Alliance4Europe

Coming up today at 16:00 – the 3rd session of the Information Defence Alliance (IDA) Digital Event Series! 💡 Sanctioned but Thriving: How Sanctions Work — And Why They Often Fail Register here: https://lnkd.in/gWHRPX7q Presented by Charles Terroille, Project and Investigative Research Officer at Science Feedback, the session features findings from a year-long digital sanctions project, done in collaboration with Alliance4Europe. The project resulted in the takedown or geofencing of hundreds of Russian influence operation channels and the start of a discussion on whether systematic sanctions violations are a systemic risk. The presentation explains the project’s methodology and provides examples. There will also be time for discussion and Q&A — a chance to join an open exchange on the planned next steps. This event is the third in a six-part series: you can join the full trajectory or choose the sessions that interest you the most. #InformationDefenceAlliance #IDA #Sanctions #Democracy #StrategicCommunication #Alliance4Europe Public task financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland within the grant competition “Public Diplomacy 2024–2025 – the European dimension and countering disinformation”. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the official positions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland.

On 16–17 September 2025, the ADAC.io consortium gathered in Lund, Sweden, for an official two-day meeting hosted by Lund University's Psychological Defence Research Institute, the project coordinator. This milestone event brought together partners from Debunk.org, Alliance4Europe, Institut für Journalistik (TU Dortmund), Cardiff University / Prifysgol Caerdydd , Uniwersytet SWPS, and Leiden University. The discussions focused on what has been achieved so far, what lessons can be drawn, and how to sharpen strategies for the final year of the project. 📚 There’s much to be anticipated in this next stage – from visual and linguistic analysis of FIMI, to defender playbooks tuned for different types of stakeholders – all of which will bring the strands of work closer together, turning each of the outputs into a stronger collective impact. Find all publications from the project at https://adacio.eu/ 🔗 #ADACio #Research #Consortium #EUHorizon #DigitalResilience #InformationIntegrity #Collaboration #Innovation

Join us TODAY for the third session of our four-part online training series on Strategic Communication – Coordinated Response: DISARM & the Kill Chain 📍Date: 6 October 2025, 3-5 PM CET 🎙️Presenter: Julian Neylan , Training Programme Lead at Alliance4Europe and Dissemination & Defense Lead at the DISARM Foundation. This session introduces the #DISARM Framework and the Kill Chain model for structuring counter-disinformation responses. DISARM provides a shared taxonomy for tagging and sharing intelligence across stakeholders. The Kill Chain breaks an operation down into four phases – Plan, Prepare, Execute, Assess – helping defenders identify opportunities for early intervention and disruption. 👉 Register here: https://lnkd.in/d3Za72XH. If you are already registered, a Zoom invitation will be sent to your email address before the session. 🎯 There will be time for discussion and Q&A – this is a chance for direct engagement with the speaker and fellow participants. Your voice, ideas, and networks can make a difference. Join us and help strengthen Europe against disinformation. For more information check: https://lnkd.in/dPgDKF-K. #IDA #InformationDefenceAlliance #Disinformation #StrategicCommunication #Training #CounterDisinformation Public task financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland within the grant competition “Public Diplomacy 2024–2025 – the European dimension and countering disinformation”. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the official positions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland.

How can a state use cultural policy as a tool of state propaganda? In Belarus, the Slavianski Bazaar festival in Vitebsk is positioned as a “cultural” and “international” event, a symbol of unity and traditional values. At the same time, it serves as a political instrument of state ideology and anti-Western rhetoric supporting the Lukashenko regime. ✏️ Methodology: Using the #DISARM framework, analysts at the Belarusian Centre for Strategic Communication examined 31 texts across nine major state and regional media outlets. They mapped contradictions, identified target audiences and strategic narratives, and traced how the festival is framed as an ideological project — domestically and internationally. 📌 Key findings: The core narratives surrounding the Slavianski Bazaar can be grouped in four clusters reflecting the ideological lines of propaganda: 1. State and Leadership: Emphasises the success of cultural projects, particularly Slavianski Bazaar, as impossible without Lukashenko’s engagement and personality. This creates his image as a guarantor of stability, a protector of cultural traditions, and an organiser of international dialogue. Support for cultural initiatives is presented as proof of the effectiveness of the state system of governance. 2. Historical memory: Frames Belarus as a guardian of historic legacy, with special emphasis on the memoir of the Great Patriotic War as a basis of the current regime’s legitimacy, underscoring the uniqueness of Belarusian suffering and sacrifice. 3. Alliance with Russia: Integration with Russia portrayed as natural, beneficial, and necessary for development. Foreign-policy dependence and domestic subordination presented as sovereign choices made for the people’s good. 4. Values and Cultural Confrontation: Constructs a cultural front between “traditional” and “moral” Belarusian and Russian culture versus an degraded and hostile West. Through art, narratives of struggle, resilience, and the need to defend against external cultural pressure are transmitted. This cluster mobilises society while justifying isolationism, censorship, and ideological control over the culture. 👉 Why is it important? Historical memory is used as a tool for consolidating society, labelling enemies, and reinforcing ideological continuity. It reinforces several key objectives of the Belarusian regime: legitimising of power, constructing enemy images, suppressing alternative views, mobilising society culturally, and controlling public consciousness. 🎯 Read the full report: https://lnkd.in/d2SfmQ_9 #Belarus #Disinformation #Report #InformationDefenceAlliance Public task financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland within the grant competition “Public Diplomacy 2024–2025 – the European dimension and countering disinformation. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the official positions of the MFARP.

Join the second session of the Information Defence Alliance (IDA) Digital Event Series! 🚨 Operation X-ploitation: X Failure to Address Vulnerabilities Enabling Child Sexual Abuse Content and Influence Operations 🗓️ 2 October, 4 PM CET 👉 Register here: https://lnkd.in/dZvykJ35 Presented by Saman Nazari, Lead Researcher at Alliance4Europe, the session will explore what happens when Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM) networks adopt the same strategies as foreign influence operations. ♦️ Saman will analyse our new investigation that uncovers how a CSAM Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) network on X (formerly Twitter) exploited platform vulnerabilities – flooded hashtags, manipulated algorithms, and evaded moderation for at least three months. ♦️ The findings reveal a systemic risk: the very weaknesses that enabled both Russian and CSAM CIB networks. 👉 Join us to discuss how to tackle systemic risks, rethink online safety, and go beyond the usual silos in addressing one of the most urgent challenges in digital governance. This event is the first in a six-part series: you can join the full trajectory or choose the sessions that interest you the most. For more information, visit: https://lnkd.in/dPgDKF-K. #InformationDefenceAlliance #IDA #CSAM #ChidSexualAbuse #CoordinatedInauthenticBehaviour #Democracy #Propaganda #StrategicCommunication Public task financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland within the grant competition “Public Diplomacy 2024–2025 – the European dimension and countering disinformation” The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the official positions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland.

🎯 Why does Belarus celebrate its Independence Day on 3 July, the Soviet liberation of Minsk in 1944, instead of 27 July 1990, the day it declared sovereignty and exited the USSR? This was the first case as part of the new report of the Belarusian Propaganda Watch, authored by the Belarusian Centre for Strategic Communication. ✏️ Methodology: Using the DISARM framework, 34 texts across 9 state-controlled outlets were examined between June and August 2025. The analysis mapped contradictions in official narratives, identified target audiences, and traced how propaganda recycles historical myths to legitimize present-day authoritarianism. 📌 Key findings: The July 3 narrative is built on the cult of the 22 June 1941, treated as a key, symbolically charged date and a marker of the most important event in modern history, and rests on five propaganda clusters: 1. Great Patriotic War and Historical Memory: World War II (“Great Patriotic War”) presented as the genocide of Belarusians and the ultimate source of modern statehood, rooted in historical trauma and the active fight against fascism, while discrediting the European institutions and international agreements. 2. Redefining Independence through the Soviet legacy: 27 July 1990 is delegitimized as an externally imposed document without popular consent, while 3 July is portrayed as the only “historically just” Independence Day when Belarusian statehood was obtained within the Soviet Union. 3. The Cult of Aleksander Lukashenka and internal legitimacy: Lukashenka is framed as a truly popular president who “let the people decide” and continues to embody national stability. 4. Geopolitics, the Enemy Image, and Contrast with the West: Europe is depicted as weak, dependent on the USA, disconnected from their citizens, and aggressive, while Belarus is a “peace-loving” state, valued and respected as a reliable, economically resilient, predictable partner, but safe only in union with Russia pursuing peace and patriotic unity of generations. 5. Socio-ideological: Stability, Values, and Justification of Hardship. Existing difficulties and hardship are normalized as the “price of acquiring sovereignty,” caused by external pressure and justified through patriotic values. 👉 Why is it important? This case clearly demonstrates how the Belarusian regime uses history as an instrument of weaponization. The rhetoric and imagery reproduced around July 3 serve to reinforce several key goals of the Belarusian regime: • legitimization of Lukashenka’s power; • maintaining a mobilization regime; • constructing the image of an enemy and justifying repressions; • replacing modern values (human rights, democracy) with the cult of a heroic past. Check the full report here: https://lnkd.in/d2SfmQ_9 #Belarus #PropagandaWatch #Alliance4Europe #Disinformation

Alliance4Europe is proud to share the last findings of the Belarusian Propaganda Watch — a project authored by Belarusian Centre for Strategic Communication that analyzes the main dimensions, strategies, and tactics the Lukashenko regime uses to influence audiences and disseminate disinformation to sustain authoritarian control. 👉 Using the #DISARM framework, researchers at the Belarusian Centre for Strategic Communication documented and analysed five major cases of propaganda: 1. “July 3 – Independence Day of the Republic of Belarus” addresses the historical-symbolic dimension, reaffirming Independence Day through a Soviet liberation narrative. 2. “The festival ‘Slavianski Bazaar in Vitebsk‘” uses cultural propaganda by instrumentalising the Slavianski Bazaar festival to promote authoritarian legitimacy. 3. “The disappearance of Coordination Council spokesperson Anzhalika Melnikava” represses and discredits the opposition by framing the disappearance of the opposition activist Melnikava as a scandal instead of state terror. 4. “Invitation of Workers from Pakistan” manipulates migration narratives, exploiting the “invitation of Pakistani workers” to fuel fear, distract from the domestic economic crisis, and incite fear. 5. “Joint Russia–Belarus Strategic Military Exercises ‘Zapad–2025‘” presents the Zapad–2025 joint military exercises with Russia as “defensive” while masking their escalation potential. 🔎 Each case demonstrates different vulnerabilities of the regime and is focused on different target audiences, counter-narratives, and strategic logic, yet all converge on common tactics: 💡 Youth and the diaspora serve as key transmitters of local vulnerabilities into the external field. 💡 Economic insecurity, family security, and cultural identity serve as universal pressure points. 💡 International expert, political, and cultural channels function as critical levers to impose real costs for the regime. 📌 Key findings: Together, these narratives feed into a closed propaganda ecosystem designed to legitimize Lukashenko’s regime, rewrite Belarusian history, justify repression and militarization, and isolate Belarusians from Europe. 👉 Unified communication strategies & stronger international coordination among democratic forces to counter disinformation are key to long-term resilience. Read the full report here: https://lnkd.in/d2SfmQ_9 #Belarus #Disinformation #PropragandaWatch #Report #EU #Alliance4Europe #DISARM --- Public task financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland within the grant competition “Public Diplomacy 2024–2025 – the European dimension and countering disinformation” The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the official positions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland.

Last week, our Managing Director Omri Preiss spoke at the European Heat Pump Association's annual #HeatPumpForum, participating in the panel "Heat Pump Hype or Hate? Demolishing Disinformation." The session tackled how to how to shift negative perceptions and counter disinformation which undermines heat pump uptake, as well as how to tackle energy disinformation more broadly. Our key messages: 🎯 Track and combat coordinated inauthentic behavioural patterns instead of only debunking incorrect claims 📱 Clear out the information space so citizens can engage with reliable, factual content instead having to sift through the disinformation that otherwise drowns out genuine discussion 💪 Empower the spread of positive narratives from sectors like heat pumps to connect with people A huge thank you to the organisers at EHPA, as well as to all fellow speakers Phoebe Cooke DeSmog, Alberto Vela European Environmental Bureau, Guillermo Yañez LCP Delta and Maria Eugenia Leoz Martin-Casallo DG ENER, for this timely discussion.

New vacancy: OSINT Analyst & Project Coordinator (Remote, Europe) 🔍 🎉 We're looking for a new team member to help drive meaningful projects across Europe in a hybrid research + coordination capacity. ⏳ Applications close Sunday 5th October. Learn more about the role here: https://lnkd.in/eBNhaF5M