Air Crash Investigations - Midair Disaster - Piper and Helicopter Collide Over Hudson River

AIR CRASH INVESTIGATIONS

Over the last decades flying has become an every day event, there is nothing special about it anymore. Safety has increased tremendously, but unfortunately accidents still happen. Every accident is a source for improvement. It is therefore essential that the precise cause or probable cause of accidents is as widely known as possible. It can not only take away fear for flying but it can also make passengers aware of unusual things during a flight and so play a role in preventing accidents.

Air Crash Investigation Reports are published by official government entities and can in principle usually be down loaded from the websites of these entities. It is however not always easy, certainly not by foreign countries, to locate the report someone is looking for. Often the reports are accompanied by numerous extensive and very technical specifications and appendices and therefore not easy readable. In this series we have streamlined the reports of a number of important accidents in aviation without compromising in any way the content of the reports in order to make the issue at stake more easily accessible for a wider public.

An e-Book is different from a printed book. Especially tables, graphs, maps, foot and end notes and images are sometimes too complicated to be reproduced properly in an e-Book. For those who are interested in the full details of the story we refer to the printed edition of this publication.

Dirk Jan Barreveld, editor.

AIR CRASH INVESTIGATIONS MIDAIR DISASTER-PIPER AND HELICOPTER COLLIDE OVER THE HUDSON RIVER

AIR CRASH INVESTIGATIONS- Midair Collision Over Hudson River: Piper PA‐32R‐300, N71MC and Eurocopter AS350BA, N401LH Collide Near Hoboken, New Jersey, August 8, 2009. NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-10/05.

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Dirk Jan Barreveld, editor

[email protected]

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ISBN: 978-1-365-53540-6

Table of Content

AIR CRASH INVESTIGATIONS--MIDAIR DISASTER-- PIPER AND HELICOPTER COLLIDE OVER THE HUDSON RIVER

Title Page

Copyright Page

Table of Contents

Executive Summary

Chapter 1: The Accident

- History of the Flight

- The Airplane

- The Helicopter

- The Collision

- Pilot Information

- Aircraft Information

Chapter 2: Investigation and Analysis

- General

- Accident Sequence

Chapter 3: Safety Issues

- Previous Safety Recommendations Issued as a

Result of This Accident

- Guidance on See-and-Avoid Concept

- Electronic Traffic Advisory Systems

Chapter 4: Conclusions

- Findings

- Probable Cause

Chapter 5: Recommendations

Board Member Statement

Notes

Figures

Abbreviations

Other Air Crash Investigations

Executive Summary

On August 8, 2009, at 1153:14 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-32R-300 airplane, N71MC, and a Eurocopter AS350BA helicopter, N401LH, operated by Liberty Helicopters, collided over the Hudson River near Hoboken, New Jersey. The pilot and two passengers aboard the airplane and the pilot and five passengers aboard the helicopter were killed, and both aircraft received substantial damage from the impact. The airplane flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91, and the helicopter flight was operating under the provisions of 14 CFR Parts 135 and 136. No flight plans were filed or were required for either flight, and visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was (1) the inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid concept, which made it difficult for the airplane pilot to see the helicopter until the final seconds before the collision, and (2) the Teterboro Airport local controller’s nonpertinent telephone conversation, which distracted him from his air traffic control (ATC) duties, including correcting the airplane pilot’s read back of the Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR) tower frequency and the timely transfer of communications for the accident airplane to the EWR tower. Contributing to this accident were (1) both pilots’ ineffective use of available electronic traffic information to maintain awareness of nearby aircraft, (2) inadequate Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) procedures for transfer of communications among ATC facilities near the Hudson River Class B exclusion area, and (3) FAA regulations that did not provide adequate vertical separation for aircraft operating in the Hudson River Class B exclusion area.

Previous safety recommendations issued to the FAA addressed standard operating procedures for the Hudson River Class B exclusion area, ATC performance deficiencies, the designation of a special flight rules area (SFRA) for the Hudson River Class B exclusion area and surrounding areas, and standard operating procedures within and training for SFRAs. The safety issues discussed in this report address changes within the recently designated SFRA surrounding the Hudson River corridor, vertical separation among aircraft operating in the Hudson River SFRA, the see-and-avoid concept, and helicopter electronic traffic advisory systems. Five new safety recommendations to the FAA are included in the report.

CHAPTER 1: THE ACCIDENT

History of the Flight

On August 8, 2009, at 1153:14 eastern daylight time,¹ a Piper PA-32R-300 airplane, N71MC, and a Eurocopter AS350BA helicopter, N401LH, operated by Liberty Helicopters, collided over the Hudson River near Hoboken, New Jersey. The pilot and two passengers aboard the airplane and the pilot and five passengers aboard the helicopter were killed, and both aircraft received substantial damage from the impact. The airplane flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91, and the helicopter flight was operating under the provisions of 14 CFR Parts 135 and 136.² No flight plans were filed or were required for either flight, and visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

The pilot of the accident airplane was conducting a personal flight from Wings Field Airport, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to Ocean City Municipal Airport, Ocean City, New Jersey, with a stopover at Teterboro Airport (TEB), Teterboro, New Jersey,³ to pick up a passenger. The pilot of the accident helicopter was conducting a local sightseeing flight from the West 30th Street Heliport (JRA), New York, New York.

The Airplane

According to the air traffic control (ATC) transcript, the accident airplane pilot contacted the clearance delivery controller at the TEB air traffic control tower (ATCT) at 1140:01. The pilot advised the controller of the airplane’s route of flight and intended en route altitude (3,500 feet)⁴ and requested departure clearance and traffic advisories (also known as flight-following services). The pilot then contacted the TEB local controller at 1141:50, indicating that he was ready to taxi the airplane for departure, and the controller provided the pilot with taxi instructions.⁵ At 1142:21, while the airplane was taxiing, the local controller asked the pilot whether he was gonna be requesting…v f r [visual flight rules] down the river to Ocean City or just…southwest bound. The pilot replied that he would take whichever route was the most direct to his destination. The local controller stated, okay just…let me know so I know who [to] coordinate [the] handoff with, to which the pilot responded, I’ll take down the river [that would] be fine.

Because the pilot requested routing over the Hudson River and planned an en route altitude of 3,500 feet, he was required to contact controllers at Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR), Newark, New Jersey, for authorization to climb into Class B airspace⁶ after the flight was transferred from TEB to EWR. The Hudson River Class B exclusion area, which comprises Class E and Class G airspace,⁷ provides passage below the Class B airspace. (ATC clearance directly into Class B airspace allows aircraft to climb above the exclusion area.) At the time of the accident, the Class B exclusion area extended from the surface of the Hudson River up to, and including, 1,100 feet.⁸

At 1148:15, the pilot indicated that the airplane was ready for departure, and the TEB local controller then cleared the airplane for takeoff and instructed the pilot to make a left turn to the southeast (to avoid entering EWR airspace and the final approach course for EWR runway 22) and maintain 1,100 feet or below. Afterward, the controller contacted the pilot of an inbound Bell 407 helicopter to advise him of the departing traffic.

At 1150:02, the TEB local controller contacted the airplane pilot to determine the airplane’s altitude. The local controller then