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Department for Protection of the People OZNA

OZNA or Organ Zatite Naroda (Armije) (Cyrillic: , ) or Oddelek za zaito naroda (literally, Department for Protection of the People) was a security agency of the SFR Yugoslavia. OZNA was founded on May 13, 1944 under the leadership of Aleksandar Rankovi (nom de guerre Marko), a top member of the Politburo until his downfall in 1965/66, and a close associate of Josip Broz Tito. Until OZNA was established, intelligence and security tasks were carried out by several organizations. In spring, 1944, the tasks were carried out by the Section for Protection of Nations in central and western Bosnia, part of Croatia, and Vojvodina; centers of territorial intelligence in Croatia, Vojvodina and Montenegro; intelligence division of the Internal Affairs Section within the SNOS Presidency in Slovenia; and intelligence service of partisan detachments in Serbia, Macedonia, and Kosovo. Organization The reorganization of intelligence and security could not satisfy the growing needs of the Supreme Staff. OZNA was created as autonomous, military organization whose unitary structure and centralized leadership were to ensure a tough political line in the intelligence and counter-intelligence services. All OZNA tasks were divided into four groups, each comprising an organizational unit: 1. 2. 3. 4. intelligence under Maks Bae Mili counter-intelligence under Pavle Peki army security under Jeftimije (aka Jefto) Sasi, and technical/statistics under Mijat Vuleti

The first section (intelligence) organized intelligence activity in other countries, enemy state institutions, and occupied territory. It recruited agents and sent them to work outside the borders of the liberated territory. It collected intelligence on enemy agent networks, police, quisling state machinery, and quisling military units. This was essentially an offensive intelligence service, directed against foreign countries and occupied territory.The second section (counterintelligence service in the liberated territory) collected information from trusted informers on political groups which had either joined the national liberation movement or stayed outside it, on enemy agent activities, and on armed groups of national traitors and fifth columnists. The third section organized counterintelligence protection of armed forces and was active only in the NOVJ & PO (People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia and Partisan Detachments). The fourth section performed statistical and technical tasks, processed information, and kept records. This section also included special photography, secret writing, radio centers, and decoders. A fifth and sixth section were formed in OZNA in March and April 1945. The fifth section was formed as a counterintelligence service against foreign agent networks in Yugoslavia; that is, foreign intelligence services. (In 1946, this section merged with the new third section, which was created after the military counterintelligence service became independent). The sixth section performed tasks dealing with counter-intelligence protection of transportation, but was absorbed soon after its establishment by the second sector. Activities When the National Liberation Army changed its name into the Yugoslav Army on March 1, 1945, the OZNA of Democratic Federal Yugoslavia proclaimed by special directive ( March 24,1945) a new organization of the Yugoslav Army - OZNA. OZNA was in direct command of counter-intelligence protection of military command posts, institutions, and units. Sections were set up within independent corps. This third OZNA section was in force until the end of July, 1945, when the "military" and "civil" part of OZNA began to separate and finally split in March, 1946. At that time, the Administrative Directorate for Security of Yugoslav Army (KOS or Kontra-Obavetajna Sluba) was formed from the military part and the Administrative State Security Directorate - (UDBA) from its civilian counterpart. Since OZNA was actually left without its third section after the military counter-intelligence service became independent, it formed a new third section unconnected to the previous one. It focused initially on reconstruction and operations of the German intelligence service (especially Gestapo). Later, the third section assumed operations for all foreign intelligence services, borders, and traffic of foreigners (which were essentially the tasks of the fifth section). The fourth section continued filing information they had been collected within the OF VOS since 1941. From initial information files on 4,000 people, by the end of the war the number had increased to 17,750. OZNA was led by a chief who was directly subordinate to the Supreme Commander of SFRJ, Marshall Josip Broz Tito. See also UDBA Kontraobavetajna sluba (KOS) Yugoslav People's Army (JNA)

State Security Directorate UDBA

UDBA or Uprava dravne bezbednosti/sigurnosti/varnosti (Serbian Cyrillic: , ) ("State Security Administration", literally state security directorate) was the secret police organization of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It is alleged that the UDBA was responsible for the eliminations of dozens of enemies of the state within Yugoslavia and internationally (estimates about 200 eliminations and kidnappings). Eliminations vary from those of notorious war criminals (e.g. Vjekoslav (Maks) Luburi and Ante Paveli) in Spain and Argentina to those of the Croatian emigrant and secessionist Bruno Bui on October 16, 1978 in Paris. Functions Vitomir Misimovi (taken in the late 1970s) was an UDBA agent that posed as Vitomir Virkez in Australia to gain the trust of Croatian contacts later named the Croatian Six whom he later admitted to framing The UDBA formed a major part of the Yugoslav intelligence services during 1946-1991 period, primarily responsible for internal state-security. After 1946 the State Security Administration (UDB) underwent numerous security and intelligence changes due to topical issues at that time, including: fighting gangs; protection of the economy; Cominform/Informbiro; and bureaucratic aspirations. In 1945 and 1946, for instance, the UDB was organized into districts. In 1950, when the administrative-territorial units were abolished as authorities,[1] the UDB was reorganized again. During this period the intelligence and security activities concentrated less on intelligence and more on internal security. There was an emphasis on collectivism, brotherhood, social harmony, loyalty, and tolerance towards those with different views. Deviation from this set of values became an immediate issue for security services. Later, the use of force was mitigated and when the process of "decentralization of people's power" began, intelligence and security services underwent further reorganization in order to deconcentrate power and increase effectiveness. The Act on Internal Affairs[2] and the Decree on Organization of State Internal Affairs Secretariat regulated the intelligence security authority as the prerogative of the State Security Directorate within the Ministry of the Interior. The following reorganization addressed issues relating to the competence of the federation (state security, cross-border traffic, foreign citizens, passports, introduction and dissemination of foreign press, and federal citizenship). Structure Intelligence and security activity was organized in the following manner:

After OZNA ( / Odeljenje zatite naroda) was abolished, intelligence activity was divided among various federal ministries: the Federal Ministry of the Interior by the State Security Directorate; and the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Service of Investigation and Documentation (SID), which collected foreign political information; military-defense intelligence was handled by the GS 2nd Department- KOS (Kontraobavjetajna sluba/ Counterintelligence Service) of JNA. SDB in the republics was not autonomous, but was tied to the federal service which co-ordinated the work and issued instructions. State security was regulated by secret legislation (secret Official Gazette), which prescribed the use of special operations. The SDB performed house searches, covert interceptions inside the premises, telecommunications interception, covert surveillance of people, and covert interception of letters and other consignments. Of primary interest to the SDB was the domestic - identifying and obstructing activities of the "domestic enemy" (i.e. the "bourgeois rightwing", clericalists, members of the Cominform, nationalists, and separatists). Intelligence work abroad was deemed less important and was under federal control. The SDB was a "political police", answerable to the party organization from which it received its guidelines and to which it reported. The SDB was so deeply rooted in the political system that one of its tasks was the preparation of "Political Security Assessments"; that is, assessments on literally all spheres of life. During its activity, the SDB enjoyed a wide range of power, including classical police powers (identifications, interrogations, and arrests).

The SDB organization was constantly changing and making improvements, but it remained tied to the central unit in republic capitals and smaller working groups in the field. All information and data flowed into the central unit in the capitals and sent on from there to the users. Field groups had working contacts with the local authorities, but did not answer to them. Activities From 1963 - 1974, security intelligence services dealt with a series of domestic and foreign political events. At home, there were political confrontation both before and after the Brioni Plenum (1966), liberal flareups and massive leftist Students' demonstrations in Belgrade in 1968, Hrvatsko proljee (Croatian Spring) or "MASPOK" (mass movement) in Croatia in 1971, an incursion of a group of nationalists (Radua, 1972), and a revival of nationalism in Kosovo, Serbia, Macedonia, and Slovenia. The most significant event abroad was the invasion of the Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968.These were the circumstances at the time the first act on internal affairs of the individual republics was adopted in 1967. According to this act, internal affairs were handled directly by the municipal administrative bodies and the secretariats of internal affairs of each republic or by their provincial bodies. This was the first time since 1945 that republics gained control and greater influence over their individual security organs and intelligence security services. The State Security Service (SDB) was defined by law as a professional service within the Republic Secretariat of Internal Affairs (RSUP). Naturally, most of its competence remained within federal institutions, as prescribed by the Act on Handling Internal Affairs Under Competence of Federal Administrative Bodies (1971), which determined that the federal secretariat of internal affairs coordinate the work of the SDB in the republics and provinces. Further steps were taken with the transformation of state administration, adoption of the Federal Act on State Administration (1978), and the Republic Act (1978). The newly adopted act on internal affairs tasked the Republic Secretariat of Internal Affairs (RSUP) with state security issues, which then became RSUP issues and were no longer given special handling "at the RSUP". This resolution remained in force until the 1991 modifications of the act on internal affairs. Eliminations Year Country 1946 Italy 1948 Austria 1957 Argentina 1960 Argentina 1962 Argentina 1966 Canada 1967 West Germany 1968 Austria Australia France Italy West Germany 1969 West Germany Spain 1971 Argentina England West Germany Sweden 1972 Italy West Germany 1973 West Germany 1974 West Germany 1975 Austria Belgium Denmark West Germany Sweden 1976 France 1977 South Africa West Germany 1978 France United States 1979 Canada United States 1980 West Germany Assassinated Ivo Protulipac Ilija Abramovi Ante Paveli,he never recovered from wounds and eventually died in 1959 Dinka Domaninovi Rudolf Kantonci Mate Milievi Joze Jeli, Mile Jeli, Vlado Murat, Anelko Pernar, Marijan imundi, Petar Tominac Josip Krtali Pero ovi Nedjeljko Mrkonji Ante Znaor uro Koki, Vid Marii, Mile Rukavina, Kreimir Tolj, Hrvoje Ursa Mirko uri, Nahid Kulenovi Vjekoslav (Maks) Luburi Ivo Bogdan Maksim Krstulovi Mirko imi Mijo Liji Rosemarie Bahori, Stjepan evo, Tatjana evo Ivan Mihali, Josip Seni Josip Buljan-Mikuli Mate Jozak Nikola Martinovi Matko Bradari Vinko Eljuga Ivica Mioevi, Nikola Penava, Ilija Vui Stipe Mikuli Ivan Tuksor Jozo Ore Ivan Vui Bruno Bui Krian Brki Cvitko Cicvari, Goran eer Marijan Rudela, Zvonko timac Mirko Desker, Nikola Milievi

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1981 France Mate Koli West Germany Petar Bilandi, Ivo Furli, Ivan Jurii, Mladen Jurii, Ante Kosti Switzerland Stanko Nii 1983 West Germany Stjepan urekovi, Franjo Mikuli, uro Zagajski, Milan upan 1984 West Germany Slavko Logari 1984 Austria Tomislav Katalenic 1986 United States Franjo Mai 1987 Canada Damir urekovi West Germany Ivan Hlevnjak 1989 West Germany . Ante api
[3]

The UDBA Since 1986 The role of intelligence and security changed after 1986, when a different mentality reigned within the Party and the processes of democratization were initiated. Intelligence security agencies came under attack, and many people started publicly writing about and criticizing the SDB. There were no more taboo subjects. The party organization was abolished in the SDB and the first attempts to introduce parliamentary control began. The appointment of a commission to monitor the work was one of the most absurd decisions made by the country's intelligence security services during the era of "social democracy", since SDB activity was regulated by federal legislation and regulations published in the secret Official Gazettes. Neither the commission members nor its president had access to these Acts. It was difficult to evaluate information, since the commission had no investigative powers or capability to verify information. The head of the service was tasked simply to deliver requested information, even classified, to the commission. The SDB was also still receiving tasks from the Party, although the supervising commission lacked the powers to control those tasks. The above-mentioned events undermined the unity of the SDB, which formulated its own, unpublished regulations (sub-legal acts, ordinances, etc.). This made any protest about violation of rights impossible, as the regulations were inaccessible to the public.The first democratic multi party elections in 1990, which enhanced the process of democratization, reverberated within the Federal Secretariat of Internal Affairs (SSUP) and Federal State Security Service (SSDB), which were fighting to maintain control over the individual SDBs in the republics. The latter became increasingly disunited; it was still legally connected to the federal bodies, but was becoming aware of the fact that it operated and worked in their particular republic. Some professional cadres, especially those in the "domestic field" (dealing with the "bourgeois right wing", clericalists, and student movements), began leaving the service. Conflict was increasing, and SDB archives were being systematically destroyed. In its search for new roles, the SDBs also began to limit information they were sending to the SSDB. It ultimately restricted its information to foreign intelligence services. Along with the weakening positions of the SSDB position was becoming weaker and attempts by the JNA (Yugoslav People's Army) Security Service or KOS to strengthen its position in the republics and in the individual SDBs were becoming more numerous. The attempts failed because they depended upon cadres of other nationalities still employed at the SDBs but who had no access to data bases and had no decision-making power due to their "Yugoslav" orientation. See also

OZNA Kontraobavetajna sluba (KOS) Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) Bezbednosno Informativna Agencija - BIA OZNA Aleksandar "Leka" Rankovi

Counter-intelligence service Kontraobavetajna sluba KOS

KOS or Kontraobavetajna sluba (Cyrillic: , ) was the counter-intelligence service of the Yugoslav People's Army. Formed in 1946 as one of the remnants of the Department for Protection of the People - OZNA; with State Security Directorate - UDBA forming the second or civil component of the new security and intelligence structure of the Yugoslav state. Most information is still scant due to its classification as military secret (vojna tajna), but some can be traced in the media, especially during the Miloevi tenure and the role played in the break-up of SFRJ (see Operation Labrador [1] and Operation Opera orientalis). See also UDBA OZNA Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) Titoism Aleksandar Vasiljevi JBTZ-trial References 1. ^ BORR Terrorism News: Yugoslav Army's Central Intelligence Unit: Clandestine Operations Foment War External links International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 'questioning' transcripts on Operations "Labrador" and "Opera". KOS @ GlobalSecurity.org

Aleksandar Rankovi
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Rankovi, Tito and ilas Aleksandar "Leka" Rankovi (Serbian: ) (1909-1983) was a leading Yugoslav Communist of Serbian origin. Rankovi was a member of the Politburo from 1940. After he was captured and tortured by the Gestapo in 1941, he was rescued by a daring Communist raid. He served on the Supreme Staff throughout the war. He was named a "People's Hero" (Hero of the People's War of Liberation) for his services during World War II. After the war, he was minister of the interior and head of the military intelligence ("OZNA") and political police ("UDBA"). He fell from power in 1966, ostensibly for abusing his authority in bugging the sleeping quarters of Josip Broz Tito in Belgrade. He was expelled from the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the same year. His fall from power marked the beginning of the end of the centralized command of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia over the country and the social and political separatist and autonomist movements that would culminate in the Croatian Spring and the new de-centralized Yugoslavia that emerged from the 1971 constitutional reforms[1] and later in the all-new 1974 Constitution. After that, he lived in Dubrovnik until the end of his life. His funeral in Belgrade in 1983 was the occasion for a huge outpouring of grief, as Rankovi had come to symbolize Serbian strength. References 1. ^ The Specter of Separatism, TIME Magazine, February 07, 1972 Slobodan Stankovic (1983-09-01). "Aleksandar Rankovic - Political Profile of A Yugoslav "Stalinist"". RFE/RL. See also OZNA UDBA Josip Broz Tito Edvard Kardelj Milovan Djilas Yugoslavia Members of the Central Committee

JBTZ-trial
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The JBTZ-trial was a political trial held in a military court in Slovenia, then part of Yugoslavia in 1988. The defendants, Janez Jana, Ivan Bortner, David Tasi and Franci Zavrl, were sentenced to between six months and four years imprisonment for "betraying military secrets", after being involved in writing and publishing articles critical of the Yugoslav People's Army. The trial sparked great uproar in Slovenia, and was an important event for the organization and development of the democratic opposition in the republic. Background In the late 1980s, Slovenia embarked on a process of democratic reform, which went unparalleled in the other five Yugoslav republics. The Slovenian communist leadership, under Milan Kuan, was allowing an ever greater degree of freedom of the press. The magazine Mladina was taking advantage of this and became extremely popular in Slovenia, deliberately testing the borders of press freedom with news and satire breaking old taboos. In 1987 it started more and more frequently attacking the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) and its leadership, for instance labeling the defense minister, Branko Mamula, a "merchant of death" for selling arms to famine-stricken Ethiopia. Many of the articles were written by the young defense expert Janez Jana, who soon became a particular irritant for the YPA leadership. As far as the YPA were concerned, Mladina were attacking the army, the main protector of Yugoslav unity, and hence attacking Yugoslavia itself. When they realized that the Slovene government were not going to crack down on Mladina, they decided to do so themselves. In 1988, Mladina got its hands on notes from a secret meeting of the central committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, detailing plans for arrest of journalists and dissidents in Slovenia. Their possession of these documents gave the YPA the pretext it needed. Shortly after, on 31 May, Jana, another Mladina-journalist David Tasi and a Slovene sergeant in the YPA Ivan Bortner were arrested. Later the editor of Mladina Franci Zavrl was also arrested. They were charged with betraying military secrets, a charge that would have to be tried in a military court. Thus the government of Slovenia had no involvement in the proceedings. The trial The YPA was hoping to impose a level of control on Slovenia, and assert its authority in the republic. In the event however, the JBTZ-trial, as it became known from the initials of the accused (Jana, Bortner, Tasi, Zavrl), was a complete failure for the YPA, and only served to alienate the Slovenes from Yugoslavia. Slovene public opinion rallied massively behind the four accused. A Committee for the defense of Human Rights was formed, and a petition drawn up in support of the four accused gathered 100 000 signatures. A demonstration on the central Congress Square of the Slovenian capital Ljubljana on 22 June was attended by at least 40 000 people. All protests passed off peacefully, giving the army no excuse to intervene. The trial was held in camera, and the nature of the documents the accused were supposed to have revealed was never officially made public, giving rise to a plethora of rumors, and to the widespread assumption that the whole trial was a frame-up to get even with Jana and Mladina. In addition, the Army made the decision to hold the trial in the Serbo-Croatian language rather than Slovenian, in spite of provisions in the Slovene republican constitution that all official business in Slovenia should be conducted in the Slovene language. This further outraged Slovenian public opinion, to which the use of the Slovenian language was of great symbolic significance. The four accused were sentenced to between six months and four years imprisonment, and handed back to the Slovene authorities, which carried out the sentences in the mildest way possible. Zavrl later related how "I spent my days editing the magazine in my office and my nights in prison. On one occasion, when I was late getting back, I had to break into the prison over the wire!" Aftermath The effect of the JBTZ-trial was what James Gow and Cathie Carmichael calls the "homogenization" of Slovene politics - it gave all Slovenes, irrespective of political stance, something to agree on. The opposition, organized in the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights, was received by Janez Stanovnik, the communist president of Slovenia, who publicly expressed sympathy for their cause. The trial became an important catalyst for the organisation of political movements in Slovenia. It also gave added strength to the idea that Slovenia should seek a greater degree of independence from the Yugoslav central authorities, a development which ended with the declaration of complete independence on 25 June 1991. Jana had by then become a prominent political figure, he became defense minister of Slovenia in 1990, and in 2004-2008 served as prime minister of independent Slovenia. See also

Sources

Aleksandar Vasiljevi KOS Janez Jana James Gow, Legitimacy and the Military - The Yugoslav Crisis, (London: Pinter, 1992) James Gow & Cathie Carmichael, Slovenia and the Slovenes: A Small State and the New Europe, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001) Laura Silber & Alan Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, (London: Penguin, 1995) Sabrina Petra Ramet, Slovenia's road to democracy in Europe-Asia Studies, 1993, vol. 45, issue 5

Janez Jana being interrogated by KOS authority Aleksandar Vasiljevi