An MTC decision was appealed to RTC Manila, Branch 1.

The RTC thereafter rendered a decision in the appealed case and attained finality.
Thereafter, Aya W. Patalo, the aggrieved party, filed a Writ of Preliminary Injunction with a separate RTC, Branch 99, to prevent
the implementation of the decision of the MTC as affirmed by RTC Branch 1. Victor Y. Wagi, the prevailing party,
opposed the Writ of Preliminary Injunction claiming that RTC Branch 99 cannot issue the said Writ since it is a court of equal rank
and jurisdiction.
Patalo, on the other hand, claims that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction is directed against the MTC’s decision,
and as such, RTC Branch 99 may issue the Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the MTC.

If you were the judge, how would you rule?

Aya W. Patalo is incorrect. A court cannot interfere by injunction with judgments or decrees of another court with concurrent or
coordinate jurisdiction possessing equal power to grant injunctive relief.
Although the writ of preliminary injunction is directed against the MTC, the same has the effect of preventing the execution of the
decision on appeal of a Regional Trial Court which is a court of equal rank and jurisdiction.
(Dela Cruz vs. Eisma, A.M. No. RTJ-00- 1544, 15 March. 2000)
The Government through the DPWH has filed expropriation proceedings for acquisition of right-of-way for the
expansion of the North Luzon Expressway against the Property of Leon.
Leon filed a Complaint for Injunction with application for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the RTC to prevent
the expropriation of his Property claiming that the value being offered to him by the DPWH is very low.

May the RTC issue a TRO or Injunction to prevent the DPWH from expropriating the property of Leon?
No.
All courts, excluding the Supreme Court, are prohibited from issuing a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), Preliminary
Injunction, or Mandatory Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the government from acquiring the site of any national
government project.
(See Republic vs. Heirs of Gabriel Q. Fernandez, 754 SCRA 298, G.R. No. 175493, March 25, 2015).
Caloy filed with the RTC an action for damages against Dong. Caloy alleged in his complaint that Dong had sold a
parcel of land to him (Caloy) in which Dong stated that he was the ”absolute owner” and that the land sold was “free
from any lien or encumbrance,” when it turned out that Dong had earlier sold the same parcel of land to Bing.
In his answer, Dong denied having executed in favor of Caloy the deed of sale, alleging that his signature therein was a
forgery. Subsequently, a complaint for estafa against Dong was filed with the prosecutor. After preliminary investigation,
the prosecutor filed with the RTC an information against Dong for estafa for having sold the same property twice.

(a) Dong filed in the civil case a motion to suspend the civil case until judgment has been entered in the criminal case.
How should the court rule on Dong’s motion?

(b) Assume that instead of filing a motion to suspend the civil case, Dong filed in the criminal action a motion to
suspend the criminal case until judgment has been entered in the civil case. How should the court rule on Dong’s
motion?

(c) Assume that no motion to suspend was filed either in the civil case or in the criminal case. May the criminal court
and the civil court both render judgment finding Dong to be civilly liable?
(a) The court should deny Dong’s motion to suspend the civil case.
Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, an independent civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal action
and is not suspended by the filing of the criminal action.
Here, the civil action filed by Caloy is an independent civil action since it is based on fraud, that is, Dong’s act of selling
a land he had previously sold. [Art. 33, Civil Code]. Thus it shall proceed independently of the criminal action and is not
suspended by its filing.
Hence, the court should deny Dong’s motion.

(b) The court should grant Dong’s motion to suspend the criminal case.
Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion to suspend the criminal case may be filed during the pendency of a
prejudicial question in a civil action.
Here, the civil action presents a prejudicial question since a finding in the civil action that Dong’s signature in the deed
of sale to Caloy was forged would mean that the criminal action may no longer proceed.
Hence, the court should grant Dong’s motion to suspend.

(c) Assuming that no motion to suspend was filed either in the civil case or in the criminal case, the criminal court and
the civil court may both render judgment finding Dong to be civilly liable.
As previously stated, the civil case shall proceed independently of the criminal action being an independent civil action
and thus a judgment may be rendered therein.
On the other hand, under the Law on Criminal Procedure, the criminal case may proceed to judgment in the absence
of a motion to suspend it based on prejudicial question.
However, the offended party may not recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action. [S3 R111]
What are litigious and non-litigious motions, and what are their procedural distinctions?
What are litigious and non-litigious motions, and what are their procedural distinctions?

Litigious motions are those which the court shall act upon only after the adverse party has been given the opportunity to be heard by filing an opposition, or after the period for filing the opposition
has lapsed. Litigious motions include:
1) Motion for bill of particulars;
2) Motion to dismiss;
3) Motion for new trial;
4) Motion for reconsideration;
5) Motion for execution pending appeal;
6) Motion to amend after a responsive pleading has been filed;
7) Motion to cancel statutory lien;
8) Motion for an order to break in or for a writ of demolition;
9) Motion for intervention;
10) Motion for judgment on the pleadings;
11) Motion for summary judgment;
12) Demurrer to evidence;
13) Motion to declare defendant in default; and
14) Other similar motions.
The Rules also state that the opposing party shall file his or her opposition to a litigious motion within five (5) calendar days from receipt thereof, and that the court shall resolve the motion within
fifteen (15) calendar days from its receipt of the opposition thereto, or upon expiration of the period to file such opposition.

Non-litigious motions are those which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of adverse parties.
These motions include:

1) Motion for the issuance of an alias summons;

2) Motion for extension to file answer;
3) Motion for postponement;
4) Motion for the issuance of a writ of execution;
5) Motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution;
6) Motion for the issuance of a writ of possession;
7) Motion for the issuance of an order directing the sheriff to execute the final certificate of sale; and
8) Other similar motions.
In the exercise of its discretion, the court may set litigious motions for hearing, after due notice to all parties,
giving the date and time of hearing. Source: Rule 15
X was having a conference with his lawyer, Y, at a restaurant. They were discussing the details of X’s ongoing criminal case.
Unknown to them, the person sitting on the table next to them could hear their discussion.

Will you consider the information privileged at the hands of the person who overheard X and Y?
No, since X and Y did not take reasonable precautions to protect the confidentiality of their communication.
It should have been obvious to them that there might be people that could overhear them, since there were in a public place.
(Please see last paragraph of Section 24, Rule 130 of the 2019 Rules on Evidence).
Anthony Tavern and Jess Dima are employees of Dimaculangan Enterprises, the biggest hardware company in Central
Luzon based in Clark Field, Pampanga.
Their company criminally charged them for attempted theft.
However, the MTC of Clark Field acquitted Tavern and Dima.
Dimaculangan Enterprises filed a petition for Certiorari with the RTC, but it was dismissed,
and the Motion for Reconsideration was also denied.
Does Dimaculangan Enterprises have the personality to file the Petition for Certiorari with the RTC
and eventually elevate the case to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court? Explain.
Dimaculangan Enterprises have no authority in filing a special civil action for certiorari with the RTC to seek the
annulment of the decision of the MTC, which acquitted Tavern and Dima from the crime of attempted theft.
In the case of Yokohama Tire Philippines, Inc. vs. Reyes et al. (G.R. No. 236686, 5 February 2020) (First Division)
[Peralta, C.J.], the High Court ruled:

It is settled that in criminal cases, the State is the offended party and the private complainant's interest is limited to the
civil liability arising therefrom.

Hence, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, a reconsideration of the order of
dismissal or acquittal may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is
concerned and may be made only by the public prosecutor; or in the case of an appeal, by the State only,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

The private complainant or offended party may not undertake such motion for reconsideration
or appeal on the criminal aspect of the case.
However, the offended party or private complainant may file a motion for reconsideration of such dismissal or acquittal
or appeal therefrom but only insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned.
Pol Guy was charged with the murder of Vic Tim.
During the trial, Guy offers in evidence a handwritten letter of Boo Radley addressed to the local police chief.
In the letter, Radley wrote that he was the one who killed Vic Tim for carrying on an affair with his (Radley’s) wife.
Radley died of COVID-19 before the trial. You are the prosecutor.

How would you respond to the offer of the letter?

I would respond to the offer of the letter by objecting that it is inadmissible hearsay.
Under the hearsay exception for declarations against interest, a statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal
liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible in evidence unless corroborating circumstances clearly
indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
Here, the statement of the declarant Radley exposes him to criminal liability for murder or homicide and it was offered
to exculpate the accused Guy. However there was no showing of corroborating circumstances that Radley’s statement
was trustworthy.
Hence, Radley’s statement is inadmissible for being hearsay.
How may a notice of lis pendens be cancelled?
Under Section 19, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only upon order of the court,
after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party,
or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.
After his properties were attached, defendant Pablito filed a sufficient counter-bond.
The trial court discharged the attachment.
Nonetheless, Pablito suffered substantial prejudice due to the unwarranted attachment.
In the end, the trial court rendered a judgment in Pablito’s favor by ordering the plaintiff to pay damages,
because the plaintiff was not entitled to the attachment.
Pablito moved to charge the plaintiff’s attachment bond.
The plaintiff and his sureties opposed the motion, claiming that the filing of the counter-bond had relieved
the plaintiff’s attachment bond from all liability for the damages.

Rule on Pablito’s motion.

Under Section 20, Rule 57, the attachment bond shall answer for all the costs which may be adjudged to the adverse
party and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment.
On the other hand, under Section 17, Rule 57, the counter-bond shall secure the payment of any judgment that the
attaching party may recover in the action.
In other words, a counter-bond is a mere replacement of the properties to be attached.
Hence, a counter-bond does not relieve the plaintiff’s attachment bond from all liability for the damages.
It only secures any judgment in favor of the attaching party. Consequently,
Pablito can still move to charge the plaintiff’s attachment bond on account of an improper attachment.
Plaintiff filed a complaint for sum of money before the RTC against the Defendant.
Summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon the Defendant on April 12.
On May 2, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and he received the order denying the motion on June 1.

What is the last day for the Defendant to file his answer?
The last day for the Defendant to file his answer is June 13.
Under the Law on Civil Procedure, when the defendant files a motion to dismiss and the same is denied,
the defendant shall file his answer within the period to which he was entitled at the time of the filing of the motion.(R22)
Here, the Defendant was entitled to 11 days within which to file his answer at the time he filed his motion to dismiss on
May 2. Hence the Defendant would have 11 days from June 1 or up to June 12 within which to file his answer.
Since June 12 is a holiday, the time for filing the answer was extended to the next day.
Hence, the last day to file the answer is June 13.
[Note: When Defendant filed his motion to dismiss on May 2, that day was excluded from the computation and added
to the remaining period of 10 days (See S2 R22)]
Elizze filed a Complaint for Ejectment against Maria, alleging that despite demands to vacate,
Maria refused to do so. Maria claims that she had possessed the land for more than 70 years, as such,
the complaint should be dismissed as Ejectment is the improper action,
and instead a case for recovery of possession should be filed.
Elizze, on the other hand, claims that her right of ownership was derived from her predecessors-in-interest and maintained that the
MTC had jurisdiction over the complaint since prior physical possession is not an indispensable requirement and all that is
required is “that the one-year period of limitation commences from the time of demand to vacate.”
Rule.
The Ejectment case shall not prosper. An ejectment is not proper since the occupant is in possession for 70 years.
A summary ejectment case only resolves the issue of who has the better right to actual possession of property.
The right of possession does not pertain to legal possession. While a party may later be proven to have the legal right of
possession by virtue of ownership, he or she must still institute an ejectment case to be able to dispossess an actual
occupant of the property who refuses to vacate. As such, it is jurisdictional that the party seeking to enforce its right to ownership
allege when the defendant’s possession became unlawful.
The ejectment case must be filed within 1 year from the date the defendant lost its rights to possess.
In this case, Elizze’s complaint did not state how and when their dispossession started.
She only alleged that the petitioner’s occupation was illegal.
Such an allegation is insufficient to determine if the action was filed within a year from dispossession,
a jurisdictional requirement in an ejectment case.
(Eversley Child’s Sanitarium vs. Sps. Barbarona, G.R. No. 195814, 4 April 2018, Leonen, J.)
BCO Bank foreclosed the Property of Sps. Tang in Manila and the same was sold at public auction
by the Sheriff on June 13, 2020.
On June 15, 2021 Sps. Tang went to the Register of Deeds and found that only the Real Estate Mortgage (REM) of
BCO Bank in the amount of P20 Million has been registered in the TCT of the Property.

May Sps. Tang redeem their Property from BCO Bank despite the lapse of more one (1) year from the time when the
Property was foreclosed and sold at public auction by filing a Complaint for Judicial Declaration to Redeem?
Yes.
The Certificate of Sale issued by the Sheriff after the extrajudicial sale is a mandatory requirement.
Here, BCO Bank did not register the Certificate of Sale with the Register of Deeds.
Accordingly, the property sold at public auction is not conveyed to the new owner and the period of redemption does
not begin to run.
(See First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc., vs. Philippine Bank Communications, 866 SCRA 438, G.R. No. 202836,
June 19, 2018).
Ms. A filed a petition for a writ of amparo, claiming that she was being threatened by Mr. B, her ex-boyfriend,
with whom she has a child out of wedlock, named C. Ms. A alleged that since she started dating someone else,
Mr. B began stalking her, parking his car on the street outside her house, and watching her house until the wee hours
of the
morning. She thus feared for her life.

(a) Is Ms. A entitled to a writ of amparo? Explain.

(b) Assuming that Mr. B took away C without Ms. A’s knowledge and consent, what is the proper remedy for Ms. A to
immediately recover C's custody? Explain.
(a) Is Ms. A entitled to a writ of amparo? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Ms. A is not entitled to the writ of amparo. In a petition for amparo, the petitioner must show by substantial evidence
that the threatened act was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State
(Navia, et al. v. Pardico,G.R. No. 184467, 19 June 2012).
An amparo case may be filed as a response to extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof and the
petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of government
participation. (Sps. Santiago v Tulfo, G.R. No. 205039, October 21, 2015).
The facts in this case do not show that Mr. B’s acts was done with the support of the State, and it does not allege any case of
extrajudicial killing and/or enforced disappearance, or any threats thereof for which there was government participation.

(b) Assuming that Mr. B took away C without Ms. A’s knowledge and consent, what is the proper remedy for Ms.
A to immediately recover C's custody? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Since the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, the Amparo rule cannot be properly
applied. Instead, Ms. A may file a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors.
(Caram v. Atty. Segui, et al.,G.R. No. 193652, 5 August 2014)
An information for murder was filed in the RTC against the accused for murder committed in 2008.
Upon his arraignment in 2009, the accused pleaded guilty to the crime charged.
The court conducted a searching inquiry and determined that there was voluntariness and full comprehension by the
accused in pleading guilty.
The trial court scheduled four hearing dates for the prosecution to present its witnesses to prove the accused’s guilt
and degree of culpability.
The prosecution however failed to present any witness. Nonetheless, the RTC found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt based on his guilty plea and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
The trial court stated that the accused maintained his plea despite being apprised that he will be sentenced and
imprisoned on the basis thereof.
The accused appealed to the Court of Appeals arguing that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime charged
on the basis solely of the his guilty plea and despite the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
The CA rendered a decision setting aside the accused’s conviction because of the RTC’s failure to require the
prosecution to prove the accused’s guilt. The CA remanded the case to the RTC with the directive that it require the
prosecution to prove the accused’s guilt.

Did the CA act correctly?

No, the CA did not act correctly.
Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the prosecution is required
to prove his guilt.
Here, the accused pleaded guilty to murder which is a capital offense since it is punishable by death under the Revised
Penal Code. However the prosecution failed to prove the accused’s guilt.
The CA should have acquitted the accused for failure of the prosecution to prove the accused’s guilt.
A remand is not proper since the prosecution was given adequate opportunity to present evidence of the accused’s
guilt but failed to do so.
Hence, the accused was entitled to an acquittal because of the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and thus the CA’s order to remand was not correct.
[People v. Pagal, e.b., 29 September 2020]
Gil filed an action for forcible entry against Miguel in the MTC of Marikina City.
The MTC issued Summons stating that the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure apply and directed the defendant to file his
answer within 10 days from service of summons.
Miguel filed his answer within the 10 day reglementary period.
Due to the pandemic, the proceedings for the case was delayed for several months.
Upon the resumption of the MTC’s operations, Miguel filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that Gil failed to state a cause of action.
Gil opposed said Motion and averred that it is a prohibited motion under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

If you were the judge, how would you rule? Explain.

I would rule in favor of Miguel. In Heirs of Ricardo Olivas vs. Flor, G.R. No. L-78343, 21 May 1988, the Supreme Court said that
it should be noted that a Motion to Dismiss filed after an Answer had already been submitted within the reglementary period
is no longer prohibited.
What the rule proscribes is a Motion to Dismiss which would stop the running of the period to file an Answer and cause undue
delay. Thus, a Motion to Dismiss is no longer a prohibited motion if it is filed after the answer has already been submitted.
Arthur was accused for counterfeiting a credit card.
During the pre-trial, the prosecution marked all its evidence, except the counterfeit credit card, which was then in the
possession of the CIDG.
During the trial, the prosecution presented the counterfeit credit card, but it was objected upon by Arthur on the ground
that it was not marked during the pre-trial.

If you were the Judge, would you sustain the objection of Arthur?
No.
The rule is that no evidence shall be allowed during trial if it was not identified and pre-marked during the pre-trial.
Here, the counterfeit credit card was still in the CIDG’s custody during the pre-trial.
This circumstance constitutes good cause or legal excuse why the prosecution was not able
to mark it during the pre-trial.
Accordingly, the objection of Arthur against the presentation of the counterfeit credit card must be overruled.
(See Anthony De Silva Cruz vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 210266, June 7, 2017).
It has been a long-observed rule that allegations in the complaint must be limited to ultimate facts.
What changes were introduced by the 2019 Amendments regarding the contents of the complaint and the attachments thereto?
The allegations in the Complaint are no longer limited to ultimate facts. They should also contain a statement of the evidence,
consisting of the names of the witnesses and the substance of their testimonies, copies of the judicial affidavits, copies of real and
documentary evidence.
In addition, relevant laws must also be cited in the body of the complaint. (Rule 7, Sections 1, 2 and 6)
X is on trial for Estafa. After the prosecution finished presenting evidence, the X filed a Demurrer to Evidence which the trial
court granted. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration.

Assuming that the prosecution’s motion raises compelling arguments, how will you resolve it if you were the judge?
I would deny the motion, pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy.
The grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable.
(Gloria Macapagal Arroyo vs. People, G.R. No. 220598, 18 April 2017)
Amalia Simburoso issued five checks at P1.0M each or a total of P5.0M in favor of Jose Dima, President and
Chairman of the Board of DIMA CORP. He is a big time businessman and cockfighting aficionado.
He is also the kumpadre of the sitting mayor of Iraga, where his company is based.
The checks were issued as a form of investments which will earn 5% per month.
Dima is the supplier of COVID-19 vaccines in Iraga, which were imported from China.
However, Dima used the money instead in an on-line Sabong and lost it.
He was charged with estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(d) of the RPC.
The Information was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Iraga.
He was convicted instead for other deceits under Art. 318 of the RPC.

Can the conviction of Jose Dima be sustained? Explain.

Yes.
In the case of Osorio vs. People (G.R. No. 207711, 2 July 2018) (Third Division) [Leonen, J.]),
the High Court explained:
Persons who receive money for investment in a particular company but divert the same to another without the
investor's consent may be held criminally liable for other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code is broad in scope intended to cover all other kinds of deceit not falling under
Articles 315, 316, and 317 of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, the crime of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code is necessarily included in the crime of
estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
Therefore, Jose Dima may be convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.
Simply put, an accused may be convicted of an offense proved provided it is included in the charge or of an offense
charged which is included in that which is proved.
Here, Jose Dima was convicted of the crime falling under "Other deceits" which is necessarily included
in the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d),
considering that the elements of deceit and damage also constitute the former.
Princesa filed a complaint against Dukesa for annulment of a contract based on fraud.
During the trial, Dukesa offers in evidence two witnesses who will testify that in their town,
Dukesa has a reputation of being an honest and scrupulous businesswoman.
Princesa objects to the offer of testimony on the grounds that it is hearsay and that it is irrelevant.

Rule on the objections.

The objection that the testimony is hearsay should be overruled.
Under the Rules on Evidence, reputation evidence as to moral character is an exception to the hearsay rule.
Here, the testimony relates to the reputation of Dukesa’s moral character,
that is, she is of an honest and scrupulous character.
Thus such reputation evidence is an exception to the hearsay rule.
Hence, the objection on the ground of hearsay should be overruled.
The objection that the testimony is irrelevant should, however, be sustained.

Under the Law on Evidence, character evidence is inadmissible in evidence in a civil case for being irrelevant
unless character itself is directly in issue.
Here, evidence of Dukesa’s honest character is inadmissible and irrelevant in the civil case for annulment of contract.
What is directly in issue in the civil case is whether or not there was fraud in that particular case,
not whether Dukesa was of an honest character.
Hence, the objection that the evidence is irrelevant should be sustained.