Institute for the Study of War

NEW: Iranian Efforts to Access Global Markets: The Iranian regime passed the Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) convention on October 22 as part of an effort to remove Iran from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklist. Iran is very unlikely to meet the FATF requirements, given that it continues to provide financial and material support to members of the Axis of Resistance. Read the October 22, 2025 Iran Update: https://lnkd.in/ebdwT5Pb, Other Key Takeaways: Foreign Fighters in Syria: The Syrian transitional government appears to be pursuing a low-level effort to target foreign fighters in Syria who have not integrated into the Ministry of Defense (MoD). The foreign fighters whom the Syrian transitional government has recently targeted have historically come into conflict with HTS.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 21, 2025: Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated that Russia is unwilling to agree to an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine that does not result in Ukraine’s complete capitulation. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 21, 2025: https://lnkd.in/eiCiet9z Other Key Takeaways: Ukraine and its European allies signaled their support for U.S. President Donald Trump’s proposal for an immediate ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine. Recent Russian war crimes in Pokrovsk highlight the humanitarian cost of Russian advances in more populated areas. Russia's long-range strike campaign continues to target critical Ukrainian energy infrastructure ahead of Winter 2025-2026. Ukrainian Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi was appointed as the commander of the newly formed Joint Forces Task Force. Polish and Romanian authorities connected Russian military intelligence to attempted acts of sabotage aimed at undermining European Union (EU) support to Ukraine. Russian forces advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast and near Pokrovsk.

NEW: Different factions within the Iranian regime are fighting for influence in Iran to determine future Iran policy after the Israel-Iran War and several scares over the health and availability of the supreme leader. Regime insiders, who possibly aim to limit any effort by moderate and former President Hassan Rouhani to reclaim political relevance, have reacted negatively to Rouhani’s post-war public criticism of the regime. Read the October 21, 2025, Iran Update: https://lnkd.in/ewRxp3wr Other Key Takeaways: The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) reported on October 20 that Iran is building unidentified structures at the former Taleghan 2 nuclear research site at Parchin Military Complex in southeastern Tehran Province. ISIS assessed that Iran has ”bunkered [two of the structures] over with earth,” likely to “improve their survivability” in the event of future Israeli strikes. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naghdi acknowledged that Iran failed to respond quickly during the Israel-Iran War. Naghdi stated that IRGC units requested authorization to strike Israel early on June 13, but the supreme leader delayed the order until the regime could appoint new commanders to replace those who Israel had just killed. Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani outlined several requirements that Russia must meet to secure basing rights and other benefits. Russia is unlikely to meet these requirements.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is currently seeking motivated and experienced students or recent graduates who can demonstrate a commitment to the core mission of ISW to join our Spring 2026 intern team. We are still looking for National Security and Intelligence Analysis interns who have the critical language skills and regional knowledge for our following research teams: • China & Taiwan • Russia & Ukraine • Iran’s Axis of Resistance We are looking for similar skills for the Cognitive Warfare Task Force Internship which primarily focuses on Russian disinformation operations against the U.S. and its allies and partners. We are also seeking Geospatial Intelligence and National Security Technologies interns, who have experience with ArcGIS software, to support our research teams. We also need Communications interns who possess excellent writing, editing, and oral communications skills. Competitive applicants are also encouraged to submit video production and multimedia samples. ISW seeks to prepare our interns for careers in national security. The Institute provides regular, formal education in war studies, analytic methods, policy writing, and more. Our interns participate in weekly briefings, seminar-style sessions, and workshops. Interns undergo an intensive two-week development program at the start of each semester on key concepts and skills. ISW interns join a broad alumni community of up-and-coming national security leaders and practitioners upon completing the program. ISW alumni work across the national security profession, in government as well as NGOs, security and management consulting, law firms, academia, and more. Click here to apply: https://lnkd.in/eCQ8Dj2Z Applications will be reviewed on a rolling basis until November 14, 2025.

NEW: US President Donald Trump's October 17 meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reportedly ended with Trump supporting a ceasefire on the current frontlines and not Russian President Vladimir Putin's demands that Ukraine cede territory in Donetsk Oblast to Russia. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 20, 2025: https://lnkd.in/eZUiGtRp Other Key Takeaways: Kremlin voices clarified Russia's position on negotiations following Western reporting about the October 17 Trump-Zelensky meeting in order to reiterate that Russia remains committed to addressing the alleged "root causes" of the war and is unwilling to agree to a ceasefire. The Kremlin is priming the Russian people for a full victory in Ukraine whatever the cost — a domestic effort that is at odds with Putin's reported willingness to make territorial concessions. The Kremlin is leaning into its cognitive warfare effort to portray Russian forces as relentlessly advancing and a Russian victory as inevitable. This effort aims to obscure the reality that Russian forces are only making minimal gains at disproportionately high manpower costs and that Russia is unlikely to obtain its strategic objectives by force in the short- or medium-term. Russian officials are also attempting to falsely portray ongoing limited Russian operations in the Kherson direction as the start of a new major Russian offensive in the province. The Kremlin is attempting to use all available informational avenues to convince the United States, Europe, and Ukraine to acquiesce to the Kremlin's demands by convincing them that a Russian victory in Ukraine is certain when it is anything but. Kremlin officials are attempting to present Ukraine as the obstacle to peace to obfuscate how Putin himself has been impeding the process by insisting that Ukraine cede more territory than Russian forces currently occupy. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction. Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykyi Burluk direction.

NEW: A senior Iranian official suggested in an interview with Nour News on October 13 that the Iranian regime is unable to develop a long-term strategy because it continues to suffer from shock and paralysis after the Israel-Iran War. Khani presented alternative policies that focus on societal resilience and deterrence at the strategic level. Iran Update October 20, 2025: https://lnkd.in/eGfXWs2p Other Key Takeaways: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani said on October 20 that 250 to 350 US “military advisers and support personnel” will remain at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq, to support US operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Syria. Lebanese and Israeli officials are very unlikely to begin negotiations in the coming weeks because preliminary diplomatic efforts aimed at renewing negotiations have reportedly stalled. Hezbollah would likely attempt to use any delay in Israeli-Lebanese negotiations to try to reconstitute its forces, bolster its domestic support base, and increase its weapons stockpile.

NEW: PRC manufacturers have dramatically increased fiber optic drone component exports to Russia, possibly indicating a heightened PRC commitment to Russian battlefield success in Ukraine. Read more in the October 20, 2025 China-Taiwan Weekly Update: https://lnkd.in/eSVbZ6Sw Other key takeaways: The PRC expanded its export controls over rare earths ahead of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, highlighting how the CCP uses its market dominance for economic coercion and can disrupt the international flow of critical materials that are essential to many advanced technologies. Cheng Li-wun won the KMT chairperson election, defeating the establishment favorite Hau Lung-bin. Cheng is a vocal advocate for a shared “Chinese” identity among Taiwanese people. South Korean Unification Minister Chung Dong-young confirmed that the Lee administration will pursue a two-state framework for inter-Korean relations, moving away from the long-standing South Korea policy endorsing unification.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 19, 2025: Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly reiterated his demand that Ukraine cede all of Donetsk Oblast as a condition for ending the war, and suggested that Russia would be willing to “surrender parts” of occupied southern Ukraine. Ceding Donetsk Oblast to Russia would set conditions for Russia to renew its aggression against Ukraine from more advantageous positions at a time of its choosing. Read the full update: https://lnkd.in/eCswpm-W Russian officials and pro-Kremlin sources are attempting to portray limited Russian offensive operations in the Kherson direction as an ongoing offensive to recapture Kherson City — efforts that are incompatible with Putin’s claimed readiness to make territorial concessions in southern Ukraine. ISW has yet to observe any indicators that Russian forces are preparing for or have launched a renewed significant offensive operation against west bank Kherson Oblast.

NEW: The Kremlin reiterated its commitment to Russia’s war demands that amount to Ukraine’s full capitulation in response to US President Donald Trump’s October 17 proposal for peace in Ukraine. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 18, 2025: https://lnkd.in/eH262jgf Other Key Takeaways: Ukraine’s October 2025 strikes against an oil terminal in occupied Feodosia, Crimea, appear to have significantly degraded the terminal, and it is unclear when or if Russia will be able to repair it. Russian state media reported that the majority of Russian drivers expect further increases in gasoline prices as Ukraine continues its long-range strike campaign against Russian fuel infrastructure. , Ukraine and Russia agreed to a localized ceasefire in western Zaporizhia Oblast to repair the remaining power line to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) amid Russian preparations to transfer the ZNPP to the Russian power grid. Russian forces advanced near Velykyi Burluk, Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Velykomykhailivka and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

NEW: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump met at the White House on October 17 and discussed ongoing US support for Ukraine and efforts to the war Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 17, 2025: https://ow.ly/VBxY50Xes4c Other Key Takeaways: The Kremlin continues to employ a dual-handed rhetorical strategy, leveraging economic proposals and veiled military threats in an effort to simultaneously pursue normalizing US-Russian relations and deterring US support for Ukraine. The Kremlin is reducing its financial incentives used to recruit volunteer soldiers, likely as part of the Kremlin’s efforts to restructure force generation efforts and centralize control over Russian recruits in an effort to sustain its protracted war in Ukraine. Russia’s short-range and long-range drone strike campaigns continue to disproportionately impact civilians in Ukraine. Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide military aid and support Ukraine’s growing defense industry. Ukrainian forces advanced near Velykomykhailivka and in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces advanced near Lyman and Siversk.