Best Practices in SIS
Documentation
Ed Marszal, President, Kenexis
Presenters
Ed Marszal
Gary Hawkins
Introduction
Safety Instrumented System Design per “ISA S84”* is
becoming a common practice
Poor documentation is being generated due to
“safety case” mentality
Current practices ignore audience of documents and
“good practices” for specifications in general
* ANSI /ISA 84.00.01-2004 (IEC 61511-Mod)
FEED Phase SIS Documents
List of Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF)
Grouping of Instrumented Protective Functions (IPF)
– Group by equipment or process
• Compressors
• Reactors
• Fired Heaters
P&ID representation of SIF
Logic description
– cause and effect tables
– Boolean logic diagrams
– Narrative (“plain English” description of operation)
Testing procedures (with documentation of results)
Preliminary Design Steps
SIF List should be precursor to SIL selection
HAZOP/LOPA without knowledge of typical SIF leads
to errors
HAZOP is a final check on a good design, not a
design task
Typical SIF based on experience, standards, codes,
and judgment
Instrumented Protective Function Groups
Group instruments together that are functionally
related
Typically based around major equipment
– Compressors
– Fired Heaters
– Reactors
Typically contains multiple SIF
Also can contain non-SIF instruments and logic
Typical Plant Groupings
PSV
104B
D A
FV 10"-A
OBL
8"-A 104 TO FLARE SYSTEM
PSV OBL 10"-A
TO FLARE SYSTEM
101
14"-A
OBL
A TO FLARE SYSTEM A D
B A
D
PV PSV
101B 104A
6"-D
2
PSHH
101D B A
FT
12"-A H-105
PSLL PSV OBL 104
TO FLARE SYSTEM (Trim: B)
101D 102 10"-B
7 OBL
TO EXPORT
PV SDV PV GAS PIPELINE
104 SDV
101A 106 D B
LSHH 106
6
6"-D 101B PSLL
OBL 1 V-101 6"-B
4
106
LSLL PSHH
FROM PRODUCTION LSLL TSHH
HEADER (NOTE 1) 101B 102B
SDV 101B 104
101 PSLL
102B PSHH PSLL
104C 104C
ST
1 STAGE
SDV LSHH
102A 102B
4"-D
F A
3 V-102
LSLL C-104
LV 102B (Trim: B)
D A 4"-F
101 8 OBL
PSV TO EXPORT LIQUID
103 PIPELINE
PSLL
FV
103C
FT 103C
103C
SDV FV
103 103A
FT FT
103B 103A
PSHH F A
103A
PSLL
103A A F
P-103
(Trim: F)
SDV
102B
4"-A
5
4"-A
IPF Grouping for Separator
H
PT A
PIC H
101A 101A D PIC
L
PV 101B L
101B
PT
101B
USC PT
Detail “A”
101 101D
H
PI
101C
PT
101C
V-101
PV
101A
LG LT USC
Detail “A”
101B 101B 101
LG LT
101A 101A
Advantages of IPF Grouping
Compact information with minimal duplication
Facilitates programming – programmer shielded for
single instruments in multiple SIF
Facilitates design and I/O counting
Facilitates test plan development and testing
P&ID representation
Symbology for SIS, specifically tag naming in
inconsistent (I, X, UC, USC)
Use of “S” is technically correct, but leads to more
confusion (PSV is always a relief valve??)
Use of typicals to minimize clutter
Typical SIS I/O Details
Detail “A” - SIS Inputs
Detail “B” - SIS Outputs
XT USC XI
XXX XXX XXX Indicator
Output
XV USC XI
XAHL
XXX
Pre-Alarm
XXX XXX XXX
Command
Status
XAHHLL Trip Alarm
XXX
XA Output
XXX
Activated
HS Bypass
XXX Switch
HS
HA Bypass XXX Reset
XXX Alarm
XDA Deviation
XXX Alarm
Safety Requirements Specs
Specifications (emphasis on ‘s’)
Limit information to what is required for audience (SIL
not required on C&E or P&ID)
Use “general requirements” statements for common
features such as bypassing
Refer to other documents for non-critical information
Typical Bypass Note
1.1 Bypass / Override SIS Logic Solver
Each of the functional groups that are described in this Safety Requirements
Specification shall require a shutdown bypass function for maintenance and testing. The
bypass functionality described in this note shall not be used for normal operations. If a
bypass is required for normal operations such as start-up, a dedicated hard-wired
bypass facility shall be provided.
The SIS shall be configured so that bypasses are implemented using a two-step process
that includes activation of a unit-specific “bypass enable” switch and activation of an
input-specific BPCS bypass soft switch. Only when both of these items are activated
shall the input be bypassed. When an input is placed in “bypass”, the SIS logic solver
shall hold the input in the non-trip state, regardless of the status of the bypassed input.
Reference External Documents
Conclusions
Room for improvement in SIS documentation
practices
Consider the audience for the documents
Use good engineering practice
Minimize data duplication
Leads to shorter preparation time and fewer errors
Business Results Achieved
Decreased implementation time and cost
– Compact documentation is easier to prepare and more
accurate
– Use of standard modules instead of custom development
– Minimal clarification and rework
Decreased ongoing maintenance effort and cost
– Updates only occur in one document
– Likelihood of inconsistent data in multiple documents
decreased
Safer processes
– Lower probability of systematic errors in system resulting
from poor documentation
Summary
SIS design can be made safer and more cost
effective through documentation method
improvements
Specification preparation time can be reduced by as
much as 50%*
Please fill out comment cards and e-mail any feed
back you have to the authors
Questions?!?
Where To Get More Information
ISA Bookstore – Safety Integrity Level Selection
Kenexis Web Site
– HTTP://[Link]/resources
Emerson SIS Lifecycle Workbook
– At Delta V SIS Booth during EGUE
– Contact Emerson After EGUE
