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GM PP Final Rev4-4

General Motors failed to recall over 10 million vehicles with a faulty ignition switch for over a decade, resulting in over 30 confirmed deaths. The failure was due to lack of communication within GM's organizational structure and a culture that prioritized cost over safety. Engineers first discovered the defect in 2001 but it took until 2014 for GM to initiate a recall. The report identifies failures of external agencies like NHTSA to catch the problem and makes recommendations to improve communication, define responsibilities clearly, and change GM's safety culture.

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113 views21 pages

GM PP Final Rev4-4

General Motors failed to recall over 10 million vehicles with a faulty ignition switch for over a decade, resulting in over 30 confirmed deaths. The failure was due to lack of communication within GM's organizational structure and a culture that prioritized cost over safety. Engineers first discovered the defect in 2001 but it took until 2014 for GM to initiate a recall. The report identifies failures of external agencies like NHTSA to catch the problem and makes recommendations to improve communication, define responsibilities clearly, and change GM's safety culture.

Uploaded by

api-268283462
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Download as PPTX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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GENERAL MOTORS:

A Failure Analysis Report of the Faulty Ignition Switch Recall


Group Three:
Shawn OGrady
Nicole Anderson
Amanda Slack
Edwin Siegner
Alex Karas

Introduction

General Motors failure to recall vehicles with faulty ignition switches within a
timely manner has resulted in thirteen fatalities and numerous crashes.
Lack of communication within GMs multi-level organizational structure is the
cause

The purpose is to identify how safety issues were communicated, to whom they
were directed, and how they were resolved
We analyzed past trends within GM culture from books; analyzed and compared
suggestions published in the Valkukas Report.

Important Numbers

30 confirmed deaths out of 196 claims


31 confirmed injuries out of 1,772 claims
Up to $600,000,000 set aside for settlement
10.6 Million vehicles recalled in this campaign

Timeline
2001 Ignition defect first detected by GM employees
2003 A service technician documents a repair to a stalling Saturn Ion
indicating that changing a key ring fixed the problem

2005 G.M. rejects a proposal to fix the problem due to time and cost
constraint

2005 A engineers recommendation to redesign the key head is rejected


2005 G.M. issues a service bulletin regarding the problem
2007 N.H.T.S.A. opens an investigation and closes it as being unfounded
2014 G.M. initiates the recall

Identified Shortcomings

Failed External Stopgaps

The T.R.E.A.D. Act


The National Highway Transportation and Safety Agency

T.R.E.A.D. Act
Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation
(TREAD) Act

Created in response to the Firestone Tire/Ford Explorer recall fiasco


Stipulated early warning reporting requirements
Introduced criminal penalty criteria
Failed because of too many loopholes

National Highway Transportation and Safety


Agency (NHTSA)
Sets safety and performance standards
Investigates safety defects
Decade of knowledge
Failed to be proactive and aggressive when enforcing the law
Failed to discover the seriousness of the flaw during their 2007 investigation
in this specific issue

Failure to Communicate
One persons failure to communicate
leads to catastrophic outcomes

A customer convenience problem.


Six years would pass
Top Executives were not made aware
Recall accounted for 35% of GMs
largest 5 recalls

Failure Due to Longstanding Culture

Mixed Messages

Cost is Everything
When safety is an issue, cost is irrelevant

Euphemisms replace words such as: safety, failure


Unspoken rule
GM Nod

Lack of Clear & Defined Responsibility


Engineers claimed they did not have all necessary information in order to
make the connection of the two failed systems being one problem

With multiple committees working as if they are independent and not linked
to the others, the unfortunate result is a lack of defined responsibility

The safety issues were transferred from one committee to the next
General Motors miscommunication comes from is its tall organizational
structure

Conclusion & Recommendations

Organizational Structure

Faster decision making will be


possible.
Employees on all levels will be
more empowered.
Clearer communication between
layers of management.
Effective coordination between
layers of management, internal
committees, etc.

Creating Clear and Defined Responsibility


Speak Up for Safety program

Employees stepping up

Improvements to program

Posters, newsletter, and bulletin


Recognition from top executives
Positive reinforcement

Changing the Culture and Personality of


General Motors
1. Culture focuses on communication.
2. Focusing on culture means focusing on daily routines.
3. Shifts attention to ignored issues.
4. Better understanding of management and leaders.
5. Identifying novel approaches for future.
6. Culture is pervasive.

Changing the Culture and


Personality of General Motors:
Steps Towards Realigning
Culture

Provide a Means for Shared Information


Database Implementation

Proper training for each


employee.

Accessibility extends to
everyone.

Internal and external


committees become a
partnership.

Provide a Means for Shared Information


Front Line Empowerment

Each employee is empowered


Timing out process
Positive Reinforcement

Lead By Example

Change Begins at the Top


Empower Employees
Changing Culture is Possible

Thank you for your time.


We look forward to working with you.

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