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210 views16 pagesUmut Ozkirimli - Theories of Nationalism A Critic
Theories of Nationalism
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© © All Rights Reserved
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/ 16
Also by Umut Ozkarimh
“Tormented by History: Nationalism in Grace and Trey (wth Spyoa A, Sos)
ry Debates on Nationalism: A Crial Engagement
im and ts Futures (eon)
Theories of
Nationalism
A Critical Introduction
Second Edition
Umut Ozkarimii
palgrave
macmillan ‘© unat Coit 2000,2010
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Contents
List of Boxes
Preface to the Second Faition
1. Introduction
‘Why nationalism?
Objectives
Seencture
2. Discourses and Debates on Nationalism
Historical overview
‘The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
1918-1945
1945-1989
From 1989 to the present
3. Primordialism
‘What is primordialism?
The nationalist ehesis
Pierre van den Berghe and the sociobiological approach
Eadward Shs, Clifford Geertz and the culturalist approach
‘Adrian Hastings and perennialista
A critique of primordialism
Primordialism today
4. Modernism
‘What is modernism?
Economic transformations
‘Tom Nairn and uneven development
Michael Hechter and internal colonialism
Political tsansformations
John Breuilly and nationalism as a form of polities
Paul R. Brass and instrumentalist
Eric J. Hobsbawm and the invention of tradition
Socialeultural teansformations
Emest Gellner and high cultures
Benedict Anderson and imagined communities
Miroslav Heoch and the three phases of nationalism vi Contents
A critique of modernism
‘Modernism today
5. Ethnosymbotism
‘What is ethnosymbolism?
John Armstrong and myth-symbol complexes
‘Anthony D. Smith and che ethnic origins of nations
A critique of ethnosymbolism
Ethnosymbolism today
6. New Approaches to Nationalism
‘Why ‘new’?
‘Michae! Billig and banal nationalism
Nira Yuval-Davis and feminist approaches
Partha Chatterjee and post-colonial theory
Craig Calhoun and nationalism as discursive formation
Rogers Brubaker and ethnicity without groups
A critique of new approaches
7. Understanding Nationalism
A crtigue of te theozetcal debate on nationalism
‘The outline ofa theoretical approach to nationalism
Nationalism studies today
Bibliography
Index
143
143
144
a48
157
165
169
169
170
175
182
187
190
194
199
199.
205
217
20
240
List of Boxes
241 Hans Koha.
2.2. BlieKedourie
3.1 Edward Shils
3.2. Piezre van den Berghe
3.3. Clifford Geertz
34 Adrian Hastings
4.1 Tom Naien
| 42 Michael Hechoer
43 John Breailly
44° Paul. Brass
| 4.5. Eric]. Hobsbawm
4.6 Exest Gellner
| 4.7 Benedict Anderson
j 4.8 Miroslav Hroch
| 5.1 John A. Armstrong
| 5.2 Anthony D. Smith
| 6.1 Michael Billig
| 6.2. Nira Yaval-Davis
' 6.3. Partha Chatterjee
| 64 Craig Calhoun
6.5 . Rogers Brubaker
36
43
50
33
56
59
”
8s
89
95
107
us
145
149
172
178
184
189
191 48. Theories of Nationalism
Durkheim, se Durkheim (1986 and 1995). Mitchel (1931), on the ater hand, is
‘quite dated, but stil useful, source m Duckheini’s views 60 nationalism. On
nationalism and he historians, see Suny (2001s) and Smith (1996). The famous
Jectire deliveted by Renan (1990) can be accessed in Bhebha (1990) and Woolf
1996).
‘Of the several generil historical sndies of nationalism produced in the fest
half ofthe swenieth century, Hayes (1931), Kohn (1958) and Care (1945) age still
relevant. In passing, ler as note that a'new edition of Kobm’s The Idea of
‘Nationalist (2005) is now available, with penetrating introduction by Calhoun,
‘On Kohn, the reader should also consul the biliant essay by Lisbich (2006).
summary of the historiographical debater isthe period can alse be found in
Lawrence (005),
of 18501 i 19605 ee St (198,
0968), reared by. nny a the acherpe of
Chapter 3
Primordialism
What is primordialism?
“Primordialism’ isan umbrella term used to describe the belief chat nationality
isa ‘natural pare of human beings, 28 natural as spech, sight or smell, and that
nations have existed from time immemorial. This i the view of nationalists
‘themselves, and was for some time the dominant paradigm among social scien
sist, notably the historians, Primordial also constcutes the laymen’ view of
nations and nationalism,
The term comes from the adjective ‘primordial’ which the Oxford English
Dictionary defines a8 ‘of, relating to, or existing from the very beginning of
time; calies in times primeval, primitive; (more generally) ancient, distant in
time and ‘that constirues the origin or starting point from which something
lees derived or developed, or on which something else depends; fandamental,
basig elemental” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2008). cis generally thought
‘that Edward Shils isthe firs vo have employed the term to describe relation-
ships within the family. In hs famous article, Primordial, Personal, Sacred and
‘Civil Ties’ Shils argues that the attachment family members feel foreach other
seems from ‘sgaiicant relational’ qualities which can only be described as
“primordial. Is not just function of interaction; itis because a certain ine
{able significance is attributed tothe te of blood? (1957: 142}. Shils notes thae
his conceptualization of primordial relations i influenced by several books on
the sociology of religion, notably by A. D. Nock’s Gorwersion and Martin P.
Nilsson’s Greek Popular Religion. ‘Is these books’ he writs, ‘the “coercive-
ss" ofthe primordial propetis of object, the ties of blood and of common
terstory was very strikingly portrayed? (ibd) Cliford Geertz uses a similar
definition inthe context of his discussion of socal and political stability in post-
colonial sates:
By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems fcom the ‘givens’ ~ os,
‘more precisely as culture is inevitably involved in such masters, the assumed
‘givens’ — of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection
‘mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a
particular religious community, speaking a pasticular language, or even a
dialect of a language, and following pacticular social practices. These
49 50. Theories of Nationalism
congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffa-
bie, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves. (1993:
259)
Like the other theoretical approaches we will zeview in the book, primordialists
do not form a monolithic category. It is possible to identify four different
versions of primordialism: the ‘nationalist, ‘sociobiological’, ‘culturaligt’ and
“perennialis? approaches. The common denominator of these approaches is
their belief inthe naturalness and/or antiquity of nations. Some commentators
prefer to distinguish between these two claims and treat those who believe in
the antiquity of nations, without holding thar they arein any way natural, as 2
separate category, calling them ‘perennialists’ (see Smith 1998a, 2000 or
BOX 3.1 Edward Shils
Born in 1910 in Philadelphia, Edward Shils was Distinguished Service Professor
in the Committee én Social Thought and in Sociology at the University of
CCicego, when he died in his Chicage home in 1995. Shils was best known for is
‘writings on tadiion and civil and for his work oa the role of intellectuals nd
ther relations to power and public policy. “F you wrote a dissertation under
Edward’, his longtime fiend Joseph Epstein reminisces, ‘you were sent to the
South af England, thence to Sumatra and back, bur when you were done, you,
really knew everything about your subject. Many a student must have lef his
apartment, hate weighted down with lst of another thirty omes he would have
to plough through and heid spinning feom having discovered that, to take the
‘next logical step in hie sudies, he would have ra learn Polish’ (1996: 388),
In ‘Primosial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties’, is major conteibusion 1 theo:
“etcal debates on nationalism, Shils wrote chat ‘modern society is n0 lonely
‘crowd, no horde of refuges flcing from freedom ee no Gesellschaft soulless,
‘egotistical, loveless, faithless, nrverly impersonal and lacking any integrative
{forces other than interest or coercion cis held together by an infinity of personal
attachments, moral obligations in eonertte contexts, professional and creative
ride, individoal ambition, prnioedial afte and a civil sense which slow in
‘many, high in some, and moderate ju mst persons’ (1957: 131) ‘These words
seflected Shill’s recurring concer for the societal zole of tradition. For him, ‘radi-
tion is not the dead hand of the past but rather the hand of the gardener, which
nourishes and elicits tendencies of judgement which would otherwise not be
stcong enough to emerge on thei own. Irestablshes contact berween the recip
ent and the sacred values of hs life a socicry. Man has anced fr being in right
relations with the sacred. A low level of intensity with intermittent surges servet
their needs. But should they be entirely deprived ofthat contact fr too long
tin, dir needs will Nace up into a passionate irationalty” ied in Dewey
1999: 75; ee also The University of Chicago Chronicle 1995 and Boyd 1998),
Primordialism $1
20012}. Iwill not follow this line of thinking in what follows, and treat peren-
nialism as simply a milder form of primordialism.
The nationalist thesis
For the nationalists, nationality isan inherent attribute of the human condition.
“Aman must have a nationality as he must have a nose and two cats’ (Geliner
1983: 6). The nationalists believe that humanity is divided inco dstinet, objec-
tively identifiable nations. Human beings can only fulfil themselves and floue-
ish if they belong co a national community, che membership of which overrides
all other forms of belonging, The nation is the sale depository of sovereignty
and the only source of political power and legitimacy. This comes with a host of
temporal and spatial claims ~ to a unique history and destiny, and a historic
homeland’
"The nationalist thesis is not the preserve of political elites only. It has also
shaped the developing fields of history, folklore and literature which acquired a
veritable nation-building mission in the course ofthe nineteenth century. As we
have already seen in Chapter 2, historians were influential figures in their
respective national movements, busy in excavating the ‘evidence’ that would
establish beyond doube the eternal character of their nation, The narratives they
produced had a number of zecurrent chemes, which we ean exemplify with the
help of Kedourie's Nationalism in Asia and Africa (1971), a collection of arti
cles by nationalist leaders and intellectuals in Asia and Africa. There is first the
theme of the antiquity ofthe (‘particular’) nation, Hence according to Tekin Alp
{Moise Cohen}, who was reporting the proceedings of the Turkish History
Congress of 1932, it was time:
to make the whole work, and to begin with the Turks themselves, under-
stand that Turkish history does not begin with Osman’s tribe, but infact
twelve thousand years before Jesus Christ. Is not the history ofa tribe of
four handzed tents, but that of a great nation, composed of hundreds of
millions of souls. The exploits of the Osman Tucks constitute merely one
episode inthe history ofthe Turkish nation which has founded several other
empires. (Kedousie 1971: 210]
Second, these isthe theme of golden age. For the Senegalese historian Cheikh
‘Anta Diop, the ‘modern pharoah’ of Aftican studies:
itwas firs the Ethiopians and then the Egyptians wino created and developed
oan extraordinary degree all the elements of civilization at atime when all
‘other peoples ~ and the Furasians in particular ~ were plunged into
barbarism ... Ie is impossible co exaggerate what the whole world ~ and in
particular the Hellenic woeld - owes to the Egyptian world. (Ibid: 275) 52. Theories of Nationalism
Primordialism 53
Third, theve is the theme of the superiority of the national culture. Choudhary
Rahmar Ali, the founder ofthe Pakistan national movement, claims that:
Pakistan is one of the most ancient and illustrious counties of the Orient.
‘Not only that. Ic is the only country in the woeld which, in the antiquity of
its legend and lore asin the character ofits history and hopes, compares with
Iraq and Egypt ~ the countries which are known as the cradle of the achieve-
ment of mankind ... Pakistan was the birthplace of human culture afd civi-
lization... ic isthe fist and the strongest citadel of Islam in the Continent of
Dinia and its Dependencies. (Ibid.: 245-6)
Fourth, there is the theme of periods of recess or ‘somnolence’ from which
the nation is destined ro ‘awaken’. This is what Adamancios Korais, the fore
‘most figure of the Neohellenic Enlightenment, has to say of the Greeks of his
time:
In the middle of the last century, the Greeks constituted a miserable nation
who suffered the most horrible oppression and experienced the nefarious
effects of a long period of slavery... Following these two developments [the
‘opening of new channels for trade and the military defeat of the Ovtomans]
the Greeks... raise their heads in proportion as their oppressors’ arrogance
bates ... This is the veritable period of Greek awakening ... For the first
time the nation surveys the hideous spectacle of its ignorance and tremblesin
measuring with the eye the distance separating it from its ancestors’ glory.
(bid: 183-4)
Finally, there isthe theme of the national hero, who comes and awakens the
nation, ending this accidental period of decadence:
He [Kemal Atatirk] could not rolecate therefore this false conception of
‘Turkish history which was current among some of the Turkish intellectuals
.. He has therefore taken it into his head to eliminate it by means of a revo~
futionary outburst which would subject it to the same fate as the other
‘misconceptions from which the Turkish people have suffered for centuries,
(Ibid: 211)
This brief foray inco the writings of nationalist elites shows that nationalists
share a common language, a common frame of reference co express their claims.
‘What remains constant and central in all these nazratives isthe belief in, and
representation of, the nation as a mystical, a-temporal, even transcendental
‘entity’ whose survival is more important than the survival of its individual
members at any given time.
Pierre van den Berghe and the sociobiological approach
“The sociobiological theory of ethnicity, race and nationalism’, writes van den
Berghe, the most outspoken proponent of this approach in the field of nation:
alism studies, “holds that eheze is indeed an objective, exceenal basis to the exis
tence of such groups’ without denying that chese groups are also socially
constructed and changeable. ‘In simplest terms, the sociobiological view of
these groupe is that chey are fundamentally defined by common descent and
maintained by endogamy. Ethnicity, Uhus, i simply Kinship writ large’ (2001b:
274; all references are to van den Berghe’s work in ths section unless otherwise
stated).
The basic question asked by sociobiology is: ‘why are animals social, chats,
why do they cooperate” (1978: 402). According to Piette van den Berghe, the
answer to this question was long intuitively known: ‘animals are social to the
BOX 3.2 Pierre van den Berghe
Emeritus Prfestor of Sociology ae the Univesity of Washington, Pierre van den
Berghe has published extensively inthe area of ethnic and race relations, includ-
ing The Ethnic Phenomenon (1981), probably the most elaboratestaement of his
sociobiological approach. “The genera failure of sociologists to understand,
such less accept, an evolutionary perspective on human behavior transcends
sere ignorance and ideological bias, although it incorporates @ good deal of
both’, he writes. Ttalso includes ageneralanthropoceacic discomfort with evoli-
tionary thinking... anda trained sociological incapacity to acept the fundainen-
tal canons of scientific theory construction: reductionism, individualism,
‘materialism and parsimony (van den Berghe 1290)
“Everything in my biography predestined me to become interested in ethnic rela-
sions says van den Berghe. ‘Born of a French mother and a Belgian father in the
then Belgian Congo, Iwas successively exposed to linguistic and cass conflicts in
bilingual Belgium, to Nexi occupation in Belgium and France, co a colonial stua-
tion inthe Congo, to American rae relations 2s an undergradnate at Stanford,
and then, as a traiaed anthropologist cum sociologist, to a succession of periods
of field work a situations of complex race and ethnic conflicts in Mexico, South
Atica, Guatemala, Kenya, Nigeria, and Peru, By the mid-1970' it was becoming
clear to me thatthe cltural deteminis, socal science paradiga, dominant for @
half century, was coming unseuck. began to look at ethnic (and ‘race’ relations
as Kinship relations writ large, and to like nepotism to che evolution of animal
‘ocialicy in gencal. Thus Larived ata model of gene-cultare co-evolution which
fooked at ethnic relations and ethnocentrism as the product of oth natural selec
tion and a aultplicity of culural factors n this, t00, my life history played a key
role: on my father’s side, Tam descended from three generations of physicians, and
‘my maternal grandfather, Maurice Cullry, was a distinguished French biologist”
{peetonal correspondence). 54° Theories of Nationalism
‘extent that cooperation is mutually beneficial’. What sociobiology does, van
den Berghe argues, isto supply the main genetic mechanism for animal sox
ity, namely ‘kin selection” co increase inclusive fitness. The concepe of ‘kin selec-
tion’ was frst developed by William Donald Hamilon in 1964, but remained
arcane to social scientists until the publication of Bdwasd Osborne Wilson's
Sociobiology: The New Syuhess (1978), and Richard Davtkins' The Ssh
Gene (1976) (2001a: 167) Ie basicaly implies th
an animal can duplicate its genes directly through its own reproduction, or
indirectly through the reproduction of relatives with which it shares specific
proportions of genes. Animals, therefore, can be expected to behave cooper
atively, and thereby enhance each other's fitness ro the extent that theyrare
sgenetically related. This is what is meant by kin selection. (1978: 402)
Van den Berghe claims that kin selection, or mating with relatives, is a powes-
ful cement of sociality in humans too. Infact, both ethnicity and race are exten-
sions of the idiom of kinship: ‘therefore, ethnic and race sentiments are to be
understood as an extended and attenuated form of kin selection’ (ibid.: 403). To
put it differently, ethnic groups, races and nations ‘are super-families of
(distant) relatives, real or putative, who tend to intermatry, and who are knit
together by vertical ties of descent reinforced by horizontal tes of marriage’
(2001b: 274). ‘That the extended kinship is sometimes putative rather than real
{snot important. Just as in the smaller kin units, the kinship is often real enough
“to become the basis of these poweeful sentiments we call nationalism, tibal-
ism, racism, and ethnocentrism’. If ehat isthe case, then how do we recognize
our ‘kin’? According to van den Berghe, ‘only a few of the world’s societies use
primarily morphological phenotypes to define themselves’, It follows that
cultural criteria of group membership are more salient than physical ones, ifthe
lavteris used acall. Ina way, chisis inevitable because neighbouring popslations
resemble each other in terms of their genetic composition. Eye colour in
Europe, van den Berghe notes, isa good case in point. The further north one
goes, the higher the proportion of lightly pigmented eyes. Yer, at no point in the
journey is there a noticeable discontinuity The criteria for identifying kinsmen,
fon the other hand, should discriminaté more reliably berween groups than
within groups. In other words, ‘the criterion chosen must show more inter:
‘group than intra-group variance’. Cultural criteria, like differences of accent,
body adornment and the like, meet this requirement far more reliably than
physical ones (1978: 404-7}. Language is particularly useful in this respect
because, van den Berghe maintains, ‘ethnic affiliation can be quickly ascer-
tained through speech and is not easily faked! (2001: 275).
‘Noting that kin selection does nor explain all of human sociality, van den
Berghe identifies two additional mechanisms: reciprocity and coercion.
“Reciprocity is cooperation for mutual benefit, and with expectation of return,
Primordialism $5
and it can operate between kin or between non-kin. Coercion is the use of force
{or one-sided benefir’. All human societies continue ro be organized on the basis
of all three principles of sociality. But, van den Berghe adds, ‘the larger and the
more complex a society becomes, the greater the importance of reciprocity”
(1978: 403). Moreover, while kin selection, real or putative, is more dominant
in intra-group relations, coercion becomes the rule in interethnic (or interracial)
relationships. Ethnic groups may occasionally eater into a symbiotic, mutually
beneficial relationship (reciprocity), but this is usually shore-lived: relations
between different groups are more often than not antagonistic (ibid.: 409)
‘Van den Berghe concedes that ethnic groups appear and disappear, coalesce
or break up. Bus, he hastens to add, all this construction, reconstruction and
deconstruction remains firmly anchored in the reality of ‘socially perceived,
biological descent’ (2001b: 274). This structure, ‘the biology of human mating
and reproduction’, is prior: ‘Ethnies have existed since the dawn of history"
(2005: 115), We may speak of nationalism, when 2 sense of belonging to an
ethnic i transformed into a demand for political autonomy or independence. A
nation, inthis sense, is simply 'a politically conscious ethnie’(2001b: 273),
Edward Shils, Clifford Geertz and the cuturalist approach
‘The culturaist approach is generally associated with the works of Edward Shils
and Clifford Geertz whose definitions of the ‘primordial’ we have alluded 10
above. In their oft-quoted 1993 article “The Povesty of Primordialism’, Eler
‘and Coughlan argue that the concept of primordialism used in the works of
‘these writers contains three main ideas:
1, Primordial identities or attachments are ‘given’, a priori, undesived, prior
to all experience and interaction ... Primordial attachments are ‘natural’,
even ‘spiritual’, rather than sociological. Primordial attachments have no
social source
2, Primordial sentiments are ‘ineffable’, overpowering, and coercive .. Ifan
individual is a member ofa group, he or she necessarily feels certain attach-
‘ments to chat group and its practices.
3. Primordialism is essentially a question of emotion and affect... These feel-
ings make primordialism more than a mere interest theory, and primordial
identities are qualitatively different from other kinds of identities. (1993
187)
Yer Eller and Coughlan do not stop there, and argue that this is indeed how
Shils and Geertz view ethnic and national ties. As several commentators have
noted, however, this isa gross misreading of these writers’ works. It is true that
Geert, for example, cites the congruities of blood, language, religion and
particular social practices among the objects of primordial attachments. But he $6 Theories of Nationalisns
Primordialism $7
never suggests that these objects are themselves ‘given’ or primordial; rathes,
they are ‘assumed? co be given by individuals:
One is bound to one’s kinsman, one’s neighbour, one’s fellow believer, ipso
facto; as the result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity,
‘common interest, or incurred obligation, but atleast in great part by virtue
cf some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the tie ise. The
general strength of such primordial bonds .. differ from person to person,
rom society to society, and from time to time. But for virtually every person,
in every society, at almost all times, some attachments seem 10 flow more
from a sense of natural .. affinity than from social interaction, (1993:
259-60, emphasis added) :
BOX 3.3 © Clifford Geertz
Born in 1926 in San Francisco, Clifford Geertz joined the Ansheepolony
DDepartnesta the Univers of Chcagp a 1960, thea beane the Ss profesor of
the newly establsed Schoo of Socal Sceaces athe Lstiutefor Advanced Study
in Princeton in 1970, whext he created 'a school of interpre socal science’
(Gander 1991: 610), an devoted himself alte research and writing el is
death in 2006, Veiously decribed ap ‘the becnown and most invent of
‘American sctheopologits of te pat several dacades’ Shwider 2007: 191] or ‘he.
foremost avizepoloit of fi'generaion' (White 2007. 11897), Gets wok
sien scl ees himanis ad his impact
was feltin areata diverse a politcal scenes philoscply wid fieraey etc Tie
| hss hs it lon of tas, The Ttereetation of Cex 1973), that
hipeerinpacin etl oni
(itis eimonc! Baking,
Riess,
oe cn
Se :
of anviempsical
‘case, Tam concerned with whats pei en acetate
a funeral means (Michelse’ 2002: 6) quips: "The elements of
‘ariel upton cameo Gad ee cat Gad en ca tt
‘we cant nd he? cen Shiveder 2007195; elo Scie: 1987).
Geertz’ language here is quite clear (see Box 3.3): the unaccountable absolute
import ‘attributed to’ the tic, attachments that ‘seem to’ flow, or earlier, the
‘assumed? givens of social existence. What attributes the quality of being ‘natu-
ral’, ‘ineffable’ and ‘overpowering’ to the ‘givens of social existence’ are the
perceptions of those who believe in them, not Geertz. In the words of Brubaker:
In most discussions, this crucial distinction between perceived ‘givens’ and
‘actual ‘givens’ is elided. Primordialists ace depicted as ‘analytical naturaliz=
crs’ rather than ‘analysts of naturalizers’. In fact, on the primordialist
account, it is participants, not the analysts, who are the real primordialsts,
tueating ethnicity as naturally given and immutable. (2004: 83),
“The same goes for ShilsFller and Coughlan infer fom Shils' 1957 essay thathe
believes in the sacredness of primordial attachments. The evidence, they
contend, is provided by his following assertion: ‘the primordial property
could have had sactedaess attributed to ie (Shils 1957: 142). Bu, lke Geer,
Shils does not attribute sacredness to these attachments; instead, he notes that
the attachment derives its strength from ‘a certain ineffable significance
attributed tothe tc of blood’ (Shils 1957: 142, emphasis added). Te needs tobe
pointed out a this poin that Eler and Coughlaa’s(mis)interpetation has in
fact peoved quite resilient Even as late as 2002, Leouss finds the labelling of
Shils and Geertz as ‘culeural peimordialis ‘quite inappropriate” given cha cis
Shils himself who coined the term ‘primordial’ and that ‘culture does not
“construct” these relationships but consecrate them by articulating, elaborat-
ingot iealising them’ (2002: 256), In fac, iis Anthony D. Smith who first
ised the term ‘cultural primordialist’ (simplified here as ‘culturalist’) in his
1998 sucvey of contemporary theories of nationalism. The passage is worth
«quoting in fll asi goes to the heart ofa serious confusion that continues to
surround the work of Shils and Geertz:
Neither Geertz nor Shils regarded primordial cies as purely matters of
emotion ... Nor did they regard primordiality as inhering in the objects
themselves, but only in the perceptions and emotions they engendered
This isthe language of pesception and belief, of the mental and emotional
world ofthe individuals concerned. Geertz is underlining the power of what
swe might term a ‘participants’ primordialism’s he is not saying thatthe world
is constituted by an objective primordial reality, only that many of us believe
in primordial objects and feel their power. (1998a: 157-8; see also Smith
2000: 215 200ta: 53-4; Fenton 2003: 82-3 and Tilley 1997)
In the light of this, the culturalst approach may be more properly described as
‘one that focuses on the cole of ‘perceptions’ in understanding ethnic and national
atsachments, of in the words of Geertz (1993: 5), on the webs of meaning spun 58 Theories of Nationalism
by the individuals themselves. As Tilley explains convincingly, Geertz is in fact
‘making use of the term “primordial” more in its sense of “fist in a series”
Jn order to highlight the ways in which foundation concepts provide the basis
for other ideas, values, customs or ideologies held by the individual’ (1997:
502; see also Horowitz 2002: 78).
Adrian Hastings and perennialism .
‘As Ihave alluded ro in the opening paragraphs of this chapter, some commen-
tators prefer to distinguish the view that nations have existed from the dawn of
history from other versions of primordialism. Smith introduces the term ‘peren-
nialism’ to refer to those who believe in the historical antiquity of the ‘natich’,
its immemorial and perennial character. The perennialists do not treat the
nation as.a“fact of nature’ but they seeit asa constancand fundamental feature
of human life throughout recorded history (1998a: 159). There are two
versions of perennialism, according to Smith. The fist, what he calls ‘continu-
‘ous perennialism’, sees the roots of modern nations stretching back several
centuries ~ even millennia in a few cases — into the distant past. This version
stresses ‘continuity’, pointing to cultural continuities and identities over long,
time spans, which link medieval or ancient nations to their modern counter
parts. The second version, ‘recurrent perennialism’, refers to those who regard
the nation as ‘a category of human association that can be found everywhere
‘throughout history’. Particular nations may come and go, but the nation itself
is ubiquitous and, as a form of association and collective identity, ‘recurrent?
(2000: 34-5; see also Smith 2001b: 243-4 and 2002: 12-14). According to
Smith, the lines separating these two versions are not cleat: Still, he continues,
recurrent perennialists, such as the medieval historians Adrian Hastings, John
Gillingham, Colette Beaune and Bernard Guenée, are more ‘careful? and
‘nuanced’ in their analyses than continuous perennialists. They argue that there
are sufficient documents and chronicles which prove the existence of ‘nations’
‘and ‘national sentiment’ in Western Europe from the later medieval epoch, but
not of ‘nationalism’ as an ideology (2002: 12; see also Box 3.4). We can better
understand the perennialist position by considering the writings of the lace
‘Adrian Hastings, probably the most commonly cited exponent of perennialise
views in nationalism studies,
“Hastings begins his analysis by defining ethnicity as ‘a group of people with
a shared cultural identity and spoken language’. The nation isa far more self
‘conscious community than ethnicity; formed from one or more ethnicities and
identified with a literature ofits own, “it possesses or claims the right o polit-
cal identity and autonomy as a people, tégether with the control of specific
territory’. Nationalism, on the other hand, can be defined in two ways. As a
political theory, it claims thar each nation should have its own state, and dates
only from the nineteenth century. In practice, howevee, it derives fom the belief
Primordialiom $9
that one’s own national tradition is particularly valuable and needs to be
Gefended atall costs through the establishment or expansion of ts own state. In
that ‘practical’ sense it existed as a powerful realty in some places long before
the nineteenth century (1997: 3-4), This is indeed Hastings’ central thesis:
modern nations can only grow out of certain ethnicities, under the impact of the
development ofa vernacular and the pressures of the state. I is true that every
ctnicity did not become a nation, but many have done so. The defining origin
of the nation, Hastings argues, like that of every other great reality of modern
‘Western experience, needs 10 he located in an age a good deal further back than
most modemist historians feel safe to handle, that of the shaping of medieval
society. Hastings contends thar ethnicities naturally turn into nations at the
point when their specific vernacular moves from an oral to written usage to the
BOX 3.4 Adrian Hastings
Born in 1923 in Kuala Lumpus, Malaya, theologian, church historian and priest
[Adtian Hastings steamy to prominence in 1973, when he exposed the massacre
by the Porcuguese army of around 400 peasants in a remote Mozambican village
called Wiryamu, His subsequent article in The Times and appearance at the
United Nations did much to precipitate the downfall ofthe Portuguese regime the
Sollowing yeat Hastings became a Profesor of Religious Studies at the University
of Zimbabvee in 1982, anda Profesor of Theology at Leeds University in 1985,
til his cevirement in 1994, The foremost expert oa Christianicy in Africa, he
died in Leeds in 2001. Hastngss main contribution to the cheoretical debate on
nationalism is The Construction of Natiouhood (1997), based on the Wiles
ered at The Queen's University of Belfast in 1996.
Leceazes he del
‘When I chose this subjece, wsites Hastings in che opening paragraphs of this
book, ‘thought that in developing my theme | would be able co begin by largely
adopting the viewpoint of rcene studies of nationalism and go on from there to
inset within it the somewhat neglected dimension of religion. In particular, 1
naturally intended to take asa stating point Eric Hobsbavem’s Wiles Lectures of
1985 on Nations and Nationalism since 1780 .. However I quickly realized that
iy own understanding of nationalism differed to0 profoundly from that of
[Hobsbawm co make this posible inthe way I bad hoped. Morcover the very
parameters he laid dovn forthe subject effectively ruled out two-thirds of what I
tvanted to discuss, Far from moving from Hobsbawm, I realized that the only
{Course open fo me was to attempt to deconstruct his central thesis in favour of a
‘very diferent one. fn consequence, the central topic of this book as become the
history of nations and nationalism in themselves... My discussion of the rla-
tionship of religion to nationalism has then had to be done within the course of a
larger historical reconstruction, and in the consciousness of speaking across the
frontline of an hstoriographical schism’ (Hastings 1997: 1-2; sex also Maxwell
2001; Gilford 2001). 60 Theories of Nationalism
‘extent that itis being regularly employed for the production ofa literature, and
particularly for the translation of the Bible (ibid: 11-12; see also 180-1),
In the light of the observations in Box 3.4, Hastings suggests that England
presents the prototype of both the nation and the nation-state in its fullest sense
Irs national development precedes every other:
Despite the, often exaggerated, counter-action of the Norman Conqugst, an
English nation-state survived 1066, grew fairly steadily in the strength ofits
national consciousness through the later twelfth and thicteenth centuries,
but emerged still more vociferously with its vernacular literary renaissance
and the pressures of the Hundred Years Wars by the end of the fourteenth,
Nevertheless the greatest intensity of its nationalist experience ... mast
undoubtedly be located in and after the late sixteenth century. (1997: 4-5)
‘The evidence for this can be found in the history of the word ‘nation’ itself.
After a brief excursas into various historical documents and chronicles,
Hastings concludes: “The frequency and consistency in usage of the word
[nation] from the early fourteenth century onward strongly suggest a basis in
experience: Englishmen felt themselves ro be a nation (ibid.: 15).
‘What makes the English case so important, on the other hand, is the role of
‘religion in the birth of English nationalism, and the precise impact of the latter
cn its neighbours and colonies. Religion is in fact an integral part of national=
isms ‘the Bible provided, for the Christian world at least, the original model of
the nation’, writes Hastings. Without it and its Christian interpretation, nations
and nationalism, as we know them, could have never existed (see Box 3.4)
A critique of primordialism
‘There are several problems with primordialist approaches. In what follows, I
will mainly focus on the general criticisms of primordialism, leaving the specific
charges brought against particular versions aside, in order to avoid ending up
with an exhaustive lst, These relate ro fous, closely related, aspects of primor:
dialist explanations: the nature of ethnic and national tes, the origins of ethnic
and national ties, the date of emergence of nations and the question of emotion
and affect. Since the problems are related, s0 too are the criticisms,
‘The nature of ethnic and national ties
One common denominator of the primordiliss, with the exception of cultural-
ists, is their tendency to take ethnic and national identities as given’, or as facts
‘of nature. They are transmitted from one generation tothe next with their ‘essen-
tial’ characteristics unchanged; they are thus fixed, or static, This view has been.
‘undermined in the last couple of decades by an ever-growing number of studies
Primordialism 61
which sues the scaly constted’ nature ofthc and atonal identi,
pointing tothe roe ofndvidual choles, racial deions, poll opportunity
acres and various contingencies in thi construction, Fa from ing fixed,
thor boundaries and contentsareconinwouly negotiated and redefined in cack
eration as group eat or adapt o changing ccumatances,
: This is the main thrust of the instrumentalist critique of primordialism.
According to Brass, one ofthe most vociferous advocates of instruenalxm,
primordial avachment are ceri variable (1991: 70-2 fr Bras own expla
Zason of natonalom se Chater), Takelanguas, or example: many people
Speak more than one language, dialect or code in mullingal society, and
tran ilterate peopl fa from being attached to ther mothe tongues, wil nt
tren know is name when asked. In some eases, members of diferent ethnic
roups wil howe o chang hr angeage n ode to provide tr oppor
Fe for thei cildren oro frente terehes futher rom oe cic
troupe, Finally many people never think about thi langsage a al, nor do
they stach ot any emotional significance, Reljons too have bee subject 0
tmany changes over the centuries Shifts in eelgoue practices brought about
Che the inlunce of religious reformers are common ostrenes in pe
tvodern moderniing, and even in posindotal oc ibid 71). As fr
lace of bit, ican be coneeded that one's homeland is important fr some
People but, Brass eras, many people have migrated by coie from tel
pare places and conskcable proportion ofthe have chosen o asl
Ino thinner society and have lot any eee ofidentfcstion with hei home-
lands. More important, «person's ateachment ro her region or bora
rarely becomes poltcallysguficant uns there is some degree of perceived
disrmanaton aint theron os people inthe larger soe Besides even
the fat of one’ place of bith ssbjet 20 vation since a region may be
defied i nny ways, When comes Kinship cosnetons, Brat lms that
‘te ange of pete hin relationships i stall foo salt be of poll
Siguicnce’ Pcie’ kin rdationshipe tay extend the ange ofthe groups,
burt the fact thatthe ave fctive presumes this variability by definition.
Moreove the meaning of sch fictive relationships will natrally vay from
person to etson sige he magined character of the atachment wil be dom
ant in thee relationships)
"The sme pine is made by Sith, an ethnoeymbolist (ce Chapter 5), who
argues thatehnc te like other sotal Bonds ae subject to economic soil
fe pola ores, and theeore fluctuate and change according to cru
Sane, mariage, migtons exteal congue and the mportaon of
labour have made it very nltely for may etic groupe to preserve "he
caleurel homegencty and pure “etence” posited by mos primordaliss
(1995:33),
Tne ler sn, van den Berghe cs tic blaming Yi onsuc-
oni for judging primordial approaches without realy understanding
Ee 62. Theories of Nationalism
them, According to him, the fact that ethnic and national actachments are based
in biology does not mean they are frozen or static. In fac, this flies in che face
‘of the theory of evolution, “Three or four generations of changing patterns of
‘exogamy or endogamy can profoundly alter ethnic boundaries ... create
entirely new ones’. In short, ‘ethnicity is both primordial and socially
constructed” (2005: 117). Yer van den Berghe never explains how thiscan beso,
‘or considers the implications of this for his sociabiological theory of eghniciry
‘which treats ethnic groups as ‘extended kin groups’. How is exozamy possible
if humans are biologically programmed to mate with relatives? Whar happens
to ‘vertical ties of descent’ if and when ethnic boundaries change? And if
extended kinship is completely fictive or ‘putative’ to use van den Berghe's
words, chen what remains of ‘biology"? A similar point is made by Smith in his
review of van den Berghe’s The Ethnic Phenomenon who points out that the
stress on cultural and environmental factors ‘that facilitate, promote, inhibit, or
‘modify these genetically dererminedl tendencies’ weaken the diect link between
sociobiological theory and the explanation of human behaviour (1983: 3673see
also Jenkins 1983; 430).
The origins of ei and national tes
If echnie and national artachments are ‘given’, then they are also ‘underived,
prior to all social interaction, and ‘ineffabe’, that is “incapable of being
expressed in words’ ~ thus unanalysable. This leads several commentators to
dismiss primordialism, especialy its navionalst and sociobiologcal versions, as
unscientific and teleological. Unscientific, because, as Eller and Coughlan
argue, primordiaism tends see the identification of primordial attachments
asthe succesful end of analysis (1993: 189). Teleological, because primordial-
ists teat the history of modern nations as an inexorable process which tends
towards a predetermined outcome ~ starting from thee radimentary beginnings
inthe ancicnt or medieval epochs o presenta nation-states (Smith 2000: 51).
AAs Horowitz nots, what is ineffable’ in evini and national attachinens is
lefe unexplained in these formulations. What is more, ‘there is no effort at
explaining how some afflicions become primordial, while other candidate
affiliations lose ou, oF wity ethnic boundaries setle where they do, including
some subgroups and excluding others’. At the end of the day, Horowitz
concludes, there i ttle in primorcilise explanations other chan an emphasis
co the intensity of ethnic afliations (2002: 74).
The same problemis underlined by Brass who argues that we cannot predict,
‘on the bass of attachments people have to their ethnic oF national identities
alone, either which groups will develop a successful nationalist movement or
the form this movement will assume. Brass cies che creations of Itael and
Pakistan as examples. A knowledge of orthodox Judaism or traditional Islam in
Inia, he argues, would have suggested thatthe least lily possibilities would
have been the rise of a Zionist movement othe movement forthe creation of
Primordialism 63
Pakistan since traditional religions authorities in both cases were opposed to a
secular stae (1991: 73).
This is the burden of nationalist narratives which embody, in Balibar’s
words, a double illusion:
I consis in believing that the generations which succeed one another over
centuries on an approximately stable territory, under an approximately
univocal designation, have handed down to each other an invariant
substance. And it consists in believing that the process of development from
which we select aspects retrospectively, s0 as to see ourselves as the culmina-
tion of chat process, was the only one possible, tha it represented a destiny.
(1990; 338)
But this ‘prehistory’ consists of a multiplicity of qualitatively distinct events,
none of which imply the subsequent nation, More importantly, these events do
rot belong to the history of one particular nation. ‘eis nota line of necessary
‘evolution buta series of conjunctural relations which has inscribed them after
the event to the prehistory of the nation form’ (ibid: 340),
Gellner approaches this problem in his own remarkable way. For him, the
fundamental question is: ‘do nations have navels? ~the analogy here is withthe
philosophical argument about the creation of mankind. If Adam was created by
God at a certain date, then he did not have a navel, because he did not go
through the process by which people acquire navels. The same goes with
nations, says Gellner. The ethnic, the cultural national community is rather like
the navel ‘Some nations have it and some don't and in any case it's inessential”
(1996; 367-70). He refers to the Estonians to illustrate his argument. The
Estonians, he contends, are a clear example of highly successfal navel-free
nationalisin:
Ac the beginning of che nineteenth century they didn’t even have a name for
themselves, They were just refereed to as people who lived on the land as
‘opposed to German or Swedish burghers and aristocrats and Russian admin-
istrators. They had no ethnonym. They were just a category without any
ethnic sel-consciousness, Since chen they've been brilliantly successful in
creating a vibrant culture .. I's a very vital and vibrant culture, but it was
cxeated by the kind of modernise process which I then generalise for nation-
alism and nations in general. (Ibid: 367-8)
‘This criticism is valid in the case of sociabiological explanations as well. These
accounts, based on such presumably “universal” factors as blood ties, kinship
relationships, are not able to explain why only a small propoction of ethnic
‘groups become aware of their common identity, while others disappear in the
‘mits of history. Ifwe accept chat ethnic groups are extensioas of the idiom of 64 Theories of Nationalism
Primordialism 65
kinship, chat is super-families, then this has to be valid in the case of al ethnic
‘groups. Bur as some scholars have underlined, for every successful nationalist
‘movement there are m unsuccessful ones (Gellner 1983: 44-5; Halliday 2000)
‘Why do some groups effectively establish their own political roof, while others
fail?
‘The date of emergence of nations
‘What primordial docs recognize, argues Gosby, sha, despite chahes in
their steuctural form, ‘there have always been primordial attachments’ (200
253), This isthe central idea behind perennialist interpretations which can be
considered asa milder version of primordialism, fr they reject the nationalist
belief in the ‘naturalness’ of nations, while retaining a belie in their antiquity.
According to Hastings, we can even talk about a ‘historiographical schism’
between modernist social scientists and medieval historians who reject the
“modemist’ orthodoxy (1997: 2; se also Box 3.4). Ths picture is noc entirely
accurate, however, since for every medieval historian who argues fo the antig-
uty of nations, there are others who emphasize their novel and constructed
nature All you need to do, says Breuilly in a recent intervention, iso find your
‘own pet medievalist (2005: 47).
Patrick J. Geary isa good example of a growing number of medieval histori-
ans who firmly reject the perennialist postion. For Geary, the congruence
beewecn early medieval (let alone ancient) and contemporary peoples isa myth.
We have difficulty in recognizing the differences between earlier ways of
perceiving group identities and more contemporary attitudes because ‘we are
‘rapped in the very historical process we are attempting to study’. What we see
inreality isthe long-term, discontinuous use of certain labels that we have come
to see as ‘ethnic’ (2002: 41, 155). Bar these names were less descriptions than
claims; the socal realities behind them underwent rapid and radical transfor-
sation in each case
‘Whatever a Goth was inthe third-century kingdom of Cniva, the realty of
Goth in sixteenth-centary Spain was far éifferont, in language, eligion,
political and social organization, even ancestry... With the constant shifting,
of allegiances, intermazriages, tcaniformations, and appropriations, i¢
appears that all that remained constant were names, and these were vessels,
that could hold differen contents a different times. (Ibid 118)
In fac, contrary 10 what Hastings and other pecenaaliss claim, names were
renewable resources; old names could be reclaimed, adapted to new circum
scances and used as rallying eres for neiv powers. ‘nd they could convince
people of continuity, even if radical discontinuity was the lived eeality ibid).
“The history ofthe nations that populated Europe, Geary concludes, begins in
the eighteenth century, notin the sixth. Given this, we should no take claims 0
continuity at their face value, The nationalist or perennialist conception of
history is statics it is che ‘very antithesis of history’:
‘The hiscory of European peoples in Late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages
isnot che story of a primordial moment but ofa continuous process. Its the
story of political appropriation and manipulation of inherited names ... leis
2 history of constant change, of radical discontinuities, and of politcal and
cculeural zigzags, masked by the repeated re-appropriation of old words t0
define new realities. (Ibid: 155-8)
As we will se in more detail in the next chapter this is also the main thesis of
modernist accounts which teat both the concepe of nation and the forms of
political units we now call nation-states as products of the last two hundeed
years. As Zubaida, for example, reminds us, many ofthe states and empires in
history ruled over diverse populations. Neither the state personnel, nor the
subject population were ethnically homogeneous, and the rulers moze often
than not had a different ethnicity than the population they ruled over.
Moreover, ‘shared ethnicity between ruler and ruled did not always constitute
rounds for favour oF mutual support’ (1978: 54). Ethnicity was not, and had
never been, the primary basis of densification forthe members of these muli-
national empites, Ethnic designations, although not devoid of reference to
linguistic groups or thnicicy, were faconsistently used and often had non-ethnic
‘connotations. For many, locality or religion remained a strong anchor of iden
sity until well ino the nineccenth century. Even then, ethnicity was one identity
‘among many, and certainly not the most important.
Breuilly expresses similar views with regard to the English case, Hastings’
prototypical nation. According to hit, ‘the continuity ofa term such as English
does not automatically mean a continuity i the meaning ofthe term’. Equally
importantly, ‘the existence of an institution does not automaticaly produce
some determinant, “matching” consciousnes’. The shire court, for example,
znay be rgarded as ‘national’ institution given its territorial reach and signi.
‘cance, bu that docs not showin itself, chat those who have used such cout,
‘thought of them as ‘national’ (2005: 22; forthe thesis ofthe histrical novelty
‘of the English nation se also Kumar 2003 and Colley 1992).
Yet it s not only the modernists who take issue with the perennilist posi-
tion. ‘sa sense of cultural and historical difference the same as “nationalism”?
asks Smith, whose reading of the modernist position is not at variance with that
of the perennialists. Or ‘can the perception of differences even in political
symbols like temple, tecrcory, and kingship be usefully termed nationalism’?
Smith's answer is ofcourse a flexible one, one tha calls for different concepts
of nationalism for diferent epochs and culture areas (2000: 49).
‘What complicates matters further in all these cases and ia general for any
attempt to sce whether there were nations and nationalism in antiquity is lack 66 Theories of Nationalism
‘of evidence, even from the small ruling stcata (Smith 2002). In the words of
Connor:
A key problem faced by scholars when dating the emergence of nations is
‘that national consciousness is a mass, not an elite phenomenon, and the
masses until quite recently isolated in rural pockets and being semi or totally
literate, were quite mute with regard ro their sense of group identiy(ies).
Scholars have been necessarily Iargely dependent upon the written word for
their evidence, yer has been the elites who have chronicled history. Seldom
have their generalities about national consciousness been applicable to the
masses .. (2004: 40-1),
| will retuen to this point lates, when I discuss the ethnosymbolist interpreta
tions of nations and nationalism. Suffice it to say at this point that the question
of ‘dating’ the origins of nations goes to the heart of the theoretical debate on
nationalism, and there are several scholars who question Connor's definition
of ‘nation’ as a mass phenomenon. Hastings himself rejects it, arguing that itis
rot necessary for a nation to exist that everyone within it should have full
consciousness that it exists; if many people beyond government circles or a
small ruling class consistently believe in it, then the nation does exist (1997:
26)
The question of emotion and affect
Primordialism is about emotions and affect. What the primordialsts offer,
argues Horowit, is‘an account ofthe thick nature of ethnic affiliations, based
as they are on community, even communion, at level that can only be justified
by myths of common ancestry and analogies of ethnicity to the family” (2002:
75), For some commentators, this is indeed the most important contribution of
pprimordialist approaches to our understanding of nations and nationalism. The
primordialsts have been able to focus our attention, writes Smith, ‘on the inte:
sity and passion that ethnicity and nationalism so often evoke, and which
_modernists [Whose alternative explanations we will se in the next chapter),
even when they condemn it, so often fail 10 address’ (2008: 10; see also Ichijo
and Uzelac 2005: 52}. 1
Biller and Coughlan, while recognizing the important role emotions play in
Jnuman social life, object to their mystification. They argue chat the mystica
tion of the primordial has led to a fallacy, namely the desocializing of the
phenomenon. It is suggested chat these emotional ties are not born in social
interaction, but are just there, Yimplicie in the elationship (kin or ethnic} itself.
According to Eller and Coughlan, the source ofthis fallacy ‘isthe faihure of soci-
ology and anthropology to deal intelligibly with emotion’ (1993: 1925 this is no
longer the case sce Chapters 6 and ? for examples of work focusing on nation:
alism and emotions from a ‘non-primordialist’ perspective)
Primordialism 67
‘The way out of this impasse lies in Geerte’s writings, ironically the main
target of Eller and Coughlan’s article. Drawing on Geertz, Tiley argues that
the ‘primordia!’ clements of culture ate not affect but the cognitive frame-
‘work which shapes and informs affect... Certain assumptions or knowledge
systems set the stage for affect, and to the extent that such knowledge
systems form a kind of cognitive substracum not only for affect but for most
‘conscious thought, they might be said to be ‘primordia. (1997: 503)
Primordialism today
In an overview of the contribution of primordialists to our understanding of
nationalism, Horowitz complains
‘The matter reached the point at which anyone wishing to make an argument
about the fluidity of identities or the rationality of pursuing a conllict has
half the argument made by citing the allegedly contrary view of unnamed,
benighted primordialists, So evocative is the epithet, there is reason to
suspect the primordialistsaze no longer much read. (2002: 73)
His words were echoing those of Brubaker who declaced in 1996 that primor-
Gialism is‘a long-dead horse that waiters on ethnicity and nationalism continue
to flog’. ‘No serious scholar today’, Brubaker wrote, ‘holds the view that is
routinely attributed to primordialists in straw-man setups, namely that nations
or ethnic groups are primordial, unchanging entities? (1996: 15). The recent
revival of primordialism showed that these words were somewhat premature
The lase decade has witnessed a proliferation of studies which resuscitated the
primordialist enterprise and presented a sanitized version of it as an alternative
to modernist explanations.
For the new primordialists, even perennialism is not enough. Hence Steven
Grosby, the most outspoken supporter of primordialism in the field of nation.
alism studies, accuses Hastings of ‘uncestain perennialism’, pointing to his
claim that Biblical Israel provided a model for later nations. ‘In so far as
Hastings recognized ancient israel to bea nation’, he maintains, ‘then the possi
bility of nationality as an historically perennial manifestation is open’ (2003:
10). According t0 Grosby, ‘evidence of humans forming large, territorially
distinct societies can be observed from ou first written records’ (2005a: 1). The
