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UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY

NO. 1099

The Capture of the USS Pueblo and Its

Effect on SIGINT Operations (8 CeO)

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 12-20-2006 pursuant to E.O. 12958, as amended. NOR 42507

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This monograph is a product of the National Security Agency history program. Its contents and conclusions are those of the author, based on original research, and do not necessarily represent the official views of the National Security Agency. Please address divergent opinion or additional detail to the Center for Cryptologic History (D9).

Contents of this publkation should not be reproduced or further disseminated outside the U.S. Intelligence Community without the permission of the Director, NSA. Inquiries about reproduction and dissemination should be directed to the Center for Cryptologic HIstory, National Security Agency, Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000, ATTN: D91.

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UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY

Special Series Crisis Collection Volume 7

The Capture of the USS Pueblo and Its Effect on SIGINT Operations (S-CCO)

Robert E. Newton

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 12-20-2006 pursuant to E.O. 12958, as amended. NOR 42507

CENTER FOR CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

1992

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Table of Contents

Page

Foreword v

Introduction 1

Chapter 1: The Political and Military Setting 3

Chapter 2: Ship Mission and Preparation 15

Chapter 3: The Patrol 45

Chapter 4: North Korean Attack and Seizure 51

Chapter 5: Indecision in Washington

and the Pacific 73

Chapter 6: Reaction -The Next Week 95

Chapter 7: North Korean Interrogation 113

Chapter 8: Return and Debriefing of the Pueblo Crew

131

Chapter 9: Post-Incident Reviews,

Damage Assessment, and Damage Control

143

Chapter 10: Conclusion 169

Appendix 177

Notes '" . . .. . .. 179

Bibliography 209

Index....................................................................... 221

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Foreword

The story of the Pueblo incident of 1968 is inherently a distasteful one for intelligence professionals, but the factors which make it unpleasant at the same time make it imperative reading. The lessons to be leamed from failed operations in general and this incident in particular are many and should be widely studied throughout the intelligence community so that we may prevent similar disasters from occurring in the future.

Indeed, as the present monograph makes clear, the components of the intelligence community conducted reviews, postmortems, and "lessons leamed" exercises of many types in the aftermath of the Pueblo incident and made numerous beneficial changes in the policy and procedure as a result.

What we must recognize, however, is that the lessons to be leamed go beyond the mechanical, Le., that intelligence officers must remain flexible in their thinking and skeptical in their approach to any problem. It is arguable that some of the fundamental problems in the case of the Pueblo were the great haste to get the operation under way and an unwillingness to challenge preconceived assumptions about the way operations should be conducted. This was compounded by a failure to communicate fully to all who needed to know about the operation - and by a failure to communicate candidly when problems or doubts appeared.

Mr. Robert Newton's monograph, The Capture of the USS Pueblo and Its Effect on SIGINT Operations, presents a thorough discussion of the incident, including the details of the ship's commissioning, its mission, the capture of ship and crew in waters adjacent to North Korea, official reactions in Washington and overseas, and the release of the crew. Mr. Newton also discusses the reaction of the cryptologic community and assesses carefully the serious damage done to the U.S. SIGINT effort by the North Korean capture of equipment, publications, and personnel.

This monograph makes an excellent companion piece to three other publications available from the Center for Cryptologic History. Background on surface collection may be found in George F. Howe, Technical Research Ships,1956-1969. The interested reader is encouraged to refer also to two volumes from the Special Series Crisis Collection: William D. Gerhard and

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Henry W. Millington, Attack on a BIGINT Collector, the USS Liberty (SCeO), andl I The Ngti()ll(1lSecurity Agency and the EC-121 Shootdown (S-CCO). Taken together with thiSmostreceAtP\l~lication, these monographs provide a stimulating discussion of the promises and manifest problems of mobile collection operations.

P.L. 86-36

Henry F. Schorreck NSA Historian

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Acknowledgments

There are a number of NSA people who participated in this work; all made a very substantial contribution to the final form of this history. Responsibility for the analysis, interpretation, and damage assessment, however, to include any errors, are mine.

First, the author wishes to acknowledge with gratitude the efforts of Henry Millington, a former historian here at NSA, who completed the painstaking tasks of initial research and drafting. His was a pioneer effort on this subject. My thanks also go to the members of the staff of the Center for Cryptologic History at NSA: to David Hatch, who reviewed the sequence of redrafts and made so many helpful suggestions during the course of research and writing; to the publications personnel, Barry Carleen, for his invaluable editorial review, andl Ifor her patience and understanding in handling an "avalanche" of changes in preparing this document for publication; to Henry Schorreck, the NSA Historian, for his encouragement and review of the manuscript; and finally, to David Gaddy, Chief, Center for Cryptologic History, for his critical review of the manuscript and for sharing his insight as chief of the cognizant NSA operations staff at the time of the Pueblo incident.

I also extend a sincere note of appreciation tol Ian. NSA

North Korean target analyst at the time of the incident, and to Benjamin Hoover of NSA's communications security office for their veryihelpful review and comments on the manuscript.

P.L. 86-36

ROBERT E. NEWTON April 1992

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Introduction

Few events in recent history have plagued the U.S. conscience more than the North Korean attack on and seizure of the United States SIGINT ship Pueblo in January 1968. It followed by less than a year a previous savage attack on a SIGINT collector by Israeli air and sea forces in the Mediterranean. Once again, a U.S. naval SIGINT collector had been caught without protection. For the U.S. public, unfamiliar at this time with SIGINT and all of its aspects, it was the seizure of one of its ships and the humiliation and frustration that came with it. For the U.S. Navy in particular, it was the realization that one of its ships had been fired upon and seized on the high seas for the first time in 160 years. Worse, not a shot had been fired in its defense at the time, nor was retaliation ever carried out in its aftermath. More significantly for those invol ved in the U.S. cryptologic effort, the loss that resulted from the subsequent compromise of classified material aboard the ship would dwarf anything in previous U.S. cryptologic history. It also gave the North Koreans and no doubt the Soviets a rare view of the complex technology behind U.S. cryptographic systems. Over the long term, the compromise would severely affect the U.S. SIGINT capability to exploit several major target areas for years to come.

This study describes the events leading up to the seizure of the ship on 23 January 1968. It relates how the United States was preoccupied with a war to the point wherein it complacently relied on international law to provide the only protection for a SIGINT collector. It describes a U.S. SIGINT ship whose captain and crew, split apart by personal differences, were poorly equipped and trained by the Navy and by the ship's captain in particular to handle the emergency that confronted them that day in the Sea of Japan. From the unique standpoint of SIGINT, this study presents an account of the mission of the ship and its seizure; the massive compromise of classified materials; the damage assessment following the debriefings of its crew members on their return from captivity a year later; and, finally, some of the actions taken by the target nations in the years after 1968 to deny the United States continued access to their communications.

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Chapter I

The Political and Military Setting

The North Korean attack upon and seizure of the USS Pueblo in the Sea of Japan in January 1968 shocked U.S. officials. The attention of the United States, both politically and militarily, was focused overwhelmingly on Southeast Asia and the Vietnam War. Since 1964, U.S. military planners and tacticians had committed increasing numbers of U.S. forces to the Vietnam struggle. By January 1968, several hundred thousand U.S. ground troops were fighting in South Vietnam, supported by U.S. Air Force tactical fighter and bomber aircraft. The U.S. Seventh Fleet was patrolling the Gulf of Tonkin to provide close-in naval artillery support, amphibious assaults, and air strikes from carrier-based planes. In brief, the principal goal of the United States was to find a political or military solution to the war in Vietnam.

Similarly, the priority activity at NSA was to support the U.S. military effort in Vietnam by keeping a close watch over indirect support rendered to the North Vietnamese from Soviet and/or Chinese Communist forces.

Active hostilities in this area were not considered imminent.

Nevertheless, the end of the Korean War and the subsequent Armistice Agreement of 1953 had not resolved the issues that divided North and South Korea and their respective allies. Bound to the Soviet Union (USSR) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) by military assistance treaties, North Korea looked to these countries for support. Although North Korea tried to steer a middle course in the Sino-Soviet dispute, from the mid-1960s it drew closer to the USSR for badly needed political and economic support, particularly after Soviet premier Alexej Kosygin visited Pyongyang in February 1965. South Korea continued to depend on its former Korean War allies, primarily the United States. Those sixteen nations, including the United States, had affirmed in 1953 that they would resist any renewed aggression against South Korea. 1

Despite the armistice agreement of July 1953, the United States had maintained about 80,000 U.S. troops in South Korea to counter any North Korean threat. These were in addition to several hundred thousand South Korean troops." General Charles H. Bonesteel III was the Commanding General,U.S. Army, Korea. He was also Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea,which included the U.S. Eighth Army. U.S. Naval Forces, Korea, and U.S. Air Forces, Korea. In this capacity, he was under the direct command of the Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral U.S.G. Sharp. General Bonesteel also served as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (UNC). In this latter capacity, Bonesteel also exercised operational control over Republic of Korea (ROK) forces."

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TENSIONS BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA

During the years following the Korean War, North Korean agents periodically infiltrated South Korea for the purpose of setting ambushes, laying mines, conducting raids near the Demilitarized Zone and engaging in other subversive activities. Such incidents increased in number and severity in the year or so before the Pueblo seizure. South Korea, the United Nations Command, and the U.S. government had all expressed concern over the increased North Korean violations of the armistice agreement. The United States and the UNC recorded 610 violations by North Korea in the thirteen months before the Pueblo incident, with over 200 North Korean infiltrators being killed. In contrast, only fifty such violations had occurred in all of 1966.4 Two days before the Pueblo incident, a band of thirty-one North Korean infiltrators attacked the presidential palace in Seoul in an attempt to assassinate the South Korean president.!

From North Korea's viewpoint, the provocations were all coming from South Korea, and North Korean statements before the Military Armistice Commission revealed particular sensitivity to intrusions into North Korean coastal waters. At various times between 1961 and 1967, North Korea complained to the commission about "infiltrating naval craft and armed espionage vessels" entering North Korea's coastal waters as well as "mobilized naval craft" intruding and attacking North Korean fisherman. These charges were often followed by threats of retaliation." On 19 January 1967, for example, a ROK naval patrol craft was controlling ROK fishing boats at a position five and one-half miles off the North Korean coast. North Korean shore batteries opened fire and sank the patrol craft four miles off the North Korean coast. The patrol craft did not violate a three-mile limit, although it was within the twelve-mile territorial limit claimed by North Korea." In general, there were a large number of intrusions by fishing vessels from both North and South Korea.

At a Military Armistice Commission meeting just three days before the Pueblo incident, North Korea summed up its grievances against the United Nations Command:

However, your side, far from stopping such criminal acts, has been running amuck to prepare another war of aggression in Korea, and perpetrating incessantly and continuously provocative acts of dispatching into our coastal waters spy boats disguised as fishing boats and villainous spies together with fleets of South Korean fishing boats.8

The North Korean charges and propaganda were so vociferous and in such great amounts that it was difficult to determine what the North Koreans considered important and to what they would react.

Thus, tensions that had existed between North and South Korea since the 1953 armistice were accelerated in the days preceding the Pueblo incident.

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NORTH KOREAN COMMUNICATIONS AND ORDER OF BATTLE

Naval headquarters at Pyongyang controlled three components on the east coast.

These were the First Naval Base at Wonsan, the Third Naval Base at Kimch'aek, and the Naval Academy at Najin. The composition of these components was as follows:

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UNIT VESSELS CLASSIFICATION
First Naval Base with four Komar-class missile boats, PT boats, minesweepers, and
squadrons 65 subchasers
Third Naval Base with
squadrons 42 Whiskey-class submarines; subchasers
Najin Naval Academy 45 Not positively identified Elements of the North Korean Air Force on the east coast consisted of the Second Fighter Division and the Air Force School. The disposition of these units in January 1968 was as follows:

KNOWN AIRFIELD
UNIT AIRCRAFT NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT LOCATION
TYPE
Second Division -- -- So'ndo'k
Twenty-sixth Regiment MiG 15/17 37 Wonsan
Fifty-eighth Regiment MiG 15/17 37 Wonsan
Fifty-eighth Regiment MiG 15/17 37 So'ndo'k
Air Force School MiG 15/17 63 Ch'o'ngin
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The cryptologic organizations on which the United States depended for intelligence about North Korea were to a large extent a legacy of the Korean War.

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The U.S. intelligence gap against North Korea was in the area of indications and warning information: U.S. intelligence users also lacked complete information on North Korean military and naval targets. It was believed that some of this information could be obtained by targeting those short-range communications that would be more accessible to a mobile platform stationed off the North Korean coast for extended periods.

In late 1967, NSA established its own analytic and reporting effort against North Korean communications. I

Although there were no plans to coordinate the two efforts in advance, the separate NSA analytic and reporting effort on the North Korean Navy occurred at the same time as the U.S. Navy's desire for an Auxiliary, General Environmental Research (AGER) collection effort against this target."

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE AGER PROGRAM

The U.S. naval collection effort focused on the Technical Research Ship Program.

Although the Naval Security Group (NAVSECGRU) and its predecessor organizations had placed communications support detachments aboard Navy ships from the First World War on, it was not until the mid-1950s that NSA and the U.S. Navy began arranging for the use of ships primarily for SIGINT collection. The first of these was a converted Libertytype cargo vessel, the USS Oxford, that was readied for operation in September 1961. In the following years, four more Liberty-type (Navy designation: Auxiliary General Technical Research or AGTR) and two Victory-type (Navy designation: TechnicalAuxiliary General or T-AG) cargo vessels underwent the same transformation to dedicated SIGINT platforms. Compared to ships of the Pueblo type (900 tons), these were relatively large ships at that time (11,000 to 12,000 tons for the AGTR and 5,000 to 6,000 tons for the T_AG.)23

In 1964 the interest of the Department of Defense (DoD) and, in particular, the Director for Defense Research and Engineering (DDR and E), Eugene Fubini, centered on the possibility of acquiring and testing smaller ships for SIGINT collection. He believed that if the Soviets could be so successful with such a program for so many years, the United States could do likewise. The ships would provide greater flexibility and be more responsive to intelligence requirements and, perhaps more importantly, would provide an attractive alternative to the large and expensive AGTRs and T-AGs. DoD and Navy

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USS Pueblo shown following its conversion to AGER, December 1967.

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interest focused on the use of trawler type hulls as a substitute. In addition to efficiency and economy, the Navy saw the proposed trawler program as a means of counterbalancing the Soviet intelligence collection trawler fleet, which at that time consisted of some fortyeight vessels on missions that provided surveillance of U.S. coastlines, overseas bases, and fleet operations. The U.S. Navy also wanted an inexpensive alternative to the practice of

equipping Navy combat and service-type ships for tactical surveillance patrols in areas of EO 1. 4. (c) intelligence interest. NSA viewed the program as a means of satisfying many intelligence requirements that were inadequately covered by existin~ pites

and other mobile collectors.P'

The difficulty was that the U.S. Navy did not at that time possess any oceangoing ships of the trawler type for purposes of conversion to SIGINT ships. If the United States was to have a SlGINT trawler program, it would mean an entirely new ship construction program. The cost of such a program would be far in excess of the cost of converting an existing ship type. The closest that the United States could come to approximating a ship the size of a trawler hull was that class of light cargo ship (Navy designation AKL) built for the U.S. Army for interisland transport in the Pacific during World War II. A number of these ships had been mothballed after the end of the war and were available for conversion. The first of these ships to undergo conversion was to be renamed the USS Banner, and work on the ship began at the Bremerton, Washington, naval shipyard in 1964.

With the problem of selection of a ship hull now solved, NSA and the Navy Department turned their attention to the matter of determining who was to control this SIGINT collection program. Although NSA and the Navy were not always in full agreement on the issue of controlling SIGINT ships' missions, NSA agreed rather reluctantly to a concept of operations by which Navy tasking of the converted AKL for direct support purposes would have priority over national SlGINT tasking by NSA. This agreement was in accordance with NSA's 1953 delegation of operational control of seaborne SIGINT platforms to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) when missions were of a direct support nature." NAVSECGRU elements would then exercise this control for the naval component commanders and assign SIGINT personnel to the ships. NSA would retain responsibility for the technical direction of the SlGINT functions being performed and ordinarily would discharge this responsibility through the Director, NAVSECGRU. In September 1967 Admiral John J. Hyland, CINCPACFLT, would provide command guidance along these lines to the SIGINT detachment aboard the Pueblo. Eventually, NSA and the Navy came to a working arrangement whereby the two alternated primary tasking for AGER operations, namely Mode 1 (Navy direction) and Mode 2 (NSA dtrectionl." At the time of the Pueblo's patrol, the ship was in Mode 1.

Intercept relating to a commander's information requirements in direct support of his mission took precedence, therefore, over collection tasks to satisfy information needs established in Washington. CINCPAC could then overrule Washington in such instances.

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Acting as picket ships to provide early warning for U.S. aircraft carriers in transit or for the U.S. fleet during exercises and operations, the direct support intercept activity

included th~ trheuprovision for EO 1. 4. (

direct support tasking of the small AGER ships by the Navy was in sharp contrast to the

SIGINT tasking of AGTR and T-AG ships, which operated under the operational and

technical control ofNSA.

The Banner, first of the small cargo ships to complete conversion and bearin the Navy designation AGER-l, was ready for SIGINT operations in October 1965.

In addition to the USS Banner, two other AGER vessels, the USS Pueblo (AGER-2) and the USS Palm Beach (AGER-3), would soon join the U.S. surface ship collection program.

In addition to differences in control and tasking, AGER vessels, because of their considerably smaller size, also differed from AGTR and T-AG ships in their capacity to accommodate SIGINT collection equipment and personnel. The AGERs had only five or six collection positions, i.e., about one-fourth that of the AGTRs; with only limited means for analytic processing tasks and for on-line communications. An AGER accommodated some thirty-three SIGINT specialists, again about one-fourth the detachment personnel strength of AGTR ships. Because of space and resource limitations, NAVSECGRU personnel aboard AGERs were limited in their analytic processing tasks; most intercepted communications were therefore forwarded to NSA for more detailed analysis. 29

There were, of course, distinct advantages for the employment of these smaller AGER vessels. The cost for converting them for SIGINT use was considerably less than that for the conversion of the larger ships. The AGER speed of 12-13 knots compared favorably with that of AGTR vessels such as the Oxford (11 knots), and it was faster than T-AG ships like the USNS Valdez (9 knots) and USNS Muller (10 knots). The improvement in speed, it was felt, would be especially useful in reacting to the movements of ships under U.S. surveillance during the fleet exercises of other nations.

In view of the potential of the AGERs, the NSA budget staff considered the need to develop some twenty-five AGER platforms, and after much deliberation by NSA and Navy

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SIGINT specialists, NSA indicated the need for fifteen such ships in its Combined Cryptologic Program (CCP) submission for fiscal years 1966-72.30 Even this number was not approved for the DoD budget - there would be only three AGERs, the Banner, the Pueblo, and the Palm Beach.

In brief, the number of SIGINT resources devoted to the Korean peninsula in the late 1960s had been considered inadequate by the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). Additional collection requirements for indications and warning information against North Korean targets were not being satisfied with existing resources. This was one of the reasons for the subsequent deployment of the USS Pueblo (and the USS Banner before it) to Korea.

Both NSA and the U.S. Navy planned for a modified A?~~pr()gram;TheDepartment of Defense believed that such platforms\iVolll4lJeasuitable response to the Soviet SIGINT

trawler collection prograID~TheAGERs could increase surveillance od I

I ~a.rid, as time permitted, would augment United Stat;! I

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available at a time of heightened tensions between North and South Korea caused by an increasing number of violations of the Armistice Agreement of 1953. Although North

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posed a considerable threat. For that reason, intelligence ~r~e~q~u'!':lr::-::e~m::=-e:-:n:;t:-:s""'7':o'::'r~i-::rID7.o:-:r=m:-a::-;t~ion on North Korean military installations, equipments, and

movements could not be overlooked. AGER collection efforts might help satisfy some of those intelligence needs.

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Chapter II

Ship Mission and Preparation

On 7 October 1965, Secretary of the Navy Paul H. Nitze expressed concern to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara about acquiring up-to-date intelligence on the operating capabilities, tactical doctrine, procedures, and state of training of the Soviet Navy. In order to accomplish this task, Nitze stated an immediate requirement for additional ship platforms of the AGER type. The USS Banner was already being outfitted as such, and Nitze stated, ..... the urgency of the program warrants two more ships with the minimum delay."! The following month, Nitze formally requested funds from the Department of Defense for two additional SIGINT ships to augment the USS Banner's surveillance and collection capability. At the same time, Nitze stated that, contingent upon approval of the funds, he would ask the Secretary of the Army to identify a good FS (Freight and Supply) class hull similar to the Banner for transfer to the Navy.2

Later in 1965, DoD did approve funding for two ships, the USS Pueblo and the USS Palm Beach, although not as much as originally requested. By December 1965, the Bureau of Ships was selecting hulls (one of which was being sought from the Army), determining a schedule of reactivation and conversion, and providing for installation of SIGINT gear at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Washington.

In response to the Bureau of Ships request, the U.S. Army transferred the small cargo ship that was to become the USS Pueblo to the Navy. Subsequently, the ship was brought to the naval shipyard at Bremerton in April 1966. This ship had been built in 1944 by the Kewayne Shipbuilding Company, Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin, and, as the FS-44 in the United States Army, transported supplies to islands in the South Pacific. Following ten years of active service, the Pueblo had been decommissioned in December 1954 at Clatskanie, Oregon. When it was reactivated and turned over to the Navy in 1966, the Pueblo was designated AKL-44, for light cargo ship, to await conversion to an AGER (Auxiliary, General Environmental Researchj.f

Although the Pueblo had arrived at Bremerton on 22 April 1966, actual refitting and installation of the SIGINT collection equipment could not begin until the start of the next fiscal year (1967) because offunding arrangements. The ship's conversion began promptly on 5 July 1966. Members of all trades besieged the Pueblo, sandblasting its hull, removing cargo winches and boom, testing engines and machinery, and examining every inch of cable.'

Rear Admiral Floyd B. Schultz, Commandant of the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, could not understand why Washington was making such a fuss about the Pueblo. He had been ordered not to make any announcement of the Pueblo's arrival or say anything that

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might attract attention to the ship. His job was to convert the ship without question. Yet he still had not received any specific set of plans for installing any new equipment." The sense of urgency for SIGINT ships expressed by Secretary Nitze during their funding approval process did not infect those entrusted with the ship's conversion since they were left with no knowledge of the ultimate mission.

As the Pueblo was being towed to Bremerton for conversion, the Director of NSA, Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter, USA, gave initial concurrence in what was known as the Phase II Trawler program, i.e., the conversion of USS Pueblo and the USS Palm Beach. (Phase I had been the refitting of the USS Banner.) In responding to the Navy's Phase II Trawler proposal, Carter mentioned major equipment for selected position capabilities, although no specific antennas or antenna systems were mentioned. At the working level, there was consensus between the Naval Ships System Command (NAVSHIPSYSCOM), the Director, Naval Security Group, and NSA (K3) that the existing ship, USS Banner, would be used as a "model" with certain im rovements to overcome deficiencies in ELINT capability

In August 1966, DoD imposed a limit of 1.5 million dollars for SIGINT equipment to be installed on the Pueblo. Because the NAVSHIPSYSCOM was the procurement office for any NAVSECGRU program, it convened a meeting at the Main Navy Building to discuss the development, design, and procurement relevant to the Phase II trawler configuration. Representatives from NAVSECGRU and NSA's collection office (K321) attended this meeting, in addition to the NAVSHIPSYSCOM personnel. Daniel Preece, Systems Command project officer, revealed that the ship'S hull work was to be completed by 1 January 1967 so that the SIGINT installation contractor could begin work on that date; this contractor was to be Ling-Tempeo-Vought (LTV) of Greenville, Texas. This choice, on a noncompetitive bid, was made because of LTV's assumed capability and experience gained as the installation contractors for the USS Banner. Initial cost estimates for installation were approximately $700,000, leaving $800,000 for equipment procurement; all equipment was to be procured by the government, to avoid higher contractor costs in procurement actions. Preece stated that new commercial components or equipment would be obtained by the Navy Shipyard Supply Procurement Office at Bremerton. Any equipment that could be provided by participating agencies was also requested. It was also agreed that special items procurable only from NSA would be handled by Systems Command in the Office of the Chief of Naval Materiel. Antenna systems were discussed, and there was general agreement that the USS Banner system would be incorporated, with some additions."

At a meeting on 28 September 1966, representatives of NAVSHIPSYSCOM, NAVSECGRU, and NSA (K321) held further discussions on the antenna system design. The representatives agreed that the Pueblo would be configured like the USS Banner and

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that the antennas would be placed toward the bow to minimize possible interference from the transmitting antennas located aft of the main mast. All antennas were to be standard U.S. Navy shipboard types or commercially available ones as specified by the NSA representative. The precise location of specific antennas was left to the Systems Command and contractor personnel. Antenna locations would depend on hull restrictions."

SELECTION OF CREW

Once the conversion of the Pueblo's hull was well under way, the Navy Department turned to the selection of personnel to man the Pueblo, both general service and Naval Security Group personnel. The Navy made the first of these selections in December 1966 when Lieutenant Commander Lloyd Mark Bucher was chosen to be the Pueblo's commanding officer. Following his commissioning as a reserve officer in 1953, Bucher had attended the Combat Information Center (CIC) School in Glenview, Illinois, and from there reported aboard the USS Mount McKinley, an amphibious force flagship. Early in 1955, Bucher's request to attend the U.S. Naval Submarine School in New London, Connecticut, was approved, and upon graduation in December he was assigned to the submarine USS Besugo as the supply, communications, and weapons officer plus a short tour as engineering officer. When the Besugo was decommissioned in February 1958, Bucher was assigned to another diesel submarine, the USS Caiman, as operations officer and navigator. His tour on the Caiman was brief, and in July 1959 he reported to Long Beach, California, as assistant plans officer for logistics on the staff of the Commander, Mine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Two years later, in the summer of 1961, Bucher received orders to another submarine, a diesel-powered Guppy-2A-class boat named USS Ronquil and for the next three years remained aboard, rising from third officer to navigator and executive officer. In July 1964, Bucher joined the staff of Commander, Submarine Flotilla Seven, in Yokosuka, Japan, as assistant operations officer. 9

Being named captain of the AKL-44 was distasteful to Bucher. According to him such orders "meant that I had been 'surfaced' out of the submarine service, a polite term for submariners who are transferred to other duties because they have reached the limits of usefulness and no longer have good prospects to command a boat of their own. The orders came as a painful turning point in my career. For eleven years my life had been dedicated to seagoing experience aboard submarines, and my goal had been to command one ... the new orders dashed the last of my hopes to remain in the submarine service .. " Instead I was to become involved with a mysterious operation about which I had some knowledge through my work at Submarine Flotilla Seven, but without having developed any particular admiration for the way it was being handled. It seemed in no way a happy exchange.t''"

The officer selected to be in charge of Pueblo's NA VSECGRU detachment was Lieutenant Stephen R. Harris. He had received a Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps

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(NROTC) commission upon his graduation from Harvard in 1960. His first assignment was as a communications officer aboard the destroyer tender USS Grand Canyon based at Newport. In April 1962, Harris was transferred to the destroyer USS Forest Sherman, again as communications officer. After twenty months of such duty, he requested and was granted a transfer to the Defense Language Institute, East Coast Branch; he reported there in January 1964 and studied Russian for the next nine months. Upon graduation, Harris was assigned to the NAVSECGRU staff at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, and occasionally served as officer in charge (OIC) of various Naval Security Group detachments afloat. In addition to hisprirn~ry dutyas()I?oft~el'u:eblo's~eta.c}lrnellt

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Personality differences and the command arrangement aboard the Pueblo were to be the cause of constant friction between the ship's captain and the OIC of the SIGINT detachrnent.P Commander Bucher and Lieutenant Harris had met in early January 1967 when Bucher was visiting NAVSECGRU headquarters in Washington, D.C., for briefings on the Pueblo's mission, tasking, and deployment." It was there that Captain (later Rear Admiral) Ralph E. Cook had assured Bucher that the N A VSECGRU component aboard the Pueblo would constitute a department instead of a detachment, Le., the NAVSECGRU personnel would be under the total command and control of the ship's captain. Later, however, Bucher learned that Admiral John J. Hyland, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, had convinced Washington that the NAVSECGRU elements should be considered a detachment under his direct operational control with Director, NAVSECGRU, Pacific, responsible to him for the detachment's use, operation, and administration. Such a shipboard command relationship was a constant irritant to Bucher in organizing the ship's activities. To set up damage control teams or fire fighting parties and to establish watch schedules, for example, Bucher had to request assistance from Lieutenant Harrts." Bucher was used to giving orders rather than requesting help. In addition, as detachment commander, Harris had the authority to communicate directly with NAVSECGRU, Pacific, concerning his operations without such messages being released by Bucher. This, too, grated against Bucher's concept of command and increased friction between him and Harris."

Lieutenant Edward R. Murphy was selected to be Pueblo's executive officer.

Commissioned in March 1961 as a graduate of Naval Officers' School, Newport, Rhode Island, Murphy was assigned to a fleet oiler, the USS Guadelupe, as communications officer. In September 1962, he was transferred for one year to the Naval Station, Subic Bay, Philippines, followed by a short period of sea duty aboard the destroyer USS Twining, where Murphy served as ship's secretary and qualified as officer-of-the-deck (OOD) (fleet steaming). In April 1964 Murphy was sent to the U.S. Naval Destroyer School, Newport. Upon graduation, he was assigned as head of the navigation department aboard the guided missile destroyer USS Robinson. Murphy's next assignment came in June 1965 when he

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was ordered to the naval facility, Centerville Beach, Ferndale, California, as assistant operations officer after a six-week training course at Fleet Sonar School, Key West, Florida. From Centerville, Murphy was ordered to the Pueblo. 16

Personality clashes also occurred between Murphy and Bucher from the moment of Murphy's arrival. At the officer's club bar one evening, Bucher recalls "Our little wardroom group kept wondering how a stiffly proper officer [Murphy] who neither smoked tobacco, drank beer or liquor, or even indulged in the stimulant of strong navy coffee, could ever fit into our freewheeling, informal ways of work and play. On such a small ship as the Pueblo, with many different personalities and talents forced to live close together, compatibility was as important as competence; pristine perfection was as unwelcome as sloppy dereliction." 17

From Murphy's point of view, Bucher was far too informal as a commanding officer, both in his dress and personal mannerisms; he did not act as Murphy felt a commanding officer should. He expected Bucher to run a tight ship but noted that he played favorites with men who saw only his point of view. As a result of these differences, communications soon broke down between the commanding officer and his executive officer. 18 In the coming weeks, these personality clashes between Bucher and Murphy would adversely affect the other members of the crew and the operation of the ship. It was not long before Bucher began to ignore his executive officer and went to his operations officer, Schumacher, when something needed to be done.

Commander Bucher's operations officer, Lieutenant Junior Grade Frederick C.

Schumacher, Jr., reported aboard during the period of the Pueblo's sea trials off San Diego. Commissioned in March 1967, Schumacher had been sent directly into Communications School, Newport. Following that seven-week course, he was assigned as communications officer aboard a refrigerated stores ship, the USS Vega. In September 1967, Schumacher had been detached from the Vega and ordered to the Pueblo as operations officer and first lieutenant. Like Ensign Harris, Schumacher had no Special Intelligence clearance when he reported aboard and did not receive it until about two weeks before the Pueblo departed on its fateful mission." Bucher reported his reaction to Schumacher's arrival: "I could feel that he was going to do a good job for me and immediately began to depend a great deal on him. He was a crackerjack officer and he was ready to go; he was totally prepared mentally and I thought he had a terrific attitude.t'"

Bucher was also pleased to find that a very capable engineering officer, Chief Warrant Officer Gene Howard Lacy, had been selected for his ship. Commissioned as a warrant officer in 1959, Lacy attended engineering officers' school in San Diego and was then assigned as main propulsion assistant on the attack transport USS Okanogan until June 1963. His next tour of duty was aboard the icebreaker USS Burton Island, again as main propulsion assistant. In December, Lacy was ordered to the Pueblo and reported aboard on 4 January 1967. In addition to his normal engineering duties, Lacy also acted as ship's

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supply officer until the arrival of Ensign Timothy L. Harris, the last of the Pueblo's complement of six officers. 21

Commissioned in April 1967, Harris had dropped out of flight school and was then sent to San Diego for crash courses in store keeping, registered publications, cryptology, and emergency ship handling. He had never had any sea duty and when he reported to the Pueblo, he lacked a Special Intelligence clearance; in fact, that clearance was not received until one week before the Pueblo set out on its operational mission.

The enlisted crewmen on board the Pueblo comprised general service personnel (who would man the ship) and communications technicians (who would conduct the SIGINT operations in the Special Operations Department or SOD hut spaces.) Two of Commander Bucher's key enlisted personnel were Quartermaster First Class Charles Benton Law, operations chief petty officer and assistant navigator, and Chief Engineman Monroe Orel Goldman, who had enlisted in 1950 and was to serve later as the Pueblo's chief master-atarms. Most of the general service crewmen were assigned to the Pueblo prior to the communications technicians (CTs). Approximately forty-four percent of the general service crew had never had sea duty.

Of the twenty-nine enlisted men assigned to the Pueblo's Naval Security Group detachment, only two had had any sea duty. While the Pueblo was being refitted, the communications technicians had little to do and no opportunity to gain any training in their individual specialties.

SHIPYARD DELAYS AND SECURITY PROBLEMS

On 29 January 1967, when Bucher took command of USS Pueblo at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, he was dismayed at the slow rate of conversion. Bucher had been led to believe that Pueblo would be on its way to Japan in April; now he realized that the conversion task would not be finished until July. To Bucher, it seemed that there should have been "a little closer rapport between the shipyard people, the Bureau of Ships people, the Naval Security Group people, and the OPNAV people.,,22

Meanwhile, the Naval Ship Systems Command was also having problems. Plans for the hull conversion had been drawn up based on the configuration of the USS Palm Beach with the assumption that the USS Pueblo was an identical ship, Many man-hours were wasted before it was discovered that the two hulls were different."

During the Pueblo's conversion, the ship was assigned to the commander, Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and the only person on that staff who was cleared for Pueblo's operations was the admiral himself. Because of this security blanket, the Pueblo, as a matter of routine, was continually receiving supplies for a bona fide AKL-type cargo ship. Many of these supplies were inappropriate for an intelligence collection vessel. 24

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EUNT collection equipment in the SOD hut, USS Pueblo,

Within the research spaces, the LTV contractors busily worked away installing the elaborate electronic gear that was to be the heart of the Pueblo's operational body. It included equipment for the intercept and recording of ELINT, manual Morse,

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receivers and recorders. In all, the Pueblo was EO 1.4. ( )

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well fitted to intercept the signals it would encounter on its voyage."

The principal NA VSECGRU detachment member working with the contractors was Senior Chief Communications Technician Ralph D. Bouden. This was his first sea duty assignment, and he wanted the equipment installed accurately. As the work progressed, however, Chief Bouden realized that gross mistakes were being made; gear that would be seldom used had been accessibly installed at eye level while that which would be used constantly had been put out of reach near the overhead or down on the deck. When the LTV contractors were asked how this had happened, they told Bucher that everything had been installed the way the company drafting department had laid it out, that every sheet of the plans had been approved by the Navy. To correct the situation would require an additional six to ten weeks' work and would delay the Pueblo's sea trials until late July. 26

To Bucher, the Pueblo's internal communications system was especially frustrating.

He had a general announcement system, a loud speaker microphone (LMC) that was adequate except that there was no speaker in the research detachment spaces. The only additional communications facility was a sound-powered secure phone from the research space to either the captain's cabin or the signal bridge; a switch at each station was used to select the called party. In Bucher's words, "We were not prepared to get information back and forth as quickly as I needed to in a battle-type situation ... I didn't have a ship control system, no sound-powered ship control system of any kind. I relied entirely on a voice tube (which, by the way, I had to fight like hell to get) just to talk to the helmsman ... I was authorized to put in these extra sound-powered telephones using ship's company [but] ... I had one Interior Communications Electrician aboard ... and it would have taken him three years to install the system .... 27

BUCHER'S CONCERN WITH LACK OF DESTRUCTION SYSTEMS

At Bremerton, Bucher was also concerned about the lack of any type of emergency destruction system aboard the Pueblo. He was well a ware of the vast amount of equipment and documentation located within the Special Operations Department hut and wanted some means of destroying it rapidly should the need ever arise. Bucher voiced his concern both orally and in writing but without success. In his debriefing, he said: "The rationale that was used in refusing my request was that the Army said that it would cost too much money. The Army apparently had done things of this nature; the Navy not so much. And so the Army was approached on this subject."28

From having read the operational reports and recommendations of the USS Banner, Bucher formed a number of opinions as to how the Pueblo should be fitted out. However, in his words, "I did not voice all of these opinions because this was my first command and I was not going to place myself in a position of trying to tell somebody how to run, how to fix

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a ship, when this was my first ship. I didn't feel that it was my place at the time, without having any experience at all to strongly criticize things that were being done, although I privately did so to ship superintendents and to one or two of my own officers. ,,29

Finally, toward the end of August 1967, the reconfiguration of the Pueblo was completed to the point that the ship was readied for tests by the Board of Inspection and Survey. For three days, a team of nine officers from the board's office in San Francisco inspected the ship thoroughly, examining the engine room, machinery, hull structure, habitability, electronics capabilities - even the ship's medical facilities. In a forty-two page report, the inspection team cited 462 separate deficiencies and stated that 77 of them must be corrected before the Pueblo left Bremerton;" The board's report received prompt action. Shipyard workers corrected most of the critical deficiencies, and on 11 September the Pueblo steamed out of Bremerton en route to San Diego for shakedown training.

To break the long trip, Bucher arranged a three-day call in San Francisco, and on 15 September the Pueblo tied up at the docks of Treasure Island Naval Base. For Bucher, the stop was especially rewarding. While there, he learned that he had been selected for promotion to full commander, as had the captains of the other AGERs, Banner and Palm Beach:"

Reaching San Diego on 22 September, the Pueblo was berthed at the Navy's antisubmarine school's docks and came under the jurisdiction of the Training Command, Pacific, for a period of refresher and predeployment training. Once again, Bucher encountered the frustration resulting from secrecy about the Pueblo's purpose. The Training Command had received information that the Pueblo was an AKL and prepared its training plan based on that type of ship. Although portions of this training were completely inappropriate for an intelligence collector, for example, cargo transfer at sea, Bucher believed that other parts of the training did benefit the crew. These were in such areas as familiarity with the operation of the ship at sea, working the ship's equipment, and working out watch sections"

While the underway training was in progress, and because there would be no electronic training for the CTs, Lieutenant Harris, with Bucher's approval, traveled to Washington, D.C., for about two weeks of briefings by NAVSECGRU and NSA about possible missions for the Puebloi"

Upon the conclusion of the training program, the Pueblo was given another inspection by Commander, Service Group One, also located in San Diego. Lieutenant Junior Grade Schumacher wrote of that inspection: "The inspecting team that came aboard found that many questions on their list did not apply or could not be answered by Pueblo officers for security reasons. Frustrated, they gave up and declared us ready - for sornething.v"

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PUEBW HEADS FOR THE PACIFIC

On 6 November 1967, the Pueblo departed San Diego and headed for Hawaii.

Although Pueblo's home port was to be Yokosuka, it had to travel to Hawaii because its fuel capacity was insufficient for a direct nonstop crossing to Japan. Looking back at that time, Bucher believed that the Pueblo and its crew were ready to go to sea but did not feel that ship and crew were prepared to go out on a specific mission and perform well."

During the eight-day voyage to Hawaii, the CTs in the SOD hut had little to do except to copy weather broadcasts and to try to familiarize themselves with the new equipment." Some of the equipment broke down, however, and because of the lack of spare parts, could not be repaired until the Pueblo reached Hawaii." The Pueblo's most serious mechanical problem continued to be its steering system: sixty malfunctions in the transit." Upon arrival at Pearl Harbor, the ship repair facility immediately began to fix the ship's faulty steering mechanism, a task requiring two days.

While his ship was being repaired, replenished, and refueled, Commander Bucher visited the Pacific Fleet staff. Here Lieutenant Commander Ervin R. Easton apprised him that the Pueblo would probably be conducting its first operations off the coast of North Korea in the Sea of Japan. Bucher recalls, "He [Easton] gave me a rundown on what to expect - which he said would probably not be very much. He said that we had been given this assignment first of all to give us a chance to shake ourselves down ... to let us get our sea legs, so to speak, and work out some of the bugs.?" When Bucher asked what would happen if he were attacked, Easton referred him to Captain Charles R. Cassel, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Pacific Fleet.'? According to Bucher, "this captain told me if you are attacked, there's absolutely nothing we can do about it at the time. There is no way that we can react fast enough. All the planes and so forth that our Fifth Air Force, the Thirteenth Air Force, and the people in Korea, the Air Force people are committed ... and can't be used in a situation like this.?"

On the afternoon of 18 November 1967, with its steering engine supposedly repaired, the Pueblo slipped out of Pearl Harbor to begin the long journey to its home port of Yokosuka, Japan. As the Pueblo proceeded northwesterly, the temperature began to fall and the weather turned foul. Conning the ship from the flying bridge was chilling duty as the heavy seas pitched the Pueblo about. At times the ship experienced fifty degree rolls. In the research spaces, it was almost impossible to operate with any efficiency. Upright chairs had to be tied down by nylon straps through rings in the deck plates and even then it was not unusual for a man to be thrown over backward when a severe roll hit. Locks on the equipment racks kept breaking and units slid out, yet the Pueblo rode out the weather and proved that it could survive, albeit barely."

On 13 December 1967, thirteen days out of Pearl Harbor, the Pueblo sailed into the shelter of Tokyo Bay and headed for a berth in Y okosuka. At this point the steering engine, which had performed erratically since leaving Pearl Harbor, failed completely,

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and, to avoid damage to the ship while docking, the ship made a somewhat ignominious entrance with assistance from a yard tug." Fortunately, the shipyard turned to and completely rebuilt the steering engine. The yard also installed a tinted, plexiglass windscreen on the flying bridge to provide the officer of the deck (OOD) with protection from wind and salt spray during rough weather.

In Yokosuka, the Pueblo came under the operational control of Rear Admiral Frank L.

Johnson, Commander, Naval Forces Japan (COMNAVFORJAPAN). Although specific dates had yet to be established for the Pueblo's first patrol, Admiral Johnson wanted the ship readied quickly and made as fit as possible. As he had at Bremerton, Bucher again expressed his concern to Admiral Johnson's staff about the lack of any emergency destruction system and was referred to the OIC of the Azuma Island Naval Ammunition Depot. In turn, an explosives and demolition (EOD) officer was sent to take a look at the Pueblo's SOD hut and make appropriate recommendations. From his examination, the EOD officer suggested to Bucher that thermite canisters be attached directly to the equipment racks. Once set off, the thermite would melt down the gear and continue burning right through the ship. As Bucher remembers, "I thought it over for two days and I discussed it with Skip Schumacher and I discussed it with Steve Harris and I finally decided that ... I was just too afraid to put it on there. I was afraid that somebody, either intentionally or unintentionally, would set one of those damn things off and just ruin, ruin thousands of dollars worth of equipment, plus perhaps endangering the entire ship." Bucher later regretted his decision."

Although very concerned about the absence of destruction gear for his ship and its highly classified contents, Bucher did not take the time to ensure the training of his crew in emergency destruction procedures nor drill his men in the Navy standard "repel boarders" procedures." He was fully aware, from his reading of the Banner reports, that the Soviets, as well as the Chinese Communists, had harassed this ship in the Sea of Japan and in the South China Sea on a number of occasions. He had made it a point to avail himself of the Banner reports and talk to its skipper prior to departure of the Pueblo on its mission. The Banner had encountered Soviet and Chinese Communist harassment during its previous missions in the Sea of Japan and in the East China Sea. Bucher fully expected to encounter the same kind of treatment. The technique used by Soviet and Chinese naval units was to employ a number of naval vessels to surround a U.S. SIGINT ship, even in international waters, thus making it extremely difficult for the U.S. ship to maneuver one way or the other without a collision. On two occasions, the Soviets and Chinese had even signaled the Banner to "Heave to or 1 will open fire." Fortunately for the Banner on these occasions, the Soviets and the Chinese had stopped short of opening fire." Bucher's ship was to encounter the same situation a few weeks later off the coast of North Korea. Subsequent events would reveal a significant difference, however: North Korean naval units would not hesitate to open fire.

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Low-capacity incinerator aboard the USS Pueblo,

At the end of December, about a week before the Pueblo was due to begin its first patrol, something new was added to the ship. The Chief of Naval Operations ordered that both the Pueblo and the Banner be armed with .50-caliber machine guns. With some assistance from Japanese planners on the shipyard repair staff, the installation of two machine guns was finally completed the day before the Pueblo left Yokosuka. No one aboard the Pueblo had any prior experience with this type of weapon except Seaman Maggard, who had once served a hitch in the Army and knew something about the weapon. Bucher made arrangements for most of the crew to receive orientation firing of the weapon at a nearby firing range."

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Bucher had insisted that the .50-caliber guns be installed in the forward and after sections of the main deck. He did this over the objections of Lieutenant Murphy, his executive officer, who recommended installation on the port and starboard sections of the superstructure where there was better protection. Bucher also regretted this decision later, when he was unable to order members of the crew to man the weapons because of their exposed positions."

In addition to changes in the Pueblo's equipment, there were also changes in the personnel complement as a result of disciplinary, medical, and normal rotational assignments. Some of these changes were critical. Personnel who had just reported aboard had no opportunity to become familiar with their surroundings before departing on the mission. Other personnel were not competent in their assignments and had tried to make this known to N AVSECGRU authorities before sailing but to no avail. Lieutenant Stephen Harris's senior enlisted assistant was transferred to Edzell, Scotland, and

r--'-lO.IoLWl.~...aJ~wo......I.Q,OI.I<....Io.I.ULI.I.I.lOi.U.II....Ioq Chief Communications Technician James F. Kell from r-_--,~"""":":~--~~~--..JInresJl()~se to Harris's request for Korean linguistsD etailed two Marine sergeants who had completed Korean language instruction at

~~e~efense Languagelnstitute,.l\1oIltere~,~alifornia;twoYE!arsearlier. One hour before the Pueblo sailed, Radioman First Class Lee Roy Hayes hurried aboard to serve as the ship's leading radio operator - having been transferred at the lastrnornent-frorn-a.combat

stores ship. 50 EO 1.4. (c)

During December 1967, two oceanographers from the U.S. Naval Oceanographic Office slated to accompany the Pueblo arrived in Yokosuka. Their job was to collect oceanographic data in order to develop sound velocity profiles that could be useful for submarine operations. Dunnie R. Tuck, Jr., and Harry Iredale had made previous trips on the USSBanner.51

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PUEBLO COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

Command and control of the various aspects of the Pueblo's mission, a fairly straightforward matter on most naval ships, was obscure and fragmented, and led to antagonism between Bucher and the OIC of the SIGINT detachment, Harris. In September 1967, CINCPACFLT had prescribed command and control relationships that governed the Naval Security Group detachment aboard the Pueblo. Mi Ii tazy command of the detachment was to be exercised by Bucher as the ship's commanding officer but operational and management control of the detachment was exercised by the Chief of Naval Operations and delegated to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. The technical direction of the detachment's SIGINT function was vested in theiN ational Security Agency and was exercised through the channels of N AVSECGRU headquarters to the N A VSECGRU, Pacific. CINCPACFLT, when it selected thecryptologic station designator for the Pueblo's NAVSECGRU detachment asl lalso said that the detachment

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personnel should not be employed in non-NAVSECGRU functions except as required on an interim basis." This personnel utilization constraint was observed by Bucher very loosely.

While the Pueblo was in Yokosuka, NAVSECGRU, Pacific, issued SIGINT Letter of Instruction (LOn 1-68 containing specific guidance for the operations of its detachments aboard both the USS Pueblo and the USS Banner during their deployments in the Pacific area. When applied to the Pueblo,this letter prescribed that command of the detachment would be exercised through the detachment's officer in charge, Lieutenant Harr is.f In turn, Harris was to exercise military and administrative control of detachment personnel and equipment under his cognizance and was responsible directly to Commander Bucher in the execution of his duties. 54

The mission and functions of the Naval Security Group detachments outlined in LOI 1-68 provided for the dual role of furnishing SIGINT direct support to the ship's commanding officer as a primary function and, as a secondary mission, satisfying specified fleet and national SIGINT collection requirements. The LOI defined five possible modes of operation for the AGERs Pueblo and Banner. The first of these was that proposed for the Pueblo's first mission - Mode 1: Continuous operation in one of the areas [North Korea Coast]. .. by one ship at a time for an indefinite period of fairly long duration for operational test and evaluation of all sensors, and for utilization as a counterirritant to Soviet trawlers. In summary, the command arrangement aboard the Pueblo was fragmented. The ship was given a direct support mission as its primary task and, therefore, the Navy controlled its operations and SIGINT tasking. NSA SIGINT tasking was secondary and on a not-to-interfere basis with the ship's direct support mission. Bucher's command of the SIGINT detachment could only be accomplished through the officer in charge of the detachment.P"

Bucher, although not in command of the detachment, held a clearance for Special Intelligence and was well aware of the Pueblo's SIGINT mission. Prior to taking command of Pueblo, Bucher had had a week of briefings about the AGER program by the NAVSECGRU headquarters in Washington, D.C.; in addition, in Yokosuka, before sailing, he had read the Banner's reports about its operations. When the Korean linguists were assigned to the Pueblo, Bucher felt that he could expect good direct support from the detachment's Interpretive Branch.i"

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PUEBLO MISSION RISK ASSESSMENT

The initial planning for Pueblo's patrol began with Admiral Johnson's staff in October 1967, well before the ship arrived in Japan. By the end of November, Admiral Hyland at CINCPACFLT had approved a schedule for the first six months of operation for both the Banner and the PuebloF' Thereafter, Johnson's operations and intelligence staffs collaborated in preparing a detailed mission proposal message about the Pueblo's January operation. On 16 December 1967, Admiral Johnson approved the message and sent it to Admiral Hyland. Concerning the risk assessment of the Pueblo's mission, Johnson stated

I personally made the initial determination that risk would be minimal since Pueblo would be operating in international waters during the entire operation .... Specifically, in evaluating the risk, three key factors weighed heavily in the final decision: (1) Pueblo operations throughout the mission in international waters; (2) low level of North Korean naval activity at sea in January and February; and (3) the complete lack of any North Korean reaction to the USS Banner's presence off North Korean coast on two occasions, one of which it loitered off Wo'nsan for about one and one-halfdays.58

From Admiral Hyland, the mission proposal message was transmitted to Admiral U.S.G. Sharp, CINCPAC, who quickly assented and transmitted the proposal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington on 23 December 1967.

Before examining what happened to this message once it reached the JCS, it is appropriate that we look first at what the normal procedures were in Washington for reviewing and approving requests for reconnaissance operations.

In December 1967, all military reconnaissance operations required approval by the JCS. Procedures for obtaining such approval were contained in JCS document SM-676, dated 19 August 1966, which stated that commanders of unified and specified commands and chiefs of military services might submit proposals to the JCS for missions in any area, "including those adjudged to be especially critical or sensitive." JCS approval was to be based upon current considerations of the sensitivity of the area, the possibility of hostile reaction, political factors where applicable, and the importance of the intelligence operations in relation to the risks involved.t"

Before the JCS would take formal action on a proposed mission, the proposal had to be processed through the Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) Staff. This staff included representatives of each of the four military services, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Department of State and the Secretary of Defense. It therefore provided the actual working mechanism of the JCS for coordinating the processing of individual missions to determine, among other things, whether the proposal was necessary to meet national service and command intelligence requirements and, at the same time, avoid unnecessary duplication in the national reconnaissance program. Once an individual mission deployment had been coordinated and staffed within the JRC, it received a formal input from each of the four services and DIA, which either concurred in the proposed mission, suggested a modification, or recommended its cancel lation.P" Under

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JCS regulations, the Defense Intelligence Agency was specifically charged with the risk assessment evaluation of each mission as well as its intelligence validation. However, these regulations did not seem to require an affirmative statement that responsible DIA authorities had fully discharged their responsibility for risk evaluation on each of the missions submitted for JCS review. 61

After the staffing of each mission, the JRC would consolidate (usually on the 23d of each month) all reconnaissance proposals into a monthly schedule of reconnaissance operations for action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, This schedule was prepared in the form of a book that set out in broad, general terms the necessity for each mission, its objectives, its area of operations, its duration, and finally, its risk assessment.P

Admiral Sharp's formal message to the JCS used this wording: "Risk to Pueblo is estimated to be minimal since operations will be conducted in international waters." In spite of the paucity of information about risk evaluation in the proposal messages, JRC representatives supposedly had telephone conversations with their counterparts at CINCPAC headquarters concerning the Pueblo mission. However, no record was made of these informal discussions."

Although NSA was also aware of the Pueblo's proposed deployment, none of the NSA officials who regularly communicated informally with the JRC staff had any specific substantive discussions affecting the Pueblo's proposed missicri."

Concerning DIA's responsibility to evaluate Pueblo's risk assessment, its then director, Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, later commented,

On the basis of this message (CINCPAC 230230Z December 1967), and there being no information available to DIA at the time to alter the risk assessment assigned by the operational commander and the theater commander, the JRC entered the proposed mission into the monthly schedule as a risk assessment of Category Four [minimal risk I ... there were daily considerations of changes in the military or political situation, increased sensitivity and reactions to other reconnaissance missions. There was nothing in these considerations to cause us in DIA or the JRC to alter the risk assessment which had tentatively been assigned to the proposed mission.w

General Carroll further stated that he did not recall any instance in which DIA had disagreed with a minimal risk assessment on an individual mission after the monthly reconnaissance schedule had been formally prepared.

The timing of the mission review process at the Washington level should not be overlooked. CINCPAC's mission proposal arrived at JCS on Saturday, 23 December. Sunday was Christmas Eve and Monday, of course, Christmas Day; normal manning levels of many government offices were reduced to minimum staffing. This time of year was not conducive to high levels of official concentration and thoughtful analysis. During the week between Christmas and New Year's, the Chairman, JCS, General Earle G. Wheeler, was out of town on leave; the Army Chief of Staff, General Harold K. Johnson, was visiting Southeast Asia and acting for him was Vice Chief of Staff of the Army

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General Ralph E. Haines. Also absent was General Wallace Greene, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, who was retiring, although filling in for him was General Leonard F.Chapman Jr., Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. Only the Air Force Chief of Staff, General John P. McConnell and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, respectively, were in Washington.P"

At 11:00 A.M. on Wednesday, 27 December, the operations deputies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff met to consider all recommendations concerning the monthly reconnaissance schedule for January 1968. In General Wheeler's words, "This is a staff action ... to resolve any differences of view between the service representatives and representatives of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. In other words, to make sure that everyone understands, everyone is in accord that these are the problem areas and so on ... ,,67 The monthly reconnaissance book was distributed by the JRC that same afternoon to all affected agencies, the armed services, DIA, NSA, CIA, and the Department of State.

The JCS usually would have met on the following Friday afternoon, 29 December, to take final JCS action on the monthly reconnaissance schedule. This time, however, the usual routine was changed. General Wheeler later revealed why: "Now it happens that this January program was released by each Chief telling his Operations deputy that he had no dissatisfaction with the program and therefore gave him permission to release it at the Operations deputies' meeting which was held on Friday morning, the 29th of December." 68

Thus it was that the monthly reconnaissance schedule, which included the Pueblo mission as well as hundreds of others, was granted approval by the JCS without their having convened any formal meeting. After the morning meeting of the JCS operations deputies, the monthly reconnaissance book was presented to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul H. Nitze, who reviewed the entire schedule and gave his approval the same day.69

One more review of the reconnaissance schedule remained, that of the 303 Committee, which gave civilian approval for the monthly schedule on behalf of the executive branch." The existence of the 303 Committee was closely held. It was headed by a senior White House aide and was so named because it had once met in Room 303 of the Executive Office Building. It was composed of Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI); Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Under Secretary of State; Paul Nitze, Deputy Secretary of Defense; and Walt Rostow, National Security Advisor to the President, as the White House representative. The "book" was forwarded to this committee also on 29 December for a policy review of the planned missions, particularly those that were directed at sensitive areas peripheral to unfriendly territory.

Because Richard Helms was on a ten-day trip outside the country, his deputy, Admiral Rufus Taylor, acted as DCI in reviewing the reconnaissance schedule proposed for January 1968.71 Helms later described the 303 Committee deliberations in congressional testimony.

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According to Helms, the 303 Committee passed on the January schedule, which contained the Pueblo mission. The Committee did not regard this mission as routine. Helms pointed out that there were four missions in the docket - one of them the Pueblo's - that were singled out for Admiral Taylor's special attention in a staff memorandum recommending his concurrence in the proposal.

It was the assessment of the 303 Committee, according to Helms, based on the experience of Pueblo's sister ship Banner in the Far East, and on the belligerent North Korean attitude, that this was a risk mission. In this sense it differed from the Navy assessment of minimal risk. The committee felt that there was indeed a possibility that the ship would encounter difficulties and possibly serious harassment but not seizure in international waters. The committee expected the Pueblo to be "shadowed, bullied, and bumped, but there was no reason to expect seizure on the high seas.'>72 In the face of the committee's assessment of the possibility of serious harassment, it would have been incumbent upon the Navy to have at least a minimum protective force available within a reasonable distance of the Pueblo should there have been a need, but ....

The 303 Committee approved the reconnaissance schedule on the 29th of December and returned it to the JCS by the end of that same day, Friday. The Pueblo's mission was approved by the JCS, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the 303 Committee all on the same day. Such speed suggests that no more than a cursory review could have been made of the reconnaissance schedule. With this final approval, the JCS sent the resulting decision to the responsible area commander in chieffor his action.

Meanwhile, NSA was also takin certain actions concern in the Pueblo. At midafternoon on 29 December 1967 Bl

sent a message t rrdtoalf field sites associated with the Korean target, requesting them to be especially watchful for and to report any SIGINT evidence of North Korean reaction to the scheduled transit of the Pueblo ofT the North Korean east coast in January 1968. This message was the normal advisory to SIGINT sites asking them to report reactions to U.S. operations."

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Within a half hour, the NSA Office of Mobile Collection (K12) released a message to Naval Security Group headquarters that answered the Pacific Fleet's request for secondary SIGINT tasking for the Pueblo. This message provided the specific COMINT and ELiNT collection requirements for the Pueblo.74

NSA ADVISORY ON POSSIBLE NORTH KOREAN HOSTILE ACTION

On 29 December, there was much soul-searching and anxiety within NSA over the suggestion that NSA send a message to the JRC/JCS expressing concern over the possibility of a hostile reaction from the North Koreans to the forthcoming Pueblo patrol. Action in favor of such a message was most strongly felt at the analytic level in Bll. Here,

~~~--~~ ~~ __ ~~~ __ _JEO 1.4. (c)

Based on this precedent and lacking a

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from the North Koreans toward a surface vessel were high."

More senior levels within NSA believed that the Agency would be overstepping its responsibility by getting involved in a Navy operational matter and thus leaving itself open to criticism. The result of these opposing views was a strongly worded message drafted at the analytic level in NSA and modified as it was coordinated with the senior levels prior to its release. During this coordination process, the statements "But there is no SIGINT evidence of provocative or harassing activities by North Korean vessels beyond twelve n[autical] m[iles] from the coast." and "[This message] is provided to aid in evaluating the requirement for ship protective measures and is not intended to reflect adversely on CINCPACFLT deployment proposal" were added in order to make the message less obtrusive." The Assistant Director, Production, and number-three man in NSA, Oliver R. Kirby, authorized its release in the absence of Marshall S. Carter, the Director ofNSA, who was out of town for the Christmas holidays." The Assistant Director for the National Cryptologic Staff (ADN), Admiral Lester R. Schulz, concurred in the message release.

A year later, when justifying this message action to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Carter said: " ... though this Agency is not directly involved in the approval chain of military reconnaissance missions, we at NSA consider it an appropriate function to review pertinent Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) information and comment on SIGINT reflections where such information will be of assistance to our customers. This was the case with regard to the NSA message concerning the Pueblo mission. It was simply a case ofNSA people doing their jobs in a normal and competent manner .... "78

Although NSA, as pointed out by Carter, had no approval role in regard to direct support missions operated by the services, the intent of this message was quite clear: it was an advisory, based on past SIGINT experience, that the North Koreans were unpredictable and might precipitate hostile action at any time. Consequently, the JRC

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might, therefore, consider the Pueblo a risk mission and assign appropriate protective measures for the ship. It was a most unusual action by NSA. It expressed an after-thefact reservation by NSA concerning the safety of the Pueblo patrol. Unfortunately, the message got "lost in the system," and no change was made in the Pueblo mission.

Released at 5:28 P.M. Washington time, this NSA message to JCS/JRC reached the Pentagon later that evening. Unfortunately, because this was the beginning of the New Year's holiday weekend, the NSA message received no attention until the following Tuesday, 2 January 1968, when Brigadier General Ralph D. Steakely, USAF, the Director of JRC, simply retransmitted it to CINCPAC. An information copy was supposed to have been sent via courier to the CNO in the Pentagon, but the forwarding instructions were misinterpreted and no copy reached the CNO. No other action was taken by the Office of the Joint Chiefs ofStafT. Nor did anyone take action on the message at DIA.79

In Hawaii, at CINCPAC headquarters, the retransmitted NSA message was received at 2026Z on 2 January 1968. The CINCPAC staff, believing that the message contained no new information that would change the risk evaluation of the Pueblo's mission, did not bring it to Admiral Sharp's attentiorr."

On the morning of 2 January, JCS transmitted the approval of the Pueblo's mission to Hawaii. With this message, the events that would lead to the attack and seizure of the ship within a few weeks were set in motion.

This NSA message concerning the Pueblo mission was the second advisory message that NSA sent to the JRC/JCS and Navy commands on the subject of the possibility of danger to a U.S. surface collection mission. Early in 1967, the Agency sent a similar message to the JRC/JCS and a large number of Navy commands advising of possible hostile actions by the North Koreans against a forthcoming mission by the USS Banner off the North Korean coast." During that mission, the Banner paused briefly for a day or two off the North Korean coast. No hostile reaction occurred on that occasion.

In general, the military forces of the USSR, the PRC, and, in more recent years, those of North Korea had a history of hostile reactions to U.S. airborne collection platforms. Since the late 1940s - early 1950s Soviet air forces were involved in the shootdown of about twelve-fifteen U.S. reconnaissance aircraft operating in international airspace in the Atlantic and Pacific areas. The same was true to a lesser extent in regard to Chinese Communist forces in the Far East. North Korean air forces reacted to U.S. airborne collection missions after 1964-65.

Reactions to surface collection platforms by the Soviets dated from at least the 1960s and involved harassment in the form of passing close aboard, bumping, and, in general, creating a serious danger to navigation. Unlike their reactions to airborne missions, none of these Soviet reactions to surface collection missions involved the use of weaponry. The same was true of Chinese Communist naval forces.

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In recommendating a "minimal risk" category for the Pueblo mission, U.S. naval commands pointed to the previous single Banner patrol off North Korea, albeit brief, as a precedent for the absence of a hostile reaction. Perhaps too, the Navy believed that the North Koreans, as did the Soviets and Chinese Communists, would also maintain the distinction between air and seaborne collection platforms in regard to the form that their reactions would take.

PUEBW SAILING ORDERS

For administrative purposes, the Pueblo was assigned to the Service Force, Pacific Fleet, but for its reconnaissance mission it was assigned to the operational control of Admiral Frank Johnson, Commander, Task Force 96 (CTF 96), who was also Commander, Naval Forces, Japan. On 4 January 1968, Admiral Johnson inspected the Pueblo and ordered Bucher to get under way on 5 January for Sasebo, Japan, in order to be in position for the coming rnission-V The formal plan for the Pueblo's operation was contained in CTF 96 Operation Order No. 301-68, which provided specific guidance and instructions for the assigned mission, including reporting instructions and operating and communications plans. The sailing order issued 5 January augmented the operations order by including the following specific instructions:

Depart Sasebo about B January and proceed via Tsushima Strait to arrive in Operational Area MARS about 10 January.

Conduct collection operations in area designated MARS (4000N to 3900N), VENUS (4100N to 4000N), and PLUTO (4200N to 4100N), concentrating on most productive areas.

Avoid detection and maintain emission control procedures except when establishing contact with Soviet naval units. At this time, break emission control and transmit a daily situation report.

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The closest point of approach (CPA) to North Korea, the Soviet landmass, and offshore islands is 13 nm.

Defensive armament (machine guns) should be stowed or covered in such a manner so that it does not cause unusual interest by surveyed units. It should be used only in the event of a threat to survival.

The provisions ofCINCPAC Instructions 003120.24A and 003100.3D apply in regard to the rules of engagement and concerning conduct in the event of harassment or intimidation by foreign units.83

The sailing order for the Pueblo used the codeword ICHTHYlC for the operation. All previous references had cited the codeword PINKROOT, but when the USS Palm Beach was assigned to the Atlantic instead of the Pacific Fleet, it became necessary to establish a codeword for worldwide AGER operations. For this purpose, CNO assigned the codeword BREEDER CLICKBEETLE (formerly used for the Banner's operations), and PINKROOT was

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While the details of the Pueblo's mission were being finalized and the ship made ready, Lieutenant Schumacher, the operations officer, received his Special Intelligence (SI) clearance. He was upset about the delay in receiving it, saying " ... I think an error was made in ordering me, as appointing me as operations officer without expediting my SI clearance ... so that I could adequately perform my job as operations officer ... "85

Commander Bucher, following COMNAVFORJAPAN's order of 4 January, made hurried preparations to depart Yokosuka on the 5th. His operation order from CTF 96 arrived at 3:00 A.M. on that day, hardly time to review it prior to an early morning departure. As the Pueblo pulled away from its berth in Yokosuka, only a partial sailing order had been received, The Pueblo was to get the remainder of its orders while the ship was en route to Sasebo."

NSA, meanwhile, was taking steps to ensure that support to the Pueblo'sTI1issi?I1

would be complete. It provide1 riththedetails'·EO

of the Pueblo's mission.as well as the ship's planned locations during-the f?~thcom:ing patrol so tha~\ Iwould be fully awareof.thepossibi lity ~fNorthKorean reactions; In addition, NSA requeste~ ItIJinc1ude the Pueblo as an addressee for

al~ ~ otre orts disseminated urin the eriod of its mission. Also, NSA requeste

~------------------------~----------~~

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Normally, the voyage from Yokosuka to Sasebo on the western coast of Kyushu would have taken three days. However, because of stormy conditions in the Sea of Japan, the Pueblo arrived on 9 January, a day later than planned. While en route to Sasebo, the Pueblo received from Admiral Johnson a list of cryptographic equipment and publications that it was authorized to hold. All items in excess of those listed were to be removed at Sasebo "due to sensitive nature of operations in relatively shallow waters during upcoming ICHTHYIC 1."88 This i nstr uct io n was not consistent with the COMNAVFORJAPAN and CINCPACFLT initial "minimal risk" category originally assigned the mission. Also during the trip to Sasebo, the WLR-1 ELINT receiver in the SOD hut had broken down and needed repair.P Before reaching port, the Pueblo informed COMNAVFOR,IAPAN of this malfunction, and, in response, a new part was flown to Saseb1 I Off-loading cryptomaterials and repairing the WLR-1 took another day, thus delaying the Pueblo's departure from Sasebo until the predawn hours of 11 January 1968.91

Looking back on that occasion, Bucher said, "I was proud of this ship and I was ready to go, wanted to get out there and get this job on the road so that we could get this

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experience behind US."92 Admiral Johnson ofCOMNAVFORJAPAN also said that he was satisfied that the USS Pueblo was in a satisfactory state of readiness and could carry out its assigned mission"

Nearly three and one-half years had passed since the Department of Defense had first mentioned the possibility of an AGER-type program; nineteen months had elapsed for the conversion of a deactivated small cargo ship into the AGER Pueblo. Now it was to embark on its first operational mission. In the minds of the Pueblo's captain and its task force commander, the ship was officially deemed ready.

In a number of storms, however, the ship had pitched about violently. At best, the steering machinery was antiquated and its reliability questionable. Small as the ship was, rough seas caused rolling and "unsettled" conditions for operators seated in the research detachment spaces; chairs fell over, equipment worked loose in the racks, and stored paper fell from overhead.

Several of Pueblo's mechanical systems and devices were far from satisfactory. The standard destruction system for classified documents was rudimentary. A small incinerator of twenty-five pounds per hour capacity and two electrical, hand-fed, paper shredders that could handle two reams per hour were barely adequate to dispose of the normal daily burn requirements. These devices were augmented by fire axes, sledges, and chipping hammers for equipment destruction. Any emergency destruction that might become necessary wherein time was a critical factor would require extraordinary measures. Although Bucher would later claim that he was attempting to devise such methods of mass destruction, he did not do so. Pueblo's internal communication system left much to be desired, and it was totally inadequate to meet the needs of any battle or emergency situation. In practice, it was discovered that, because of temperamental adjustments to the firing mechanisms, the .50-caliber machine guns took at least ten minutes to activate." Only one crew member, with former army experience, had ever had any experience with such weapons, although members of the crew had received rudimentary instruction on the weapons immediately prior to the ship's deployment.

In regard to general service crew staffing, it had been on the basis of AKL needs and specialities; forty-four percent had never been to sea when first assigned. Of the NSG detachment, only four had had prior sea duty, and one third were assigned duties in which they had no practical experience apart from that received in Communications Technician (CT) school. In addition, none of the CTs had had live experience in their specialties for approximately nine months. This fact, coupled with the commanding officer's practice of assigning CTs to deck duties when necessary, had markedly lowered the morale of the NSG detachment. The assistant to the detachment's OIC joined the ship when it left Y okosuka, six days before the operation began. This was hardly sufficient time for him to become familiar with the capabilities of the individual CTs in order to use them effectively - or to earn their respect and trust. The Korean linguists, too, boarded the Pueblo when it left Yokosuka. These two Marine sergeants made no secret of their Korean language

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ineptitude. A similar situation pertained to the ship's ranking radioman. He too had scrambled aboard the Pueblo just an hour before its departure from Yokosuka - and, like the linguists, the radioman had little confidence in his own abilities.

In short, the upcoming voyage of the Pueblo had all the earmarks of a training cruise rather than an operational intelligence collection mission. A more experienced crew would have gone a long way toward relieving some of the confusion aboard the Pueblo when it was accosted by the North Koreans. It was clear the voyage would be a troubled one, danger from the North Koreans aside.

We have seen how the review and approval of the Pueblo's proposed mission was handled in Washington. Arriving as it did at the beginning of the 1967 Christmas and New Year holiday season, the proposal was buried under several hundred other missions in the January 1968 reconnaissance schedule. Absenteeism at the JCS level precluded the JCS from following their normal pattern of meeting personally to review the schedule; instead, approval was given by their several staffs. In fact, the JCS, DoD, and 303 Committee reviews and approvals were all accomplished within the space of a single day. Although something of a record for speedy efficiency, such procedural achievement suggested only cursory or token examination of the total reconnaissance schedule - not to mention a detailed look at the Pueblo's operational mission. The NSA message to JCS, summarizing SIGINT information on North Korean aggressiveness, was intended to serve as an advisory to those personnel looking at such things as risk assessment and back-up ship protection measures for the Pueblo. Instead, the message was virtually ignored by DIA, JCS, and CINCPAC. The Pueblo sailed into the Sea of Japan for operations off the North Korean east coast poorly prepared for its mission and subsequent actions by the North Koreans.

43

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L:-:~~_~ __ ~~"""":"-:-----:-:-:-__.IThisinformation was transmitted to the Pueblo via the I

U.S. Navy's operational intelligence broadcast. I

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Chapter III

The Patrol

The Pueblo's sailing orders specified that upon leaving Sasebo, it was to check out of the U.S. Navy's ship movements reporting system and maintain radio silence, i.e., emission control (EMCON). Only if detected was the ship to transmit and give its position. Before departing port, Bucher discussed with Admiral Johnson's staff just what constituted "detection." It was agreed that this meant visual observation by a ship or aircraft that would most likely report the Pueblo's presence to either the Soviets or North Koreans; this definition excluded radar detection.'

To help a void detection, Bucher relied on both SItG:=I=N:T=a:n:d=c:o:l:la:t:e:r:a:l:i:n:t:e:ll:i~:le:n:c:eJ

sources. The dav before the Pueblo departed Sasebo-L

~OMrNT revealed that a I

Daily reconnaissance flights ?ut04 Ikept track of the

location of Soviet naval units, and thus Bucher knew, when leaving Sasebo, that a Soviet destroyer and tanker-were plying the Tsushima Strait.' To avoid detection, Bucher decided to hug-the coast of the Japanese island of Honshu and give the Soviet ships a wide berth-rHis intention was to proceed northward through the Sea of Japan, keeping forty to

fifty miles from the coast of North Korea until the Pueblo reached its northernmost operating area, PLUTO (see Operational Map, page 40).5

Weather forecasts monitored b the Pueblo on its first da out were not favorable. The

prognosis from Guam,

was for rough

weather immediately a ea . IS was con rrrne y e ng IS anguage weather

broadcas~ ~ucher found that these reports were very reliable."

On 12 January 1968, at a point approximately 35 degrees, 15 minutes north, the Pueblo headed into the Sea of Japan on a track toward the Demilitarized Zone" so as to pass roughly twenty miles south of the South Korean island of' Ul'lung-do." Shortly beyond that point, as it entered operational area MARS (see Operational Map, page 40), the Pueblo ran into a severe winter storm. The ship reacted violently and forced Bucher to go some

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seventy miles out to sea in order to maintain a safe condition. Many of the crew were sick, including all of the officers except Warrant Officer Lacy and Bucher himself. This alteration of course delayed the Pueblo in keeping to its planned itinerary.

By Sunday, 14 January, the worst of the storm was over. The Pueblo turned back toward the North Korean east coast through heavy swells and proceeded north following the contour of the coast but well out to sea. The weather now was overcast with six miles visibility and westerly winds at fourteen to twenty knots. Although the storm was over, the Pueblo faced still another problem. As the ship worked its way northward, the temperature turned bitterly cold, and the Pueblo began to ice up. Sometimes as much as two inches of ice would form during the night over the entire deck, and Bucher would have the crew, including CTs, chipping away at it."

On Tuesday, 16 January, the Pueblo arrived at the 42d parallel, the northernmost limit of its operating area, just south of Vladivostok and the boundary separating North Korea and the USSR. The ship was still approximately twenty-five to thirty miles from the coast, but that same day it cruised to a point off Ch'ongjin and carne within fifteen miles of shore, closer than at any previous time. By using the "Big Eyes" (twenty-two-inch binoculars), Bucher could see smoke corning from chimneys. 10

At this time, to make certain that the Pueblo did not approach the shore closer than thirteen nautical miles, navigation became critical. Bucher ordered navigational fixes every half-hour during the day and every twenty minutes at night. He also ordered all officers-of-the-deck to head the ship out to sea whenever they had any doubts about where the ship was and to call Bucher immediately. Once they were positive they were a good fifteen miles from land, they were to come to "all stop" so that the exact position could be determined. Apart from Lieutenant Murphy and Quartermaster First Class Law, Bucher's crew had marginal navigational experience. In his words: "I had only one other quartermaster on board, Plucker, who is a third class and he did not have much experience. My other two people standing quartermaster watches were Electronics Technician Second Class Nolte, who never had any experience along this line, and Crandell, Radioman Third Class, who never had any experience. . .. I did not have a highly professional group of seamen to do my na vigational chores for me."!'

EO 1.4.(c) EO 1.4.(d)

Having arrived at the patrol's northern limit, and before beginning the transit down the North Korean east coast, Bucher called together all his general service chiefs, first class, and leading petty officers to brief them on the general operations of the ship. Nothing about the SIGINT mission was disclosed. He advised them that they were on a classified intelligence operation, that they were not to get any closer to the coast than

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46

TO,. 5EeRET~MIIRA

thirteen miles, that the coast and shipping were to be surveyed, and to perform correctly because they might not get a chance to do it twice. Photographer's Mate First Class Mack remembered thinking that navigation shouldn't be a problem because Quartermaster First Class Charles Law was such a good navigator. 13

Commander Bucher was sure that he hadn't been detected while traveling northward to operational area PLUTO. He had taken particular pains to avoid observation. When debriefed, he said, "If I saw a mast on the horizon in the direction I was going, if necessary I would turn and run in the other direction in order to avoid coming into real good view. 14

Operating closer to shore, however, the Pueblo saw occasional merchant ships going in or out of ports such as Ch'ongjin. None of these evidenced any interest in the Pueblo; in fact, the closest passed one evening at about five to eight thousand yards. Photographer's Mate First Class Mack would photograph the vessels and then prepare slides for Commander Bucher's use in identifying the ships by comparing them with photographs contained in on-board publications about merchant ships of the world.P In total, Mack estimated that he photographed about eight different ships while the Pueblo was on patrol. 16

As sundown approached each evening, Bucher ordered his officer of the deck (OOD) to take the Pueblo farther out to sea,usually to a distance of eighteen to twenty miles. Then on the morning watch (4:00 to 8:00 A.M.), the OOD would turn the Pueblo around so that the ship would again be fourteen to fifteen miles from shore by dawn.i"

On the way to the PLUTO area, one of the Pueblo's three generators blew up. Fireman Bandera completely tore it down but realized that its repair would have to wait until the ship returned to Yokosuka. Later, one of the auxiliary generators also broke down and remained inoperable for lack of spare parts."

The frigid weather encountered in the PLUTO operational area required constant chipping of ice. Not only were the crew's quarters cold because the heating system wasn't working well, but according to Communications Technician Third Class Ralph McClintock, there were other discomforts as well: ee ••• we had trouble with the water all the time ... the bilge pump was backing up or something and I'd wake up in the morning sometimes and find everything floating around the deck.?"

the crew established a routine for burning

~--------------------------~

classified material, particularly incoming traffic collected by the "0" Branch

(Communications) that was not needed by the Pueblo. Every day at about 8:00 A.M., two or three CTs from the SOD hut would use the incinerator. Usually eight or nine burn bags required destruction. Using the on-board shredders was so time consuming that most

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often paper was balled up instead and fed into the incinerator, which had a capacity of one or two "burn bags" at a time. After burning, the incinerator was stoked to shake down the ashes that, when cooled, were loaded into buckets and thrown over the side. During this operation, no general service crewmen were allowed in the incinerator area. 21

After spending about two days ofT Ch'ongjin, the Pueblo deployed farther south under cover of darkness on the night of 17 January. By the next morning, it had entered the VENUS operational area and was stationed off So'ngjin (now Kirnch'aek), some sixteen miles out at about parallel 41 degrees and 14 minutes north longitude.f In this location as well as at Ch'ongjin but at least the weathei had improved. Skies were clear and, although the temperature was cold, the ship was no longer icing Up.23

On 19 January, Lieutenant Harris recommended that the Pueblo depart the So'ngjin area and head south toward the next coastal target

during the night of 19 January and was operating some fourteen to

~--------------~

fifteen miles offshore on the morning of 20 -Ianuary" The Pueblo was now in area MARS,

the southernmost of the three operational areas.

PUEBLO SIGINT DET ACHMENT AND ITS MISSION

The SIGINT detachment aboard was organized similarly to otherN A VSECGRU units ashore and afloat. Any differences were primarily of size rather .than basic function. For example, the Administrative Branch (A) consisted of one CT1, and the Maintenance Branch (M) was staffed by a CTCS and two CT3s. Four men manned the Communications Branch (0), just barely enough to cover a three-shift operation responsible for operating the teletypewriters and cryptographic equipment, handling message routing and cryptographic procedures, and assuring pro,eruse of circuits. Aboard the Pueblo, the

N A VSECGRU crew carried ou~ jProcessing operations as follows:

The Collection Branch (R), with four people, was responsible for Morse intercept, high frequency direction finding, and radiotelephone intercept that did not require linguistic skills.

The Technical Branch (T), with a personnel strength of twelve men, did the intercepting, recording, processing, and analyzing of all types of non-Morse systems.

The Intercept Branch (I) CTs, five in number, performed all tasks requiring foreign language proficiency and served as radiotelephone operators and transcribers.f

The U.S. Navy had provided the primary operational tasking for the Pueblo's patrol:

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As the Pueblo neared the Wonsan area, some of the senior people aboard had some thoughts about the Pueblo's attempt to remain undetected. Communications Technician First Class James A. Shepard, the ship's senior ELINT analyst, firmly believed that the North Koreans were always aware of the Pueblo's presence. At his intelligence debriefing on his return to the United States, he stated, "During the whole course of the operation, the transit u and the transit back.\

In preparing his daily reports about patrol operations, Commander Bucher made some strong comments about the desirability of not conducting a mission at that particular time of year because of the lack of activity. Lieutenant Schumacher, Pueblo's operations officer, said of the SIGINT effort, "The opinion I'd got from Lieutenant Harris every time I went through the SOD hut wast

We could have come up with some positive recommendations for not

~------------~

going back up there. Because of, primarily the time of year, mid-winter, everybody was

staying home, while we were out there trying to chip off the deck"?

The Pueblo continued to operate off Mayang-do. The Pueblo crew did not realize that North Korean guerrillas were at that moment preparing to infiltrate South Korea in an attempt to assassinate President Pak Chung Hee in his residence, the Blue House, on the following day. The weather was overcast with unlimited visibility and light southwesterly winds. There was no hint of the difficult times in store for the Pueblo.

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Chapter IV

North Korean Attack and Seizure

On Saturday, 20 January, the Pueblo was dead in the water in the MARS Operational Area about 15.4 miles southwest of Mayang-do. At 5:30 p.M.,l while located at position 39 degrees, 47 minutes north, and 128 degrees, 25.5 minutes east, a North Korean modified SO-I-class subchaser passed the Pueblo at a range of about 4,000 yards. In the twilight, the subchaser appeared only as a silhouette, and no identification could be made. This ship was apparently headed for Wonsan. The Pueblo reported that the subchaser showed no apparent interest in the Pueblo. In the light of subsequent events, it may only be guessed that this ship conducted an initial North Korean reconnaissance of the Pueblo?

That night the Pueblo headed south toward Wonsan, the last area of interest in the MARS Operational Area. Commander Bucher intended to arrive at a point fifteen miles east of Won san at 7:00 A.M. on 22 -January."

NORTH KOREAN VISUAL SURVEILLANCE

Arriving on station as planned, the Pueblo remained dead in the water for most of the day. It was a bright, brisk day with a temperature of 36 degrees and a slight breeze. At 12:25 P.M., two North Korean ships were sighted at a range of about 10,000 yards, bearing 170 degrees and an estimated speed of eight knots. When the ships were within 1,500 yards, one changed course and passed close aboard the Pueblo's starboard beam at about 100 yards. The two North Korean ships then hove to about 9,000 yards apart." This was a more identifiable North Korean reconnaissance effort.

Noting some Korean writing on the ships' sterns, Bucher called for the Korean linguists in the research spaces to come to the bridge and translate the Korean characters. Marine Sergeants Chicca and Hammond could not translate the names immediately but, after obtaining a dictionary in the SOD hut, identified the ships as Rice Paddy 1 and Rice Paddy 2. Bucher also called Lieutenant Harris to the bridge to ask if the detachment was intercepting any communications between the two ships. When none was indicated, Bucher expressed dismay at the linguists' lack of proficiency. Until now he had been unaware of the sergeants' limited capability."

Both ships were identically painted navy gray and closely resembled the Soviet Lentra-class intelligence collection trawler. Each had stack markings of black, red, and black bands with a red star in a white circle in the center of the red band. No radar or ELINT equipment was observed, but each had a triple long wire antenna between the

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masts. Neither ship carried an ensign nor flew anyflag. Both appeared heavily laden and fishing nets and lines were stowed neatly on each. At 3:00 P.M. both ships began another approach. The Pueblo remained dead in the water af39 degrees, 14.8 minutes north and 128 degrees, 7.33 minutes east. This time, the trawlers. closed to about thirty yards and proceeded aft along the Pueblo's port side,cutting closelyacross the stern and down the starboard side. During their passage, it appeared that all hands (about nineteen people on each) observed the Pueblo. No flag signal or oral exchange was initiated and following this surveillance, both ships retired on course 340 degrees and disappeared by 4 P.M. Throughout this incident the Pueblo was showing the international signal flag for hydrographic operations."

Convinced that the two trawlers would notify North Korean authorities of the Pueblo's presence, Bucher ordered his operations officer, Lieutenant Schumacher, to draft a message notifying Admiral Johnson, COMN A VFORJ APAN, of the Pueblo's detection. This message would mark the first time that Pueblo had broken radiovsilence since departing Sasebo. Schumacher notified the GTs in the research area to bring up a circuit to Kami Seya and then began to prepare the message."

Bucher's assumption that he had been •. detected was valid. NSA's subsequent

reevaluation atthallirrierevealed SIGINT reflections

(unknown to the Pueblo) of this encounte hat

period, no U.S. official knew where the Pueblo was located because of the ship's radio silence.

After completing his draft, Schumacher gave the message to Bucher who, with the executive officer, Lieutenant Murphy, continued to work on the exact wording. Finally, at about 2200, the message was returned to Schumacher for transmission. Knowing that he was scheduled for the 4 A.M. to 8 A.M. watch, Schumacher left the message in the cryptoroom and went to bed."

Following Schumacher's instructions, Communications Technician First Class Donald

E. Bailey, in the NAVSECGRU Communications Branch, started to make contact with Kami Seya. Attempts to use the circuit were frustrating; when transmission seemed good, the Pueblo reception was nil and vice versa. At about midnight, the circuit was activated for a short time but not long enough to pass any traffic. to Poor atmospheric conditions were working to the Pueblo's disadvantage. Bailey kept trying to set up communications all night long with no success. At 8 A.M. on the 23d he went off watch and was relieved by

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Communications Technician Third Class Sidney J. Karnes; the circuit to Kami Seya was still out."

During the night, the midwatch had detected eighteen different vessels in the Pueblo's vicinity, the closest contact being 3,000 yards. At 1:45 A.M. one of these vessels lit a large orange flare that glowed for about thirty seconds. The purpose of the illumination was unclear. There were, however, no further attempts at close surveillance or harassment throughout the remainder of the night. Thereupon, another message was drafted to notify COMNAVFORJAPAN that the Pueblo no longer considered itself under surveillance and was reverting to radio silence but intended to remain in the Wonsan area.P Unfortunately, the earlier message reporting the initial detection had yet to be transmitted.

On the 23d of January, after having breakfast in the wardroom with Commander Bucher, Schumacher dropped by the cryptoroom to see if the CTs had transmitted the message he had left with them the previous night. In Schumacher's words: "I went in there and it was 'all stop,' nobody was doing anything ... " He discovered that Kami Seya had given the ship a choice of about four frequencies to try. Schumacher himself cut a transmission tape and started sending it on one of the given frequencies. He then switched to the cryptosetting for the new radio day and could hear Kami Seya trying to answer. Reception wasn't clear, and Schumacher could not spend any more time on the problem so he left it with the CTs to keep trying." Cipher communications were finally established with Kami Seya at 1054 on 23 January, and Schumacher transmitted his entire backlog of three messages. The first announced that the Pueblo had been sighted and that it intended to institute at least daily situation reports. Bucher gave the position of his vessel and a detailed description of the North Korean vessels and their reaction to the Pueblo. The second was a detailed list of activity since the Pueblo entered the operational area, and it was addressed only to a SIGINT audience. In the third, written to fulfill the daily reporting schedule already proposed, Bucher gave an operational summary of the Pueblo's activity, stated that he felt that they were no longer under surveillance, and announced his intention to discontinue reporting. In the last of these messages, the Pueblo reported its position as 39 degrees, 24 minutes north and 127 degrees, 59 seconds east (18.2 nautical miles from U ng-do)."

Thus, Admiral Johnson's command, COMNAVFORJAPAN, finally learned around noon on 23 January of the Pueblo's position and that, although it had been detected by the North Korean vessels, the Pueblo was no longer under surveillance.

It should be noted in the ensuing discussion of the seizure of the Pueblo that most of the SIGINT data intercepted by U.S. I Isitesuweremnotavailableuror NSA reporting until after the event occurred, a period covering several hours to several days.

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Althou h the Pueblo reported that it was not under visual observation, subsequent

.__--- .....J It was during this time that the North Koreans referred to the Pueblo

as an "enemy ship" in North Korean naval communications, and the Kukchi-bong radar station was noted directing the activity of two North Korean Navy (NKN) vessels toward it.15 These SIGINT data clearly indicated that-the North Koreans at this time held some

Of particular importance prior to the approach of the North Korean subchaser and

EO L4.(c) torpedo boats to the Pueblo operating area was the,

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When Schumacher joined Bucher for breakfast on the 23d, he found Bucher slightly upset that the Pueblo had gotten about twenty-five miles ofT the coast during the night. Bucher immediately ordered the 000 to steam back in.!? At about 0800, Lieutenant Harris reported to Bucher that SIGINT activity was definitely picking up and that this was going to be the most fruitful area in which the Pueblo had operated. The SIGINT detachment was detecting quite a number of radars, but there were no indications of any hostile intent. IS

As noon approached, the Pueblo was lying to, dead in the water. The temperature was near freezing, and there was a breeze of four knots from the northwest. At 11:40 A.M., Quartermaster First Class Charles B. Law relieved Chief Warrant Officer Lacy as 000. Shortly thereafter, Law spotted a vessel coming up fairly fast ofT the Pueblo's port quarter at a distance estimated at six miles. Law notified Bucher immediately and was told to notify him again when the ship had closed to about three miles. 19 As Bucher was finishing lunch in the wardroom, he got word from the bridge that the ship, identified as an SO-1-

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class subchaser, was still closing and had not swung toward the coast. Arriving topside, Bucher summoned Harris from the SOD hut, Schumacher, and his signalman, Wendell G. Leach. After verifying that the approaching ship was an SO-1 subchaser and noting that it carried a SKINHEAD fire control radar, Harris returned to the research spaces."

As the subchaser drew closer, approaching from the south, Bucher had Dunnie Tuck, one of the two oceanographers aboard, make a Nansen cast (to collect water samples) and simultaneously ordered Leach to display the flag signals indicating hydrographic work in progress." Traveling at about 15 knots, the subchaser closed to 500 yards from the Pueblo, circled it, and then laid to toward the shore. Again the SO-1 (bearing hull number 35, i.e., SC-35) circled the Pueblo and this time hoisted a flag signal querying the Pueblo's nationality. Bucher immediately told his signalman to show it and Leach broke out a brand new American flag and hoisted it up the mast.f

25, 1
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The research detachment aboard the Pueblo was receiving a lot of!

\ none of this intelligence would have been of any use to the Pueblo crewmen in preparing them for what happened in the next instant.

By this time, the subchaser was more certain of its target, i.e., it knew the nationality of the Pueblo, it knew its hull number, i.e., GER-2, and, according to SIGINT, it also knew that its mission was electronic surveillance. This information was apparently sufficient for the North Koreans, and it soon became apparent that the Pueblo would receive special attention. For the Pueblo, it would not be a simple matter of being chased out of the area similar to what the North Korean subchaser, SC-34, had done to the South Korean fishing vessels on 10 January when a number of them came across the Northern Limit Line (see Chapter III, page 1). It would also not be a case of simple harassment such as that previously received by the USS Banner while in waters off the coasts of the USSR and the PRC.

NORTH KOREAN WARNING SIGN AL

For a third time, the subchaser circled the Pueblo and this time hoisted the flag signal "Heave to or I will open fire." This signal had been seen before by U.S. surface collection

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platforms. The USS Banner had received this signal from Soviet ships while in the Sea of Japan off Vladivostok in 1965-66. The Banner had encountered it again at the hands of the Chinese Communists in the East China Sea off Shanghai in 1967.25 The Chinese had known what the Banner was from the moment the ship first appeared off Shanghai on its first mission to that area in November 1966. Harassment had begun almost immediately. It had been met by armed Chinese trawlers that were probably vectored to the Banner by Chinese shore authorities. To the captain of the Banner, it had appeared that the trawlers were waiting for the Banner.26 This suggests that the Soviets may have given the Chinese an advance tip-off of the identity of the Banner and its mission. The Banner had first operated off the coast of the USSR in 1965-66, and Soviet officials were familiar with the ship.

On the Pueblo's flying bridge, Bucher reacted to the North Korean signal. He turned and ordered Schumacher to send out a flash precedence message to report the Pueblo's harassment and the Pueblo's intention to remain in the area if at all possible. Schumacher returned to the radio shack to draft the message, getting the Pueblo's position from the executive officer and other instructions by voice tube from the pilot house. 27

Schumacher had already called down to the cryptoroom and told them to keep open the teletype circuit to Kami Seya." Communications Technician Don Bailey had just finished transmitting all the traffic the Pueblo had for Kami Seya when someone came by the cryptoroom and told him that there were some more ships coming out toward the Pueblo. The North Koreans could not have had this quick a reaction to the Pueblo without some suspicion beforehand of what the Pueblo was and not without some degree of preplanning on what their actions would be if their suspicions had proved correct. Bailey quickly informed the Kami Seya operator that the Pueblo was getting "some more company." 29

A few seconds before, Bucher had spotted three torpedo boats headed for the Pueblo at a high rate of speed. Overhead, two MiGs flew ast the Pueblo at an altitude of about 4,000 feet in a north to south direction.

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and they surrounded the Pueblo, that IS, two forward and two aft. It soon became apparent

just what the North Koreans had in mind; Bucher had read about this deployment when reviewing the Banner reports prior to the Pueblo's departure from Japan. The Soviets had

used it against the Banner in the Sea of Japan off Vladivostok. It had also been used by the Chinese Communists in 1967 in the East China Sea off Shanghai. The pattern was designed to cut off any possible escape attempt by a vessel caught in its center. It was a

good pattern with which to intimidate a ship's crew, especially when the intended victim

was outgunned.

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Bucher told the OOD not to go to General Quarters because he did not want people corning on deck with helmets on, nor did he want the .50-caliber guns uncovered. He wanted to avoid any hostile appearance and did not want to give the Koreans any excuse to open fire on him. Bucher wanted to appear as nothin more than an innocent hydrographic ship for as long as possible.31 However,

The North Koreans knew by this time L_~~~~----~~~--~--~

that the Pueblo was an electronic surveillance ship.

In response to the subchaser's flag signal, "Heave to or I will open fire," Bucher ordered Signalman Leach to hoist a signal flag to indicate that the North Koreans were interfering with the Pueblo's free passage of international waters. Leach, however, was unable to find the exact flag signal for this in the International Code of Signals (H. O. No. 103), and so he tried to get the attention of SC-35 by flashing signal light. The subchaser did not answer or acknowledge Leach's light call, probably because it was interested only in having its order carried out. The Pueblo did not send its message."

Finishing the initial flash message, Schumacher took it to the cryptoroom for transmission. The message advised Air Intelligence Group 7623, the United States National Military Command Center in Washington, D.C., and the USS Banner of the encounter with the subchaser and that it had ordered the Pueblo to heave to or it would open fire.33 Bailey, alerted to the message preparation, had already told Kami Seya "Got a flash coming for you ... Stand by." Bailey transmitted the message (date/time group 230352Z January 1968) twice, and Kami Seya acknowledged receipt. The Pueblo's position was reported as 39 degrees, 25.2 minutes north and 127 degrees, 55 minutes east at 1200 hours. The message was immediately followed by Bailey's chatter to the Kami Seya operator: "It is worse out here now. Got more company and not doing good with them so will have to keep this circuit up." 34

Returning to the bridge, Schumacher arrived in time to see one of the torpedo boats approaching the Pueblo's starboard quarter with about eight to ten armed men positioned and ready to attempt to board the Pueblo. This was a clear indication that the North Koreans had something far more serious in mind than mere intimidation. Bucher, too, saw this maneuver and immediately signalled his engine room "all ahead full" while ordering the helmsman to course 080 that would take him directly toward the open sea.35 At the same time he ordered Signalman Leach to make up the signal that the Pueblo was departing the area. Not being able to compose this signal by international flag signal, Leach tried again to call by flashing light but got no reply from the subchaser. Bucher next told Leach to thank them for their hospitality. Since the signal light had proved ineffective, Leach attempted to send this message by semaphore; again he got no response." Once again, the North Koreans proved that they were only interested in having their orders obeyed and in getting aboard the Pueblo.

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Schumacher, in the meantime, had retired to the radio shack to prepare another flash message to update the Pueblo's situation. Desiring to make this follow-up message as accurate and as complete as possible, Schumacher scampered back to the bridge to see what signals were flying and to identify the torpedo boats so that he could include these details in the message text. This done, he typed a smooth copy and raced down to the cryptoroom to have it transmitted." This message advised the same addressees as the first message that SC-35 had been joined by three North Korean fast patrol boats and that these vessels had surrounded the Pueblo at close range. Further, the message stated that SC-35 had signalled the Pueblo, "Follow in my wake. I have a pilot aboard." This instruction to the Pueblo again indicated that the North Koreans, with a pilot aboard one of their ships, had planned to take the ship in tow prior to departing base. The second flash message from the Pueblo also advised that two MiG fighter aircraft were circling overhead; that one of the patrol boats had come alongside the Pueblo's bow with fenders rigged; that there was an armed party of North Koreans on the bow of the patrol boat ready to board; and, finally, that it was Pueblo's intention to depart the area. This second message, date/time group 230415Z January, was also sent twice and receipted for by Kami Seya."

It was now approaching 1320 hours, about eighty minutes since the Pueblo was first challenged by the subchaser. The North Koreans had been frustrated in their boarding attempt when Bucher had suddenly ordered his ship to proceed immediately toward the open sea. The Pueblo had left the intended boarding party on the bow of the PT boat with the space between the two vessels increasing as the Pueblo moved away. SIGINT analysis by NSA after the fact revealed that, having raised the flag signal "Heave to or I will open fire," the subchaser ordered one of the torpedo boats to "get a decision quickly." From 1245

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waters if there were a possible U.S. rescue attempt. They desired to get as close to North Korean territorial waters as possible before going aboard the Pueblo.

Down in the research spaces/

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Topside, Bucher was totally engaged in conning the Pueblo as he attempted to maneuver it toward the open sea and away from the North Korean subchaser. As the Pueblo began to pick up speed, the PT boats tried to force it in a more southerly direction. Running somewhere in the neighborhood of 25 to 35 knots, the PTs on the Pueblo's bow criss-crossed in front of the ship, often cutting as close as 10 yards. Bucher saw that all PT boats had their machine guns trained on him, and one on his starboard quarter had uncovered one of its torpedo tubes to aim it in the Pueblo's general direction. SC-35 remained lying to as the Pueblo opened up 2,000-3,000 yards between them. Bucher saw SC-35 lower its flag signal "Heave to or I will open fire," and shortly thereafter watched a second North Korean vessel pull alongside SC-35, and the two seemed to exchange personnel. A few minutes later, SC-35 again raised the flag signal "Oscar Lima," meaning "Heave to or I will open fire." At this time, Bucher thought, "The guy may be bluffing and I may get ou t of this yet." 42

In the research detachment, Chief Communications Technician James F. Kell, assistant to Lieutenant Harris, was convinced that the situation was deteriorating dangerously and asked Harris to request permission from the bridge to begin emergency destruction. When Harris was refused permission, Kell took it upon himself to order the detachment to commence emergency destruction immediately - he was convinced that they simply could not wait any longer."

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hopes of escaping were about to be dashed. On the flying bridge, Bucher observed the PT boats preserve their positions all around the Pueblo but open up a range of about 300 yards from his ship in all directions. Then he saw SC-35 begin closing at a high rate of speed. Bucher had an inkling of what was coming. In Bucher's words, "He had a large bone in his teeth and was closing rapidly." Bucher immediately ordered a course change of twenty degrees to starboard in order to keep the subchaser dead astern and thus give the Korean ship the smallest possible target should it open fire. It was obvious, however, that this was going to be very difficult to maintain in view of the subchaser's vastly superior speed and maneuverability. The Pueblo was being forced farther and farther south and eventually would be headed for land. SC-35 kept coming, and when it reached a position just forward

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of the Pueblo's stern ofT the port quarter, it fired its first salvo from its 57mm batteries. Almost simultaneously, a number of the surrounding PT boats raked the Pueblo with machine gun fire."

These first rounds struck the Pueblo's forward mast, knocking out one of the antennas, and shrapnel exploded all about the flying bridge. Signalman Leach was struck in his left calf and upper right side. Bucher, too, received slight shrapnel wounds, but they were not incapacitating. Immediately, Bucher passed the word to begin emergency destruction with the exception of the communication equipment then in use and turning to Chief Warrant Officer Lacy, his engineering officer, he asked if the ship could be scuttled. Lacy replied that it would take hours to do so. Bucher promptly dismissed this action. Lacy then asked, "Shall we go to General Quarters?" and Bucher replied, "Not yet" - because the ship had not been hit hard, and there was no damage along the water line."

Within seconds, the subchaser fired additional 57mm salvos that made a shambles of the plexiglass screen on the flying bridge. To Bucher, it was obvious that the Koreans were deliberately trying to knock out the Pueblo's command and control. None of the North Korean gunfire from the 57mm mount hit the Pueblo near the waterline; all of it was directed at the superstructure. It indicated that the North Koreans did not want to sink the ship but, rather, to get aboard and seize it. According to one crew member, the North Koreans had raked the ship with machine gun fire to keep the Pueblo crew from destroying or disposing of material. 47

When the firing continued, Bucher immediately ordered everyone on the flying bridge into the pilot house where there was more cover. Simultaneously, he ordered General Quarters but modified it by ordering no one to come topside. In doing so, Bucher's purpose was only to man General Quarters in order to combat flooding and fire. He did not want a large number of crewmen in helmets running about on the deck in full view of the North Koreans. He still wished to prevent any display of a hostile attitude."

Bucher's order to begin emergency destruction triggered a frenzy of activity throughout the ship. The incinerator installed just aft of the pilot house was put into use at once, but it was quickly apparent that this device could not keep up with the volume of materials to be burned. The destruction activity was, of course, hampered by Bucher's GQ order not to go on deck.

In the research spaces, just after the Korean subchaser first appeared, Harris removed his emergency destruction bill from a backlog file and posted it for possible reference. The bill had been routed to all detachment personnel to read several weeks earlier so that each man would know his individual destruction responsibilities." However, actual simulation of emergency destruction procedures aboard the Pueblo had never been carried out.

Emergency destruction related both to classified equipment (particularly the cryptographic gear) and to classified cryptologic and cryptographic documents of all shapes, sizes, and bindings. The primary tools for equipment destruction were three fire axes, three sledges, and some small chipping hammers.P" Two electric shredders which

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were stored outside the research spaces up near the incinerator, although used under normal conditions for pre-incinerator preparation of materials, were never broken out. These devices could accept only six or seven sheets of paper at one time, and through use, the cutters dulled quickly; for mass destruction, they were worthless. It was clear that this effort would require an extraordinary measure, one that would destroy a large amount of paper in the very minimum of time.

Within two or three minutes after Chief Kell ordered his men to begin emergency destruction, the official order to do so was passed from the bridge. By then, destruction had begun with sledges and axes." Upon getting the official word, Harris asked Murphy, the executive officer, what the water's depth was in their location. He was told it was about thirty-five fathoms. 52 This meant it would be risky to jettison material overboard where it might be recovered from such relatively shallow water. Nevertheless, since it was obvious that it would be impossible to burn everything, many documents and publications were tossed into lead-weighted, canvas bags that had been specially made for the Pueblo while it was being outfitted at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. 53 Mattress covers and laundry bags, too, were used to hold classified materials that would have to be jettisoned if necessary.

Realizing the inadequacy of the incinerator, Communications Technician First Class James A. Shepard went to the crew's head and grabbed several metal waste cans and distributed them in the passageway just outside of the research area for use in burning publications. 54 Soon after these fires were started, however, the smoke build-up inside was too great to endure, and the cans were moved up to the starboard weather deck. With the Pueblo in a General Quarters condition, its internal ventilation system was shut down and this, of course, made the smoky conditions in the research detachment passageway worse.55 When burning was slowed down because of the smoke, crewmen attempted to keep up with the bulk of material to be destroyed by tearing up publications into small pieces and scattering these about to make it difficult to piece them together. 56

The frantic burning efforts by the Pueblo crew did not escape the eyes of the North Koreans aboard the vessels near the Pueblo.57 This burning activity and the fact that the North Koreans knew that the Pueblo was still transmitting were probably additional reasons for the North Korean urgency in getting aboard and stopping these activities by the crew.

In the cryptoroom, Senior Chief Communications Technician Ralph W. Bouden began smashing equipment not then in use. He found the fire axe to be effective for destroying chassis; the sledge, however, just seemed to bounce off open drawers. Although this was testimony to the solid durability of the equipment, it was also a deterrent to rapid destruction. In the cramped cryptospaces too, there was virtually no room to swing either an axe or sledge. Bouden used a chipping hammer to destroy cryptoboards, rotors, and key cards by pounding them on the metal deck. 58

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Outside, Bucher, having abandoned the damaged flying bridge, scrambled into the pilot house for additional protection. Once inside, Bucher called Harris by telephone to find out how the destruction was progressing and was told that things were going all right. It is difficult to understand why Harris, in the SOD hut, gave Bucher such a response in view of the mass of material yet to be destroyed at that point in time and the large amount of material eventually compromised. It is a clear indication that Harris did not have control of the destruction operations in the SOD area.

Bucher reported later that all he could think of at this time was how he could augment the destruction process. In the mass of confusion caused by the North Korean firing, no one thought of using one of the Pueblo's small compartments, opening the porthole, sealing off the room, and using this space as a large incinerator with flammable liquid that was available aboard the Pueblo. After his return from captivity, Bucher admitted that this was one solution he had not thought of at the time. 59

Bucher also believed that his reasoning in not having crewmen come topside in a full General Quarters alarm was a valid one. He did not want to give the North Koreans another excuse to continue their firing by having a large number of his crew on deck with helmets on and thinking that the Pueblo was about to do battle. A limited number of crewmen on deck would keep down the number of casualties. Those crewmembers not topside would also be available to help in destroying equipment and documents. so

It was a forlorn hope. Although there was a destruction bill made up prior to the arrival of the ship in the Sea of Japan, the crew was never drilled in its application. Consequently, many members of the crew did not know where they were assigned during the destruction activity; relatively few crewmembers, including CTs, during their debrief in the United States, said that they had a duty station during the emergency destruction activity while others said that they had never seen the destruction bill. It was truly a chaotic emergency destruction effort, and the result was that a massive amount of classified material was left untouched.

By now, the subchaser was only 800 yards from the Pueblo, and it began pumping 57- mm shells into the Pueblo's superstructure at point-blank range. One salvo ripped through the pilot house. Fortunately, no one was seriously wounded, but Bucher could see that his executive officer, Lieutenant Murphy, was hugging the deck of the pilot house and not reacting. Bucher lashed out with his foot and ordered Murphy to get off the deck. 61 When the next salvo struck the Pueblo seconds later, Chief Warrant Officer Gene Lacy, Bucher's engineering officer, turned to his commanding officer and said, "Are you going to stop this goddam ship before we're all killed?" Thereupon, in Bucher's words, "I looked at him and Gene looked at me and 1 lowered my eyes and I was trying to think how the hell to answer him because I didn't want to panic the rest of the people in the pilot house 'cause the shells were coming pretty hot and furious and I didn't have a ready made answer for

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him ... and without any further ado, Gene goes over to the annunciator and rings up 'all stop'. ,,62 Bucher, for the moment, had lost control of his ship.

As the ship stopped, so did the firing. At this point, Bucher decided not to do anything about Lacy but rather to leave the ship at "all stop" for a few minutes and go below to get rid of the classified materials in his stateroom. Returning to the bridge in about two minutes, Bucher saw the subchaser flying the flag signal "Follow me, I have a pilot aboard." Deciding to heed the message and follow SC-35 while checking the progress of destruction of classified materials, Bucher rang up "all ahead one-third" and turned in a wide circle to starboard behind the subchaser."

North Korean firing on the Pueblo occurred at two intervals between 1:32 and 1:51 P.M. At 1:36 P.M., NSA reported from intercepted communications that SC-35 stated that it had brought the target to a stop by firing "warning shots." (No warning shots were fired by the subchaser; from the moment it opened fire, the rounds were directed at the Pueblo.t At 1:40 P.M., SC-35 said that it intended to fire a few more rounds to make the target "come in," 64 i.e., turn around and come in closer toward the Korean coast. From the beginning of this situation, Bucher had been depending on Schumacher to report developments to U.S. naval authorities by means of the circuit to Kami Seya. As soon as the North Koreans began firing on the Pueblo, Bucher ordered a CRITIC message transmitted. In the cryptoroom, Lieutenant Harris and Communications Technician First Class Bailey were frantically searching for a prepoked tape that contained all the formal CRITIC message heading prescribed by pertinent instructions. Upon stepping into the room and seeing this frenzy, Communications Technician First Class James D. Layton shoved Bailey out of his chair and took over the circuit. Layton phased the KW-7 cryptodevice and immediately started sending the "zebra" and "bell" flash indicators. He reported the Pueblo's position as 39 degrees, 25 minutes north and 127 degrees, 54.3 minutes east followed by a string of SOS's; he notified Kami Seya that the Pueblo was holding emergency destruction, was being boarded, and asked for assistance. At 1:52 P.M., Layton sent word that the Pueblo was probably being escorted into Wonsan. Seeing that Bailey had gotten over his nervousness, Layton returned the circuit to him." Kami Seya, in reply, said that "word has gone to all authorities and Admiral Johnson is requesting assistance.?" (In regard to Admiral Johnson, the Kami Seya operator may have been trying to give the Pueblo crew some encouragement. Johnson could not have known about the Pueblo's difficulty until some time afterward, since he was on temporary duty in Tokyo at the time and did not have access to secure communications to his command. He did, nevertheless, leave Tokyo immediately after notification and returned to his command.)

With the Pueblo now following the subchaser, Bucher decided to check on the destruction being done at the incinerator. From the bridge, he could see people working furiously to burn his own communications publications piled up by the incinerator. Realizing that there was still quite a bit to destroy, Bucher ordered "all stop." 67

66

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The subchaser, at this time, was about 800 yards ahead of Pueblo ofT its starboard bow.

When the North Korean ship saw that the Pueblo had come to a stop, its reaction was swift and deadly. It fired two salvos of 57mm shells, which struck the Pueblo aft of the bridge on the starboard side. One of the shells exploded in the passageway outside the wardroom, virtually severing the right leg of Fireman Duane Hodges at the thigh and seriously wounding Fireman Steven Woelk, both of whom had been helping to destroy publications. A second shell struck nearby and both Sergeant Robert Chicca (one of the Korean linguists) and Radioman Third Class Charles Crandell sustained shrapnel wounds.

Following this shelling, Bucher ordered the Pueblo "all ahead one-third" and then departed the bridge on the port side through the interior passageway to assess the damage. He could see that Hodges was mortally wounded and went immediately to the research spaces to make a personal report of the Pueblo's situation. Arriving there he saw a great quantity of paper and publications lying around on the deck and the banks of equipment being attacked with fire axes and sledges. He ordered Harris to get rid of all the material on the deck and then stepped into the cryptoroom. Bucher told the teletype operator to notify COMNAVFORJAPAN that he had several wounded and was surrendering the ship." Thereupon, at 2:03 P.M., Bailey typed the following: "Have been requested (sic) to follow into Wonsan. Have three wounded and one man with leg blown ofT. Have not used any weapons nor uncovered 50 cal MG [machine gun]. Destroying all key lists and as much elec equip as possible. How about some help, these guys mean business. Have sustained small wound in rectum. Do not intend to ofTer any resistance. Do not know how long will be able to hold u ckt [to maintain communications with you on this circuit]. And do not know ifcomms spaces will be entered." Bucher waited for a few moments to be sure the message was received and for any reply. The Kami Seya operator came back with: "We still with you and doing all we can, old man. Everyone really turning to and figure by now Air Force got some bird winging ur way." 69 In his attempt to encourage the Pueblo crew, however, the Kami Seya operator was holding out a false hope of assistance. With this word from COMNAVFORJAPAN, Bucher returned to the bridge.

The senior chief petty officers on watch had responsibility for the supervision of destruction activities in the research detachment spaces. As soon as Bucher gave the order for destruction, Harris left the area to destroy registered publications and then went to the cryptoroom to oversee what was being reported to Kami Seya. Harris later reported during his debrief in the United States: "I spent most of my time overseeing the circuit, making sure that nothing went out, that wasn't fully approved ... so I didn't pay any attention to the emergency destruction, but I would like to have, but I felt that there should be no unauthorized information transmitted because this was being watched very closely by high-ranking people."?" It was another example of misdirection by the Pueblo crew in not recognizing what the priorities should have been, i.e., destruction of classified material.

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There was an extremely large mass of material to destroy. In his debriefing, Harris recalled, " ... we had retained on board the obsolete publications and had all good intentions of getting rid of these things but had not done so at the time we had started the mission. I wanted to get the place organized eventually and we had excessive numbers of copies on board ... "71 Harris believed that, considering the size of the task confronting them and the fact that there had been no formal shipboard training sessions on either the methods or priorities of destruction, it was surprising how much the research detachment CTs accomplished." It was wishful thinking on Harris's part. Only a small percentage of the total classified material aboard the ship was destroyed.

Harris himself characterized the situation as one of panic and admitted, when debriefed, that he was "a little bit scared" and "pretty confused.?" It was at this same time too that Bucher realized the magnitude of the detachment's store of publications. In his words, "There was a just fantastic amount of paper, almost I would say ten times what I would have expected that we would have had on board. I just had no idea of how damn much of this stuff there was on board ... no concept that there was this much documentation on board; no concept whatsoever.I'"! The desperation of this destruction situation finally became clear to Bucher as he returned to the bridge.

Arriving in the wheelhouse, Bucher ordered Signalman Leach to raise the signal for "Medical Assistance Required.Y" Lieutenant Murphy was ordered to go below and break out the morphine for Baldridge to use in treating Hodges and Woelk.

When he had left the bridge earlier, Bucher had ordered "all ahead one-third." Now he noticed that the ship was making "two thirds" speed. Gene Lacy, OOD at the time, told Bucher that he had increased the speed because the PT boats had urged him to go faster." Bucher dropped the speed back to "one third" and ordered Lacy to leave it there, reminding him that he was giving the orders and not the North Koreans.

Once the Pueblo had resumed its westerly track, SC-35 and the torpedo boats arranged themselves preparatory to boarding. At about 2:08 P.M.,

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international waters and wanted to get as close to this boundary as possible before boarding so that there would be fewer questions about the seizure of the ship. It was also possible that the North Koreans did not want to get caught aboard the Pueblo in international waters in the event a U.S. military rescue/force appeared on the scene. Throughout the time that the North Koreans were forcing the Pueblo toward W onsan, they continually tried to get the Pueblo to increase its speed."

In the cryptoroom, Bailey wasfrantically destroying as much equipment as possible and Communications Technician Second Class Donald McClarren had relieved him on the circuitl IKami Seya requested information about the status of classified

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material remaining to be destroyed and McClarren reported on the Pueblo's helplessness and the fact that several publications would be compromised."

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After following in the wake ofSC-35 for about twenty-five minutes, the North Koreans signalled Bucher to come to "all stop" and he complied. It was apparent that the North Koreans now intended to board, the Pueblo having reached a more satisfactory position, probably immediately inside the claimed twelve-mile territorial waters limit. Realizing this, Bucher hurried below to get his commander's cap, change his bloodied socks and put on a pair of heavy navy boots. Quickly returning to the bridge, he ordered Boatswain's Mate First Class N. J. Klepac to prepare to receive boarders.t"

The teletype operator in the cryptoroorn began typing the Pueblo's last words to Kami Seya: "Have been directed to come to all stop and being boarded. Four men injured and one critically. Going off the air now and destroying this gear." Kami Seya's repeated reply to "please transmit in the clear" went unheeded. The time was 1:45 P.M., 23 January 1968.81

Senior Chief Communications Technician Bouden and Communications Technician First Class Bailey began smashing the KW-7 cryptogear to render it useless. Their efforts were only partially successful." With this act, the Pueblo's link with U.S. authorities was severed.

From the bridge, while watching the approaching PT boat with the boarding party, Bucher accepted Chief Warrant Officer Lacy's recommendation and advised the crew over the Pueblo's intercom to give only their name, rank, and serial number;"

On the port side of the main deck, Klepac and another crewman secured a line passed from the PT boat as it worked itself alongside the Pueblo. Two North Korean officers with pistols drawn stepped aboard the Pueblo. They were followed by eight enlisted men, each carrying a bayonet-tipped AK-47 automatic weapon. Bucher presented himself to the first officer as the Pueblo's captain." None of the boarders spoke English, but by sign language, one officer indicated that he wanted to know how many men were on board and for all to assemble on the well deck.a5 Another officer and an enlisted man went to the pilot house and ordered Helmsman Berens off the bridge and back to the fantail. The Korean guard stationed there fired a short burst from his AK-47 over the heads of crewmen standing on the fantail to demonstrate his authority and readiness to use his weapon." The North Koreans ordered Bucher up to the bridge and, shortly thereafter, Berens was returned to the bridge to take the helm again. They ordered Bucher to increase the speed from "one third," but when he said he couldn't go faster, the Koreans didn't insist."

Meanwhile, some of the North Korean enlisted men went below and brought back sheets which they tore up in strips. They then ordered the Pueblo crewmen to blindfold

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each other. For almost an hour, the crew shivered on the open deck before being ordered into the forward berthing compartrnent.t" In the engine room, Chief Engineman M.O. Goldman and Engineman First Class R. S. Blansett were permitted to remain to tend the engines as the Pueblo followed the subchaser toward Wonsan." Corpsman Baldridge, although guarded by a North Korean enlisted man, was also permitted to continue treating Hodges and Woelk.90

About an hour after the initial boarding, the North Korean officer on the bridge ordered the Pueblo "all stop" to receive another group of officers who had boarded from one of the PT boats. In this party was a senior colonel (later referred to as "Colonel Scar"), who was the officer in command of the North Korean force, and an interpreter'." As senior officer, he probably did not think it prudent to board the Pueblo until it had been brought closer to shore and the initial North Korean boarding party had gotten complete control of the ship. The senior colonel immediately ordered Bucher to take him on a complete tour of the ship, including the research detachment spaces.

The door to the research spaces was open, and Bucher was surprised to see the same bags that were lying on the deck an hour before still lying in the same position with nothing done to them. There was a deep layer of loose codeword papers scattered about the passageway." Upon entering the crypto-area, the North Koreans noticed that a few of the teletype machines were still clattering away and immediately began jerking out patch panel wiring and hitting power switches, but even then they could not completely shut down the equipment. According to Bucher, "the Koreans' eyes really bugged open when they saw that shack in there. They just didn't know what the hell they had ... " 93

Another member of the second boarding party was a civilian pilot who went directly to the bridge and sent Berens down below to join the rest of the Pueblo crew. The pilot rang up "all ahead flank," and the engine room responded promptly so that the Pueblo began making about 12.5 knots."

Later analysis ofSIGINT revealed

Following the tour of the ship, Bucher's captors returned him to the passageway just forward of his stateroom and ordered him to sit there on the deck beside the blanketcovered body of Fireman Hodges. Corpsman Baldridge told Bucher that Hodges had died a

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short time before and remembers that the commander "seemed to be rather emotionally upset and more or less just had a shocked look on his face. ,,96

Probably because of the variety of clothing worn by the Pueblo's crew, it was difficult for the North Koreans to readily identify the other Pueblo officers. In any case, none of the other officers were singled out and given special attention. In Bucher's words " ... none of us looked very Navy ... the crew were in dungarees with either blue or leather jackets ... some of them had on foul weather gear ... we were not a really military looking group." 97 Thus subdued and subject to North Korean military control, the Pueblo plowed on toward Wonsan. Sometime after sunset at about 7:00 P.M., the ship was brought to "full stop" and moored to a concrete pier in Wonsan. Its crew was about to begin its harrowing ordeal of detention. There was still no reliefin sight from U.S. military forces.

In summary, the maiden voyage of the newly recommissioned USS Pueblo in January 1968 was not a well-planned operation. The ship's preparation was hurried, and the crew was not adequately trained to meet the emergency that confronted them. The SIGINT detachment did not know how to conduct aspects of its mission and, more importantly, did not train in emergency destruction measures. There were numerous highly classified documents aboard the ship that were outdated, some were not needed to carry out the mission, and still others were in unnecessary duplicate copies. When the destruction order finally came, the Pueblo crew was thrown into complete disorder.

By at least 20 January, North Korean military authorities were aware of the Pueblo's presence off North Korea. Visual reconnaissance of the Pueblo began shortly thereafter. Once the Pueblo was confirmed by the North Koreans as an American vessel and as an intelligence collector, the North Korean purpose was to force the ship into submission and to seize it.

On the basis of a striking similarity in the manner of treatment, it would appear that the Soviets, Chinese, and the North Koreans had coordinated their efforts and procedures against U.S. SIGINT ships in international waters. This conclusion is drawn from the fact that all used the same tactics and signals against U.S. AGERs. In the Sea of Japan off Vladivostok in 1965-66, and in the East China Sea off Shanghai in 1967, and finally off Korea in 1968, the objective of such tactics may have been to get aboard the U.S. ships either by force or intimidation and to seize what was available of classified material; this purpose was carried out by the North Koreans. They avoided sinking the ship in contrast to their treatment of a number of South Korean fishing vessels; they carefully directed their fire in order to knock out the command and control of the Pueblo, thus making it easier to seize control of the ship; none of the North Korean gunfire hit the Pueblo near the waterline - all of it was directed at the superstructure.

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Whatever their intentions, the North Koreans had now captured an American SIGINT collector - giving them unfettered access to equipment, documentation, and the crew's knowledge.

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Chapter V

Indecision in Washington and the Pacific

u.s. PREOCCUPATION WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA

On 23 January 1968, the United States government was preoccupied with events in Southeast Asia. Now in early January 1968, there was evidence that the North Vietnamese were planning an assault on the Khe Sanh Combat Base in the far northwest corner of South Vietnam. This brought forth memories of the French debacle at Dien Bien Phu (1954). In Washington, the White House Situation Room was dominated by a large aerial photographic mosaic of the Khe Sanh area showing details of the U.S. Marine trench line and the latest-reported communist positions; a large terrain model of the Khe Sanh area had also been acquired for the president's use.

U.S. Air Force operations also reflected the sharp increase in hostilities in Southeast Asia. Because of the increased movement of North Vietnamese troops and truck convoys along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos during January 1968, the USAF temporarily shifted most of its attention from targets in North and South Vietnam in order to concentrate on this major infiltration route to South Vietnam. An estimated 250 planes a day, more than triple the average daily rate, carried out these air strikes.' If there were to be serious trouble for the United States in the immediate future, it was expected to come in South Vietnam.

I

U.S. MILITARY CHAIN OF COMMAND IN THE PACIFIC

It was against this background that the Pueblo incident took place. To appreciate the U.S. military reaction to news of the attack on the Pueblo, one should be aware of the geographic location of the headquarters of the command echelons that could respond to the Pueblo's plight. These commands and their locations were as follows: Commander, Naval Forces, Japan, Yokosuka, Japan; Commander, Seventh Fleet, aboard the cruiser USS Providence, deployed in the Gulf of Tonkin off Vietnam; Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Honolulu; Commander in Chief, Pacific, Honolulu; Commander, Fifth Air Force, Fuchu, Japan; Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force, Honolulu; Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, Seoul, South Korea; National Military Command Center, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.; and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon, Washington. Although all of these commands were linked by communications facilities, the physical distances restricted easy and rapid military response to the Pueblo's needs. In effect, the Pueblo's chain of command threaded itself from a point approximately sixteen miles off the port of Won san, North Korea, through Japan, down to the Gulf of Tonkin, then eastward

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across the Pacific to Hawaii and from there to Washington. It stretched almost halfway around the globe. This would prove to be a major problem.

PACIFIC COMMAND RESPONSE TO PUEBLO EMERGENCY

Shortly after noon on Tuesday, 23 January, Lieutenant Commander Carl L. Hokenson Jr., the duty officer at Commander, Naval Forces, Japan, received Situation Report (SITREP) #1 message of the previous evening in which the Pueblo reported being observed and circled by two North Korean trawlers. Within ten minutes, Hokenson received SITREP#2. This message reported that no surveillance attempt had been made during the night and that this message would be the last SITREP on this incident. The Pueblo would return to radio silence. After reading both messages, the duty officer took no action other than to post them on the intelligence interest board at headquarters."

In less than an hour, at 12:52 p.M.1 ~amimSeya,u(twefitY~riiriemiriilesmtrom

Yokosuka) received Pueblo's message labeled JOPREP Pinnacle #1, which reported that the Pueblo had been ordered to heave to or be fired upon. The label designated the message as a Joint Operational Report (JOPREP) of special interest to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Military Command Center, and the White House. This was quickly relayed to Lieutenant Commander Hokenson, who immediately took the message to the Chief of Staff, Captain Forest A. Pease, USN. Upon reading it, Pease said, "Looks like We might have some trouble ... let me know what develops.r" Thereafter, at 1:25/p.M., Lieutenant Commander Hokenson directed that the Pinnacle #1 message plus the SITREP messages be delivered to the Operations Staff (N3), Captain William H/Everett, USN, located in Building C-39 several hundred yards away." Looking at the/messages, Everett interpreted the North Korean action as only harassment and intimidation." After all, the Soviets had issued a similar threat to the Banner while in the Sea of Japan a short time earlier.

This assessment of the situation changed quickly. The Intelligence Staff offices at COMNAVFORJAPAN received the Pueblo's Pinnacle Number 2 message at 1:39 P.M. and delivered it to Captain Pease. This report of attempted boarding prompted Pease to direct Hokenson to notify Captain Everett to "relay this info to Fifth Air Force and push the button for contingency action.' This action indicated that Pease also believed that contingency back-up protective forces for the Pueblo were in place and that they could be called upon in case .: of' need. The Intelligence yaff (N2) Iwas ordered to be ready to issue a CRITIC message, and almost simultaneously began relaying to N2 the on-line point-to-point operator chatter between it and the Pueblo? COMNAVFORJAPAN's initial CRITIC was released at 1:36 P.M. (230436Z) based upon the Pueblo's Pinnacle #2 message;

I r1so relayed the Pueblo's message in CRITICOMM channels.

At about the same time, Lieutenant Commander Ager L. Wilson on the N3 Staff, COMN A VFORJAPAN, placed a secure telephone call to the Fifth Air Force Command

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Center at Fuchu. At that headquarters, knowledge of the Pueblo's operation was minimal. Although the Fifth Air Force had been an information addressee on Pacific Fleet and Naval Forces, Japan, planning messages in December 1967, it was included as an addressee of the execution message of 5 January 1968 only in an address indicator group distribution. As a result, only a limited number of officers in the Fifth Air Force Intelligence and Operations saw the execution message. Because the message did not request air cover or strip alert by the Fifth Air Force, and since the planning message had estimated risk to be "minimal," the execution message was not brought to the attention of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Fifth Air Force, or anyone in the command section. As a result, none of these officers knew that the Pueblo operation was under way."

When the Fifth Air Force Command Center received Wilson's telephone call for Lieutenant Colonel James F. Duggan, the call was considered routine since Wilson did not give any precedence indicator. Because Duggan (assigned to Operations and Training) was not assigned to the Command Center, the operator telephoned Duggan's secretary only to learn that he was on temporary detached duty. Duggan's assistant, Major Raymond A. Priest, Jr., was present, however, and was asked to come to the command center to take a secure telephone call. It was 1:45 P.M. when Priest arrived at the secure phone in the Fifth Air Force Command Center. Wilson advised him of the codeword "ICHTHYIC," gave the Pueblo's position, stated that it was being circled by two MiG aircraft and North Korean boats and was under attack. He requested Air Force assistance. This word from Wilson meant nothing to Priest as he had never heard of the Pueblo. He asked Wilson to repeat the message to ensure that he, Priest, had the correct information. Wilson did so, and this time he added that the codeword was formerly «CLICKBEETLE." This was a term that Wilson recognized, but since the telephone call had no precedence, he believed it to be an exercise and started for an office he knew was familiar with CLICKBEETLE operations. On his way, Priest encountered Commander Thomas E. McDonald, Seventh Fleet liaison officer to Fifth Air Force, and asked if Wilson's message meant anything to him. McDonald said «yes" and that he would take care of it. The time was 1:50 P.M. Thereafter, Commander McDonald notified the Fifth Air Force cognizant officer and the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, and briefed them. They plotted the Pueblo's position and requested information on the status of Fifth Air Force aircraft. 7

Back at Yokosuka, COMNAVFORJAPAN issued a second CRITIC at 1:46 P.M. based on the Pueblo's operator chatter indicating that the ship was being boarded. A few minutes later Captain Pease placed a call to Rear Admiral Frank L. Johnson, COMNAVFORJAPAN, at the Sanno Hotel in Tokyo where Johnson was attending the annual Pacific Command TROPICAL CYCLONE Conference at which he delivered the welcoming address. The unclassified telephone circuit permitted Pease to report on the Pueblo incident only sketchily. He indicated that the Pueblo was in trouble and stated, "She is probably gone." Admiral Johnson asked if the Fifth Air Force had been alerted and whether search and rescue operations had been requested since he had drawn the

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inference that the Pueblo had been sunk. In reply to Pease's information, Johnson said that he would return to Yokosuka immediately. A United States Army helicopter was obtained from Camp Zama to take Johnson to Hardy Barracks in Tokyo. From there, he transferred to another helicopter and arrived at Fleet Activities, Yokosuka heliport, at 3:05 P.M. Five minutes later he was in his headquarters where he received a briefing on the Pueblo situation."

NO U.S. FORCES AVAILABLE TO ASSIST PUEBW

At 1408, Wilson again telephoned the Fifth Air Force to find out what action had been taken in response to his earlier call for assistance. McDonald told Wilson that no action on the scene could be expected in less than three hours, and he further asked Wilson to confirm his request by message. COMNAVFORJAPAN sent this confirming message to the Fifth Air Force at 1420. It had now been an hour and a half since the Pueblo's first distress message. About ten minutes later the Fifth Air Force telephoned Yokosuka and reported that there were no aircraft on strip alert; in fact, the policy for Sea of Japan missions did not call for specific alerts by the Fifth Air Force as had been previously requested for East China Sea operations. The Fifth Air Force estimated that there would be a two- to three-hour delay in launching aircraft. Soon after this telephone call, Admiral Johnson received word that the Pueblo was being taken to Wonsan and, in view of this development, made no further requests for assistance from any other command." Later in the evening, Admiral Johnson, as Commander, Task Force 96, instructed the USS Banner (AGER 1), just beginning a patrol, to return to Yokosuka because of the Pueblo incident and the probable compromise of its on-board key lists. The Banner returned to port at approximately 0700 the following day.

At Fuchu, Lieutenant General Seth J. McKee, Commander, Fifth Air Force, was informed of the Pueblo matter at 2: 15 P.M. by his Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations; the Chief, Reconnaissance Division; and Commander McDonald. Immediately, General McKee went to his command center and placed a secure telephone call to headquarters, Pacific Air Force, in Hawaii. While waiting for this call to be completed, McKee called the commander, 18th Tactical Fighter Wing in Okinawa and directed him to prepare for immediate deployment of F-105 fighter bombers to Osan Air Force Base, South Korea. In order to expedite their deployment, these aircraft were to be launched on an incremental basis with only the first six available configured with loaded guns. By 1446, General John D. Ryan, CINCPACAF, had arrived at his secure telephone in Hawaii and was advised of the situation and actions taken. His staff also informed him of General McKee's attempt to launch strikes in support of the Pueblo, provided the aircraft could get to the scene before darkness and prior to the time that the ship arrived inside the three-mile limit of North Korea. General Ryan agreed with the actions taken and those proposed. 10

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About 510 miles south of the Pueblo, the nuclear-powered USS Enterprise, America's largest aircraft carrier, was steaming southward in the Sea of Japan toward Subic Bay, Philippine Islands. The Enterprise had recently departed the United States for Southeast Asia, had made a brief stop in Sasebo, Japan, and was to proceed south to the Philippines area as rapidly as possible to engage in several days of refresher air operations in order to prepare for action in the Gulf of Tonkin. The ship had encountered a severe storm in crossing the Pacific, and many of the aircraft were under repair because of corrosion and water damage. Aboard the Enterprise were four F-4B Phantom fighter bombers on alert with pilots standing by, but these aircraft were armed with air-to-air ordnance only. The planes were not equipped for an air-to-surface engagement."

channels. This was delivered at once to Rear Admiral Horace H. Epes, Jr., Commander, Carrier Division One and Task Force 71, with his flag on board the Enterprise. Admiral Epes had never heard of the Pueblo but assumed that, ifhe were to have responsibility for it, he would have been so informed. Not being familiar with the Pueblo's mission, Epes sent for naval publications that might contain a description of the Pueblo. At the same time, he sent for a chart and had the Pueblo's position plotted. The ship appeared to be close to Wonsan Harbor. He got the distance from the Enterprise to Wonsan and obtained from the Enterprise's captain the status of his aircraft and the amount of time it/would take the carrier to get some aircraft in the air. The time given was one and one half hours. Epes's staff got out all the intelligence material on board regarding North Korea - charts, air order of battle, missile and antiaircraft order of battle, an estimate of weather conditions at Wonsan, and the time of darkness. The pilots of the four ready aircraft, however, were not briefed, and no one had officially requested help from the Enterprise. 12

By 3:00 P.M., Admiral Epes had received additional messages about the shooting incident and reached the judgment that it would be futile to launch aircraft to assist the Pueblo. He concluded that by the time he could get any aircraft there, it would be well inside the North Korean three-mile limit. In Epes's opinion, to fuel/ and suitably arm a group of aircraft and to ready the carrier deck for a launching would have taken an hour and a half, even if the flight crew had known what they were going to do and had all the materials on hand for that purpose." Probably, the naval task force commander believed that he had done all that he could in regard to the Pueblo's situation.

In the Gulf of Tonkin, the guided missile cruiser USS Providence, flagship of the Seventh Fleet, was steaming toward the South China Sea .. For the past several weeks, it had been stationed off the coast of Vietnam, and it was now/headed for a few days of liberty in Hong Kong." It was 2:10 P.M. Korean time when the Providence received the Pueblo's Pinnacle #2 message that an armed North Korean party/was attempting to board the ship. This information had been passed byl Ivia torn tape relay at Naval

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Communications Station, Philippines. Shortly thereafter, the relayed, fragmentary, operator chatter revealed that four men had been injured and that the Pueblo was being ordered into Wonsan Harbor." With this news, the Seventh Fleet staff immediately notified its commander, Vice Admiral William A. Bringle. The admiral unfortunately was not personally aware of the specifics of the Pueblo mission and did not know that it was operating off Wonsan. Naval Forces, Japan, had failed to send a copy of the Pueblo's sailing orders to Seventh Fleet by electrical means. Instead, it forwarded a copy of the orders via the Armed Forces Courier Service, and this copy would not reach the flagship until 27 -Ianuary."

After assessing the status and location of the Pueblo and the nearest Seventh Fleet units, Admiral Bringle ordered the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise to proceed together with the nuclear-powered guided missile frigate USS Truxton at best possible speed to a holding area at 32 degrees, 30 minutes north and 127 degrees, 30 minutes east, a location about four hundred miles from Wonsan and there to await further developments.F The Pueblo's time was 3:06 P.M. Admiral Bringle's message also directed the destroyers Higbee (in Sasebo), Collett (located 120 miles south of Yokosuka), and the O'Bannon (in Yokosuka) to rendezvous with the Enterprise and Truxton.

In Honolulu, it was 7:15 P.M. local time, 22 January, when the War Room at Pacific Headquarters received a telephone call from the National Military Command Center in Washington notifying it of the Pueblo incident. Almost immediately, the same information in fragmented form began arriving on the War Room teletype followed by

receipt of the Pueblo's Pinnacle #1 message as relayed b~ Eoll. 4. (c)

Appropriate Pacific Fleet staff personnel were notified immediately, including the Chief of

Staff for Plans and Operations, Major General Royal B. Allison, USAF. 18 Admiral Ulysses

S. G. Sharp, CINCPAC, was in Danang, South Vietnam, conferring with General Westmoreland and Lieutenant General Cushman concerning the threat of a serious enemy

offensive.

Five minutes later, the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Center received simultaneous telephone calls from the Pacific Indications Center and from Lieutenant Commander Wilson in Yokosuka to alert it to the Pueblo incident. Wilson reported that the Fifth Air Force had been requested to provide air support. The Intelligence Center quickly took action to augment existing watch personnel and notified Admiral John J. Hyland, CINCPACFLT.

Staff officers established telephone communications with CINCPAC, COMN A VFORJAPAN, the Fleet Activities at Yokosuka and Sasebo, and the Fifth Air Force to determine the availability of forces that might assist the Pueblo. At 7:41 P.M. Hawaii time, the Intelligence Center received the Pueblo's Pinnacle #2 message confirming the attempted boarding. Although the situation was tense, it was not interpreted as being out of control. Within the next forty-five minutes, Pacific Fleet headquarters had received all follow-ups to Yokosuka's original CRITIC message. The

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Pueblo's deteriorating situation, personnel injuries, equipment destruction, and final circuit deactivation were all now known."

Meanwhile, at Fuchu, Lieutenant General McKee was trying to determine what his Fifth Air Force could do to support the Pueblo. The outlook was bleak. At Osan Air Force Base there were four F-4 aircraft on strategic alert,

L..:---:----:-------:-----:-i Although McKee doubted that the F-4s co~ldreachWonsaribefore darkness, he nevertheless ordered the F -4sl ~onfigured with 3,000-pound bombs, the only ordnance they could carry with equipment available. Racks for smaller bombs were located at main support bases in Japan. Further,there were no air-to-air rockets nor launching rails and pylons in Korea with which to arm the F-4s. The F-I05s stationed at Yokota, Japan, could not reach Wonsan before darkness. Flying time was about an hour and forty-five minutes, but darkness would occur in an hour and a half. At 3:20 P.M., PACAF headquarters telephoned General McKee and, when advised of the situation, General Ryan authorized McKee to attack the North Korean ships in the vicinity of the Pueblo but only if they were outside the three-mile limit. Further, Ryan instructed McKee not to send in the F -4s unless they were armed against the threat of the MiG cover over the Pueblo. 20

NSA RESPONSE TO THE PUEBLO INCIDENT

NSA representatives in the Far East responded promptly to CRITIC reporting of the

Pueblo's plight. At 2:40 p.M.,1 Ifarid

1 ~~ I

In Washington, it was almost midnight (local time on 22 January, 1:45P.M:Pueblo time on 23 January) when the initial CRITIQmes~age froml raridNaval Forces, Japan, arrived at both the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and atthe National Security Agency SIGlI'-(TCOmmand Center (NSASCC), Fort Meade, Maryland. In the next twenty minutes.-tfie NMCC notified the White House Situation Room, the State Department\yatchOffice, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. At NSA,~ I Ithe NSA Senior Operations Officer (SNOO) in the SIGINT Comman~

first notified the B Group Operations Center. which. in turn. began caning key personnel

from the cognizant office at NSAI 1 Thereafter,1 t

informed General Carter, Director, NSA; Brigadier General John E. Morrison, USAF, Assistant Director, NSA, for Production (ADP); Rear Admiral Lester R. Schulz, USN, Head, National Cryptologic Staff (D3); Captain Barr, USN, Assistant Director, Naval

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Security Group,(~D~~(});uall~1 uuuummmmmmmmmuuulUSA,1 r~~llu '::;P'p • L. 86- 3 6

D0fthelnformation and Reporting element (P2), NSA. ....._---------,

At twenty minutes past midnight, General Morrison arrivedat.theCommand Center followed very shortly b Ca tain Barr; P2; Leonard Bienvenu, Chief,

Office of Security (M5)' of Mobile Collection (K12); Milton Zaslow, Deputy

Chief, B Group; Francis Smead and rom B05; andl Ifrom

B11. As the Pueblo operator chatter being relayed via CRITIC circuits reflected the worsening situation, General Morrison notified the Deputy Director, NSA, Dr. Louis Tordella. The NSA Communications Security Watch Officer was also called to report to work.

Apart from the natural concern for the physical safety of the Pueblo and its .crew, NSA's immediate concern about the Pueblo's seizure and whereabouts was centeredon the damage that would result from compromise of the cryptologic materials and cryptographic

equipment aboard the ship. The B Group Watch Office andl linuJapariht:!ld

informal teletype discussions, as did Milton Zaslow, withl ~n order to

determine what assistance from NSA was needed; to ensure that all SIGINT collectors/had been alerted; to request a summary of technical reporting; and to advise them of NSA's

intent to request continuous coverage of

the Korean east coast. 22 .__---------------------.

Elsewhere in Washington, others were also scrambling to find out information about the Pueblo. Having been advised by the White House Situation Room, Special Assistant to the President Walt W. Rostow arrived at the White House and telephoned General Carter at NSA to ask what command and control procedures were applicable to instances such as the Pueblo. The Director replied that there was a clear division of responsibility between NSA and the JCS concerning such reconnaissance patrols. General Carter also informed Rostow that NSA provided technical guidance and support for the SIGINT collection mission but that the JCS/JRC retained full responsibility for deployment of the ship including evaluation of physical risk factors. Carter indicated that any action taken regarding the Pueblo was a matter under JCS cognizance.f The time in Washington, D.C., was 1:30 A.M. (3:30 P.M. Pueblo time), 23 January 1968.

After talking with General Carter, Rostow telephoned Hawaii asking for information on the Enterprise's distance from Wonsan and the status of efforts to assist the Pueblo. General Allison told him that it was estimated that no aircraft could reach the Pueblo in time to help the ship." Following further telephone conversations with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Rostow notified President Lyndon Johnson ofthe situation at 2:25 A.M.

At the Pentagon, too, activity was brisk. The National Military Command Center notified both Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense, and his deputy, Paul Nitze. In turn, McNamara discussed the situation with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and then huddled with his assistant for public affairs, Phillip G. Goulding, to discuss the Pueblo's status and

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the preparation of a press release. In the interim, at 2:31 A.M. EST, the NMCC telephoned CINCPAC to notify all forces not to make any public release concerning the Pueblo incident. Nearby, the JCS/JRC was hurriedly trying to find information about the Pueblo's patrol. At 3:20 A.M., General Morrison at NSA told Captain Vineyard, USN (JCS/JRC), that because the Pueblo had been operating under radio silence during its patrol, NSA had not received any messages from the ship prior to the incident. Thereupon, Captain Vineyard requested that NSA query all appropriate stations for any SIGINT reflections of the Pueblo's location since 8 January 1968. NSA released this message query at 3:55 A.M.Z5

U.S. PREPARES PRESS RELEASE ON PUEBLO

At NSA, Robert X. Boucher, the Public Information Officer, telephoned Phillip Goulding, the Secretary of State's Assistant for Public Affairs, at 8:30 A.M. and learned that the White House, the Department of State, and the Secretary of Defense had approved a press release about the Pueblo incident. Goulding's secretary dictated the approved release to one of Boucher's staff, and copies were distributed to the NSA Directorate." At 9:15 A.M., the Department of Defense formally issued the release which identified the Pueblo as a "Navy intelligence collection auxiliary ship ... designated the AGER-2." The release gave the bare details of the seizure in international waters, the size of the ship's personnel complement, and its physical dimensions.

In less than an hour, Captain Pickett Lumpkin, Deputy Chief of Information of the Navy Department, called Boucher and asked if the Pueblo might be likened to the USS Liberty. Boucher referred him to the Department of Defense press release. When Lumpkin asked for a photograph of the Pueblo, Boucher said he would call him back. Boucher discussed the request with Gerard P. Burke and Lieutenant Commander Koczak from the executive office of the Director (DO. Both agreed that because the ship was a naval vessel, Lumpkin should be referred to the NAVSECGRU.27

Soon thereafter, both the Department of State and the Defense Intelligence Agency realized that inquiries would now be made concerning the risk assessment that was assigned to the Pueblo's mission prior to its departure for the Sea of Japan. They therefore requested copies of NSA's message of 29 December 1967 to the JCS concerning North Korean aggressiveness. Both were denied because NSA believed that JCS should provide such information, if at al l, General Carter instructed his staff that no historical information about the ship was to be released to any outside agency. This policy had been discussed with Brigadier General Ralph D. Steakely, USAF, JCS/JRC, and he agreed with General Carter's decision;" Based on this instruction, Boucher called Lumpkin at the Navy Office of Information to advise him to check with JCS/JRC for all background information on the Pueblo.29

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By mid-morning at NSA, General Carter had briefed Patrick Coyne, secretary to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) and explained that the Pueblo was a Navy responsibility and that NSA was only peripherally involved. In addition, General Carter briefed Admiral Rufus Taylor, Deputy Director, CIA; Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, USAF, Director, DIA; and Bromley Smith from the White House staff. Meanwhile, Louis Tordella, Deputy Director of NSA, talked with Coyne about the cryptographic equipment aboard the Puebloi"

Whatever course of action that the U.S. government decision makers might choose, NSA wanted to be prepared to assist. At 2:30 P.M., David McManis, the NSA representative to the White House Situation Room, telephoned Arthur J. McCafferty, an aide at the Situation Room, to learn of any decisions. McCafferty said that he had heard nothing from either the JCS or from the outcome of the White House luncheon discussions. An hour later, General Carter talked to Patrick Coyne to be sure he was receiving all the information he needed. Coyne replied that the White House Situation Room was taking care of him. Coyne then asked if NSA had any additional information on the incident, including any contemplated action by the United States. In reply, Carter said that he had not learned of any planned actions but assumed that discussions were taking place, and that he was not about to get involved in the White House and Department of State decisions."

PACIFIC COMMAND PREPARES MILITARY OPTIONS

While Washington officials hastily sought to get information about the Pueblo attack and seizure, U.S. military commands in the Pacific prepared to take some action against North Korea if requested. From Hawaii, Admiral Hyland, at approximately 5:00 P.M. Pueblo time, directed the Seventh Fleet to take steps as soon as possible to place and support a destroyer offWonsan immediately outside the twelve-mile limit. This ship was to be prepared to engage in operations that might include towing the Pueblo and/or retrieving its crew. The Seventh Fleet was also to provide air cover for the ship." Admiral Bringle of the Seventh Fleet recommended to Hyland that the presence of a naval task group in the Sea of Japan be made known to the North Koreans, and that this warning be accompanied by U.S. government demands for immediate release of the Pueblo and its crew. He also recommended compensation for material damage and personnel injuries, action against guilty parties and guarantees against any recurrence. Failing such response from North Korea, Bringle recommended naval air strikes against a suitable military target." CINCPACFLT was also considering other options, such as strikes by land-based aircraft; sending the Enterprise, Truxton and several other destroyers into the Sea of Japan to begin photo reconnaissance at first light; locating and seizing any North Korean ship on the high seas; sailing the USS Banner to the Wonsan area under heavy

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escort as a show of resolve and to provide possible assistance to the Pueblo; and blockading the port of Wonsan."

In Fuchu, at about 4:00 P.M. local time, General McKee, from his Fifth Air Force headquarters, telephoned General Ryan to give him a readiness report. Six F-I05s armed only with guns were already airborne from Kadena Air Force Base, Okinawa. The first flight of these was due at Osan within the hour and would be reconfigured, if necessary, but would not be able to strike before dark. The remaining F-I05s from Kadena, equipped with pylons only, would continue to be deployed and reconfigured upon arrival at Osan. General McKee had instructed the Eighteenth Tactical Fighter Wing to commandeer three C-130 aircraft in Okinawa to support the F-I05 squadron's deployment to South Korea. General Ryan readily approved. The F -4s, downloading at Osan, could probably launch within a half hour, but General McKee did not recommend such a launch because of the MiG screen over Wonsan. He pointed out that there were over 100 MiGs stationed within the Won san area. General Ryan again concurred. All aircraft in Japan (four F- 105s and six F-4s at Yokota and seven F-4s at Misawa) were being readied for deployment to I tazuke Air Force Base on 24 January if needed. 35

To give additional armament support to the Fifth Air Force aircraft being readied in Japan, General Ryan directed the Thirteenth Air Force at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines to fly thirty-eight Sparrow air-to-air missiles to Itazuke, Japan, as quickly as possible, together with their loading crews. Delivery would take about twelve hours. General Ryan advised the Fifth Air Force of this action and directed that the RF -4s (reconnaissance version of the F4) be positioned to reach Wonsan on the 24th and to consider the possibility of using an RB-57 for oblique offshore photography."

In South Korea, meanwhile, U.S./UN commander General Bonesteel had received word from Yokosuka at 2:25 P.M. local time about the Pueblo situation. He immediately passed this information to his component commanders with instruction to increase their alert status. \

Admiral Sharp, having completed his meeting in Danang, flew to the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk, flagship of the Commander, Task Force 77. Vice Admiral Bringle and Rear Admiral Cousins, Commander, Task Force 77, met Sharp and briefed him immediately on the Pueblo situation at about 6:00 P.M. Korean time." During the night, Admiral Sharp developed action recommendations and sent these to JCS at approximately

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7:00 A.M., 24 January, Korean time. He recommended that the North Korean action be met with a stern protest and demand for immediate release of the Pueblo and crew, full explanation ofthis act of piracy, and indemnity for all damages." Sharp did not direct nor explicitly approve of the order to position a destroyer off Wonsan outside the twelve-mile limit to be prepared to engage in operations including towing Pueblo and/or retrieving the crew. Admiral Hyland, CINCPACFLT, had issued this order. Sharp did believe, however, that the presence of a V.S. ship off Wonsan would provide one means whereby custody of the Pueblo and crew could be returned to the United States expeditiously even though the ship might be disabled. In order to minimize tension in any such act, the decision to carry out this plan should be preceded by an announcement to the North Korean government concerning the purpose of such a mission.

In this light, Admiral Sharp recommended that authority be granted to carry out the plan to station a destroyer off Wonsan in international waters for a prescribed and preannounced purpose and duration. He also recommended that the Enterprise and escorting destroyers proceed to a point about 100 miles south of Won san in the Sea of Japan and be prepared to come to the assistance of the destroyer in the event of any hostile action. In addition, Sharp stated that the Fifth Air Force should have aircraft, preferably F-4s, on strip alert ready to assist. 42

While the military commands in the Pacific assumed a readiness posture, senior officials at the Pentagon considered the possibility of taking direct military action. General Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the JCS, telephoned Admiral Hyland at about 1030 hours Washington time to direct that there be "no repeat no show of force in incident area.r" Specifically, Wheeler ordered that no air or surface forces were to reconnoiter or approach the subject area and no destroyer was to be positioned off Wonsan. Fleet units that had been repositioned as a result of the Pueblo incident were directed to proceed no farther north than their current positions." At least for the moment, there would be no V.S. military response to the seizure of the Pueblo.

Later in the evening, JCS amplified its instructions to the Pacific commands. V.S. naval and air forces were to remain outside the area within eighty nautical miles of the coast of North Korea north of a line extending east of the DMZ. The JCS also ordered the VSS Enterprise task group to operate in the southern part of the Sea of Japan south of latitude 38 degrees north. Following these instructions, JCS informed CINCPAC that V.S. forces in Korea would be maintained at present levels unless otherwise authorized by JCS.45

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u.s. MILITARY GIRDS FOR QUESTIONS ON LACK OF RESPONSE

Earlier in the day, the USAF command post in the Pentagon forwarded a request from Secretary of Defense McNamara to General Ryan asking for the number and type of USAF aircraft that could have responded to the Pueblo within an hour and forty-five minutes of the request for help and within three hours. The Fifth Air Force provided these answers: at one hour and forty-five minutes, zero aircraft; after three hours, four F -48 that had been reconfigured to carry conventional bombs but with no air-to-air combat capability." From these and other facts, General Wheeler realized that there would be questions from many sources as to why the U.S. armed services failed to prevent the Pueblo's capture. Accordingly, he sent a Flash precedence message to CINCPAC, with information copies to CINCPACFLT, Pacific Air Force, U.S. Army Pacific, and U.S. Forces Korea. The message requested these commands to provide as soon as possible a complete and detailed chronology of events that had occurred up to the time of reporting, and also the identity of combat forces by location, type, quantity, and readiness that could have come to the assistance of the Pueblo during the time the incident was taking place. Commanders were also asked to report all actions they considered taking and subsequently ruled out. Later instructions specified that replies to JCS were due no later than 8:00 A.M. Washington time on 24 -January."

The JCS also tasked the Defense Intelligence Agency to gather some information. At 2100 hours local time, the DIA Alert Center in the Pentagon sent a facsimile transmission to the NSA SIGINT Command Center asking the following questions about the Pueblo incident:

8S the Pueblo fired on by the North Korean vessels? Were any U.S. personnel wounded through enemy action?

Colonel Robert E. Duvall, DIA team chief, indicated that the questions had been asked originally by the chairman, JCS, and that a reply was desired by 8:00 A.M., 24 January. The NSA Command Center passed this query tol linutheuNavymbrarichuoffhe North Korean analytic di vision (B 11) for action.

At 2:45 A.M. on the 24th, the NSA Command Center telephoned Colonel Duvall at DIA

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U.S. BEGINS ASSESSMENT OF SIGINT COMPROMISE

DIA notified the NSA SIGINT Command Center about midnight on 23 January that the JCS had directed DIA, in coordination with NSA, to assess the impact and potential compromise resulting from the seizure of the Pueblo. DIA had sent a similar message to Headquarters, Naval Security Group Command. The NSA Command Center made certain that the NSA S13 Compromise Watch was aware of the DIA request and then notified Howard C. Barlow, the NSA Assistant Director for Communications Security. The Command Center then telephoned Madison E. Mitchell, Executive to the Assistant Director for Production at NSA, and requested that he report to work to take action on the JCS task. About three hours later, Mitchell sent an interim reply to DIA stating that an assessment of the security impact would be made as soon as NSA acquired a complete list of all COMINT-cleared personnel aboard the Pueblo and a compilation of SIGINT materials aboard the ship." The Assistant Director, Naval Security Group, had already advised NSA that NSG Headquarters was sending a message to Commander, Naval Forces Japan, at Y okosuka requesting the names of the Pueblo crew and a list of cryptologic documents

held aboard the ship." At 5:00 A.M. on 24 January, NSG for\V~r<ledutoNSAI 1

listing of all classified materia~ provided to the Pueblo. In addition, the NSA Operations Group, co located with Pacific Command headquarters in Hawaii, had telephoned to the Command Center a partial list of the Pueblo crew. The Command Center gave the list to M5, NSA's Office of Security,which was compiling a list of CO MINTcleared personnel aboard the Pueblo for the Director, NSA. 51

General Carter's concern about communications security compromises had prompted him to telephone the NSA Command Center at 6:00 P.M. to ask if the COMSEC organization at NSA had sent out any information on probable cryptographic compromises. Carter learned that these messages were then being drafted. By 7:45 P.M. Washington time, NSA had released messagesl IthecOMSEC components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and CIA concerning the possible compromise of keying materials for specific cryptographic systems and what follow-on actions would be required.f

NSA concentrated its efforts in two areas. Of first importance was the need to collect

and analyze all available I ~signals)

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NSA WASHINGTON ESTABLISHES SIGINT READINESS

Back in Washington, NSA, at 4:35 A.M. on 24 January, established SIGrNT Readiness ALPHA. (This was a stand-by condition requiring an increased degree of watchfulness during a serious situation, and it sometimes included a modification in operating nrocedures.) The ALPHA was in effect for the following stations: NSA;\

USM-81 had already established a SIGINT Readiness BRAVO for all subordinate stations because of the North Korean naval reaction to a U.S. ship off the east coast. (A SIGINT Readiness BRAVO was an alert condition declared by NSA requiring a high degree/of

vigilance, cancellation of leave, adjustments to collection posture, and reporting

periodicity of four to six hours.) Within twenty-five minutes'LI .... lchanged its

readiness condition to ALPHA to conform with NSA instructions. 55

At Fort Meade,1 tBGroup)atNSA,while

L- ~'

assessing the impact of the Pueblo seizure, reacted to events as it became aware of them.

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When the Korean Division (B11) learned of the movement of the USS Enterprise task group toward W onsan, it requested lany SIGINT reflections of North Korean reactions to this naval movement.59

Similarly, when the Seventh Fleet acted to place a destroyer outside the twelve-mile

limit off Wonsan, the B Group Watch Office directed I laswellasuthe

to report all SIGINT reflections of possible rescue

~----~~~~--~------~~~

operations by that destroyer." At 7:30 A.M. Washington time, the U.S. Foreign Broadcast

Information Service (FBIS) monitored Radio Pyongyang's report that the USS Pueblo had been captured in North Korean territorial waters. NSA (811) then directed an immediate

U.S. ADVISES ROK OF PUEBLO INCIDENT

As mentioned earlier, concern over cryptologic damage resulting from the Pueblo's capture was intense. The Korean Division at ,SA. r 6 .... : .. 4 .... 0 .... A.M. Washington time, .. s .•• e .; n •••.•• t •.••.. a ..... message t~ Irequestingmthatmhemalerttomthempossiblemcompromisemofuthe

technical support package aboard the Pueblo. NSA's intentionwas to provid with a warning in the event that the compromise precipitatedanexte'I1$ive

c ange. T e Korean?ivisigninsth.l.cte t6/accgTl1plish thiE!

""ta-s-:"k--w":"it:":"h-o-u-:"t~d:':"iv_'ulging any details.ofwhat may have been compromised.65 To-addhis.own

personal concern about-such a compromise, General Carter also sent anExclusive message

t~ p:sking him to advise oftheuprobableucompromise.mIIl

addition, Carter toldl ~6impress upo ...

information and requested that it be retained within was also to

inform General Bonesteel and appropriate U.S. emi?assyofficials 0 this potential intelligence compromise.P" In reply to Carter! (reported that he had discussed the situation privately wit~ I who appreciated being informed and who shared the

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concern over the actions of the North Koreans.Dgavehisassurancethathislfpswould. remain closed as he fully understood the extreme sensitivity of th/

reporting on the Pueblo incident."

~ \also be made aware of what Ihad happen!~to the Pueblo. Thus, the deputy

..._ .....

commander, United Nations Command, in the late afternoon of 23 January, briefed the

South Korean minister of defense and several other ROK officials concerning the incident.

\Recognizing this delicate diplomatic position and wanting to preserve

L..-----:-~~~~--:-'

good ROK-U.S. relations, General Bonesteel felt that he needed more timely information

and asked JCS to advise him, in advance, of the estimated time of arrival of any U.S. Navy craft off Wonsan in international waters. He also voiced his concern about not being informed of actions occurring at the national level and of not receiving messages that his command should have been aware of. He justified these needs on the basis of a requirement to brief President Pak of South Korea and for operational requirements."

U.S. ADVISORY TO JAPAN

In addition to U'S'I fighter rrcraft arrivin~uinmJapanfroIIlm()~i~~lNa'mt h e r e w as

increased activity at Air Base from which Airborne Communications

Reconnaissance Platform (ACRP) aircraft were staged. y~orllr=&rningofthe ~~elJlo

incident, the NSA Representative,l/ Irequeste(lth~ ISecurity

Squadrorf Ito provide maximum coverage ofl t

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1-_~r:-_~""""'"""""'::::'-':"7'Ie.ommu~ications··concerning··the··Pueblo;12 In •• response, I

I Faunched a C-130 ACRPI ... . Iwith instru .... c-:"t .... io-n-s-:"t-o ....

remain south of the 39th parallel. 13 U.S. Pacific Headquarters supported this action and requested the Pacific Air Force to maintainj Icoveragemofluuasmriear continuous basis as possible while canceling other/reconnaissance missions as necessary

(see ACRP orrt mat, p. 91). Ther e c o nn~issa.n c e a i.r c r a ••.• ft •.•.•.•.•.•.•.• w •.•.•.•.• e •.•.•.• r •.•.• e •.•.•.•.•.• a •.• I .. S ". 0 gI · v ellatlthori:~tion

for the use of AirmBasemas needed. 74 Because there wasJuuuuu I

~lity withi~the U.S. SIGIN.'l' . .forcesluuuu Itheapproval for ACRP flights to us ... e .:

L_Jthelocation oq Iwas vital to speedy translation.

At NSA headquarters, B11, the North Korean division, also recognized the critical need for airborne SIGINT collection. At 5:05 A.M. Washington time, B 11 requested JCS/JRC to authorize immediate and continuous ACRP flights off the east coast of Korea.

nd that the first

B11 also requested that the aircraft deliver intercept materials t priority be gi ven to its processing."

At Kelly Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas, the United States Air Force Security Service (USAFSS), whose personnel manned the SIGINT collection positions aboard the ACRP aircraft, was concerned about the safety of airborne collection platforms off the coast of North Korea. From discussions with JCS/JRC, USAFSS learned that consideration was being given to providing fighter cover for thel !flights. Having received an information ~OPYb of ~SA's message to JCS requesting additional

~~::h~:!~:Sa:! :~~;:~~::~ :n or It at~~~~i~:7::::~~~~o:~~~a;;;;~i~::~i~~~

according to NSA Representative to JCS/JRCI Ith~mission then being conducted was only in the orbit area during the hours of darkness and therefore didnot require fighter cover. USAFSS was still concerned because of the Pueblo incident, nevertheless, and queried NSA andJC~/J~?uw~et~ertheu~ircrafts~ollldberecalleci.m'I'he message also instructedl ~ot to ta~l1(;hany additional~?~Rair<:ra£tjother than

!~;:ea~:~:~~u~~1c~:~~led and al~~~~h:~'h:~:o~!:~:a~:t:~~~t:r:: t:::t~~ie T~:::~::~~

positions, and therefore .i. t would be preferable to .. ~~yerecovery of the aircraft atD ... -: .or processing purposes. 76

Fifteen minutes after receiving tlleUSAFSS message, NSA receivedone froml .... ~ __ ....

I ladvising that Gener~lB6nesteel had approved continuousACRP coverage and

necessary flight clearances.rThe message also advisedl !that the ACRP flights

would recover at Da.nd provided instructions to bothl ror handling

and processing the intercept tapes."

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The USAFSS instructions were confusing and conflicting. Pacific headquarters had ear lier directed the Pacific Air ~orce to rnai~tai~ co~tillUOllS.A.~R.~covera.~ea.lld.approve<l recovery atDTheNSAelements in the Pacific were arranging and coordinating the details incident to tape handling and transcription. Now, USAFSS was issuing directives tol IthatuweremcontrarytouthemeatHetmplans.muAtthismpoIriCtht?JCS still had not responded to NSA's request for ACRP coverage.

At NSA the Pueblo incident had caused the Office of Mobile Collection (K12) to-set up a twenty-four-hour watch to keep abreast of and guide changes in SIGIJ'.{Tcollection resources and tasking; the ACRP effort was of prime concerll.. At 12:50 f><M., Harold Welch

from USAFSS called the NSA K12 watch officer! larh:lwant~~~~~tiQW~>

USAFSS or JCS should recall th~ .... / .... ..hSB.pthat~~~~jrbOl'll.eat

that time. Welch further stated thats~vent~fig.hter~w()uldbe ~~~~~citoprovide air cover for round-the-clock AC~P~ights:I// Ithen had a seri~~.Qftelephone conversations\\,ith

I Ithe NSA.representati~: ... ~9JCS/JRC at the Pentagon. I / I

reported that GeneralSteakle~,J.s.§lJRC;authorized the ACRP flight inprogressand its recoveryatl I . ... // jadded, however, that Steakley wanted-the aircraft out of the area beforeslln~upin Korea and would take action to recal l it.accordingly.: At 1:24 P.M., Dca.l1ed Welch to pass along this information and requested that Welch take no further action until he heard from NSA.78

Acting for General Steakley, ColoneYJoseph Cut.r.ona , in the JCS Joint Reconnaissance Center, telephoned the CINCPAC Joint Reconnaissance Center at 2:00 P.M. (Washington time) and directed the recall of the aircraft. Cutrona also ordered that no other reconnaissance aircraft belaunched against Korea pending a decision by the JCS whether such flights should be escorted by fighter aircraft."

The JCS and DIAwere deliberating on how to respond to NSA's request for extended EO
ACRP coverag-e.Earlier in the day,1 ~ad given NSA Representative to the JCS/JRC
I ~he following information about the proposed flights: the ACRP aircraft would
.: .: .:
DIA also requested information about NSA's ACRP proposal. At three o'clock in the
afternoon.l I Chief of B 1 at NSA informed Edward Dakin DIA that NSA
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hours with take-offl latapproximately 6:00 A.M. local time. Acknowledging USAFSS's request, NSA also asked for recover~ ~s previously

recommended." On the heels of this message, NSA sent one to USAFSS andl I

r=:....:....:.;=~ them of the revised ACRP requirement andmaskil1~ ltosendcopiestomuEO

or any

NSA also asked

any linguistic or transcription assistance it might need."

---....I

Although the JCS had restrained all military operations, the Joint Reconnaissance Center was still considering NSA's request for ACRP coverage. At 4:30 P.M. the JRC interpreted the proposed ten-hour coverage as a minimum, and it decided to increase this to twenty-four-hour coverage with a fighter combat air patrol of four aircraft at all times.

I ~tutheuJCS/JRCteleph6fieduK12utomadvisemofthismdevelopmentmbutUaddedmth~t

the schedule should be considered tentative because it still required approval by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who was busily engaged at the White House and wouldn't see the proposal until the 24th. Under the circumstances, it was decided not to call USAFSS until there was a definite and final plan for ACRP coverage."

OTHER CONCERNS

The ripple effect of the Pueblo seizure extended to the operations of other U.S. SIGINT collection shi s. NSA advised the SIGINT collector USNS Muller and other sites tar etin

In Washington, in addition to the high level of activity in military circles, there was also diplomatic activity concerning the Pueblo. The Department of State had asked the Soviet Union to convey to the North Koreans theLl.S. urgent request for the immediate release of the Pueblo and its crew, but the initialSoviet response was completely negative. In the United Nations, U.S. ambassador Arthur Goldberg expressed the concern of the United States to the Secretary General.Fv'lf Goldberg were to bring the Pueblo matter before the United Nations Security Council, he would have to be completely briefed beforehand. Therefore, at 4:45 P.M.! General John Morrison, Assistant Director, NSA, for Production, talked with I pt the JCS/JRC about such a briefing. Immediately

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thereafter, Morrison telephoned Admiral Jackson, Goldberg's senior military advisor, to brief him on the impact of the Pueblo's seizure as it related to collection equipment, cryptologic documents, cryptographic gear, and the SIGINT personnel aboard the ship."

Twenty-four hours had passed since U.S. authorities first became aware of the USS Pueblo's emergency situation. The unprepared posture of the U.S. armed forces in the area had precluded prevention of the Pueblo's capture, and any immediate counterblow had been ruled out. The Pueblo's exact current position was unknown as was the disposition of its crew. Information concerning the vessel's precise location at the time of boarding was also tenuous. Photographic and SIGINT reconnaissance flights that might collect intelligence information about the ship were ordered to stand down. Concerned about enlarging the incident, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had taken precautions to prevent any military action that might aggravate the situation. Prior to the departure of the Pueblo, one U.S. naval authority in Japan told Commander Bucher not to expect any help if he got into trouble - and, indeed, none was forthcoming.

The Department of Defense had released to the public a statement giving the barest of facts about the ship and its seizure. For a few days, the Pueblo replaced the war in Vietnam in press headlines. One fact, however, was certain. Compromise of the intelligence materials aboard the Pueblo and the SIGINT information held by its crewmen posed a potentially crippling blow not only to the U.S. intelligence community but to the whole of U.S. naval communications. Cognizant of this, the JCS requested an assessment of the loss. The SIGINT community began to tally the damage. The United States also continued deliberations at the policy level to determine its response to North Korean aggression.

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Chapter VI Reaction

The Next Week

U. S. ASSESSMENTS OF NORTH KOREAN ACTIONS

At the request of the Secretary of Defense, Richard Helms - the Director of Central Intelligence - submitted a preliminary assessment of North Korean intentions to the other decision makers at the White House, the Departments of Defense and State, and the directors ofDIA and NSA. This report of23 January 1968 stated that the circumstances of the Pueblo's capture indicated that this was a deliberate act and not the result of a local North Korean commander exceeding his instructions. It further stated that the North Koreans were prepared to face a period of sharply heightened tensions. This report also estimated that the North Koreans would probably not release the crew or the ship promptly unless they judged that the United States would resort to retaliatory action, such as an air attack against the patrol craft involved in seizing the Pueblo. Should tensions rise sharply, the assessment concluded that the Soviets would be bound to take a hand at least privately and would almost certainly advise the North Koreans to terminate the episode at an early date.'

On the morning of 24 January, Arthur McCafferty at the White House informed General Carter at NSA that a "kitchen cabinet," composed of Walter Rostow, National Security Council (NSC), Earle Wheeler, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, and Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Undersecretary of State, was meeting in the Situation Room to discuss the Pueblo incident. The NSC discussed only the Cyprus situation, not the Pueblo matter."

Later in the day, a larger group of individuals met at the Department of State to consider North Korea's objective in seizing the Pueblo, its future plans, and how the United States should respond. Attending this meeting were Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Katzenbach, Wheeler, Helms, Rostow, Paul Nitze, Clark Clifford, Samuel Berger, Paul Warnke, Bromley Smith, and George Christian. Rostow believed that the Soviets were really the ones behind this action and suggested that "we might take the unusual move of getting the South Koreans to pick up the Soviet ship that has been shadowing the Enterprise." The others opposed this proposal. General Wheeler suggested a number of military actions but stated that "before we do anything we need reconnaissance." McN amara recommended a build-up offorces including the call-up of Air Force Reserve units and extension of terms of service. The meeting finally resulted in the group listing possible pressure actions, to include a blockade of North Korean ports; seizure of North Korean ships; air or ground strikes against North Korea; and replacing

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