lbe Rlse and Fall of

the Bulgarlan Gonnectlon

EDWARD S. HERMAN and FRANK BRODHEAD

SHERIDAN SQUARE PUBUCATIONS, INC.

NEW YORK
Publisher's Note: This book is one of a series of in-depth studies This book is a compelling exposé of the plot behind the p|ot-the
of cunent intelligence- and media-related issues For a concoction by the ltalian secret services of a Bulgarian Connection in
catalog, please write to Sheridan Square Publications, Inc
the attempted assassination of the Pope.
,

P. O Box 677, New York, NY 10013.

The reader of this book is faced with staggering proof that the media
utterly failed to meet acceptable standards of care and professionalism.
Tke Rise and Fall of the BuLgarian Connection is a serious and realistic
Copyright O 1986 by Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead. All rights reserved
assessmeilt of the handling by the western press of a propaganda trick; it
shows how the press was led by a handful of journalists linked to the
First printing, May 1986
CIA into accepting as proof a fabricated story.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
In following this case, lawyers were disheartened by the erosion of
Herman, Edward S. the principle of the presumption of innocence. And just as the legal sys-
The rise and fall of the Bulearian connection. tem failed to probe the case against the accused Bulgarians in accor-
dance with that presumption, so the media ignored information suggest-
lncludes index
ing hidden political motives behind the accusations.
l. John Paul II, Pope, 1920-
-Assassination
attempt, 1981. 2. Espionage-Bulgaria. 3. Disin-
The book is a chilling indictment of our so-called "free" press, a
formation-United States. I. Brodhead, Frank. press which abuses its freedom by omissions, by half-truths, and by stir-
II Title. ring the continuation of a Cold War climate. It deserves to be read and
BXl378 5.H48 1986 364.1',524',O94s634 86-6582 remembered.
tsBN 0-940380-07-2
ISBN 0-940380-064 (pbk.) ---Seán MacBride. S.C'

Seán MacBride is a recipient of the Nobe| Peace Prize (|974), the Lenin
Peace Prize (19'77), and the American Medal of Justice ( l 978); former Chief of
Staff of the lrish Republican Army, Foreign Minister of lreland, and United Na-
tions Ambassador; U.N. Commissioner for Namibia; and author of the UN-
ESCO Report on The New World Information and Communication Order; cur-
rent Chairman of the Board of Advisers of the Institute for Media Analysis, Inc.

The lnstitute for Media Analysis, Inc. is a non-profit educational institution

devoted, in paft, to the study of western media disinformation and deception op-
erations. This book was prepared with the assistance of the lnstitute and mem-
bers of its Board. For further information about the Institute for Media Analysis,
Inc., please write to: IMA, 145 West 4th Street, New York, NY 10012.
Gontente

Preface lx
l. lntroduction I

2. The Evolution of the Bulgarian Connection 9

3. The First Conspiracy:
Agca and the Gray Wolves 42
4. The Rome-Washington Connection 66
5. Darkness in Rome:
The Western System of lnduced Confession l0l
6. The Disinformationists:
Sterling, Henze, and Ledeen 123
7. The Dissemination of the Bulgarian Connection Plot 174
8. Conclusions 26
Appendices:
A. Did the Western Media Suppress
Evidence of a Conspiracy? 2t6
B. Bulgaria and the Drug Connection 225
C. The Use and Misuse of Defectors 234
D. Sterling versus Andronov 241
E. The Georgetown Disinformation Center 245

Index 248
 Preface

..DesÚoy his fib or sophistry: in vairp. n March 29, 1986, a jury in Rome, composed of two judges and
The creature's at his dirty work again." six lay members, concluded that three Bulgarians and six Turks
-ALEXANDER
POPE, 1735 charged with conspiracy to assassinate Pope John Paul II should be ac-
quitted for lack of evidence. The decision was an abrupt and, for many,
"After a disinformation effort has been launched, surprising end to four years of claims and speculations about the "Bul-
if it gets into replay it can be manipulated garian Connection." During those years the charges, linked in the
for long periďs of time using assets in
media to more general accusations that the Soviet Union stood behind
other areas and be revived at will."
"international terrorism," regularly found their way into the headlines:
-{ENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. 1982
"Dramatic new revelations. " "The investigation is continu-
ing. . . . " "Bulgaria today angrily denied. . . . " "U.S. officials re-
fused to speculate. . . . " Long before the trial began, the flow of leaks
from a supposedly secret investigation, and repeated assertions by sup-
porters of the Connection that the evidence was abundant and compel-
ling,' conditioned most people in the West to believe that the Bulgarians
were guilty.
From its inception, however, the case had rested on the testimony of
the would-be assassin, a young Turkish terrorist named Mehmet Ali
Agca. It was therefore somewhat disconcerting to those who had taken
the charges seriously that on the opening day of the trial, in May 1985,
Agca's first sentences to the court announced that he was Jesus Christ,
and that he had returned to warn of the imminent end of the world. He
revealed further that he held the occult secrets of Fatima, that the Pope
supported him in his claims to be Jesus, and that mysterious forces in
Rome wanted to kidnap him and set him up as Pope. To prove his
claims about being Jesus, and incidentally to support his charges against
l. Pauf Henze, in a 1985 update of his book, The Plot to Kill the Pope (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985), wrote that the case for Bulgarian involvement has gotten
"continually stronger" and the "evidence" for the Plot has "steadily accumulated to the
point where little rational doubt is now possible" (p 196),
 PREFACE XI

It'. nurg*iuns, he orrered to raise,r".JT;":;"".".t:T; The trial in Rome raises many questions. If the only evidence against
Reagan and other world leaders. the Bulgarians consisted of assertions by an imprisoned and half-crazed
The prosecutor, Antonio Marini, claimed that Agca was deliberately crimina|, why did anyone in the Italian state appaÍatus take them seri-
sabotaging the case . Others maintained that Agca was just having some ously? Did Agca think up these charges himself, or was he coached and
good fun, or that he was mysteriously signaling his Bulgarian col- supplied with information by people who somehow gained access to
laborators to rescue him from jail.'z Still others asserted that Agca was him in his solitary confinement? And how was the claim of a Bulgarian
mad. The case became a shambles, but dragged on for almost a year. Connection sustained for four years in a Free World media that prides
Agca agreed to dozens of conflicting versions of the truth, shifting itself on investigative reporting and skepticism about sources? Was this
major claims two or three times within half an hour. He launched into a case of massive disinformation, beginning with planted stories and
tirades about the Soviet Union, or western imperialism, and then be- then growing to a universally agreed upon version of the truth? Or was
came confused when the judge sternly reminded him about the here and the media's cooperation with the myth of the Bulgarian Connection sim-
now of the case. He withdrew in protest from the trial several times, ply a series of journalistic mistakes, taking the error-ridden ltalian judi-
each time returning with an even more improbable explanation of his cial process at its word and elaborating on the story from there?
shifts in testimony. But he stuck to his guns that he was Jesus Christ, In this study of the rise and fall of the Bulganan Connection we at-
come to announce the end of the world. tempt to answer these questions. Its main thesis is that the only Bulga-
While the prosecution successfully developed a coherent case for a rian Connection in the plot to assassinate Pope John Paul II existed in
papal assassination conspiracy by Agca and perhaps a dozen of his as- the minds of its originators and spokespersons in the West and in the
sociates in the Turkish rightwing movement called the Gray Wolves, the selective coverage of the topic in the western mass media. The story of
case against the Bulgarians made sense only if one believed it already.' the "rise" of the Connection is therefore the tale of how and why this
Not a single witness was produced during the trial to support Agca's politically useful story was put over by a small coterie of U.S. jour-
claims that the assassination plan was hatched in Bulgaria, that he had nalists who we believe to be propagandists and disinformationists, most
plotted with Bulgarians in Rome, or that he had collaborated with Bul- notably Claire Sterling, Paul Henze, and Michael Ledeen.s More
garians on the day of the assassination attempt itself. Despite a lengthy broadly, The Rise and Fall of the Bulgarian Connection is a case study
summation before the court in which Marini frequently implied that the of how the mass media of the Free World function as a propaganda sys-
Bulgarians stood behind the assassination attempt, this was so much tem.
rhetoric: While asking for prison sentences for Agca and three of his The ''fall" of the Bulgarian Connection may be something of a mis-
Turkish collaborators, the prosecutor was compelled to recommend dis- nomer. While the case against the Bulgarians has been dismissed, it
missal of the charges against the three Bulgarians for lack of evidence. does not follow that the public will now be provided with sufficient in-
The jury, in its turn, however, acquitted all of the defendants of the con- formation about the failed case to alter their well-ingrained perceptions
spiracy charges.o
finding of nol guilty.
2 The prosecutor also suggested this in his final summing up, although he never indi- 5 Claire Sterling's September 1982 Reader's Digest article, "The Plot to Kill the
cated how the Bulgarians could have rescued Agca, or why, after Agca had given up "sig- Pope," launched the Bulgarian Connection in the western media. Paul Henze, former
naling'' he still fďled to produce any confirmable evidence about Bulgarian invo|vement. CIA station chief in Ethiopia and Turkey, wrote influential background reports proposing
3. The present writers have always maintained that the claims and demonstrations of a a Bulgarian Connection shortly after the assassination attempt. These reports were used by
Bulgarian Connection were deficient in both logic and evidence. While this position has many major media outlets (see Chapters 6 and 7) Sterling elaborated her views in llre
been sustained in the trial and courtjudgment, we show in this book that the fatal weak- Time of the Ássassins (New York: Ho|t, Rinehart and Winston, l983), while Henze later
nesses of the case were quite apparent when the Connection was at its peak ofpopularity produced The Plot to Kill the Pope (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1983). Michael
(see especially Chapter 2) Ledeen, though playing a lesser role, served to link the ideas ofSterling and Henze to the
4. In Italian criminal law, in addition to a hnding of guilty or not gullty, there is a third Reagan administration and to the influential Georgetown Center for Strategic and Intcma-
possibility, a finding of not guilty because of insufficient evidence. Thus, failure to prove tional Studies. We analyze the product and influence of these, the Big Three, in Chapters
a charge beyond a reasonable doubt does not mandate, as it does in the United States, a 5,6, and 7
Xii THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION PREFACE xlll

of Bulgarian and Soviet guilt. In our analysis of the rise of the Connec- evidence was proof of Soviet guilt, because the professionals of the
tion, we stress that the initiation and handling of the case in Italy' and KGB were always careful to establish "plausible deniability," and left
the willingness of the western media to accept uncritically a stream of no clues behind. As there were no clues, ergo, the Soviets did it. Ster-
implausible allegations, were based not only on western preconceptions ling and Henze abandoned this line when the case rested on Agca's claim
and prejudices, but also on the serviceability of the Plot to important that three or more Bulgarians openly paraded around Rome with him,
political interests. Both extemal pressures and internalized preferences hosted him socially, and participated in the May 13, l98l shooting.
caused the Italian courts and the media to follow blindly a politically With the loss of the case, we believe Sterling and Henze will return to
convenient western party line. And just as the party line was followed the plausible deniability argument, assuming, probabIy coÍTect|y' that
uncriticďly, so alternative Iines of fact and argument were not pursued, the western media will once again fail to challenge them with facts or
and dissent from the preferred view was rarely admitted to public in- the record of their somersaults.
spectlon. o Sterling and Henze will also contend that the case was lost because
With the case against the Bulgarians now rejected by an Italian court the western powers failed to cooperate fully with ltalian authorities in
after a lengthy trial, the mass-media sponsors and supporters of Sterling bringing the KGB to heel. Sterling has made this point frequently, argu-
and other proponents of the Connection will have no interest in explain- ing that the Reagan administration has been fearful that revelations of
ing to the public why they were wrong and how the public was manipu- Soviet misbehavior wou|d undermine détente!u It is testimony to the
lated into accepting a myth. Earlier critics of the Plot will not be hon- power of ideology and interest that this Orwellian nonsense has not in-
ored for their foresight, but will continue to be marginalized. The terf-ered in the least with Sterling's credibility as an expert.T
creators and disseminators of the party line will not be subjected to close o It will be contended further that Soviet threats coerced t}le ltalian
inspection and serious criticism, but will be given further access to the government into voluntarily losing the case, again to preserve détente.E
media, now to explain the legal setback. And out of their explanations Before the 1985-86 trial, while the case was under investigation by
the Bulgarian Connection will arise like a phoenix, available once again Judge Ilario Martella, Sterling, Henze, and the mass media periodically
for regular service by consewative politicians and pundits. claimed that the Bulgarian Connection was being built in the face of
The bases on which the Bulgarian Connection will be revived became strong political opposition. They have never acknowledged the exis-
clear in the mass media's coverage (or noncoverage) of the waning days tence of potent vested interests and biases favoring the pursuit of the
of the trial. It is apparent that media creators of the Connection like case." And as Martella shared the Sterling-Henze preconceptions, he
Claire Sterling and Paul Henze have not been discredited, and that the was consistently lauded as hardworking and conscientious and his in-
media will recycle themes already advanced by Sterling, Henze, and vestigation was found to be meticulous and thoroughgoing.ro With the
others in explaining why the case was lost. For example: 6. ' 'l think there's been a deliberate effort by certain sections of the government not to
o lt will be argued that the case failed because western legal stand- take a public position that would concede any possiblc Bulgarian-Sovict connection bc-
ards require excessive evidence in order to protect the innocent. Of cause they consider it a destabilizing factor in the East-West power balance for the public
course, Sterling and the mass media operated on principles precisely the to know such things. " ("Why Is the West Covering Up for Agca? An exclusive interview

reverse of this great western tradition, asserting for years that the Bulga- with Claire Stcrling," Human Events, June 26, 1984, p. 54.)
7. See Chapters 6 and 7 for an analysis ofSterling's conspiracy theories, overall record,
rians and Soviets were guilty prior to any judicial rulings. They work and hcgemonic position in mass media expositions of the plot from August 1982 to mid-
both sides ofthe street, arguing guilt beforehand and explaining away a I 985

decision of non-guilt on the basis of western presumptions of innocencel 8 AWollStreetJournalediaonalofJanuary2l,|985,statesthat:"ClaircStcrling,thc

So while the KGB really did it, this couldn't be proved with the overly Rome-based journalist and terror crpert, says the Italian judiciary [sic] is scared to death
thc po|iticians wíl| insist on such a coveruP [a deal where Antonov makcs a |imited con-
cautious and soft legal system of the West.
fession and is releasedl."
o In explaining the loss of the case, Sterling and company will also
9. These are developed at length in Chapters 4, 6, and 7
return once again to the cleverness of the KGB in hiding its guilt be- 10. We show in Chapter 5 that whilc Martella was hardworking, his biases and conduct
neath a web of proxies. Initially they charged that the very absence of of the investigation left everything to be desired.
xiv THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION PREFACE

thoroughgoing and open trial" yielding a rejection of the Bulgarian a hoax and analyzing the earlier propaganda outpourings asserting KGB
Connection, the powerful supporters of the Connection will resort once guilt-will stillnot get much airing. Furtherrnore, the right wing, now
more to a political explanation of this (to them) untoward result. '' When well represented in all parts of the mass media, will be quite free to con-
the disinformationists succeed, it is because the truth is on their side; tinue to assert Bulgarian-Soviet guilt. Old, fabricated, and disproved
they lose only because of the intrusion of "politics"! anticommunist tales never die, they merely fade into the dimmer back-
c Finally, it will be alleged that an enorÍnous and uncontested Soviet ground of popular mythology.
disinformation campaign affected the climate of opinion in the West, We make no pretense that this book provides an exhaustive treatment
contributing substantially to the loss ofthe case. This has already been a of the Bulgarian Connection case. Our objective, instead, has been to
primary thrust of Sterling, Henze, and their close allies at the George- provoke serious debate on both the substantive issues involved in the
town Center for Strategic and lntemational Studies, the primary sources case and its treatment tiy the media. Toward this end, we have tried to
..internationď give a coherent and factually accurate alternative analysis to the stan-
for media commentary on both the case in Rome and
terrorism" in general.'' dard version. We have provided information about the Turkish back-
We predict that these rationalizations will be given far more exposure ground to the assassination conspiracy, and have explored the ltalian
than any analyses showing the case to have been an obvious fraud from context in which the Bulgarian Connection was fabricated. We have
the beginning, and one which survived only by virtue of media conni- also attempted to set the scene in the United States itself, where the case
vance.'o While most journalists and editorial writers in the respectable found a warmly receptive audience, and where disinformationists and
media will no longer make outright assertions that the KGB organized the media played an important role in originating and developing the
the plot to kill the Pope,'' the contrary case-showing that the Plot was case.
We have gone into considerable detail to show the remarkable lack of
I l.
The Martella investigation was not open This allowed its biases and evidential both coherence and empirical support for the standard version of the
weaknesses to be kept under cover until the trial forced them into public view.
Connection as expounded by Claire Sterling and Paul Henze. The weak-
l2 This was greatly facilitated by prosecutor Marini's closing statement in the trial in
which he suggested that the case was lost because the judge refused to allow sufficient nesses and chameleon-like shifts in the ingredients of the party line'u
time to call all the necessary witnesses. The mass media quickly latched on to this oppor- raise serious questions about how and why the line came into being and
tunity to rationalize the loss of the case. (See, a.9., Elisa Pinna and Luca Balestricri, dominated the field so thoroughly for an extended time span. In short,
"Conviction of Bulgarians in papal plot trial seen as unlikely," Christian Science Moni- the independence and integrity of the mass media are at issue. We there-
ror, March 14, |986; John Tagliabue, ..Acquit Bulgarians' ProsecutoÍ Asks,,, New York
fore devote considerable space to evaluating the quality of the media
Tirnes, February 28, 1986.) These articles fail to note the following: (l) that thc trial was
exceptionally lengthy and called a very large number of witnesses; (2) that it had been pre- sources in the case and the processes whereby a party line was in-
ceded by a two-year investigation which presumably yielded relevant and usable data; and stitutionalized. r7

(3) that Marini's effusions may have been a political gesture to protect the ltalian estab-
lishment from attacks for having brought a case and having expended substantial re- evidence, ahe Journal ediaorialized that "the question now is not whether there was a Bul-
sources where not even a diligent prosecutor could ask for a verdict of guilty garian Connection but when it began" (February 19, 1986). This was based on the pro-
l3 "The Intemational Implications of the Papal Assassination Attempt: A Case of secutor's strongest flights of rhetoric and resort to weak hearsay evidence immediately be-
fore his abandonment of the case! It would be entirely out of character for the Journal ao
State-Sponsored Terrorism," A Report of thc CSIS Steering Committee on Tenorism,
Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert Kupperman, Cochairmen, CSIS, 1985. For a further dis- wait for the presentation of the defense case, or the decision of the court; it is the pro-
cussion of this document, see Appendix E. On the hegemony of western disinformation in sccutor who is saying what the editorialists want to believe. For the Journal, when Agca
the national perception of the Bulgarian Connection, see Chapters 6 and7. says something compatible with their preconceptions, he "admits" it; when he says
l4 See Chapter 7. something incompatible with these beliefs, he "attacks his own credibility " This is the
..ideologi. language used by Gordon Crovitz in aJournalOp-Ed piece on February 12, 1986, entitled
l 5 The editoria| page of the WaII Street Journ4l-56mg1iÍng3 known as the
"The Bulgarian Connection Still Holds." We may be sure that the Bulgarian Connection
cal page"-is a notable exception Any claim that puts the enemy in a bad light Frnds a
welcome home there, whatever the credibility of the source, implausibility of the allcga- will "hold" indefinitely for the Journal as its truths are independent of the world of fact
tion, or existence of incompatible facts (which are duly suppressed). One week beforc the 16. See Chapters 2,5, and 6
| 7 See Chapters 6 and 7
prosecutor himself asked for dismissal of the charges against the Bulgarians for lack of
XVi THE BULCARIAN CONNECTION PREFACE xvlt

The inadequacies of the mass media's performance on the Bulgarian formance on the Bulgarian Connection, suggest that on major foreign
Connection were hardly a consequence of a poverty of materials; they policy issues the mass media is systematically unable to seek the truth
were the result of a failure to ask questions, to follow leads, and to use and serves instead to dispense system-supportive propaganda.2l
readily available documents. As we describe in Chapters 2 and'7, the The authors are indebted to numerous individuals for help in translat-
media did do some investigative work on the Turkish right wing and the ing documents, discussing the issues of this complex case, and reading
Gray Wolves-the true locus of the plot to shoot the Pope-im- and evaluating parts of the manuscript. We would like to make speciď
mediately following the assassination attempt. Once the party line-the mention of the following: Wolfgang Achtner, Feroz Ahmad, Sister El-
Bulgarian Connection-was firmed up, however, all such leads were vira Arcenas, John Cammett, Noam Chomsky, Alexander Cockburn,
abandoned and any context fbr the case incompatible with the line was Kevin Coogan, Ellen Davidson, Doug Dowd, David Eisenhower,
ignored. Franco Fenaresi, Gianni Flamini, Anna Garbesi, Anna Hilbe, Diana
The failure of the western media to meet its own alleged professional Johnstone, Martin Lee, Bill Montross, Ed Morman, Ugur Mumcu, Njat
standards is illustrated and dramatized by comparing its handling of the Ozeygin, Donatella Pascolini, Nicholas Pastore, Jim O'Brien, Mark
case to that of a single reporter, Diana Johnstone. It is our belief that be- O'Brien, Muieann O Briain, Ellen Ray, Bruno Ruggiero, Bill Schaap,
tween May 13, 1981, and August 1985, Johnstone, writing on the Bulgar- Hayden Shaughnessy, Helen Simone, and Lou Wolf. We owe very spe-
ian Connection and related issues for a small weekly newspaper, 1n cial debts to Howard Friel and Andy Levine. Frank Brodhead would
These Times (circulation about 30,000), conveyed more relevant facts, also like to thank Christine Wing and Benjamin Boyd for rheir support
used more pertinent documentary materials,'8 and provided more intelli- and great patience during this project. Finally, the authors want to ex-
gent analysis and insight on the Bulgarian Connection than the entire press their gratitude to Carol and Ping Ferry for their generous financial
U.S. mass media taken together-radio, TV, newspapers, and weekly assistance. The authors remain responsible for the content of this book.
news magazines.'n While this is a testimonial to Johnstone's abilities, it
is also indicative of structurally based blinders that hamper and con- mationist Michael Lrdeen. During this 18 month period, however. the./Vew yorkTimes
strain mass media investigative efforts and reporting. These obstnrctions never discussed Pazienza, with the exception of a single, brief news article in the Business
are apparently not applicable to a reporter working for a small, nones- section of the paperon March 25, 1985. our hypothesis is that this systematic avoidancc
was a result of the paper's commitment to the party line, which would be disturbed by re-
tablishment publication.'zo This contrast, and the overall mass media per-
ference to Pazienza and his shenanigans. Again, Diana Johnstone was not subject to this
18. We will show in Chapter 7 that the U.S. press completely ignored a major 1984 re- kind of self-imposed prior constraint and could use these voluminous and highly relevant
port of the Italian Parliament on a rightwing conspiracy, P-2, that had penetrated a secret press materials freely. (See further, Chapter 7, under "The New yorkTimes-Saerling-lr-
service organization, SISMI, which played an important role in getting Agca to talk. Also deen Axis.")
entirety unmentioned was a major court report of July 1985 that described repeated comrpt 21. An interesting case study could be done on the timing of media investigations and
behavior by SISMI, including the forging and planting of documents. These reports, disclosure of the stolen wealth of the Marcos family. Although the Marcoses' looting oc-
along with other materials available to but ignored by the U.S. media, were regularly em- curred over an extended period, the U.s. mass media were exceedingly quiet and their in-
ployed by Johnstone. vestigatory zeal reined in on that subject until the U.S. government withdrew its support
| 9. Citations to Johnstone's writings will be found throughout the text below and in the from Marcos in late 1985. Ar that point, as if by a tacit signal, there appeared a flood of
index. disclosures. While Marcos was a valued ally, his looting was off the agenda; with Marcos
20. On September 12, 1985, Ralph Blumenthal wrote in the New YorkTimes that "more in process of ouster, his looting was freely discussed.
than a thousand news articles" had appeared in ltaly in the previous l8 months on the story
of Francesco Pazienza, a key player in any analysis of the origins of the Bulgarian Con-
nection. Many of these aíicles claimed that Pazienza was invo|ved in the manipu|ation oť
Agca in prison, while most of the rest related to abuses with which Pazienza was a party as
a member of the intelligence agency SISMI and often in collaboration with U. S disinfor-
t. Introductlon

n May l 3, l98 l a young Turkish gunman fired shots at Pope John

Íl
lJ Paul II as the Pope's vehicle circled slowly through the crowd in
St. Peter's Square. Gravely wounded, the Pope was rushed to the hospi-
tal. His assailant, Mehmet Ali Agca, was tackled by a nun and captured
by the crowd. The Italian police soon reconstructed his movements prior
to the shooting, seeking to determine his motives and accomplices. Yet
when Agca was brought to trial in July 1981, little of this information
was produced in court; his aims were still unclear and no co-con-
spirators were named.
Agca's crime was committed in the fourth month of the Reagan presi-
dency. From the outset administration officials and supporters sought to
link the assassination attempt to the Soviet Union and its allies, in accor-
dance with its new stress on ''terrorism,' ' and in aid of the new plans for
a military buildup at home and the placement of advanced missiles in
Western Europe. This effort did not bear fruit, however, until the publi-
cation of an article by Claire Sterling in the September 1982 issue of
Reader's Digest. Sterling maintained that the attempted assassination,
previously thought to have been the work of a rightwing gunman, acting
either alone or as a member of a Turkish rightwing network, was in fact
instigated by the Bulgarian secret services, and behind them the KGB.
This latter claim took on particular significance because at that moment
the heir apparent to the terminally ill Leonid Brezhnev was Yuri An-
dropov, who had been the head of the KGB at the time of the assassina-
tion attempt. Thus a successful linking of the KGB to the shooting
would seriously cripple the prospective leader's ability to project any
moral claims for Soviet policies were he actually to succeed Brezhnev.'
I Andropov received little notice in the West as a possible successor to Brezhnev until
the death of Mikhai| Sus|ov in January 1982 An artic|e by Don oberdoďer in the
tilashington Past on April 3, 1982, mentioned Konstantin Chernenko as a likely succes-
 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION

The claim of a Bulgarian Connection received apparent confirmation

in November 1982, when Agca declared that several Bulgarian officials
residing in Rome had assisted him in his crime, and that the plan had
originally been laid while he was passing through Bulgaria in the sum-
A Dual Conspiracy
mer of 1980. Two of the named officials had returned to Bulgaria, but
Where the creators of the Bulgarian Connection see one conspiracy, we
one of them, Sergei Antonov, deputy director of Balkan Air, was im-
see two. The irrst was a conspiracy to assassinate the Pope. The second
mediately arrested. With the heightening of Cold War tensions, and
was a conspiracy to take advantage of control over the imprisoned Agca
European debate and demonstrations over the scheduled deployment of
to pin the assassination attempt on the Bulgarians and KGB. We, like
new U.S. missiles reaching their peak, Agca's accusations found a
Claire Sterling and her associates, believe there was a conspiracy to as-
ready and uncritical reception in the western media. While no indepen-
sassinate the Pope. But who were the participants? In the Sterling model
dent evidence linking Agca to the Bulgarians, or the Bulgarians to the
it was the Bulgarians and KGB. But throughout the investigation and
crime, was forthcoming, Agca's mere declaration and its apparent con-
trial in Rome, the only evidence of Agca's linkages that was not based
firmation by the arrest of Antonov all but convicted Bulgaria in the
on his word alone (and that of Claire Sterling and company), suggested
western press. Leaks of Agca's evolving claims, which soon included a
a conspiracy rooted in a Turkish neofascist organization called the Gray
Bulgarian-instigated plot to murder Lech Walesa, served to keep the pot
Wolves. Its members assisted Agca in escaping from a Turkish prison in
boiling. Despite severe problems of fact and logic, the ltalian judicial
November 1979; aided, financed, and sheltered him during the 18
machinery ground slowly but steadily through its investigations, cul-
months prior to the assassination attempt; and cooperated with him in
minating in an official indictment of three Bulgarians and six Turks on
carrying it out. There is extensive evidence in the final report of Inves-
October 25, 1984. A trial of these indicted individuals began on May
tigating Magistrate llario Martella, and in the record of the Rome trial,
27, 1985, and ended with the acquittal of the Bulgarians on March 29,
of these continuing and intimate contacts between Agca and the Gray
r986.
Wolves network in the months prior to the assassination attempt. lnves-
It is our judgment that the media's uncritical, even enthusiastic, em-
tigations into Agca's background in Turkey have also placed him
brace of the case developed by Claire Sterling and the ltalian prosecu-
squarely in the midst of an intricate web of political rightists, drug deal-
tion was not merely wrong, but also points up the more general prop-
ers, and gun runners-a large proportion also Gray Wolves-who were
aganda role played by the press. As we will show below, the credibility
the only known participants in the conspiracy to shoot the Pope.' We
of Agca, the primary (in fact, sole) witness-based on his character,
develop these links, and the possible motivations that might have led
history, political affiliations, círcumstances of imprisonment, and Shifts
Agca and his associates to attempt to kill the Pope, in Chapter 3.
and contradictions in testimony-is close to zero.2 Furthermore, the
The main focus of our work, however, is on the second conspiracy,
logic of the case, as advanced by its leading proponents, was seriously
which used the imprisoned Agca to advance various Italian and New
flawed and rested ultimately on Cold War premises.' We believe that
Cold War political interests. The Rome trial, while discrediting the Bul-
similar evidence and arguments put forward in a case not helpful to
garian Connection, greatly strengthened the hypothesis that Agca was
western political interests would have been objects of derision and
coached to implicate the Bulgarians. This conspiracy was implemented
quickly rejected and buried.o
being held captive in a Bulgarian prison for l8 months, suddenly confessed that he had
sor. lt was not until Andropov was appointed to an importaní new post in the Party Sec- acted for the CIA, several of whose officials he identified from a picture album showed to
retariat on May 24, and resigned from his position as head of the KGB two days later, that
him by the Bulgarian secret services!
he was regarded publicly in the West as a leading candidate to succeed Brezhnev This 5 Up to the time of the trial it was thought that Agca had one or more Turkish accom-
period of the emergence of Andropov coincides with lhe sudden decision by Agca to plices in Rome at the time of the assassination attempt. The trial raised doubts about any
cooperate and name his alleged Bulgarian collaborators. on-the-scene accomplices of Agca, although it has not diminished the force of the evi-
2 See Chapters 2-5 dence that Agca was moving through the Gray Wolves network in his passage through
3 See Chapters 2, 5, and 6 Europe to the rendezvous in Rome. See further, Chapter 3, pp. 53-55.
4 For example, imagine the response of the West if a lifelong leftisl terrorist, after
 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION

by the ltalian secret services and their allies in the Vatican and the support, and political backing for such an initiative.8 Encouragement
Mafia, with assistance from other members of the ltalian government, and support came in part from the pressures built up in the U.S. mass
their friends in the Reagan administration, and the press.u We believe media, but they also flowed through more direct channels. The penetra-
that a poweÍfu| analogy can be drawn between the..confessions'' ex- tion and manipulation of the ltalian state by the CIA and other agencies
tracted during the Soviet political trials of the 1930s and Agca's "con- of the U.S. government is a matter of public record, conhrmed by the
fessions" of 1982 and 1983. In Chapter 4 we describe the domestic and Pike Committee of the House of Representativese and by many indepen-
international forces at work in recent years which encouraged the Italian dent ltalian investigations. In Chapters 4 and 5 we describe this back-
initiators to press Agca into implicating the eastem Bloc in the Plot. We ground of manipulation and quasi-dependency. We also discuss some of
also discuss the background of the Italian security services, which were the recent evidence in ltalian court documents and in the press revealing
mobilized early in the Cold War era as an activist, anticommunist in- linkages and cooperative ventures between officials of the Reagan ad-
strument of U.S. and conservative Italian political aims.'These services ministration and agents of the ltalian secret services. We show that the
played an important role in rightwing destabilization strategies of the team of Michael lrdeen and Francesco Pazienza, which had already
1960s and 1970s, including efforts to plant fabricated evidence on the achieved a notable success in manufacturing the "Billygate" scandal in
[,eít' we discuss the massive rightwing conspiracy Propaganda Due, or 1980, was virtually directing U.S.-Italian relations during the Reagan
P-2, which was exposed in a major scandal shortly after the assassina- transition era. This team was well positioned to encourage the second
tion attempt against the Pope in 1981. An Italian Parliamentary Report conspiracy and disseminate information Iinking the papal assassination
on P-2, issued in July 1984, showed that those agencies of the ltalian attempt to the Bulgarians and Soviets.
state which held Agca in captivity, which had daily access to him, and We also show that the Bulgarian Connection had already been con-
which participated in the investigation of his evolving claims, had been cocted in documents fabricated by the ltalian secret services only days
thoroughly penetrated by P-2. after the assassination attempt, and that the idea of getting Agca to tell
The gradually accumulating evidence that Agca was induced to impli- this story had arisen early from several different sources. There were
cate the Bulgarians by means of both positive incentives and threats is numerous avenues through which interested parties in the secret ser-
spelled out in Chapters 4 and 5. We also describe the weaknesses of the vices, Mafia, Vatican, and other political interests could persuade,
Italian judicial process in its investigative phase, which combined major threaten, and instruct Agca on a proper confession. The evidence
violations of judicial and scientific procedure in handling evidence with suggests that Agca was induced to confess properly by a variety of indi-
a flow of timely leaks that allowed numerous Cold War points to be viduals and interests, sometimes acting alone, sometimes working in
scored by proponents of the Plot. We show in Chapter 5 that Judge collaboration.'u We believe that the ltalian background and the interna-
Ilario Martella was an ideal choice to pursue the investigation, quietly
8 Part of the conservalivc line on the Bulgarian Connection is thal its prosecution suf-
dignified but dedicated to proving an a priori tntlh. fercd grievously from Reagan adminisrration and CIA negativism and foordragging,
The ltalians did not decide to pursue the Bulgarian Connection en- rooted in a devotion to détente' with perhaps some assistance from KcB mo|es who have
tirely on their own. ttaly is a part of the Free World, and it was caught penetrated the government. This line, which stands the truth on irs head, reached its finest

up in a web of larger interests. The Reagan administration's rearmament flowering in the writings of Claire Sterling and in the Georgetown Center for Strategic and
International Studies pamphlet on the papal assassination auempt. See Chapter 6 and Ap-
plans and antiterrorism campaign provided encouragement, ideological
pendix E.
6. We believe that this conspiracy was loosely organized and tacit, not centrally di- 9. The "Pike Committee" was the Select Committee on lntelligence of the U S. House
rected, and with a number of participants pursuing the same end quite independently, ofRepresentatives. Its report on the CIA's record, completed in February 1976, was never
some playing their role knowingly, others contributing innocently in the belief that they published by the govemment, but was leaked and made available by theVillage Voice on
were merely expressing or eliciting a self-evident truth. (See the beginning of Chapter 8 February l6 and 23, 1976. It was issued in book form by Spokesman Books in England in
on the multiple invention of the second conspiracy ) |977,withanintroductionbyPhilipAgee'underthetit|eClÁ:ThePikeReport Forsome
7 See Chapter 4. of its findings pertaining to the CIA in ltaly, see Chapter 4, p. 73.
10. ln the account of Giovanni Pandico, a former Mafia leader, now the chief state wil-
 THE BULGAR]AN CONNECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION

tional New Cold War political context are essential to understanding the aganda service. Here the very individuals actively participating in the
Bulgarian Connection. It is this context which explains why many indi- manufacture of the Plot were mobilized to serve as the main media
viduals with access to Agca were anxious that he confess, and why the sources of information on the subject. The most important investigative
western political and media environment was receptive to an implausi- work----or, we should say, creative writing-in establishing the
ble confession. This essential background, however, has rarely been hypothesis of the Bulgarian Connection was done by Claire Sterling,
mentioned by the New York Times or the major media sources in the Paul Henze, and Michael Ledeen. Their writings in the New York
West. Thus, while featuring prominently the report of Prosecutor Al- Times, Christian Science Monitor, Reader's Digest, and other publica-
bano and the final report of Magistrate Martella in 1984, the Times and tions, and their frequent appearances on the MacNeil/Lehrer News
its mass media associates completely ignored the sensational findings of Hour, the Sunday television news programs, and before Senator
the July 1984 ltalian Parliamentary Report on P-2 and the major July Jeremiah Denton's Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism show them
1985 ltalian court report on the multiple abuses of Francesco Pazienza to be the media's commentators of choice on the Bulgarian Connection.
and SISMI, the Italian intelligence agency with which he was as- That these individuals have long records of CIA and other intelligence
sociated. The only"politics" which the media allow to enter the discus- agency connections and disinformation service has not been disclosed to
sion of the Connection is the Soviet concern over Solidarity and the the American public. We discuss their role and peďormance at |ength in
Polish upheaval, which happens to coincide with the interpretation of Chapter 6. In Chapter 7 we describe the remarkable dominance which
the motivations for the assassination attempt developed by Claire Ster- they have been able to exercise over the U.S. mass media in the dis-
ling and her associates semination of the Plot.
The reasons for this dichotomous treatment seem quite clear. If the This pattern of media bias is a uniform characteristic of Red Scare
media is playing a supportive political role, it will not only concentrate eras. In every such period, as during the Palmer raids (1919-20) or the
its attention on reports and political themes damaging to the enemy, but McCarthy years (1950-54), hysteria and bias overwhelm any sense of
it will also ignore any information that would suggest hidden political fair play, justice, and concern for truthfulness. A wave of passion and
motives behind the case or cast doubt on the quality of our allies (the propaganda establishes guilt beforehand and makes doubts seem subver-
supporting cast). This allows commentators such as the Wall Street sive . While Red Scares require a favorable climate of opinion in which
Journal's Suzanne Garment to endorse the Bulgarian Connection on the to develop, they do not simply emerge spontaneously; rather, they are
basis of the integrity and even superior wisdom of the ltalians: "Mind cultivated and stoked by prospective beneficiaries and their agents.''?
you, this is the ltalians-no American hawk paranoids but instead The Bulgarian Connection met a need in the emerging New Cold War
people who live with a new government every thirty days. You simply comparable to that met by earlier Red Scares. We believe that it was
cannot doubt their word."" While it would be interesting to examine similarly created and stoked by Claire Sterling, Paul Henze, Michael
Garment's view that political instability is a source of sound political Ledeen, and their governmental and media allies.'r These influential
judgment, the more important point is that not only can we doubt the disinformation specialists, linked to both the Reagan administration and
"word" (and the political processes) of an ltalian state machinery satu- to the Italian secret services, first created and packaged the Bulgarian
rated with P-2 cadres, but we must do so if we are to arrive at the truth Connection, and then helped sell it to the Italians. Finally, in a scenario
behind the Bulgarian Connection. worthy of Pirandello, they became the terrorism "experts" and com-
While the U.S. media have suppressed the ltalian context of the Bul- mentators to whom the N ew Y ork Time s, the C hristian S cience Monitor,
garian Connection, their treatment of the involvement of U.S. citizens 12. See Robeí Murray, Red Scare: A Study of National Hysteria, I919-I92o (Min-
in the creation of the Connection attained an even higher level of prop- neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955); David Caute, The Great Fear: The Anti-
Communis! Purge Under Truman and Eisenhower (New York: Simon and Schuster,
ness in a trial of the Naples Mafia, it is suggested that a number of convergent interests- l 978)
Mafia, Vatican, and secret services-worked together in getting Agca to talk. See below' l3. It was a|so simultancously created and stoked by Itďian inte||igence and other |oca|
Chapters 4 and 5 sources. This was a case of multiple invention and causation. See Chapter 8, pp. 206-09.
ll Wttll Street Journal. June 15. 1984
 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTTON

the MacNeil/l,ehrer News Hour, and the NBC Nightly News turned to
elucidate and evaluate the real story of what the nefarious KGB was up
to.

2. lhe Evolutlon of the

Bulgarlan Gonnectlon

his book is a case study in the response of the West---of its intelli-
gence agencies and mass media, intellectuals and disinfor-
mationists-to an act of terror. The response was complex, but the
"Bulgarian Connection" was its most important outcome. The Connec-
tion did not emerge full-blown from a single source; it grew piece by
piece over a periď of four years, and many hands contributed to its
manufacture. In this chapter we will examine the craft of these many
laborers, and look at the evidence, claims, and hypotheses with which
they constructed the Connection.

The Preliminary Version: A Turkish Conspiracy

tnoking back, it seems amazing that the story could have been turned around so
swiftly and smoothly, before the eyes of several hundred joumalists gathered in
Rome from the four comers of the globe to cover the papal shooting. The truth
was close enough to touch for a fleeting instant, and then it was gone. At the
first sign of a probable conspiracy, government and Church leaders perceived
the dangers of exposing it. A wall of refracting minors went up overnight, de-
flecting our vision at every turn.'

So begins Claire Sterling's argument that a great international cover-

up was organized to conceal the conspiracy that supported Agca's at-
tempt to kill the Pope . At the very outset of her study of the Bulgarian
Connecťion, Sterling characteristically distorts elementary aspects of the
historicď record to make it appear that-against the ca|lous indifference
| . C|ďrc Ster|ing, The Time of the Assassins (New York: Ho|t, Rinehart and Winston,
1983), p. 5.
IO THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION TWO: EVOLUTION OF THE CONNECTION l l

of the West and the active disinformation efforts of the East-she has Italian officials continued to pursue the possibility that he had help.'zThe
rescued the truth about the Soviet-Bloc conspiracy to kill the Pope. conspiracy under investigation, however, which Sterling fails to see,l
What was "the truth that was close enough to touch"? According to was a Turkisá conspiracy, based in the shadowy rightwing network
Sterling, Italian authorities determined immediately after Agca shot the called the Gray Wolves and in its parent organization, the Nationalist
Pope that he had been aided by "other persons who remain unknown," Action Party of Turkey. To the extent that there was any official hesi-
as Attorney General Achille Gallucci put it in his arrest order. Judge tancy in investigating this wider conspiracy, therefore, it can only be in-
Luciano Infelisi, who signed the order, noted that "for us, there is ferred that someone or some institution was reluctant to explore any
documentary proof that Mehmet Ali Agca did not act alone." These possible links to international fascist networks that might compromise
quotations, from the May 15, l98l issue of the Turin newspaper La Italy's NATO allies.
Stampa, are cited by Sterling at the beginning of her book. They are im- This finding, moreover, was reflected across the board in the U.S.
mediately contrasted with a statement from the New York Times of the media. Summaries of the evening news broadcasts of the three major
same day that "Police are convinced, according to government sources, U.S. television networks reveal a sustained interest in Agca's Turkish
that Mr. Agca acted alone." For Sterling, this was the beginning of the roots.n Time magazine, in its first issue after the assassination attempt,
cover-up. described Agca as a "right-wing fanatic" and connected him to the
As she develops this line of thought in the introductory pages of The Nationalist Action PaÍty.. Similar|y, Newsweek,s (far more extensive)
Time of the Assassins, Sterling makes four points: coverage placed Agca in the world of the Gray Wolves, even speculat-
l. ltalian officials were initially convinced that there was a consplr- ing on more far-reaching connections to European fascists as well.u
acy to kill the Pope, and then suddenly retreated on this issue, saying Finally, we must point out that this preliminary model seemed so
that there was insufficient evidence; compelling that it convinced even Claire Sterling, who made what were
2. The western media generally followed this lead, dropping any in- perhaps her most cogent remarks on the Plot in an interview with People
vestigation into the possibility that there was a conspiracy to kill the magazine immediately after the papal shooting.?
Pope, and taking as true Agca's claim to be "an intemational terrorist"
Some people are saying that the Russians plotted this because of the Pope's role
acting alone;
3. The conspiracy that the ltalian authorities initially detected was 2. For example, on May 25, 1981, SISMI turned over to investigating magistrare
one involving international terrorists and Soviet-backed organizations; Domenico Sica the names of I I Turks with whom Agca was known to have associated in
and West Germany anďor Switzer|and, and who were wanted by Turkish police íor ..subver.
sive activities" in association with the Gray Wolves (SISMI document number 13569M)
4. The ltalian authorities and the western media backed off from in-
Among the I I Turks named were Mehmet Sener, AMullah Catli, and Oral Celik. On May
vestigating this conspiracy because of their overriding interest in main- 2'7, 1981, DICOS, the Italian anti-terrorist police, forwarded to Judge Sica information
taining or supporting détente. about l7 "suspected Turkish citizens" who were known to have links with Agca (DIGOS
Was there a cover-up? It is evident from a sirnple reading of the west- document number 051 195/81). This latter document was published in Espresso on De-
ern press in the days and weeks following the assassination attempt that cember 6, 1982. (See Sari Gilbert, "3 Bulgarians Linked To Shooting of Pope,"
the question of a conspiracy was very much alive. A day-by-day ac-
Washington PosÍ,December8' l982.)TheDIGoSreportof September|5, |98,l ,(see
below, note 20) indicates that the investigation continued.
count of the reporting in the New York Times and the Washington Post 3. Just as Sterling can never see rightwing teÍTor (see Chapter 6), so it is possible that
for the first ten days following.the assassination attempt, which we pre- she is unable to recognize a rightist conspiracy as a genuine conspiracy.
sent in Appendix A, clearly shows that Sterling's "wall of refracting 4 Vanderbift University Television News Archive, Television News Index and
mirrors" was completely ineffective in stemming the media's pursuit of Abstracts (May 14-25, l98l), pp. 831-902.
5. "Not Yet Hale, But Hearty," Time, lune l, 1981, pp 34-35.
a possible conspiracy. We also know from leaked documents and pub-
6. "The Man With the Gun," Newsweek, May 25, 1981, pp. 36-38.
lished accounts of the investigation that up to the time of Agca's trial, 7. "An Authority on Terrorism Offers A Chilling New Theory on the Shooting of the
Pope," People, June l,1981, pp.32-35
12 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION TWO: EVOLUTION OF Tt{E CONNEC"TION 13

in Poland, but I think that's crazy. If it was an organized plot by a serious group. Connection were divided on whether Agca was always a KGB recruit
t suspect there would have been a better Setaway plan. Maybe this was a son of who was simply using his Gray Wolves associations for cover, or
kamikaze mission, but usually these people are skillful at escapes. There would whether he was in fact a genuine participant in rightwing activities and
have been some distraction in the crowd, some escape route. I could envision a terrorism who was later recruited by the KGB. Claire Sterling, for ex-
small splinter group of Moslem fanatics with Agca among them vowing to get ampfe, told a congressional investigating committee in 1982 that Agca
the Pope. But more likely he made the final decision alone was "a sleeper," a lifelong Soviet agent who was activated only when a
strike against the Pope became necessary.e Others have argued that
Sterling saw a possible motivation for an attack on the Pope, noting Agca was recruited at the university, or while in a Turkish prison, or
that he "isn't perceived as just the head of the Roman Catholic Church, on|y later, in Bulgaria. But the only known/ac's aÍe that Agca was con-
but as the supreme symbol of the intrusion of western civilization" into tinuously involved with Turkish fascists from his high school days.
the Moslem world. She also noted that the attack occurred shortly after
the release of the hostages at the U.S. Embassy in lran, and in the wake
of the attack on the Grand Mosque at Mecca, which in the Middle East
Agca's stay in Bulgaria. A key element in Bulgarian Connection
scenarios has always been the fact that Agca stayed in Sofia, Bulgaria
was widely (but falsely) attributed to the CIA and Israel.E Sterling also
for some days or weeks in the summer of 1980. 'o Sterling and NBC-TV
argued that the Pope's trip to Turkey in 1979 had been highly inflam-
claimed that the very fact of Agca's presence in Sofia proved Bulganan
matory and "a terrible mistake." Finally, she placed Agca within the
guilt, because the Bulgarian police know everything and must have been
networks of the Gray Wolves, "the paramilitary wing of the neo-Nazi
"protecting" Agca. Thus, according to Marvin Kalb, it "seems safe to
National [slc] Action Party."
conclude that he had been drawn into the clandestine network of the
This, then, may be taken as the preliminary paradigm of any possible
Bulgarian secret police and, by extension, the Soviet KGB-perhaps
"Connection" to Agca and the assassination attempt: a conspiracy
without his even being aware of their possible plans for him. " " This is a
which was rooted in Turkish neofascism, sustained by the European
non sequitur that rests on a number of assumptions, some of them quite
branches of the Turkish Right, and motivated by the problematic ideol-
foolish. Agca came into Bulgaria on a false passport, and the flow of
ogy of the Gray Wolves and the unstable personality of Agca himself.
Turks through Bulgaria numbers in excess of a million a year. The as-
We call this the "first conspiracy." We will examine the Turkish roots
sumption that the Bulgarians knew of Agca's presence is therefore un-
ofthis conspiracy in Chapter 3, and show that no agents ofthe East were
proven.'t The further assumption that, if his presence was known, he
required to originate and execute Agca's assassination attempt.
must have been protected and recruited by the Bulgarians for some se-

9. "The Assassination Attempt on Pope John Paul Il," Hearing before the Commission
The Challenges Confronting Sterling and Company on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 97th Congress, 2nd Session (September 23,
1982), p 7 She has never given evidence that this was so, but this has never been de-
manded of her by friendly congressional and media interlocutors.
The facts unearthed by police and journalists that connected Agca to a I0. Perhaps the most important aspect of his stay is that even Agca has rarely claimed
Turkish rightwing conspiracy provided a formidable challenge to Ster- contact there with any Bulgarian official. For a long time he claimed to have worked
ling and her associates in their efforts to transform the case into a stÍict|y thÍough intermediaries' although eventually a Bulgarian officia| came into the pic-
Soviet-based plot. As the case for a Bulgarian-KGB Connection was de- ture. During lhe trial Agca disconcertingly took rhe new rack that on July 4, 1980, he had
been introduced to the First Secrelary ofthe Soviet Embassy in Sofia, whovisited him in
veloped, logical contradictions also emerged that demanded (but never
his hotel room!
received) resolution. Some of the core problems were as follows: I I "The Man Who Shot the Pope-A Sfudy in Tenorism," transcripr of NBC-TV
pÍogram of September 2|, |982, pp. 44-45
Agca's relation to the "Gray Wolves." Those arguing for a Bulgarian f 2. During his testimony at the Rome trial on September 22, 1985, Gray Wolves leader

Abdu|lah Cat|i gave as one reason for Agca's visiting Bulgaria, instead oí proceeding di.
8 Agca had mentioned the attack on the Mosque and attributed it to the United States rectly into Western Europe, the fact that the volume of Turkish traffic is so large that a
and Israel in his 1979 note in which he first announced his intention to shoot the Pope Turk may enter Bulgaria without having to undergo very careful checks!
14 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION TWO: EVOLUTION OF THE CONNECTION 15

cret purpose is simple-minded Cold War ideology. If the Bulgarians Soviet politics regard the Soviet leadership as cautious and not inclined
knew who Agca was they may have been uninterested in him, or they to adventurism.rl
may have failed to arrest him because of incompetence or indifference Finally, there is some evidence that the Soviets regarded the Church
to the appeals of Turkish authorities, or they may have left him alone as as a conservative force in Poland. According to the Turin newspaper La
a favor to Turkish smuggling interests with whom the Gray Wolves Stampa, in December 1980 Vadim Zagladin, Vice-Secretary of Foreign
were linked. Affairs in the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee, told the
Vatican that "Moscow does not intend to invade Poland, but that the
The Bulgarian-Soviet motive. The issue of motive also bedevils various Church should continue to use its influence so that certain situations do
accounts of the alleged Bulgarian link. Why would the Bulgarians or the not escalate." (At this time western media and government officials
Soviets want to kill the Pope? Advocates of the Bulgarian Connection considered a Soviet invasion of Poland imminent.) A second Soviet of-
hypothesis have built a motive out of the situation in Poland between the ficial, accordingto La Stampa, told Vatican Secretary of State Cardinď
election of Cardinal Wojtyla as Pope in 1979 and the proclamation of Agostino Casaroli that "If the Church committed itself to stem the ardor
Solidarity in late August 1980. It was the Pope's support for Solidarity of the Polish strikers within limits acceptable to Moscow, then Moscow
which is held to be the key to the Soviet desire to want him out of the in her turn would renounce the idea of an invasion. ' ' 'o According to this
way, and at one point it was even claimed that he had declared his inten- line of thought, which has considerable support in the historical record,
tion to lay down the papal crown and return to Poland in the event of a the Polish Pope, the Vatican, and the Polish Church acted as a stabiliz-
Soviet invasion. ing force in Poland; and the assassination of Pope John Paul II would
There are several very serious difficulties with this imputed rationale. only threaten the very stability the Soviets sought there.
First, Agca had already threatened to kill the Pope in 1979 during the
Pope's visit to Turkey, long before Solidarity existed or Poland was in Operational ineptitude: ( I ) hirinq Agca. Each successive version of the
turmoil. This suggests the likelihood that the real explanation for the as- Bulganan Connection has also had to wrestle with the overall ineptness
sassination attempt is to be found in Turkey. Second, the timing of of the alleged plot. Why would the Bulgarians want to hire Agca in the
Agca's alleged conspiracy with the Bulgarians also presents problems, first place? Of the hundreds of rightwing terrorists wanted by the Tur-
as Solidarity was formed in late August 1980, while, according to Ster- kish government, Agca was probably the most notorious; and, as the
ling, Agca's dealings in Sofia were largely completed by early July of events of his 1985 trial have demonstrated, he was personally unstable.
that year. Third, there is no reason to believe that killing the Pope would As an anticommunist he would have little compunction in confessing to
have been useful to thc Soviet Union, and the costs and risks ofeither a Bulgarian involvement. The hypothesis that Agca was hired by the Bul-
successful or a bungled assassination plot were great. The magnitude of garians in the summer of 1980, after his escape from Turkey's
the potential damage from such an effort has been demonstrated by the maximum security prison and then from Turkey itself, must contend
events which have unfolded since May 1981, as the attempted assassi- with the fact that at just that moment Turkey and Interpol were issuing
nation was ultimately pinned on the Soviets on the basis of mere suspi- bulletins asking for his immediate anest. [n their respective reports,
cion. Nowhere is the belief in Soviet complicity stronger than in Poland, Deputy Prosecutor Albano and Judge Martella stressed Agca's notori-
and it is hard to imagine how any Soviet official could have expected ety, maintaining that both the Bulgarians and the Turks who allegedly
that a successful assassination attempt would have quelled unrest in Po- assisted Agca should have known precisely with whom they were deal-
land. Furthermore, if an assassination had been convincingly linked to
l3 See,e.g.,GeorgeKennan,TheNuclearDelusion:Soviet-AmericanRelationsinthe
the Soviet Union, this would have had a devastating effect on Soviet ef- Atomic Age (New York: Pantheon, 1982); John Lowenhardt, Decision-Making in Soviet
forts to oppose the new missiles planned for Europe and to advance the Poliri.s (New York: St. Martin's Press, l98l); and Jerry Hough and Merle Fainsod, How
gas pipeline project, goals then considered by the Soviets to be ofgreat the Soviet Union is Coverned (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979).

importance. In short, this would have been an extremely foolhardy en- 14. Cited in "The Papal Attack Background," Intelligence Digest (Great Britain), Oc-

terprise for the Soviet Union to embark on, and western analysts of
tober l, 1981.
16 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION TWO: EVOLUTION OF THE CONNECTION 17

ing and could not plead ignorance that "Farouk Ozgun" was in fact nor killed. Writings and other items found in Agca's room and on his
Agca, the wanted criminal.'' Yet precisely this notoriety would have person after his arrest would have helped incriminate and identify him,
caused any intelligence service to steer clear of Agca. even if he had escaped or been killed. On the whole there was nothing in
this operation that even hinted at the alleged professionalism of the
Operational ineptitude: (2) the Sofia gambit. In explaining the lack of Soviet-Bloc intelligence services. Rather, the obvious amateurishness
any direct evidence for Bulgarian or Soviet involvement, Claire Sterling of the assassination tactics fits far better an operation managed by Agca
and her associates have ďways retreated to the notion that the KGB is a and perhaps a few of his friends.
very professional body that does things well, covers its tracks, and oper-
ates from a base of "plausible deniability." Thus the very lack of evi- Operational ineptitude: (4) the Bulgarian involvement in Rome. The op-
dence, according to the Sterling school, pointed to a Soviet hand in the erational weaknesses of the alleged Plot reached epic proportions after
plot. In the version of the Connection developed in the second half of Agca had declared that Bulgarian state officials met with him and
1982 by Sterling in the Reader's Digest and by Marvin Kalb on NBC- guided his movements in Rome. Proponents of the case would have us
TV, the implausibility of bringing Agca to a prominent hotel in Sofia to believe that the Bulgarian secret service involved its agents in direct
be recruited anďor to get his instructions was not mentioned. ln the in- contiact, planning, and tactical maneuvers with Agca up to the moment
terest of maintaining plausible deniability, however, Sofia is the last of the assassination attempt itself. Agca and two or three Bulgarians al-
place to which any Bulgarian co-conspirators would want Agca to be legedly visited St. Peter's Square on each of the two days preceding the
traced. If contact between Agca and Bulgarian officials were observed assassination attempt in order to make the final plans. Not one but two
by western agents in Sofia----certainly a reasonable possibility-the of the Bulgarians would allegedly drive Agca to rhe Square, and one
logic of hiring a fascist to provide a cover for a Bulgarian- and KGB- Bulgarian official would use smoke bombs to divert the crowd's atten-
sponsored plot would be badly compromised from the start. tion so that Agca cou|d get a good shot anďor make a getaway. This
Thus the presence of Agca in Sofia, rather than supporting a Bulga- would, of course, entail serious risk of a Bulgarian being arrested right
rian Connection, tends to undermine it. In fact, it more readily supports at the scene of the crime, the very thing that hiring a Turk with right-
two alternative views. The first is that someone wanted Agca to be wing credentials was supposed to avoid, according to the Sterling-
linked to Bulgaria before he got on with his assassination attempt, after Henze model!
which he could be worked over at leisure until he "confessed." The In his early declarations implicating the Bulgarians, Agca even
second, which we believe to be entirely valid, is that because Agca had claimed that he visited Antonov and Aivazov in their homes in the Em-
stayed in Sofia, Italian and other western intelligence services and prop- bassy compound; and in one instance, just days before the assassination
agandists seized the opponunity to build a case which, with an induced attempt, he supposedly met Antonov's wife and young daughter. This
confession, would be salable in the well-conditioned West. latter statement was subsequently "withdrawn," but this was not done
on the basis of scrutiny or ridicule on the part of the western press, nor
Operational ineptitude: (3) the assassination attempt. Another major doubts and investigative efforts by Martella. The accumulated con-
operational difficulty with the hypothesis of the Bulgarian Connection is tradictions and exposed lies, as we shall see, had simply become too
the gross ineptitude of the assassination attempt. It is hard to imagine a top-heavy to sustain.
more poorly managed plan of attack than the one employed in Rome.
Agca not only failed to kill the Pope, but he himself was neither rescued The lag inAgca's confession. It took Agca more than 17 months after
15. On a number of occasions Turkish authorities were notified that Agca had been
his arrest to name his Bulgarian co-conspirators-six months after he
sighted in Italy, Switzerland, or West Germany, and unsuccessfully requested that he be had agreed to "tell all." Investigating Magistrate Martella never
arÍested For some reason, no negative implications have been attached to the West Ger- bothered to explain this long time lag. Sterling explained the delay as a
man, Swiss, and ltalian authorities for their failure to apprehend Agca, despite lengthy result of Agca's expectation that the Bulgarians and KGB would get him
stays in their countries and repeated Turkish prorestations
out of prison. But she never indicated how the Bulgarians could do this
I8 THE BUTcARIAN CONNECTION TrlÍo: EVOLUTION oF THE coNNEcTIoN 19

without admitting guilt and once again contradicting the logic of em- after making this statement Agca announced that he would take no more
ploying a rightwing assassin.'o part in the trial, and attempted to dismiss his lawyer. The prosecutor,
These weaknesses in the case were never overcome. The most inter- saying that "no one can understand or even guess the reason behind this
esting questions, therefore, are why, by whom, and how so implausible, act, " called Agca ''the son of modern-day terrorism, that sinister afflic-

undocumented, and internally contradictory a Plot was created and sus- tion of our time," and described the assassination attempt as "symbolic
tained in the ltalian courts and in the western press for a three-year patricide. " '' At the end of his three day trial, therefore, the jury deliber-
period. ated for six hours and sentenced Agca to life imprisonment. He would
be eligible for parole in 30 years.
The Court's decision, however, also observed that "the plea of guilty
by the accused must not close the case, since it is necessary still to ex-
The First Trial: Agca's Fast One of l98l plore certain aspects of the affair and to throw light on the background
from which a crime of this kind emerged."'o Thus, when the Court is-
While there were immediate efforts to link the Soviets to the assassina- sued its full 5l-page "Statement of Motivation" on September 24,
tion attempt, when the Italian government brought Agca to trial in July 1981, Agca was described as "only the visible point of a conspiracy
l98l any co-conspirators were assumed to have been fellow Turks and which, though impossible to define, was widespread and menacing and
members of the Gray Wolves. Yet little was revealed by the trial, and no devised by shadowy forces." The report described Agca's act as the
solid information about any possible conspiracy was forthcoming. "fruit of a complex machination orchestrated by hidden minds inter-
It is puzzling that the ltalian authorities moved to try Agca so quickly, ested in creating new conditions of destabilization. " Despite the Court's
before the investigation of a conspiracy could be completed. One possi- uncertďnty over the precise relations between Agca and the Gray
ble explanation is that ltalian authorities wished to have him convicted Wolves-"which not even the Turkish authorities were able to render
and under their control, and feared that any delay would increase the intelligible"-the Statement of Motivation maintained that Agca was
possibility that Agca would be found mentally incompetent to stand "not a religious fanatic" but a disciplined and well-trained terrorist well
trial. Media reports about Agca's childhood and Turkish background, suited to carry out a "confidential task," "One must ask oneself,"
combined with his wild lies under interrogation, raised the possibility maintained the repoí, whether an organization which had broken Agca
that he was seriously deranged. Indeed, Agca's court-appointed out of prison and supported him financially and in other ways between
lawyer-Pietro d'Ovidio, a frequent defender of rightwing criminals- that time and the assassination attempt "would have permitted him to
asked the court to delay the trial until Turkish authorities could furnish take a personal initiative that was not in keeping with a common plan
the court with copies of psychiatric examinations conducted at the time worked out in advance in all its details."il
of Agca's murder trial in 1979. The court ruled, however, that the con-
tents of these examinations (which had allegedly said that Agca was Sons, 1985), p. 7. We are citing the revised paperedition. Theoriginal edition was pub-
lished in 1983.
medically competent to stand trial) were known through press reports, 18. Henry Tanner, "Italian Prosecutor Requests a Life Sentence for the Pope's Assail-
and d'Ovidio's request was refused. ant," Ncw York Times, luly 22, l98l; "Manic Motives," Newsweek, August 3 | , l98l ,
At the opening of his trial, Agca maintained that he acted alone. "I p.38.
did not want to talk to anyone about my plan to kill the Pope," he said. |9- Martelh Report, p.9(| |). ln citing Judge MaÍtella's unpub|ished Report, we use

"l acted independently, in the name of truth above ideologies' I do not two sets of pagc numbers. The first refers to the English-language translation made avail-
able to the authors by the Intemational Association of Democratic Lawyers, a nongov-
belong to any organization. International terrorism as I conceive it is not emmental organization in consultaaive status wilh UNESCO; the second, in parentheses,
concerned with ideology. It needs no idea. It needs a gun."'' Shortly refers to the original |talian version.
20. Henry Tanner, "Attack on Pope A Conspiracy, Court Says," New YorkTimes,
l6 This issue is discussed below in this chapter and in Chapter 6. Scptember 25, l98l; and John Earle, "Pope 'Victim of Hidden Conspiracy,' " Iondon
17 Cited in Paul Henze, The Plor To Kill the Pope (New York: Charles Scribner's Tirnes, September 25, 1981. The Court's Statement of Motivation was supported by, and
20 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION TWO: EVOLUTION OF THE CONNECTION 21

or anyone else that a conspiracy existed, however, was a photograph

showing a figure fleeing from the Square, supposedly in the moments
The Bulgarian Connection Emerges just following the assassination attempt.z2 Agca subsequently identified
this individual as a Bulgarian, and still later as his Turkish friend Oral
The publication of the Statement of Motivation followed by three weeks Celik, but never as Mustafa Eof. The latter has disappeared from sight,
the airing of a British television program on the assassination attempt and may reasonably be presumed to have been a figment of Agca's
which anticipated many of the ideas which were later developed as the imagination.
"Bulgarian Connection." Thd program was produced by Julian Man-
yon, a rightwing reporter Íbr Thames Television's ..TV Eye''; Paul The Martella Investigation The Court's conclusion that Agca had been
Henze served as a consultant. Ttre broadcast claimed that the Pope was pan of a conspiracy returned the case to the Public Prosecutor; and on
shot because of his inspirational relationship to Poland's Solidarity, an November 7, 198 I , the Prosecutor appointed Magistrate Ilario Martella
idea developed in the program primarily by Francesco Mazzola, the Ital- to conduct the investigation.'. In accordance with ltďian |aw, Martella
ian junior minister in charge of the halian security forces at the time of was given broad powers of investigation during this, the "Instruction
the shooting. Mazzola noted that, at the time of the assassination at- Phase" ofthe legal proceedings against Agca "and persons unknown."
tempt, the Pope had recently met with Lech Walesa, and was about to His function might be compared to that of a Grand Jury in the United
announce his return to Poland to administer the last rites to Cardinal States, in that he was not constricted by formal rules of evidence and
Wyszynski. According toMazzola, the Soviets believed that such a visit there was no burden of proof on the prosecution. Like a Grand Jury, the
would produce a potentiall), dangerous series of anticommunist demon- lnstruction Phase is supposed to be secret. The examining magistrate is
strations; andMazzola maintained that the Vatican was convinced that also supposed to pursue lines of ínvestigation that wou|d demonstrate
this was why the Pope had been shot. the innocence, as well as the guilt, of the accused. Finally, the Instruc-
The "TV Eye" program also extracted several items from Agca's tion Phase culminates in a decision whether there is sufficient evidence
early declarations whicb were to re-emerge in Claire Sterling's Reader's to bring the accused to trial.'za
Digest article, "The Plot to Kill the Pope. " It claimed that Agca stayed Martella began his investigation by re-interviewing the witnesses to
in Bulgaria for 60 days, that his contact there with one Omer Mersan the assassination attempt and by asking a team of forensic experts to in-
helped him to obtain his forged Turkish passport, and that Mersan intro- vestigate how many bullets had been fired. These efforts revealed little
duced him to a mysterious "Mustafa Eof." According to Mazzola, new information. The forensic experts concluded that one pistol had
Mustafa Eof was Agca's contact with the Bulgarian secret service and fired two bullets.'z5 The eyewitnesses apparently had little to add to their
supplied Agca with money, documentation, and instructions. Eof sup-
posedly met Agca again in Tunis, where he had fled following the mur- London Times, September 5, 1981.
22. This photograph, taken by Lowell Newton, is discussed below.
der of a Turkish Gray Wolves leader in West Germany. Mazzola main-
23 For a fuller treatment of Martella's handling of the Bulgarian Connection case, see
tained that Eof directed Agca's apparently random wanderings through- Chapter 5, pp. I l4-21
out Western Europe, which were all somehow directed toward the at- 24. G. Leroy Certoma, The ltalian Legal System (London: Butterworth, 1985), p. 219;
tack on the Pope.'zr The only evidence presented by Mazzola, Manyon, cited in Intemational Association of Democratic Lawyers, Report of the International
Commission aÍ stud) and Information on ,.The Antonov Ajfair'' (Brussels: May 13,
probably drew on, a report by the anti-lerrorist police force DIGOS, dated September 15, 1985), pp 7-8
t981. This report summarized information gathered up to that point on Agca's travels and 25 Martella Reporr, pp 22-27(25-30) Martella eventually concluded rhat a second
associations, and traced the history of the assassination weapon from its Belgium man- gunman must have fired a third bullet. While there was disagreement among the witnesses
ufacturer to an Austria gun dealer (Martella Report, pp.9-16(12-18).) Claire Sterling, in as to how many bullets were fired, Martella neverexplained why he ovemrled his forensic
her account of the Statement of Motivation in The Time of tha Ássassins, neglects to men- experts in deciding that there must have been three bullets fired It was this conclusion,
tion that it connects Agca with the Gray Wolves. and the equally shaky conclusion that Agca had fired only two bullets, which led Martella
2l Michael Knipe, "West Germans Now Believe KGB Inspired Attack on Pope," to state in his final Report that Agca had been accompanied by a second gunman on the
22 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION TWO: EVOLUTION OF THE CONNECTION 23

trial testimony, although Lowell Newton, the U.S. photographer who ians----either in a jail break, through a prisoner exchange, or by being
had taken the picture of a man running away from St. Peter's Square im- 14ns6msd-would not be fulfilled.'8
mediately after the shooting, who he said was carrying a gun, provided On the other hand, in December 1982, immediately after the arrest of
a detailed description of Agca's apparent accomplice.'u the Bulgarian Antonov, a mass of details and allegations were published
We now come to a critical period in the fabrication of the Bulgarian in the Italian press strongly suggesting that Agca was pressured or
Connection. According to Martella's Report, sometime in late April bribed to "confess." Martella's Report is notable for its failure to ex-
1982 Agca told the prison authorities that he wished to make a state- plore the possibility that Agca was coached; and, as we will see in
ment. The "new ,{gca" was suddenly voluble and cooperative, giving Chapter 5, Martella was an important part of the machinery of an in-
Martella for the first time plausible testimony on some of his Gray duced confession.
Wolves associates and connections.tt Most significantly, Agca began to What and when did Agca tell Martella about his alleged Bulgarian co-
bring the Bulgarians into his story, at frrst incidentally and tentatively, conspirators? Throughout his "confessions" during the first week in
but later moving them to the front of the stage. May there was apparently only a single reference to Bulgarian coopera-
Why did Agca suddenly decide to talk? On this question Martella's tion. According to Martella's Report, sometime in early 198 I Agca con-
Report is silent, implying that Agca had simply decided to cooperate tacted a Syrian in Sofia who had earlier attempted to help out with his
and tell ' ' the truth. ' ' Claire Sterling and others committed to the validity passport difficulties. A few days later, Agca told Martella, they met in
of the Bulgarian Connection maintďn that Agca decided to talk because Vienna and, "during a meeting held in the presence of a Bulgarian dip-
he realized that his hopes of being rescued from prison by the Bulgar- lomat named Petronov, [the Syrian] not only gave Agca the sum of
100,000 Austrian schillings but promised him that, if he managed to or-
day of the assassination attempt. This unexamined aspect of Martella's Report, of course, ganize some terrorist attack against the European Parliament, NATO, or
provided the media with its headlines and lead paragraphs when the Report was released
the Common Market, he would receive in return unconditional hospital-
in late October I 984. The effect of this was to reinforce, if only subliminally, support for
a Bulganan Connection, even though the second gunman was presumed to be the Gray ity in Syria, Bulgaria, or East Germany."'e
Wolves leader, Oral Celik, not one of the Butgarians. Agca's wild tale of a meeting in the presence of a mythical Bulgarian
26. Martella Report, pp. 19-21(22-24) According to Newton, the man ran towards and diplomat named "Petronov" was the only time that any charge of Bul-
past him, carrying a gun in íront of him. Newton, who said he waited for the man to run garian cooperation was recorded by Martella until late October 1982.1o
past him before using his camera, later "pointed out a definite resemblance" between the
Then, under questioning about his companion or companions in St.
running man and a photograph of Celik, according to a letter he later sent to Martella in
April 1984. Soon after his original deposition for Martella, however, Newton had iden- 28 On December 20, 1981, Agca began a hunger strike that lasted for l0 days Claire
tified the man in the Square as identical to one "Ali Chafic"'whose picture was circu- Sterling is fond of pointing out tha! Agca was repeating the Turkish scenario of | 979, dur-
lated as a composite drawing by the Reagan administration after the "Libyan hit squad" ing his trial for the murder of the Turkish newspaper editor Abdi lpekci. That is, Agca's
furor in November 1981. ("Conspiracy to Kill the Pope," Time, January ll' 1982' p. 3l; hunger stríke was a
..signal'' to the Bu|garians
to re|ease him
..or
else,'' and when a suit.
and James Coates, "FBl Probes Libyan Link to Pope Attack," ChicagoTribune,lantary able period of time had gone by Agca began to talk, as he had earlíer threatened to do in
..Libyan hit squad''
lo. l982.) It was later discovered that this secret officíal U.S. list of Turkey before he was broken out of prison (For a critique of Sterling's "signaling"
members included Nabih Berri and the names of other prominent members of the theory, see Chapter 6, pp 138-40 ) Sterling and company also advanced the hypothesis
Lebanese Shiite party Amal and aging Lebanese parliamentarians; but this information that Agca began to talk when he was confronted with the "information" that his alleged
was suppressed in the United States. See Duncan Campbell and Patrick Forbes, New Bulgariar co-conspirators intended to have him killed in St Peter's Square, but bungled
Statesman, August 16, 1985. the job. This was also the conclusion of La Stampa, which reported that "What convinced
27- Exaclly how valuable this information was is hard to determine. Martella's Report [Agca] to talk were the conclusions of the investigalors . who found out thaa Agca's
only occasionally contains actual quotations írom his interviews with Agca. More typi. accomplices, if the killer made it out safe and sound from St. Peter's Square, were going
cally it offers summaries and reconstructions of Agca's responses to his questions ln light to eliminate him instead of bringing him to safety across the border. " "Pressure on Agca
of the complete breakdown of Agca as a useful witness during the trial that began in May Reported," Philadelphia Inquirer [UPI], December 8, 1982.
1985, the accuracy ofMartella's Report in even correctly reconstructing Agca's state- 29 Martella Reporr, p. 45(50).
ments is seriously open to question. It seems very likely that Martella sifted from Agca's 30 On January 27, 1984, Agca admitted to Martella that his story about Petronov was a
changing and conflicting statements a more-or-less logical version of what miSht have figment of his imagination. This means that before October 1982 Agca had not named a
happened. Thus Martella's Report must be used with caution in reconstructing even the single nonfictional Bulgarian in all of his extensive intenogations. Martella Report, pp.
flow of the investigation. 40'7(534-35)
24 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION TWO: EVOLUTION OF THE CONNECTION 25

Peter's Square on May 13, Agca suddenly began to tell Martella about Pope posed a threat to the Soviets because of his support for Solidarity
his Bulgarian co-conspirators. And a week later Agca picked three Bul- and Polish nationalism, and more particularly from his alleged warning
garians out of a photo album, telling Martella that these were the men to the Soviet leadership that an invasion of Poland would cause him to
who organized the assassination attempt on the Pope and assisted him lay down his crown and join the Polish resistance. While this claim has
on the day of the assassination attempt itself. Was this, again, simply a never been supported by any evidence, and has been consistently re-
matter of Agca finally deciding to tell the "truth"? Or had something futed by Vatican spokesmen,3' the Pope's alleged threat to the Soviets
happened in the interim to persuade Agca not only to continue talking was the heart of the NBC case. Like the earlier "TV Eye" program,
but to talk about the Bulgarians? NBC relied heavily on former ltalian Security Minister Mazzola to sup-
port the plausibility of such risky (and foolish) action by the Soviets.
Art Anticipates Reality. Indeed, much had happened between the And, as in Sterling's Reader's Digest article, the program stated that
"new" Agca's confessions of May and those of late October. Most im- Agca had been recruited by the KGB before he ever left his hometown,
portant, in the interim Claire Sterling had published her article in the and that his subsequent association with thb Right in Turkey was only a
Reader's Digest arguing that Agca was acting on behalf of the Bulga- cover for his real commitment to the Left. The mass of detail which
rians, and NBC-TV had broadcast its special "white paper," "The Man showed that Agca had been assisted by this rightwing network of Turks
Who Shot the Pope: A Study in Terrorism." While neither of these ef- in the two years before shooting the Pope was thus dismissed as irrele-
forts contributed any new information, they sketched a model of a vant, because if Agca had already been recruited by the KGB, the right-
"Bulgarian Connection" which was adopted and embroidered on by wing network also must have been manipulated by the Soviets and their
Agca. agents. Finally, the NBC program concluded with the interesting obser-
Sterling's article, "The Plot To Murder The Pope," was published in vation that a Soviet plot against the Pope was not without precedent, cit-
the September issue of the Reader's Digest, which reached subscribers ing as examples the U.S. plots against Lumumba, Castro, and "possi-
in mid-August. Despite the many lies and contradictions in Agca's bly" Qaddafi!
evolving confessions, Sterling's Reader's Digest article relied heavily One significant U.S. follow-up to the NBC program was the hearing
on Agca's May l98l declarations that he had been trained at a Syrian/ held by the congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in
PLO camp in Lebanon, and that his primary political connections in Europe on September 23, 1982, two days after the NBC broadcast. The
Turkey were with the Left and not the Right. Both in the Reader's Di- Commission, which had been established to oversee Soviet compliance
gest and later, Sterling maintained that whatever links Agca had with with the Helsinki Accords, heard Claire Sterling, Michael Ledeen, and
the Gray Wolves were a cover for his real, Ieftist sympathies. Sterling Bulgarian émigréAtanas Slavov. The Commissioners were unanimous
found the chief link between Agca and the Bulgarians in the Turkish in their certainty that the Bulgarians and the Soviets were behind the
smuggler Abuzer Ugurlu, who she claimed worked hand-in-glove with Plot. Claire Sterling outlined for the Committee the version of the assas-
Bulgarian authorities. Sterling also introduced Ugurlu's associate Omer sination pfot which she had recently written for Reader's Digesr. She
Mersan, who was later to tell an ltalian court that he had given $770 to implied that great significance lay in the fact that Solidarity and the
Agca (who he knew under another name) at Ugurlu's behest' Out of Polish government ratified the Gdansk agreement on August 3l , 1980,
these "links" Sterling created a chain of command by which the Bulga- the same day that Agca left Bulgaria for Westem Europe. She also told
rians induced their agent Ugurlu to hire Agca to shoot the Pope. the Committee that no one from any of the U.S. intelligence agencies
Five weeks after Sterling's story reached the public, NBC-TV broad- had discussed her findings with her."
cast ''The Man Who Shot the Pope: A Study inTerrorism." Thepro- 31. See Chapter 7, p. 20O.
gram, which was narrated by Marvin Kalb, employed Sterling and Paul 32. The hearing was apparently held at the urging of Commission member Representa-
Henze as consultants. While many of its points had already been made tive Donald Ritter of Pennsylvania. A guest at the hearing was Senator Alfonse D'Amato
by Sterling, perhaps the chief characteristic of the report was its stress of New York, who declared that (a) he had talked with the monsignor in the Vatican who
on the Soviet's motive in shooting the Pope. According to NBC, the had delivered the alleged message from the Pope to the Soviet Union; (b) the Vatican was
26 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION TWO: EVOLUTION OF THE CONNECT]ON 27

The most significant outcome of the efforts of Sterling and NBC was sum would go to Musa Celebi's Western European network of Gray
to frame the case in ltaly itself. On October 5 Judge Martella flew to Wolves in exchange for the support they would provide Agca and his
.,in hope of evďuating companions; and it was Celebi who supposedly telephoned Agca the go-
Washington, according to the Washington Post,
two recent U.S. media reports suggesting that Soviet Bloc intelligence ahead signď at the end of Apri| l98l. Meanwhi|e .,Ko|ev''' according
agencies were involved." Martella told a Post reporter that, while no to plan, arrived in Rome at the beginning of May to supervise last-
hard evidence existed linking the eastern Bloc to the plot, "he could not minute operations. Together he and Agca cased the Square, and
rule out the possibility.'' According to the PosÍ, Martella..has asked "Kolev" made arrangements for Agca to stay at a guest house under the
the Justice Department to help him obtain meetings with persons famil- name of Ozgun. On the following day "Kolev" pointed out another
iar with the case including, possibly, the journalists responsible for the Bulgarian-"Bayramic"-who was to assist Agca in escaping after the
NBC and Reader' s Digest articles . ' '33 He is known to have met with Ar- assassination.
naud de Borchgrave and to have been given a special viewing of the The most significant step in Agca's identification of the Bulgarians
NBC-TV program on the Plot Against the Pope. came a week later. On November 8 Agca was shown a photograph
On October 29, according to Martella's Report, the interrogation of album of 56 Bulgarians living in Rome since 1977. He was asked if any
Agca was renewed. Martella asked Agca about the reports of several of the people in the photos were "Kolev" or "Bayramic." Agca im-
witnesses, supported by the Lowell Newton photograph, that Agca had mediately identified the first photograph as that of "Kolev," and the
been assisted by at least one other person in St. Peter's Square on the second as "Bayramic."tt Agca then went on to identify the person in
day of the shooting. Agca readily volunteered the information that photograph number 20 as ..Petrov,'' a military attaché at the Bulgarian
"there was in fact another person . , namely the Bulgarian citizen Embassy. "I admit that I have not so far referred to this person in order
Sotir Kolev" who had been introduced to him in Sofia "as an expert on not to worsen my case," Agca told Martella, saying that he had no cor-
terrorism in Europe." Shortly after several meetings with Kolev, Agca roborating evidence. But Agca then stated that he had known "Petrov"
told Martella, his companion Oral Celik anived in Sofia. His coming, since November 1980, having been given the Embassy telephone
according to Agca, was determined "by the opportunity to plan terrorist number by Celenk in Sofia in August.36
acts in Europe, using the 'Gray Wolves' in the interests of countries this money has never been located in the course of four years of Italian official investiga-
within the Soviet sphere such as Bulgaria." The most important such tions. During the Rome trial, also, Yalcin Ozbey, a member of the Gray Wolves and close
act, according to Agca, was a projected assassination of the Pope. friendof Agca,testifiedonSeptember20, l9S5,tharCelikhadvisitedhiminWestGer-
According to Martella's Report, on the day that Agca first named his many, and had not only failed to mention the receipt ofany money, but even had ao bor-
row from Ozbey for current expenses.
Bulgarian contact, "Kolev," he placed him at the center of an elaborate
35. Later, on June 28, 1983, Agca stated that, ar rhe time of his identification of
conspiracy which would net him and his gang over a million dollars in "Bayramic," he did not know that his real name was Antonov or that Antonov worked for
exchange for killing the Pope. The money would be paid into Celik's Balkan Air. But when it was "recorded that the person I recognised as .Bayramic' was
bank account by Turkish businessman Bekir Celenk.* One-third of this Sergei Antonov, employed at the 'Balkan Air,' . not only did I declare falsely that I
knew the real occupation of Bayramic' but a|so that Í knew by heart the two te|ephone
convinced that the Soviet Union was behind the assassination; (c) he had told this to the numbers of Balkan Air. " Agca then went on to declare that he had leamed these telephone
CIA on October I9, l98l; and (d) he had met with Claire Sterling immediately after his numbers when Martella briefly stepped out of the room and he was able to consult a tele-
..and
retum from ltaly began to compÍr're some notes.'' (..The Assassination Attempt on phone directory. Martella Report, pp. 372-73(486-87).
Pope John Paul II," Hearing Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in 36. When he first mentioned Celenk to MaÍte|la in May |982, Agca had said that ..he
Europe, 97th Congress, 2nd Session [September 23, 1982], p. | 2.) At the hearing Senator had not talked directly with Celenk" but had only seen him and had him identified at a
Patrick Leahy of Vermont said that, as a mcmber of the Senate Intelligence Committee, he distance. Subsequently, Agca read Mumcu's book Árms Smuggling and, Terrorism, in
had been briefed by the CIA about the possible Soviet role in the papal assassination at- which Celenk was a íeatured performer. The Turkish journalist orsan Oymen points out
tempt on more than one occasion (p. 3), though no dates were given that following his reading of this new source, Agca related episodes from Mumcu's book
33. Robert J. McCartney, "Plodding Inquiry Studies Bulgarian Link," Washington ín the form ..I was told by Celenk'' that such-and-such had occurred! Martella never
Post. October 6. 1982. caught on to this process. See Orsan Oymen, "Behind the Scenes of the 'Agca Investiga-
34. Despite Agca's claim that it was actually paid and was thus presumably traceable,
28 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION TWO: EVOLUTION OF THE CONNECTION 29

With the insights gained from his visit to Washington and Agca's ever tentativeness the earlier program had contained the rebroadcast de-
identification of Bulgarians,tt Martella reguested warrants for the arrest leted. And where the original program had concluded with the some-
of Sergei Antonov ( Bayramic' ') and the military attaché Jelio Vassi|ev
..
what startling point that a Soviet-backed conspiracy was conceivable
("Petrov"). He also directed that proceedings be started against the dip- because of earlier U.S. assassination plots against Castro and
lomat Todor Aivazov ("Kolev"), who was protected by diplomatic im- Lumumba, the rebroadcast dropped this point and concluded with a
munity. ringing warning that the failure of western governments, particularly the
Although both Aivazov and Vassilev had already retumed to Bul- United States, to pursue the case aggressively wherever it might lead
garia, apparently as part of a routine rotation, Antonov was arrested at was tantamount to treason. "The Reagan administration," intoned Mar-
his office on November 25. His home was searched and a "guide to the vin Kalb, "is etching no profile in courage, allowing ltaly to stand alone
Vatican" was confiscated. The next day the interrogation of the in- agďnst the fury of the Soviet Union.'' For the Reagan administration,
credulous Antonov was begun, with Martella quizzing him about each and particularly for the CIA, proof of Soviet guilt "could shatter hopes
of Agca's statements concerning "Bayramic": Did he like flowers? Did lor détente, trade, and arms agreements.'' ..The continuing investiga-
he collect miniature liquor bottles? Et cetera. Martella's investigation of tion," concluded Kalb, "has the potential of a time bomb ticking away
Antonov and his alibi, which occupies much of the remaining 1,000 in a corner of East-West relations."38
pages of his Report, reflects his belief that any contradictions in An-
tonov's testimony or any lapses in his memory after l8 months about
where he was and what he was doing in May l98l were indicative of
Bulgarian guilt. Similarly, any shifts or contradictions in the testimonies
The Baroque Era of the Bulgarian Connection
of those Antonov claimed could vouch for his whereabouts at key times
were seen by Martella as signs of connivance among the defense wit-
Once Agca had begun to talk about "Kolev" and the Bulgarian Connec-
tion, there suddenly seemed no end to the "Connections" which he
nesses to get their story straight.
could reveal. He claimed to have been sent by the Bulgarians on a sur-
While Martella's investigation largely degenerated into mere alibi
veillance mission to Malta and Tunisia to check out whether it would be
checking following the arrest of Antonov, the sensational news that the
feasible to assassinate their heads of state, Dom Mintoff and Habib
Soviet Bloc had been implicated in the papal assassination attempt
Bourguiba. He spoke of spying in Switzerland and of plotting to kill
shifted the locus of the case out of the investigators' offices and back to
Lech Walesa. His testimony also linked the plot to kill the Pope to on-
the mass media, which swung behind the new story with only marginal
going investigations into Bulgarian state involvement with smuggling$
reservations. The shift in tone of western media coverage as a result of
and with the Red Brigades. Each of these alleged plots, complex in
Agca's declarations and the arrest of Antonov is well illustrated by the
themselves and resting often on Agca's testimony alone, "confirmed"
changes made in the NBC program, "The Man Who Shot the Pope,"
each other through repetition and through their sensational treatment by
rebroadcast in the one-hour slot before President Reagan's "State of the
the mass media. The media also developed their own information from
Union" message on January 25, 1983. Information about Agca's Tur-
intelligence agencies and defectors to help forward the chorus of a Bul-
kish roots was almost entirely deleted, and the sole concern of the pro-
garian Connection.{ The cumulative effect of all this was to consolidate
gram was to present-with a supportive framework and completely un-
western belief in the truth of the Bulgarian Connection. Yet the support
critically-Agca's declarations that the Bulgarians had done it. What-
given by these tangential plots and scandals to the basic claims was only
tíon,, ,, Milliyet, November |984
37. We show in Chapter 5 that the photo albums were almost certainly shown to Agca 3E. "The Man Who Shot the Pope: A Study of Terrorism. Update." January 25, 1983,
prior to the identification parade of November 8, 1982. We will see, also, that the photos 8 p.m. to 9 p.m. Official transcript, pp. 6l-62.
allegedly showing Bulgarians on the scene on May l3 were misidentified by Agca (the 39. We take up this thread of investigation-propaganda in Chapter 3 and Appendix B
Lowell Newton photo of the fleeing person) or probably fabricated by a source not yet 40. See the discussion in Chapter 7 of the "Mantarov Connection" developed by the
identified (the photo showing Antonov in the Square) New York Times.
30 THE BI,JLGARIAN CONNECTION TV/O: EVOLUTION OF THE CONNECTION 3l

atmospheric, producing no real evidence to strengthen Judge Martella's on this subject again on February I l, and a week later sent a recommen-
case. dation to the Attorney General of the Court of Appeal in Rome that in-
dictments be issued in this alleged conspiracy. After some jurisdictional
The " Plot" to Kill Lech Walesa. By far the most important of the sec- juggling, Martella's investigation into the conspiracy to murder Walesa
ondary plots that emerged out of Agca's testimony was the alleged con- was renewed in mid-April.*
spiracy to kiil Lech Walesa. Agca first mentioned such a plot on Then, somewhat mysteriously, came Agca's "Retraction" of June
November 8, 1982. But the issue apparently was not investigated in 28, 1983. In that part of Agca's retraction concerning the Walesa plot,
depth until December 29, 1982, when he was interrogated by magis- Agca maintained that he had never met Dontchev, and that the details
trates Priore and lmposimato, who were conducting further inquiries which he gave to Judge Imposimato on December 29, 1982 concerning
into the case of the Red Brigades and one of their leaders, Agca's prison the plot had been learned from listening to Imposimato read portions of
neighbor Giovanni Senzani. Once again Agca was shown the album of the testimony of an indicted trade unionist-Luigi Scricciolo-to Judge
56 photographs, and once again he identified his three Bulgarian co- Priore. He also said that he was able to pick out Dontchev from the
conspirators. On this occasion, however, "Agca not only recognised photo album because Imposimato showed him Dontchev's picture and
the same photographs that he had identified before . , but he also said, "This is lvan Tomov, Scricciolo's friend, do you recognise him?"
stated that he recognised in photo no. 8 Mr. Ivan Tomov. "'' According While Agca continued to maintain that he and his papal co-conspirators
to the MaÍtella Report, Agca told the magistrates:a2 discussed killing Walesa, he now said the plot never went anywhere .
On August 23 Martella charged Agca with slander against himself
During our meetings Ivan Tomov and Kolev expounded to us a plan to kill and the others. During his examination of September 15, 1983, Agca
Walesa when he came to ltaly. According to this plan I was supposed to take admitted that he had lied-"in order to make my declarations more
part in the murder of Walesa using a pistol or a remote-controlled plastic bomb. credible.''o'But Maíella persisted in pressing Agca on how he knew so
Ivan Tomov and Kolev told me that the choice of which method to use would many details, because none of them was contained in any of Scric-
depend on information that would certainly come from Italian trade unionists ciolo's interrogations prior to December 29; and so even if Judge Im-
who were close to Walesa-people who were in contact with them and who
posimato had read portions of these interrogations to Judge Priore in
could supply them with all the necessary details about Walesa's itinerary.
Agca's presence, Agca could not have learned the details to which he
confessed at that time.6
In a further interview on February 4, |983, Agca agďn stated that he
There the matter has rested. Agca has maintained rather lamely that
had plotted with the three Bulgarians indicted in the papal conspiracy
he was able to lie in such detail because his interrogators asked him
and with the Bulgarian Dontchev ("Ivan Tomov" 's real name) to kill
questions in a yes-or-no fashion and he was able to make lucky guesses.
Walesa in January 198l. Again Agca repeated details of their prepÍrra-
tions and of the spots chosen for the assassination. But now he stated ings at the U.S. Embassy, one with a U.S. diplomat and a second with an assistant to
that the plans were canceled "because [Dontchev] told us that he had AFL-CIO chief Lane Kirkland (For a warm letter of solidarity to Scricciolo from AFL-
CIO represencative Irving Brown, see Christian Roulette, La Filiere: Jean-Paul II, An-
learned from an Italian trade unionist whose name I don't know that the
ronov, Agca (Paris: Editions du Sorbier, | 984), p. 265. ) His later confessions of involve-
Italian Secret Service had by now received the 'information' of a possi- ment with the Bulgarians in spying and in negotiations with the Red Brigades fed well into
ble assassination attempt against Walesa."ot Martella questioned Agca the ongoing Bulgarian Conncction publicity. Scricciolo's involvement in the alleged
Walesa plot remains obscure. He supposedly told investigators that he knew of such a
41. Martella Report, p. 132(l8l-82). plot, and Agca later claimed to have obtained many details about the plot from hearing
42. Ibid., pp. 132-33(182-83) Scricciolo's earlier testimony on the mattcr While Scricciolo is still in jail and awaiting
43. Ibid., pp 358-59(467-68). The "Italian trade unionist" in question was undoubted- tria|, it is significant that Maíe|la dropped all charges against Agca, Scricciolo, and the
ly Luigi Scricciolo. The "Scricciolo Affair" remains among the murkiest aspects of the Bulgarians tor involvement in the Walesa plor
Bulgarian Connection Scricciolo had been arrested in February 1982 and charged with 44. Martella Report, p. 36'l(479).
being an accessory in the kidnapping ofGeneral James Dozier, who had been held by the 45. Ibid., p. 3'17(492-93).
Red Brigades for six weeks, from mid-December l98l to late January 1982, before being 46. Sterling, op. cit., n- I, pp 242-43.
rescued by the Italian police. But while allegedly spying for Bulgaria, Scricciolo had
worked closely with the AFL-CIO, arranging for Solidarity delegates to attend two meet-
32 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION TWO: EVOLUTION OF TI{E CONNECTION 33

Claire Sterling maintains-still-that Agca was able to provide details adjusted his story. In an interview with Judge Martella on June 28,
of the alleged plot against Walesa because the plot was real and Agca's 1983, Agca admitted to having lied about three crucial poinrs. First, he
initial declarations were true. Others-including the authors-believe stated that he had never met Antonov's wife and daughter, as he had
that Agca was able to provide his detailed description because he was claimed earlier. Second, he now said that he had never visited An-
coached while he was in prison, an argument which we develop in tonov's apartment at all. As in the case of his claims about Mrs. An-
Chapter 5. As for Scricciolo, whether he was a Bulgarian spy, a double tonov, Agca's appa.rent ability to describe Antonov's apartment had
agent, or none of the above, his case and his declarations served to give added weight to his more general claims. But a telling error in his de-
credibility to Agca's primary claims: that he was hired by Bulgaria to scription-his claim that Antonov's apartment was divided by a folding
kill the Pope. door, present in other apartments in the building, but which had been re-
moved from Antonov's apartment before Agca's alleged visit-not only
led to this particular retraction but also added strength to the charge
that Agca had been coached. Finally, Agca admitted that he had never
The Case Starts to Unravel met the Bulgarian Dontchev, though he continued to maintain that he
had discussed assassinating Lech Walesa with Antonov and the other
The Walesa plot, and Agca's claims of Bulgarian sponsorship of trips Bulgarians. Once again, Agca's ability to describe Dontchev, whom he
hither and yon to scout out assassination possibilities, took a toll on the now admitted he had never met, raised questions about coaching.
credibility of the Bulgarian Connection, although the western media Although Agca's retractions would seem on their face to be of great
succeeded in keeping these matters very low key. The most serious importance in assessing the truth of the Bulgarian Connection, Italian
damage, however, resulted from a growing Iist of Agca's "retractions" authorities and the mass media kept these facts (which would have
of previously key claims in his story. The first retraction came in De- called into serious question the Sterling.Henze paÍ|y line) almost com-
cember 1982, after Aivazov and Vassilev held a press conference in pletely under wraps for more than a year. In late September 1983 an
Sofia to deny Agca's allegations. At this press conference it was obvi- item by Henry Kamm appeared in the New YorkTimes saying that "Ital-
ous to the assembled reporters, based on distinctive physical character- ians May Charge Turk With Slander of Jailed Bulgarian. "o? The article
istics, that Aivazov ("Kolev") could not have been the character shown noted that Antonov's lawyer had not been notified of the nature of the
running away from the Square in the Lowell Newton photograph of May slander. After reviewing some of the apparent weaknesses in Agca's
l3' l98l. Three days after the presŠconference Agca recanted his claim story, Kamm concluded that "It could not be learned whether these
that Kolev had been the person in the Square. were the reasons for the reported decision to indict Mr. Agca for slan-
The most significant retraction concerned Agca's claim that he had der." In late November a small item in the Times, reporting that An-
visited dntonov's apartment just a few days befbre the assassination at- tonov's lawyer was going to sue Agca for slander, quoted the attorney
tempt, and that while there he had met Antonov's wife and young as saying he had been told that Martella's charge against Agca con-
daughter. This touch added seeming veracity to Agca's story, be-
cerned the alleged plot against Walesa.o* It was not until June 1984,
cause-if true-it showed that he was on very familiar terms with at nearly a year after the retraction took place, that the leaking of the Al-
least one of the alleged co-conspirators. On the other hand, Agca's
bano Report brought them into the public domain.o'
claim seemed wildly improbable in the context of a carefully con- Claire Sterling maintains that Agca's retraction was false, being
structed plot, as it violated in the extreme the cardinal rule of "plausible prompted by the kidnapping of Emmanuela Orlandi, the daughter of a
deniability. "
Antonov's defense team was able to assemble documentary evidence 4'1 . New York Times, September 30, 1983.
that Antonov's wife and daughter had left Rome several days before the 48. "Pope's Attacker, Accused of Slandering Bulgarian, To Be Sued," New york
Times [AP), November 26, 1983
time when Agca said that he had met them. Soon after news reports of 49 TheNewYorkTimes,theoriginal vehicleofthisrelease,kepttheretractionunder
the alibis of Mrs. Antonov and her daughter had appeared, Agca again cover for a much longer time; see Chapter 7, pp. 190-94.
34 llllL lll'1,(l^l(l^N (l)NNl'I"l'l()N 'I'WO: EVOLUTION OF THE CONNECTION 35

Vatican official. This kidnapping took place on June 22, 1983, and was Wolves leader Celebi, as well as Agca, be re|eased.í While the evi-
reported in the press four days later. Agca's retractions were made to dence is thin, it suggests that if the kidnappers had any real link at all
Judge Martella on June 28, two days after the press reports. "The kid- with Agca-something which the police increasingly came to doubt-
napping may have convinced him," wrote Sterling, "that his Turkish or they were probably paÍt of the Gray Wolves network.55
Bulgarian accomplices were trying to get him out of prison."so But Agca's impromptu press conference was but the first of a series of
Sterling's interpretation is not only far-fetched, it disregards some rele- events following his June 28 retractions which served both ro keep the
vant facts.sr First, demands for Agca's release were not made public alleged Bulgarian Connection before the public eye and to mask the
until someone claiming to be one of the kidnappers called both the Vati- growing weaknesses of the case. The publication in late 1983 of Ster-
can and ANSA, the Italian news agency, on July 6. The caller to ANSA ling's The Time of the Assassins and of Henze's The Plot to Kill the
said that "some days ago we had contact with a Vatican secretary, a Pope, whrch were received with generally respectful if not enthusiastic
message that the Vatican has hidden."" Thus Agca's retraction pre- reviews, were given wide recognition and served to restate the case of
ceded, rather than followed, the kidnappers' announcement that Em- the disinformationists.56 A similar effect was achieved by the publicity
manuela was being held until Agca was released. Second, if Agca's re- given to Agca's two-hour reenactment of his supposed movements in
tractions were made in order to influence his would-be liberators, he and around St. Peter's Square on the day of the assassination attempt.
must have assumed that they had an informer in Judge Martella's office, This mini-drama, which occurred on October 18, was followed on
for, as we noted above, these retractions were largely unknown for al- November 7 by a similar exercise in which Agca was taken to the street
most a year after they were made. Moreover, when he was given an op- on which the Bulgarian Aivazov had lived, in order to see if Agca could
portunity for a brief exchange with the press just after Emmanuela's kid- identify Aivazov's house. The fact that he could not do so did not de-
napping, Agca repeatedly stated that he had been trained by the KGB tract from the public-relations effect of the exercise, which was to re-
and the "Bulgarian secret services" for his assassination attempt, and vive media interest in the alleged plot.57 The Bulgarian Connection re-
shouted that "I refuse any exchange."" Finally, while the Italian police 54. "Caf l to Rome Paper is Latest Kidnap Clue," Philadelphia Inquirer [UPI], July
received hundreds of hoax calls from people claiming to be her kidnap- 23,1983.
pers, the police consistently credited the kidnapping to a group calling 55. Sari Gilbert of the Washingron Porl noted thar DIGOS, the Italian anti-terrorist
itself the "Turkish Anti-Christian Liberation Front." A call from the police, turned the case over to the homicide squad on July I l, and that the investigation
was "now concentrating on the possibility that the demands regarding Agca are probably
group to the ltalian newspaper Il Messaggero demanded that Gray a cover-up for something else, ranging from murder to a secret romantic elopement"
50 ..Agca.. recantedpaÍtof histestimonyaboutthepurportedp|otonMr.Walesa
("Hoax Calfs Regarding Agca Bedevil Italian Officials," Washington Posr, July 13,
983, as soon as he could after he found out about a kidnapping of the daugh-
l983). A month |ater' however, UPI reported that ltalian magistÍates were investigating
on June 28, I

ter of a Vatican employee " Claire Sterling, "Agca's Other Story: The Plot to Kill
the possibility that the KGB had organized the kidnapping to discredit the Pope. ' ' ' 'Rome
Said to Suspect KGB Role in Abduction," New York Times, August ll, 1983.
Wafesa." New York Times. October 2'7, 1984.
56. See, for example, Edward J. Epstein, "Did Agca Act Alone?" New york Times
5l For a fuller discussion, see Chapter 6, pp 138-40
Book Review, January |5, |984' pp. 6-7; Gordon Crovitz, ..The Bulgarían Connection'''
52. "Caller: Have Girl; Agca Must Be Free," Philadelphia Inquirer, July 7' 1983.
Wall Street Journal, February 3, 1984, p. 20. A mass market version of the pre-confes-
Another article said that the caller told ltalian news agencies that he had contacted the Vat-
sion Sterling-Henze line appeared in mid-1983, with rhe publicationof Pontiff, by Gordon
ican after the Pope's first appeal for Emmanuela's release, which was made on July 3.
("Pope John Paul Pledges Support for Efforts to Find Missing Teenager," Philadelphia Thomas and Max Morgan-Witts (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company,
1983). Pontiffwas serialized in a number of newspapers. As we have pointed out else-
Inquirer, July I I, 1983.)
where, the use of evidence in this study is so appalling that none of its conclusions can be
53. "Agca Asserts KGB Aided in Pope Plot," New YorkTimes, luly 9, 1983. As the
taken seriously See "The Press, the K.G.B., and the Pope," The Nation, July 2, 1983,
Washington Pos! noted, both U.S. and ltalian observers were convinced that Agca's infor-
pp. I, l4-17
mal press conference was "not accidental." (Sari Gilbert, "Hoax Calls Regarding Agca
Bedevil Italian Officials," July 13, 1983.) The Italians' actions were denounced by both
57 "Assassin Re-enacts His Steps Before '81 Shooting of Pope," New york Times
the Bulgarians and the Soviets. Agca's remarks-that he had been trained by the KGB, [UPI],octoberl9'l983;and..AssaiIantofPopeisQuestioned,''NewYorkTimesÍ|JP||,
that he had been trained in Syria and Bulgaria, and that the Bulgarians and Antonov were
November 7, 1983.

guilty-were featured on all three U.S television networks.

36 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION TWO: EVOLUTION OF THE CONNECTION 3'7

On October 26, 1984, Judge Martella frnally issued his own report,
turned to the front pages again in late December, when the Pope visited which accompanied his decision that Antonov, Agca, and other Bulga-
Agca in prison. The 2l-minute meeting received front-page coverage in rians and Turks should be brought to trial. ln some respects this came as
both the Times and the Post, which reported that the Pope forgave Agca an anticlimax. The Martella Report contained little that was new. None
while the latter expressed his repentance. t' of the problems in the case was resolved in the indictment, and no new
evidence was advanced which removed the burden of the case from rest-
Downhill to the Trial. In December 1983 Judge Martella completed his ing entirely on Agca's credibility. The first news accounts of the indict-
two-year investigation and delivered his report on the case to state pro- ment were written without access to Martella's Report, so that they pro-
secutor Antonio Albano, who had the responsibility to decide whether vided minimal information, but once again returned the prosecution's
there was sufficient evidence to bring Antonov and the other accused case to the headlines. The initial focus was on Martella's claim that
Bulgarians and Turks to trial. Prosecutor Albano's Report was filed Agca had been accompanied by a second gunman, Oral Celik, who fired
with the court on May 8, 1984. The 78-page document declared that the one shot at the Pope, slightly wounding him. Newsweet announced that
evidence gathered by Judge Martella warranted bringing the defendants the indictment gave "new credence to the 'Bulgarian Connection,' "
to trial, thus returning the case to Martella for a final determination of while the New YorkTimes editorialized that "the existence of the plot
whether or not to proceed. The Albano Report was "leaked," and ap- no longer seems conjectural."6l
peared first on June 10, 1984, in an extensive front-page article in the ln the months separating Martella's final Report from the beginning
Sunday New YorkTimes, authored by Claire Sterling herself.'n of the trial in May 1985, several developments raised issues that would
The immediate consequence of the Albano Report was to return the come to the fore at the trial, and that presaged Agca's wild vacillations
Bulgarian Connection to the headlines, now bolstered by official claims
ble deniability," which is characteristic of the entire Plot. The movemenr of TIR trucks is
of Bulgarian guilt. Although primarily a rehash of earlier charges, the known to the ltalian government, and the Bulgarian Embassy is surely under intelligence
Report had two features worthy of mention. Most important, it dis- surveillance This would make their use extraordinarily risky. On the other hand, as the
cussed Agca's retractions of June 28, 1983, although it explained them police would know about TIR truck movements, this could have been the basis of a
away as a "signal" to Agca's sponsors. The Report also gave promi- coached response. During the course of the trial, Agca suddenly abandoned the TIR truck
sequence as the primary escape route, claiming instead that an auto getaway with Gray
nence to Agca's contention that the getaway plan called for the assassins
Wolves was the first option, with e TIR to be held in reserve.
to be driven from the Square to the Bulgarian Embassy by Antonov, Other problems with the truck as the escape vehicle are as follows: (l) the truck was
where they were to be loaded onto a Transport Internationaux Routiers |oaded and sea|ed by Ita|ian customs officials on a pub|ic street, not withín the Bulgarian
(TIR) truck, which would then be sealed by customs officials and driven Embassy compound; (2) the ltalian customs officials responsible for inspecting the truck
across several national frontiers to Bulgaria. (Such trucks, once sealed, have given swom statements that when it was sealed nobody was secÍeted within it; (3) if
Celik was somehow smuggled out of Italy to Bulgaria by this route, the Bulgarians unac-
escape having their contents examined at each international border.) Al-
countably allowed him to resume his travels through Europe (he has been seen in a
bano's Report said that such a truck was in fact sealed at the Bulgarian number of countries in recent years); (4) the trial evidence brought out the fact that the
Embassy on the very afternoon of the assassination attempt.o Bulgarians had requested that the truck be loaded and inspected on May 12, but that a one-
day delay occurred by request of Italian customs; (5) a note found in Agca's possession on
58. Henry Kamm, "Pope Meets in Jail With His Attacker," New York Times, De-
May 13, 1981, with details of his plans, mentions a train ticket and rrip to Naples, but
cember 2E, 1983; and John Winn Miller, "Pope Visits Assailant As 'Brother,'"
nothing about Bulgarians, cars, ortrucks; and (6) if, as some have suggested, the Bulga-
lilashington Posl, December 28, 1983. None of the published accounts of the Pope's visit
rians intended (but failed) to kill Agca in St. Peter's Square, why would they arrange for a
included any reference to what Agca later claimed transpired, which was that the two men
truck to convey him out of harm's way?
discussed Agca's belief that he was Jesus Christ and the relation of the assassination at-
61. "The Pope Plot: A Second Cun," Newsweet, November5, 1984, p.39; "The
tempt to the so-called third secret of the Miracle of Our Lady of Fatima.
Fingerprints on Agca's Gun," New York Times, editorial, October 30, 1984 Virtually
59 For an analysis of Sterling's distorted summary of the Albano Report, and the Re- alone in the mass media, Michael Dobbs of the Washington Pasr pointed out that the only
port itself, see Chapter 7, pp. 190-94
plot convincingly argued in Martella's Report was aTurkish plot, and that any Bulgarian
60. While the presence of the truck on May I 3 was consistenl with the Bulgarian Con-
Connection still rested on Agca's word only "Pope Investigation Focuses on Would-be
nection hypothesis, the burden ofevidence indicates that this was a coincidence unrelated
Assassin's Accomplices," October 28, |984.
to the events at the Square. The use of a TIR truck would be another violation of "plausi-
38 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION TWO: EVOLUTION OF THE CONNECTION 39

on the witness stand. One was the discovery that Agca had written a let- formationists seeking to link the Bulgarians and Soviets to the attempt
ter to a military attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Rome claiming that he on the Pope. We will return to Pazienza at length in anothercontext;6s
had accused the Bulgarians under instructions from the United States. here we note that readers of the Times' s business section were given a
The letter, which was written in August 1983, expressed distress that short (and extremely inadequate) preview of the role this major figure in
certain U.S. publications had called him a liar. "What is my guilt?" he modern Italian com-rption would soon come to play in the trial of the
asked. "You told me: 'Speak up!'and I began to spea11."ou Bulearian Connection.
Two weeks later Agca's credibility again suffered damage when, in a
taped television interview with a reporter from the Italian state-run net-
work RAI, he still maintained that he had been trained by Bulgarian
The Second Trial
agents in Syria, but now denied that he had acted on anyone else's be-
half in his attempt on the Pope.63
The trial of Agca, Sergei Antonov, and their alleged co-conspirators,
A final topic that made its appearance in the immediate pre-trial
lasted the better part of a year, running from May 2'7, 1985, to March
period soon came to have a substantial impact on the trial itself. On
29, 1986. Led by veteran Judge Severino Santiapichi, with another
March 20. 1985. the business section of the New YorkTimes carried an judge and six lay jurors, and state prosecutor Antonio Marini, the court
article on the interwoven scandals of Francesco Pazienza, an ltalian
did not rely very heavily on the findings of Investigating Judge Mar-
former secret services employee and all-around "fixer" who had been
tella. It chose instead to cover the charges with a virtually fresh inquiry,
jailed in New York City in connection with the collapse of the Banco
focusing less intently on Bulgarian alibis and looking more closely at
Ambrosiano.* The article, the first to bring Pazienza to the notice of
Agca as a witness, examining his Gray Wolves links, and even delving
Times readers, noted toward the end that an ltalian Parliamenúary Com.
into possible abuses by the security services. Aside from the require-
mission had named Pazienza as the moving force behind "Super S" (a
ment of Italian law that all witnesses be heard, the thoroughness of the
secret clique within Itďian intelligence); that he had been a |iaison be-
trial coverage appears to have resulted from skepticism by the couí
tween Super S and the Mafia; that he had "attempted to serve as a link
about the quality of the investigative phase of the case, and from the
between ltalian officials and the incoming Reagan administration after
case's political sensitivity, which demanded the appearance of com-
the election of 1980"; and that his counterpart in this diplomatic work
prehensiveness to legitimate any outcome.
was none other than Michael lrdeen, a junior partner among the disin-
In some respects the trial was over in the first days of Agca's tes-
62. "1983 Agca Letter Faulted U.S.," New YorkTimes, January 19, 1985 The letter timony, which demonstrated to the court and other observers that, while
also claimed that a former Soviet diplomat in lran could provide testimony that Andropov intelligent and resourceful, Agca was subject to delusions of grandeur
had conspired to kill both the Pope and Lech Walesa; and thar, as "the U S foreign policy and was highly unreliable as a witness. His reiterated claims to be Jesus
is in a state of irresoluteness and bankruptcy . . , to overcome the Soviet threat it should
Christ and to be in possession of the secrets of Fatima took the court
be said to the public that Andropov bears the responsibility for the assassination attempt
against the Pope and the Kremlin should be made to change its leader." Agca's letter was aback. But equally devastating was his continuously changing tes-
published in the Italian newspaper Repubblica on January 18, 1985. The Times failed to timony and his failure to provide any evidence or basis for confirmation
note that Agca's claim to have had contact with a Soviet diplomat ln lran had been "re- of his central claims of Bulgarian involvement. It became evident that
tracted'' in January |984 Sce Sari Gilbert' ..Agca lrtter to Envoy Published ín Rome,'' Martella had distilled out one version of Agca's claims, which corre-
Washington Post, Ianuary 19. 1985.
sponded closely to the one put up by Claire Sterling and Marvin Kalb in
63. "Agca Recalls Prison Visit by Pope," y'Vaw York Times, February 5, 1985, and
ABC Evening News, February 4, 1985. In NBC's Evening News on the same date, Mar- the summer and fall of 1982, and that Martella had failed to obtain inde-
vin Kalb reported only Agca's clďms that he had been trained to destabi|ize Turkish de- pendent evidence for these allegations or to examine seriously their in-
mocracy and was then sent on a mission to kill the Pope. ternal inconsistencies.
& E. J. Dionne, Jr , "New Hope for CIues in ltalian Scandals," New YorkTimes, The case against the Bulgarians disintegrated further as the parade of
March 25. 1985.
Turkish Gray Wolves passed through the court. None of them admitted

65. See Chapter 4, pp. 9l-99.

40 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION TWO: EVOLUTION OF TTIE CONNECTION 4l

to participation in the plot or knowledge of Bulgarian involvement, al- and Yalcin Ozbey's revelation that the West German police had tned to
though several claimed to have heard rumors of the latter. A witness bribe Celik and Ozbey to confirm Agca's claims. Sometimes it was
such as Abdullah Catli, who admitted sheltering Agca and buying a gun more direct, such as Giovanni Pandico's detailed description of the cir-
for him, had no apparent reason to deny Bulgarian paÍticipation in the cumstances by which Agca's confession was coerced and guided by the
plot if it had been real. Yet the trial failed to uncover a single witness to Mafia and secret services.u' The great publicity given in ltďy to
a Bulgarian contact with Agca. The $1.3 million allegedly paid by the Pazienza's and SISMI's abuses of power forced a closer Iook at the sec-
Bulgarians through Celenk to Agca and his fellow conspirators has ret services role and led to new claims supporting the coaching
never been found.6 The rented automobile allegedly used by the Bul- hypothesis. None of this evidence was conclusive, but as we will see in
garians to move Agca around Rome has never been traced. And the Chapter 5, it had cumulative power vastly greater than Agca's implausi-
photo of Antonov in the Square has been rejected by the Court as not au- ble claims.
thentic. Before looking in more detail at the evidence showing the Bulgarian
While the case against the Bulgarians fell apart in the Rome trial, the Connection to be a fake, however, we will examine the Turkish back-
Gray Wolves connection was confirmed and strengthened. The trial evi- ground of the "f,rrst conspiracy," and then look at the ltalian context
dence showed that Agca traveled within the Gray Wolves network all within which the second conspiracy could be forged.
through Westem Europe, up to the time of his coming to Rome. Some
of his Gray Wolves comrades admitted to knowing what he was up to in
the spring of 1981, although they all denied participating in the Plot.u'
However, he got money from the network, its members supplied him
with the gun, and he had meetings and contacts with them even in the
Iast, Italian phase of his travels. It has not been proved that any of his
Gray Wolves comrades were with Agca in Rome on May 13, 1981, but
we strongly suspect that one or more of them were present. Whatever
the truth of the Gray Wolves' assassination-day presence and support,
the trial left Agca within a Gray Wolves, not a Bulgarian, network and
support system. The first conspiracy was clearly a Gray Wolves con-
sprracy.
The trial also strengthened the case for a "second conspiracy" and
the coaching hypothesis. In the investigative phase of the case, con-
ducted by Judge Martella, the lid had been kept tight on the role of the
secret services, the conditions of Agca's imprisonment, and the evi-
dence for inducements and pressures. That lid was partially removed
during the trial. Sometimes this was inadvertent, as in Abdullah Catli's
66. In the middle oí the tria| Ce|enk was re|eased by Bulgaria and allowed to retum to
Turkey, where he was arrested, interrogated, and held for various crimes. Celenk died
shortly thereafter, while incarcerated. lt is an interesting fact that while the Bulgarians
were willing to free Celenk, the Turkish government would not permit him to go to Rome
to testify on the Bulgarian Connection despite urgent requests from the Italian court.
67. On September 20, 1985, Yalcin Ozbey, when asked whether Agca had invited him
to participate in the assassination attempt, refused to answer the question on the ground ol
possible self-incrimination. 68. See Chapter 5, pp. 102-12
 THREE: AGCA AND THE CRAY WOLVES 43

formed in 1965, when Col. Alparslan Tiirkes and some other former
army officers took over the Republican Peasants' Nation Party (RPNP),
a largely moribund party of the traditional Right. Tíirkes was a charis-
matic former army officer who first came to national prominence in
3.The Flnst Gonsplracy: 1944 when he, along with some 30 others, was anested for participation
in an anticommunist demonstration, a f,rrst indication that the govern-
Agca and the Gray Wolveg ment of Turkey was about to drop its tacit alliance with Hitler and join
the allies. Tiirkes again achieved prominence when he and other ex-
treme rightwing military officers were exiled from Turkey following the
1960 military coup that eventuďly established Turkey's modern con.
stitutional structure. The return of Tiirkes. and the other officers who
had been exiled, in 1963' and TÍirkes's subsequent takeover of the Re-
publican Peasants' Nation Party, signaled a resurgence of the Turkish
hile it is possible that the Pope's would-be assassin was manipu- Right; and the swift exit of the RPNP's traditional leadership left TÍirkes
lated by some outside party, in our view Agca's motivation must and his associates in undisputed control of the small party.'
be sought in his Turkish roots. In this chapter we will show that Agca The Pan-Turkism movement, to which Ttirkes and his colleagues
was f,rrmly based in Turkey's neofascist Right, and that he had long were the heirs, had its roots in the late nineteenth century. At first the
been active in the terrorist group called the Gray Wolves. These roots Pan-Turks had hoped to reunite all Turkic peoples in a single nation
are quickly passed over by the "terrorism experts" who, claiming to see stretching from western China to parts of Spain.'As the map in lllustra-
no reason why aTurk would want to kill the Pope, cast their gaze to the tion 3.1 shows, Turkish nationalists considered the Turkish people a na-
East to find the motivation for such a conspiracy. Yet an elementary ac- tion divided, separated by boundaries which ignored Turkic cultural and
quaintance with the history and ideology of the Gray Wolves quickly re- linguistic unity. While the pre-World War I Ottoman Empire included
veals a world view which adequately supports-if it does not "ration- most of the Turkish people, many Turks were left out, and the Empire
ally" explain-an attempt on the Pope's life. Just after the attempted as- also included other nationalities and ethnic groups which were not Tur-
sassination, for example, Agca's younger brother Adnan told a reporter kish. Thus Pan-Turkism developed in opposition to the Ottoman Em-
from Newsweek that Agca wanted to kill the Pope "because of his con- pire; it sought, as did many nationalist movements of that era in south-
viction that the Christians have imperialist designs against the Muslim eastern Europe, an international realignment which would regroup their
world and are doing injustices to the Islamic countries."' Such a view, suppressed peoples into a single, homogeneous nation.
as we shall see, was in accord with the mainstream of Turkish rightwing The breakup of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War,
thought; and Agca's attempt to assassinate the Pope was but an extreme however, hardly satisfied these aspirations. The new nation of Turkey
instance of the campaign of terror used by the Turkish Right against its which emerged from the war and the Kemalist revolution was much re-
enemles. duced in scope and left the majority of the Turkic peoples outside of its
boundaries. Moreover, rather than causing the breakup of the Russian
Empire, the World War and the Russian Revolution reconf,rrmed

The Roots of Turkish Fascism 2. Jacob M. Landau, Radical Politics inTurkey (Leiden: Brill, 1974), pp. 193-211;and
..Tíirkes:
Char|es Patmore, The Right's Chosen l.eader,', New Statesman' April 6' |979'
p- 418.
The chief vehicle for the rise of a neofascist Right in Turkey in the 3 By "Turkic peoples" we follow the broad deirnition outlined by Charles W. Hostler
1960s and 1970s was the Nationalist Action Party (NAP). The NAP was in his Turkism and the Soviets: The Turks of the World and Their Political Objectives
(New York: Praeger, 1957), pp. 4-83.
| "The Man With The Gun," Newsweek, May 25, 1981, p 36.

Áa
M THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION TTIREE: AGCA AND THE CRAY WOLVES 45

the subjugation of the predominantly Turkish regions of Tsarist Russia,

cementing them to the new Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
frustrating the hopes of Pan-Turks that these areas could be detached
from the Soviet Union and aligned with an enlarged Turkish nation. Fi-
}IIR IRKIN O!3TONDE TORl( INKIT nally, the relatively cordial relations achieved by the new Soviet and
Turkish revolutionary regimes in the 1920s resulted in the suppression
of Pan-Turkish organizations and ideas within Turkey, while the en-
thusiastic nation-building projects of the Kemalist state served to deflect
potential recruits to Pan-Turkism into the Turkish political mainstream.
There were several consequences of this realignment of national
boundaries and political forces. First, Pan-Turkism henceforth focused
even more sharply on the plight of the "Outer Turks," those peopies
who spoke one of the Turkic languages or who shared the Turkish cul-
ture and were outside Turkey's new national boundaries. They were
consistently numbered by Pan-Turkish writers at more than 50 percent
of all Turkish peoples, and an exceedingly high priority was placed on
Turkish reunification. Moreover, the most important or politically sen-
sitive areas in which they were found were in Cyprus (the biÍthplace of
TÍirkes) and in the Soviet Union. The Pan-Turkism movement referred
to these latter peoples as "Captive Turks," and for both ideological as
well as revanchist reasons the Pan-Turkism movement became strongly
anticommunist and anti-Soviet between the World Wars. In fact, Pan-
Turkism became increasingly a|igned with the internationď fascist
movement, and became subtly transformed. Where it had once based its
definition of "Turkism" on a common language and culture shared by
different peoples throughout what its more misty-eyed advocates called
"Greater Turan,"o under the influence of the fascist movements of the
1930s it increasingly emphasized the common racial ties of the Turkish
peoples and preached a doctrine of Turkish racial superiority akin to the
Nazis' doctrine of Aryan supremacy.
Thus it was not surprising that the German invasion of the Soviet
Union in l94l was greeted with enthusiasm by Pan-Turkish organiza-
tions. Not only did it strike a blow at the ideological enemy; more im-

4. According to Jacob Landau, Pan-Turanism ' 'has as its chief objective rapprochement
.AYI tStaLuil xurua and ultimately union among all people whose origins are purported to extend back to
tl raat ao Turan, an undefined Shangri-La-like area in the steppes ofCentral Asia. . Turanism is
consequently a far broader concept than Pan-Turkism, embracing such pegples as the
Hungarians, Finns, and Estonians " The term came to be adopted by many Pan-Turkists,
who used it to mean Turkish Homeland in a very broad sense Pan-Turkism in Turkey A
Study of lrredenrrsm (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, l98l), p. I

Illustration 3.l: Cover oÍ Bozkurt showing extent of spread of Tur.

kish people beyond the boundaries of Turkey.
46 THEBULGARIAN CONNECTION THREE: AGCA AND THE GRAY WOLVES 41

portantly, it promised an opportunity to dissolve the Soviet Empire and cism, they also became aligned with the U.S.-led anti-Soviet camp in
to unite with the Turkish motherland the Turkish peoples "held cap- the emerging Cold War.'
tive" within the Soviet Union. These hopes were also recognized by the This was the inheritance that Ttirkes and his colleagues brought to the
Nazis. As German armies advanced into the Soviet Union, Germany's NAP in the mid-1960s. The party's structure served in turn as a vehicle
ambassador to Turkey, Franz von Papen, cabled a secret report to the to disseminate aPan-Turkish world view, and it soon emerged as a force
Ministry of Foreign Affairs outlining the possibilities for enlisting the to be reckoned with in modern Turkish politics. The political program
"Pan-Turanism Movement" against the Soviet Union. "Germany," of the NAP was set almost exclusively by Tiirkes himself, whose writ-
concluded von Papen,t ings and speeches combined a vision of a science-based, state-planned
economy which would modernize Turkey with an archaic world view
is called upon to pay special attention to the drawing of details for the formation that was rooted in the legends of the gray wolf who led the Turkic
of a strong state organization in the southeast with the aim of keeping the peoples out of Asia to their homeland in Anatolia.
Soviets constantly apprehensive of this state. This task cannot be fulfilled in a As with European fascism, Tiirkes's unwieldy ideological amalgam
satisfactory manner by the Ukraine; its people are Slavs, and they could easily sought to appeal to the "little man" allegedly crushed between
come to betieve at any time . . that their common concord lies with the capitalist monopolies and a growing labor movement. It is important to
U.S.S.R. As far as the Turks are concerned, this possibility is wholly excluded. understand this, if only because westem terrorism "experts" have ex-
pressed skepticism that Agca could both be a rightist and make anti-
As for the Turks, many responded eagerly to German overtures and capitalist statements, as he has done. A good example of the NAP's at-
the possibilities created by the apparently impending defeat of the titude toward capitalism can be found in this passage from one of its
Soviet Union. One area expert notes that "the Pan-Turkist irredentists journals:'
regarded as inevitable the defeat of the U.S.S.R. and considered possi-
ble the creation of a confederation of all the Turkish peoples of Soviet Finance capital is by its nature and purpose not national. Banks, insurance com-
Russia and Chinese Turkestan under the Turkish Republic's leader- panies, and financial trusts that are attached to it are the mortal enemies of the
ship." tn the autumn of 1942, anticipating the fall of Stalingrad, the national economy. Finance capital is concerned with weakening and de-
Turkish Republic concentrated troops at the Caucasian border, "ready stroying the national economy in all its aspects by robbing the banks, manipulat-
to exploit all the possibilities the German-Soviet war and a collapse of ing the stock exchange, and by various other swindles. . . . There is also a class
the U.S.S.R. could furnish for the realization of Pan-Turkish ideals. "u of compradors which particípates in these activities of this anti-national capita|,
Beginning in late 1941, more than a hundred thousand Soviet Turks reaping large profits and sharing in the crime. They are virtually traitors. Thus
the struggle between the national and the anti-national economy is one between
were recruited out of prisoner-of-war camps by the Nazis and enrolled
international capital and its accomplices against the nation.
into army units that fought alongside the Germans . In 1944 the Turke-
stan National Committee initiated the formation of the East Turkish
Yet, continuing the parallel with National Socialism, none of this
Waffen Verband, an SS unit, which consisted of four regiments of
"little man" propaganda prevented the NAP from enlisting the support
Turks from the Soviet Union. But by this time the cause of Germany,
of wealthy businessmen. According to the prosecutor's indictment of
and thus of the Pan-Turks, was all but lost; and with the defeat of Ger-
the NAP in the spring of 198 I , following the crackdown on the party in
many in 1945 most Turkish people were still outside Turkey proper.
the wake of the military coup the previous fall, records seized at party
Pan-Turkish organizations and publications continued to be dominated
by a strongly anticommunist, and especially anti-Soviet, ideology; and '7 lbid., pp. 55, 179; and Jacob Landau, op cil., n 4, Chapters 3 and 4.
while they were later to resume their alignrnent with international fas- 8 Yeniden Milli Mticadele,54 (February 9,l97l), cited in Feroz Ahmad,TheTurkish
Experiment in Democracy: 1950-1975 (London: C. Hurst & Co , 197'7), pp. 263-64
5. Cited in Hostler, op cit., p. 174
6. Ibid , pp. 116-77
48 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION THREE: AGCA AND THE GRAY WOLVES 49

headquarters showed that the NAP received funds from the Chairman of leadership. According to a leading historian of modern Turkey:"
the Executive Committee of the Secretariat of Turkish Businessmen, the
President of the lstanbul Chamber of Industrialists, the Chairman of the Newspapers which supported the Front parties popularized the slogan "Demirel
Union of Chambers, the President of the Istanbul Chamber of Industry, in Parliament, TÍirkes in the street. . . . '' As a manifestation of this ..division
the President of the Executive Committee of the Istanbul Bank, and of labor," by the beginning of 1975 rightwing violence in the street carried out
many others.e by Action Party ..coÍnÍnandos'' had become almost a daily occunence. The aim
Ttirkes's brand of Pan-Turkism was also addressed to ultra-patriots of this violence was to emphasize the so-called danger from the Left, and it gave
the Nationalist Action Party an opportunity to exert a political influence totally
who believed that their nation was being humiliated by its weakness in
out of proportion to its following in the country and its strength in the Assem-
relation to the Soviet Union and the capitalist powers of the West, par-
blv.
ticularly the United States. This point is also overlooked by those prop-
agators of the Bulgarian Connection who profess to be mystified by
Two of the NAP's three parliamentary representatives were given
Agca's various pronouncements against ..imperiďism.'' Perhaps the cabinet posts in the National Front government: Tiirkes was made Depu-
most important such instance was his handwritten message, allegedly
ty Prime Minister, while a second NAP deputy was made Minister of
found among his possessions upon his arrest in Rome, declaring that his
Customs and State Monopolies. r'zBy 1977 the party was strong enough
assassination attempt was a protest against both the Soviet invasion of
to win seven percent ofthe vote in the general elections, giving them l6
Afghanistan and the U.S.-supported counterinsurgency in El Salvador.
Members of Parliament. Skillfully using its parliamentary faction and
Yet Pan-Turkish propaganda is rich in such denunciations.
its forces in the streets, the NAP gained control of the Ministry of Edu-
As is readily apparent. the Pan-Turkish social and political milieu cation, which in turn assisted the Gray Wolves terrorists who beat and
into which the young Mehmet Ali Agca was absorbed in the 1970s had
murdered their opponents to gain hegemony in many schools.'3 And the
a well-developed, distinctive fascist ideology. While still in high
school, Agca became involved with the NAP's youth affiliate, the Gray I I Feroz Ahmad, op cit-, n. 8, p. 347.
Wolves. The Wolves were so-named not only to enhance their ferocious 12. A physical attack on Demirel occurred shortly after the formation of the Front. At
the trial, his assailant was shown to have been associated with the NAP If Demirel had
image, but also to emphasize the atavistic part of the NAP's heritage;
been killed, Tiirkes would have assumed the posÍ of Prime Minister. According to Feroz
and it is said that the young recruits would howl when assembled to- Ahmad, "There was much speculation as to what might have happened if Demirel had
gether. In the late 1960s the NAP had established dozens of training been killed. Some thought that the govemment, led by Tiirkes (a man with fascist lean-
camps for young people throughout Turkey, and had built the move- ings),mighthavedeclaredastateofemergency...andestablishedanopenlyfascistre-
ment's strength largely on the basis of its youth organizations.'o The gime. This conspiracy theory was made more plausible because Tiirkes was said to
have a large following among junior officers in the armed forces, who were willing to sup-
military coup of March 12, 197 | , gave the NAP its chance: as the mili-
port such a regime. During the summer of 1975, the author heard both stories constantly
tary government turned against the Left, the Gray Wolves became a while in Turkey" (ibid , pp. 351, 361). Ahmad also notes that "Ttirkes wanted ro have
dominant force in many schools and the universities. martial faw proclaimed" (p.362), and nearly succeeded in doing so in June 1975. Just be-
The NAP also prospered on the national political scene. A parliamen- fore a visit by Tiirkes to the city of Diyarbekir, a stronghold of Shia and Kurds who were
tary crisis in late 1974 left the small rightwing parties, including the strong|y opposed to TÍirkes and the NAP's Sunni and Turkish chauvinism, NAP comman.
dos "came to Diyarbekir 'like an occupation force,' . . . and shouted slogans in the
NAP, holding the balance of power in parliament. Demirel, the leader
streets: 'Flee, the Turks are coming.' " Ahmad reports that, in response to these provoca-
of the conservative Justice Party, moved to form a "National Front" tions, there was a demonstration against Ttirkes "which became violent and almost led to
government which would combine the forces on the right under his the proclamation of martial law" (p. 362)
13. Sterling, Henze, and NBC-TV have dwelt on the fact that Agca mysteriously
9. Searchlighr (Great Britain), No 75 (September l98l), p. 13.
passed an entrance examination al|owing him to enteÍ Istanbul University They hint that
10. A secret report. prepared by the Turkish Ministry of the lnterior in 1970 but sup-
this is evidence that Agca was aided by some sinister (i.e., Red) power They never ac-
pressed by Prime Minister Demire| of the Justice PaÍty, Iisted 26 such camps a|leged|y or.
knowledge the special position which the extreme Right had obtained in the educational
ganized between August 1968 and July 1970. The report was made public during the
field, which provided an institutional basis for easing favored candidates through the edu-
height of NAP activity in November 1978. Searchlighr, No 47 (May 1979), pp 5-6
cational system in the late 1970s
50 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION THREE: AGCA AND THE GRAY WOLVES 5l

NAP used its control of the Customs Ministry to tum the endemic Henze, and Investigating Magistrate Martella saw Agca's relationship
smuggling from Turkey to Europe to its own profit. Finally, the NAP with the Gray Wolves as either bogus or ephemeral, the evidence points
deployed its small but politically crucial weight in the parliamentary to a durable connection, providing organization, personnel, funding,
balance ofpower to prevent the government from cracking down on the and an ideological basis for the assassination conspiracy.
party's terrorist "commandos," the Gray Wolves. Agca's association with the Gray Wolves began when he was in high
At the time of the military coup of September 1980, there were some school. According to Rasit Kisacik, a Turkish journalist who has
1,700 Gray Wolves organizations in Turkey with approximately studied Agca's early years, he was often seen with Gray Wolves leaders
200,000 registered members and about a million sympathizers. Im- while in high school; and when the police raided Agca's home in 1979,
mediately following the coup, the NAP was outlawed and Tiirkes was they found photographs showing the young Agca in the company of
arrested.'a In its indictment of the NAP. which was handed down in leaders of the Gray Wolves.'t Moreover, the people Agca came to know
May 1981, the Turkish military government charged 220 members of among his hometown Gray Wolves activists aided him in many of his
the paÍty and its affiliates with the responsibi|ity for 694 murders' This later terrorist activities. While in theory the Gray Wolves were directed
was only a fraction of the killing attributed to the Turkish Right. Statis- by the NAP, in fact, according to Michael Dobbs of the Washington
tics for 1978, for example, recorded 3,319 fascist attacks, which re- Post, "the command structure seems to have been a loose one, allowing
sulted in 831 killed and 3,121 wounded.'' Contrary to the impression plenty of room for semiautonomous factions and groups that did not
advanced by Claire Sterling in The Terror Nework, the overwhelming necessarily take their orders from the top. "18 The loose network of Gray
bulk of political and sectarian violence in the pre-manial law period was Wolves from Agca's home base, the Malatya region of eastern Turkey,
initiated by the Gray Wolves, who were protected by their friends in the seems to have functioned as one such semiautonomous group. Led by
military, police force, and government. Oral Celik-apparently involved in the murder of Turkey's most promi-
nent newspaper editor, Abdi lpekci, and in the operation that broke
Agca out of prison in 1979, and identified by Agca as the second gun-
man in the attack on the Popere-the Malatya gang supported itself by
Agca As Terrorist: The Gray lVolves Connection smuggling and robbery. We find them present at each of the milestones
on Agca's path from high school to St. Peter's Square.
Although Agca's immersion in the world of the Gray Wolves has In 1978 Agca enrolled in Istanbul University. He apparently spent lit-
been inconvenient for supporters of the Bulgarian Connection t|e time in classes. Instead he hung out in rightwing cafés |ike the Mar-
hypothesis, the evidence connecting Agca to Turkey's neofascist Right mora, which "advertised the politics of those who frequented it with a
is overwhelming. What is more, these connections never tapered off and large mural of a gray wolf on one of the walls."2o According to Feroz
may be traced right up to Agca's sojourn in Rome.'o Where Sterling, Ahmad, "students in the hostel where he lived remembered him as a
14. Diana Johnstone has suggestcd that the assassination anempt on the Pope might well-known 'militant' who was allegedly seen shooting two students in
have been motivated in part by thc NAP-Gray Wolves rcscntment at their betrayal by the legs during an attack on a leftist hostel. His notoriety in terrorist cir-
NATO and the West. for whom they had served as a destabilizing force, but who had then
allowed them to be swcpt up along with the Lrft in the aftermath of thc Turkish military 17. Manrine Howe, "Turk's Hometown Puzzled by His CIimb to Notoriety," New
coup. "Assassins: Goal of Turkish Terror is Confusion," In These Tizes, June 3-16, York Times, May 23, 1981.
r98t. 18. Michaef Dobbs, "Child of Turkish Slums Finds Way in Crime," Washington Post,
15. Searchlight (Great Britain), No 47 (May 1979), p. 6. October 14, 1984
16. The trial provided solid proof of the Gray Wolves connection up to Agca's stay in |9. This identification was supportď by ozbey during the tria.l' but was denied by other
Rome. lt failed to clarify the question of which, if any, Gray Wolves were with him on Gray Wolves. Celik was a good friend of Agca, and Agca's motive in falsely implicating
May 13, l98l . The lasl authenticated contact was on May 9, when Omer Bagci delivered Celik is not clear.
a gun to Agca in Milan. We believe that onc or more Gray Wolves accompanied Agca at 20. R. W. Apple, Jr., "Trail of Mehmet Ali Agca: 6 Years of Neofascist Ties," New
the assassination attempt, but hard evidcnce is lacking. YorkTimes, May 25, l98l
52 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION rHREE: AGCA AND THE GRAY WOLVES 53

cles was such that leftists tried to kill him on a number of occasions. "t' gang failed to carry out their threat to kill the heavily guarded Pope dur-
On February l, 1979, the Malatya gang assassinated lpekci. Agca ing his visit to Turkey, such an act was on their agenda.
was arrested a few months later; and, although there now seems to be At this point Agca's life as a fugitive began. Wanted by Turkish au-
serious doubt whether Agca was indeed the gunman or just an accom- thorities and Interpol, Agca nevertheless moved with apparent ease
plice, he quickly confessed to the crime. At his trial the following Oc- through some dozen countries in the 18 months separating his prison es-
tober Agca steadfastly denied any connection with the NAP or the Gray cape from his rendezvous with the Pope in May l98l. Throughout this
Wolves, claiming instead to "represent a new form of terror on my time Agca was rarely outside the Gray Wolves network and was fre-
own." After several sessions of his trial, Agca threatened in court to quently in contact with the Malatya gang. After murdering the informer
name "the truly responsible parties" when the trial next convened. This who had earlier tipped off the police to his whereabouts, Agca was
clear signal that someone had better get him out was delivered within taken by the Gray Wolves to lran to hide out. Some months later he re-
days after the formation of a new, conservative government, dependent turned to Turkey and, aided by a false passport provided him by Gray
on NAP votes for its parliamentary majority; and a few days later some Wolves members, he was smuggled into Bulgaria and through that
Gray Wolves led by Oral Celik smuggled Agca, disguised as a soldier, country, arriving in Western Europe in the fall of 1980. Agca thus nar-
through eight checkpoints and out of prison. rowly escaped the military coup which forced many Gray Wolves un-
Agca's first act upon escaping from prison was to send a letter to Mil- derground or into exile abroad. The Malatya gang soon followed Agca
lÍyet, Ipekci's newspaper' threatening to kill the Pope, who was about to to Western Europe, where they sought shelter among the Gray Wolves
visit Turkey. Once again we stumble on an event which presents incon- network in the large Turkish immigrant communities of Switzerland and
venient facts for Sterling and company, for on its face Agca's act sup- West Germany.
ports the probability that he (and the Mďatya gang) needed no KGB In fleeing from Turkey Agca was not abandoning the Gray Wolves
hand to guide them toward a papal assassination. In his letter to Milliyet network so much as seeking the shelter of its extěrior branches. The
Agca stated:" NAP and the Gray Wolves had recruited for many years among the mil-
lions of Turkish men who left their country to work in Switzerland,
Fearing the creation of a new political and military power in the Middle East by West Germany, or other European countries for one or more years be-
Turkey along with its brother Arab states, western imperialism has . . . dis- fore returning home.'o When a 1976 Turkish court decision made it il-
patched to Turkey in the guise of religious leader the crusade commander John
legal for the Gray Wolves and the NAP to maintain foreign affiliates,
Paul. Unless this untimely and meaningless visit is postponed, I shall certainly
the Western European branches were reorganized into the Federation of
shoot the Pope.
Turkish ldealist Associations or into Turkish "cultural" clubs, but they
secretly maintained their ties to the NAP. The Federation claimed
Was this letter written at the directiorr of Agca's KGB controller, as
50,000 members in Europe at the time of the military coup in September
Sterling and Henze maintain, as a devilishly clever cover for Agca's
1980, with 129 chapters, including 87 in West Germany. The West Ger-
KGB links? Was it written, as Agca himself later maintained, as a diver-
man police estimated that at least 26,000 Turkish workers in West Ger-
sion to throw his pursuers off the scent? While we cannot say with cer-
many were members of neofascist organizations.2s
tainty, the fact that the contents of the |etter accord peďectly with the
ideological views of the Gray Wolves and the NAP strongly suggests 24. For a vivid account of this great migration, see John Berger and Jean Mohr' Á
that the letter simply speaks for itself;" and while Agca and the Malatya Seventh Man (London: Penguin Books, I975)
25 Another report estimated that there were 200 conservative lslamic centers in West
2l .Feroz Ahmad, "Agca:TheMakingof ATerrorist," BostonGlobe, June7, 1981. Germany; and the New YorkTimes cited "recent documentation by West Germany's labor
22 Sinan Fisek, "Attacker Named As Escaped Assassin," London Times, May 14, t-ederation [which] poínted out strong anti-Western, anti.Semitic, and anti-Christian cur.
l98l, A sf ightly different translation may be found in Claire Sterling, TheTime of the As- rents in the lslamic centers' publications" (John Tagliabue, "Militant Views Among
.r.zssins (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1983), p. 19 Turks Trouble Bonn," May 21, l98l) The de facto political alliances between rhe NAP
23 For evidence of NAP press hostility to the Pope's visit in 1979, see Chapter 6, p and Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey were probably operative in Western Europe as
156. n 90 well.
 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION THREE: AGCA AND THE GRAY WOLVES 55
54

This network of rightwing Turkish organizations sheltered Agca be- militant, and up to May 13, 198 l, all his contacts led straight to the
tween the time he left Turkey and the day he shot the Pope' Simply to Gray Wolves.
list the confirmed links which have emerged at Agca's trial in Rome and
in collateral trials in other Gray Wolves centers in Western Europe rein-
forces this conclusion: Agca As An "International Terrorist"
l. Agca came to Western Europe with a passport provided by Gray
wolves leader Abdullah catli. catli had obtained the passport with the Sterling, Henze, and some members of the Italian judiciary" have por-
help of a customs official who was a member of the Gray Wolves' trayed Agca as a "pure" or "international" terrorist, who rises above
2. Agcawas sheltered by Catli and other Gray Wolves in Olten, Swit- mere political loyalties and dedicates his life to random political vio-
zerland, a major Gray Wolves smuggling center.26 One of Agca's com- lence. We may usefully pause to examine the "proofs" that Agca was
panions in Olten, Mehmet Sener, was sentenced in Switzerland to a an apolitical international terrorist, for the fallacies they embody are not
five-year prison term for drug smuggling. Catli and Oral Celik were only relevant to evaluating the Gray Wolves linkage, they also illumi-
wanted for questioning at Sener's trial. nate the quality of the Sterling-Henze-Kalb evidence for the Bulgarian
3. Yalcin Ozbey, who was brought in to testify in Rome, was jailed in Connection.
Bochum, West Germany on drug smuggling charges. Before the murder
of Ipekci in l9't9, Ozbey and Agca had a joint bank account' Another Agca' s Cray Wolves affiliation as "cover. " The Sterling-Henze school
Gray Wolves friend of Agca, Rifat Yildirim, was caught with heroin in has suggested that the Soviets and the Bulgarians recruited Agca early
Frankfurt. and had him serve in the Gray Wolves as a "cover." Thus his threat to
4. Musa Celebi , one of the top leaders of the Gray Wolves in Western kill the Pope in 1979 was an attempt to provide a later basis for the claim
Europe, had numerous contacts with Agca in 1980 and 1981, giving that he was a Turkish fascist, when in fact he was already under KGB
him money and meeting with him in Zurich only six weeks before the discipline.
assassination attemPt. One problem with this line of argument is the absence of the faintest
5. Agca's gun was purchased for him by Catli, and was delivered to trace of supporting evidence. Another is that many of Agca's Gray
him in Milan only four days before the assassination attempt by the Wolves comrades would have had to be similarly manipulated. A third
Olten Gray Wolves leader Omer Bagci and two other Gray Wolves' problem is that the alleged Soviet motive to kill the Pope-the threat of
6. At the time of the Pope's visit to the Netherlands in May 1985, Poland's Solidarity--did not exist in earlier ye.rs, nor at the time when
another Gray Wolves member, Arslan Samet, was arrested at the Dutch Agca made the threat in 1979. A further problem is that the assassina-
border while carrying a Browning revolver stolen at the same time as the tion threat can be explained on grounds of Gray Wolves-NAP ideology
one used by Agca in St. Peter's Square. without resort to hypothetical scenarios. Anything can be proved by this
7. Numerous phone calls between Agca and Gray Wolves leaders in form of pseudoscientific reasoning.
west Germany and Switzerland were intercepted by the police in the
months before the assassination attempt. Agca was not a card-carrying member of the Gray Wolves. Sterling and
In short, the available evidence shows that Agca was a Gray Wolves Henze claim that Agca never obtained an official Gray Wolves member-
ship card. It may be noted that this line of proof is diametrically opposed
26 For the cray wolves in switzerland, see "Tiirkische Mafia und Die Grauen wolfe
in Der Schweiz,,, InformationstelleTiirkei (Postfach 2151,4001 Basel, 1985). This use- to that made in the previous point. If Agca were a KGB recruit and they
ful volume includes analyses and excerpts from Turkish and Swiss newspapers on the wanted to tar him with the brush of Turkish fascism to cover up a later
criminal activities of many of the Gray wolves mentioned above. Much useful informa- terrorist act, the KGB would have made sure that Agca did the neces-
tion also emerged during the 1985 sessions of the trial, as ozbey, catli, and other Gray sary paperwork. Indeed, the absence of a membership card undermines
wolves were called by Judge santiapichi and testified about Agca's connections to the
Gray Wolves in Switzerland. 27. See Chapter 5, pp. l13-15.
56 THE BULCARIAN CONNECTION THREE: AGCA AND TTIE GRAY WOLVES 57

the argument that Agca was controlled by the KGB while a Gray abruptly clammed up when the magistrates refused his demand that joumalists
Wolves activist. Apart from this contradiction, however, the record of be present as he "confessed."
durable linkages and a longstanding political commitment must be per-
suasive to nonpseudoscientists, barring credible alternative evidence. Having exhausted his ability to derive eminence from shooting the
Pope, Agca's deal to implicate the Bulgarians opened up new avenues
The motive behind Agca's confessions. Apart from their unwillingness to attain star status and TV recognition. So did the trial, where he could
to give proper weight to Agca's Gray Wolves connections, Sterling and reveal his special role as the Son of God.
company ignore three motivations for Agca's confessions implicating
the Bulgarians that render them worthless as evidence: Agca says just what Claire Sterling says an international terrorist ought
Loyalry: By claiming he was an "international terrorist," Agca took ro say. Since deciding to cooperate with the Italian authorities, Agca has
the blame and kept the heat off his Gray Wolves comrades for many played the internationď terrorist card aggressive|y. Perhaps too aggres-
months. He had done the same thing in Turkey by "confessing" to the sively. Although until the 1985 trial he only claimed to have had contact
Ipekci murder in 1979. In the case of the Bulgarian Connection, Agca with low-level Bulgarian functionaries, he kept saying with great deci-
should certainly have little objection to channeling ultimate guilt from siveness that the KGB was involved. He could not know this from any
his best friends to the Communists, a longstanding Gray Wolves foe.28 direct experience, but he learned the "model" into which his mentors
Self-Preservation: By accommodating his captors he made life much and captors wanted him to fit, and he kept helping them out. During the
easier for himself. We describe later the probable "deal" struck, and trial, he suddenly trotted out a Sofia meeting with the Soviet Deputy
the inducements and threats that made it worth his while to finger the Ambassador, to the consternation of the prosecution and a chorus of de-
Evil Empire. rision from the defense and the press. Agca's caricature of the Sterling
Publicity: Agca had long sought fame and recognition. According to vision of the terrorist-for-hire (by the KGB) is so close to the originď
Turkish journalist Ismail Kovaci, "Agca suffers both from jealousy and that some of the ltalian magistrates have been impressed by the excel-
delusions of self-grandeur. For him, terrorism represented his way of lent fit!t'
leaving his mark on the world. "B Michael Dobbs of the Washington ln the real world, coached witnesses say what their coaches want
PosÍ states:.o them to say. In a world of disinformation and internalized propaganda,
the courts and press mÍIrvel at the conformity of the ..confession'' to the
Many who encountered Agca both in Turkey and in ltaly, have spoken of his forecasts of the coaches!
"Carlos Complex"-his image of himself as a top-flight internatfonal terrorist
with the whole wor|d hanging breath|essly on'his every word. His desire ťor per-
sonal publicity seems unquenchable. At one point in the Italian investigation, he The Smuggling Versus CIA Connection
28. One theory of Gray Wolves involvement, expounded by Orsan Oymen, is that the
Gray Wolves in Western Europe were not keen on the assassination attempt, which was a Money was the lifeblood of the NAP and the Gray Wolves networks:
preoccupation of Agca's (held over from the Pope's visit to Turkey in I979). Agca per- money for guns, money for bribes, and money to maintain the party's
suaded his comrades to support him by promising that ifcaught he would blame the Soviet organizational apparatus. As one former Gray Wolves member tes-
Bloc for the Plot, not the Gray Wolves. Agca did implicate the Bulgarians and Soviets im-
tified,3'z the Western European network of the Gray Wolves
mediately, although along with others, and eventually he came through with a full-scale
"confession. " It is interestihg to note that Celebi held a press conference in Bonn on May
3l See the comments of Magistrate Rosario Priore in Chapter 4 below.
2l, l98l, in which he proclaimed that Agca had nothing to do with the Gray Wolves and 32 DieTageszeitung(a\NestBerlindaily),September4, lg80.Thewitness,AliYur-
that the assassination plot had been organized and sponsored by the KGB See Orsan turslan, was later used as a source on tbe NBC program, "The Man Who Shot the Pope
Oymen, "Behind the Scenes of the 'Agca Investigation,' " Mtlliyet, November 1984. A Study in Terrorism," but any information he had given NBC about Cray Wolves -
29. Michael Dobbs, "Child of Turkish Slums . . ," Washington Posl, October 14, smuggling was not used.
| 984.
30. rbid.
58 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION THREE: AGCA AND THE GRAY WOLVES 59

sends large quantities of money back to Turkey. Not only money' but weapons trol that form of smuggling have been given credence by the U.S. Cus-
and equipment. Guns from France, West Germany, Belgium, and Bulgaria are toms Service (see Appendix B).
smuggled by sea into Turkey. . . . One of the Nationalist Action Party's Sreat- It is dangerous to make the leap from the existence of smuggling to
est sources offunds is drug smuggling. Heroin and hashish are smuggled out of state direction and control of smuggling, and even more dangerous to
Turkey and into Europe, and the NAP even markets much of the drugs in then claim state responsibility for all the crimes of the smugglers.
Europe itself. The profits go to buying guns in Turkey. Moreover, we now know that the Turkey-Bulgaria-Italy smuggling
route was run at least in part by ofťrcials from Itďy's military intelli-
A British survey of the NAP's participation in drug smuggling states:.1
gence agency (SISMI);'4 and in reporting on March 23, 1983, that the
three top CIA officials in Rome were in "deep trouble," NBC News
The first indications of their involvement came in 1973 when Kudret Bayhan, a suggested that one source of their problems was "that they might have
NAP member of the Turkish senate, was detained in France with a consignment
been using a guns and drug smuggling route between Sofia, Bulgaria
of heroin. Also arrested with Bayhan were two other members of the NAP's ex-
and Milan, Italy to run their own agents into Eastern Europe. . . . " In
ecutive committee. In 1976 another NAP senator with a car [trunk] loaded with
short, it would appear that, as with ď| lucrative but illega| trades, the
the drug was anested on the border between ltaly and Yugoslavia. Three years
later ltalian police at Trieste arrested nineteen Turkish right wingers transport- smugglers' highway between Turkey and Western Europe was lined
ing a total of f,2 million labout $5 million] worth of heroin. Some of them ad- with money and accommodated the intelligence agents of many nations
mitted to police investigators that the heroin was destined for the United States' as well as the smugglers themselves.
where it was to be traded for arms with underworld contacts' Sterling, Henze, and Martella saw the root of the Bulgarian Connec-
tion in the drug and arms smuggling activities of what they call the
While it is dangerous to place much confidence in any of Agca's decla- "Turkish Mafia." The main linkages are those between the Turkish
rations, Turkish military prosecutors who reopened the Ipekci murder Mafia and those Bulgarian state officials who tolerated, protected, anď
case have accepted as plausible Agca's assertion that while in Istanbul or helped organize the smuggling. In Sterling's view, Agca was a rela-
he supported himself through a black market smuggling operation or- tively low-level employee of this Mafia, and while in Bulgaria he was
ganized by the Malatya BanE. on the payroll of Abuzer Ugurlu, the "Godfather" of the Turkish
Although much of the smuggling to and from Turkey was carried out Mafia. Ugurlu, in turn, worked with or for another Godfather, the Tur-
by sea, some of it also crossed the Bulgarian land bridge separating Tur- kish businessman Bekir Celenk. According to Sterling and company, it
key from Western Europe. Given the vast flow of Turks and others was through Celenk and Ugurlu that the Bulgarians directed the Turkish
traversing Bulgaria on their way to and from Western Europe in the smuggling operations, and through them that the smugglers received
1970s, it was virtually impossible for Bulgaria to control its borders Bulgarian protection. And according to Agca (and then Martella), it was
against smuggling. Even with appaÍently Serious efforts to control the Celenk who offered to pay Agca more than a million dollars to kill the
drug trade it is a notable fact that many of the biggest complainers (e.9., Pope.
the United states and ltaly) have been unable to curb the traffic in their The weaknesses of this linkage of Agca and the assassination attempt
own countnes. to the Bulgarians via the smuggling connection are severe. First, once
Some credible ltalian and Turkish investigators have claimed that again much of this story rests on the credibility of Agca, the sole source
Bulgaria tolerates and even participates in some facets of smuggling' of many crucial details. Furthermore, we know that Agca had read Ugur
such as the arms trade, in order to earn hard curency. But this alleged Mumcu's Arms Smuggling andTeruorism, and there is reason to believe
participation and acquiescence has never been proved to extend to that many of the details Agca gave his interrogators about such well-
drugs, and the Bulgarian government's claims of serious efforts to con- "La P-2, les service italiens, Ie trafic drogues/armes: I'attentat contre le pape et la
34-
33. "The Heroin Trail and Gray Wolves Guns," Searchlight (Great Britain), No 65 CIA," Le Monde du Renseignement, October-December 1983, pp. 43-44.
(November 1980), p. 7 See also Feroz Ahmad, op. cit., n' 21

li
it
60 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION THREE: AGCA AND THE GRAY WOLVES 6l

known smugglers as Abuzer Ugurlu and Bekir Celenk were taken from While the Bulgarians had links to the Turkish Mďia via the smug-
this book.rs gling trade, the United States had established a far more powerful posi-
Second, while the smuggling trade between Turkey and Bulgaria has tion in the heart of Turkish society, notably in its army and intelligence
been significant, it has involved the principals in a business relationship services. The huge Turkish loans of 194'7 -48 and the integration of Tur-
with reciprocal benefits. The assumption that the Bulgarians control the key into the U.S.-dominated NATO made the U.S.-Turkish relationship
Turkish Mafia participating in that trade is unproven and implausible.'u one of patron and client by the early 1950s.' Between 1950 and 1979
So is the assumption that the NAP is a simple instrument of the Turkish the United States provided a further $5.8 billion in military aid.o' The
Mafia. Michael Dobbs presents evidence that Ugurlu was dependent on arms supply and training programs helped integrate the Turkish mili-
the NAP for protection, rather than the other way around. Dobbs notes tary, police, and intelligence services into those of the United States.
that "to carry out this large-scale smuggling operation, Ugurlu . . Under the Military Assistance Program and the International Military
needed agents in the Turkish customs ministry," and points out that "it Education and Training Program, 19,193 Turks received U.S. training
is now known that key customs posts were infiltrated by supporters of between 1950 and 1979. U.S. trainees in client states have been instru-
the [NAP] . . . during the late 1970s."" Particularly between 1975 and mental in leading counterrevolutionary coups that have served their pa-
1978, when they participated in the National Front government, the tron's interests.nt The patron is also often effectively an occupying
NAP placed many of its supporters in key positions in the customs power, organizing the rnilitary and police, rnanipulating the political en-
ministry and at border crossing points. Needing funds to carry out party vironment, and building its own bridges to serviceable (usually right-
activities, the NAP was in a position to deal profitably with the wing) groups within the state.
smugglers and was increasingly able to take over the business itself. Ac- The most likely avenue linking the CIA to the Turkish Right runs
cording to Orsan Oymen, "My opinion is that . it was the Gray through Turkey's "Counter-Guerrilla, " a branch of the Turkish General
Wolves who were in a position to ask favors from the Mafia. They were Staff's Department of Special Warfare, which was created sometime in
the ones with the politicď influence at the time, because of their contro| the 1960s. One study of Turkey's Counter-Guerrilla notes that it was
over the customs ministry."38 Finally, Ugur Mumcu, the leading au- headquartered in the same Ankara building that housed the U.S. mili-
thority on the Turkish-Bulgarian drug connection, does not accept the tary mission, and that the training of officers assigned to this unit "be-
notion that Ugurlu, the Turkish Mafia, and the Gray Wolves were in- gins in the U.S. and then continues inside Turkey under the direction of
struments of Bulgarian political policy merely by virtue of their mutu- CIA officers and military 'advisers.' " During the 1960s, according to
ally profitable business linkages.'o the same study, the CIA assisted the Turkish intelligence organization
A third important weakness of the smuggling-based model is its ne- MIT in drawing up plans for the mass aÍrest of opposition f,rgures; and
glect of the anticommunism of the NAP and Gray Wolves and their the same work claims that this plan was put into operation following the
links to the United States and CIA. If these are given their proper l97l coup.o'Another study, by former Turkish military prosecutor and
weight, not only is the idea that the Gray Wolves were up for hire by the
40. By the end of Fiscal Year 1950 the Turks had received $150 million in economic
communist powers seen as foolish, but questions are also raised about aid, plus over $200 million in military aid, along with over 1,200 U S military advisers
the possibility of a CIA root for the assassrnation attempt. JoyceandGabriel Kolko,TheLimitsof Power(NewYork:Harper&Row, 1972),p.413.
41. MichaelT. KlareandCynthiaArnson,SupplyingRepression: U.S SupportforAu-
35. See Chapter 2, p. 21 , n.36. thoritarian Regimes Abroad ('\Uashington: Institute for Policy Studies, l98l), p. 8l
3Ó. See Appendix B.
42. See Edward S. Herman, The Real Terror Nenlork (Boston: South End Press.
37 ..child of Turkish Slums,'' Washington PosÍ, october l4' l984
t982), pp. 121-32.
38 Quoted by Michael Dobbs' jáld 43. Jurgen Roth and Kamil Taylan, DieTiirkei-Republik UnterWolfen [Turkey: A Re-
39 Ugur Mumcu, Papa, Mafua, Ágca (Istanbu|: Tekin Yayinevi, l984)' pp. l 98-2l l.
public Ruled by Wolvesl, (Bomheim, West Germany: Lamur Verlag, l98l) Excerpts
Michael Dobbs points out that Mumcu believes that Ugurlu also worked forTurkey's in-
tiom this study were traÍlslated inCounterSpy, Vol. VI, No. 2 (February-April l982), pp.
telligence agency, MIT. "Agca Makes His Way From Sofia to St. Peter's," Washington
23 and 25, and some of it was reprinted in ' 'Tiirkische Mafia Und Die Grauen Wolfe in
Post. October 15. 1984.
62 THEBULGARIANCONNECTION THREE: AGCA AND THE GRAY WOLVES 63

Supreme Court Justice Emin Deger, states that there was a close, work- his book, The Belarus Secret. Loftus discovered that a secret division of
ing colfaboration between the NAP armed commandos, or Bozkurts, the U.S. State Department had recruited the leadership of a Byelorus-
and the Counter-Guerrilla units. There was also a close tie between the sian military unit which had governed that region of the Soviet Union i

Counter-Guerrilla and the CIA. Deger chargď further that the CIA' act- while it was under Nazi occupation. This "Belarus Brigade" had par-
ticipated zeďous|y in massacres of Jews, and had retreated westward
I

ing through MIT and the Counter-Guerrilla, promoted rightwing ter-

rorist actions to destabilize the Turkish government and to prepare the with the defeated German Army, even engaging U.S. military forces in I

way for the military coup of 1971.* It also seems quite clear that the combat. Loftus found that the State Department's secret Office of Pol-
United States and the CIA were very anxious to oust the Demirel gov- icy Coordination had recruited the Byelorussians, thinking that they
ernment in 1971, and assisted in the coup of that year. According to were gaining a working intelligence appaÍatus and the nuc|eus of a pos-
former U.S. diplomat Robert Fresco, Demirel's government had simply sible guerrilla operation within the Soviet Union.a' While no evidence I

become incapable of containing the growing anti-U.S. radicalism in has come to light of a similar U.S. operation directed toward the tattered
I

Turkey.nr Turkish writer Ismail Cem argues, inhis March 12 From the remnants of those units of Soviet Turks that had fought alongside the
Perspective of History, that the failure of the Demirel government to Germans against the Soviet Union, there is no reason to suppose that the
I

deal with the "Hashish Question"-i.e., to curb hashish and heroin U.S. motivations and practices toward pro-Nazi East Europeans that
production in eastern Turkey-as well as its failure to check radicalism, have been exposed by Loftus were not also operative in the U.S. ap- I

prompted U.S. support for the coup.* proach to Turks.

Within this broad framework of overwhelming U.S. influence in Tur- The best-known link between the CIA and the modern-day Pan-Tur-
key and its apparent willingness to use it to manipulate Turkish politics, kish movement is that provided by Ruzi Nazar. Nazar is a Turkoman
there are indications that the United States, and paíicularly the CIA' who was born near Tashkent in the Soviet Union and deserted the Red
exercised influence in the rightwing political sectors that included the Army to join the Nazis during World War II. After the war Nazar was
Gray Wolves. The CIA-Gray Wolves Connection starts with the "Cap- recruited by the CIA, and according to Turkish joumalist Ugur Mumcu,
tive Turks," those peoples of Turkic origin who lived in the Soviet he "was successful in penetrating Turkish fascist circles in the days I

Union and were the objects of much of the Pan-Turkish propaganda and when Agca worked as a hired gun" for the NAP..B In the 1950s Nazar
solicitude. These Captive Turks provided a target of opportunity for 47. John laftus,The Belarus Secret (New York: Alfrcd A. Knopf, 1982). Some indica-
U.S. intelligence in the post-World War II years similar to the Byelorus- tion of the Pentagon's interest in the "Captive Turks" is given in the prefatory material in
sians, Ukrainians, and others who joined forces with the Nazis against Charfes W. Hostler's Turkism and the Sovlers. Hostler was a member of the U S. Military I'
the Soviet Union and later enlisted in the shadowy East European net- Mission to Turkey from 1948 to 1950; and, while a member of the U.S. Air Force, con-
ducted this study on Turkish peoples within the U.S.S R In his Introduction he notes that, illl
works of the CIA. These latter operations have recently received a great
.
"My aim is toconsider the political potentiality of the Turkish world. . In the case of a
deal of publicity, particularly as a result of the work of John l.oftus and Third World War----or intensification of the Cold War----or in case of intemal troubles in- llll
volving disintegration of Soviet power, Turkish nationalism (especially the Pan-Turkish
Der Schweiz", op. cit., n.26.
variety of Turkish nationalism) will influence the policies of the Turkish Republic and the
44. Emin Deger, CIA, Counter-Guerrilla, andTurkey, cited in S. Benhabib, "Right-
action of the politically developed Turkish peoples of the Soviet Union. " (lbid., pp. 2-3.)
Wing Groups Behind Political Violence in Turkey," MERIP Reports, No. 77 (May llll
The Turkish military government's 945-page indicrment of the NAP in May l98l in-
1979),p. lT.Degerbasespartofhisargumentonwhathecallsthe"DicksonReport,"a
cluded a letter from the party's West European leader, Enver Altayli, to Tiirkes, in which
document which was apparently the product of U.S. military intelligence in Turkey and
Altayli listed his West German intelligence contacts. Among them was a Dr Mehmet
which argues, according to Deger, "the common goals of imperialism with the Justice ilt
Kengerli, who was described as a former Nazi SS officer bom in Azerbaijan. Marvine
Party"(p 138).Theauthenticityofthisdocumenthasbeendisputed(seeClaireSterling,
Howe, "Turks Say Suspect in Papal Attack is Tied to Rightist Web of lntrigue," New
The Terror Networt (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, l98l), p. 333), but no evi- lili
York Times, May 18, 1981.
dence has ever been published by those who claim it is a forgery.
48. Mumcu was interviewed and some of his work summarized in the Atlanta Constitu-
45. Robert M. Frcsco, "A Problem of Visibility," The Nation, September 14, 1980.
tion, January 30, 1983. Mumcu claims to have received information aboul Nazar's CIA
46. Ismail Cem.Tarih Acisindan 12 Man (Istanbul: CEM, 1977).
links from a Turkish general who maintained close ties with Nazar. illl

iltl

ilti
lll'

llli

lli
G THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION THREE: ACCA AND THE GRAY WOLVES 65

had worked as a pan-time contributor tc the Voice of America, and it

was perhaps through this work that he met Paul Henze, who was then
working for the CIA at Radio Free Europe. Nazar apparently joined Finď Note
Henze when the latter was sent by the CIA to the U.S. Embassy in Tur-
key in 1959. But by the time that Henze had become Chief of Station in Mehmet Ali Agca was a Turkish fascist, linked closely to the Gray
1974. Nazar's cover had been blown and his usefulness in Turkey had Wolves and working with them every step on the way to Rome. This
come to an end. Nazar was then transferred to the U.S. Embassy in was amply reconfirmed at the I 985-86 trial, whicb highlighted the com-
Bonn where, according to Mumcu, his assignment was to penetrate plex web of associations linking Agca to other Gray Wolves activists.
Gray Wolves organizations for the CIA, while maintaining his close ties At the same time, the trial produced not a shred of evidence, indepen-
to Col. Ttirkes and the NAP.4e Nazar was still active in these functions dent of Agca's own testimony, that he had had any contact with a Bul-
in the 1980s. His continuing extreme rightwing orientation is evidenced garian in Sofia, Rome, or elsewhere. Thus, when Agca entered Bulgaria
by the fact that he is a leading member of the Munich-based Anti-Bol- through a border customs station controlled by the Gray Wolves, or
shevik Bloc of Nations (ABN), and represented that organization at the when he procured a passport issuď in the name of NAP militant Faruk
World Anticommunist League Convention in Dallas in September Ozgun, obtained with the help of Abdullah Catli and a customs official
1985.'o also in the Gray Wolves, there is no reason not to take these events at
CIA to the NAP and Gray Wolves were easily
In sum, the links of the face value: One of Turkey's most notorious terrorists had boarded the
as impressive as any NAP-Gray Wolves connections to the Bulgarians't' "underground railroad" Iong used by the Gray Wolves to get their
While the NAP was admittedly ambivalent toward the capitalist West, it drugs, guns, money, and militants back and forth between Turkey and
shared with the West an unmitigated hostility toward the Soviets that Western Europe.
makes a CIA connection to the assassination attempt more politically
credible than a Bulgarian Connection. Finally, there is a matter of re-
sults. If we look for the source of the Plot in the real beneficiaries, the
Plot turned out very well for the United States and badly for the Soviets.
Nonetheless, we do not believe that the CIA was behind the Plot' In our
view, the origin of the shooting lies in the Gray Wolves'ideology and
Agca's need to attain hero status by a political act. The benefits to the
West accrued from the "second conspiracy"-the induced confession
in Rome-and not by the shooting per se.
49. |n his book Papa, Mafyo, Agca, Mumcu reprďuces a |ong |etter from the West
German Gray Wolves leader Enver A|tay|i to Tíirkes, which indicates clearly that a
friendly and cooperative relationship existed between Altayli and Ruzi Nazar, and that
AltayliobtainedinformationfromNazar(pp.145-46) Nazaralsohadadirectandcordial
relationsnip with Tíirkes (p' |44). Mumcu also reports that while stil| in Turkey in the
early 1970s, Nazar helped Tiirkes's daughter obtain a job in a U.S. airlines agency. See
hisÁgca Dosyasi (Istanbul: Tekin Yayinevi, 1984)' pp 28.29.
50. Martin A Lee and Kevin Coogan, "The Agca Con, " V illage V oice, Decembet 24,
1985, p. 23.
51. The Soviet author lona Andronov has put up aClA-based model thal is somewhat
more credible than that of Claire Sterling. See Appendix D.
 FOUR: THE ROME-WASHINCTON CONNECTION 67

1980s, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the new wave of terrorism,

and the New Cold War environment in the United Stales strengthened
the Right and Center and weakened the Communist Party and ltalian
popular movements. With the coming into power of Reagan, the ruling
4. Tlre Rome-Washlngton Italian parties joined the New Cold War with enthusiasm and competed
energetically for honors as the local favorite.
Gonnectlon
The New Cold War and the "Antiterrorism" Offensive

ln the United States the forces opposing détente have had aÍl important
institutional representative in the Committee on the Present Danger
(CPD) and its follow-on Coalition for a Democratic Majoriry (CDM).
11 he creation and institutionalization of the Bulgarian Connection The CPD has had high-level representarion in both political parties.,
I must be sifuated in the political environment of the late 1970s and
Among the intellectual weapons used by the CPD and its allies, "inter-
early l980s. In the late seventies, anti-détente forces within the United national terrorism" and the "Soviet Threat" rank supreme. By the mid-
States waged a furious battle against the second Strategic Arms Limita-
1970s, the so-called "Vietnam Syndrome" had weakened the force of
tion Treaty (SALT II) and any further pursuit of understandings and rap-
traditional anticommunist appeals in rallying support for U.S. interven-
prochement between the great powers. Aided by the Iranian hostage
tion abroad. Terrorist and Soviet threats are well suited to reinvigorate
crisis, they were sufťrcient|y powerful and well mobilized to be able to that traditional appeal, and they have been used regularly by the CPD to
kill SALT II and help usher in the New Cold War. justify a more aggresssive stance toward the Soviet Union (and all of its
In ltaly, also, the strengthening of the Communist Party in the mid-
alleged proxies and sympathizers).
1970s and the threat of its participation in government had aroused great
A major problem for the CPD faction has been credibility: What can
fears in U.S. officials and Italian conservatives. A landmark in the ero-
the media and public be induced to swallow in tbe way of evidence of
sion of that threat was the murder of moderate Christian Democratic
leader Aldo Moro in 1978.'The recession of the late 1970s and early Gradoli in Viterbo province, and dispatched police there in vain. Moro was actually being
hcld right in Rome, in thc via Gradoli, as was discovered too late. Musumeci led another
l. Although Moro was murdered by the Red Brigades, the ultimate source of his death wild goose chase to a frozen mountain lake on a false tip that, when published, was inter-
is in dispute. As noted in the text below, Moro was number one on the hit list of an preted by the Red Brigades as a signal from the authorities that Moro's death was ac-
aborted rightwing conspiracy of 1966, Plan Solo. Contacts with the Red Brigades were cepted." ("Latest scandal leads to Reagan administration," /n TheseTimes, December 5-
made by a variety of political interests: Libya, George Habash's Popular Front for the Lib- ||' l984.)Given thedamagingeffcctof thedeathof MoroontheCommunistPaÍtyandthe
eration of Palestine, the CIA, and lsrael (which sought a relationship with the Red Left in general, a rightist role in channeling the Red Brigades actions is a plausible, even
Brigades in the hopes that destabilization in Italy would make the United States more de- if unproven, hypothesis. Further support to the hypothesis is given by other Red Brigades
pendent on Israel as its Mediterranean area alty). (See Luciano Violante, "Politica della actions that have been immensely convenient to the Italian Right, such as their laaest
sicurczza, relazioni internazionali e terrorismo," in Gianfranco Pasquino, editor, La crime, the March 27, 1985 murder of economist Ezio Taranrclli, killed by the Red
Prova Delle Armi (Istituto Carlo Cattaneo, Bologna: Societa Editrice II Mulino, 1984)' p. Brigades allegedly because of his interest in weakening a pÍotective wagc-price
llO, note 54.) Violante declares ironically that "the only services to which the Red mechanism. But not only was Tarantelli an implausible trrget, his murder swung popular
Brigades seem to have been impenetrable are the Italian ones" (p. I l2), but this is not support toward the very things the Red Brigades claimed to be opposing. Are they dumb
firmly established. It is an interesting fact that the ltalian establishment refused to ransom fanatics or serving a hidden agenda?
Moro, although they paid lavishly to obtain the release of a lesser Christian Democratic 2. Carter's National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, was a member of thc
functionary, Ciro Cirillo. The Italian security services were remarkably ineffective in CPD. Brzezinski's chiefofpropaganda was Paul Henze, a long{ime CIA officer and one
locating the kidnapped Moro, missing important leads. Diana Johnstone notes that "Gen- of the leading exponents of the Bulgarian Connection. See Chapter 6.
eral Musumeci interpreted the clear tip to Moro's whereabouts, 'Gradoli,' as the village of

66
68 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION FOUR: THE ROME-WASHINGTON CONNECTION 69

the Soviet Threat? In the late 1970s the claim of Soviet military especially from the defense and intelligence establishments.o The U.S.
superiority and U.S. "unilateral disarmament" made substantial head- contingent was virtually a Who's Who of the CPD and CDM, including
way, and a further turn to the right yielded a further enhancement of Richard Pipes, Norman Podhoretz, Midge Decter, Senator Henry
media and public gullibility. A continuing difficulty, however, was Jackson, Ben Wattenberg, George Will, and Bayard Rustin. Also pre-
that-aside from remote Afghanistan-the failure of the Soviet Union sent from the United States were Claire Sterling and Vice-President-to-
to send troops beyond its borders made the Soviet Threat too abstract for be George Bush. CIA and other U.S. intelligence representation was
some Americans and many Europeans. Something closer to home was substantial: Bush, former Director of the CIA; Ray Cline, former CIA
needed. Depury Director for Intelligence; and Major-General George Keegan,
A substantial contribution to solving this dilemma came from the Jr., former chief of Air Force intelligence. Present from Great Britain
State of Israel. Israel was under international attack in the late 1970s for were Brian Crozier and Robert Moss, both long-time assets of the CIA
its policies of forcibly displacing Arabs and installing Jewish settlers on and British intelligence.
the West Bank, its violation of the civil rights of non-Jews, and its re- The conference opened with an address by Israeli Prime Minister
fusď to recognize any Palestinian right of self-determination. Ín |979 Begin, who urged the conference members to get out and disseminate
even the Carter administration assailed Israel for its violations of Arab the "Soviet temorism" message. While.the conference was still in ses-
rights, and 59 well-known U.S. Jews petitioned Prime Minister sion, Ian Black of the Jerusalem Posr noted that "The Conference or-
Menachem Begin to reconsider his policy of expropriation and resettle- ganizers expect the event to initiate a major anti-terrorist offensive."t
ment. The participants were well situated to implement this offensive. Many
The Israeli solution to this problem was to step up the propaganda were important politicians, and a large contingent were media pundits
war. This had two features. One was to identify the Palestinians as "ter- with direct access to a mass audience. Throughout the West the confer-
rorists." This served to dehumanize them and make it possible to deal ence propaganda theme resounded, immediately and repetitively. In
with them as "two-legged animals" (Begin), which is to say, on the France, Jacques Soustelle, former leader of the OAS secret army (par-
basis of force alone. The second theme of the invigorated propaganda doned in 1968 for his treasonous activity during the Algerian war), a
campaign was to claim that the PLO was a tool of the Soviet Union, and conference panicipant and newspaper correspondent, summed it all up
that the Soviets were engaged in a worldwide campaign to destabilize it L'Aurore: The conference had "confirmed" that the Soviets "pull all
the democracies. This second theme was well designed to appeal to the strings" behind "international terrorism. " "Toujours le
U.S. conservatives and to fit in with the Reagan presidential campaign .K'G.B.' '' was the paper's caption. The same poínt was made to a re-
and programs. Israel would be a front-line defender of democracy ceptive western press by Will, Wattenberg, Sterling, Crozier, and
against "Soviet-sponsored terrorism. " The forcible Israeli settlement of Moss. The Jonathan Institute conference sponsors issued a compendium
the West Bank and refusal to deal with the Palestinians would be ac- of world press coverage some time later, noting in the introduction:
cepted as part of the unified struggle against "international terrorism,"
rather than as a denial of basic human rights. The Western press .. responded to the challenge. As these pages show, the
An important focal point of this refurbished, two-tiered propaganda Conference's message penetrated into many ofthe leading newspapers andjour-
campaign was the first meeting of the Jonathan Institute, held under Is- nals in the United States, Western Europe, South America and elsewhere. That
raeli auspices in Jerusďem from July 2-5, |9,79. The Jonathan Institute the Conference had finally exposed what speaker Robert Moss, Editor of the
is a virtual arm ofthe Israeli government,r and representation at the July Economist Foreign Report, called the "Conspiracy of Silence" was no better
demonstrated than in the television documentary called The Russian Connec-
1979 conference included a very large contingent from the Israeli state,
4. Four former chiefs of Israeli military intelligence participated in the conference. Our
3. For a brief account of the Institute, see "The Jonathan Institute," CovertAction In-
account of the conference draws on the valuable M.A. Thesis in International Relations by
formation Bulletin, Number 22 (Fall 1984), p. 5. The Institute has met twice since its Philip Paull, "lntemational Terrorism: The Propaganda War," San Francisco State
original meeting, once in Washington and again in Israel
University, June 1982.
-5 Quoted in ibid., p 19
-IO THE BULCARIAN CONNECTION FOUR: THE ROME-WASHINGTON CONNECTION -11

tion. lointly produced by the American Public Broadcasting Service and the bargaining chip strategies, and the genuine interest of the Reagan ad-
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, it was shown nationally in the United ministration in arms control and reducing nuclear arms to zero.8
States and Canada on September 25, 1979. Nevertheless, the contradiction between the Reagan arms buildup and
the assertions of benign purposes is so immense that a larger infusion of
On November 2, 1980, the last Sunday before the U.S. presidential propaganda has been required. In fact, it has been necessary to stir up a
election that brought Reagan to power, the New York Times Magazine serious quantum of fear and irrationďity to bridge the Reagan credibility
carried an article by Robert Moss entitled "Terror: a Soviet Export." gap. The public had to be convinced that the Reagan policies were de-
(This is the same Moss who had previously been exposed as the author signed to contend with something truly threatening and evil. The theme
of a ClA-funded attack on Allende, 10,000 copies of which were bought of Soviet sponsorship of international terrorism has served this need ef-
by the Pinochet government.) This article, so strategically placed and fectively. The way in which the Reagan administration took advantage
timed, symbolizes the power of the rightwing syndicate that met in July of the Soviet downing of the Korean airliner, using it as a propaganda
1979, and the alliance between that syndicate and the mass media. It instrument to dehumanize the enemy, is an object lesson in both the uses
also served to usher in the Reagan-Haig propaganda campaign and its of propaganda and the perceived importance of placing the Soviets in a
focus on "international terrorism." bad light.' To be able to pin the attempted assassination of the Pope on
Reagan, Haig, Weinberger, and company faced a problem similar to the Soviet Union would be an even more important propaganda coup.
that of Begin. They came into office determined to reestablish clear Accomplishing this useful end was a challenge to westem intelligence,
U.S. military superiority over the Soviet Union. As spelled out in the media, and political institutions, but it was one which they met with re-
Pentagon's Five-Year Plan, the objective was to allow the United States markable success.
to operate without constraint over the entire globe----even to destabilize
and roll back the Soviet Empire.u An arms race would also be useful in
impoverishing the Soviet Union, as the poorer country would have to
The Italian Context: The Fascist Tradition and the Postwar
spend to painful excess to keep only modestly behind the wealthier and
Rehabilitation of the Right
more technologically advanced one. While this strategy is clear,' the
cooperative western media have not allowed this reality to interfere with
Western commentators have typically assumed that ltalian authorities
their uncritical transmission of official U.S. claims of Soviet prowess,
investigated the Bulgarian Connection reluctantly, embarrassed by its
6. A summary of this Five-Year PIan was provided by Richard Halloran, "Pentagon international implications, and that they pursued the case with the integ-
Draws Up First Strategy For Fighting a Long Nuclear War," New YorkTimes, May 30, rity and fair play characteristic of the Free World. That the very exist-
982.
l
ence of the Bulgarian Connection might possibly be explained by its
7 Halloran says, "As a peacetime complement to military strategy, the guidance docu-
ment asserts that the United States and its allies should, in effect, declare economic and 8. The New YorkTimes, having published the excellent summary by Halloran cited in
technical war on the Soviet Union. It says that the United States should develop weapons the previous note, then proceeded to ignore its implications in its editorials over the next
that 'are difficult for the Soviets to counter, impose disproportionate costs, open up new several years.
areas of major military competition and obsolesce previous Soviet investment.' " Hallo- 9. For a discussion of the treatment of Korean Air Line flight 007 as a model prop-
ran continues: "At the other end of the scale, the plan says that 'we must revitalize and aganda exercise, see Edward S. Herman, "Gatekeeper Versus Propaganda Models: A
enhance special-operations forces to project United States power where the use ofconven- Case Study," in Peter Golding, Graham Murdock, and Philip Schlesinger, eds., Com-
tional forces would be premature, inappropriate or infeasible,' particularly in Eastern municating Politics: ássays in Memory of Philip Elliott (Leicester: University of l,eicester
Europe. Special operations is a euphemism for guerrillas, saboteurs, commandos and Press. 1986)
.to
similar unconventional forces. . . FuÍther, exploit politica|, economic and military
weaknesses within the Warsaw Pact and to disrupt enemy rear opeÍations, specia|-opera- l
I

tions forces will conduct operations in Eastem Europe and in the northem and southern
NATO regions,' the document says. Particular attention would be given to eroding sup-
port within the Soviet sphere of Eastern Europe.'' Iál. l

I
I

I
I

I
I

I
72 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION FOUR: THE ROME-WASHINGTON CONNECilON 73

ltalian context-by conservative vested interests, political infighting, U.S. Penetration and Manipulation With its military occupation of
and Cold War politics-is
point that never arises in the western media.
a Italy during and immediately after World War II, the United States was
This reflects a potent propaganda system at work. not only the major force reshaping the Italian political economy, it es-
In reality, Italy has been periodically torn by major political scandals tablishéd a patron-client relationship that persists up to the present. This
ever since its defeat in the Second World War. An important feature of relationship was based on U.S. economic and military power, an ag-
postwar Italy was the continued and virtually unimpaired power of the gressive use of that power, and the willingness of the ltalian elite to
industrial, financial, military, and intelligence elite that had worked for enter into a profitable though subordinate relationship with an external
Mussolini. The rehabilitation of the Mussolini-era elite was part of a protector.
worldwide phenomenon, by which U.S. and allied occupying armies As ín |922, when Mussolini seized control of the Italian state, the
systematically supported the very forces which had collaborated with threat of the Left in postwar Italy was the overriding concern of U. S . au-
fascism-whether in Korea or Thailand, Italy or Germany.'o Thus, in thorities, and they were prepÍrred to go far to keep the Left out of
the ltalian case, the prime aim of the U.S. occupying authorities was to power..o Enormous resources were poured into ltaly to manípulate the
contain and defeat the leftwing forces that had achieved great strength as postwar elections. A Marshall Flan subsidy of some $227 million was
antifascist partisans. " U.S. protection of Klaus Barbie was in no way an voted by Congress just prior to the Italian elections of April 18, 1948.
exception:'2 The U.S. occupying authorities in Italy went to great pains Much of this money was transmitted secretly to the Christian Democrat-
to protect Prince Junio Valerio Borghese, a noted fascist collaborator ic Party and to the split-off trade unions organized under U.S. sponsor-
with the Nazis,'t and most senior fascist politicians and military and se- ship. '' ln the mid-1970s the Pike Commitree of the U.S. House of Rep-
cret police figures were quickly returned to positions of power under al- resentatives estimated that $65 million had been invested in Italian elec-
lied pressure. tions in the period 1948-68. Ten million dollars was pumped into the
This antidemocratic underpinning to the superimposed democratic election of 1912.'u Former CIA officer Victor Marchetti estimated CIA
framework was strengthened by the Cold War. Fascist forces gained outlays were $20-30 million a year in the I 950s, dropping to a mere g 10
greater confidence as they came to understand their serviceability to million a year in the 1960s. These funds were also used to subsidize
Washington as protectors of the Free World. As ltaly was seen in newspapers, antipommunist labor unions, Catholic groups, and favored
Washington as an especially vulnerable area, given its large Communist political parties (mainly the Christian Democrats).17
Party and powerful working class movement, the United States did not A second thrust of U.S. policy was the buildup of the Right. Accord-
hesitate to bolster the power of these Mussolini-era holdovers in the in- ing to one study of the U.S. penetration of ltaly:''
terest of containing the Left.
l4 U S officials and leading businessmen had greeted enthusiastically Mussolini's
l0 See Noam Chomsky, "Containing the Anti-Fascist Resistance: From Death Camps march on Rome and overthrow of a democratic order, regarding it as a defeat for Bol-
toDeathSquads,"inhisTurningtheTide: U.S InterventioninCentralAmericaandthe shevism and reÍormism and a return to ..stability '' For the magnate and secretary of the
Struggle for Pedc" (Boston: South End Press, 1985) Treasury Andrew Mellon, Mussolini was "a very upstanding chap making a new na-
I l. Kolko,The Politics of War (New York:
See Gabriel Random House, 1968), pp. 60- tion out of ltaly." According to Judge Elbert Gary, Chairman of U S. Steel, "a master
63; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), hand has' indeed, strong|y grasped the helm ofthe Ítalian state..'Fordetai|s see David F
pp. 147-5l; Basil Davidson, Scenes FromThe Anti-Nazi War (New York: Monthly Re- Schwartz, "'A Fine Young Revolution': The United States and the Fascist Revolution in
view Press, 1980); and Roberto Faenza and Marco Fini, Gli americani in ltalia (]Níilan: ttaly, l9f9-1925," Radical History Review,33 (1985), pp. ll7-38
Feltrinelli. 1976) 15. Faenza and Fini, op. cil , n I l, pp. 267-304, especially p 298
f2. See Magnus Linklater, Isabel Hinton and Neal Ascherson, The Fourth Reich: Klaus 16. CIA: The Pike Report (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1977), p. 193.
Barbie and the Neo-Fascist Connection (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1984). l7. "The CIA in ltaly: An lnterview with Victor Marchetti, " in Philip Agee and Louis
13. On the roles of James Angleton (OSS, laterCIA) and Ellery Stone, head of the Al- Wolf, eds. , Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe (Secaucus, N.J : Lyle Stuart, | 97t r,
fied Control Commission, in the protection of Borghese, seeFaenzaand Fini, op. cit.,n. pp.168-69
ll, p. 321 See also, Francoise Hervet, "Knights of Darkness: The Sovereign Military 18 "The CIA Collects Fascists," Faenza and Fini, op cir., n t l, p 262.
Order of Malta," CovertAction Information Bulletin, Number 25 (Winter 1986), pp 30-
3l
74 THE BULGARJAN CONNECTION FOUR: THE ROME-WASHINGTON CONNECTION '75

The link between American strategic services and armed rpactionary groups was A third strand of U.S. containment policy was the buildup and
established in 1944 when James Angleton was invited to Rorne by the OSS to strengthening of ltďy's military and intelligence services, manned by
direct thc "special Operations" section and then the Strategic Services Unit. the proper anticommunist cadres. In 1949, in the framework of ltaly's
His relations with the movements of the Right and with the clandestine forma- joining NATO, the Information Service of the Armed Forces (SIFAR)"
tions ďways had a double objective: on the one hand, to receive anticommunist was organized under the guidance of U.S. intelligence. The close re-
information and, on the other, to utilize certain men and certain groups in spe- lationship between ltďy's joining NATo and the reorganization of the
cial operations. . . . lt is certain that many of the initiatives taken by the ltalian
Italian intelligence services is enlightening. According to the most re-
extreme Right in those years found aid, connivance and especially legitimation
cent study of the ltalian secret services, by Giuseppe De Lutiis:'zs
from these services.

Between the two events there is a strict temporal succession: March 30 the re-
A National Security Council report of March 1968 stressed the U.S. constitution of the services being decided, and then the signing of the Atlantic
..to
undeÍtaking help out the clandestine anticommunist [i.e., extreme alliance on April 4. On August l, Parliament ratified the adhesion of ltaly to the
Right and fascistl movement with funds and military assistance." It Pact, on August 24, NATO became operational and on September l, SIFAR
contended that the ltalian army affords "no serious guarantee against started. . . .
Tito's [sic!] armies . . . [which] makes it necessaÍy that all forces an-
ticommunist in sentiment should be taken into consideration."'e Fol- According to Gianni Flamini, SIFAR was essentially established by
lowing the victory of the Right in the elections of April 1948, a new, the CIA, and served as a "docile referent" of all the American ser-
secret antisubversive police force was established under the Ministry af vices-{he Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence
Interior, with U.S. advisers. This was filled largely from the old fascist Agency, and the National Security Agency-as well as the West Ger-
secret police of Mussolini. At the same time, the fascist party Italian So- man secret service, the Bundesruchrichtdienst (BND).'zo Flamini
cial Movement (MSI) began a massive expansion program, with the as- states:27
sistance of U.S. intelligence officials.D MSI had significant backing
from business interests in both ltaly and the United States, and probably In substance, SIFAR was also a kind of pied-i-terre for American espionage
received Frnanciď support from the U.S. government.2| The honorary agencies, an instnrment used to collect information useful to Washington, to
chairman of MSI was Prince Junio Vďerío Borghese, the |ong-time fas- control the |oyalty to NATO of the ltalian armed forces, to interfere in political
cist leader, who had been protected by the United States at the end of the life, and to orient the selection of military officers in favor of the interests of
war. General Vito Miceli, another MSI leader, received an $800,@0 American strategy and American big industry.
U.S. subsidy through U.S. Ambassador Graham Martin in 1972." MSI
official Luigi Turchi was a guest of honor at the Nixon White House in The dependent status of Italy's intelligence services is spelled out
t9'72.',3
more precisely by Massimo Caprara:E

19. "The Importance of Recognizing Anticommunisl Revolutionary [sic] Forces," 24. This nďne was |ater changed, becoming sID. sID in tuÍn was eventua||y divlded
into SISDE, concerned with intemal security affairs, and SISMI, the service with respon-
NSC Document No. 7z0454, Mar.ch |2, 1968' quoted in stuaÍt christie, Stefano delle
sibility for extemal intclligence matters.
Chiaie: Portrait of a Black Terrorisl ([.ondon: Refract Publications, 1984), p. 10.
25. Giuseppe De Lutiis, Storia dei seruizi segreti in Inlia (Rome: Fiitori Reuniti,
20. Christie, op. cil., n. t9, pp. l0-12.
1985), pp. 46-47.
2l . La Strage di Stato: Connoinchiesta (Rome: Edizioni Samona c Savelli, 1970), pp.
26. Gianni Flamini, II partito del golpe: Le stategie della tensione e del terrore dal
I 15 ff.
primo centrosinistra organico al sequestro Moro,l(Fenara: Italo Bovolenta, l98l), pp.
22. Diana Johnstone, "The 'fright story' of Claire Sterling's tales of terrorism," ln
5-'7.
These Times, May 20-26, 1981, p. lO; CIA: The Pike Report, op. cdl., n. 16, p. 195.
27. Ibid., p. 7.
23. Christie, op. cit., n. 19, pp. 44-45.
28. Massimo Caprara, "I setti diavoli custodi," II Mondo, June 20, 1974, quoted in De
Lutiis, ap. cil., n.25, p. 46.
16 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION FoUR: THE ROME-WASHINGTON CONNECTION 7'l

On the basis of the NATO accords, SID lthe later name of SIFAR] was obliged paramilitary police force in Europe, which was quickly integrated into
to pass information and to receive instructions from a central office attached to the defense plans of NATO." Both SIFAR and the carabinieri were
the CIA. . . . The code name of the receiving office in the USA was Brenno. In loaded up with individuals of the Right.
strictly military matters, the relations with the USA were conducted with the A fourth thread of U.S. policy in Italy was preparing organizations
ONI [Office of Naval Investigations], with OSI [Office of Special Investiga- and contingency plans specifically oriented to contesting a victory ofthe
tions (Air Force)1, and with the DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency], which de- Left, even if brought about by strictly democratic processes. Marchetti
pended, in turn, on the Defense DepaÍtment and which also co|lected informa-
noted in 1974 that "the CIA has emergency plans," and he thought thar
tion in technical and scientific ftelds. . . .
the possibility of a coup d'état along the lines of that of the Greek Co|o-
nels in 1967 was a likely CIA scenario. The military and intelligence
De Lutiis points out that the obligations of the secret services go
structures put in place in Italy, as in Greece and Chile, were well suited
beyond this, as they rely on U.S. facilities in the fields of espionage and
to such contingency plans. NATO, for example, strongly encouraged
telecommunications, including NSA interception and decoding of sig-
the development of secret military and paramilitary organizations under
nals, and the secret services are parties to a 194-l western intelligence
the rubric of Civil Emergency Planning, with forces and plans that
agency information pooling system in which their unequal status was
would go into action in defense of the Free World in the event of a
fixed by prior agreement.2e
Soviet (or Yugoslavl) invasion or internal political upheavals. The
SIFAR was the instrument of a "permanent project of anticommunist
workings of this protective model were on full display in Greece in
offensive cďled in code Demagnetize, a version analogous to a similar
1967, when the fascist Colonels' takeover put into effect the NATO
project under way in France."to The main features of this project, ac-
contingency "Plan Prometheus" in toppling the democratically elected
cording to Flamini,t' were
government. The forces implementing this plan were elite members of
the U.S.-trained and NATO-controlled Mountain Assault Brigade.ro It
political, psychological and paramilitary operations aiming to reduce the pre-
should be noted that this coup, using NATO forces, was not in response
sence of the Italian communist paÍty. . ' , The u|timate objective of the plan is
to reduce the strength of the communist parties, their material resources, their to a Soviet invasion or any internal Communist threat-it merely facili-
influence in the French and Italian govemments and partigularly in the trade un- tated the preservation in power of a government that would be strongly
ions, in order to reduce as much as possible the danger that communism poses in responsive to U.S. and NATO orders, and removed the threat of one
France and ltaly, in accord with the interests of the United States in these two coming to power that would be somewhat more independent.
countries. The buildup of NATO military and paramilitary forces ro combat the
threat from the Left was actually part of a larger U. S. strategic ptan. The
The extreme rightwing orientation of SIFAR is indicated by the fact 1960s was the age of maturation of the U.S. "insurance policy" strate-
that in 1952 its project Demagnetize was directed by Giovanni De gy of building up security forces in client states, training them in coun-
Lorenzo (head of SIFAR) and, from U.S. intelligence, Vernon Walters. terinsurgency methods, indoctrinating them on the Communist threat,
Walters has been a central figure in U.S. destabilization efforts abroad. and then sending them home to protect "freedom. ".s Although this was
He was active in Brazil in the coup of 1964, and close to Pinochet and
33 lbid., pp 25-28; Tenacini ea aL, Le instituzioni militari e l.ordinamento cos_
the head of the secret police, Manuel Contreras, in Chile. De Lorenzo, a
tiruzionale (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1974), p. 54. SIFAR had an economic research section
man of the extreme Right and a friend of Borghese," was a principal (REI) that worked closely with ltalian industry, serving as an informational link and coor-
planner and organizer of two attempted fascist coups in postwar ltaly. dinator of activities between intelligence agencies and business. The head of the research
De Lorenzo also became head of the ltalian carabinieri, the largest unit stressed the role of intelligence in facilitating economic policy-for example, its ser-
vice ín combating Communist attempts ro exp|oit austerity measures. See Flamini, op.
29 lbid , p. 47 -
tit , n. 26, p. 11 .
30. Roberto Faenza, Il malaffare (Milan: Mondadori, 1978), p. 313, quoted ln Flamini, 34. Christie, op. cir., n. 19, p. 39.
op. cit., n. 26, p. 10. 35. See especially, Miles Wolpin, Military Aid and Counterrevolution in the Third
3t. tbid. World(Boston: Lexington, 1972). Theconceptofan "insurancepolicy" strategy isbased
32. De Lutiis, op. cit., n 25, p.105. onaspeechbyU.S-GeneralRobertW Porter,whodescribedourinvestmentintheLatin
78 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION FOUR: THE ROME-WASHINGToN CONNECTION 79

all done under the facade of "protecting democracy,"3u this pretense vide the conditions justifying the termination of democratic govern-
was one of the great hypocrisies of modern times. In the wake of this ment.
strategy carne a series of counterrevolutions, led by U.S.{rained mili- The "party" came into existence in response to the political and or-
tary and security service personnel, that left Latin America covered with ganizational advance of the Left in the early l96Os, the subsequent for-
neofascist National Security States, and institutionalized torture and mation of a Center-Left government in 1964, and the increasing possi-
death squads-tt Fascists are reliable anticommunists, and where an- bility that the Communist Party itself might share in the exercise of na-
ticommunism is the paramount value, there will be little hesitancy in tional political power. A landmark event in the coalescence of this
mobilizing them to do the dirty work and to rule or share the rule of loosely knit group was a 1965 meeting organized in Rome by the Pollio
threatened clients. Institute, an independent foundation linked to the military and the Chris-
In ltaly, the formation of NATO led to the development of auxiliary tian Democratic government. The meeting was chaired by an active-
forces, recruited from the fascist underground, who could act under of- duty general and the president of the Milan Court of Appeals, and was
f,rcial cover as paÍt of a military backup force. Under this program, spe- attended by leaders of the security forces, rightist politicians, and a
cial training was given by the ltalian armed forces in western Sardinia to number of individuals who later achieved notoriety as fascist terrorists
members of Stefano delle Chiaie's extreme rightwing organization, (Stefano delle Chiaie, Mario Merlino). The dominant themes of rhe
which authored many of the most important terrorist outrages of later meeting were the Communist threat and the need for a global mobiliza-
years in ltaly.r8 Some 200 cadres of the extreme Right were also sent by tion to counter this threat. The use of subversive and violent methods
the ltalian intelligence agency SID for training in the Colonels' Greece was openly discussed. lt was proposed that organizing work be done
in 1968.'u Thus NATO contributed to the strengthening of both official among the most conservative constituencies: state functionaries, profes-
and unofficial forces looking toward an authoritarian solution to politi- sionals, teachers, small industrialists, etc.; that there be "pressure ac-
cal problems and willing to collaborate with rightwing terrorism in lions" (azioni di pressione) undertaken by armed groups; and that clan-
achieving that end. destine destabilizing actions be carried out. All this was to be coordi-
nated by a top level council,{ which continued to function for some
The ''Party of the Coup." This phrase has bee n used in Italy to refer to a years. Many of the participants in the meeting were eventually recruited
loose alliance of extreme rightwing activists, intellectuals, indus- into the secret seryices and played a role in later coup attempts and ter-
trialists, and military and secret services personnel who were deter- rorist acts.al
mined to counter the rise of the Left by seeking a "law and order" or There were numerous coup plans and at least one genuine but aborted
fascist government. They worked toward a coup by enlisting and or- attempt at a coup by the forces of the Right between 1964 and 1974.ln
ganizing sympathetic persons in power [or an actual coup attempt, and 1964 a plan was drawn up by General De Lorenzo (head of the
by encouraging and using strategies of terrorism and disruption to pro- carabinieri and SIFAR) and some 20 other senior military officials for a
coup that would have involved the assassination of Premier Aldo Moro
military establishment as a form of insurance policy against investment losses. See Jan and his replacement by a rightwing Christian Democrat. This coup plan,
Black, IJnited states Penetration of Brazil (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania,
code named "Plan Solo," was called off at the last moment as a result
t9'17), p. 228
36. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara testified before CongÍess on Apri| 9. t962'
of a political compromise between the socialists and rightwing Christian
that one of the great merits of U.S. military training programs was thal "Each of these Democrats.n2 A rightwing coup was actually begun in 1970, using the
men will receive an exposure to democracy at work." Cited in Black' op. cil ' n 35, p'
160.
40. Franco Fenaresi, "La Destra Eversiva," in Ferraresi, ed , La destra radicale
(Milan: Feltrinelli, 1984), pp. 57-61.
37 See Edward S Herman, The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Prop-
aganda (Boston: South End Press, 1982), Chapter 3
4l. The we||-known Ítalian fascist Guido Giannettini attended the l965 conference and
subsequently worked for both the ltalian and German secret services. De Lutiis, op cit ,
38. Christie, op. cir., n. 19, P. l4l
n. 25, pp. 95-107; Christie, op. cit., n. 19, pp. 139-zlo.
39. De Lutiis, op. cit., n. 25, P. l9l.
42. Christie, op. cit., n. 19, p. 24.Plan Solo was so named because its instrumentality
80 TTIE BULGARIAN CONNECTION FOUR: THE ROME-WASHINGTON CONNECTION 8l

code name "Tora, Tora" (although in later years it was usually referred the secret Rose of the Winds conspiracy, stated to the investigating
to as "the Borghese coup"). Fascist leader.Iunio Valerio Borghese and magistrates that the organization was established "at tbe request of the
Stefano delle Chiaie led an occupation of the buildings of the Ministry Americans and NATO Cavallero also claimed that the Rose of
of Interior in Rome on December 7 , 1910. For reasons still not clear, the the Winds secret parallel group was under the direction of "Italian and
coup was called o[f, and for three months the matter was hushed up by American secret service members, as well as some agents of multina-
the Italian secret services.ot After the story broke, Borghese and delle tionď corporations.''a7
Chiaie, forewarned as usual, were able to escape to Spain, still under
friendly fascist rule.* Propaganda Due (P-2).In a scandal that broke in 1981, shortly after the
De Lorenzo was in the forefront of another effort to build for a coup attempted assassination of the Pope, Italians became aware of the im-
,.Rose of the
d'état, helping to organize a putchist group known as the mense power of P-2. In a sense, P-2 merely extended the Rose of the
Winds." His carabinieri were purged of any dissidents from hardline Winds conspiratorial structure beyond the military and secret services to
anticommunism, and a further effort was made to make all of the secret the entire administrative apparatus of the Italian state. As a later official
services into politicized, ideologically rightwing agencies. Within the investigation put it, P-2 had established a "state within a state."
armed forces a secret organization of anticommunist officers was estab- The immediate effect of the scandal was the resignation of several
lished. At the top of this Rose of the Winds conspiracy was a group of cabinet ministers and high civil servants whose membership in p-2 had
87 officers representing every military and secret services branch. been revealed. This was quickly followed by the fall of the Forlani gov-
SIFAR was given the job of collecting dossiers on ltalian "subver- ernment in June l98l . It was not until July 12, 1984, however, that the
sives" who were to be neutralized in a coup. This conspiracy was un- Italian Parliament completed its extensive investigation of P-2 and is-
covered in 1974. According to one of the plotters, Roberto Cavallero, sued its 170-page final report, The Report of the Parliamentary Com-
"when trouble erupts in the country-rioting, trade union pressure, vio- mission of Inquiry on the Masonic Lodge P-2,0E which went completely
lence, etc.-the Organization goes into action to conjure up the option unnoticed in the U.S. mass media, describes one of the most com-
of a return to order. When these troubles do not erupt (of themselves), prehensive attempts to undermine and control a western democracy
they are contrived by the far Right . . . directed and financed by mem- since World War II. It reveals a far-reaching rightwing conspiracy
bers of the Organization."n' which permeated the higher echelons of Italian political life, including
It should be reiterated that De Lorenzo, a major force in organizing all those institutions which took responsibility for creating and then in-
the Rose of the Winds, and a man of the extreme Right, came into vestigating the Bulgarian Connection.
prominence and authority as head of SIFAR, a ClA-dominated organi- Licio Gelli, the head of P-2, was a lifelong supporter of fascist
zation. A later head of SlD, the successor organization to SIFAR, Gen- causes. As a youth he fought for Franco in the Spanish Civil War, and
eral Vito Miceli, was also of the extreme Right, and was a conduit for he served Mussolini |oyď|y during World War tI. Soon after the war,
U.S. funds in ltaly. Bottr De Lorenzo and Miceli, upon leaving the following disclosures that he had been involved in the torture and mur-
"public service," became leaders of MSI, the Italian fascist party. It is der of Italian partisans, Gelli fled to Argentina. There he became inti-
also worthy of note that Miceli, when acknowledging the existence of mate|y involved with fascists, including José LÓpez Rega' the founder
was solely the carabinieri, a militroy force controlled by De Lorenzo and, as noted, inte-
of the AAA Anticommunist League, whose members gained notoriety
grated inlo NATO De Lutiis, ap clt , n. 25. p 85. as torturers and executioners in the "secret war" of the early 1970s.
43 At the time, it was nrmored in ltaly that the coup had been called off because the Gelli remained in Argentin a for 20 years before retuming to ltaly as an
promised tJ S support failed to materialize, Among the documents seized after Borgh- Argentinian consul.
ese's flight was a draft plan to send a special ambassador to the United states to ask íor a
foan and offer to send Italian troops to Vietnam Ferraresi, op. cit., n 40, p 102 46. rbid
44. De Lutiis, op cil., n- 25, pp 103-5. 47. De Lutiis, op. cit., n. 25, p I I l.
45 Quored in Christie, op cir , n. 19, p. 36. 48 All quotations in this section not otherwise attributed are to this Report.
82 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION FOUR: THE ROME-WASHINGTON CONNECIION 83

Upon his return to ltaly, Gelli was initiated into Freemasonry. In they wanted to make higher rank or achieve their preferred posts.
Italy, as in many other countries, freemasonry long served as a secret, Gelli was equally successful in recruiting among the intelligence ser-
anti-clerical organization, generally drawing its members from the mid- vices. The Parliamentary Report points out that the heads of all three
dle class and the technocratic strata. Gelli's sponsor recommended him secret services in Italy---General Grassini of SISDE, General Santovito
as "someone in a position to make a notable contribution to the order in of SISMI, and Prefect Peolosi of CESIS-were members of P-2. The
terms of recruitment of qualified [i.e., important] persons." In I97l Report also states flatly that Gelli himself was a member of the ltalian
Gelli was made organizing secretary of Loggia Propaganda, which secret services. Gelli's influence in the highest circles of ltalian intelli-
henceforth was known as "the Gelli-P-2 Group." In his new role Gelli gence was similar to the role he played with the ltalian military: These
was permitted to initiate new members, a privilege previously permitted intelligence organizations and their leaders, often acting at the behest of
only to Venerable Grand Masters. He immediately began to recruit "a Licio Gelli, were "involved with subversive groups and organizations,
great number" of generals and colonels in the ltalian military. At the inciting and aiding them in their criminal projects" in support of Gelli's
same time, going against the longstanding tradition of Italian masonry political objectives.
that excluded political discussions, Gelli began to politicize P-2 lodge The major shift to the left in ltaly, which was marked by the elections
meetings. According to an agenda in the possession of the Parliamen- of 1975 and 1916, suggested the real possibility of an eventual acces-
tary Commission, for example, one meeting considered "the political sion to power of the Communist Pafty. This produced a fundamental
and economic situation in Italy, the threat of the Communist Party now shift in Gelli's P-2 strategy. According to the Parliamentary Commis-
in accord with clericalism aiming at the conquest of power," and "our sion, where Gelli had earlier f<rstered destabilization. he now aimed at
position in the event of a coming to power of the clerico-communists. " political stabilization.ae This would be achieved through penetrating the
During the initial phase of Celli's conspiracy, he recruited with an highest reaches of not only the military and intelligence agencies, but
eye to the possibility that P-2 would have to organize political action also the top echelons of all levels of ltalian life. Gelli's new objective
against a seizure of power by the Left. For this reason he placed particu- was to obtain a position of outright control-behind the scenes-so that
lar emphasis, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, on recruiting mili- even if the Communist Party came to power it would make no real dif-
tary and intelligence personnel. By 1974 Gelli had recruited a total of ference in the basic structures of Italian political life.
195 military officers, of whom 92 held the rank of general or colonel. With his new strategy, Gelli successfully "penetrated into the most
The Report of the Parliamentary Commission concluded that Gelli's re- important sectors of the institutions of the State." By 1979, p-2 mem-
cruitment of ltalian military personnel constituted "a map of military bership had grown to at least 953, and the Parliamentary Report notes
power at the highest level with persons who often assumed a role in eve- that Celli's "new members came from the most sensitive quarters and
nts of particular significance in the recent history of our country, as well highest levels of national life, . . . amounting to an extended, authorita-
as in relation with events of a subversive character." The Report also tive, and capillary apparatus of persons which Gelli, in his capacity as
noted that Gelli was able to manipulate the P-2 military membership to Venerable Master of P-2, could dispose at will. " P-2 membership rolls
advance "the political objectives of Gelli and P-2, objectives hardly included three cabinet ministers; 43 generals; eight admirals, including
compatible with services on behalf of democratic institutions since they the head of the armed forces; the heads ofthe three intelligence services;
responded to directives from centers of power extraneous, if not hostile, 43 Military Policemen; the police chiefs of ltaly's four main cities; the
to such institutions." Gelli also "played a direct role in promotions in mayors of Brescia and Pavia; the editor of ltaly's leading newspaper,
the military service," according to the Report, which claimed that "The 49 The Parliamentary Commission implied that the shift in strategy was more complete
penetration of P-2 into circles at the top of the military hierarchy ended than it was in fact A new two-track strategy is more plausible and more compatible with
in creating a situation in which entrance into the [P-2] lodge constituted subsequent events. lt is noteworthy, for example, that a December 1985 Bologna court in-
a sort ofobligatory passage in order to rise to higher levels ofresponsi- dictment named Gelli as one of the organizers of the Bologna bombing of 19g0.

bility." High officers also pressured their subordinates to join P-2 if

84 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION FOUR: THE ROME-WASHINGTON CONNECTION 85

the Corriere della Sera; 36 members of Parliament and members of As for the "Bulgarian Connection," would the members of the an-
numerous state agencies.s0 The number of P-2 members in the state ad- ticommunist brotherhood of P-2 be capable of concocting a case against
ministration totalled 422. Especially important in the view of the Par- the arch-enemy that would involve falsifying evidence? Were they in a
liamentary Commission was P-2 infiltration into the Italian Treasury position to do this by their reach into the police, secret services, the
and those institutions involved in foreign trade. P-2 also penetrated the press, the judiciary, political parties, and the state apparatus? These
prestigious Bank of Italy, an institution with important overseas connec- questions were not explored in the western media; the quality of the ltal-
tions.t' ian police-security establishment, with its deep roots in ltalian fascist
The "silent coup" also targeted ltaly's mass media. One of Gelli's history, is off the western agenda.
most important successes was the takeover of the Rizzoli publishing
group. Rizzoli controlled the leading Italian newspaper, the Corriere The ''Strategy of Tension'' . The "strategy of tension" was a rightwing
della Sera of Milan,'2 whose daily sales of 500,000 were the highest in creation, put into extensive practice beginning in the late 1960s by the
..paÍy of the coup.''53 The
all ltaly. At its zenith the Rizzoli publishing group was printing one in strategy was based on the idea that terrorist
four ltalian newspapers. The Gelli-P-2 Group also acquired control or acts, if carried out by secret agents in a political environment where the
important influence over many local newspapers, including Il Mattino, acts would be attributed to the Left, would be serviceable to rightwing
Sport Sud, Il Piccolo, Eco di Padova, Il Giornale di Sicilia, Alto Adige, and fascist ends. The point was to make people very apprehensive and
and Il Lavoro. Gelli and P-2 used this influence within the media, ac- insecure, to put them in a mood to support a regime of law and order.
cording to the Parliamentary Report, for the "coordination of the entire This would be facilitated if the police, courts, and press regularly failed
provincial and local press, so as to control public opinion throughout the to identify correctly the perpetrators of violence, and allowed them-
country." selves to be manipulated into false attributions of its source.
Gelli's influence over the Corriere della Sera and other newspapers, Many of the proponents and implementers of the strategy were open
his intimate ties with the ltalian secret services, and his influence in al- fascists, aiming explicitly for a totalitarian solution. (The journalist
most every major ltalian institution, revealed "the general line of an Guido Giannettini' ťor examp|e, who was employed by the ltalian secret
alarming, comprehensive plan for the penetration and conditioning of services, cafled himself a "nazi-fascist," not just a plain fascist.'n)
national life. " Mussolini's coup of 1922 and the Greek fascist takeover of 1967 were
models for this "party." The Parliamentary Report on P-2 comments:
50. A paÍtia| list of P-2 membership in the lralian state sector in l979 is as fo||ows: ln-
tcrior Ministry: l9 members; Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 4; Ministry of Public Works: 4;
P-2 contributed to the so-called strategy of tension, that was pursued by righr
Ministry of Public lnstruction: 32; Ministry of State: 2l; Treasury: 67; Ministry of Health:
3; Ministry of Industry and Commerce: | 3; Finance Ministry: 52; Ministry of Justice, in-
wing extremist groups in Italy during those years when the purpose was to de-
cluding MagistratuÍa..2|; Ministry of Cultural Affairs: 4; Minislry of Scientific and Tech- stabilize ltalian politics, cÍeating a situation that such groups might be ab|e to ex-
nological Research: 3; Ministry of Transportation: 2.
53. The expression "strategy oftension" has been widely used in the ltalian media to
5 I . Other major banks targeted for the establishment of strategic P-2 contacts in the in-
describe the attempt by rightwing forces to stop the leftward trend in ltalian politics by the
ternalional banking and business community were the Banca Nacionale del Lavoro, the
use of force. While there is little dispute about the reality of the actions carried out in sup-
Monte dei Paschi di Siena, the Banca Toscana, the Istituto Centrale delle casse rurali et
port of this political objective, there is debare over the degree of explicit planning and or-
artigiani, the lnterbanca, thc Banca di Roma, and the Banco Ambrosiano.
ganization of the whole process, and the exact composition of the forces involved. p-2
52. Corriere della Serahad fallen under the control of Banco Ambrosiano, whose pres-
contributed to a centralizing tendency in the implementation of the strategy, but much of it
ident, Roberto Calvi, was a P-2 member and major financier of P-2 projects. Upon P-2's
seems to have been informal and loosely coordinated
acquisition oÍ .he Corriere' its editor' Piero Ottone, a thorn in the side of both the
54 Christie,op cit.,n. 19,p vii.Giannettini wasgreatlyappreciatedbytheUS mil-
Socialist and Christian Democratic Parties in ltaly for many years, was replaced by his
itary establishment. ln November l96l he was brought to rhe United States to conduca a
deputy, Franco Di Bella. When the P-2 house of cards fell in l98l, the records showed
three-day seminar on ..The Techniques and Prospects of a Coup d'État in Europe'' at the
that Di Bella had bcen a member of the P-2 |ďge since October |0' 1978. Ca|vi, of
U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. Christie, ibid., p.26; De Lutiis, op cit.,
coursc, was the leading figurc in the Vatican banking scandal ofthe late 1970s, and mil-
n.25, p. l&.
lions of dollars passed through his hands to rightwing dictators in Latin America.
 I

86 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION FOUR: THE ROME-WASHINGTON CONNECTION 8'l

I

ploit in their own intercst to bring about an authoritarian solution to Italy's prob- in accordance with the logic of the strategy of tension, they were blamed I

lems . . to condition political and public opinion that changes were demanded on the Left. The Piazza Fontana bombing, for example, was im- I

and radical solutions possible . . . with the overthrow of the democratic repub- mediately blamed on the anarchists, a diverse and weak group that was I

lic a real alternative among various possible outcomes. an easy victim of a well-managed conspiracy of the Right. The police, I

secret services, judiciary, and press all ptayed their roles in this frameup.
The strategy of tension was implemented through a series of mas- The local anarchist leader Giuseppi Pinelli died in police custody, an al-
sacres, frameups, and abortive coup attempts. Prior to 1969 there had leged "suicide." Although the evidence was soon clear that thepiazza
been numerous fascist attacks on Communists, unionists, and demon- Fontana bombing was a rightist strategy of tension action,.6 it has never
strators, but r1o major tenorist attacks. The new strategy of massacre been possible to bring the perpetrators (or the police who murdered
began in April 1969 with bomb explosions at the University of Padua Pinelli) to justice.
and a Milan industrial fair. On August 8, 1969, bombs were placed in The mďn reason for this is that the strategy of tension was im-
ten trains moving out of major stations, injuring ten people. Then in plemented and protected by important elements of the state apparatus.
Milan on December 12, 1969, a bomb was placed in a bank on market Franco Ferraresi points out, for example, that in a judicial investigation I

day in the crowded Piazza Fontana. Sixteen people died and 90 more at Arezzo of the Italicus bombing, it was disclosed that..some fascists" I

were injured. A bomb placed in another bank in the center of Milan was among the accused actually worked for the police or secret services. It
discovered before it could go off. Three bombs were set off in Rome, was also disclosed that they received valuable information on the prog- I

one of which injured 13 people. Subsequently. there were other mas- ress of the investigation being carried out against them, and that Gelli
I

sacres by the instruments of the party of the coup: The most notorious had connections with key officials in the repressive apparatus of i

and "productive" were the December l7 , 1973 rocket attack on a Pan Arezzo.s'Ferraresi adds that "Not by chance, in the course of the inves-
N

Am plane at Rome's Fiumicano airport, killing 32; the May 28, 19'14 tigation the accused [spoke] repeatedly of the links between SlD, the p- I

bombing at an antifascist rally in Brescia, killing eight and injuring 102; 2 lodge, MSI [the ltalian neofascist party], and elements of the Right in I

the August 4, 1974 bombing of the Rome-Munich ltalicus train near Arezzo."ta I

Bologna, killing l2 and injuring 48; and the Bologna station bombing of I

August 2, 1980, which left 85 dead and 200 injured. I

The evidence is overwhelming that these terrorist acts were carried

The Italian Intelligence Services and Rightwing Terrorism
out by fascists in collusion with members of the security services.tt But

55' |t is a c|iché of the U.S. Right' uncontested in the United States' that ltalian ter- Given the importance of the Italian secret services in the development
rorism is a predominantly leftwing phenomenon. This is based on major fabrications, A of the Bulgarian Connection case, and the assertions by Atbano and
favorite author cited by the U.S. Right to authenticate their position is Dr. Vittorfranco S.
Martella that these services were apolitical and quite trustworthy,s, it
Pisano, whose study, "Terrorism and Security: The ltalian Experience," was published
as a Report of the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism in November 1984 the grand total. If we added in other clearly neofascist killings, we would well exceed half i

Pisano states that neofascist terror is not even a close runner.up to Red terror in Íta|y. the total deaths by terrorism. It is clear why Pisano fails to make any count by potitical
Among other reasons for this is the alleged fact !ha( "the terrorist right lacks the suppor- class of terrorist-
tive struc.ure avai|able to its |eftist counterpaí'' (p. 35). This chapter demonstrates tha( 56. See Christie, op. cit., n. 19, pp. 6l-63, and the rext below.
Pisano's assertion is a fabrication: The "terrorist right" in ltaly has had the support not 57. Gelli's connections included "magistrates (one of whom, the Attorney Marsili, was
only of P-2, with its extensive institutional ramifications, but also the ltalian intelligence his son-in-law), an assistant chief of police and the leader of the cc [carabinieri], not to
services, carabinieri, and officers of the regular armed forces, who are in turn linked in mention the national leadership of sID which was partly involved also (Gen. Miceli) in
various supportive ways to the CIA and NATO (see below) theBorgheseaffair andintheRoseoftheWindsplan."Ferraresi,op.cit,n 40,p.
It is also interesting that Pisano carefully avoids breaking down lenorist incidents in to'l.
Italy by allocation to the Left and Right. He does give an appendix table showing terrorist 58. Ibid. I

incidents by year, 19Ó8.82 (p. 63). The grand tola| of deaths by tenor shown on his 59. See especially the remark of Albano cited in chapter 7, p. l9l; also the discussion
table is 334. The terrorist deaths allocable to neofascists based on the incidents mentioned of Martella's views in Chapter 5, pp. I l7-18
on this page alone, which hardly exhausts the neofascist total, amounts to l5l or457o of I

i
88 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION FOUR: THE ROME-WASHINGTON CONNECTION 89

may be useful to provide further and more detailed evidence of the secu- A related feature of secret services involvement in rightwing ter-
rity services' involvement in rightwing terrorism. In this connection, we rorism has been their protection of the terrorists and refusal to cooper-
should note f,rrst the virtual unanimity of informed Italian opinion of the ate with the judicial system. Five days after the Piazza Fontana bomb-
generality of such involvement. Luciano Violante, a member of the ltal- ing, for example, SID circulated a note to its branch offices stating flatly
ian Parliament and former Magistrate of the Court of Turin, has stated that delle Chiaie had organized the attack, and that his man Mario Mer-
that "One cannot say that there has been a single important episode of lino, who had infiltrated the anarchists, had actually planted the bomb.
black [i.e., rightwing] terrorism that does not involve in some way or But SID failed to pass this information on to the magistrates in charge of
another men who are either directly or indirectly connected to the ser- the case.g A poweďul statement of the same point was made by Rosario
vices. "* Stefano Rodota, also a member of Parliament and Professor of Minna, Magistrate of the Court of Florence, in a recent volume on ter-
Law at the University of Rome, has said the same thing: "Traces, some rorism in Itďy. According to Minna:65
heavy, some light, of direct actions or of involvement of the services are
evident in all the judicial decisions that relate to the more serious acts of The classic example . . - of a web which indissolubly links togerher both the
terrorism (especially black): the massacre of thePiazza Fontana; of the bottom and the top of the ltalian power structure in its relations with black ter-
Piazza Della Loggia; of the ltalicus train; of the Bologna station; the rorism concems the help given by the Italian secret services to the accused in the
Rose of Winds affair; the Borghese coup."6'As noted above, the trial for the massacre of Piazza Fontana. Giannettini was helped financially
Arezzo investigations revealed that a number of the suspects worked for when he escaped abroad; worse still, after the Magistrate of Milan had requested
the carabinieri, police, and secret services. An internal document of the the arrest of Pozzan,. . . the Italian services took Pozzan to Spain, where they
intelligence agency SID indicates that Stefano delle Chiaie himself- handed him over to delle Chiaie in Madrid, at a time when delle Chiaie himself
was a fugitive from justice, wanted for the very same massacre of Piazza Fon-
mastermind of the Bologna bombing and an associate of Klaus Barbie-
tana. So far, there has been no news of administrative or political sanctions
was ''an informer of the Rome central police" with contacts also in the
against those officials who betrayed the state by these critical actions. There-
Ministry of Interior.u' fore, it is practically impossible that it was a matter of personal and improvised
Experts on Ita|ian terrorism have also noted Íhefrequent Íailure oÍ the initiative on the part of a captain or general.
security services to disclose or do anything about advance khowledge of
terrorist actions. From the beginning of the implementation of the strat- The network protecting terrorists in ltaly extended far. In the ltalicus
egy of tension in the late 1960s, the secret services successfully infil- case, the neofascist paÍy MsI actually funded the terrorist killers. Ad-
trated both right and left groups that were later accused of crimes, but miral Birindelli, a past president of MSI,* apparently not liking this
failed to prevent any terrorist acts. According to Giovanni Tamburino, support of deadly terrorist actions, reported the MSI role to the
Magistrate of Padua and a member of the Superior Council of Magis- carabinieri within several weeks of the massacre. This important infor-
trates, "Those close to the victims of the massacre which occurred on mation took seven years to reach the magistÍates in charge of the case.u'
August 2, 1980 in the station in Bologna lamented the fact that the ser- In attempting to understand why this delay occurred, we need only re-
vices, despite having prior warning of the disaster, did not act on this call that the carabinieri as well as the secret services were heavily infil-
knowledge, nor did they pass the information on to the magistrate after trated by P-2, and the head of the carabinieri to whom Birindelli gave
the massacre had taken place."u' his information was a P-2 member.
60. Luciano Violante, "Politica della sicurezza, relazioni internationali e terrorismo,"
64. Linklater, et al., op. cit , n. 12, p.2O1 .
in Gianfranco Pasquino, ed., Ia prova Delle Armi (Istituto Cattaneo, Bologna: Societa
65. Rosario Minna, "Il terrorismo di destra," in Donatelladella Porta, ed., Terrorismi
Editrice Il Mulino, 1984), p. 100.
in ltalia (lslituto Cattaneo, Bologna: Societa Editrice Il Mulino, 1984), p. 57
6l. Stefano Rodota, "La riposta dello stato al tenorismo: gli apparati," in Pasquino,
66. And also a former Mediterranean NATO commander
ed., op. cit., n. 60, p. 82.
67. Ferraresi, op cit., n 40, p 107
62. Linklater, et al., op. cit., n 12, p. 2O7.
63 Giovanni Tamburino, "Le stragi e il loro contesto," in Paolo Corsini and Laura
Novati. eds . L'Eversione Nera: Cronache Di Un Decennio, 1974-1984 (Milan: Franco
Angeli, 1985), p. 142.
90 THE BUI-GARIAN CONNECTION FOUR: THE ROME-WASHINGTON CONNECTION 9l

Stefano delle Chiaie was a principal in many major terrorist attacks in states, politicians and press in the West would shriek with indignation
Italy between 1969 and 1980. He is almost certainly responsible for and pound tables over eastern Bloc "support of terrorists." Delle
more deaths by violence than Carlos the Jackal. We have seen, how- Chiaie, however, has been a "strategy of tension" activist and a sub
ever. that delle Chiaie attended the Pollia Institute Conference of 1965, rosa western "asset." The West accommodates well to his differences
was an informer for the ltalian police , and was used by the secret ser- from Carlos.t'
vices as a friendly vehicle to help spirit wanted criminals out of the
country. Delle Chiaie also had ties with Federico D'Amato, the head of
the ltalian internal security service SISDE.* It is frequently pointed out
Corruption Unlimited: SISMI, Pazienza, and Company
in ltaly that delle Chiaie has a charmed life. In 1984 the new head of
SISDE, Vicente Parisi, updated the Italian Parliament on the Bologna
The abuses of the secret services recounted above had deep structural
massacre. Journalist Maurizio De Luca summarizes his remarks as fol-
roots in ltalian society and in the American-NATO connection, and they
lows:u"
continued into the period of the genesis and implementation of the Bul-
garian Connection. On July 29, 1985, the Criminal Court of Rome is-
He spoke inevitably about delle Chiaie, and the nearly legendary impossibility
sued a lS4-page report and ..Sentenza'' (hereafter, Judgment) agďnst
of capturing him. tt is known that delle Chiaie has naveled, and still does, in
Francesco Pazienza, Pietro Musumeci, Giuseppi Belmonte, and others
South and Central America quite undisturbed. Parisi explicitly said that the fas-
cist leader is evidently given great protection first of all by the South American for crimes committed while serving as high officials and agents of
secret services. This implies that somebody else, more powerful, allows this SISMI.?' They were found guilty of embezzlement and comrption, but
protection. Who? Somebody asked Parisi openly, is it a superpower? In other many of their crimes have larger implications and bear on the Bulgarian
words, are there American lnterests protecting delle Chiaie? Parisi, expressing Connection case. They show an intelligence service out ofcontrol, car-
himself very cautiously, seemed to imply so. He pointed out that the American rying out fraudulent and illegal acts, and manipulated for personal and
secret service had given very inadequate help to their ltalian counterparts in at- political purposes.
tempting to capture delle Chiaie. Given this situation, the committee overseeing Among the crimes enumerated in the Judgment, we may note the fol-
the secret services decided to write to Craxi to take an official stand toward the lowing:
nations who protect delle Chiaie, starting with the South American nations.
7l . British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher illustrates well the westem pattern of dis-
This interesting exchange was not reported in the mainstream U. S. crimination and hypocrisy. Speaking before the American Bar Association in July 1985,
Mrs. Thatcher stated that "We need action-action to which all countries are committed
press. Martin Lee and Kevin Coogan point out that the U.S. Customs
until the terrorist knows that he has no haven and no cscape." Two weeks earlier, Mrs.
Service was apparently aware of the fact that delle Chiaie had entered Thatcher had ignorcd an impassioned plea from Prime Minister Craxi for her aid in obtain-
Miami on a plane from South America on September 9, 1982, traveling ing thc deportation of ltalian rightwing terrorists, who had found a safe haven in England.
with Abdullah Catli, a leader of the Gray Wolves and friend of Agca.'o The particular casc arousing Craxi's ire involved Roberto Fiore, a leading member of the
Armed Revolutionary Nuclci, convicted in 1984 of subversive conspiracy, attempted
He was not apprehended, and the Italian government was not informed
murder, armed robbery, and six counts of arson. The Home Offioe has rejected ltalian ap-
of his whereabouts. peals for Fiore's extradition on the ground that European Community Law requires that it
If Carlos the Jackal could be shown to be an informer for the Bulgar- be shown "that his personal conduct was such as to constitute a present ahreat to one of the
ians or KGB, used by them as an interÍnediary and in other business re- fundamental interests of socicty." Apparently a rightwing tenorist does not mect this
lations, and allowed to move about freely in their territory and client standard by his terrorist rccord alone. Are wc to prcsumc that Carlos would also be safe in
England on this ground? See Mark Hotlingsworth, "Fascist prosecutes journalist," Nep
68. De Lutiis, op. cil., n. 25, pp. 98-100. Statesman, Novcmber 15, 1985, p. 5
69. "Operazione Primula Nera," L'Espresso, August 5, 1984. 72. Criminal Court of Rome, Judgmenr in the Mafier of Francesco Pazienza, et al.,
70. Quoted in Martin A. [-ee and Kevin Coogan, "The Agca Con ," Village Voice ' De- Ju|y 29, 1985' signed by Francesco Amato, President of the couí.
cember 24, 1985. Pazienza told Lee and Coogan that customs officers informed him that
"delle Chiaie enters and leaves the United States as he likes."
92 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION FOUR: THE ROME-WASHINGTON CONNECTION 93

Forgery . Pazienza arranged for the forgery of a document carrying the to f,rnd the kidnapped man and to single out his captors . . . turned into
signatures of Licio Gelli and others, which was planted in the May 8, an operation characterized by the payment ofa very heavy ransom to a
l98l issue of Agenzia Repubblica." He either forged or passed along terroristic group which would take advantage of it to carry on further
fraudulent papers supposedly showing that the then President of Italy, their aggression against the state."m
Pertini, had been on the Soviet payroll!'o Articles secretly subsidized by
SISMI smearing various other individuals were planted in the press.75 Protection of criminals and terrorists. The Court charged Pazienza with
One forgery described in the Judgment was of "Letters of Information" using a SISMI plane to transport a man wanted for crimes out of the
about terrorist plans, allegedly obtained from a secret source that was country.8r SISMI officials were also charged with giving investigating
paid a large sum of money for the information. The court concluded that bodies information which they knew to be untrue about terrorists ď.
the ktters were fabricated and the source did not exist, and that the pur- legedly involved in the Bologna bombing, thereby diverting the investi-
pose of the entire process was to allow Musumeci, Belmonte, and San- gation away from the real terrorists.S'z
tovito to divert large sums to their own pockets.to In early December 1985, magistrates in Bologna issued l6 arrest war-
rants, accusing both Licio Gel|i and former sIsMI officiďs Pazienza,
Political manipulation. Pazienza attempted to split the Communist Belmonte, and Musumeci of "subversive association with the aim of
Party by supporting a hard line pro-Soviet faction within the PCI. He terrorism" in connection with the Bologna bombing of 1980. Initial
engaged in this effort as an agent of SISMI, although he sought external newspaper reports indicate that the secret service officials were being
(mainly American) financing to advance the project." Santovito ac- charged not merely with covering up the massacre, but with involve-
knowledged to a Parliamentary Commission on P-2 that SISMI had ment in its overall planning.s'
worked hard to try to pin some link to the Bulgarians on the PCI.'8
Numerous other efforts to enhance or denigrate favored or disfavored Disinformation. In early 1981, from information provided by Pazienza
politicians, movements, or countries are recounted in the Judgment. and an "external collaborator," two reports were prepared by SISMI
(one of them, the ..Bíllygate Affair,'' we discuss below.) tying the drug and arms traffic to Arabs and Bulgaria. The Judgment im-
plies that these reports were fabricated, intended to divert attention
Improper dealings with terrorists. The Judgment describes in detail how, away from SISMI's ongoing abuses by providing evidence of energetic
ďter the Red Brigades had kidnapped the Christian Qemocratic po|iti- secret service activity. lt is possible that the ..externď co|laborator'' in
cian Ciro Cirillo, Pazienza used his contacts with the Mafia to negotiate this case was Michael lrdeen (see below). It is also noteworthy that the
a deal that was extremely generous to both the Mafia intermediaries and Bulgarians are already being introduced as villains in these pre-May 13,
the Red Brigades. The Court felt that the mode of dealing with the ter- l98l reports.
rorists was highly inappropriate, and that in this kind of operation
Pazienza was doing things "of incredible danger to society. ."'n The The Ledeen-Pazienza Connection. The Judgment devotes considerable
Court concluded that "An operation which began as an attempt space to the coordinated operations of Pazienza and Michael Ledeen.
Pazienza was an operator of international scope, with significant re-
73. Ibid., p. lO2.
lationships and mutual service extending especially to France and the
74- Ibid., p. rO3.
'15. Ibid., pp 99-102. United States. The Judgment alleges thatPazienza was on the payroll of
76. Ibid., pp. I l9-73. Bruno Di Murro declared to the court that the "Pazienza group" the French secret services.to (It was well-known that he was a close
took sums amounting to about one billion two hundred million lire from thc coffers of
80. Iáid.' p. |8.
SISMI between October 1980 and May 1981. Ibid-, p. 169.
81. Ibid., p. 25.
7'I . Ibid., p. rO8.
78. ttalian Parliamentary Committee of Investigation into the P-2 Masonic Lodge, 82 lbid., pp. 147-68.

Documentation Vol 3, Tome XIX, March 2, 1982, p. 2O2.

83. See the series of articles in It Repubblica, December l2-13, 1985.
79. Judgment, p. 26 84. "From a reading of the quoted documents one can deduce the superior position that
94 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION FOUR: THE ROME-WASHINGTON CONNECTION 95

friend of its head, Comte Alexandre de Marenches.) He had also estab- SISMI and was placed on its payroll.m He had the coded identification,
lished a relationship with Alexander Haig, which added to his authority Z-3." Ledeen received at least $120,000 plus expenses from SISMI in
in Italy (see further below). 1980-81, some of which he funneled into a Bermuda bank account.e2 He
Pazienza was also a good friend of Licio Gelli, and provided his pri- received the money for various services: what he vaguely calls "risk as-
vate yacht to help Gelli flee after his escape from prison. He was also a sessment," helping train ltalian intelligence agents,e. and providing
close associate of Roberto Calvi, the murdered head of Banco Am- analyses of terrorism and the Soviet threat. The Italian press reported
brosiano. Before his death Calvi had swindled more than a billion dol- that Ledeen actually sold old U.S. intelligence reports to SISMI at stiff
lars through a complex chain of bank transactions that deeply involved prices, which Santovito then passed on to ltalian officials as the prod-
P-2 and the Vatican Bank. Pazienza helped Calvi try to extricate himself ucts of secret and original SISMI investigations. According to Diana
from his difťrculties, then to take refuge as the Banco Ambrosiano crisis Johnstone' Italian journalists to whom these secret repoÍts were leaked
reached its peak. He also introduced Cďvi to Flavio Carboni, the last were not fooled, and "found them an unconvincing rehash of old gos-
man known to have seen Calvi alive.t' sip, such as the notion that the Italian Communist Party was really run
At the time of Agca's assassination attempt, SISMI was headed by by a secret 'parallel' hierarchy commanded by Moscow."q The docu-
General Giuseppe Santovito, a P-2 member andPazienza's patron. Dur- ments did further the echo-chamber effect, however, providing ltalian
ing Santovito's tenure Pazienza was a SISMI operative with extraordi- intelligence service "confirmation" of the truths that U.S. disinfor-
nary powers. In fact, the Judgment suggests that Pazienza even con- mationists were purveying widely.
trolled Santovito.s6 Pazienza was not only Santovito's top aide, he was An important collaboration between Ledeen and Pazienza involved
also the dominant individual in a small group of secret service "plumb- the so-called "Billygate" affair. Italian investigators had already shown
ers" called "Super S," made up of P-2 members, which used the re- that SISMI, Pazienza, and Michael Ledeen, working through Super S,
sources of SISMI, and was answerable only to Santovito.sT lured President Jimmy Carter's brother Billy into a compromising re-
Michael Ledeen enters the picture as a rightwing journalist, longtime lationship with Qaddafi during the 1980 presidential campaign. Accord-
associate of Claire Sterling,*' friend of Alexander Haig, and the "Italy ing to the Italian newspaper La Repubblica, prosecuting Judge
expert" in the Reagan transition team of 1980-81.*'In tandem with Domenico Sica had evidence "that SISMI was the architect of the scan-
Pazienza, Ledeen was well placed to help forward Reagan's political dal over Billy Carter," and that the material in the case "was gathered
aims in Italy at the time of the assassination attempt against the Pope. At mostly by Pazienza and by his American friend Michael Ledeen." The
least as early as 1980 Ledeen became a friend of and collaborator with indictment against Pazienza explicitly mentioned Michael LelJeen as a
Pazienza. Perhaps through Pazienza's influence Ledeen worked for co-conspirator in the illegal activities attributed to Pazienza. La Repub-
blica went on to say:es
Pazienza-already on the payroll of the French secret military service and connected with
centers of foreign powers lthe U S. State Department is mentioned specifically]-had
Pazienza availed himself of SISMI both for the use of some secret agents and for
managed to acquire in the security organization." Judgment, p. 37.
85. On Pazienza and Calvi, see Rupert Comwell, God's Banker (New York: Dodd, 90. This point was confirmed by Santovito, the head of SISMI. Judgment, p, I lO.
Mead. 1984). 9r.lbid., p.39
86 Judgment, pp 30-33. 92 Jonathan Kwitny, "Tale of Intrigue: Why an Iratian Spy Got Closely Involved In
8'7 lbid., pp.34-40 Valuable details are also given in Sandro Acciari and Pietro the Billygate Affair," Wall Street Journal, August 8, 1985
Calderoni, "C'ero io, c'eraPazienza, c'era . . ," L'Espresso, November I l, 1984; and 93 The Judgment describes an "Operation Training Camps," in which Ledeen re-
Diana Johnstone, "Latest scandal leads to Reagan administration," InTheseTimes,De- ceived 300 million lire for organizing training camps on antiguerrilla-anticommunist waÍ.
cember 5-l l, 1984. fare. Pazienza claimed that paí of the sum was his, but Ledeen kept the entire amount for
88 See Chapter 6, p 160 himself. Judgment, p. 109
89 DuringtheearlyyearsoftheReaganadministrationhewasalsoaconsultanttothe 94. Diana Johnstone, " A method to Agca's madness?,' ' In These Times , luly lO-23,
State Department and Pentagon "Italian Officials Finger Ledeen, CIA," CovertAction | 985.

Idormation Bulletin, Number 22 (Fall 1984), p. 41. 95. Quoted in Johnstone' iáid
96 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION FOUR: THE ROME-WASHINGTON CONNECTION 9'l

the expenses of organizing the scandalous plan. It seems that the organizers got Lugaresi, and other members of SISMI, were the ones who actually
a huge payoff for "Billygate. " Moreover, Santovito and Pazienza got great ad- coached Agca. According to Pazienza, Michael Ledeen had worked
vantages in return from American officials, in fact may have been helped in with Col. Sponelli and the SISMI chief of station in New York, Col.
other obscure affairs. The "Billygate" operation did not come under SISMI's Marcello Campione, both of whom remained after the departure of San-
institutionally mandated task, and for that reason Judge Sica brought charges of tovito. Pazienza claims that not only did the successor team coach
pursuing private interest through official activities.
Agca, they also collaborated with Ledeen in questioning the former
Czech General and disinformationist Jan Sejna, whose fabrications were
SISMI provided the tape recorder and hired a photographer to take pic- channeled from Ledeen to Claire Sterling.'*
tures of Billy Carter with a Libyan representative.* As the enterprise
Thus, there was no general housecleaning of SISMI, and there is no
was strictly in aid of Reagan's election campaign, the Court did not con-
reason to believe that the fundamental character of SISMI was altered.
sider this a proper use of Italian secret service resources.
In fact, several of the remaining SISMI officials were subsequently ar-
After Reagan's election Ledeen and his friend Pazienza became more rested for involvement in the drug trade. Furtherrnore, while Pazienza
powerful in Italy. Umberto D'Amato, a high police official in Italy,
has attempted to shift some of the accusations against SISMI and him-
claims that in the uncertain conditions prevailing during the Reagan self to his formercolleagues and successors, his own role in the Bulga-
transition, "there was an interregnum during which relations between
rian Connection is still far from clear. Soon after his exit from SISMI,
Italy and the United States were carried on in the persons of the duo
Pazienza and former high SISMI official Pietro Musumeci organized a
Pazienza-l-ndeen."e7 Tbe influential position of the Ledeen-Pazienza
security consulting firm, which was quickly employed by Roberto Calvi
team is suggested by their role as intermediaries between ltalian politi-
and his Banco Ambrosiano. Pazienza then became very active in help-
cians and high officials wanting to make contact with officials of the
ing Calvi manage the bank's investments in and contacts with the Italian
new Reagan administration. Even the ltalian Foreign Minister Emilio political parties. This gave him fresh resources, including closer rela-
Colombo used their services in making arrangements for a visit. The
tions with Socialist Party head Bettino Craxi, who visited Pazienza at
head of the Christian Democratic Party, Flaminio Piccoli, testified be-
the latter's house. Craxi's Socialist Party had been heavily financed by
fore a Parliamentary Committee that during a visit to Washington, after
illegal contributions from Calvi's bank from 1975, and Craxi had been
several days of futile attempts to visit Secretary of State Haig, General
Calvi's stout defender when Banco Ambrosiano's misdeeds besan to be
Santovito suggested that he seek out Pazienza. Jonathan Kwitny reports
uncovered in the late 1970s.'u'
that "Mr. Piccoli testified that one phone call from Mr. Pazienza to a
Pazienza's Maf,ra ties were also important. Following the kidnapping
contact persuaded Mr. Haig to postpone a trip to Camp David to help
of the Christian Democratic official Ciro Cirillo by the Red Brigades in
President Reagan with a major speech, and grant Mr. Piccoli a 43-
1981, Pazienza was brought in by the police to negotiate for Cirillo's
minute meeting. "ot
ransom. Pazienza was able to negotiate Cirillo's release through his
In August 198 l, following the P-2 scandal of the previous spnng,
contacts with Raeffele Cutolo, the leader of the Naples Camorra
General Santovito was dismissed as head of SISMI, and Pazienza's role
(Mafia). According to the June 16, 1985 statement of former Cutolo as-
in SISMI was greatly reduced. Pazienza claims that he resigned from
SISMI in March 198 l, more than a month before the attack on the in a police raid of March 17, l98l lt is possible that pressure on P-2 members and their
Pope.* He also alleges that the successor to Santovito, General Nino close associates began shortly after that date, although Santovito did not leave SISMI until
August 1981.
96. Judgment, pp. 8l-86. Pazienza's claims were spelled out in a letter from him to Christian Roulette, which was
97. Quoted in Sandro Acciari and Pietro Calderoni, "C'ero io, c'era Pazienza- C'era introduced by Roulette into the trial record in January | 986 The contents of the letter are
. ," L'Espresso, November ll, 1984. summarized by Diana Johnstone in "Bulgarian Connection: Finger-pointing in the pontiff
98 Jonathan Kwitny, "Tales of lntrigue: How an Italian Ex-Spy Who Also Helped p|ot labyrínth,'' In These Times, ]anuary 29-February 4, l986.
U.S. Landed in Prison Here," Wall Steet Journal, August 7, I985. For corroborating 100. See Chapter 6, pp 135-36
evidence of this account, see Judgment, p. 86. l0l Comwell, op cir., n. 85, pp. ll4, l4l
99 TheP-2scandal originatedinthediscoveryofGelli'slistofsecretmembersofP-2
98 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION FOUR: THE ROME-WASHINGTON CONNECTION 99

sociate Giovanni Pandico,'0t when Cutolo was threatened with a transfer Under Secretary for Security, was the first Italian official to refer pub-
out of Ascoli Piceno prison in 1982-with the implication that Cutolo licly to a "Bulgarian Connection."'6 In short, Italian intelligence had
might be killed during the transfer-{utolo contacted Pazienza and fabricated a KGB plot and was already disseminating it long before
Musumeci to help extricate him from his frx. Pandico claimed that Agca made his first serious claims of Bulgarian involvement.16
Musumeci visited Ascoli Piceno prison in late February or early March Third, SISMI was honeycombed with comrption in the 1970s and
1982,'o' and stmck a deal: Cutolo would stay in Ascoli Piceno, but he early 1980s. In addition to the matters dealt with in the Judgment,
would help persuade Agca to implicate the Bulgarians and Soviets in the Pazienza was deeply involved in the Banco Ambrosiano scandal. He is
plot to assassinate the Pope. now wanted in Italy for, among other things, arranging a $3 million loan
to an ltalian construction company, whose top official used $2 million
for personal ends, with Pazienza drawing a $250,000 finder's fee. We
have mentioned Pazienza's numerous Mafia contacts. Santovito and
Ledeen, Pazienza, sIsMI' and Úhe Bu|garian Connection several of his associates were eventually arrested and convicted for ac-
tive participation in the drug and arms traffic. Some of these transac-
As we have seen, recent investigations of the Italian secret services in tions even involved cooperation with the Turkish Gray Wolves to trans-
general, and SISMI and the t-edeen-Pazienza-SlSMl connoction in par-
port contraband goods across Bulgaria.'o7 This relationship between
ticular, have uncovered a wide variety of suggestive facts and relation- SISMI and the Gray Wolves may have helped induce Agca to cooperate
ships that bear on the emergence of the Bulgarian Connection. First, it is
in the manufacture of the Bulgarian Connection.
clear that SISMI and other ltalian intelligence agencies have long been
Finally, SISMI was exceedingly amenable to serving as an errand boy
infiltrated and even dominated by P-2 members and the extreme Right.
for U.S. officials. We have mentioned the longstanding dependency on
These groups have been associated for many years with attempts to sub-
the CIA, reflecting the larger and deeper dependency of the ltalian elite
vert Italian democracy, to weaken and destroy the Left by means of a
on U.S. poweÍ. The Bi|lygate case, with Ledeen, Pazienza, and SISMI
"strategy of tension," and, if need be, to organize a coup to install a
working together in the service of the Reagan election campaign, and
government of law and order. It is apparent that agencies like SISMI
manipulating the Italian media and political environment with money
have been thoroughly politicized and have spent considerable effort pur-
and the resources of an important intelligence agency, is suggestive.
suing covert political strategies. "Billygate" was a model of what can be done in the way of setting
Second, there is substantiď evidence that SISMI had |ittle scrup|e in somebody up for a media coup, using the power available to U.S.
serving up forged documents, disseminating them, and planting them on
agents and their ltalian allies. It takes little imagination to contemplate
its political enemies. On May 19, 1981, only six days after the assassi- the possibility that this duo or their numerous associates in the ltalian in-
nation attempt on the Pope , SISMI circulated a secret report within the telligence agencies and police might have worked out a way to take ad-
government claiming that the shooting of the Pope had been decided vantage of Agca's presence in jail and his visit to Bulgaria.
upon and announced at a meeting of Warsaw Pact military leaders in
Rumania by Soviet Minister of Defense Marshal Ustinov in November cratic Lawyers, 1985), pp. 20-21 . If this document were not a forgery, we may be sure
that it would have been introduced into evidence by Martella and his colleagues much ear-
1980. This fabricated document is now paÍt of the evidence in the case
lier.
against Pazienza and others and has been impounded by the ltalian 105. He made his statement in an interview on Thames Television, T V. Eye, on Sep-
courts.'e An associate of Pazienza's, Francesco Mazzola, then Italian tember3, 1981. Aconsultanttotheproducersof theprogramwasPaul Henze.Twodays
after the broadcast Henze delivered his report on the Bulgarian connection to Reader's
102. Pietro Calderoni, "Cella con Servizi," L'Espresso, June 23, 1985. This was
Dlgesl, which then procecded to hire Claire Sterling to investigate ahe "Connecaion."
based on an exclusive interview with Pandico.
106. As we note elsewhere in the text, Agca mentioned the Bulgarians very early, but
103. Pandico told Calderoni the visit took place on March l, but in his trial testimony
superficially and along with a large number of other implausible claims.
Pandico changed this to sometime in February.
l07. ..La P.2, les service italiens, lc trafic drogueďarmes: l'atlsntat contÍe le pape et la
|04. See discussion and citations il Repon of the International Comnission oÍ Study
CIA," 12 Monde du Renseignement, October-December 1983, pp. 43-45
and lnformation on "The Antonov Affair" (Brussels: lnternational Association of Demo-
 ill

100 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION :

Craxi and the Politics of the Bulgarian Connection I

i

E. Darkness ln Rome:
I

There is intense hostility and conflict between the ltalian Communist

Party and the Socialist Party and Christian Democrats. It is obvious that
a successful linking of the Bulgarians and Soviet Union to the assassina- lhe Wesúem 8ystcm of
tion attempt against the Pope would be a severe blow to the Communist
Party and the [rft. Socialist Minister of Defense Lagorio stated to the lnduced Gonfesslon
Italian Parliament that the attempted assassination attempt by Bulgaria
was a "declaration of war. " And the conservative press in ltaly has pro-
duced a steady outpouring of the Sterling-Jonathan Institute line that the
Soviet Union is the base of all terrorism. The western media have not
commented on the fact that Lagorio's statement about a declaration of
war was based on a belated confession by a long-imprisoned murderer,
and that this assertion of guilt was made before any court had reached
n his novel Darkness at Noon, Arthur Koestler imagines the way in
such a conclusion. Coming from a high official of the government, the 1
statement shows both the high political stakes involved and the dubious- l which confessions were induced in the Soviet staged triďs of the
ness of the ltalian political scene for a fair investigation and trial. 1930s. Isolating the prisoner, persuading him of the hopelessness of his
Socialist Party leader Bettino Craxi has been either unable or unwill- position, and convincing him that he could best contribute to his own
ing to carry out any extensive progrÍrms of socia| reform. ln place of and the national welfare by a properly directed confession yielded the
these, he has built his political strategy on anti-Soviet rhetoric, militari- desired results. With the incarceration and isolation of Agca, the sub-
zation within the New Cold War framework. and associated service to sequent pressures for cooperation, and the resultant confessions chan-
the Reagan administration.'ot Craxi therefore had a large vested interest neled to mutual advantage, the West produced an analogous result in
in the initiation, pursuit, and successful outcome of the case against the Rome. Although the case against the Bulgarians was finally lost, the
Bulgarians. The Christian Democrats, P-2, and reactionary elements in analogy still holds for a four-year travesty of justice that produced a
the police and security forces had a parallel interest. Thus the political huge propaganda windfall to its sponsors.l
elements with a stake in bringing and winning the case were formidable Throughout the period immediately preceding Agca's naming of Bul-
and have commanded powerful business, financial, and press support in garians, the Reagan administration and the powerful right wing of Italy
Italy. They also received strong support from the Reagan administra- were striving to put into effect the message of the Jonathan Institute con-
tion, which gained enorrnous benefits from the Connection. ference of July 1979: Tie the Soviet Union to "international terrorism. "
Agca's confessions and Martella's mindless pursuit of the case served
well both the Reagan-Jonathan Institute objectives and those ofP-2 and
Bettino Craxi and his political ďlies in Itďy.

l. The Bulgarian Sergei Antonov, although now released, was incarcerated for more
than tfuee years. He a|so seems to have collapsed mentally and physicď|y from the stress
of the accusations and confinement.

l0l
f08. See Diana Johnstone, The Politics of Euromissiles: Europe's Role in America's
World (London: Verso, l984)' ChapteÍ 4.
t02 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION FIVE: DARKNESS IN ROME 103

Hoemeyer, Secretary General of the Union of Catholic Bishops, to per-

suade Agca to say that he had been hired by the KGB.I
[Iow Agca Was Coached Orsan Oymen, the West German correspondent of the Turkish paper
Milliyet, and its specialist in the assassination attempt, was told by
We believe that Agca was coached to implicate the Bulgarians. Coach- Padre Ginno, a Vatican librarian, that "Our Church took advantage of
ing, as we use the term here, involved three elements. One was identify- the assault against the Pope. It suggested in a secret manner the KGB
ing for Agca the preferred villains. The second was inducing him, by of- thesis to the press, and then stepped aside." The Vatican also had an
fering benefits anďor threatening him with damage, to name them as his agent within the prison: Father Mariano Santini, the Catholic chaplain in
collaborators. The third ingredient was to supply Agca with the infor- Ascoli Piceno. Santini had regular access to Agca in prison, and Padre
mation necessáry to al|ow him to formulate a plausible scenario of a Ginno suggested to Oymen that Santini was a key figure in getting Agca
conspiracy and to name specific co-conspirators. The direct and cir- to talk. Giovanni Pandico, the chief state witness in the trial of the
cumstantial evidence that all three of these things were done in the Bul- Mafia in Naples, also gives Santini a prominent place in his account of
garian Connection case is now compelling. how Agca was induced to talk. Cardinal Silvio Oddi acknowledged to
Many individuals with an interest in pinning the plot on the Bulga- Oymen that Agca wrote a letter on September 24, 1982-just weeks be-
rians had access to Agca in prison, and they had an extended opportu- fore he named the Bulgarians, and immediately after the publication of
nity to bribe and threaten him. We saw in the previous chapter that the Sterling's Reader's Digest article-in which he complained to Vatican
Italian secret services were dominated by P-2 members in l98l and had authorities that the prison chaplain was putting pressure on him and that
a long history of subservience to U.S. intelligence. They also had a he feared for his life.'In short, not only did P-2and the ltalian secret
well-documented history of planting fabricated evidence on the [rft. services have a political interest in getting Agca to talk and have direct
Both SISMI and the Interior Ministry were spreading concocted tales of access to him, so did agents of the Vatican, who were actively using
Soviet and Bulgarian involvement in the assassination attempt long be- their influence in this direction from the time of the shooting.
fore Agca named any Bulgarians. The intelligence services not only had Agca's motives are equally clear. There is solid evidence that he was
access to Agca in prison, they also had longstanding relations with the induced to talk by the classic method of carrot and stick. After his first
Mafia, whose incarcerated leaders dominated the Ascoli Piceno prison trial, he was taken to Ascoli Piceno prison, where he was supposed to be
in which Agca was held. kept in solitary confinement for a full year. lsolated and harassed in var-
There is also evidence that some people within the Vatican were ious ways by prison officials, Agca complained about these pressures,
eager to make Agca talk. The western press accepted the Sterling-Henze both physical and psychological, to his family and to prison authorities.
line that the Soviets sought to quell the Solidarity movement in Poland Following a softening up period, but long before the expiration of his
by removing its papal support. Unmentioned was the possible papal term of solitary confinement, he was provided with a comfortable cell
motivation for getting the imprisoned Agca to implicate the Soviets in with TV, radio, and private bath. On December 29, 1981 , officials of
order to strengthen Polish resistance to martial law and to weaken Soviet Italian intelligence visited him. Shortly thereafter Agca was visited for
influence in Poland and elsewhere. The first book on the assassination
3. This plan was eventually called off in March 1982, shortly after the meeting which,
attempt, The Drama of May 1-1, was published in West Germany by a according to Giovanni Pandico, took place between Musumeci and Agca in February or
Vatican priest, who claimed that the KGB had trained Agca in the early March 1982, as described in the text. orsan oymen, who reported these arÍange-
Soviet Union and had ordered the shooting.' Suleyman Yetkin, an old mentsbetweenHoemeyerandYetkin,wasshownalelterof March l9S2callingoff the
Turkish comrade of Agca's from Malatya residing in West Germany' visit to the prison. See Orsan Oymen, "Behind the Scenes of the 'Agca lnvestigation,' "
M illiyet, November 1984.
was paid a substantial sum of money in several installments by Dr'
4. Ibid. Dunng the trial, Judge Santiapichi commented to Santini that Agca seemed to
2. The author, Vendelin Sluganov, got this "information" from the intelligence report use an "ecclesiastically tinged" version of ltalian. Santini denied having given Agca in-
forged by SISMI and released on May 19, 1981, mentioned in the previous chapter' structions in the ltalian language, but in his final defense statement on March 8, 1966, An-
tonov's counsel Giuseppi Consolo claimed that Santini visited Agca more than 90 times
IM THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION FIVE: DARKNESS IN ROME lO5

the first time by Investigating MagistraÍe llario Martella. on February statement of Giovanni Pandico, Agca was f,rnally induced to talk by
2, 1982, Agca told his lawyer that he had been offered a deal by the in- Raeffele Cutolo, the Naples Mafia chief, who was an inmate of Ascoli
telligence services for talking-a reduction of his prison sentence to ten Piceno prison at the same time as Agca. Cutolo had been persuaded to
years or less.t It was also reported in the Italian press that Agca was do this by General Giuseppi Musumeci, a p-2 member and formerly
threatened with a |oss of his privileges and with being re|eased Ínto the second in command of SISMI.8 In pandico's account, Musumeci,
general Italian prison population if he failed to cooperate. The implica- Cutolo, a prison chaplain, and a prison official explained to Agca that
tion was that this might result in assassination for the assailant of the he could expect trouble in prison if he failed to cooperate. It was also
Pope.6 Martella himself acknowledged in his final Report that he had suggested to him that it might be possible ro arrange for getting him out
held out to Agca the possibility of having his sentence commuted by in six or seven yeaÍs' if he did what was required of him. It was at this
presidential pardon if he cooperated with the investigation.' Thus a point, also, according to Pandico, that Agca was given detailed instruc-
period of using the stick, and a continuing threat of further applications tions on the lines of a preliminary confession.n
of the stick, were combined with positive inducements to talk. As a rightwinger and anticommunist it should not have been too diffi-
There is some dispute over the number and significance of intelli- cult to persuade Agca that by implicating the Bulgarians he was contrib-
gence services visits to Agca in prison. Judge Martella and Prosecutor uting to a useful crusade against a common enemy. Many Agca obser-
Albano both claimed only a single visit in which nothing of great inter- vers have noted that Agca will tell his interrogators what they want to
est occurred. On the other hand, an ltalian police report in August 1982 hear, as long as this is not damaging to his own interests. Agca will, in
stated that the secret services conducted "interviews" (plural) with fact, tell his interrogators more than they want to hear because of his
Agca for the purpose of trying to determine whether or not there were longstanding propensity to spin out mythical tales in which he is the
"international connections " (i. e., a Bulgarian Connection) underlying hero. Orsan Oymen noted that "During my previous conversations with
the plot. The ltalian press also reported multiple visits by the secret ser- friends of Agca I had noticed some things which suggested signs of
vices to Ascoli Piceno prison and to Agca in particular. The interview of Agca's being obsessed with a mania for concocting stories. For in-
December 29, 1981, lasted five hours, according to one of the officers stance, when Suleyman from Malatya told me about Mehmet Ali's
involved. The Albano and Martella Reports stress that Agca said little years at high school, he claimed that his schoolmate had a liking for ad-
that was useful on December 29, l98l, and that Agca could hardly have
8. Pandico's claims have been denied by Cutolo, Musumeci, pazienza, and others.
been coached by officials who knew so little themselves. This misses Pandico's statement has not been corroborated, but the denials, by people in serious
the complexity of coaching, which is not limited to the supply of details. trouble on whom the ltalian state has leverage, are of dubious credibility There is no evi-
At the meeting of December 29, Agca was almost surely shown who the dent reason why Pandico would create a false scenario for this set of events, and his
secret services wanted to cast in the role of villains and what he would clďms are plausible. Pazienza has suggested that Pandico,s story was part of a plot by
sISMI to shift the blame for the second conspiracy to him. According to
other elements of
have to do to get back into the limelight and improve his personal condi-
Pazíenza, it was these other e]ements in SISMI who coached Agca (see below)
tion as a prisoner. These are important elements of coaching. Pazienza's accusations are quite detailed and are possibly true, although he has lied on
The actual decision to "confess" and the more detailed mechanics of many matters and lacks credibility. Furthermore, Pandico's naming of Musumeci and
making a proper confession undoubtedly came later. According to the Pazienza occurred only a week after his mother was injured in an attack presumably by the
Mafia, and would seem to be aimed at damaging the Mafia, not as part of a SISMI-Mafia
5 DianaJohnstone, "Latest scandal leads to Reagan administration," InTheseTimes, pfot to cover themselves at the expense ofPazienza. surprisingly, pandico's claims were
December 5-l l, 1984. given indirect support by claire Sterling, who asserred that she was told by an ttalian
6 The secret services ' 'visited Agca and warned him that once his solitary confinement iudge that cutolo had tried ro "scare Agca to death" in order to ingratiate himself with the
.the
was over, authoÍities cou|d no longer guarantee his sďety ' Days before he was due to ltalian prison authorities Claire Ster|ing, ..Si|enzio so spaÍa,'' Panorama, Apri| 23,
be moved to the main wing of the prison Agca began to reveal the 'Bulgarian Connec- l 984
tion.' " Tana de Zulueta and Peter Godwin, "Face To Face With The Colonel Accused "Cell With Services," L'Espresso, June 23, l9g5; Bruno Rubino,
9. Pietro Calderoni,
Of Plotting To Kilt the Pope," Sunday Times (London), May 26, 1983' p 50 "Pazienza? TheBulgarianTrailIsHisldea," L'Epoca,July l,1985 Bothof thesearti-
7 Martella Report. pp 464-65(622-23) cles are interviews with Pandrco.
106 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION FIVE: DARKNESS IN ROME 107

venture and spy novels, invented all sorts of scenarios, and believed access to the Sterling-Kalb version of the Plot, Agca was provided with
them himself. "'o enough detail to make a plausible first approximation case. He was
Agca would also be amenable to fingering the Bulgarians because this eventually shown pictures of individuals and apaÍtments, with identifi-
provided him with another opportunity to make a mark on the world. cation sufficient to allow him to provide "surprising details."r, Then,
Self-aggrandizement and public recognition-what Mumcu and others with generous access to journalistic accounts of the case and related is-
call his "Carlos complex"-are apparently among Agca's driving emo- sues,'t and by the intelligent use of further questions by the secret ser-
tional needs. Agca was referred to half-affectionately by some of his vices and magistrates,ra Agca could provide new claims and more ..sur-
Gray Wolves colleagues as the "Emperor. " The Emperor likes to be in prising details" without requiring explicit coaching.
the limelight, and enjoyed the notoriety of shooting the Pope. In fact, A curiosity in the case, which strongly supports the coaching
this appears to have been one of the motivating forces for the assassina- hypothesis, is the long time that it took for Agca to name the Bulga-
tion attempt itself. Moving once again to center stage by his confession rians. Arrested in May I 98 I , Agca did not begin to name his Bulgarian
implicating the Bulgarians and KGB, Agca was pleased with the re- accomplices until October and November of 1982, a lapse of 17 to 18
newed attention and was eager to provide his new collaborators with months. This was the period of opportunity, during which the coinci-
what they wanted. Playing his new role, he repeated in rote fashion, and dence of interest between Agca and his captors could be made to yield a
like a bad actor, all the formulas of the Sterling school of "international congenial confession. Agca failed to provide a single Bulgarian name
terrorism. " until some six months after he had agreed to cooperate with the ltalian
In our view of what actually transpired in ltaly, Agca would not have authorities, which was in April 1982. Neither Sterling nor Martella has
required much direct coaching. Having been shown his options, and the provided a satisfactory explanation for Agca's long delay in implicating
usefulness and personal advantage ofcooperation, he would understand the Bulgarians.'t Our conclusion is that he did not confess earlier about
that his captors were deeply interested in proving a Bulgarian involve- Bulgarian participation because he had nothing to confess. He had to be
ment in the assassination attempt. This had already been made clear in softened up in prison and then induced to say the right things.
the interviews of the secret services and in the drift of Martella's interro- To recapitulate the reasons for believing that Agca was coached:
gations. By September 1982 Sterling's Reader's Digest article and the o A large array of political factions in ltďy, extending from P-2
NBC-TV spectacular on the Plot had made their mark, and the Sterling through the Craxi socialists, and including important people within the
model of a Bulgarian Connection had surely reached Agca through the Vatican, had a strong politicď stake in getting Agca to implicate the
media as well as via interrogations. Here was a ready-made opportunity Bulgarians and Soviet Union.
to move back to center stage! 12. We discuss below the evidence that the photo identification parade was pre-ar-
Pandico claimed that Musumeci came to Ascoli Piceno with a set of ranged.
note cards on which were written the motivations that Agca was sup- l 3. "Every single fact that Agca describes about the workings of the Turkish Mafia and

posed to offer as the basis for his confession, as well as the details on its links with Bulgaria was contained in a series of newspaper articles which Agca read in
jail.'' De Zulueta and codwín, op. cil , n. 6' p 50.
what he was to say about Bulgarian and Soviet involvement. A year and
14. "when asked by Martella in Bulgaria whether he had any salient physical features,
a half before Pandico's statement, another Mafia member turned in- vassilev said that he had a mole on his left cheek. ln a subsequent confession, as vassilev
former, Giuseppi Cilleri, had already been cited in the Italian press as points out, .Agca described my mole ín lhe very same words which I used in describing it
cfaiming that FrancescoPazienza had been a "frequent visitor" to As- here.' " Ibid., pp.48, 50. In his final defense summary on March 7, 1996, Antonov's at_
coli Piceno prison and that he had personally given Agca instructions in torney consolo pointed out that Agca originally described Aivazov as speaking Italian
"quite well." The proprietor of the boarding house in Rome where Agca stayed sub_
preparation for the photo identification of Bulgarians." Whether by
sequently testified that the individual who resewed a room for Agca, alleged by Agca to
such means, or by judiciously informative questioning combined with have been Aivazov, spoke "perfect" Italian. shortly thereafter Agca changed his ac-
count: Aivazov spoke "perfect" Italian. Agca was supposedly not privy to the secret tes-
10. Oymen, op. cit., n. 3.
tlmony of the boarding house proprietor. This pattern occurred with great frequency.
I l. Calderoni, op. cit., n.9. The account of Cilleri's testimony was given in an article
15. We discuss Sterling's attempts at an explanation in Chapters 2 and 6.
on Agca ín L,Espresso, December 25' l983.
r08 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION FIVE: DARKNESS IN ROME 109

o The Reagan administration was also anxious to demonstrate the also know that he was visited by U.S. and Turkish intelligence officials,
depth of Soviet evil in the early 1980s, and its propaganda instruments by a Turkish journalist, and by others. His prison conditions were
were in the forefront in pressing each and every propaganda opportu- ludicrously porous for a condemned criminal who the Investigating
nity. Agca's visit to Sofia provided such an opportunity to Sterling, Magistrate was relying upon for new information.
Henze, and company. The power of the U.S. media, and the links of the o Agca was in a prison cell next to that of Dr. Giovanni Senzani, a
U.S. government, intelligence agencies, and business community to "penitent" member of the Red Brigades, who stood to benefit by
their counterparts in Italy are capable of affecting Italian political cooperating with SISMI and the prison authorities. Senzani was in regu-
choices. lar contact with Agca and supposedly taught him ltalian.
. Agca was perfectly positioned to be manipulated. He was in prison . Agca was also frequently attended to by Father Mariano Santini, a
for life and easily subjected to inducements and threats by his captors. Catholic prison chaplain who was later jailed for serving as a prison
c Agca was also readily manipulable by virtue of his personal charac- emissary of the Mafia. Why would Agca, a non-Catholic, require the
teristics and politics. He liked to make up stories and to be at the center aid of a Catholic chaplain? As we noted earlier, a Vatican off,rcial de-
of attention. He also had durable ties to the anticommunist extreme scribed Santini as a Vatican instrument in inducing Agca to talk, and
Right of Turkey. Agca himself complained to the Vatican and elsewhere of pressure from
o The possibilities of manipulating Agca were recognized by all par- Santini.
ties from the start, and both SISMI and the Vatican "jumped the o Former mafioso Pandico has described in detail the pressures ap-
gun"-the former fabricated a Soviet plot within a week of the assassi- plied to Agca by Pandico's former boss Cutolo. Cutolo, an inmate in the
nation attempt, while Vatican interests proposed that Agca be induced Ascoli Piceno prison at the same time as Agca, was in a position to
to talk long before he had claimed any Bulgarian involvement. threaten him. Pazienza has denied his or Musumeci's involvement,
o All of the ltalian intelligence services were headed by P-2 members claiming that other elements in SISMI, also linked to Michael Ledeen,
and were broadly infiltrated by P-2 at the time of the assassination at- actually did coach Agca, but have tried to shift the blame on to him.
tempt. This provided the opportunity to disseminate disinformation on Pazienza named names and provided many details, although he is not
Bulgarian-KGB involvement and then coach Agca to claim the reality of noted for reliability. But as Diana Johnstone points out: "With
the disinformation scenario. In early 1981 Francesco Pazienza was a Pazierzďs denials and counter-accusations, the controversy is boiling
SISMI agent, and he and Michael Ledeen had been in an alliance of down to a question of who within SISMI invented the Bulgarian Con-
convenience to serve Reagan in the Billygate affair. Italy has a nection and whether they were prompted by American colleagues."'t
longstanding rightwing and intelligence tradition of planting fabricated o Following his period of isolation and harassment, but while still
evidence on the Left. theoretically in solitary confinement, Agca had a TV set and radio, and
a Despite his "solitary confinement," Agca had numerous visitors, received newspapers and private communications from outside the
many without the knowledge or approval of Investigating Magistrate prison. According to Prosecutor Albano's Report, when in June 1983
Martella. As noted earlier, officials of the Italian intelligence services Agca withdrew his assertion that be had visited Antonov's apaÍtment
visited Agca on December 29, 1981, already probing into "interna- and met his wife and daughter, he stated thar he had obtained his de-
tional connections" and almost surely telling Agca who the security ser- scription of Antonov's apartment-its layout, fumishings, etc.-from
vices were interested in implicating in the Plot and the advantages that newspapers.'* The prosecutor also conceded that Agca's feat in produc-
would accrue to him by "cooperating." The Italian press has claimed
l7 Diana Johnstone, "Bulgarian Connection: Finger-pointing in the pontiff plot
that Agca was also visited by other SISMI officials, including Lieuten- labyrinth," ln These Times, January 29-February 4, 1986
ant Colonel Giuseppi Belmonte and FrancescoPazienza.'u Agca himself 18. Agca got useful materials for his confessions from Turkish books and rnagazine ar-
told the court in June 1985 that he had been visited by Pazienza. We ticles, as well as radio, TV, newspapers, and coaches The role of Celenk in Agca's plot
scenarío escalated sharply after he read a book by Mumcu on arms smuggling in which
16. Johnstone, op cit , a 5. Celenk was a key |rgure. see note 36 in Chapter 2. See also nďe 13 above.
I IO TI{E BULGARIAN CONNECTION FIVE: DARKNESS IN ROME III

ing the telephone numbers of various Bulgarians had been accomplished would appear that the security services were trying to make it easier for
by his looking them up in a telephone book "inadvertently" provided to Agca to select the right people ("Remember, the one with a military
him. Agca repeated these declarations during the trial, telling the court uniform, and the first two in the album"!). Finally, the photo album
that he had found the details of his "confessions" in the newspapers. shown to Agca had been used earlier in a trial involving Senzani, the
While these admissions demonstrate the breakdown of controls over Red Brigades prisoner who was in the next cell to Agca and in frequent
Agca's sources of information bearing on the case, they do not prove communication with him. Senzani would have been well situated to
coaching. The Bulgarians, and Antonov's defense counsel, claim, how- brief Agca on the Bulgarian details that he needed to know in the iden-
ever, that a thoroughgoing search of press coverage shows that at the tification parade.
time he provided the details on Antonov's apartment, no ltalian or Tur- aAntonov was allegedly introduced to Agca as "Bayramic."
kish newspaper had yet produced a single word about Antonov,s Ílat in Bayramic is the name of a small town in Turkey located near Agca's
Rome. This defense claim is in accord with common sense. Why would home in Malatya. (This was disclosed by Antonov's defense counsel in
any paper have provided details of Antonov's apartment before Agca's his concluding remarks on March 6, 1986.) This would be another ex-
claims made those details an issue? Such descriptions only followed his traordinary coincidence if we were to take Agca's word that this was a
confession and the first investigative visit to Antonov's flat on June I l, code name ťrxed by the Bulgarians; on the other harid, it is entirely com-
1983.'" prehensible if we assume that the name was another concoction by
a Former Minister of Defense Lagorio stated before the Italian Parlia- Agca.
ment that Agca identified his Bulgarian accomplices in September 1982 o According to Agca, "Bayramic" was the only name by which he
from a photo album that had been prepared by the secret services. Al- knew Antonov. But he allegedly communicated with Antonov by call-
bano's Report placed the photo identification on November 8, 1982, ing him at the BulgaÍian Embassy, through the general switchboard.
and Martella also stated that on November 8 Agca picked out the Bulga- Martella never addressed the question of how Antonov could be reached
rians "without being informed in any way of the names or positions of through the switchboard operator, who presumably did not know An-
the people involved."a The contradiction between Lagorio and Albano- tonov's highly secret code name, by Agca, who knew Antonov only by
Martella has never been explained, but lends credence to the supposition the code name.
that Agca was shown the photo album before November 8. . Initially Agca identified Antonov as having a beard. While An-
There are several other features of the photo album display which tonov had a beard at the time of his arrest, his counsel was able to prove
suggest bias, coaching, or both. One is that the album contained exclu- that he did not have a beard at a time when Agca claims they met. Agca
sively pictures of Bulgarians-56 in all-which means that if Agca had identified Antonov on the basis of a later photograph, making the kind
picked three persons at random he would still have named three Bulga- of mistake in timing that occurs with coaching, when the beard appear-
rians. Second, prior to his initial photo identification session Agca had ing later is carelessly assumed to have been worn earlier. How did Agca
"confessed" to knowing only two Bulgarian officials, "Kolev" and even recognize the bearded Antonov whom he had never seen in the
"Bayramic." He identified these two as being photos number one and bearded state? On the supposition that he might still have recognized
number two in the album, an amazing coincidence. (The odds against him, would he not be likely to note his former nonbearded state? Agca
any two of 56 photos occupying places number one and two in the subsequently suggested that Antonov probably wore a false beard. And
album by chance are I,540 to one). Another noteworthy feature of the the beard apparently changed color at each meeting, as in a bad spy
photo identification is that at his second session he picked out as "Pet- thriller.2
rov" the only person in the album dressed in military uniform.'' It o In his detailed description of Antonov's apartment, Agca men-
tioned a folding door that divided the apartment. But while such a door
f 9. Boyan Traikov, Mystification, Dr. Martella! (Sofia: Sofia Press, 1984), p. 28.

20. Quoted in Michael Dobbs, "A Communist Plot to Kill the Pope--Or a Liar's Fan- Agca's memory.
tasy,,, Washington Posí, November l8' l984' 22. For the actual sequence of Agca's changing claims about Antonov's beard, see the
21. Although Petrov was allegedly his "control," his existence had previously slipped text below on pp. I 16-17.
tt2 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION FIVE: DARKNESS IN ROME ll3
existed in the other apartments in the building, the folding door had determination, conscientiousness, and integrity; but his background and
been removed in Antonov's apaÍtment and replaced by a curtain prior to performance were never considered in any depth or with the slightest
Agca's alleged visit. Again, as in the case of Antonov's beard, we have critical perspective. This allowed the press to proceed on the assumption
the kind of mistake easily made by imperfect coaching, where the ar- that we were witnessing in Italy a thorough and unbiased judicial inves-
rangements in Antonov's apartment are inferred from those in other tigation, and it permitted the steady stream of fresh allegations and leaks
apartments in the same building.'z3 to be given full propaganda vďue.
o After Agca retracted his claim that he had been on reconnaissance With an unbiased media, by contrast, we believe that the fraudulent
missions planning to murder Walesa, he was asked to explain how he character of the pre-trial proceeding would have been quickly made evi-
knew so much about Walesa's hotel if he had never been there? Accord- dent.27 The preceding chapter described a political environment that
ing to Michael Dobbs, "Agca claimed that he learned the details from seriously threatened the integrity ofjudicial processes, and in fact the
magistrates who had interrogated him in connection with a parallel in- antiterrorism law under which the case was brought suspends many of
vestigation into an alleged Bulgarian spy ring in ltaly."'?a This admis- the traditional rules that distinguish democratic from nondemocratic
sion once again displays a broken-down judicial process. But there are societies. The passionate public statements by political leaders in ltaly
two further problems. First, at the time that Agca was interrogated by and the United States that clearly prejudged the case, the enormous
these magistrates, they themselves had not received the information media barrage that did the same, and the huge stake of Italian and U.S.
which they supposedly passed on inadvertently to Agca. Second, the in- conservatives in the outcome made this a politicď and politicized case
terrogations of Luigi Scricciolo, which he named as the source of his in- from the very beginning. Would this not affect the judicial system, the
formation, do not contain any descriptions of the building in question." choice of investigators and judges in ltaly, and their ability and willing-
Agca also named a Bulgarian diplomat, Ivan Dontchev, as a partner in ness to look for the truth? The question did not arise in the West.
the Walesa murder plot, and he identified Dontchev from a photo The P-2 conspiracy penetrated the lralian judiciary. The 1984 Par-
album. Subsequently Agca admitted that he had never seen Dontchev in liamentary Report, for example, states that Dr. Carmelo Spagnulo,
his life. How did he identify Dontchev's picture without coaching?'u chief prosecutor of the Rome Court of Appeals, attended a key meeting
held in Gelli's home in 1973.In the Report's general enumeration of
P-2 penetration into public administration, which counted 422 P-Z-
linked officials, 16 active and 3 retired magistrates were included.
Martella, Priore, and Italy's Investigation of the Plot Whatever the affiliations of particular judges such as Martella, this is
symptomatic of an unhealthy judicial environment.
Just as the U.S. press has never seen fit to examine the Italian political By the late 1970s the Italian judiciary was saturated with the Sterling-
environment, so also it has never analyzed closely Magistrate Ilario Jonathan Institute perspective on terrorism. This framework was im-
Martella and his handling of the Bulgarian Connection. Martella was mediately applied to the plot against the Pope. Thus Martella's col-
often given laudatory and entirely uncritical accolades emphasizing his league Rosario Priore, Judge of the Court of Appeal and serving as In-
23. Also living in the same apartment building in l98l was Reverend Felix A. Morlion, vestigating Judge at the Rome Tribunal, produced a report entitled ''The
a veteran reactionary and CIA asset. Perhaps the folding door idea was obtained from cases Moro, Dozier and the attack on the Pope, " which is vintage Ster-
Morf ion See "The Role of Felix Morlion," CovertAction Information Bulletin, Number ling.28 After describing Agca's account of his stay in Sof,ra and present-
25, Winter 1986, p. 30: II Mondo, April 8, 1985; and L'Espresso, May 19, 1985.
ing a number of alleged facts about the Bulgarians named by Agca,'o
24. Michael Dobbs, "Agca's Changing Testimony," Washington Posl, October 17,
l984. 27. We are speaking of the initiation and investigative phase of the case, not the trial,
25. Marte lla Reporr, pp. 375-82 (490-500), 423-2'7 (557-63). whose conduct was fair, although subject to political constraints.
26. Coaching would include a disclosure by a magistrate during interrogation which the 28. This document was circulated in the United States by the ltalian Embassy.
witness seizes upon and is allowed to use as conf,irmation of his special knowledge of the 29. Two of them were in Bulgaria at the same time as Agca, and two "were in service
matter disclosed to him! See note l4 above on Agcfsidentificatlon of Vassilev's mole. in Rome at the same time the structure discussed above was ín operation-acquiring infor-
l14 THE BUTCARIAN CONNECTION FIVE: DARKNESS IN ROME l r5

Priore says that this "network" shows "the interweaving of a number illustration of this was his reaction to Agca's numerous lies and retrac-
of international interests and the existence of centers that manipulate ter- tions. In a normal judicial process, lies and retractions that destroy parr
rorism, which are located in other countries and in their intelligence ser- of the claims of a witness weaken the credibi|ity of those paÍts that can.
vices. ."T Priore quotes without qualification Agca's description of not be positively disproved. Disbelief is directly related to the number
his own role:
,.I am an international terrorist, ready to he|p the teÍrorists of lies and retractions. This was not true in the Martella investigation.
of any nation."rr Priore asserts that the manipulators of international Martella postulated that, having decided to tell the truth, Agca was al-
terrorism "aim at destabilizing the western democracies,"tt although he ways struggling to make that core truth more credible. He lied, accord-
does not point to any evidence that would support this claim. This is of ing to Martella, in order to "give more credibility to his statement."*
course a major theme of Claire Sterling's The Terror Nentork, which That the statement to which Agca desired to give credibility was not also
she could not sell to western intelligence agencies, but which found a a lie was, of course, merely Martella's gratuitous assumption, for which
happy home in the Italian judicial system.3r Priore infers a "network" he gave no rationale. This assumption flies in the face of normal reason-
from an alleged Bulgarian Connection alone, and "international cen- ing-which does not rationalize selected lies by a priori assumptions
ters" of terrorism (plural) from the same evidence. He shows not the about the liar's intent. Martella's investigation was therefore hopelessly
slightest skepticism concerning Agca's testimony, despite its continu- biased at the outset.
ally shifting character and other deficiencies. He refers to Agca's state- When Agca retracted evidence, for Martella ihis was to Agca's cred-
ment-"I am an international terrorist" etc.-as "highly signihcant," it, as he was cleansing himself of excesses in his search for the truth.
not as a statement that would be significant if true. The extremely rote
("We cannot ignore the particular importance in the search for truth of
quality of Agca's remarks on international terrorism, which conform so the 'retraction' made by the same Agca during the course of judicial in-
precisely to--{ven caricature--the Sterling model of a modern terrorist, quiry."") An alternative explanation, which Martella never addressed,
does not elicit doubts from this ltalian judge, and coaching is not enter- is that Agca shifted his testimony in order to make a new dramatic entry
tained as a possibility. The hypothesis that the Bulgarians and Soviets on to the stage. This would, of course, require that he say that which the
might have been set up by some other "centers of terrorism" (if any audience (i.e., Martella and his associates) wanted most to hoar.
exist for Priore) is never addressed. Another possibility which Martella never mentioned is that Agca re-
Judge llario Martella apparently shares Priore's frame of reference. tracted claims because his lies had run into so many contradictions that
He was put in charge of the case in November 1981. Like Priore, Mar- they were no longer sustainable. Thus, Agca ultimately withdrew his
tella started out with a prior assumption that the charges which he was claim that Aivazov was the man photographed from behind fleeing the
supposed to be investigating were essentially true. The most remarkable Square on May 13, claiming instead that it was his friend Oral Celik. I

The reason for this recantation, according to Agca, was that he had de-
mation on the ltalian trade unions. . . . " Rosario Priorc, "The cases Moro, Dozier and termined "to tell the truth to the end even at the risk of harming a friend
the attack on thc Pope," p. 24.
who like Celik is dearer to me than a brother but in the knowledge that I
30- rbid.
31. Ibid., p. 25.
am telling the absolute truth."16 Martella quoted this with admiration,
32. Ibid-, p.26. although it was an assertion of a man who had lied incessantly up to that
33. The judge in charge of the second trial in Rome, Severino Santiapichi, who also very moment.tt Martella made no reference to the fact that Agca's re-
prcsided over Agca's initial tria| for the attemptď assassination of the Pope' stated at the traction fol|owed shortly after a press conference in Soťra, at which the
conclusion of the eartier trial that Agca was mercly the surface representation of a "deep opportunity to see Aivazov had made it clearly evident to the assembled
conspiracy . . . orchestrated by secret forces, carefully planned and directed down to the
smallest detail." This reference !o "secret forces" has a Sterling-like ring, and as we dis- 34. Martella Report, p. 37'7(492-93).
cuss elsewhere in this book, the planning of the assassination attempt was remarkably 3s. Ibid-, p. 769(986).
mismanaged. ln the second trial, just concluded, Santiapichi showed that he was not com- 36. Ibid., p. t27(172).
mitted to the a priori "deep conspiracy" view, and the course of the rial as conducted by 37. Thc trial has cast doubts on the truth of Agca's identification ofCelik in thc Square.
Santiapichi effectively undermined the "first conspiracy" scenarios of western disinfor- It appcars that Martella was gulled twice about thc idcntification of thc one photograph.
mationists and their "secret forces."
116 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION FIVE: DARKNESS IN ROME 117

press that he bore no resemblance to the man in the Lowell Newton he had been introduced to Agca not by his control officer but at the
photograph, and thus it could not have been he in the Square. When the Hotel Archimede back in December 1980. At that time thev discussed
counsel for the defense suggested that this, rather than a sudden burst of plans to assassinate Lech Walesa!
sincerity, might have had something to do with Agca's recantation, (5) On November 21 , 1982, Agca now claimed to have f,rrst met An-
Martella refused to accept sucla a cynical view! tonov in the apartment of his control officer at 36 Via Galiani.
Because for Martella Agca was a truth-seeker, he could adjust his evi- (6) By late December, Agca had moved on to a version of greater
dence by a system of successive approximations. In fact, the greatjudi- complexity and intimacy. He now claimed that he had met Antonov and
cial innovation brought to the Bulgarian Connection case by Martella his wife in their own apaÍment several days before the assassination at-
was allowing the witness supporting the a priori Free World truth about tempt-a version Agca retracted on June 28, 1983.
the assassination attempt to adjust his testimony by a trial-and-enor pro- Agca also adjusted his story several times concerning the events of
,.The
cess wiÍlr no penalty for error. As Michael Dobbs pointed out, the day of the assassination attempt. It turned out that so many people
overall effect of these changes was to bring his evidence into line with had seen Antonov at the Balkan Air office on May 13, l98l at 5 P.M.-
events occurring outside the top-security prison where he was being the time when Agca claimed that Antonov was with him-that Agca's
held as well as with revelations about the case in the mass media. "3* Al- evidence was not sustainable. Well, Agca could then recall that he had
though he made eÍTors on key points and radica||y contradicted himself in fact rnet Antonov somewhat earlier. This was perfectly understanda-
time and again, this never fatally damaged Agca's credibility for Mar- ble to Martella.
tella. Agca's method was to adjust his claims until they fit times for which
Agca's identif,rcation of Antonov and his claim to have done business the Bulgarians had no ironclad alibis. His ability to get away with this
with him were strategic points in the case. Consider, then, how Agca depended on the fact that Martella disbelieved Bulgarians as strongly as
identified Antonov:3e he believed Agca (and anybody who supported his claims). For Mar-
(l) It took him six months after agreeing to cooperate with the Itďian tella, Bulgarians were not seekers after the truth. Their failures to re-
authorities even to mention Antonov's existence. member all of the <letails of the events during a day two years earlier
(2) In his first reference to Antonov, made at the end of October quickly aroused his suspicions. Numerous Bulgarian and Italian wit-
1982, Agca was brief . He said only that on May 1 2, 1 98 1 , his Bulgarian nesses brought forward by the defense were dismissed for lack of preci-
"control officer" pointed out Antonov to him as the man who would sion and for contradictions in their recollections. But when Agca was
drive him on the next day to the assassination rendezvous. Agca said caught unable to state on what floor Aivazov's apartment was located
that Antonov had a blondish beard. (he allegedly visited it a number of times), Martella says "it would have
(3) On November 8, 1982, Antonov was recognized by Agca in the been much more surprising had Agca been not mistaken."ao
photo ďbum. He now had a black beard. Agca now remembered that he The Martella process was completed by his further dichotomous treat-
had seen Antonov on two or three previous occasions (whereas l0 days ment of possible coaching. Martella was extremely alert to the possibil-
earlier he stated that he had seen Antonov only on May 12 and that he ity that the Bulgarians might connive among themselves to create an
had had a blond beard). alibi, and he was quick to dismiss new claims that corrected earlier in-
(4) On November 19, ll days afterbeing shown the photo, Agca's consistencies. These he saw to be clearly based on collusion. But re-
recollections bloomed and finer details were forthcoming. He now re- garding the possibility that Agca was primed from the beginning, or step
mernbered that Antonov had a broad forehead and a big nose, and that by step, one can observe a completely different Martella-more under-
38. Dobbs, op. cit., a.24. 40. Traikov, op cit , n 19, p- 38 When Agca tried to locate Aivazov's apartment, he
39' The íacts in this account are taken from the chronology given by Michael Dobbs in got badly confused. He also misspelled the street name, using two 'ls' in Galiani, a mis-
his "A Comnrunist Plot to Kill the Pope---Or a Liar's Fantasy," Washington Post, take made in the telephone directory, but not on the street sign on the block. None of these
Novemirer 18, 1984 This article summarizes Martella's interrogation of Agca on pages crrors imoressod Martella
84-87 (103-7) of |lís Report.
It8 TTIE BULGARIAN CONNECTION FIVE: DARKNESS IN ROME I 19

standing of Agca's problems in searching for the truth, and remarkably This point eventually showed up in Agca's testimony. Agca clďmed
naive and vague about the possibilities of connivance and collusion. that the Bulgarians urged speed in executing the plot, as the French and
Here again was a double standard that protected a case which so well Rumanian secret services were aware of it and the papal authorities
served western political interests. What makes Martella's naiveté about might take countermeasures. Martella cited these claims in his Report's
the possibility that Agca was coached especially ludicrous was that he summary, apparently taking them seriously. He never seems to have
maintained no control over the imprisoned Agca's visitors or activities, noted the contradiction between the claim that the alleged conspirators
whether by Iack of power or because he delegated it to the intelligence feared prior knowledge of the plot by the authorities, and the incredibly
services and prison authorities. Martella was vague about this lack of loose behavior of the Bulgarians in entertaining Agca and openly parad-
control and its implications, but denied his own responsibility' Martella ing around with him for several days preceding the assassination at-
himself visited Agca only after a long delay, and shonly ďter the visit tempt. We feel confident that this de Borchgravian information offered
by the intelligence services. This suggests the possibility of a "two by Agca was fed to him by one of his interrogators, to be regurgitated
track" system, by which the intelligence services and prison authorities for the delectation of the investigating magistrate.
arranged for Agca to be primed, and Martella then accepted the new in- Claire Sterling also appears to have had a close relationship with MaÍ-
sights and sought to confirm them independently. This division oflabor tella. She states in The Time of the Assassins that she "dropped in on
would allow SISMI and others to do the dirty work of getting Agca to Matella" to check up on his agenda,o2 and apparently did so more than
see the ligbt and feeding him the requisite information, while Martella once,ot although she notes elsewhere that he "was free to discuss the
would be left as an innocent if perhaps naive judge playing dumb about case only with competent judicial authorities."* It would appear to be
the SISMI preparations as he doggedly searched for the truth. no coincidence that the first journalist to obtain the Albano Report was
ln the summary of his final Report Martella spoke of the plot as "a Claire Sterling. The Sterling "imprint" is evident in both the Albano
real act of war. " This language was close to that demagogically used by and Manella Reports in their Cold War premises and in their framing of
Defense Minister Lagorio on the floor of the Italian Parliament, but it is the Bulgarian Connection case.
an especiďly flamboyant and politically loaded phrase in a case resting Under Martella's management the case was ďso notable for leaks and
strictly on Agca's claims and still untested in a jury trial. After noting delays. Martella always reluctantly produced just enough copy to keep
that Agca had been provided with a perfectly forged passport and that he the pot boiling. After Agca was persuaded to implicate the Bulgarians in
had received financial support and protection during his travels up to November 1982, Martella busily visited Antonov's apartment and
May 13, Martella concluded that "Ali Agca was only a pawn in a vast otherwise displayed to the press that energy in pursuing Agca's claims
plot. . . . '' The facts cited by Martella, however, were peďectly com. that was one of his most distinctive attributes. On July 8, 1983, Agca
patible with a "tiny plot" involving the Malatya branch of the Gray was brought out ofjail to be interrogated concerning the kidnapping of
Wolves. The "vast" plot is political rhetoric not grounded in evidence. Emmanuela Orlandi, the Vatican official's daughter. The press was in-
MaÍtella's political bias was also reflected in his affinity for U.S. dis- gence agency that passed the story along to the Vatican, Comte Alexandre de Marcnche,
informationists. Just prior to anesting Antonov, Martella visited the was a good friend of Francesco Pazienza, who was at that time a member of SISMI and
United States, where he was given a special viewing of the NBC-TV colfaborator with lrdeen. Pazienza claimed that he and de Marenche warned the Vatican
program "The Man Who Shot The Pope," and consulted with various ot rhis threat six months ahead of the assassination attempt. (Jonathan Kwitny, ..Tales of
Intngue: Why an Italian Spy Got Closely Involved In the Billygare Affair," Wall Street
government officials and experts on the case. One of his informants was
Journal, August 8, 1985, p. 12.) This was not the first time that de Marenche had warned
Arnaud de Borchgrave, a Red Scare novelist and major disinformation the Pope about an ď|eged assassination attempt. De Marenche was himself an impoÍtant
source. From de Borchgrave Martella got the information that the head disinformationist and recycler of the disinformation of other intelligence agencies.
of the French secret services had learned about an "Eastern" plot 42. Claire Sterling, The Time of the Assasslns (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1983), p 64
against the Pope in advance, and had actually warned the Vatican'o
43- Ibid., pp. 109, 194.
41. The ultimate source of this information is unclear The head of the French intelli- 44. Ibid., p 144.
I2O THB BULGARIAN CONNECTION FIVE: DARKNESS IN ROME l2l
formed of the occasion; and Agca was allowed to speak before ltalian and affidavits of identification at hotels and border crossings. At the
TV cameras, where he presented a full litany of Sterling clichés' as a time Agca allegedly met Mrs. Antonov at the Picadilly restaurant, she
spokesman for law and order: "I was trained in Bulgaria and Syria . . . was in Sofia. The defense was obliged to seek out and produce compel-
the Bulgarian services. . . . Yes, by the KGB. " Martella disclaimed re- ling data showing this. Martella never even bothered to check out Mrs.
sponsibility for allowing this organized press conference for Agca, but Antonov's movements through the Rome airport. The Bulgarians claim
if this is true it indicates a serious lack of control over judicial processes. that when Martella finď|y interrogated Mrs' Antonov, his questioning
In December 1984 Agca was again allowed to be interviewed by an ltal- was lengthy and hostile. Subsequently, Agca admitted that he had never
ian journalist, although he was presumably scheduled for trial for con- met Mrs. Antonov.
spiracy to murder. The leak of the Albano Report to Claire Sterling fits Martella was clearly a "team player"-the team being the ltalian
the same pattern. political-intelligence elite and their allies in Washington, D.C. His
Martella showed no interest in any possible locus of the plot other function was to push the Bulgarian Connection as far as it could be
than Bulgaria, a point also stressed and criticized by Turkish analyst pushed, to deflect criticisms as best he could, to keep the ball in the air
Ugur Mumcu.a5 Agca spent a great deal of time in Switzerland and West as long as public relations points could be extracted from it. He per-
Germany, which are major Gray Wolves centers, and the Gray Wolves formed this function well.
provided Agca with money and guns throughout his travels in Europe. It
is important, too, that the details showing extensive Gray Wolves in-
volvement are independent of Agca's testimony. Although Celebi, The Triď and The Coaching Hypothesis
Agca's paymaster, lived in Frankfurt, Martella Í-ai|ed to go there and
seek evidence of a possible Gray Wolves conspiracy. The trial provided important support for the coaching hypothesis in two
Martella was also extremely unenterprising in seeking evidence that ways. For one thing, by exposing Agca ro open view and by its failure
contradicted Agca's claims, and when he was confronted with it he to obtain confirmation anywhere for his claims of Bulgarian involve-
tended to look the other way. In Bulgaria, Martella visited the Vitosha ment, the trial stripped away the last vestiges of believability of the
Hotel, where Agca claimed to have stayed and met his accomplices in Sterling-Henze model. In doing this, the trial proceedings inevitably
Room 9ll. The Vitosha keeps extensive records-the guest register, suggested questions about the route through which Agca came to latch
passport data, and details on the occupants of each room. During the
on to the Bulgarians, although this line of analysis was notpursued re-
period of Agca's alleged stay, neither his name nor passport aliases ap- lentlessly. The courl apparently felt that testing Agca's claims was the
pezu on the hotel records. According to Bulgarian authorities, Martella
first order of business. If they were not confirmed, the prosecution's
didn't even bother to make a court-usable copy of these records, nor did case was lost. The issue of how Agca came to expound false claims,
he show any interest in checking out and verifying the complete record while indirectly relevant, was not regarded as worthy of a major in-
of all of the room occupants during the relevant period.ou quiry. That area ďso happens to be especially sensitive politica|ly.
Another important illustration concerns Agca's claim to have met The trial also contributed to validating the coaching hypothesis more
Mrs. Antonov on several different occasions and to have visited An- directly by information that cropped up during the proceedings. Some-
tonov, his wife, and daughter in their apartment. Even though these times this information was thrust upon the court by independent de-
claims were extremely implausible, Martella believed them and failed to velopments in ltaly. Pandico's interview in L'Espresso describing a
show any initiative in proving Agca wrong. The defense had to dig up coaching scenario in detail could hardly be ignored. During the interro-
the evidence that Mrs. Antonov had driven with friends to Yugoslavia. gations of the Gray Wolves Ozbey and Catli, the court was taken aback
The defense-not the dogged investigator-got copies of hotel registers
by Catli's contention, and Ozbey's reluctant admission, that the West
45 Ugur Mumcu, Papa, Mafya, Ágca (Istanbul: Tekin Yayinevi, |9B4), p' 2,| German police had offered a bribe to Celik to come to West Germany to
46. Christian Roulette, L,aFiliere: Jean-PaulII, Antonov, Ágca (Paris: Editionsdu Sor- testify in support of Agca's claims. This evidence added plausibility to
bier, 1984), pp. 245-52.
r22 T}IE BULGARIAN CONNECTION

the coaching hypothesis by showing that the willingness of intelligence

services to manipulate evidence in support of the Bulgarian Connection
was not confined to ltaly. As for Italy itself, during the course of the
trial another court, in Milan, issued its dramatic judgment agďnst
Pazienza, Belmonte, and Musumeci for crimes, including the forgíng of (o. TlreDtstnformatlonlstss
evidence. This ďso helped to focus attention on the question of the in-
tegrity of the Italian secret services, an issue that Albano, Martella, and Sterllng, HenzzGs
Sterling had carefully' avoided.
In sum, the trial greatly strengthened the case-already formidable-
and Ledeen
that Agca was coached while in prison, and that the Bulgarian Connec-
tion rested on a "second conspiracy."

s we have stressed, the Bulgarian Connection was exceedingly

functional and met urgent political and ideological needs of the
West. The Reagan administration's plan to build 17,000 new nuclear
warheads and to deploy space-based battle stations is much more salable
to the public and Congress when news headlines read: "Soviets Plot to
Kill Pope. " In Italy also the Bulgarian Connection served well the Craxi
socialists, Christian Democrats, and the neofascist P-2 in their efforts to
embarrass and isolate the Communist Party and to facilitate participa-
tion in the U.S.-sponsored New Cold War.
Given the great serviceability of a Bulgarian-Soviet Connection to
powerful western interests, it was to be expected that the mass media of
the West would quickly accept and then help extract publicity mileage
from claims of Soviet involvement. U.S. conservatives. of course. con-
tend that the media are hotbeds of dissent, the source of unceasing strug-
gle against established government and corporate interests. We will
show in this and the following chapter that the conservative model has
no relationship to reality in the Bulgarian Connection case, where mass
media coverage of the Connection was almost completely dominated by
the conservative Sterling-Henze-Ledeen axis. It is ironic that this trio
and their allies regularly assail the media, while at the same time main-
taining their own full, almost exclusive, access and essentially complete
freedom from criticism. But the conservative attacks are purposeful, de-
signed to intimidate the media into keeping out dissident voices al-
togetherr and moving the system toward a desired 100 percent con-

l. Given their position as established, brand name authorities, whose appearance will

t23
t24 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION SIX: THE DISINFORMATIONISTS 125

formity. As Murray B. Levin points out in his Political Hysteria in U.S and because they realized that it would be used on such a scale as to raise
America "A near unanimity of pro-conspiratorial communications may questions among thoughtful observers, they raised the issue in advance them-
be a necessary precondition for the successful creation of a myth'"' selves.
Another important factor that causes the conservatives to attack the
media is that they are themselves in the disinformation business. They The best defense is a good offense. And if the U.S. disinformationists
all, of course, make periodic, usually brief, genuflections to Western are able to command extensive and respectful attention in the mass
Freedom, but their enthusiasm for the practice of political freedom is media, they can kill two birds with one stone: disseminate their own dis-
less evident.'This may be why they skirt so easily around the political information, and protect themselves from serious criticism by threaten-
crimes of rightwing states like Turkey and South Africa' Many conser- ing the media with accusations of being Soviet stooges in reporting any
vatives contend that we are fighting a holy war against an enemy that dissenting fact or opinion.
has no scruple. We are at a disadvantage because of our tradition of hon- Claire Sterling, Paul Henze, and Michael Ledeen were the principal
esty, etc. Fortunately, we have people like Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew exponents of the Bulgarian Connection in the United States in the years
Brzezinski, Robert Moss, Ray Cline, and a few thousand others who are I 982-85. It is our belief that they were important participants in the cre-

prepared to overlook our tradition of honesty in the face ofthe challenge ation of the Connection, as well as its leading disseminators. The ac-
to our National Security. In short, they will lie without scruple and counts which follow will show that they are disinformationists in the lit-
create and/or disseminate fabrications, but they will call it "news man- eral sense of the term.6 We will describe more fully in Chapter 7 their
agement."o Fred Landis argues persuasively that the recent spurt in dominance over the media's portrayal of the Bulgarian Connection.
rightwing attention to alleged Soviet disinformation and Soviet moles
was closely related to the new surge of disinformation by the very indi-
viduďs |evying the charges:'
Claire Sterling: Terrorism Pseudoscholar
Because this group planned to use the technique of disinformation within the
For many years a journalist in Europe for the Reporter and other
not be protested by Accuracy in Media or the State Department, Sterling and Henze have magazines, with the publication of The Terror Nenvork in 198 I , Claire
been ab|e to exc|ude contesting views from the media An officia| of oneTV netwoÍk in.
Sterling became the leading publicist of the alleged Soviet-backed cam-
formed us that both Sterling and Henze refuse to appeal on netwoÍk programs with critics'
insisting on a de facto exercise of veto power over participants Only once in the years paign of international terrorism. This work, which was immediately
I 982-85 was a dissident voice on the Bulgarian Connection heard on national TV On that adopted as a fundamental text by the incoming Reagan administration,
occasion, when Claire Sterling was confronted by AlexanderCockbum, we are informed established Sterling's credentials in the eyes of the western nedia. The
by network personnel that Sterling had vetoed participation by the present writers and Terror Network, along with her more recent study of the papal assassi-
Michael Dobbs of the Washington Po,r, When she appeared at the station and found that
nation plot, The Time of the Assassins, and her frequent articles in the
Cockbum was also to be on the program, she was outraged, and only at the last moment
was persuaded not to walk out of the studio See note 65 below on Henze's even more New York Times and Wall Street Journal, can be analyzed as primary
comprehensive prior restraints on media programming materials in the study of the pseudoscience of tenorism.
2. (New York: Basic Books, 197 l), p. I 18. This pseudoscience is illustrated by the infamous Lusk Report, a
3, The same is true of their leader. See, e.g., Walter Karp, "Liberty Under Siege: The product of a post-World War I investigation by the New York state leg-
Reagan Administration's Taste for Autocracy," Harper's, November 1985
..dis- islature which found a Red underevery bed. Murray B. Levin describes
4 According to Arnaud de Borchgrave, Free World spokespersons neverprďuce
information," they only engage in "management of the news." See Fred Clarkson and 6. Disinformationists are those who originate and/or dispense disinftrrmation "Disin-
Louis Wolf, "Amaud de Borchgrave Boards Moon's Ship," CovertAction Information tormation is an rntelligence word which describe s the covert attempt to rnanipulate the in-
Bulletin, No.24 (Summer 1985), p. 35 formational environmcnt of a selected target group by such actions as planted stories,
5 "spies and the Reagan Victory: 'The October 22 Movemenl,' " CovenAction lnfor- selective leaks, rumors, forged documents-all orchestrated toward a particular
mation Bullerin, Number 12 (April l98l), p 36. theme "Ibid,p 35
126 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION SIX; THE DISINFORMATIONISTS 127

the methodology of this Red Scare classic as follows:' ian judiciary"had not "chosen. " Antonov was being held for an inves-
tigation, but the investigating magistrate had not yet given an opinion,
The data is presented without any effort-serious or otherwise-to evaluate its and of course a trial had not been held. For a terrorism pseudoscholar,
validity or relevance. Generalizations and conclusions, unsupported by data, are however, the choice precedes careful investigation and a legitimate ju-
sprinkled throughout. . . . The pseudoscholar proceeds to laboriously accumu- dicial finding. For the Sterlings of the 1920s, Sacco and Vanzetti were
late vast numbers of "details" and documents. Some of the details and guilty before the trial because they were on the wrong side and one had
documents refcr to facts. Some of the details are fiction. Nothing remains un- to "choose."
explained. . . . The authors of the various parts of the report cite each other's
analysis as authoritative.s Documents are taken at face value, regardless oftheir
Apologetics and coverup for rightwing terror. Sterling is a committed
source or the context within which they originally were presented. . . . Simul-
rightist. In The Terror Networ,t she provides systematic apologetics for
taneity is taken as proof of cause and effect. . . . Possibilities are invested into
certainties. Following the presentation ofendless details, the conclusion is "in-
rightwing dictatorships, whose intelligence services are an important di-
evitable." . . . [V]ast historical forces are assumed to be set in motion by the rect and indirect source for her claims about terrorism. She does not use
mere will of a few monstrously evil but brilliant men. They pull puppet strings the word "terrorism" to describe the torture and murder of political dis-
and duped and compliant millions act out their will. sidents by the Chilean, Argentinean, and South African police, and she
applies no indignant and sarcastic words to their actions. Even when
The qualities of the "pseudoscholar" are on full display in Sterling's their operations fit the category of "international terrorism" very liter-
writings on terrorism in general, and on the Bulgarian Connection in ally, such as in their cross-border assassinations'o and preventive inva-
particular. We detail some of these qualities in the balance of this sec- sions,r' they fail to arouse her ire.
tlon. Her apologetics for military dictatorships take two forms. First, she
repeatedly suggests that military takeovers were a consequence of left-
Manicheanism: Us versus them, Bood versus evil. Terrorism pseudo- wing terrorist provocations.r'?This is a complete fabrication for the im-
scholars are committed ideologues who divide the world into people, portant cases of Chile and Brazil, and is a misleading half truth for
movements, and states that are good and those that are evil. The former, others. Her second mode of apologetics is to suppress the facts about
which usually coincides with the analyst's fellow citizenry, country, what her favored military dictatorships do. Even if they were "pro-
leadership, and clients, are generous and kind, but also bumbling and voked" into taking control of the state, how much killing, torture, and
insufficiently alert to the need to be harsh with the forces of darkness. dísmantling of democratic institutions fol|owed? Sterling carefully av-
The forces of evil are cruel, insidiously clever, and constantly plotting erts her eyes,'r as details on state terror would weaken the force of her
the downfall of the forces of decency. attempt to make rebel movements the exclusive "terrorists."
In the case ofthe plot to assassinate the Pope, Sterling is convinced of
10. Under "Operation Condor" in the 1970s the security forces of Argentina, Brazil,
Bulgarian-KGB guilt because this is just the kind of thing that the forces Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay apprehended and murdered hundreds of dissidents by a col-
of darkness do. The truth flows so easily from fundamental preconcep- lective monitoring and assassination system across borders. See Edward S. Herman, 7áe
tions of good and evil that evidence is really required only for public re- Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda (Boston: South End press,
1982), pp. 69-73 Sterling has never discussed this tenorist enrerprise
lations service. With or without evidence, one must choose. For exam-
||. See Richard Leonard, South Africa Át War (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hi|l,
ple, Sterling says that in "choosing sides" one must take one or the 1973); Sean Gervasi, "Secret Collaboration: U.S. and South Africa Foment Terrorist
other "on trust: the Italian judiciary or Bulgaria's Communist establish- Wars,,, CovertAction InÍormation Bulletin, No. 22 (Fall l984), pp. 36-40.
ment. "n At the point when Sterling wrote these lines in 1983, the "Ital- |2 InThe Terror Network (New York: Ho|t' Rinehaí and Winston, l98l), Ster|ing
states that "the wall of police states" in Latin America in the mid-1970s was ,,largely of
1 Op. cir., n.2, pp 122-26. the teÍrorists' own making''(p l l0)
8. See the discussion of the "echo chamber effect" in Chapter 7 under "The lntellectu- f3. She says tnThe Terror Network that rightwing terrorism has big plans and is .,well
als: Somnolence and Complicity." worth a book on its own" 1p I I l). but she has not embarked on this book as vet
9. The Time of the Assassins (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1983), p. 163
J
I
I28 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION SIX: THE DISINFORMATIONISTS lZ9
and subversive acts against its neighbors. Instead she fbcuses exclu-
Sterling's identification with the state terrorists is illustrated by her
sively on alleged South African rebel ties to an external Red Network.
contrasting personal reactions to rebels and western officials in the kill-
ing business. She reports in The Terror Network that at one time she Thus the implicit SmeaÍ process contains the fo|lowing sequence: Some
rebe|s get some arTns and training ťrom the Soviet Union and its surro-
found herself on a plane with a rebel terrorist who had been trained in
gates; the Soviets aim to destabilize the "democracies"; all the recipi-
Havana, and "l was too frozen with fear to open my mouth."ro On the
ents of Soviet largesse are agents of a Communist Combat army;,u there-
other hand, Sterling frequently cites conversations with representatives
of the secret police of the Free World, who kill as ruthlessly and at least fore, all of these liberation movements are tainted as elements of the
master consplracy.
as frequently as her rebel, but she never mentions the slightest trepida-
In The Terror Network Sterling brings in South Africa very cautious-
tion or lack of sympathy. In fact, she tells us that:''
ly, in a chapter on Henri Curiel, a Paris-based activist and supporter of
One of my more memorable conversations in France was with a personage of Third World liberation movements, whom she tries to make out to be a
vast charm and qualified experience who assured me that he would brand me a KGB agent. (On her loss of a slander suit in Paris based on this accusa-
compulsive liar if I quoted him, tf, now and then, I should notice a small news tion, see below.) In the course of that chapter she writes that all the
item about a body washed up on a beach, he said, it might well be that of some Palestinian tenorists could count on Curiel's support, and "so could the
trained and unregenerate professional terrorist, sent on "a long, long voyage- front-line guerrilla forces of southern Africa, regularly supplied by Sol-
very long, rnadame," in the interests of preserving public order. idarité [one of Curiel's organizations] with funds and clandestine equip-
ment."'' Elsewhere in the same chapter she discusses the case of the
This was a "gentleman" of the Free World speaking to her, not a "ter- South Aťrican poet Breyton Breytenbach, who set up a printing plant for
rorist. " the South African underground "and was soon arrested under the an-
Sterling's The Terror Network is a running attack on liberation move- titerrorist laws."'t (We may note in passing that Sterling doesn't use
ments in the Third World. She doesn't discuss how the West sustains quote marks, comment, or provide a word of sarcasm on this usage-as
the conditions giving rise to them nor how it arms the military services she would perhaps if the Polish government arrested an underground
and death squads designed to keep the Third World majorities in their Solidarity worker under "antiterrorism laws.") She goes on to say that
place. Instead, she stresses the frequency with which these liberation just as an international campaign of appeal for Breytenbach was getting
movements allegedly fall into the hands of leftists who are tools of Mos- under way, he pleaded guilty. She doesn't say what he pleaded guilty
cow or one of its surrogates. Sterling demonstrates in The Terror Net- to, but implies that this was meaningful, proving something like real
work how it is possible for a rightwing journalist, by carefully ignoring guilt. She states that he later suggested to his brother that he had been
the massive violence and oppression of the terrorist slates, and by con- "manipulated" in Paris; in Sterling's words, "Gradually the conviction
íining her attention to rebe| vio|ence and alleged rebel |inks (via arms grew on Breytenbach that So|idarité fronted for a deep underground ap-
supply and training) to radical states, to make the terrorist states and paratus providing technical services to international terrorist groups."',
their atlies look like victims, and the true victims look like baddies, wit- Sterling gives no source for this infbrmation, very possibly provided her
tingly or unrvittingly part of a plot to "destabilize Western Democ- by the South Afrrcan po|ice. We may note also her seeming naiveté on
racy" !
the "growing conviction" which apparently came upon Breytenbach in
It is interesting to see how Sterling deals with South Africa' She is a South African prison. Although it is well publicized that "terrorists"
careful not to smear the South Atiican liberation movements directly are regularly tortured in South African prisons, Sterling takes Breyten-
and openly as terrorist, or to characterize the apartheid regime as fight- bach's alleged reconsiderations at face value.
ing terrorism. But she does this indirectly. At no point does she discuss
South African state terrorism against its black majority or its invasions 16 lbid.,p l6 See the subsecrion on The Conspiratorial lmperative, below
p 54.
17. Ibid.,
t4. Ibid.p 248. t8. Ibid,p 5l
15 lbid , p. 68 19 lbid.o 54.
 I

I3O THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION SIX: THE DISINFORMATIONISTS l3l

At the time Sterling wrote on Breytenbach's admission of guilt there ous voice of the controller in it."'zo
was already in print an account of Breytenbach's trial in an lntroduction The main point, however, is that in her not very subtle way Claire
by André Brink to a translation of Breytenbach's Á Season in Sterling succeeds in tarnishing South Africa's liberation movements by
Paradise,t" which reads as follows: tying them to the KGB-with no solid facts, no numbers, no evidence
that these ties, if they existed at all, were not marginal, and by relying
After more than two months in detention he was brought to court on eleven heavily on South African police interrogations for evidence. Focusing
cbarges of what, in South Africa, passes for "terrorism." Many of the charges on local South African conditions would suggest that the African Na-
were patently ridiculous, aud the fact that all the persons charged with Breyten- tional Congress is fighting a t-erociously terroristic and antidemocratic
bach were subsequently allowed to go scot-free seemed to corroborate this im- regime in a thoroughly just cause. Sterling never allows such considera-
pression. However, Breytenbach's interrogators had succeeded, during his tions to surface-South Africa is part of the Free World, and she dis-
months of solitary confinement and constant interrogation, in convincing him plays throughout her work a solidarity with it, its leaders, its secret
that he might well qualify for the death sentence should he try to contest the police, and other similar terror regimes.
charges in court. Consequent|y an aÍTangement was made whereby some of the
more far-fetched charges were dropped, in return fbr a plea of guilty to all the
All disagreement.s with her views are enemy propaganda and often
others. The plea was accepted, with the result that a minimum of witnesses were
traceable to the Kremlin. Just as the world of states is divided into
called.
blocs, so is the world of ideas. ln criticizing Michael Dobbs of the
Washington Post, for example, Sterling asserts that Dobbs's statements
Brink goes on to point out that in spite of this plea, Breytenbach got a
lend "considerable credence to the Bulgarian argument."rs This is
nine-year sentence, that all appeal was refused, and that the documents
taken as sufficient to invalidate Dobbs's aÍgument. It also imp|ies as a
in the case rniraculously disappeared. Breytenbach himself, in a 1983
matter of course that the Bulgarian contentions are incorrect. Sterling
autobiography, also contradicts Sterling in both letter and in spirit. His
never for a moment allows that she could be wrong.
work is a crushing indictment of the South African system, which "is
ln a speech on disinformation given in Paris on December 5, 1984,.0
against the grain of everything that is beautiful and hopeful and dig-
Sterling attacked the effort of ltalian newspapers to link what we call the
nified in human history. Curiel. on the other hand, is one o[
"second conspiracy"-1he framing of the Bulgarians-to Ledeen,
Breytenbach's heroes, "an inspiring man: a timpid ideologue, and a
Pazienza, and the U.S. and ltalian secret services. She does this, not by
man who remained comrnitted to the better instincts in mankind."tt
oifering evidence, but by claiming to have traced the source of these al-
Speaking of George Suffert, the journalist who, based on intelligence
legations to a Communist paper in ltaly and a Communist disinforma-
leaks and florgeries, first attacked Curiel in print as a KGB agent' and on
a tion campaign. She does not give any evidence that these were the
whom Sterling relies heavily, Breytenbach calls him "cowardly
sources, or that the alleged disinformation campaign had any success,
French journalist . . the mouthpiece of the South African masters. "t'
but she uses these assertions----essentially smears by association-to dis-
And on his trial and confession, Breytenbach says that given "the at-
credit an alternative line of thousht.rT
mosphere of terror created by the powerful political police" his lawyers
felt obliged to tread very lightly. Of his short statement read to the court 24 lbid,p 63.
in these circumstances, he says: "Read it-you will also hear the insidi- 25. Claire Sterling, "The Attack on the Pope: There's More to the Story," Washingron
Posr, August 7, 1984.
20. (New York: Persea Books, 1980), pp l0-l I 26. This speech was given at a conference on disinformation sponsored by Inter-
2l The True Confessions of an Albino Terrorist (New York: Farrar Straus Ciroux, nationale de la Resistance, a coalition of rightwing resistance/"liberation" organizations
1983), p 73 and refated support networks from Europe and the united states. John Banon of Reader's
22 lbid., p 89 Digest and Arnaud de Borchgrave, an Adjunct Fellow of the Georgetown center for stra-
23 Ibk! , p 5 | Suffert had on the top of his list o[ "terrorist" organizations the Afri- tegic and International studies, were also in attendance we are citing an offprint put out
can National Congress, which suggests that the South African secret police may have had by the sponsoring organization.
a hand in assisting Suffert's "rescarches" (and indirectly, Claire Sterling's work). 27 Henze works the same way ln The Plor rc Kitl the pope he spends a great deal of
 ;

132 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTTON SIX: THE DISINFORMATIONISTS 133

often for the purpose of demonstrating Cuban dirty tricks..o E. Howard

IJncritical use of disinformation sources. One of the main weapons of Hunt, a long-time CIA agent working with the Nixon "plumbers,"
terrorism pseudoscience is the use of convenient facts from intelligence even forged a document, with CIA knowledge and logistical support, in
agencies and defectors (the latter often themselves creatures of the intel- a l91I effort to embarrass Senator Edward Kennedy by publicly im-
ligence agencies). Sometimes this is done knowingly-"planned gulli- plicating John F. Kennedy in the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem of
bility"-but it is often a reflection of the loss of critical capacity in the South Vietnam.'' If CIA operatives will lie to discredit a U.S. president
search for proof of that which the pseudoscientist knows by instinct. for political purposes, of what would they be capable regarding foreign
It is well established that all intelligence agencies will forge and plant enemies?
documents and lie where useful and practicable, so that from at |easÍ one Although disinformation is one of her favorite words, to our knowl-
of them it is possible to obtain any desired "fact." Intelligence agencies edge Claire Sterling has never admitted that there is such a thing as
also operate in an environment in which political "crazies" can survive western disinformation. In her Paris speech on disinformation, she as-
and even flourish. For example, James Angleton, long-time CIA chief serts with disdain that a Soviet author on the Bulgarian Connection,
of counterintelligence, was firmly convinced that the apparent Chinese- Iona Andronov, "is a colonel of the KGB attached for the duration of
Soviet hostility after 1959 was a conspiratorial deception to lull the the Papal plot to the Literaturnaya Gazeta. ."32 The implication is
West into a false sense of security.t* What theory of Red Conspiracy that, as a KGB officer, Andronov could hardly be taken seriously as a
would not be sincerely believed by some intelligence source and thus be purveyor of information. Whatever the truth of her contention about An-
confirmable for a Claire Sterling? dronov's KGB affiliation, it is noteworthy that Paul Henze is not con-
In his book Deadly Deceits, former CIA officer Ralph McGehee taminated in her eyes by is extensive intelligence career. In the Mani-
states that theCIA has "lied continually," and that "Disinformation is chean world of Sterling and her associates, the intelligence agencies on
a large part of its covert action responsibility, and the American people our side do not lie, forge documents, or engage in disinformation strate-
are the primary target of its lies."'o Philip Agee's Inside the Company gies; only those on the enemy side do these things. Whether this is de-
provides dozens of examples of CIA sponsorship of violence, forging of i liberate suppression of known fact or the self-deception of the true be,
documents, and planting of fabricated stories with conduit journalists,
fl
I
liever, it makes Sterling a superb instrument of propaganda.
$ Claire Sterling has long used, and served as a conduit for, the Free
space on Soviet-Bulgarian oftheir involvement in the assassina-
responses to accusations
tion attempt Most of this is a venomous caricature, providing a straw man enabling
World's intelligence agencies. InThe Terror Netvvork, she has 37 cita-
Henze to attack weak arguments. More important, it also allows hím to identify criticism tions directly to intelligence sources,3l of them anonymous, with still
of the Connection with the Enemy. [n an article "From Azeff to Agca," in Survey, a larger numbers of references to individuals and works that themselves
Journal of East and Wel Sradiss, Autumn-Winter 1983, for example, he dismisses the depend heavily on intelligence sources (Brian Crozier, Robert Moss,
present writers as Soviet apologists, based on their article critical of the BulSarian Con-
nection No evidence was given that they relied on Soviet sources or a-rguments, or that 30. Philip Agee, Inside rhe Company: CIA Diary (New York: Stonehill, 1975), pp
they have any ties to the Soviets lt is enough for Henze that their article contested the 145-46,279-81,283-8'7,292-95,453-5'7,468-69,411-72 AndseeWarnerpoetchau,
Connection. ed., Whie Paper Whitewash: Philip Agee on the CIA and E! Salvador (New York: Deep
ln the same article Henze rcfers to the Turkish journalist Ugur Mumcu as "well known Cover Publications, 198 l), pp. 28-41.
as a purveyor of Soviet disinformation in Turkey. " Mumcu, in fact, has been highly criti- 3l E. Howard Hunt, Undercover (New York: Putnam, 1974), pp. 178-81. And see
cal ofalleged Bulgarian involvement in the Turkish drug traffic, and he has rejected An- Powers, op cit., n. 28, pp 254-55; Poelchau, ed , op. cit., n. 30, p. 38.
dronov's (Soviet) thesis that the CIA is behind the assassination attempt on the Pope For 32. Op cit., n 26. Andronov vigorously denies the charge, with considerable logic
the former CIA station chicf in Turkey to be ca|ling anybody e|se,let ďone Mumcu, a dis. Sterling was apparently unaware that he had been, quite openly, the LireraturnayaGazeta
informationist is audacious, as we will discuss in the next section. correspondent in the United States from 1972 to 1978, or that his work has appeared regu-
28 See Thomas Powers,The ManWho Kept the Secrers (New York: Knopf, 1979), pp. larly in that newspaper for more than 15 years. Moreover, in 1985 he returned to New
63. 289, 350. York to resume his foreign conespondent's work in this country, with the consent of lhe
29. Ralph McGehee, Deadly Deceits: My 25 Years in the CIA (New York: Sheridan United States govemment. If anyone other than Claire Sterling thought he was a nefarious
Square Publications. 1982). p 192 KGB colonel, is it likely he would have received such permission?
134 THE BULCARIAN CONNECTION SIX: THE DISINFORMATIONISTS 135

John Barron).tt Conor Cruise O'Brien observes in his review of The in connection with this judicial proceeding showed no evidence what-
Terror Network that Sterling "consistently assumes that anything she is soever of Curiel having a KGB connection. Thus, in this rare event
told by her western intelligence sources must be true. Her copious but where the cover of "confidential sources" was lifted by legal process,
naive footnotes often refer to unnamed intelligence sources, whose ver- the western intelligence service closest to Curiel's activities revealed de
acity she simply takes for granted."* Borchgrave and Sterling to be playing a disinformation role, perhaps
In her use of ltalian intelligence sources, Sterling quotes frequently serving as a conduit for the same intelligence service that organized
from reports of SISMI, an intelligence agency run for a number of years Curiel's murder. Sterling lost one of the slander suits and was assessed a
by General Santovito, a member of P-2 and a sponsor of Francesco fine; another she slipped out ofon legal technicalities and by the court's
Pazienza. P-2, as we have seen, was an illegal rightwing conspiracy that acceptance of her claim that she had not accused Curiet of being a KGB
heavily infiltrated the ltalian intelligence, police, and army and whose agent, but was merely presenting a "hypothesis."r'The Curiel trials,
members were involved earlier in major disinformation efforts, includ- which bear so clearly on Sterling's credibility, were reported upon only
ing the forging and planting of documents." Sterling always quotes a in the back pages of the Washington Post, and w.ere unmentioned in the
SISMI statement as authoritative fact, never as one from a potential dis- New York Times, Time, or Newsweek, or on the TV networks.rs
information source. Nowhere inThe Terror Network, nor inThe Time of Defectors are also a prime source of information for Sterling. The use
the Assassins, does she so much as mention P-2 or the "strategy of ten- and abuse of defector evidence is discussed in more detail in Appendix
sion" pursued for many years by ltaly's right wing, including elements C, but we note here that Sterling'sThe Terror Network rests heavily on
of the security services. This non-discussion is essential to preserving the testimony of General Jan Sejna, aCzech defector of 1968, who, ac-
the appearance of authenticity and integrity of handouts from SISMI. cording to Sterling, had defected "a jump ahead of the invading Soviet
As we noted earlier, in The Terror Network Sterling also passed on arrny" during the Czech Spring.to This is a fabrication-Sejna was an
the claims of unidentified "intelligence sources" that Henri Curiel was old Stalinist who defected in the middle of the Czech Spring,' long be-
a KGB agent. Sterling's comrade-in-disinformation, Amaud de Borch- fore the invasion, and in the midst of a comrption scandal in which
grave, asserted that it was an "open secret" in the intelligence world Sejna was a principal.n' Sejna was so forthcoming in his debriefings that
that Curiel was a KGB agent.16 As Curiel had already been murdered by the CIA finď|y decided to test his veracity by forging a document with
unknown assailants, his ťami|y and severa| associates sued Sterling for elaborate but phony details on Soviet sponsorship of terrorism. Sejna
slander in the French courts. French secret police documents provided immediately claimed the document to be authentic-it was one that had
just slipped his mindlo'Ten years later. Michael [rdeen got Sejna to re-
33 Phi|ip Pau||, InternationalTerrorism: The Propaganda Wur, M A Thesis in Ínter.
national Relations, San Francisco State University, June 1982, p 73 37. See Jonathan Randal, "French Socialists Seek to Solve Slaying of Alleged Masrer
34 "The Roots of Terror:sm," New Republic, July 25, l98l When her sources say Spy ," Washington Post, August 19, I 98 I , and ' 'Court in Paris Fines Author of Terrorism
something convenien( to her argument, Sterling's gullibility shows no limits O'Brien Book," Washington Posr, March 30, 1982. Sterling made no effort in the Paris trial to
gives an excellent illustration in his review in discussing Sterling's treatment of the lrish prove the truth of her case by innuendo-she and her publisher used her reliance on the
Provos An even more spectacular example was her swallowing without blinking the methodology of terrorism pseudoscience to disclaim having said anything definite
"Tucuman Plan," supposedly prepared "undefKCB supervision" in Argentina's Tucu- J8 In connection with the Curiel cases, Sterling was given unusual assistance by the
man province in May 1975, and calling for the mobilization of 1,500 Latin American "ter- CIA in aid of her defense against accusations of slander. See noie 63 below
rorists" to be sent to Europe for an orchestraled destabilization effort For a detailed dis- 39. Op cir., n 12, p. 290.
cussion of this antl other illustrations of her use of intelligence disinformation, see Diana 40. According to Leslie Celb, "The defector, Major Gen Jan Sejna, was said to have
..Disinformation: The .íright story'oiC|aire ster|ing'S ta|es of terrorism,'' /n been closely associated with Antonin Novotny, the Stalinist party leader of Czecho-
Johnstone,
These Times, May 20-26, l98l slovakia. The General fled to the United States in early 1968 after Mr. Novotny hacl been
35 See Chapter 4, pp 8l-99 replaced by Alexander Dubcek, the leader of the short-lived liberalization period."
36 See the letter to ceorge Suffert by de Borchgrave' reproduced in Frank Brďhead "Soviet-Terror Ties Called Outdated," New York i'imes, October 18. l98l
and Edward S Herman, "The KGB Plot to Assassinate the Pope: A Case Study in Free 41. See Diana Johnstone, "The 'fright story'of Claire Sterling's aales of terrorism," /n
Wor|d Disinforma.ion,,' CovertAction InÍormation Bulletin, No |9 (Spring-Summer These Times, May 20-26, t981.
1983), p l5 42. Lars-Erik NeIson, ..The deep terror plot: a thickening oť si|ence,'' New York Daily
 !

t36 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION SIX: THE DISINFORMATIONISTS t3'l

peat this scenario, and this evidence constitutes the heart of Sterling's lustration, she states that a SISMI report describes the gun dealer Horst
proof of a Soviet terror netvvorktal This should have discredited Sterling Grillmaier as having "traveled often to Syria, East Germany, and other
completely and permanently, but she is under mass media protection for countries of Eastern Europe."6 Looking up her reference, the SISMI
valuable services rendered and it appears that no fabrication or lunacy report in question mentions Grillmaier in passing and does not say a
(see below under The Conspiratorial lmperative) can render her less word about his alleged travels to Syria and East Germany.
than an authentic expert. Another form of manipulation of evidence is her selective use of
some facts, her suppression of others, and her simple refusal to discuss
The manipulation oÍ evidence. Sterling's misuse of evidence assumes conflicting facts. As we discuss below, Sterling attempts to tie the I

many forms. one is to twist words to alter meanings' ÍnThe Terror Net- leftwing Minister of the Interior in the Ecevit government, Hasan Fehmi
work, for example, Sterling purports to quote directly from a CIA re- Gunes, to Agca's escape from a Turkish prison in 1979. To show that he
I

port:{ was a "leftist" she refers to him as a "Marxist" and mentions that his
brother was a radical. The Turkish journalist Ugur Mumcu, who knew
"Warsaw Pact members' assistance to terrorists originates in Pankow (East Gunes well, says that Gunes never considered himself a Marxist and
I

Germany) and Prague," said the CIA in "International and Transnational Ter- that the term was not properly applied to him. Mumcu also points out
rorism,'' April |976, p 2l of the ClA's Annua| Repoí. that Gunes had another brother, who was a conservative, whose exist-
ence somehow escaped Sterling's notice.o'
What the CIA report actually says is: "ln any event, the only hard Another illustration of Sterling selectivity and suppression is her han-
r

evidence of Warsaw Pact member assistance to individuals associated dling of Agca's letter in which he expressed his devotion to Ttirkes, the
I

with the Baader-Meinhof Gang points to Pankow and Prague." Ster-

I

leader of the fascist Nationalist Action Party of Turkey. She and Henze
ling's bogus quote distorts the meaning of the real quote. The CIA re- do not like this letter, as it shows a rightwing political commitment that
port speaks of "the only hard evidence" of assistance to individuals they consistently try to downplay as they strive to make Agca into a
"associated with" a specific terrorist group (as opposed to the more mercenary terrorist without politics. Sterling therefore dismisses the let-
I

generic and broader-based usage ofthe word "terrorists"). The original ter as a "laughably clumsy forgery. "0. A problem, however, is that this
does not say that Warsaw Pact assistance "originates" in Pankow and letter was introduced as evidence in a trial in Ankara by the Turkish mit-
Prague as Sterling writes, but "points to" Pankow and Prague, a looser itary government, usually adequate proof for Sterling of authenticity.
connection. If this is what happens to verifiable quotes in Sterling's This provides considerable insight into Sterling's methods. On the one
work, what happens to those quotes which are not verifiable? hand, if we have a "laughably clumsy forgery," what do we conclude
Sterling's eÍToneous citations are numerous. ln The Time of the As- about the quality of the Turkish judicial system that admits such a docu-
sassins, for example, she says that Bulgaria was responsible for "four- ment into evidence? On the other hand, perhaps we should look more
fifths of the arms reaching the Middle East."o'Her source for this closely at the Turkish evidence, which Sterling does not find it conve-
whopper, the New York Times of February 9, 1983, actually states that nient to do in this instance. Ugur Mumcu devotes five pages of his book
lsraeli intelligence authorities attributed to Bulgarian sources four-fifths Agca Dossier to a detai|ed account of the TÍirkes |etter. He reports that
of the weapons the Israelis had captured from the PLO. As another il- the Turkish military government went to great pains to analyze its au-
y'Vews, June 24, 1984, p Cl4 In 1981, when then Secretary of State Alexander Haig thenticity, putting it through many tests at the police laboratory and hir-
asked the CIA to "produce the kind of evidence that Ms. Sterling had cited in her book ing an outside consultant from the Department of Graphic Arts at Istan-
. the CIA shamefacedly confessed that it was being asked to confirm its own phony bul University to study the document. The conclusion on all sides was
document-and Haig had to let the issue drop."
43 See The Terror Network, pp. 14, 3a, 221,290-92. 46 lbid , p. 34
44. Ibid., p. 341 47 Ugur Mumcu, Papa, Mafya, Ágca (Istanbu|: Tekin Yayinevi, |984), p 205.
45 I he Time of the Assassins, p 2ll 48 The Time oJ rhe Assassins, p. 10
138 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION SIX: THE DISINFORMATIONISTS 139

that the letter was authentic.4e garian Connection slowly, makes mistakes, or retracts evidence, he is
Equally interesting, Sterling mentions that after his arrest for shooting trying to convey a message to his sponsors. He is warning them to do
Ipekci, even after a week or so in the hands ofthe police, Agca appeared something, or that he will say more. The empirical foundation for this
in court without the slightest evidence of police maltreatment, which notion was Agca's behavior in the last days of his trial in Turkey for the
Sterling remarks was "customary under whatever political regime in shooting of Ipekci, in October 1979, when he issued in court an explicit
Turkey. "'o When the military took over in 1980, torture was stepped up warning, that he had things to tell that some people would regret. Sev-
and many individuals died under torture. Neither Sterling nor Henze eral days later the Gray Wolves heeded his message and he was escorted
discuss this, nor do they ďlow it to qualify their faith in evidence from out of prison. According to Sterling, Agca adopted the same strategy
this source. So Sterling mentions police brutality when it serves her con- after his imprisonment for shooting the Pope. The most important in-
venience (here to suggest that maybe Agca was being protected from on stance of Agca's alleged signaling in Rome came in June 1983, when a
high), but usually ignoring it in reference to a favored police state. Vatican official's daughter, Emmanuela Orlandi, was abducted. A few
In her Reader's Digest article, Sterling traced Agca's gun to the pre- days later, on June 28, Agca withdrew key elements of his previous tes-
viously mentioned Horst Grillmaier, an Austrian gun merchant who, ac- timony. To this day Sterling claims that by his renunciation Agca was
cording to Sterling, had fled behind the Iron Curtain after May 13, signaling to his Bulgarian sponsors that he wanted to be either ex-
1981, to avoid questioning in the West. It tumed out later that changed or rescued from prison.t'
Grillmaier was a former Nazi who specialized in supplying rightwing There are many difficulties with the signaling theory as an explana-
gun-buyers; that he had not disappeared behind the lron Curtain at all; tion of Agca's behavior in Rome. For one thing, he delayed his signal-
and that the gun had gone through a number of intermediaries before fi- ing for a very long time. Why? Then when he started to talk, in May
nally being passed to Agca by a Gray Wolves friend. In the last pre-trial 1982, he did so without any known prior signal; i.e., without warning
version of Agca's story, the Bulgarians supposedly gave him a package, his sponsors of his intentions (as in the lpekci case). Furthermore, in
including his gun, on May 13, 1981. Why would Agca have given up Rome neither the Gray Wolves nor the Bulgarians would be in a posi-
his gun to the Bulgarians, to have them return it to him on May l3? Why tion to spring Agca in a prison break, and the idea that Agca would ex-
would the Bulgarians have had to go through all the transactions with pect the Bulgarians to bargain for his release is far-fetched. His crime
Grillmaier and others to provide Agca with a gun, given their extensive was one for which the ltalians would not be likely to engage in political
facilities in Rome? bargaining for a release. Even more important, to bargain the Bulgar-
Sterling handles the disintegration of the original Grillmaier line in ians would have to acknowledge openly their own involvement in the
typical Sterling fashion, by simply shifting to new conspiratorial plot. On Sterling logic, the Bulgarian-KGB strategy was to establish
ground. Thus instead of showing a Bulgarian Connection by enough distance from the hired killer to be able to make a case for non-
Grillmaier's eastern links, she tums things on their head-the sinister involvement. Even Agca would realize that any signals to the Bulga-
Bulgarians had Agca purchase a gun through a known fascist to rians and Soviets would be fruitless.
strengthen the suggestion that Agca was a rightwinger who could not There are other problems with Sterling's signaling theory. Why did
possibly be connected with the Communist powers! The Grillmaier Agca produce inconsistent signals? While he retracted some of his
readjustments show well that no matter what happens to facts, the Ster- 51. See the discussion of the Emmanuela Orlandi case in Chapter 2, pp. 33-35. Agca
ling methodology will yield the prescribed conclusions. eventually adopted the signaling theory himself. After a particularly bizarre series of ac-
Possibly the most enterprising Sterling innovation in her efforts to cusations and withdrawals while testifying in court, Agca refused to talk for several days.
rationalize Agca's lies and retractions is her elaboration of a signaling He then told the court that a kidnapping was part of a pre-arranged plan, and rhat "the
Cray Wolves and the Bulgarians kidnapped Emmanuela Orlandi so that I would retract the
theory. According to this theory, if Agca releases evidence on the Bul-
accusations against them, confuse the trial, and then I was to discredit the western press. "
49. Ugur Mumcu, Agca Dosyasi (Ankara: Tekin Yayinevi, 1984), pp. 106-lO. ("ln New Account Agca Tells of a Fourth Turk at Shooting of John Paul," New York
50. The Time of the Assassins, o. 48. Times [AP), July 2, 1985 )
 SIX: THE DISINFORMATIONISTS 14l
140 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION
rior, Hasan Fehmi Gunes, who she implies was complicit in Agca's
major ctaims just after the Ortandi kidnapping, he also made wild alle- prison break. Sterling says that "he [Agca] could not have done it with-
gations of KGB and Bulgarian involvement in the assassination attempt
out high level help." This is not true. It would seem quite possible to
atanimpromptupressconferenceonJulyS,lgs3,justl0daysafterhis organize an escape if a prisoner has as allies a large number of the
retraction. If he was trying to mend his fences with his would-be prison's guards and officers. And, in fact, the Gray Wolves and NAP
there-
liberators on June 28, why would he publicly assail them shortly were extremely well represented at Agca's prison. According to official
how wou|d his sponsors-Íescuers know that he had
after? FurtheÍTnore'
accounts, about a dozen members of the Gray Wolves, three of them
made his retractions, and, in effect, receive his signals?st They were
not
soldiers, dressed Agca in a military uniform and conducted him through
reported in the press at the time, and were made public only when
the
eight security checkpoints to a waiting car. There is no doubt that this
Albano Report was leaked a year later' was a Gray Wolves operation, and in February 1982 three Gray Wolves
Thus,thesignalinghypothesisisneitherplausiblenorcapableofex- conspirators were sentenced to prison by a Turkish martial law court for
plaining the actual pattern of confessions, erors, and retractions' The
by having helped Agca to escape.
coactring hypothesis fits comfortably' It explains Agca's slow start
about Bul- After noting that Gunes was a radical, Sterling points out that at his
the circumstance that initially he had nothing to confess
the
trial Agca "waited in what appeared to be the expectation of getting
garians. Later on, the pump was primed: Agca was first persuaded and/
get the sprung," and in mid-October he told the court that he had been offered a
ár coerced to talk' and he was then given the basic data needed to
press' deal by Gunes: If he admitted membership in the NAP he would get off.
Connection rolling. His enlarging "knowledge" came from the
Two weeks later, says Sterling, Agca told the court that "l did not kill
secret prison briefings, and other connections with the outside, as well ..that
publicity. His retractions Ipekci, but I know who did.'' He added he would reveal the tÍue
as his own íerti|e imagination and quest for
assassin's name at the court's next sitting. It was an explicit warning to
were the result of the disclosure of incompatible facts and contradictions
his patrons to get him out," says Sterling, "and that is what they did."
that required the overworked state to be tidied up' As we noted earlier'
Turk- It is clear that Sterling is trying to implicate Gunes-"a radical well
he mentioned Celenk only after reading a book by Mumcu on the
to the left of Ecevit"-in Agca's prison break. Her assertion that high
ish-Bulgarian smuggling connection in which Celenk's name appeÍued.
level help was necessary, as we have seen, is not convincing. Further-
HewithdrewhisclaimthathisfleeingaccompliceatSt.Peter'sSquare
more, she gives not a shred of evidence that Gunes had any Soviet ties
on May l3 was the Bulgarian Aivazov only days after western reporters
or that he had anything to do with the escape. Finally, she either doesn't
attending a press conference in Sofia were able to witness for them-
know or suppresses the important fact that Agca gave his courtroom
selves (and rlporty that Aivazov's physical characteristics were totally
at
photo. Agca's major retraction speech at the very time when a new conseryative government was being
odds with those of the individual in the
formed, after Ecevit's more liberal government had lost its parliamen-
of June 1983, acknowledging that he had never met Mrs' Antonov or
tary majority in mid-October. Thus, Agca's escape was engineered two
visited the Antonovs' apaÍtment, followed press accounts of the defense
weeks after Gunes had been replaced and a new conservative govern-
having obtained substantial evidence that Mrs. Antonov had
counsel's
ment-which had been a long-time ally of the Gray Wolves and NAP-
not been in Rome at the time of Agca's alleged rendezvous'
had taken office.
A key element in Sterling's argument that the Pope plot was con-
trolled by the Soviet union has always been her account of the events KGB propaganda. A favorite theme
The press is being overwhelmed by
surrounding Agca's escape from a Turkish prison in November 1979'
of Sterling and her colleagues is that the press regularly plays into the
Both in hei originď Reader,s Digest article and in her later book she
hands of the enemy. Sterling uses the Bulgarian Connection as an illus-
tries hard to tie that escape to a social democratic Minister of the Inte-
tration of the successes of KGB disinformation. In her Paris Conference
52 We pointed out in Chapter 2 that the retraction preceded the kidnapper's demand speech, Sterling claimed that disbelief in the Connection was a result of a
that Agca be released. Soviet-inspired propaganda barrage. She noted that the Soviets sent the
40-page book on the Plot by "KGB Colonel" Iona Andronov to "every
142 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION SIX: THE DISINFORMATIONISTS 143

important or unimportant joumalist, columnist, newspaper commen- enemy in every country. In the case of the Bulgarian Connection this has
tator, television commentator, editor, of every western newspaper that I helped to overcome doubts that might arise from the absence of evi-
know of, in Europe and in the United States. " This operation had great dence and the implausible and shifting scenarios dispensed by Agca. It
effect according to Sterling; disbelief in the Connection has become is in such a world that a Claire Sterling can thrive.
"the accepted position, the socially indispensable position. . . . Pro-
digious effon and one of the world's most expert craftsmanship [sic] The conspiratorial imperarive. Another essential feature of terrorism
had gone into generating such doubts."53 At no point does she present pseudoscience is the elaboration of leftwing conspiracies. InThe Terror
evidence that Andronov's work was read, or that it influenced anybody Network the great conspiracy is of course the Soviet Union's attempt to
in the West. Its theme, that the CIA was behind Agca's assassination at- destabilize the western democracies by aiding assorted dissidents and
tempt, has never been espoused or taken seriously in any mainstream rebels. Sterling makes the blanket statement that all of these aided par-
publication in the United States or Western Europe. Andronov's book ties "come to see themselves as elite battalions in a worldwide Army of
has been mentioned in the western media solely in derogatory references Communist Combat. "s5 Terrorists aid one another and act as if unified.
by Claire Sterling and Paul Henze. Killed terrorists "are unfailingly replaced," and defeats lead to changes
Sterling asserts in The Time of the Assassins that if only she had ar- in "pressure points," suggestive of a central planning body.
gued for a CIA connection, her message would have been welcome. She She also says that there is "nothing random in this concentrated as-
portrays herself as a latter-day Joan of Arc, fighting a lonely battle sault," noting that the Red Brigades, "who like to think that they speak
against the forces of the establishment.'o If only she had taken the easy for many or most of their kind . . . have even published a terror timeta-
road and blamed things on the CIA, "my fortune would have been ble."'u Sterling doesn't tell us how she knows what the Red Brigades
made"-but the indomitable Sterling was blaming it on the KGB, and like to think, but the truly Sterlingesque trick here is her use of this
this message was very hard for the American elite to swallow. Despite phony Red Brigade spokesmanship and timetable to establish nonran-
the lunatic quality of this assertion, no establishment book review or ar- domness, to suggest that the Red Brigades really do speak for all recipi-
ticle has ever noted the contradiction between Sterling's claims that she ents of Soviet aid and that they all have a timetable!
has been rejected by the U.S. political and media elite because of their What is the proof that the Soviets aim to destabilize westem democ-
détente-induced bias, and her obvious commercial and journalistic suc- racies? Sterling has nothing in the way ofevidence except afew stale as-
cesses. sertions of defectors. Her claim is an ideological premise of terrorism
Sterling's vision of the media stands the truth on its head. Western pseudoscience. Would destabilization of the West benefit the Soviet
propaganda sources are vastly more powerful and believable in the West Union? For Sterling the answer is obvious and she doesn't discuss it.
than Soviet sources, as exemplified by former CIA propaganda officer And her proofs of Soviet sponsorship of destabilizing terror, by selec-
Henze's role and authority and alleged KGB officer Andronov's effec- tive illustration, all disintegrate upon close inspection.
tive nonexistence. Sterling and Henze are pÍopaganda sources, or oper- She tries hard, for example, to tie the KGB to the Italian Red
ate in close collusion with them, and they have full access to the mass Brigades, and to their assassination of former Italian Prime Minister
media. Furthermore. there is a will-to-believe in the villainv of the Aldo Moro. But Moro was murdered precisely because of his role in en-

53.TheTime of the Assassins, p. l4l. 55. The Terror Nenvork, p. l6. Sterling later contradicts herself, noting that "Not all
54. Ofcourse, she did have the benefit ofgenerous funding from the Reader's Digest those who took the Cubans and Russians up on their aid offer were for sale, or even for
Association, and the built-in audience of many millions that it commands. Sterling herself rent. Many have proven to be a headache to their former benefactors." This suggests that
notes in Tlre Time of rhe Assasslns that "It isn't every day that a reporter gecs an offer like some unknown but possibly very large fraction of those aided did not see themselves as a
the one l had from Reader's Digest: takeas longasyou like . " (p 4). Sbegivesspe- part of the "Army of Communist Combat," and that the Soviets didn't "control" the ter-
cific numbers for the cost of the ABC 2Ol2O program of May 13, 1983, which raised ror network. Sterling even concedes at various points that there is no central direction,
doubts about the Bulgarian Connection. In contrast, she never provides dollar figures for on|y ..links,'' and arms sa|es (pp. l0, l6). But these contradictions don't inteďere with
her own expenses or those of the NBC programs with which she was affiliated and which reiteration of her incompatible generalization.
peddled her line 56. Ibid., p.7
144 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION SIX: THE DISINFORMATIOMSTS l4S
gineering the "Historic Compromise," that sought to bring the Com- The most remarkable conspiracy doctrine in Sterling's works is her
munist Party into a greater role in governing ltaly. The Red Brigades contention that the truth of the Bulgarian connection has had to pene-
fought violently against the ltalian Communist Party, and the Com- trate a longstanding "western intelligence shield" protecting the Soviet
munist Party was the strongest proponent of a policy of harsh repression Union, which for many years has been concealing from public view the
against the Red Brigades. The murder of Aldo Moro was a major set- truth about soviet terrorism.u' The reason for the establishment coveruD
back for the Communist Party and for détente' Was it in the interest of is that the truth was too shocking and wou|d disturb internationál
the Soviet Union to weaken the Italian Communist Party and détente? Is equi|ibrium and détente.
it not curious that killing Aldo Moro was a key element in a rightwing These contentions are crackpot nonsense. In order to facilitate its
coup plan (Plan Solo) of 1964?" If the Red Brigades are an instrument rearrnament program and to help place new missiles in Europe, from
of Soviet policy, is the Italian Communist Party not only independent of 198 I onward the Reagan administration desperately sought means of
the Soviet Union but its actual enemy? Sterling never addresses any of portraying the Soviet Union as the Evil Empire. The Bulgarian Connec_
these questions. tion was exceptionďly helpfu| in achieving that objective. If the absurd
Sterling and Henze claim, without presenting any evidence, that the notion that Reagan seeks to protect détente failed to dent Sterling's cred-
Soviet Union was pouring resources into Turkey to "destabilize" that ibility in the United states, it is a restimonial to the establishment's tol-
country in the 1970s. Again, given the power of Turkey's military es- erance of congenial and serviceable propaganda.
tablishment, wasn't this foolish, likely to produce a military coup domi- What are we to make of the expressions of doubts about the Bulgarian
nated by anti-Soviet forces? Furthermore, the terrorist acts themselves Connection by the CIA and other government ofÍicials, and their refusa|
were in the majority righnving attacks and murders, largely against left- to embark on a massive propaganda campaign? One reason for their
ist forces or areas. How would sponsoring rightwing terror help the caution is that many officials probably knew that the Connection was a
Soviet Union? Sterling never tells us. She notes in The Terror Network creation of Sterling, Henze, and the Italian secret services. and was thus
that the military takeover of 1980 was "hardly in a manner living up to unsustainable in the long run. The wise strategy, therefore, was to allow
Soviet expectations."ts It never occurs to Sterling that her understand- and encourage Sterling and her propaganda cohorts to milk the plot for
ing of Soviet expectations might be wrong and that the Soviet destabili- all it was worth, while the Reagan administration remained publicly un-
zation hypothesis, so conspicuously irrational and contrary to Soviet in- committed and ambivalent. This would permit a great deal of publicity,
terests, might also be in error. some even generated by debates between the Sterling forces and the am_
Sterling argues that the Soviet motive for shooting the Pope was to bivalent CIA, while giving the government an emergency exit.
stop the Solidarity movement. Apart from its other deficiencies of logic A second reason for U.S. govemment caution is that it makes the CIA
and evidence,5n this argument fails because shooting the Pope could not a "moderate" critic in the debates on the truth or falsity of the Connec_
reasonably have been expected to stop the Solidarity movement. Fur- tion. With Sterling, Henze, Senator Alfonse D'Amato, and Zbigniew
thermore, the risks involved in such an action would be very great, in- Brzezinski accusing the CIA of dragging its [eet, the CIA becomes an
cluding the high probability that the shooting would be attributed to the anti-establishment truth seeker (which it is not) rather than an instru-
Soviet Bloc. In their rational self-interest Soviet officials would have ment of the administration (which it is). Thus the debate on the case can
anticipated this and avoided any such risky and exceptionally stupid be reasonably restricted to Sterling and company on the right and the
ventures.o CIA on the left.6'
57. See Chapter 4, p.79. move, "to provoke a Polish revolt, and pulr poland out of the warsaw pact " TheTime o!
58. The Terror Nenvork, p. 245. the Assassins, p. 79. Sterling fails to discuss the point, as usual refusing to consider alter-
59. See Chapter 2, pp 14-15. native hypotheses or the weaknesses of her own
60 In SterÍing's vcrsion ofher interview with former Turkish Interior Minister Gunes, 6l Although this point is strewn throughout her The Time of the Assassins, it is fea-
he made thc poi,lt that, given the predictable results of an assassination attempt-that is, tured prominently in an exclusive interview with sterling entitled "why is the west Cov-
ready accusations and blame accruing to the Soviets-it would be a plausible rightwing ering Up for Agca," Human Events, April 21, 1984
62 See the discussion in Chapter 7 oí Robert Toth's artic|e in the Los Angeles Times on
146 THE BUI,CARJAN CONNECTION SIX: THE DISINFORMATIONISTS 147

A third reason for U.S. government reticence in commenting on the and he served as station chief in Turkey from 1974 through 1977. Wben
Connection was that the case was still being adjudicated in the Italian Zbigniew Brzezinski assembled his National Security Council team for
courts. For the U S . government to organize an open press campaign ar-
. President Jimmy Carter, Henze was hired as the CIA's representative to
guing KGB guilt would be a blatant interference with the Italian legď the NSC office in the White House. Throughout Henze's determined
process and would therefore be badly conceived even as a public rela- media campaign to link the Soviet Union to the shooting of the Pope, in-
tions strategy. cluding his articles in the Wall Street Journal and the Christian Science
A ťrna| reason for officia| U.S. restraint is that the public relations job Monitor, and in his regular appearances on the MacNeil/Lehrer News
was being handled very well by the private sector, led by Claire Sterling Hour, Henze has consistently refused to allow himself to be identified as
and her friends. As we will describe in the next chapter, they dominated a former caÍeer offlcer of the CIA.6. A case in point is the jacket cover
the media and established the Bulgarian Connection as true for the gen- of his book, The PIot to Kill the Pope , where Henze is described as fol-
eral public. Further government inputs have been unneeded. We believe lows:
that Sterling and her friends are well regarded by the administration and
served a key role in propagandizing the case exactly as the administra- Paul Henze spent thirty years in various government and government-related or-
tion desired. Sterling's assertions of administration and CIA cowardice ganizations, including Radio Free Europe and U.S. Embassies in Ethiopia and
Turkey. During 1977-1980 he was a key member of Zbigniew Brzezinski's Na-
are understood to be the crankish outbursts of a very serviceable instru-
tional Security Council Staff. Since his retirement from government, Henze has
ment, who has an important paÍt to p|ay in a common enterprise.Ór
been a free-lance writer, lecturer, and business consultant.

Thus, Henze's readers are not informed that his position in the "U.S.
Paul Henze: "Specialist in U.S. Propaganda" Embassies in Ethiopia and Turkey" was as CIA station chief, and that
as "a key member of Zbigniew Brzezinski's National Security Council
Paul Henze began his long CIA career under Defense Department cover Stafť' he was the CIA liaison to the white House. In addition, even
as a "foreign affairs adviser" in 1950. Two years later, he began a six- though much of his book is written in the first person narrative style
year hitch as a policy adviser to Radio Free Europe (RFE) in Munich, ("The sun had just set, bringing to an end a cool, bright autumn day
West Germany.* By 1969,Henze was CIA chief of station in Ethiopia, when I stepped off the bus near the central square of Malatya. . . . I had
come to probe Mehmet Ali Agca's background"), there isn't a single
CIA opinion on the case and the Sterling reaction. This was in fact the lineup ofcontcs-
word from Henze about his CIA career in Turkey or anywhere else.
tants organized on a MacNeil/lrhrer program in January 1983.
63. In spite of her attacks on the CIA for cowardice and footdragglng, the CIA entered
into an agreement with Sterling to help her out ofher legal difficulties in the Curiel case. Henze and the Board for International BroadcastinS @lB). In May
By a signed agreement of March 24, 1983, the CIA provided Sterling with an Affidavit 1980 four members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee-Frank
verifying that the published document "Intemational Terrorism in 1978" from which Church of Idaho, Jacob Javits of New York, Claiborne Pell of Rhode Is-
Sterling had quoted was in fact an official CIA document, and that, going beyond the as-
..headed land, and Charles Percy of lllinsis-\ /1s1s a letter of protest to President
sertions of the 1978 report, the CIA was preparcd to sweaÍ that Curie| an appa-
ratus that provided technical support to groups that engaged in tenorist acts." The CIA
Jimmy Carter concerning certain proposed appointments to the Board
also agreed to provide Sterling with any documents subsequently released to anybody elsc
65. We were informed by one TV network producer that as a condition for his participa-
on Curiel under the Freedom of lnformation Act. As Sterling's counsel noted in a letter to
tion in a program Henze requires that his long association with the CIA not be mentioned.
Sterling dated March 24, | 978, "That means that you do not have to wait on the Freedom
Another network official told us that Henze, like Sterling (see note l, above), will not par-
of Information Act line. The Office of General Counsel [of the CIA] will tag your file and
ticipate in a program where a seriously dissenting view would be expressed. Beyond this,
respond expeditiously." It is not everybody that gets this kind of expedited and special ili
he insists on control over the script, which helps explain why he ls never asked embarrass- i,l
service from the ClA.
ing or penetrating questions (see the analysis of the MacNeil/lrhrer News Hour treatment
64. ln the early t970s, a time of increased interest in the activities of U.S. intelligence
tl

ofthe Bulgarian Connection in Chapter 7). The stations, networks, and printed media that 1,
agencies, it was leamed that the Munich-based RFE of the 1950s was controlled by the
go along with these demands are committing serious acts of suppression and deception on
ClA, which managed RFE's Cold War propaganda.
I

the public.
I

I
I48 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION SIX: THE DISINFORMATIONISTS 149

for International Broadcasting (BIB). The BIB was created by Congress an unpatriotic consideration in discussing hypothetical Soviet crimes:o'
in 1973 to oversee the operations of the two U.S. government-operated
radio stations based in Munich, West Germany: Radio Free Europe The extent to which the Soviet Union has encouraged, underwritten, and insti-
(RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL). The BIB had been organized following gated political destabilization is a complex and widely debated question- I be-
lieve we are past the point where it serves the interests of any party except the
disclosures that the CIA was behind the two radio stations. The senators
Soviets to adopt the minimalist, legalistic approach which argues that if there is
complained that "former intelligence officials are trying to redirect the
no "documentary evidence" or some other form of incontrovertible proof that
board away from its oversight role to one more compatible with the two the Government of the U.S.S.R. is behind something, we must assume that it is
stations' old role as a tool for propaganda."
ť
I
not.
The former CIA official within the Carter administration "trying to
redirect" the BIB was Paul Henze, described by the New YorkTimes as Ii
Although this article played an insignificant role in U .S. media cover-
"the National Security Council specialist on United States prop- i age of the investigation into the shooting, it is important because it
aganda." Henze had been the policy adviser at RFE when it was con- openly denies the need for documentation in a case where Henze was
trolled by the ClA. The BIB controversy centered around two Henze shortly to become a leading source of evidence for the Free World's
nominees to fill vacancies on the board. This was an effort, according to media. As Philip Taubman and Lrslie Gelb noted in the New YorkTimes
the senators, "to make the board more responsible to the National Secu- shortly after the arrest of Antonov: u8
rity Council," i.e., to Henze. One of Henze's nominees, Leo Cherne,
reportedly received CIA money in the 1960s. The senators commented Several former govemment offlrcials, including Henry A. Kissinger, Secrerary
in their letter:6 of State in the Nixon and Ford administrations, and Zbigniew Brzezlnski, na-
tional security advisor to President Carter, have said that they believe that Bul-
We believe that the work of a decade in assuring the professional integrity of garia and the Soviet Union were involved in the assassination attempt.
RFBRL would be undone if any of the present members were to be replaced by Support for this theory has come from Paul Henze, a former CIA station chief
persons who could even be remotely identified as presently or formerly as- in Turkey and an alde to Mr. Brzezinski. Mr. Henze, now a consuttant to the
sociated with the CIA or intelligence activities in any capacity. Rand Corporation, was hired by the Reader's Digest after the shooting of the
Pope to investigate Mr. Agca's background.
It is profoundly ironical that Henze's attempt to influence the over- Mr, Henze's findings, which included information about links between Mr.
sight authority of the BIB was strongly opposed by the senators on the Agca and Bulgaria as well as the Soviet Union's use of Bulgaria as a surrogate
ground that broadcast integrity demanded a severed relationship be- to spread unrest in Turkey, were incorporated in a Reader' s Digest article on the

tween news journalism and lntelligence officials. In sharp contrast, shooting of the Pope that was written by Claire Sterling and published lasr Sep-
tember.
there has been no audible protest, or even minimal disclosure, as this in-
Mr. Henze said he later sold his reports to NBC-News and Newsweek, which
telligence figure became a leading mass media source of information on
have explored possible Bulgarian and Soviet involvement. Mr. Henze made his
the Bulgarian Connection.
rcsearch material available to the New York Times for a fee.

Henze and the Media. Henze was the first prominent American to ac-
In brief, Henze's researches were incorporated into virtually all of the
cuse the Soviets in print of conspiring to shoot Pope John Paul II. His
major mass media pieces which introduced the Bulgarian Connection to
November l98l article ín Atlantíc Community, in which he made this
a U.S. mass audience and established the Plot's hegemonic position in
charge, provided no evidence to show that the Soviets had anything to
the U.S. media: Claire Sterling's article in the Reader's Digest of Sep-
do with the shooting. For Henze, however, the question of evidence was
67. Pauf Henze, "The Long Effort to Destabilize Turkey," Atlantic Community,
66 Quoted by A. O. Sulzberger, Jr., "U.S. Overseas Radio Stirs Dispute Again," Winter l98l-1982, p. 468.
New York Times, May 15, 1980 68. "U.S. Officials See A Bulgarian 'Link'," New York Times, lanuary 27, 1983.
I5O TTIE BULGARIAN CONNECTION SIX: THE DISINFORMATIONISTS l5l
tember 1982; Marvin Kalb's special White Paper broadcasts in Sep- "devising a more viable democratic system, which is now under way,
tember 1982 and January 1983; and the Newsweeit cover story of Janu- has the support of the overwhelming majority of the people."Tt In the
ary 3, 1983. 1985 revision of The PIot To Kill the Pope, Henze makes no qualifica-
Thus, Paul Henze, long-time CIA officer and specialist on prop- tion to his comprehensive apologetic for the martial law regime.
aganda, who had openly denied the need for hard evidence in supporting Henze's fondness for martial law Turkey may help us understand his
accusations against the Soviets, was probably the most important indi- statement that "In reality fascism is no force in ltaly. Communism
vidual source of information for the U. S. media in its coverage of the al- is."tt We showed in Chapter 4 that fascism is an enormous force in
leged Soviet-Bloc conspiracy. Furthermore, having helped generate the Italy, extensively organized within the security forces and state appa-
Connection, Henze was then used by the media to confirm the truth of ratus, and involved in numerous subversive attempts at coups and ter-
the Plot. He was a prime mover in establishing the "echo chamber ef- rorist activities over the past several decades. We may interpret Henze's
ťect,'' whereby the originators of disinformation on the Bulgarian Con- statement that fascism is no force to be partly simple misrepresentation
nection were then called upon by the mass media to verify its accuracy. of fact. But it is also a reflection of his belief that fascism is no threat.
Something is not a threat if you like it and if your counrry regularly
Henze and Turkey. Henze's unsuitability as a media expert on the Bul- builds it up as an asset to contain other groups. The military in Turkey
garian Connection is strikingly revealed in his writings on Turkey. We was not a threat, it was an agent of stability. We would wager that
discuss them briefly here because they display not only his uncritical at- Henze did not view the military as a threat in Greece before (or after)
tachment to the Turkish military regime and his apologetics for state ter- 1967.
rorism-if advantageous to U.S. interests-but also his lack of self-dis- Nowhere in his letter or book does Henze mention torture in reference
cipline as a purported journalist or analyst.un Henze's basic methodolog- to Turkey. He says exactly what a public relations spokesman for the
ical precepts are: Anything helping my cause I will accept and military regime would say, and when he runs into insurmountable diffi-
rationalize; anything hostile to it is not only wrong but is probably culties he resorts to silence or smeaÍs''3 A report by Amnesty Intema.
Soviet disinformation. This methodology was transferred intact to his tional released in July 1985 states that the torture ofpolitical detainees
analysis of the Bulgarian Connection. in Turkey continues to be "widespread and systematic." The report
On the quality of the Turkish martial law regime, Henze is rapturous. provides detailed testimony on the use of electric shocks, beating of the
Assessing the military takeover of September 12, 1980, he writes: "The soles of the feet, burning with cigarettes, hangings for long periods of
country heaved a collective sigh of relief. There was no resistance. In- time, assaults with truncheons, and violence directed to the sexual or-
stead there was jubilation. With quaneling politicians silenced and mas- gans.'o According to Helsinki Watch:7s
sive arrests of terrorists, the country quickly returned to order."70 Note 71. l-etter published on February 22, 1982.
the rhetorical "collective sigh," the implication that a lack of resistance 72. The Plot ro Kill the Pope, p. 65.
was a mark of general approval, and the enthusiasm for stilling quarrels 73. In his February 22, 1982 letter to the New york Tines, attacking five prominent
among unruly politicians (a normal characteristic of nonauthoritarian U.S critics of the Turkish military regime, Henze wrote: "The judgments about the cur-
rent situation in Turkey which the five professors in the social sciences express in their let-
states). In a letter to the New York Times a year and a half after the coup,
ter are almost identical to those which Pravda pnnts." This is typical Henze (see his refer-
Henze said that "evidence of political oppression is hard to hnd in Tur- ences to the pÍescnt authors and Mumcu in note 27 , above) It results in part from the ex.
key," and he claimed that "to a man I have found Turks enthusiastic" treme Manicheanism that Henze shares with Sterling, Ledeen, and thcircolleagues. It is
about economic developments. He maintained that the new process of a|so a pa't of their program of delibcrately tarring a|l opposition as paí of an immense
Soviet disinformation campaign. It is, of course, very convenient to be able to dismiss any
69' The Turkish joumalist Ugur Mumcu, after recounting a series of episďes in which hostile point as a product of insidious enemy propaganda.
Henze told plain lies, suggests that Henze is not only a bad journalist, but could hardly 74. Amnesty Intemational, Turkey: Testimony onTorture (London: AI, l9g5).
even serve as a quality intelligence agent! Ugur Mumcu, Papa, Mafya, Ágca (Istanbul: 75. Helslnki Watch, Ien Years Inter: Violations of the Helsinki Accords (New york:
Tekin Yayinevi, 1984), p. 230. Helsinki Watch, 1985), pp. l,t0-41.
70 Paul Henze,The PlotTo KiII the Pope (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985),
p. 40.
t52 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION SIX: THE DISINFORMATIONISTS 153

of these rules were the 631 laws it had enacted following the 1980
Under torture, which is used routinely during interrogation to gather informa- takeover, which could not be changed or criticized by the new Turkish
tion about terrorist movements, individuals are often forced to confess any parliament. On January 28, 1984, the Washington Post reported the
crime and to name as many individuals as possible. ln this way, thousands of consequences of the new constitution and press laws:
people-particularly young people-have been gathered into police stations and
military jails. Many were convicted on the basis of "confessions" obtained Bound by these limits, the Ozal government is seen by many observers here as
through torture or upon the testimony of other toÍtuÍed victims. no more than a token step in the direction of democratic civilian rule, with linle
chance of exercising more than a moral influence on Evren and the determined
Ali Briand, a correspondent for Milliyet, claims that between 1980 officers who joined him in the military coup of 1980.
and 1984 178,565 people were detained, 65,505 were arrested, 41 ,-12'l
were condemned for politicď motives, 326 were sentenced to death, and As noted, Henze cites without qualms or qualifications the evidence
25 were executed.T Henze mentions in his book that the martial law of Turkish prisoners who "confess." Similarly, if the Turkish military
government had arrested "43,140 terrorists and terrorist collaborators," government claims that its arrests and censorship of writers and jour-
and he notes that "during much of 1982, the national television service, nalists are based on the latter's support of "terrorism," Henze raises no
TRT-TV, broadcast almost nightly roundups of confessions and pro- questions. He also takes the government's announced discoveries of
ceedings at trials of terrorists in ď| parts of the country.'''' Henze iakes weapons caches at face vďue, using them to implicate the accused or-
..terrorists,'' and their
a|| of this at ťace value-the people taken are a|l ganizations in terror and subversion: "Most of them [the weapons] were
confessions are all bona fide. discovered in hideouts in former 'liberated areas' in premises of organi-
Regarding Henze's claim of the overwhelming support for the more zations such as TOBDER [a teachers' union], DISK [a major trade
"viable democracy" being installed by the military government, it is union organizationl, and groups associated with the National [sic] Ac-
notable that when the opportunity arrived for the Turkish people to pass tion Party."?8 Helsinki Watch points out that these claims of discoveries
judgment on the military government in the 1983 parliamentary elec- of weapons caches, which are used as the basis for fresh waves of ar-
tions, the paÍty supported by the military Írnished last. Referring to the rests, are never verified by independent investigation. Henze never ad-
1983 Turkish election, Helsinki Watch reported: "The Turkish people dresses the question of the validity of the government pronouncements
overwhelmingly rejected the military-backed party and gave their sup- or their possible use as disinformation and propaganda. Given the fact
port to the Motherland Party, which in the absence of any real opposi- that Henze is a long-time professional propagandist, this uncritical use
tion, was the only alternative to the junta. " Before permitting elections of contaminated materials must be a conscious act, and one serving a
to occur in the firrst place, the military regime had forbidden all previ- propaganda íunction.
ous|y established politica| parties and politicians from paÍticipating in Just as everything the Turkish military government says is taken as
the election: | 2 of the l5 political parties that sought to participate were true, the other side of the coin is Henze's reliance on assertion without
banned. This arrangement assured that the winning paíy or coalition evidence to castigate the Enemy. A central feature of Henze's writings
would be acceptable to the generals and would be prepared to abide by is his claim that in the 1970s Turkey was the victim of a comprehensive
the rules that they had already built into Turkey's now "viable demo- Soviet plan for destabilization through terrorism. He asserts that "The
cratic" system. Soviet modus operandi included multi-faceted infiltration and build-up
The generals also ngged the election by institutionalizing their power of rightist groups to serve as a foil for the left and accelerate the de-
through a new constitution, which legalized the extension of martial law stabilization process."tn He cites no independent evidence to support
in many provinces and guaranteed the continued presidency of General
78 lbid., p 61. Ugur Mumcu staaes that Henze's comments on TOBDER and DISK as
Kenan Evren until at least 1989. The military was to be the real behind-
terrorist organizations "are based on straightforward lies." Mumcu, op. cit., n. 69, p.
the-scenes government that deťlned the ru|es of the political game. Part 230
'79 Henze, op. cir , n pp 63-64.
76. Ibid., p r38.
7O,

7'I Henze, op. cit., n 7O, pp. 62-63.

 t
154 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION SIX: THE DISINFORMATIONISTS 155

these claims, nor does he explain how the alleged Soviet plan would
serve Soviet interests. Proof that the Soviets provided arms is that Henze on the Bulgarian Connection. Henze has devoted considerable
' 'there is no other logical source, ' "o whatever the trademark of weapons energy to proving that Agca is neither unbalanced nor a fascist, as this is
manufacture. There are other "logical" sources, but Henze does not important for making him a credible witness. Given Agca's courtroom
discuss them. By what logic would the Soviet Union support right- peďormance and repeated c]aims to be Jesus Christ, it is usefu| to have
wingers as a "foil" for destabilization, when strengthening the Right Henze's assurance that "He [Agca] was too rational, too proud to be
would shift the balance of power toward an adverse result-a able to make himself appear deranged. "s' In his proof of Agca's lack of
crackdown by the rightwing and pro-NATO rnilitary-which did in fact political commitment, Henze cites a neutral statement by Agca's brother
occur? Henze never bothers to explain. The fact is that the real benefi- Adnan, but suppresses Adnan's highly political explanation reported in
Newsweek, that Agca wanted to kill the Pope "because of his conviction
ciary of the decade of terrorism was not the Soviet Union, but rather the
United States, as Henze himself acknowledges-"Turkey's relations that the Christians have imperialist designs against the Muslim world
with her NATO allies were probably, on balance, strengthened rather and are doing injustices to the Islamic countries."*" Although Agca
spent the better part of his life with Gray Wolves, this has no evidentiary
than weakened by terrorism"-without awareness of his internal con-
tradictions.'' value for Henze. Agca's friends like Gray Wolves militant Oral Celik
are only "allegedly" rightists, who were "claimed to have been" close
Given the results of the decade of terrorism. the question arises
wbether it might have been the beneficiary-the United States-who friends of Agca's.'5 Henze's standards of proof here are greatly different
ftom those required to demonstrate Agca's alleged Bulgarian links.
sponsored terrorism. Henze never mentions U.S. intervention and de-
Henze attributes all of the voluminous evidence tying Agca to the
stabilization efforts in Turkey. As we discussed in Chapter 3, however,
U.S. intervention in that country was massive and its links to terror Turkish Right to Soviet disinformation. For example, after the lpekci
groups clearer than any Soviet connections. Henze is perhaps con- murder Agca was arrested at the Marmora café, a Gray Wolves hang-
strained in discussing these U.S. activities, not only from his political out. Henze says: "lt was almost as if the arrest had been staged to sub-
stantiate the impression that Ipekci had been killed by the extreme right,
commitments, but also because he was an actor in the events of the ter-
at the connivance of Alparslan Tiirkes."tu This is a wonderful illustra-
ror yeaÍs. ln the spring of l985, former Turkish Prime Minister Bulent
Ecevit was quotecl in the ltalian weekly Panorama as saying that he was tion of terrorism pseudoscience, which allows its user to make a point
by purely verbal manipulation. Note the "almost as if," which is gib-
certain that Henze, as the CIA station chief in Turkey in the 1970s, was
a behind-the-scenes organizer of rightwing violence and massacres in berish, but which allows Henze to suggest that the aÍTest at the caÍéwas
arranged by the Reds to give the impression that the Right was involved
those years.*r The United States had been upset with Ecevit, who pur-
in the lpekci shooting. There is, of course, no evidence for this, and it is
sued a policy o| détente with the Soviet Union and closed the U.S. mi|i-
absurd in that Agca was well-known in Turkey as a rightist without hav-
tary bases in 1975 after the U.S arms embargo following the Turkish
ing to be arrested at the Marmora. (Henze uses this bit of pseudoscience
invasion ol'Cyprus. The U.S. "loss" of lran in 1918-19 greatly in-
to influence an Arnerican audience" not one in Turkey.) The technique
creased the strategic importance of Turkey and its thcilities' Turkey's
used here is to attribute a "cover" in any situation in which we want a
reliability as a military partner and host to key U.S. surveillance posts
was only reestablished following the outbreak of terrorism that led in
role reversal. As another illustration, Henze says that Agca's connec-
tions with Celebi in Frankfurt, West Germany, "which on the surface
turn to the military coup of 1980. This pattern of alleged Soviet-spon-
appeared rightwing," were in fact a rightwing cover for Red control.*'
sored terrorism, with the United States consistently reaping valuable
gains in consequence of these lbolish Soviet acts, recurs in the Bulgar-
No evidence is provided that the surface was not the reality. Further-
ian Connection Henze, of course, never addresses this paradox. 83 Henze, op cit , n 70, p 7. See also p. 4l
84 Newsweek, May 25, l98l
80 lbid,p 62 85 Henze, r,tp tit , n. 10, p 147
8t lbid, pp 5l-52 86 lbid, p. 148
82. Panoratna, Ivlay 26, 1985, P 107
8'l lbid, p. 160
156 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION SIX: THE DISINFORMATIONISTS 157

more, within a week after the shooting of the Pope in Rome, Celebi direct contact with Butgarian intelligence officials. According to his statements
called a press conference to announce that while Agca's attack might to the ltalian authorities in the summer of 1982, Agca met with these Bulgarians

create the appearance of Gray Wolves involvement, in fact the Bulgar- at the Hotel Archimede in early January 1981 to discuss the assassination of
Lech Walesa. The talk was of blowing up his car it seems.
ians and KGB were behind the assassination attempt. Henze does not
mention Celebi's press conference, but his and Sterling's methodology
can cope with it (or anything else)." As there has never been anything in the way of evidence or eyewit-
nesses linking Agca to Bulgarians, Henze relies entirely on Agca's own
Henze's method is also illuminated by his analysis of the 1979 threat
by Agca to kill the Pope in Turkey. He tells us that Agca's letter story. Agca eventually withdrew his claims that a plan to assassinate
threatening the Pope was very probably written under Bulgarian instruc-
Walesa had materialized, or that a meeting at the Hotel Archimede ever
tions and was "his first open move toward implementing a plan that took place, and he recanted on other major contentions that had been
could have been developing for nearly a year."to Henze offers no evi- used to confirm his links to Bulgarians. The 1985 edition of Henze's
dence for this scenario; it is entirely hypothetical. The fine-tuning by the book never mentions these retractions.
KGB was remarkable: They supposedly anticipated the Solidarity crisis Following the meeting in which the Agca-Bulgarian team supposedly
planned to assassinate Walesa, "The Bulgarians must have continued
by hiring Agca well in advance and got him to make threats as a cover
several years before the actual assassination attempt. Still more remark- frequent contacts with him.''o'No evidence is presented to sustďn this
able, the KGB organized the rightwing press to denounce the Pope's assertion. Henze goes on to further fancies:n'
visit, to give the further impression that the Turkish Right was hostile to
The Bulgarians there [in Rome] were neither the architects nor the prime con-
the Pope and the things he stands for.s Why, with all this fine-tuning,
tractors for Agca's activities. They were journeymen with the task of seeing that
the KGB then sent Agca for a long, visible stay in Sofia, and used a
plans drawn up and approved elsewhere were executed efficiently. Control rest-
legion of Bulgarian employees to help Agca in Rome, is a puzzle. ed in Sofia or Moscow. The architects remained in Moscow. They were press-
Henze's position is that the KGB got careless after its numerous "suc- ing the men in Rome to get on with the job. Something had to be done about this
cesses" in ltaly, but he never explains the contrast between the careful Polish pope.
planning in Turkey and the foolishness elsewhere.
Although the key to demonstrating a Bulgarian Connection is pre- He writes that the "architects remained in Moscow" with the same
sumably to be found in Agca's supposed links with the three Bulgarians assurance that "the Bulgarians must have continued frequent contact
charged with conspiracy to shoot the Pope, only four and a halfpages of with Agca," although there is no evidence for either and the underlying
Henze's 217-page book are devoted to developing an actual Agca-Bul- premise rests only on Agca's word. As with Sterling, a secret of
garian link-two pages for the "Bulgarian Connection in Rome" and Henze's persuasiveness for the media is the breezy confidence with
two and a half pages fbr "Bulgarian Big Brothers." Henze's first at- which he presents his alleged facts and conclusions and glides over his
tempt to link Agca directly with the Bulgarians proceeds as follows:e' omissions and contradictions.

Agca made his way back to Rome. There he was no longer on his own but in Boris Henzoff: KCB Propaganda Specialisr. One of the most remarka-
88. They would cope with it as follows: Celebi was using a double deception in which, ble features ofthe history ofthe Bulgarian Connection has been the abil-
while on the surface this rightist denied involvement and blamed the KGB, in reality he ity of Henze to assume a dominant position as news analyst and report-
did this because he knew he would be disbelieved By blaming the KGB he helped exon- er, given his badly compromised credentials. Henze's bias, and the
erate it!
media's culpability in not recognizing and acknowledging this bias,
89 Henze, op cil , n. 70, pp. 204-05.
90 Henze denies that the rightwing press was hostile to the Pope's visit. Ugur Mumcu, may be made clearer by constructing an experiment.
however, gives numerous cítations from the rightwing Turkish press of the time to demon.
92 lbid., p. 172.
strate that Henze was telling another whopper. Mumcu, op cit., n 69, pp 213-20.
93 tbid.
9l Henze, op. cit., n 70, p. l7l
I58 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION SIX: THE DISINFORMATIONISTS 159

Let us imagine that there was a Soviet KGB officer with the following they quickly trace these protests and alleged contrary evidence to the
characteristics: CIA. And why should they take the western allegations of fraud seri-
He had been the KGB station chief in the country from which the ously? For the KGB man is a former intelligence officer of their own
would-be assassin came, one where the Soviet-backed regime routinely country; and, as for each country in the world, it is an article of faith that
tortured its own citizens: only intelligence officers of somebody else's state tell lies.
He had at one time been the policy adviser for a European radio sta-
tion that the Soviets now admit was a KGB operation to spread the
Soviet version of the news throughout Western Europe;
He had recently nominated known intelligence experts and suspected
KGB agents to oversee this same radio station; and Michael Ledeen
His most recent assignment within the Soviet apparatus was the post
of propaganda specialist in the Politburo. Like Sterling and Henze, Michael l.edeen has had a long career of ser-
kt us now imagine that this same KGB officer undertakes a prop- vice to the U.S. foreign policy establishment, and durable links to the
aganda task, allegedly "on his own," at the precise moment that the
establishment's conservative network. In his 1980 efforts on behalf of
Soviet Union is about to deploy an increased number of nuclear missiles Reagan, Ledeen co-authored a series of anicles with Arnaud de Bor-
on European soil. The new missiles are opposed by many Europeans, chgrave, and Ledeen's recent book Grave New World q was enthusias-
including substantial numbers of citizens in countries allied with the tically reviewed in de Borchgrave's (and the Reverend Moon's)
Soviet Union. The "former" KGB officer's snde3v61-3s the Kremlin Washington Times.In his acknowledgments in Grave New World, Le-
is dramatizing the U.S. threat to the Soviet Union and manipulating in-
deen expresses in groveling language his indebtedness to a large number
íormation about the military balance in Europe-is to orchestrate a be- of the key members of the rightwing network, from Henry Kissinger to
hind-the-scenes media campaign to persuade intemational opinion that
Vernon Wa|ters (..one of the gÍeat personages of our time, whose tire-
the highest leaders of the United States government have conspired to less service and remarkable personal qualities have done so much for
shoot the Pope.
our country").
While the KGB officer's campaign finds a ready acceptance in the An important institutionď base of Ledeen has been the Georgetown
Soviet press and in communist party publications throughout the world, Center for Strategic and Intemational Studies (CSIS), a research center
it must be admitted that his story raises doubts in other quarters. But "affiliated with" Georgetown University. (Although no courses are
even though he can provide no real evidence-no "smoking gun" or taught there, this affiliation fumishes an academic cover for a rightwing
eyewitness tostimony-that demonstrates that the papal assassination at- propaganda agency/thinktank. ) Funded by conservative foundations and
..minima|ist, |ega|istic ap-
tempt was a U.S. p|ot, he Írrgues that a corporate interests, CSIS provides a revolving door between govern-
proach" to the U.S. conspiracy "would only serve the interests of the ment-CIA personnel and journalist-academics. Former CIA Deputy Di-
Americans." This reminder about patriotic duty apparently convinces rector for Intelligence Ray Cline has been a leading official of the Cen-
Pravda and lzvestia, which print the front-page news that the United ter, and the senior researchers tend to be former intelligence officials of
States has conspired to shoot the Pope. the CIA and State Department. The CSIS has specialized in reports on
As the story gains in credibility with each retelling, new confessions various forms of the Red Threat. Fred Landis makes a good case that it
by the would-be assassin issue from his Bulgarian prison. These are also provides an outlet for CIA and other intelligence reports and a
confirmed by the Bulgarian investigators. The KGB officer is called cover for CIA black propaganda.o' Perhaps most important, the CSIS
upon by the "quality" Soviet media to comment on these startling reve- provides a means for organizing the preparation and dissemination of
lations. In fact, the KGB officer becomes a prime source for the com-
munist media throughout the world. The communist media pay no atten- 94. Michael l*eden, Grave New WorM (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).
tion to protests from the West about the credibility of their source, for 95. Frcd Landis, "Georgetown's lvory Tower for Old Spooks," Inquiry, September
30, 1979, pp. 7-9; Landis, "The Best Selling Lies of t980," Inquiry, Seprember 29,
1980, pp, 17-23.
 q
I

THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION STX: T}IE DISINFORMATIONISTS l6r

the appropriate conservative"lines" on various subjects, and for pro- unwelcome in ltďy.-
viding "experts" like Michael Ledeen, Robert Kupperman, and Walter It even appears that Ledeen had a significant relationship with Licio
Laqueur to appear on the TV networks to expound these views. The in- Gelli, the head of P-2 now wanted in ltaly for a variety of crimes. On
tellectual status of the organization is enhanced by the affiliation of March 29, 1982, the Italian weekly Panorama reported that a phone call
scholar-notables like Kissinger, Brzezinski, and Adjunct Fellow Arnaud from Gelli in Uruguay to Florentine lawyer Federico Federici, which
de Borchgrave. was intercepted by the police, had instructed Federici to pass the manu-
Ledeen's role within the rightwing intellectual establishment has been script of Gelli's new book on to Michael Ledeen. When Gelli's files
based on his credentials as an expert on ltaly, and especially on political were seized by the Uruguayan police, Michael Ledeen went down to
extremism and "Soviet-sponsored terrorism" in ttaly. As Italy has pro- Uruguay on behalf of the U.S. State Department to try to acquire some
vided a dramatic example of these phenomena for conservatives, Le- of the files.'- One can only wonder what Michael Ledeen was looking
deen has become a leading spokesperson for the thesis of Soviet ma- for in those files!
nipulation and disinformation.e6
ln ltaly in the mid-1970s Ledeen served as a journalist for the right- Ledeen's disinformation role. Michael Ledeen's function as an intellec-
wing paper Il Giorncle Nuovo, a 1974 breakaway from Corriere Della tual-propagandist of the haÍd-line Right is to find plausible reasons to
Sera, and probably funded by the CIA."' During the ltalian election oppose détente and to justify a renewed Íums race, the free use of force,
campaign of 1916, the Italian Communist Party was expected to make and support for the enlarging network of rightist regimes and counter-
great gains, which aroused acute alarm in the U.S. foreign policy estab- revolutionary Freedom Fighters. His objective is to move the frontier of
lishment. In these dire circumstances Ledeen played an important role accepted premises as far to the right as is at present feasible. In the sum-
in trumpeting both at home and in ltaly itself the fearsomeness of the mer of 1985, for example, Ledeen aggressively pushed the desirability
Red Threat. [n collaborative articles with Claire Sterling, Ledeen al- of bombing the l,ebanese Shiites in retaliation for the TWA-hostage in-
leged that Soviet money was flowing into ltalian politics. (Characteristi- cident, as part of a harder-line policy of force in dealing with the taking
cally, and once again revealing a feature of Sterling and Ledeen as dis- of hostages;|o' and during the same period he urged the higher morďity
informationists, this was a period of enormous secret inflows of U.S. of invading Nicaragua in the interest of Freedom.'o2
money into the ltalian electoral process.") The themes addressed over the years by Ledeen in pursuit of this
While lrdeen has close links to the U.S. hard-line Right, perhaps his basic agenda are very similar to those pressed by Sterling, Henze, de
most notable distinction lies in his affiliations with the extreme Right in Borchgrave, Brzezinski, Robert Moss, and Henry Kissinger. The Com-
Italy. As we saw in Chapter 4, he was associated with Francesco munists are gaining power, pursuing their fixed agenda of conquest, in-
Pazienza. a friend of Licio Gelli and the Mafia and a member of the Ital- filtrating everywhere, and posing ever more serious threats to Liberty.
ian secret service organization SISMI, and Ledeen himself was on the The Free World's defenses are down and sagging. The First Amend-
SISMI payroll and participated in its dirty tricks. According to ltalian ment as an encumbrance that allows the liberal-dominated media to play
press reports, furthermore, Pazienza and Ledeen foisted some stale U.S. into the enemy's hands. We need to organize and behave more
intelligence reports about the Communist PIot on SISMI for large con- ruthlessly to contend with the forces of Evil. This means providing more
sulting fees. Ledeen's manipulative operations in ltaly were of suffi- consistent support to our allies (e.9., the late Somoza, the late Shah,
cient scale and quality to cause a new head of SISMI to denounce Le- Pinochet, Botha, and Marcos) and being more willing to move militarily
deen on the floor of the ltalian Parliament in 1984 as an "intriguer" and
99 Maurizio De Luca' ..Fuori |'intrígante,,' L,Espresso, August 5' |984
96. With the cooperation of the mass media, in which they are a powerful force, the 100 Diana Johnstone, "The l-edeen connections," In These llmes, September 8-14,
conservatives have succeeded in pushing under the rug the massive rightwing destabiliza- t982.
tion and terrorism in ltaly in the period 1969-80 They pretend that Italian terrorism is pre- l0l. "Be Ready to Fight," New YorkTimes, June 23, 1985 (Op-Ed column)
dominantly a product of the Left. (See Chapter 4 ) 102- "When Security Preempts the Rulc of Law," New York Times, April 16, 1984
97 See Landís' ..The Best Sel|ing Lies of 1980''' llp cit , n 95 (Oo F,d column)
98 See Chapter 4, p 73
162 THE BI.JI.GARIAN CONNECTION SIX: TIIE DISINFORMATIONISTS 163

against the forces of the enemy (Angola, Nicaragua, the Shiite Mos-
lic the vision of Soviet superiority and menace. This requires the ser-
vices of intellectuals like Michael Ledeen.
lems).
lrdeen's role in developing and propagating the Bulgarian Connec-
The soviet terror network Another established premise of the disinfor-
tion was thus only one of many threads of conservative thought he has
mationists is that there is a Soviet-supported terror network. This idea
been pursuing. What unites these threads is Ledeen's determination to
therefore enters Ledeen's writings as a truth not requiring evidence.
show the Soviet hand everywhere. This can be seen by examining his
"The terror network was (among other things) a way of intensifying the
recent volume of essays, Grave New WorM. Our examination will il-
pressure on the West to make space for the extreme kft."ro6 As we
luminate the place of the Bulgarian Connection within a family of right-
noted earlier, the overall effect of the activities of the ..terrorists" in
wing themes, and it will reveal more clearly the pseudoscientific quality
Italy, Turkey, and West Germany has served western interests, not
of the entire body of thought of lrdeen and his fellow disinformationists
those of the Soviet Union. The Soviets have never been keen on the
centered in the CSIS. ..extreme
[,eft.'' And their stress on détente and building economic re-
lationships with the West runs counter to building a Terror Network.
Soviet military superiority. Ledeen consistently acts as if certain partly
Ledeen never discusses these points.
or fully institutionalized propaganda lies are true, and proceeds from
there. For example, a premise of the rightwing establishment is that the
The Korean airliner 007 as a case study in Soviet terrorisn. An exam-
Soviet Union achieved military superiority in the late 1970s. Ledeen
ple of Soviet terrorism in action, according to lrdeen, was the shooting
presents this as an assured truth, without bothering to provide argument
down of Korean airliner KAL 007 in September 1983. This incident was
or citations: "This [earlier Soviet] inferiority has now been overcome,
quickly capitalized on by the Reagan administration, which alleged that
and insofar as one side now has an overall edge in military power, it is
the Soviets had knowingly shot down a civilian airliner without wam-
the warsaw Pact that leads the NATO countries. "r03 This statement can
ing. The extreme Right contended that this was a Soviet bullying act, or
be refuted by reference to numerous U.S. Defense DepaÍtment esti.
even one designed explicitly to eliminate rightwing Congressman Larry
mates and posture statements. NATO defense expenditures have always
McDonald, a passenger. Ledeen accepts and builds on the propaganda
exceeded those of the Warsaw Pact countries, its naval fire power is
line and the Soviet coercion theme, using it to try to portray the then
twice that of the Warsaw Pact countries, it has comparable levels of mil-
Soviet Premier Andropov as a villainous bully. According to Ledeen,
itary manpower, and it has numerical and technical superiority in nucle-
aÍ weapons. In a significant exchange on May l|, |982, Senator Car|
the shooting down of the airliner was a "show of force . . . brutally
threatening those who did not behave as he [Andropov] wanted. "ror Tho
Lrvin asked the chairman of the Joint chiefs if he would trade Soviet
incident was actually a disaster for the Soviet Union, which shot down
military capabilities for our own. General Vesey would not trade' On
the plane not knowing that it was a civilian aircraft,'os and then stumbled
April 29, 1982, Senator Charles Percy asked Defense Secretary Caspar
badly in confusion before a well-organized Reagan administration prop-
Weinberger whether he would trade nuclear arsenals with the Soviets.
aganda onslaught. That it was a planned effort to bully the West is the
Weinberger said that "l would not for a moment exchange anything' be-
effusion of a propagandist.
cause we have an immense edge in technology."'il Part of the genius of
the system is that military officials can acknowledge our military
The Crenada Threat. The Grenadian revolution of 1979, according to [-e-
superiority and plans for destabilization of the Soviet Bloc based on in-
creases in military advantage,'o' while maintaining for the general pub- l(b. lrcdeen, op. cit., n. 94, p. 196.
tO7.IbA., pp. 192-95.
f03 Ledeen, op. cit , n 94, P. 5.
108. This point was even belatedly conceded by the clA, bur this did not diminish the
I04. These quotes and a full range of statistics are available in Center for Defense Infor- effectiveness of the propaganda campaign See David Shribman, ..U S Experts Say
mation, .,U.S.-Soviet Military Facts,'' 7áa DeJense Monitor, Vol. XIII' No.6' l984 Soviet Didn't See Jet Was Civilian," New york lirnes, October 7. 1993.
105. See Chapter 4, n. 7 and associated tex(
IU THEBULGARIANCONNECTION SIX: THE DISINFORMATIONISTS 165

deen, established an important Soviet outpost, and was part of "a with a military oligarchy. The 1979 coup was engineered by progressive
ma.;or direct [Soviet] commitment in the Caribbean."rm Of course, this junior officers, not generals. These progressive officers were quickly
was all by proxy, but the Soviet commitment to the Grenadians was ousted in a countercoup that left power in the hands of the same military
..quite
explicit when Marshall [sic] ogarkov told the ranking ofťtcer of elements that had collaboratecl with the old economic oligarchy for de-
the Grenadian aÍmy, Major Einstein Louison, that the revolution in Gre. cades. As noted by Raymond Bonner:"'
nada was irreversible, thus extending the Brezhnev doctrine to the
Caribbean region. " "o But why should the Soviets operate carefully only The young, progressive officers who carefully plotted the coup lost control of it
through proxies if they were willing to make an "explicit" extension of as swiftly as they had executed it. Their ideals and objectives were subverted by

the Brezhnev doctrine to the Caribbean? Ledeen provides no direct quo- senior, more conservative officers who had the backing of Devine [U. S. Am-
bassador to El Salvadorl and the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador and key Carter
tation from Ogarkov. It is obvious that if Ogarkov had made a Soviet
administration officials in Washington. These senior officers were not about to
promise that they would not permit areversal of the revolution, I-edeen
surrender their unfettered sovereignty to civilians. They recoiled at the prospecÍ
would have mentíoned this. As it is, he is forced to transform what was
of having criminal charges lodged against any of their colleagues. They blocked
probably a rhetorical flourish at a cocktail party into a Soviet commit- the implementation of economic reforms. And they continued to use excessive
ment. Here propaganda trickery attains the comic. force against dissent: More people were killed in the tfuee weeks following the
coup than in any three-week period during the Romero regime [the dictatorship
The Reaganite history of El Salvador. Ledeen's rewriting of Salvadoran which preceded the coupl.
history is in the same mold as his treatment of the 007 incident. That is,
he knows that the Reagan administration was successful in selling the (2) Duarte was brought into the junta in March 1980 after the resigna-
1982 and 1984 Salvadoran elections as marvels of the democratic pro- tion of the progressive elements in the junta. His function was to serve
cess. He therefore feels able to take their integrity at face value and go as a figleaf for the escalating violence, in the course of which over
on from there. His manipulation of evidence also illustrates the larger 20,000 unarmed civilians were killed by the securiry forces in 1980-81
disinformation function of turning all popular movements against U.S.- without audible protest from Duarte. He was elevated to President of the
supported dictatorships into minority attacks on reformist governments. 'l junta in December 1980, following the rape-murder of four U.S. reli-
According to Ledeen:"' gious women, an action by the security forces that required a public re-
lations response. Duarte himself conceded just prior to the 1982 elec-
A group of progressive generals had seized power in 1979 from an oligarchic ), tions that he had lacked any real power and served as a figurehead.",
group that had long ruled the country. This coup constituted a moderate revolu- (3) Ledeen suppresses the fact that a state of siege was imposed in
tion: Some thirty thousand of the old ruling class left El Salvador. . . . In 1980,
March 1980, from which ensued a level of state terror that far exceeded
the generals brought NapoleÓn Duarte in to head the government, and Duarte
the violence of the preceding Romero dictatorship. This was the period
and his colleagues promised constitutional reform, democratic elections, and a
continuation of the redistribution program. All of these promises were main-
in which the ,.death squads'' became important factors in Sďvadoran
tained [slc]-an achievement in itself. It was only after this progressive coup life.
that a unified guerrilla movement came into being. . . . (4) The promise of "constitutional reform" was nullified im-
mediately after the progressive junior officers and civilians were ousted.
We may note the following fabrications and misrepresentations in this Instead of a constitutional process a new reign of terror descended on El
account: Salvador. Even William Doherty, head of the ClA-funded American In-
(l) The economic oligarchy had ruled the country in close collusion ll2. Weakness and Deceit: U S. Policy and E! Salvador (New York: Times Books.
984), p. 149.
109. [rdeen, op. cit., n 94, p. 195.
I

110. Ibid., p. 196.

ll3. See the interview with Duarte by Raynrond Bonner, y'ťew YorkTimes, March |'
1982.
lll lbid, pp. 97-98
 T

166 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION SIX: THE DISINFORMATIONISTS 167

stitute for Free Labor Development, stated in 1982 that "there was no ticommunist and whether they consider the Soviet Union to be a source
system of justice in El Salvador.""n of problems or a major contributor to solutions. The answers to the latter
(5) The Salvadoran guerrilla movement came into existence in the questions are so blatantly obvious that the neoconservatives have to
early 1970s. It gained strength as popular movements of peasants, evade them entirely. The trouble with the liberals is that, while usually
highly patriotic and very hostile to communism, many of them actually
workers, and professionals were brutally repressed, and as the electoral
believe in the principles of political democracy and competitive enter-
path to reform was closed. lt then grew rapidly under the reign of terror
prise. Thus, they will sometimes criticize radical deviations from these
that followed the countprcoup in early 1980'
principles on the part of Free World governments. It is this margin of
dissent that the neoconservatives can't stand; they want a full mobiliza-
Lecleen on the media. one function of the disinformationists is to make
tion of propaganda resources, in the interest of National Security!
the media more pliable in accepting without question rlreir disinforma-
tion handouts. As we have noted, one way they do this is to trumpet The statement by Ledeen quoted above is of course wildly inaccurate.
loudly about Soviet disinformation, as part of the larger campaign of The press in the United States occasionally portrays its own country as
having erred, but it invariably ascribes these errors to miscalculation in
bullying the media into submission to their own. Ledeen's attack on the
the national desire to do good. For the Free World media, U.S. inter-
media fits the standard neoconservative format.
(l) The media are a separate "largely homogeneous political class ventions or violations of international law are deviations from a general
tendency to do good in the world. By contrast, the press almost uni-
with the usual overri<ling class interest: increasing their own power.""'
tbrmly regards the Soviet Union and its allies as sources of problems,
The neoconservatives pretend that the lower echelons ofjournalists-pro-
not means of their solu(ion.
ducers are all there are in the media. But the media are a very complex
(3) "Most joumalists these days consider it beneath their dignity to
set that includes reporters, anchorpersons, producers, owners, pub-
lishers, and corporate paÍents. The large media are all sizable corpora-
simply report the words of government officials-and let it go at
that."r18 This is a fine illustration of Ledeen's (and the general neocon-
tions or affiliates of very large companies, and the bulk of their revenue
servative) view that the media should properly serve as an uncritical
is derived from the a<Jvertising outlays of other large companies' The
conduit for government handouts. Some might argue that Big Govern-
media are owned and controlled by powerful corporate interests and
ment threatens to dominate the media and gradually to become Big
weafthy individuals. What is their "class" and class interest? Why
Brother. The neoconservatives have little fear of this, as long as their
would they be opposed to a foreign policy geared to the interests of their
pals are in charge of the government! Big government is bad only in its
corporate confreres? Do these owners, managers, and publishers have
intrusions into the economy, and even there, only where it tries to curb
no influence over their employees' activities'J Would these owners stand
business excesses and redistribute income downward. [n short, Ledeen
by helplessly in the face o[ systematic attacks on the corporate system
is a spokesman for a National Security State and unbridled corporate
and the essentials of national foreign policy agreed upon by the corpo-
domination of the economy.
rate community? Ledeen, of course, never addresses these questions'rrb
(4) "The United States and its allies are held up against standards that
(2) The media culture is liberal and represents a liberal conformity.
"Theirs is a view of the world in which the United States is a major are not applied to the Soviet Union and its allies. Relatively minor
human rights transgressions in a friendly country (especially if ruled by
problem, not a major contributor to solutions.""'lnterestingly, Ledeen
an authoritarian government of the Right) are given far more attention
and his neoconservative allies never ask whether the liberals are an-
and more intense criticism than far graver sins of countries hostile to
I l4 committee on Foreign Alfairs, House of Representatives, Hearings on Presiden- us."rre This is one of those neoconservative and Ledeenean whoppers
rial Certificarion on El Salvador, gTth Congress, 2nd Session, 1982, vol. 2' p' 105 that astound by their sheer audacity. Abuses of peasants and trade un-
l15 Ledeen, op cit, n.94, P. 108.
ll seegeneratly,Michael Parenti, InventingReality:ThePoliticsof theMassMedio tt8 lbid.,p ttl
(New York: St Martin's Press' l9Í]6)' especially Chaprers 2,3, aad 4 t19. lbid., p tll
I 17 Ledeen, op tit , n. 94. P 107
 il

168 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION SIX: THE DISINFORMATIONISTS 169

cynicism a success of Soviet disinformation, suggesting a cause and ef-

ionists in Guatemala and Turkey are given more attention in the U.S.
fect relation. He provides not one jot of evidence that any domestic criti-
media than abuses in Poland? The murders of human rights activists in
cism of U.S. policies is based on Soviet sources. He just implies this by
El Salvador are given more publicity than the treatment of Sakharov,
word manipulation. He actually goes on to explain that it must be Soviet
Orlov, and Shcharansky in the Soviet Union? The media have paid a lot
influence that causes suspicion of motives because the United States is
of attention to human rights violations in Indonesia and mass murder by
good,'24 and when forced into conflict "will strain to support democratic
the lndonesian government in East Timor, while neglecting Pol Pot and
the trials and tribulations of the Vietnamese boat people?
felsss"-as it has done for so many years in Guatemala andZaire,for
example. Although Ledeen is supposed to be a political scientist, he of-
Ledeen demonstrates the media's "ideological double standard" by
..the relative authority given statements from western and fers no serious discussion of U.S. interest and policies, only propaganda
comparing
non-western sources."''o He illustrates by the fact that "a denial by
clichés. '''
.CBS News' to speak of 'alleged' Libyan invoh'ement tn (6) Ledeen is deeply bothered by the First Amendment, especially in
Qaddafi leads
its claims for "unlimited free speech" and its lack of requirement for
Chad (after all, it was only alleged by the American government, and
thus it was somehow suspect). As Ledeen gives neither date "responsible use of that right. "'tu He sees this claim as the slogan of the
"new class" that dominates the media and as a weapon in a "class
nor source for this quotation, it is not clear whether the use of the word
"alleged" accompanie<l Qaddafi's denial, but the implication that Qad- struggle." We have to do something about the First Amendment in
order to ensure serious debate, because you can't have serious debate
dafi is treated with deference in the U S. media as an authority superior
when one side (i.e., the media) "is itself an interested party."'t'The
to U.S. government officials is grotesque nonsense. The fact that Qad-
notion of the media as a ''class interest" in systematic opposition to the
clafi was given a few minutes of time on CBS News proves nothing
government is pure neoconservative ideology and indefensible, as dis-
about how he was used-which is usually as a straw man to knock
down. The main point, however, is that Qaddafi is the long-established cussed in points (l) and (2) above. [t is interesting to note, however, Le-
bogeyman of both administration and press. Any negative allegation deen's complaisance in the face of centralizing government power. Lib-
about Qaddafi is publishable, and his credibility as a source is abso- era|s ask: lsn't the government very poweďu| and doesn't it pose the
lutely nil. Ledeen's suggestion to the contrary, based on the application problem of manipulating consent and overwhelming the publig in a cen-
of a single word, is silly even for a propagandist. tralizing system? If the media is more "responsible" in a Ledeenean
(5) "Perhaps the greatest success of Soviet disinformation is the con- sense (i.e., serves as a conduit for State Department handouts), where
stant cynicism about American motives that characterizes so much of will we find any debate at all? Ledeen is silent on these points.
contemporary journalism."'tt The assertion of media cynicism about Ledeen does end up on a constructive note, however. He would pro-
American motives is nonsensical , and the reverse of the truth' The vide for easier libel suits, an ombudsman, and more competition (how,
standard liberal format is to postulate beneticent motives which are re- he does not say). His positive recommendations, in short, are dangerous

grettably not being implemented properly. No matter how many Latin (libel suits), vague (more competition), and trivial (an ombudsman)
American dictatorships are brought into being and loyally supported by trated by KGB moles and well-populated with KGB dupes.
American power, the mass media never fail to find its country pursuing |24 |a an op.Ed column in the Npw York Times , Ledeen even refers to our respect Íbr
democracy and other reasonable ends. law as "innate " Ledeen, op t'it , n lO2.
lpdeen also uses here the standard disinformationist technique for 125. On the history of the U S. struggle against dernocracy in Guatemala, see espe-
cialfy, Blanche Wiesen Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower (New York: Doubleday,
smearing the media spelled out in T/re Spike.'" Note how he makes the
l98f ); Richard lmmerman, The CIA in Cuatemala (Austin, Texas: University of Texas
tzO lbid,p 132 Press, 1982); Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Frnil (New York: Double-
tZt Ibid., pp 132-33 day, f 98l) On the U S role in Zaire, see Jonathan Kwitny, Erulless Enemies (New York:
122 lbid., p 134. Congdon & Weed, 1984), pp 8-103.
l23.RobertMossandArnauddeBorchgrave'TheSpike(NewYork:Crown,1980) 126 Ledeen, op t'ir, n 94, p 109
The authors argue that a substantial sector of the "establishment" media is deeply pene- l2'7. Ibid.o lll
r70 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION SIX: THE DISINFORMATIONISTS t7l
His function, however, is to discredit the media and set the stage for an- tial value is the Pope's belief? These allegations about "beliefs" and
timedia pressures that will reduce dissent and enhance the power and "growing evidence" are rhetorical tricks that Ledeen resorts to time and
freedom from criticism of the preferred and relevant disinformation. again.
His own touch is "that Agca's network of Bulgarians and Turks . . .
Ledeen on the Bulgarian Connection. Ledeen discusses the Bulgarian provided Agca with money, with the gun he fired at the pope, and with
Connection in the framework of his critique of the media. He tries to other forms of organizationď assistance. .'']' What is proven is that
show that the media were lax in not pushing the case more aggressively. Agca's network of Turkish Gray Wolves gave him money, his gun, and
He also uses the case to Íeinforce the contention that the Bulgarian Con- organizationď assistance; what still rests entirely on Agca's belated,
nection is true and the Evil Empire evil. This is a precious theme for the contradictory, and unverif,red claims is that these Turks were involved
disinformationists, and ďl of its members and associates try as best they with Bulgarians in the plot to shoot the Pope.
can to stress that the Connection is proved, and to make it into an in- Ledeen alleges that the American press stayed away from the Bulga-
stitutionalized truth whicb no reasonable person could question. rian Connection. Initially, he tells us, the media suppressed the ..facts"
In pressing the Connection, lrdeen relies heavily on Sterling-Henze of the Connection "because it would give added credibility to Haig's
aÍguments, to which he adds his own quota of alleged facts and Suppor- claim that the Russians were behind a good deal of terrorism in the
tive innuendoes. He commends Sterling for her "careful article" which world."r32 No supporting evidence is given for this assertion, which is
was subjected for many months "to checking, cutting, and rewriting" clearly shown to be totally false by the news story summaries in Appen-
(which if done for Andronov's work in Moscow, would presumably add dix A. He rules out the possibility that something convenient to a patrio-
to irs validity for Ledeen). tic line may be disbelieved because it is incredible and untrue. There
Ledeen follows the Sterline-Henze line on motive-that the must be a hidden subversive motive. We will show in the next chapter
Soviets had a clear motive to shoot the Pope, and the Italians had no mo- that his basic factual claim is false-the mass media swallowed and wal-
tive to put the blame for the shooting on the Bulgarians and KGB. On lowed uncritically in the Connection as soon as a remotely plausible
the latter subject, lrdeen asks: Would Italian judges of "impeccable James Bond scenario was provided by Sterling and company.
reputation" (i.e., Ledeen likes what they are doing) push the case Ledeen's statement on why journďists were hostile to the KGB p|ot is
"without compelling evidence? Would they jeopardize ltaly's national followed by this:r33
interest (which includes, at a minimum, good commercial relations with
the Soviet Empire) without something approaching solid proof?"'u But in several stories in early 1983 it was casually revealed that most know-
ledgeable people in the West are thoroughly convinced of this Soviet connec-
Like Sterling-Henze, Ledeen never mentions P-2, the "strategy of ten-
tion, particularly in the case of ltaly. When Henry Kamm quoted his unnamed
sion," Pazienza, SISMI, or the politics of the Cold War in Italy. He
Israeli intelligence source to undermine the Bulgarian connection, he went on to
doesn't even ask whether the pursuit of the case might have any spinoff provide considerable proof of communist bloc involvement in international ter-
benefits to the Socialist and Christian Democratic Parties. The dishon- rorism. Sari Gilbert, the Washington Post's stringer in Rome, revealed on
esty and hypocrisy here are extraordinary: Just as Henze, the "expert" March 20 that the ltalians were quite convinced of a long-standing connection
on Turkey, ignores the Turkish roots of the assassination plot, lrdeen, between Eastem Europe (primarily Czechoslovakia) and the Red Brigades, a
the "expert" on ltaly, ignores the Italiair context of Agca's confession. point also made by Time and Newsweek. Thus, those of us who for years have
"Bit by bit the logic of the case began to assert itself. .'ir2e "Time been arguing for such 6 s6nn6sfi6n-nnd were subjected to the most remarkable
revealed that the Pope himself believed that Agca was part of a KGB scorn from our colleagues in the elite media-have been vindicated. But the ac-
plot and went on to deal with the growing evidence. "'- The Papal Of- ceptance of these views is done in such a way as to deprive it of any political im-
pact.
fice denied this alleged belief, but even if it were true, of what eviden-
128. Ibid., pp. 121-28.
l3l. Ibid., pp. I l9-20.
t29. Ibid., p. 127. 132. Ibid., p. 127.
t3O Ibid., p. 126. 133. Ibid., pp. 129 30.
t'72 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION SIX: THE DISINFORMATIONISTS 173

Gilbert's statement is a "revelation" and true-and vindicates Michael

These lines combine direct lies, unproven allegations, faulty infer- Ledeen. The point that is being made, or "revealed," is that the "Ital-
ences, stripped context, and innuendo. Note first the opening reference ians" allegedly believe something to be true. Presumably if "the Ital-
to several stories that "casually revealed" that "most knowledgeable ians" believed in flying saucers, that would be all that Ledeen would re-
people in the West were thoroughly convinced . . . ," etc. Ledeen quire for the establishment of the truth of flying saucers.
doesn't cite a single one of these alleged sources, nor does he discuss In the passage quoted above, Ledeen concluded that "the acceptance
their sampling procedures. Who are "knowledgeable people"? Note the of these views is done in such a way as to deprive it of any political im-
rhetorical ploy "casually revealed," which suggests authentic truth pact. " He suggests that this applies to the publicity on the ptot ro kill the
( "revealed") unreasonably given inadequate attention (only "casually" Pope. As we indicated in discussing the Kamm article, Ledeen and
advanced despite the staggering implications of the revelations). The Sterling pick and choose their evidence of critical attacks on the Bulga-
knowledgeable people are convinced of a Soviet Connection which in rian Connection and ignore the massive, supportive publicity. In the
the preceding sentence refers to a generic "terrorism. " It is not even next chapter we will provide evidence that the mass media of the United
clear that the knowledgeable people were asked anything specific about States have presented the Bulgarian Connection in a systematicďly
the Bulgarian Connection (as opposed to a looser Soviet connection to biased fashion, featuring the disinfbrmationists, and in such a way as to
spies and assorted villainy). maximize its political impact. In reading Michael Ledeen, the rule
Ledeen refers next to Henry Kamm's article in the New YorkTimes in should be: Take anything he says, stand it on its head, and you have a
which Kamm cited several intelligence officials who expressed doubts better than average chance of approximating the truth.
about the Soviet involvement in the plot against the Pope. Both Sterling
and Ledeen jump on this to prove media negativism and attempts to
"undermine the Bulgarian Connection." This is patent nonsense that
misreads Kamm's article, takes it out of context, and misses the forest
for a single tree. Kamm's article was full of accusations and innuendoes
about Soviet and Bulgarian support for terrorism. More important, as
we describe in the next chapter, the Kamm article was exceptional in al-
lowing any negat\ve assessments of the Connection to suďace at ďl. Le-
deen thus suppresses the fact that surrounding the cited Kamm article
were dozens that passed on the Sterling-Hetze view of the plot uncriti-
cally and helped build up the critical mass of a propaganda campaign.
Consider the next series of sentences, about Sari Gilbert and the Red
Brigades. Note the use of the words "revealed" and the "Italians were
quite convinced. " If Sari Gilbert had "revealed" that Italians were con-
vinced that Michael Ledeen was a CIA flak, Ledeen would say that "re-
vealed" is a grossly inappropriate word because it implies that some-
thing is true. He would prefer "alleged. " But in the case of a point that
he likes, where Sari Gilbert is saying something agreeable, she "re-
vealed'' it. And ,.the point [is] ďso made'' by Time uld Newsweek-
not the "allegation" or "claim" is made, the point is made. The point
is now doubly established, because if Sari Gilbert andTitne and News-
week agree, given the fact that they are subject to the bias of liberal class
interest and are very possibly manipulated by the KGB, their admissions
are contrary to interest-by neoconservative premise. That is why Sari
 SEVEN: DISSEMINATION OF THE PLOT t75

?. Tlre Dlsgemlnatlon of the and Vietnamese refugees, Lech Wďesa and Soviet dissidents--.are sub-

Bďgar|an Gonnectlon Plot

jects of day-in-day-out coverage. A tabulation inThe Real Terror Net-
wort shows that between January l, 1976 and March 30, 1982, the Nerv
York Times had more than twice as many articles on Anatoly
Shcharansky as it ran on an aggregate of 14 notable Free World victims
of state terror. Shcharansky generated five different spurts of intensive
coverage during that period.'z
The process of mobilizing bias depends heavily on the initiatives and
power of the mass media, with perhaps a dozen entities capable of get-
ting the ball rolling and sustaining interest. If several of these, like
/l propaganda system is one which uses--and sometimes manufac- Reader's Digest, NBC, and the New York Times decide to push a story,
!l tures-a politically serviceable fact or claim, gives it aggressive it quickly becomes newsworthy. Many people hear of it, and thus other
and one-sided coverage, and excludes from discussion all critical facts members of the media fraternity feel obliged to get oir the bandwagon
and analyses. An impeďect propaganda system will ďlow a small quan- because this is the news. When one of the authors (Herman) wanted to
tum of leakage, but not enough to prevent the effective mobilization of write on both Cambodia and East Timor in 1980, not Cambodia alone,
bias and the establishment of the convenient story as a patriotic truth in the editor of a liberal magazine objected on the ground that "nobody
the minds of the general public. In its handling of the Bulgarian Connec- had heard of" East Timor. The Reader's Digest had had no article on
tion story the U.S. mass media behaved as an imperfect propaganda sys- the subject; William Safire, Hugh Sidey, and William Buckley had nor
tem. discussed the matter; and the coverage of East Timor by the New York
Times had been inversely related to lndonesian state violence (starting
from a modest level and a pro-Indonesia bias to begin with).3 With this
Media Processes in a Propaganda Campaign silence at the top of the media power structure, and thus "nobody hav-
ing heard of East Timor," only eccentricity could cause the lesser media
Propaganda takes its effect, f,trst, by repetition-by day-in-day-out to bring up a subject so obviously unnewsworthy.
coverage which drives home the fact that something is important. It is For news that is more acceptable to major power groups, if cir-
significant that the U.S. media do not provide day-in-day-out coverage cumstances are ripe a propaganda campaign can be mobilized. Espe-
of the victims of death squads in Latin America, or assaults by South cially during periods when the business community is in an aggressive
Africa on its neighbors, or lndonesia's invasion and continuing pacifica- mood, eager to discredit unionism, regulation, and the welfare state,
tion of East Timor. These are actions and victims of ''friendly" nations, and has succeeded in bringing a conservative govemment into power
who provide an excellent investment climate and align themselves as and frightening liberals into quiescence, Red Scares and even reprcssive
clients and military allies with the dominant powers of the Free World. violence can occur. The prcss will then provide daily coverage of the
With them we therefore enter into "constructive engagement," and es- latest revelations of Red linkages, confessions, and newly found docu-
chew boycotts and threats no matter how violent and unconscionable ments, and will carry speculation by notables on the intent of the con-
their behavior.' On the other hand, victims of enemy powers-{uban spirators. The aggressive and assured portrayal of the conspiracy as
clearly proven by the media elite produces an equally uncritical "popu-
l. The "human rights" policy of the Carter years did constitute a deviation from this
pattern, but it was a deviation. A residue of the Vietnam War era, it was pressed by Con- The Washington Connection andThird tiy'orM Fascism (Boston: South End Press, 1979),
gress, and was frequently vigorously resisted and used heavily for rhetorical purposes by pp. 33-37.
the administration itself. t oaded with exceptions and weak in implementation against 2. Edward S. Herman, The RcolTerror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propagando
client states, it was subject to intense and ultimately effective opposition by the business (Boston: South End Press, 1982), pp. 196-99.
community and military-industrial complex. See Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman' 3. See Chomsky and Herman, op cit . , n. | , pp. | 45-5 I .

t74
116 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION SEVEN: DISSEMINATION OF THE PLOT t7't

lar belief" that helps stifle any opposition views in the rest of the media. Bulgarian Connection frequently during the high intensity period.
Such views are quickly seen as very "far out" and even subversively Besides its intensity, another indicator of the propagandistic character
deviant. of the campaign was that its news content was minimal. Of the 32 news
The mobilization of bias is helped along by the large number of right- aÍicles in the New York Times on, or closely related to, the Plot which
wing columnists who come into prominence in conservative eras. It is appeared between November l, 1982 and January 31, 1983, 12 had no
the function of people like William Safire, George Will, and Ben Wat- news content whatever, but were reports of somebody's opinion or
tenberg to take advantage of any opportunity that presents itself to shift speculation about the case----or even their refusal to speculate about it!
the political spectrum farther to the right, and they leap into the fray TIrc Times carried one news article whose sole content was that Presi-
without any encumbrance by intellectual scruple. They are quickly dent Reagan had "no comment" on the case. More typical was the
joined by conservative academics and thinktank operatives (Walter fronrpage article by Henry Kamm, ..Bonn is Feaďu| of Bulgaria Tie
Laqueur, Michael Novak, Ernest Lefever), who bring their "expertise" With Terrorists" (December22, 1982), or Bernard Gwertzman's "U.S.
to the proof of Red Evil and to the important task of keeping the issue Intrigued But Uncertain On a tsulgarian Tie" (December 26, 1982). In
..news
alive. In such an environment, with critical judgment by the mass media report'' after news report unnÍImed officia|s are ..intrigued,''
suspended, rightwing propagandists given free rein, and dissident opin- their interest is "piqued," evidence is said to be "not wholly convinc-
ion effectively excluded, lies can be institutionalized. As Munay Levin ing," or "final proof is still lacking." Four of the news arlicles in the
concluded in his study of the Red Scare of l9l9-2D, millions of people Times were on peripheral subjects such as smuggling in Bulgaria or Vat-
were led to believe in the existence of a Red Conspiracy "when no such ican-Soviet relations. Of the 16 more direct news items, only one
threat existed. "o covered a really solid news fact: the arrest of Antonov in Rome. The
other 15 news items were trivia, such as Kamm's "Bulgarians Regret
Tarnished Image" (January 2'7, 1983), or another Kamm piece entitled
"Italian Judge Inspects Apartment of Suspect in Bulgarian Case" (Jan-
The Bulgarian Connection as a Media Propaganda Campaign
uary 12, 1983). All of these expressions of opinion, doubt, interest,
supposition, or news of minor details served to produce a lot of smoke,
The mass media buildup of the Bulgarian-KGB Connection is a model
and kept the issue of possible Soviet involvement before the public. The
illustration of the principles and processes just outlined. Once again, it
New York Times was so aggressive in smoke creation that its article on
is an alleged enemy act of villainy that is shown to be capable of gener-
smuggling in Bulgaria was placed on the front page, with the heading
ating day-in-day-out coverage. The process started with Claire Ster- "Plot on Pope Aside, Bulgaria's Notoriety Rests on Smuggling" (Janu-
ling's Reader's Digest article and the NBC-TV program of September
ary 28, 1983)-a little editorial reminder of the Plot for the benefit of
21 , 1982. But the real media buildup followed Agca's "confession,"
the reader, plus a further editorial judgment on "notoriety," all in a
which led to the arrest of Antonov in late November. The New York
single headline!
Times, for example, had only two articles on the Bulgarian Connection
Smoke was also generated by the large stable of rightwing journalists
in September 1982, none in October, and two in November; then it had
and scholars-Safire, Will, Buckley, Pipes, and of course the Big
20 in December, 15 in January 1983, and a modest fall-off to 8 in Feb-
Three-who took advantage of the newsworthiness of the Plot, added to
ruary. All the other major media enterprises-Iime, Newsweek, the
it, and kept the pot boiling. Another of their functions was to make it ap-
Vlashington Post, theWall Street Journal, and the TV networks-had a
pear that not only was the proof clear, but that there was also a sinister
comparable escalation of coverage in December 1982 and January
coverup in high places of the true extent and enormity of Soviet guilt. In
1983. The second layer of media followed in close order with a spate of
a charming little game, the ClA-reported to be "not sure," although
articles; and commentators, humorists, and cartoonists attended to the
believing that the Soviets "at a minimum" knew about the Plot-was
4- Murray B. Levin, Political HJsteria in America (New York: Basic Books, l98l), p. made to appear the epitome of caution and judiciousness, not as a
3
178 THE BI.JLGARIAN CONNECTION SEVEN: DISSEMINATION OF THE PLOT t'79

longstanding participant in rightwing disinformation.s Time magazine KGB Connection that fits a propaganda model has been the virtually
played this game with considerable flair, following Sterling in suggest- complete exclusion of dissenting opinion. The ..debate'' is conťrned to
ing that foot-dragging in Washington was based on the fear that the true assertions and speculations by western terrorism experts, intelligence
story
..might scuttle any aÍms-control talks'' (February 7' 1983). This sources, and politicians, on the one hand, and Soviet and Bulgarian de-
delightful gambit, which patriotically assumed Reagan's deep devotion nials on the other. Communist denials, obviously to be expected, come
to arms control in the face of obvious evidence to the contrary, thereby from a source that the public will not find believable. Western critics of
converted a factor that might arouse suspicion as to the source of the the story, who might have greater credibility, are not admitted to the de-
Plot into a basis of 4dministration regrets and coy protection of the bate.
Soviets. In the news articles and opinion pieces in the New york Times be-
Time also did a masterful job of building up its favored sources of evi- tween November l, 1982 and January 31, 1983, for example, not one
dsnse-"nsrmally cautious ltalian politicians . . . exude confidence," serious voice of opposition is to be found. (This characteristic ďso ap-
"circumstantial evidence [which] seems overwhelming" to U.S. plied to theTimes's coverage up to the time of the trial in 1985.) The
intelligence, the British alone remaining skeptical. On the other hand, Times,likeTime, conveyed the views of the CIA, Italian politicians, the
the Soviet reply was "emotional," with attacks on western journalists' establishmefrt terrorism experts, other intelligence services, and of
but not on Marvin Kalb, "which tends to add credibility to the facts as course Zbigniew Brzezinski. Brzezinski's belief in Soviet involvemenr
well as to the tone [sic] of his reporting" (February 22, 1983). There was put forth in a "news" article devoted solely to this enlightening
was the necessary playing down of the problem of the credibility of fact; and tbe TimeŠthen gave Brzezinski op-Ed co|umn space to restate
Agca, his confession, his photo identification in the Italian police- his opinion. This is a good illustration of the main form of editorial writ-
prison-political context; batTime threw in just enough in the way of in- ing in the mass media--confining questions and answers in purported
telligence doubts and admissions of lack of final proof so that their com- "news" articles to those whose conclusions preclude the necessity of
pletely uncritical use of sources and packaged sell of the Connection the editor expressing his or her personal judgment.
was not obvious. A final important propaganda characteristic of media coverage of the
As we noted earlier, rightwing analysts like Sterling and Ledeen took Bulgarian Connection, implicit in a number of the preceding points, was
articles like those of Toth and Kamm, in which intelligence agencies the media's suspension of critical analysis and investigatory zeal. For
were quoted as expressing doubts about Soviet involvement, and tried to system-supportive claims of enemy evil, the mass media do not require
use these articles as evidence ofCIA "footdragging" and reluctance to much in the way of evidence or plausibility. They join a herd-like
pursue the "truth. " But not only did the cited articles invariably impli- chorus with patriotic enthusiasm. As we have noted, the 1982 Sterling
cate the Soviets and Bulgarians one way or another,6 they were also part Reader's Digest article and the associated NBC-TV special contained
of a large cloud of smoke whose net effect was to sell the Connection. no credible evidence of a Bulgarian Connection, and were crudely de-
The occasional qualified doubt or reservation actually contributed to the magogic. Analogous claims of CIA involvement in the plot, if recog-
net effect by giving the impression offairness and reasonableness on the nized at all, would have been carefully examined and scornfully dis-
part of the press. The modest qualifications that were allowed to sur[ace missed.T A propaganda system chooses its preferred myths and
were swamped by the larger enthusiastic chorus of nondoubters. scenarios, disseminates them without critical scrutiny, and protects
A further characteristic of mass media coverage of the Bulgarian- them from attack. Disinformation has free sway, eliciting no threatening
flak; critics of that disinformation, who woud elicit flak, are mar-
5. Robert Toth, "Bulgaria Knew of Plot on Pope, CIA Concludes"' Los Angeles ginalized.'
Times, lanuary 30, 1983.
6. Toth's article incriminated the Bulgarians by suggesting that they knew about the 7. We show in Appendix D that the Soviet joumalist l...:na Andronov made a case fora
plot but did nothing to prevent its implementation. Kamm transmitted western intelligence CIA connection to Agca and the assassination attempt that is certainty more persuasive
agency doubts about Soviet involvement in the plot to assassinate the Pope, but conveyed than the case made by Sterling against the KGB. Andronov's work is unknown in the
strong claims about Soviet contributions to "terrorism." United States.
8. one media official told the authors that for any criticisms ofthe Connection, the pro-
180 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION SEVEN: DISSEMINATION OF THE PLOT r8l

Following the huge spurt of publicity between December 1982 and firmed Agca's original testimony, which was suddenly threatened by
February 1983, press coverage of the Bulgarian Connection fell to a Agca's announcement that he was Jesus Christ.
lower level. But it was periodically renewed with fresh disclosures and Considerab|e news coverage was ďso generated by Agca's informal
new leaks from Rome. For example, in a long article in the New York news conference of July 7 , 1983. Emmanuela Orlandi, the daughter of a
Times on March 23, 1983, Nicholas Gage passed on claims made by Vatican officiď, had been kidnapped, and messages purportedly from
French counterintelligence that a Bulgarian defector had implicated both the kidnappers had demanded Agca's release in exchange for the kidnap
the Bulgarian state security agency and the Soviet KGB in the papal as- victim. Agca was brought from his prison cell to a courtroom to testify
sassination plot. The defector was lordan Mantarov, supposedly a on these events. In the process, the media were assembled and Agca
former deputy commercial attaché at the BulgaÍian Embassy in Paris, was ď|owed to engage in some verbal exchanges with reporters. Agca
who repeated information he had allegedly received from one Dimiter reiterated his new devotion to liberty and shouted that the Bulgarians
Savov before defecting in July 1981. Mantarov identified Savov as a and the KGB were both involved in the assassination attempt. Agca's
high ranking Bulgarian counterintelligence official. The Bulgarian gov- claims were broadcast on all U.S. television networks that evening; the
ernment responded that Mantarov had actually been a maintenance introductory lead-in was that Agca had at last brought the KGB directly
mechanic at a Bulgarian-owned company in Paris called Ag- into the case. The new and highly significant retractions that Agca had
romachinaimpeks, which exports farm equipment. In a smal| aíicle re- made two weeks earlier, by contrast, were not leaked to the press (or
porting the Bulgarian government's response on April 8' 1983' Craig R- were not reported by the press). In fact, Agca's retractions were not
Whitney, foreign editor of the New YorkTimes, admitted that Mantarov even hinted at by the media for the entire year that followed.
was not listed on the Bulgarian Embassy roster, which as a commercial The case took off with renewed vigor in June 1984 with a front-page
attaché he certainly would have been. (The Bulgarians also denied that article in the New York Times by Claire Sterling herself, giving an ac-
any "Savov" worked for the state security agency, and noted that this count of the Albano Report.,o This sparkď a new set of follow-up arti-
was a common Bulgarian surname.)n Despite the quick collapse of this cles and interviews which stressed the enhanced likelihoď of Bu|garian
apparently new evidence, the Mantarov story has retained its usefulness guilt, given the claims of the Italian prosecutor. Another surge of pub-
to the disinformationists: On the opening day of Agca's trial, for exam- licity took place in late October 1984, when Magistrate Martella issued
ple, Paul Henze reminded Judy Woodruff on the MacNeil/Lehrer News his final Report, claiming the evidence sufficient to send the accused
Hour that the testimony of the Bulgarian defector Mantarov had con- Bulgarian Antonov and others to trial. The beginning of the trial itself
sparked a further stage of media interest, although the events of the trial,
gram would have had to make sure "ofevery comma." He noted that such care was not
with Agca frnally exposed to full public view, quickly began ro erode
required for pro-Plot programming.
9. Gage's story, on which he supposedly spent two months while traveling to seven the established presumption of Bulgarian guilt.
countries, appeared only days before his cover story in the New York Times Sunday
Magazine describing his search, while working as aTimes reporter, for the Greek Com-
munist who repoíedly murdered his mother during the civi| war in the l940s. In the arti.
cle Gage described himself as armed and seeking vengeance, though he ultimately could The Dominance of Sterling, Henze, and Ledeen in Media
not bring himself to act whcn he found the alleged murderer. The movie version of his Coverage
book on the subject was reviewed critically in the New York Times. Jimrny Carr reports
that Gage "thinks it may have stcmmed from his unfashionable antileftist stance. 'l think
As we noted in Chapter 2, for some months following the assassination
there is a double standard in judging evil people if they're rightist or leftist,' he says "
("Gage says'Eleni''payment'to mother," BostonGlobe, November 10, 1985 ) In as- attempt the main thrust of media attention was on Agca's Turkish fascist
signing Gage to investigare the Bulgarian Connection, lhe Times undoubtedly considered background. With the publication of Sterling's Reader's Digest article,
him "objective" in reporting on a matter of potentially great East-West tension'
For a devastaaing account of Gage's background and misrepresenlations of history in 10. New YorkTimes, June lO, 1984. See betow, pp. 190-94. In an extraordinary depar-
Eleni, see Nikos Raptis, " 'Eleni': The work of a 'Professional Liar" " CoverlAction In' ture from its standard practice, theTimes gave Sterling a page-one by-line, and did not in-
dicate that she was not a stďf reporter (unti| the end of the article, on an inside page).
Íomotion Bulletin, Number 25 (winter l986).
r82 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION SEVEN: DISSEMINATION OF THE PLOT 183

the airing of the NBC-TV programs of September 1982 and January

1983, and Agca's declarations in November 1982, the media shifted en Table 7.1 Continued.
masse to an uncritical acceptance of the Bulgarian Connection. Sterling
and Henze were quickly established as the "experts" on the Plot, and Domestic
Circulation
their line was institutionalized and preserved more or less intact until the Media or Btoadcast Extent of
beginning of the trial in May 1985. The predominance of Sterling and Outlet Audience lDominance Evidence
Henze (and to a lesser extent Ledeen) in mass media coverage of the
subject cannot be described with precision, because much of their influ- Christian 141,2474 Virrually Henze primary reporter-
ence was indirect, as others in the mass media read, heard, and absorbed Science complete commentator, accounting for l2
their message. However, we have attempted to summarize their Monitor of 14 articles. Jan. l. 1983-
July 15, 1985
hegemonic position in the accompanying table, which describes their
importance in nine major media outlets during two and a half years of a CBS-TV I l,2OO,0O0f Virtually 3 in-depth interviews with
News complete Sterling; no dissent or critical
virtually uncontested line.
analysis at any time (see text)

Table 7.1. Sterling-Henze-Ledeen Dominance of Mass Media New York 934,530^ Virtually Bought Henze information; used
Coverage of the Bulgarian Connection, September 1982-May 1985. Times (daily) complete Sterling as news reporter; adopt-
|,533,'720" ed S-H line intact; no deviant
(Sunday) facts or analyses allowed
Domestic
Circulation December 1982-May 1985
(see text)
Media or Broadcast Extent of
Outlet Audience Dominance Evidence Newsweek 3,03'7,2'7'74 Virtually Henze primary source of major
complete articleJanuary 3, 1983; no
Reader's 18,012,3974 Complete Sponsor of Sterling (see text);
deviation from S-H line
Digest no deviation to be found
Time 4.630.6874 Substantial No evidence ofdirect use, but as
NBC-TV 7,500,000b Virtually Kalb close ally of S-H; latter
with Newsweet. no deviation
complete consultants on 2 major programs:
.t
no senous devlatlon
from S-H lines

Editorial Page, while the latter offered pure Sterling through August 1985, the news col-
MacNeiV 3,OOO,OOO' Virtually 767o of time given to S-H-L; no umn put out the excellent pair of articles by Jonathan Kwitny cited in the text, although
Lehrer complete dissident allowed (see text) these did not appear until August 1985.
f An average value for households watching the daily evening news program in De-
Wall Street 1.959.873" Virtually Sterling only outside commenta-
cember 1984 and January 1985, taken from the Nielsen National TV Rating Reports.
Journal complete tor, with 3 separate items, g. Not only did Time follow the Sterling-Henze line, in an unusual footnote to one arti-
favorable book review and cle it paid homage to Sterling as follows: "Late last year, Sterling brought our a book,The
editorial citations: no dissente Time of the Assassins, that meticulously expounded the theory of a Bulgarian connection.
It was greeted with some skepticism in many quarters, including the pages of the New
YorkTimes" ("Thickening Plot," June 25,1984). As we discuss in the text, the slight
a. Taken from Audit Burcau of Circulation figures for March-September 1984, The
skepticism shown in the New York Times was confined to two superficial and overgener-
1985 IMSlAyer Directory of Publicarions, IMS Press, Fort Washington, Pa.
ous book reviews.
b. Number of households estimated by Nielsen to have watched the NBC-TV program
of September 21 , 1982 on "The Plot Against the Pope. "
c. Average household audience in early 1985 as estimated by staff of the News Hour. The essence of the propaganda line that the Big Three successfully in-
d. For an analysis of the September 2l , | 982 program, see Frank Brodhead and Edward stitutionalized had six main elements:
S. Herman, "The KGB Plot to Assassinate the Pope: A Case Study in Free World Disin- (l) Agca is a credible witness. The belatedness of his confession, his
formation," CovertAction Information Bulletin, Number 19, Spring-Summer 1983.
lies, his retractions, and the lack of independent confirmation of his
e. Reflecting the dichotomy between the quality news offerings and pre-Neandenhal
 SEVEN: DISSEMINATION OF THE PLOT 185
184 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION
in-depth interviews, during which she made all her standard points: The
claims can all be explained and do not cast reasonable doubts on his pri-
Bulgarians and Soviets are surely guilty, western intelligence agencies
mary allegations.
are dragging their feet, and the Pope himself believes in a Soviet-Bloc
(2) The core evidence is Agca's stay in Sofia, Bulgaria, his claims of
conspiracy. She was asked no critical (or intelligent) questions. CBS
meetings with Bulgarian emissaries there, and his identification of Bul-
News also cited three different Bulgarian defectors to make the same
garians in Rome with whom he allegedly conspired to carry out the as-
points. Zbigniew Brzezinski was given an opportunity to assert his be-
sassination attempt.
lief in the Bulgarian Connection and the need to take aggressive retalia-
(3) The Bulgarians would not initiate such an act on their own. They
tory action. Agca's various clďms of Bu|garian and Soviet invo|vement
were obviously being directed by the KGB.
were broadcast on several occasions, without criticď comment. No con.
(4) The Bulgarians and Soviets may be presumed guilty on the basis
trary views were provided.
of Agca's claims.
(5) The motive which led them to this despicable act was their desire
CBS News ďso used a number of unnamed sources to ďlege Bulgar-
ian involvement in the kidnapping and interrogation of General Dozier
to quell the uprising in Poland by eliminating an individuď lending the
and in other unnamed Bulgarian "operations" in ltaly. CBS used
Poles moral support.
selected ltalian news accounts that supported claims of a Bulgarian Con-
(6) The wanton immorality and recklessness of the assassination at-
nection and avoided the large number of news accounts that raised
tempt are the kinds of things we would expect of the Soviet leadership'
doubts about the Plot. In short, CBS News did not depart even once
The line was institutionalized by giving the Big Three the floor and
from an uncritical dissemination of the Sterling-Henze tine in the period
making no effort to probe beneath their renditions of the Plot. As we
from November 1982 through September 1984.
described earlier, once a system-supportive propaganda theme is ac-
cepted and pressed by the top media, it is sustained by popular belief as
The MacNeillLehrer News Hour.The coverage of the Bulgarian Con-
well as an institutional nexus. It becomes difficult and even risky to
nection by the MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour was also extraordinary for its
challenge the new line and easy to ignore dissent. In most instances the
conformist bias and absence of any application of critical intelligence.
major media would not want to encourage dissent anyway, This was ob-
This is in line with the general character of the program, which has cho-
viously true in the case of the Reader' s Digest, where the line was con-
sen the easy road of accommodating the poweďul: obtaining established
veyed by exclusive reliance on Sterling. Other major media also pressed
and mainly conservative brand names as news respondents, and then
the party line with positive and uncritical enthusiasm' In the two major
never asking them challenging questions.
NBC-TV programs of 1982-83, Sterling and Henze were consultants
In the three programs on which the Bulgarian Connection was ad-
and their imprint is clear throughout. Marvin Kďb, the naÍrator of these
dressed, thero were only five individuals interviewed:'r paul Henze,
programs, provided the bulk of NBC-TV's subsequent coverage of the
Michael lrdeen, Claire Sterling, Harry Gelman, and Barry Carter. The
case, which continued to argue energetically for the Connection' Even
Big Three accounted fbr 76 percent of the discussion time on these pro-
CBS-TV News and the MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour' supposedly the
grams.'t Gelman was a former CIA officer and Carter a former member
more "liberal" purveyors of TV news, served as straight conduits of the
of the National Security Council. In short, there was no dissident or crit-
propaganda line. A closer look at CBS and MacNeil/Lehrer, to which
we now turn, shows how tbe disinformationists and media use each I l. we exclude from this count interviewees in a video insert on the subject from the

other. Canadian Broadcasting System, which was a segment of the News Hour program of May
27, 1985. The quotations below are from the official transcript.
12. The percentage would fall to 60 if we include the CBC documentary film, which
CBS-TV News. A review of CBS-TV News's coverage of the Bulgarian
itself used sterling and did not depart in any way from the sterling-Henze party line. The
Connection between November 25, 1982, and September 30, 1984' documentary, apparent|y based on an earlier Italian state Television prďuction' used ac-
shows that the program gave great play to claire Sterling and attention tors to dramatize Agca's version of his movements and those of the Bulgarians im-
to other supporters of the Bulgarian Connection hypothesis, but allowed mediately prior to the assassination attempt.
not a single witness hostile to the line. Sterling was used in three long,
 Í|}

t!

186 THE BULGARIAN CoNNEcÍ|oN SEVEN: DISSEMINATION OF THE PLOT lg7 lt

ti
ical voice in any of these programs. CIA officer Gelman cautiously anything to that?" Instead of a question based on fact or the intemal l'
raised a few possible objections to the standard line, which in the end he logic of the case, Lehrer threw out a giveaway and biased piece of l'
speculation that a professional propagandist would quickly take advan- t:
did not dispute. He tailed entirely to offset the aggressive and assured
propaganda outpourings of the Big Three. tage of. Henze answered "Well, it is entirely possible."
The bias in news sourcing was reinforced by the failure to identify ln his introductory remarks to the program of January 5, 19g3, Lehrer
properly the Big Three. While Gelman was identified as a former CIA gave a summary of the "facts" of the case that was both biased and er_
officer, in all three appearances on the News Hour Henze was described roneous. For example, he said that in Turkey Agca was arrested for the
only as a consultant to Rand and a former member of Carter's National assassination of "a prominent newspaper editor. " In fact, Ipekci was
Security Council, not as a long-time CIA officer and former CIA chief also a leading progressive editor, but including that would raise a ques_
of station in Turkey. (Mention of Henze's position on Carter's NSC tion about Agca's affiliations. Lehrer said that after his escape from
may have been intended to suggest program balance, otfsetting tr- Turkey Agca traveled around, "ending up eventually in Sofia, Bul-
deen's link to the Republicans.) Ledeen was identified only as as- garia." This is a distortion of fact. Agca started out through Bulgaria
sociated with the Georgetown Center for Strategic and lnternational and ended up in ltaly, and spent most of his travel time in countries of
Studies and the State DepaÍtment. No mention was made of his link to Western Europe. Lehrer stated as an unqualified fact that Agca ..met
Francesco Pazienz.a or Licio Gelli of P-2, facts which were already in three Bulgarians" in Sofia, and ended up asking Henze whether there is
the public domain in January 1983. Sterling was introduced by an awed "anything you would add to my description of what the evidence is up
Jim Lehrer as perhaps the
..only'' journalist expeÍt on terrorism, and the 'til now?"
first to report "authoritatively on the networks about terrorists."r3 Besides opcn-ended questions without substance, the most notable
Putting before the public a trio of "experts" with enormous biases, feature of the interviewing style of the MacNeil-Lehrer team was their
the MacNeil-lrhrer team then proceeded to ask them a series of unintel- failure to ask questions that beg to be asked in the flow of the interview.
ligent and open-ended questions that almost always assumed in advance For example, Henze said that "It's inconceivable that the Bulgarians,
the truth of the Bulgarian Connection.'o Of 55 questions asked on the which [sic] does, after all, follow Turkish affairs closely and which is
three programs, only one had critical substance. (Robert MacNeil asked right next door, didn't know who Agca was." Noquestion was raised
Henze about the 1979 Agca letter threatening to kill the Pope, sent out by MacNeil or Lehrer on either how a single Turk with a false passport
before Solidarity existed.) Otherwise the questions ran like this: (Mac- would be readily identifiable, or why Agca was not known to the au_
Neil) "Mr. Ledeen, is the Bulgarian Connection with Agca and this plot thorities in west Germany, Switzerland, and ltaly by similar reasoning.
credible to you?" (Lehrer to Sterling) "And there is no doubt in your Henze also suggested that Agca was instructed by the Kremlin to write
mind about it, is there?" and "No question in your mind that the his 1979 letter threatening the Pope: "I can see no other reason why
Soviets knew what was going on?" A great many of the questions were Agca would write a letter about the Pope. T'he pope's visit to Turkey
vague inquiries about opinions on Soviet involvement, Soviet reactions, went off very successfully and there was no opposition to it." If Mac_
and what our responses should be if the case should be proved. Judy Neil and lrhrer had done the least amount of homework they would
Woodruff even asked Henze whether the Soviets might have "any de- have discovered that Gray wolves ideology could explain the letter, and
sire to try this again," as if the fact of their guilt was already estab- that Henze's statement that there was "no opposition" to the pope's
lished. Jim Lehrer asked Henze, "Well, one piece of speculation I read visit was a fabrication-the Nationalist Action party-Gray wolves press
today was that he [Agca] went from Iran to the Soviet Union. Is there was violently hostile to the visit.'5 The idea that Agca was under KGB
discipline to the point that they would instruct him ro write a specific let-
l 3. tn fact, reviews in the quality newspapers did not f.ind her ana|ysis oí the terÍor neÍ-
work "authoritativc," and scholarly reviews considered her work distressingly in- 15. ln his ttook, Papa. Mafya, Agca (Istanbul: Tekin yayinevi, l9g4), Ugur Mumcu
aOequate. provided extensive evidence, including numerous quotations from the Turkish newspa-
l4 As we mentioned in Chapter 6, Henze insists on control over the script, which may pe.rs Hergun and,Tercuman strongly hostile to the pope's visit, to show that this
claim of
help explain thc almost complete absence of probing questions Henze's is a plain falsehood.

i
r88 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION SEVEN: DISSEMINATION OF THE PLOT 189

ter is not only lacking in a trace of evidence, it suggests further ques- Soviet blaming of things on the CIA, "nobody has ever advanced any
tions. Henze had just told his interviewers, rather indignantly, that the other explanation of the plot." This was a knowing fabrication, as a
Bulgarians surely must have recognized Agca when he entered from number of investigators in Europe and the United States, including the
Turkey shortly after writing the 1919 letter. But if he was already under present authors, had given a two plot version of events: a Turkish plot to
tight KGB discipline, the problem of recognition is foolish: Why would kill the Pope, and an Italian secret services/Mafiďrightwing plot to im-
the Bulgarians want to "recognize" a KGB agent? A question that plicate the Bulgarians and Soviets by manipulating Agca. But Henze
would arise with a coherent analysis is: How could the KGB and Bulga- could contradict himself and tell outright lies without opposition on a
rians be so foolish as to bring Agca to Sofia for an extended stay to get program that allows the spokespersons for a propaganda line free and
his instructions? But Henze's confusion and the questions staring one in uncontested play.
the face aÍe never confronted by the kindly MacNei|-Lehrer inter-
rogators.
MacNeil-Lehrer never once asked about the massive violations of
The New York Times-Sterling-Ledeen Axis
"plausible deniability" in the KGB-Bulgarian hiring of Agca, bringing
him to Sofia, and then involving numerous Bulgarian officials in his
In an editorial published on August 15, 1985, the New yorkTimes fi-
Rome operation. They never raised a question about the enorrnous time
nally announced that the Plot being acted out in Rome was reminiscent
lag in Agca's naming Bulgarians, nor the reports in the ltalian press that
of "a farce by Pirandello." By acoincidence, the present writers had
Agca was given substantial inducement to talk, or the great convenience
described the case in similar terms many months earlier, but we
of the Plot from the standpoint of western political interests. Although
explicitly mentioned the New York Times as an active participant in the
the MacNeil-Lehrer show had run a program on the P-2 scandal, they
farce:'t
never raised a question about the ltalian political-judicial context or the
conduct of the case. Sterling cited a report by the ltalian secret service
The Bulgarian Connection thus provides a scenario worthy of a plot by piran-
SISMI on the Soviet connection to Italian terrorism, but Lehrer never dello: Influential disinformation specialists linked to the ltalian secret services
asked about SISMI's links to P-2 or the long history of Italian intelli- and the Reagan administration create a useful scenario, sell it to the slow-mov-
gence agency forgery and participation in rightwing destabilization ing ltalians, who then implement it-with the final touch being that the Nelt
plans.'o When Sterling spoke about Agca's confessions being "corrobo- YorkTimes Íet aI.] .. . then rely on Henze, Sterling, and Ledeen to elucidate
rated in astonishing detail," Lehrer was too ignorant or politically the real story on what the nefarious KGB has been up to!
biased to ask an intelligent question based on Agca's retractions and the
ability to produce "astonishing detail" about things he admitted he had The Times's editorial, however, took no credit for the farce. It is just
never seen in his life. that Agca now lacked credibility; there was no "independent confirma-
Sterling, Henze, and Ledeen all stressed with great energy how mar- tion" of his claims; he altered details at will; and there was a simpler
velous Magistrate Martella was and how beautifully the Italian judicial hypothesis available-namely, "that the roots of the plot were in Tur-
process was working. Barry Carter added that "The Italians appear to key. " The Tlmes asserted, of course, that Agca's earlier account "was
be doing a good investigative job." MacNeil-Lehrer once again asked sufficiently convincing" to have justified proceeding to a trial. But this
no questions. (E.g., "Mr. Carter, how do you know how good a job the is disingenuous. The Times swallowed Agca's earlier assertions without
Italians are doing given the secrecy of much of the process? How do you question, although they were not independently confirmed, and al-
reconcile your statement with the frequent leaks that are supposedly though he had a reputation as a "chronic liar" (in the words of the
contrary to ltalian legal rules of secrecy?") Times,s own coÍTespondent Marvine Howe). In its editorial of De-
Paul Henze told Judy Woodruff on June 25, 1985 , that except for the cember 18, 1982, the Times asserted as a positive fact that "he [Agca]
16. See Chapter 4, PP. 86-99 17. Frank Brodhead and Edward S. Herman, "The KGB Plot to Assassinate the pope:
A Case Study in Free World Disinformation," CovertAction Information Bullerin, No. 19
(Spring-Summer 1983), p 5.
 t
ll
r90 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION SEVEN: DISSEMINATION OF THE PLOT
I

t9l I

checked into Sofia's best hotels," although this Agca claim was never as a result of her commitment and ideology, and this is what she did I

"corroborated." In an editorial of June 21 , 1984, the Times asserted with the Albano Report. I

that Agca's "detailed accounts of meetings with Bulgarian agents in The Albano Repor-t is a highly po|itica| document, Í.u|| of rhetorical
I

Sofia and Rome . . . [have] been cross-checked and, with conspicuous flourishes and simple misstatements of fact ("Extraordinary is the at- I

exceptions, corroborated where possible." This evasive statement fails story";.tu 4 - !

to mention that the corroborations were only negative; that is, the Bul- Bulgarians as i

garians did not have alibis two years after the event adequate to satisfy rudge against i

Martella.'E No evideflce has ever been produced verifying the delivery actions.2' On
of money for the assassination attempt or the rental of the getaway car, the other hancl, as the Bulgarians had been accused by Agca, any
nor has a single person been found to testify that he or she had seen Bulgarian statements (as opposed ro rhose of the politically neutral ltal-
Agca with a Bulgarian. That is, by August 1985 nothing in the case had ian police) were statements of an interested party and must be regarded
changed, except the Times's assessment of its public salability. wlth suspicion.22 Furthermore, a|though the i<lea of any ltalian áduun-
We described earlier how the New York Times's coverage of the Bul- tage or lnterest in attacking the East was old cold war stuff, there was
garian Connection from December 1982 through March l9U3 fits well a an "iron logic" (a phrase repeated more than once) in the case suggest-
model of a propaganda operation. Apart from the initial flurry of inves- lng an eastern assault on the institutions of the West.
tigation in the immediate aftermath of the shooting (see Appendix A), People who Albano found credible were: (l) Albano himself. Al_
the only independcnt research commissioned by the Times was that of though a devout Catholic, a matter brought up by him in his Report, he
Nicholas Gage, whose deeply flawed effort was discussed above. We was "without any political, religious or moral prejudice whatever."'3
saw in the previous section that the Times did not mention Agca's major (2) Agca. Although Albano acknowledged thar Agca told many lies,
he
retractions of June 28, 1983, for over a year. lt also refused to entertain was cited as an authority for dozens of unconfirmed statements. (3) Ar_
a word of dissenting opinion or analysis in that period, although these naud de Borchgrave, whose statements the Report refers to as "abso-
were available and offered to it.'' In effect, the editors of the paper lutely unquesti intelligence ser-
adopted the Sterling-Henzc line as either true, politically useful, sala- vices. Because
ble, or some combination of these, and refused to look at the issue criti- Agca on any se i:#i;Ti.":J:
cally or even allow minimal debate in its pages. Prosecutor. (5) s the Steriing line
20. Report of May 8, 1984, of state prosecutor Antonio Arbano (hereafter Albano
Re.
The Albano Report. The low point in the Times's coverage of the Bulga- port), p. 2. A papal assassination had many precedents. According to one
account:
rian Connection was reached on June 10, 1984, when the paper featured "Few popes in rhe cenrury folrowing John VIlr died peacefuily in
thcir beds. As we
a long front-page story by Claire Sterling on the still "secret" Albano have seen, John vlll himself was murdcred; Stcphen vr (g96-97) stranglcd in prison; Be-
nedict vl (9'73-74\ smothered; John XIV (9ti3-94) done to death in the castel Sant'
Report. Sterling was a strong-minded partisan on this issue, and while
Angelo " Geoffrey Baracrough, The rr4edievar papacy (New york: Irarcourt, Brace
she had a background as a reporter, her recent work with the Reader's &
world' 1968), p. 63 This quotation is far from exhausring rhe record of papar assassina-
Digest and in her book The Terror Network indicated that she had de- tions and assassination attemDts.
teriorated from a mediocre Cold War reporter to a rightwing crank. ings on SÍSMl provide
Given her record, it was inevitable that Sterling would distort any news had spent considerable
ther political enemies.
l8 This is the subject to which Martella devoted his maximum energies See Chapter newspaper with enter-
5.
| 9. An excel|ent op-Ed article by Diana Johnstone, European Editor oť /n These Times, 22. Albano Report, p. 4.
which discussed the already impressive evidence that Agca had been threatened and in- 23. Ibid., p.5.
duced to implicate the Bulgarians, was rejectctj by the paper in 1983. A minor exception 24 lbid , p. 30.
to the generalization in the text was a single letter to the editor attacking the Connection
written by Carl Oglesby
t92 THE BTJLGARIAN CONNECTION SEVEN; DISSEMINATION OF THE PLOT 193

in such detail that she must be regarded as the intellectual godmother if do."28 He gave no evidence that the prison escape was not a strictly
not an actual co-author. Thus the Repon uses the signaling theory, for Gray Wolves operation, nor that money was important for a prison
example, with Agca bargaining for release by cautious disclosures. It break. Later on, however, he asked, "How can we account for the
stresses á la Sterling that Agca has always been consistent on the core of money Agca squandered so lavishly on hotel accommodations, restau-
his charges-namely, that the originally named Bulgarians are guilty. It rants,'' etc., unless we trace it to a political source and by iron logic to
asserts that the changes Agca made in his testimony were always
"spon- the Bulgarians? The answer he gave earlier and had forgotten was that
taneous," at his own initiative, and would not have occurred but for the Turkish-Gray Wolves drug connection yielded a great deal of
Agca's voluntary acts.'s As we discussed in Chapter 5, this is highly money.
misleading: The initiatives frequently followed real world events that Reading Sterling in the New York Times of June 10, 1984, one would
made his prior claims untenable. have missed all sense of the bias, incompetence, and comedy that Al-
Albano added his own original touch to the motives for Agca's retrac- bano's Report affords. Readers would also not have been informed
tions. He was signaling, but he was also telling Antonov and the Bulgar- about the one new major fact in the Report that up to that time had been
ians that he bore them no grudges: "Essentially this is the hand held up kept out of the U.S. press-namely, that on June 28, 1983, Agca had
to Antonov, an undoubted indication that Agca holds no malice, no per- retracted a significant portion of his evidence. Sterling's only hint at the
verse acrimony, no venomous vindictiveness."2u Another wonderful retraction runs as follows:
touch is the Report's explanation of how Agca could know facts about
Despite widespread press reports, Mr. Agca will probably not have to face the
apaÍtments that he subsequently admitted never having visited. The an-
curious charge of "self-slander and slander" that arose from his briefretraction
swer is that Agca's retractions were false; Agca really had been to all of
of some testimony that had already been corroborated. Judge Martella sent him
those places! Albano is the iron logician. Having disproved the coach- a communication that he was under investigation for such charge last September
ing hypothesis-i.e., SISMI had no axe to grind, and said it was inno- in regard to certain confusing allegations of his in the Lech Walesa plot. i

follows by iron logic that Agca must have been to places he de-
""nJt
nied ever having seen. This is extremely convenient for the prosecution: The serious misrepresentations in these sentences may be seen from i

Only assertions fitting tbe a priori iron logic of the case will be taken as the following;
true; others are disposed of as "the" lies! Thus the Albano Report states (l) What Sterling calls "confusing allegations" was Agca's state-
rhat
..At these collective sessions [held by Agca with the Bulgarians in
ment that he had lied about having participated in a plot to murder
the life of Lech Walesa who was
Walesa! Although he had described Walesa's hotel in detail, he admit-
possibilitY was contemPlated to
ted that he had never seen it, and that he had never met the Bulgarian
usly, as the two were scheduled diplomat whom he had identified from a photo as a co-conspirator.
to meet."2'This Albano puts as fact, even though it is far-fetched, was
There is nothing "confusing" in these allegations.
never "independently corroborated" by anybody, and even though (2) Sterling states that Agca only retracted testimony that "had al-
Agca later denied some of the meetings and his participation in the al-
ready been corroborated." This is a fabrication. Agca withdrew the rl
leged Walesa plot. claims that he had met Mrs. Antonov and her daughter and visited An-
Another illustration of the power of logic in Albano's Report is its use tonov's apartment. Agca's ability to recall precise details of the apart-
of Agca's lavish expenditures in Europe as evidence for eastern involve- ment had been previously advanced by the Sterling school as proof of
menť in the assassination plot. At one point Albano noted that the Tur- his claims. His description of Mrs. Antonov was taken as "corrobora-
kish drug Mafia had money, citing Agca's escape from prison in Turkey tion" of his claim to have met her. ln no other sense were Agca's claims
as a demonstration of "what the Mafia's money and efficiency can ..corroborated,''
and the dishonesty of Sterling's assertions in the ťace
25. Ibid., pp. l5-16. of Agca's admitted lying about "corroborated evidence" is extraordi-
26. Ibid., p. 1l
28. Ibid., p 9
27 . lbid., p. 2l
t94 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION SEVEN: DISSEMINATION OF THE PLOT 195

nary. Even the prosecutor admitted the serious effect of these retractions stress Agca's "thoughtful and measured account of how he obtained the
on Agca's credibility, but in her purported news article Sterling sup- gun. " It was still backup time, not bailout time. The trial next made the
pressed both Agca's retractions and Albano's statement on the meaning front page on June 12, when Agca claimed to have heard that a Soviet
of those retractions. aide had paid money to have the Pope killed. On the other hand, when
Following the June 10, 1984 front-page article, the New YorkTimes the Pandico revelations appeared, providing something close to a
ran another front-page article by Sterling on October 27 , 1984, in which "smoking gun" for the coaching hypothesis, an article about that was
she finally acknowledged Agca's retractions of June 28, 1983. Even rather inconspicuously placed on page 5.s In the course ofthe latter arti-
here. however, the bulk of the article was devoted to presenting the de- cle, Tagliabue said that Ascoli Piceno prison, where Agca was housed,
tails of the claims which Agca had withdrawn, and she tried to minimize is "notoriously porous. " This symbolized the beginning of a shift from
the significance of the retractions by her usual formulas. Once again she backup to bailout time-the New York Times had never before thought
asserted that Agca's original confessions provided a wealth of details Agca's prison conditions were relevant to the case, and they had cer-
that were "independently confirmed. " But if Agca wasn't there---<ither tainly never alerted their readers to the fact that Agca's prison was
at Walesa's hotel or Antonov's apartment-independent corroboration "notoriously porous." But the case was becoming notably porous, and
is not only meaningless, it also points to judicial fraud. Sterling then re- the rats were getting ready to abandon ship.
sorted to her signaling theory, claiming like Albano that Agca really Up to the recess of the trial in August 1985, however, Tagliabue es-
rvas there, and that his retractions were false. According to Sterling, he sentially held fast to the Sterling line, peddling Agca and his claims as
was responding to the kidnapping of Emmanuela Orlandi on June 22, objective news. A number of elements of the Sterling perspective can be
1983. We have discussed her signaling theory in Chapter 6 and shown traced in his reporting.
its complete implausibility, but also its great utility for ex post facto (l) The Bulgarians and the Soviets had an adequate motive for the as-
rationalization of anything one wishes to prove. sassination attempt based on Polish unrest and the Pope's opposition to
leftism in the Third World. No counterargument was ever suggested by
The Trial. once the triď in Rome was under way, the Times's on-the- Tagliabue, and his news coverage tended to suppress incompatible facts
scene reporter was John Tagliabue. Tagliabue had been the Times's re' or claims. On June 7, for example, Judge Santiapichi asked Agca about
porter in Germany when the assassination attempt occurred. At that time the note found on his person on May 13, 1981, which described the
he contributed several useful articles on the Gray Wolves in West Ger- shooting as a political act, a protest against "the killings ofthousands of
many, and on the West German government's unsuccessful efforts to innocent peoples by dictatorships and Soviet and American im-
determine whether and how long Agca stayed there and the nature of his perialism. " Agca acknowledged that the note represented his views and
activities. His peďormance during the trial, by contrast, illustrates the that he had acted for "personal motives." Michael Dobbs, writing in
hegemony of the Sterling model in shaping the Times's coverage of the the Washington Post,3t pointed out that:
Connection.
The note appeared to contradict his subsequent attempts to present himself as "a
Tagliabue's troubles began on the first day of the trial, when Agca de-
terrorist without ideology" who had agreed to shoot the Pope in return for the
clared that he was Jesus Christ. This extraordinary claim was not fea-
equivalent of $1.2 million by the Bulgarian secret service. The mercenary mo-
tured in the headline of his article the next day ("Prosecutor Asks tive has been accepted as accurate by an ltalian state prosecutor.
Broader Inquiry in Trial of Agca"), nor in the first paragraph of the
text, ďthough the day before (with Sterling's collaboration,,) Tagliabue
These themes were also central to Claire Sterling's analysis. John
had stressed Agca's credibility as the key issue in the case. Immediately Tagliabue in the New York Times failed to mention this exchange during
after noting Agca's self-identification as Jesus, Tagliabue hastened to
30. New YorkTimes, June 17, 1985
29. Articlcs by Sterling on the trial appeared in the^/ew YorkTimes of May 27' 1985 31. "Agca Refuses to Testify on Accomplices," June 8, 1985.
(the opening date of the trial) and on August 6, 1985
196 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION SEVEN: DISSEMINATION OF THE PLOT t9'l

the trial. Similarly, in testimony given by Yalcin Ozbey on June 19, the four years. The session of the conspiracy trial yesterday, however, ap-
witness suggested that Agca's real motive in shooting the Pope was his peared to set a record for the scale and rapidity of corrections offered by
hunger for fame. This claim also never reached the readers of theTimes. Agca to earlier descriptions of the logistiqgof the assassination at-
(2) The case was an embarrassment to the ltalian govemment, which tempt."Y John Tagliabue, writing in the New York Times, was much
pursued it reluctantly. This classic Sterling line was pressed in the arti- more circumspect.
cle Tagliabue wrote jointly with Sterling on May 27 1985. Characteris-
' (7) Tagliabue raised no questions about how Martella assembled a
tically, no mention was made of any possible political benef,rts that case based on Agca's testimony, given the evidence accumulating in
might have accrued to Craxi and others in bringing the case. court that Agca lied and contradicted himself on an hourly basis and suf-
(3) No mention was made by Tagliabue or Sterling of P-2' Pazienza, fered from serious delusions.
Ledeen, or ltalian political conditions urÍ1| afier the Pandico bombshell. (8) Following prosecutor Antonio Marini's recommendation on Feb-
(4) There was a steady reiteration of the Sterling cliché that Agca ruary 27, 1986, that the Bulgarian defendants be acquitted for lack of
"has not budged from his basic contention that Bulgarians, and thus the evidence, Tagliabue chose to feature heavily the prosecutor's attack on
Soviet Union. commissioned and financed the plot to murder the the judge for failing to admit additional witnesses, and the fact that Ma-
Pope.''.' And this cliché is not true. As noted above, Agca stated before rini called upon the jury to make its own decision..s
the Court on June 7, 1985, that he had acted for "personal" motives
T/re Times and the Disinformationis's. We noted earlier that the lťew
with the intent of making a political protest, which contradicts the
York Times not only used Sterling as a reporter and source of data and
mercenary hypothesis. Even more dramatic, on March 3, 1986' Agca
themes, it also suppressed information about her credentials. Her books
returned to the witness stand after a long absence, immediately after
were regularly reviewed: The Time of the Assassins was reviewed in
Marini's summing up and request for dismissal of the case against the
both the daily and Sunday New YorkTimes. Her reliance on Czech Gen-
Bulgarians, to reiterate the point he made in the letter threatening to
eral Sejna, an established liar-informer, as a key source in The Terror
shoot the Pope in 1979: that he had committed his act because of the
Network has never been disclose d to Times readers; and the slander suits
crimes of westem Christianity. "I thought I should strike at western
over her smearing of Henri Curiel were never mentioned in the Times.
civilization and Christianity in the person of the Pope because they have
Equally compromising has been the New York Times's alliance with
been repressive and oppressive ofthe people." In explaining his actions
and protection of Michael Ledeen. Ledeen was given Op-Ed column
of May 13, 1981, he made no mention of the Bulgarians or KGB. Tag'
liabue and the Times blacked out this statement' 34. Washington Posr, June 26, 1985.
(5) Tagliabue swallowed the signaling theory and Agca's "double 35. "Rome Prosecutor Urges Acquittal of 3 Bulgarians,,, New yorkTimes, February
game." "By his own admission," wrote Tagliabue, Agca was playing 28, l936.Tagliabuepretendedthattherewasaseriouschancethatthejurywouldoverride
the prosecutor and find the Bulgarians guilty, which was foolish and naive He also dis-
a double game, which seemed "to play into the hands of the defense at- p|ayed the same kind ofpolitica| naiveté that we noted above under (2); Marini's rhetoric
torneys" who claimed that Agca was coached.33 The use of "admis- was taken at face value, and ragliabue never hinted at the possibility that the prosecutor
sion" we have already seen to be a manipulative device of the Sterling- might be protecting his colleagues in the ltalian establishment, who had initiated and
Henze school. Tagliabue does not say that Agca "admitted" he was enthusiastically supported a case that was suffering such a dismal ending. Tagliabue of-

Jesus Christ. There are alternative explanations to the signaling theory;

fered no analysis of the causes of the failure, despite the long record of claims by the New
Yorkrimes and its favored sources that Bulgarian guilt was all but proved. Apart from the
Agca could be acrazy opportunist, in which case he is revealing his true Marini gambit, Tag|iabue blamed the dénouement on Agca's undermining of the case,
nature. The phrase "playing into the hands of" the Bulgarian defense without explaining why none of Agca's claims of Bulgarian involvement had ever been
reflects Tagliabue's and the Times's identification with the case for the confirmed by a single independent witness over the course of a four-year period of investi-
prosecution. gation and trial.
(6) Tagliabue regularly understated the number of contradictions in
Agca's testimony. As Michael Dobbs wrote in the Washington Post:
''Agca has changed elements of his story almost continuously in the last
32. New York Times, August 6, 1985
33 lbid., June 22, 1985.
198 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION SEVEN: DISSEMINATION OF THE PLOT 199

space twice in 1984-85,'u allowing him to issue a call for the greater ap- The author, E. J. Dionne, never asked why Pazienza, wanted in ltaly for
plication of force in Lebanon and to stress the greater importance of Na- over a year, had never been extradited. He failed to mention that
tionď Security than individuď liberty-themes that would delight the Pazienza was wanted in Italy in connection with serious abuses by the
heart of Licio Gelli. Ledeen's book Grave New World was given a sub- intelligence services, including involvement in the Bologna railroad sta-
stantial and favorable notice in the Sunday New York Times Book Re- tion bombing. When it came to Pazienza's involvement with Michael
view. Ledeen, the reporter telephoned Ledeen, who told him that Pazienza
Perhaps more serious has been the New YorkTimes's cover-up of [-e- had exaggerated his influence with the Reagan administration, and that
deen's role in ltaly and his unsavory linkages to Italian intelligence and he himself had had only a very brief, unspecified relation with Pazienza.
the Italian Right. The Times has never mentioned his connections with Dionne raised no questions and tapped no alternative information
Santovito, Gelli, and Pazienza,t' his controversial sale of documents to sources. He had all the news fit to print.
SISMI, or the fact that the head of Italian military intelligence stated be- From December 1982 through February 1986 the New York Times
fore the Italian Parliament that Ledeen was an "intriguer" and unwel- featured heavily and almost exclusively claims of prosecutors and pro-
come in Italy.38 Actually, lheTimes's suppressions on Ledeen have been ponents of the Plot. After a long trial in which the claims of the pro-
part of a larger package of suppressions that excluded any information secutor were once again explored in great detail, the prosecution rested
that would disturb the hegemony of the Sterling-Henze line. Thus, just at the end of February, acknowledging its lack of an adequate case
as Sterling and Henze never mention P-2 in their writings , so the Times against the Bulgarians by asking for a dismissal for lack of evidence. It
failed even to mention the Italian Parliamentary Report on P-2 of July was f,rnally the defense's turn to present its case. The ltalian counsel for
12, 1984, which raised many inconvenient questions about the quality Antonov took the floor March 4, and finished his presentation on March
of ltalian society and the intelligence services. The Parliamentary Com- 8. His powerful statement, which assailed the Martella investigation
mission, which held extensive hearings on SISMI (published in five vol- mercilessly, described in detail the evidential weakness of the case, and
umes), was also blacked out for readers of theTimes.In July 1985 an gave powerful support to the coaching hypothesis, was blacked out in
Itafian court pronounced sentence against Francesco Pazienza and other the New York Times (and the rest of the mass media). This completes the

officials of SISMI for serious crimes. The accompanying 1S5-page re- circle of propaganda service, with the preferred line pushed as long as it
port described spectacular abuses of secret service authority in Italy,tt could be issued as news without gross embarrassment, and then failing
including the forging and planting of documents. Although these crimes to give the defense even minimal coverage, even after it is apparent to
were committed by individuals regularly linked in the Italian press to the all that the preferred line has been discredited. This process suggests the
Bulgarian Connection, this report and sentence were also suppressed by unlikelihood that any retrospectives will be provided that might explain
the Times. We believe that it is precisely this connection-and the fact the reasons for the failure-and the media's gullible and uncritical trans-
that these sensational documents would raise questions about Ledeen mission----of a case long portrayed as cogent and true.
and the Sterling-Henze portrayal of the Bulgarian Connection-that
caused the Times to avoid providing its readers with such information.
For years the Italian press carried reports of SISMI and Mďra in- The Smďl Voices of Dissent
volvement in threatening and coaching Agca. Tbe New York Times te'
frained from mentioning, let alone investigating, these matters. The first There were serious voices of dissent in the mass media, but they were
reference to Pazienza in the Times came only with his arrest on March few and without serious effect on the general run of media opinion and
24,1985, and the article appeared in the Business Section ofthe paper. reporting. The only major TV program to challenge the Sterling-Henze
36. Michael trdeen, "Be Ready To Fight," New YorkTimes, June 23, 1985; and line before the 1985 trial was an ABC-TV News "20120" show on May
"When Security Preempts the Rule of Law," New YorkTimes, Apd.l 16, 1984 IZ, 1983.In that program ABC did some very remarkable and unique
37. A minor exception is noted in the text below. things: It investigated the obvious leads and implausibilities in the Ster-
38. Maurizio De Luca, "Fuori I'intrigante," L'Espresso, August 5, 1984. ling-Henze line with diligence, it went at it with an open and somewhat
39 See Chapter 4, pp. 00-000
 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION SEVEN: DISSEMINATION OF THE PLOT 2Ol

skeptical view of the truth of the case, and it tapped a wide array of noted Agca's June 28, 1983 retraction of most of his previous declara-
sources. The results were devastating. It established from drug enforce- tions, and presented evidence that appeared to undermine fatally the
ment officials that Agca's travels Frt well into the pattern of movement Truck Ploy. A month later, on July 22, 1984, Dobbs returned to the at-
of the international drug trade. Citing Mumcu and others, it stressed tack, noting in an article headlined "Probers Divided Over Evidence in
Agca's psychopathic personality and overweening desire to be in the Pope Attack" that there were many loose ends in the case and that Agca
limelight. It effectively disposed of the alleged letter from the Pope to lacked credibility.
Brezhnev, citing Cardinal Krol (a Vatican-appointed spokesman) and This was too much for Claire Sterling. In an Op-Ed column in the
other Vatican officials, who denied the existence of such a letter and Washington Post ("Taking Exception," August 7, 1984), Srerling ac-
claimed that verbal messages from the Pope at the time were concilia- cused Dobbs of "numerous omissions or misstatements." She alleged
tory. It pointed out the many ways in which the implementation of the "a curious ignorance of how this investigation developed," and main-
plot violated basic laws of spycraft (e.9., planning meetings in Bulga- tained that "while Dobbs dwells on [Agca's] retraction," he failed to
rian residences). It pointed up strategic errors in Agca's evidence (mis- take note that "practically everything Agca tried to take back had been
takes in describing Antonov's apartment, and the alleged presence of substantiated already, and not a single point in the retraction changed
Mrs. Antonov, who was in Sofia). It showed how Agca adjusted his tes- the basic lines in Agca's story."
timony to take account of Bulgarian counterclaims (e.8., pushing back In a reply in the Posl a few days later (August 10, 1984), Dobbs noted
the meeting time with Antonov on May 13, given Antonov's strong alibi Sterling's "tendency to conclude that anybody who questions her thesis
for the originally "confessed" time). Examining the Bulgarian alibis' that the assassination attempt has already been shown to be a Soviet-
ABC found them paÍtly convincing. It discussed the problem of the lan- bloc conspiracy is accepting Bulgarian arguments." But he dwelt
guage barrier between Antonov and Agca. And it cited ABC's own in- primarily on Sterling's essential dishonesty in failing to include in her
telligence and police contacts to cast doubts on the testimony of Man- story that Albano's Report had raised the issue of Agca's "retractions"
tarov and on the general vďidity of the case. of June 28, 1983. In a separate document, made available to readers on
In brief, the ABC inquiry was an eye-opener, raising many questions request, he accused Sterling of omitting sections of the Report "that call
and providing partial and skeptical answers. Nevertheless, the pro- into question Agca's credibility." This document lists a further dozen
gram's information fetl still-born from the tube. Although it received errors that Sterling made in her statement in the Posr about Dobbs's re-
powerful support from Agca's retractions one month later, the retrac- porting on the case, including clear misstatements of what Albano's Re-
tions were not leaked and publicized, and so did not strengthen the skep- port actually says. Later, in a four-part series in the Washington Post in
tical case. The Sterling-Henze line held firm in the mass media for mid-October 1984, Dobbs relocated the root of the assassination attempt
another year. in the Turkish right wing, raised severe doubts about Agca's credibility
The most important dissenting voice in the mass media was that of and his allegations of working for the Bulgarians, and traced the evolv-
Michael Dobbs, the Washington Post's Rome correspondent, who ing "confessions" to show that they were merely embellishments on a
began to present an alternative and cautiously critical view following first-approximation tale that was corrected by information learned from
Sterling's June 10, 1984 misrepresentation of the Albano Report. In a the media and perhaps from the questions asked him by his inter-
series of articles beginning on June 18, 1984----cight days after the rogators.
Times caried Sterling's rendition of Albano's Report-Dobbs began to During the last half of l9B4 and in the early phase of the 1985 trial
provide U.S. readers a second opinion. While featuring Albano's con- Michael Dobbs's writing on the Plot gave readers of the Washington
clusion that the Bulgarians were behind the plot, Dobbs also noted in his Post (and some subscribers to the Post's news service) a nearly unique
opening paragraph that the evidence was "largely circumstantial"; and channel of information, providing a well-reasoned altemative to the
in the fifth paragraph he said that "much of the circumstantial evidence neaÍ tidal wave of pro-Plot outpourings from the pub|ishers of Ster|ing,
. . . could undermine rather than confirm the conspiracy theory. . . . " Henze, and their allies. Dobbs raised many questions, pointed up
The remainder of Dobbs's lengthy article questioned Agca's reliability, Agca's numerous lies and contradictions, and showed in a variety of
202 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION SEVEN: DISSEMINATION OF THE PLOT 203

ways the weaknesses of the Itďian handling of the case. one of Dobbs's were no doubt dealing with more important matters, they may also have
chief contributions was to trace a large proportion of Agca's claims to been constrained by the fact that the links between academic political
the Italian media. and to demonstrate the extensive access that Agca had scientists, international relations specialists, conservative thinktanks,
to outside information which would help him develop his claims and de- and the federal government are extensive and pervasive. The silence of
clarations. the academy is evidence that these aÍe to a great extent coopted disci-
Despite these merits, Dobbs was unable to break free of the c|ichés plines, "handmaidens of inspired truth. "a' The Bulgarian Connection is
that Martella was "wise" and "judicious," and that the coaching an inspired truth.
hypothesis was a "Btrlgarian argument."no [n his exchange with Ster- We mentioned earlier that Michael Ledeen's book Grave New World
ling, Dobbs was on the defensive, claiming that his own role was report- was favorably reviewed in the Sunday New York Times Book Review.
ing "both sides, in contrast to Sterling." In the end this lone mass The reviewer, William E. Griffiths, a Professor of Political Science at
media reporter, who had built up an impressive case against the Connec- MIT, remarked parenthetically that "his [Ledeen's] discussion of the
tion, was unable to state a firm conclusion. This is arguably reasonable; probable Soviet involvement in the plot to kill the Pope is surely cor-
a reporter can give the facts and let readers make up their own minds. In Íect.,,., Grifrlths gives no support for this statement. But Griffiths, who
the context, however, nobody in the mass media was drawing negative is a "roving editor" for the Reader's Digest, is also on the Editorial
conclusíons on the Plot. Sterling, Henze, and their allies suffered no Board of Orbrs, a semi-academic joumal which carried the lone "schol-
such constraints. They were free to assert Bulgarian and Soviet guilt, arly" article on the plot. Perhaps this was the source from which Grif-
and even to denounce doubters as victims of Soviet disinformation. The fiths deduced the validity of the Connection.
contrast tells us a great deal about the power of the political forces that The "scholarly" article was published in Orbis in the Winter 1985
originated and sustained the case' issue. Entitled "The Attempted Assassination of the Pope," it was writ-
ten by Thomas P. Melady and John F. Kikoski, members of the faculty
of Sacred Heart University of Fairfield, Connecticut.a3 The most notable
feature of this piece is its complete and uncriticď reliance on Claire
The Intellectuals: Somnolence and Complicity Sterling, Paul Henze, and Michael Ledeen as authorities on the subject.
The article is, in fact, a rehash of the works of these authors. Thirty-
Between 1982 and 1985, when the Bulgarian Connection became incor- three of 78 footnotes are to the works of the Big Three. A further 15
porated into the public's consciousness, the academic community re- footnotes cite Sterling's version of the Albano Report. The remainder of
rnained almost totally silent on the subject. Journals in the fields of the citations range from NBC's Marvin Kalb and the Reader's Digest ta
political science, international relations, and Near Eastern studies re- quotations from Henry Kissinger, Richard Pipes, and Zbigniew
cord only a single article on the Bulgarian Connection. Academic intel- Brzezinski. Michael Ledeen's Commentary article is described as "a
lectuals were content to allow this issue to be monopolized by the Big thorough treatment of media coverage of this affair and of the reluctance
Three and their allies at the Georgetown CSIS. While the academicians of the 'elite media' to more actively pursue this story. The au-
40. As late as June 19, 1985, Dobbs was still asserting that "Soviet Bloc propagandists 41. See Robert A. Brady, The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism (New York:
and leftist Italian newspapers have claimed for some time that Agca was 'fed' in prison Viking' 1937). Chapter 2' ..Science, Handmďden of Inspired Truth,'' described the
with details on the Bulgarians he later accused of being his accomplices, but have so far accommodation of German scientists to the social philosophy of the Nazi state.
failed to provide convincing evidence to support their assertions." This reference to 42. New YorkTimes Book Review, May 19, 1985.
,'soviet Bloc propagandists" is the same kind of Sterlingesque designation that Dobbs
43. Melady is also President of the University He has been U.S Ambassador to
objected to when applied to himself. Furthermore, it isn't even accurate. A fair number of Burundi and Uganda and a Senior Adviser to the U.S. Delegation at the United Nations.
analysts not reasonably designated as "soviet Bloc propagandists and leftist ltalian news- 44. Thomas P. Melady and John F. Kikoski, "The Attempted Assassination of the
..convincing evidence'' is a matteÍ
papers'' have c|aimed that Agca was coached. What is Pope," Orbis (Winter 1985), p.TlT,n.4.TheCommentaryarticlewasincorporatedinto
for debate, but Dobbs has never explained how Agca could have given details about An- Ledeen's book Grave New World. The contents of that chapter are discussed above in
that were never previously published and that Agca admitted he had Chapter 6,
:."X:':":::.."nt
2U THE BI.JLGARTAN CONNECTION SEVEN: DISSEMINATION OF THE PLOT 205

thors cite the Albano Report as an authoritative and objective document, The reď function of articles like this orbis production is their ..echo
and refer to its "exhaustive documentation" of various matters, al- chamber" service. Relying entirely on Sterling and company, Melady
though they acknowledge never having read the Report. They rely on and Kikoski provide a nominally ..scholarly article'' conťtrming the
Sterling's summary and her general inferences based on her own read- Sterling-Henze claims. This is now available for citation as scholarly
ing of the document.o' This lures them into citing at length Agca's "re- confirmation of the truth of the Sterling-Henze claims.ns Thus Henze
markable details" on the Walesa plot and Antonov's apartment, oblivi- cites this work in support of his own conclusions in his 1985 update of
ous to the fact that the Albano Report acknowledged that on June 28, The Plot to Kill the Pope, and it will undoubtedly provide others with a
1983 Agca admitted that he had either concocted or knew only by hear- respectable citation for the Sterling-Henze version of the story, despite
say these "remarkable details." its wholly derivative and uncritical properties. Readers unfamiliar with
The authors never cite Michael Dobbs's four-part critique of the pro- the "echo chamber" might conclude that Melady and Kikoski had
secution's case , nor any other reporter or analyst with a different view- sifted evidence possibly unavailable to Henze, or that they had
point. When ABC-TV in 1983 checked the specifics of the Kalb-NBC examined competing hypotheses and come down on Henze's side.
claim that the Pope had sent a warning note to Brezhnev, it came up Readers who have not read the Orbis article would have no way of
with sharply contradictory facts.{ Melady and Kikoski give the straight knowing that Henze, in citing Melady-Kikoski, is simply citing himself
Katb-NBC version, never hinting that it had been disputed. Agca's (and Sterling) at second hand. Thus disinformation echoes through the
claims which Sterling and Henze selectively chose to fil their model are chamber to create the illusion of independent scholarly confirmation.
also presented as valid, even where they have been retracted. Henze's
version of the alleged Soviet attempt to destabilize Turkey is presented
as uncontested truth-alternative facts and an alternative literature are
simply ignored. Henze's possible bias is suppressed and the authors
adopt Henze's own form of nondisclosure of his background-the
[ormer CIA station chief in Turkey is said to have "a strong prior back-
ground in Turkish ďfairs, and presently is a research scholar [sic] with
the Rand Corporation."
Melady and Kikoski do not even take into consideration contrary evi-
dence from sources with which they are apparently familiar. For exam-
ple, they (along with Sterling and Henze) continue to rely on Nicholas icy Research Institute, a conservative thinktank affiliated with the lnternational Relations
Gage's story about the Bulgarian defector Mantarov, long after the program of the university of Pennsylvania. Its editorial board of 35 academics and
thinktank intellectuals includes 24 members currently on the staffs of universities, among
Times's foreign editor Craig Whitney had essentially conceded the truth
them william Van cleave, Allen whiting, Robert Scalapino, paul Seabury, william Grif-
of the Bulgarians' denials and refutations of Mantarov's contentions. fiths, Richard Pipes The thinktank members include colin Gray of the Hudson Institute
The list of problems which tbe orĎis authors sidestepped by ignoring in- and Lawrence B. Krause of the Brookings Institution. presumably this article meets this
convenient evidence is a long one, encompassing all those that would be group's conception of scholarly standards.
relevant to a work of serious academic scholarship. In short, Melady 48. A f,rne example of this process was the alleged admission by Khmer Rouge leader,
Khieu samphan, that his govemment had slaughtered a million people His statement was
and Kikoski provided the academic world with a Reader's Digest article
reportedly made in an interview with a remote ltalian journal, Famiglia cristiana, in
salted with a few footnotes.tt 1976. It is extremely doubtful that this interview ever took place, but translations and mis-
translations abounded. A mistranslation by John Barron and Anthony paul of the Reader,s
45. "Sterling, who has read the as yet umeleased Albano Report in its entirety, wrote
that: 'Judicial belief in Mr. Agca's confession was apparently fortified by a mass ofcor-
Digest was cited by Donald wise in the Far Eastern Economic Review, which was then
cited by Professor Karl Jackson in Asian survey as authentic evidence Jackson provided
roborative evidence'." Ibid , p.799.
the "scholarly " source to be cited further For a fuller discussion see Noam chomsky and
46. See the discussion of the ABC progÍam in the preceding section of this chapter.
47. That it was published by Orbis is revealing. Orlls is published by the Foreign Pol- Edward S. Herman, After the Cataclysm: Postyvar Indochina and the Reconstruction oÍ
Imperial ldeology (Boston: South End Press, 1979), pp 172-17
 t

EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS

early to elements of the secret services, and it demonstrates their will-

ingness to forge or pass along false evidence on the Connection itself.
This forgery appeared as fact in the first book published on the Plot,

B. Gonduslons
by a Vatican priest; and a Vatican official subsequently acknowledged
that the hypothesis of KGB-Bulgarian involvement in the shooting had
been secretly disseminated by the Vatican very soon after the event.
Furthermore, an official Catholic group in West Germany paid substan-
tial sums to a Gray Wolves member and friend of Agca to visit Agca in
prison and to persuade him to talk., Testimony during the recent triď in
Rome also indicated that the West German police offered money and le-
niency to Oral Celik (through Yalcin Ozbey, held by the Germans in
y t is an important truth that "necessity is the motherof invention." pnson) if he would agree to come to West Germany and help confirm
tr This was true of the Bulgarian Connection, which was needed by the Agca's testimony. In short, the willingness to implicate the Bulgarians
New Cold Warriors in the United States, by Craxi, Spadolini, Gelli, and Soviets by disseminating lies and seeking to induce false witness by
Santovito, and the Vatican in Italy, and by others. Thus, as in the case westem intelligence agencies and other political interests was displayed
of many inventions, this one had multiple authorship. With the shooting early and often.
of the Pope on May 13, 1981, a number of different individuals im- We also showed in Chapter 6 that the two primary U.S. sources on
mediately knew in their hearts that the KGB did it---or ought to have the Bulgarian Connection, Claire Sterling and Paul Henze, have demon-
done it-and from several independent sources there soon emerged strated similar creative propensities in dealing with the subject. Paul
claims that the KGB did do it. Henze is a long-time CIA professional and specialist in propaganda,
who has openly admitted impatience with demands for evidence when
dealing with hypothetical enemy crimes.'Both Henze and Sterling use
what has been called the "preferential method of research," which con-
The Bulgarian Connection as Western Disinformation sists of picking out those pieces of fact or claims that are "preferred"
for their argument and disregarding all others. Both have a strong pen-
That the idea of the Bulgarian Connection was conceived early and chant for relying on the claims of badly compromised intelligence
pushed by a number ofindependent sources, none ofwhom had any evi- sources and discredited defectors.a Sterling's creativity-and lack of
dence for the Connection, is one of several lines of accumulating evi- scientific self-discipline-in dealing with the Bulgarian Connection is
dence pointing more and more conclusively to the Bulgarian Connection shown in her response to Orsan Oymen's claim that Agca's lifelong and
as a product of both deliberate disinformation and some form of ma- extensive relations with the Gray Wolves must have had a bearing on his
nipulation and coaching of the imprisoned Agca. It is now known, for actions. Her answer, that she "could not see how to reconcile that with
example, that the Italian secret service agency SISMI issued a document Agca's summer in Bulgaria," is revealing. His stay in Bulgaria, a thru-
on May 19, l98l-within a week of the assassination attempt-which way for Turkish migrants (and Gray Wolves), proves or suggests noth-
claimed that the Plot had been announced by a Soviet official at a ing. But to one who knows the truth beforehand and employs the prefer-
gathering of the Warsaw Pact nations in Bucharest, Rumania, and that ential method of research, it is a telling point.
Agca had been trained in the Soviet Union.' This report was pure disin- Based on Agca's visit to Bulgaria in the summer of 1980, both Ster-
formation, generated from within SISMI or supplied in who|e or paÍt
from some other intelligence source. It is an important document in two 2. This plan was ca||ed off ďter it was found that Agca had already begun to talk. See
Chapter 5, n. 3.
respects: It shows that the idea of pinning the crime on the East came
3. See Chapter 6, pp. 148-49.
l. The points summarized here arc developed more fully in Chapters 4 and 5. 4. See Chapter 6 and Appendix C.

206
 T
208 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS 2@

ling and Henze saw an opportunity to create a Soviet Plot scenario.' ernment, was in regular contact with Agca. He was familiar with the
Both were well funded, and they were generously received by the mass photo album of Bulgarians from which Agca selected his alleged co-
media, despite their blemished credentials and demagogic arguments. conspirators (it had been used earlier in Senzani's own trial). Giovanni
We believe that the Sterling-Henze model and the western media's Pandico, a former Mafia official and principal witness in the trial of
eager and uncritical acceptance of the Bulgarian Connection helped hundreds of Mafia personnel in Naples, provided details on just how
shape the case in Rome. Sterling and Henze provided the basic scenario Agca was induced to talk by Mďra chief Cutolo, former sIsMI officiď
adopted by both Agca and Martella, and the quick upsurge of popular Musumeci, and various others in the Ascoli Piceno prison. Francesco
belief and political vested interest in the Plot gave the case an almost un- Pazienza has denied the allegations of his own involvement in persuad-
stoppable momentum. Agca's guidance to a proper confession was en- ing Agca to "confess," claiming that he has been made the "fall guy"
couraged and made more effective by the pre-packaged scenarios and for the actual peÍpetIators of the induced confession----other members of
the already prepared groundwork of belief. SISMI whose names and role he spelled out.8
A second body of evidence suggesting that Agca was manipulated These various threads of evidence show that there was an intent to im-
and coached while in prison has been the accumulating data on P-2, plicate the Bulgarians arising from several different sources, all of
SIsMl' Pazíenza, and the Ledeen Connection. It has long been known whom had access to Agca in prison, and that the interested parties in the
in ltaly that the extreme Right-the ..paÍty of the coup''-has had an Italian secret services and Vatican had no compunction about doctoring
important place in the military establishment and secret services. But a evidence. There are also now a number of explicit statements that de-
spate ofnew evidence on these topics has surfaced in the past few years, scribe how and by whom Agca was prodded and coached. This aggre-
much of it highly relevant to the Bulgarian Connection.u This evidence gate of evidence, when combined with the lack of any support for
shows clearly the very important role that P-2 had assumed in the mili- Agca's frequently revised claims of Bulgarian involvement, leaves little
tary and intelligence services, the frequency with which elements of the doubt that the Bulgarian Connection was a product of encouragement
secret services have had cooperative relations with terrorists and the and coaching.
Maťra, and their willingness to forge and plant documents to achieve We believe that the actual plot to kill the Pope-in contrast with the
their political ends. There has also been considerable evidence ofthe in- plot to implicate the Bulgarians-íu.ose from indigenous Turkish
volvement of individuals with important links to the Reagan administra- sources. No other scenario yet advanced has comparable plausibility, let
tion, notably Francesco Paztenza and Michael Ledeen, in the dubious alone such solid empirical support, as one based on Agca's link to the
practices of the secret services. Gray Wolves.o The Gray Wolves' hostility to the Pope has demonstrable
A further set of evidence that has strengthened the case for coaching ideological roots, although the actual shooting was very probably af-
has been the growing number of plausible claims of "smoking guns. "' fected by Agca's own psychological peculiarities and "Carlos com-
A Vatican official has named the prison chaplain Mariano Santini, who plex."'o The Gray Wolves had links to some Bulgarians through the
was in close and regular contact with Agca, as a Vatican agent attempt- smuggling trade, but they also had links to the CIA and numerous other
ing to get Agca to confess. (Santini was ďso close to the Mafia, and was rightwing groups with whom they had more ideological compatibility. It
subsequently jailed as a Mafia emissary.) In 1983, Mafia official is our belief that none of these foreign connections had any direct bear-
Giuseppi Cilleri claimed that Francesco Pazienza had been visiting ing on the assassination attempt.
Agca in prison and had given him detailed instructions on proper tes-
8. See Diana Johnstone, "Bulgarian Connection: Finger-pointing in the pontiff plot
timony and identification of the Bulgarians. Agca's cell neighbor, labyrinth," InThese Times, lanuary 29-February 4, 1986.
Giovanni Senzani, a Red Brigades terrorist who had rallied to the gov- 9 For details, see Chapter 3 above.
10. See Chapter 3, p. 56.
5. They may even have believed in the truth of theirown creations, ďthough this must
remaln unceíain Nobody has yet invented a sincereiometer.
6. See especially Chapter 4 above.
7. See especially Chapter 5 above.
 2to THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS 2tl
Sterling-Henze analyses, this is a key fact showing Bulgarian guilt. But
if the KGB is smart and covers its tracks, concern over plausible denia-
The Flaws in the Case From lts Inception bility would have caused them to go to great pains to keep Agca away
from Bulgaria. Thus, Agca's visit to Bulgaria provides the raw material
We have stressed throughout this book that the Bulgarian Connection for creating a Bulgarian Connection only because a propaganda system
was never at any time supported by credible evidence or logic, and sur- allows its principals to contradict themselves and one another virtually
vived only by a tacit refusal of the western media to examine closely a without challenge. The Keystone Kops arrangements outlined by Agca
convenient politicď line. Let us recapifulate briefly a few of these fun- involving Bulgarian officials in Rome would have been laughed off the
damentď flaws. stage by NBC or the New York Times-if this propaganda show had
o The alleged Soviet "motive"-fear of the Pope's aid to Solidar- been put on in Moscow.
ity-lacked plausibility from the beginning. Rational behavior would o As pointed out by Michael Dobbs, "Agca can be shown to have
have led the Soviet leadership to cďculate that the Poles and West lied literally hundreds of times to judges both in his native Turkey and in
would quickly attribute an assassination attempt to them even if it were Italy."'' Orsan Oymen estimates some l15 changes in testimony by
well covered. There was ďso every reason to anticipate that the effect of Agca recorded in the Martella Report. Agca withdrew significant parts
an assassination attempt on the Poles would be adverse to Soviet inter- of "confessions," which he admitted were based on outside assistance
ests (i.e., it would elicit rage and increased hostility). The purported or produced out of thin air. As Agca was for all practical purposes the
motive has also never been reconciled with the fact that Agca's threat to sole witness in the case, Martella's decision to proceed to a triď in the
murder the Pope in 1979 and the "deal" he allegedly struck with the face of this self-destruction of credibility reflected a broken-down judi-
Bulgarians in Sofia in the summer of 1980 took place before Solidarity cial process.
even existed. o The Sterling-Henze-Martella school referred frequently to Agca's
o A related "paradox" of Soviet involvement has also never been testimony as having been "independently confirmed." This assumed a
satisfactorily resolved. That is, while the alleged plot was intended to properly managed investigation of Agca's claims. But Martella con-
strengthen the Soviet's hand in dealing with Poland, as it worked out in ceded a lack of control oyer or knowledge of Agca's visitors in prison,
the real world the plot caused the Soviet Union severe propaganda dam- and we have seen that Agca's outside contacts were extensive . Fuíher-
age (even though the Pope was not killed and evidence of Soviet in- more, Martel|a,s presumption of the vďidity of Agca's primary al|ega-
volvement has not yet been produced). On the other hand, the Reagan tions|] ínjected an additional element of impropriety into the process of
administration and western hard-liners have benefitted greatly from the confirming Agca's claims. Given the high probability that Agca was fed
plot. On the Sterling-Henze model, the Soviets must be incredibly information by individuals in SISMI and elsewhere in the Italian prison-
stupid. On our model, in which the Bulgarian Connection was manufac- intelligence-political-judicial network, "independent confirmation" has
tured by Sterling-Henze and U.S. and Itďian officials, the source of the to be taken with a grain of sďt.
plot and the resultant flow of benefits are comprehensible." a Not a single witness was produced in more than three years of in-
o According to Sterling, Henzp, Marvin Kďb, Albarro, and Martella, vestigations and trial to support any Agca claim of a contact with Bulga-
the Soviet and Bulganan secret police are highly efficient and try to rians, in Rome or anywhere else, although his supposed meetings and
maintain "plausible deniability." This is incompatible with hiring an travels with them were frequent and in conspicuous places. The car al-
unstable rightwing Turk, bringing him to Sofia for an extended stay, legedly hired by the Bulgarians in Rome for the assassination attempt
and especially with arranging to have him supervised in detail by Bulga- has never been traced. The large sum of money supposedly paid by the
rian off,rcials in Rome. Agca did visit Sofia, Bulgaria in 1980. In the Bulgarians for the shooting has never been located or traced.

I l. In our analysiS, the assassination attempt was a fortuitous event from the standpoínt 12. "A Communist Plot to Kill the Pope---Or a Liar's Fantasy,,, Washington posr,
of both East and West, but with the imaginative anticommunist Agca in an Italian prison, November 18, 1984.
the West was able to take advantage of this event-through the actions of SISMI and 13. See Chapter 5, pp. l 14-17.
Sterling and company-to construct a "second conspiracy."
I

I
 7$

BULGARIAN CONNECTION EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS 2r3

2t2 TT{E

a With one exception, every proven transaction by Agca, from his

escape from a Turkish prison in 19'79to May 13, 1981, including all
transfers of money or a gun, was with a member of the Gray Wolves.'o
Conclusion: The Lessons and Future of the Bulgarian
. The photographic evidence of May 13, 1981, one of the bases on Connection
which Martella arrested Antonov, collapsed long ago. Martella eventu-
The history of the Bulgarian Connection illustrates well the role of the
ally asserted that the photograph allegedly showing Antonov on the
mass media as a servant of power. The New Cold Warriors were look-
scene was actually that of a tourist, not Antonov, and the matter was
ing hard for a basis on which to assail the Evil Empire in 198 I , and the
dropped. But this tourist has never been located by independent re-
shooting of the Pope and the incarceration of Agca in an Italian prison
searchers, and the photo of Antonov in St. Peter's Square is a remarka-
offered them a marvelous propaganda opportunity. The mass media per-
bly exact likeness, requiring a phenomenal coincidence. An alternative
formance, from the time of Sterling's Reader' s Digest article in August
hypothesis is that the photo of Antonov was faked.15 In the Lowell New-
1982 up to the time of the trial, allowed that propaganda opportunity to
ton photograph, the individual fleeing from the scene, originally iden-
be fully realized. '' As we have seen, in dealing with the Bulgarian Con-
tified by Agca as the Bulgarian ' 'Kolev, ' ' was later identified as Agca's
Gray Wolves friend Oral Celik.'u It is thus possible that Martella was nection the major U.S. media violated norms of substantive objectivity''g
lured into arresting Antonov by a combination of a fabricated Antonov in several ways:
likeness and one of Agca's lies, which together placed nvo Bulgarians in
(l) They used as primary sources individuals with badly tarnished
credentials, and failed to provide adequate disclosure of their back-
St. Peter's Square at the time of the shooting. Martella's gullibility quo-
grounds and affiliations.
tient on claims of Bulgarian guilt was unflagging up to the submission
(2) Although the Sterling-Henze analysis and Agca's claims were not
of his finď Report.
o The formal photo identification of Bulgarians by Agca on supported by independent evidence, were logically faulty, and were
November 8, 1982, put forward by Martella and the media as compel- ludicrous in their shifting James Bond scenarios and blatant ideological
ling evidence of Bulgarian involvement, was rendered meaningless by underpinning,2o they were not subjecteo ro critical scrutiny- Instead they
the statement of Minister of Defense Lagorio on the floor of the ltalian were passed along as "news" even when they were displacing and con-
Parliament that Agca had already identified the Bulgarian photos two tradicting earlier versions of the "news."
months previously. The dramatic photo show was thus almost surely a (3) The media "played dumb" on a variety of important issues, such
staged rerun of a prior briefing and "identification. " It should be recal- as Agca's prison conditions, the belatedness of his confession, the pos-
led that Agca took seven months after deciding to "come clean" before sibilities of coaching, and the massive violations of "plausible deniabil-
naming a single Bulgarian-'' ity" in the Plot.
(4) The media also played dumb on the ltalian and Cold War context,
14. The exception was that he apparcntly received a small sum of money from Mersan, and suppressed information on a whole string of Italian parliamentary
who was acting as a courier for Ugurlu. Given Ugurlu's ties with the Gray Wolves, and
and court reports on the abuses of the intelligence services. Attention to
perhaps even Turkish intelligence, this single exception to the Gray Wolves pattern wíl|
hardly bear the weight given it by Sterling-Henze, who claimed that it removes Agca's these issues and documents would have raised serious questions about
crime from a Cray Wolves context and points the finger of guilt at the Bulgarian-Turkish
f 8. As we point out in Chapter 7, Michael Dobbs of ahe Washington Posr and ABC-TV
Mafia. We argued in Chapter 3 that these links took place within the larger framework of
provided partial exceptions to this generalization, but they were relatively insignificant in
the activities of the Nationalist Action Party and the Gray Wolves.
the total coverage of the case.
15. For a discussion of the ease with which Antonov's face could have been inserted
19. Nominal objectivity may be met by reporting verbatim a statement by Claire Ster-
into the crowd by a computerized photo-ediain8, machine widcly used in the publishing
ling or George Shultzl substantlve objectivity would require, among other things, an as-
and advertising industries, see Howard Friel, "The Antonov Photo and the Bulgarian
sessment of whether the quoted statement was true or false before it was transmitted as rel-
Connection," CovenAcrton Information Bulletin, Number 2l (Spring 1984), pp 2O-21.
evant "news." Bias is also displayed in the selection of only those authorities and state-
lÓ. The tria| in Rome raised doubts about this second identification, and the true iden-
ments that the joumalisreditor-publisher likes to reward with publicity
tity of the fleeing individual is uncertain
20 See Chapter 2, on "The Challenges to the Disinformationists "
l7 SeeChapter5,pp. ll0-ll,forafurtherdiscussionof thisphotoidentification
 T

214 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS 215

ine. Instead of Sterling, Henze, and Ledeen being discredited by the trial
the and dismissal of the case, we believe that they will be given the floor
full once again to explain it away. With their rationalizations, and with few
eof critical retrospectives, not only will the disinformationists and the mass
media come out of this affair smelling like roses, the Bulgarian Connec-
disinformation was passed off on the public as a truth for more than
tion itself will be salvaged. It will perhaps be quietly placed on the back
three years.t'
burner for a while, but the myth has entered populaÍ consciousness by
with the case for a Bulgarian connection dismissed by an ltalian
justice have intense and indignant repetition, and it will take on renewed life ďter
court following a lengthy trial, can not be said truth and
memories of the upsetting trial are dimmed.
been finally vindicated? The answer is no. we have shown in this book
Looking at the international dimension, the West and the western
that the sutgarian connection is a myth. The court has acquitted for
mass media were guilty of a huge fraud, with Bulgaria and the Soviet
lack of evidence rather than for innocence, making the rectification only
Union subjected to an intense and effective multi-year propaganda cam-
partial. The court also has left open an avenue through which the west-
paign based on false evidence. With the dismissal of the case, will the
ern disinformationists and media can continue to suggest that the Bul-
West now suffer a severe propaganda blow and will the Soviets and Bul-
garians recoup some of their losses? We believe that this will not hap-
pen: U.S. and western power and media domination are so great that lies
can be institutionalized as rnyths and can remain effective even after ex-
posure.23 If you are strong enough, just as you are never a "terrorist"
but only ''retaliate" to the terror of others, so there is no such thing as a
losing propaganda campaign. In the words of Alexander Pope: "Des-
loss of the case will be reported briefly and the subject will then be
troy his sophistry: in vain-The creature's at his dirty work again."
dropped. There will be no extended analyses or
the media sold the public a bill of goods, nor wil
the comrption involved in uncritical reliance on d
coached witness to serve the New Cold War'
story im-
2l Herbert cans contends that "the rules of news judgment call for ignoring ..aÍe
plication,'' and thatjoumalists follow such rules. The personal values ofjouma|ists
news profes- 23 The history of the Soviet shooting down of the Korean airliner 007 in | 983 provided
left at home," he tells us, and "the beliefs that actually make it into the
are
j<.rurnalists learn on the job' "
siontt! values that are intrinsic to national joumalism and that an object lesson and answer. The day after the event, the United States organized a huge
..Are Joumalists Dangerously Liberal?''' Columbia Journalism Rayja}ť, November-De- propaganda campaign based on the claim that the Soviets had knowingly murdered 259 ci-
cember 1985, pp.32-3S.WewouldsubmitthatGans'sassertionsarecompletelyincom- vilians Five weeks later, the CIA acknowledged that the Soviets had not realized that the
patible with the history of news coverage of the Bulgarian Connection plane was a civilian carrier. ("U.S. Experts Say Soviet Didn't See Jet Was Civilian,"
..politica|'' íactors any.
22. As we noted in the Pref.ace, the disinformationists stress New York Times, October 7, 1983 ) As that information was surely available to U.S offi-
time they lose. The domina cials within hours of che downing, it is clear that the United States suppressed crucial in-
western (as described in Ch formation to allow it to conduct a propaganda banage Following the revelation that the
portant part in bringing the Soviet Union had not recognized that it was shooting down a civilian plane, there were no
lieve that the failure of the discernible criticisms of the United States for its propaganda assault based on disinforma-
bias. In addition to normal westem suspicion of the communist powers, we believe tion, and Soviet villainy in the case has been institutionalized. See Edward S. Herman,
that

there was an unwillingness to repudiate completely the ltalianjudges and prosecutors and "Gatekeeper Versus Propaganda Models: A Case Study," in Peter Golding, Graham
orher western interests with a large stake in the connection. Dismissal for
lack of evidence Murdock, and Philip Schlesinger, eds., Communicating Politics: Essays in Memory of
frees the victims, while affording some mcasure of solace and protection
to the establish- Philip Elliou (Leicester: University of Leicesrer Press, 1986)
ment interests that oÍiginated and pushed the case.
 f,

Appenďces APPENDIX A

vide his captors with any fresh leads; and on l|iÁay 25 the New york
217

Dld the Western lrledfa

Times provided its readers with a long, summary article which brought
A. the various threads of the investigation together. Our recounting of this

guppress Evtdence of a coverage by two of the leading U.S. newspapers will serve two pur-
poses. First, it provides us with what might be called a preliminary

Gonsplracy? paradigm, a well-textured first draft of what we call the First Conspir-
acy. (We elaborate on the background of the First Conspiracy in Chap-
ter 3.) Second, from this summary it will be evident that, contrary to
Sterling, the most casual reader of these newspapers in the first weeks
after the papal assassination attempt would have been overwhelmed by
information about Agca's background in Turkey, and by speculation
about the involvement of the Gray Wolves in his attempt on the pope.
o May 14, l98l: In its initial report on the assassination attempt, the
/F)laire Sterling maintai that western
New York Times noted Agca's background in Turkey and his earlier
lí gou".*ents and the way from the
threat to kill the Pope. The front-page article connected Agca with the
initial statements of ltalia assassination
attempt on Pope John Paul II was the result of a conspiracy In the open- Nationalist Action Party. The Washington Post, in a long article by its
ing lines of her book, Sterling says that "for but a fleeting instant, the Turkish correspondent Metin Munir, probed Agca's Turkish back-
truth was close enough to touch . , and then it was gone."' While ground, focusing on his association with the Gray Wolves and his re-
space does not allow us to discuss each instance of the misuse of evi- sponsibility for the murder of the Turkish newspaper editor Ipekci.'
dence which characterizes Ms. Sterling's book from beginning to end, o May 15, l98l: The lead article in the New yorkTimes, by R. W.
as the alleged media coverup of a conspiracy is her opening theme, an Apple, Jr., was headlined "Police Trace the Path of the Suspect from
analysis ofthat claim provides a valuable case study ofthe quality ofher Turkey to St. Peter's Square, " Once again the Times noted Agca's con-
work. nections to the Nationalist Action Party and the failure of the interna-
As we noted in Chapter 2, the conspiracy initially perceived by the tional police to arrest Agca when Turkey had requested it.. A second ar-
western media was a Turkish one. Rather than quickly backing off from ticle on the l5th of May, contained the words quoted by Sterting as
any investigation into a SovieGbacked conspiracy, as Sterling main- suggesting that the ltalian authorities had abandoned the search for any
tains, the western media vigorously pursued the abundant evidence that conspiracy: "Police are convinced, according to government sources,
Agca had been aided and sheltered by his colleagues in the Gray that Mr. Agca acted alone. " This article, without a by-line, focused on
Wolves. While the western media can rightly be accused of many the Pope's medical condition and was printed on the inside pages. Even
things, to say that it did not immediately provide its readers with details 2.The London Tirnes focused its article on the pope's attackeron the tpekci assassina-
about a possible conspiracy in the attempt on the Pope's life is absurd, tion and his subsequent letter threatening to kill the Pope in 1979. It described Agca as
though tactically of great value to Sterling in her effons to portray her- "without doubt the most wanted rurkish terrorist," and quoted rurkish authorities com-
plaining that West European govemments had repeatedly ignored the Turkish govern-
self as a misunderstood seeker after the real truth, the Bulgarian Con-
ment's warnings that Agca was in their country and its requests that Agca be arrested
nectron.
3. lnterestingly, R. W Apple, Jr. quoted from a letter purportedly found on Agca's
To demonstrate this point, we will summarize the coverage which the person after his arrest-in which he claimed thar "I, Agca, have killed the pope so that
unfolding investigation received in the New York Times and the the world may know of the thousands of victims of imperialism"-and then went on to
Washington Post for the period from May l4-the day after the assassi- describe this as "language that seemed to support his assertion lhat he was not part of an
nation attempt-to May 25. By this latter date Agca had ceased to pro- intemational plot." The full text of the letter protests against u.S. intervention in El sal-
vador and soviet intervention in Afghanistan. These sentiments are perfectly compatible
I Claire Sterling' The Time of the Assassins (New York: Ho|t, RinehaÍt and winston, with the ideology of the Gray Wolves, as we discuss in Chapter 3.
1983), p s.

216
 *

2I8 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION APPENDIX A 219

this peripheral aside, however, was followed with the observation that Rome on Infelisi's contention that, because of Agca's well-financed and
"police do not exclude the possibility that Mr. Agca was backed by an extensive travels, "we have ruled out the theory that this was a gesture
organization and had the help of friends in some of the countries that he of an isolated madman"; but Infelisi also said "he still was'not con-
had visited since escaping from a Turkish prison in November 1979."n vinced' that there was an international conspiracy." Gilbert noted that
The Washington Post of May 15 included an article by Metin Munir Agca claimed he had received his assassination weapon in Bulgaria, but
headed "Turk Describes Suspected Gunman as 'Determined, Highly quickly pointed out that Italian police had been able to trace the murder
Trained."'The Turk in question was Hasan Fehmi Gunes, a former weapon from the Belgian factory where it was made, following its path
Minister of the Interior in Turkey at the time when Agca was arrested f,irst to Switzerland and then to ltaly. An inside-page article by the
for killing lpekci. According to Gunes, "We know he [Agca] was ex- Post's Turkey correspondent included an interview with Agca's brother
treme Right because we know that the people who gave him money and Adnan, who said that his brother "hoped to win world fame and a place
arms and helped him in his crime were extreme rightwing." To this arti- at the head of the Moslem world. ' ' ' ' If tbey torture or spiritually oppress
cle were appended reports from Turkey and West Germany that elabo- my brother," Adnan said, "the whole Islamic world will flock to his
rated on Turkish efforts to apprehend Agca and the apparent lack of side. The crusaders are against the entire Islamic wor|d.'' The PosÍ's
cooperation they received from West Germany and other countries. The correspondent again noted Turkey's irritation that other countries were
report quoted a Frankfurt joumalist who specialized in the activities of so unwilling to cooperate with the martial law government in its attempt
rightwing Turks in West Germany. He recounted the attempt of a 60- to have the many convicted terrorists who had escaped its borders re-
man squad of Turkish police to track Agca down there, "but it was turned to Turkey. The Post also noted that several Gray Wolves had
given little support by German police and did not find him." been arrested in connection with Agca's passport fraud, a story given a
o May 16, 1981: TheTimes's article noted the conviction of the Ital- headline and much bigger play in that same day's London Times.
ian press-both leftwing and rightwing-that the Pope was the victim of o May 17, l98l: On this date, Sunday, the front-page article in the
an international plot. It ďso quoted the issue of La Stampo cited by New York Times was headlined, ''Police Lack Clues to Foreign Links of
Sterling in which magistrate Luciano Infelisi said, "As far as we're con- Suspect in Shooting of the Pope." The burden of the article, however,
cerned, documents prove that Agca did not act alone. He is a killer en- was the near.universď acceptance ofthe idea that some kind ofconspir-
listed by an internationď group with subversive aims. '' The lines's ar- acy lay behind Agca's attempt on the Pope, contrasted with the disap-
ticle went on to detail the Turkish background of Agca's false passport, pointing results of efforts by the police to find clues. "The assertion that
noting that this fact "was just one suggesting links with Turkish politi- Mr. Agca was unquestionably the agent of an international conspir-
caf groups." A second front-page article, by the Times's Turkey corre- acy," claimed the Times, "has spread around the world in the last 48
spondent Marvine Howe, was headed "Turks in Disagreement on Mo- hours, and official statements of caution seem powerless to counter the
tive of Alleged Assailant." The debate described in the article pitted impression that terrorists in Europe and the Middle East plotted to assas-
some Turks who claimed that Agca was simply a psychopath and had sinate the Pope." The article went on to trace the debate in the Italian
acted alone against Gunes and others who pointed to Agca's extensive press over the nature and extent of the conspiracy, and ciaed La
ties to the Gray Wolves, and who argued that the assassination attempt Stampa's story that Italian investigators believed "Mr. Agca may have
was almost certainly based in such a conspiracy. An article on the inside been financed and supported by friends belonging to rightwing groups
pages of the Times by John Tagliabue gave many details of apparent in the large Turkish communities in Western Europe, particularly in
sightings of Agca in West Germany, and of Agca's alleged ties to the West Germany, rather than by a network of international terrorist or-
many branches of the Gray Wolves in West Germany. ganizations. "
The Wctshington Post for May 16 headed its main front-page story The debate within Italy was clearly not whether Agca was part of a
"Wider Plot Is Probed in Papal Attack. " In it Sari Gilbert reported from conspiracy, but what kind of conspiracy stood behind the assassination
attempt. What some Italian officials seemed to be backing away from
4. Given this language, it is entirely possible that the words "acted alone" related sim-
was the idea that Agca was linked to a network of internationď ter-
ply to the events in St. Peter's Square, and may well bc true.
 22O THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION APPENDIX A 221

rorists, á la Carlos the Jackal. The view that Agca's conspiracy was same report around which claire Sterling framed her Reader's Digest
most likely a Turkish one received support from an anicle by Marvine article some l5 months later; but "ltalian investigators," noted Gilbert,
Howe on an inside page of the Times headlined "Turk Is Called a Prod- "seem to feel there was never any such conversion. 'He is trying to ll
uct of Violence in His Nation." Sari Gilbert, in the Washington Post, further muddy already murky waters,' one of them was quoted by news
noted that the police now believed that the man seen running away from agencies as saying here today."
the scene of the crime might be Agca's long-time Turkish comrade, a May 19, l98l: Tlte Washington Post's main headline on the front
Mehmet Sener. (The London Sunday Tines pursued the same theme in a page announced that the "Italian Police Seek 2nd Suspect." They (ap- li
long article, "The Wolf Who Stalked A Pope," which traced Agca's parently erroneously) identified this second suspect as Mehmet Sener,
terrorist record in Turkey.) evidently on the basis of the Lowell Newton photograph, which had
o May I 8 , 198 I : On this, the fifth day after the assassination attempt, been provided to the Italian police. The police were also reportedly
the New York Times had a front-page article by Marvine Howe which looking for "Oral Gelik" [sic], described as "another Turkish right-
was headed, "Turks Say Suspect in Papal Attack is Tied to Rightist wing extremist. " The declaration that the Italian police were looking for
Web of Intrigue. " This was the longest exposition to date of Agca's ties a second suspect "seemed to lend weight to the growing conviction in
to Turkey's neofascist Right. Howe drew on the recently released in- some circles that there was a conspiracy against the Pope's life and that
dictment of the Nationalist Action Party, the parent organization of the a terrorist organization was behind it." But the Post's reporter also
Gray Wolves, to provide readers with some background analysis. The noted that the head of DIGOS, the special antiterrorist police, ..took a
article focused on the Western European branches of the Gray Wolves, more cautious approach," and that according to this source Agca..may
or "ldealists," which led Howe to state that "it is not difficult to imag- have been a hired killer, or he rnay not have been. As for an interna-
ine how he lAgca] could have traveled widely in Europe and evaded the tional conspiracy, it's a very remote possibility. " In an article on the in-
r:uthorities." She also noted that the martial law prosecutors of the side pages-"Probe of Turkish Right Links Pope Suspect"-the posr
Nationalist Action Party had found links between the party and the West fof lowed the Times's lead of the previous day in using material from the
German secret service.TheWashington Post noted that "ltalian magis- indictment of the NAP to trace Agca's ties to Turkey's neofascist Right.
I

trates are so convinced that the Turkish terrorist is connected to a right- For its part ÍheTimes reported from Bonn that ..Germany Finds No Evi-
wing organization that yesterday they assigned five Roman judges who dence Accused Turk Lived Here." The Times's reporter, John Tag- il
are specialists in ltalian right-wing subversive groups to the team carry- liabue, also drew on the NAP indictment to ask questions of West Ger-
ing out his interrogation." man officials about Agca's links to any of the NAP's European branch-
r

Also on this day both the Times and the Post discussed the way that es; but they said there was no evidence that Agca had ever been in West
I

Agca was standing up to interrogation. The Times's article noted Agca's Germany. i

..refusa| to answer key questions,'' while the PosÍ said that Itďian o May 20, l98l: The focus of the western media turned to some re-
police were describing Agca as "tough and cool, a professional terrorist marks Agca apparently made during his intenogation on May 18, in
who has not yet shown any sign of breaking down under the pressure of which he claimed that he had considered killing other world leaders, in-
interrogation." Both the press and the police were realizing that Agca cluding the Queen of England and the Secretary General of the United
had provided investigating authorities with an abundance of information Nations. "I went to London to kill the King," the police quoted Agca as
about himself, but that only some of it was true and none of it concerned saying, "but I found he was a woman and decided against it because I
his Gray Wolves associations or any assistance he was given between am Turkish and a Moslem and I don't kill women." For the same
I
his escape from a Turkish prison and his assassination attempt. Sari Gil- reason, he added, "I did not kill Simone Weil, the president of the
bert ofthe Post noted that "Agca has given the police a six-page deposi- European Parliament, after I had been to Brussels to study how the
tion in which he is reported to have admitted initial close ties to a right- Community works. " The Washington Post report claimed that Agca's
wing movement in Turkey, but to have added that he subsequently con- statement "left his interrogators highly skeptical about its veracity"; but
veÍted to Marxism at a Palestinian base in Syria. '' This is apparently the R. W. Apple, Jr. of the New York Times apparently considered this
 T

222 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION APPENDIX A 223

statement food for thought, saying that it "lent credence to the thesis that tive Justice Party and included the Nationalist Action Party, and quoted
Mr. Agca's views are essentially anarchístic, growing out of a hatred of local sources as saying that Agca had been frequently seen in the com-
authority, rather than conventionally leftwing or rightwing. " The lpn- pany of the Gray Wolves. Finally, the article described the wave of
don Times, meanwhile, quoted British authorities who denied that Agca rightwing terrorism which resulted in more than 700 shops owned by
had ever set foot in Britain. leftists being burned or looted in 1978, following the murder of the local
a May 21, 1981: TheTimes's correspondent John Tagliabue reported Justice Party chief. This outbreak resulted in the proclamation of martial
from Bonn on "Militant Views Among Turks Trouble Bonn." The re- law for the Malatya region, the first Turkish province to be put under
port surveyed the West German government's fears about the large Tur- control of the Army.
kish "guest worker" population, and focused on the activities of right- . May 23, l98l:TIreTimes's story, by Marvine Howe, followed the
wing organizations there. lead of the PosÍ's story of the day before ..Turk's Hometown Puzzled
The Washington Post story on this day was headed, "Interrogation of by His Climb to Notoriety." The article included interviews with
Agca Turns Up Several Baffling Mysteries." This article summarized Agca's brother and mother (as had the Posr's story the previous day);
what was known and not known about Agca and his travels before but despite his mother's disclaimer that Agca was "good and honest and
shooting the Pope, and stressed the general bafflement of the police of brilliant, just an ordinary boy," Howe quoted "political sources that in-
several Western European countries in the Agca case. Apparently for sisted that Mehmet Ali Agca was associated with extreme rightwing or-
the first time a possible Bulgarian Connection was proposed. The Posr ganizations known as ldealist Clubs" [the Gray Wolves]. The article
..high-ranking Ítalian official'' who noted that Agca had
quoted a also noted that Agca's high school had been taken over in 1975 by the
passed through Bulgaria after escaping from Turkey. According to this Nationalist Action Party, "naming one of their prominent members as
hypothesis, continued the Posr story, "the Bulgarians might be upset director and filling the staff with militants. Seminars were held on fas-
enough by the altemative to communism evolving in Poland and the cism and Nationalist Action Party principles, which were basically anti-
strong backing of the Catholic Church, as well as of the Polish Pope, to foreign, anti-West, and militantly nationalistic. "
the Solidarity independent union movement to encourage Agca in his The Washington Post for this day contained only a short report on the
endeavor. . . . " The Posr story did not give this hypothesis much cre- Pope's continuing recoyery.
dence, however, quickly quoting a "western diplomatic source" who 3 May 24, l98l: Once again, the Posr's comments were restricted to
called this theory "off the wall." a medicaf note that the Pope was now out of danger , The Times focused
o May 22, l98l: The Times's report for this day was quite short and on Agca's European travels, again highlighring claims by Turkey that
was printed on the inside pages. It described Agca's transfer from police European governments had failed to cooperate with their earlier requests
headquarters to Rebibbia prison, just outside of Rome. The story's for Agca's arrest and extradition. In the "Review of the Week" section,
headline reflected Agca's shouted remark to reporters that he was the Times noted that "Questions Continue, " particularly those connect-
"sorry for the two foreign tourists [who had been wounded] but not for ing Agca to the Nationalist Action Party and the "Idealist Associa-
the Pope." The story also noted that Agca had been interrogated by tions" of Westem Europe .

police for more than 75 hours over the past 9 days. o May 25, 1981: By this date the broad outlines of the preliminary
A much longer story tn the Washington Post, datelined Malatya, Tur- paradigm of the case had been established, and both newspapers pre-
key, was headed, "Accused Turk Looked for Exit From Poverty." It pared summary articles. The Post headlined their contribution. "Tur-
traced Agca's life from its beginnings in extreme poverty through his as- key, Searching for Modernity, Offers Fertile Field for Terrorism." It
sassination of Abdi lpekci in 1979. The article noted that Malatya had portrayed Agca as a product of the rapid social and economic changes
been a center of the opium trade, and that the region had suffered se- which were drawing Turkey into the modern world economy, while
verely. when the trade was suppressed in the early 1970s. The article leaving backwaters like Agca's hometown of Malatya to suffer in pov-
also noted the profound effect on the Malatya region of the formation of erty. For its part, the Times wrapped up its coverage of this phase of the
I
the coalition government in 1976, which was headed by the conserva- case with a very long article by R. W. Apple, Jr., which began on the
224 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION

íront page (..Trail of Mehmet Ali Agca: 6 Years of Neofascist Ties'')

and filled up an entire inside page as well. Apple rooted Agca solidly in
Turkey's neofascist Right, and traced his involvement with the Gray
Wolves and rightwing terrorism from his high school days, through his
brief university career, and tben on to greater things. Apple found B. Bulgarla and
Agca's motivation puzzling, still sturnbling over Agca's claim that he
thought of killing most of the crowned heads of Europe; but he also the Dnrg Gonnectlon
quoted Turkish sources who believed that Agca was mentally unbal-
anced and aspired after greatness or notoriety. Finally, the article gave a
detailed account of Agca's wanderings through Western Europe, shel-
tered by the Gray Wolves and completely unhampered by the conti-
nent's police forces.

Taking advantage of Bulgaria's sudden prominence in the western

Summary media to strike another blow at the Evil Empire, the disinformationists
have used the Bulgarian Connection episode to raise sweeping charges
It should by now be abundantly clear that it is impossible to subscribe to that Bulgaria, acting of course as a Soviet instrument, is engaged in a
Claire Sterling's assertion that, for but a fleeting moment, the possibil- campaign to destabilize the West by flooding it with narcotics. This
ity of a conspiracy was a "truth close enough to touch," and that this campaign has been quite successful, resulting in diplomatic setbacks for
truth was suppressed by western governments and the western media in Bulgaria and adding to the established truth that the Soviet Bloc is be-
the interests of preserving détente. on the contraÍy' the western media hind international terrorism, now expanded to include "narco-ter-
vigorously pursued the clues that there was a Turkish-based, rightwing rorism."
conspiracy which connected Agca through a multitude of threads to the In this appendix we address two specific claims advanced by the dis-
Nationalist Action Party and the Gray Wolves. The distortion perpe- informationists. These are, first, that the Bulgarian state agency KIN-
trated by Sterling at the opening of her book is characteristic of her han- TEX organizes much of the international narcotics flow; and second,
dling of all evidence, perhaps because of her confidence that the major that Bulgaria violates the intemational conventions establishing the
media outlets of the West are content to rely on her testimony, without Transport Internationaux Routiers (TIR) truck system, even using a TIR
even examining the files of their own newspapers. truck to facilirate the escape of Agca's fellow assassin, Oral Celik. To
assess these claims we will look at the evidence put forward at two U.S.
congressional hearings that were held in the summer of 1984 on the Bul-
garian role in arms and narcotics smugg|ing. Paul Henze paÍticipated in
both of these hearings, being joined by representatives of the State De-
partment, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the Cus-
toms Service, and by supposed experts on Bulgarian drug smuggling.
These hearings, which allowed only marginally dissenting notes from
the main theme of Bulgarian guilt, afforded the proponents of the Bul-
garian Connection ample scope to present whatever evidence they had.

225
 ilr1

226 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION APPENDIX B 227

saw-pact weaponry," thus fueling Middle Eastem terrorism. Adams

charged that this action by Bulgaria was the product of a 1970 Bulgarian
Background to the Hearings Committee for State Security (KDS, later DS) directive to destabilize
the West through the narcotics trade. Adams's article, which he later
Charges that Agca was linked to Bulgaria through his participation in claimed was based on six months' research in eight nations, became the
Bulgarian-supported drug smuggling had been an integral part of the primary source for the congressional investigation into the Bulgarian
pre-confession allegations of the Bulgarian Connection. The Ugurlu- role in narcotics trafficking; and although it was deeply flawed, it has
Mersan-Agca link had been at the heart of both Claire Sterling's Read- gone unchallenged in the West.'z
er's Digest article and the NBC "White Paper" broadcast in September Charges that KINTEX was promoting drug dealing were renewed in
1982. The link between Agca's attempt on the Pope and Bulgarian sup- April 1984, when a Danish television report was picked up by CBS
port for smuggling was appaÍently made tighter in ear|y December News. In its report for April 26,1984, CBS quoted from a signed lerter
1982, when an investigation into arms and drug smuggling in the ltalian from one Peter H. Mulack, a West German national residing in Miami
city of Trent indicted Bekir Celenk, who had already been named by since 1979. Mulack was allegedly involved in trading in embargoed
Agca as the person who offered him over one million dollars to kill the high-technology goods with Eastern Europe, and in shipping East Euro-
Pope. The charge that the Butgarian state import-export agency KIN- pean weapons to African nations, primarily South Africa. According to
TEX was involved with smuggling was included in ltalian Defense documents presented by CBS, Mulack told KINTEX that " . . I can
Minister Lagorio's speech to the Chamber of Deputies on December 20. deliver the required. electronic material. However, as the material is
And the arrest of Celenk on smuggling charges was featured by both under embargo, it will take at least three months to deliver. Payment for
Time and Newsweek in their January 3, 1983 issues which put the papal the consignment may be made in heroin or morphine base. . . . " CBS
assassination attempt on the covers of both magazines.r The Christian showed a return letter from KINTEX thanking Mulack for committing
Science Monitor devoted an article to Turkish investigations into Bulga- himself to "deliver the requested goods and you are willing to accept
rian smuggling and Bulgarian links to the Turkish "Mafia" on January payment as mentioned. "s This certainly seemed like hard evidence, and
20. Four days later New York Times conespondent Henry Kamm re- to this day the viewers of the CBS report have not been told a most sa-
ported from Sofia on a press conference held there by Bekir Celenk; and lient fact: that the documents they were shown were forgeries, as was
on January 28 the Times pinted another piece by Kamm, "Plot On revealed in the fine print of a U.S. congressional report.a
Pope Aside, Bulgaria's Notoriety Rests On Smuggling." 2. Adams was making a career of such allegations. The July t982 Reader's Digesr run a
Probably the most influential of all the media reports on Bulgarian five-page article in which he claimed that vast quantities of drugs were coming to the U.S.
smuggling was "Drugs for Guns: The Bulgarian Connection," by from Cuba and Nicaragua. See William Preston, Jr. and Ellen Ray, "Disinformation and
Nathan M. Adams, which appeared in the November 1983 issue of the Mass Deception: Democracy as a Cover Story," CovertAction Information Bulletin,
Number l9 (Spring-Summer 1983), pp. 9-l l.
Reader' s Digest. Adams, a Reader' s Digest Senior Editor, claimed that
3. Cited from Drzgs andTerrorism, /984, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Al-
"over 50 percent of the heroin consumed in Europe and much of that in coholism and Drug Abuse of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Senate,
the United States flows across Bulgaria's borders with the full knowl- 98th Congress, 2nd Session, August 8, 1984, p.16.
edge and direct participation of high-ranking [Bulgarian] government 4. According to the DEA, the conespondence between the Bulgarians and the West
officials." He further claimed that the drugs were "paid for with War- German dealer shown on Danish television (and also on CBS-TV) was "probably not
genuine," and the DEA "has no corroborating evidence." "Written documentation of il-
I . [n November 1984 the prosecutor in the Trent case issued 37 indictments--of 25 ltal- licit activities," cautioned the DEA, "is not typical of the modus operandi of KINTEX"
ians, 9 Turks, 2 Syrians, and an Egyptian----on charges of smuggling drugs and arms, and (Bulgarian-Turkish Narcotics Connection: United States-Bulgarian Relations and Inter-
possibly even an atomic bomb. One of the accused was Bekir Celenk. Another was the national Drug Trfficking, Hearings and Markup before the Committee on Foreign Af-
Italian Frlm star Rossano Brazzi. see E J. Dionne, Jr., "Italian Case Uncovers an Alpine fairs, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, 1984, pp. I 13-14) To our
Heart of Darkness," New York Times, November 24, 1984. knowledge there has been no follow-up on the question of who forgcd the documents fed
to Danish TV, nor an investigation of whether CBS-TV was the victim of a deliberate dis-
information ploy.

!l
228 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION APPENDIX B 229

Accusations that Bulgaria was supporting smuggling, whether for At the House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on the alleged
gain or as a means of destabilizing the West, were clearly important in "Bulgarian-Turkish Narcotics Connection" it quickly became apparent
straining Bulgaria's ties with ltaly, which withdrew its ambassador from that there was little quarrel among the witnesses about the extent of Bul-
Bulgaria on December l l, l982; shortly thereďter travel by Bulgarians garian nefariousness. Only Jack Perry, a former U.S. Ambassador to
to ltaly was restricted.'The United States also acted quickly. In January Bulgaria, questioned whether Bulgaria supported naÍcotics smuggling
1983 the U.S. Embassy in Sofia presented a protest to Bulgaria, citing and illegal arms trafficking as a matter of state policy, noting that he had
what they claimed were the activities of known drug and arms heard nothing about this before being removed by the Reagan adminis-
smugglers in Bulgaria and demanding that something be done. When tration in 1981. But the issue of smuggling immediately became entan-
Bulgaria's response the following month was judged unsatisfactory, gled with the alleged Bulgarian role in the attempt on the Pope, a charge
further protests followed. A decade of cooperation between the two pressed not only by Henze but by Senator Altbnse D'Amato of New
countries in countering narcotics smuggling was broken off (see below). York. This forced the State Department into an awkward position, for
Though the State Department successfully lobbied against a bill by Jesse the measures which the Foreign Affairs Committee proposed would be
Helms that would have banned U.S. trade with Bulgaria, in .Iuly 1984 it tantamount to taking a position on the Bulgarian Connection case in
banned "nonessential" government travel to Bulgaria.u Rome. This was obviously what Henze and D'Amato wanted; but the
State Department's appeal to postpone any sanctions pending the out-
come of the imminent trial in ltaly was finally acceded to by the Com-
mittee.t
The Hearings
Somewhat lost in this discussion was the weakness of the case for
Bulgarian support of smuggling and arms trafficking. For example, the
By the summer of 1984, charges that Bulgaria supported narcotics and
central piece ofdocumentary evidence used by several witnesses to sup-
arms smuggling had gained a firm foothold in the western media. This
port these charges was Adams's Reader's Digest article, "Drugs for
provided congressional conservatives with a means of pressuring the
Guns: the Bulgarian Connection." As noted above, Adams's most sen-
State Department on the Bulgarian Connection. A House Foreign Af-
sational charge was that between 196l and 1970 plans were formulated
fairs Committec "Task Force on International Narcotics Control" held
by the Soviet Union and Bulgaria to destabílize the West by, among
hearings on the "Bulgarian-Turkish Narcotics Connection: United
other things, narcotics. The source for this charge was Stefan Sverdlev,
States-Bulgarian Relations and International Drug Trafficking," in June
a defector from the Bulgarian KDS who fled to Creece in 197 l. He
and July of 1984. One of the goals of the committee members was to
claimed that Bulgaria's role in narcotics trafťrcking was part of a larger
urge that the Reagan administration take further diplomatic sanctions
against Bulgaria.t A second hearing, on "Drugs and Terrorism, 1984,"
Warsaw Pact project initiated in 1967 to destabilize the West.
was held by Florida Senator Paula Hawkins in August. The purport of
(Sverdlev's dubious evidence is analyzed in Appendix C.) Adams
charged that between 1970 and l980 "billions upon billions of dollars'
her hearing was to dramatize the global role of Soviet proxies in narco-
worth of narcotics and aÍms were moved or exchanged through Bulgaria
tics smuggling. Both committees heard representatives of the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration and U.S. Customs Service, as well as Paul
by the state trading agency KINTEX, whose clandestine activities
were-and 416-unds1 the direct control of the First Directorate of the
Hcnzc and Nathan Adams.
DS. . . ."0
..Italy .Act of War,' ,, Washington PosÍ' December
5. l,oren Jenkins, Calls Pope P|ot
21,1982. 8. On September 12, 1984, W. Tapley Bennett, Jr. wrote to the Committee on behalf of
6. Clyde Farnsworth, "U.S. Restricts Govemment Travel to Bulgaria," New York the State Department: "Any legislation declaring or implying a U.S. belief in Bulgarian
Times, luly 10, 1984. wrongdoing should await the outcome of the Italian judicial proceedings concerning the
7 See Rick Atkinson, ..U.S. Links Bulgaria, Drug Trďfic,'' Washingttln Post, lu|y attempted assassination ofthe Pope . Senior ltalian officials have urged us to maintain

25. t98r'.. this position of strict non-intervention " Bulgarian-Turkish Narcotics Connection, op
cit., n. 4, pp. 90-91.
9. Ibid.,p 74.
230 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION APPENDIX B 231

It was on the basis of Adams's article that members of the Foreign acknowledged that the United States and Bulgaria lacked the kind of ex-
Affairs Committee casually bandied about their estimates of the extent change agreement which Bulgaria had negotiated with several coun-
of Bulgarian state smuggling. Adams charged that in the late 1970s tries, including West Germany and Austria, under which investigations
"approximately 25 percent of heroin reaching the United States either by one country's customs service are carried out at the request of
moved through Bulgaria or was in some way abetted by KINTEX."'o another country's service. Negotiations for such an agreement had been
This preposterous statcmcnt was reduced in the Committee's bargaining begun by the United States and Bulgaria, but were broken off at the di-
with the representative of the DEA to a more modest l0 percent. Yet in rection of the State Department in early 1983.'n In answer to written
response to written questions at the conclusion of the Committee's hear- questions the Customs Service stated that it "has no hard evidence that
ings, the DEA admitted,that they had "no substantive evidence to sup- the Government of Bulgaria has conducted illicit narcotics traffick-
port these allegations,"" and that "there is not enough evidence to in- ing."'' Indeed, it apparently maintained this position at an interagency
dict any Bulgarian official at this time."r2 meeting on July 18, between the first and the second session of the
The Customs Service's testimony also helped to demystify the TIR Committee's hearings, which was obviously called to iron out the dif-
trucking system, whose alleged abuse by the Bulgarians had become ferences in the stories being given the Committee by the two agencies.
such a central issue in the Bulgarian Connection case. The Customs Ser- Noting that the DEA representative at the meeting had admitted that
vice pointed out that (a) the TIR Convention made provision for on-the- "evidence in DEA's possession would be considered hearsay in an Eng-
spot inspection where smuggling was suspected, so that the system was lish coun of law and that credible evidence would be difficult to ob-
not a carte blanche for smuggling; (b) the U.S. shipping industry had a tain,"16 the Customs Service refused to budge from its position. In fact,
major stake in the continuation of the TIR system; (c) "recent trend as- in answer to another question , the Customs Service stated that ' 'the ces-
sessments by DEA indicate that overland transportation of drugs has de- sation of customs contact between U. S . and Bulgarian Customs is a pos-
creased considerably over the last decade"; and (d) "U.S. Customs ition which is not enthusiastically supported by customs administrations
does not have a documented factual basis to conclude that Bulgaria has of U.S. allies."''
violated the TIR system and we are not aware of any other agency hav- While there are many loose ends in the question of Bulgarian state
ing such information."'t Thus, whatever allegations were made by the participation----or even direction-in the smuggling trade that clearly
DEA, the State DepaÍtment, and by western disinformationists, the sends vast quantities of drugs and other contraband back and forth be-
U.S. agency most likely to be aware of Bulgarian violations of the TIR tween Westem Europe and the Middle East, for certain interests in both
Convention did not believe there was much substance to them. the United States and ltaly these charges constituted a target ofopportu-
Finally, Bulgarian guilt was reinforced for members of the Foreign nity. The availability of uncheckable testimony from defectors, con-
Affairs Committee by the frequent reminders coming from both DEA victed smugglers, and others with real or fabricated "information" to
and the State Department that the U.S. Customs Service had broken off sell provided a ready and endless supply of material to document
its ear|ier re|ationship with their Bu|garian counterpaÍts-a re|ationship charges of Bulgarian culpability. Yet without the implication of Bul-
which had involved training programs, conferences, and information garia in the attempt on the Pope it is doubtful that there would have been
exchanges. Once again, however, the fine print at the end of the Com- any market for these charges. A search through the indexes of the
mittee's report revealed a more complex story. The Customs Service Washington Post and the New York Times, for example, reveals that

tO. Ibid., p. 15. t4. Ibid., p. 84

tl. Ibid., p. ll3. 15. Ibid., p. lr5.
12. Ibid.,p ll4.ThisdenialwasrepeatedbytheDEAinanswertoasimilarquestion 16 Ibid.
at Senator Hawkins's "Drugs and Terrorism, 1984" hearings later in the summer: "No 17. Ibid., p. l3l
direct association between KINTEX and the 'Gray Wolves' has been reported to the
DEA" (Drzgs and Terrorism, 1984, op. clt., n. 3, p. 64).
13. Bulgarian-Turkish Narcotics Connection, op. cit., n. 4, pp l3l-35.

L'
232 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION APPENDTX B z)-)

only a few articles published prior to 1982 even allege any Bulgarian translated especially for the Wall Street Journal.
participation in narcotics smuggling. Yet following the arrest of An- lgnatius's long article was then presented to the next meeting of the
tonov media interest in Bulgarian smuggling blossomed. And even House investigative committee by Senator Alfonse D'Amato, an adhe_
though no new evidence of substance was discovered, publicity about rent of the Bulgarian Connection hypothesis and a collaborator with
alleged Bulgarian smuggling and charges that Bulgaria was behind the claire Sterling since the fall of 198 l. D'Amaro claimed that the article
attempt on the Pope were mutually reinforcing, one "confirming" the corroborated the findings of Sterling and Henze. And a little over a
other. week later, testifying before a Senate subcommittee looking into ,.the
link between drugs and terrorism," Henze cited the Journal article
("the only U.S. newspaper to report these developments") in support of
his Agca-Ugurlu-Bulgaria linkage.''
The Echo Chamber
Thus, in the real world of the disinformation process, two congres-
sional committees had heard witnesses testify about the Agca-Ugurlu-
As with other aspects of the Bulgarian Connection, the drugs-for-guns
Bulgaria link. The testimony had been supported by aWall Street Jour-
allegations benefitted from a recycling process that appeared to give the
ncl investigatiďn. And the Journal, drawing on a previously unknown
claims independent confirmation. We call this the "echo chamber";
Turkish prosecutor's report and expert testimony before Congress, had
and it has become a hallmark of the work of the disinformationists.
updated its readers on the growing evidence that Bulgarian-backed
A good example of the echo chamber at work occurred during the
smuggling formed the root of the Bulgarian Connection. It would be
congressional hearings on Bulgarian support for narco-terrorism. On
only naturď for the creators and consumers of ..informed opinion'' to
June 7, 1984, Paul Henze told the House Committee on Foreign Affairs'
"Task Force on Intemational Narcotics Control" that "with Bulgarian believe that a fact of some importance was being confirmed by severď
sources. It is unlikely that anyone noticed that these apparent confirma-
help, what came to be called the 'Turkish Mafia' set up elaborate net-
works, lodged in part among Turkish workers in Europe, for moving tions were only the echo chamber at work, reverberating another of
opium products westward. " On July l7 the Wall Street Journal printed
Henze's claims to create the appearance of multiple confirmation.
a long article by David lgnatius about the ongoing investigation of
Agca's links to Turkish drug-smuggling bosses, particularly Abuzer
Ugurlu.'t Ignatius drew on Henze's House testimony and supplemented
this with an interview, in which Henze claimed that "it is inconceivable
that a widely known criminal operative such as Ugurlu could have lived
and worked in Bulgaria without the approval of the Bulgarian intelli-
gence service and the rest of the Bulgarian Communist Party hierar-
chy." In all other respects as well, Ignatius's article was pure Henze,
and was probably inspired by him, as it drew on a Turkish prosecutor's
report which had "received little attention outside of Turkey," and was

18. "Turks Closer to Linking Pope's Assailant with Bulgaria." The alleged Agca-
Ugurlu link contributed to the reopening of the investigation into the murder oflpekci in
December l 982, just after Agca named Ugurlu. Ugur| u had surrenderď himse|f for anest
in West Germany in March 1981, just before the deadline announced by the new Turkish
martial law govemment for some forty wanted criminals to surrender or lose their Turkish
citizenship. West Germany extradicted Ugurlu to Turkey. Characterístically, Henze and
Sterling never mention that Ugurlu had surrendered himself voluntarily to the West Ger-
man police
19. Drugs and Terrorism, 1984, op cir., n. 3, p 97
 l

APPENDIX C 235

trcs, as broadcasters for Radio Free Europe, or as analysts for the CIA.
The defector may share one or more of these attributes, but to be a de-
fector the émigrémust possess certain other characteristics which are of

c. The Use and lillsuse use to the West. The value of defectors is governed by two things: the
information that they bring with them, and their willingness ro bear wit-

of Defectors ness to the evils of the state they left behind. Some defectors, such as
star athletes or dancers, can fulfill this latter category passively, simply '

by living and performing in the West. But government workers or mili-

tary officers, having no independent source of fame-and thus salabil-
ity-in the West, must provide important information anďor be willing
to testify publicly about life in the East, and especially about the plans
and methods of the Soviet-Bloc rulers.
The testimony of defectors, however, is extremely unreliable and eas-
ily subject to manipulation. For one thing, many defectors are bitter and
During the Red Scare of the late 1940s and early 1950s' some ex-com- may want to generate hostility against their homeland, which may lead
munist witnesses briefly made a new career for themselves, testifying
them to inflate or invent negative information. Furthermore, defectors
and writing about their f,trst-hand experience with the communist who claim a Iot of knowledge about the enemy aÍe more marketabIe
menace. Not surprisingly, this new profession fell under the sway of
than those admitting that they know very little. Once defectors have
economic laws; and ex-communist witnesses were forced to develop been debriefed in the West on their areas of expertise, however, they
and improve their products once the novelty of their original message
have nothing else to sell, and must either enter the private economy or
wore off. As noted by David Caute, "invention" was "the specialty of "discover" new information to remain employed by the public sector.
renegades, who traded heavily in mounting American popular fears,"
..were This provides a market incentive to create information.
and Soviet émigrés always ready to delight congressional com-
Sometimes sudden shifts in consumer demand reactivate old defec-
mittees with the wildest'inside stories'of diabolical Kremlin plots."l tors. This was the case with the Bulgarian Connection, which breathed
By their assertions and claims of Red evil the ex-communist witnesses
I

new life into the market for Bulgarian defectors. Elements of the secu-
helped to legitimate the repression of the Red Scare era; and subsequent
rity services of the West are often willing to connive with defectors to
exposure of much of their information as completely fictitious had only concoct serviceable points of disinformation, and to use defectors to
l

a marginď impact on the media's receptivity to similar testimony by convey these documents to the mass media. Edward Jay Epstein cites
other witnesses. the testimony of former CIA officer Joseph Burkholder Smith, "who
What the ex-communist witness was to the era of the Red Scare and disclosed that the CIA had sent a Soviet defector to deliver fReader's
McCarthyism, the defector is to the age of "international terrorism" Digest editor Johnl Barron a story it had wholly invented," and which
and disinformation.'z Most of those who leave Soviet Bloc countries or Barron subsequently used in his published writings under Reader's Di-
other official enemies of the United States, of course, simply come to gesÍ auspices.'
the West to start a new life . Some émigrésundoubtedly hope to return'
A timely illustration of the political economy of the defector can be
and await the collapse of whatever regime rules his or her homeland. found in the case of former Soviet diplomat Arkady Shevchenko, whose
And some take up the cause of counterrevolution, whether it be as con- book Breaking With Moscow became a best seller in mid-1985. Two
f. David Catte, The Greal Fear (New York: Simon and Schuster' 1978)' pp' I3l-32' fine investigative reports have traced the rehabilitation and marketing of
2. To our knowledge there are no studies which scrutinize the sum total of defector cvi-
3. Edward J. Epstein, ..Thc Spy Who Camc In To Be Sold,'' y'Ýew Republic, July 15.
dence analogous to the several useful studies of ex-communist witnesses of the Red Scare
era. sec, for cxample, Herbert Packer's Et-Communist witnesses (Stanford: Stanforo
22,1985, p.4l-
University Prcss, 1962); or Victor Navasky's Narning Natnes (New York: Viking Prcss'
t980).

234

t ill
236 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION APPENDIX C 237

Shevchenko. After his defection in 1978, he initially produced material western intelligence services and the Reader's Digest.
which was then characterized by Time magazine as "far less valuable as Shevchenko's story is illustrative of the role of the defector in fab-
an intelligence source than had been anticipated." Based on its own in- ricating myths about Soviet strategies to defeat the West. Needless to
telligence sources, Time concluded that Shevchenko "had little knowl- say, writers such as Sterling, Henze, and Ledeen do not pause for even a
edge of the inner workings of current Soviet policies or intelligence op- moment to consider whether defector testimony presents any problems
erations." This estimate was shared by analysts from the Defense Intel- of veracity. A delightful example of this is found in Sterling's The Ter-
ligence Agency. lndeed, when the Simon and Schuster publishing house ror Network, where she brings in a Czech defector, Major General Jan
received the completed manuscript of Shevchenko's story in 1979, for Sejna, to support her claim that the Soviets had set up terrorist training
which they had advanced $146,000 on their $600,000 contract, they camps as far back as 1964. Indeed, Sejna's testimony plays a centrď
sued for the return of their advance because the book "did not contain role in Sterling's argument about Soviet responsibility for international
sufficient new material about the Soviet Union to merit its publication. terrorism. Yet it turns out that Sejna had been debriefed by western in-
There were no revelatory firsthand conversations with Soviet leaders- telligence in 1968, and had never mentioned this important information,
and no mention of any espionage activities by him."o because (according to Sterling) "nobody ever asked him about such
But in 1984, in a new political climate with a lower threshhold of gul- matters. " It wasn't until 1980, when Michael Ledeen fortuitously asked
libility, Shevchenko's memoirs returned to the publishers. This time Sejna about So-viet'plans for intemational terrorism, that Sejna thought
they were repackaged, with entirely new sections on his alleged conver- to tell anyone about the terrorist training camps. This convenient recol-
sations with Khrushchev, and with the revelation that he had actually lection coincided with the Haig-Ledeen demand for just this kind of in-
been a mole for the CIA all along. Edward Jay Epstein made a point-by- formation, essential to make the transition from "human rights" to "in-
point analysis of the plausibility of several of Shevchenko's claims, ternational terrorism" as the public relations face of the new administra-
characterizing them as "demonstrably fictitious," and calling Shev- tion's foreign policy.
chenko "the spy who never was. " Moreov6l-3nd of great relevance to Sejna's testimony, however, does not withstand examination. [rav-
the Bulgarian Connection-Epstein pointed out that Shevchenko's ing aside the absurdity that Sejna would let such an accusation languish
..super in his notes for 12 years before bringing it to public attention, as we
mole'' activities were first passed on by the CIA to Íhe Reader,s
Digest's John Barron, and that Barron incorporated them into his 1983 noted in Chapter 6, Sejna's claims were so implausible that the CIA
publication, The KGB Today: The Hidden Hand. Coverage by CBS's 60 concocted a document outlining a supposed Soviet plan for world domi-
Minutes, aTime cover story, a best seller, a lucrative movie deal, and a nation. When it was shown to Sejna, he verified it as authentic.u There
position as a regular coÍnmentator on Soviet ďfairs for ABC News soon is evidence that this document, with Sejna as a conduit, served to feed
followed. Shevchenko's marketability has been completely untouched the fires of the anti-Soviet and anti-terrorism crusades of the late 1970s.
by the exposure of his fabrications.s Thus Shevchenko shares with In l98l the New YorkTimes's teslie Gelb was told by intelligence offi-
Mehmet Ali Agca this dubious distinction: Two of the most famous cials, skeptical about information on terrorism coming to them from
disinformation sources of our era have been sold to the U.S. public European intelligence agencies, that "what we are hearing is this l0-
through a series of fabrications that began with the collaboration of year old testimony coming back to us through West European intelli-
i

gence and some of our own CIA people. "7 Alexander Cockbum claims
4. lbid., pp. 35-36. See also David Remnick, "Shevchenko: The Saga Behind the Best
that Arnaud de Borchgrave rushed back from France in 1978 with the ex-
Seller, " lVaslrin gton Poil, June I 5, I 985 The quotations from Time are cited in Epstein,
op cit., n 3., p. 35. citing new information from French intelligence that the Soviets had a
5. In November 1985, for example, the New YorkTimes published Shevchenlo's OP
6. Lars-Erik Nelson, "The deep tenor plot: a thickening of silence," New York Daily
Ed article on the redefection of Soviet KGB official Viraly Yurchenko. ("A l,esson of the
News, June 24, 1984, p. Cl4; Alexander Cockburn, "Beat the Devil," The Nation, Au-
Yurchenko Affair," November 12, 1985). And ABC called upon Shevchenko to com-
gust 17-24, 1985. p 102.
ment on the significance of the Summit. [.ong ďter Epstein's exposé, thc /Vep YorkTilnes
7. tesfie Gelb, "Soviet-TerrorTies Called Ourdated," New York Tines, October lE,
Book Review gave favorable notice and an unqualified recommendation of Slrcvchenko's
198
book to its readers. (December 8, 1985; January 26, 1986.)
|

illi
238 THEBULCARIAN CONNECTION APPENDIX C 239

master plan for world domination, which was the CIA forgery repack- Sverdlev, like the ex-communist witnesses of an earlier era, developed a

aged once again. Alexander Haig had also been delighted with the new product.
sejna-based stories, particularly as cited by Claire sterling inThe Ter- Sverdlev's new area of specialization became the alleged Bulgarian
ror Network, and was quite annoyed that his own officials kept telling role in international narcotics trafficking. He served as the primary
..he was basically repeating the stories of the czech defec- source for Nathan Adams's 1983 Reader's Digest article, which in turn
him that
tor. "t served as the major documentary "evidence" for the House Foreign Af-
Between them, Shevchenko and Sejna illustrate several general prin- fairs Committee hearing on the "Bulgarian-Turkish Narcotics Connec-
ciples of the political economy of defectors that we noted earlier. They tion'' in the summer of 1984.'o JusÍ as Maj. Gen. Sejna suddenly recall.
serve a critical role in testifying publicly about the Soviet system. They cd critical evidence on Soviet support for international terrorism when
appear to be the conduits of forged or imaginary documents. And their he was interviewed more than a decade after his defection by Michael
value is closely tied to market conditions, rising steeply during the Ledeen, the most important piece of news that Sverdlev gave Nathan
Reagan administration. This latter point has been doubly applicable in Adams in 1983 was about the existence of a secret 1970 Bulgarian di-
the case of Bulgarian defectors, whose boats have risen with the tide' rective to implement a 1967 Warsaw Pact plan to destabilize and comrpt
but who have been especially lifted by the alleged Bulgarian connec- the West through narcotics. Sverdlev had not thought to tell anyone
tion. In Chapter 7 we bnefly noted the useful role played by Iordan about this directive before his interview with Adams." Needless to say,
Mantarov, the agricultural mechanic who claimed to have been on the Sverdlev did not have this directive in his possession; it had been left be-
staff of the Bulgarian Embassy in France, and to have passed on infor- hind with Greek intelligence, he claimed, when he left Greece for West
marion on the plot to kill the Pope to French intelligence. Discredited, Germany in 19'77 . (Conditions in Greece apparently became steadily
less comfortable for him after the fall of the Colonels' junta in 19'74.)
Mantarov has quietly passed into at least temporary obscurity'
Perhaps the person who has gained the most by the sudden rise in the But he did remember the docurnent's date (July 16, 1970) and its
number (M-120/00-0500), despite the fact that he had not been called
maÍketability of Bulgarian defectors is Stefan Sverdlev, a former Bulga-
rian official who defected to Greece in 1971. Sverdlev was a colonel in upon to retrieve this information from his memory in over a decade.
the Bulgarian State Security Service, the KDS (now DS). After the ar-
Sverdlev's testimony is highly suspect. It seems unbelievable that,
rest of Antonov in November 1982, Sverdlev was the western media's
given his apparently continuing connection with western intelligence
primaÍy Source for the claim that' if the Bulgarians were involved, the after leaving Greece in 1977, he would fail to mention such a salable
Soviets must have known about it because the Bulgarian security ser- commodity. It also seems unlikely that, given the Greek government's
vices are completely dominated by the Soviets.' This claim, of course, connections to the CIA, such a document would have been kept from
the Agency prior to l9'l'I . And when former U.S. ambassador to Bul-
could only be used so many times before its novelty wore off. And so
10. "Drugs forGuns: The Bulgarian Connection," Reuder's Drgesr, November 1983,
8 Ibid,t Cockburn, op. cit., n. 6; and Nelson, op. cir', n' 6'
pp. 84-98 These hearings and their context are examined more generally in Appendix B,
9. According to claire Sterling, "lengthy interviews with col. Sverdlev have appeared
above.
in dozens of publications, including lheNewYorkTimes, Newsweek,the Reader's Digest,
I l. Paul Henze told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that "Many of Sverdlev's re-
the leftwing Paris daity Liberation, the conservative Le Figaro, and the ltalian socialist
velations were taken lightly at the time he made them, even by intelligence profession-
Pany's Avanti.,, (,.An Eastern Defector's Family Is Taken for a Ride Home," wall street
als." (Bulgarian-Turki,rh Narcotics Connection: United States-Bulgarian Relations and
Journal, November 23, 1983.) The burden of sterling's article, incidentally, was to de-
International Drug Trafficking, Hearings and Markup before the Committee on Foreign
scribetheallegedkidnappingofsverdlev'swifeand l3-year-oldsonbytheBulgarianson
Affairs, House of Rcpresentatives, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, | 984, p. 30. ) But news of
the weekend of November l2-13, 1983. Neither Sterling nor the Journcl followed up on
the Warsaw Pact destabilization plan was apparently omitted completely. During Adams's
this sad story. As the New YorkTimes reported three weeks later, it quickly became appar-
testimony before the same corillnittee, there was some momentary confusion about
ent that Sverdlev's wife was unhappy in the West and retumed, taking their son with her
whether Adams's claim to have been the first to hear Sverdlev's infomation. as Sverdlev
"She has done this because she has the nature of an adventurer," said Sverdlev. James
..Bulgarian Exiles Get Reminder from Motherland," New York Times, De- also mainmrned, was conect A subsequent insenron into the committce s record acrsed
Markham,
with Adams. Ibid., p.99
cember 12. 1983.
2Q THE BULGAR]AN CONNECTION

aria Jack Perry testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee's
hearings on the "Bulgarian-Turkish Narcotics Connection," he told the
Committec tlrat "I read about that [Sverdlev's claims] rn the Reader' s Di-
gesÍ, but l was never aware of tt when I was on active duty, and I have
never scen that intelligence."'2 Thus it seems most likely that D. 9terllng vcfsus Andronov
Sverdlev's document never existed, and that Adams and Sverdlev had
developed the sort of mutually beneficial relationship which character-
izes the contemporaÍy misuse of defectors.
[n sum, defectors aÍe now part of the market system, with the demand
for particular kinds of evidence eliciting the required supply. This sys-
tem only works because the mass media refuse to look critically at sys-
tem-SuppoÍtive claims. Even devastating exposés of a Sejna or Shev.
The methodology used by Claire Sterling and Paul Henze can be readily
chenko fail to dislodge charlatans or constrain the use of demonstrable
employed to prove CIA involvement in the assassination attempt against
fraud. This allows the system of defector mobilization and management
the Pope. This was done by Soviet journalist lona Andronov in his
to continue unimpaired.
monograph On the Wolf s Track ' Although we do not find it very con-
vincing, Andronov provided a somewhat more compelling case than
Sterling and Henze. As he advanced the wrong villain, however, his
work has been ignored in the West. A brief comparison of Sterling and
Andronov may be instructive in showing the irrelevance of method and
the overwhelming importance of proper conclusions in mass media
choices of stories to feature.

Red Network Methodology Applied to Bulgarian and CIA

Connections.
i

.ed NelwoÍk melbodology staÍts with the prim know|edge of Red cen.
ter guilt' Itr consequence, it does nol requiŤe much in lhe way of sup.
poÍting evidence. The heaí of the method is !o find ..tinkages,, snd

**]ry,tr*l'ff ffi ii.:*#l;"J#l*#'.:"ffi

n zrcď |engŮ in Thz TinE ďl'" ÁssaJsi'J' sterling found an unnamed
nteÍpol agent who gave ..his oaib'' lbat the BulgaÍian secrEt services
contfoued e T!*Áh Mafia', Experts in this aÍea, including the U's.
)rug Eď.Íretnent AdminislÍation, the U's. cusloms service' and TuÍk-
ish joumďist Ugur MuÍtctl' bave stated ÍepealÉdly that therc is no evidence
that Butgaria co ro|s lhe Turkieh Mďia. ster|ing p.ďe.J the c|aim of
the anonymous informant (if he exists) who ass rted BulgaÍian conEol'

12- Ibid. L I@! Andrcnov, O' rh. Potls tlel (Soriar Sofi! pE.s, 1983).
2' Th. Ti@ oÍ |fu AsWriB (New York Holt' RirchM Úd wifuton' t933)' o 225

aa1
242 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION APPENDIX D 243

and on this basis Bulgarian control becomes definitive fact for Sterling.s that the CIA armed the Gray Wolves and that the United States funded
The Turkish Mafia works frequently with the Gray Wolves. Basď on Tiirkes. He agrees with Sterling and Henze that the terror of the late
this association, Sterling says "The Wolves were being run by this huge 1970s aimed at destabilization; but, reversing the Sterling-Henze line, he
contraband ring, the Turkish Mafia, unique in the world in that it was contends that destabilization was rightist in origin and served U.S. and
really working for a Communist state corporation under the sponsorship rightwing interests. Andronov claims that the murder of lpekci on Feb-
of the Communist state of Bulgaria. "n Thus once again we move from a ruary I , 1979, was part of this U.S.-inspired destabitization effort.
linkage to control, here without even bothering with the anonymous Ipekci was deeply concerned about the destabilization program and had
confirmation. Supplemented by the imputed motive, the Soviet desire to assailed the Gray Wolves as an instrument of murder. Two weeks be-
stop the Polish Solidarity movement, the Bulgaria-Turkish Mafia-Gray fore his assassination, on January 13, 1979,Ipekci met by appointment
Wolves-Agca links become a chain of command responsible for the as- Paul Henze, former CIA station chief in Turkey and at the time on the
sassination attempt. staff of the National Security Council. Andronov proposes that Ipekci
Using this same Red Network methodology, it is not at all difficult to was warning Henze and urging him to control his subversive program in
put up an imaginative demonstration that the CIÁ was behind the plot to Turkey.s
kill the Pope. This is the case that Andronov develops, which is the east- For Andronov, a key link in the U.S.-backed destabilization effort
ern variant of the Sterling mode|. Andronov aÍgues' as does Ster|ing, was Ruzi Nazar, a former Nazi who worked in the U.S. Embassy in
that the Gray Wolves themselves had no real motive for shooting the Turkey with Henze and then moved to West Germany. Nazar served in
Pope; they had to be manipulated by an external power. The purpose of both Turkey and West Germany as the U.S. liaison with the Gray
the Plot was to discredit the Soviet Union, in accordance with the new Wolves. Andronov cites several individuals, including Mumcu, who
Reagan-Haig anticommunist crusade. It depended for its success on the say that Nazar had real influence over the Gray Wolves.t
likelihood that the western press "will jump at the murky fabricated ac- Andronov's scheme of linkages and controls is as follows: Agca's
cusations against Moscow and Sofia of complicity in international ter- paymaster in Europe was Celebi, a high Gray Wolves official in West
rorism."t Andronov acknowledges that such an act against the Pope Germany. It was Celebi who gave Agca the final go-ahead on the assas-
seems incredible even for the CIA, but he notes that the CIA hired sination attempt in April 1981. Celebi, however, was a subordinate of
Maf,ra murderers to try to assassinate Cuban President Fidel Castro, and both TÚrkes and Enver A|tayli, an associate of Tíirkes who was in con.
he claims that there is a profascist grouping within the CIA that is capa- trol of all Turkish fascist finances and Gray Wolves propaganda. An-
ble of anything.o dronov quotes from an interview with Orsan Oymen, the Bonn corre-
Andronov puts great weight on the linkages built up by the CIA in spondent of Milliyet: "According to information I have, Altayli collabo-
Turkey with the extreme Right. He points out that former CIA agent rates with the American CIA."'o The linkages are complete: a CIA-
Frank Terpil acknowledged supplying arms and training to the Gray Gray Wolves-Agca connection is confirmed by at least three named
Wo|ves. He quotes Mumcu's statement that TÍirkes, the head of the sources.
Nationďist Action Party, ..has a|ways been strong|y connected with the Although we do not believe these arguments to be true, the Andronov
CIA.''' Andronov c|aims that the Turkish papers were full of repoÍts case is far stronger than Sterling's. What gives it special strength is the
consistency of motive and results. The motive was to incriminate the
3. "He [Agca] was picked by a unique criminal band called the Turkish Mafia, which
Soviet Union and discredit it in the eyes of the world, to help Reagan
operates out of Sofia, Bulgaria, which, indeed, is under the direct control and supervision
of the Bulgarian Secret Sewice. " "Why Is the West Covering Up for Agca: Exclusive In- convince the U.S. public to accept a major rearmament and to persuade
terview with Claire Sterling,', Hunan Events, Ápnl. 2l' 1984. Europeans of the necessity of Pershing and cruise missiles. What is
4. rbid.
5. Op. cit., n. l, p.46. 8. Ibid., p- 30.
6. lbid-, p. 43. 9. Mumcu reproduces a long letter from Gray Wolves leader Enver Altayli to Tiirkes in
1 Ibid., p. 33- which a cooperative relationship with Nazar is made clear. See above, p. 64, n. 49.
lO. Op- cit., n. l, p. 39.

i-
244 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION

more, the assassination plot worked well to meet these ends. By con-
trast, Sterling's version requires irrational and exceptionally incompe-
tent Soviet behavior. The Andronov model is consistent with rational
CIA behavior and the results of the plot are compatible with Reagan-
CIA objectives. E. Tlre Georgetown
Sterling and Henze, of course, would rule out CIA involvement on
the ground that this is not the kind of thing the United States would do.
Dtslnformatlon Genter
There is some truth in this. Shooting the Pope, even through a hired sur-
rogate, would be an extraordinary act. It is doubtful that the top officials
of the CIA would authorize it as a means of helping a propaganda war
against the Soviets, even though the CIA has arranged for many at-
tempts to kill foreign leaders. '' But similar doubts may be raised that the
cautious Soviet leadership would be any more likely to engage in such
an extraordinary and risky venture than the CIA.'t
The papal assassination attempt provided a comucopia of propaganda
11. See, AIIeged Assassination Plots lnvolving Foreign Leaders, Interim Report of the opportunities for hardliners, both in government and out. A well-pub-
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence, U.S. licized report by the Georgetown Center for Strategic and Intemational
Studies (csN)' entitled ..The trnternationď Implications of the Papď
Senate Report No. 94-465, 94th Congress, lst Session, November 20, 19'15
12. See Chapter 2, pp. l4-15 and n. 13. In a fine illustration of Sterling methodology'
in The Time of the Assassins she reports a conversation involving Martin Peretz, editor of Assassination Attempt: A Case of State-Sponsored Terrorism,"' took
the New Republic and several New Republic interns who think the KGB plot far-fetched: full advantage of these opportunities to score political points. While the
"Tell me," pursued Marty "What do you think of the story that the CIA plotted title of the document suggests that readers might expect a serious discus-
to kill Fidel Castro?" "Oh, that! Of course!" "Why are you so ready to believe sion of the substance of the casé, Bulgarian and Soviet guilt were as-
that the CIA would kill Castro, but not that the KGB would kill the Pope?" Marty
sumed beforehand as a working premise. The big question raised by the
went on, intrigued." "Because the CIA does things like that."
Sterling fails to note that the CIA's multiple efforts to murder Castro are not "a story" but report was: What should U.S. responses be f the Soviets are shown to
are on the record, acknowledged by govemment authorities. By contrast, the evidence for be behind the papal shooting? The document thus had the built-in objec-
a Soviet connection to the plot to kill the Pope is sorely lacking. Furthermore, the doubt tivity of a report on an individual entitled: ..How should we deď with
in8 íntems may be questioning the logic of the plot, which, as we spe|led out eaÍlier, has John Doe if it is established that he beats his wife?"
serious flaws.
The Plot was framed in a Sterlingesque setting in which international
terror is sponsored by states which aim to "undermine world order."
The guilty state is of course the Soviet Union, and the point of the CSIS
report was to stress that "the papal case can be used as a symbol" in a
propaganda campaign to dramatize the Soviets as the center of ter-
rorism. The authors of the report faced several problems, however.
First, there is the issue of whether the United States has clean hands.
Are South Africa and Israel terrorist states? Are they U.S. surrogates?
Are the contras U.S. instruments of tenor? Are Chile, El Salvador, and
Guatemala engaged in terrorist attacks on their own citizens? Can the
Soviets match the CIA's numerous attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro?

I This is a "Report of the CSIS Steering Committee on Terrorism," Zbigniew

Brzezinski and Robert H. Kupperman, Co-chairmen, published in December 1984 by the
CSIS in its Significant Issues Series, Vol Vl, No. 20

245
 246 THE BI.JLGARIAN CONNECTION APPENDIX B 24':

This issue is mentioned fleetingly in the report and passed by without perhaps even in the disinformation business?3 Banish the thought! It is
serious discussion. obvious that the truth did not prevail in ltaly because of the power of
A second problem was that the truth of the Bulgarian Connection had KGB disinformation and the West's fear of offending the Soviet Union
not yet been decided in the Italian courts at the time the report was pub- and disnrrbing détenÍe.aIf I win, justice is done; if I lose' the deck is
lished. As noted. the conferees assumed Soviet involvement without stacked.
presenting any supportive evidence. Co-chairman Robert Kupperman The composition of the working group that produced the report ena-
smoothly asserted in his Overview that "most thoughtful observers" bles us to understand its content: Paul Henze, former CIA propaganda
believe in the Connection. He does not name any such observers nor off,rcer; Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Adviser to Car-
provide any citations. The issue of Soviet guilt was also dealt with in a ter and member of the Committee on the Present Danger (CpD); Max
manner suggesting the Henze "print": doubts on this point represent a Kampelman, CPD member and Reagan's choice for arms control
"legalistic and narrow-minded" attitude that "is not politically negotiator; Ray Cline, formerly of the CIA; Robert Kupperman, ,.ter-
sound."t The report also notes that aggressive U.S. government accusa- rorism expert" of CSIS; Marvin Kalb, author of the extremely biased
tions of Bulgarian and Soviet guilt might be regarded as inteďering with NBC-TV progrÍrm on the plot; and Arnaud de Borchgrave, Red Scare
Italian judicial processes. This did not prevent the conferees from con- novelist and editor of Reverend Moon's Washington Times. That de
cluding that there should be an "organized effort on the part ofthe gov- Borchgrave is an Adjunct Fel|ow of the CSIS tells us a EÍeat deď about
ernment to develop as much credibility and access to information about that organization. So does this report in general.
the case as is needed to generate a political attitude."
This perceived need for a more aggressive government propaganda
effort was based on an alleged widespread disbelief in the Plot, which
was attributed to a "prodigious" Soviet disinformation effort. The con-
ferees agreed that the western media had been penetrated and that Soviet
disinformation had ..had an effect.'' The western mďia |acked awaÍe.
ness "about how disinformation functions." The conferees did not con-
sider U.S. disinformation, which may not exist for them. This stress on
Soviet disinformation and western media victimization is a longstanding
focus of the Henze-Sterling-de Borchgrave school, which tries to make
all dissenting opinion a product of Red influence, not disagreement
about the facts. This vision leads naturally to the conclusion that we
should bring Big Government into play to deal with this menace: The
CSIS report urges the U.S. government to use "informal connections"
to "discourage the internal process of imposing more and more skepti-
cism on the Bulgarian (and possibly Soviet) involvement." (Transla-
tion: the U.S. government should intervene to discourage dissenting
views on the Plot.)
Given the loss of the case in ltaly, several questions arise. If, as Kup-
..most
peÍTnan suggested, thoughtfu| observers'' thought the Bulgarians
and KGB guilty, how did they blunder so egregiously? Could it be that
3. Michae| Ledeen has been a sta|waí of the CsIs, and Kupperman hired as his
the people the CSIS regard as "thoughtful" are a wee bit biased, on ltďy FrancescoPazienza, under multiple indictment in ltaly for forgery, theft,
adviser
and co|-
laboration with terrorists. See Chapter 6.
2. See Chapter 6, pp. lztS-149
4 This last point is pur forward regurarry by Sterring. See preface and Chapter 6,

L__ L
 INDEX 249

arrest of, 23,28, l'l'l Caprara, Massimo, 75-76

Apple, R. W., Jr., 217,221-22,223-U .|6-77,
carabinieri, Ítz|ian, 79-80' 89
Arms Smuggling und Terrorism Carter, Barry, 185, 188
(Mumcu), 27, 59-60 Carter, Billy,95-96
Ascoli Piceno prison, 102, I03, 195 Catli, Abdullah, 13, 4041 , 54, 65, 90,
Index Atlantic Community, 148 t2l
Caute, David. 234
Bagci, Omer, 50, 54 Cavallero, Roberto, 80, 8l
Banco Ambrosiano, 38, 84, 94,97,99 CBS-TV News, 183, 184-85,22'I
Barron, John, 134, 235, 236 Celebi, Musa, 2'1 ,35, 54,56, 120, 155,
"Bayramic," 27,28, ll0, lll t56,243
Begin, Menachem, 68, 69 Celenk, Bekir, 26,27, 40,59-60, 109,
Belarus Secret, The (LofEts), 62-63 t4o,226
ABC-TV. t99-2m, 2M,213 initia| tes.imony oÍ' 2o, 22o-22 Belmonte, Giuseppi, gl, 92, 93, 108, Celik, Oral, 2r, 22, 26, 37 , 5l , 52, 54,

Adams, Nathan M., 22G27, 228, 23O, long delay of, in naming alleged ce r22 r t5, l2r, t55, 207, 212, 22r, 225
239 conspirators, l'l -18, 23-24, 107 "Billygate" scandal. 5, 95-96, 99 Cem. Ismail.62
Adnan (Mehmet Ali Agca's brother), 42, retractions by, of previous testimony, Birindelli. Admiral. 89 Central Intelligence Agency, 69, 70,
155.219 t1. 3t, 32-34, 36, 38, 109-10, l 15- Board for Intemational Broadcasting, t32-33, r35, t36, 142, t46, 159,236
Agca, Mehmet Ali, I, 10, 16-17,35,36, 17, r38-40, 157, l8l, t92, t93, 147-48 alleged involvement of, in papal
120, 138, l8l, r87-88 t94. t96-9'1,200,20t Bonner, Raymond, 165
assassination attempt, 179, 242-44
allegations by (later retracted), of plot role of, in assassination of progressive Borghese, Prince Junio Y aleno, 72, 74, and Korean airliner incident, 163, 215
to kiff L,ech Walesa, 2, 29,30-32, newspapeÍ editor lpekci, 52' |87, 80 in ltaly, 5, 59. 73, 75, 77, 80, 99,
33, | 17, t57, 192, t93 2t'7.222 B reaking with M osc ow (Shevchenko),
160
as a longtime rightwing activist in testimony of, in second trial, ix-x, 39, 23s-36 links of, to right-wing Turks, 6l-64,
Turkey,42,48, 50-56, 65, 137-38, t94-9't Breytenbach, Breyton, 129-31 242-43
t55,217,2t8, 220, 221,223, 224; threat by, to kill the Pope in Turkcy, Briand, Ali, 152
Paul Henze as longtime employee of,
see also Gray Wolves 14,52-53, 156, 186, 187, 196 Brink' André' l30 64, f33, 142, t4647, t50. 154.
as an unlikely recruit for Soviet-bloc trial of, in July 1981, 18-19 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 67, 145, 147, 243
secret services, l5-l6i see also trip to Brilgaria by, l3-14, 16, 20. 53, 149, f60, 16l, 179, 185,203,247 reaction of, to Bulgarian Connection
Agca, as a longrime rightwing f84. f87,20'1,210-ll Buckley, William F., Jr., 175, l7'1 theory, 29, 14546, 177 -78
activist in Turkey Agca Dossier (Mumcu), 137-38 Bulgarian Connection: Cheme. Leo. 148
as sole witness against the Bulgarians, Agee, Philip, 132 alleged Soviet motivation in, l4-15, Christian Science Monitor,'7, l4'7, 183,
2, ts't, t90,ztl Ahmad, Feroz, 49,51-52 20,2+25, 55, t44, t84, 210 226
claim of, to be Jesus Christ, ix-x, 39, Aivazov, Todor, 17, 28,32,35, lO7, discrediting of, in second trial, ix-xi, CIA. See Central Intelligence Agency
155, 18l, 194,196 | 15, I17, l,l0 2, 3941, l 8l . 194-97 Cilleri, Giuseppi, 106, 208
coaching of, in prison, 3-4, 5,32,33, Afbano, Antonio, 36, 87, l04., 122, l9l, emergence of, in l98l-82, 20-29,222 Cirif lo, Ciro, 66,92,97
40,-4r, 57, 102-t2, t 19, l2t-22, 210 logical difficulties presented by, l2-18, Cline, Ray, 69, 159,24'l
195. t98. 202 Albano Report, 15-16, 36, 109-10, I 19, 36-3'7, 55-5'7, t87-88, 210-12 Coalition for a Democratic Majority
credibility of, ix-x, 2,2'1 , 37-38, 59- t90-94,203-4 multiple origins of, 206-7, 208-9: see
(cDM),67, 69
60. l2G2r, 183-84, 189, l9l, 197, coveÍage of, in western media' 6' |8|' also Agca, coaching of; Mafial Cockbum, Alexander, 124, 23'l
2OO-O1,236-37; see also Agca, rm-94,20G201 secret services, ltalian; Vatican Commentary,2O3
retractions by, of previous testimony leaking of, 33, 36, I 19, 120, 140 post-trial attempts to rehabilitate, xii- Commission on Security and Cooperation
desire of, for public attention, 56-57, Amnesty International, l5l xv, 214-215 in Europe, 25
105-6, 108, 196,200 Andronov, Iona, 64, '133, l4l-42, l7O, propagation of, by U S. media, xi- Committee on the Present Danger (CPD),
escape of, from Turkish prison, 52, t79,24t44 xvii, 1, 5-6, 7-8, 123, 176-89, 213- 6'7

Andropov, Yuri, l-2 Communist Party of Ítaly (Pct)' 66' 76'

t3'I , t4041 14,215', see also individual
identiÍication of Bulgarians by, 2' 2| Angleton, lames,'l 4, 132 publications and TV networks 79,83,92, 100, lzl4, 19l
Antonov, Mrs. Rossitsa, 17, ll7, l2O-
' Consolo, Giuseppi, 103, 107
22, 23-24, 26-2'1, f0, I l0-l I, I lG Reagan administratíon as beneficiary
t7 21, t40, t76, t93,2N of, 1,71, 100, l0l, Coogan, Kevin, 90
123,145
influence on, of media presentation of Antonov, Sergei,2, l0l, l2'1 Bush, George, 69 Corriere della Sera.83-84. 160
Bulgarian Connection, 24,28, 5'1 , Agca's testimony against, 1'1, 32-33, Counler-Guerrilla. 61 . 62
202.20'l 36, 109-10, lll-12, l t6-t'1, 212 Craxi, Bettino, 9l, 97, 100, l0l, 196
Calvi, Roberto, U, 94. 9'7 Crozier, Brian, 69. 133

248

I
 250 THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION INDEX 251

CSIS. See Georgetown Center for Gage, Nicholas, 180, 190, 2M as longtime CIA employee, 64, 133, KCB, xii-xiii, l,8, 16, l3l,133, 14t.
Strategic and lnternational Studies Gallucci. Achille, l0 t42, t46-47, 150, ls4. 243 143, t80, l8l, 184, 187-88,206
Curiel, Henri, 129, 130, 134-35, l9'7 Gans, Herbert, 214 attacks by, on those with opposing alleged employment of Agca by, 13,
Cutolo. RaefÍ.e|e, 97.98' lM' l09' 209 Garment. Suzanne,6 viewpoints, 'l3l-32, 142, t5l ,20Z 25, 52, 55-56. 156
Gelb, l-eslie, 135, 149,237 attempts by, to deny that Agca was a KCB Today, The (Banon), 236
D'Amato. Sen. Alfonse, 25-26, 145, Gelli, Licio, 8l-84. 87, 92, 94, l13, rightist, 49, 5 1 , 52, 55-56 Kikoski, John F., 203-5
229,233 t6l, 198 denial by, of need for hard evidence in Kisacik, Rasit, 50
D'Amato, Federico, 90 Gelman, Harry, 185, 186 making accusations agďnst the Kissinger, Henry A., 149, 159, 160,
D'Amato. Umberto. 96 Georgetown Center for Strategic and Soviet Union, 149, 150,2O'7 t61.203
Darkness at Noon (Koestler), l0l lntemational Studies, 5, 159, 186, influence of, on development of Koestler, Arthur, l0l
de Borchgrave, Arnaud, 26, l18,124, 202,245-47 Bulgarian Connection theory, 20, "Kolev, Sotir," 26, 2'7,28,29,30, 32,
134, 135, 159, 160, l6l, 168-69, l9l, Giannettini, Guido, 85, 89 24, 99, t49-50,'t82-84, 20'r no.2t2
238-39,247 Gilbert, Sari, 35, l7l, 112-73, 218, 22O- influence of, on Reader's Digest Korean airliner incident, 71, 163,215
De Lorenzo, Giovanni, 76-7'l ,79, 80 2l article,99, 149-50 Kovaci. Ismail. 56
De Luca, Maurizio, 90 Ginno, Padre, 103 on alleged Bulgarian drug smuggling, Kupperman, Robert, 160, 246, 247
De Lutiis, Giuseppi, 75, 76 Giornale Nuovo, Il, 16O 59, 225, 228, 229, 232-33, 239 Kwitny, Jonathan, 96, 183
de Marenche, Comte Alexandre, I l9 Crave New World (Ledeen), 159, 162- refusal by' to appeaÍ on TV shows
Deadly Deceits (McGchee), 132 u. t6G73, 198, 203 with critics, 124. 147 Lagorio' Minister of DeÍ.ense Lelio,
Deger, Emin, 62 Gray Wolves, 34-35, 48, 50, l4l, 218, refutation of, by Ugur Mumcu, 150, 100, I l0, n8,212.226
delle Chiaie, Stefano, 78, 79, 80, 88, 219,243 153, t56,187 Landis, Fred, 124-25, 159
89.90. 9l Agca as participant in, l2-13, 50-55, see also Plot to Kill the Pope, The Laqueur, Walter, 160, 176
to6. 2t2, 218, 2t9, 223 (Henze) Ledeen, Michael, xi, 135-36, 160, t70-
Demirel, Prime Minister Suleyman, 48-
49.62 as witnesses in second trial, 39-40 "Henzoff, Boris," 157-59 t3. 178.237.247
Denton. Jeremiah, 7 connections of, to CIA, 62-64 Hoemeyer, Dr., 102-3 as advocate of hard-line foreign policy,
DTGOS, 20,35, Z2l involvement of, in smuggling, 5?-58, Howe, Marvine, 189, 218, 22O,223 l6l-66, r98
Dionne, E. J., Jr., 199 60 Hunt, E Howard, 133 as an "authority" on the assassination
Dobbs, Michael, 37, 51, 56-51, @, ll2, possible involvement of, in attempt,'7, 25, 182, 203
16, t24, 195, t9G9'7,200-02,204, assassination attemPt, 3, I l, 'lO, Ignatius, David,, 232-33 association of, with Francesco
2|,2t3 ll8, t7l lmposimato, Judge, 3G3l Pazienza, 5, 38-39, 93, 94-9'1 , 99,
criticisms of, by Claire Sterling, l3l, relation of, to Nationalist Action PaÍty' ln These Times. xy r@, t99
201 48.49, 50, 5l lnfelisi, Luciano, 10, 218, 219 attacks by, on the media, 166-70, 17l-
sheltering of Agca bY, in westem Ínformation Service of the Armed Forces l3
Doherty, William, 165-66
Europe, 3, I |, 40, 50, 53-55, 65, (sIFAR), 15-7'r,19,80 connections of, to extreme Rieht in
Dontchev, Ivan, 30, 31, 33, I 12
d'Ovidio. Pietro, l8 t20.220 Inskle rhe Company (Agee), 132 Italy, 160-61
Drama of May 13, The, lO2 Grenada, 163-64 tpekci, Abdi, 51, 52, 187, 217, 222, 243 influence ot,7, 125, 182
Griffiths. William 8., 203 Israel, 68-69 involvement of, with Italian secret
drug traffic, 57-58, 60
allegacions of Bulgarian involvement Grillmaier. Horst. 137, 138 Italian Social Movement (MSI), 74, 80, services, 94-96, 9'1, 109, 160, 198,
in. 29. 58-6O, 93, l'17, 225-33, Gunes, Hasan Fehmi, 137, l4O-41,144- 89 208
239-40 45.2t8 role of, in "Billygate" affair, 95-96,
Duarte, Napole n, 164, 165 Gwertzman. Bernard, | 77 John Paul ll, Pope, l,35, 170-7t, 185, 108
20o,223 role of, in fabricating Bulgarian
East Timor, 175 Haig, Afexander,'7O, 94, 96, 136, l7l, hostility to, of rightwíng Turks, l2, Connection, T,125, l3L
Ecevit, Bulent, 154 238 52. t8'7.206 see also Grave New World i,edeen\
El Salvador, 164-66 Hawkins, Sen. Paula, 228 Soviets' alleged motives for wanting Lee, Martin. 90
"Eof, Mustafa," 20, 2l Helsinki Watch, l5l-52, 153 killed, l4-15, 20, 24-25, 55, 144, Lefever, Ernest, 176
Epstein, Edward Jay, 235,236 Henze, Paul, xi, 7,67, 125, 145, 156- 184, 210 Lehrer, Jim, 186-87, 188
59. f6l, t10, t93-94, 203,205, 2tO, Johnstone, Diana, xvii, 50, 66-67. 95, Levin, Murray 8., 124, 176
Federici, Federico, 16l 247 109. 134. lm Loftus, John, 62-63
Ferraresi, Franco, 87 appeaÍances of, on TV, l80-8l' l85' Jonarhan lnstitute, 68-70, 100, l0l London Times, 2l7, 219, 22O, 222
Fiore. Roberto.9l 18G89 Lugaresi, Gen. Nino, 96-97
as apologist for state tenorism in Kalb, Marvin, 13, 16,24,29,38,39,
Flamini, Gianni, 75
Turkey,150-54 150, 178, 184, 203, 2M, 210, 247 MacNeil, Robert, 186, 187, 188
freemasonry, 82
as consultant to TV shows, 20, 99, Kamm, Henry, 33, l'72, l7'1 , 178,226 MacNeif/l.ehrer News Hour, 146, 182,
see also Propaganda Due
r84 Keegan, Major-General George, Jr., 69 184.185-89
Fresco. Robert, 62

l-
 I

THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION INDEX 253

252

propagation by, of Bulgarian coverage of Pazienza scandals by, 38, 99

appearances on, by stcrling, Henze,
Connection, xi-xvii, 1, 5-6, 7-8, 39 P te magazine, 2
and [-edeen,'7, 8, 14'1, 180-81, 185- e op | 1 -'l

123, l'16-89,213-14,215' see also failure of. to present opposing Perry, Jack, 229,240
89
individual publications and TV ner viewpoints, 179, t83, 190, 199 "Petronov," 23
Mafia, 208
ignoring by, of ltalian pdlitical "Petrov," 2'I , 28, ll0
relation of, to Francesco Pazieaza,38, works
reliance by, on Sterling, Henze, and context,6, 196 Piccoli, Flaminio, 96
92,97-98
Ledeen, l8l-89 initial coverage by, of assassination Pike Committee, 5, 73
role of, in fabricating Bulgarian
attempt, 10, 194, 216-24 Pipes, Richard, 69, 177,2O3
Connection. 3-4,41,98, 102, 198 role of, in propaganda campaigns, xi,
see also Cutolo, Raeffele t14-76 role of, in disseminating Bulgarian Pisano, Dr Vittorfranco S , 86-87
"Mafia, Turkish," 59, 60, 61, 192-93, McGehee, Ralph, 132 Connection 189-91, 193-99; see also PIot to Kill rhe Pope, The (Henze),35,
Melady, Thomas P., 203-5 Sterling, Claire, articles by, in New t31-32, t47, 15l,205
232.24r-42
Malatya gang, 5l-52, 57 Merlino. Mario. 79, 89 York Times; Gage, Nicholas Political Hysteria in America (Levin),
see also Howe, Marvine; Kamm, 124
"Man Who Shot the PoPe, The" (NBC- Mersan, Omer,20,24
Miceli, Gen. Vlto, 74, 80-81 Henry; Whitney, Craig R.; Pollio Institute, 79, 90
TV special), 24-25,26,28-29, 106,
Milliyet, 52, 103, 152, 243 Tagliabue, John Pontiff (Thomas and Morgan-Witts), 35
rf 8, 142, t76, l'79,226
New York Times Magazine, TO Pope, the. See John Paul II, Pope
Mantarov. lordan, 180-81, 200, 2U, 238 Minna. Rosario. 89
MIT (Turkish intelligence service), 61, Newsweek, 37, 135, 149, 150, l7l, 172, Priore, Judge Rosarío' 30, 3l, l l3-l4
Manyon, Julian, 20
March l2 lron the Perspective of History 62 t76, t83,226 Propaganda Dne,8l-85, l0l, 134, 198,
(Cem), 62 Morgan-Witts, Max, 35 initial coverage by, of assassination 208
Marchetti. Victor, 73, 77 Morlion, Felix A., I 12 attempt, 11,42, 155 connections of, with Italian secret
Newton, Lowell,22 services, 83, 89, 94, 98, 102, 108,
Marini, Antonio, x, 197 Moro, Aldo, 66-6'7,'79, 143-44
Martella. Ilario, 59, l0l, 107, ll0, 190, Moss, Robert,69,'7O, 133, l6l, 168-69 photograph by,21,26,32, I l5-16, 134
2t0 MSI. See Italian Social Movement 2t2,221 exposure of, 4, 6, 188
l5-16, I l7-18. Mulack. PeÍer H .22.7 Novak, Michael, 176 penetÍation of ltalian judiciary by, l |3
credulousness of, 87, I
t97. 2|l. 2t2 Mumcu, Ugur, 59-60, 63, &, 106, l2O,
ignoring by, of contrary evidence, 17, t32. t37, 140, 200, 241,242,243 O'Brien, Conor Cruise, 134
23, 5l, I 1 t, 120, 122 refutation by, of Paul Henze, 150, Oddi, Cardinal Silvio, I03 Reader's Digest, l, 7, 175, 182, 184,
influence on, of Bulgarian 153.156. r87 Oglesby, Carl, 190 203,235,237
Connnection publicists, 26, 39, ll8- Munir, Metin, Zl7, 218 on the Wolf s Trac& (AndronoÝ)' 24|, on alleged Bulgarian drug smuggling,
t9 Musumeci, Pietro, 66-67, 91, 92, 93, 242-44 226-27, 228,230, 239
investigation by, 2l-24, 30-31, 33. 36, 97.98. lM, 106, r09, t22,209 Orbis,203-5 see also Sterling, Claire
103-4. 199. 2t I Orlandi, Emmanuela, kidnapping of, 33- Reagan. Ronald, 70, 178,243,244
leaks allowed by, I 19-20 34, ll9, 139, l8l, t94 Reagan administration:
prejudging of case by, 4,28, l14-15, NAP. See Nationalist Action Party Oymen, Orsan, 27-28, 56, 60, 103, 105- alleged foordragging of, in accepting
2rl Nationalist Action Party, I I, 47-50, 53, 6, 207, 2||, 243 Bulgarian Connection theory, xiii.
role of, in Agca's induced confession, 58, 60, 62, l4r, 187, 220, 221. 223 Ozbey, Yalcin, 40, 41, 54, t2t, 196, 5,29, 145-46, 178
23. lM. l18 anticommunism of, 60, 64 207 as beneficiary of widespread belief in
uncritical treatment of, in U.S. media, involvement of, in drug smuggling, Bulgarian Connection, l, 71, 100,
xiii, 6, I 12-13, 188,2O2 58, 60 P-2 See Propaganda Due r0r, t23, 145
see also Martella Report origins of, 42-43 Pan-Turkism, 43-47, 48, 62, 63 efforts by, to link rhe Soviet Union
Martella Report, 3, 15-16,22-23, 30, relation of, to Gray Wolves, 48, 49, hostility of, to Soviet Union, 45-46, with "terrorism," t, l0l, 108, 125,
104. il8. il9. l8l, 2l l 50,5l 64 145
weaknesses of,22-23,37, I 18, I 19 NATO, 7s. 17,78, t54, t62 see also Nationalist Action Pany mifitary buildup by, l, 70, t23, t45
Mazzola, Francesco, 20, 25, 98-99 Nazar. Ruzi,63-&,243 Pandico, Giovanni, 5-6, 41, 98, 103, Real Terror Network, The (Herman), 175
media, U.S.: NBC Nightly News, 8, 38, 59, 149 104, 106, tog, t2't, t95,209 Red Brigades. 29, 30, 66-6'1 ,92-93,9'7,
criticisms of, by conservatives, 123- NBC-TV, t3, 16,49,5'7, r75, 182, r84, Punorama, 16l 143-44
25, t66-'l0 2M.2tl Parisi, Vicente, 90 Red Scares, 7, 175, l'?6
deference of, to Rcagan administration, New Cold War, 3, 6, 7, 66 Pazienza, Francesco, 5, 90, 108, I 19, Repubblica, La,95
70-7 | New York Times, '7, 33, 35, 37, I 35, 134,208, 247 Republican Peasants' Nation Party, 43
double standard applied by, 157-59, 136, 148, t49, fl5, t76, r77,203, alleged role of, in inducing Agca's Ritter, Rep. Donald, 25
t67-68, t'74-'75 2tt,231-32 testimony. 105, 106, 108, l3l, 208, Rizzoli publishing group, 84
initial coverage by, of assassination backing away by, from Bulgarian 209 Rodota, Stefano, 88
attempt, l l, 216-24 Connection theorv. 189-90. 195 exposure of, 6, 38, 91-99, t22,198- Rose of the Winds conspiracy, 80, 8l
 Ý

254 TTIE BULGARIAN CONNECTION INDEX 255

SaÍire' Wi||iam' |.75, |76, |77 article by, in Reader's Digcst, xi, |, "terrorism," as propaganda term, l, Vassilev, lelio, 28, 32, lO7
Samet. Arslan. 54 |6,20,24,25' 99, |03, l0Ó' |3E' 67-7t, tot, tt4, t2'7-28,129, 135- Vatican, role of, in fabricating Bulgarian
Santiapichi, Judge Sevcrino, 39, 103, 142. t49-50,170, 176, 179, l8l- 36,143-44, t52, 153. 163, t72. Connection, 3-4, 102-3,108, 207
l 14, 195 82, t84, 190, 213, 221, 226 2ts,23't, 243 Violante, Luciano, 108
Santini. Father Mariano, 103, 109, 208 articlcs by, rn New York Tines,36, Thatcher, Margaret, 9l
Santovito, Giuseppi, 83, 92, 94, 96, 9, 125. l8l, 190-94, 196 Thomas, Gordon, 35 Walesa, [rch, 20, 175
t34, l9l attacks by, on ahose with opposing Time magazine, ll,
135, l'10, l7l, 112, afleged plot to kill, 2, 29,30-32, 33,
Scricciolo, Luigi, 3G31, 32, lll, ll2 vicwpoins, l3l, 133, 201 116, t78, 183,226,236 tt7, t5'7, t92. t93.
Season in Paradise, Á (Breyt.nbach)' characterization by, of Agca as Time of the Ássassins, Tlre (Ster|ing), |0' Wall Streer Journal, xiv-xv, 6. 125, l4'7,
130 longtime Soviet agcnt, 13,25,49, 20, 35, l t9, 142, t9't,2t6,241 176, t82,232-33
sccret scrvices, Italian, 52, 55-56 reviews of, 35, 183, 197 Walters, Vernon, 76, 159
abetting of terÍorism by' 86-9l' 92.93 credulousncss of, toward favorcd "Tomov, lvan," 30,3l Washingron Post,10,26, 35, 135, 153,
as rightwing force in Italian politics, 4, sourccs, 32. 122, 132-36,2O7,23'l Toth. Robe(. 178 t76,2t6-23, 231-32
80, 98 distoÍtion of evidcnce by, |25-3| , |32- trials: see also Dobbs, Michael; Gilbert, Sari
connections of, with Propganda Duc, 38. l,l04l, 2O'1, 224, 241 42 of Agca for attempted murder, 18-19 Washington Times, 159, 247
83, 89,94,98, 102, r08, r34 influence of, on the invcstigation in of three Bulgarians and six Turks for Wattenberg, Ben, 69, 176
formation oÍ,75.77 Italy, 24, 26, S'1, 10É,I t9, l9l-92, conspiracy, ix-xi, xii, 2, 3, 39-41, Weinberger, Caspar, 70, 162
role of, in fabricating Bulgarian 207 l8l. t9+97. West German police, l2l ,2O7
Connection, 3-4, 5, 1, 41, W97, influcnce of, gn U S. mcdia Tiirkes, Col. Alparslan, 43, 47, 48,49, Whitney, Craig R., lE0, 204
102-3, 108, l18, r98, ?jÉ'-'7,209, interpÍetations, 6,.|, u, 182-85, &, t3'1 ,242-43 Will, George, 69, 176, 111
2tl 188 "TV Eye," 20,25,99
,,20120,,,
Woodruff, Judy, 180, 188
see also,lnformation Service of the initia.l rcsponsc by, to assassination |42. |99.2(Ň
Armed Forces (SIFAR); SID; attempt, 9-10 Yetkin, Suleyman, lO2-3
SISDEI SISMI logical difficulties poscd by theorics Yildirim, Rifat. 54
Scjna, Jan, 9'1, 135-36, l9'7, 231-38 of, 14, 16, 107, 138-40, 143'44, Ugurlu, Abuzer,24, 59-60, 212, 232 Yurturslan. Ali. 57
Sener, Mehmct, 54, ?20,221 195, 210-l I
Senzani, Giovanni, 30, 109, l l l, 208-9 on South Africa, 129-31
Shcharansky, Anatoly, 175 lestimony of, to congressional
Shevchcnko, Arkady, 235-37, 238 committces, 13, 25
Sica, Judge Domenico, 95, 96 use by, of discredited testimony by Jan
srD, 75, 76,78, 80, 88, 89 Sejna, 97, 135-36, 197,237-38
SIFAR. Sae lnformation Service of the verdict of slander agďnst, l34.35
Armed Forces (SIFAR) sce also Terror Network, The
srsDE, 75, 83,90 (Sterling); Time of the Ássassizs,
srsMl, 6. 41, 59, 75,83, 9r, 92, 93, Táe (Sterling)
94-9'r,98,99, tDz, l0s, 108, 109, "strategy of tension," 85-87
l18, r34, t37, 188, l9l, r98,206-7, Subcommittee on Terrorism and Security,
2@,211
Slavov, Atanas.25 Suffert, George, 130
Smith, Joscph Burkholdcr, 235 Sverdlev, Stefan, 229, 238-zl0
Solidarity, 14, 20, 25, 144
Soustelle, Jacqucs, 69 Tagliabue, John, 194-97, 218, 221, 222
Spagnulo, Dr. Carmelo, ll3 Tamburino, Giovanni. 88
Spike, The (Moss and dc Borchgrave), Taubman, Philip, 149
l 68-69 Teruor Network, T/re (Stcrling), 50, I14,
Stampa, La, 10, 15,23,218,219 t25, 127-29, 133-34, t35-36, 14344,
Sterfing, Clairc, xi, 3, 5G51, 59,69,94, t90. 197. 23'7
105, 125, 142, t6t,202,203,244 terronsm:
allegations by, of cover-up, xiii, 5, 9- in Turkey, 49, 50, 5l-53, 62, l44,
lo, t42, t45, t78,216,224 1s4,243
appearances by, on TV, 124, 183, in ltaly, 66-67, 78-79, 86-91, 92-93,
184-85, r86 t43-44