Qilin Wu Affidavit
Qilin Wu Affidavit
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
Case Number: 26-MJ-OOOOI-JAM
I, the undersigned complainant, being duly sworn, state the following is true and correct to
the best of my knowledge and belief:
Between on or about December 2,2025 and December 3,2025, in the Western District of
Missouri, the defendant, QILIN WU, knowingly and intentionally photographed and took video
footage of a vital military installation and equipment which were classified, designated, and
marked under the authority and at the direction of the President as restricted, and which were
located within a military reservation, base, airfield, station and district, pursuant to Executive
Order No.1 0 104, without first obtaining permission of the commanding officer, to include: a video
of a Northrop B-2 Spirit aircraft taking off from Whiteman Air Force Base ("WAFB"); a
photograph of the eastern perimeter fence line ofW AFB near the Weapons Storage Area ("WSA");
a video of the southeast side of WAFB; several photographs depicting Arnold Gate and a B-52
static display on the north side of WAFB, to include an image of the security fence that obscures
the B-2 hangars inside the base perimeter; a photograph of the security fence on the South end of
B- 2 navigation and anti-collision lights; and a photograph of the LeMay commercial vehicle gate,
an access point at WAFB, capturing the fence line of the base housing along the roadway, all in
2
Case 4:26-mj-00001-JAM Document 1 Filed 01/06/26 Page 2 of 2
fi
Case No. 26-MJ-0000I-JAM
AFFIDAVIT
I, Michael Alexander Smith, being duly sworn, state under oath that:
1. I am a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") and have
been since October 2023. I am currently assigned to the Kansas City Division,
Kansas City, Missouri, on the Counterintelligence squad. In the course of my
duties, I have worked closely with Air Force Office of Special Investigations
("OSI") on national security matters pertaining to Whiteman Air Force Base
("WAFB"). I am familiar with trade craft and techniques employed by foreign
adversarial nations, as well as the methods those nations use to collect intelligence
on elements of U.S. military infrastructure. I received my initial Special Agent
training at the Counterintelligence Special Agents Course at Fort Huachuca,
Arizona in 2018. I served as a Counterintelligence Special Agent with the
United States Army from 2018 - 2023. I graduated as a FBI Special Agent from
the FBI Academy, Quantico, Virginia in March 2024. In connection with my
official duties, I have conducted both criminal and national security investigations.
Based upon my training, experience, and investigation in this matter, I believe the
following facts to be true and correct:
2. This Affidavit contains information necessary to support probable cause for this
complaint. It is not intended to include every fact or matter observed by me or
known by law enforcement. The information provided is from my participation in
this investigation as well as from reviewing investigative reports, physical evidence
obtained during the investigation, my review of records and documents, from
discussions with others, including law enforcement officers, and from my personal
knowledge, training, and experience.
3. Title 18, United States Code, Section 795, is part of the Espionage Act. More
specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 795 (i) authorizes the President of the United States to
defme certain vital military and naval installations or equipment as requiring
protection against the general dissemination of information relative thereto; and (ii)
prohibits, in the interest of national defense, the making of any photograph, sketch,
picture, drawing, map or graphical representation of such vital military or naval
installations or equipment without first obtaining requisite permissions (e.g., from
the commanding officer of the military or naval post).
6. The next day, on December 3,2025, at approximately 12:00 p.m., AFOSI SA Kerry
McGuire responded to a report of a suspicious vehicle positioned outside the
southeast perimeter fence of WAFB. Upon arrival, SA McGuire made contact
with the driver of the vehicle, who identified himself as Qilin WU. WU presented
a valid Massachusetts driver's license for identification. The suspicious vehicle
was the same Toyota Sienna van bearing Massachusetts license plate number
3RGG16 that the Security Forces Patrolman had observed on December 2,2025.
During this new encounter on December 3, 2025, SA McGuire noted that WU's
English proficiency appeared to be limited. WU again relied primarily on a
translation application installed on his cellular phone, which appeared to display
Mandarin characters, to facilitate communication with the agent. WU provided
additional background information regarding his entry into the United States and
his personal history. WU stated that he entered the United States in or around
2022 by crossing the Mexican border into Arizona on foot. He explained that prior
to this crossing, he had flown from China to Ecuador and then traveled north
through Mexico. WU disclosed that he was detained at some point by U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, but WU reported that he was subsequently released
after he claimed asylum. WU further stated that he had previously served in the
1 During the consensual contact with the Security Forces Patrolman Jacob McCleerey, WU
provided a copy of his Massachusetts driver's license that referenced this personally identifiable
information.
2
SA McGuire used Google Translate for a machine translation of this image and
captured the following screenshot depicting the English translation:
• Video_175804000 - Date Stamp; unknown (SA Note: WU stated this video was
taken on December 2, 2025); Description: the video is dark and blurry; however,
B-2 navigation and anti-collision lights are seen in the video and the afterburner of
the dual engine aircraft is heard while a B-2 is taking flight over WAFB.
• Video_175824000 - Date Stamp; unknown (SA Note: WU stated video was taken
on 2 December 2025); Description: this video is dark and blurry; however, B-2
navigation and anti-collision lights are seen in the video in the upper righthand
corner and the afterburner of the dual engine aircraft is heard while a B-2 is taking
flight over WAFB.
• Video_175919000 - Date Stamp; unknown (SA Note: WU stated video was taken
on December 2, 2025); Description: video depicts a hand pressing a button on the
upper console of a van. The video then depicts the south end of the runway
perimeter security fence line and then pans to the east showing the roadway.
9. The United States' critical infrastructure provides the essential services that
underpin American society. It is comprised of physical and virtual assets and
systems so vital to the United States that their incapacity or destruction would have
a debilitating impact on national security, national economic security, or national
public health or safety. The Department of Defense ("DoD") has further
established critical infrastructure that is identified as networked assets and facilities
essential to the projection, support and sustainment of military forces and
operations worldwide. Defense Critical Infrastructure ("DC I") consists of
infrastructure owned and controlled by the DoD that is critical to the execution of
one or more operational plans; and infrastructure on which the DoD depends on for
operations but does not own or control, e.g., power, water, communications.
10. WAFB hosts critical DoD infrastructure that is essential to the Department of the
Air Force's nuclear deterrence capabilities and a variety of other DoD missions.
WAFB plays a central role in national security by housing the B-2 Spirit stealth
bomber fleet, enabling precision global strike, strategic deterrence, and nuclear
readiness. Its assets provide advanced stealth, radar-evading technology, and
secure command and control systems that ensure the credibility of the
United States' nuclear triad. Consequently, the incapacitation or destruction of
WAFB would have a debilitating impact on the nation's nuclear deterrence posture
and one or more critical DoD missions.
11. Based on DoD Manual 5200.08, Volume 3, which governs physical security and
access control for all DoD installations, I know that this manual specifically applies
to Air Force Bases with strategic assets. Additionally, Facilities Criteria (FC 4-
420-07F, 2018) confirms that bases supporting nuclear missions, such as Whiteman
Air Force Base ("W AFB") with the B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber, must be treated as
restricted areas with enhanced security. Therefore, WAFB qualifies as a vital
military installation as set forth in 18 U.S.c. § 795 and defined in Executive Order
10104. The aforementioned images and videos that depict WAFB are depicting
vital military installations and equipment.
12. On December 3, 2025, WU provided AFOSI SAs consent to search WU's vehicle.
SAs conducted a plain view search of WU's vehicle with WU's consent. SA
McGuire conducted a preliminary search of the vehicle and discovered bedding
material, food, drinks, and an iPad. SA McGuire did not discover any contraband.
WU permitted agents to look at the iPad; however, when SAs looked at the device
they did not discover any photographs or messages. WU maintained control over
the device, limiting the scope of the consensual search of the device. During the
encounter, WU explained that once he had seen a B-2 Spirit aircraft, he intended to
travel to Florida to observe an F-35 aircraft and then continue on to "Houston Star
14. On December 5, 2025, OSI SA Jessica Gross verified the official flight schedule
for WAFR The schedule confirmed that two B-2 Spirit aircraft departed WAFB
on December 2,2025, at approximately 1730 and 1731 local hours. The B-2 Spirit
is a strategic bomber equipped with classified and sensitive systems throughout its
design and operation.
15. On December 4,2025, FBI SA James Churchill and I interviewed WU. Prior to
serving as a federal agent, SA Churchill was a Mandarin linguist for the FBI. WU
was advised of his Miranda rights verbally and in writing in English and Mandarin.
The interview was both video and audio recorded. WU indicated he understood
his rights and was willing to answer questions. WU stated that, in or around 2023,
he traveled from China to Ecuador. From Ecuador, WU traveled by bus through
Mexico to the United States. WU then walked across the border in the area of
Nogales, Arizona. WU admitted to taking photographs of WAFB using his
cellular telephone. Specifically, WU stated he took photographs of planes in the
sky, some of the railing and fencing of the base perimeter, and the B-52 outside of
base. WU stated he was unaware he was not allowed to take photographs. WU
stated he did not see anything that clearly stated he could not take photographs.
WU took a total often photographs and videos. Four of them were taken at night
and the others were taken durmg daytime hours. (Affiant Note: On December 2,
2025, Security Forces Patrolman McCleerey informed WU that he was prohibited
from taking photographs or videos of WAFB. Based on the time stamps observed
on some of the photographs, I know that WU took at least some photographs of
WAFB after WU was told he was not permitted to do so.