Case #9. G.R. No.

190823 April 4, 2011

DOMINGO CARABEO, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES NORBERTO and SUSAN DINGCO, Respondents.

Facts: On July 10, 1990, Domingo Carabeo (petitioner) entered into a contract denominated as "Kasunduan sa Bilihan ng Karapatan sa Lupa"1 (kasunduan) with Spouses Norberto and Susan Dingco (respondents) whereby petitioner agreed to sell his rights over a 648 square meter parcel of unregistered land situated in Purok III, Tugatog, Orani, Bataan to respondents for P38,000. Respondents tendered their initial payment of P10,000 upon signing of the contract, the remaining balance to be paid on September 1990, and paid small amounts to petitioner, who still had to settle a family squabble over said land. After the case was submitted for decision or on January 31, 2001,2 petitioner passed away. The records do not show that petitioners counsel informed Branch 1 of the Bataan RTC, where the complaint was lodged, of his death and that proper substitution was effected in accordance with Section 16, Rule 3, Rules of Court. Petitioners counsel filed a Notice of Appeal on March 20, 2001.

Issue: Whether or not the counsel had personality to act on behalf of the deceased petitioner.

Ruling: The death of a client immediately divests the counsel of authority. Thus, in filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioners counsel of record had no personality to act on behalf of the already deceased client who, it bears reiteration, had not been substituted as a party after his death. The trial courts decision had thereby become final and executory, no appeal having been perfected.

Case #17 Atty. Mangontawar M. Gubat vs NPC G.R. No. 167415, February 26, 2010

FACTS: Petitioner, Atty. Mangontawar M. Gubat instituted this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to question the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals. The facts are clear that petitioner is counsel of certain Ala Mambuay, Norma Maba, and Acur Macarampat in a separate case against herein respondent. Corresponding attorney fees are fixed in favor of petitioner. However, a compromise agreement was entered into between petitioners clients and the National Power Corporation without the knowledge of herein petitioner. The latter then filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on his attorneys fees which was granted by the lower court. NPC opposed this in its petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals which decision was granted by said court. Hence, petitioner instituted this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to question the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in favor of respondent NPC.

ISSUE: Is the remedy of petitioner in filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 proper?

RULING: No. Petitioner is amiss in filing the wrong mode of appeal. Under Rule 65, a petition for certiorari is available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. But such is not the case in the instant petition. The remedy of appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper mode of appeal that should have been filed by the petitioner. The Supreme Court further declared that petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 as a substitute for a lost appeal.

Case# 20 Olazo vs. Tinga 637 SCRA 1 Dec. 7, 2010 Facts: The complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land in Taguig. The land was previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that was segregated and declared open for disposition. The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02: Complainant claimed that respondent abused his position as congressman and as member of the committee on awards, when respondent unduly interfered with complainants sales application because of his personal interest over the subject land. As a result, complainants sales application was denied. T he Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03: The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel Olazo, the complainants brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999, the respondent met with Manuel for the purpose of nullifying the conveyance of rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The complainant claimed that the respondent wanted the rights over the land transferred to one Rolando Olazo, the Barangay Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this regard executed an "Assurance" where he stated that he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01: The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering his knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary . The complainant averred that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of the proclaimed areas and does not qualify for an award.

Issue: Whether the respondents actions constitute a breach of the standard ethical conduct first, while the respondent was still an elective public official and a member of the Committee on Awards; and second, when he was no longer a public official, but a private lawyer who represented a client before the office he was previously connected with.

Ruling: 1.) Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility highlights the continuing standard of ethical conduct to be observed by government lawyers in the discharge of their official tasks. In addition to the standard of conduct laid down under R.A. No. 6713 for government employees, a lawyer in the

government service is obliged to observe the standard of conduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility. Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government service is more exacting than the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government service are subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of public accountability. They also bear the heavy burden of having to put aside their private interest in favor of the interest of the public; their private activities should not interfere with the discharge of their official functions. The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It imposes the following restrictions in the conduct of a government lawyer: A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties. The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public position to: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with his or her public duties. We previously held that the restriction extends to all government lawyers who use their public offices to promote their private interests.

2.) In Cayetano v. Monsod, we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should be correlated with R.A. No. 6713 and Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which impose certain restrictions on government lawyers to engage in private practice after their separation from the service. Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads: Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x x (b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not: x x x x

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; x x x

These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply. As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their profession during their incumbency. By way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice of his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her official functions.[30] The last paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception to the exception. In case of lawyers separated from the government service who are covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with. Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers, after leaving the government service, to accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the term intervene which we previously interpreted to include an act of a person who has the power to influence the proceedings.[31] Otherwise stated, to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must have accepted engagement or employment in a matter which, by virtue of his public office, he had previously exercised power to influence the outcome of the proceedings.

3.) Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. From the above discussion, we already struck down the complainants allegation that respondent engaged in an unauthorized practice of law when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards. We find that a similar treatment should be given to the complainants claim that the respondent violated paragraph 4(1) of Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged the sales application of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez despite his knowledge that his nephew was not a qualified applicant. The matter of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguezs qualifications to apply for a sales application over lots covered by the proclaimed areas has been resolved in the affirmative by the Secretary of the DENR in the decision dated April 3, 2004, when the DENR gave due course to his sales application over the subject land. We are, at this point, bound by this finding.

As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by the Office of the President, the Court of Appeals and, finally, the Court, per our Minute Resolution, dated October 11, 2006, in G.R. No. 173453. In our Resolution, we dismissed the petition for review on certiorari filed by the complainant after finding, among others, that no reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision. All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the burden rests on the complainant to present clear, convincing and satisfactory proof for the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers. The respondent generally is under no obligation to prove his/her defense, until the burden shifts to him/her because of what the complainant has proven. Where no case has in the first place been proven, nothing has to be rebutted in defense.