apprentices in the final decades of the fifteenth century.
Figure 1 shows that the period 1465-1480 accounts for 41.4 per cent of all recorded
contracts, indicating a potential temporal bias.18 Nevertheless, selection into the sample of
contracts depends primarily on the survival and legibility of archival records. The limited
number of contracts in the first and last ten years of the study period probably reflects an
incomplete preservation of notarial registers rather than actual labour market trends.

[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]

To estimate the proportion of missing records, in the absence of reliable totals for reg-
istered apprentices, I follow Casarino et al. (1979) by comparing the number of distinct
notaries drafting apprenticeship contracts with those whose records have survived in the
State Archive of Genoa. A 1462 reform fixed the maximum number of notaries at 150,
although the available evidence suggests the actual number was lower.19 Approximately 75
per cent of notaries with surviving records for 1480-1500 are represented in the dataset.
This figure is conservative since not all Genoese notaries engaged in drafting apprenticeship
contracts, as they were working as public notaries or judicial clerks. Thus, despite archival
losses, the sample represents a substantial share of active notaries, reinforcing the robustness
of the dataset.
The sample of professions aligns closely with the secondary literature on the Genoese
labour market (Gatti 1980; Gatti 1986; Ghiara 1983). Table 1 shows that most apprentices
were active in textile production (silk and wool above all), reflecting the centrality of these
sectors in Genoese industry in the late fifteenth century. The distribution of silk workers
also aligns closely with the 1531 Genoese Census of Occupations.20 Comparative evidence
from Florence, Venice, and Bologna (Molà 2000) suggests that silk production dominated
18
Ghiara (1979) notes that the sharp decline in contracts in the second half of the 1470s may partly reflect
a problem of erroneous dating of the archival sources.
19
Costamagna, Il notaio genovese tra prestigio e potere, 1995; Puncuh, Gli statuti del collegio dei notai
genovesi nel XV secolo, 2006.
20
ASG, Senato, Senarega, Diversorum, 1073

11
urban economies across Italy, confirming that the Genoese labour market followed broader
patterns of economic restructuring in the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries
Fewer apprentices in Genoa were active in the leather, food, and construction industries
than in textiles. Within construction trades, shipbuilding apprentices are under-represented,
likely due to the relocation of these activities to the sub-urban area of Sampierdarena (Gatti
1980).

[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]

The length of apprenticeship contracts in Genoa in my dataset reflects changes in eco-

nomic conditions and labour demand, rather than adherence to fixed terms as prescribed by
guild statutes. Table 1 shows a modest increase in average contract duration in the second
half of the fifteenth century, particularly after the 1470 crisis, possibly allowing employers
to benefit from having below-market remunerated workers and relying on workers’ reduced
contractual power. While some contracts may have fallen slightly below the guild-mandated
minimum, evidence from the few surviving statutes is too limited to test this systematically.
This variability in contract length is not a unique phenomenon as various scholars have high-
lighted that apprenticeship contracts were often adapted to local economic circumstances
(Hamilton 1996; Wallis 2008).
Looking at the evidence for the largest guilds in Genoa, it is clear that changes in contract
duration were heterogeneous and influenced by labour market conditions (Table 1). Among
the silk and wool trades, differences in training length may have affected the likelihood of
attaining mastership. Although shorter contracts could suggest that guilds tolerated a larger
share of inexperienced workers, the evidence does not support the idea that guild statutes
were formally altered. Rather, observed changes appear to have reflected flexible practice
in response to economic pressures and political circumstances.

3.3 Kinship, guild and geography in Genoese apprenticeship

The characteristics of apprenticeship in Genoa confirm the central role of kinship and pro-
fessional networks in shaping apprentices’ career trajectories. As noted in Section 2, access
to established relationships facilitated the entrance into the labour market and influenced

12
the opportunities available at the end of training. Having a father in Genoa, especially if a
member of the same guild, as well as pre-existing ties with masters or guarantors, were all
factors that could significantly improve an apprentice’s prospects.
Table 2 reports the characteristics of apprentices, with a breakdown of family and social
ties at the time of contracting. About 40 per cent of apprentices had a father mentioned
in the contract,21 while only 5 per cent had a father active in the same guild and a similar
share had a kinship tie with their master.22 Ties with guarantors were more frequent: over
50 per cent of apprentices were related to their guarantors, usually as sons, brothers, or
nephews. This confirms that guarantors often acted as protective intermediaries, at least at
the time of contracting. Moreover, 19 per cent of apprentices had guarantors from the same
guild, indicating that direct recruitment by guild insiders was a relatively common practice.

[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]

The geographic origins of apprentices provide a complementary perspective on recruit-

ment patterns (Table 2). Around 13 per cent came from Genoa itself, a further 56 per cent
from Genoese territories, and 14 per cent from outside the Republic, with the remainder
unspecified. The fact that nearly one-fifth of apprentices originated beyond the Republic’s
borders suggests that large-scale recruitment required a degree of openness to outsiders,
even as kinship and guild connections continued to play a protective role for local families.
Table 2 also distinguishes apprentices starting before and after the economic contraction
of the 1470s. At first glance, reliance on kinship and professional ties changed only modestly.
The proportion with fathers mentioned declined from 42.3 to 38.8 per cent (significant at
the 5 per cent level), while the share with a father in the same guild or a kinship tie to
the master rose slightly, from 4.6 to 5.1 per cent and from 5.0 to 6.3 per cent, respectively.
The most marked shifts are in the relationships with guarantors: kinship ties declined from
62.8 to 52.9 per cent, while the proportion of guarantors in the same guild rose from 15.6
to 20.0 per cent (both significant at the 1 per cent level). Geographic origins show a similar
21
When reported, the presence of the father in the contract indicates his role (e.g. master, guarantor,
witness) but not necessarily his occupation.
22
These shares are likely underestimates, since fathers’ professions and statuses are not observable when
they were not working in Genoa.

13
pattern of adjustment: the share from the dominion declined by 11.3 percentage points,
while apprentices from outside the Republic rose by 5.4 points, suggesting that post-crisis
recruitment relied more heavily on non-local entrants.
Taken together, these patterns suggest that apprentices’ reliance on protective networks
became less pronounced after the crisis, particularly in the role of guarantors, while geo-
graphic openness expanded. Families and guilds increasingly relied on social ties to secure
apprenticeships for insiders, yet large-scale recruitment led to a greater reliance on appren-
tices from outside the dominion. This dual-protective mechanisms for insiders alongside
openness to outsiders captures the tension between kinship-based access and labour-market
demand in late fifteenth-century Genoa.
Unavoidably, the estimates in Table 2 provide only a minimum measure of family connec-
tions, since mothers and many other relatives (e.g., brothers and uncles) were not system-
atically recorded unless serving as masters or guarantors, and last names were not always
stable. These omissions almost certainly underestimate the true prevalence of kinship ties.
Nevertheless, with the available information, it is still possible to test the effect of strong
ties with locally active relatives on the probability of reaching mastership. The absence of
additional family evidence should therefore be seen as a limitation that biases the estimates
downward, rather than as evidence against the importance of kinship networks.

[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]

Table 3 shows that around 5 per cent of apprentices had more than one training period,
with a small number changing paths three or more times. The reasons why apprentices might
leave training were multiple, including death, migration, or voluntary transfer through the
contractual arrangement known as “avalacio famuli” (transfer of the apprentice), through
which an apprentice or guarantor compensated the old master to release the rights he held
over the apprentice. Although on one side this system created some flexibility, it is also
true that it was mediated by family resources (Casarino 1982). Sons of masters or of fathers
in the same guild were two times more likely to start multiple apprenticeships than those
without, suggesting that family status reduced the opportunity and other costs of quitting
and starting a new training period.

14
 Having more than one apprenticeship did not necessarily signal failure. On the contrary,
it could represent an investment in skill accumulation and in gaining knowledge of alternative
opportunities within the labour market. It might also reflect the ability to switch away from
a master or trade that proved unsuitable, whether due to poor conditions or a mismatch
of expectations. In this sense, multiple apprenticeships could have potentially enhanced,
rather than hindered, the chances of eventually attaining mastership.

4 Empirical analysis

4.1 Econometric framework and determinants of mastership

Section 3 showed that apprentices in early modern Genoa differed across multiple dimen-
sions: time, origin, trade, and family background. In this section, I extend the analysis
a step further by estimating multivariate regressions explaining the probability of achiev-
ing mastership in Genoa as a function of these and other characteristics (see Table 4 for
summary statistics).

[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]

I estimate the relationship between the dependent variable and its possible drivers
through the following regression:

Pit = β0 + β1 · Ri + β2 · Mi + β3 · Xi + β4 · gi + β5 · πt + ϵit (1)

where the dependent variable, Pit , is a binary variable equal to one if an apprentice later
appears in the dataset as a master in Genoa and zero otherwise. Given the binary nature of
the outcome, I employ a probit model. To account for the temporal imbalances highlighted
in Section 3, and considering the time needed to complete training before taking apprentices
of one’s own, the analysis is restricted to contracts signed between 1460 and 1510.
Figure 2 shows that the proportion of apprentices who eventually appear as masters fell
sharply in the late 1460s and then stabilised at around 5% for the following four decades.
This figure is consistent with the limited evidence available for late medieval and early mod-
ern Italy (Bellavitis and Sapienza 2022; Casarino 2018; Franceschi 1993). More broadly,

15
Carocci (2011) argued that from the beginning of the fourteenth century, apprenticeship in
Italy increasingly resembled a form of wage employment rather than a pathway to master-
ship, unlike the thirteenth century when it still offered real chances of social and occupational
mobility.

[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]

As discussed in Section 2, kinship ties strongly influenced an apprentice’s career, both in

the choice of trade and in access to networks of support. The main explanatory variable, Ri ,
tests the effect of such ties on the probability for a given apprentice of later being observed
as a master.
Firstly, I test the potential effect of having a father already active in the same guild.
As noted in Section 3, close family ties reduced the risks of investment in training. Sons
of guild members were less likely to make poor matches and could draw on their fathers’
connections for their professional advancement. In line with Ogilvie (2019), I conjecture a
positive bias towards insiders, as guild membership by a parent implied preferential access
and an insider advantage that improved both persistence in training and, ultimately, later
promotion prospects.
A direct kinship tie with the supervising master constituted another potential advan-
tage. Apprentices having strong ties with their masters benefited not only from closer skill
transmission but also from privileged access to market knowledge and workshop resources
(Prak and Wallis 2019; Wallis 2008). As Carocci (2011) observed, the increasingly rigid
Italian apprenticeship regimes encouraged masters to treat workshops, clients, and know-
how as family assets to be transmitted to descendants. Yet, these attempts to manage and
transmit the competences of a specific trade and any connected privilege were limited by
institutional and guild constraints. This might explain why only 6 per cent of apprentices
included in my dataset has a family tie with the master (Table 4). By testing how family ties
with masters impacted the probability of becoming a master in turn, I aim to understand
both the importance of direct skill transmission and the openness of early modern Genoese
guilds to the transmission of technical know-how.

16
 Guarantors also played an important role but their effect likely depended on guild affil-
iation. As guilds imposed significant institutional barriers to admission, being backed by a
guild member reduced the perceived risks for masters and guilds, thereby facilitating entry
and, eventually, the achievement of mastership. This effect reflects the dual role of guaran-
tors described in Section 2: protecting apprentices and simultaneously reassuring guilds. By
contrast, kinship with a guarantor outside the guild was less advantageous, since it lacked
the institutional weight to offset entry barriers in contract negotiations. To capture these
differences, I therefore include two distinct variables in the regression: the first captures the
effect for an apprentice of being related to his guarantor while the second accounts for being
backed by a guarantor in the same guild.
To separate the effect of family status from that of network ties, I also include a binary
variable equal to one when the father was explicitly mentioned in the apprenticeship con-
tract, indicating his presence during the contract’s stipulation. Recent research on Italian
apprenticeship practices suggests that fathers were usually cited in contracts when they
acted as guarantors or when their involvement could reduce the risks of hiring their sons
(Morello 2016). This variable therefore proxies for family background without conflating it
with direct kinship ties.
The existing literature on pre-modern apprenticeship has highlighted the importance of
masters’ supervision as a potential explanation for the professional take-off of their appren-
tices (De la Croix et al. 2018). At the time of sending their children for an apprenticeship
period in a workshop families faced a trade-off. On the one hand, they could place children
with less experienced masters, who offered closer supervision and fewer competing appren-
tices. On the other hand, they could have preferred opting for established masters, whose
wider networks might facilitate long-term advancement but entailed higher short-term costs.
If this was the case, I conjecture a positive relationship between a master’s experience and
the probability of becoming a master afterward for a given apprentice. To test which of
these two effects prevailed, I match every apprentice to his supervising master and add the
categorical variable Mi , equal to one if the master had previously supervised apprentices,
as a proxy for his experience.
In Section 3 I shed light on the large number of migrant apprentices active in the urban

17
labour market of Genoa. Therefore, in one of my specifications, I introduce the variable
Xi to account for the geographic origin of apprentices. Origin was not only an indicator of
birthplace but also a proxy for access to networks, being strongly correlated with having
kin or a father in the guild. Local apprentices likely enjoyed an easier entry into work-
shops and greater early opportunities, while foreigners often faced higher barriers to entry
and promotion unless they could secure support from guild members through kinship or
guarantor ties. Moreover, as shown in other European contexts, guilds frequently imposed
higher entry fees or stricter requirements on outsiders (Ogilvie 2019). Testing the role of
geographic origin therefore disentangles the double channel of informal network access and
formal institutional barriers.
Time fixed effects for decades (πt ) account for wider shocks - such as the contraction of the
1470s and changes in trade patterns following the loss of overseas colonies - that could have
reshaped opportunities for professional advancement. Compared with apprentices bound in
the 1460s, those starting after 1480 were only half as likely to become masters (Figure 2),
consistent with the closure strategies described in Section 2 and the protective behaviour of
guilds during crisis (Bezzina 2015; Ogilvie 2019).
To account for differences across guilds, regressions also include guild fixed effects (gi ).
Casarino (1982) and Epstein (1996) highlighted that Genoese guilds varied not only in
training norms, such as the minimum mandatory contract length, but also in economic
performance and political weight. Apprentices in stronger guilds plausibly enjoyed better
prospects regardless of individual characteristics, especially in the aftermath of the 1470s
crisis.
Finally, unobserved factors are captured by the error term ϵit . Standard errors are
clustered at the guild level to account for intra-guild correlation.23

4.2 Results

Table 5 reports the results of six estimated models. Column (1) presents a baseline model,
excluding contractual variables and fixed effects. Column (2) shows the full model without
23
As a robustness check, Table B2 reports estimates with robust standard errors instead of clustering.
Results are very similar, though clustering is preferred in the main specification as it better accounts for
potential within-guild correlation in unobserved factors.

18
fixed effects. In Column (3), time fixed effects are added, while Column (4) includes both
time and guild fixed effects. Column (5) restricts the sample to apprentices whose fathers
were present at the contract drafting, a proxy for higher-status families. Finally, Column
(6) tests for a potential geographic effect of the place of origin by including a dummy for
Genoese origin.
The estimates in Table 5 show that a kinship tie with the master had a strong positive
effect on the likelihood of becoming masters among apprentices in early modern Genoa.
Across all specifications, this variable is positive and highly significant, resulting in a 60 per
cent increase in the probability of achieving mastership relative to other apprentices.
A possible explanation for this result is that apprentices having a tie with their masters
were more often from wealthier, Genoese families, unveiling a potential advantage of insiders
over foreigners. However, results in Columns (5) and (6) confirm that this result is not
driven by the social status of apprentices’ families or by their geographical origin. At the
same time, even accounting for these factors, the coefficients associated with the presence of
kinship ties with the master remain positive and statistically significant. This result reflects
the master’s active role in training and transmitting skills, as well as the intergenerational
transfer of workshop resources and social connections.
A second strong predictor was having a father active in the same guild in which appren-
ticeship would have taken place. Sons of guild members not only benefited from trust and
reputation effects, but also from the patronage and lobbying power of their families within
the guild structure. This confirms that guild membership eased privileged access to scarce
opportunities for professional advancement, consequently limiting the career prospects for
outsiders.

[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]

By contrast, kinship ties with the guarantor alone had little effect on the likelihood of
achieving mastership. However, being in the same guild of the guarantor has a positive
and statistically significant effect in three out of the six models, resulting in a 24 per cent
increase in the probability of achieving mastership. Overall, this suggests that the backing
of an insider at the moment of contract was a valuable signal of reliability to other guild

19
members. These results underscore that professional advancement depended less on generic
family ties than on connections embedded directly in the institutional structure of the guild.
Other variables show weaker associations. The father’s formal presence at the contract
did not increase promotion chances, once ties to masters and guild members are accounted
for. Genoese fathers with higher social status might still have tried to use their influence to
secure better career prospects for their sons. However, my results suggest that this positive
effect is channelled through the presence of ties with key actors in the labour market (masters
and guild members), independently from family status.
Similarly, results in Table 5 provides limited support for the idea that a master’s experi-
ence had an effect on career outcomes, which may reflect data limitations in identifying the
master’s first contracts.24
Overall, Table 5 highlights the central role of kinship and guild-based connections in
securing professional advancement. But it leaves open the question of how these ties exerted
their influence. One possible mechanism, discussed in Sections 2 and 3, was through more
favourable contract terms - specifically, shorter durations - and the possibility to undertake
multiple apprenticeships. To investigate these channels, Table 6 re-estimates the models
shown in Table 5 but now using contract length and the fact of having started multiple
training periods as the outcomes.

[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]

The results in Table 6 indicate that family and guild ties influenced contract design in
ways consistent with their role in securing career prospects. Apprentices with kinship ties
to their masters were more likely to undertake multiple apprenticeships, suggesting lower
switching costs and greater flexibility in pursuing alternative career paths. Sons of guild
members negotiated significantly shorter contracts and were also more likely to undertake
multiple apprenticeships, highlighting the higher bargaining power and reputation effects
coming from family connections within the guild. Finally, apprentices backed by guarantors
from the same guild obtained shorter contracts, though the effect on multiple apprenticeships
24
In the absence of some portion of apprenticeship contracts drafted in Genoa, it is impossible to precisely
match masters with their first appearance in this role, especially in the first decades considered when the
number of contracts is lower.

20
was weaker. These findings support the interpretation that ties worked partly by shaping the
contractual framework of training, easing both the cost of exit and the speed of progression.
The final step is to test whether these relationships shifted during the crisis of the 1470s,
when opportunities for advancement contracted and guilds had to face a higher economic
pressure. Table 7 explores these dynamics by interacting social ties and guild affiliation with
a crisis dummy.

[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE]

The first panel of Table 7 shows that the crisis did not fundamentally alter the advan-
tage conferred by kinship with the master for later promotion. However, in line with the
hypothesis presented in Section 2, it did affect contract terms: apprentices having kinship
with their supervising masters had to accept longer apprenticeships than before, consistent
with a greater competition for scarce opportunities in the urban labour market.
Rather than changes in the importance of social networks for professional advancement,
Table 7 confirms that the crisis brought differences in internal organization and economic
performances between Genoese guilds, which influenced the career prospects of their appren-
tices. In the second panel of Table 7, I display the marginal effects associated with three
of the major Genoese guilds, all operating in different segments of the urban economy (silk,
wool and shoemaking). Apprentices in silk, a sector hit hard by the economic contraction,
faced significantly worse long-term outcomes after 1470, while those in wool and shoemaking
were comparatively less affected. These contrasting trajectories confirm that the interplay
between networks and guild-specific dynamics25 was central to shaping opportunities for
professional advancement in Genoa (Gatti 1980; Ghiara 1991).

5 Discussion

The results of the econometric analyses have shown that social networks affected, or at
least were correlated with, professional advancement in early modern Genoa, particularly
25
This interpretation is consistent with the evidence presented in Appendix B.1, which shows that intra-
guild dispersion in contract length widened after the 1470s crisis, suggesting that several guilds relaxed
institutional constraints and allowed greater contractual heterogeneity.

21
regarding the transition from apprenticeship to mastership. While the findings are consistent
across specifications, they also reveal complexities in the mechanisms at work.
The empirical analysis confirms that family ties with guild members played the most
important role in an apprentice’s likelihood of becoming a master. Apprentices related to
their supervising masters experienced the largest advantage, while sons of guild members
also benefited substantially, though to a slightly lower degree. These advantages operated
not only at the crucial moment of mastership’s admission but also throughout the train-
ing process.26 Guild members’ sons typically enjoyed shorter contracts, more favourable
terms and faced lower opportunity costs when deciding to terminate a contract and pursue
alternative career paths (Table 6).
More importantly, kinship ties with guild members led to the inclusion in a common
network of professional connections rooted in families and guilds that extended beyond the
workshop itself. My dataset of apprenticeship contracts does not enable us to observe the
real utilization of these connections. However, being related to a guild member likely im-
plied getting access to economic opportunities, established client relationships and strategic
advice. Overall, these findings suggest that kinship ties with actors in the urban labour
market not only facilitated career advancement but also contributed to a segmented market
structure, in which outsiders had to face greater obstacles to attaining mastership.
Interestingly, while guarantor ties also mattered, their effect was contingent on guild
affiliation. Apprentices whose guarantors belonged to their guilds benefited more than those
whose guarantors were merely kin or neighbours. However, these patterns do not necessarily
imply direct institutional interventions by guilds. Rather, they once again underscore that
apprentices who could draw on professional connections embedded within the guild network
enjoyed advantages that extended beyond the immediate training contract. In the Genoese
case, these dynamics are consistent with the broader literature on how informal ties within
guild structures provided better access to opportunities, even without clear evidence of
formal restrictions (Ogilvie 2019, pp. 110–116).
The importance of kinship ties for achieving mastership suggests that most of the func-
26
Figure B2 in Appendix B.2 shows that apprentices with pre-existing ties not only had higher chances
of attaining mastership, but probably also reached it over a shorter time horizon, confirming that kinship
ties accelerated both access and advancement within the guild system.

22
tioning of the Genoese market for skills appears to have been strongly shaped by informal
connections between the actors involved which significantly influenced the outcomes and the
professional success of guild apprentices.
This pattern has implications for our understanding of early modern economies. In Genoa
at least, the market for skills had structures constraining meritocracy and access to economic
opportunities for outsiders, thereby limiting occupational mobility and reinforcing existing
social hierarchies (Ogilvie 2019). Such dynamics stand in stark contrast to more open
and meritocratic apprenticeship markets observed in other contexts, such as early modern
London, where returns to parent-specific human capital were relatively low (Humphries
2006; Leunig et al. 2011).
The 1470s economic contraction did not fundamentally alter this logic. As Genoa lost
access to Eastern Mediterranean markets, guilds - particularly in trades most exposed to
overseas commerce, such as silk - tightened their control over apprenticeship training. For
this reason, these guilds began to increase apprenticeship length to rely on apprentices as
a cheaper source of labour, while simultaneously trying to maintain their dominance in the
urban economy by limiting avenues for upward mobility (Table 7). Yet, the crisis did not
diminish the premium associated with kinship ties. These adjustments suggest that guilds
sought to preserve stability for their members in a period of economic downturn, even if this
meant shifting some of the costs onto apprentices. Rather than acting as uniformly restrictive
cartels, Genoese trades appear to have responded to this external shock by balancing the
protection of insiders with a necessary integration of apprentices into the urban labour
market (Ogilvie 2019; Prak and Wallis 2019; Wallis 2025).
This study provides one of the first piece of quantitative evidence showing that kinship
and professional networks had a positive effect on the achievement of guild mastership in
early modern Italy. The low share of apprentices eventually becoming masters at the end
of training confirms that apprentices and their families must have been aware that the
achievement of mastership was the exception, not the rule, for those starting a training
period. Yet, for those embedded in guild networks, the chances of attaining mastership were
significantly higher. Although studies of mastership’s attainment are still limited (Wallis
2019; Schalk et al. 2017), my results challenge interpretations that portray apprenticeship

23
as a broadly meritocratic mechanism of skill formation in continental Europe. At the same
time, they highlight that in some cases apprenticeship was used also as a tool to ration
opportunities and supply underpaid labour, especially during economic downturns.

6 Conclusion

This study has explored the role of family and professional connections in shaping the career
trajectories of guild apprentices in early modern Genoa. Using the information contained
in a sample of 8,000 apprenticeship contracts, I analysed how the kinship and professional
ties of an apprentice influenced his likelihood of attaining mastership.
The evidence underscores the key role of social connections, particularly family ties, for
securing professional advancement. Apprentices whose fathers were active in the same guild
were approximately 60 per cent more likely to become masters in Genoa than those without
such ties. The mechanism through which this happened was not only due to a better contract
negotiation at the moment of binding but also reflected the benefits of accessing a network
of insider knowledge and strategic advantage. Family networks provided enduring and key
support throughout the apprenticeship process, from the selection of trades to negotiating
better contractual terms, ultimately allowing young trainees to achieve professional success.
Notably, this network-based advantage extended even to those apprentices whose fathers
were not masters in the same trade, highlighting that the importance of family connections
went beyond the internal hierarchy of guilds. These findings challenge the notion of a purely
meritocratic guild apprenticeship and indicate that parental ties were crucial for accessing
economic opportunities.
The analysis also underscores the role of guilds in structuring apprenticeship and oc-
cupational mobility within the urban context. My findings highlight that guilds restricted
access to the upper tiers of their trades by adjusting apprenticeship terms and contract
arrangements, particularly in response to economic fluctuations. Being already embedded
in a guild-based network increased the probability of obtaining favourable career prospects,
reflecting how kinship and professional ties operated alongside institutional structures to
shape apprentices’ opportunities.
Finally, by showing the interplay between family networks and guild structures, this

24
study shows that apprenticeship in Genoa was not inherently a vehicle for upward social
mobility in early-modern continental Europe. Although guild apprenticeship gave access
to technical training without being constrained by family lines, access to opportunities was
strongly mediated by social connections, reinforcing existing hierarchies and economic dis-
parities. My findings thus highlight the need for a deeper understanding of apprenticeship
and its limitations and suggest caution against generalizing the role of this form of inter-
generational transmission of skills across times and places, as this institution varied in its
structure, access and professional implications according to the power dynamics of its key
actors.

25
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30
Tables and Figures

Table 1: Number of contracts and average length of apprenticeships in the ten largest guilds

Avg. length of apprenticeship

Guild Observations All 1451-1470 1471-1530 ∆

Silk 2,696 6.4 6.3 6.5 0.2∗∗∗

Wool 1,402 5,9 5.8 5.9 −0.1
Mercers 354 5.8 6.0 5.8 −0.2∗∗∗
Tanners 348 5.9 6.1 5.9 −0.2
Shoemakers 324 6.0 5.8 6.0 0.2∗
Joiners 283 6.6 6.0 6.6 0.6∗∗∗
Barbers 194 5.8 5.7 5.8 0.1
Tailors 181 6.0 5.9 6.0 0.1
Bakers 163 5.2 4.9 5.2 0.3
Furriers 152 6.1 6.2 6.1 −0.1
Other guilds 1,266 5.6 5.6 5.7 0.1
Total 7,363 6.1 6.2 6.0 −0.2∗∗∗

Notes: The table reports the number of apprenticeship contracts and the average contract length in years
for the top 10 guilds in the linked Genoa sample, 1451-1530. The ten most frequently recorded trades
are shown individually; remaining occupations are grouped under “Other guilds”. Columns (3)-(5) report
average lengths for the full period and for the sub-periods 1451-1470 and 1471-1530 to highlight differences
before and after the economic contraction of the 1470s. The last column (∆) shows the difference in average
length between these sub-periods from two-sample t-tests: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.

31
 Table 2: Characteristics of new apprentices in Genoa, 1451–1530

All apprentices 1451-1470 1471-1530 ∆

N (%) N (%) N (%) (%)

Panel A. Family and professional ties

Father mentioned in contract 2,986 39.5 641 42.3 2,345 38.8 -3.5∗∗
Father in same guild 377 5.0 69 4.6 305 5.1 0.5
Kinship tie with master 457 6.0 75 5.0 382 6.3 1.3∗
Kinship tie with guarantor 4,145 54.9 952 62.8 3,193 52.9 -9.9∗∗∗
Guarantor in same guild 1,445 19.1 236 15.6 1,209 20.0 4.4∗∗∗

Panel B. Geographic origins

Genoa city 947 12.5 223 14.7 724 12.0 -2.7∗∗∗
Genoa dominion 4,264 56.4 992 65.5 3,272 54.2 -11.3∗∗∗
Outside 1,080 14.3 151 10. 929 15.4 5.4∗∗∗
Not specified 1,263 16.7 149 9.8 1,114 18.4 8.6∗∗∗

Note: Panel A reports apprentices’ family and professional connections observable in the contracts. A family
tie is defined as a close kinship relation (father, brother, or uncle). Panel B reports apprentices’ geographic
origins, distinguishing apprentices from Genoa, its dominion, apprentices from outside the Republic, and
cases not specified. Apprentices are considered pre-crisis when the year of start is prior to 1470. Categories
in Panel A are not mutually exclusive (e.g., an apprentice may have both a father present and a tie with the
master), so percentages are calculated relative to the total number of apprentices in each column. Statistical
significance of differences between pre- and post-crisis proportions is indicated in the last column: * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: see text and Appendix.

32
 Table 3: Apprentices by number of training periods

Father absent Father mentioned Father = guild Tie with master Tie guarantor All apprentices
No. appr. (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) N (%)
1 94.7 95.4 91.9 89.4 95.6 7,172 95.0
2 4.6 4.1 7.1 9.0 3.9 333 4.4
3 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.4 41 0.5
4+ 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.8 0.1 8 0.1

Note: Columns (2)-(5) indicate the share of apprentices in each family/social category who experienced 1,
2, 3, or 4+ apprenticeships. Categories are not mutually exclusive (e.g. an apprentice may have both a
father in the same guild and a kinship tie with the master). The final two columns show absolute numbers
and overall percentages for all apprentices in the dataset. Source: see text and Appendix.

33
 Table 4: Summary statistics of the variables used in the regression analysis

Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max

Father in same guild 7,498 0.05 0.22 0 1
Kinship tie with the master 7,498 0.06 0.24 0 1
Kinship tie with the guarantor 7,498 0.55 0.50 0 1
Guarantor in same guild 7,498 0.19 0.39 0 1
Father mentioned in the contract 7,498 0.40 0.49 0 1
Multiple apprenticeship periods 7,498 0.05 0.22 0 1
Contract length (years) 7,318 6.05 1.25 1 15
Experienced master 7,488 0.43 0.49 0 1
Genoese origin 6,246 0.18 0.38 0 1

Note: The table reports descriptive statistics for the variables employed in the regression analysis. Sample
sizes differ slightly across variables due to missing information in some contracts.

34
 Table 5: Determinants of access to mastership, Genoa 1460–1510

Promotion to mastership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Kinship tie with the master 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.037*** 0.027***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007)
Father in same guild 0.029** 0.029** 0.028** 0.026*** 0.013** 0.028***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Kinship tie with the guarantor 0.007 0.011* 0.009 0.008 -0.012 0.008
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.018) (0.006)
Guarantor in same guild 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.006 0.003 0.009
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.006)
Father mentioned in the contract -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Experienced master -0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.000 0.001
(0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Genoese 0.003
(0.004)

Time FE N N Y Y Y Y
Guild FE N N N Y Y Y
Observations 6,248 6,240 6,240 6,198 2,426 5,557
Sample mean of outcome 0.041 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.043 0.043
Number of clusters 27 27 27 25 21 25
R2 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.07

Note: The dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if the apprentice later appears as a master.
Coefficients are average marginal effects from probit regressions. Standard errors, clustered at the guild
level, are shown in parentheses. ***Significant at 99%, **Significant at 95%, *Significant at 90%.

35
 Table 6: The role of ties in contract length and number of apprenticeships

Contract length (years) Multiple apprenticeships

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Kinship tie with the master -0.111 -0.071 -0.074 0.022*** 0.018*** 0.017**
(0.096) (0.093) (0.094) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Father in same guild -0.123 -0.233*** -0.262*** 0.026* 0.024** 0.023**
(0.083) (0.052) (0.061) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011)
Kinship tie with the guarantor 0.059 0.067 0.081 -0.009** -0.009** -0.007
(0.044) (0.043) (0.048) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Guarantor in same guild -0.331*** -0.354*** -0.353*** 0.007 0.005 0.003
(0.084) (0.074) (0.065) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Father mentioned in the contract 0.043 0.030 0.052 0.003 0.000 -0.005
(0.052) (0.058) (0.069) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Experienced master 0.117** 0.032 0.029 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.046) (0.026) (0.024) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Genoese 0.040 0.001
(0.034) (0.008)

Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Guild FE N Y Y N Y Y
Observations 6,094 6,094 5,459 6,240 6,084 5,454
Sample mean of outcome 6.102 6.102 6.128 0.045 0.047 0.047
Number of clusters 27 27 27 27 23 23
R2 0.07 0.16 0.17 0.03 0.05 0.05

Note: Columns (1)-(3) report OLS estimates where the dependent variable is the length of the apprenticeship
contract (in years). Columns (4)-(6) report probit marginal effects at mean, where the dependent variable
equals one if the apprentice undertook multiple training periods. Standard errors, clustered at the guild
level, are shown in parentheses. ***Significant at 99%, **Significant at 95%, *Significant at 90%.

36
 Table 7: Networks and urban guilds during the 1470 crisis

Contract length Promotion to mastership

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Panel A: Network during Crisis

Kinship tie with the master -0.261** -0.269** 0.036*** 0.030***

(0.108) (0.121) (0.008) (0.009)
Kinship tie with the master x Crisis 0.225** 0.240* -0.013 -0.006
(0.103) (0.133) (0.014) (0.014)
Father in same guild -0.095** -0.184*** 0.037*** 0.041***
(0.045) (0.040) (0.010) (0.009)
Same guild x Crisis -0.181 -0.101 -0.014 -0.018*
(0.121) (0.112) (0.011) (0.011)
Crisis 0.269*** 0.285*** -0.031*** -0.033***
(0.065) (0.057) (0.007) (0.008)

Time FE Y Y Y Y
Guild FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 6,094 5,459 6,198 5,557
Sample mean of outcome 6.102 6.121 0.042 0.043
Number of clusters 27 27 25 25
R2 0.15 0.16 0.05 0.05

Panel B. Urban guilds during Crisis

Silk 0.786*** 1.010*** -0.015 -0.013

(0.108) (0.128) (0.009) (0.009)
Wool 0.317*** 0.528*** -0.009 -0.007
(0.106) (0.127) (0.009) (0.009)
Shoemakers 0.262** 0.475*** 0.001 0.005
(0.105) (0.125) (0.009) (0.009)
Silk x Crisis 0.267* 0.254* -0.031*** -0.036***
(0.143) (0.125) (0.011) (0.010)
Wool x Crisis 0.069 0.050 0.019* 0.016
(0.139) (0.123) (0.011) (0.010)
Shoemakers x Crisis 0.175 0.192 -0.014 -0.025**
(0.142) (0.125) (0.011) (0.010)
Crisis 0.068 0.097 -0.015 -0.013
(0.144) (0.127) (0.011) (0.010)

Time FE Y Y Y Y
Guild FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 6,094 5,459 6,198 5,557
Sample mean of outcome 6.102 6.121 0.042 0.043
Number of clusters 27 27 25 25
R2 0.16 0.17 0.05 0.06

Note: Columns (1)–(2) report OLS estimates where the dependent variable is the length of the apprenticeship
contract (in years). Columns (3)–(4) report probit marginal effects at mean, where the dependent variable
is a binary indicator equal to one if the apprentice later appears as a master. Panel A tests whether the
effect of family and guild ties changed during the 1470s crisis. Panel B examines how the crisis affected
three major urban guilds in Genoa (silk, wool, and shoemakers). Standard errors, clustered at the guild
level, are shown in parentheses. *Significant at 99%, **Significant at 95%, *Significant at 90%.

37
 Figure 1: Apprenticeship contracts registered in Genoa, 1451-1530.

Notes: The dotted line shows the annual number of apprenticeship contracts registered in Genoa each
year. The solid line shows the 10-year moving average to account for short-term fluctuations. See text and
Appendix A for further details.

38
 Figure 2: The long-run trend in the percentage of apprentices obtaining mastership

Notes: The long-run trend in the percentage of apprentices for each year of start reaching the role of masters
after the completion of apprenticeship. The dashed line shows the number of apprentices promoted for each
year of start. The dark line shows the 10-year moving average to account for short-term fluctuations. Source:
see text and Appendix.

39
Appendices

Table of contents

A Data and Methodology 41

A.1 Sources and database construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
A.2 Occupational standardization and guild classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
A.3 Standardisation of first names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
A.4 Record linkage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
A.5 Reconstruction of geographic origins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

B Additional results and alternative regression specifications 51

B.1 Guild flexibility and contractual adaptations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
B.2 Time to mastership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
B.3 Regression table with robust standard errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
A Data and Methodology

A.1 Sources and database construction

The collection with all the apprenticeship contracts used in this paper is preserved in the
State Archive of Genoa, within the collection of “Antique Notaries” (Archivio di Stato di
Genova, Fondo Notai Antichi).27 Figure A1 shows a model contract in its entirety.

Figure A1: An example of an apprenticeship contract (acordacio famuli ) included in the database. Key
information later stored in the dataset is highlighted in red.

27
Archivio di Stato di Genova (ASG), Fondo Notai Antichi. A guide to the collection is available at:
http://www.archiviodistatogenova.beniculturali.it/index.php?it/205/guida-ai-fondi-archivistici.

41
 Table A1: Storage and standardisation of four contracts drafted in Genoa in 1499.

N. First Name Last Name Role Occupation Father Lenght

66 Cristoforus De Promontorio Apprentice Wool dealer Beneditus 8

66 Iohannes Antonius De Promontorio Guarantor - Franciscus 8
66 Raphael Richenie Master Wool dealer Neapoleonis 8
66 Mattheus Beriso Witness Wool dealer Bartholomaeus 8
66 Gaspar De Sanpetro Witness Wool dealer Antonius 8

89 Nicolaus Collanis De Teirano Apprentice Silk dealer Santinus 7

89 Santinus Collanis De Teirano Guarantor Silk dealer Iacobus 7
89 Augustus Iusto Master Silk dealer Lucas 7
89 Nicolaus De Palodio Witness Silk dealer Bartholomaeus 7
89 Pantaleone Bottario Witness Silk Spinner Antonius 7

98 Beneditus Calistanus Apprentice Food retailer Simon 6

98 Simon Calistanus Guarantor Cap maker Beneditus 6
98 Petro Baptista De Andrea Master Food retailer Thomas 6
98 Pantaleone Marsano Witness Cap maker Iacobus 6

102 Castilionus De Carbono Apprentice Wool dealer Lanfrancus 6

102 Lanfrancus De Carbono Guarantor Sock manufacturer Iohannes 6
102 Petro Baptista De Andrea Master Wool dealer Thomas 6
102 Hieronymus Iexicco De Sigestro Witness Wool worker Nicolaus 6
102 Bartholomaeus De Vairolo De Levio Witness Wool worker Cristoforus 6

Following the criteria used by Casarino et al. (1979), during the transcription, I main-
tained all the info digitized in Latin, the language used in the original contract and I trans-
lated them into English in a second phase. This approach facilitates integration with other
Latin-based sources from late medieval Genoa.
The standardised structure of Genoese apprenticeship contracts eased the extraction
of key information. Some recurring figures appear in nearly all contracts. The guarantor
(promittente-dante) acted as an intermediary, offering security to both parties: for the
master, a safeguard against potential losses from an apprentice’s misconduct or departure;
for the apprentice, especially as a minor in an unfamiliar environment, a guarantee of fair
treatment and protection of rights. In more than half of the cases (Section 3), the guarantor
was related to the apprentice and therefore could have exercised parental authority either
by right or by mandate. The master (promittente-accettante) accepted the apprentice and
was responsible for his training.28 The apprentice (famulus), committed himself to serve the
master. Each contract contains the names of two or three witnesses, who provide a guarantee
of its validity. Contracts sometimes mention additional figures, but their occasional presence
makes them unsuitable for systematic analysis.
The dataset includes personal details (names, patronymics, roles), contract length, date
28
“Docere artem bene et legaliter ”, Casarino et al. (1979).

42
of binding, and - where available - the father’s name and other family relations. After
the first phase of collection and digital reproduction of the archival source, all information
was organised in a single spreadsheet. Rather than coding one row per contract, I created
one row per individual mentioned. This allows each figure to be analysed separately. In
Table A1, I provide a visual representation of how the content of four contracts was stored
in my database.
Finally, to make the record linkage process easier, all references to relatives were stan-
dardised into distinct columns according to their relationship (e.g. father of, son of, uncle
of). This organisation eased the identification of kinship ties across contracts.

A.2 Occupational standardization and guild classification

I standardised the occupational information from the contracts to facilitate record linkage
and to enhance comparability with existing studies on late medieval and early modern
Italy. The main reference for this work was Luciana Gatti’s catalogue of professions in
late medieval Genoa,29 which lists occupations according to their original denomination.
Building on this source, I created a codebook covering the hundreds of occupational terms
found in the contracts and provided English translations for each.
To allow broader comparison, I further coded occupations using two widely adopted inter-
national classifications: the Historical International Standard Classification of Occupations
(HISCO),30 which allows to group trades into macro-categories, and the Cambridge PSTI
six-point code, which captures the Primary-Secondary-Tertiary division. For the roles of
individuals within contracts, I translated the original Latin terms following the descriptions
provided by Casarino et al. (1979).
Reconstructing guild affiliations required additional steps. Despite the State Archive of
Genoa containing various statutes and other records of guild activity in the fifteenth century,
for several trades there is no direct evidence of either their foundation or survival.
For this reason, to reconstruct all the guilds active in Genoa between 1450 and 1530, I
had to rely on the three most consistent secondary sources tracing Italian guilds. The first is
29
Gatti, Un catalogo di mestieri, Genova, 1980.
30
See https://historyofwork.iisg.nl/ for details on HISCO.

43
the Italian Guild Database, which documents 1,385 guilds in 50 different Italian cities31 . The
second source is the dataset created by Sheilagh Ogilvie in 2019, which contains observations
for 600 different Italian guilds.32 The third source is the Catalogo Chelazzi33 , a ten-volume
work published between 1943 and 2024 that compiles guild statutes, customs, and privileges
from the Middle Ages to the eighteenth century. The Chelazzi catalogue, named after its first
curator, Corrado Chelazzi, collects works by Italian historians from the mid-19th century
onwards, hence in some cases, it employs sources not covered by the other two databases.
By merging these sources and applying strict criteria for cross-referencing guild names
and categories,34 I was able to assign each occupation in my dataset to its corresponding
Genoese guild. This standardisation ensured consistency across contracts and underpins the
occupational and guild-level analyses presented in Sections 3 and 4.

A.3 Standardisation of first names

The transcription of apprenticeship contracts revealed a wide variety of spellings and forms
of first names. Such variation is typical of late medieval notarial sources, where orthographic
rules were fluid and often reflected the preferences of individual notaries. To ensure consis-
tency across the dataset, I harmonised these spellings into standardised forms. For example,
names such as Barnaba could appear as Barnabonum, while Petrus was often rendered as
Petro. In each case, I adopted a single canonical form - Barnaba and Petrus respectively -
while retaining the original spellings in a separate column to preserve the version mentioned
in the original source.
Standardisation also involved collapsing variant or colloquial forms into a single recog-
nised name. Thus, Ludovicus was used in place of the diminutive Bigo. Suffixes that denoted
relative age or stature were likewise eliminated: Iohanninus (“Little John”) and Iohannonus
(“Big John”) were both recorded as Iohannes. This procedure follows established approaches
31
Available online at https://dataverse.nl/file.xhtml?fileId=1446&version=1.0.
32
Available online at https://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/people/faculty/sco2/projects/ogilvie-guilds-databases.
33
Catalogo della raccolta di statuti, consuetudini, leggi, decreti, ordini e privilegi dei comuni, delle associ-
azioni e degli enti locali dal Medioevo alla fine del secolo XVIII
34
Bonato, Edoardo (2024). Guilds in the 12th–18th Century: An Empirical Approach. Milano: Università
Bocconi. [Unpublished master’s thesis].

44
in historical name standardisation.35 Diminutives were often applied to younger individuals
but usually disappeared over time, as they were replaced by the adult form of the name.
This task is not merely clerical as name variants often conveyed social meaning. In many
cases, diminutives were used to identify younger individuals within a family or community,
but they typically disappeared over time as apprentices grew up and were recorded under
the adult form of their name. This decision to standardise such names therefore not only
eases record linkage - by reducing the risk of treating the same individual as two separate
entries - but also reflects an awareness of the naming conventions of the time.

A.4 Record linkage

The apprenticeship contracts did not contain any unique identifier, which made it necessary
to construct links between records in order to follow individuals across contracts and to
identify those that achieved mastership in Genoa. For this purpose, I employed Splink, a
Python package for probabilistic record linkage that implements the Fellegi–Sunter model
of record matching.36
For my dataset on Genoese apprentices, the basic task was to compare pairs of records
and decide whether they represent the same entity. As with any large dataset, it is com-
putationally infeasible to compare every row with every other row, since the number of
comparisons grows quadratically with the number of records. To address this, I relied on
blocking rules, which generate only those pairwise comparisons that are plausible matches.
For example, I restricted comparisons to cases where either the first name or the surname
matched. Record linkage therefore proceeded in two stages:

1. Blocking rules generated candidate pairs of records.

2. A probabilistic model scored each candidate pair to determine whether it represented

a match.

When designing blocking rules, there was a trade-off between performance and accu-
racy. For example, rules that were too loose generated excessive comparisons and reduced
35
See Bloothooft (1994), Thorvaldsen et al. (2015), and Postles (1996).
36
For an in-depth guide to the package see: https://moj-analytical-services.github.io/splink.

45
 Figure A2: Levels of missingness by variable in the dataset of apprentices and masters.

efficiency, while rules that were too strict risked missing some valid matches. I therefore
allowed comparisons where the first name matched exactly, or where the surname and the
initial letter of the first name coincided (to account for siblings active in the same trade).
Before proceeding, I examined the level of missingness across my variables, since columns
with a high level of missingness reduce the accuracy of linkage. Figure A2 shows the extent
of missingness in my dataset, restricted here to apprentices and masters.
The probabilistic linkage model estimated a match score for each candidate pair, reflect-
ing the likelihood that the records referred to the same person. This involved learning the
relative importance, or “match weights” of different fields. For instance, a shared surname
is a stronger indicator of identity than a shared occupation. Conversely, a mismatch in oc-
cupation is less informative than a mismatch in first name, since names were often entered
with more orthographic variation (subsection A.3).
Match weights are derived from the parameters of the underlying Fellegi–Sunter model:
the m - probability (the likelihood that two records agree on a field given that they are
the same person) and the u - probability (the likelihood that two records agree given that
they are not the same person). Splink estimates these parameters through various iterative

46
routines. In my case, matches were based on first name, surname, father’s name, and occu-
pation, with term-frequency adjustments for occupation to avoid bias from trades appearing
more often, such as silk weaving.
The model estimated that the probability of any two random records being a true match
was 8.58e−5 - meaning that among all possible 158,963,365 comparisons, approximately
13,636 represented true links. The u parameters were estimated from random samples of
non-matches (up to 3 million pairs), while the m-parameters were estimated via Expectation
Maximisation (EM). To ensure robustness, I employed two EM passes: one blocking on exact
matches of first and last name, and a second blocking on father’s name, thereby generating
parameter estimates across all columns.

ˆ Random match probability: 8.58e−5 (≈ 1 in 11,655 comparisons).

ˆ Sample size for u-estimation: 3 million random pairs.

ˆ m-estimation: Expectation Maximisation using two blocking passes (first name +

surname; father’s name).

Another interesting application of my trained model was to identify unlinkable records,

entries too sparse to be matched with confidence. An example is a record containing only
“Andrea Doria” with no additional details. By linking records to themselves, it is possible
to identify such cases: if a record fails to meet its own match threshold, it will never match
with others. As shown in Figure A3, nearly 16 per cent of records were unlinkable at a
match weight of 2.10, corresponding to a probability of 81.1 per cent.
For the final linkage, I set the threshold probability at 0.27: any comparison scoring below
this was discarded. The resulting output consisted of clusters of records, each representing a
unique individual, rather than a simple list of pairwise matches. This approach allowed me
to identify repeated appearances of apprentices and masters across contracts, track kinship
relations, and ensure that the database reflected coherent career progressions rather than
fragmented record entries.

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 Figure A3: Share of records with insufficient information to exceed given match thresholds.

A.5 Reconstruction of geographic origins

The expansion of the Genoese economy in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries - particularly
in the textile trades - drove urbanisation and attracted hundreds of workers from across the
Republic and beyond. The heterogeneous geographic origins of this workforce are reflected
in the apprenticeship contracts and, consequently, in my dataset.
Out of more than 8,000 contracts, 5,874 contain explicit information on the place of
origin of the apprentice. The most direct indication is residence at the time of contract
stipulation, though this appears in only 15 per cent of cases. In early modern Genoa, last
names (cognomina) had the precise scope of indicating the place of origin of an individual
and her family. They typically consisted of a toponymic element preceded by the prefix
“de” (e.g. de Montobio, de Savignono, de Novi). Some included additional patronymic or
locative elements (Aycardus, Ricius, Bottus). In the former case, the toponymic reference
could become simplified as migrants settled in the city - for example, “de Montanario de
Rovereto” might later stabilise as “de Montanario”. The existing literature (Casarino et al.
1979; Ghiara 1991) confirms that in the Republic of Genoa, last names were stable for at

48
 Figure A4: Geographic origins of apprentices in Genoa

Notes: Each dot marks a distinct municipality from which apprentices originated, illustrating the large geo-
graphic reach of the Genoese apprenticeship network. The red diamond corresponds to Genoa, highlighting
its role as the main destination for apprentices in the region.

least two generations and were uniformly attributed to all family members
Reconstructing the link between a place of residence or a last name as mentioned in the
source and the underlying geographical entity is a fundamental prerequisite to carry out
more sophisticated historical-spatial analyses in a GIS (Geographical Information System)
environment37 . This task was articulated in several stages. The first one involved attaching
coordinates to places of residence by translating the original lemma from Latin and using
GeoNames to geo-reference them. With the names of unfamiliar small settlements, on
the contrary, it was first necessary to identify the place, also considering its ancient name
in the vernacular language. To recognise the rarest toponymics forms, use was made of
secondary sources (Bezzina 2015; Ghiara 1991) and historical cartography - mostly using
digital collections38 . Where surnames provided the only indication of origin, I matched
them to geographic entities whenever possible, prioritising the first element of the name
and then subsequent components. When the first element of the last name did not contain
37
On this process, see Cossu (2022)
38
Available online at https://ianua.arianna4.cloud/

49
any geographic indication, I checked whether it was the case for the second element or the
following ones. This procedure yielded geographic attributions for 4,015 out of 4,876 distinct
surnames.
The resulting georeferenced dataset provides the basis for the spatial analyses presented
in Section 3. As shown in Figure A4, apprentices were drawn not only from Genoa and its
immediate hinterland but also from more distant regions. A significant share came from
the Levante coast and from the Oltregiogo in the northern part of the Republic. Others
came from beyond Genoese territory, notably from the Duchies of Milan and Savoy. These
findings underscore the role of apprenticeship as a channel of migration into Genoa and
highlight the city’s position as a regional hub for labour mobility.

50
B Additional results and alternative regression specifications

B.1 Guild flexibility and contractual adaptations

In theory, guilds may have relaxed institutional constraints following the economic contrac-
tion of the 1470s, leaving a greater space for bilateral negotiation or departures from standard
training norms. In this Appendix, I try to proxy institutional flexibility using the intra-guild
dispersion of apprenticeship contract lengths, measured through the Herfindahl–Hirschman
Index (HHI). Following Ogilvie (2019), who argues that guilds varied significantly in their
ability to enforce rules, I interpret a higher intra-guild dispersion as evidence of greater space
for bilateral negotiation. The underlying logic is that tightly clustered contract lengths re-
flect strict enforcement of standard terms, whereas greater variation suggests tolerance or
incapacity to prevent contractual heterogeneity.

Figure B1: Apprenticeship contract lengths in the top 5 guilds, pre vs. post 1470

Figure B1 shows the distribution of contract lengths in the five largest guilds in Genoa
before and after the 1470s crisis, confirming a clear broadening of contract lengths post-crisis
in several guilds. This is consistent with the idea presented in the main text (Section 2) of
greater institutional flexibility in times of economic stress.
Table B1 presents the HHI values in contract length for the ten largest guilds before

51
and after the 1470s crisis. The difference column (∆) highlights changes in intra-guild
dispersion, with negative values indicating increased heterogeneity post-crisis and positive
values indicating greater clustering.

Table B1: Dispersion in contract length before and after the crisis for the top 10 guilds.

HHI

Guild Pre-1470 Post-1470 ∆

Apothecaries 0.78 0.70 -0.08

Bakers 0.25 0.29 0.04
Barbers 0.45 0.45 -0.01
Furriers 0.68 0.65 -0.03
Joiners 1.00 0.63 -0.37
Shoemakers 0.47 0.54 0.07
Silk 0.31 0.66 0.36
Tailors 0.48 0.55 0.07
Tanners 0.75 0.44 -0.31
Wool 0.75 0.51 -0.24

Overall, the post-crisis period seems to be characterized by increased variation in contract

lengths across multiple guilds in Genoa, as reflected by negative ∆ values in Table B1.
Taken together, the figure and table indicate that guilds exercised measurable flexibility in
the aftermath of the 1470s crisis. Instead of uniformly enforcing rigid institutional rules,
several guilds allowed or were unable to prevent greater contractual heterogeneity.

B.2 Time to mastership

A different angle to study the impact of ties within the guild system is the time required
to achieve mastership. In Figure B2, I show the evolution of the time to mastership for
apprentices in Genoa, distinguishing between those with pre-existing ties to the guild from
those without such connections. The figure reveals a pronounced leftward skew among
apprentices with ties, indicating that these not only reached master status more frequently,
as shown in Section 4, but also did so over a shorter time horizon.
It is important to interpret these estimates with caution. Time to mastership is inferred
from the first recorded appearance of an individual as a master rather than from precise
contractual data. As a result, it may underestimate the actual time for some apprentices,
particularly when formal registration of the first contract as a master was delayed or incom-
pletely recorded. For this reason, these results are not included in the main text, but they

52
 Figure B2: Distribution of the time to mastership

Notes: Distribution of time to mastership for apprentices in Genoa. “With ties” refers to apprentices who
either had a kinship tie with their master or whose father/guarantor belonged to the same guild.

remain informative for understanding general patterns of career progression.

The pattern in Figure B2 is consistent with two complementary mechanisms. First, as
shown in the main text, apprentices embedded in networks - through family, kinship, or other
connections, appear to have benefited from preferential access to advancement opportunities.
At the same time, ties seem to have accelerated as evidenced by the clustering of connected
apprentices at the lower end of the time-to-mastership spectrum. This pattern suggests
that guild networks functioned not only as entry facilitators but also as channels for faster
professional advancement.
These findings point to a segmented apprenticeship market, with some similarity with
frameworks proposed for both contemporary and pre-industrial labor markets (De Vries
1994). Apprentices with ties effectively participated in a “primary” networked market,
characterized by higher chances of promotion and an accelerated advancement. Those with-
out ties operated in a more fragmented “secondary” market, facing longer apprenticeships,
greater variability in outcomes and, ultimately, lower probabilities of reaching mastership.
These findings complement my results on Genoese guilds highlighted in the main text,
where access to mastership and subsequent career progression often depended on kinship

53
and professional networks. Similar dynamics have been documented in other pre-industrial
urban labour markets, where network membership not only facilitated initial entry but
also promoted retention and rapid advancement within the craft hierarchy (Buscemi 2024;
Garcı́a-Zúñiga and López-Losa 2021; Lombardo 2001). In the Genoese context, this implies
that the guild system did not merely enforce formal rules regarding training and apprentice-
ship length but also operated as a conduit for reproducing social and professional advantages
across generations.

B.3 Regression table with robust standard errors

As a complement to Table 5, Table B2 reports the same set of probit specifications but
estimated with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that are not clustered at the guild
level. Results remain consistent with the clustered estimates in the main text, suggesting
that the findings are not driven by the choice of clustered versus non-clustered inference.

Table B2: Determinants of access to mastership, Genoa 1460–1510

Promotion to mastership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Kinship tie with the master 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.041*** 0.029***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009)
Father in same guild 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.013 0.029***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.009)
Kinship tie with the guarantor 0.006 0.010 0.008 0.009 -0.008 0.008
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.018) (0.007)
Guarantor in same guild 0.012* 0.011* 0.010 0.011* 0.011 0.015**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.020) (0.007)
Father mentioned in the contract -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Experienced master -0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Genoese 0.002
(0.006)

Time FE N N Y Y Y Y
Guild FE N N N Y Y Y
Observations 6,513 6,513 6,513 6,198 2,426 5,557
Sample mean of outcome 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.042 0.043 0.043
R2 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.06

Note: The dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if the apprentice later appears as a master.
Coefficients are average marginal effects from probit regressions. Robust standard errors are shown in
parentheses. ***Significant at 99%, **Significant at 95%, *Significant at 90%.

54
Additional Appendix References

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Press.
Bloothooft, Gerrit, 1994. Corpus-based Name Standardization. History and Computing 6
(3): 153–167.
Buscemi, Tancredi, 2024. Working time, careers, and the labour market in the early mod-
ern period: evidence from the Royal Palace of Palermo (1579-1609). Rivista di storia
economica 40 (2): 221–242.
Casarino, Giacomo, Luciana Gatti, Carola Ghiara, and Oscar Itzcovich. 1979. Maestri e
garzoni nella società genovese fra XV e XVI secolo. Genoa: Quaderni del centro di studio
sulla storia della tecnica del Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche.
Jacopo Cossu (2022). “From documentary sources to geographical entities: Premises for
a geography of apprenticeship in the early modern period.” In: Anna Bellavitis and
Valentina Sapienza. Apprenticeship, Work, Society in Early Modern Venice. London:
Routledge, 77–100.
Jan De Vries (1994). “How did pre-industrial labour markets function?” In: George Grantham
and Mary MacKinnen. The Evolution of Labour Markets. London: Routledge, 39–63.
Garcı́a-Zúñiga, Mario, and Ernesto López-Losa. 2021. Skills and human capital in eighteenth-
century Spain: wages and working lives in the construction of the Royal Palace of Madrid
(1737–1805). The Economic History Review 74 (3): 691–720.
Gatti, Luciana, 1980. Un catalogo di mestieri. Genoa: Quaderni del Centro di studio sulla
storia della tecnica del Consiglio nazionale delle ricerche.
Ghiara, Carola, 1991. Famiglie e carriere artigiane: il caso dei filatori di seta. Genoa:
Quaderni del Centro di studio sulla storia della tecnica del Consiglio nazionale delle
ricerche; 17.
Gabriella Lombardo (2001). “Guilds in Early Modern Sicily: Causes and Consequences of
Their Weakness”. PhD thesis. London School of Economics and Political Science.
Ogilvie, Sheilagh, 2019. The European guilds: an economic analysis. Princeton: Princeton
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Postles, David, 1996. Personal Pledging: Medieval ”Reciprocity” or ”Symbolic Capital”?
Journal of Interdisciplinary History 26 (3): 419.

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Thorvaldsen, Gunnar, Trygve Andersen, and Hilde L. Sommerseth. 2015. Record Linkage in
the Historical Population Register for Norway. In Gerrit Bloothooft, Peter Christen, Kees
Mandemakers, and Marijn Schraagen (eds.), Population Reconstruction Cham: Springer
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