To Waltz or Not to Waltz? Germany, Europe, and ¾ Time

To Waltz or Not to Waltz? Germany, Europe, and ¾ Time

Colette Mazzucelli and Sanja Milovac-Carolina

History records a country dance in 18th century Europe, in Bavaria and Tyrol, which has become known in ballrooms as the waltz. Its ¾ time is distinctive in contradistinction to the more common quadruple or 4/4 time.  

At the end of the last millennium, continental antagonisms and nationalistic rivalries among European neighbors led to three wars between Germany and France in less than a century: the Franco-Prussian War, 1870-71; World War I, 1914-18; and World War II, 1939-45. Millions experienced war as commonplace.

During the 1950s, realists, notably Kenneth Waltz, urged students of international relations to question whether the origins of conflict reside in human nature, within the structure of different states or in the international system. (1)

Waltz, a defensive realist, argued that states never have enough security. The uncertainty that characterizes inter-state relations is a default condition: anarchy in 4/4 time. During the first half of the twentieth century, the Germany unified by Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in 1871 lived under anarchy.

The short twentieth century, identified by historians as the period starting with the Great War in 1914, closed as the bipolar system disappeared in 1991. The former USSR dissolved on 26 December of that fateful year. The destiny of a Continent “whole and free” (2) hung in the balance as the Cold War ended.

For the Federal Republic of Germany, anchored in the European Communities since the 1950s, the choice to deepen integration to consolidate peace or to widen its geographical scope loomed large. Sheltered under NATO’s nuclear umbrella, West Germany lived exceptionally, for a few brief decades, in ¾ time.

The Marshall Plan (3) allowed the Bonn Republic to rebuild a ruined economy, revitalize a traumatized political system, and restore a downtrodden society. The choice to integrate in Community Europe was a West German renunciation of the balance of power mechanism and a rejection of the recourse to war.

West Germany after WWII responded with purpose to the construction of Europe, thereby rejecting nationalism. That gray rhino, to use Wucker’s metaphor (4), led to wars in Europe’s anarchical system driven by an ideology that endured despite those who failed to predict its growth, as Berlin explains (5).

In hindsight, Germany and its neighbors, France, Italy and BENELUX, agreed to take possibly the largest “positive risk” (6) of the twentieth century: to seize an opportunity in the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community relying on a window of opportunity, which closed with De Gaulle’s return to power.

During the early years of the Allied Occupation, the Weimar Republic, 1919-33, was, for some, the yardstick by which to measure the viability of the Bonn Republic.  Could a “fragment of a state,” no matter how secure internally, rest on anything other than a precarious foundation? (7)

Over time, West Germany developed a culture that was ambivalent about power, especially the use of military force in relations among states. West German influence became inextricably linked with the growing economic clout of a European Community, which let a single voice be heard in trade negotiations. 

The stalemate between East and West in intra-German relations ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989. Germany would no longer be the frontline object of bipolar ideological, capitalism versus communism, or military, NATO versus Warsaw Pact, confrontations.

Unification on 3 October 1990 again raised “the German Problem” (8) in reference to Waltz. Yet, the internal condition of the German state is sui generis. Given its bifurcated Cold War history, the potential for conflict lies within a unified Germany whose identity has become synonymous, in part, with ¾ time.

While the East-West division of Germany is no longer a physical reality, its legacy remains asking us to revisit the failure of illiberalism and to consider once again Stern’s narrative (9). We undertake such an odyssey with knowledge that the 21st century starting point and the steps in time are completely different.

Policymaking in the present-day European Union (EU) is marked by a starting point, interconnectedness, which defines Germany’s external, rather than “foreign,” policy. As a geo-economic power, Germany evolved via steps in time that Stern recognized, yet, which Waltz, writing in the 1950s, could not foresee.

As colleagues observe, interdependencies created by multinational cooperation and subsequent globalization, starting with communications and financial revolutions, altered Germany’s scope of action on the national level, which the financial crisis of 2008 and global pandemic illustrate in distinct ways.

Merkel, as Chancellor, carefully exercised leadership drawing on formative experiences with totalitarianism in East Germany. Her responsibility was to govern for all Germans in a country where East and West are oftentimes still at odds and where liberal values cannot be taken for granted. (10)

Merkel’s sensitivity to the prospect that democracy could give way to illiberal practices ranging from the ubiquitous spread of disinformation via social media to increasing abuses of facial recognition by surveillance states demonstrates her understanding of the challenges inherent in technology innovations.

As Marton explains in her biography, The Chancellor, Merkel’s aim to set Germany and Europe apart from other powers in the articulation of legal frameworks to regulate the misuses of personal data by firms and states provides an indication of ways in which the EU may yet chart its own path in transnational security.

Her speech before the Bundestag when Russia invaded Crimea spoke to values the Chancellor sought to defend. Merkel’s words rejected “the solutions of the 19th and 20th centuries” in favor of “the principles and interests of our age, the 21st century” (11), as nationalism spread in Central and Eastern Europe.

Coalition dynamics in a united Germany gave Merkel occasion to speak the language of national interest in her definition of austerity. Over a decade later, it was possible to draw on that experience to define with French President Macron a recovery package that spoke to European unity during a global pandemic.

Merkel’s legacy in ¾ time is her refugee policy, which made Germany home to a million displaced persons from Syria, Lebanon, and other countries. The concurrent rise of the German Far Right, its AfD Party (12), illustrates the reality of internal, rather than inter-state, conflict, which threatens peace in Europe.

Systemically, anarchy is relevant in the context of an expansionist Russia, as Putin strives to reclaim superpower ascendancy by playing a new Great Game in Central Asia. His nationalism, reliance on military action, and quest for Empire, speak to Mearsheimer’s offensive realism in the quest for more power (13).

Waltz’s second image provides insights into the economic, political, and social problems Russia faced under Yeltsin as the Cold War ended, which, in turn, paved the way for the rise of a nationalist strongman, Putin, who came to an agreement with the oligarchs challenging state power as they plundered its assets.

Early in 2022, the question of domestic conflict in Germany is all the more relevant as Putin threatens Ukraine yet again, thereby raising the prospect of a failed Nord Stream 2 opening at a time when energy resources are at a premium across the Continent.

As the United States and the Russian Federation negotiate over Ukraine, NATO, not the European Union, is at the center of the dispute given its expansion to countries near Russia’s border in 1999. Under its Basic Law, the Federal Republic can only deploy military force within a multinational organization such as NATO.

As long as Russia and the USA remain at the negotiating table, an open question is how the indivisibility of security may be defined to take into account, diplomatically, Russian concerns. Germany remains committed to the “Normandy” talks with France, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation (14).

This rejection of zero-sum thinking in relations with Putin, who masters the game in 4/4 time, along with the German interest in diplomacy rather than deterrence as the default operational mode are definitive aspects of its postwar Western identity, yet are by no means a subject of consensus in eastern Germany.

The challenge for NATO in its own interest and that of Germany in Europe is to “close its door” on further expansion, as Kimmage asserts (15).  Successive enlargements after the Madrid Summit were contested in the US military establishment (16) and weakened NATO’s core functions as a defensive alliance. 

Will successors to Chancellor Merkel with no memory of World War II bear the post-1945 domestic culture in mind? Or will a return to “normalcy” make the Cold War experience an exceptional one in German history? This is a fundamental question to raise in the post-Merkel era.

As long as Germans construct European peace by rejecting hegemonic instability, the sui generis nature of the Berlin Republic will continue to be synonymous with the waltz in ¾ time. Its tempo is determined neither by anarchy, in reference to Waltz’s third image, nor by a liberal reflex in the German state.

The checks on illiberal democracy, in Zakaria’s definition (17), are the decentralized nature of German policymaking, respect for the Basic Law, and limitations on the use of German military force among or within states. Corruption scandals, lack of transparency, and private interests in politics raise concerns.

Coming from East Germany, Merkel recognized as a leader what Fukuyama (18) the philosopher initially did not.  The triumph of liberal democracy is not inevitable. The resort to nationalism is ever present, the rise of populism signals growing inequalities, and the lure of authoritarianism is humanity’s peril.  

Notes

(1)  Kenneth Waltz. With a Foreword by Stephen M. Walt. Man, the State, and War. Anniversary Edition. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.

(2)  President George Bush. “A Europe Whole and Free.” Remarks to the Citizens in Mainz. Rheingoldhalle. Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany, May 31, 1989, https://usa.usembassy.de/ etexts/ga6-890531.htm.

(3)  Every CRSReport.com. The Marshall Plan. Design, Accomplishments, and Significance. January 18, 2018, https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R45079.html.

(4)  Michele Wucker. The Gray Rhino. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2016.

(5)  Isaiah Berlin. Against the Current. Essays in the History of Ideas. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001; Robert Zaretsky. “We Are All Isaiah Berliners Now.” Foreign Policy, November 7, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/07/we-are-all-isaiah-berliners-now/.

(6)  Michele Wucker. You Are What You Risk. New York: Pegasus Books, 2021.

(7)  F.R. Allemann. “Will History Repeat Itself in Germany? Must the Bonn Republic Go the Way of Weimar?” Commentary, March 1955, https://www.commentary.org/articles/f-allemann/will-history-repeat-itself-in-germanymust-the-bonn-republic-go-the-way-of-weimar/

(8)  David Calleo. The German Problem Reconsidered. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

(9)  Fritz Stern. The Failure of Illiberalism. Essays on the Political Culture of Modern Germany. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992.

(10) Kati Marton. The Chancellor. The Remarkable Odyssey of Angela Merkel. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021.

(11)  Policy statement by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel on the situation in Ukraine, Thursday, 13 March 2014 in the German Bundestag, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/chancellor/policy-statement-by-federal-chancellor-angela-merkel-on-the-situation-in-ukraine-443796

(12) Paul Hockenos. “The Political Price of Merkel's Migrant Policy.” The Atlantic. September 14, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/09/merkel-isis-refugee-germany-afd/499550/

(13) John Mearsheimer. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2014.

(14) Alexander Ratz and Pavel Polityuk. “Germany says Russia will pay price if it moves on Ukraine.” Reuters, January 17, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-says-russia-will-pay-price-if-it-moves-ukraine-2022-01-17/

(15) Michael Kimmage. “Time for NATO to Close Its Door.” Foreign Affairs. January 17, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2022-01-17/time-nato-close-its-door?check_logged_in=1

(16) The Debate on NATO Enlargement. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations. United States Senate. One Hundred Fifth Congress. October 7,9,22,28,30 and November 5, 1997. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1998.

(17) Fareed Zakaria. The Future of Freedom. Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003.

(18) Francis Fukuyama. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press, 2006. 

Dr. Colette Mazzucelli, MALD, EdM, PhD, Graduate Faculty, NYU New York, is Chair, NYU European Horizons Advisory Board, President (Academia), Global Listening Centre, and Founder, LEAD IMPACT Reconciliation Institute LLC.

Dr. Sanja Milovac-Carolina, MA, PhD, Independent Researcher, Public Policy and International Relations, is a Consultant with Sciocertus in London, United Kingdom.