301 SCRA 298; G.R. NO.

12809620 JAN 1999]

LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts:
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime
syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery
andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and
petitioner-intervenors.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation
Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the
Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of
investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police
operation. However, a review board modified the panels finding and recommended the indictment
for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal,
and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman
filed amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an
accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that
under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the principal accused are government officals with
Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they
did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was
approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word principal from the
phrase principal accused in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which
provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun
as of the approval hereof.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners right to due process and the
equal protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the
Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.
(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.

(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was
committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination
whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayans or Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction.
RULING:
Petitioner and intervenors posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal
protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument
were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed
reasonable and the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. The
classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to
existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which
are present in this case.
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving certain public officials
and under the transitory provision in Section 7, to all cases pending in any court. Contrary to
petitioner and intervenors argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong
Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan
but also in any court.
There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive effect
of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in
character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish
penalties for their violations or those that define crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975,
as regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has
been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one which
prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer
justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as
unconstitutional.
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the
office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the
performance of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which
is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the
amended information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the
said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers.
Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated
the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge
set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is
alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not established.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense
charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.

Fukuzume vs People (2005) G.R. 143647

Facts:
Sometime in July 1991, Yu, a businessman engaged in buying and selling aluminum scrap wires,
accompanied by Jovate, went to the house of Fukuzume in Paraaque. Jovate introduced Fukuzume to
Yu telling the latter that Fukuzume is from Furukawa Electric Corporation and that he has at his
disposal aluminum scrap wires. Fukuzume confirmed this information and told Yu that the scrap wires
belong to Furukawa but they are under the care of NAPOCOR. Believing Fukuzumes representation to
be true, Yu agreed to buy the aluminum scrap wires from Fukuzume. This transaction later turned
uneventful as Fukuzume failed to comply his undertaking to return Yus money when Yu was refused by
NAPOCOR, thus, prompting Yu to file an estafa case.
Upon arraignment, Fukuzume pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued, finding the accused guilty as charged.
Aggrieved by the trial courts decision, he appealed to CA but CA affirmed the trial courts decision
modifying only the penalty, hence, the petition before the SC.
Issue: WON the trial court of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Held: SC answered on the negative. We agree with Fukuzumes contention that the CA erred in ruling
that the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged.
The CA ruled on the basis of the sworn statement of Yu filed with the NBI and the affidavit subscribed
by Fukuzume. With respect to the sworn statement of Yu, which was presented in evidence by the
prosecution, it is clear that he alleged that he gave Fukuzume the amount of P50,000.00 at the
Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However, we agree with Fukuzumes contention that Yu testified
during his direct examination that he gave the amount of P50,000.00 to Fukuzume in the latters
house. It is not disputed that Fukuzumes house is located in Paraaque.
Settled is the rule that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a
witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are
inferior to testimony given in court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes
inaccurate.
More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he gave
any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap
wires inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in Makati for
that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. Citing Uy vs. Court of
Appeals: However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere
else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside from the
sworn statement executed by Yu, the prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or
documentary, to corroborate Yus sworn statement or to prove that any of the above-enumerated
elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. From the foregoing, it is evident that the
prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the
essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court
convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without
prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent jurisdiction.