U.S. Hegemony: Decline or Sustainability?
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akshat_das7U.S. Hegemony: Decline or Sustainability?
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akshat_das7Arlington High 2009 Huge Ass Heg File
Hegemony File
Poverty Destroys Hegemony...................................................................................................................20 Inequality Undermines Hegemony..........................................................................................................21 Environmental Leadership Critical to Global Leadership.......................................................................22 Economic Competitiveness Key to Leadership.......................................................................................23 Economic Competitiveness Key to Leadership.......................................................................................24 Economic Decline Collapses Leadership................................................................................................25 Anti-Americanism Undermines U.S. Power..........................................................................................26 *** Uniqueness Issues Hegemony/Leadership Low Now ***...........................................................27 Hegemony Collapsing General............................................................................................................28 Hegemony Collapsing General............................................................................................................29 Hegemony Collapsing General............................................................................................................30 Hegemony Collapsing General............................................................................................................31 Hegemony Collapsing General Leadership..........................................................................................32 Hegemony is Collapsing.........................................................................................................................33 Hegemony is Collapsing.........................................................................................................................35 No U.S. Global Leadership/Credibility...................................................................................................36 U.S. Collapse Now, No Multipolarity....................................................................................................37 Hegemony Collapsing Soft Power.......................................................................................................38 Hegemony Collapsing Obama Policies................................................................................................39 Hegemony Collapsing Obama Policies................................................................................................40 Apolarity Collapsing...............................................................................................................................41 Apolarity Now.........................................................................................................................................42 Apolarity Now.........................................................................................................................................43 Apolarity Now.........................................................................................................................................45 Economic Decline Now..........................................................................................................................46 Economic Decline Now...........................................................................................................................47 U.S. Decline Now Multipolarity Now..................................................................................................48 U.S. Decline Now Perception...............................................................................................................49 U.S. Decline Now EU/China Will Supplant U.S. Leadership..............................................................50 U.S. Decline Now Europe Will Supplant U.S. Leadership..................................................................51 U.S. Decline Now European Soft Power Outpacing U.S. Soft Power.................................................52 U.S. Decline NowChina Will Supplant U.S. Leadership....................................................................53 U.S. Decline Now China Will Overtake the U.S. Economically.........................................................54 Collapse Inevitable - Counterbalancing..................................................................................................55 ................................................................................................................................................................55 Collapse Inevitable -- Public Support....................................................................................................56 Soft Balancing Now................................................................................................................................57 Military Power Wont Secure Our Leadership.......................................................................................58 Status Quo Hard Power Causes Counterbalancing................................................................................59 Apolarity Collapses Multilateralism.......................................................................................................60 Hegemony Declining Asia....................................................................................................................61 Hegemony Declining - - China Power Increasing General..................................................................62 Hegemony Declining China Power Increasing Economy.................................................................63 Hegemony Declining -- China Power Increasing -- Military.................................................................64 Hegemony Declining -- China Power Increasing Soft Power.............................................................65 Hegemony Declining -- China Power Increasing -- Asia.......................................................................66 Hegemony Declining Human Rights Leadership Declining................................................................67 Multipolarity Now...................................................................................................................................68 Multipolarity Now...................................................................................................................................69 *** Uniqueness Issues Hegemony/Leadership High Now ***..........................................................70 U.S. Hegemony Not Declining General...............................................................................................71 U.S. Hegemony Not Declining General...............................................................................................72 U.S. Hegemony Not Declining -- General..............................................................................................73 U.S. Hegemony Not Declining -- General..............................................................................................74 U.S. Hegemony Not Declining -- General..............................................................................................75
Arlington High 2009 Huge Ass Heg File U.S. Hegemony Not Declining -- General..............................................................................................76 U.S. Hegemony Not Declining -- General..............................................................................................77 U.S. Hegemony Not Declining Will be the Hegemon of the Future....................................................78 U.S. Hegemony Not Declining India Focused Inward.........................................................................79 U.S. Hegemony Not Declining................................................................................................................80 U.S. Hegemony Not Declining................................................................................................................81 U.S. Hegemony Not Declining................................................................................................................82 U.S. Hegemony Not Declining................................................................................................................83 U.S. Hegemony Will Rebound................................................................................................................84 No Counterbalancing Now......................................................................................................................85 U.S. Will Remain a Global Hegemon.....................................................................................................86 U.S. Hegemony Sustainable....................................................................................................................87 U.S. Hedge High Now, Will Continue to Be...........................................................................................88 U.S. Global Hegemon Now 30 Years...................................................................................................90 U.S. Global Hegemon Now....................................................................................................................91 Hegemony Now, Sustainable .................................................................................................................92 U.S. Hedge High Now, Will Continue to Be...........................................................................................93 U.S. Hedge High Now, Will Continue to Be Educational System Strong...........................................94 U.S. Hege Now, Iraq doesnt Threaten....................................................................................................95 U.S. Hege High Now, Will Continue to Be University Educational System Strong...........................96 U.S. Hedge High Now, Will Continue to Be Secondary Educational System Strong.........................97 U.S. Hege High Now, Will Continue to Be U.S. Will Lead Global Growth........................................98 U.S. Hege High Now, Will Continue to Be U.S. Will Lead Global Growth........................................99 U.S. Hege High Now, Will Continue to Be U.S Will Dominate Europe............................................100 U.S. Hege High Now, Will Continue to Be No Economic Declne Now............................................102 U.S. Hege High Now, Will Continue to Be...........................................................................................103 U.S. Hege High Now, Will Continue to Be No Asia Threat..............................................................104 U.S. Hege High Now, Will Continue to Be No European Economic Threat....................................105 U.S. Hege High Now, Will Continue to Be No China Threat...........................................................106 Hegemony Not Declining Asia...........................................................................................................107 U.S. Hegemony Not Declining Chinese Soft Power Doesnt Threaten.............................................108 U.S. Hegemony Not Declining Chinas Economic Power Doesnt Threaten...................................109 U.S. Hegemony Not Declining Low Population Growth Doesnt Threaten.....................................110 U.S. Hegemony Not Declining No Eastern Shift...............................................................................112 U.S. Hegemony Not a Threat Europe Not a Threat............................................................................113 U.S. Hegemony Not Declining Environmental Problems Dont Destroy..........................................114 Hegemony U.S. Hedge High Now, Will Continue to Be Iraq Hasnt Hurt.....................................115 U.S. Hege High Now, No Challengers.................................................................................................116 Collapse Leads to Apolarity..................................................................................................................117 No Isolationism Now............................................................................................................................118 No Isolationism Now.............................................................................................................................119 Iraq Not Causing Isolationist Backlash in the US.................................................................................120 Bandwagoning Not Balancing...............................................................................................................121 Military Lead Now................................................................................................................................122 Military Lead Now................................................................................................................................123 Global Military Dominance Now..........................................................................................................124 No Economic Hege Decline Now.........................................................................................................125 No Economic Hegemony Decline Now................................................................................................126 No Economic Hegemony Decline Now................................................................................................127 No Economic Hegemony Decline Now................................................................................................128 No Economic Overstretch.....................................................................................................................129 Answers to: Foreign Debt Causes Overstretch ................................................................................130 Answers to: Foreign Debt Causes Overstretch.................................................................................131 Answers to: Dollar Collapse............................................................................................................132 No Military Hegemony Decline Now...................................................................................................133 A2: Layne Primacy Sustainable / No Overstretch..............................................................................134 A2: Layne Primacy = Bandwagoning................................................................................................135 I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of orange juice.
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Arlington High 2009 Huge Ass Heg File A2: Layne War On Terrorism Is Winnable.........................................................................................136 A2: Layne War On Terrorism Is Winnable.........................................................................................137 A2: Layne Iraq War Was/Is Good......................................................................................................138 A2: Layne Iraq War Was/Is Good......................................................................................................139 A2: Layne Layne Relies On Ad Homs...............................................................................................140 Multipolarity Now.................................................................................................................................141 *** Advantage Answers ***.................................................................................................................142 Leadership Advantage Answers -- Frontline.........................................................................................143 Leadership Advantage Answers Frontline..........................................................................................144 Leadership Advantage Answers -- Frontline.........................................................................................145 *** More Links to the Hegemony Debate ***.....................................................................................146 Links: Multilateralism Threatens Hegemony........................................................................................147 Links: Multilateralism Threatens Hegemony........................................................................................148 Links: Multilateralism Threatens Hegemony........................................................................................149 Links: Multilateralism Threatens Hegemony........................................................................................150 Links: Multilateralism Threatens Hegemony........................................................................................151 Links: Multilateralism Threatens Hegemony........................................................................................152 Links: Multilateralism Threatens Hegemony........................................................................................153 Links: Multilateralism Threatens Hegemony........................................................................................154 Links: Multilateralism Threatens Hegemony........................................................................................155 Links: Multilateralism Threatens Hegemony........................................................................................156 Links: Recession Threatens Hegemony................................................................................................157 Links: Economic Decline Threatens Hegemony...................................................................................158 Links: Economic Decline Threatens Hegemony...................................................................................159 Links: Increased TROOP Deployments Threaten Hegemony...............................................................160 Links: Loss of Public Support Threatens Hegemony............................................................................161 *** Hegemony Good Frontlines, Key Cards, and Modular Impacts ***..........................................162 Hegemony Bad Answers -- Frontline................................................................................................163 Hegemony Bad Answers -- Frontline................................................................................................165 Hegemony Bad Answers Frontline.................................................................................................174 Hegemony Bad Answers -- Frontline................................................................................................175 Hegemony Bad Answers -- Frontline................................................................................................176 Hegemony Bad Answers Frontline (Multilateralism Fails)............................................................177 Hegemony Bad Answers Frontline (Multilateralism Fails)............................................................178 Hegemony Sustains International Cooperation.....................................................................................179 U.S. Hegemony Generally Good...........................................................................................................180 Unipolarity Good: Global Nuclear Exchange (Khalilzad)....................................................................181 Unipolarity Good: Global War (Thayer)...............................................................................................183 Unipolarity Good: Global War (Thayer)...............................................................................................184 Unipolarity Good: Global War (Ferguson)............................................................................................185 Unipolarity Good: Extinction (Smil).....................................................................................................186 Hegemony Net-Beneficial.....................................................................................................................187 Hegemony Net-Beneficial.....................................................................................................................188 Hegemony Produces Global Stability..................................................................................................189 U.S. Leadership Key to Global Peace...................................................................................................190 Hegemonic Collapse Causes War..........................................................................................................191 Hegemony Critical to Democracy Promotion.......................................................................................192 Hegemony Critical to the Global Economy..........................................................................................193 Hegemony Critical to Free Trade..........................................................................................................194 Hegemony Critical to Humanitarianism................................................................................................195 Hegemony Critical to East Asian Stability Module..............................................................................196 Hegemony Hegemony Critical to East Asian Stability.........................................................................197 Hegemony Necessary to Stop East Asian Proliferation .......................................................................198 Hegemony Necessary to Stop Taiwan War...........................................................................................199 Hegemony Necessary to Stop Taiwan War...........................................................................................200 Hegemony Stops Japanese Rearmament...............................................................................................201 Hegemony Protects Middle Eastern Stabilit.........................................................................................202 I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of orange juice.
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Arlington High 2009 Huge Ass Heg File Hegemony Sustains Balkan Stability....................................................................................................203 Hegemony Stops Indo-Paki Wars..........................................................................................................204 A2: Decreased Hegemony Solves Proliferation (1/1)...........................................................................205 ..............................................................................................................................................................205 A2: Decreased Hegemony Solves Terrorism........................................................................................206 A2: Can't Deter Everyone.....................................................................................................................207 Counter-Balancing A2: China...............................................................................................................208 Counterbalancing A2: European Union................................................................................................209 Counterbalancing A2: European Union................................................................................................210 Counterbalancing A2: European Union.................................................................................................211 Hegemony Causes Bandwagoning, Not Counterbalancing..................................................................212 Isolationism Bad: Terrorism..................................................................................................................213 Off-Shore Balancing Bad Frontline (1/3)...........................................................................................214 Off-Shore Balancing Bad Frontline (2/3)...........................................................................................215 Off-Shore Balancing Bad Frontline (3/3)...........................................................................................216 Off-Shore Balancing Bad China (1/2)................................................................................................217 Off-shore Balancing Bad Primacy K2 Stability (1/2)........................................................................218 Off-shore Balancing Bad Primacy K2 Stability (2/2)........................................................................219 *** Hegemony Good Impact Extensions ***....................................................................................220 Isolationism Bad: Asian Draw-Down Bad............................................................................................221 Isolationism Bad: Asian Draw-Down Bad............................................................................................222 Isolationism Bad: Economic Collapse..................................................................................................223 Isolationism Bad: Economic Collapse..................................................................................................224 Isolationism Bad: Economic Collapse..................................................................................................225 Unipolarity Good: Alternative is Apolarity...........................................................................................226 ..............................................................................................................................................................227 Unipolarity Good: Human Rights.........................................................................................................227 Unipolarity Good: Stops War................................................................................................................228 Unipolarity Good: Stops War................................................................................................................229 Unipolarity Good: Stops War................................................................................................................230 Unipolarity Good: Stops War................................................................................................................231 Unipolarity Good: Stops War................................................................................................................232 Unipolarity Good: Hard Power Impacts................................................................................................233 Unipolarity Good: Credible Hard Power key to Deterrence.................................................................234 Unipolarity Good: Khalilzad Impact Extensions..................................................................................235 Unipolarity Good: Asian Wars..............................................................................................................236 Unipolarity Good: Asian Wars..............................................................................................................237 Unipolarity Good: Democracy Promotion ...........................................................................................238 Unipolarity Good: Nuclear Proliferation...............................................................................................239 Unipolarity Good: Economy ................................................................................................................240 Unipolarity Good: European Wars .......................................................................................................241 Unipolarity Good: Free Trade ..............................................................................................................242 Unipolarity Good: India-Pakistan War .................................................................................................243 Unipolarity Good: Middle East Proliferation........................................................................................244 Unipolarity Good: No Alternative.........................................................................................................245 Unipolarity Good: No Alternative.........................................................................................................246 Unipolarity Good: No Alternative.........................................................................................................247 Unipolarity Good: No Alternative.........................................................................................................248 Unipolarity Good: No Alternative.........................................................................................................249 Unipolarity Good: No Alternative.........................................................................................................250 Unipolarity Good: No Alternative.........................................................................................................251 Unipolarity Good: No European Alternative to U.S. Leadership..........................................................252 Unipolarity Good: No Effective Alternative to U.S. Unipolarity..........................................................253 Unipolarity Good: Free Trade/Military Hegemony Key to Global Democracy...................................255 Unipolarity Good: No Country Can Replace U.S. Leadership.............................................................256 Unipolarity Good: No Alternative Will Arise in Response to U.S. Decline.........................................257 Unipolarity Good: Unipolarity Best/Multipolarity Fails.......................................................................258 I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of orange juice.
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Arlington High 2009 Huge Ass Heg File Unipolarity Good: Unipolarity Best/Multipolarity Fails.......................................................................259 Unipolarity Good: Unipolarity Best/Multipolarity Fails.......................................................................260 Unipolarity Good: Unipolarity Best/Multipolarity Fails.......................................................................261 Unipolarity Good: Unipolarity Best/Multipolarity Fails.......................................................................262 Unipolarity Good: Unipolarity Best/Multipolarity Fails.......................................................................264 Unipolarity Good: Unipolarity Best/Multipolarity Fails Wont Stop Prolif.......................................266 Unipolarity Good: Multilateralism Bad Arms Sales..........................................................................267 Unipolarity Good: Multilateralism Bad Arms Sales..........................................................................268 Unipolarity Good: Multilateralism/International Cooperation Isnt Needed to Solve Global Problems270 Unipolarity Good: Multilateralism/International Cooperation Isnt Needed to Solve Global Problems271 Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: Multilateralism Fails.....................................................................272 Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: Multilateralism Fails.....................................................................273 Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: Multilateralism Fails.....................................................................274 Unipolarity Good: Multilateralism Fails: U.N. Fails............................................................................275 Unipolarity Good: Multilateralism Fails: U.N. Fails............................................................................276 Unipolarity Good: Multilateralism Fails: U.N. Fails............................................................................277 Unipolarity Good: Multilateralism Fails: U.N. Fails............................................................................278 Unipolarity Good: Multipolarity Increases Terrorism...........................................................................280 Unipolarity Good: Multilateralism Wont Solve Proliferation..............................................................281 Unipolarity Good: Multilateralism Wont Solve Proliferation..............................................................282 Unipolarity Good: NATO Fails.............................................................................................................283 Unipolarity Good: Alliances Fail..........................................................................................................284 Unipolarity Good: Alliances Fail..........................................................................................................285 Unipolarity Good: Alliances Fail..........................................................................................................287 Unipolarity Good: Creates False Multipolarity ....................................................................................289 Unipolarity Good: Creates False Multipolarity ....................................................................................290 Unipolarity Good: Creates False Multipolarity ....................................................................................291 Unipolarity Good: Creates False Multipolarity ....................................................................................292 Unipolarity Good: Creates False Multipolarity ....................................................................................293 Unipolarity Good: Creates False Multipolarity ....................................................................................295 Unipolarity Good: Creates False Multipolarity ....................................................................................296 Unipolarity Good: Creates False Multipolarity.....................................................................................297 Unipolarity Good: Creates False Multipolarity ....................................................................................298 Unipolarity Good: Creates False Multipolarity.....................................................................................299 Unipolarity Good: Multilateralism Doesnt Make US Power More Effective......................................300 Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: Multipolarity Fails Net Worse....................................................301 Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: No European Alternative...............................................................302 Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: No European Alternative...............................................................303 Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: No European Alternative...............................................................304 Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: No European Alternative...............................................................305 Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: No Japan Alternative.....................................................................306 Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: No NATO Alternative....................................................................307 Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: No Asian Alternative.....................................................................308 Unipolarity Good: No Islamic Alternative............................................................................................309 Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: No U.N. Alternative......................................................................310 Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: The U.N. Doesnt Increase Legitimacy........................................311 Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: The U.N. Doesnt Increase Legitimacy........................................312 Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: War is Less Likely in Unipolar Worlds Than Any Other..............313 Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: Soros Specific................................................................................314 Unipolarity Good: AT: Multilateralism Solves Anti-Americanism.................................................315 Unipolarity Good: Answers to: Hegemony Causes War....................................................................316 Unipolarity Good: Answers to: Unipolarity Causes Terrorism..........................................................317 *** Unilateralism & Bush Doctrine Good ***.....................................................................................318 Unilateralism Good: Preemption Bad Answers (Defense)....................................................................319 Unilateralism Good: Preemption Good: Frontline................................................................................320 Unilateralism Good: Preemption Good: Regime Change Good...........................................................323 Unilateralism Good: Preemption Good: Answers to: Pre-emption Sets a Precedent........................324 I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of orange juice.
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Arlington High 2009 Huge Ass Heg File
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Unilateralism Good: Preemption Good: Prolif......................................................................................325 Unilateralism Good: Preemption Good: Wont Snowball.....................................................................326 Unilateralism Good: Preemption Good: General..................................................................................327 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Generally Good...........................................................................328 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Generally Good...........................................................................329 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: Emphasis on Democracy Promotion Good......................330 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: Middle East Democratization Succeeding Now ..............331 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: PSI Effective Against Proliferation..................................332 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: PSI Effective Against Proliferation..................................333 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: PSI Effective Against Proliferation..................................334 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: PSI Effective Against Proliferation..................................335 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: Key to stop Iranian Prolif ................................................336 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: Key to stop Iranian Prolif.................................................337 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: Nuclear proliferation Alternatives Fail to Deter Prolif..338 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: General Answer to harms not unique in its embrace of unilateralism or preemption.............................................................................................................................................339 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: General Answer to harms not unique in its embrace of unilateralism or preemption.............................................................................................................................................340 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: AT Violates International Law..........................................341 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: AT Violates International Law..........................................342 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: AT Endless Military Involvements for the US ................343 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: AT Violates International Law..........................................344 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: AT Endless Military Involvements for the US.................345 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: AT Endless Military Involvements for the US.................346 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: AT Endless Military Involvements for the US.................347 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: AT Endless Military Involvements for the US.................348 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: AT Undermines Cooperation and Multilateralism............349 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: AT Undermines Cooperation and Multilateralism............350 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: AT Undermines Cooperation and Multilateralism............351 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: AT Hurts EU Relations not unique many threats........352 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: AT Hurts EU Relations not unique many threats........353 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: Doesnt Undermine Relations..........................................354 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: Doesnt Undermine Relations..........................................355 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: Doesnt Undermine Relations..........................................356 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: Doesnt Undermine Relations..........................................357 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: AT Hurts EU Relations Will Never Collapse-Economic Interdependence ....................................................................................................................................358 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: AT spurs immoral or unjustified military interventions. . .359 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: AT Grounded in Realism..................................................360 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: AT Props Up Capitalism...................................................361 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: Appeasement Bad.............................................................362 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: AT- Iraq Proves Bush Doctrine Bad................................364 Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: Bush Doctrine Not Responsible for Reversing Libyan Nuclear Program ...............................................................................................................................................................365 Unilateralism Good: Hard Balancing Answers ....................................................................................366 Unilateralism Good: Hard Balancing Answers.....................................................................................367 Unilateralism Good: Hard Balancing Answers.....................................................................................368 Unilateralism Good: Hard Balancing Answers.....................................................................................369 Unilateralism Good: Hard Balancing Answers: Russian/China............................................................370 Unilateralism Good: Hard Balancing Answers: Russian/China............................................................371 Unilateralism Good: Hard Balancing Answers: Only Soft Balancing .................................................372 Unilateralism Good: Hard Balancing Answers: European Balancing Answers....................................373 Unilateralism Good: Hard Balancing Answers: Brooks & Wolforth Are Wrong..................................374 Unilateralism Good: China Counterbalancing Answers.......................................................................375 Unilateralism Good: China Counterbalancing Answers.......................................................................376 Unilateralism Good: Russia/India Counterbalancing Answers.............................................................377 Unilateralism Good: Russia/India Counterbalancing Answers.............................................................378 I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of orange juice.
Arlington High 2009 Huge Ass Heg File
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Unilateralism Good: European Counterbalancing Answers..................................................................379 Unilateralism Good: European Counterbalancing Answers..................................................................380 Unilateralism Good: European Counterbalancing Answers..................................................................381 Unilateralism Good: European Counterbalancing Answers..................................................................382 Unilateralism Good: Soft Balancing Answers.......................................................................................383 Unilateralism Good: Soft Balancing Answers.......................................................................................384 Unilateralism Good: Soft Balancing Answers.......................................................................................385 Unilateralism Good: Soft Balancing Answers.......................................................................................386 Unilateralism Good: Soft Balancing Answers.......................................................................................387 Unilateralism Good: Soft Balancing Answers ......................................................................................388 Unilateralism Good: Soft Balancing Answers.......................................................................................389 Unilateralism Good: Soft Balancing Answers.......................................................................................390 Unilateralism Good: Soft Balancing Answers.......................................................................................391 Unilateralism Good: Soft Balancing Answers: Opposition to the Iraq War Wasnt Driven by Counterbalancing.....392 Unilateralism Good: Soft Balancing Answers: Opposition to the Iraq War Wasnt Driven by Counterbalancing.....393 .............................................................................................................................................................393 Unilateralism Good: Answers to: Need Soft Power to Reduce Global Opposition and Terror Recruiting............394 ..............................................................................................................................................................395 Unilateralism Good: U.S.-European Relations Advantage Answers/AT -Turn.....................................395 Unilateralism Good: U.S.-European Relations Advantage Answers/AT -Turn.....................................396 Unilateralism Good: U.S.-European Relations Advantage Answers/ AT - Turn...................................397 Unilateralism Good: U.S.-European Relations Advantage Answers/ AT -Turn....................................398 Unilateralism Good: Answers to: Intl Coop/Multilat Reduces Hatred/Terrorism Toward the U.S.. .399 ..............................................................................................................................................................400 Unilateralism Good: No Value to Anti-Terror Cooperation..................................................................400 Unilateralism Good: No Value to Anti-Terror Cooperation..................................................................401 Unilateralism Good: No Value to Anti-Terror Cooperation..................................................................402 Unilateralism Good: Doesnt Hurt Democracy.....................................................................................403 Unilateralism Good: Doesnt Hurt Democracy.....................................................................................404 Unilateralism Good: No Value to Anti-Terror Cooperation..................................................................405 Unilateralism Good: Answers to: Military Power Projection/War Triggers Animosity Toward the U.S................406 Unilateralism Good: Answers to: Unilateralism Causes U.S.-China War.........................................407 Unilateralism Good: Answers to: Unilateralism Causes U.S.-China War.........................................408 Unilateralism Good: Answers to: Unilateralism Causes U.S.-China War.........................................409 Unilateralism Good: Answers To: Hegemony = Militarism .............................................................410 Unilateralism Good: Answers to: Hegemony Means Empire...........................................................411 Unilateralism Good: Answers to: Hegemony Means Empire...........................................................412 Unilateralism Good: Answers to: Hegemony Means Empire...........................................................413 Unilateralism Good: Answers to: Hegemony Means Empire...........................................................414 Unilateralism Good: Answers to: Hegemony Means Empire...........................................................415 Unilateralism Good: Answers to: Hegemony Means Empire...........................................................416 Unilateralism Good: Stops Terrorism....................................................................................................417 Unilateralism Good: Stops Terrorism ...................................................................................................418 Unilateralism Good: Answers to: Hegemony Means Empire...........................................................419 Unilateralism Good: Answers to: Hegemony Means Empire...........................................................420 Unilateralism Good: Doesnt Increase Terrorism..................................................................................421 Unilateralism Good: Doesnt Increase Capitalism................................................................................422 Unilateralism Good: Answers to: Realism Flawed...........................................................................423 Unilateralism Good: Multilateralism Decreases Soft Power................................................................424 Unilateralism Good: No Isolationism....................................................................................................425 Unilateralism Good: Unilateralism Leads to Effective Multilateralism................................................426 Unilateralism Good: Global Nuclear War ............................................................................................427 Unilateralism Good: Global Nuclear War.............................................................................................428 Unilateralism Good: Global Nuclear War.............................................................................................429 Unilateralism Good: Global Proliferation.............................................................................................430 Unilateralism Good: Transition Wars....................................................................................................431 Unilateralism Good: Global Peace .......................................................................................................432 I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of orange juice.
Arlington High 2009 Huge Ass Heg File Unilateralism Good: Answers to: Need Soft Power for International Cooperation..........................433 Unilateralism Good: Democracy Promotion.........................................................................................434 Unilateralism Good: Democracy Promotion.........................................................................................435 Unilateralism Good: Democracy Promotion.........................................................................................436 Unilateralism Good: Democracy Promotion.........................................................................................437 Unilateralism Good: Democracy Promotion.........................................................................................438 Unilateralism Good: Shouldnt Kick Us Off the Planet..................................................................439 Unilateralism Good: U.S. Exceptionalism Bad Answers.................................................................440 *** Hegemony Bad ***........................................................................................................................441 Hegemony Bad: Frontline.....................................................................................................................442 Hegemony Bad: Frontline.....................................................................................................................443 Hegemony Bad: Frontline.....................................................................................................................444 Hegemony Bad: Frontline.....................................................................................................................446 Hegemony Bad: Frontline.....................................................................................................................448 Hegemony Bad: Frontline.....................................................................................................................451 Hegemony Bad: Frontline.....................................................................................................................452 Hegemony Bad: Frontline.....................................................................................................................453 Hegemony Bad: Frontline.....................................................................................................................454 Collapse By 2030 2nd Line A2: Sustainable Collapse Inevitable (1/1).......................................455 Hegemony Bad: Doesnt Solve Global War..........................................................................................456 Hegemony Bad: Doesnt Solve Global War..........................................................................................457 Hegemony Good Impact Answers.........................................................................................................458 Hegemony Good Impact Answers.........................................................................................................459 Hegemony Bad: War.............................................................................................................................460 Hegemony Bad: Doesnt Solve Global War..........................................................................................461 Hegemony Bad: Doesnt Solve Global War..........................................................................................462 Hegemony Bad: Doesnt Solve Global War..........................................................................................463 Hegemony Bad: Doesnt Solve Global War..........................................................................................464 Hegemony Bad: Doesnt Solve Global War..........................................................................................466 Hegemony Bad: Doesnt Solve Global War..........................................................................................467 Hegemony Bad: Doesnt Solve Global War..........................................................................................469 Hegemony Bad: Doesnt Solve Global War..........................................................................................470 Hegemony Bad: Doesnt Solve Global War..........................................................................................471 Hegemony Bad: Doesnt Solve Global War..........................................................................................472 Hegemony Bad: Doesnt Solve Global War..........................................................................................473 Hegemony Bad: Doesnt Solve Global War..........................................................................................474 Hegemony Bad: U.S. Leadership Doesnt Avoid the Impacts..............................................................475 Hegemony Bad: U.S. Leadership Doesnt Avoid the Impacts..............................................................476 Hegemony Bad: U.S. Leadership Doesnt Avoid the Impacts..............................................................477 Hegemony Bad: U.S. Leadership Doesnt Avoid the Impacts..............................................................478 Hegemony Bad: U.S. Leadership Doesnt Solve Middle East Conflict................................................479 Hegemony Bad: U.S. Leadership Doesnt Solve Global Environmental Problems..............................480 Hegemony Bad: Extinction...................................................................................................................481 Hegemony Bad: Extinction...................................................................................................................482 Hegemony Bad: Threatens Global Peace..............................................................................................483 Hegemony Bad: Threatens Global Peace..............................................................................................484 Hegemony Bad: Capitalism...................................................................................................................485 Hegemony Bad: Proliferation................................................................................................................486 Hegemony Bad: Proliferation................................................................................................................488 Hegemony Bad: Proliferation ...............................................................................................................490 Hegemony Bad: Proliferation...............................................................................................................491 Hegemony Bad: Terrorism....................................................................................................................492 Hegemony Bad: Terrorism....................................................................................................................493 Hegemony Bad: Terrorism....................................................................................................................494 Hegemony Bad: Terrorism....................................................................................................................495 Hegemony Bad: Terrorism....................................................................................................................497 Hegemony Bad: Terrorism....................................................................................................................499 I need a 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Arlington High 2009 Huge Ass Heg File
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Hegemony Bad: Economy.....................................................................................................................501 Hegemony Bad: Economy.....................................................................................................................502 Hegemony Bad: Economy.....................................................................................................................504 Hegemony Bad: Proliferation................................................................................................................506 Hegemony Bad: Middle East War.........................................................................................................507 Hegemony Bad: Middle East War.........................................................................................................508 Hegemony Bad: Middle East War.........................................................................................................509 Hegemony Bad: Counterbalancing.......................................................................................................510 Hegemony Bad: Counterbalancing........................................................................................................511 Hegemony Bad: Proliferation................................................................................................................512 Hegemony Bad: Proliferation................................................................................................................513 Hegemony Bad: Proliferation................................................................................................................514 Hegemony Bad: Imperialism.................................................................................................................515 Hegemony Bad: Democracy Promotion Bad........................................................................................516 Hegemony Bad: U.S.-EU Relations......................................................................................................517 Hegemony Bad: U.S.-EU Relations......................................................................................................518 Hegemony Bad: U.S.-EU Relations: Russian Aggression....................................................................519 Hegemony Bad: U.S.-EU Relations: Terrorism....................................................................................521 Hegemony Bad: Space Weapons...........................................................................................................522 Hegemony Bad: Global Economy.........................................................................................................523 Hegemony Bad: Global Economy.........................................................................................................524 Hegemony Bad: Japanese Rearmament................................................................................................525 Hegemony Bad: Japanese Rearmament................................................................................................526 Hegemony Bad: Iran Strikes.................................................................................................................527 Hegemony Bad: AT: Empirically Denied..........................................................................................529 Hegemony Bad: AT: Preemption Solves............................................................................................530 Hegemony Bad: Counter-Balancing 2nd Line A2: U.S. Is A Benevolent Hegemon (1/2).............531 Hegemony Bad: Counter-Balancing 2nd Line A2: U.S. Is A Benevolent Hegemon (2/2).............532 Hegemony Bad: Counter-Balancing 2nd Line A2: U.S. Is A Status Quo Power (1/1)...................533 Hegemony Bad: Counterbalancing.......................................................................................................534 Hegemony Bad: Counterbalancing.......................................................................................................535 Hegemony Bad: Counterbalancing.......................................................................................................536 Hegemony Bad: Counterbalancing -- Europe Will Counterbalance.....................................................537 Hegemony Bad: Counterbalancing -- Answers to: The U.S. is a Benevolent Power States Wont Counterbalance That......................................................................................................................................................538 Hegemony Bad: Counterbalancing -- Answers to: Other States Wont Fear Us Because We are a Democracy.....539 Hegemony Bad: Counterbalancing -- Answers to: U.S. Seen as Benevolent...................................540 Hegemony Bad: Counterbalancing Impacts.......................................................................................541 Hegemony Bad: Counterbalancing Wolforth Answers......................................................................542 Hegemony Bad: Khalizad Indites..........................................................................................................543 Hegemony Bad: Ferguson Wrong About The Value of Empire/Imperialism........................................544 Hegemony Bad: Ferguson Wrong About The Value of Empire/Imperialism........................................545 Primacy Causes U.S.-Sino War 1st Line (1/2)...................................................................................546 Primacy Causes U.S.-Sino War 1st Line (2/2)...................................................................................547 Primacy Causes U.S.-Sino War 2nd Line Offshore Balancing Solves (1/1)...................................549 Primacy Causes U.S.-Sino War 2nd Line U.S.-Sino War Impacts (1/1).........................................550 Primacy Causes U.S.-Sino War 2nd Line Most Probable Scenario For Conflict (1/1)...................551 Primacy Causes U.S.-Iran War 1st Line (1/1)....................................................................................552 Primacy Causes Demo Promo 1st Line (1/1).....................................................................................554 Primacy Causes Demo Promo 2nd Line Demo Promo Causes War (1/2).......................................556 Primacy Causes Demo Promo 2nd Line Demo Promo Causes War (2/2).......................................558 Primacy Causes Demo Promo 2nd Line Next Wave Uniquely Bad (1/1).......................................560 Primacy Causes Demo Promo 2nd Line Impact Chinese Demo Promo Causes War (1/1)..........561 Primacy Causes Demo Promo 2nd Line Impact ME Demo Promo Causes War (1/2)................562 Primacy Causes Demo Promo 2nd Line Impact ME Demo Promo Causes War (2/2)................563 Hegemony Ineffective 2nd Line Domestic Politics (1/1)................................................................564 Hegemony Ineffective 2nd Line Paradox of Hegemony (1/1)........................................................566 I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of orange juice.
Arlington High 2009 Huge Ass Heg File Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line Solves Conflicts General (1/2)............................................567 Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line Solves Conflicts General (2/2)............................................568 Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line Solves Conflicts Regional (1/1)..........................................569 Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line Solves Conflicts Great Power (1/1)....................................570 Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line Solves Conflicts ME and Asia (1/1)...................................571 Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line Solves Conflicts U.S. Draw-In (1/1)...................................572 Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line Solves Conflicts A2: Countries Wont Start (1/1)...............573 Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line Solves Burden-Sharing (1/1).................................................574 Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line Solves Terrorism (1/1)...........................................................575 Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line A2: Isolationism Bad (1/3).....................................................576 Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line A2: Isolationism Bad (2/3).....................................................577 Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line A2: Isolationism Bad (3/3).....................................................578 Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line A2: Still Need Military (1/1)..................................................580 Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line A2: U.S. Still Needs Influence (1/1)......................................581 Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line A2: Too Modest / Pessimistic (1/1)........................................582 *** Hegemony Bad Europe Turn Scenario *** ................................................................................583 Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn -- 1NC....................................................................................................584 Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn -- 1NC....................................................................................................585 Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe is the Global Leader.................................................................586 Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe is the Global Leader.................................................................587 Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe is the Global Leader.................................................................588 Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe is the Global Leader.................................................................589 Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: European Leadership Model Better.....................................................590 Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe is the Global Leader: Soft Power.............................................591 Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe is the Global Leader: Soft Power.............................................592 Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe is the Global Leader: Soft Power.............................................593 Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe is the Global Leader: Soft Power.............................................594 Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe is the Global Leader: Economic Power...................................595 Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe is the Global Leader: Soft Power.............................................596 Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: U.S. Decline Has Boosted Europe.......................................................597 Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: European Power Turn: U.S. Decline Has Boosted Europe.................598 Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe Supports Multilateralism Now................................................599 Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe A Unified Global Power..........................................................600 Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe A Unified Global Power..........................................................601 Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe A Unified Global Power..........................................................602 Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Zero-Sum Competition........................................................................604 Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: AT: Europe Doesnt Have Military Power........................................605 Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: AT: Europe Doesnt Have Military Power........................................606 Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe Doesnt Need Military Power..................................................607 Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe Can Resolve Global Conflicts.................................................608 Europe Supports Multilateralism...........................................................................................................609 Unilateralism Destroys U.S.-European Relations.................................................................................610 U.S.-European Relations Impact: Iraq...................................................................................................611 *** Multilateralism Good ***..............................................................................................................612 Multilateralism Good: U.S. Leadership................................................................................................613 Multilateralism Good: UN Is Effective/Good.......................................................................................614 Multilateralism Good: Key to Solving Global Problems......................................................................615 Multilateralism Good: Solves War........................................................................................................616 Multilateralism Good: Key to Global Survival.....................................................................................617 Multilateralism Good: Key to US Hegemony.......................................................................................618 Multilateralism Good: Solves counterbalancing...................................................................................619 Multilateralism Good: Key to Solve Terrorism.....................................................................................620 Multilateralism Good: Cosmopolitanism..............................................................................................622 Multilateralism Good: Israeli Strikes....................................................................................................623 Multilateralism Good: Sino-Franco Alliance........................................................................................625 Multilateralism Good: Sino-Franco Alliance........................................................................................626 Multilateralism Good: Sino-Russia Relations.......................................................................................627 I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of orange juice.
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Multilateralism Good: Naval Power......................................................................................................628 Multilateralism Good: US/Brazil Relations..........................................................................................629 Multilateralism Good: Space Militarization..........................................................................................631 Multilateralism Good: Space Militarization..........................................................................................632 Multilateralism Good: US/Russia Relations.........................................................................................633 Multilateralism Good: US/Russia Relations.........................................................................................634 Multilateralism Good: US/Turkey Relations.........................................................................................635 Multilateralism Good: US/Japan Alliance.............................................................................................636 Multilateralism Good: Trade Blocks.....................................................................................................637 Multilateralism Good: US/Europe Relations........................................................................................638 Multilateralism Good: US/Europe Relations........................................................................................639 Multilateralism Good: U.S.-European Relations Impact: Clash of Civilizations.................................641 Multilateralism Good: US-Canada Relations........................................................................................642 Multilateralism Good: WTO.................................................................................................................643 Multilateralism Good: Multilateralism Key to WTO............................................................................644 Multilateralism Good: Unilateralism Fails............................................................................................645 Multilateralism Good: Key to Sustained US Support for Global Leadership.......................................646 Multilateralism Good: Key to Decrease Terrorism...............................................................................647 Multilateralism Good: Presumptively Best...........................................................................................648 Multilateralism Good: Russia Isnt a Threat.........................................................................................649 Multilateralism Good: Regionalism Good............................................................................................650 Multilateralism Good: China.................................................................................................................651 Multilateralism Good: Unilateralism Not Key to Primacy...................................................................652 Multilateralism Good: Perceptions of Legitimacy Key to Primacy......................................................653 Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: Militarism.........................................................................654 Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: Militarism.........................................................................655 Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: Militarism Will attack other countries.........................656 Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: Undermines U.S. Hegemony...........................................657 Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: Undermines U.S. Hegemony...........................................658 Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: Bush Doctrine Violates International Law.......................659 Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: Nuclear Proliferation .......................................................660 Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: Nuclear Proliferation........................................................662 Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: Nuclear Proliferation........................................................663 Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: Nuclear Proliferation........................................................664 Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: Nuclear Proliferation........................................................665 Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: Nuclear Proliferation AT Libya.....................................666 Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: Undermines Multilateralism............................................667 Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: Undermines Multilateralism............................................668 Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: EU Relations-AT Relations Resilient...............................669 Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: EU Relations-AT Economic Interdependence Means No Impact..........670 Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: American Exceptionalism ..............................................671 Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: American Exceptionalism ..............................................672 Multilateralism Good: American Exceptionalism Bad: Undermines US Security...............................673 Multilateralsim Good: American Exceptionalism Bad: Undermines Legitimate US Leadership.........674 Multilateralsim Good: American Exceptionalism Bad: Undermines Legitimate US Leadership.........675 Multilateralism Good: American Exceptionalism Bad: Undermines International Law......................676 Multilateralism Good: American Exceptionalism Bad: American Exceptionalism Can Repair Damage to US leadership...............................................................................................................................................677 Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: North Korea.....................................................................678 Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: North Korea.....................................................................679 Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: North Korea: Policy Fails to Stem North Korean Proliferation.............680 Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: North Korea: Policy Fails to Stem North Korean Proliferation.............682 Multilateralism Good: Unilateralism Fails............................................................................................683 Multilateralism Good: Soft Balancing Now..........................................................................................684 Multilateralism Good: Soft Balancing Now..........................................................................................685 Multilateralism Good: Unilateralism Soft Balancing.......................................................................686 Multilateralism Good: Unilateralism Soft Balancing.......................................................................687 I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of orange juice.
Arlington High 2009 Huge Ass Heg File Multilateralism Good: Unilateralism Soft Balancing.......................................................................688 Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Soft Balancing.....................................................................689 Multilateralism Good: Preventive War Soft Balancing....................................................................690 Multilateralism Good: Preventive War Bad: Deterrence Works...........................................................691 Multilateralism Good: Preventive War Fails.........................................................................................692 Multilateralism Good: Preventive War Fails.........................................................................................693 Multilateralism Good: Preventive War Fails.........................................................................................694 Multilateralism Good: Multilateralism Reduces Soft Balancing..........................................................695 Multilateralism Good: Soft Balancing Bad: Readiness........................................................................696 Multilateralism Good: Soft Balancing Hard Balancing...................................................................697 AT: International Institutions Constrain U.S. Hegemony......................................................................698 Multilateralism Critical to Solve Global Problems...............................................................................700 Multilateralism Good: Soft Balancing Bad: Readiness........................................................................701 ..............................................................................................................................................................701 *** Unilateralism Bad ***....................................................................................................................702 Unilateralism Bad: Undermines Leadership.........................................................................................703 Unilateralism Bad: Fails........................................................................................................................704 Unilateralism Bad: Fails........................................................................................................................705 Unilateralism Bad: Undercuts Democracy Promotion..........................................................................706 Unilateralism Bad: AT- Multilateralism constrains US power..............................................................707 Unilateralism Bad: AT- Multilateralism Constrains US Power.............................................................708 ..............................................................................................................................................................709 *** Military Readiness Good ***.........................................................................................................709 Military readiness Advantage Answers.................................................................................................710 Military Readiness Advantage Answers................................................................................................711 Readiness Good: Troop Overstrech......................................................................................................712 Readiness Good: Global Nuclear War...................................................................................................713 Readiness Good: Readiness Key to Leadership....................................................................................717 Readiness Good: Readiness Key to Leadership....................................................................................718 Readiness Good: Readiness Key to War on Terror...............................................................................719 Readiness Good: Deterrence.................................................................................................................720 Readiness Good: Power Project Solves Nuclear War...........................................................................721 Readiness Good: Power Project Solves Nuclear War...........................................................................722 Readiness Good: Stops Allied Prolif, Deterrence.................................................................................723 Readiness Good: Taiwan.......................................................................................................................725 Readiness Good: Taiwan.......................................................................................................................726 Readiness Good: Taiwan War Impact Extensions.................................................................................727 Readiness Good: North Korea...............................................................................................................728 Readiness Good: Iraq............................................................................................................................729 Readiness Good: Iraq............................................................................................................................730 Readiness Good: Iraq............................................................................................................................731 Readiness Good: War on Terror............................................................................................................732 Readiness Good: Diplomacy.................................................................................................................733 Readiness Good: Global Democracy....................................................................................................734 Readiness Good: Global Economy........................................................................................................735 Readiness Good: U.S. Military Power Checks Global Aggression.......................................................736 Readiness Good: U.S. Military Power Checks Global Aggression.......................................................737 Readiness Good: TROOPS Key to Readiness.......................................................................................738 Readiness Good: US Military Action/WOT Effective: Afghanistan.....................................................739 Readiness Good: US Military Action/WOT Effective: Afghanistan.....................................................740 Readiness Good: Doesnt Threaten Soft Power....................................................................................742 Readiness Good: Hard Power Key to Soft Power.................................................................................743 Readiness Good: Deter WMD Use........................................................................................................744 Readiness Useless: General...................................................................................................................745 *** Military Readiness Bad ***...........................................................................................................746 A2: Military Power Good 1st Line (1/1)............................................................................................747 A2: Military Power Good 2nd Line - A2: Key To War On Terrorism (1/1).......................................748 I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of orange juice.
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Arlington High 2009 Huge Ass Heg File A2: Military Power Good 2nd Line - A2: Key To U.S. Interests (1/1)..............................................749 A2: Military Power Good 2nd Line - A2: Key To Allied Defense (1/1)............................................750 A2: Military Power Good 2nd Line - A2: Forward Deployment Good (1/2)....................................751 A2: Military Power Good 2nd Line - A2: Forward Deployment Good (2/2)....................................752 A2: Military Power Good 2nd Line Drawdown Of Armed Forces Solves (1/1)............................753 Military Power Bad: Useless (No Wars, Mandlebaum-Style)...............................................................754 Military Power Bad: Useless (Wont Solve).........................................................................................755 Military Power Bad: Useless.................................................................................................................756 Military Power Bad: Useless.................................................................................................................757 Military Power Bad: Useless.................................................................................................................758 Military Power Bad: Useless.................................................................................................................759 Readiness Useless: Terrorism................................................................................................................760 Readiness Useless: Terrorism................................................................................................................761 Military Power Bad: Terrorism.............................................................................................................762 Military Power Bad: Middle East..........................................................................................................763 Military Power Bad: Overstretch..........................................................................................................764 Readiness Bad: US Military Action/WOT Fails Military success in Afghanistan Irrelevant............765 Readiness Bad: US Military Action/WOT Fails Military success in Afghanistan Irrelevant............766 Readiness Bad: US Military Action/WOT Fails Military success in Afghanistan Irrelevant............767 Readiness Bad: AT: WOT Successful No Attacks on the US Since 9/11...........................................768 Readiness Bad: Undermines Soft Power...............................................................................................769 Readiness Bad: Undermines Soft Power...............................................................................................770 Readiness Bad: Undermines Soft Power...............................................................................................771 Readiness Bad: Undermines Soft Power...............................................................................................772 *** Supwerpower Syndrome Kritik ***...............................................................................................773 Superpower Syndrome Kritik................................................................................................................774 Superpower Syndrome Kritik................................................................................................................775 Superpower Syndrome Link Extensions...............................................................................................776 Superpower Syndrome Alternatives......................................................................................................777 Superpower Syndrome Alternatives......................................................................................................778 Superpower Syndrome Impacts.............................................................................................................779 Definition of Superpower Syndrome.................................................................................................780 *** No Solvency for Anti-Americanism ***........................................................................................781 No Solvency for Anti-Americanism......................................................................................................782 Anti-Americanism Solvency Answers..................................................................................................782 Plan Cant Solve U.S. Unilateralism.....................................................................................................783 Can Solve Anti-Americanism By Changing Policies............................................................................784 Can Solve Terrorism By Changing Policies..........................................................................................785 The U.S. Needs to Follow International Norms and Rules...................................................................786 Answers to: Terrorism Proves Realism Useless................................................................................787 ..............................................................................................................................................................787 Cant Solve Unilateralism Bad..............................................................................................................788 *** Etc ***............................................................................................................................................789 Pivotal Power Cooperation Good..........................................................................................................790 Pivotal Power Cooperation Good..........................................................................................................791 Naval Power Counterplan.....................................................................................................................792 Sea Power Emphasis Solves Hegemony Bad Arguments.....................................................................793 China is a Threat....................................................................................................................................794 China is A Threat...................................................................................................................................795 China Threat Answers...........................................................................................................................796 China Threat Answers...........................................................................................................................797 Soft Power Answers..............................................................................................................................798 Western Decline.....................................................................................................................................799 U.S. Hard Power Increases Chinese Soft Power...................................................................................800 U.S. Hard Power Increases Chinese Soft Power...................................................................................802 China Threatens Hegemony..................................................................................................................803 Allies are Bad Hurt the U.S................................................................................................................804 I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of orange juice.
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Arlington High 2009 Huge Ass Heg File Alliances Are Bad..................................................................................................................................805 Alliances Are Bad..................................................................................................................................806 *** Author Indicts ***..........................................................................................................................807 Indict: Kristol........................................................................................................................................808 Indict: Brooks & Wohlforth...................................................................................................................809 Indict: Brooks & Wohlforth...................................................................................................................810 Indict: Brooks & Wohlforth...................................................................................................................811 Indict: Kagan.........................................................................................................................................812 Indict: Ferguson.....................................................................................................................................813 A2: Thayer 1st Line (1/1)...................................................................................................................815 A2: Thayer 2nd Line Extension Unwarranted (1/1).....................................................................816 A2: Thayer 2nd Line Extension Offshore Balancing Solves (1/1)...............................................817 A2: Thayer 2nd Line Extension Schmitt Evidence (1/1).............................................................818 A2: Mandelbaum 1st Line (1/2).........................................................................................................819 A2: Mandelbaum 1st Line (2/2).........................................................................................................821 A2: Mandelbaum 2nd Line Extension Not Specific To Primacy (1/1).......................................823 A2: Mandelbaum 2nd Line Extension Rieff Evidence (1/1).......................................................824 A2: Mandelbaum 2nd Line Extension Doesnt Assume Offshore Balancing (1/1)....................825 A2: Mandelbaum 2nd Line Extension Lieven Evidence (1/1)....................................................826 A2: Mandelbaum 2nd Line Thesis Is Wrong (1/1)..........................................................................827 A2: Mandelbaum 2nd Line Iraq Disproves (1/1)............................................................................828 A2: Mandelbaum 2nd Line Doesnt Assume Bush (1/1)................................................................829 A2: Mandelbaum 2nd Line Economic Assumptions Wrong (1/1)..................................................830 A2: Khalilzad 1st Line (1/1)...............................................................................................................831 A2: Khalilzad 2nd Line Extension Unwarranted (1/1)................................................................832 A2: Khalilzad 2nd Line Extension Doesnt Assume Offshore Balancing (1/1)...........................833 A2: Khalilzad 2nd Line Extension Neo-Conservative Hack (1/1)...............................................834 A2: Khalilzad 2nd Line Extension Seaver Evidence (1/1)...........................................................835 *** Soft Power & Smart Power***......................................................................................................836 Smart Power Good................................................................................................................................837 Soft Power Solvency Answers..............................................................................................................838 Soft Power Solvency Answers..............................................................................................................839 ..............................................................................................................................................................839 *** Soft Power Good ***.....................................................................................................................840 Soft Power Good 1AC Card...............................................................................................................841 Soft Power Good -- Multiple Scenarios................................................................................................842 Soft Power Good Multiple Scenarios.................................................................................................843 Soft Power Good Multiple Scenarios.................................................................................................844 Soft Power Good Multiple Scenarios.................................................................................................845 Soft Power Good Multiple Scenarios.................................................................................................846 Soft Power Good Multiple Scenarios.................................................................................................847 Soft Power Good Russia Scenario......................................................................................................848 Soft Power Good Russia Scenario......................................................................................................849 ..............................................................................................................................................................849 Soft Power Good Russia Scenario......................................................................................................850 Soft Power Good Russia Scenario......................................................................................................851 Soft Power Good Russia Scenario......................................................................................................852 Soft Power Good Democracy Scenario..............................................................................................853 Soft Power Good Democracy Scenario..............................................................................................855 Soft Power Good Democracy Scenario..............................................................................................856 Soft Power Good Democracy Scenario..............................................................................................857 Soft Power Good Relying on Hard Power Collapses Hegemony......................................................858 Soft Power Critical to Hegemony.........................................................................................................860 Soft Power Necessary to Stem Terrorism..............................................................................................861 Soft Power Necessary to Stem Terrorism..............................................................................................861 Soft Power Necessary to Stem Terrorism..............................................................................................863 Soft Power Necessary to Stem Terrorism..............................................................................................865 I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of orange juice.
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Soft Power Necessary to Stem Terrorism..............................................................................................866 Soft Power Necessary to Stem Terrorism..............................................................................................867 Soft Power Necessary to Stem TerrorismTerrorists Using Soft Power.............................................868 Soft Power Necessary to Stem Terrorism -- Hard Power Response Undermines Critical Soft Power. 869 Soft Power Necessary to Stem Proliferation.........................................................................................870 Soft Power Necessary to Stem Proliferation.........................................................................................871 Soft Power Necessary to Stem Proliferation.........................................................................................872 Soft Power Necessary to Stem Proliferation.........................................................................................873 Soft Power Key to Global Stability.......................................................................................................874 Soft Power Key to Global Stability.......................................................................................................875 Soft Power Key to Hegemony...............................................................................................................876 Soft Power Key to Leadership...............................................................................................................877 Soft Power Key to Leadership...............................................................................................................878 Soft Power Key to Leadership...............................................................................................................879 Soft Power Key to Leadership...............................................................................................................880 Soft Power Key to Leadership...............................................................................................................881 Soft Power Key to Leadership...............................................................................................................882 Soft Power Key to Leadership...............................................................................................................883 Soft Power Solves Counterbalancing....................................................................................................884 Soft Power Solves Counterbalancing....................................................................................................885 Soft Power Solves Many Problems.......................................................................................................886 Soft Power Best for Democracy and Human Rights Promotion...........................................................887 Soft Power Solves Mid East Conflict....................................................................................................888 Soft Power Solves North Korea Conflict..............................................................................................889 Soft Power Solves Trade.......................................................................................................................890 Soft Power Reduces Soft Balancing......................................................................................................891 Soft Power Key to Effective Democracy Promotion ...........................................................................892 Soft Power Key to Effective Democracy Promotion............................................................................893 Soft Power Key to Effective Democracy Promotion............................................................................894 Soft Power Key to Effective Democracy PromotionBush Doctrine for Democracy Promotion Fails Because it Doesnt Incorporate Soft Power............................................................................................................895 Soft Power Key to Effective Democracy PromotionBush Doctrine for Democracy Promotion Fails Because it Doesnt Incorporate Soft Power............................................................................................................896 Soft Power Key to Effective Democracy PromotionBush Doctrine for Democracy Promotion Fails Because it Doesnt Incorporate Soft Power............................................................................................................897 Soft Power Critical to Mid East Democracy Promotion.......................................................................898 Soft Power Critical to Mid East Democracy Promotion.......................................................................899 Soft Power Key to Middle East Peace...................................................................................................901 Soft Power Good: US Faces Stiff Competition for Soft Power Leadership in the Middle East...........902 Soft Power Good: US Faces Stiff Competition for Soft Power Leadership in the Middle East...........903 Soft Power Best for Russian Democratization......................................................................................904 Soft Power Good: North Korea: Soft Power Necessary for North Korean Prolif Resolution..............905 Soft Power Good: North Korea: Soft Power Necessary for North Korean Prolif Resolution..............906 Soft Power Good: North Korea: Soft Power Necessary for North Korean Prolif Resolution..............907 Soft Power Good: North Korea: Loss of Soft Power Spurred North Korean Proliferation..................908 Soft Power Good: North Korea: AT: Bush Wont Employ Soft Power Approach Toward North Korea Even if we have Credible Soft Power......................................................................................................................909 Soft Power Good: North Korea: AT: Turn: US Soft Power Pressure on China Risks War with North Korea........910 Soft Power Good: North Korea: AT: Turn: US Soft Power Pressure on China Risks War with North Korea........911 Soft Power Good: North Korea: AT: Turn: US Soft Power Pressure on China Risks War with North Korea........913 Soft Power Good: North Korea: AT: Turn: US Soft Power Pressure on China Risks War with North Korea........914 Soft Power Good: North Korea: AT: Turn: US Soft Power Pressure on China Risks War with North Korea........915 Soft Power Good: North Korea: AT: Turn: US Soft Power Pressure on China Risks War with North Korea........916 Soft Power Good: North Korea: AT: Chinese Soft Power Lead Good Better at Resolving North Korean Prolif....917 Soft Power Good: Chinese Soft Power Leadership on North Korea Undermines US/South Korean Ties918 Soft Power Good: Iranian Proliferation: US Soft Power/Engagement Only way to Stop Iranian Prolif919 Soft Power Good: Iranian Proliferation: Hard-Line Position Fails to Stem Iranian Prolif...................920 I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of orange juice.
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Soft Power Good: China Scenario China Challenging US For Soft Power Lead..............................921 Soft Power Good: China Scenario Chinese Soft Power Increasing Now..........................................922 Soft Power Good: China Scenario Chinese Soft Power Increasing Now..........................................923 Soft Power Good: China Scenario Chinese Soft Power Increasing Everywhere...............................924 Soft Power Good: China Scenario China Challenging US For Soft Power Lead in Asia..................925 Soft Power Good: China Scenario China Challenging US For Soft Power Lead in Asia..................926 Soft Power Good: China Scenario China Challenging US For Soft Power Lead in Asia..................927 Soft Power Good: China Scenario China Challenging US Soft Power Leadership in Africa............928 Soft Power Good: China: China Challenging US Soft Power Leadership in Latin America..............929 Soft Power Good: China: China Challenging US Soft Power Leadership in Latin America...............930 Soft Power Good: China: China Has Not Taken the Lead the Yet........................................................931 Soft Power Good: China: Zero Sum Trade Off China Fills in as US Soft Power Declines..............932 Soft Power Good: China: US Shunning Developing Countries Allows China Opportunity to Increase its Soft Power ...............................................................................................................................................................933 Soft Power Good: China: Soft Power Good: China: Institutions........................................................934 Soft Power Good: China: China Increasing Soft Power Through Commitment to International Norms and Institutions.............................................................................................................................................935 Soft Power Good: China: Iraq has Allowed China to Increase Its Soft Power....................................936 Soft Power Good: China: Chinese Soft Power Lead BadSeeks to Replace US Leadership Role in Asia.............937 Soft Power Good: China: Chinese Soft Power Lead BadSeeks to Replace US Leadership Role in Asia.............938 Soft Power Good: China: Chinese Soft Power Lead BadGenerally Challenges US Security ........939 Soft Power Good: China: Chinese Soft Power Lead BadGenerally Challenges US Security.........940 Soft Power Good: China: Chinese Soft Power Lead BadThreatens US Global Hegemony............941 Soft Power Good: China: Loss of U.S. Asian Leadership Causes War................................................942 Soft Power Good: China: China Uses Soft Power to Present Alternate Development Model.............943 Soft Power Good: China: Chinese Soft Power Lead BadLaundry List Reasons why Development Model is Bad ...............................................................................................................................................................944 Soft Power Good: China: Chinese Soft Power Lead BadUndermines Democratization and Good Governance Efforts....................................................................................................................................................945 Soft Power Good: China: Chinese Soft Power Lead BadUndermines Democratization and Good Governance Efforts....................................................................................................................................................946 Soft Power Good: China: Chinese Soft Power Lead BadWorsens Ethnic conflicts, genocide and refugee crises 947 Soft Power Good: China: Chinese Soft Power Lead BadChinese Development Model Flawed.....948 Soft Power Good: China: Chinese Soft Power Lead BadChinese Development Model Bad for the Environment ...............................................................................................................................................................949 Soft Power Good: China: Chinese Soft Power Lead BadThreatens US Access to Critical Resources950 Soft Power Good: China: Increasing US Soft Power Best Way to Respond to Growing Chinese Soft Power.........951 Soft Power Good: China: Increasing US Soft Power Best Way to Respond to Growing Chinese Soft Power.........952 Soft Power Good: China: Increasing US Soft Power Best Way to Respond to Growing Chinese Soft Power.........953 Soft Power Good: China: Increasing US Soft Power Best Way to Respond to Growing Chinese Soft Power.........954 Soft Power Good: China: Careful US Response Key to Ensure that Chinese Soft Power Is Used in a Positive Manner...................................................................................................................................................955 Soft Power Good: EU Tradeoff Scenario: EU Competes with the US for Soft Power Lead................956 Soft Power Good: EU Tradeoff Scenario: High US Soft Power Key to Ensuring that EU Soft Power Will Complement US Goals .........................................................................................................................957 Soft Power Good: US Can Rebuild Its Soft Power...............................................................................958 Soft Power Generally Important to National Security..........................................................................959 Soft Power Generally Important to National Security..........................................................................960 Soft Power Generally Important to National Security..........................................................................961 Soft Power Stops Militarism.................................................................................................................962 Soft Power Most Effective Way to Achieve Foreign Policy Goals.......................................................963 Soft Power Good Most Effective Way to Achieve Foreign Policy Goals.............................................964 Soft Power Most Effective Way to Achieve Foreign Policy Goals.......................................................965 Answers to: Soft Power Cant Be Wielded as an Effective Policy Tool............................................966 Answers to: Doesnt Work With Populations That Dont Share Our Values.....................................967 Soft Power Good Says Colin Gray (The Nutty Hard Power Professor)...............................................968 *** Answers to Soft Power Bad Turns ***.......................................................................................969 I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of orange juice.
Arlington High 2009 Huge Ass Heg File Answers to: Soft Power Causes Free Trade, Free Trade Bad................................................................970 Answers to: Soft Power Causes Free Trade, Free Trade Bad................................................................971 Answers to: Soft Power Causes Free Trade, Free Trade Bad................................................................972 Answers to: Soft Power Causes North Korea Sanctions, North Korea Sanctions Bad.........................973 Answers to: Soft power undermines hard power..................................................................................974 Answers to: Soft power undermines hard power..................................................................................975 Answers to: Soft Power Doesnt Solve a Backlash...............................................................................976 Answers to: Soft Power Leads to Iran sanctions...................................................................................977 Answers to: Soft power leads to Iran sanctions....................................................................................978 1AR Russia and China will never agree to Iran sanctions.................................................................979 Answers to: Soft Power Increases Arms Sales.....................................................................................980 Answers to: Democracy Promotion Bad...............................................................................................981 Answers to: Soft Power Leads to British Support for Missile Defense.............................................982 Answers to: Soft Power Leads to British Support for Missile Defense.............................................983 Answers to: War on Drugs Bad Turn....................................................................................................984 Soft Power Does Not Promote Empire/Imperialism.............................................................................985 *** Soft Power & Hard Power ***.......................................................................................................986 Soft Power More Important to Leadership Than Hard Power..............................................................987 Soft Power Key to Hard Power.............................................................................................................988 Soft Power Key to Hard Power.............................................................................................................989 Military Power Alone Inadequate..........................................................................................................990 Iraq Proves Limits of Hard Power.........................................................................................................991 Soft Power Necessary for Effective Hard PowerStops Counterbalancing........................................992 Answers to: Turn -- Hard Power Increases Soft Power.....................................................................993 Soft Power Not Distinct from Hard Power...........................................................................................994 Need to Combine Hard & Soft Power...................................................................................................995 ..............................................................................................................................................................996 *** Solvency Extensions ***................................................................................................................996 US Can Rebuild Its Soft Power.............................................................................................................997 Soft Power Good: Now Key Time To Rebuild US Soft Power.............................................................998 *** Advantage Answers ***.................................................................................................................999 Soft Power Advantage Answers -- Frontline.......................................................................................1000 Soft Power Advantage Answers Frontline........................................................................................1001 Soft Power Advantage Answers -- Frontline.......................................................................................1002 Soft Power Advantage Answers -- Frontline.......................................................................................1003 Uniqueness: U.S. Unilateralist............................................................................................................1004 *** Solvency Answers/Soft Power Not Good ***.............................................................................1005 Cant Boost Soft Power.......................................................................................................................1006 Cant Boost Soft Power.......................................................................................................................1007 Cant Boost Soft Power.......................................................................................................................1008 Soft Power Not Beneficial...................................................................................................................1009 Soft Power Not Beneficial...................................................................................................................1010 Soft Power Not Beneficial...................................................................................................................1011 Soft Power Doesnt Boost Democracy................................................................................................1012 Soft Power Alone Wont Solve Hedge................................................................................................1013 Soft Power Wont Solve Counterbalancing.........................................................................................1014 Soft Power Wont Boost Middle East Influence.................................................................................1015 Changing Policies Wont Improve Relations With Europe.................................................................1016 Soft Power Wont Solve Iranian Proliferation.....................................................................................1017 Soft Power Wont Solve Iranian Proliferation.....................................................................................1018 Soft Power Not Critical to Fighting Terrorism....................................................................................1018 Soft Power Doesnt Solve Terrorism...................................................................................................1020 Soft Power Doesnt Solve Terrorism...................................................................................................1021 Soft Power Doesnt Solve Terrorism...................................................................................................1022 Soft Power Wont Solve Counterbalancing.........................................................................................1023 Soft Power Wont Boost Middle East Influence.................................................................................1024 Soft Power Not Critical to Basing.......................................................................................................1025 I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of 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Arlington High 2009 Huge Ass Heg File Soft Power Not Critical to Basing.......................................................................................................1026 Soft Power Not Critical to Basing.......................................................................................................1027 Soft Power Not Critical to Basing.......................................................................................................1028 Answers to: Need Soft Power to Stop Chinese Global Leadership.................................................1029 Answers to: Need Soft Power to Stop Chinese Global Leadership.................................................1030 Answers to: Need Soft Power to Stop Chinese Global Leadership.................................................1031 Answers to: Need Soft Power to Stop Chinese Global Leadership.................................................1032 Answers to: Need Soft Power to Stop Russian-China Alliance.......................................................1033 Answers to: Need Soft Power to Stop Russian-China Alliance.......................................................1034 Answers to: Need Soft Power to Stop Russian-China Alliance.......................................................1035 Answers to: Need Soft Power to Stop Russian-China Alliance.......................................................1036 Answers to: Need Soft Power to Stop Russian-China Alliance.......................................................1037 Answers to: Soft Power Key to Stop European Counterbalancing.................................................1038 Answers to: Need Soft Power to Limit EU Soft Power...................................................................1039 Answers to: Need Soft Power to Limit EU Soft Power...................................................................1040 Answers to: Need Soft Power to Limit Japan Soft Power...............................................................1040 *** Soft Power Links ****.................................................................................................................1042 Unpopular US Policies Undermines Soft Power................................................................................1043 American Exceptionalism Undermines Soft Power...........................................................................1044 Perceived Hypocrisy in Policies Undermines Soft Power.................................................................1045 War on Terror Excesses Undermines Soft Power...............................................................................1046 Bush Doctrine/Unilateralism Undermines Soft Power......................................................................1047 Bush Doctrine/Unilateralism Undermines Soft Power......................................................................1048 Bush Doctrine/Unilateralism Undermines Soft Power......................................................................1049 Bush Doctrine/Unilateralism Undermines Soft Power......................................................................1050 Bush Doctrine/Unilateralism Undermines Soft Power......................................................................1051 Transnational Jurisprudence Undermines US Soft Power.................................................................1052 Working Through Multilateral Institutions Increases US Soft Power................................................1053 Development Assistance Increases US Soft Power............................................................................1054 Human Rights/Democracy Promotion Increases US Soft Power......................................................1055 Multilateralism Increases US Soft Power..........................................................................................1056 Domestic and Foreign Policy Influences US Soft Power...................................................................1057 Policies More Important than Culture.................................................................................................1058 *** Soft Power Bad ***......................................................................................................................1059 ............................................................................................................................................................1059 ............................................................................................................................................................1059 Soft Power Against North Korea Bad Risks War.............................................................................1060 Soft Power Against North Korea Bad Risks War.............................................................................1061 ............................................................................................................................................................1062 *** Politics ***...................................................................................................................................1063 ............................................................................................................................................................1063 Soft Power Popular.............................................................................................................................1064 Public Supports Soft Power Approach Toward North Korea..............................................................1065 Public Supports Soft Power Approach to Counter Terrorism.............................................................1066
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Poverty Destroys Hegemony
Systemic poverty has collapsed U.S. global leadership necessary to avert global conflict
Senator John Edwards, Spring 2007, Journal of Gender, Race & Justice, Restoring the American Dream: Fighting Poverty and Strengthening the Middle Class p. 390-1 But there is another reason why it is important that we do something about poverty in America . That picture that you saw on your television screens, the picture coming out of New Orleans? You are not the only ones who saw it - the entire world saw it. I do a lot of traveling these days, and everybody knows what happened on the Gulf Coast all around the world. Here is their reaction: "How can it be, in the richest nation on the planet, the most powerful nation on the planet, that those conditions existed in New Orleans? What are you going to do about it?" If we actually want to be the model for the rest of the world, then we have to do something about poverty in America, because the world knows about it now. It is no secret. They know about it, and they want to know: "What are you going to do about it? Are you actually going to do something about it?" I saw a publication overseas right after the hurricane hit, and it had pictures of victims of the hurricane from the Lower Ninth Ward. The headline read "The Shaming of America." If we want to be the country that represents the model for the rest of the world - and we used to be - if we want to be the light - and we used to be the light - then we have to demonstrate what we care about, what our priorities are, and that we patriotically about something other than war. We need to be willing to act patriotically about what is good for our country and not just out of self-interest. America is better than this - and you know it. We did not use to be the country of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo. We were the country that everybody looked up to and respected. They wanted to be like the United States of America. They wanted to be like the American people. That is who we are at our best. What do we do about the millions of Americans who are living in poverty? What do we do about the forty-six, nearly forty-seven million people who do not have health care coverage? Our actions demonstrate to the world what we care about. And I want to add - it is not specifically on topic, but it fits
into the bigger context of how all these things are connected - look at what is happening on your television screens today. The Hezbollah fighting the Israelis and Hamas launching missiles out of Gaza into Israel. The President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, going before the United Nations to denounce the United States. The same man is doing everything in his power to get a nuclear weapon. The North Koreans are testing nuclear weapons and testing missiles. Over the last five or six years, we
. We are the preeminent power in the world today. We are the only superpower. But you cannot lead simply by being powerful. It is not enough. You have to be powerful, but you have to be something else. You have to be moral and just. You have to be the nation that the rest of the world looks up to. You have to have the moral authority to lead. And you do not have to take my word for this - it is clear. If anything demonstrates this, it is the last six years. You look at what is happening in the world today. You look at every single crisis, like the Hezbollah fighting the Israelis that I mentioned a few minutes ago or Iran trying to get a nuclear weapon. We go to the United Nations Security Council, to try to get consensus, but people do not rally around the United States of America. And when they do not, there is no leadership. There is no natural leader in the world, except us. And when we do not show that we care not only about ourselves but that we actually, as the most powerful nation on the planet, care about humanity, then people in other countries will not rally around us. They will not. This is not a feel-good thing. If you want your children to grow up in a safe America, in a safe world, then you want to live in a world where America is the great, shining example. A world where we are the place everyone looks to. A world where everyone says, "The United States of America - they are the ones that come to the rescue of the downtrodden." When an earthquake hits, here comes the United States. Uganda, which I just came back from, has an extraordinary humanitarian crisis. There has been a civil war for twenty years. Between one and two million people are housed in less-than-humane camps in northern Uganda. Kids are being
see Russia going from a democracy to an autocracy. All of this is happening right in front of us. It is right in front of us. And we react. What is so important for us to understand as a nation is that we are the most powerful nation on this planet abducted and forced into the military, the resistance army, the Lord's Resistance Army - a great name - and forced to kill their parents and their brothers and sisters. This genocide continues to go on in Darfur and western Sudan. The United States declares
. We have so many opportunities to show who we really are. We can demonstrate who we are at home by not turning our backs on millions of our own people who live in poverty. But we have lots of chances
it a genocide and does nothing around the world to show what the character of the United States is. There will be lots of children born in Africa with AIDS because their mothers cannot afford a four dollar dose of medicine. How can we let that happen? How can we call ourselves moral and just and allow that to happen? Right in front of us, we know what is going on, and we turn our backs. It is not right. We are better than this. And you know it. You do not need me to say it. You know it. The world needs to see our better side, and it
Will there always be people who denounce us? Of course. There are dangerous human beings. There are extremists in the world, and there are dangerous nation-states. That is not the question. The question is: "When bad things happen, when crises occur, will the rest of the world rally around the United States of America?" Because they believe in us; because they believe in what we represent - both what we do at home and what we do in the rest of the world? There is an awful lot at stake. It is not hyperbole to say that the future of the world is at stake, because it is.
matters to us. In a very selfish way, it matters to us.
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Inequality Undermines Hegemony
Reducing inequality strengthens U.S. global networking capabilities
Anne-Marie Slaughter, of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton, Foreign Affairs, January- February 2009, America's Edge Subtitle: Power in the Networked Century, p. 94 HOW TO GET THERE FROM HERE At the moment, the United States' edge in this new world is more potential than actual. The country will face a vast amount of work in digging itself out of the many holes it has gotten itself into, both at home and abroad. In the process, the United States must adopt five policies and postures that will seize on its edge and sharpen it. First, the United States must adopt comprehensive immigration reform that will make it easier for immigrants and guest workers to move across borders, regularize the status of the millions of illegal immigrants currently in the United States, and increase the number of visas for the world's most talented individuals. Part of changing U.S. attitudes toward immigration must include a recognition that because of their ties to their home countries,
immigrants are potential engines of economic growth. New economic policies could offer subsidies or tax incentives to immigrants who create businesses based on connections they have cultivated to markets and talent in their home countries. Instead of a one-way, outgoing flow of remittances, the United States needs a two-way flow of goods, services, and people. Second, as part of overhauling its educational system, the United States must come to see overseas study as an essential asset for all Americans. Indeed, organizations such as the BrownBell Foundation promote opportunities to study abroad for students at historically black colleges and universities, where such programs have traditionally been lacking. Just as important, the United States must see the children of immigrants who grow up learning Arabic, Hindi, Mandarin, Spanish, and other foreign languages as huge assets. Government programs and private initiatives should encourage them to study abroad in the countries of their parents or grandparents and, assuming they keep
A networked world requires a genuinely networked society, which means fostering economic and social equality. The United States has never been as egalitarian as it imagines itself to be, but this divide has worsened in the past decade, as the rich have become the superrich.
their U.S. passports, to gain dual citizenship.
generally allowed inequality to expand, whereas Democratic presidents have not
Between the late 1950s and 2005, the income share of the wealthiest one percent of the U.S. population more than doubled. Even the Democratic Party is not immune: on the night that Obama accepted the nomination to be the Democratic presidential candidate, at Invesco Field in
Denver, Colorado, his campaign blocked off an entire section of the stadium for big donors, stopping everyone else at the door. For a time, a culture in which money could buy status was a radically democratic and egalitarian idea. Instead of the European class system, in which breeding always trumped money, Americans could rely on education and employment for self-advancement. But this same culture becomes radically inegalitarian if only a relatively few have the chance to prosper financially. As the political scientist Larry Bartels argues, rising economic inequality is a political choice: Republican presidents have
. If so, then the United States can choose to decrease inequality by making its society more horizontal, more democratic, and more integrated by class and race -- and this is the third reform it should adopt. Doing so would add more potential circuits to the network. In this century, global power will increasingly be defined by connections -on the whole, the positive effects of networks will greatly outweigh the negative. Imagine, for example, a U.S. economy powered by green technology and green infrastructure. Communities of American immigrants from Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East will share this new generation of products and services with villages and cities in their home countries. Innovation will flow in both directions. In the United States, universities will be able to offer courses in truly global classrooms, relying on their international students and faculty to connect with educational institutions abroad through travel, the Internet, and videoconferencing.
who is connected to whom and for what purposes. Of course, the world will still contain conflict. Networks can be as malign and deadly as they can be productive and beneficial. In addition, the gap between those who are connected to global networks and those who are excluded from them will sharply multiply existing inequities. But Artists of all kinds will sit at the intersection of culture, learning, and creative energy. U.S. diplomats and other U.S. government officials will receive instant updates on events occurring around the world. They will be connected to their counterparts abroad, able to quickly coordinate preventive and problem-solving actions with a range of private and civic actors. The global landscape will resemble that of the Obama campaign, in which a vast network brought in millions of dollars in donations, motivated millions of volunteers,
In a networked world, the United States has the potential to be the most connected country; it will also be connected to other power centers that are themselves widely connected. If it pursues the right policies, the United States has the capacity and the cultural capital to reinvent itself. In the twenty-first century, the United States' exceptional capacity for connection, rather than splendid isolation or hegemonic domination, will renew its power and restore its global purpose.
and mobilized millions of voters. It need not see itself as locked in a global struggle with other great powers; rather, it should view itself as a central player in an integrated world.
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Environmental Leadership Critical to Global Leadership
United States leadership credibility on environmental issues is critical to sustain global leadership New York Times 8-29-2002
FRANKFURT At present, there is much talk about the unparalleled strength of the United States on the world stage. Yet at this very moment the most powerful country in the world stands to forfeit much political capital, moral authority and international goodwill by dragging its feet on the next great global issue: the environment. Before long, the Bush administration's apparent unwillingness to take a leadership role - or, at the very least, to stop acting as a brake - in fighting global environmental degradation will threaten the very basis of the American supremacy that many now seem to assume will last forever. American authority is already in some danger as a result of America's relative absence from the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg - "relative," that is, to its share of both the world economy and global pollution. The absence of President George W. Bush from Johannesburg
symbolizes this decline in authority. In recent weeks, newspapers around the world have been dominated by environmental headlines. In Central Europe, flooding killed dozens, displaced tens of thousands and caused billions of dollars in damage. In South Asia, the United Nations reports a brown cloud of pollution that is responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths a year from respiratory disease. The pollution, 80 percent man-made, also cuts sunlight penetration, thus reducing rainfall, affecting agriculture and otherwise altering the climate. Many other examples of environmental degradation, often related to the warming of the atmosphere, could be cited. What they all have in common is that they severely affect countries around the world and are fast becoming a chief concern for people everywhere. Nobody is suggesting that these disasters are directly linked to anything the United States is doing. But when a country that emits 25 percent of the world's greenhouse gases acts as an uninterested,
The Bush administration seems to believe it is merely an observer - that environmental issues are not its issues. But not doing anything amounts to ignoring a key source of current world tension, and no superpower that wants to preserve its status can go on dismissing such a pivotal dimension of political and economic conflict. In my view, there is a clear-cut price to be paid for ignoring the views of just about every other country in the world today. The United States is jettisoning its hard-won moral and intellectual authority and perhaps the strategic advantages that come with being a good steward of the international political order. The United States may no longer be viewed as a leader or reliable partner in policy-making: necessary, perhaps inevitable, but not desirable, as it has been for decades. All of this because America's current leaders are not willing to acknowledge the very real concerns of many people about global environmental issues. No one could expect the United States to provide any quick fixes, but one would like to see America make a credible and sustained effort, along with other countries, to address global environmental problems. This should happen on two fronts. The first is at home in the United States, through more environmentally friendly policies - for example, greater fuel efficiency standards for cars and light trucks and better insulation for buildings. The second is international, through a more cooperative approach to multilateral attempts at safeguarding the environment.
sometimes hostile bystander in the environmental debate, it looks like unbearable arrogance to many people abroad.
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Economic Competitiveness Key to Leadership
Competitiveness key to leadership Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek International, 2008, The Post-American World, p. 106-8 The regime is working to make sure the Chinese people understand its strategy as well. In 2006 and 2007, Chinese television aired a twelve-part series , The Rise of the Great Nations, clearly designed as an act of public education. Given the intensely political nature of the subject matter, one can be certain that it was carefully vetted to present views that the government wished to be broadcast. The series was thoughtful and intelligent, produced in BBC or PBS style, and it covered the rise of nine great powers, from Portugal and Spain to the Soviet Union and the United States, complete with interviews with scholars from around the world. The sections on the individual countries are mostly accurate and balanced. The rise of Japan, an emotional topic in China, is handled fairly, with little effort to whip up nationalist hysteria about Japanese attacks on China; Japan's postwar economic rise is praised repeatedly. Some points of emphasis are telling. The episodes on the United States, for example, deal extensively with Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt's programs to regulate and tame capitalism, highlighting the state's role in capitalism. And there are a few predictable, but shameful, silences, such as the complete omission of the terror, the purges, or the Gulag from an hour-long program on the Soviet Union. But there are also startling admissions, including considerable praise of the U.S. and British systems of representative government for their ability to bring freedom, legitimacy, and political stability to their countries. The basic message of the series is that a nation's path to greatness lies in its economic prowess and that militarism, empire, and aggression lead to a dead end. That point is made repeatedly. The final episodeexplicitly on the "lessons" of the serieslays out the keys to great power: national cohesiveness, economic and technological success, political stability, military strength, cultural creativity, and magnetism. The last is explained as the attractiveness of a nation's ideas, corresponding with concept of "soft power" developed by Joseph Nye, one of the scholars interviewed for the series. The episode ends with a declaration that, in the new world, a nation can sustain its competitive edge only if it has the knowledge and technological capacity to keep innovating. In short, the path to power is through markets, not empires.
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Economic Competitiveness Key to Leadership
A LOSS OF ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS THREATENS U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP Rocco Leonard Martino, internet & software entrepreneur, ORBIS, Winter 2007, p. 267-70
Much of the foreign policy discussion in the United States today is focused upon the dilemma posed by the Iraq War and the threat posed by Islamist terrorism. These problems are, of course, both immediate and important. However, America also faces other challenges to its physical security and economic prosperity, and these are more long-term and probably more profound. There is, first, the threat posed by our declining competitiveness in the global economy, a threat most obviously represented by such rising economic powers as China and India. There is, second, the threat posed by our increasing dependence on oil imports from the Middle East. Moreover, these two threats are increasingly connected, as China and India themselves are greatly increasing their demand for Middle East oil. 2The United States of course faced great challenges to its security and economy in the past, most obviously from Germany and Japan in the first half of the twentieth century and from the Soviet Union in the second half. Crucial to America's ability to prevail over these past challenges was our technological and industrial leadership, and especially our ability to continuously recreate it. Indeed, the United States has been unique among great powers in its ability to keep on creating and recreating new technologies and new industries, generation after generation. Perpetual innovation and technological leadership might even be said to be the American way of maintaining primacy in world affairs. They are almost certainly what America will have to pursue in order to prevail over the contemporary challenges involving economic competitiveness and energy dependence. The computer is the first machine in history that was invented as an adjunct of the mind. All prior machines were adjuncts of physical strength and capabilities, such as movement. Hence it is no surprise that, since the invention of the computer, the generation of wealth has shifted from physical labor and associated industries to mental pursuits and related inventions and industries. Where in the 1960s the United States was concerned that the Soviet Union might overtake it in essential industries such as steel and chemicals, today it is Ireland, India, and China that are building economies based on mental pursuits reflected and augmented by electronic devices and applications, including instant information and instant communication. The Soviet Union's passage into history left the United States the world's only superpower. Will the United States, too, be eclipsed in a new world order, where ideas and innovations are of paramount importance in economic growth and national economic security? U.S. prosperity and security depends on new inventions that will create the new industries and new jobs the new world order needs. The United States is eminently positioned for this role.
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Economic Decline Collapses Leadership
Economic decline is a fundamental threat to global hegemony Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek International, 2008, The Post-American World, p. 180 The fundamental point is that Britain was undone as a great global power not because of bad politics but because of bad economics. It had great global influence, but its economy was structurally weak. And it made matters worse by attempting ill- advised fixesgoing off and on the gold standard, imposing imperial tariffs, running up huge war debts. After World War II, it adopted a socialist economic program, the Beveridge Plan, which nationalized and tightly regulated large parts of the economy. This may have been understandable as a reaction to the country's battered condition, but by the 1960s and 1970s it had condemned Britain to stagnationuntil Margaret Thatcher helped turn the British economy around in the 1980s.
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Anti-Americanism Undermines U.S. Power
ANTI-AMERICANISM HAS DIMINISHED U.S. POWER
Julia Sweigh, Council on Foreign Relations, FRIENDLY FIRE, 2006, p. 173 The consequences for the United States are far more momentous than losing likeability. The new anti-American default has accelerated the process of the diminution of U.S. power. It has exposed a fundamental rift in American society over how to use our power. It has left the United States isolated in Iraq, hobbling America's ability to focus attention on other international issues. It has further weakened the United Nations and efforts to reform it, and it has slowed the process of trade integration, among other items on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. It has severely damaged credibility of the United States as an advocate of democratic values. Anti-America, though, is not just the result of immutable organic conditions that necessarily inspire resentment of U.S. power by those with less of it.
ANTI-AMERICANISM GENERATES GLOBAL HOSTILITY TO U.S. FORERIENG POLICY
Julia Sweigh, Council on Foreign Relations, FRIENDLY FIRE, 2006, pp. xiv The United States is now attuned to expect opposition or hostility from their ranks. Now, at least, it comes as no surprise. But the overt enmity of governments and overwhelmingly negative public opinion in countries as culturally diverse and geographically distant as Great Britain, Germany, Turkey, and South Korea, where the United States historically assumed that an attitude of deference would ultimately overcome the usual resentment of power, has taken America aback. It is Anti-America among traditional U.S. allies where we must come to grips with the sources, internal and external, of the extraordinary wave of bitterness and distrust now entrenched among governments, elites, and broad sectors of public opinion. Without the consent and support of U.S. allies on a complex constellation of international issues that by their nature require global cooperation, Anti-America may turn out to be more than an ephemeral anomaly with negligible consequences. Instead, if allowed to settle into a global reflex, the new anti-Americanism will undermine the international community's political will to give the United States the benefit of the doubt on a range of foreign policy goals and thus hamper the prospect for cooperative initiatives to confront global challenges. By sowing the seeds of suspicion and anger among young generations who have no memory of America as a credible, trustworthy partner, AntiAmerica will sabotage even the best-intentioned U.S. leadership or well-designed policy and will weaken national and international security for decades to come.
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*** Uniqueness Issues Hegemony/Leadership Low Now ***
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Hegemony Collapsing General
America is overstretched; collapse of hegemony inevitable
Guardian January 19, 2009 http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/jan/19/barack-obama-romeempire But from China's rapidly rising status as a global player, to Russia's show of force in Georgia, to rising tensions in South Asia and the Middle East, America is facing a wide array of increasingly troubling threats, while struggling internally to recover from an economic collapse not seen since the Great Depression. American supremacy in a post-cold war environment seems outmatched by a progressively more unstable world. Like Rome, America has spread itself too thin and is unable to respond to new threats as they emerge with either a convincing show of military force or a skilled use of soft power to leverage its credibility in the world. While the dangers we face were once diverse and scattered, the Iraq war pushed many of our enemies to see us as a common threat where religious differences would have otherwise made cooperation impossible. Moreover, in collapsing the Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein, America has paved the way for an even less palatable Iranian dominance in the region. While the comparison to ancient Rome is imperfect,
By virtue of its economic and military power, as well as a political system extolled for its superiority to all other systems, America has been the leader of the free world for the last 60 years.
there are nonetheless parallels worth considering. America today faces the same dilemma of the eastern Roman empire: should it attempt to regain its lost global supremacy or fortify and adapt to the new world? Will we follow Virgil's famous line from the Aeneid, "Rome, 't is thine alone, with awful sway, To rule mankind, and make the world obey," or preserve our strength and create a framework for global cooperation in which America acts as a mediator and responsible actor rather than instigator.
U.S. naval power declining
Robert D. Kaplan, National Correspondent for The Atlantic and a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2009, Center Stage for the Twenty-First Century, pp. 16-31 is unclear how much longer U.S. naval dominance will last. At the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy boasted about 600 warships; it is now down to 279. That number might rise to 313 in the coming years with the addition of the new "littoral combat ships," but it could also drop to the low 200s given cost overruns of 34 percent and the slow pace of shipbuilding. Although the revolution in precision-guided weapons means that existing ships pack better firepower than those of the Cold War fleet did, since a ship cannot be in two places at once, the fewer the vessels, the riskier every decision to deploy them.
Yet as the challenges for the United States on the high seas multiply, it
Downturn of 2008 collapses U.S. geopolitical influence
Roger Altman, Chair and CEO of Evercore Partners, He was U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary in 1993-94.Foreign Affairs, February 2009, The Great Crash, 2008 Subtitle: A Geopolitical Setback for the West, p. 2 The financial and economic crash of 2008, the worst in over 75 years, is a major geopolitical setback for the United States and Europe. Over the medium term, Washington and European governments will have neither the resources nor the economic credibility to play the role in global affairs that they otherwise would have played. These weaknesses will eventually be repaired, but in the interim, they will accelerate trends that are shifting the world's center of gravity away from the United States. A brutal recession is unfolding in the United States, Europe, and probably Japan -- a recession likely to be more harmful than the slump of 1981-82. The current financial crisis has deeply frightened consumers and businesses, and in response they have sharply retrenched.
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Hegemony Collapsing General
U.S. global power eroding
Roger Altman, Chair and CEO of Evercore Partners, He was U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary in 1993-94.Foreign Affairs, February 2009, The Great Crash, 2008 Subtitle: A Geopolitical Setback for the West, p. 2 Much of the world is turning a historic corner and heading into a period in which the role of the state will be larger and that of the private sector will be smaller. As it does, the United States' global power, as well as the appeal of U.S.-style democracy, is eroding. Although the United States is fortunate that this crisis coincides with the promise inherent in the election of Barack Obama as president, historical forces -- and the crash of 2008 -- will carry the world away from a unipolar system regardless. Indeed, rising economic powers are gaining new influence. No country will benefit economically from the financial crisis over the coming year, but a few states -- most notably China -- will achieve a stronger relative global position. China is experiencing its own real estate slowdown, its export markets are weak, and its overall growth rate is set to slow. But the country is still relatively insulated from the global crisis. Its foreign exchange reserves are approaching $2 trillion, making it the world's strongest country in terms of liquidity. China's financial system is not exposed, and the country's growth, which is now driven by domestic activity, will continue at solid, if diminished, rates. This relatively unscathed position gives China the opportunity to solidify its strategic advantages as the United States and Europe struggle to recover. Beijing will be in a position to assist other nations financially and make key investments in, for example, natural resources at a time when the West cannot. At the same time, this crisis may lead to a closer relationship between the United States and China. Traderelated flashpoints are diminishing, which may soften protectionist stances in the U.S. Congress. And it is likely that, with Washington less distracted by the war in Iraq, the new administration of President Obama will see more clearly than its predecessor that the U.S.-Chinese relationship is becoming the United States' most important bilateral relationship.
U.S. geopolitical dominance collapsing
Joseph Nye, Harvard, Chinadaily.com.cn, March 26, 2009, p. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/200903/26/content_7617363.htm At best, Americas unipolar moment lasted through the 1990s, but that was also a decade adrift. The post-cold-war peace dividend was never converted into a global liberal order under American leadership. So now, rather than bestriding the globe, we are competing " and losing " in a geopolitical marketplace alongside the worlds other superpowers: the European Union and China .
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Hegemony Collapsing General
The foundation of hegemony the economy has been declining
Robert A. Pape is professor of political science at the University of Chicago, Chicago Tribune, March 8, 2009, p. 29 The Bush administration pursued ambitious objectives in three major regions at the same time -- waging wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, seeking to denuclearize North Korea and expanding America's military allies in Europe right up to the borders of Russia. For the past eight years, our foreign policies have not been based just on questionable arguments in individual cases. More troubling, the perimeters of American global influence have been extended at precisely a period when the ultimate foundation of U.S. power -- the superiority of America's economy in the world -has been in steep decline relative to our rivals. Let's look at the facts. Major assessments of international power have long turned heavily on a single statistic: a country's share of world economic product. According to International Monetary Fund figures, the U.S. enjoyed 31 percent of gross world product in 2000, far eclipsing our closest geopolitical rival, China, at 4 percent and Russia at 1 percent. Since then, America's share of GWP has been collapsing -- declining to 23 percent in 2008 and is projected by the IMF to fall to 21 percent in 2013. At the same time, the share of China -- our most likely future rival -- has been skyrocketing, to 7 percent in 2008 and a projected 9 percent in 2013 (when it is likely to overtake Japan as the world's second-leading economy) and Russia's share has grown to 3 percent in 2008 and is projected at 5 percent in 2013. Put differently, since 2000 the U.S. has lost nearly a third of its relative power in international politics, while China's has doubled and Russia's has tripled. This is the fastest decline relative to other major countries in U.S. history. True, China and Russia are starting from a much lower base and are also having internal economic problems. But America's internal problems are doing far more to reduce our economic growth than China's or Russia's, and so the power gaps are likely to either remain as close as today or narrow further in the coming years. Simply put, America is a declining power . Worse, our international decline was well under way before the economic downturn of 2008, which is likely to further weaken our power. These new realities have tremendous implications for America's grand strategy. First, America's relative decline is sounding a death knell for the age of U.S. global dominance. For decades, those convinced of America's "unipolar moment" have encouraged U.S. policymakers to act unilaterally and seize almost any opportunity to advance American influence, virtually discounting the possibility that Russia, China, Iran and others could seriously oppose American power. With 30 percent of GWP, U.S. leaders could imagine confronting opponents in multiple regions at the same time. Nearing 20 percent, this is simply not realistic. Second, America's relative decline has created a significant overcommitment problem, especially in light of the Bush administration's aggressive policies in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. The era when the United States can credibly commit to the military defense of allies in all three regions simultaneously is quickly coming to an end, and our rivals sense America's increasingly hollow.
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Hegemony Collapsing General
The U.S. doesnt have the financial capability to sustain global leadership
Joseph Nye, Harvard, Chinadaily.com.cn, March 26, 2009, p. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/200903/26/content_7617363.htm At some point, tighter global credit conditions are sure to significantly constrain Americas freedom of action internationally. After all, Chinese and East Asian investors, to offer but one example, are now quite capable of reining in, and even undermining, the federal government (if they choose to), rather than vice versa. Though it may not yet have penetrated American consciousness, a national fiscal crisis is also bound to be a crisis of national security . In the coming years, a new president will have to deal with a growing disparity between the historically hegemonic role of this country on the world stage and its diminishing capacity. Simply put, the U.S. will have to do more with less, even to maintain a semblance of its current strategic profile. What effect this has on geopolitical stability, on the number of small and big wars that occur globally, and on collective problems ranging from climate change to human rights remains to be seen .
U.S. soft power collapsing
Joseph Nye, Harvard, Chinadaily.com.cn, March 26, 2009, p. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/200903/26/content_7617363.htm Diminishing U.S. economic and military influence only underscores a third trend: the wilting of Americas soft power. At the U.N. in September, for instance, President Bush faced a tsunami of whispered complaints about Americas flawed stewardship of the global economy. Manifest failure in an area in which Americans took such pride saps Washingtons ability to persuade and build alliances in areas like resisting slaughter in Darfur, fighting piracy in the Gulf of Aden, or stemming Russian designs on what it calls its near-abroad.
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Hegemony Collapsing General Leadership
U.S. global leadership has collapsed
Korea Herald, January 29, 2009, http://media.daum.net/foreign/englishnews/view.html? cateid=1047&newsid=20090129092014169&p=koreaherald In his inauguration speech, new U.S. President Barrack Obama said, "We are in the midst of a crisis." He also said, "Challenges are real, but they will be met." As his speech shows, the Obama administration has begun with daunting, international challenges. The global financial crisis, originating in the United States, should be managed as a top priority. Concern is not simply about the American decline but about the contagious global downturn. Handling the Iraqi and Middle East issue is an immediate foreign policy challenge. Honorable retreat from Iraq while maintaining regional stability in the Middle East is not simple. Regaining trust in U.S. leadership for global governance is a must. Because of its appearance as a revisionist hegemony during the previous administration, America's fame in the world significantly diminished. The Washington consensus based on the neoliberal market economy principle is doubted in and outside the United States. Without reinvigorating American leadership, the status of the United States as a global hegemony may be challenged in the future.
U.S. global influence is weakening
University Wire, March 6, 2009, Yale professor Kennedy surveys U.S. power politics, p. online Paul Kennedy, the J. Richardson Dilworth professor of history and director of International Security Studies at Yale University, addressed a large audience Thursday on the current state of American power. The event was part of the 2008-2009 Duke Provost's Lecture Series, "Policy Visions for a New Presidency." Kennedy, who is considered one of the leading scholars on the rise and fall of great societies throughout history, told attendees that studying the three main indicators of any given nation's strength-military, economic and "soft" power-may suggest that America is in a decline. One of Kennedy's central points was that America's ability to exert influence over other nations has weakened in recent years. This influence, he argued, was one of America's most important assets. "It was also culture, the power of ideas, the capacity to co-opt other nations through international institutions, the influence of new technology... all of that gave the United States a sort of attractiveness and capacity to get things done," Kennedy said.
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Hegemony is Collapsing
Slow hegemonic decline now Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek International, 2008, The Post-American World, p. 41 The United States' share of the global economy has been remarkably steady through wars, depressions, and a slew of other powers rising. With 5 percent of the world's population, the United States has generated between 20 and 30 percent of world output for 125 years. There will surely be some slippage of America's position over the next few decades. This is not a political statement but a mathematical one. As other countries grow faster, America's relative economic weight will fall. But the decline need not be large-scale, rapid, or consequential, as long as the United States can adapt to new challenges as well as it adapted to those it confronted over the last century. Relative decline in U.S. power
Richard N. Haass, President, Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs , May/June 2008 ,
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html?mode=print
But the reality of American strength should not mask the relative decline of the United States' position in the world -- and with this relative decline in power an absolute decline in influence and independence. The U.S. share of global imports is already down to 15 percent. Although U.S. GDP accounts for over 25 percent of the world's total, this percentage is sure to decline over time given the actual and projected differential between the United States' growth rate and those of the Asian giants and many other countries, a large number of which are growing at more than two or three times the rate of the United States. GDP growth is hardly the only indication of a move away from U.S. economic dominance. The rise of sovereign wealth funds -- in countries such as China, Kuwait, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates -- is another. These government-controlled pools of wealth, mostly the result of oil and gas exports, now total some $3 trillion. They are growing at a projected rate of $1
trillion a year and are an increasingly important source of liquidity for U.S. firms. High energy prices, fueled mostly by the surge in Chinese and Indian demand, are here to stay for some time, meaning that the size and significance of these funds will continue to grow. Alternative stock exchanges are springing up and drawing away companies from the U.S. exchanges and even launching initial public offerings (IPOs). London, in particular, is competing with New York as the world's financial center and has already surpassed it in terms of the number of IPOs it hosts. The dollar has weakened against the euro and the British
A majority of the world's foreign exchange holdings are now in currencies other than the dollar, and a move to denominate oil in euros or a basket of currencies is possible, a step that would only leave the U.S. economy more vulnerable to inflation as well as currency crises. U.S. primacy is also being challenged in other realms, such as military effectiveness and diplomacy. Measures of military spending are not the same as measures of military capacity. September 11 showed how a small investment by terrorists could cause extraordinary levels of human and physical damage.
pound, and it is likely to decline in value relative to Asian currencies as well.
Relative U.S. decline now Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek International, 2008, The Post-American World, p. 45
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I began this chapter by arguing that the new order did not herald American decline, because I believe that America has enormous strengths and that the new world will not throw up a new superpower but rather a diversity of forces that Washington can navigate and even help direct. But still, as the rest of the world rises, in purely economic terms, America will experience relative decline. As others grow faster, its share of the pie will be smaller (though the shift will likely be small for many years). In addition, the new nongovernmental forces that are increasingly active will constrain Washington substantially.
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Hegemony is Collapsing
U.S. hegemony collapsing Madeleine Albright, former Secretary of State, 2008, A Memo to the President Elect, p. 21-2
Even the most basic building blocks of U.S. power appear to be chipped and worn. Our military has been deployed to the point of exhaustion, including our National Guard and Reserves. Our international economic leadership has been hurt by an incon sistent approach to trade and by budget policies that have spun the gold of surpluses into the straw of record deficits. Our alli ances in Europe and the Asian Pacific have been strained. And on nuclear weapons, human rights, and the rule of law, we are thought to be hypocrites. Your job as president will be to recapture what has been lost and to proceed from there. You must begin with the understanding that our right to lead is no longer widely accepted. We have lost moral legitimacy. If we fail to comprehend this, we will not know how to formulate a successful strategy. We will be like a lawyer who assumes that, because of past triumphs, she has the jury in her pocket when she hasn't, precisely because the jury resents being taken for granted. In Kennedy's time, the memory of World War II was part of every adult's consciousness; so, too, was America's role in rebuilding Western Europe and helping Japan to become a democracy. The rehabilitation of former Axis powers was seen as a luminous accomplishment. America's leadership was still disputed, but its credentials were acknowledged. The country that had stood up to Hitler, Mussolini, and Tojo had earned, at a minimum, a respectful hearing from people everywhere. We can no longer assume that our understanding of our own history is widely shared. Relatively few hear the word "America" and think first of the Battle of Lexington or the landings at Omaha Beach. To those under the age of twentythe majority in many countriesthe cold war confrontation between freedom and communism means little. To many, the Statue of Liberty has been replaced in the mind's eye by a hooded figure with electrodes. In marketing terms, the American brand needs a makeover. Amid the swirl of events these past fifteen years, four trends pose a clear and present danger to American interestsfirst, terror and the rise of anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim worlds; second, the erosion of international consensus on nuclear proliferation; third, growing doubts about the value of democracy; and fourth, the gathering backlash against globalization due primarily to the widening split between rich and poor.
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No U.S. Global Leadership/Credibility
IRAQ HAS DESTROYED U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP
Zbigniew Brzezinski, professor of American foreign policy at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies , SECOND CHANCE: THREE PRESIDENTS AND THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 146-7 First, the war has caused calamitous damage to America's global standing. America's global credibility has been shattered. Until 2003 the world was accustomed to believing the word of the president of the United States. When he made an assertion of fact, he was presumed to know the facts and tell the truth about them. Yet two months after the fall of Baghdad, Bush was flatly still asserting (in an interview destined for a European audience) that "we found the weapons of mass destruction." As a result, America's capacity to make a credible case on such internationally contentious issues as the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs suffered grievously. Distrust has also undermined Americas international legitimacy, an important source of the nations soft power. Previously America's might was viewed as legitimate because America was seen as somehow identified with the basic interests of mankind. Power viewed as illegitimate is inherently weaker because its application requires a higher input of force to achieve the desired result. Loss of soft power thus reduces "hard power."
ABU GRAIB HAS DESTROYED AMERICAS STANDING
Zbigniew Brzezinski, professor of American foreign policy at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies , SECOND CHANCE: THREE PRESIDENTS AND THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 147 America's moral standing in the world, an important aspect of legitimacy, was also compromised by the prisons at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, as well as by the increasing number of cases suggesting that demoralizationinherent in the psychological brutality of waging a counterinsurgency in the midst of hostile civiliansis beginning to infect the occupation troops. The brutalities documented at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo should have implicated the secretary of defense and his deputy for permittingand perhaps even generatingan atmosphere congenial to such abuse. The lick of subsequent high-level accountability transformed the transgressions by individual soldiers into acts of U.S. statesmanship, staining America's moral escutcheon.
THE IRAQ WAR HAS DISCREDITED AMERICAN LEADERSHIP
Zbigniew Brzezinski, professor of American foreign policy at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies , SECOND CHANCE: THREE PRESIDENTS AND THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 147-8 Most important of all, the war has discredited America's global leadership. America was able neither to rally the world to its cause nor to decisively prevail by the use of arms. Its actions have divided its allies, united its enemies, and created opportunities for its rivals and ill wishers. The world of Islam has been stirred to bitter hatred. Respect for American statesmanship has plunged precipitously, while Americas capacity to lead has been severely damaged.
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U.S. Collapse Now, No Multipolarity
U.S. unipoliarity has collapsed, no multipolar world has emerged and none will
Richard N. Haass, President, Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs , May/June 2008 ,
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html?mode=print
Charles Krauthammer was more correct than he realized when he wrote in these pages nearly two decades ago about what he termed "the unipolar moment." At the time, U.S. dominance was real. But it lasted for only 15 or 20 years. In historical terms, it was a moment. Traditional realist theory would have predicted the end of unipolarity and the dawn of a multipolar world. According to this line of reasoning, great powers, when they act as great powers are wont to do, stimulate competition from others that fear or resent them. Krauthammer, subscribing to just this theory, wrote, "No doubt, multipolarity will come in time. In perhaps another generation or so there will be great powers coequal with the United States, and the world will, in structure, resemble the pre-World War I era." But this has not happened. Although anti-Americanism is widespread, no great-power rival or set of rivals has emerged to challenge the United States. In part, this is because the disparity between the power of the United States and that of any potential rivals is too great. Over time, countries such as China may come to possess GDPs comparable to that of the United States. But in the case of China, much of that wealth will necessarily be absorbed by providing for the country's enormous population (much of which remains poor) and will not be available to fund military development or external undertakings. Maintaining political stability during a period of such dynamic but uneven growth will be no easy feat. India faces many of the same demographic challenges and is further hampered by too much bureaucracy and too little infrastructure. The EU's GDP is now greater than that of the United States, but the EU does not act in the unified fashion of a nation-state, nor is it able or inclined to act in the assertive fashion of historic great powers. Japan, for its part, has a shrinking and aging population and lacks the political culture to play the role of a great power. Russia may be more inclined, but it still has a largely cash-crop economy and is saddled by a declining population and internal challenges to its cohesion. No multipolarity now Richard Haas, Council on Foreign Relations, April 16, 2006, Financial Times, p. 11
Still others predict the emergence of a modern multipolar world, one in which China, Europe, India, Japan and Russia join the US as dominant influences. This view ignores how the world has changed. There are literally dozens of meaningful power centres, including regional powers, international organisations, companies, media outlets, religious movements, terrorist organisations, drug cartels and non-governmental organisations. Today's world is increasingly one of distributed, rather than concentrated, power. The successor to unipolarity is neither bipolarity or multipolarity. It is non-polarity.
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Hegemony Collapsing Soft Power
U.S. soft power declining globally
Joseph S. Nye Jr teaches at Harvard and is author of 'The Powers to Lead', Gulf News (United Arab Emirates), February 11, 2009, p. online In her confirmation hearings to become secretary of state, Hillary Clinton said: "America cannot solve the most pressing problems on our own, and the world cannot solve them without America... We must use what has been called 'smart power,' the full range of tools at our disposal." Smart power is the combination of hard and soft power. Soft power is the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through attraction rather than coercion or payments. Public opinion polls show a serious decline in American attractiveness in Europe, Latin America and, most dramatically, across the entire Muslim world.
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Hegemony Collapsing Obama Policies
Obamas policies have collapsed U.S. military credibility
Defense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy, March 2009 p. 2 The United States Administration of Pres. Barack Obama, however, appears to have taken a doctrinaire approach to the US' strategic position which -- even apart from the questionable approach to economic recovery -- invites disaster to itself and to the traditional allies of the US and to the West in general. It is an approach which fails to learn anything from history. To begin, the Obama White House appears to believe that its mere appearance as the antithesis of the former Government of Pres. George W. Bush is sufficient to transform the fortunes of, and attitude to, the United States. It is true that many former friends and adversaries of the United States have welcomed the appearance of the Obama Administration, but for many -- such as the governments of Iran, Russia, and the like, and groups such as HAMAS and HizbAllah -- what has been welcomed has been the perception that the US can no longer be a cause of concern for their own security. It is true that the Obama election platform was, in part, to remove the perception globally that the US represented a threat to other states. However, the result in Moscow and Tehran has not been to see the new face of the United States in a more positive light, but to see the US now as a toothless tiger, a power which is now, by its own hand, contemptible.
Obama has collapsed U.S. Central Asia deployments
Defense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy, March 2009 p. 2 Not only has the Obama White House committed to the early withdrawal of its forces (and therefore the forces of its allies) from Afghanistan, it has seen its entire strategy in the Caucasus and Central Asia collapse, totally transforming the global strategic map. Russia, defeated in its Soviet form at the end of the Cold War in 1990, is now on the ascendant in many respects. Almost no-one in Washington yet comprehends this reality. The arrogance of long-held power cannot begin to comprehend the scale of the rapid degradation of US wealth, influence, and the thing which causes wealth and influence: prestige. It is clear that unless the problem is recognized, the healing cannot begin. Indeed, the Obama Administration does not recognize that it has a problem of strategic reach or influence, and has welcomed the retirement of the US from its position of global leadership. Except, of course, that Pres. Obama and his key leadership team -particularly Secretary of State Hillary Clinton -- still expect to be treated above the station of "first among equals". The last time we saw hubris and ignorance in such profusion was during the Administration of US Pres. "Jimmy" Carter (January 20, 1977-January 20, 1981). Carter's actions saw the US in retreat from influence in Latin America, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Among other things, Carter gave away control of the Panama Canal; and deliberately overthrew the Shah of Iran, giving us today's world of jihadist terrorism, a collapsed Afghanistan and a threatened Pakistan, while at the same time extending the duration of the Cold War.
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Hegemony Collapsing Obama Policies
The military does not support Obama
Defense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy, March 2009 p. 2 It is not about budgets. The Obama Administration has spent wildly, without regard for "balancing the budget" or "reducing the deficit". It does not even mind allowing the US military leadership to commit a division or two of extra troops to fight in Afghanistan, even though the White House privately already knew (by January 2009) that it would withdraw from Afghanistan unilaterally as soon as possible, regardless of the consequences for Afghanistan, the region, or the US allies who entered the fray at Washington's behest. The Obama attack on the US military has been more insidious than mere disregard for its opinion. Pres. Obama himself committed his Government to the policy that US troops would be liable to pay their own long-term medical bills for injuries sustained in fighting for their country. He made it clear that this was not a mistake. When queried on the approach, he repeated it. The move was part of budget-savings, he said. It was not until massive political and media opposition that he finally withdrew the proposal on March 23, 2009. The incident could have been put down to political navet, but more likely it was navet accompanied by anti-military sentiment. The damage has, to a large part been done. The US military will not trust Obama, and the US runs an all-volunteer Armed Force. Military recruiting will suffer at a time when the US could be expected to undertake some semblance of global credibility despite shrinking missions. It is significant that, concurrently, Russia is increasing its commitment to defense spending and deployment.
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Apolarity Collapsing
U.S. unipolarity weakening Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek International, 2008, The Post-American World, p. 217-8 That was then. America remains the global superpower today, but it is an enfeebled one. Its economy has troubles, its currency is sliding, and it faces long-term problems with its soaring entitlements and low savings. Anti-American sentiment is at an all-time high everywhere from Great Britain to Malaysia. But the most striking shift between the 1990s and now has to do not with America but rather with the world at large. In the 1990s, Russia was completely dependent on American aid and loans. Now, it posts annual budget surpluses in the tens of billions of dollars. Then, East Asian nations desperately needed the IMF to bail them out of their crises. Now, they have massive foreign-exchange reserves, which they are using to finance America's debt. Then, China's economic growth was driven almost entirely by American demand. In 2007, China contributed more to global growth than the United States didthe first time any nation has done so since at least the 1930sand surpassed it as the world's largest consumer market in several key categories. In the long run this secular trendthe rise of the restwill only gather strength, whatever the temporary ups and downs. At a military-political level, America still dominates the world, but the larger structure of unipolarity economic, financial, culturalis weakening. Washington still has no true rival, and will not for a very long while, but it faces a growing number of constraints Apolarity is not a binary condition. The world will not stay unipolar for decades and then, one day, suddenly switch and become bipolar or multipolar. There will be a slow shift in the nature of international affairs. While unipolarity continues to be a defining reality of the international system for now, every year it becomes weaker and other nations and actors grow in strength. Globalization has produced a non-polar world
Richard N. Haass, President, Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs , May/June 2008 ,
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html?mode=print
Finally, today's nonpolar world is not simply a result of the rise of other states and organizations or of the failures and follies of U.S. policy. It is also an inevitable consequence of globalization. Globalization has increased the volume, velocity, and importance of cross-border flows of just about everything, from drugs, e-mails, greenhouse gases, manufactured goods, and people to television and radio signals, viruses (virtual and real), and weapons.
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Apolarity Now
Non-polar world emerging
Roger Altman, Chair and CEO of Evercore Partners, He was U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary in 1993-94.Foreign Affairs, February 2009, The Great Crash, 2008 Subtitle: A Geopolitical Setback for the West, p. 2 The rising nations' growing economic strength brings increased global influence and competition with it. The result, in the words of Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, is the emergence of a "nonpolar world." China, for example, will suffer a lesser blow from the global crisis. It is experiencing some economic pain. Its export markets, led by the United States and Europe, are slowing dramatically. China is also suffering from price declines in certain urban real estate markets. Its growth slowed to nine percent during the third quarter of 2008 -- a rate that other nations would envy but was China's slowest in five years. These factors explain why the Chinese leadership is implementing a multiyear economic stimulus plan worth over $500 billion, or approximately 15 percent of GDP. Still, the IMF is projecting that the country's economy will grow by 8.5 percent in 2009. In financial terms, China is little affected by the crisis in the West. I ts entire financial system plays a relatively small role in its economy, and it apparently has no exposure to the toxic assets that have brought the U.S. and European banking systems to their knees. China also runs a budget surplus and a very large current account surplus, and it carries little government debt. Chinese households save an astonishing 40 percent of their incomes. And China's $2 trillion portfolio of foreign exchange reserves grew by $700 billion last year, thanks to the country's current account surplus and foreign direct investment. This means that although China, too, has been hurt by the crisis, its economic and financial power have been strengthened relative to those of the West. China's global influence will thus increase, and Beijing will be able to undertake political and economic initiatives to increase it further. China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations are just concluding an agreement that would create the world's largest free-trade area, and Beijing could take additional steps toward Asian interdependence and play a stronger leadership role within the region. China could also expand its diplomatic presence in the developing world, in order to further its model of capitalism and, in places such as Angola, Kazakhstan, and Sudan, satisfy its thirst for natural resources. In the midst of this crisis, it might also help finance emergency loans, either directly, through bilateral financing arrangements, or indirectly, by creating an additional facility at the IMF that could expand the organization's available credit beyond what current quotas allow. China should also be expected to make strategic investments through its sovereign wealth funds. Given China's appetite for natural resources, this is one likely area of interest; its relatively underdeveloped financial-services infrastructure is another.
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Apolarity Now
U.S. unipolarity waning Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek International, 2008, The Post-American World, p. 42 For the roughly two decades since 1989, the power of the United States has defined the international order. All roads have led to Washington, and American ideas about politics, economics, and foreign policy have been the starting points for global action. Washington has been the most powerful outside actor on every continent in the world, dominating the Western Hemisphere, remaining the crucial outside balancer in Europe and East Asia, expanding its role in the Middle East and Central and South Asia, and everywhere remaining the only country that can provide the muscle for any serious global military operation. For every countryfrom Russia and China to South Africa and Indiaits most important relationship in the world has been the relationship with the United States. That influence reached its apogee with Iraq. Despite the reluctance, opposition, or active hostility of much of the world, the United States was able to launch an unprovoked attack on a sovereign country and to enlist dozens of countries and international agencies to assist it during and after the invasion, It is not just the complications of Iraq that have unwound this order. Even had Iraq been a glorious success, the method of its execution would have made utterly clear the unchallenged power of the United Statesand it is this exercise of unipolarity that has provoked a reaction around the world. The unipolar order of the last two decades is waning not because of Iraq but because of the broader diffusion of power across the world. Unipolarity has already ended in some areas Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek International, 2008, The Post-American World, p. 43 On some matters, unipolarity seems already to have ended. The European Union now represents the largest trade bloc on the globe, creating bipolarity, and as China and then other emerging giants gain size, the bipolar realm of trade might become tripolar and then multipolar. In every realm except military, similar shifts are underway. In general, however, the notion of a multipolar world, with four or five players of roughly equal weight, does not describe reality today or in the near future. Europe cannot act militarily or even politically as one. Japan and Germany are hamstrung by their past. China and India are still developing. Instead, the international system is more accurately described by Samuel Huntington's term "uni-multipolarity," or what Chinese geopoliticians call "many powers and one superpower." The messy language reflects the messy reality. The United States remains by far the most powerful country but in a world with several other important great powers and with greater assertiveness and activity from all actors. This hybrid international systemmore democratic, more dynamic, more open, more connectedis one we are likely to live with for several decades. It is easier to define what it is not than what it is, easier to describe the era it is moving away from than the era it is moving towardhence the post American world.
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Apolarity Now
Non-polarity now, unipolarity collapsing China Daily, March 11, 2008 (The author is a researcher with the Research Center of Contemporary World)
These words should not be taken lightly, as they are related to views on the status of the United States and its influence in today's world, assessment of damage the US has suffered in the war in Iraq and evaluation of the role of the so-called "BRIC" nations -Brazil, Russia, India and China - and "VISTA" countries -Vietnam, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey and Argentina. Also on Jan 18, a respected Japanese current affairs magazine carried an article titled "the non-polar world is becoming more complicated everyday", which quoted John Chipman, director-general and chief executive of the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies, as saying the "lack of an outstanding leader country" makes the world today a "polar-free" one: the world today is not moving toward orderly "multipolarization", but unstable "non-polarization". A "unipolar world" existed for a while after the Cold War; the US is a superpower no more, and the world is headed for "non-polarization". These concepts are inter-connected yet different and worth careful study. By "world structure" I mean the strategic structure constituted by individual powers (countries) or power groups (alliances of nations) capable of influencing the whole world significantly and the structural status quo they maintain in their interaction. The status of the US as a superpower reached its zenith after the Cold War as it single-mindedly pursued a unilateralist global strategy and there seemed to be only one pole left in the world; while in fact the world was in a relatively long transitional phase from a "bipolar" to "multipolar" structure. The transition to a multi-polar is continuing. Multi-polarization is a development trend, which does not mean we are already there. There is a relatively lengthy period of transition when a new one is finally established. The basic situation during this transitional period is that the US will enjoy the "sole superpower" edge unchallenged for a rather long time within "a setup featuring one superpower and multiple major powers", but none of the major powers are strong enough to rival the US and therefore have to find solace in statements such as "superpowers" no longer exist. If we see "the sole superpower" the US as one pole, then we probably should view the "multiple major powers" as a collective "para-pole". It is these "pole" and "para-pole" that form the multi-polar world structure, while the ideas of "unipolar world" and "non-polar world" do not reflect the reality of today's world. The number of "multiple major powers" is growing and the new comers are developing nations or their alliances only, such as certain members of the BRIC nations and VISTA countries and perhaps the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The ongoing accumulation and advancement of regional multi-polarization will complement and enrich the multi-polarization of the world.
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Economic Decline Now
Economic power shifting away from the U.S.
Conn Hallinan, Foreign Policy in Focus, January 30, 2008, http://www.alternet.org/audits/75223/
Rather than the "American Century" the Bush administration neo-conservatives predicted, it is increasingly a world where regional alliances and trade associations in Europe and South America have risen to challenge Washington's once undisputed domination. When Argentina thumbed its nose at the U.S.-dominated World Bank and International Monetary Fund, it had the powerful Mercosur trade association to back it up. When the United States tried to muscle Europe into ending agricultural subsidies (while keeping its own) the European Union refused to back down. And now India, China, and Russia are drifting toward a partnership -- alliance is too strong a word -- that could transform global relations and shift the power axis from Washington to New Delhi, Beijing, and Moscow. It is a consortium of convenience, as the interests of the three countries hardly coincide on all things. U.S. share of the global GDP is declining
Roger Altman, Chair and CEO of Evercore Partners, He was U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary in 1993-94.Foreign Affairs, February 2009, The Great Crash, 2008 Subtitle: A Geopolitical Setback for the West, p. 2 Or, as Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan said more diplomatically, "The teachers now have some problems." This coincides with the natural and very long-term movement away from the U.S.-centric world that started after the fall of the Berlin Wall two decades ago . CHINA'S GAIN This movement also reflects the rapid rise of other economies, especially China and India. The U.S. share of world GDP had been declining for seven years before the financial crisis hit. And it looks increasingly likely that China's GDP will surpass the United States' at some point during the next 25-30 years.
U.S. global economic power has collapsed
Salon.com, April 1, 2009 , p. online In a preview of the G-20 summit meeting Edward Luce and Krishna Guha write in the Financial Times that the United States' reputation as economic role model is kaput. The "soft power" of the U.S. private financial sector has also been devastated by the economic turmoil. Under George W. Bush, U.S. officials used to urge countries such as China to embrace the likes of Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch and use them as engines of domestic transformation -- an idea no one is advancing today.
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Economic Decline Now
Budget collapses destroys readiness
Congressional Quarterly Weekly, March 15, 2009, p. online Probably not this year, but at least by the next one, the Defense Department will have to start making do with less. Eight years of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, and six years of ever-larger emergency war budgets, will begin to give way to more modest defense budgets as the nation climbs out of a credit crisis and a deep and worldwide recession, only to face the prospect of inflation . "One thing we have known for many months," Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates told the Senate Armed Services Committee on Jan. 27, "is that the spigot of defense funding that opened on 9/11 is closing." "With two major campaigns ongoing," Gates said, "the economic crisis and resulting budget pressures will force hard choices on this department." A month later, Sen. John McCain of Arizona, the committee's ranking Republican, told his colleagues bluntly, "A train wreck is coming. " Look at the president's 10-year budget," McCain said on March 3, "and you'll see a decrease, overall decrease, in defense spending." At the same time, the armed forces are under pressure to repair the damage, in materiel and manpower, wrought by the fighting in Iraq and what will probably be more combat in Afghanistan, while continuing to modernize and reorganize to meet other possible threats elsewhere in the world.
U.S. global hegemony has collapsed
Robert A. Pape is professor of political science at the University of Chicago, Chicago Tribune, March 8, 2009, p. 29 For nearly two decades, the U.S. has been viewed as a global hegemon -- vastly more powerful than any major country in the world. Since 2000, however, our global dominance has fallen dramatically. During the Bush administration, the self-inflicted wounds of the Iraq war, growing government debt, increasingly negative current account balances and other internal economic weaknesses cost the U.S. real power in a world of rapidly spreading knowledge and technology. Simply put, the main legacy of the Bush years has been to leave the U.S. as a declining power.
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U.S. Decline Now Multipolarity Now
Multipolarity now
Fred Kaplan is the national security columnist for Slate and the author of "Daydream Believers: How a Few Grand Ideas Wrecked American Power," due out this week, Los Angeles Times, February 3, 2008, http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/opinion/la-op-kaplan3feb03,1,459094.story The United States has emerged from the tectonic shift as something more like an ordinary country -- a world power but not a superpower. This is unfamiliar territory for Americans. For half a century, we had been a superpower in a world that was tightly structured. Now we're upper-middle management in a world without big bosses -- a world that's either becoming multipolar or teetering toward anarchy.
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U.S. Decline Now Perception
Perception of U.S. decline now Charleston Gazette, 1-27, 8
But here's what is different this year: The rich and the powerful at Davos are already looking beyond the United States as present and future global leader. The talk is about whether emerging economies, primarily China, India and resource-rich Russia, can pick up the economic slack if America falters and maintain global growth. No one underestimates the continued importance of America. But a series of policy setbacks - the failure to foresee or head off this mortgage debacle, the decline of the dollar, the continuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq - has created the sense that the era of the American hyperpower is history. George W. Bush is already regarded as a lame duck; the meager results of his recent trip to the Middle East showed how little he is able to achieve. "Our failed economic and political policies have caused us to become increasingly irrelevant," says Philadelphia executive John Strackhouse, senior partner in Heidrick & Struggles. His words echoed other comments I heard my first day here. He worries about an outflow of capital and talent to Asia, leading to permanent job losses. "China has a 3-1 ratio of engineers to the United States," he notes. The unease about America's ability to right its own ship is reflected in the subject matter of many Davos panels. The themes at Davos, as I've observed year after year, have an uncanny knack for reflecting global trends. One panel is titled "Rebuilding Brand America: Five Suggestions for the Future President." The blurb for the panel reads: "Global opinion surveys consistently show that the level of confidence in the U.S. is declining in a number of areas. How should the next U.S. president reverse the trend and rebuild the brand equity of the country?"
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U.S. Decline Now EU/China Will Supplant U.S. Leadership
EU and China undermine U.S. global leadership
Parag Khanna, Senior Research Fellow and Director, Global Governance Initiative, New America Initiative, January 28, 2008, New York Times Magazine, Waving Goodbye to Hegemony, http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/waving_goodbye_hegemony_6604 At best, America's unipolar moment lasted through the 1990s, but that was also a decade adrift. The post-cold-war "peace dividend" was never converted into a global liberal order under American leadership. So now, rather than bestriding the globe, we are competing -- and losing -- in a geopolitical marketplace alongside the world's other superpowers: the European Union and China. This is geopolitics in the 21st century: the new Big Three. Not Russia, an increasingly depopulated expanse run by Gazprom.gov; not an incoherent Islam embroiled in internal wars; and not India, lagging decades behind China in both development and strategic appetite. The Big Three make the rules -- their own rules -- without any one of them dominating. And the others are left to choose their suitors in this postAmerican world.
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U.S. Decline Now Europe Will Supplant U.S. Leadership
Europe growing at the expense of the U.S.
Parag Khanna, Senior Research Fellow and Director, Global Governance Initiative, New America Initiative, January 28, 2008, New York Times Magazine, Waving Goodbye to Hegemony, http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/waving_goodbye_hegemony_6604 Robert Kagan famously said that America hails from Mars and Europe from Venus, but in reality, Europe is more like Mercury -- carrying a big wallet. The E.U.'s market is the world's largest, European technologies more and more set the global standard and European countries give the most development assistance. And if America and China fight, the world's money will be safely invested in European banks. Many Americans scoffed at the introduction of the euro, claiming it was an overreach that would bring the collapse of the European project. Yet today, Persian Gulf oil exporters are diversifying their currency holdings into euros, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran has proposed that OPEC no longer price its oil in "worthless" dollars. President Hugo Chvez of Venezuela went on to suggest euros. It doesn't help that Congress revealed its true protectionist colors by essentially blocking the Dubai ports deal in 2006. With London taking over (again) as the world's financial capital for stock listing, it's no surprise that China's new state investment fund intends to locate its main Western offices there instead of New York. Meanwhile, America's share of global exchange reserves has dropped to 65 percent. Gisele Bndchen demands to be paid in euros, while Jay-Z drowns in 500 euro notes in a recent video. American soft power seems on the wane even at home. And Europe's influence grows at America's expense. While America fumbles at nation-building, Europe spends its money and political capital on locking peripheral countries into its orbit. Many poor regions of the world have realized that they want the European dream, not the American dream. Africa wants a real African Union like the E.U.; we offer no equivalent. Activists in the Middle East want parliamentary democracy like Europe's, not American-style presidential strongman rule. Many of the foreign students we shunned after 9/11 are now in London and Berlin: twice as many Chinese study in Europe as in the U.S. We didn't educate them, so we have no claims on their brains or loyalties as we have in decades past. More broadly, America controls legacy institutions few seem to want -- like the International Monetary Fund -- while Europe excels at building new and sophisticated ones modeled on itself. The U.S. has a hard time getting its way even when it dominates summit meetings -- consider the ill-fated Free Trade Area of the Americas -- let alone when it's not even invited, as with the new East Asian Community, the region's answer to America's Apec.
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U.S. Decline Now European Soft Power Outpacing U.S. Soft Power
European soft power exceeds U.S. soft power now
The Guardian, February 2, 2008, p. 27 Europe has its own vision of what world order should look like, which it increasingly pursues whether America likes it or not. The EU is now the most confident economic power in the world, regularly punishing the United States in trade disputes, while its superior commercial and environmental standards have assumed global leadership. Many Europeans view America's way of life as deeply corrupt, built on borrowed money, risky and heartless in its lack of social protections, and ecologically catastrophic. The EU is a far larger humanitarian aid donor than the US, while South America, east Asia and other regions prefer to emulate the "European Dream" than the American variant.
Europe gaining at the expense of the U.S. The Guardian, February 2, 2008, p. 27
And Europe's influence grows at America's expense. While America fumbles at nation-building, Europe spends its money and political capital on locking peripheral countries into its orbit. Many of the foreign students shunned by the US after 9/11 are now in London and Berlin: twice as many Chinese study in Europe as in the US.
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U.S. Decline NowChina Will Supplant U.S. Leadership
China is growing at the expense of the U.S.
Parag Khanna, Senior Research Fellow and Director, Global Governance Initiative, New America Initiative, January 28, 2008, New York Times Magazine, Waving Goodbye to Hegemony, http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/waving_goodbye_hegemony_6604 The East Asian Community is but one example of how China is also too busy restoring its place as the world's "Middle Kingdom" to be distracted by the Middle Eastern disturbances that so preoccupy the United States. In America's own hemisphere, from Canada to Cuba to Chvez's Venezuela, China is cutting massive resource and investment deals. Across the globe, it is deploying tens of thousands of its own engineers, aid workers, dambuilders and covert military personnel. In Africa, China is not only securing energy supplies; it is also making major strategic investments in the financial sector. The whole world is abetting China's spectacular rise as evidenced by the ballooning share of trade in its gross domestic product -- and China is exporting weapons at a rate reminiscent of the Soviet Union during the cold war, pinning America down while filling whatever power vacuums it can find. Every country in the world currently considered a rogue state by the U.S. now enjoys a diplomatic, economic or strategic lifeline from China, Iran being the most prominent example. Without firing a shot, China is doing on its southern and western peripheries what Europe is achieving to its east and south. Aided by a 35 million-strong ethnic Chinese diaspora well placed around East Asia's rising economies, a Greater Chinese Co-Prosperity Sphere has emerged. Like Europeans, Asians are insulating themselves from America's economic uncertainties. Under Japanese sponsorship, they plan to launch their own regional monetary fund, while China has slashed tariffs and increased loans to its Southeast Asian neighbors. T rade within the India-Japan-Australia triangle -- of which China sits at the center -- has surpassed trade across the Pacific. At the same time, a set of Asian security and diplomatic institutions is being built from the inside out, resulting in America's grip on the Pacific Rim being loosened one finger at a time. From Thailand to Indonesia to Korea, no country -- friend of America's or not -- wants political tension to upset economic growth. To the Western eye, it is a bizarre phenomenon: small Asian nation-states should be balancing against the rising China, but increasingly they rally toward it out of Asian cultural pride and an understanding of the historical-cultural reality of Chinese dominance. And in the former Soviet Central Asian countries -- the so-called Stans -- China is the new heavyweight player, its manifest destiny pushing its Han pioneers westward while pulling defunct microstates like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as oil-rich Kazakhstan, into its orbit. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization gathers these Central Asian strongmen together with China and Russia and may eventually become the "NATO of the East."
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U.S. Decline Now China Will Overtake the U.S. Economically
China will overtake the U.S. economically
New Yorker, April 21, 2008 Still, the current economic growth of China--and also of India and Russia--is impressive. In "Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade" (Harcourt; $26), the former Economist editor Bill Emmott refers to a World Bank analysis predicting that both China and India "could almost triple their economic output" in the next ten years or so. By the late twenty-twenties, China could overtake the United States as the world's biggest economy. The spectacle of Chinese turbo-capitalism is inspiring Marco Polo-like awe in some Western commentators. Mark Leonard, the author of "What Does China Think?" (PublicAffairs; $22.95), reports, with more enthusiasm than plausibility, that "a town the size of London shoots up in the Pearl River Delta every year." Parag Khanna, in "The Second World" (Random House; $29), informs us, rather gleefully, that "Asia is shaping the world's destiny--and exposing the flaws of the grand narrative of Western civilization in the process. Because of the East, the West is no longer master of its own fate."
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Collapse Inevitable - Counterbalancing
COUNTERBALANCING CAUSES AN INEVITABLE COLLAPSE OF HEGEMONY Roger Burbach, director of the Center for the Study of the Americas based in Berkeley, 2003
[Imperial Overstretch in Iraq, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/BUR305A.html ] This is a flawed interpretation of the historic impact of the Iraqi intervention. Rather than the triumph of a new imperial order, the war may actually accelerate the decline of U.S. hegemony. In late 2002, Charles Kupchan, a professor at Georgetown University and a member of the National Security Council in the Clinton administration, released a book titled "The End of the American Era." Cast in mainstream political language, Kupchan argues "Pax Americana" will end due to "the rise of alternative centers of power and a declining and unilateralist U.S. internationalism." Even before France and Germany headed up the Western opposition to the U.S .war in Iraqi, Kupchan asserted that the European Union would be in the forefront of an emergent "multipolar world" that will eclipse U.S. ascendancy in the early part of the twenty-first century.
ECONOMIC COUNTERBALANCING AGAINST THE U.S. IS INEVITABLE
Chalmers Johnson, professor emeritus of political science @ the University of California, San Diego, President and cofounder of the Japan Policy Research Institute, 2000 [The Consequences of Empire excerpted from the book Blowback The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Blowback_CJohnson/CostsConsequences_BCJ.html ] Meanwhile, resentment is growing over American exploitation of the global economic crisis. Big American companies are buying up factories and businesses in East Asia and elsewhere at ludicrously low prices. Procter & Gamble, for instance, has picked up several state-of-the-art Korean factories for next to nothing. Morgan Stanley, Bankers Trust, Salomon Brothers, and CS First Boston expect returns of around 20 percent on their purchases of real estate loans in Tokyo. In Thailand, any number of American investment companies have been buying up service, steel, and energy companies at concessionary prices. In June 1998, a Washington-based merchant bank, the Carlyle Group, sent a group of its executives, led by its adviser, former president George Bush, to Bangkok to "evaluate opportunities." It plans to invest $500 million in Thailand. Asia Properties, a San Diego firm founded in April 1998, was created specifically "to take advantage of the fire-sale real estate prices along Bangkok's main thoroughfares." According to its vice president, "Asia is going through the largest transference of assets in the history of the world.'' Many East Asians call this "vulture capitalism" and suspect that it was the true purpose of the economic advice given to them in the first place. The Americans buying these foreclosed properties in East Asia may believe they are merely responding to the signals of normal market forces, but they would be fools to believe that the sellers agree with them. Countries like Thailand and Indonesia have long been on the receiving end of U.S. pressures to deregulate and open their countries to international investors. As a result of doing so they now find themselves destitute, selling off what they built with their own labor in the years since the Vietnam War ended. It is only a matter of time until the small nations of East Asia get tired of this American bullying and find a suitable leader to create an anti-American coalition
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Collapse Inevitable -- Public Support
COLLAPSE IS INEVITABLE LACK OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FORCES WITHDRAWAL
Asia Times, 2006
[The US: Too late for empire 7-28, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/HG28Aa01.html] But if there is one clear lesson that the history of recent empires has taught, it is that modern peoples have both the will and the capacity to reject imperial rule and assert control over their own destinies. Less interested in the contest between East and West than in running their own countries, they yearned for self-determination, and they achieved it. The British and French imperialists were forced to learn this lesson over the course of a century. The Soviet Union took a little longer, and itself collapsed in the process. The United States, determined in the period in question to act in an imperial fashion, has been the dunce in the class, and indeed under the current administration has put forward imperial claims that dwarf those of imperial Britain at its height. It is only because the United States has attempted the impossible abroad that it has had to blame people at home for the failure.
PUBLIC REJECTS U.S. ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM
Chalmers Johnson, professor emeritus of political science @ the University of California, San Diego, President and cofounder of the Japan Policy Research Institute, 2006 [CHINA REPLACED THE UNITED STATES AS THE TOP EXPORTER TO JAPAN, http://agonist.org/20060515/the_china_factor_and_the_overstretch_of_the_us_hegemony] As I argue in Chapter Nine of The Sorrows of Empire, globalization has now been revealed as a hoax sponsored by the United States. Globalization is an attempt to camouflage American economic imperialism by claiming that American behavior abroad is dictated by ineluctable forces and technological developments, not by conscious policy. It was the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, that more or less spelled the end of globalization. Whereas the Clinton Administration strongly espoused economic imperialism, the Bush government was unequivocally committed to military imperialism. However, whenever globalization might damage American economic interests, it is invariably ignored (as in George W. Bush's protection of the domestic steel industry and America's agro businesses). Increasingly even people who believed in pro-globalization solutions to international economic and environmental problems threw up their hands in despair. The only people left who believe in globalization are university professors of economics, who continue year-in and year-out to recycle their old lectures.
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Soft Balancing Now
SOFT BALANCING HAS BEGUN
Francis Fukuyama, International Relations Professor @ Johns Hopkins, AMERICA AT THE CROSSROADS: DEMOCRACY, POWER, AND THE NEOCONSERVATIVE LEGACY, 2006, pp. 189-90 The United States is not going to provoke France and Germany into forming a hostile military coalition, but it has provoked a great deal of unity among normally fractious Europeans around the view that the irresponsible exercise of American power is one of the chief problems in contemporary politics. This has already resulted in "soft balancing," where countries like Germany and France have tried to block American initiatives or refused cooperation when asked for it.' Similarly, Asian countries have been busy building regional multilateral organizations because Washington has been perceived as not particularly interested in their needs. Hugo Chavez in Venezuela has been using oil revenues to detach countries in the Andes and Caribbean from the American orbit, while Russia and China are collaborating to slowly push the United States out of Central Asia.
THE EU IS SOFT BALANCING WITH CHINA, THREATEN THE U.S. IN EAST ASIA
Stephen Walt, Harvard, TAMING AMERICAN POWER, 2005, p. 128-9 A potentially more significant illustration of this sort of soft balancing is the expanding strategic partnership between the EU and China. Not only is each now the other's largest trading partner, but Chinese leaders now hold regular meetings with European officials and each now speaks openly of their strategic "partnership." Plans are underway for military exchanges, several European countries have already conducted search-and-rescue exercises with Chinese naval forces, and other forms of strategic dialogue are increasingly frequent. Perhaps most important of all, the EU is about to lift the arms embargo it imposed after Tiananmen Square-despite strong U.S. pressure to keep it in force-a step that will facilitate China's efforts to increase its military power. These developments are still relatively modest and are probably not inspired by a desire to balance U.S. power directly; but the trend highlights Europe's increasing independence from the United States and its willingness to take steps that could complicate U.S. strategic planning in East Asia. Given their shared preference for a more multipolar world in which U.S. power is at least somewhat constrained, it is hardly surprising that Europe and China are beginning to move closer together."
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Military Power Wont Secure Our Leadership
OUR MILITARY POWER MAY BE GREATER, BUT OUR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP HAS COLLAPSED
Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter, CSIS, SECOND CHANCE: THREE PRESIDENTS AND THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 181 In a word, badly. Though in some dimensions, such as the military, American power may be greater in 2006 than in 1991, the country's capacity to mobilize, inspire, point in a shared direction and thus shape global realities has significantly declined. Fifteen years after its coronation as global leader, America is becoming a fearful and lonely democracy in a politically antagonistic world.
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Status Quo Hard Power Causes Counterbalancing
The status quo U.S. focus on promoting hard-power is alienating the rest of the world. A dramatic increase in foreign aid is needed to boost U.S. soft power
The Boston Globe, November 7, 2007, p. A2 The next US president must expand American involvement in the United Nations and other international bodies and dramatically increase foreign aid - especially among Muslim countries - to reverse the steep decline in American influence and enhance national security, a bipartisan group of politicians, business executives, and academics said in a report yesterday. The report, titled "A Smarter and Safer America," also condemned what it called the American "exporting of fear" since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, and criticized the use of "hard power," military might, as the main component of US foreign policy instead of the "soft power" of positive US influences.
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Apolarity Collapses Multilateralism
Nonpolarity collapses multilateralism
Richard N. Haass, President, Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs , May/June 2008 ,
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html?mode=print
Nonpolarity complicates diplomacy. A nonpolar world not only involves more actors but also lacks the more predictable fixed structures and relationships that tend to define worlds of unipolarity, bipolarity, or multipolarity. Alliances, in particular, will lose much of their importance, if only because alliances require predictable threats, outlooks, and obligations, all of which are likely to be in short supply in a nonpolar world. Relationships will instead become more selective and situational. It will become harder to classify other countries as either allies or adversaries; they will cooperate on some issues and resist on others. There will be a premium on consultation and coalition building and on a diplomacy that encourages cooperation when possible and shields such cooperation from the fallout of inevitable disagreements. The United States will no longer have the luxury of a "You're either with us or against us" foreign policy.
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Hegemony Declining Asia
War on terror has undermined U.S. influence in Asia
Yoichi Kato is bureau chief of the American General Bureau of the Asahi Shimbun, Fall 2008, Washington Quarterly, p. 165 Return from 9/11 PTSD to Global Leader Moreover, the challenges facing the United States do not come only from Islamic extremism or the Middle East. Various challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, especially the rise of China, must also be addressed. The failure of the Iraq war and the war on terrorism has had an enormous impact on U.S. standing in the Asia Pacific. It has reduced U.S. influence among the policy elites and the general publics of nations throughout the region. The United States is now often perceived as a not-socapable and sometimes insecure country despite its powerful hard-power economic and military assets. One of the most telling examples of U.S. insecurity is the way the United States scrambled to respond to the region's initiation of a new multilateral policy forum in 2005, the East Asia Summit, which does not include the United States. Koizumi first proposed the summit in 2002. Yet, the Bush administration perceived the initiative as a strategic move by China to marginalize the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which the United States regards as the mainstay of multilateral cooperation in the region. Even though the U.S. government refrained from making an open criticism of the plan, they expressed intense frustration to the Japanese government. At one point, the Japanese government ironed out a compromise to offer observer status to the United States, but the United States flatly rejected it. One U.S. official asked, "The United States owns the Pacific. Why do we have to sit in the back of the room and take notes?" 5 Instead of accepting the observer status, the United States quietly accused Japan of being naive in working with China to establish a new regional forum. The prevailing perception among the regional states was that this kind of reaction showed U.S. weakness and a lack of confidence rather than strength.
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Hegemony Declining - - China Power Increasing General
China boosting all forms of power hard, soft, and military
Khaleej Times (United Arab Emirates), April 5, 2009 This February Xi Jinping, China's vice-president and heir presumptive to Hu Jintao, sounded off to a Chinese audience in Mexico about rich, powerful countries "messing around" with poorer ones. Now who could he be thinking of? Last year a senior official in China's defence ministry said the world should not be surprised if China builds its own aircraft carrier. Beijing and Washington have publicly locked horns about the level of Chinese defence spending. At the same time, the Chinese are fascinated by the idea, originally promoted by an American scholar, of a G2 within the G20. China and the United States - this Group of Two - should be to the world what the Franco-German couple used to be to Europe. China is also investing more in public diplomacy, with nearly 300 Confucius Institutes around the world, increased international broadcasting, and Chinese leaders placing op-ed pieces in western newspapers. "Soft power" is well on the way to becoming a Chinese phrase. So in all three key dimensions of power economic, military and soft - China is stepping up its game . There's many a slip twixt cup and lip. China has so far weathered the economic crisis better than America. Millions of suddenly unemployed migrant workers have not yet shaken the system.
Chinas military, economic, and soft power are all growing
China Post, April 1, 2009, p. online With the issue of Taiwan independence having subsided, China is turning its attention to the question of Tibet, using its newly acquired power, soft and hard, to impress upon all countries that if they want good relations with Beijing, they will have to give up support of the Dalai Lama. China's determination to get its way was illustrated by its decision to cancel a summit meeting with the European Union in December because of French President Nicolas Sarkozy's decision to meet the exiled Tibetan leader. One sign of China's success was the decision by South Africa to bar the Dalai Lama, a winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, from taking part in a peace conference. China knows it is unlikely that any country in Asia, Africa or Latin America will stand in its way. Its focus is on the West. In March, the United States Congress, to mark the 50th anniversary of the failed Tibetan uprising, voted 422 to 1 to adopt a resolution calling on Beijing to end repression in Tibet. At the same time, the European Parliament passed a resolution urging dialogue between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government. China clearly feels the tide is turning. The successful Olympic Games last summer was a demonstration of the country's greatly enhanced soft power, while its dispatching of a naval task force to the Somali coast and of patrol vessels to the South China Sea are signs of its increasing hard power . Beijing's demands for reform of the international financial system ahead of the G-20 meeting in London are another reflection of its new-found influence amid the global economic crisis, which it clearly sees as an opportunity .
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Hegemony Declining China Power Increasing Economy
China ascending economically
New York Times, April 2, 2009, p. 12 Evidence of China's ascension is everywhere. Three years ago, China did not have a single bank among the world's top 20, measured by market capitalization. Today the top three are Chinese . (In 2006, the United States had 7 of the top 20 banks, including the top 2; today it has 3, and the biggest, Morgan Stanley, is rated fifth.) China's government-owned enterprises are buying companies, technology and resources worldwide. This year they have spent $13 billion in Europe, and plan new investments in the United States. China has struck long-term oil contracts with Brazil and Russia, and is angling for a more than $20 billion stake in three Australian mining companies . China holds $1 trillion in United States government debt, and that is but half the foreign reserves generated by its huge trade surplus and investment inflows. The rest of the West owes China money, too.
Chinas economic growth is strong
New York Times, April 2, 2009, p. 12 That does not negate China's newly enhanced status. With most of the world in financial collapse, China's economy has suddenly become too big -- and too healthy, expected to grow by at least 6.5 percent this year -- for the rest of the world to ignore.
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Hegemony Declining -- China Power Increasing -- Military
China naval power expanding while U.S. naval power is declining Robert D. Kaplan, National Correspondent for The Atlantic and a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2009, Center Stage for the Twenty-First Century, pp. 16-31 Meanwhile, by sometime in the next decade, China's navy will have more warships than the United States'. China is producing and acquiring submarines five times as fast as is the United States. In addition to submarines, the Chinese have wisely focused on buying naval mines, ballistic missiles that can hit moving targets at sea, and technology that blocks signals from GPS satellites, on which the U.S. Navy depends. (They also have plans to acquire at least one aircraft carrier; not having one hindered their attempts to help with the tsunami relief effort in 2004-5.) The goal of the Chinese is "sea denial," or dissuading U.S. carrier strike groups from closing in on the Asian mainland wherever and whenever Washington would like. The Chinese are also more aggressive than U.S. military planners. Whereas the prospect of ethnic warfare has scared away U.S. admirals from considering a base in Sri Lanka, which is strategically located at the confluence of the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, the Chinese are constructing a refueling station for their warships there. Chinas military and economic power are increasing
Joseph Nye, Harvard, Chinadaily.com.cn, March 26, 2009, p. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/200903/26/content_7617363.htm A: China has a lot to gain from soft power. China's economic and military power are clearly rising, and in a period when you have a rising power, it often creates fear in neighboring countries, and that often leads other countries to join together to resist the rising country. But if the rising country also has soft power, and it is able to make itself attractive, it reduces the amount of fear the other countries have, and that makes it less likely that the other countries will try to balance China's power.
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Hegemony Declining -- China Power Increasing Soft Power
Chinas soft power will continue to increase
Josephy Nye, Harvard, Chinadaily.com.cn, March 26, 2009, p. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/200903/26/content_7617363.htm Joseph Nye, professor of the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, is the creator of the theory of "soft power". He was interviewed by masters degree student Ying Carol Yu recently. Nye gives his thoughts on issues including China's Soft Power, Sino-US Relations and China's Foreign Policies. Following is first part of the interview: Soft Power Implications Q: In what areas do you think China can further improve its soft power? Do you think one day China's soft power might catch up with that of the US? A: I think in the long term, China's soft power will definitely be increased, as long as China continues to liberalize and open up among other reforms as well. If China becomes more prosperous and democratic, that will increase Chinese soft power. I would expect that to be the case.
China working to boost its global soft power
Australian, April 8, 2009, p. 12 China's international bid for soft power comes with arm-twistin g, contends David Bandurski WHEN China's ideological chief, politburo member Li Changchun, met Prime Minister Kevin Rudd on March 21, his visit was undoubtedly part of an attempt by China to boost its global soft power. For months Communist Party leaders have spoken of this as an urgent need. Following an important use of the term by President Hu Jintao in October 2007, Li made the point more forcefully late last year. ``Communication capacity determines influence,'' he said. ``In the modern age, whatever nation's communication techniques are most advanced, whatever nation's communication capacity is strongest, it is that nation whose culture and core values are able to spread far and wide, that nation that has the most power to influence the world.'' Li spoke about the need to strengthen China's ``communication capacity'' at home and abroad to give China a more prominent place ``within the international public opinion structure''. China's propaganda campaign on Tibet, which in recent weeks has saturated its domestic media and sent salvos scudding overseas, reads like the opening act of this strangely antagonistic bid. The campaign, an all-out assault on the notion that Tibet is a troubled region, argues aggressively that human rights in Tibet have taken a dramatic turn for the better in the past 50 years and that Tibetan culture has been generously preserved by the Chinese Communist Party.
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Hegemony Declining -- China Power Increasing -- Asia
Chinas influence in Asia is rapidly expanding
Agence France Presse , April 8, 2009, p. online China and Japan will battle for influence in Southeast Asia at a key summit this week, holding out the promise of economic aid as the region reels from the impact of the global downturn. The Asian giants are trying to win not only the lion's share of the market of more than five hundred million people but also the hearts and minds of the region to expand their diplomatic and political sway. Tokyo and Beijing are the biggest contributors to a massive currency swap fund designed to provide emergency liquidity, which will be discussed at the three-day summit starting on Friday in the Thai resort of Pattaya. But they will be making separate efforts to woo the region, with China looking to capitalise on its continued growth despite the global meltdown even as Japan tries to mitigate its worst post-war recession. Analysts said the summit -- grouping the Association of Southeast Asian nations with regional partners China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand -would be an indication of the way the wind is blowing. "At the summit, the countries will probably remain in a cooperative tune to cope with the economic crisis. But in the long term, China will expand its economic power in the region over Japan," said Yoshinobu Yamamoto, professor of international politics at Japan's Aoyama Gakuin University. While Japan has traditionally relied on "soft power" and aid programmes, China is still widely seen as wielding its growing economic and military might in a bid to accumulate natural resources for its rapid expansion.
Chinas military spending is increasing
New York Times, April 2, 2009, p. 12 Just as clearly, China harbors global ambitions. Military spending has grown for years at a double-digit clip, though as a share of gross domestic product, it is half of the United States' military spending. China is slowly building a blue-water navy, and in December it sent three ships to the waters off Somalia to patrol against pirates, in the first modern active deployment of its warships beyond its home waters.
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Hegemony Declining Human Rights Leadership Declining
U.S. human rights leadership is collapsing
USA TODAY February 27, 2009, p. 10A When it comes to relationships, particularly in today's globalized world, countries are like people: complex, intertwined. Yet Secretary of State Hillary Clinton set off a controversy simply by bowing to that reality on a recent trip to China. The global economic crisis is too important, she said, to press hard and publicly on human rights in a ritual in which the back-and-forth is always the same. For good measure, she added climate change and national security issues to the priority list. Clinton's comments have human rights advocates up in arms. The Obama administration, they say, is abandoning imprisoned dissidents, setting back the cause of repressed Tibetans and sending the signal that it will look the other way when abuses occur.
U.S. human rights credibility has collapsed
Yoichi Kato is bureau chief of the American General Bureau of the Asahi Shimbun, Fall 2008, Washington Quarterly, p. 165 Return from 9/11 PTSD to Global Leader As such, the United States can no longer champion human rights, with its credibility severely undermined by the controversial treatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, nor can American society proclaim its erstwhile openness. Immigration controls have been made ever stricter, security checks have been stepped up across the nation, and people remain fearful of the next terrorist attack. For foreigners, it is not as fun and comfortable to live in the United States as it once was. It seems the free, open, and just America has gone, as has its exceptional soft power and the unique global leadership role that power guaranteed. Former deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage has lamented that following the September 11 attacks, Americans "started exporting something that's very foreign to the United States: we started exporting our anger and our fear, rather than more traditional exports of hope, opportunity, [and] optimism." 1 Some of the changes in how the United States acts have probably been inevitable in order to secure the nation from the new type of threats that emerged on September 11, 2001. In the eyes of the rest of the world, however, some of those changes seem to be unjustifiable overreactions, difficult to understand and to support.
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Multipolarity Now
Financial system multipolar now
Reuters, October 9, 2008, http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=081009060122.8tk2vw73&show_article=1
The Group of Seven meeting will bring together finance ministers and central bankers on Friday from the United States, Germany, Japan, France, Britain, Italy and Canada for some collective-thinking on the credit crunch and crashing stocks. They are to be joined by counterparts from emerging markets including Brazil, Russia, India and China for an impromptu gathering of the expanded so-called G20 group.
The United States finds itself in a rare position of weakness, facing many allies that have been highly critical of its economic policy and regulatory system blamed for the problems. The gathering will be closely watched by investors, who are eager to see solutions and cross-border action by the world's leading powers to help a return to normal lending practices and calm stock markets. US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson said Wednesday the meeting would be a forum "to discuss the steps that each of us are taking to confront this crisis and ways to further enhance our collective efforts." Treasury Under Secretary David McCormick said the meeting would be "heavily focused on current economic conditions, financial market developments and our collective and individual policy responses to recent financial market turmoil." A final statement from the group is expected late on Saturday. Paulson played down the possibility of a one-size-fits-all response to the crisis, however, stressing the different challenges by each country. The four European members of the G7 have themselves been unable to find a common response and other countries have declined to follow the example set by the United States despite pleas from Paulson. The US approved a 700-billion-dollar rescue package for financial firms last week that will see the Treasury buy up toxic debt from banks in a bid to encourage them to continue lending. A European source told AFP at the beginning of the week that it was difficult to predict what would be in the final
On Wednesday, leading central banks unleashed coordinated interest rate cuts on Wednesday in their latest attempt to counter the financial problems, caused by bad debts linked to declining house prices in the United States. Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso on Tuesday urged the G7 to send a "strong message" on the market turmoil. "If the G7 fails to
communique given the rapid developments in the crisis . send a strong message, it will have a big impact which I am concerned could spread to Japan," Aso told reporters. "I would like them to make an effort to reach an agreement that everybody can support," he said. Tension is expected at the meeting given recent comments by countries affected by the crisis. German officials in particular have been openly critical in the past weeks, saying the United States and Britain had delayed for years efforts to regulate financial markets that were out of control. "The United States lacked laws, a regulatory framework that would have prevented" what Social-Democrat Finance
"The USA will lose its superpower status in the global financial system. The world financial system is becoming multipolar," Steinbrueck said on September 25 in a speech to parliament.
Minister Peer Steinbrueck called "uncontrolled speculation" in an interview on September 28.
Financial crisis means economic multilateralism now
Lee Hudson Teslik, Associate Editor, CFR.org, 10-9, 8, Long-Term Implications of the Financial Crisis, http://www.cfr.org/publication/17489/future_of_financial_power.html?breadcrumb=%2F
Taking a step back from the fear gripping global financial markets, many analysts are starting to grapple with the long-term implications of the 2008 credit crisis. The financial breakdown, which originated in the United States, coincides with what many see as a shift from U.S. geopolitical dominance to a multipolar international framework. Here, Anne-Marie Slaughter, the dean of Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, discusses what she sees coming of the turmoil.Slaughter, a member of CFR's Board of Directors, says she doesn't see any city taking over as the world's financial superpower, even if New York loses its financial preeminence. Rather, she foresees a more integrated network in which financial firms do business in many different regional financial hubs. In terms of U.S. geopolitical influence more broadly, she fears a fiscal pinch will lead to reductions in U.S. foreign aid, with potentially harmful side effects both for U.S. security and overall strategy.
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Multipolarity Now
Globalization of financial capital now
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 109, 8, Long-Term Implications of the Financial Crisis, http://www.cfr.org/publication/17489/future_of_financial_power.html? breadcrumb=%2F I think on this one it's what Fareed Zakaria calls the rise of the rest. I lived in Shanghai for the last ten months, and Shanghai is booming, and Hong Kong is booming, and Singapore is booming. London was already growing enormously so I would have said that London and New York together were the greatest concentration of global capital. That trend will continue regardless of this financial crisis. The problem is that it's wrong to think that any one city can possibly be the source of global capital. If you look at the people who work in those cities, who work in New York, they spend their time hopscotching from one center to another. It makes much more sense to think of a network of global capitals that you can get capital from. All the major firms or the hedge funds or private equity firms operate in all of them.
No dominant international financial power now or in the future
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 109, 8, Long-Term Implications of the Financial Crisis, http://www.cfr.org/publication/17489/future_of_financial_power.html? breadcrumb=%2F The global financial system is the most integrated part of the world. It is way ahead, certainly, of any kind of global political integration, but [it's] even [ahead of] global social or global economic integration if what you're talking about is movement of labor. Capital is the easiest thing to move. Think about what Sam Palmisano, the head of IBM, calls the globally integrated enterprise. ArcelorMittal, the steel company, doesn't have a global headquarters. They meet in different countries around the world. That's already this notion that it is a combination of cities and countries that are the global financial system, and no one is going to be so dominant that you can talk about it in those terms.
Georgia proves the world is multipolar
Gulf News, September 1, 2008, p. online (Dr Abdullah Al Shayji is Professor of International Relations and the Head of the American Studies Unit- Kuwait University) Anthony Cordesman, the head of the Burke Chair in Strategy at the Centre of Strategic and International Studies, opined: "We need to face the fact that the time window in which the Soviet Union was in collapse and China was still a weak and uncertain power is over... Accordingly, if there is any lesson that can be drawn from the fighting in Georgia... America's so-called status as a 'superpower' does not prevent us from living in a multi-polar world in which America's 'real power' is sometimes challenged by Russia and China, and is at other times ignored because they see other strategic interests as more important".
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*** Uniqueness Issues Hegemony/Leadership High Now ***
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U.S. Hegemony Not Declining General
The U.S. is structurally superior to all other challengers and will remain so in the future
Heinrich Kreft, senior foreign policy advisor to the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the german bundestag, The World Today, February 2009 p. 11 During the presidential election campaign, both Barack Obama and his Republican opponent John McCain expressed the view that the United States was and ought to remain the guarantor of international stability and the indispensable stabilising power. Against the backdrop of the present financial and economic crisis and rekindled discussion about the decline of US power, it is easy to overlook the fact that America is structurally superior to all other countries and will remain so for the foreseeable future. THE GEOGRAPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE UNITED States, its material resources and human capital, its military strength and economic competitiveness as well as its liberal political and economic traditions, are the ingredients of superiority. It has the capacity to heal its own wounds like no other country. STRENGTHS The US not only possesses large deposits of natural resources and vast areas of productive farmland, but also enjoys favourable medium- and long-term demographic trends. Thanks to immigration and a high birth rate, it has a young population compared to Europe, Japan, Russia as well as China. This makes the burden of providing for an ageing population far less onerous. In spite of the present crisis, the economy, which accounts for more than a quarter of the world's gross domestic product (GDP), is essentially vibrant. Over the past twenty five years, its growth has been significantly higher than Europe's and Japan's; the economy is adaptable and more innovative than any other. It is the most competitive globally, with particular strengths in crucial strategic areas such as nanotechnology and bioengineering. The US has the best universities and research institutes and trains more engineers in relation to its population than any other major economy. It invests 2.6 percent of its GDP in higher education, compared with 1.2 percent in Europe and 1.1 percent in Japan. President Barack Obama's plan for more educational investment aims to maintain this advantage also against China, which is increasing its higher education investments. In the military domain too, no other country comes close to matching the capability of the US to project its power globally. America accounts for almost half of global military spending, six times more than China, its only potential rival. Current defence spending, however, at 4.2 percent of GDP, is still far below the double-digit Cold War peak. Even if the cost of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan runs at an annual figure of $125 billion, this is less than one per cent of GDP and hence considerably lower than the cost of the Vietnam war. In contrast to the 'hard power' of military strength, Iraq and the Guantnamo Bay and Abu Ghraib problems have severely dented the image and thereby diminished its 'soft power'. Nevertheless, the structural components of soft power remain intact, from US mass culture - the dominance of American global communications such as the internet and television - to the unfailing appeal of its universities.
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U.S. Hegemony Not Declining General
A decline in relative power is insignificant
Heinrich Kreft, senior foreign policy advisor to the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the german bundestag, The World Today, February 2009 p. 11 There is no doubt that the relative world power of the US is diminishing. The percentage contribution of the US economy to global GDP is falling because of growth in emerging economies. The global connections of the US economy are also expanding rapidly, particularly with China, which has replaced Japan as Washington's main creditor. And Europe has become the preferred partner formany countries. In spite of these developments there has been scarcely a sign of any significant 'ganging up' on the US, which has been extremely unpopular under President George Bush. No country or coalition has emerged as a credible rival, if we set aside the long-termp rospect that China might one day be able to mount a serious challenge. Europe's GDP is larger than that of the US, and in economic and fiscal policy the European Union has long been an equal partner, but for want of progress in political unification, the Europeans are not yet strategic world players; the EU is at best a major political power in the making . With German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy in charge, there has been a reversion to a more realistic view of the Union's role in the world than under their immediate predecessors, who harboured the perfectly serious intention of establishing the EU as a counterweight to American hyperpower'. Russia undoubtedly has the political will to challenge the US. Over the past two years, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitri Medvedev have scarcely missed an opportunity to stake their country's claim. With a national economy comparable in size to that of the Benelux countries, however, its economic basis is too weak and its dependence on energy exports revenue too great. These factors, along with a spectacular decline in the size of the population, which is already only half that of the US, are hardly the basis from which Russia could aspire to medium- or long-term global leadership. China has a great interest in internal and external stability. Although it has achieved an impressive economic, and hence political, upsurge over the past thirty years, the social and environmental debit side of this development is becoming ever more plainly visible. Since a high rate of economic growth, which is regarded as a prerequisite for the country's social stability, and thus its political stability, is dependent on exports and on imports of raw materials and energy sources, Beijing has a great interest in global free trade and stable international relations. India undoubtedly possesses great growth potential. But an oversized bureaucracy and inadequate infrastructure still weigh like millstones on its emerging economy. In addition, there are major social challenges and growing threats of terrorism, which came to light in the recent attacks in Mumbai. India likewise needs stability in the surrounding region to enable it to concentrate on these major domestic challenges. Japan has a declining, ageing population, and the idea of playing a leading role in international politics is alien to its political culture. In view of the growing strength of China, whose long-term political intentions are distrusted in Tokyo, Japan's relations with the US, particularly in security policy, have become even closer.
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U.S. Hegemony Not Declining -- General
U.S. decline claims poorly founded Stephen G. Brooks & William Wohlforth, government professors, Dartmouth, Foreign Affairs; March/April 2009, p49-63
Only a few years ago, pundits were absorbed in debates about American "empire." Now, the conventional wisdom is that the world is rapidly approaching the end of the unipolar system with the United States as the sole superpower. A dispassionate look at the facts shows that this view understates U.S. power as much as recent talk of empire exaggerated it. That the United States weighs more on the traditional scales of world power than has any other state in modern history is as true now as it was when the commentator Charles Krauthammer proclaimed the advent of a "unipolar moment" in these pages nearly two decades ago. The United States continues to account for about half the world's defense spending and one-quarter of its economic output. Some of the reasons for bearishness concern public policy problems that can be fixed (expensive health care in the United States, for example), whereas many of the reasons for bullishness are more fundamental (such as the greater demographic challenges faced by the United States' potential rivals). So why has opinion shifted so quickly from visions of empire to gloomy declinism? One reason is that the United States' successes at the turn of the century led to irrational exuberance, thereby setting unreasonably high standards for measuring the superpower's performance. From 1999 to 2003, seemingly easy U. S. victories in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq led some to conclude that the United States could do what no great power in history had managed before: effortlessly defeat its adversaries. It was only a matter of time before such pie-in-the-sky benchmarks proved unattainable. Subsequent difficulties in Afghanistan and Iraq dashed illusions of omnipotence, but these upsets hardly displaced the United States as the world's leading state, and there is no reason to believe that the militaries of its putative rivals would have performed any better. The United States did not cease to be a superpower when its policies in Cuba and Vietnam failed in the 1960s; bipolarity lived on for three decades. Likewise, the United States remains the sole superpower today.
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U.S. Hegemony Not Declining -- General
There is no rise of the rest
Stephen G. Brooks & William Wohlforth, government professors, Dartmouth, Foreign Affairs; March/April 2009, p49-63 Another key reason for the multipolar mania is "the rise of the rest." Impressed by the rapid economic growth of China and India, many write as if multipolarity has already returned. But such pronouncements mistake current trajectories for final outcomes--a common strategic error with deep psychological roots. The greatest concern in the Cold War, for example, came not from the Soviet Union's actually attaining parity with the United States but from the expectation that it would do so in the future. Veterans of that era recall how the launch of Sputnik in 1957 fed the perception that Soviet power was growing rapidly, leading some policymakers and analysts to start acting as if the Soviet Union were already as powerful as the United States. A state that is rising should not be confused with one that has risen, just as a state that is declining should not be written off as having already declined. China is generally seen as the country best positioned to emerge as a superpower challenger to the United States. Yet depending on how one measures GDP, China's economy is between 20 percent and 43 percent the size of the United States'. More dramatic is the difference in GDP per capita, for which all measures show China's as being less than 10 percent of the United States'. Absent a 1930s-style depression that spares potential U.S. rivals, the United States will not be replaced as the sole superpower for a very long time. Real multipolarity--an international system of three or more evenly matched powers--is nowhere on the horizon. Relative power between states shifts slowly.
No country can match U.S. power in the future
Stephen G. Brooks & William Wohlforth, government professors, Dartmouth, Foreign Affairs; March/April 2009, p49-63 When it comes to making, managing, and remaking international institutions, states remain the most important actors--and the United States is the most important of them. No other country will match the United States' combination of wealth, size, technological capacity, and productivity in the foreseeable future. The world is and will long remain a 1 + x world, with one superpower and x number of major powers. A shift from 1 + 3 to 1 + 4 or 5 or 6 would have many important consequences, but it would not change the fact that the United States will long be in a far stronger position to lead the world than any other state.
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U.S. Hegemony Not Declining -- General
Innovation means the U.S. will remain a global leader
Anne-Marie Slaughter, of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton, Foreign Affairs, January- February 2009, America's Edge Subtitle: Power in the Networked Century, p. 94 A nation's economic fate depends on its being able to maintain and nurture innovation. This past year, all the U.S. presidential candidates made repeated calls for a renewal of the conditions that had long made the United States the world leader in innovative technology. In the twenty-first century, corporations, civic organizations, and government agencies will increasingly operate by collecting the best ideas from around the globe. In such an environment, it is critical not only to stimulate domestic innovation but also to foster networks that can produce collaborative innovations across the globe . To this end, the United States needs to improve education and increase government investment in science and technology. But the most important U.S. edge in innovation is cultural. Fundamental flaws in China's political and economic systems will make it very difficult for China to move from being the world's factory to being the world's designer. The Chinese government is determined to develop innovation as if it were developing a fancy variety of soybeans, relying on industrial parks that mix equal parts technology, education, research, and recreation in
self-described "talent highlands." The results can be extraordinary, as I saw last year at the Shanghai Zizhu Science-Based Industrial Park. The park, built in just five years, has enormous university campuses, research headquarters for over 20 Asian and Western firms, and a residential complex. The aim is to inspire innovation through a balance of nature, science, and ecology, or, as its planners suggest, to create the "building blocks" for a future Chinese society, just like the building blocks for a new generation of skyscrapers. The park is awe-inspiring. "In China," our guide told us, "anything is possible." Looking at the pace, scale, and quality of the construction, it was quite possible to believe it. In the end, however, the Zizhu industrial park struck me as being similar to an aquacultural facility for manufacturing cultured pearls. But as all pearl lovers know, the richest innovations are created through unexpected and irregular irritations, not tightly controlled conditions. In 2003, the University of California alone generated more patents than either China or India. That same year, IBM generated five times as many patents as both countries combined. The problem is certainly not a lack of creativity on the part of Chinese or Indians; Silicon Valley is full of entrepreneurs from both groups. The issue is the surrounding culture, or what the urban studies theorist Richard Florida calls an "innovation ecosystem." At the same time that China is seeking to maintain political tranquility, it depends on continued growth powered by innovation, which requires conflict -- not violent conflict but positive, or constructive, conflict, the kind of conflict that produces non-zero-sum solutions. This is the kind of conflict found on American playing fields, in American courtrooms, and in the American political system. It is the conflict of structured competition, in which losers have a chance to win another day and everyone has a stake in continually improving the game. It is also the conflict of creative destruction, the process of destroying old business models to make way for new ones. Most important, a culture of constructive conflict rewards challenging authority in every domain. Perhaps the best example is Google, a company in which hierarchy is almost
. In the United States, educational institutions have long emphasized critical thinking in ways that China and other countries are now trying to emulate. But a culture of innovation requires more than the ability to critique. It requires saying what you think, rather than what you believe your boss wants to hear, something many Western managers struggle fruitlessly to encourage in China. A culture that requires a constant willingness to reimagine the world is not one that the Chinese Communist Party is likely to embrace. Indeed, a culture of innovation requires the encouragement of conflict within a larger culture of transparency and trust, placing a premium on cross-cultural competence. It is a cul ture for which Americans are ideally suited by both temperament and history.
nonexistent. Individuals are encouraged to go their own way, come up with their own ideas, and counter orthodoxies at every turn
U.S. global credibility has collapsed
Nicholas Kristoff, January 23, 2009, p. A13 The second reassuring theme has to do with "hard power" and "soft power," in the terminology of Joseph Nye, a Harvard professor. In the Bush-Cheney years, America sought to rely overwhelmingly on military "hard power," and the result was setbacks around the world, from Iran's accelerated nuclear program to North Korea's processing of plutonium for a half-dozen nuclear weapons (compared with zero during the Clinton presidency). As my colleague David Sanger documents in his superb new book, "The Inheritance": "We pursued a path that has left us less admired by our allies, less feared by our enemies, and less capable of convincing the rest of the world that our economic and political model is worthy of emulation."
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U.S. Hegemony Not Declining -- General
U.S is an entrepreneurial leader
The Economist, March 14, 2009, p. http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13216037 FOR all its current economic woes, America remains a beacon of entrepreneurialism. Between 1996 and 2004 it created an average of 550,000 small businesses every month. Many of those small businesses rapidly grow big. The world's largest company, Wal-Mart, was founded in 1962 and did not go public until a decade later; multi-million dollar companies such as Google and Facebook barely existed a decade ago. America was the first country, in the late 1970s, to ditch managerial capitalism for the entrepreneurial variety. After the second world war J.K. Galbraith was still convinced that the modern corporation had replaced "the entrepreneur as the directing force of the enterprise with management". Big business and big labour worked with big government to deliver predictable economic growth. But as that growth turned into stagflation, an army of innovators, particularly in the computer and finance industries, exposed the shortcomings of the old industrial corporation and launched a wave of entrepreneurship. America has found the transition to a more entrepreneurial economy easier than its competitors because entrepreneurialism is so deeply rooted in its history. It was founded and then settled by innovators and risk-takers who were willing to sacrifice old certainties for new opportunities. American schoolchildren are raised on stories about inventors such as Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Edison. Entrepreneurs such as Andrew Carnegie and Henry Ford are celebrated in monuments all over the place. One of the country's most popular television programmes, currently being recycled as a film, features the USS Enterprise boldly going where no man had gone before.
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U.S. Hegemony Not Declining -- General
U.S. benefits in a wiki-dominated world
Anne-Marie Slaughter, of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton, Foreign Affairs, January- February 2009, America's Edge Subtitle: Power in the Networked Century, p. 94 THE WORLD OF WIKIS Starting with Alexis de Tocqueville, nearly every observer of American culture has noted that Americans are inveterate joiners, volunteers, and debaters. Today, however, instead of sewing circles, debating societies, and charity bake sales, Americans have MySpace, blogs, and the Clinton Global Initiative. These qualities are evident in a growing number of collaborative enterprises, both online and off. In the world of wikis, perhaps best exemplified by Wikipedia, ideas are challenged, edited, and challenged again. The final product is the result of a different and gentler kind of adversarial process than that found in the U.S. legal system. But the premise is the same: multiple minds clashing and correcting one another in pursuit of the truth. The work of one contributor is open and available for others to use. Participants in this process are trusted to not take advantage of that openness but instead add their own contributions. In a world that favors decentralization and positive conflict, the United States has an edge . Although trust and transparency are not unique to the United States, it is still one of the most open societies in the world. The Internet world, the wiki world, and the networked world all began in the United States and radiated outward. The characteristics of those worlds are the keys to innovation and problem solving in the twenty-first century. In his book Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny, Robert Wright, a senior fellow at the New America Foundation, writes of human history as a steady process of increased exposure to complexity and the resulting ability to turn zero-sum problems into non-zero-sum solutions. The barbarian invasions that swept across Asia and Europe, for instance, were disastrous for many individual societies. Yet by adding new ideas and practices to the sum of human knowledge, the invaders spurred the process of innovation and problem solving. In other words, they brought progress. Today, the invaders are online rather than on horseback, and interaction is considerably more voluntary. The benefits will flow to those individuals and states that are most comfortable reaching across cultures. It will become increasingly necessary to appreciate and absorb contributions in any language and from any context. Here, however, the conventional wisdom depicts Americans as woefully ignorant of foreign geography, languages, and cultures. Many Americans may still fit this description. But many others -- immigrants and their children especially -- negotiate cultural differences every day in their schools, in their workplaces, and on the street. From Boston to Los Angeles, recently immigrated Africans, Arabs, East Asians, Latinos, South Asians, and Southeast Asians all rub shoulders with members of more established communities, both black and white. At the elite level, the top graduate schools in the United States offer a similar education in multicultural competence; many of the cross-cultural couples who are changing the face of global cities met at places such as Harvard and Stanford. Obama's parents may have been ahead of their time, but today far more young Americans than ever before are following their example. They are truly, as Zogby calls them, "the First Globals."
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U.S. Hegemony Not Declining Will be the Hegemon of the Future
U.S. will become the dominant global power in the future
Ilan Peleg is a professor of government and law, Providence Journal-Bulletin (Rhode Island), March 7, 2009, p. 5 Although some observers might believe that America s days as a world leader are numbered, the future looks significantly more promising. By the sheer size of its economic and military power, the creative inventiveness and ingenuity of its people, the diversity of its population, and the openness of its culture, the U.S. is destined to be among the top world leaders and, in all probability, the single most prominent global leader in decades to come.
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U.S. Hegemony Not Declining India Focused Inward
India is too focused inward to advance geopolitically
Roger Altman, Chair and CEO of Evercore Partners, He was U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary in 1993-94.Foreign Affairs, February 2009, The Great Crash, 2008 Subtitle: A Geopolitical Setback for the West, p. 2 India may also survive the crisis relatively unhurt. There, as in China, the financial system plays a small role in the overall economy. India also remains a fairly closed economy in terms of foreign investment, and so it is less dependent on external capital. Close observers expect India's growth to continue, perhaps at an annual rate of 6.5-7 percent. But India does not have nearly the wealth or the internal cohesion of China. This past fall, the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh narrowly avoided losing a parliamentary vote of no confidence and having to dissolve itself over opposition to the nuclear agreement it signed with the United States in 2005. The overall result is that India is inwardly focused and not particularly equipped to advance its geopolitical standing. Much of the rest of the world, however, has been hit hard by the crisis.
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U.S. Hegemony Not Declining
U.S legitimacy has not collapsed
Stephen G. Brooks & William Wohlforth, government professors, Dartmouth, Foreign Affairs; March/April 2009, p49-63 For analysts such as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger, the key reason for skepticism about the United States' ability to spearhead global institutional change is not a lack of power but a lack of legitimacy. Other states may simply refuse to follow a leader whose legitimacy has been squandered under the Bush administration; in this view, the legitimacy to lead is a fixed resource that can be obtained only under special circumstances. The political scientist G. John Ikenberry argues in After Victory that states have been well positioned to reshape the institutional order only after emerging victorious from some titanic struggle, such as the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, or World War I or II. For the neoconservative Robert Kagan, the legitimacy to lead came naturally to the United States during the Cold War, when it was providing the signal service of balancing the Soviet Union. The implication is that today, in the absence of such salient sources of legitimacy, the wellsprings of support for U.S. leadership have dried up for good. But this view is mistaken. For one thing, it overstates how accepted U.S. leadership was during the Cold War: anyone who recalls the Euromissile crisis of the 1980s, for example, will recognize that mass opposition to U.S. policy (in that case, over stationing intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe) is not a recent phenomenon. For another, it understates how dynamic and malleable legitimacy is. Legitimacy is based on the belief that an action, an actor, or a political order is proper, acceptable, or natural. An action--such as the Vietnam War or the invasion of Iraq--may come to be seen as illegitimate without sparking an irreversible crisis of legitimacy for the actor or the order. When the actor concerned has disproportionately more material resources than other states, the sources of its legitimacy can be refreshed repeatedly. After all, this is hardly the first time Americans have worried about a crisis of legitimacy. Tides of skepticism concerning U.S. leadership arguably rose as high or higher after the fall of Saigon in 1975 and during Ronald Reagan's first term, when he called the Soviet Union an "evil empire." Even George W. Bush, a globally unpopular U.S. president with deeply controversial policies, oversaw a marked improvement in relations with France, Germany, and India in recent years--even before the elections of Chancellor Angela Merkel in Germany and President Nicolas Sarkozy in France.
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U.S. Hegemony Not Declining
U.S. leadership will be sustained Stephen G. Brooks & William Wohlforth, government professors, Dartmouth, Foreign Affairs; March/April 2009, p49-63 Of course, the ability of the United States to weather such crises of legitimacy in the past hardly guarantees that it can lead
the system in the future. But there are reasons for optimism. Some of the apparent damage to U.S. legitimacy might merely be the result of the Bush administration's approach to diplomacy and international institutions. Key underlying conditions remain particularly favorable for sustaining and even enhancing U.S. legitimacy in the years ahead. The United States continues to have a far larger share of the human and material resources for shaping global perceptions than any other state, as well as the unrivaled wherewithal to produce public goods that reinforce the benefits of its global role. No other state has any claim to leadership commensurate with Washington's. And largely because of the power position the United States still occupies, there is no prospect of a counterbalancing coalition emerging anytime soon to challenge it. In the end, the legitimacy of a system's leader hinges on whether the system's members see the leader as acceptable or at least preferable to realistic alternatives. Legitimacy is not necessarily about normative approval: one may dislike the United States but think its leadership is natural under the circumstances or the best that can be expected.
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U.S. Hegemony Not Declining
Networking means the U.S. will continue to dominate the world
Anne-Marie Slaughter, of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton, Foreign Affairs, January- February 2009, America's Edge Subtitle: Power in the Networked Century, p. 94 Almost 30 years ago, the psychologist Carol Gilligan wrote about differences between the genders in their modes of thinking. She observed that men tend to see the world as made up of hierarchies of power and seek to get to the top, whereas women tend to see the world as containing webs of relationships and seek to move to the center. Gilligan's observations may be a function of nurture rather than nature; regardless, the two lenses she identified capture the differences between the twentieth-century and the twenty-first-century worlds. The twentieth-century world was, at least in terms of geopolitics, a billiard-ball world, described by the political scientist Arnold Wolfers as a system of self-contained states colliding with one another. The results of these collisions were determined by military and economic power. This world still exists today: Russia invades Georgia, Iran seeks nuclear weapons, the United States strengthens its ties with India as a hedge against a rising China. This is what Fareed Zakaria, the editor of Newsweek International, has dubbed "the post-American world," in which the rise of new global powers inevitably means the relative decline of U.S. influence. The emerging networked world of the twenty-first century, however, exists above the state, below the state, and through the state. In this world, the state with the most connections will be the central player , able to set the global agenda and unlock innovation and sustainable growth. Here, the United States has a clear and sustainable edge. THE HORIZON OF HOPE The United States' advantage is rooted in demography, geography, and culture. The United States has a relatively small population, only 20-30 percent of the size of China's or India's. Having fewer people will make it much easier for the United States to develop and profit from new energy technologies. At the same time, the heterogeneity of the U.S. population will allow Washington to extend its global reach. To this end, the United States should see its immigrants as living links back to their home countries and encourage a two-way flow of people, products, and ideas. The United States is the anchor of the Atlantic hemisphere, a broadly defined area that includes Africa, the Americas, and Europe. The leading countries in the Atlantic hemisphere are more peaceful, stable, and economically diversified than those in the Asian hemisphere. At the same time, however, the United States is a pivotal power, able to profit simultaneously from its position in the Atlantic hemisphere and from its deep ties to the Asian hemisphere. The Atlantic and Pacific Oceans have long protected the United States from invasion and political interference. Soon, they will shield it from conflicts brought about by climate change, just as they are already reducing the amount of pollutants that head its way. The United States has a relatively horizontal social structure -- albeit one that has become more hierarchical with the growth of income inequality -- as well as a culture of entrepreneurship and innovation. These traits are great advantages in a global economy increasingly driven by networked clusters of the world's most creative people. On January 20, 2009, Barack Obama will set about restoring the moral authority of the United States. The networked world provides a hopeful horizon. In this world, with the right policies, immigrants can be a source of jobs rather than a drain on resources, able to link their new home with markets and suppliers in their old homes. Businesses in the United States can orchestrate global networks of producers and suppliers . Consumers can buy locally, from revived local agricultural and customized small-business economies, and at the same time globally, from anywhere that can advertise online. The United States has the potential to be the most innovative and dynamic society anywhere in the world.
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U.S. Hegemony Not Declining
Connectivity and net-working mean the U.S. will dominate the 21st century
Anne-Marie Slaughter, of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton, Foreign Affairs, January- February 2009, America's Edge Subtitle: Power in the Networked Century, p. 94 The power that flows from this type of connectivity is not the power to impose outcomes. Networks are not directed and controlled as much as they are managed and orchestrated. Multiple players are integrated into a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts -- an orchestra that plays differently according to the vision of its conductor and the talent of individual musicians. Obama's team-based campaign, with its relatively flat structure and emphasis on individual organizers, is a model of the twenty-first century's management style. Most important, networked power flows from the ability to make the maximum number of valuable connections. The next requirement is to have the knowledge and skills to harness that power to achieve a common purpose. The United States is already following this model in a few specific ways. In combating terrorism, it has been able to stop planned attacks thanks to a dense global network of law enforcement officers, counterterrorism officials, and intelligence agencies. The U.S. government dramatically improved its standing in the Muslim world due to its swift and effective relief effort in Asia following the December 2004 tsunami. It coordinated an emergency-response strategy among government agencies and aid workers in Australia, India, Japan, and the United States itself. More recently, when the global financial crisis hit this past fall, the United States first reached out to central banks around the world to coordinate a monetary response and then reached out to central banks in key emerging markets to make sure their foreign currency needs were being met. From this vantage point, predictions of an Asian century -- such as those made by Kishore Mahbubani, a foreign policy scholar and dean of the Lee Kwan Yew School of Public Policy, in Singapore -- seem premature. Even Zakaria's argument about "the rise of the rest" takes on a different significance. If, in a networked world, the issue is no longer relative power but centrality in an increasingly dense global web, then the explosion of innovation and entrepreneurship occurring today will provide that many more points of possible connection. The twenty-first century looks increasingly like another American century -although it will likely be a century of the Americas rather than of just America.
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U.S. Hegemony Will Rebound
U.S. leadership will be restored now, China & Russia will also suffer
Francis Fukuyama; professor of International Political Economy at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, October 13, 2008, Newsweek, p. 29 American influence can and will eventually be restored. Since the world as a whole is likely to suffer an economic downturn, it is not clear that the Chinese or Russian models will fare appreciably better than the American version. The United States has come back from serious setbacks during the 1930s and 1970s, due to the adaptability of our system and the resilience of our people.
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No Counterbalancing Now
Counterbalancing arguments empirically false, more nations aligning with the U.S. than against Robert Kagan, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the author of The Return of History and the End of Dreams, September/October 2008, Foreign Affairs, THE NEXT administration has a chance to learn from the Bush administration's mistakes, as well as to build on the progress the Bush administration has made in correcting them. The United States' position in the world today is not nearly as bad as some claim. Predictions that other powers would join together in an effort to balance against the rogue superpower have proved inaccurate. Other powers are emerging, but they are not aligning together against the United States. China and Russia have an interest and a desire to reduce the scale of U.S. predominance and seek more relative power for themselves. But they remain as wary of each other as they are of Washington. Other rising powers, such as Brazil and India, are not seeking to balance against the United States. Indeed, despite the negative opinion polls, most of the world's great powers are drawing closer to the United States geopolitically. A few years ago, France's Jacques Chirac and Germany's Gerhard Schroder flirted with turning to Russia as a way of counterbalancing U.S. power. But now, France, Germany, and the rest of Europe are tending in the other direction. This is not out of a renewed affection for the United States. The more pro-U.S. foreign policies of French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel reflect their judgment that close but not uncritical relations with the United States enhance European power and influence. The eastern European nations, meanwhile, worry about a resurgent Russia States in Asia and the Pacific have drawn closer to the United States mostly out of concern about the rising power of China. In the mid-1990s, the U.S.-Japanese alliance was in danger of eroding. But since 1997, the strategic relationship between the two countries has grown stronger. Some of the nations of Southeast Asia have also begun hedging against a rising China. (Australia may be the one exception to this broad trend, as its new government is tilting toward China and away from the United States and other democratic powers in the region.) Even in the Middle East, where anti-Americanism runs hottest and where images of the U.S. occupation in Iraq and memories of Abu Ghraib continue to burn in the popular consciousness, the strategic balance has not shifted against the United States. Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia continue to work closely with the United States, as do the nations of the Persian Gulf that worry about Iran.
The most notable shift has occurred in India, a former ally of Moscow that today sees good relations with the United States as critical to achieving its broader strategic and economic goals.
Iraq has shifted from implacable anti-Americanism under Saddam to dependence on the United States, and a stable Iraq in the years to come would shift the strategic balance in a decidedly pro-U.S. direction, since Iraq sits on vast oil reserves and could become a significant power in the region.
This situation contrasts sharply with the major strategic setbacks the United States suffered in the Middle East during the Cold War. In the 1950s and 1960s, a pan-Arab nationalist movement swept
across the region and opened the door to unprecedented Soviet involvement, including a quasi alliance between the Soviet Union and the Egypt of Gamal Abdel Nasser, as well as a Soviet alliance with Syria. In 1979, a key pillar of the U.S. strategic position in the region toppled when the pro-American shah of Iran was overthrown by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's virulently anti-American revolution. That led to a fundamental shift in the strategic balance in the region, a shift from which the United States is still suffering. Nothing similar has yet occurred as a result of the Iraq war.
Those who today proclaim that the United States is in decline often imagine a past in which the world danced to an Olympian America's tune. That is an illusion. Nostalgia swells for
the wondrous U.S.-dominated era after World War II. But although the United States succeeded in Europe then, it suffered disastrous setbacks elsewhere. The "loss" of China to communism, the North Korean invasion of South Korea, the Soviet Union's testing of a hydrogen bomb, the stirrings of postcolonial nationalism in Indochina--each was a strategic calamity of immense scope, and was understood to be such at the time. Each critically shaped the remainder of the twentieth century, and not for the better. And each proved utterly beyond the United States' power to control or even to manage successfully. Not a single event in the last decade can match any one of those events in terms of its enormity as a setback to the United States' position in the world.
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U.S. Will Remain a Global Hegemon
U.S. will remain the dominant global superpower Robert Kagan, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the author of The Return of History and the End of Dreams, September/October 2008, Foreign Affairs, Chinese strategists believe that the present international configuration is likely to endure for some time, and they are probably right. So long as the United States remains at the center of the international economy and continues to be the predominant military power and the leading apostle of the world's most popular political philosophy; so long as the American public continues to support American predominance, as it has consistently done for six decades; and so long as potential challengers inspire more fear than sympathy among their neighbors, the structure of the international system should remain as it has been, with one superpower and several great powers.
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U.S. Hegemony Sustainable
Globalization will make the U.S. a global economic power Futurist, September 1, 2008
Most of the discussion revolves around the impact of globalization, which Shapiro believes will produce the greatest amount of change as it breaks down barriers and opens up economies. He argues that the United States (along with the rest of the world) has no choice but to embrace globalization, despite its drawbacks and limitations. In fact, globalization will ultimately favor the United States and China, while creating much greater economic challenges for Europe and Japan (whose economies are significantly less productive overall). Indeed, the economic futures of America and China are intrinsically linked, for better or for worse, now that China has emerged as an economic superpower. One reason for this connection is the seemingly endless shift of production jobs to China, which provides an equally endless supply of low-skilled, lowwage workers. "A decade from now, America will still be the world's largest and most technologically advanced economy, and the one with the greatest impact on everyone el se," Shapiro writes. "But nothing will stop globalization from destroying job security for millions of Americans, along with their European and Japanese counterparts." By the year 2020, the vast majority of manufacturing jobs will have permanently relocated to the developing world.
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U.S. Hedge High Now, Will Continue to Be
No U.S. hegemonic decline, comparrisons to Britain are false Fareed Zakaria, Editor of Newsweek International, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008,
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501facomment87303/fareed-zakaria/the-future-of-american-power.html? mode=print
Fast-forward to today. Another superpower, militarily unbeatable, wins an easy victory in Afghanistan and then takes on what it is sure will be another simple battle, this one against Saddam Hussein's isolated regime in Iraq. The result: a quick initial military victory followed by a long, arduous struggle, filled with political and military blunders and met with intense international opposition. The analogy is obvious; the United States is Britain, the Iraq war is the Boer War -- and, by extension, the United States' future looks bleak. And indeed, regardless of the outcome in Iraq, the costs have been massive. The United States has been overextended and distracted, its army stressed, its image sullied. Rogue states such as Iran and
Venezuela and great powers such as China and Russia are taking advantage of Washington's inattention and bad fortunes. The familiar theme of imperial decline is playing itself out one more time. History is happening again. THE LONG GOODBYE But whatever the
apparent similarities, the circumstances are not really the same. Britain was a strange superpower.
Historians have written hundreds of books explaining how London could have adopted certain foreign policies to change its fortunes. If only it had avoided the Boer War, say some. If only it had stayed out of Africa, say others. The historian
Niall Ferguson provocatively suggests that had Britain stayed out of World War I (and there might not have been a world war without British participation), it might have managed to preserve its great-power position. There is some truth to this line of reasoning (World War I did bankrupt Britain), but to put things properly in historical context, it is worth looking at this history from another angle. Britain's immense empire was the product of unique circumstances. The wonder is not that it declined but that its dominance lasted as long as it did. Understanding how Britain played its hand -- one that got weaker over time -- can help illuminate the United States' path forward. Britain has been a rich country for centuries (and was a great power for most of that time), but it was an economic superpower for little more than a generation. Observers often make the mistake of dating its apogee by great imperial events such as the Diamond Jubilee. In fact, by 1897, Britain's best years were already behind it. Its true apogee was a generation earlier, from 1845 to 1870. At the time, it was producing more than 30 percent of global GDP. Its energy consumption was five times that of the United States and 155 times that of Russia. It accounted for one-fifth of the world's trade and two-fifths of its manufacturing trade. And all this was accomplished with just two percent of the world's population. By the late 1870s, the United States had equaled Britain on most industrial measures, and by the early 1880s it had actually surpassed it, as Germany would about 15 years later. By World War I, the United States' economy was twice the size of Britain's, and together France's and Russia's were larger as well. In 1860, Britain had produced 53 percent of the world's iron (then a sign of supreme industrial strength); by 1914, it was making less than 10 percent. Of course, politically, London was still the capital of the world at the time of World War I, and its writ was unequaled and largely unchallenged across much of the globe. Britain had acquired an empire in a period before the onset of nationalism, and so there were few obstacles to creating and maintaining control in far-flung places. Its sea power was unrivaled, and it remained dominant in banking, shipping, insurance, and investment. London was still the center of global finance, and the pound still the reserve currency of the world. Even in 1914, Britain invested twice as much capital abroad as its closest competitor, France, and five times as much as the United States. The economic returns of these investments and other "invisible trades" in some ways masked Britain's decline. In fact, the British economy was sliding. British growth rates had dropped below two percent in the decades leading up to World War I. The United States and Germany, meanwhile, were growing at around five percent. Having spearheaded the first Industrial Revolution, Britain was less adept at moving into the second. The goods it was producing represented the past rather than the future. In 1907, for example, it manufactured four times as many bicycles as the United States did, but the United States manufactured 12 times
Scholars have debated the causes of Britain's decline since shortly after that decline began. Some have focused on geopolitics; others, on economic factors ,
as many cars.
such as low investment in
new plants and equipment and bad labor relations. British capitalism had remained old-fashioned and rigid, its industries set up as small cottage-scale enterprises with skilled craftsmen rather than the mass factories that sprang up in Germany and the United States. There were signs of broader cultural problems as well. A wealthier Britain was losing its focus on practical education, and British society retained a feudal cast, given to it by its landowning aristocracy. But it may be that none of these failings was actually crucial. The historian Paul Kennedy has explained the highly unusual circumstances that produced Britain's dominance in the nineteenth century. Given its portfolio of power -- geography, population, resources -- Britain could reasonably have expected to account for three to four percent of global GDP, but its share rose to around ten times that figure. As those unusual circumstances abated -- as other Western countries caught up with industrialization, as Germany united, as the United States resolved its North-South divide -- Britain was bound to decline. The British statesman Leo Amery saw this clearly in 1905. "How can these little islands hold their own in the long run against such great and rich empires as the United States and Germany are rapidly becoming?" he asked. "How can we with forty millions of people compete with states nearly double our size?" It is a question that many Americans are now asking in the face of China's rise. Britain managed to maintain its position as the leading world power for decades after it lost its economic dominance thanks to a combination of shrewd strategy and good diplomacy. Early on, as it saw the balance of power shifting, London made one critical decision that extended its influence by decades: it chose to accommodate itself to the rise of the United States rather than to contest it. In the decades after 1880, on issue after issue London gave in to a growing and assertive Washington. It was not easy for Britain to cede control to its former colony, a country with which it had fought two wars and in whose recent civil war it had sympathized with the secessionists. But it was a strategic masterstroke. Had Britain tried to resist the rise of the United States, on top of all its other commitments, it would have been bled dry. For all of London's mistakes over the next half century, its strategy toward Washington -- one followed by every British government since the 1890s -- meant that Britain could focus its attention on other critical fronts. It remained, for example, the master of the seas, controlling its lanes and pathways with "five keys" that were said to lock up the world -- Singapore, the Cape of Good Hope, Alexandria, Gibraltar, and Dover. Britain maintained control of its empire and retained worldwide influence with relatively little opposition for many decades. (In the settlement after World War I, it took over 1.8 million square miles of territory and 13 million new subjects, mostly in the Middle East.) Still, the gap between its political role and its economic capacity was growing. By the twentieth century, the empire was an enormous drain on the British treasury. And this was no time for expensive habits. The British economy was reeling. World War I cost over $40 billion, and Britain, once the world's leading creditor, had debts amounting to 136 percent of domestic output afterward. By the mid-1920s, interest payments alone sucked up half the government's budget. Meanwhile, by 1936, Germany's defense spending was three times as high as Britain's. The same year that Italy invaded Ethiopia, Mussolini also placed 50,000 troops in Libya -- ten times the number of British troops guarding the Suez Canal. It was these circumstances -- coupled with the memory of a recent world war that had killed more than 700,000 young Britons -- that led the British governments of the 1930s, facing the forces of fascism, to prefer wishful thinking and appeasement to confrontation. World War II was the final nail in the coffin of British economic power: in 1945, the United States' GDP was ten times that of Britain. Even then, Britain remained remarkably influential, at least partly because of the almost superhuman energy and ambition of Winston Churchill. Given that the United States was paying most of the Allies' economic costs, and Russia was bearing most of the casualties, it took extraordinary will for Britain to remain one of the three major powers deciding the fate of the postwar world. (The photographs of Franklin Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin, and Churchill at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 are somewhat misleading: there was no "big three" at Yalta; there was a "big two" plus one brilliant political entrepreneur who was able to keep himself and his country in the game.) But even this came at a cost. In return for its loans to London, the United States took over dozens of British bases in Canada, the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific. "The British Empire is handed over to the American pawnbroker -- our only hope," said one member of Parliament. The economist John Maynard Keynes described the Lend-Lease Act as an attempt to "pick out the eyes of the British Empire." Less emotional observers saw that the transition was inevitable. Toynbee, by then a distinguished historian, consoled Britons by noting that the United States' "hand will be a great deal lighter than Russia's, Germany's, or Japan's, and I suppose these are the alternatives." THE ENTREPRENEURIAL EMPIRE Britain was undone as a global power not because of bad politics but because of bad economics. Indeed, the impressive skill with which London played its weakening hand despite a 70-year economic decline offers important lessons for the United States. First, however, it is essential to note that the central feature of Britain's decline -- irreversible economic deterioration -- does not really apply to the United States today. Britain's unrivaled economic status lasted for a few decades; the United States' has lasted more than 120 years. The U.S. economy has been the world's largest since the middle of the 1880s, and it remains so today. In fact, the United States has held a surprisingly constant share of global GDP ever since. With the brief exception of the late 1940s and 1950s, when the rest of the industrialized world had been destroyed and its share rose to 50 percent, the United States has accounted for roughly a quarter of world output for over a century (32 percent in 1913, 26 percent in 1960, 22 percent in 1980, 27 percent in 2000, and 26 percent in 2007). It is likely to slip, but not significantly, in the next two decades. Most estimates suggest that in 2025 the United States' economy will still be twice the size of China's in
This difference between the United States and Britain is reflected in the burden of their military budgets. Britannia ruled the seas but never the land. The British army was sufficiently small that Otto von Bismarck once quipped that were the British ever to invade Germany, he would simply have the local police force arrest them. Meanwhile, London's advantage over the seas -- it had more tonnage than the next two navies put together -- came at ruinous cost. The U.S. military, in contrast, dominates at every level -- land, sea, air, space -- and spends more than the next 14 countries combined, accounting for almost 50 percent of global defense spending. The United States also spends more on defense research and development than the rest of the world put together. And crucially, it does all this without breaking the bank. U.S. defense expenditure as a percent of GDP is now 4.1 percent, lower than it was for most of the Cold War (under Dwight Eisenhower, it rose to ten percent). As U.S. GDP has grown larger and larger, expenditures that would have been backbreaking have become affordable. The Iraq war may be a tragedy or a noble endeavor, but either way, it will not bankrupt the United States. The price tag for Iraq and Afghanistan together -$125 billion a year -- represents less than one percent of GDP. The war in Vietnam, by comparison, cost the equivalent of 1.6 percent of U.S. GDP in 1970, a large difference. ( U.S. military power is not the cause of its strength but the consequence. The fuel is the United States' economic and technological base, which remains extremely strong . The United States
terms of nominal GDP.
Neither of these percentages includes second- or third-order costs of war, which
allows for a fair comparison even if one disputes the exact figures.)
does face larger, deeper, and broader challenges than it has ever faced in its history, and it will undoubtedly lose some share of global GDP. But the process will look nothing like Britain's slide in the twentieth
. The United States will remain a vital, vibrant economy, at the forefront of the next revolutions in science , technology, and industry. In trying to understand how the United States will fare in the new
century, when the country lost the lead in innovation, energy, and entrepreneurship world, the first thing to do is simply look around: the future is already here. Over the last 20 years, globalization has been gaining breadth and depth. More countries are making goods, communications technology
capital has been free to move across the world -- and the United States has benefited massively from these trends. Its economy has received hundreds of billions of dollars in
has been leveling the playing field,
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holds. Consider the industries of the future.
65
and the World Economic Forum currently ranks the United States
as the world's most competitive economy. GDP growth, the bottom line, has averaged just over three percent in the United States for 25 years, significantly higher than in Europe or Japan. Productivity growth, the elixir of modern economics, has been over 2.5 percent for a decade now, a full percentage point higher than the European average. This superior growth trajectory might be petering out, and perhaps U.S. growth will be more typical for an advanced industrialized country for the next few years. But the general point -- that the United States is a highly dynamic economy at the cutting edge, despite its enormous size --
Nanotechnology (applied science dealing with the control of matter at the atomic or molecular scale) is likely to lead to fundamental breakthroughs over the next 50 years, and the U nited States dominates the field. It has more dedicated "nanocenters" than the next three nations (Germany, Britain, and China) combined and has issued more patents for nanotechnology than the rest of the world combined, highlighting its unusual strength in turning abstract theory into practical products.
Biotechnology (
explanation of
a broad category that describes the use of biological systems to create medical, agricultural, and industrial products
) is also dominated by the United States.
Biotech revenues in the United States approached $50 billion in 2005, five times as large as the amount in Europe and representing 76 percent of global biotech revenues. Manufacturing has, of course, been leaving the country, shifting to the developing world and turning the United States into a service economy. This scares many Americans, who wonder what their country will make if everything is "made in China." But Asian manufacturing must be viewed in the context of a global economy. The Atlantic Monthly's James Fallows spent a year in China watching its manufacturing juggernaut up close, and he provides a persuasive
howoutsourcing has strengthened U.S. competitiveness. What it comes down to is that the real money is in designing and distributing products -- which the United States dominates -- rather than manufacturing them. A
vivid example of this is the iPod: it is manufactured mostly outside the United States, but most of the added value is captured by Apple, in California. Many experts and scholars, and even a few politicians, worry about certain statistics that bode
ill for the United States. The U.S. savings rate is zero; the current account deficit, the trade deficit, and the budget deficit are high; the median income is flat; and commitments for entitlements are unsustainable. These are all valid concerns that will have to be addressed. But it is important to keep in mind that many frequently cited statistics offer only an approximate or an antiquated measure of an economy. Many of them were developed in the late nineteenth century to describe industrial economies with limited cross-border activity, not modern economies in today's interconnected global market. For the last two decades, for example, the United States has had unemployment rates well below levels economists thought possible without driving up inflation. Or consider that the United States' current account deficit -- which in 2007 reached $800 billion, or seven percent of GDP -- was supposed to be unsustainable at four percent of GDP. The current account deficit is at a dangerous level, but its magnitude can be explained in part by the fact that there is a worldwide surplus of savings and that the United States remains an unusually stable and attractive place to invest. The decrease in personal savings, as the Harvard economist Richard Cooper has noted, has been largely offset by an increase in corporate savings. The U.S. investment picture also looks much rosier if education and research-and-development spending are considered along with spending on physical capital and housing.
The United States has
serious problems.
By all calculations, Medicare threatens to blow up the federal budget. The swing from surpluses to deficits between 2000 and 2008 has serious implications. Growing inequality (the result of the knowledge economy, technology, and globalization) has
But such problems must be considered in the context of an overall economy that remains powerful and dynamic.
become a signature feature of the new era. Perhaps most worrying, Americans are borrowing 80 percent of the world's surplus savings and using it for consumption: they are selling off their assets to foreigners to buy a couple more lattes a day.
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U.S. Global Hegemon Now 30 Years
The U.S. will retain primacy for at least the next thirty years. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007
["The Case For The American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 12]
The United States has the ability to dominate the world because it has prodigious military capability, economic might, and soft power. The United States dominates the world today, but will it be able to do so in the future? The answer is yes, for the foreseeable futurethe next thirty to forty years . Indeed, it may exist for much longer. I would not be surprised to see American dominance last much longer and, indeed, anticipate that it will. But there is simply too much uncertainty about events far in the future to make reliable predictions .
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U.S. Global Hegemon Now
U.S. is a global power now
Helle Dale is director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation Washington Times, November 14, 2007, http://washingtontimes.com/article/20071114/EDITORIAL06/111140011/1013/EDITORIAL And yet, it remains true that as with Rome, all roads lead to Washington. In times of a challenge, the world continues to look to the United States for leadership. It remains the case, though, that the United States is the only country able and willing to enforce the international order by military force - to be the world's policeman, if you will. When international concerns go up about Iran's nuclear ambitions, when Turkey threatens to invade northern Iraq, when the Pakistani government looks to be on the verge of collapse, and when Russian authoritarianism is on the rise. Washington still plays the key role in setting the course.
Primacy is high now the U.S. has unchallenged dominance. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007 ["The Case For The American Empire," American Empire: A Debate,]
While all states have grand strategies, they differ in their means to advance their interests in the face of threats. France has greater means than Bangladesh. The United States has the greatest means. In fact, the United States finds itself in a special position in international politics: by almost any measureeconomic, ideological, military it leads the world. It is the dominant state, the hegemon, in international politics. If you stop and think a moment, it is really remarkable that 6 percent of the worlds population and 6 percent of its land mass has the worlds most formidable military capabilities, creates about 25 to 30 percent of the gross world product, and both attracts and provides the most foreign direct investment of any country. If it were a person, it would have the wealth of Microsoft chairman Bill Gates or entrepreneur Donald Trump; its [end page 1] military would have the punch of a heavyweight boxer like Muhammad Ali or Mike Tyson; its charisma and charm would equal those of a movie star such as Cary Grant or George Clooney; and it would have as many friends, hangers on, and potential suitors as Frank Sinatra did at one time or as Oprah or Britney Spears do now .
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Hegemony Now, Sustainable
Hegemony is high and sustainable the will to primacy is key. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007
["The Case For The American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, p.12]
The U.S. military, economy, and soft power answer the first question these elements give it the ability to do so. How long the American Empire
lasts depends on three variables: first, its hard and soft power capabilities; second, the actions of other states; and third, its will to continue its empire. Americas ideology answers the second issue. These critical questions are inextricably linked. The United States has the ability to dominate the world, but that is only one of the key ingredients necessary for the meal of empire. The will to do so is equally important. If the United States does not have the will, then no amount of combat aircraft or ships or economic might will suffice to ensure its dominance in international politics. I will consider the second issue in the next section of this chapter.
At the outset of this discussion, I want to state an obvious but, nonetheless, salient point: Nothing lasts forever. The American Empire will end at some point in time, as every empire has in the past from the empire the Egyptian Pharaohs created over 2,800 years before Christ to the one forged by Lenins Bolsheviks in 1917and as future empires will as well. As Table 1.2 shows, the American Empire is young when compared to the other empires throughout history, having lasted Just over a century if we take the beginning of the SpanishAmerican War as its starting date, as conventional history often does. Although it may be young, it is the profound responsibility of the custodians of the American Empire to use hard and soft power to ensure that it lasts as long as they want .
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U.S. Hedge High Now, Will Continue to Be
The U.S. will remain a dominant military and economic power The Washington Times, April 6, 2008, p. B3
Surely, America is powerful. Never has there been a nation as economically potent, geopolitically influential, culturally dominant, scientifically important, and with a language that has become universal - American, or if you prefer, English. I have worked more than 40 years examining and interpreting American and international social and economic data. To me the evidence seems clear. There is no collapse in sight. The United States will become vastly more powerful in the decades to come. My primary reason concerns demographics. The first U.S. Census counted 3.9 million Americans. The Census of 2000 counted roughly 300 million Americans, an increase of 7,500 percent. Just over the course of the 20th century, the population grew by 400 percent. Careful projections by both the U.S. Census Bureau and the United Nations Population Division now show a growth path to 400 million by 2050 and 500 million by 2100 . But that is an increase of 67 percent - not close to 7,500 percent or 400 percent. Relatively, growth is slowing down - but a half a billion people is a big number. Population yields influence. The astonishing point of this sequence of numbers is that almost every other nation - developed or less-developed - is on a path toward, or has already started decline. The exceptions I can think of are Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Israel. In 2004 I wrote a book titled "Fewer." Its operative sentence was "Never have birth and fertility rates fallen so far, so fast, so low, for so long, in so many places, so surprisingly." I think the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is the most meaningful way of measuring what is going on demographically. It reflects the average total number of children born per woman over the course of her childbearing years. It takes 2.1 children per woman to "replace" a population over time. Sooner or later the two parents die - and the .1 represents those children who do not live to the reproductive age.
U.S. is a global hegemon now and will remain so
Professor Robert Singh is in the School of Politics and Sociology at Birkbeck College, London University.World Today, January 1, 2008 A 'new declinism' is fashionable among commentators on American power . Bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, with anti-Americanism widespread and the International Monetary Fund revising forecasts of United States economic growth downwards to 1.9 percent for this year, Washington appears a weakened global force. Yet, despite the unpopularity of Bush's foreign policies, no other power is close to challenging American primacy. Whether rising: China, recovering: Russia or hedging: the European Union (EU), America's predominant position is intact. Beyond the international system's unipolar, multipolar or post-polar structure, the more prosaic features remain that only Washington can project global military power, its economy accounts for a quarter of global gross domestic product, and a weakened America is in the interest of neither other advanced industrialised democracies nor an increasingly integrated world economy. There is also still no evidence of 'hard' military balancing against America, not least since those regional powers on the rise - China, Russia, Iran - are of immeasurably more concern to their immediate neighbours than is the US. The challenges confronting other powers - from ageing populations to potential pandemics - suggest additional caution in heralding the end of the American era.
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U.S. Hedge High Now, Will Continue to Be Educational System Strong
The U.S. educational system is not collapsing Fareed Zakaria, Editor of Newsweek International, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008,
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501facomment87303/fareed-zakaria/the-future-of-american-power.html? mode=print
The numbers, however, are wrong. Several academics and journalists investigated the matter and quickly realized that the Asian totals included graduates of two- or three-year programs training students in simple technical tasks. The National Science Foundation, which tracks these statistics in the United States and other nations, puts the Chinese number at about 200,000 engineering degrees per year, and the Rochester Institute of Technology's Ron Hira puts the number of Indian engineering graduates at about 125,000 a year. This means that the United States actually trains more engineers per capita than either China or India does. And the numbers do not
address the issue of quality. The best and brightest in China and India -- those who, for example, excel at India's famous engineering academies, the Indian Institutes of Technology (5,000 out of 300,000 applica nts make it past the entrance exams) -- would do well in any educational system. But once you get beyond such elite institutions -- which graduate under 10,000 students a year -- the quality of higher education in China and India remains extremely poor, which is why so many students leave those countries to get trained abroad. In 2005, the McKinsey Global Institute did a study of "the emerging global labor market" and found that 28 low-wage countries had approximately 33 million young professionals at their disposal. But, the study noted, "only a fraction of potential job candidates could successfully work at a foreign company," largely because of inadequate education. Indeed, higher education is the United States' best industry. In no other field is the United States' advantage so overwhelming. A 2006 report from the London-based Center for European Reform points out that the United States invests 2.6 percent of its GDP in higher education, compared with 1.2 percent in Europe and 1.1 percent in Japan. Depending on which study you look at, the United States, with five percent of the world's population, has either seven or eight of the world's top ten universities and either 48 percent or 68 percent of the top 50. The situation in the sciences is particularly striking. In India, universities graduate between 35 and 50 Ph.D.'s in computer science each year; in the United States, the figure is 1,000. A list of where the world's 1,000 best computer scientists were educated shows that the top ten schools are all American. The United States also remains by far the most attractive destination for students, taking in 30 percent of the total number of foreign students globally, and its collaborations between business and educational institutions are unmatched
And although China and India are opening new institutions, it is not that easy to create a world-class university out of whole cloth in a few decades.
anywhere in the world. All these advantages will not be erased easily, because the structure of European and Japanese universities -- mostly state-run bureaucracies -- is unlikely to change.
deep regional, racial, and socioeconomic variation.
Few people believe that U.S. primary and secondary schools deserve similar praise. The school system, the line goes, is in crisis, with its
students performing particularly badly in science and math, year after year, in international rankings. But the statistics here, although not wrong, reveal something slightly different. The real problem is one not of excellence but of access. The Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), the standard for comparing educational programs across nations, puts the United States squarely in the middle of the pack. The media reported the news with a predictable penchant for direness: "Economic Time Bomb: U.S. Teens Are Among Worst at Math," declared The Wall Street Journal. But the aggregate scores hide
Poor and minority students score well below the U.S. average, while, as one study noted, "students in affluent suburban U.S. school districts score nearly as well as students in Singapore, the runaway leader on TIMSS math scores." The difference between the average science scores in poor and wealthy school
districts within the United States, for instance, is four to five times as high as the difference between the U.S. and the Singaporean national average. In other words, the problem with U.S. education is a problem of inequality. This will, over time, translate into a competitiveness problem, because if the United States cannot educate and train a third of the working population to compete in a knowledge economy,
U.S. system may be too lax when it comes to rigor and memorization, but it is very good at developing the critical faculties of the mind. It is surely this quality that goes some way in explaining why the United States produces so many entrepreneurs, inventors, and risk takers. Tharman Shanmugaratnam, until recently Singapore's minister of education, explains the difference between his country's system and that of the United States: "We both have meritocracies," Shanmugaratnam says. "Yours is a talent meritocracy, ours is an exam meritocracy. We know how to train people to take exams. You know how to use people's talents to the fullest. Both are important, but there are some parts of the intellect that we are not able to test well -- like creativity, curiosity, a sense of adventure, ambition. Most of all, America has a culture of learning that challenges conventional wisdom, even if it means challenging authority." This is one reason that Singaporean officials recently visited U.S. schools to learn how to create a system that nurtures and rewards ingenuity, quick thinking, and problem solving. "Just by watching, you can see students are more engaged, instead of being spoon-fed all day," one Singaporean visitor told The Washington Post. While the United States marvels at Asia's test-taking skills, Asian governments come to the United States to figure out how to get their children to think.
this will drag down the country. But it does know what works. The
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U.S. Hege Now, Iraq doesnt Threaten
IRAQ HAS NOT DESTROYED ROLE OF US HEGEMONY IN GLOBAL STABILITY
Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 83 It is also important to remember that much about todays global security environment is desirable. The United States leads a remarkable alliance system. Never before has a great power elicited such support from the worlds other powers and provoked so little direct opposition. This situation is in some jeopardy as a result of the Bush administrations internationally unpopular decision to go to war against Saddam Hussein in 2003, but on balance it holds
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U.S. Hege High Now, Will Continue to Be University Educational System Strong
The U.S. is a university educational leader Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek International, 2008, The Post-American World, p. 187 Higher education is America's best industry. There are two rankings of universities worldwide. In one of them, a purely quantitative study done by Chinese researchers, eight of the top ten universities in the world are in the United States. In the other, more qualitative one by London's Times Higher Educational Supplement, it's seven. The numbers flatten out somewhat after that. Of the top twenty, seventeen or eleven are in America; of the top fifty, thirtyeight or twenty-one. Still, the basic story does not change. With 5 percent of the world's population, the United States absolutely dominates higher education, having either 42 or 68 percent of the world's top fifty universities (depending which study you look at). In no other field is America's advantage so overwhelming. A 2006 report from the London-based Centre for European Reform, "The Future of European Universities," points out that the United States invests 2.6 percent of its GDP in higher education, compared with 1.2 percent in Europe and 1.1 per- cent in Japan. The situation in the sciences is particularly striking. A list of where the world's 1,000 best computer scientists were educated shows that the top ten schools are all American. U.S. spending on R&D remains higher than Europe's, and its collaborations between business and educational institutions are unmatched anywhere in the world. America remains by far the most attractive destination for students, taking 30 percent of the total number of foreign students globally. All these advantages will not be erased easily, because the structure of European and Japanese universitiesmostly state-run bureaucraciesis unlikely to change. And while China and India are opening new institutions, it is not that easy to create a world-class university out of whole cloth in a few decades. Here's a statistic about engineers that you might not have heard. In India, universities graduate between 35 and 50 Ph.D.'s in computer science each year; in America, the figure is 1,000.
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U.S. Hedge High Now, Will Continue to Be Secondary Educational System Strong
U.S. secondary schools are innovative leaders Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek International, 2008, The Post-American World, p. 191-2
If American
universities are first-rank, few believe that the same can be said about its schools. Everyone knows that the American school system is in crisis and that its students do particularly badly in science and math, year after year, in international rankings. But the statistics here, while not wrong, reveal something slightly different. America's real problem is one not of excellence but of access. Since its inception in 1995, the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) has become the standard for comparing educational programs across nations. The most recent results are in. Most of all, America has a culture of learning that challenges conventional wisdom, even if it means challenging authority. These are the areas where Singapore must learn from America." This is one reason that Singaporean officials recently visited U.S. schools to learn how to create a system that nurtures and rewards ingenuity, quick thinking, and problem solving. As the Washington Post reported in March 2007, researchers from Singapore's best schools came to the Academy of Science, a public magnet school in Virginia, to examine U.S. teaching methods.' As the students "studied tiny, genetically altered plants one recent afternoon, drawing leaves and jotting data in logbooks," the Singaporean visitors "recorded how long the teacher waited for students to answer questions, how often the teenagers spoke up and how strongly they held to their views." Har Hui Peng, a visitor from Singapore's Hwa Chong Institution, was impressed, as the Post noted. "Just by watching, you can see students are more engaged, instead of being spoon-fed all day," said Har. The Post article continued, "[In Singapore], she said, the laboratories are fully stocked but stark, and the students are bright but reluctant to volunteer answers. To encourage spontaneity, Hwa Chong now bases 10 percent of each student's grade on oral participation." While America marvels at Asia's test-taking skills, Asian countries come to America to figure out how to get their kids to think. Top high schools in Beijing and Shanghai are emphasizing independent research, science competitions, and entrepreneur clubs. "I like the way your children are able to communicate," said Rosalind Chia, another Singaporean teacher on tour
9
in the States. "Maybe we need to cultivate that morea conversation between students and teachers." Such c ha nge d oe s not c om e e a s i l y. I nde e d, J a p a n re c e nt l y attempted to improve the flexibility of its national education system by eliminating mandatory Saturday classes and increasing the time dedicated to general studies, where students and teachers can pursue their own interests. "But the Japanese shift to yutori kyoiku, or relaxed education," the Post says, "has fueled a back-to-basics backlash from parents who worry that their children are not learning enough and that test scores are slipping."
In other words, simply changing curricula a top-down effortmay lead only to resistance. American culture celebrates and reinforces problem solving, questioning authority, and thinking heretically. It allows people to fail and then gives them a second and third chance. It rewards self- starters and oddballs. These are all bottom-up forces that cannot be produced by government fiat.
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U.S. Hege High Now, Will Continue to Be U.S. Will Lead Global Growth
U.S will continue to lead global growth Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek International, 2008, The Post-American World,
p. 182-3
When trying to explain how America will fare in the new world, I sometimes say, "Look around." The future is already here. Over the last twenty years, globalization has been gaining breadth and depth. More countries are making goods, communications technology has been leveling the playing field, capital has been free to move across the world. And America has benefited massively from these trends. Its economy has received hundreds of billions of dollars in investment a rarity for a country with much capital of its own. Its companies have entered new countries and industries with great success and used new technologies and processes, all to keep boosting their bottom lines. Despite two decades of a very expensive dollar, American exports have held ground. GDP growth, the bottom line, has averaged just over 3 percent for twenty-five years, significantly higher than in Europe. (Japan's averaged 2.3 percent over the same period.) Productivity growth, the elixir of modern economics, has been over 2.5 percent for a decade now, again a full percentage point higher than the European average. The United States is currently ranked as the most competitive economy in the world by the World Economic Forum. These rankings
have been produced every year since 1979, and the U.S. position has been fairly constant, slipping sometimes in recent years to small northern European countries like Sweden, Denmark, and Finland (whose collective population is twenty million, less than that of the state of Texas). America's superior growth trajectory might be petering out, and perhaps its growth will be more "normal" for an advanced industrial country for the next few years. But
the general pointthat America is a highly dynamic economy at the cutting edge, despite its enormous sizestill holds. Look at the industries of the future. Nanotechnology applied science dealing with the control of matter at the atomic or molecular scaleis considered likely to lead to fundamental breakthroughs over the next fifty years. At some point in the future, or so I'm told, households will construct products out of raw materials, and businesses will simply create the formulas that turn atoms into goods. Whether this is hype or prescience, what is worth noticing is that by every conceivable measure, the United States dominates the field. It has more dedicated nanocenters than the next three nations (Germany, the United Kingdom, and China) combined, and many of its new centers focus on narrow subjects with a high potential for practical, marketable applications such as the Emory-Georgia Tech Nanotechnology Center for Personalized and Predictive Oncology. At market exchange rates, government nanotech funding in the United States is almost double that of its closest competitor, Japan. And while China, Japan, and Germany contribute a fair share of journal articles on nanoscale science and engineering topics, the United States has issued more patents for nanotechnology than the rest of the world combined, highlighting America's unusual strength in turning abstract theory into practical products. The firm Lux,
led by Dr. Michael Holman, constructed a matrix to assess countries' overall nanotech competitiveness. Their analysis looked not just at nanotechnology activity but also at the ability to "generate growth from scientific innovation."12 It found that certain countries that spend much on research can't turn their science into business. These "Ivory Tower" nations have impressive research funding, journal articles, and even patents, but
gory. A full 85 percent of venture capital investments in nanotechnology went to U.S. companies. Biotechnologya broad category that describes the use of
somehow don't manage to translate this into commercial goods and ideas. China, France, and even Britain fall into this cate biological systems to create medical, agricultural, and industrial productsis already a multibillion-dollar industry. It, too, is dominated by the United States. More than $3.3 billion in venture financing went to U.S. biotech companies in 2005, while European companies received just half that amount. Follow-on equity offerings (that is, post-IPO) in the United States were more than seven times those in Europe. And while European IPOs attracted more cash in 2005, IPO activity is highly volatilein 2004, U.S. IPO values were more than four times Europe's. As with nanotechnology, American companies excel at turning ideas into marketable and lucrative products. U.S. biotech revenues approached $50 billion in 2005, five times greater than those in Europe and representing 76 percent of global revenues.* Manufacturing has, of course, been leaving the United States, shifting to
Asian manufacturing must be viewed in the context of a global economy in which countries like China have become an important part of the supply chainbut still just a part.
the developing world and turning America into a service economy. This scares many Americans and Europeans, who wonder what their countries will make if everything is "made in China." But
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U.S. Hege High Now, Will Continue to Be U.S. Will Lead Global Growth
The U.S. retains almost all of the economic value from produced products Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek International, 2008, The Post-American World, p. 186 The Atlantic Monthly writer James Fallows spent a year in China watching that manufacturing juggernaut up close, and he provides a persuasive explanationone well understood by Chinese businessmenof how outsourcing has strengthened American competitiveness. Most Americans, even management experts, have not heard of the "smiley curve." But Chinese manufacturers know it well. Named for the U- shaped smile on the simple 1970s cartoon of a happy face, 0, the curve illustrates the development of a product, from conception to sale. At the top left of the curve one starts with the idea and high-level industrial designhow the product will look and work. Lower down on the curve comes the detailed engineering plan. At the bottom of the U is the actual manufacturing, assembly, and shipping. Then rising up on the right of the curve are distribution, marketing, retail sales, service contracts, and sales of parts and accessories . Fallows observes that, in almost all manufacturing, China takes care of the bottom of the curve and America the top the two ends of the Uwhich is where the money is. "The simple way to put this that the real money is in the brand name, plus retailmay sound obvious," he writes, "but its implications are illuminating." A vivid example of this is the iPod: it is manufactured mostly outside the United States, but the majority of value added is captured by Apple, Inc. in California. The company made $80 in gross profit on a 30gigabyte video iPod that retailed (in late 2007) for $299. Its profit was 36 percent of the estimated wholesale price of $224. (Add to that the retail profit if it was sold in an Apple store.) The total cost of parts was $144. Chinese manufacturers, by contrast, have margins of a few percent on their products.)
13 14
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U.S. Hege High Now, Will Continue to Be U.S Will Dominate Europe
U.S will dominate Europe economically Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek International, 2008, The Post-American World, p. 195-6
America's advantages might seem obvious when compared with Asia, which is still a continent of mostly developing countries. Against Europe, the margin is slimmer than many Americans believe, The Eurozone has been growing at an impressive clip, about the same pace per capita as the United States since 2000. It takes in half the world's foreign investment, boasts labor productivity often as strong as that of the United States, and posted a $30 billion trade surplus in 2007 from January through October. In the WEF Competitiveness Index, European countries occupy seven of the top ten slots. Europe has its problemshigh unemployment, rigid labor marketsbut it also has advantages, including more efficient and fiscally sustainable health care and pension systems. All in all, Europe presents the most significant short-term challenge to the United States in the economic realm. But
most of the developed world. Nicholas Eberstadt, a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, estimates that the U.S. population will increase by 65 million by 2030, while Europe's will remain "virtually stagnant." Europe, Eberstadt notes, "will by that time have more than twice as many seniors older than 65 than children under 15, with drastic implications for future aging. (Fewer children now means fewer workers later.) In the United States, by contrast, children will continue to outnumber the elderly. The U.N. Popul at i on Di vi si on e st i ma t e s t ha t t he ra ti o of working-age people to senior citizens in western Europe will drop from 3.8:1 today to just 2.4:1 in 2030. In the U.S.,
Europe has one crucial disadvantage . Or, to put it more accurately, the United States has one crucial advantage over Europe and The United States is demographically vibrant.
. Some of these demo graphic problems could be ameliorated if older Europeans chose to work more, but so far they do not, and trends like these rarely reverse." The only real way to avert this demographic decline is for Europe to take in more immigrants . Native Europeans actually stopped replacing themselves as early as 2007, so even maintaining the current population will require modest immigration. Growth will require much more. But European societies do not seem able to take in and assimilate people from strange and unfamiliar cultures, especially from rural and backward regions in the world of Islam. The question of who is at fault herethe immigrant or the societyis irrelevant. The political reality is that Europe is moving toward taking in fewer immigrants at a time when its economic future rides on its ability to take in many more. America, on the other hand, is creating the first universal nation, made up of all colors, races, and creeds, living and working together in considerable harmony .
the figure will fall from 5.4:1 to 3.1:1
20
Surprisingly, many Asian countrieswith the exception of Indiaare in demographic situations similar to or even worse than Europe's. The fertility rates in Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, and China* are well below the replacement level of 2.1 births per female, and estimates indicate that major East Asian nations will face a sizable reduction in their working-age population over the next half century. The working-age population in Japan has already peaked; by 2010, Japan will have three million fewer workers than in 2005. Worker populations in China and Korea are also likely to peak within the next decade. Goldman Sachs predicts that China's median age will rise from thirty-three in 2005 to forty-five in 2050, a remarkable graying of the population. By 2030, China may have nearly as many senior citizens sixty-five years of age or older as children under fifteen. And Asian countries have as much trouble with immigrants as European ones. Japan faces a large prospective worker shortage because it can neither take in
. The effects of an aging population are considerable. First, there is the pension burdenfewer workers supporting more gray-haired elders. Second, as the economist Benjamin Jones has shown, most innovative inventorsand the overwhelming majority of Nobel laureatesdo their most important work between the ages of thirty and forty-four. A smaller working- age population, in other words, means fewer technological, scientific, and managerial advances. Third, as workers age, they go from being net savers to being net spenders, with dire ramifications for national saving and investment rates. For advanced industrial countrieswhich are already comfort able, satisfied, and less prone to work hard bad demographics are a killer disease. The native-born, white American population has the same low fertility rates as Europe's. Without immigration,
enough immigrants nor allow its women to fully participate in the labor force U.S. GDP growth over the last quarter century would have been the same as Europe's. America's edge in innovation is overwhelmingly a product of immigration. Foreign students and immigrants account for 50 percent of the science researchers in the country and, in 2006, received 40 percent of the doctorates in science and engineering and 65 percent of the doctorates in computer science. By 2010, foreign students will get more than 50 percent of all Ph.D.'s awarded in every subject in the United States. In the sciences, that figure will be closer to 75 percent. Half of all Silicon Valley start-ups have one founder who is an immigrant or first-generation American. America's potential new burst of productivity, its edge in nanotechnology, biotechnology, its ability to invent the futureall rest on its immigration policies. If America can keep the people it educates in the country, the innovation will happen here. If they go back home, the innovation will travel with them. Immigration also gives America a quality rare for a rich countryhunger and energy. As countries become wealthy, the drive to move up and succeed weakens. But America has found a way to keep itself constantly revitalized by streams of people who are looking to make a new life in a new world. These are the people who work long hours picking fruit in searing heat, washing dishes, building houses, working night shifts, and cleaning waste dumps. They come to the United States under terrible conditions, leave family and community, only because they want to work and get ahead in life. Americans have almost always worried about such immigrants whether from Ireland or
these immigrants have gone on to become the backbone of the American working class, and their children or grandchildren have entered the American mainstream. America has been able to tap this energy, manage diversity, assimilate newcomers, and move ahead economically. Ultimately, this is what sets the country apart from the experience of Britain and all other historical
Italy, China or Mexico. But
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examples of great economic powers that grow fat and lazy and slip behind as they face the rise of leaner, hungrier nations.
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U.S. Hege High Now, Will Continue to Be No Economic Declne Now
Statistics that show U.S. economic weakness are misleading Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek International, 2008, The Post-American World, p. 199-201 Many experts, scholars, and even a few politicians worry about a set of statistics that bode ill for the United States. The savings rate is zero, the current-account deficit, trade deficit, and budget deficit are high, median income is flat, and commitments for entitlements are unsustainable. These are all valid concerns and will have to be addressed by Washington. If America's economic system is its core strength, its political system is its core weakness. But the numbers might not tell us everything we need to know. The economic statistics that we rely on give us only an approximate, antiquated measure of an economy. Many of them were developed in the late nineteenth century to describe an industrial econ omy with limited cross-border activity. We now live in an interconnected global market, with revolutions in financial instruments, technology, and trade. It is possible that we're not measuring things correctly. It used to be a law of macroeconomics, for example, that in an advanced industrial economy there is such a thing as NAIRUthe nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment. Basically, this meant that unemployment could not fall below a certain level, usually pinned at 6 percent, without driving inflation up. But for the last two decades, many Western countries, especially the United States, have had unemployment rates well below levels economists thought possible. Or consider that America's current-account deficitwhich in 2007 reached $800 billion, or 7 percent of GDPwas supposed to be unsustainable at 4 percent of GDP. The current- account deficit is at dangerous levels, but we should also keep in mind that its magnitude can be explained in part by the fact that there is a worldwide surplus of savings and that the United States remains an unusually stable and attractive place in which to invest. Harvard University's Richard Cooper even argues that the American savings rate is miscalculated, painting an inaccurate picture of massive credit card debt and unaffordable mortgages . While many households do live beyond their means, the picture looks healthier at the aggregate level, Cooper argues. Private U.S. savings, which includes both household saving (the "often-cited" low figure of about 2 per- cent of personal income) and corporate saving, reached 15 percent in 2005. The decrease in personal saving, in other words, has been largely offset by an increase in corporate saving. More important, the whore concept of "national saving" might be outdated, not reflecting the reality of new modes of production. In the new economy, growth comes from "teams of people creating new goods and services, not from the accumulation of capital," which was more impor tant in the first half of the twentieth century. Yet we still focus on measuring capital .
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U.S. Hege High Now, Will Continue to Be
The U.S. will remain the leading global power
Richard N. Haass, President, Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs , May/June 2008 ,
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html?mode=print
In this world, the United States is and will long remain the largest single aggregation of power. It spends more than $500 billion annually on its military -- and more than $700 billion if the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are included -- and boasts land, air, and naval forces that are the world's most capable. Its economy, with a GDP of some $14 trillion, is the world's largest. The United States is also a major source of culture (through films and television), information, and innovation. The U.S. is a leader now the choice is between cooperation and domination Zbibniew Brezisnski, former national security advisor, 1-27, 8
JP: In an August 2007 article in Foreign Affairs, Barack Obama said the US must "lead the world once more." Surely, with the Bush era near its close, we've learnt that it doesn't work for America to lead the world alone. It has to be a group effort. ZB: Well, yes and no. The way I'd put it is that the US is, and potentially still will be, preponderant in foreign affairs. But one should not confuse preponderance with omnipotence. What "leading" really means is that the US is the critical catalyst for effective international co-operation. No one else can do it. There's a choice between leadership and domination.
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U.S. Hege High Now, Will Continue to Be No Asia Threat
No leadership threat from Asia Fareed Zakaria, Editor of Newsweek International, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008,
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501facomment87303/fareed-zakaria/the-future-of-american-power.html? mode=print
Surprisingly, many Asian countries (with India an exception) are in demographic situations similar to or even worse than Europe's. The fertility rates in China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are well below the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman, and estimates indicate that the major East Asian nations will face a sizable reduction in their working-age populations over the next half century. The working-age population in Japan has already peaked; by 2010, Japan will have three million fewer workers than it did in 2005. The worker populations in China and South Korea are also likely to peak within the next decade. Goldman Sachs predicts that China's median age will rise from 33 in 2005 to 45 in 2050, a remarkable graying of the population. And Asian countries have as much trouble with immigrants as European countries do. Japan faces a large prospective worker shortage because it can neither take in enough immigrants nor allow its women to fully participate in the labor force. Pivotal powers do not threaten U.S. leadership
Ni na Hachi gi a n & Mona S tup he n , S t anford Gradu at e S chool and fo rm er S ervi ce Offi c er in t he C li nt on adm i ni st rat i on, 200 8 , The Next Am eri c an C ent ury p. 162-3 Now push comes to shove, so to speak. We have argued so far in this book that we cannot know which, whether, or how fast the pivotal powers will continue to grow. Demographics, climate, political stability, and myriad other factors Americans do not control will conspire to shape their futures. We have also shown that the pivotal powers affect what Americans care about in both positive and harmful ways, but that the benefits are more substantial, broad, or immediate and the harm is more nebulous, indirect, narrow, or distant. The pivotal powers help the U.S. battle the largest security threats it now faces in terrorism, disease, and proliferation of nuclear and other dangerous materials. The pivotal powers benefit from the world order and fight side by side with the U.S. against global killers that heed no authority. None poses a direct security threat to America today, and their growth supports overall U.S. economic growth. The pivotal powers do not undermine U.S. liberal democracy at home and do not present a serious ideological challenge outside our borders either. Finally, we know that the pivotal powers want stable and positive relations with the United States, and the United States is largely in the driver's seat in steering these relationships . For now, none seeks to unseat the U.S. as sole superpowerrowever, the pivotal powers are challenging U.S. leadership and prestige, as well as making it more difficult for the U.S. to get its way in all matters. America is seeing its operational freedom erode.
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U.S. Hege High Now, Will Continue to Be No European Economic Threat
Europe is not a serious economic threat to the U.S. Fareed Zakaria, Editor of Newsweek International, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008,
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501facomment87303/fareed-zakaria/the-future-of-american-power.html? mode=print
The United States' advantages might seem obvious when compared with conditions in Asia, which is still a continent of mostly developing countries. Against Europe, the margin is slimmer than many Americans believe. The eurozone has been growing at an impressive clip, about the same pace per capita as the United States since 2000. It takes in half the world's foreign investment, boasts strong labor productivity, and posted a $30 billion trade surplus in the first ten months of 2007. In the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Index, European countries occupy seven of the top ten slots. Europe has its problems -high unemployment, rigid labor markets -- but it also has advantages, including more efficient and fiscally sustainable health-care and pension systems. All in all,
Europe presents the most significant short-term challenge to the United States in the economic realm. But Europe has one crucial disadvantage. Or, to put it more accurately, the United States has one crucial advantage over Europe and most of the developed world. The United States is demographically vibrant. Nicholas Eberstadt, a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, estimates that the U.S. population will increase by 65 million by 2030, whereas Europe's population will remain "virtually stagnant." Europe, Eberstadt notes, "will by that time have more than twice as many seniors older than 65 than children under 15, with drastic implications for future aging. (Fewer children now means fewer workers later.) In the United States, by contrast, children will continue to outnumber the elderly. The United Nations Population Division estimates that the ratio of working-age people to senior citizens in western Europe will drop from 3.8:1 today to just 2.4:1 in 2030. In the U.S., the figure will fall from 5.4:1 to 3.1:1." The only real way to avert this demographic decline is for Europe to take in more immigrants. Native Europeans actually stopped replacing themselves as early as 2007, and so even maintaining the current population will require modest immigration. Growth will require much more. But European societies do not seem able to take in and assimilate people from strange and unfamiliar cultures, especially from rural and backward regions in the world of Islam. The question of who is at fault here -the immigrant or the society -- is irrelevant. The reality is that Europe is moving toward taking in fewer immigrants at a time when its economic future rides on its ability to take in many more. The United States, on the other hand, is creating the first universal nation, made up of all colors, races, and creeds, living and working together in considerable harmony. Consider the current presidential election, in which the contestants have included a black man, a woman, a Mormon, a Hispanic, and an Italian American. .. The effects of an aging population are considerable. First, there is the pension burden -- fewer workers supporting more gray-haired elders. Second, as the economist Benjamin Jones has shown, most innovative inventors -- and the overwhelming majority of Nobel laureates -- do their most important work between the ages of 30 and 44. A smaller working-age population, in other words, means fewer technological, scientific, and managerial advances. Third, as workers age, they go from being net savers to being net spenders, with dire ramifications for national savings and investment rates. For advanced industrialized countries, bad demographics are a killer disease.
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U.S. Hege High Now, Will Continue to Be No China Threat
China will not replace the U.S. as a superpower Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek International, 2008, The Post-American World, p. 98 China will not replace the United States as the world's superpower. It is unlikely to surpass it on any dimensionmilitary, political, or economicfor decades, let alone have dominance in all areas
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Hegemony Not Declining Asia
Despite Bush, U.S. soft power in Asia is high now
Josephy Nye, Harvard, Chinadaily.com.cn, March 26, 2009, p. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/200903/26/content_7617363.htm American soft power rests also on culture, values and foreign policies. What's interesting is that in the Bush administration, American policies were not seen as legitimate in many parts of the world, and this undercut American soft power. But American culture remained attractive. So when the Chicago Counsel on Global Affairs did a study of soft power in Asia, which they published last year, it still showed American soft power being higher than that of China or Japan or any other country .
U.S. leadership in East Asia is high
The Economist, February 21, 2009, http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13145069 A well-received first trip abroad as secretary of state, listening not lecturing UNTIL this week only one American secretary of state had made his first foreign trip to Asia: Dean Rusk, in 1961. So Hillary Clinton's decision to start her travels with a tour to Tokyo, Jakarta, Beijing and Seoul surprised even her hosts. The message seems to be that war elsewhere and economic turmoil may be the current preoccupations, but America's future environment will be shaped in Asia. Besides, it is always good to go where you are welcome. It is not simply that President Barack Obama's four childhood years in Indonesia make him a hero there; nor that learners of English have cleaned out the Tokyo bookshops of volumes of his speeches. Rather, despite the damage George Bush did to America's prestige, in East Asia it remains high.
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U.S. Hegemony Not Declining Chinese Soft Power Doesnt Threaten
Chinas confrontational approach to promoting soft power undermines its ability to project it
Australian, April 8, 2009, p. 12 In countries such as the US, soft power arises predominantly from strong, independent institutions, from the strength of nongovernmental organisations, universities, media and cultural industries such as Hollywood. On the issue of Tibet, China's leaders have approached soft power as though it can be packaged for export at a central location in Beijing, which is precisely what they have done. A photography exhibition, consonant with the CCP's propaganda message on Tibet, has travelled across the world, from Seoul, South Korea, to Larnaca, Cyprus, highlighting the sufferings of Tibetans before 1959 and portraying the Dalai Lama as a hateful oppressor. The exhibition's international reception has been reported loudly and favourably in numerous languages by China's official state media. These and other soft power ploys have worked in tandem with political arm-twisti ng. Facing stiff Chinese pressure, the South African Government denied entry to the Dalai Lama, who was to have participated in a conference of Nobel peace prize winners on March 27. Hong Kong's Foreign Correspondents Club, an independent professional association, was similarly pressured into postponing a scheduled talk by Kate Saunders, of the Washington-based International Campaign for Tibet. One underlying problem with China's conception of soft power is its fundamentally confrontational view of the world. In articulating the need for a bigger share of ``global public opinion'', China reverts to type, talking in official rhetoric about ``anti-Chinese forces'' and a monolithic and hostile Western media. It rails against the West for ``harbouring a Cold War mind-set'', when what it glimpses is in fact little more than a self-reflection of its persistent Mao-era rhetoric about the West. In fact, China's deficit of soft power has little to do with its ``communication capacity'' or the hostile attitude of the foreign press and everything to do with its failure to recognise the basic nature of soft power: the articulation of values that the rest of the world can aspire to and emulate. If China indeed hopes to improve its international reputation and boost its soft power, it will have to act in a spirit of openness and exchange, not with a hard-minded insistence on facts that do not admit discussion or challenge. Most important of all, it will have to allow the emergence within China of credible and diverse voices that can engage with the world, and this means encouraging more independent media, real academic and artistic freedom, and unleashing the power of civil society.
Government secrecy collapses Chinese soft power
South China Morning Post, April 7, 2009, p. 7 But Yu Wanli, an associate professor at Peking University's Centre for International and Strategic Studies, said there was also a gap in the way the central government wished to present itself and the way the world perceived it. "The soft-power campaigns will remain ineffective as long as the government keeps a tight control on everything. But in China, diplomacy is solely under the government's control," he said. "Soft power is not about what the government says, it's about what its people really think about their own country."
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U.S. Hegemony Not Declining Chinas Economic Power Doesnt Threaten
Chinas share of the global GDP isnt even close to the Wests
The Straits Times (Singapore), March 17, 2009, p. online For a start, China's share of global gross domestic product, though growing, is just 11.4 per cent, compared to 43 per cent for the US and Europe combined Asean's growth still hinges on these two economies, and their outlook is bleak according to the latest International Monetary Fund projections - negative growth this year and just slight expansion next year.
Chinas economic growth is not sustainable
Dr John Lee is a visiting fellow at the Centre for Independent Studies, April 4, 2009, Sydney Morning Herald, p. 4 With the shift of economic power from West to East becoming more apparent, this issue has become more important. Beijing performs a double act. It is desperate to promote China as a successful and confident country, legitimately authoritarian. On the other hand, Chinese leaders are profoundly aware of weaknesses that could bring down the regime and cause chaos throughout the country. Despite three decades of economic growth, for example, half of the people live on $US2 a day or less. Illiteracy has doubled since 2000. China has become the most unequal Asian country and one of the more corrupt. Officially recorded instances of mass unrest reached 87,000 in 2005. Chinese economists are worried about the sustainability of China's economic approach. While many in countries like Australia fear perceptions of growing Chinese strength, the Chinese Communist Party fears China's weakness. As the Chinese President, Hu Jintao, repeatedly warns, hostile foreign forces have not given up on westernising and carving up a vulnerable China. The image of a secure and confident China is a staged act. China remains an insecure power governed by an insecure regime. Yet the Communist Party has staked its legitimacy on returning prosperity and respect to China and its people. In an attempt to remain relevant and in control, the party has expanded - rather than reduced - its role and influence in Chinese society and economy. Rather than one-party rule being identified as the source of many modern Chinese problems, Beijing insists only a strong, authoritarian apparatus can steer the ship and avoid chaos in a country of 1.3 billion people.
Poverty and authoritarianism limit Chinas rise
New York Times, April 2, 2009, p. 12 ''China is a major global economy now. That is a fundamental reality,'' Chu Shulong, who directs the Institute of Strategic Studies at Tsinghua University in Beijing, said in an interview. ''What China says and does has an effect on international finance, international economics and other economies.'' But just as real, Mr. Chu and others said, are the factors that hamstring China: widespread poverty, authoritarian rule, a culture shrouded by decades of isolation and poorly understood intentions. China's global ambitions are unlikely to be realized until it resolves those issues.
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U.S. Hegemony Not Declining Low Population Growth Doesnt Threaten
Low population growth rates dont threaten U.S. power
Anne-Marie Slaughter, of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton, Foreign Affairs, January- February 2009, America's Edge Subtitle: Power in the Networked Century, p. 94 MORE PEOPLE, MORE PROBLEMS Demography is often cited as the chief factor behind the relative decline of the West. China and India make up over a third of the world's population, while Europe and Japan are actually shrinking and the United States is suddenly a relatively small nation of 300 million. This argument, however, rests largely on assumptions formed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Throughout most of human history, territory and population translated into military and economic power. Military power depended on the number of soldiers a state could put into the field, the amount of territory an enemy had to cross to conquer it, and the economy's ability to supply the state's army. Population size mattered for economic power because without trade a state needed a domestic market large enough for manufacturers and merchants to thrive. With trade, however, small mercantile nations such as the Netherlands and Portugal were able to punch far above their weight. In the nineteenth century, to increase their power, small countries expanded their territory through colonization. But by the twentieth century, as political unrest in the colonial world grew, the advantages of trading rather than ruling became increasingly clear. Although the United States and the Soviet Union, two great continental powers, dominated the second half of the twentieth century, the countries that grew the richest were often the smallest. In 2007, the ten countries with the highest per capita GDPs all had populations smaller than that of New York City, with one notable exception: the United States. In the twenty-first century, less is more. Domestic markets must be big enough to allow national firms to obtain a foothold so as to withstand international competition (although such markets can be obtained through free-trade areas and economic unions). But beyond this minimum, if trade barriers are low and transportation and communication are cheap, then size will be more of a burden than a benefit. When both markets and production are global, then productive members of every society will generate income across multiple societies. Business managers in one country can generate value by orchestrating a global and disparate network of researchers, designers, manufacturers, marketers, and distributors. It will remain the responsibility of government, however, to provide for the less productive members of society, namely, the elderly, the young, the disabled, and the unemployed -- think of them as national overhead costs. From this perspective, the 300 million citizens in the United States look much more manageable than the more than a billion in China or India. A shrinking population can actually act as a catalyst for innovation. In China, the answer to many problems is simply to throw people at them -- both because people are the most available commodity and because the Chinese government needs to provide as many jobs as possible. In Japan, by contrast, the answer is to innovate. Nintendo, the Kyoto-based gaming giant, is bringing much of its manufacturing back to Japan from China and other parts of Asia. How can it possibly compete using high-cost Japanese labor? It will not have to -- its new factories are almost entirely automated, with only a handful of highly skilled employees needed to run them. This approach uses less energy, costs less, and guarantees a higher standard of living for the Japanese population. As the priority shifts from economic growth to sustainable growth, the formula of fewer people plus better and greener technology will look increasingly attractive. Finally, size carries its own set of political challenges. Over the past four centuries, the arrow of history has pointed in the direction of national self-determination. Empires and multiethnic countries have steadily divided and subdivided into smaller units so that nations, or dominant ethnic groups, could govern themselves. Ninety years after Woodrow Wilson laid out his vision of self-determination for the Balkan states, the process continues in Kosovo. In many ways, the breakup of the Soviet Union was another round of the decolonization and self-determination movement that began in the 1940s. It continues today with the conflicts over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as with the potential for conflict on the Crimean Peninsula and in eastern Ukraine. Much of China's 5,000-year history has been a saga of the country's splitting apart and being welded back together. The Chinese government, like the Indian government, legitimately fears that current pockets of instability could quickly translate into multiple secessionist movements. The United States faces no threats to its essential unity, which has been forged by a political and cultural ideology of unity amid diversity. The principal alternative to this ideology is the solution employed by the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of orange juice.
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which individual states come together as larger economic and, gradually, quasi-political units. The most promising dimension of recent Chinese politics has been its adoption of a version of this solution with regard to Hong Kong and Macao -- and one day Beijing may apply this model to Taiwan. The United States benefits not only from its limited population but also from who makes up that population. It has long attracted the world's most entrepreneurial, creative, and determined individuals. A vast mixing of cultures has created an atmosphere for a fruitful cross-fertilization and innovation. These arguments still hold. In San Francisco, for instance, a new municipal telephone help line advertises that it can talk with callers in over 150 languages. This diversity, and the creativity that it produces, is visible everywhere: in Hollywood movies, in American music, and at U.S. universities. At Princeton University this past fall, five of the six student award winners for the highest grade point averages had come from abroad: from China, Germany, Moldova, Slovenia, and Turkey. In the nineteenth- and twentieth-century era of nation-states, the United States absorbed its immigrants and molded them into Americans, thereby creating the national cohesion necessary to build military and economic strength. Today, diversity in the United States means something more. Immigrant communities flourish not only in large cities but also in smaller towns and rural areas. A mosaic has replaced the melting pot, and, more than ever, immigrants connect their new communities to their countries of origin. Along the southern border of the United States, for instance, immigration experts talk about "transnational communities," about clusters of families in the United States linked with the villages of Mexico and Central America. Now, where you are from means where you can, and do, go back to -- and whom you know and trust enough to network with. Consider, for example, how valuable the overseas Chinese community has been to China. Alan Wang, a former student of mine, was born in China, moved to Australia with his family at the age of 12, and went to college and law school there. He later came to the United States to pursue a graduate degree at Harvard. For a while, he practiced law with a large British firm in London, and then moved to its Shanghai office. When I asked him how he identified himself, he replied, "overseas Chinese." Millions of people similar to Wang have spread out from China throughout Southeast Asia, Australia, the United States, and Canada, creating trading and networking opportunities for people in all those places. Similarly, the United States must learn to think of its ethnic communities as the source of future generations of "overseas Americans." Already, young Chinese Americans and Indian Americans are heading back to their parents' homelands to seek opportunity and make their fortunes. Soon, the children of U.S. immigrants from Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East will follow a similar path and return to their ethnic homelands, at least for a time. The key to succeeding in a networked economy is being able to harvest the best ideas and innovations from the widest array of sources. In this regard, the United States is plugged into all corners of the global brain. Beyond its immigrant communities, the United States can also depend on a new generation to forge connections around the world. John Zogby, the influential pollster, calls Americans between the ages of 18 and 29 "the First Globals," a group he describes as "more networked and globally engaged than members of any similar age cohort in American history." More than half of the respondents aged 18 to 29 in a poll conducted in the United States in June 2007 by Zogby International said that they had friends or family living outside the United States, vastly more than any other U.S. age group. Other Zogby polls have shown that this generation holds passports in roughly the same proportion as other age groups but uses them far more frequently. A quarter of this group, according to Zogby's data, believes that they will "end up living for some significant period in a country other than America." These young people spreading out around the world will be a huge asset to the United States. Children born abroad who acquire U.S. citizenship as a result of their parents' heritage or life decisions will add to this number. A college classmate of mine was born to Hungarian immigrants in Canada and later acquired U.S. citizenship. After graduation, he moved to China and then Japan, where he gained a Japanese residency permit while also applying for Hungarian citizenship. He now lives with his Chinese wife in Beijing, where his daughter was born. Not long after her birth, he took her to Tokyo so that she could register as a U.S. citizen and reenter China on a U.S. passport. These stories are legion in any large global city -couples from two different countries who are raising their children in a third or fourth or even fifth country. For many people who orbit in this floating cloud of nationalities, a U.S. passport, particularly now that the United States has relaxed its rules on dual citizenship, has become a new kind of reserve currency. With one, even the most venturesome and peripatetic have the guarantee of the political and cultural stability of the West. The United States must devise the incentives and conditions that will allow it to both encourage this phenomenon and profit from it.
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U.S. Hegemony Not Declining No Eastern Shift
Global power is not shifting east
Anne-Marie Slaughter, of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton, Foreign Affairs, January- February 2009, America's Edge Subtitle: Power in the Networked Century, p. 94 THE WORLD IS ROUND AGAIN For most of modern history, the Eurocentric view of the world has placed North and South America in a hemisphere of their own -- the Western Hemisphere. Today, the world is mapped in the round, with Asia in the East and Africa, the Americas, and Europe in the West. That, at least, is how some Asians increasingly think of themselves. In his recently published book, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East, Mahbubani argues that the era of "Western domination of world history is over" and that the world is witnessing an "Asian march to modernity." But if half of the world is now "the East," defined as the Asian hemisphere, then the other half is the Atlantic hemisphere, made up of Africa, the Americas, and Europe. It is quite a promising neighborhood, home to a wealth of human, economic, material, and natural resources. Politically, Europe and North America constitute a spreading community of liberal democracies that accounts for one-sixth of the world's population, almost 60 percent of global GDP, and the two primary global reserve currencies. More trade and direct investment pass over the Atlantic Ocean than any other part of the world -- over $2 trillion in cumulative foreign direct investment alone.
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U.S. Hegemony Not a Threat Europe Not a Threat
Europe lacks hard & soft power
The Guardian (London), January 30, 2009, p. 41 The debate about Europe in this country always takes place on the basis that the EU is too strong. Yet the reality is in many ways the opposite. Actually Europe is often too weak, in terms both of the hard power of integrated military effectiveness and the soft power of international influence building. Whatever Europe's strength vis-a-vis the sovereign states that make up the union, it is certainly too weak to be really effective in representing its own best interests internationally, or in commanding resources that would enable it to sit at the top table as a truly effective player. Britain ought therefore to have a strong national interest in building up the EU.
Infighting means no unified European response
The Christian Science Monitor, April 2, 2009, p. 6 Even people with diverging views on economic and foreign policy were united against the US policy," says Karim Bitar, a Paris consultant and scholar at the Institute for International and Strategic Relations. "But now the US can no longer be accused of all the world's ills. The truth is, Europeans now think more about America than about Europe. There is no European consensus on the most basic questions of our future, what we should be. Under Bush, we could evade them. Not now." Europe's internal conflict over the Russian war in Georgia last summer, and the crisis over interrupted oil and gas supplies to Europe this winter, were indicators of division in what is still an economic union struggling to achieve political solidarity.
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U.S. Hegemony Not Declining Environmental Problems Dont Destroy
Environmental problems dont threaten American leadership
Anne-Marie Slaughter, of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton, Foreign Affairs, January- February 2009, America's Edge Subtitle: Power in the Networked Century, p. 94 The potential for further integration of the hemisphere is enormous. Even more important is the potential for deeper economic integration within the Americas. On energy questions, Canadian oil sands and Brazilian sugar cane are more promising than depending on Russian pipelines or Sudanese oil. Markets for renewable energy -- such as from biomass, wind, geothermal technology, and other sources -- are growing in Latin America. Miami is already a financial center for Latin America, and the steady growth of the Latino population in the United States will only deepen intra-American investment. The rise of Brazil and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Mexico will create an emerging counterbalance to the United States south of its border. But any initiative for strengthening economic ties must come from the United States itself. It first must address its immigration policy and then, similar to the economic and political assistance it provided to the European Union, offer support for an economic union in Central and South America. The result could be an integrated market and trading bloc of 800 million people, with tremendous natural resources, enormous opportunities for development and sustainable growth, and deep ties to Africa, Asia, and Europe. That market would still have the protection of two wide oceans, and even in a networked world, there are benefits in being disconnected. Those oceans protect the United States against massive refugee flows, against other threats to security from civil and interstate wars, and, increasingly, from the effects of climate change. Researchers at Princeton University have found that rain over the Pacific Ocean washes out of the air substantial amounts of ozone and some other gases emitted in Asia before the air can ever get to the Americas. Most climate-change projections forecast rising waters overflowing the deltas of South and Southeast Asia, potentially threatening millions of lives in countries such as Bangladesh. Increasing desertification in northern Africa will force emigrants across the Mediterranean and into Europe; a similar process in northern China could push even greater numbers into Russia. Conflict is likely to follow these displaced peoples. New democracies, such as Indonesia, and one-party states, such as China and Vietnam, will find themselves economically and politically vulnerable. Of course, the Americas will not be fully protected from rising oceans, flooding, desertification, or the other nasty consequences of climate change. Still, both geography and demography -- and the absence of hundreds of millions of people on the move -- will insulate the New World from the afflictions of the Old.
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Hegemony U.S. Hedge High Now, Will Continue to Be Iraq Hasnt Hurt
The Iraq war has strengthened U.S. military dominance Australian, April 25, 2008,
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23599516-25377,00.html
THE US war in Iraq has strengthened its strategic position, especially in terms of key alliances, and the only way this could be reversed would be if it lost the will to continue the struggle and abandoned Iraq in defeat and disarray. Surely the author of this sentence is on the ganja, you might say. Something a little weird in the coffee? It goes against every aspect of conventional wisdom. But the author of this thesis, stated only marginally less boldly, is one of the US's most brilliant strategic analysts. Mike Green holds the Japan chair at Washington's Centre for Strategic and International Studies and was for several years the Asia director at the National Security Council. He is also one of America's foremost experts on Japan and northeast Asia generally. His thesis, applied strictly to the US position in Asia, is correct. First, Green states and acknowledges the negatives. He writes: ``The Iraq war has had one important, pernicious impact on US interests in Asia: it has consumed US attention.'' This has prevented the US from following up in sufficient detail on some positive developments in Asia. Green also acknowledges that the US's reputation has taken a battering among Muslim populations in Asia. Yet Green's positive thesis is fascinating. The US's three most important Asian alliances -- with Australia, Japan and South Korea -- have in his view been strengthened by the Iraq campaign. Each of these nations sent substantial numbers of troops to help the US in Iraq. They did this because they believed in what the US was doing in Iraq, and also because they wanted to use the Iraq campaign as an opportunity to strengthen their alliances with the US. More generally, in a world supposedly awash in anti-US sentiment, pro-American leaders keep winning elections. Germany's Angela Merkel is certainly more pro-American than Gerhard Schroeder, whom she replaced. The same is true of France's Nicolas Sarkozy. More importantly in terms of Green's analysis, the same is also true of South Korea's new President. Lee Myung-bak, elected in a landslide in December, is vastly more pro-American than his predecessor, Roh Moo-hyun. Even in majority Islamic societies, their populations allegedly radicalised and polarised by Bush's campaign in Iraq and the global war on terror more generally, election results don't show any evidence of these trends. In the most recent local elections in Indonesia, and in national elections in Pakistan, the Islamist parties with anti-American rhetoric fared very poorly. Similarly Kevin Rudd was elected as a very pro-American Labor leader, unlike Mark Latham, with his traces of anti-Americanism, who was heavily defeated. Even with China, the Iraq campaign was not a serious negative for the US. Beijing was far more worried by the earlier US-led NATO intervention into Kosovo because it was based purely on notions of human rights in Kosovo. Such notions could theoretically be used to justify action (not necessarily military action) against China over Taiwan and Tibet. Iraq, on the other hand, was justified on the basis of weapons of mass destruction, a justification with which the Chinese were much more comfortable. Further, the Chinese co-operated closely with the Americans in the war on terror, especially in tackling what they alleged was extremism among some of the Muslim Uighurs in the vast Xinjiang province.
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U.S. Hege High Now, No Challengers
No other powers are future competitors to the U.S. New Yorker, April 21, 2008
However fast the economies of new powers are growing, then, forecasts of their world domination leave out a great deal. China has a demographic problem--too many boys--compounding its potentially catastrophic ecological problems. Russia's wealth is dependent on the price of oil. India, with its messy democratic system, might well have staying power, but no one sees it as a threat to the United States. And, besides, the "Harmonious Society" of Asia could still be violently disrupted by conflicts over Taiwan, North Korea, Tibet, Kashmir, and various islands, some of them sitting on oil reserves claimed by Vietnam, India, China, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. China is frightened that Japan might become a nuclear power, and makes every effort to keep it down, or at least out of the United Nations Security Council. Russia and China watch each other tensely across the Siberian border. North Korea periodically lobs missiles in the direction of Japan. And the South Koreans and the Southeast Asians are stuck between a democratic Japan they don't trust and an autocratic China they must warily accommodate.
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Collapse Leads to Apolarity
Collapse of U.S. unilpolarity leads to apolarity
Richard N. Haass, President, Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs , May/June 2008 ,
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html?mode=print
The principal characteristic of twenty-first-century international relations is turning out to be nonpolarity: a world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power. This represents a tectonic shift from the The twentieth century started out distinctly multipolar. But after almost 50 years, two world wars, and many smaller conflicts, a bipolar system emerged. Then, with the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, bipolarity gave way to unipolarity -- an international system dominated by one power, in this case the United States. But today power is diffuse, and the onset of nonpolarity raises a number of important questions. How does nonpolarity differ from other forms of international order? How and why did it materialize? What are its likely consequences? And how should the United States respond? NEWER WORLD ORDER In contrast to multipolarity -- which involves several distinct poles or concentrations of power -- a nonpolar international system is characterized by numerous centers with meaningful power. In a multipolar system, no power dominates, or the system will become unipolar. Nor do concentrations of power revolve around two positions, or the system will become bipolar. Multipolar systems can be cooperative, even assuming the form of a concert of powers, in which a few major powers work together on setting the rules of the game and disciplining those who violate them. They can also be more competitive, revolving around a balance of power, or conflictual, when the balance breaks down. At first glance, the world today may appear to be multipolar. The major powers -- China, the European Union (EU), India, Japan, Russia, and the United States -- contain just over half the world's people and account for 75 percent of global GDP and 80 percent of global defense spending. Appearances, however, can be deceiving. Today's world differs in a fundamental way from one of classic multipolarity: there are many more power centers, and quite a few of these poles are not nation-states. Indeed, one of the cardinal features of the contemporary international system is that nation-states have lost their monopoly on power and in some domains their preeminence as well. States are being challenged from above, by regional and global organizations; from below, by militias; and from the side, by a variety of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and corporations. Power is now found in many hands and in many places. In addition to the six major world powers, there are numerous regional powers: Brazil and,
arguably, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela in Latin America; Nigeria and South Africa in Africa; Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East; Pakistan in South Asia; Australia, Indonesia, and
A good many organizations would be on the list of power centers, including those that are global (the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, the World Bank), those that are regional (the African Union, the Arab League, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the EU, the Organization of American States, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), and those that are functional (the International Energy Agency, OPEC, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the World Health
South Korea in East Asia and Oceania.
Organization). So, too, would states within nation-states, such as California and India's Uttar Pradesh, and cities, such as New York, S o Paulo, and Shanghai. Then there are the large global companies, including those that dominate the worlds of energy, finance, and manufacturing. Other entities deserving inclusion would be global media outlets (al Jazeera, the BBC, CNN), militias (Hamas, Hezbollah, the Mahdi Army, the Taliban), political parties, religious institutions and movements, terrorist organizations (al Qaeda), drug cartels, and NGOs of a more benign sort (the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Doctors Without Borders, Greenpeace).
Today's world is increasingly one
of distributed, rather than concentrated, power.
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No Isolationism Now
GLOBALIZATION AND THE INFORMATION AGE OVERWHELM ISOLATIONIST IMPULSES
Vans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, SEEING THE ELEPHANT: THE U.S. ROLE IN GLOBAL SECURITY, 2006, p. 204 'A larger issue raised by Huntington is whether the American people, who -have historically preferred isolationism, will continue to support costly foreign policy involvements in faraway places such as the Middle East and Asia. If the American people see such involvements as only peripherally related to vital national interests, they might tire of them and withdraw support. A shift to a "fortress America" mentality could arise if its people believe that the United States is too big and powerful to be menaced by any coalition of overseas powers: it has wealth and technology, and its population now numbers nearly 300 million, more than double the 140 million during World War II. Such strength prevents invasion of its shores and might yield indifference to events abroad. Against this trend are globalization and the information age, the fact that fully one-fourth of the U.S. economy depends upon overseas commerce, and perhaps most visibly, the threats posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The American people seem to have no taste for empire, yet they appear willing to support an ambitious foreign policy.
INTERVENTIONISM MORE LIKELY THAN ISOLATIONISM
Doug Bandow, Vice President of Policy Research for Citizen Outreach, FOREIGN FOLLIES: AMERICAS NEW GLOBAL EMPIRE, 2006, p. 33 Today the charge of isolationism is errant nonsense. The same Republican Senate that Clinton attacked for killing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) approved the expansion of NATO. The Republican Congress that cut the President's foreign aid budget nevertheless had approved nearly $13 billion in outlays. Indeed, the real danger today is promiscuous intervention, not isolation. On issue after issue, foolish and unnecessary meddling is making America as well as other nations less prosperous and secure
THE U.S. HAS NEVER DETACHED ITSELF FROM THE WORLD
Rajan Menon, international relations professor, Lehigh, THE END OF ALLIANCES, 2007, p. 20 Norand this bears repeatingdo I maintain that the United States will turn isolationist. The United States has never been detached from world politics and the label of "isolationism" that is routinely affixed to particular phases of American foreign policy is a misnomer. Even if it were possible to do so, a retreat into "Fortress America" is hardly the sole alternative to a strategy resting on fixed alliances and the permanent positioning of thousands of troops overseas. For most of its history the United States engaged the world while shunning alliances, but it changed course after 1945, adopting a strategy of permanent alliances. Both were ways of engaging the world)
THE PUBLIC SUPPORTS GLOBAL LEADERSHIP
Rajan Menon, international relations professor, Lehigh, THE END OF ALLIANCES, 2007, p p. 198 Last but not least, comes justice. Opinion polls show consistently that Americans want their country to do good works in the world and to practice the values it professes. One specific way to meet these expectations is for the U.S. government to assume the leadership in assembling a community of wealth and know-how dedicated to reducing global poverty.
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No Isolationism Now
PUBLIC OPPOSITION WONT TRIGGER MILITARY ISOLATIONISM
Ashton B. Carter, chair of the International Relations, Science and Security area at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. William J. Perry is a professor at Stanford's Institute for International Studies. Both are co-directors of the Preventive Defense Project, a research collaboration of Harvard and Stanford Universities, NATIONAL INTEREST, March/April 2007, p. 88 Meanwhile, experience in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere in the past 15 years suggests the world will call upon U.S. forces to conduct peacekeeping and stability operations, notwithstanding public ambivalence about such involvements. These missions require large ground forces with a wide range of capabilities, from combat to policing to economic reconstruction.
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Iraq Not Causing Isolationist Backlash in the US
PUBLIC SUPPORTS US INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT DESPITE OPPOSITION TO IRAQ WAR
World Public Opinion.org, 2006, Americans continue to support international engagement despite frustration over the war in Iraq, October 10, http://worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brunitedstatescanadara/256.php?nid=&id=&pnt=256&lb=brusc Most Americans believe the war in Iraq has not reduced terrorism or helped spread democracy in the Middle East. Instead they say the war has hurt U.S. relations with the Muslim world and should make nations more cautious about using military force. Nonetheless, Americans are not turning against international engagementstrong majorities still want the United States to play an active role in world affairs. The 2006 Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found no evidence of declining support for U.S. engagement on a wide-range of international issues. Americans believe the United States is and should remain the most influential country in the world. But they do not want their government to take on the role of world policeman, preferring that it work with other countries to solve global problems through the United Nations and other international institutions. Most Americans respond negatively when asked about the impact of the war in Iraq. Two out of three (66%) say that the war has damaged U.S. relations with the Muslim world and believe that the U.S. experience in Iraq should make nations more cautious about using military force to deal with rogue states. Majorities disagree with those who argue that the war will help promote democracy in the Middle East (64%) and that it has reduced the threat of terrorism (61%). Nonetheless, the Chicago Council survey finds that frustration with the war in Iraq has not affected Americans general attitudes about foreign policy. Since World War II, about two-thirds of the U.S. public has said that the United States should play an active role in world affairs, a proportion that fell significantly only during the period following the Vietnam War. Sixty-nine percent of Americans say in the 2006 poll that the United States should remain engaged in international affairs, statistically the same as in 2004 (67%).
US PUBLIC SUPPORTS CONTINUED MILITARY ENGAGEMENT WORLDWIDE
World Public Opinion.org, 2006, Americans continue to support international engagement despite frustration over the war in Iraq, October 10, http://worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brunitedstatescanadara/256.php? nid=&id=&pnt=256&lb=brusc Although Americans do not want the United States to be the worlds policeman, a majority (55%) says that maintaining military superiority should be an important goal of U.S. foreign policy. About the same percentage (53%) thinks the United States should keep most of its long-term overseas bases. Most Americans favor sending U.S. forces on humanitarian missions. Strong majorities say they support the use of U.S. troops to stop a government from committing genocide (71%), to deal with humanitarian crises (66%) and to join an international peacekeeping force to stop the killing in Darfur (65%).
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Bandwagoning Not Balancing
US PRIMACY CAUSES BANDWAGONING NOT BALANCING
Bradley A. Thayer, Professor Defense & Strategic Studies, Missouri State University, 2006, The National Interest, November/December, p. Lexis A remarkable fact about international politics today--in a world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display--is that countries want to align themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes-their own protection, or to gain greater influence. Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America--their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements--and they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies.
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Military Lead Now
THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE THE WORLDS MOST ADVANCED ECONOMY AND MILITARY Doug Bandow, Vice President of Policy Research for Citizen Outreach, FOREIGN FOLLIES: AMERICAS NEW GLOBAL EMPIRE, 2006, p. 31 Anyway, even significant budget cuts would leave Washington with the world's largest and most advanced military, far stronger than that of any other state or coalition of states. And those cuts would allow the economy, America's most important source of influence, to grow faster. Today, Washington's disproportionate military burden does more than divert precious economic resources down wasteful channels. It simultaneously relieves America's industrialized competitors from spending more on their militaries. This has allowed Japan and Europe, in particular, to gain an edge they otherwise would not have. Not surprisingly, such international dependents want to keep their generous U.S. subsidies: both Germany's Helmut Kohl and France's Jacques Chirac shamelessly demanded a continued U.S. military presence in Europe even while cutting back their own militaries.
THE U.S. ENJOYS GLOBAL MILITARY POWER PROJECTION & DOMINANCE
Chalmers Johnson, author and professor emeritus of the University of California, San Diego, NEMESIS: THE LAST DAYS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 2006, p. 5-6 After all, we now station over half a million U.S. troops, spies, contractors, dependents, and others on more than 737 military bases spread around the world. These bases are located in more than 130 countries, many of them presided over by dictatorial regimes that have given their citizens no say in the decision to let us in. The Pentagon publishes an inventory of the real estate it owns in its annual Base Structure Report, but its official count of between 737 and 860 overseas installations is incomplete, omitting all our espionage bases and a number of others that are secret or could be embarrassing to the United States. For example, it leaves out the air force base at Manas in Kyrgyzstan, formerly part of the Soviet Union and today part of our attempt to roll back the influence of the Soviet Union's successor state, Russia, and to control crucial Caspian Sea oil. It even neglects to mention the three bases built in tiny Qatar over the past few years, the headquarters for our high command during the invasion of Iraq in 2003, so as not to embarrass the emir of that country, who invited in our "infidel" soldiers.
NO TIME-FRAME TO THEIR TURNS: THE U.S. WILL BE DOMINANT FOR 30 TO 50 YEARS!
Colin Gray, political scientist specializing in national security policy, THE SHERIFF: AMERICAS DEFENSE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER, 2004, p. 178 U.S. military power should be globally dominant for at least the next thirty to fifty years. That claim can be advanced with a fair measure: of confidence . But that is not to suggest that the United States will win every conflict in which it participates. The claim is only that its potency in the increasingly joint regular warfare of the future assuredly should bury any enemy=. To beat the United States, adversaries will need either to prosecute unusual and irregular forms of combat or to devise cunning plans that succeed in locating and exploiting such vulnerabilities as may lurk beneath the obvious American strengths. Expressions of approval must be qualified because the only conclusive test is the test of actual war. It is important to remember that America's strategic performance in warfare will reflect both the character of the transforming military establishment and the effectiveness of its employment by political leaders.
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Military Lead Now
THE U.S. MILITARY LEAD WILL INCREASE, NOT DECREASE
Colin Gray, political scientist specializing in national security policy, THE SHERIFF: AMERICAS DEFENSE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER, 2004, p. 69 Military-technical competition comprises the third class of threat to American preeminence, or, more exactly, to America's ability to translate preeminence into strategic effectiveness. U.S. military preponderance over all comers, singly or in any combination, is simply a fact of strategic life in the early twenty-first century. Moreover, the U.S. lead over potential rivals in military reach and striking power is going to lengthen much further before it begins to shrink.
THE U.S. HAS GREATER RELATIVE POWER THAN ANY CHALLENGERS
Colin Gray, political scientist specializing in national security policy, THE SHERIFF: AMERICAS DEFENSE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER, 2004, p. 69 It is true that both absolutely and relatively the United States is very such greater than were any of the great states of modern times, but only limited comfort should be taken from that impressive fact. The character of American military power in the twenty-first century, especially in its still growing dependence on information technologies, offers potential opportunities for exploitation by both state and transnational competitors. Such competitors will not he rivals for the sheriff's badge; by and large what they will seek is freedom of action to pursue their interests, forcefully if need be, in the neighborhoods in which they are most interested.
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Global Military Dominance Now
THE U.S. PROJECTS ITS MILITARY POWER ALL OVER THE GLOBE
Julia Sweigh, Council on Foreign Relations, FRIENDLY FIRE, 2006, p. 34-5 America's military preeminence is both reflected by and enhanced by its global military presence. As of 2004, the United States had roughly 250,000 soldiers, sailors, and airmen deployed in more than a hundred countries. It has 1,000 or more troops in at least a dozen countries, not counting the forces currently occupying Iraq.' Smaller contingents are also active in dozens of countries, and the United States provides military training for personnel from over 130 countries. ' The United States maintains hundreds of military bases and other facilities around the world, with an estimated replacement value of $118 billion." The United States has the largest and most sophisticated arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons, and it is the only country with a global power projection capability, stealth aircraft, a large arsenal of precision-guided munitions, and integrated surveillance, reconnaissance, and command-and-control capabilities.' - U. S. military personnel are also far better trained."
THE U.S. COULD DEFEAT ANY FOE WITHOUT ANY MILITARY SUPPORT
Julia Sweigh, Council on Foreign Relations, FRIENDLY FIRE, 2006, p. 211 Given these disparities, the United States could have defeated anv of its recent foes without active military assistance from any other country. Indeed, the "coalitions" that the United States has organized and led during this period have been decidedly one-sided affairs. With the partial exception of Great Britain, its various allies have provided token forces largely for symbolic purposes. By 2001, the United States was refusing to let even its closest allies take on meaningful combat roles in Afghanistan so that it would not have to coordinate its military activities with any other country. Historian Paul Kennedy correctly termed this a "Potemkin alliance," where "the U.S. does 98 percent of the fighting, the British 2 percent, and the Japanese steam around Mauritius."" The US. Air Force performed the lion's share of the patrol duties over the "no-fly zones" in Iraq (with a modest assist from Great Britain), and the U.S. military has also provided logistical support for peacekeeping operations in Africa, East Timor, and elsewhere. The gap was perhaps most apparent in the invasion of Iraq: the United States supplied over 80 percent of the occupying force and used over 10 percent of its total military manpower. By contrast, other members of the coalition used less than 1 percent of their manpower. Clearly, no single state can hope to matched the combined U.S. economic and military capabilities, and even a large coalition would find it difficult to amass a comparable portfolio of power.
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No Economic Hege Decline Now
Hegemonic economic decline will not occur in the status quo
Joseph Nye, Harvard, university distinguished-service professor , July 27, 2007, American Foreign Policy After Iraq. By:
Nye Jr., Joseph S., Chronicle of Higher Education, 00095982, 7/27/2007, Vol. 53, Issue 47, http://chronicle.com/subscribe/login?url=https%3A%2F%2Fsiteproxy.ruqli.workers.dev%3A443%2Fhttp%2Fchronicle.com%2Fweekly %2Fv53%2Fi47%2F47b00601.htm The bankruptcy he predicts from military expenditures seems unlikely. Wisely or not, we spend less than half the percentage of our GDP on the military today than we did at the height of the cold war. And Johnson's comparisons of the United States with the Roman Empire fail to convince, especially when couched in language that describes Octavian's rise to power as "tainted by constitutional illegitimacy -- not unlike that of our own putative Boy Emperor from Crawford, Texas." Whatever one thinks of the legal reasoning in the Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore, the political outcome in 2000 bears little resemblance to what Augustus did to Roman republican institutions in 23 BC.
U.S. growth & competitiveness rates relatively high
Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek International, 2008, The Post-American World, p. 40-1
What's puzzling, however, is that these trends have been around for a whileand they have actually helped America's bottom line. Over the past twenty years, as globalization and outsourcing have accelerated dramatically, America's growth rate has averaged just over 3 percent, a full percentage point higher than that of Germany and France. (Japan averaged 2.3 percent over the same period.) Productivity growth, the elixir of modern economics, has been over 2.5 percent for a decade now, again a full percentage point higher than the European average. Even American exports held up, despite a decade-long spike in the value of the dollar that ended recently. In 1980, U.S. exports represented 10 percent of the world total; in 2007, that figure was still almost 9 percent. According to the World Economic Forum, the United States remains the most competitive economy in the world and ranks first in innovation, ninth in technological readiness, second in company spending for research and technology, and second in the quality of its research institutions. China does not come within thirty countries of the United States in any of these, and India breaks the top ten on only one count: market size. In virtually every sector that advanced industrial countries participate in, U.S. firms lead the world in productivity and profits.
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No Economic Hegemony Decline Now
No U.S. economic decline
Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek International, 2008, The Post-American World, p. 180-2
First, however, it is essential to note that the central feature of Britain's declineirreversible economic deteriorationdoes not really apply to the United States today. Britain's unrivaled economic status lasted for a few decades; America's has lasted more than 130 years. The U.S. economy has been the world's largest since the middle of the 1880s, and it remains so today. In fact, America has held a surprisingly constant share of global GDP ever since. With the brief exception of the late 1940s and 1950swhen the rest of the industrialized world had been destroyed and America's share rose to 50 percent!the United States has accounted for roughly a quarter of world output for over a century (32 percent in 1913, 26 percent in 1960, 22 percent in 1980, 27 percent in 2000, and 26 percent in 2007). It is likely to slip but not significantly in the next two decades. In 2025, most estimates suggest that the U.S. economy will still be twice the size of China's in terms of nominal GDP (though in terms of purchasing power, the gap will be smaller)." This difference between America and Britain can be seen in the burden of their military budgets. Britannia ruled the seas but never the land. The British army was sufficiently small that the German chancellor Otto von Bismarck once quipped that, were the British ever to invade Germany, he would simply have the local police force arrest them. Meanwhile, London's advantage over the seasit had more tonnage than the next two navies put togethercame at ruinous cost to its treasury. The American military, in contrast, dominates at every level land, sea, air, spaceand spends more than the next fourteen countries put together, accounting for almost 50 percent of global defense spending. Some argue that even this understates America's military lead against the rest of the world because it does not take into account the U.S. scientific and technological edge. The U nited States spends more on defense research and development than the rest of the world put together. And, crucially, it does all this without breaking the bank. Defense expenditure as a percent of GDP is now 4.1 percent, lower than it was for most of the Cold War. (Under Eisenhower, it rose to 10 percent of GDP.) The secret here is the denominator. As U.S. GDP grows larger and larger, expenditures that would have been backbreaking become affordable. The Iraq War may be a tragedy or a noble endeavor, depending on your point of view. Either way, however, it will not bankrupt the United States. The war has been expensive, but the price tag for Iraq and Afghanistan together$125 billion a yearrepresents less than 1 percent of GDP. Vietnam, by comparison, cost 1.6 percent of American GDP in 1970 and tens of thousands more soldiers' lives. American military power is not the cause of its strength but the consequence. The fuel is America's economic and technological base, which remains extremely strong. The United States does face larger, deeper, and broader challenges than it has ever faced in its history, and the rise of the rest does mean that it will lose some share of global GDP. But the process will look nothing like Britain's slide in the twentieth century, when the country lost the lead in innovation, energy, and entrepreneurship. America will remain a vital, vibrant economy, at the forefront of the next revolutions in science, technology, and industryas long as it can embrace and adjust to the challenges confronting it.
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No Economic Hegemony Decline Now
Not true current defense spending is sustainable. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007
["The Case For The American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 14]
No other country, or group of countries, comes close to matching the defense spending of the United States . Table
1.3 provides a context for this defense spending through a comparison of the defense spending of major countries in 2004, according the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The United States is far ahead of the defense spending of all other countries, including its nearest competitor, China. This is by design. As former Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich has argued, You do not need todays defense budget to defend
the United States. You need todays defense budget to lead the world. If you are prepared to give up leading the world, you can have a much smaller defense budget .9 To maintain the robust American lead in military capabilities, it must continue to spend large, but absolutely affordable, sums . And it is affordable. While the amount of U.S. defense spending certainly is a large sum, it is only about 4 percent of its gross domestic product, as Table 1.3 illustrates. An examination of the data in the table is remarkable for four reasons. First, U.S. defense spending is about half of the worlds total defense spending. Second, the United States spends more than almost all the other major military powers in the world combined. Of course, most of those major military powers are also allies of the United States. Third, U.S. defense spending is very low when measured as a percentage of its economy, about 3.7 percent of its total economy. Fourth, defense spending at that level is easily affordable for the United States into the future.
Imperial overstretch is impossible this evidence isolates several reasons that heg won't collapse the economy. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007
["The Case For The American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, p. 20-25 ]
The United States is the worlds largest and most efficient economy. Its currency is the worlds reserve currency, it fosters and protects international trade and helps to serve as the lender of last resort for the world economy. Additionally, the United States is enjoying historically low levels of inflation, unemployment, and interest rates . However, despite this unrivaled economic dominance, no economy is perfect. The U.S. economy certainly has problems, such as a large
federal budget deficit and a considerable current account deficit (the difference between what Americans earn from and pay to foreigners). [end page 20] Continuing deficits have made the United States the worlds leading debtor. But neither deficits nor debt are a major problem for the United States.
The federal budget deficit may be serviced by selling bonds, raising taxes, or reducing the spending of the federal government. Unlike the budget deficit, the current account deficit is not something the United States wholly controls since it involves international trade. The United States must borrow money from abroad to service the debt if Americans choose not to save their disposable income. And Americans love to spend, rather than save, their money. Much of the current account deficit is due to China and, to a lesser extent, Japan. That actually is good news for the current account deficit of the United States because the Chinese, Japanese, and other central banks in East Asia have an enormous stake in selling to the United States. These economies depend on exports, and the United States is an enormous market for their products and services. To ensure that their currency is weak against the American dollar, which is good for their export industries, they keep buying dollars and securities based on the dollar . If they did not, the dollar would lose value against the Chinese currency (the renminbi), causing Chinese imports to cost more, resulting in fewer Americans buying them, in turn causing a loss of jobs and downturn in the Chinese economy at a critical timemillions of Chinese are moving from rural areas to the cities to seek manufacturing jobs. If there were a substantial downturn in the Chinese economy, unemployment could lead to political unrest. The communist leaders of China are acutely aware of this, since economic problems fueled the revolution in which they took power .
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No Economic Hegemony Decline Now
(continued from previous page nothing cut)
Prominent historian Niall Ferguson estimates that if the dollar fell by one-third against the renminbi, the Chinese could suffer a loss of about 10 percent of their GDP.27 That would be catastrophic, and so it is unacceptable to the Chinese.
Thus, Chinas economic interest requires it to fund the current account deficit of the United States. The United States may be discovering what the British found in their imperial heyday, Ferguson writes; that is, If you are a truly powerful empire, you can borrow a lot of money at surprisingly reasonable rates. Todays deficits are in fact dwarfed in
relative terms by the amount the British borrowed to finance their Global War on (French) Terror between 1793 to 1815and the British Empire lasted another 150 years.28
Despite problems, the American economy is both huge and robust, and it continues to grow at healthy rates . Depending on how one counts the numbers, the U.S. economy accounts for between 20 to 30 percent of world GDP. Moreover, the United States is the worlds most productive country and still leads the World in innovation according
to the World Economic Forum (WEF), an organization that measures the competitiveness of countries around the world. Each year, it publishes a ranking of each countrys economic competitiveness. This is comprised of the quality of the macroeconomic environment of a given country, the health of its public institutions, and its technological [end page 21 pages 22 and 23 are graphs/tables] sophistication. Traditionally the United States is ranked first or second. In 2004, it was ranked second of 104 countries, behind only Finland (China is 46th). According to the World Economic Forum, the United States is ranked second, with overall technological supremacy, and especially high scores for such indicators as companies spending on R&D [research and development], the creativity of the scientific community, personal computer and internet penetration rates.29 Also in 2004, the United States was first in the WEFs rankings for business competitiveness (China is 47th) and technological innovation (China is 104th) a critical indication of long-term prosperity. Nor is the 2004 ranking an aberration; the United States historically ranks first in those categories of global competitiveness. The U.S. economy continues to grow and, most importantly, much of its productivity is based on the information technology (IT) revolution. Significantly, this is not the case in Europe or Japan, where substantial growth has yet to occur (as in Europe) or has peaked (as in Japan). According to economist Deepak Lal, the big difference in the productivity increases between the U.S. and Europe has been in the sectors that are substantial users of IT equipment I and software, and these industries are the key to continued economic growth in the information age.3 The United Statess lead in IT may be overcome a some point, perhaps by China, but not in the
foreseeable future, as the United States remains the worlds IT leader. In turn, this helps to ensure the military dominance of the United States, as so much military technology depends on information technology . Given the historical economic growth rates of these countries, it is unlikely that any of them (or the EU) will be able to reach the levels of economic growth required to match current U.S. defense spending and, thus, supplant the United States. China comes closest with 6.6 percent annual economic growth estimated by the World Bank through 2020, or the 7 percent annual
economic growth estimated by the World Economic Forum through 2020.31 It is not even clear if China can sustain its growth rates and, other than China, no other country is even in the ballpark. Table 1.5 shows the sustained economic growth rates necessary to match the present military spending by the United States. Thus, the economy is well placed to be the engine of the American Empire. Even the leading proponent of the imperial overstretch argument, Yale University historian Paul Kennedy, has acknowledged this. Imperial overstretch
occurs when an empires military power and alliance commitments are too burdensome for its economy. In the 1980s, there was much concern among academics that the United States was in danger of this as its economy strained to fund its military operations and alliance commitments abroad. However, Kennedy now acknowledges that he was wrong when he made that argument in his famous book , The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, because of the robustness of American economic and military power. Indeed, if there is any [end page 24] imperial overstretch, it is more likely to be by China, France, Britain, India, Russia, or the EUnot the United States . Reflecting on the history of world politics, Kennedy submits that the United States not only has overwhelming dominance but possesses such power so as to be a historically unique condition: Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing. I have returned to all of the comparative defense spending and military personnel statistics over the past 500 years that I compiled in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, and no other nation comes close, not even an empire as great as the British, because even the Royal Navy was equal only to the next two navies. Right now all the other navies in the world combined could not dent American maritime supremacy. Moreover, Kennedy recognizes that the steady economic growth of the American economy, and the curbing of inflation, means that Americas enormous defense expenditures could be pursued at a far lower relative cost to the country than the military spending of Ronald Reagans years, and that fact is an incomparable source of the U.S. strength. When Kennedy, who was perhaps the strongest skeptic of the economic foundation of Americas power, comes to acknowledge, first, that no previous empire has been as powerful as America is now; and, second, that its strength will last because of the fundamental soundness of its economy, then, as Jeff Foxworthy would say, You might be an empire.. .. And it is one that will last a Considerable amount of time. As with its military might, the economic foundation of the American empire is sound for the projected future.
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No Economic Overstretch
U.S. HEGEMONY IS ON SOLID ECONOMIC GROUND; NO RISK OF OVERSTRETCH NOW OR IN THE FUTURE David H. Levey recently retired after 19 years as Managing Director of Moody's Sovereign Ratings Service. Stuart S. Brown is Professor of Economics and International Relations in the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, 2005 (Foreign Affairs, March-April 2005 v84 i2 p2 The Overstretch Myth Can the Indispensable Nation Be a Debtor Nation?) Would-be Cassandras have been predicting the imminent downfall of the American imperium ever since its inception. First came Sputnik and "the missile gap," followed by Vietnam, Soviet nuclear parity, and the Japanese economic challenge--a cascade of decline encapsulated by Yale historian Paul Kennedy's 1987 "overstretch" thesis. The resurgence of U.S. economic and political power in the 1990s momentarily put such fears to rest. But recently, a new threat to the sustainability of U.S. hegemony has emerged: excessive dependence on foreign capital and growing foreign debt. As former Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers has said, "there is something odd about the world's greatest power being the world's greatest debtor." The U.S. economy, according to doubters, rests on an unsustainable accumulation of foreign debt. Fueled by government profligacy and low private savings rates, the current account deficit--the difference between what U.S. residents spend abroad and what they earn abroad in a year--now stands at almost six percent of GDP; total net foreign liabilities are approaching a quarter of GDP. Sudden unwillingness by investors abroad to continue adding to their already large dollar assets, in this scenario, would set off a panic, causing the dollar to tank, interest rates to skyrocket, and the U.S. economy to descend into crisis, dragging the rest of the world down with it. Despite the persistence and pervasiveness of this doomsday prophecy, U.S. hegemony is in reality solidly grounded: it rests on an economy that is continually extending its lead in the innovation and application of new technology, ensuring its continued appeal for foreign central banks and private investors. The dollar's role as the global monetary standard is not threatened, and the risk to U.S. financial stability posed by large foreign liabilities has been exaggerated. To be sure, the economy will at some point have to adjust to a decline in the dollar and a rise in interest rates. But these trends will at worst slow the growth of U.S. consumers' standard of living, not undermine the United States' role as global pacesetter. If anything, the world's appetite for U.S. assets bolsters U.S. predominance rather than undermines it.
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Answers to: Foreign Debt Causes Overstretch
U.S. DEBT WONT DESTROY ITS ECONOMY
David H. Levey recently retired after 19 years as Managing Director of Moody's Sovereign Ratings Service. Stuart S. Brown is Professor of Economics and International Relations in the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, 2005 (Foreign Affairs, March-April 2005 v84 i2 p2 The Overstretch Myth Can the Indispensable Nation Be a Debtor Nation?) Discussion of the United States' "net foreign debt" conjures up images of countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Turkey, evoking the currency collapses and economic crises they have suffered as models for a coming U.S. meltdown. There are key differences, however, between those emerging-market cases and the current condition of the global hegemon. The United States' external liabilities are denominated in its own currency, which remains the global monetary standard, and its economy remains on the frontier of global technological innovation, attracting foreign capital as well as immigrant labor with its rapid growth and the high returns it generates for investors. The statistic at the center of the foreign debt debate is the net international investment position (NIIP), the value of foreign assets owned by U.S. residents minus the value of U.S. assets owned by nonresidents. Until 1989, the United States was a creditor to the rest of the world; the NIIP peaked at almost 13 percent of GDP in 1980. But chronic current account deficits ever since have given the United States the largest net liabilities in world history. Since foreign claims on the United States ($10.5 trillion) exceed U.S. claims abroad ($7.9 trillion), the NIIP is now negative: -$2.6 trillion at the start of 2004, or -24 percent of GDP. Unpacking the NIIP gives a better sense of the risk it actually poses. It has two components: direct investment, the value of domestic operations directly controlled by a foreign company; and financial liabilities, the value of stocks, bonds, and bank deposits held overseas. At the start of 2004, foreign direct investment in the United States was $2.4 trillion, while U.S. direct investment abroad was about $2.7 trillion. (Direct investment is relatively stable, changing mostly in response to changes in expected long-term profitability.) Removing direct investment from the equation leaves $5.1 trillion in U.S.held foreign financial assets versus $8.1 trillion in U.S. financial assets held by foreign investors. This last figure represents a whopping 74 percent of U.S. GDP--a statistic that would seem to give ample cause for alarm. But considering foreign ownership of U.S. financial assets as a percentage of GDP is less enlightening than comparing it to the total available stock of U.S. financial assets. At the start of 2004, total U.S. securities amounted to $33.4 trillion (some 50 percent of the world total). Foreign investors held more than 38 percent of the $4 trillion in U.S. Treasury bonds, but only 11 percent of the $6.1 trillion in agency bonds (such as those issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac); 23 percent of the $6.5 trillion in corporate bonds; and 11 percent of the $15.5 trillion in equities outstanding. These foreign liabilities are the result of a string of current account deficits that have grown from 1.5 percent of GDP in the mid-1990s to an estimated 5.7 percent of GDP--about $650 billion--in 2004. Economists at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development estimate that ongoing deficits of 3 percent of GDP would bring the U.S. NIIP to -40 percent of GDP by 2010, and that it would eventually stabilize at around -63 percent. If the deficit remains at today's level, they foresee the NIIP growing to -50 percent of GDP by 2010 and eventually to -100 percent. These estimates, however, fail to consider that future dollar depreciation and market adjustments in interest rates and asset prices will likely check the increase of the NIIP. Dollar depreciation against the euro and the yen in 2002 and 2003 kept the NIIP flat despite large current account deficits. The same result is likely for 2004 (final numbers will not be available until the end of June). Thus, although the NIIP will surely continue to grow for many years to come, its increase will be far less dramatic than many economists fear. False Alarm The real question is just how much the United States' deteriorating NIIP threatens to undermine the economic foundations of U.S. hegemony. The precise answer depends on whether you explain current account deficits in terms of trade, domestic savings and investment, or the composition of global wealth. In each case, though, the risks are far less dire than they are made out to be. And in many ways, chronic current account deficits reflect strong economic fundamentals rather than fatal structural flaws.
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Answers to: Foreign Debt Causes Overstretch
(continued) deficit because it grows faster than its trading partners and spends a disproportionate share of its growing income on imported goods and services. An alternative perspective takes as its point of departure the accounting identity that equates the current account deficit with the difference between total investment in the United States and U.S. domestic saving. Low domestic saving, according to this view, is to blame for deficits. The fear is that a sudden reluctance by foreigners to continue exporting their excess savings to the United States would choke off the investment needed to sustain economic growth, sending the U.S. economy into crisis. This explanation becomes less alarming, however, when you consider that both savings and investment are seriously undervalued in U.S. economic accounts. Capital gains on equities, 401(k) plans, and home values are excluded from measurements of personal saving; when they are added, total U.S. domestic saving is around 20 percent of GDP--about the same rate as in other developed economies. The national account also excludes "intangible" investment: spending on knowledge-creating activities such as on-the-job training, new-product development and testing, design and blueprint experimentation, and managerial time spent on workplace organization. Economists at the National Bureau of Economic Research estimate that intangible investment grew rapidly during the 1990s and is now at least as large as physical investment in plant and equipment: more than $1 trillion per year, or 10 percent of GDP. Consequently, the size and growth rate of the U.S. economy have been seriously underestimated. In fact, when tangible and intangible investment are both counted, the apparent (and much decried) increase in consumer spending as a share of GDP turns out to be a statistical artifact. A third approach to the current account deficit focuses on the growth and composition of global wealth. In this framework, international capital movements drive the current account balance, rather than vice versa. With the United States expected to grow faster than Europe and Japan over the next several decades and wealth growing rapidly in Asia-- especially in China and India--it makes sense that foreign investors will continue to flock to U.S. financial markets. This could generate a sequence of U.S. deficits as high as 5 percent of GDP, causing the NIIP to balloon. But such an increase would not mean an end to the foreign appetite for U.S. assets; NIIP ratios that appear dangerously high relative to U.S. GDP would be sustainable because of the rapid growth of global wealth. U.S. financial markets have stayed strong even as the financing of the U.S. deficit shifts from private investors to foreign central banks (from 2000 to 2003, the official institutional share of investment inflows rose from 4 percent to 30 percent). A large percentage of the $1.3 trillion in Asian governments' foreign exchange reserves is in U.S. assets; central banks now claim about 12 percent of total foreign-owned assets in the United States, including more than $1 trillion in Treasury and agency securities. Official inflows from Asia will likely continue for the foreseeable future, keeping U.S. interest rates from rising too fast and choking off investment. In a series of recent papers, economists Michael Dooley, David Folkerts- Landau, and Peter Garber maintain that Asian governments--pursuing a "mercantilist" development strategy of undervalued exchange rates to support export-led growth--must continue to finance U.S. imports of their manufactured goods, since the United States is their largest market and a major source of inward direct investment. Only a fundamental transformation in Asia's growth strategy could undermine this mutually advantageous interdependence--an unlikely prospect at least until China absorbs the 300 million peasants expected to move into its
industrial and service sectors over the next generation. Even the widely anticipated loosening of China's exchange-rate peg would not alter the imperatives of this overriding structural transformation. Ronald McKinnon of Stanford argues that Asian governments will continue to prevent their currencies from depreciating too much in order to maintain competitiveness, avoid imposing capital losses on domestic holders
Official Asian capital inflows, moreover, should soon be supplemented by a renewal of private inflows responding to the next stage of the information technology (it) revolution. Technological revolutions unfold in stages over many decades. The it revolution had its roots in World War II and has proceeded via the development of the mainframe computer, the integrated circuit, the microprocessor, and the personal computer to culminate in the union of computers and telecommunications that has brought the Internet. The United States--thanks to its openness, its low regulatory burden, its flexible labor and capital markets, a positive environment for new business formation, and a financial market that supports new technology--has dominated every phase of this technological wave. The spread of the IT revolution to additional sectors and new industries thus makes a revival of U.S.-bound private capital flows likely.
of dollar assets, and reduce the risk of an economic slowdown that could lead to a deflationary spiral. According to both theories, there should be no breakdown of the current dollar-based regime.
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Answers to: Dollar Collapse
DOLLAR COLLAPSE WONT TRIGGER A MASSIVE INVESMENT WITHDRAWL
David H. Levey recently retired after 19 years as Managing Director of Moody's Sovereign Ratings Service. Stuart S. Brown is Professor of Economics and International Relations in the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, 2005 (Foreign Affairs, March-April 2005 v84 i2 p2 The Overstretch Myth Can the Indispensable Nation Be a Debtor Nation?) Whichever perspective on the current account one favors, the United States cannot escape a growing external debt. The "hegemony skeptics" fear such debt will lead to a collapse of the U.S. dollar triggered by a precipitous unloading of U.S. assets. Such a selloff could result--as in emerging-market crises--if investors suddenly conclude that U.S. foreign debt has become unsustainably large. A panicky "capital flight" would ensue, as investors raced for the exits to avoid the falling dollar and plunging stock and bond prices. But even if such a sharp break occurs--which is less likely than a gradual adjustment of exchange rates and interest rates--market-based adjustments will mitigate the consequences. Responding to a relative price decline in U.S. assets and likely Federal Reserve action to raise interest rates, U.S. investors (arguably accompanied by bargain-hunting foreign investors) would repatriate some of their $4 trillion in foreign holdings in order to buy (now undervalued) assets, tempering the price decline for domestic stocks and bonds. A significant repatriation of funds would thus slow the pace of the dollar decline and the rise in rates. The ensuing recession, combined with the cheaper dollar, would eventually combine to improve the trade balance. Although the period of global rebalancing would be painful for U.S. consumers and workers, it would be even harder on the European and Japanese economies, with their propensity for deflation and stagnation. Such a transitory adjustment would be unpleasant, but it would not undermine the economic foundations of U.S. hegemony.
THE U.S. DOLLAR WILL CINTINUE TO DRIVE GLOBAL TRADE
David H. Levey recently retired after 19 years as Managing Director of Moody's Sovereign Ratings Service. Stuart S. Brown is Professor of Economics and International Relations in the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, 2005 (Foreign Affairs, March-April 2005 v84 i2 p2 The Overstretch Myth Can the Indispensable Nation Be a Debtor Nation?) The U.S. dollar will remain dominant in global trade, payments, and capital flows, based as it is in a country with safe, well-regulated financial markets. Provided U.S. firms maintain their entrepreneurial edge--and despite much anxiety, there is little reason to expect otherwise--global asset managers will continue to want to hold portfolios rich in U.S. corporate stocks and bonds. Although foreign private demand for U.S. assets will fluctuate--witness the slowdown in purchases that precipitated the decline in the U.S. dollar in 2002 and 2003--rapid growth of world financial wealth will allow the proportion of U.S. assets held by foreigners to increase.
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No Military Hegemony Decline Now
US military power is uber-high in the squo. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007 ["The Case For The American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN
0415952034, p. 12-13]
The U.S. military is the best in the world and it has been so since end of World War II. No country has deployed its forces in so many countries and varied climatesfrom the Arctic to the Antarcticfrom below the sea to outer space. [end page 12] No country is better able to fight wars of any type, from guerrilla conflicts to major campaigns on the scale of World War II. No country or likely alliance has the ability to defeat the U.S. military on the battlefield. Thus, measured on either an absolute or relative (that is, comparing the U.S. military to the militaries of other countries) scale, American military power is overwhelming. Indeed, it is the greatest that it has ever been . This is not by accident. The United States has worked assiduously, particularly since 1940, to produce the best military. The causes of American military predominance include extensive training and professional education, high morale, good military doctrine, frequency of use, learning from other militaries in the right circumstances, exceptional equipment and sound maintenance, and high levels of defense spending .
Despite challenges, military strength is high the military is incredibly adaptive and has high-quality officers. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007 ["The Case For The American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN
0415952034, p. 18]
Although the United States is the dominant military power at this time, and will remain so into the foreseeable future, this does not mean that it does not suffer from problems within its own military , many of which are being addressed. The defense transformation efforts started by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld are attempts to make the U.S. military more combat effective and efficient. The U.S. military is the best, but no one would claim that it is perfect. However, a large part of the reason the U.S. military is the best is because it is constantly evaluating its problems so that it may solve them. Many people do not realize this. Despite a common image of the military in American popular culture as lowbrow and full of Cletus-the-Slack-Jawed-Yokel characters from The Simpsons television show, the military is comprised of some of the smartest and best-educated people you will ever meet. Most mid- and high-ranking officers have masters or even doctoral (Ph.D.) degrees. These are people who would be very successful in corporate careers but choose the military because of their patriotism and desire to serve their country.
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A2: Layne Primacy Sustainable / No Overstretch
Layne is wrong about imperial overstretch heg is sustainable and off-shore balancing doesn't save enough money to justify the risk. Gary J. SCHMITT, Director of the Program on Advanced Strategic Studies and Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 2007
["Pax Americana," The Weekly Standard, Posted Online March 5th, Published March 12th, Available Online at http://www.aei.org/publications/ pubID.25706,filter.all/pub_detail.asp]
And speaking of money: Layne's argument about looming imperial overstretch is itself a stretch. Even with all the problems in Iraq, a war in Afghanistan, and an emerging hedging strategy vis-a-vis China, the defense burden is still barely over 4 percent of the country's gross domestic product. The United States has certainly had far higher defense burdens in the past, while still retaining its status as the world's economic juggernaut. There may be plenty of reasons to worry about the country's economy, but "guns over butter" is hardly one of them. Moreover, while pulling back from a forward-leaning defense strategy would undoubtedly save money, offshore balancing would still require
the United States to have a major military establishment in reserve if it wanted to be capable of being a decisive player in a game of great power balancing. Is the $100 billion or so saved--or, rather, spent by Congress on "bridges to nowhere"--really worth the loss in global influence that comes from adopting Layne's strategy?
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A2: Layne Primacy = Bandwagoning
Primacy spurs bandwagoning Layne is wrong about counterbalancing. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007
["Reply to Christopher Layne: The Strength of the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 107-108]
Third, countries want to align themselves with the United States. Far from there being a backlash against the United States, there is worldwide bandwagoning with it. The vast majority of countries in international politics have alliances with the United States. There are approximately 192 countries in the world, ranging from the size of giants like Russia to Lilliputians like Vanuatu. Of that number, you can count with one hand the countries opposed to the United States China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela. Once the leaders of Cuba and Venezuela change, there is every reason to believe that those countries will be allied with the United States, as they were before their present rulersFidel Castro and Hugo Chavezcame to power. North Korea will collapse someday, removing that threat, although not without significant danger to the countries in the region. Of these states, only China has the potential power to confront the United States. The potential power of China should not be underestimated, but neither should the formidable power of the United States and its allies. There is an old saying that you can learn a lot about someone by looking at his friends (or enemies). It may be true about people, but it is certainly true of the United States. Of the 192 countries in existence, a great number, 84, are allied with the United States, and they include almost all of the major economic and military states. This includes twenty-five members of NATO (excluding the United StatesBelgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom); fourteen major non-NATO allies (Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Jordan, New Zealand, Argentina, Bahrain, Philippines, Thailand, Kuwait, Morocco, and Pakistan); nineteen Rio Pact members (excluding Argentina and VenezuelaThe Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay [end page 106], Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay); seven Caribbean Regional Security System members (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), and thirteen members of the Iraq coalition who are not captured by the other categories: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Fiji, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Singapore, Tonga, and Ukraine. In addition, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and Tunisia are now important U.S. allies. This is a ratio of almost 17 to 1 (84 to 5) of the countries allied with the United States against those who are opposed to it. And other states may be added to the list of allies. For example, a country like Nigeria is essentially pro-United States although there is no formal security arrangement between those countries. This situation is unprecedented in international politics never have so many countries been aligned with the dominant state in modern history. As Figure 3.1 demonstrates, it is a big change from the Cold War when most of the countries of the world were aligned either with the United States (approximately forty-five) or the Soviet Union (about twenty-four countries), [end page 107] as captured by Figure 3.2. Figure 3.3 illuminates the ratio of states aligned with the United States to those opposed to it in the post-Cold War period. So, while we are entitled to our own opinions about international politics, we not entitled to our own facts. They must be acknowledged. In the post-Cold War world, the United States is much better offit is much more powerful and more securethan was during the Cold War. What is more, many of the allies of the United States have become more dependent on the United States for their security than during the Cold War. For many years now, most NATO countries have only spent a fraction of their budget on defense, and it is not transparent how they would defend themselves if not for the United States did not. Only six of the twenty-five members of NATO (not counting the United States) are spending 2 percent or more of their GDP on defense, while nineteen spend less than 2 percent. Such a low level of defense spending is possible only because of the security provided by the United States.
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A2: Layne War On Terrorism Is Winnable
The war on terror is winnable -- a commitment to victory is key. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007
["The Case For The American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 3941]
The Threat from Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism: Dangerous but Manageable The terrorist attacks of 9/11 demonstrated the danger the terrorist group al Qaeda poses to the United States. In the wake of that attack, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom to overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which sheltered al Qaeda, and to put great pressure on al Qaedas members and finances throughout the world. Great progress has been made in the war against al Qaeda. The United States has been successful at undermining that terrorist network, the Department of Homeland Security has been created to aid the defense of American territory, and, most importantly, no attacks have occurred on American soil since 9/11. But the war on terrorism is at root a war of ideas. As Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld explained 2003, all elements of national power: military, financial, diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence and public diplomacy, are necessary to win the war on terror. But, he added, to win the war on terror, we must also win the war of ideas. Military, diplomatic, and other elements are necessary to stop terrorists before they can terrorize, but even better, we must lean forward and top them from becoming terrorists in the first place.55 Winning the war of ideas is critical to keeping people from becoming terrorists. Americans need to
remember that their country has fought and won wars of ideas before. World War II was a war of ideas between liberalism and fascism. The Cold War took the war of ideas to new heights . Few Americans comprehend how attractive
communism was in a Europe destroyed by World War II. Communism seemed to offer a better life and, in many countries, such s Prance and Italy, the communists had a solid record of fighting the Germans. Nonetheless, the United States engaged communism in a war of ideas and won. It can also win the physical battle with the few extremists in the Islamic world who are motivated by a
contorted fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. The majority of Muslims are not fundamentalists, and in fact reject fundamentalism as simply wrong. Leading Sunni scholars have stigmatized fundamentalism as aberrant a perversion of the religion. Even to most Muslims who are fundamentalists, al Qaeda is seen as a deviant group that is wrong to use terrorism as a weapon against innocent civilians, including their coreligionists (many of al Qaedas victims have been Muslim), governments in the Islamic world, and the West. [end page 39] To combat al Qaeda, the United States must take the following actions. First, it has to stress that the war on terrorism is not conducted by the West against Muslims, but is a struggle between al Qaeda, which wants to take the Muslim world into the twelfth century, and those who want to bring it into the twenty-first. Americans must realize that we have many allies in the Muslim world. Like the Cold War, the war against terrorism is not a war we fight alone . The United States has many
allies not only in Europe and northeast Asia, like Japan but, more importantly for this struggle, it has numerous allies in the Muslim world. In fact, when one examines the U.S. allies in the region, what is remarkable is the amount of support that Washington has among the governments in the Middle East. The major allies of the United States at the end of the Cold War remainEgypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are strong allies. Moreover, from Morocco to the Gulf, most of the smaller states in the Arab world are allied with the United States. Jordan is a reliable ally, as is Morocco. This provides the United States with a powerful foundation from which to exert influence within and outside of the Middle East . Even Libya has made a dramatic about-face. In 2003, it renounced its weapons of mass destruction program and now is changing from being one of the most anti-American countries to one that is beginning to support the United States and the West as it seeks to integrate into the global economy. Indeed, of all the states in
the Middle East, only Iran and Syria remain outside the orb of U.S. influence. From Morocco to Indonesia, the vast majority of the countries of the Arab and, more broadly, Muslim world are allied with the United States . Second, the United States must have the will to conduct this war. It will be a long conflict with setbacks, including other terrorist attacks against American targets at home and abroad. The American people need to be steeled for a long campaignone that George W. Bush will pass on to his successor, and the one after that. There were nine U.S. presidents during the Cold War, and we should expect a like number in this campaign . To its credit, the administration is taking many of the right steps and has labored assiduously to place pressure on at Qaeda as rapidly as possible to weaken it. It has evicted at Qaeda from its training camps in Afghanistan and labored to cut off at Qaedas considerable financial resources. It is attempting to extinguish all of the known cells at once, from Germany to Kenya to Malaysia, by placing pressure on the governments . There will be no quick and easy victory against al Qaeda and its related and spin-off terrorist groups, but there will be victory. It will not be like the end of World War II, where there was a surrender ceremony on the decks of the USS Missouri; this does not happen when terrorist groups are defeatedthey usually just wither away. This might happen as terrorist organizations splinter into impotence and gradually die as the social and political conditions in the Muslim world change, making al Qaeda and similar groups political [end page 40] dinosaurs in the age of mammals. Or perhapsmuch like the Provisional IRAformer terrorists could melt into established political life of some countries in the Islamic world .
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A2: Layne War On Terrorism Is Winnable
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The American victory in the war against at Qaeda begins by recognizing that terrorist organizations not only can be defeated but, indeed, often are. Almost all of the left-wing terrorist organizations of the Cold War were defeated-from the Weather Underground in the United States to the Japanese Red Army, the Red Army faction in Germany, and the Red Brigades in Italy. The Peruvians defeated the Shining Path. The British fought the IRA to a standstill. The French defeated Corsican nationalists and the communist terrorist group Direct Action. The Algerians have successfully suppressed the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), an especially vicious terrorist organization
that killed well over one hundred thousand people between 1990 and 2000 in Algeria and France.56 In 1994, a GIA terrorist thankfully was thwarted from flying an Air France aircraft into the Eiffel Toweran attack that served as a template for the 9/11 attacks in the United States. Spain has greatly weakened the Basque separatist terrorist group ETA. The Turks have emasculated the PKK (now called New PKK). The
Israelis defeated the PLO, as did the Jordanians. And while the Israelis have not destroyed the three major terrorist groups, Fatah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, they have been extremely effective at penetrating these groups to prevent attacks. Attacks have declined 60 percent between 2003 and 2004there were only six suicide bombings in Israel and eight in the occupied
territoriesand the Israelis believe they foiled 114 planned suicide bombings in 2004. Reflecting on the decline of these groups over the last few years, the Israel internal security organization, Shin Bet, estimates that it prevents 90 percent of attacks before they occur. The Egyptians have broken the
back of the Islamic Group and of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. So while it is true that at Qaeda should not be underestimatedit is motivated, competent, and resilientit does have vulnerabilities and can be defeated, just as many terrorist groups before it were.
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A2: Layne Iraq War Was/Is Good
The Iraq war was justified and successful removing Hussein was worth the cost. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007
["Reply to Christopher Layne: The Strength of the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 110-112]
This should not be a surprise, since much of the American media persistently shows a country of bombings and chaos. Most Americans do not have the time to get their news from other, more objective sources that illuminate the good, the bad, and the ugly in Iraq, rather than just the bad (terrorism) and ugly (corruption). Too frequently, the goodIraqs liberation and path toward democratic ruleis not emphasized. Countless American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines have complained about the coverage of Iraq by the American media and have argued that such negative coverage ignores the great improvements taking place in Iraq, undermines the support of the American people for the efforts of the military, and aids the insurgency, making the job of the military that much harder. You can find these accounts online, in blogs and other news sources. It takes effort to bypass big media corporations, or, at least, access to the Internet and a bit of time to gain a more accurate impression. But because not everyone has the time, there is a common perception that Iraq is in chaos. That impression is wholly wrong. Iraq has gone from an authoritarian country to a free country with a constitution. Iraqis are voting in elections for the first time in their lives. More Iraqis participate in the electoral process than Americans. In 90 percent of Iraq, peace and stability reign, and people see the U.S. military as liberators and want to work with the United States as a partner in the region. That is the success of Iraqand it is a success. To be sure, with economic and political modernization there will be ups and downs. No country has transitioned without profound difficulties from the misrule of a tyrant like Saddam Hussein through liberation to its social and physical reconstruction after generations of horrible abuses and great neglect. But the slope of the curve is positive; Iraq is becoming stronger and more stable every day. Elections are a major indication of progress, and demonstrate that the vast majority of Iraqis support the government. Iraq has about 14 million eligible voters, and 11 million voted in 2005. Its voter participation rate puts the United States to shame. It is common wisdom that the Kurds and Shia support the government, but now the majority of Sunnis do as well. For example, voter turnout from the mostly Sunni province of Anbar climbed from 2 percent in the elections of January 30, 2005, when Sunnis where opposed to the government, to 55 percent in the elections of December 2005. [end page 110] When Iraq is a free and stable country, when its economy flourishes due to its oil wealth, when tourists flock to wonder at the remnants of ancient Babylon, what will those who belittled the Iraqi reconstruction and stabilization efforts say? There will come a day when they have to respond to the facts on the ground and admit that Iraq has been restored to its rightful place in the community of nations and as a leader in the Arab world. To get to that day, the United States labors to resolve two problems. The first is the insurgency, which is comprised of foreign jihadists who have come to Iraq to fight the United States and the new Iraqi government; criminals who were let loose by Saddam before the invasion in March 2003; and diehard Baathists who dream of restoring Saddam Hussein to power and who comprise most of the insurgents. Second, there is the risk of civil war among the three major groups in Iraq: the Shia (about 60 percent of Iraqs population), Sunni (between 15 and 20 percent), and Kurds (approximately 17 percent). The risk of civil war is reduced as long as a large U.S. military force is present in Iraq. Its risk is disappearing as the new Iraqi government finds its strength. The insurgency is a danger the United States confronts now. The insurgency can be defeated and is being defeated by following the classic prescription for doing soadvancing economic, political, and social changes simultaneously with improving the lives of the Iraqi people. Principally, these measures will be done by the Iraqis themselves, not by the United States. One of the foremost experts on guerrilla warfare, T.E. Lawrence, better known as Lawrence of Arabia because he led the Arab guerrilla war against the Ottoman Empire in World War I, famously described fighting an insurgency as learning how to eat soup with a knife. 3
That is, counterinsurgency operations are messy and they take a longtime. The Iraqi and American people and their militaries have to understand both points. Fighting the insurgency in Iraq is messy at times there is great violence, innocent people are hurt or killed, soldiers are killed brutally, and Iraqi governmental forces are targeted by the insurgents. Both the U.S. and Iraqi forces must have the will power to endure this difficult situation.
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A2: Layne Iraq War Was/Is Good
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Prodigious progress is being made. The infrastructure of Iraq is being rebuilt, and life has returned to normal for the vast majority of Iraqis. But progress takes time, just as eating soup with a knife does. Indeed, time is probably the most important factor for counterinsurgencies. Time is necessary to convince the proSaddam diehards in the insurgent movement that Saddam and Baath rule are never coming backthe new Iraq is here to stay. Time is necessary to weaken the insurgency gradually and bring its members to realize that their path is a dead end. The new Iraq is passing them by. Every campaign against guerrilla movements takes timeat least a half a decade, and sometimes several decades. The American and Iraqi people must realize that the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq will take many years, and they must have the will to stick it out, to persevere through the low points in [end page 111] the campaign against the guerrillas. The insurgency is roughly fixed in size, it is not likely to grow or decline rapidly, and, as history has proven of most insurgencies, they are resilient. Table 3.1 provides important context for the insurgency in Iraq. Historically, major insurgencies averaged a little over thirteen years to resolve. The United States is undermining guerrillas and destroying their cohesion by demonstrating the integrity and competence of the new government in Iraqthe new government is working for the people of Iraq, all elements of the Iraqi population, and it is an encouraging sign that the Sunni Population is participating in the political process. In contrast, the insurgents want to take the Iraqi people back to the bad old days of torture, executions, and misery under Saddam Hussein and Baath Party rule. The insurgents murder innocent Iraqis and attack Iraqi and Coalition troops but offer no positive vision for the people of Iraq. They can offer only intimidation, subjugation, and hatred. This malicious message resonates less and less with the Iraqi people and with others in the region. Commentators often speak of the Arab Street, popular opinion in the Arab world, and warn that it will erupt against the United States. The assumption is that the Arab Street will always be opposed to the United States and its allies. The evidence does not support that. In December 2005, the Arab Street did erupt, but it did so against Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Over two hundred thousand Jordanians protested his terror attacks in Jordan and Iraq. This shows that Arabs, just as everyone else, are fed up with the senseless killing conducted by the insurgents in Iraq.
Their Iraq war is a success liberating its people has paved the way for democracy and U.S. leadership. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007
["Reply to Christopher Layne: The Strength of the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 115-116]
The United States will be successful in Iraq, and the insurgency will wither away, despite the best efforts of Iran to keep it going. But Americans must understand that an independent and free Iraq will not be a toady or pawn of the United States. The United States may expect to have significant differences with a free Iraq, and this may cause frustration in Washington. When Iraqs interests coincide with those of the United States, Washington may expect to be able to work closely with Baghdad. In other words, we may expect Iraq not to be subservient to the United States, but an ally of it: a major reason for America to have fought to liberate Iraq from tyranny. Most poignantly, in 2006, U.S. Army Colonel H.R. McMaster, who was a hero in Operation Desert Storm, reflected on his long experience in Iraq as commander of the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment and what he could communicate to the American people to permit them to understand the conditions in Iraq: I was patrolling after an attack on police recruits. It was a suicide attack immediately after the operation. And I was walking with a small element up the street of Hasan Koy, which previously was a hostile area. I saw an Iraqi coming toward me on crutches, a young man, and I thought, well, this is an insurgent, a terrorist... .So I went up to him and started asking him some questions. It turns out he was wounded in that attack where he was waiting in line to be recruited for the Iraqi police. He was now walking on crutches across town to join the Iraqi army so he could defeat these terrorists and bring security to his family. guess what people dont get to see is, they dont get to see how resolute and how determined these courageous Iraqis are. And the other thing I wish we could communicate more clearly is the relationships weve developed with people. I mean, weve made lifetime friends among the good Iraqi people. So the Iraqi people you tend to see most on coverage.. .are the ones.. .who are conducting attacks against us.. ..But there are so many good people in this country who deserve security and who [end page 115] are doing everything they can to build a future for their families, their towns and their country.4 A major step in remaking the Middle East began with Operation Iraqi Freedom. As a result of the success of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States has been able to foster change in the region from Lebanon to Iraq. The change has been along the following parameters. First, regimes opposed to the interests of the United States are pressured to reform or face the possibility of being removed. Second, the United States should spread democracy in the Middle East if this can be accomplished without hurting existing friendly regimes.5 This is part of a larger effort to promote liberal democracy around the world. The more liberal democracies there are in the world, the more congenial for the United States and the easier it is for the United States to maintain its hegemony.
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A2: Layne Layne Relies On Ad Homs
Layne relies on ad homs his arguments rely on anger, not logic. Gary J. SCHMITT, Director of the Program on Advanced Strategic Studies and Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 2007
["Pax Americana," The Weekly Standard, Posted Online March 5th, Published March 12th, Available Online at http://www.aei.org/publications/ pubID.25706,filter.all/pub_detail.asp]
The biggest problem, however, lies in Christopher Layne's dyspeptic analysis of current policy opponents. Rather than taking the opposing argument as seriously as Thayer takes his, Layne resorts to unsubstantiated claims about "neocons," the White House lying, and small cabals (the so-called "Blue Team") trying to foment a "preventive" war with China. Similarly, his dismissal of the democratic peace theory is equally over-the-top. Even if one thinks that the theory is, at times, oversold, to claim that it has absolutely no merits is bound to leave most readers with the sense that there is as much anger as argument in the case Layne is making.
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Multipolarity Now
World moving to multipolarity now China Daily, March 11, 2008 (The author is a researcher with the Research Center of Contemporary World)
However, this situation does not mean the US will give up unilateralism in favor of multilateralism, but rather it has been forced to go along with the latter. The same is true with multi-polarization, which the US would very much not have but cannot get rid of at the moment. Because the gap between the "sole superpower" and "multiple major powers" is narrowing by the day, the idea of the world entering the era of "relative major powers" in the next 30 to 40 years sounds original, but it is far from confirming the word "superpower" is already obsolete. The debate over the question of world structure has been going on since day one, because the international situation has been complicated and changing all the time.
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*** Advantage Answers ***
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Leadership Advantage Answers -- Frontline
EVEN CRITICS CONCED THAT THE U.S. WILL LEAD FOR AT LEAST TWO DECADES IN THE SATUS QUO
Walden Bellow, Director of Focus on the Global South, DILEMMAS OF DOMINATION: THE UNMAKING OF AMERICAN POWER, 2005, p. 213 The crisis of overproduction and overcapacity will continue to haunt the global economy. Financial crises will increase in number and intensity. These will eat away at the leading role of the U.S. economy. The United States is likely to remain the dominant power over the next two decades. In terms of relative economic strength, however, the nation is on the decline. Analysts estimate that, barring a massive downturn or a political catastrophe, China will have an economy larger than that of the United States perhaps within two or three decades, and one 50 percent larger by 2050
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Leadership Advantage Answers Frontline
Military primacy does not prevent a global nuclear exchange or create regional stability
Nina Hachigan and Monica Sutphen, Stanford Center for International Security, 2008, The Next American Century, p. 168-9 In practice, the strategy of primacy failed to deliver. While the fact of being the worlds only superpower has substantial benefits, a national security strategy based on suing and ratiaing primacy has not made America more secure. Americas military might has not been the answer to terrorism, disease, climate change, or proliferation. Iraq, Iran, and North Korea have become more dangerous in the last seven years, not less. Worse than being ineffec tive with transnational threats and smaller powers, a strategy of maintaining primacy is counterproductive when it comes to pivotal powers. If America makes primacy the main goal of its national security strategy, then why shouldnt the pivotal powers do the same? A goal of primacy signals that sheer strength is most critical to security. American cannot trumpet its desire to dominate the world military and then question why China is modernizing its military.
Unipolar hegemony is unsustainable and doesnt solve the terminal impacts David P. Calleo, September 2007, Survival, p. 73-8 (David Calleo Dean Acheson Professor; Director of the
European Studies Program; University Professor of The Johns Hopkins University)
Given our future's high potential for discord and destruction, having a hegemonic superpower already installed might seem a great good fortune. Yet, recent experience also reveals that America's global predominance has been seriously overestimated. Put to the test, American power counts for less than expected. While the United States is lavishly outfitted for high-technology warfare, pursuing a hegemonic agenda in today's world requires different capabilities for more primitive forms of combat, like countering guerrilla warfare and suicidal terrorism. The American military loathes this kind of fighting and, to date, has not been very good at it. Greater success would seem to require a different sort of military - with more and cheaper troops, trained for intimate contact with the enemy, and prepared for high casualties. Controlling hostile populations will demand extensive linguistic and policing skills. The United States is now spending heavily to compensate for its deficiencies, but is still far short of the resources needed to prevail. This current shortage of means is a further blow to America's hegemonic expectations. Financial experience during the Cold War accustomed the United States to abundant credit from the world economy, with
a good part of the exchange costs of America's world role eventually covered by others who accumulated the surplus dollars. During the Cold War, however, these others were allies dependent on American
the United States' external deficit is bigger than ever, credit to finance it no longer depends on allies in urgent need of protection. Instead, credit comes increasingly from states whose indefinite accumulation of dollars seems contrary to their own long-term interests. China, for example, by continuing to add to its already immense reserves of surplus dollars, subsidises its own imports, together with American consumption and investment, but at the expense of its own more balanced internal development. Given the growing protectionism against its exports, it seems unreasonable to expect China to continue this practice indefinitely. If credit from China is restricted, the United States will face the tougher choices between guns and butter it has long been able to avoid. In the face of this unaccustomed constraint, how long will America's enthusiasm for hegemony endure?
military protection. Today, while
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Leadership Advantage Answers -- Frontline
A UNIPOLAR POWER IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD WILL SPREAD CONFLICT, NOT CONTAIN IT
Steven Weber, Director of the Institute for International Studies, Berkeley, Foreign Policy, Jan/Feb 2007., p. 48
That's nice work if you can get it. But the United States almost certainly cannot. Not only because other countries won't let it, but, more profoundly, because that line of thinking is faulty. The predominance of American power has many benefits, but the management of globalization is not one of them. The mobility of ideas, capital, technology, and people is hardly new. But the rapid advance of globalization's evils is.
. For the first time in modern history, globalization was superimposed onto a world with a single superpower. What we have discovered in the past 15 years is that it is a dangerous mixture. The negative effects of globalization since 1990 are not the result of globalization itself. They are the dark side of American predominance. THE DANGERS OF UNIPOLARIT A straightforward piece of logic from market economics helps explain why unipolarity and globalization don't mix. Monopolies, regardless of who holds them, are almost always bad for both the market and the monopolist. We propose three simple axioms of "globalization under unipolarity" that reveal these dangers. Axiom 1: Above a certain threshold of power, the rate at which new global problems are generated will exceed the rate at which old problems are fixed Power does two things in international politics: It enhances the capability of a state to do things, but it also increases the number of things that a state must worry about. At a certain point, the latter starts to overtake the former. It's the familiar law of diminishing returns. Because powerful states have large spheres of influence and their security and economic interests touch every region of the world, they are threatened by the risk of things going wronganywhere. That is particularly true for the United States, which leverages its ability to go anywhere and do anything through massive debt. No one knows exactly when the law of diminishing returns will kick in. But, historically, it starts to happen long before a single great power dominates the entire globe, which is why large empires from Byzantium to Rome have always reached a point of unsustainability. That may already be happening to the United States today, on issues ranging from oil dependency and nuclear proliferation to pandemics and global warming. What Axiom 1 tells you is that more U.S. power is not the answer; it's actually part of the problem. A multipolar world would almost certainly manage the globe's pressing problems more effectively. The larger the number of great powers in the global system, the greater the
Most of that advance has taken place since 1990. Why? Because what changed profoundly in the 1990s was the polarity of the international system chance that at least one of them would exercise some control over a given combination of space, other actors, and problems. Such reasoning doesn't rest on hopeful notions that the great powers will work together. They might do so. But even if they don't, the result is distributed governance, where some great power is interested in most every part of the world through productive competition Axiom 2: In an increasingly
The second axiom acknowledges that highly connected networks can be efficient, robust, and resilient to shocks. But in a highly connected world, the pieces that fall between the networks are increasingly shut off from the benefits of connectivity. These problems fester in the form of failed states, mutate like pathogenic bacteria, and, in some cases, reconnect in subterranean networks such as al Qaeda. The truly dangerous places are the points where the subterranean networks touch the mainstream of global politics and economics. What
networked world, places that fall between the networks are very dangerous places-and there will be more ungoverned zones when there is only one network to join made Afghanistan so dangerous under the Taliban was not that it was a failed state. It wasn't. It was a partially failed and partially connected state that worked the interstices of globalization through the drug trade,
Can any single superpower monitor all the seams and back alleys of globalization? Hardly. In fact, a lone hegemon is unlikely to look closely at these problems, because more pressing issues are happening elsewhere, in places where trade and technology are growing. By contrast, a world of several great powers is a more interest-rich environment in which nations must look in less obvious places to find new sources of advantage. In such a system, it's harder for troublemakers to spring up, because the cracks and seams of globalization are held together by stronger ties Axiom 3: Without a real chance to find useful allies to counter a superpower, opponents will try to neutralize power, by going underground, going nuclear, or going "bad. Axiom 3 is a story about the preferred strategies of the weak. It's a basic insight of international relations that states try to balance power. They protect themselves by joining groups that can hold a hegemonic threat at bay. But what if there is no viable group to join? In today's unipolar world, every nation from Venezuela to North Korea is looking for a way to constrain American
counterfeiting, and terrorism power. But in the unipolar world, it's harder for states to join together to do that. So they turn to other means. They play a different game. Hamas, Iran, Somalia, North Korea, and Venezuela are not going to become allies anytime soon. Each is better off finding other ways to make life more difficult for Washington. Going nuclear is one way. Counterfeiting U.S. currency is another. Raising uncertainty about oil
Here's the important downside of unipolar globalization. In a world with multiple great powers, many of these threats would be less troublesome. The relatively weak states would have a choice among potential partners with which to ally, enhancing their influence. Without that more attractive choice, facilitating the dark side of globalization becomes the most effective means of constraining American power The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity, and the United States is bearing most of the burden. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. There's effectively a market out there for proliferation, with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon). The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand, to the detriment of U.S. national security.
supplies is perhaps the most obvious method of all
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*** More Links to the Hegemony Debate ***
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Links: Multilateralism Threatens Hegemony
INTERNATIONAL INSTUTTIONS CONSTRAIN U.S. PLOWER
Colin Gray, political scientist specializing in national security policy, THE SHERIFF: AMERICAS DEFENSE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER, 2004, pp. 89-90 Theorists such as Ikenberry fail to appreciate how inappropriate the analogy is between U.S. power institutionalized and allegedly somewhat tamed by Cold War NATO and that power disciplined by international institutions in the absence of a dominant geopolitical rivalry, In the former case, the United States could be strategically effective because the geopolitical context was so structured as to lend focus and, periodically urge a clear, principal security duty --the containment of the Soviet imperium. But in the geopolitical con text of the early twenty-first century, most states discern no real urgency about, or truly agree on, the sheriff's principal security duty. In this new geopolitical context, the international institutionalization of U.S. power is more apt to produce paralysis than the strength of which Ikenberry writes. This is not to praise, and still less is it to urge, unilateralism. However, it is to claim that the price demanded for the additional legitimacy and durability which the institutionalization of multilateralism may well convey is one which frequently would condemn the American sheriff to ineffectiveness. Manifest strategic failure as sheriff of world order would do more damage to the legitimacy and durability of U.S. power and influence than would the occasional showing of some prudent disdain for the opinions of Upper Volta, or even of France and other permanent members of the UN Security Council.
MULTILATERAL NORMS TEMPER AMERICAN POWER
Charles Krauthaumer, DEMOCRATIC REALISM: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN A UNILATERAL WORLD, April 2004, http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040227_book755text.pdf Moral suasion is a farce. Why then this obsession with conventions, protocols, legalisms? Their obvious net effect is to temper American power. Who, after all, was really going to be most constrained by these treaties? The ABM amendments were aimed squarely at American advances and strategic defenses, not at Russia, which lags hopelessly behind. The Kyoto Protocol exempted India and China. The nuclear test ban would have seriously degraded the American nuclear arsenal. And the land mine treaty (which the Clinton administration spent months negotiating but, in the end, met so much Pentagon resistance that even Clinton could not initial it) would have had a devastating impact on U.S. conventional forces, particularly at the DMZ in Korea.
MULTILATERALISM REDUCES U.S. FREEDOM OF ACTION
Charles Krauthaumer, DEMOCRATIC REALISM: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN A UNILATERAL WORLD, April 2004, http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040227_book755text.pdf But that, you see, is the whole point of the multilateral enterprise: To reduce American freedom of action by making it subservient to, dependent on, constricted by the willand interestsof other nations. To tie down Gulliver with a thousand strings. To domesticate the most undomesticated, most outsized, national interest on the planetours.
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Links: Multilateralism Threatens Hegemony
MULTILATERALISM IS USED TO TIE DOWN GREAT POWERS
Charles Krauthaumer, DEMOCRATIC REALISM: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN A UNILATERAL WORLD, April 2004, http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040227_book755text.pdf Historically, multilateralism is a way for weak countries to multiply their power by attaching themselves to stronger ones. But multilateralism imposed on Great Powers, and particularly on a unipolar power, is intended to restrain that power. Which is precisely why France is an ardent multilateralist. But why should America be? Why, in the end, does liberal internationalism want to tie down Gulliver, to blunt the pursuit of American national interests by making them subordinate to a myriad of other interests? REALISM PROVES THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM CANNOT FUNCTION LIKE DOMESTIC SOCIETY Charles Krauthaumer, DEMOCRATIC REALISM: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN A UNILATERAL WORLD, April 2004, http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040227_book755text.pdf
Realism recognizes the fundamental fallacy in the whole idea of the international system being modeled on domestic society. First, what holds domestic society together is a supreme central authority wielding a monopoly of power and enforcing norms. In the international arena there is no such thing. Domestic society may look like a place of self-regulating norms, but if somebody breaks into your house, you call 911, and the police arrive with guns drawn. Thats not exactly self-enforcement. Thats law enforcement. Second, domestic society rests on the shared goodwill, civility and common values of its individual members. What values are shared by, say, Britain, Cuba, Yemen and Zimbabweall nominal members of this fiction we call the international community? Of course, you can have smaller communities of shared interests NAFTA, ANZUS, or the European Union. But the European conceit that relations with all nations regardless of ideology, regardless of culture, regardless even of open hostility should be transacted on the EU model of suasion and norms and negotiations and solemn contractual agreements is an illusion. A fisheries treaty with Canada is something real. An Agreed Framework on plutonium processing with the likes of North Korea is not worth the paper it is written on. The realist believes the definition of peace Ambrose Bierce offered in The Devils Dictionary: Peace: noun, in international affairs, a period of cheating between two periods of fighting. Hence the realist axiom: The international community is a fiction. It is not a community, it is a cacophonyof straining ambitions, disparate values and contending power
LIBERAL COMMITMENT TO MULTILATERALISM THREATENS US SECURITY INTERESTS
Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 214 Americas centrality in the international order is another aspect of the reason why moderates and progressives must be careful when they suggest that multilateralism will be a core element of their foreign policy, as many do. While multilateralism is desirable, it should not be taken so far as to devolve simplistically into a democratic approach to world affairs in which each nation essentially gets equal say. As Harvard professor and former Pentagon official Joseph Nye argues, the United States should not act multilaterally when doing so would contradict core American values, delay responses to immediate threats to its security, or promote poor policies that might have been improved through a tougher (and more unilateral) bargaining process. The United States will sometimes have to do things that are unpopular internationally; it will usually have to help forge consensus among nations rather than wait for it to develop; and it will generally have to act rather than hope that crises will go away on their own. On the subject at hand, this means that America needs to be ready to defend its allies without waiting for global approval or the formation of large coalitions to do so.
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Links: Multilateralism Threatens Hegemony
MULTILATERALISM IS MEANT TO CONSTRAIN US POWER
Charles, Krauthammer, IR expert, "The Unipolar Moment Revisited" THE NATIONAL INTEREST, Winter 2002/2003, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_2002_Winter/ai_95841625/pg_7 Multilateralism is the liberal internationalist's means of saving us from this shameful condition. But the point of the multilateralist imperative is not merely psychological. It has a clear and coherent geopolitical objective. It is a means that defines the ends. Its means-internationalism (the moral, legal and strategic primacy of international institutions over national interests) and legalism (the belief that the sinews of stability are laws, treaties and binding international contracts)-are in service to a larger vision: remaking the international system in the image of domestic civil society. The multilateralist imperative seeks to establish an international order based not on sovereignty and power but on interdependence-a new order that, as Secretary of State Cordell Hull said upon returning from the Moscow Conference of 1943, abolishes the "need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power." Liberal internationalism seeks through multilateralism to transcend power politics, narrow national interest and, ultimately, the nation-state itself. The nation-state is seen as some kind of archaic residue of an anarchic past, an affront to the vision of a domesticated international arena. This is why liberal thinkers embrace the erosion of sovereignty promised by the new information technologies and the easy movement of capital across borders. They welcome the decline of sovereignty as the road to the new globalism of a norm-driven, legally-bound international system broken to the mold of domestic society. The greatest sovereign, of course, is the American superpower, which is why liberal internationalists feel such acute discomfort with American dominance. To achieve their vision, America too-America especially-must be domesticated. Their project is thus to restrain America by building an entangling web of interdependence, tying down Gulliver with myriad strings that diminish his overweening power. Who, after all, was the ABM treaty or a land mine treaty going to restrain? North Korea? MULTILATERAL CONSTRAINTS THREATEN TO ERODE AMERICAS ABILITY TO LEVERAGE MILITARY POWER AND THREATEN THE USE OF FORCE CONTINUED UNILATERALISM IS NEEDED TO BREAK THEM David B. Rivkin, Jr., and Lee A. Casey, Partners in the D.C. Firm of Baker & Hostetler LLP and Served in the Department of Justice, Reagan and H.W. Administrations, Fall 2003 (Leashing the Dogs of War National Interest) p. lexis The continued perpetuation of legal and moral confusion could eventually erode the American public's consensus supporting any future use of force , and threaten U.S. security and national interests. Hence, it is necessary to make reaffirmation of the traditional laws of war, rules that appropriately balance humanitarian imperatives and the demands of military necessity, an American priority. Ideally, a vigorous U.S. effort to reestablish the traditional jus in bello and jus ad bellum, and restore the role of sovereign states in both developing the substantive norms and upholding them, would bear fruit. Alternatively, the United States and its allies can simply acknowledge that, because of the policy choices they have made in accordance with differing principles, they are now subject to different international law norms. While Americans cannot expect Europeans to ignore the commitments they have made, Europeans cannot expect the United States to comply with rules it has not accepted. This does not mean that joint action and operations are impossible, but it does mean that the range of areas in which U.S. and allied forces can act together has narrowed. The result must inevitably be more American "unilateralism", louder choruses of European opposition, and the steady deterioration of a once-ideologically consistent alliance. Yet, even this would be preferable to an American embrace of the policing model of warfare, which would impair our ability to prevail in combat . At a time when our way of life is again besieged by violent and unscrupulous adversaries, such a turn of events borders on the suicidal.
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Links: Multilateralism Threatens Hegemony
MULTILATERALISM INEVITABLY CONSTRAINS FREEDOM OF ACTION PREVENTING FLEXIBILITY NEEDED TO PREVENT THREATS AND PROJECT PRIMACY THE US HAS THE POWER TO RELY ON COALITIONS OF THE WILLING Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, Senior Fellows in Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings Institution, Summer 2003 (Power and Cooperation: An American Foreign Policy for the Age of Global Politics Agenda for the Nation) http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/daalder/20030814.pdf Hegemonists see Americas primacy as the key to achieving its foreign policy goals. Preponderant power enables the United States to achieve its goals without relying on others. As Charles Krauthammer, a forceful Hegemonist voice, argues, An unprecedentedly dominant United States . . . is in the unique position of being able to fashion its own foreign policy. After a decade of Prometheus playing pygmy, the first task of the new [Bush] administration is precisely to reassert American freedom of action. In short, the flexibility that arises out of the reality of U.S. dominance is the best guarantor of American security. September 11 only underscored the vital importance of maintaining the freedom to act as Washington sees fit. As President Bush argued in rejecting advice that he take account of allied views in conducting the war on terrorism, At some point we may be the only ones left. Thats okay with me. We are America. The premium Hegemonists place on freedom of action leads them to view international institutions, regimes, and treaties with considerable skepticism. Such formal arrangements inevitably constrain the ability of the United States to make the most of its primacy. This is not to say Hegemonists rule out working with others. Rather, their preferred form of multilateralismto be indulged in when unilateral action is impossible or unwiseinvolves building ad hoc coalitions of the willing, what Richard Haass calls multilateralism la carte. MULTILATERALISM IS DE-FACTO A POLICY OF TRYING TO CONSTRAIN US POLICY, ESPECIALLY THE USE OF FORCE David B. Rivkin, Jr., and Lee A. Casey, Partners in the D.C. Firm of Baker & Hostetler LLP and Served in the Department of Justice, Reagan and H.W. Administrations, 4/5/2004 (A Clash of Interests National Review) p. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1282/is_6_56/ai_n13610154/pg_2 What our allies can offer, though, is the cloak of multilateralism. The "international community"'s permission is just about the only coin Old Europe has left to spend, and so it is determined to inflate that currency's value. It has accomplished this by advancing a view of international law that , on virtually every issue, works primarily as a means of constraining the United States. This is especially true with respect to the legal justification for the use of military force, and explains Europe's insistence that only the United Nations (where France enjoys veto power)
can authorize legitimate use of military force. It also explains the near-hysterical Franco-German reaction when the administration sought to reward its friends, and disadvantage its opponents, by reserving certain reconstruction contracts for nationals of Iraqi Coalition countries. Naturally, the new Carolingians recognize an exception to this rule where their own vital interests are involved--as demonstrated by the 1999 NATO war with Serbia over Kosovo. The Kosovo crisis was of paramount importance to France and Germany (one fearing Muslim reaction, the other a renewed flood of Balkan refugees)--but of only humanitarian concern to the United States. Russia would have vetoed any Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force against the Serbs, and so France, Germany, and the EU were happy to have NATO proceed without U.N. authorization. It is a purely selfinterested form of legitimacy that our allies are peddling, and the role they appear to have reserved for the United States is not unlike that of the 18th-century Hessians: the muscle.
This, ultimately, is what the multilateralism the Democrats have embraced means, and this is what they will ask the American people to endorse on November 2. In the months to come, the Bush administration would be well advised to articulate clearly the profound differences between its national-interest-driven foreign policy--where multilateral action is a means to an end-and Senator Kerry's policy, where multilateralism is an end in itself. (Indeed, Kerry proudly proclaims that he is supported by many foreign leaders against President Bush.) The electorate can then decide whether Uncle Sam should become Uncle Sucker.
But unlike the Hessians, who were paid for their services, the United States is expected to both fight and foot the bill.
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NORMS AND SOFT POWER FAIL TO PROVIDE FOREIGN POLICY BENEFITS THE ENTIRE GOAL OF MULTILATERALISM IS TO TIE DOWN AMERICAN POWER THEREBY REMOVING THE SOLE SOURCE OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER Charles Krauthammer, Essayist and Columnist for the Washington Post, Frequent Contributor to the Weekly Standard, the New Republic, and the National Interest, Winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy, Member of the Presidents Council on Bioethics, Board-Certified Psychiatrist and Received Medical Degree, Harvard Medical School, 2004 (Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World American Enterprise Institute) http://www.aei.org/publications/bookID.755/book_detail.asp
The other defining feature of the Clinton foreign policy was multilateralism, which expressed itself in a mania for treaties. The Clinton administration negotiated a dizzying succession of parchment promises on bioweapons, chemical weapons, nuclear testing, carbon emissions, antiballistic missiles, etc. Why? No sentient being could believe that, say, the chemical or biological weapons treaties were anything more than transparently useless. Senator Joseph Biden once defended the Chemical Weapons Convention, which even its proponents admitted was unenforceable, on the grounds that it would provide us with a valuable toolthe moral suasion of the entire international community. Moral suasion? Was it moral suasion that made Qaddafi see the wisdom of giving up his weapons of mass destruction? Or Iran agree for the first time to spot nuclear inspections? It was the suasion of the bayonet. It was the ignominious fall of Saddamand the desire of interested spectators not to be next on the list. The whole point of this treaty was to keep rogue states from developing chemical weapons. Rogue states are, by definition, impervious to moral suasion. Moral suasion is a farce. Why then this obsession with conventions, protocols, legalisms? Their obvious net effect is to temper American power. Who, after all, was really going to be most constrained by these treaties? The ABM amendments were aimed squarely at American advances and strategic defenses, not at Russia, which lags hopelessly behind. The Kyoto Protocol exempted India and China. The nuclear test ban would have seriously degraded the American nuclear arsenal. And the land mine treaty (which the Clinton administration spent months negotiating but, in the end, met so much Pentagon resistance that even Clinton could not initial it) would have had a devastating impact on U.S. conventional forces, particularly at the DMZ in Korea. But that, you see, is the whole point of the multilateral enterprise : To reduce American freedom of action by making it subservient to, dependent on, constricted by the willand interestsof other nations. To tie down Gulliver with a thousand strings. To domesticate the most undomesticated, most outsized, national interest on the planetours. Today, multilateralism remains the overriding theme of liberal internationalism . When in power in the 1990s, multilateralism expressed itself as a mania for treaties. When out of power in this decade, multilateralism manifests itself in the slavish pursuit of international legitimacyand opposition to any American action undertaken without universal foreign blessing.
EU VIEWS MULTILATERALISM AS A WAY FOR WEAK STATES TO CONSTRAIN POWERFUL ONES
Robert Kagan, Carnegie Endowment, 2004, American Power in the 21st Century, eds. David Held & Mathias KoenigArchibugi, p. 143-4 This natural and historic disagreement between the stronger and the weaker manifests itself in todays transatlantic dispute over the question of unilateralism. Europeans generally believe their objection to American unilateralism is proof of their greater commitment to certain ideals concerning world order. They are less willing to acknowledge that their hostility to unilateralism is also self-interested. Europeans fear American unilateralism. They fear it perpetuates a Hobbesian world in which they may become increasingly vulnerable. The United States may be a relatively benign hegemon, but insofar as its actions delay the arrival of a world order more conducive to the safety of weaker powers, it is objectively dangerous. This is one reason why in recent years a principled objective of European foreign policy has become, as one European observer puts it, the multilateralizing of the United States. It is not that Europeans are teaming up against the American hegemon, as Huntington and many realist theorists would have it, by creating a countervailing power. After all, Europeans are not increasing their power. Their tactics, like their goal, are the tactics of the weak. They hope to constrain American power without wielding power themselves. In what may be the ultimate feat of subtlety and indirection, they want to control the behemoth by appealing to its conscience.
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SUPPORT FOR UN PEACEKEEPING UNDERMINES THE DETERRENT VALUE AND RESOLVE OF US POWER PROJECTION Frederick H. Fleitz, Special Assistant to the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security and Former Analyst of the United Nations for the Central Intelligence Agency, 2002 (Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and US Interests) p. 7-8 Finally, the Clinton peacekeeping policy undermined respect for the United States as a great power. The prospect that U.S. military force could be used against a recalcitrant state should be enough to force most malefactor states or groups from taking actions that would risk incurring Washington's wrath. U.S. participation in failed peacekeeping missions with vague mandates damaged America's reputation as a powerful and decisive nation and reduced the prospect that Washington could stare down states that threaten U.S. national interests. On the other hand, peacekeeping cannot perform its vital confidence-building function if peacekeeping troops are armed to the teeth. SUPPORT FOR THE MULTILATERALISM CONFERS LEGITIMACY TO HIPPIE EURO-WEENIE POLICY THEREBY PREVENTING STRONG US RESOLVE Roger Scruton, Founder of the Conservative Philosophy Group, 6/5/2003 (The United States, The United Nations, and the Future of the Nation-State The Heritage Foundation) p. http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/HL794.cfm It is worth recalling that the League of Nations, the predecessor of the U.N., proved entirely powerless to stop war from breaking out in Europe, or to prevent that war from spreading around the world. True, those who drafted the U.N. Charter believed that they had learned the lesson taught by the League of Nations' failure. But they worked in unusual circumstances, after a world war which left only a few competitors still standing. Since that time, many new states have emerged or achieved prosperity and military power, many new dangers have begun to make themselves manifest, and animosities have nowhere really dwindled . Furthermore, the long-standing alliance between Europe and the United States is beginning to show signs of strain, and recent attempts by the U.S. to take effective action against terrorist states have been impeded by the U.N., often with the encouragement of America's European allies. In addition to conferring legitimacy on despots, the U.N. has acquired the habit of substituting liberal pieties for hard-headed judgements when faced by the serious threat of war. Its institutions and bureaucracies give sanctimonious Scandinavians of the Blix and Bruntland variety their longed-for opportunity to put us all in our place, and its secretaries general are usually more anxious to preserve their reputation as moral figureheads than to dirty their hands by violent actions, however necessary they may be. Indeed, perhaps the greatest danger now presented by the U.N. is its ability to confer the status of Realpolitik on the dangerous illusions of the European elites. MULTILATERALISM CREATES THE PERCEPTION OF INDECISIVE FOREIGN POLICY CLINTON PROVES Sarah B. Sewall, Program Director, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping, 2002 (Multilateralism and United States Foreign Policy edited by Stewart Patrick) p. 211-212 Multilateralism as embodied by the UN remains suspect. Jeanne Kirkpatrick argued that the pursuit of multilateral means implied the pursuit of multilateral (rather than national) goals. She also charged that the "reason the Clinton administration's foreign policy seems indecisive is that multilateral decision-making is characteristically complicated and inconclusive. The reason Clinton policy seems ineffective is that UN operations-in Bosnia or Somalia or wherever-are characteristically ineffective."
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Multilateralism creates dangerous paralysis better to act alone
Frank J. Gaffney Jr., President, Center for Security Policy and Contributing Editor, National Review Online, 2/26/2004 (Should Voters Trust the U.N. To Protect Americas Security Insight Magazine) http://www.insightmag.com/news/2004/03/02/FairComment/FairCommentshould.Voters.Trust.The.U.n.To.Protect.Americas.Security-607350.shtml. Fortunately, Bush has acted instead on his conviction that peace through American strength is a far better guarantee of our security than clueless - or worse, malfeasant - international organizations and officials. In so doing, President Bush has offered the public a choice between effective, proactive stewardship in the war on terror and potentially very dangerous paralysis in that conflict, justified by the predictable lack of multilateral consensus. This is a choice we cannot afford to get wrong.
Multilateralism causes policy gridlock
Richard Halloran, Former New York Times Reporter in Asia, 8/24/2003 (Unilateralism: Just a Question of Perspective- The Honolulu Advertiser) http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2003/Aug/24/op/op16a.html. Part of the disagreement is a tangle of semantics. Those who accuse the United States of unilateralism say they favor multilateralism, in which everyone involved has a say. The multilateralists don't come right out and say so, but each wants a veto, a sure formula for gridlock. Americans rarely have been enthusiastic about multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, the most multilateral of them all.
Multilateralism results in feeble policy and jeopardizes effectiveness
Frank J. Gaffney Jr., President, Center for Security Policy and Contributing Editor, National Review Online, 2/26/2004 (John Kerrys Treaty: Outsourcing Sovereignty The National Review) http://www.nationalreview.com/gaffney/gaffney200402261356.asp. John Kerry wants a world in which the United Nations calls the shots and U.S. freedom of action, in the absence of the U.N.'s permission, is sharply circumscribed. Most Americans recognize that this would be a formula for disaster a world in which the lowest-common-multilateral-denominator would routinely trump, and often jeopardize, our security interests.
Multilateralism undermines credibility and resolve by adding weak partners
Joseph Farah, Founder, Editor, and Chief Executive Officer, World Net Daily and is a Nationally Syndicated Radio Talked Show Host, 3/18/2004 (The Dangers of Multilateralism World Net Daily) http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/printer-friendly.asp?ARTICLE_ID=37633. Let me be the first to point out that one of the dangers of multilateralism was just illustrated in Spain. Spain didn't necessarily contribute much significant in terms of actual military capability in Iraq. As with most of the nations contributing combat or peacekeeping forces to the coalition, Spain's participation was more symbolic than substantive. But symbolism is a two-way street. And when a symbolic partner decides to leave the coalition under pressure, that symbolism is more destructive than its original commitment was constructive.
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Multilateralism restrains and delays US power Israel proves
Michla Pomerance, Professor of International Law, Hebrew University, Spring 2002 (U.S. Multilateralism, Left and Right Orbis) That multilateralism can readily serve as a restraint on U.S. power, as a reason and pretext for inaction, and as a conscience-soothing substitute for action is a lesson that Israel , for one, long ago learnedor should have learned. The events preceding the Six-Day War furnished one unforgettable illustration of the problem. While the Johnson administration vacillated, seeking to mobilize an unattainable multilateral naval task force to break the Egyptian blockade, the threat to Israels security was becoming more palpable daily. A less well-known, but not less meaningful, lesson could be garnered from the subsequent scheme by Senator Fulbright for limiting (indeed, emasculating) Americas security commitment to Israel by anchoring it in a formal treaty placed in a multilateral casing. The United States would grant the guarantee bilaterally, but only to supplement and repeat a previously adopted UN Security Council resolution; and the guarantee would be implemented only multilaterally. US SUPPORT OF PEACEKEEPING SQUANDERS RESOURCES AND ABILITY TO LEAD Michla Pomerance, Professor of International Law, Hebrew University, Spring 2002 (U.S. Multilateralism, Left and Right Orbis) With respect to multilateral peace enforcement and peacekeeping tasks, Republicans were more inclined than Democrats to approach these with skepticism and to ask which were worthy of U.S. support; which, less worthy or delegable to others; and which, unworthy and to be resisted even at the expense of generating scathing criticism and being labeled obstructionist "spoilers." Republicans have been particularly fearful of what they deemed U.S. overinvolvement in protracted peacekeeping missions in chronically unstable regions worldwide. This, they have felt, squanders Americas resources and weakens its ability to lead when its leadership is truly indispensable and the task cannot be delegated to regional actors or to a Sweden or a Canada. Another Persian Gulf War, perhaps, but not necessarily another Somalia, Haiti, or even Kosovo.
Iraq proves multilateralism delays and impedes necessary US action
Roger Scruton, Founder of the Conservative Philosophy Group, 6/5/2003 (The United States, The United Nations, and the Future of the Nation-State The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/HL794.cfm U.N. sanctions proved ineffective, and the Security Council and General Assembly combined to delay the necessary military action to the point where it was far more costly than it should have been . By impeding George Bush Senior from pursuing the Gulf War to its logical conclusion, the U.N. ensured the repression and massacre of those involved in the uprisings at Basra and elsewhere. By failing to endorse George Bush's pressing decision of Realpolitik, it has made the task of reconstructing Iraq and winning the confidence of its people so much the more difficult. Its effect on the whole decision-making process, in short, has been negative.
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The plan creates a soft-line perception that the US is weak
Laura Rozen, Freelance Journalist Foreign Policy Writer in D.C., July 2004, (Building a Better UN the American Prospect) p.32 It's not hard to see why. There's the practical advantage that NATO is likely to act more quickly at crisis times. Beyond that, there is, for Democrats, a clear domestic political appeal in invoking NATO over the UN: Talking about the UN and multilateralism makes them look weak. "'Multilateralism' is code for getting the whole world together and singing 'Kumbaya,'" a staffer who works for a prominent Senate Democrat told me. "When we use words like 'UN,' it's code for softheadedness, and the Republicans and White House get traction on it. . . It's important that we use words like 'NATO' and 'P5' to talk about institutions that are considered more effective."
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Europe uses multilateralism to constrain the U.S.
Soeren Kern is Senior Fellow for Transatlantic Relations at the Madrid-based Grupo de Estudios Estratgicos / Strategic Studies Group, Spero News, January 10, 2008, http://www.speroforum.com/site/article.asp?idarticle=13519 Europeans know they will never achieve hard power parity with America, so they want to change the rules of the international game to make soft power the only acceptable superpower standard. Toward this end, European elites seek to de-legitimize one of the main pillars of American influence by making it prohibitively costly in the realm of international public opinion for the United States to use its military power in the future. By ensconcing a system of international law based around the United Nations, they hope to constrain American exercise of power. For Europeans, multilateralism is about neutering American hard power, not about solving international problems. It is, as the clich goes, about Lilliputians tying down Gulliver.
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Links: Recession Threatens Hegemony
Recession undermines hegemony
Financial Times, 1-23, 8, The rising price of energy - and the general threat of a recession in the US - will be a further constraint on US ability to lead in 2008. In cramped economic times, it is harder for US leaders to make the case for expensive commitments overseas.
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Links: Economic Decline Threatens Hegemony
Economic strength is the driving force behind hegemony
Robert A. Pape is professor of political science at the University of Chicago, Chicago Tribune, March 8, 2009, p. 29 From Rome to the United States today, the rise and fall of great nations have been driven primarily by economic strength. At any given moment, a state's power depends on the size and quality of its military forces and other power assets. Over time, however, power is a result of economic strength -- the prerequisite for building and modernizing military forces. And so the size of the economy relative to potential rivals ultimately determines the limits of power in international politics. The power position of the U.S. is crucial to the foreign policy aims that it can achieve. Since the Cold War, America has maintained a vast array of overseas commitments, seeking to ensure peace and stability not just in its own neighborhood, the Western hemisphere, but also in Europe, Asia and the oil-rich Persian Gulf. Maintaining these commitments requires enormous resources, but American leaders in recent years chose to pursue far more ambitious goals than merely maintaining the status quo.
U.S. economic growth critical to military strength and global leadership Richard Holbrook, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations from 1999 to 2001 and chief architect of the 1995 Dayton peace agreement, Chair of Asia Society, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2008, p. foreignaffairs.org To restore the United States to its proper world leadership role, two areas of weakness must be repaired: the domestic economy and the United States' reputation in the world. Although the economy is usually treated as a domestic issue, reviving it is as important to the nation's long-term security as is keeping U.S. military strength unchallengeable . This will require more than a cyclical upturn; to repair the economy in the long term, a new national policy on energy and climate change will be essential. ECONOMIC STRENGTH CRITICAL TO U.S. HEGEMONY
Vassilis K. Fouskas , Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Stirling, The New AMERICAN IMPERIALISM: BUSHS WAR ON TERROR AND BLOOD FOR OIL, 2005, p. 24 Since the United States emerged as the dominant global superpower at the end of World War II, U.S. hegemony has rested on three unchallengeable pillars: overwhelming U.S. military superiority over all its rivals, the superiority of American production methods and the relative strength of the U.S. economy, and control over global economic markets, with the U.S. dollar acting as the reserve currency
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MILITARY HEGEMONY CANNOT SUBSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC HEGEMONY
Vassilis K. Fouskas , Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Stirling, The New AMERICAN IMPERIALISM: BUSHS WAR ON TERROR AND BLOOD FOR OIL, 2005, p. 30-1 While its huge military is an indispensable instrument in maintaining the American empire, it cannot supplant the essential role played by economic hegemony and the dollar's vital role as a reserve currency. Equipped with advanced precision-guided munitions, high-performance aircraft, and intercontinental-range missiles, the American armed forces can unquestionably deliver death and destruction to any target on earth and expect little in the way of retaliation. But as its own political theorists have acknowledged, "The dominant power concentrates (to its detriment) on the military; the candidate for successor concentrates on the economy. The latter has always paid off, handsomely. It did for the United States."
U.S. ECONOMIC GROWTH KEY TO MILITARY HEGEMONY AND SUSTAIN PEACE AROUND THE WORLD
Clark Murdoch, CSIS, BEYOND GOLDWATER-NICHOLS, July 2005,
http://www.csis.org/isp/bgn/docs/bgn_ph2_report.pdf
Second is sea and air power, which enables the United States to exert force in all areas where its interests may be threatened. Beyond this power structure is an economic strategy, which again comes out of the British playbook. America will build an economic system, given this balance-of-power policy, that will make it rich enough to afford the military investments necessary to maintain its power strategy, just as in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the British made enough money from trade to be able to afford subsidies to their continental allies and to maintain the forces necessary to meet their military objectives. But America also uses its economic system in other ways. It pacifies other countries; Germany and Japan after World War II were able to become rich by participating in the American system. Today, Washington is trying to keep the Chinese focused on their ability to enrich themselves by participating in the world's economic system, so they arent tempted to overturn it. The possibility of losing access to that system also acts as a deterrent. For example, as China industrializes, it becomes more dependent on exports to the United States. That dependence would make China think two or three times before entering into war with America. Imports of oil and food play a critical role, as well. Washington is encouraging the Chinese to be globalized, dependent on commodities they do not have that come from all over the world, where U.S. air and sea power, if necessary, can interdict these supplies. So this economic system both draws them in and then makes it dangerous for them to leave. After World War II, this was a tremendously effective tool with both Germany and Japan.
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Links: Increased TROOP Deployments Threaten Hegemony
THE PUBLIC WILL NOT TOLERATE INCREASED TROOP DEPLOYMENTS
Walden Bellow, Director of Focus on the Global South, DILEMMAS OF DOMINATION: THE UNMAKING OF AMERICAN POWER, 2005, p. 76 The United States currently spends about $400 billion a year on defense, more than the next twenty-three countries combined." It enjoys absolute superiority in nuclear and conventional arms. But as Afghanistan and Iraq have shown, these advantages count for little in fighting wars of national liberation, in much the same way a sledgehammer is useless in swatting flies. In both urban and rural contexts, the often-touted uses of airpower and precision bombing were nullified by the conditions of guerrilla warfare. To make any headway in guerrilla warfare, the Pentagon would have to increase the number of ground troops. But there is no way that the American people would tolerate a much larger commitment of troops to a war that more than half of those polled said was not worth it."
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Links: Loss of Public Support Threatens Hegemony
LACK OF PUBLIC SUPPORT KILLS U.S. GLOBAL HEGEMONY
Colin Gray, political scientist specializing in national security policy, THE SHERIFF: AMERICAS DEFENSE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER, pp. 94-5 Seventh, the American sheriff cannot police world order if domestic opinion is not permissive. The longevity of U.S. guardianship depends vitally upon the skill, determination, and luck with which the country protects and burnishes its reputation for taking strategically effective action. But it also depends upon the willingness of American society to accept the costs that comprise the multi-faceted price of this particular form of glory. The American public is probably nowhere near as casualty-shy as popular mythology insists, though the same cannot be said with equal confidence of the professional American military. Such, at least, are the conclusions of the major recent study on this much debated subject." It is the opinion of this author that popular American attitudes toward casualties stem fairly directly from the sense of involvement, or lack of the same, in the matters at issue. If valid, this judgment is good news for the feasibility of U.S. performance in the sheriff's role, but a dire systemic problem may still remain. Specifically, as principal global guardian, the United States risks being thwarted on the domestic front by the central and inalienable weakness that mars attempts to practice the theory of collective security. Bacevich and others advance powerful arguments connecting American strategic behavior to the promotion of what they see, not wholly implausibly, as an informal American empire. But many, if not most, American voters will be hard to convince that U.S. military action is warranted save in those mercifully rare instances when it is directed to thwart some clear and present danger. A doctrine of military preemption, typically meaning prevention, no matter how strategically prudent, will be as difficult to justify domestically as abroad. There is an obvious way to diminish the amount, intensity, and duration of domestic political opposition to military operations conducted for purposes that do not resonate loudly on Main Street. That solution is to adopt a style of warfare that imposes few costs on American society, especially in the most human of dimensions-casualties. But since war is a duel, the United States' ability to perform all but painlessly as sheriff can never lie totally within its own control. Nonetheless, the potential problem of a reluctant domestic public should be eased if care is taken in selecting policing duties and if the troops who must execute the strategy are tactically competent. All of this would be more reassuring were we not respectful students of Clausewitz's teaching that "War is the realm of chance," an aphorism that we have had occasion to quote before
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*** Hegemony Good Frontlines, Key Cards, and Modular Impacts ***
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Hegemony Bad Answers -- Frontline
Hegemonic decline causes global nuclear war
Zalmay Khalilzad, Rand Corporation, The Washington Quarterly 1995 What might happen to the world if the United States turned inward? Without the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), rather than cooperating with each other, the West European nations might compete with each other for domination of East-Central Europe and the Middle East. In Western and Central Europe, Germany -especially since unification -- would be the natural leading power. Either in cooperation or competition with Russia, Germany might seek influence over the territories located between them. German efforts are likely to be aimed at filling the vacuum, stabilizing the region, and precluding its domination by rival powers. Britain and France fear such a development. Given the strength of democracy in Germany and its preoccupation with absorbing the former East Germany, European concerns about Germany appear exaggerated. But it would be a mistake to assume that U.S. withdrawal could not, in the long run, result in the renationalization of Germany's security policy. The same is also true of Japan. Given a U.S. withdrawal from the world, Japan would have to look after its own security and build up its military capabilities. China, Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia already fear Japanese hegemony. Without U.S. protection, Japan is likely to increase its military capability dramatically -- to balance the growing Chinese forces and still-significant Russian forces. This could result in arms races, including the possible acquisition by Japan of nuclear weapons. Given Japanese technological prowess, to say nothing of the plutonium stockpile Japan has acquired in the development of its nuclear power industry, it could obviously become a nuclear weapon state relatively quickly, if it should so decide. It could also build long-range missiles and carrier task forces. With the shifting balance of power among Japan, China, Russia, and potential new regional powers such as India, Indonesia, and a united Korea could come significant risks of preventive or proeruptive war. Similarly, European competition for regional dominance could lead to major wars in Europe or East Asia. If the United States stayed out of such a war -- an unlikely prospect -- Europe or East Asia could become dominated by a hostile power. Such a development would threaten U.S. interests. A power that achieved such dominance would seek to exclude the United States from the area and threaten its interests-economic and political -- in the region. Besides, with the domination of Europe or East Asia, such a power might seek global hegemony and the United States would face another global Cold War and the risk of a world war even more catastrophic than the last. In the Persian Gulf, U.S. withdrawal is likely to lead to an intensified struggle for regional domination. Iran and Iraq have, in the past, both sought regional hegemony. Without U.S. protection, the weak oil-rich states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would be unlikely to retain their independence. To preclude this development, the Saudis might seek to acquire, perhaps by purchase, their own nuclear weapons. If either Iraq or Iran controlled the region that dominates the world supply of oil, it could gain a significant capability to damage the U.S. and world economies. Any country that gained hegemony would have vast economic resources at its disposal that could be used to build military capability as well as gain leverage over the United States and other oil-importing nations. Hegemony over the Persian Gulf by either Iran or Iraq would bring the rest of the Arab Middle East under its influence and domination because of the shift in the balance of power. Israeli security problems would multiply and the peace process would be fundamentally undermined, increasing the risk of war between the Arabs and the Israelis.<continued> The extension of instability, conflict, and hostile hegemony in East Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf would harm the economy of the United States even in the unlikely event that it was able to avoid involvement in major wars and conflicts. Higher oil prices would reduce the U.S. standard of living. Turmoil in Asia and Europe would force major economic readjustment in the United States, perhaps reducing U.S. exports and imports and jeopardizing U.S. investments in these regions. Given that total imports and exports are equal to a quarter of U.S. gross domestic product, the cost of necessary adjustments might be high. The higher level of turmoil in the world would also increase the likelihood of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and means for their delivery. Already several rogue states such as North Korea and Iran are seeking nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. That danger would only increase if the United States withdrew from the world. The result would be a much more dangerous world in which many states possessed WMD capabilities; the likelihood of their actual use would increase accordingly. If this happened, the security of every nation in the world, including the United States, would be harmed. Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but
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because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
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Hegemony Bad Answers -- Frontline
Pack up the boxes, you lose --the U.S. is the dominant international power and it must remain so to solve global war, counterbalancing is a myth, offshore balancing & multipolarity fail Robert Kagan, 7 is author, most recently, of Dangerous Nation: Americas Place in the World from Its Earliest Days to the Dawn of the Twentieth CenturyHe is senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September, October, Policy Review, and senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund. A version of this essay will appear in Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro, eds., To Lead the World: American Strategy After the Bush Doctrine (Oxford University Press, 2008), http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html The world has not been transformed, however. Nations remain as strong as ever, and so too the nationalist ambitions, the passions, and the competition among nations that have shaped history. The world is still unipolar, with the United States remaining the only superpower. But international competition among great powers has returned, with the United States, Russia, China, Europe, Japan, India, Iran, and others vying for regional predominance. Struggles for honor and status and influence in the world have once again become key features of the international scene. Ideologically, it is a time not of convergence but of divergence. The competition between liberalism and absolutism has reemerged, with the nations of the world increasingly lining up, as in the past, along ideological lines. Finally, there is the fault line between modernity and tradition, the violent struggle of Islamic fundamentalists against the modern powers and the secular cultures that, in their view, have penetrated and polluted their Islamic world.
Creating and sustaining the unipolar world
How will the United States deal with such a world? Today there is much discussion of the so-called Bush Doctrine and what may follow it. Many prefer to believe the world is in turmoil not because it is in turmoil but because Bush made it so by destroying the new hopeful era. And when Bush leaves, it can return once again to the way it was. Having glimpsed the mirage once, people naturally want to see it and believe in it again. The first illusion, however, is that Bush really changed anything. Historians will long debate the decision to go to war in Iraq, but what they are least likely to conclude is that the intervention was wildly out of character for the United States. Since the end of World War ii at least, American presidents of both parties have pursued a fairly consistent approach to the world. They have regarded the United States as the indispensable nation2 and the locomotive at the head of mankind.3 They have amassed power and influence and deployed them in ever-widening arcs around the globe on behalf of interests, ideals, and ambitions, both tangible and intangible. Since 1945 Americans have insisted on acquiring and maintaining military supremacy, a preponderance of power in the world rather than a balance of power with other nations. They have operated on the ideological conviction that liberal democracy is the only legitimate form of government and that other forms of government are not only illegitimate but transitory. They have declared their readiness to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by forces of oppression, to pay any price, bear any burden to defend freedom, to seek democratic enlargement in the world, and to work for the end of tyranny. 4 They have been impatient with the status quo. They have seen America as a catalyst for change in human affairs, and they have employed the strategies and tactics of maximalism, seeking revolutionary rather
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than gradual solutions to problems. Therefore, they have often been at odds with the more cautious approaches of their allies. 5 When people talk about a Bush Doctrine, they generally refer to three sets of principles the idea of preemptive or preventive military action; the promotion of democracy and regime change; and a diplomacy tending toward unilateralism, a willingness to act without the sanction of international bodies such as the United Nations Security Council or the unanimous approval of its allies. 6 It is worth asking not only whether past administrations acted differently but also which of these any future administration, regardless of party, would promise to abjure in its conduct of foreign policy. As scholars from Melvyn P. Leffler to John Lewis Gaddis have shown, the idea of preemptive or preventive action is hardly a novel concept in American foreign policy. 7 And as policymakers and philosophers from Henry Kissinger to Michael Walzer have agreed, it is impossible in the present era to renounce such actions a priori.8 As for regime change, there is not a single administration in the past half-century that has not attempted to engineer changes of regime in various parts of the world, from Eisenhower s cia-inspired coups in Iran and Guatemala and his planned overthrow of Fidel Castro, which John F. Kennedy attempted to carry out, to George Herbert Walker Bush s invasion of Panama to Bill Clintons actions in Haiti and Bosnia. And if by unilateralism we mean an unwillingness to be constrained by the disapproval of the un Security Council, by some of the nato allies, by the oas, or by any other international body, which presidents of the past allowed themselves to be so constrained? 9 These qualities of American foreign policy reflect not one man or one party or one circle of thinkers. They spring from the nation s historical experience and are a characteristic American response to international circumstances. They are underpinned, on the one hand, by old beliefs and ambitions and, on the other hand, by power. So long as Americans elect leaders who believe it is the role of the United States to improve the world and bring about the ultimate good,10 and so long as American power in all its forms is sufficient to shape the behavior of others, the broad direction of American foreign policy is unlikely to change, absent some dramatic indeed, genuinely revolutionary effort by a future administration. Realist theory has assumed that other powers must inevitably band together to balance against the superpower. These American traditions, together with historical events beyond Americans control, have catapulted the United States to a position of pre-eminence in the world. Since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of this unipolar world, there has been much anticipation of the end of unipolarity and the rise of a multipolar world in which the United States is no longer the predominant power. Not only realist theorists but others both inside and outside the United States have long argued the theoretical and practical unsustainability, not to mention undesirability, of a world with only one superpower. Mainstream realist theory has assumed that other powers must inevitably band together to balance against the superpower. Others expected the post-Cold War era to be characterized by the primacy of geoeconomics over geopolitics and foresaw a multipolar world with the economic giants of Europe, India, Japan, and China rivaling the United States. Finally, in the wake of the Iraq War and with hostility to the United States, as measured in public opinion polls, apparently at an all-time high, there has been a widespread assumption that the American position in the world must finally be eroding. Yet American predominance in the main categories of power persists as a key feature of the international system. The enormous and productive American economy remains at the center of the international economic system. American democratic principles are shared by over a hundred nations. The American military is not only the largest but the only one capable of projecting force into distant theaters. Chinese strategists, who spend a great
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deal of time thinking about these things, see the world not as multipolar but as characterized by one superpower, many great powers, and this configuration seems likely to persist into the future absent either a catastrophic blow to American power or a decision by the United States to diminish its power and international influence voluntarily. 11 Sino-Russian hostility to American predominance has not yet produced a concerted effort at balancing. The anticipated global balancing has for the most part not occurred. Russia and China certainly share a common and openly expressed goal of checking American hegemony. They have created at least one institution, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, aimed at resisting American influence in Central Asia, and China is the only power in the world, other than the United States, engaged in a long-term military buildup. But Sino-Russian hostility to American predominance has not yet produced a concerted and cooperative effort at balancing. China s buildup is driven at least as much by its own long-term ambitions as by a desire to balance the United States. Russia has been using its vast reserves of oil and natural gas as a lever to compensate for the lack of military power, but it either cannot or does not want to increase its military capability sufficiently to begin counterbalancing the United States. Overall, Russian military power remains in decline. In addition, the two powers do not trust one another. They are traditional rivals, and the rise of China inspires at least as much nervousness in Russia as it does in the United States. At the moment, moreover, China is less abrasively confrontational with the United States. Its dependence on the American market and foreign investment and its perception that the United States remains a potentially formidable adversary mitigate against an openly confrontational approach. In any case, China and Russia cannot balance the United States without at least some help from Europe, Japan, India, or at least some of the other advanced, democratic nations. But those powerful players are not joining the effort . Europe has rejected the option of making itself a counterweight to American power. This is true even among the older members of the European Union, where neither France, Germany, Italy, nor Spain proposes such counterbalancing, despite a public opinion hostile to the Bush administration. Now that the eu has expanded to include the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, who fear threats from the east, not from the west, the prospect of a unified Europe counterbalancing the United States is practically nil. As for Japan and India, the clear trend in recent years has been toward closer strategic cooperation with the United States. If anything, the most notable balancing over the past decade has been aimed not at the American superpower but at the two large powers: China and Russia. In Asia and the Pacific, Japan, Australia, and even South Korea and the nations of Southeast Asia have all engaged in hedging against a rising China. This has led them to seek closer relations with Washington, especially in the case of Japan and Australia. India has also drawn closer to the United States and is clearly engaged in balancing against China. Russia s efforts to increase its influence over what it regards as its near abroad, meanwhile, have produced tensions and negative reactions in the Baltics and other parts of Eastern Europe. Because these nations are now members of the European Union, this has also complicated eu-Russian relations. On balance, traditional allies of the United States in East Asia and in Europe, while their publics may be more anti-American than in the past, nevertheless pursue policies that reflect more concern about the powerful states in their midst than about the United States. 12 This has provided a cushion against hostile public opinion and offers a foundation on which to strengthen American relations with these countries after the departure of Bush.
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As for Russia and China, their hostility to the United States predates the Iraq War and, indeed, the Bush administration. The Iraq War has not had the effect expected by many. Although there are reasonable-sounding theories as to why America s position should be eroding as a result of global opposition to the war and the unpopularity of the current administration, there has been little measurable change in the actual policies of nations, other than their reluctance to assist the United States in Iraq. In 2003 those who claimed the U.S. global position was eroding pointed to electoral results in some friendly countries: the election of Schr der in Germany, the defeat of Aznars party in Spain, and the election of Lula in Brazil.13 But if elections are the test, other more recent votes around the world have put relatively pro-American leaders in power in Berlin, Paris, Tokyo, Canberra, and Ottawa. As for Russia and China, their hostility to the United States predates the Iraq War and, indeed, the Bush administration. Russia turned most sharply anti-American in the late 1990s partly as a consequence of nato enlargement. Both were far more upset and angered by the American intervention in Kosovo than by the invasion of Iraq. Both began complaining about American hegemonism and unilateralism and calling for a multipolar order during the Clinton years. Chinese rhetoric has been, if anything, more tempered during the Bush years, in part because the Chinese have seen September 11 and American preoccupation with terrorism as a welcome distraction from Americas other preoccupation, the China threat. The worlds failure to balance against the superpower is the more striking because the United States, notwithstanding its difficult interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, continues to expand its power and military reach and shows no sign of slowing this expansion even after the 2008 elections. The American defense budget has surpassed $500 billion per year, not including supplemental spending totaling over $100 billion on Iraq and Afghanistan. This level of spending is sustainable, moreover, both economically and politically. 14 As the American military budget rises, so does the number of overseas American military bases. Since September 11, 2001, the United States has built or expanded bases in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in Central Asia; in Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania in Europe; and in the Philippines, Djibouti, Oman, and Qatar. Two decades ago, hostility to the American military presence began forcing the United States out of the Philippines and seemed to be undermining support for American bases in Japan. Today, the Philippines is rethinking that decision, and the furor in Japan has subsided. In places like South Korea and Germany, it is American plans to reduce the U.S. military presence that stir controversy, not what one would expect if there was a widespread fear or hatred of overweening American power. Overall, there is no shortage of other countries willing to host U.S. forces, a good indication that much of the world continues to tolerate and even lend support to American geopolitical primacy if only as a protection against more worrying foes. 15 Predominance is not the same thing as omnipotence. Just because the United States has more power than everyone else does not mean it can impose its will on everyone else. American predominance in the early years after the Second World War did not prevent the North Korean invasion of the South, a communist victory in China, the Soviet acquisition of the hydrogen bomb, or the consolidation of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe all far greater strategic setbacks than anything the United States has yet suffered or is likely to suffer in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nor does predominance mean the United States will succeed in all its endeavors, any more than it did six decades ago. By the same token, foreign policy failures do not necessarily undermine predominance. Some have suggested that failure in Iraq would mean the end of predominance and unipolarity. But a superpower can lose a war in Vietnam or in Iraq without ceasing to be a superpower if the fundamental international conditions continue to support its predominance. So long as the United States remains at the center of the
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international economy and the predominant military power, so long as the American public continues to support American predominance as it has consistently for six decades, and so long as potential challengers inspire more fear than sympathy among their neighbors, the structure of the international system should remain as the Chinese describe it: one superpower and many great powers.
This is a good thing, and it should continue to be a primary goal of American foreign policy to perpetuate this relatively benign international configuration of power. The unipolar order with the United States as the
predominant power is unavoidably riddled with flaws and contradictions. It inspires fears and jealousies. The United States is not immune to error, like all other nations, and because of its size and importance in the international system those errors are magnified and take on greater significance than the errors of less powerful nations. Compared to the ideal Kantian international order, in which all the world s powers would be peace-loving equals, conducting themselves wisely, prudently, and in strict obeisance to international law, the unipolar system is both dangerous and unjust. Compared to any plausible alternative in the real world, however, it is relatively stable and less likely to produce a major war between great powers. It is also comparatively benevolent, from a liberal perspective, for it is more conducive to the principles of economic and political liberalism that Americans and many others value. American predominance does not stand in the way of progress toward a better world, therefore. It stands in the way of regression toward a more dangerous world. The choice is not between an Americandominated order and a world that looks like the European Union. The future international order will be shaped by those who have the power to shape it. The leaders of a post-American world will not meet in Brussels but in Beijing, Moscow, and Washington.
The return of great powers and great games
If the world is marked by the persistence of unipolarity, it is nevertheless also being shaped by the reemergence of competitive national ambitions of the kind that have shaped human affairs from time immemorial. During the Cold War, this historical tendency of great powers to jostle with one another for status and influence as well as for wealth and power was largely suppressed by the two superpowers and their rigid bipolar order. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not been powerful enough, and probably could never be powerful enough, to suppress by itself the normal ambitions of nations. This does not mean the world has returned to multipolarity, since none of the large powers is in range of competing with the superpower for global influence. Nevertheless, several large powers are now competing for regional predominance, both with the United States and with each other. National ambition drives Chinas foreign policy today, and although it is tempered by prudence and the desire to appear as unthreatening as possible to the rest of the world, the Chinese are powerfully motivated to return their nation to what they regard as its traditional position as the preeminent power in East Asia. They do not share a European, postmodern view that power is pass ; hence their now two-decades-long military buildup and modernization. Like the Americans, they believe power, including military power, is a good thing to have and that it is better to have more of it than less. Perhaps more significant is the Chinese perception, also shared by Americans, that status and honor, and not just wealth and security, are important for a nation. The Chinese do not share the view that power is pass; hence their now twodecades- long military buildup.
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Japan, meanwhile, which in the past could have been counted as an aspiring postmodern power with its pacifist constitution and low defense spending now appears embarked on a more traditional national course. Partly this is in reaction to the rising power of China and concerns about North Korea s nuclear weapons. But it is also driven by Japans own national ambition to be a leader in East Asia or at least not to play second fiddle or little brother to China. China and Japan are now in a competitive quest with each trying to augment its own status and power and to prevent the other s rise to predominance, and this competition has a military and strategic as well as an economic and political component. Their competition is such that a nation like South Korea, with a long unhappy history as a pawn between the two powers, is once again worrying both about a greater China and about the return of Japanese nationalism. As Aaron Friedberg commented, the East Asian future looks more like Europe s past than its present. But it also looks like Asias past. Russian foreign policy, too, looks more like something from the nineteenth century. It is being driven by a typical, and typically Russian, blend of national resentment and ambition. A postmodern Russia simply seeking integration into the new European order, the Russia of Andrei Kozyrev, would not be troubled by the eastward enlargement of the eu and nato, would not insist on predominant influence over its near abroad, and would not use its natural resources as means of gaining geopolitical leverage and enhancing Russia s international status in an attempt to regain the lost glories of the Soviet empire and Peter the Great. But Russia, like China and Japan, is moved by more traditional great-power considerations, including the pursuit of those valuable if intangible national interests: honor and respect. Although Russian leaders complain about threats to their security from nato and the United States, the Russian sense of insecurity has more to do with resentment and national identity than with plausible external military threats. 16 Russias complaint today is not with this or that weapons system. It is the entire post-Cold War settlement of the 1990s that Russia resents and wants to revise. But that does not make insecurity less a factor in Russia s relations with the world; indeed, it makes finding compromise with the Russians all the more difficult. One could add others to this list of great powers with traditional rather than postmodern aspirations. India s regional ambitions are more muted, or are focused most intently on Pakistan, but it is clearly engaged in competition with China for dominance in the Indian Ocean and sees itself, correctly, as an emerging great power on the world scene. In the Middle East there is Iran, which mingles religious fervor with a historical sense of superiority and leadership in its region. 17 Its nuclear program is as much about the desire for regional hegemony as about defending Iranian territory from attack by the United States. Even the European Union, in its way, expresses a pan-European national ambition to play a significant role in the world, and it has become the vehicle for channeling German, French, and British ambitions in what Europeans regard as a safe supranational direction. Europeans seek honor and respect, too, but of a postmodern variety. The honor they seek is to occupy the moral high ground in the world, to exercise moral authority, to wield political and economic influence as an antidote to militarism, to be the keeper of the global conscience, and to be recognized and admired by others for playing this role. Islam is not a nation, but many Muslims express a kind of religious nationalism, and the leaders of radical Islam, including al Qaeda, do seek to establish a theocratic nation or confederation of nations that would encompass a wide swath of the Middle East and beyond. Like national movements elsewhere, Islamists have a yearning for respect, including self-respect, and a desire for honor. Their national identity has been molded in defiance against stronger and often oppressive outside powers, and also by memories of ancient superiority over those same powers. China had its century of humiliation. Islamists have more than a century of humiliation to look back on, a humiliation of which Israel has become the living symbol, which is partly why even Muslims who are neither radical nor fundamentalist proffer their sympathy and even their support to violent extremists who can turn the tables on the
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dominant liberal West, and particularly on a dominant America which implanted and still feeds the Israeli cancer in their midst. Islamists have more than a century of humiliation to look back on. Israel has become its living symbol. Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as No. 1 and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe. The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying its regional as well as its global predominance . Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of
such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic.
It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not only on the goodwill of peoples but also on American power.
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Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. Conflicts are more likely to erupt if the United States withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene even if it remained the worlds most powerful nation could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe if it adopted what some call a strategy of offshore balancing this
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could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances. It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, offshore role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more even-handed policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel s aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground.
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Hegemony Bad Answers Frontline
COLLAPSE OF HEGEMONY RESULTS IN APOLARITY AND WAR NOT MULTIPOLARITY
Nial Ferguson, history professor, NYU, FOREIGN POLICY, July/August, 2004, p. online Anyone who dislikes U.S. hegemony should bear in mind that, rather than a multipolar world of competing powers, a world with no hegemon at all may be the real alternative to U.S. primacy. Apolarity could turn out to be an anarchic new Dark Age, an ear of warring empires and religious fanaticism; of endemic plunder and pillage in the worlds forgotten regions; of economic stagnation and civilizations retreat into a few fortified enclaves.
DECLINE IN HEGEMONY CAUSES MASSIVE WARS
Nial Ferguson, history professor, NYU, FOREIGN POLICY, July/August, 2004, p. online So what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous roughly 20 times more so friction between the worlds disparate tribes is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, so it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. .The reversal of globalization which a new Dark Age would produce would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. .The worse effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the warring great powers. The wealthiest powers of the global economy from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evanglical Christianity imported by U.S. religious workers. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria could continue their deadly work. If the United States retreats from global hegemony, its fragile -- its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new area of multipolar harmony., or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder.
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Hegemony Bad Answers -- Frontline
ONLY U.S. POWER CAN PROTECT THE WORLD ORDER
Colin Gray, political scientist specializing in national security policy, THE SHERIFF: AMERICAS DEFENSE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER, 2004, pp. 5-6 The United States is the, indeed is the only, essential protecting power for the current world order Again, this is not to be deterministic. Although there are no other bidders for this crown at present, it does not follow that the United States is condemned to play this role. After all, American world leadership in Paris in 1919 was succeeded post haste by a scuttle from many potential international obligations. Americans today could elect to withdraw from the outside world, insofar as they could in political-military way s They would hope that the civilizationa1 offense given by the soft power of their now globally beamed culture would not be found unduly provocative abroad. Whether The Great Satan, as Iranian spokespeople have delighted in calling the United States, would be allowed to hunker down in peaceful sanctuary in North America, we should doubt. Still, it could be tried. After September 11, 2001, isolationist sentiment temporarily has lost much We may not be much interested in terrorism, but it woulfd appear that terrorism is interested in us. For good or ill, we are what we are . Exactly what this is has been explained in no uncertain terms by Henry Kissinger in the opening lines of his book, Doer America Need a Foreign Policy? No prizes are awarded for guessing that his question is strictly rhetorical. Kissinger proclaims that At the dawn of the new millennium, the United States is enjoying a preeminence unrivalled by even the greatest empires of the past. From weaponry to entrepreneurship, from science to technology, from higher education to popular culture, America exercises an unparalleled ascendancy around the globe. During the last decade of the twentieth century, Americas preponderant position rendered it the indispensable component of international stability . The condition of unchallenged, indeed unchallengeable, primacy will not endure-it is not strategic history's "last move"-but while it does the United States is the only candidate for sheriff. If Americans should decline the honor, they are at least uniquely well equipped to ensure that no one else could possibly succeed in that informal office .
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Hegemony Bad Answers -- Frontline
Only U.S. leadership can secure global peace, decline causes counterbalancing by other powers that are incapable of achieving world peace
The Yomiuri Shimbun, 1-4, 8, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editorial/20080104TDY04309.htm
With globalization has come a heightened feeling of insecurity around the world. The biggest factor behind this insecurity is the wobbling status of the United States, which has been a superpower of overwhelming strength at the top of a unipolar world. Apart from its fumbles in Iraq and other places, the shaken status of the United States is consequential because China and Russia are attempting to expand their international influence, with an aim of becoming other poles that can challenge Washington's dominance. The rise of China is creating changes in East Asian regional power relationships. In the seven years since George W. Bush took the office of president of the United States, the biggest trading partnership for Japan and South Korea has shifted from the United States to China. As for military power, China's ballooning naval strength has been felt in the western Pacific--the most strategically important area of operations for the U.S. 7th Fleet. === Russia making comeback Looking at Europe, the resurgence of Russia looms large. Under the direction of President Vladimir Putin, the nation is achieving an annual economic growth rate of nearly 7 percent. Escalating oil prices have helped amplify the might of Russia's returning economy. Russia is ranked third in the world in foreign currency reserves, behind China and Japan. Some observers predict that in about a decade, Russia will have caught up with Britain and France in economic power. Backed by its strengthening influence on European countries as the supply source of crude oil and natural gas, Russia is taking a more confrontational stance against the United States. Despite the growing influence of China and Russia to change the world's strategic balance, they still lack the
strength on a global scale to take responsibility for smooth international relationships. Among the major powers, only the United States is capable of playing a
leading role for peace and stability in the world. However, the Bush administration, which is now in its last full year, seems more and more to be losing this ability.
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Hegemony Bad Answers Frontline (Multilateralism Fails)
NYE AGREES THAT MULTILATERALISM WILL NOT SOLVE
Joseph Nye, Dean, JFK School of Government, Harvard, 2002 (THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER, pp. 12-13) America's power-hard and soft-is only part of the story. How others react to American power is equally important to the question of stability and governance in this global information age. Many realists extol the virtues of the classic nineteenth-century European balance of power, in which constantly shifting coalitions contained the ambitions of any especially aggressive power. They urge the United States to rediscover the virtues of a balance of power at the global level today. Already in the 1970s, Richard Nixon argued that "the only time in the history of the world that we have had extended periods of peace is when there has been a balance of power. It is when one nation becomes infinitely more powerful in relation to its potential competitors that the danger of war arises. But whether such multipolarity would be good or bad for the United States and for the world is debatable. I am skeptical. War was the constant companion and crucial instrument of the multipolar balance of power. The classic European balance provided stability in the sense of maintaining the independence of most countries, but there were wars among the great powers for 60 percent of the years since 1500. Rote adherence to the balance of power and multipolarity may prove to be a dangerous approach to global governance in a world where war could turn nuclear.
A DECLINE IN HEGEMONY ENSURES BALANCING
STEPHEN WALT, PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS @ HARVARD, AMERICAN UNRIVALED, 2002 P. 134-5 Thus, the United States has long enjoyed a hegemonic position in the Western Hemisphere, both because its immediate neighbors have been too weak to challenge it directly and because other great powers have been preoccupied by events in their own regions. This argument implies that other states might be more likely to balance against the United States were its power to decline, which in turn suggests that the United States has ample incentive to preserve its material superiority
EVEN THOUGH THE U.S. WAGES WAR, THERE IS A NET INCREASE IN PEACE UNDER U.S. HEGEMONY
Colin Gray, political scientist specializing in national security policy, THE SHERIFF: AMERICAS DEFENSE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER, 2004, p. 63 A ccepting the risk of trying the reader's patience with repetition, the point of this discussion may be clearer if we cite again the golden thought of Donald Kagan, who -wrote that "what seems to work best, even though imperfectly is the possession by those states who wish to preserve the peace of the preponderant power and of the will to accept the burdens and responsibilities required to achieve that purpose."' Americans' motives may well be mixed, but the historical record is tolerably clear in support of Kagan's claim. U.S. hegemony, meaning only preeminence and leadership, not detailed direction of most aspects of political, economic, and social behavior, is by far the best prospect for world order in the twenty-first century. It cannot guarantee peace, because the U.S. superstate will, from time to time, need to wage war or at least apply coercion on behalf of order. Nonetheless, with global security the interest of peace will be advanced prodigiously for so long as the United States is willing and able to sustain its current position of preponderance. A good part of the contemporary difficulty into which American statecraft has stumbled derives from a lack of understanding at home- and abroad of the truth in Kagan's dictum. In addition, of course, there are critics who understand the theory of the benign hegemon and reject it.
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Hegemony Bad Answers Frontline (Multilateralism Fails)
MULTILATERAL ACTION IS TOO SLOW TO PREVENT ESCALATION
Fran Schuller and Thomas Grant, Professors of Political Science, 2003, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, No. 79, p. 39 The opposing principle, that of multilateralism, equally miscasts international policy in a world where circumstances may indeed warrant unilateral decisiveness. In the 1920s and 1930s, the League of Nations nurtured multilateral discussions, producing only futility. Rather than mounting individual effective actions against the provocations of Japanese empirebuilding in China, Italian aggression against Ethiopia or Nazi trial runs for Blitzkrieg and Holocaust, European leaders endlessly consulted one another, grasping for a common denominator that no consultation would ever achieve. In current circumstances, some unilateral actions override soothing diplomatic nattering. The attacks of 11 September on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon count as an incident deserving of response regardless of the sentiments and sympathies of other nations. The United States, as the superior power in the world, must assume the responsibility of deploying its might for the benefit and welfare of itself and the rest of the world.
UNIPOLAR WORLD MORE STABLE THAN MULTIPOLAR WORLD
William C. Wohlforth, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, America's Strategic Choices, Revised Edition, ed. Brown, Cote, Jr., Lynn-Jones and Miller, 2000, p. 292-3 Waltz argued that bipolarity is less war prone than multipolarity because it reduces uncertainty. By the same logic, unipolarity is the least war prone of all structures. For as long as unipolarity obtains, there is little uncertainty regarding alliance choices of the calc ulation of power. The only options available to second-tier states are to bandwagon with the polar power (either explicitly or implicitly) or, at least, to take no action that could incur its focused enmity. As long as their security policies are oriented around the power and preferences of the sole pole, second-tier states are less likely to engage in conflict prone rivalries for security or prestige. Once the sole pole takes sides, there can be little doubt about which party will prevail. Moreover, the unipolar leader has the capability to be far more interventionist than earlier system leaders. Exploiting the other states' security dependence as well as its unilateral power advantages, the sole pole can maintain a system of alliances that keeps second-tier states out of power.
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Hegemony Sustains International Cooperation
Existence of a hegemon is necessary for international cooperation Stephen G. Brooks & William Wohlforth, government professors, Dartmouth, Foreign Affairs; March/April 2009, p49-63 Creating a league of democracies, revamping the UN Security Council, revitalizing the nuclear nonproliferation regime--proposals for revising international institutions are all the rage these days. And for good reason: no one sitting down to design the perfect global framework for the twenty-first century would come up with anything like the current one. The existing architecture is a relic of the preoccupations and power relationships of the middle of the last century--out of sync with today's world of rising powers and new challenges, from terrorism and nuclear proliferation to financial instability and global warming. It is one thing to agree that change is needed, but quite another to settle on its specifics. As soon as the conversation shifts to brass tacks, competing visions begin to clash. In an anarchic world of self-interested states--that is to say, in the real world--the chances that those states will cooperate are best when a hegemon takes the lead. Some would argue that the United States' window of opportunity for fostering institutional change has closed. In today's "post-American world," the thinking goes, surely only an idealist would suggest that Washington retains the power to lead the way out of the current institutional impasse. And even if the United States were somehow able to come up with enough hard power to spearhead reform, skeptics question whether a hegemon that has squandered so much goodwill in eight years of unilateralism and rule breaking would have many followers.
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U.S. Hegemony Generally Good
U.S. leadership is capable of restoring the international order Stephen G. Brooks & William Wohlforth, government professors, Dartmouth, Foreign Affairs; March/April 2009, p49-63 Nonetheless, there are hardheaded reasons to believe that the United States has the means and the motive to spearhead the foundation of a new institutional order. It still has the power and legitimacy such an effort would require, as well as a strong incentive to mount it, because overall, international institutions channel the United States' power and enhance its security. If Washington wants to succeed, it should follow a strategy that highlights the benefits of the institutional revisions, links the proposed order to the current one, and uses the United States' power position to persuade other governments to sign on to reform. This approach to pursuing institutional change presents a challenge for diplomacy, but one that many of history's hegemons have met in order to smooth the path to reform. And it is a challenge worth taking up if the United States wants to maximize the prospects for a peaceful, prosperous twenty-first century.
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Unipolarity Good: Global Nuclear Exchange (Khalilzad)
SUSTAINED US LEADERSHIP IS KEY TO PREVENT MULTIPLE SCENARIOS FOR NUCLEAR WAR
Zalmay Khalilzad, Rand Corporation, The Washington Quarterly 1995 What might happen to the world if the United States turned inward? Without the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), rather than cooperating with each other, the West European nations might compete with each other for domination of East-Central Europe and the Middle East. In Western and Central Europe, Germany -especially since unification -- would be the natural leading power. Either in cooperation or competition with Russia, Germany might seek influence over the territories located between them. German efforts are likely to be aimed at filling the vacuum, stabilizing the region, and precluding its domination by rival powers. Britain and France fear such a development. Given the strength of democracy in Germany and its preoccupation with absorbing the former East Germany, European concerns about Germany appear exaggerated. But it would be a mistake to assume that U.S. withdrawal could not, in the long run, result in the renationalization of Germany's security policy. The same is also true of Japan. Given a U.S. withdrawal from the world, Japan would have to look after its own security and build up its military capabilities. China, Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia already fear Japanese hegemony. Without U.S. protection, Japan is likely to increase its military capability dramatically -- to balance the growing Chinese forces and still-significant Russian forces. This could result in arms races, including the possible acquisition by Japan of nuclear weapons. Given Japanese technological prowess, to say nothing of the plutonium stockpile Japan has acquired in the development of its nuclear power industry, it could obviously become a nuclear weapon state relatively quickly, if it should so decide. It could also build long-range missiles and carrier task forces. With the shifting balance of power among Japan, China, Russia, and potential new regional powers such as India, Indonesia, and a united Korea could come significant risks of preventive or proeruptive war. Similarly, European competition for regional dominance could lead to major wars in Europe or East Asia. If the United States stayed out of such a war -- an unlikely prospect -- Europe or East Asia could become dominated by a hostile power. Such a development would threaten U.S. interests. A power that achieved such dominance would seek to exclude the United States from the area and threaten its interests-economic and political -- in the region. Besides, with the domination of Europe or East Asia, such a power might seek global hegemony and the United States would face another global Cold War and the risk of a world war even more catastrophic than the last. In the Persian Gulf, U.S. withdrawal is likely to lead to an intensified struggle for regional domination. Iran and Iraq have, in the past, both sought regional hegemony. Without U.S. protection, the weak oil-rich states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would be unlikely to retain their independence. To preclude this development, the Saudis might seek to acquire, perhaps by purchase, their own nuclear weapons. If either Iraq or Iran controlled the region that dominates the world supply of oil, it could gain a significant capability to damage the U.S. and world economies. Any country that gained hegemony would have vast economic resources at its disposal that could be used to build military capability as well as gain leverage over the United States and other oil-importing nations. Hegemony over the Persian Gulf by either Iran or Iraq would bring the rest of the Arab Middle East under its influence and domination because of the shift in the balance of power. Israeli security problems would multiply and the peace process would be fundamentally undermined, increasing the risk of war between the Arabs and the Israelis.<continued> The extension of instability, conflict, and hostile hegemony in East Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf would harm the economy of the United States even in the unlikely event that it was able to avoid involvement in major wars and conflicts. Higher oil prices would reduce the U.S. standard of living. Turmoil in Asia and Europe would force major economic readjustment in the United States, perhaps reducing U.S. exports and imports and jeopardizing U.S. investments in these regions. Given that total imports and exports are equal to a quarter of U.S. gross domestic product, the cost of necessary adjustments might be high. The higher level of turmoil in the world would also increase the likelihood of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and means for their delivery. Already several rogue states such as North Korea and Iran are seeking nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. That danger would only increase if the United States withdrew from the world. The result would be a much more dangerous world in which many states possessed WMD capabilities; the likelihood of their actual use would increase accordingly. If this happened, the security of every nation in the world, including the United States, would be harmed. Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On
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balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
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Unipolarity Good: Global War (Thayer)
US HEGEMONY KEY TO PEACE, LIBERTY, AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC GROWTH
Bradley A. Thayer, Professor Defense & Strategic Studies, Missouri State University, 2006, The National Interest, November/December, p. Lexis THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power-Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.3 So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States CONTINUES Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States
created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist
the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy.4 As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides. Fourth and finally, the United States, in seeking primacy, has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all over the globe. The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War--and most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed, the U.S. military is the earth's "911 force"--it serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need.
ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that
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Unipolarity Good: Global War (Thayer)
RETRENCHMENT FROM US PRIMACY DISASTROUS INCREASES WARS AND INSTABILITY
Bradley A. Thayer, Professor Defense & Strategic Studies, Missouri State University, 2006 , The National Interest, November/December, p. 148 But retrenchment, in any of its guises, must be avoided. If the United States adopted such a strategy, it would be a profound strategic mistake that would lead to far greater instability and war in the world, imperil American security and deny the United States and its allies the benefits of primacy.
MAINTENANCE OF US HEGEMONY VITAL TO GLOBAL STABILITY
Bradley A. Thayer, Professor Defense & Strategic Studies, Missouri State University, 2006 , The National Interest, November/December, p.149 A GRAND strategy of ensuring American primacy takes as its starting point the protection of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor. In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats. And when enemies must be confronted, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This requires a physical, on-the-ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing. Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, U.S. primacy is secured because America, at present, commands the "global commons"--the oceans, the world's airspace and outer space--allowing the United States to project its power far from its borders, while denying those common avenues to its enemies. As a consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its allies are reduced, and the robustness of the United States' conventional and strategic deterrent capabilities is increased. This is not an advantage that should be relinquished lightly.
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Unipolarity Good: Global War (Ferguson)
IMPACT - LOSS OF LEADERSHIP CAUSES MULTIPLE NUCLEAR WARS, SYSTEMIC GLOBAL INSTABILITY, AND MAGNIFIES ALL IMPACTS Niall Ferguson, Professor, History, School of Business, New York University and Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, September-October 2004 (A World Without Power Foreign Policy) http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3009996.html So what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous--roughly 20 times more--so friction between the world's disparate "tribes" is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, too, so it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization--the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital--has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalization--which a new Dark Age would produce--would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy--from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai--would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global hegemony--its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier--its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity--a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder.
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Unipolarity Good: Extinction (Smil)
A GLOBAL LEADER IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT ENVIRONMENTAL AND CIVILIZATIONAL COLLAPSE Vaclav Smil, Distinguished Professor, University of Manitoba, POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 31(4): The Next 50 Years: Unfolding Trends, 605643 (DECEMBER 2005), p. 640 The absence of a globally influential power in a world dominated by forces of globalization would be akin to the retreat of Roman power that stood behind the centuries of coherent civilization extending from Mauritania to Mesopotamia: a chaotic, long-lasting fragmentation that would be inimical to economic progress and greatly exacerbate many of todays worrisome social and environmental trends. About 2 billion people already live in countries that are in danger of collapse, and there are no convincing signs that the number of failing and nearly failed states will diminish in the future (Foreign Policy/Fund for Peace 2005). A century ago a failure, or chronic dysfunction, of a smallish (and particularly a landlocked) state would have been a relatively inconsequential matter in global terms. In todays interconnected world such developments command universal attention and prompt costly military and humanitarian intervention: prominent recent examples include Afghani stan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Congo, Iraq, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan. Were a number of such state failures to take place simultaneously in a world without any dominant power, who would step in to defuse the most threatening ones? As Niall Ferguson has warned, Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolaritya global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder .
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Hegemony Net-Beneficial
Hegemony is good benefits outweigh the costs. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007 ["The Case For The American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN
0415952034, p. 41-42]
Should America Dominate the World? Yes, It Is a Force for Good in the World and Far Better than Any Realistic Alternative
A great amount of good comes from American dominance, although that good is little acknowledged, even by Americans. In this section, I will demonstrate the good that comes from the American Empire. Specifically, it provides stability, allows democracy to spread, furthers economic prosperity, and makes possible humanitarian assistance to countries beset by natural and other disasters. The United States has an opportunity to do an enormous amount of good for itself and the entire world. Realizing this good requires that Americans be bold, that they lead. In return, Americans enjoy the benefits that flow to a leader. [end page 41]
But as professors teach in Economics 101, there is no free lunch. No one gets anything for free; everything has a cost. The American Empire is no exception. I want to make it clear that the benefits that the world and the United States enjoy come with a cost. Leadership requires that the United States incur costs and run risks not borne by other countries. These costs can be stark and brutal, and they have to be faced directly by proponents of the American Empire. It means that some Americans will die in the service of their country. These are the costs. They are considerable. Every American should be conscious of them. It is equally the case that Americans should be aware of the benefits they enjoy. I believe that the substantial benefits are worth the costs .
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Hegemony Net-Beneficial
Despite its costs, hegemony is comparatively better for the world. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007
["The Case For The American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 4647]
The American Empire is fully in keeping with the Founding Fathers dreams for America. America has never been a shrinking violet, hiding from the world. Rather, it has been a bold country, making a place for itself in international politics since its inception. The empire Americans have worked hard to create can last well into the future, but only if the American people want it to persevere. As I have argued in this chapter, the American Empire should be valued by the American people largely because of the enormous good it does for America and the honorable and goodhearted actions it undertakes for the world. It is equally true that this good is not often appreciated by the rest of the world, or
sometimes even in the United States. Despite its benefits, Americans have to recognize that they will be criticized, and that this is simply a consequence of its power. A half a century ago, the great British historian Arnold Toynbee hit this point precisely when he wrote of American power: The giants sheer size is always getting the giant into trouble with people of normal stature.63 Toynbee writes of a Latin American diplomat who captured the point well: When the United States sneezes, Latin America gets influenza,64 Its actions will always have an exaggerated impact on smaller countries. And that fact alone will generate resentment and jealously from those who are weaker. No matter what, people will launch invective against the United States. Muslims will attack it as too atheistic and hedonistic; Europeans will assault it from the opposite direction, labeling the United States as too religious and crude. Mark Steyn, the witty columnist for the Daily Telegraph, wrote with great insight: Fanatical Muslims despise America because its all lapdancing and gay porn; the secular Europeans despise America because its all born-again [end page 46] Christians hung up on abortion.. ..America is also too isolationist, except when it is too imperialist. And even its imperialism is too vulgar and arriviste to appeal to real imperialists.. ..To the mullahs, America is the Great Satan, a wily seducer; to the Gaullists, America is the Great Cretin, a culture so selfevidently moronic that only stump-tooth inbred Appalachian lardbutts could possibly fall for it... .Too Christian, too Godless, too isolationist, too imperialist, too seductive, too cretinous.65
The key question for the future is not how Muslims, Europeans, or others will perceive the American Empire. Rather, it is How should Americans want our empire to be remembered? As one that fostered democracy in places where freedom was unknownfrom Afghanistan and Iraq to Chile and Argentina to Germany and Japan. As one that developed respect for free market values and institutionalized these values in organizations like the World Trade Organization. Did it make mistakes? Of course, it did. Did Americans have to sacrifice their lives? Unfortunately, many did. But when the sun sets on the American Empire, we will acknowledge that the world was the better for having it.
Strong U.S. leadership necessary for conflict resolution Bruce Jentleson, Survival, September 2007, p. 179-200 (Professor of Public Policy and Political Science at Duke
University)
A key element is the role, often played by the United States, of peace broker, a third party asked to help negotiate a resolution to a conflict. Today this role, consistent with the semi-hierarchical international structure, is much less exclusive than was the case with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's 1970s Middle East shuttle diplomacy or the Camp David negotiations of presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton. Other major powers also are involved, through such arrangements as the Middle East Quartet (United States, European Union, Russia, United Nations), the Six-Party Talks (US, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea and North Korea) and the E3+3 on Iran (Britain, France and Germany and the United States, Russia and China). But within each of these configurations the US role is key, particularly with regard to the security dimension.
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Hegemony Produces Global Stability
Hegemony is key to global stability U.S. presence prevents conflicts. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007 ["The Case For The American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN
0415952034, p. 42]
Stability
Peace, like good health, is not often noticed, but certainly is missed when absent. Throughout history, peace and stability have been a major benefit of empires. In fact, pax Romana in Latin means the Roman peace, or the stability brought about by the Roman Empire. Romes power was so overwhelming that no one could challenge it successfully for hundreds of years. The result was stability within the Roman Empire. Where Rome conquered, peace, law, order, education, a common language, and much else followed. That was true of the British Empire (pax Britannica) too. So it is with the United States today. Peace and stability are major benefits of the American Empire. The fact that America is so powerful actually reduces the likelihood of major war. Scholars of international politics have found that the presence of a dominant state in international politics actually reduces the likelihood of war because weaker states, including even great powers, know that it is unlikely that they could challenge the dominant state and win. They may resort to other mechanisms or tactics to challenge the dominant country, but are unlikely to do so directly. This means that there will be no wars between great powers . At least, not until a challenger (certainly China)
thinks it can overthrow the dominant state (the United States). But there will be intense security competitionboth China and the United States will watch each other closely, with their intelligence communities increasingly focused on each other, their diplomats striving to ensure that countries around the world do not align with the other, and their militaries seeing the other as their principal threat. This is not unusual in international politics but, in fact, is its normal condition. Americans may not pay much attention to it until a crisis occurs. But right now states are competing with one another. This is because international politics does not sleep; it never takes a rest.
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U.S. Leadership Key to Global Peace
US leadership is key to solve stability, foreign aggression, proliferation, nuclear terrorism and nuclear war. DOLE, 1995 (Robert, Senator from Kansas, Foreign Policy, No. 98., Spring, 1995, JSTOR)
The world of 1995 and beyond is still a dangerous place. There are many new and emerging threats as we approach the millennium. A resurgent Russia filling a vacuum in Central Europe or looking for a foreign diversion from internal secessionist struggles; a revitalized Iraq threatening the oil fields of Saudi Arabia; a fundamentalist Iran seeking to dominate the Persian Gulf; a nuclear-armed North Korea threatening South Korea and Japan with ballistic missiles- all are scenarios that the United States could face in the near and medium terms. Islamic fundamentalism sweeping across North Africa could overwhelm the
successes to date in achieving peace in the Middle East. A fourth conflict between India and Pakistan could escalate into the world's first nuclear war. Nuclear-armed terrorist states like Libya or Iran, emboldened by the North Korean example and armed with missiles from Pyongyang, could threaten allies in the Middle East or Europe. Economic competition between Japan and China could take a military turn. Radical "ethno-nationalists," religious militants, terrorists, narcotics traffickers, and international organized crime networks all pose threats to states in regions of the world where America has core interests . While the collapse of Somalia or Rwanda may not affect those interests, the disintegration of states like Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, or Pakistan would. American leadership, however, can overcome the challenges of building a just and durable peace after the Cold War . The words of President Dwight Eisenhower's first inaugural address are as true today as they were in 1953: To meet the challenge of our time, destiny has laid upon our country the responsibility of the free world 's leadership. So it is proper that we assure our friends once again that, in the discharge of this responsibility,
we Americans know and we observe the difference between world leadership and imperialism; between firmness and truculence; between a thoughtfully calculated goal and spasmodic reaction to the stimulus of emergencies. As the United States approaches the next century, two principles should remain constant: protecting American interests and providing American leadership. The end of the Cold War has provided us with a historic opportunity. Such an opportunity should not be forfeited in favor of the pursuit of utopian multilateralism or abandoned through intentional isolationism. We have seen the danger to America's interests, prestige, and influence posed by both of these approaches. Instead, we must look to the lessons of the Cold War to guide our future foreign policy: Put American interests first and lead the way. The future will not wait for America, but it can be shaped by an America second to none .
The withdraw of the US would cause a major world war, with catastrophic political and economic ramifications The World Wars prove MANDELBAUM Professor and Director of the American Foreign Policy Program at Johns Hopkins 2005 [Michael, The
Case for Goliath: How America Acts As the Worlds Government in the Twenty-First Century, p. 187-188]
If public pressure within the United States were to compel the American government to withdraw most or all of the military forces stationed beyond North America and to do far less than it had become accustomed to doing to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons, to cope with the consequences of fiscal crises outside its borders, and to help keep global markets open to trade, what impact would this have on the rest of the world? The last occasion on which the United States placed itself on the periphery rather than at the center of international affairs, the period between the two world wars, was not a happy one. Indeed, the antecedents of the American twenty-first-century role as the world's government lie in the fear, after World War II, that in the absence of an expansive American international presence the world would experience repetitions of the two global disasters of the 19305 and the 194osthe Great Depression and World War II. It was to prevent a recurrence of these economic and political calamities that the United States assumed the responsibilities it bore during the Cold War, which, modified and extended, comprise its postCold War role as the world's government. Although the history of the interwar era will not precisely repeat itself even if the United States takes a far less active part in international affairs, a substantial contraction of the American global role would risk making the world a less secure and less prosperous place.
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Hegemonic Collapse Causes War
Hegemony is key to national security only U.S. primacy can protect the country from existential threats. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2006 [In Defense of Primacy, National Interest, Issue 86, November/December, Available Online via Academic
Search Premier]
A GRAND strategy of ensuring American primacy takes as its starting point the protection of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor. In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats. And when enemies must be confronted, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This requires a physical, on-the-ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing. Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, U.S. primacy is secured because America, at present, commands the "global commons"--the oceans, the world's airspace and outer space--allowing the United States to project its power far from its borders, while denying those common avenues to its enemies. As a consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its allies are reduced, and the robustness of the United States' conventional and strategic deterrent capabilities is increased. This is not an advantage that should be relinquished lightly.
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Hegemony Critical to Democracy Promotion
Hegemony is key to democracy promotion. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007 ["The Case For The American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN
0415952034, p. 42-43]Spreading Our Form of Government
The American Empire gives the United States the ability to spread its form of government, democracy, and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Using American power to spread democracy can be a source of much good [end page 42] for the countries concerned as well as for the United States . This is because democracies are more likely to align themselves with the United States and be sympathetic to its worldview. In addition, there is a chance small as it may bethat once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of conflict will be reduced further .
Natan Sharansky makes the argument that once Arabs are governed democratically, they will not wish to continue the conflict against Israel. This idea has had a big effect on President George W. Bush. He has said that Sharanskys woridview is part of my presidential DNA. Whether democracy in the Middle East would have this impact is debatable. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in October 2004, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. Elections were held in Iraq in January 2005, the first free elections in that countrys history. The military power of the United States put Iraq on the path to democracy. Democracy has spread to Latin America, Europe, Asia, the Caucasus, and now even the Middle East is becoming increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority, and Egypt. The march of democracy has been impressive. Although democracies have their flaws, simply put,
democracy is the best form of government. Winston Churchill recognized this over half a century ago: Democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time. The United States should do what it can to foster the spread of democracy throughout the world .
US hegemony is essential to support democracies DIAMOND, 1996 (Larry, Senior researcher fellow at Hoover Institution, Orbis, Beyond the Unipolar Moment: Why the United States Must Remain Engaged, p. 405-413)
In the past, global power has been an important reason why certain countries have become models for emulation
by others. The global power of the United States, and of its Western democratic allies, has been a factor in the diffusion of democracy around the world, and certainly is crucial to our ability to help popular, legitimate democratic forces deter armed threats to their overthrow, or to return to power (as in Haiti) when they have been overthrown. Given the linkages among democracy, peace, and human rights -as well as the recent finding of
Professor Adam Przeworski (New York University) that democracy is more likely to survive in a country when it is more widely present in the region-we should not surrender our capacity to diffuse and defend democracy. It is not only intrinsic to
our ideals but important to our national security that we remain globally powerful and engaged-and that a dictatorship does not rise to hegemonic power within any major region.
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Hegemony Critical to the Global Economy
Hegemony is key to the global economy free trade and globalization. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007 ["The Case For The American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN
0415952034, p. 43-44]
Economic Prosperity
Economic prosperity is also a product of the American Empire. It has created a Liberal International Economic Order (LIEO)a network of worldwide free trade and commerce, respect for intellectual property rights, mobility of capital and labor marketsto promote economic growth. The stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit , particularly states in the Third World. The American Empire
has created this network not out of altruism but because it benefits the economic well-being of the United States. In 1998, the Secretary of Defense William Cohen put this well when he acknowledged that economists and soldiers share the same interest in stability; soldiers create the conditions in which the American economy may thrive, and we are able to shape the environment [of international politics] in ways that are advantageous to us and that are stabilizing to the areas where we are forward deployed, thereby helping to promote investment and prosperity... business follows the flag. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the American Empire comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat, researcher at the World Bank, prolific author, and now a professor who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India that strongly condemned empire. He has abandoned the position of his youth and is now one of the strongest proponents of the American Empire. Lal has traveled the world and, in the course of his journeys, has witnessed great poverty and misery due to a lack of economic development. He realized that free markets were necessary for the development of poor countries, and this led him to recognize that his faith in socialism was wrong. Just as a conservative famously is said to be a liberal who has been mugged by reality, the hard evidence and experience that stemmed from working and traveling in most parts of the Third World during my professional career caused this profound change.61 Lal submits that the only way to bring relief to the desperately poor countries of the Third
World is through the American Empire. Empires provide order, and this order has been essential for the working of the benign processes of globalization, which promote prosperity. 62 Globalization is the process of creating a common economic space, which leads to a growing integration of the world economy through the increasingly free movement of goods, capital, and labor. It is the responsibility of the United States , Lal argues, to use the LIEO to promote the well-being of all economies, but particularly those in the Third World, so that they too may enjoy economic prosperity.
US heg is key to supply people with normal lives and is critical to the world economy LAKE Assistant to President Clinton for National Security Affairs 1996
[Anthony, U.S. Department of State Dispatch, The enduring importance of American engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, Volume 7, Issue 45, p. 545, November 4]
By using our power to promote stability, we accomplish two goals. First, we help hundreds of millions of people to live what President Clinton has called the quiet miracle of a normal life. Thanks to America's efforts, the Pacific has finally begun to live up to its name. In Cambodia, farmers can till fields that once yielded only death and destruction. In South Korea, schoolchildren can worry more about their exams than about war. And in Thailand, one of the biggest threats that a thriving democratic middle class now faces are traffic jams. Second, in promoting stability, we spur the economic progress that benefits all our businesses and workers. Freed from the threat of war and inspired by a greater stake in their futures, the peoples of an Asia-Pacific region at peace have propelled their nations into the front ranks of economic growth. Now, our economic strategy is enlarging the shared stake that we have in sustaining that growth. The United States is working to encourage the free flow of trade and investment that is creating jobs and opportunities for Americans, fueling Asia's high-octane economies, and uniting nations across the Pacific in the common pursuit of prosperity .
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Hegemony Critical to Free Trade
US hegemony is key to the global economy and free trade MANDELBAUM, 2005 (Michael, professor and director of the American foreign policy program at Johns Hopkins, The
Case for Goliath) pg 149-150
It is satisfying because if the strings that manipulate events the world over lead back to Washington and New York, then the world may be seen as intelligible, coherent, and rational, if not benign. It is plausible because, as by far the most powerful member of the system of sovereign states, the United States surely does exercise considerable influence. Globalizationthe spread around the world of cross-border economic transactions is not an American invention, nor does the United States control the trade and investment that enriches some, harms others, and alters the daily routines of tens of millions; but American-based firms certainly do conduct a large part of the world's trade and investment, American economic policies do affect conditions in the rest of the world and the system of global market relations within which these often disruptive transactions take places does rest on the military might and the economic strength of the international system's most powerful member.
Heg is key to free trade WTO proves MURAVCHIK (Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, PhD at Georgetown) 1996
[Joshua, The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-Isolationism, p.204-205]
We ought to see the WTO as an ideal arena for resuming American leadership in behalf of free trade. A natural agenda exists in extending the WTO principles to industries still not covered, negotiating additional rounds of tariff reductions or elimination, strengthening protections of intellectual property, making the dispute procedures work effectively, and bringing in new members who are willing to play by the rules. A key to exercising effective leadership in the WTO will be to reverse the foolish trends within our own trade policies that arose from the yellow-peril scare. Even within the rules of the WTO, nations have a lot of leeway in creating or dismantling barriers. We ought to set an example of liberal trading practices. Liberalization will mean lower prices for American consumers, and economists in substantial majority agree that it is economically wise. It will bring other benefits as well. Alfred E. Eckes, the former chairman of the U.S. International Trade Commission, argues that with the cold war over, America can "stop trading access to the American market for foreign policy favors."47 But in addition to its faulty economics, this argument is wrong politically. In foreign policy, economic concessions are a cheap coin. The other main currency is blood. The world remains dangerous, and peace and security must be top
priorities. If they can be advanced at the expense of economics, it is a wise exchange.
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Hegemony Critical to Humanitarianism
Hegemony is key to humanitarianism only U.S. leadership solves. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007
["The Case For The American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 4446]
Humanitarian Missions If someone were to ask How many humanitarian missions has the United States undertaken since the end of the Cold War?, most Americans probably have to think for a moment and then answer three or four. In fact, the number is much larger. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War, and while wars like the invasion of Panama or Iraq received considerable attention from the worlds media, most of the fifty actions were humanitarian in nature and received almost no media attention in the United States. The U.S. military is the earths 911 forceit serves
as the worlds police; it is the global paramedic, and the planets fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, typhoon, or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need . In 1991, when
flooding caused by cyclone Marian killed almost 140,000 people and left 5 million homeless in Bangladesh, the United States launched Operation Sea Angel to save stranded and starving people by supplying food, potable water, and medical assistance. U.S. forces are credited with saving over 200,000 lives in that operation. In 1999, torrential rains and flash flooding in Venezuela killed 30,000 people and left 140,000 homeless. The United States responded with Operation Fundamental Response, which brought water purification and hygiene [end page 44] equipment saving thousands. Also in 1999, Operation Strong Support aided Central Americans affected by Hurricane Mitch. That hurricane was the fourth-strongest ever recorded in the Atlantic and the worst natural disaster to strike Central America in the twentieth century. The magnitude of the devastation was tremendous, with about 10,000 people killed, 13,000 missing, and 2 million left homeless. It is estimated that 60 percent of the infrastructure in Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala was destroyed. Again, the U.S. military came to the aid of the people affected. It is believed to have rescued about 700 people who otherwise would have died, while saving more from disease due to the timely arrival of medical supplies, food, water, blankets, and mobile shelters. In the next phase of Strong Support, military engineers rebuilt much of the infrastructure of those countries, including bridges, hospitals, roads, and schools. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra and killed 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. More importantly, Washington not only contributed a large amount of aid, $350 million, plus another $350 million provided by American citizens and corporations, but alsoonly days after the tsunami struckused its military to help those in need. About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention, as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished this Herculean effort, and it is important to keep in mind that its costs were separate from the $350 million provided by the U.S. government and other money given by American citizens and corporations to relief organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent. The generosity of the United States has done more to help the country fight the war on terror than almost any other measure . Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving 3 million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the war on terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States provided about $156 million in aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the generosity of the United States, it left a lasting impression about the United States. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the war on terror. There is no other state or international organization that can provide these benefits. The United
Nations certainly cannot because it lacks the military and economic power of the United States. It is riven with conflicts and major cleavages that divide the international body time and again on small matters [end page 45] as well as great ones. Thus, it lacks the ability to speak with one voice on important issues and to act as a unified force once a decision has been reached. Moreover, it does not possess the communications capabilities or global logistical reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the United States to supply UN forces. Simply put, there is no alternative to the leadership of the United States . When the United States does not intervene, as it has not in the Darfur region of Sudan and eastern Chad, people die . In this conflict, Arab Muslims
belonging to government forces, or a militia called the Jingaweit, are struggling against Christian and animist black Africans who are fighting for independence. According to the State Department, 98,000 to 181,000 people died between March 2003 and March 2005 as a result of this struggle. The vast majority of these deaths were caused by violence, disease, and malnutrition associated with the conflict.
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Hegemony Critical to East Asian Stability Module
A) US presence is key to economic and political stability in East Asia SCHWARZ Correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly 1996
[Benjamin, Why America thinks it has to run the world, The Atlantic Monthly, Vol.277, Iss. 6, pg. 92-100, June]
All these benefits would be lost, according to Coll, if the "traditional rivalries among Asian powers .. . unravel into unrestrained military competition, conflict and aggression." In the same vein the author of the Clinton Administration's security strategy for East Asia, Joseph Nye, then the assistant secretary of defense, asserted last year that the U.S. military protectorate is "the basis for stability and prosperity in the
region"; if the United States were to forsake its "leadership role" in East Asia, "the stable expectations of entrepreneurs and investors would be subverted." Although the United States committed forces to Japan ostensibly to protect it from the Soviets, and to South Korea to protect it from the North, in 1993 the deputy defense secretary, William Perry (now the Secretary of Defense), declared that
America would continue to reassure and stabilize East Asia by maintaining troops "permanently" in Japan and even in a future unified Korea.
B) East Asian instability leads to nuclear war LANDY, 2000 (Jonathon, National Security and International Correspondent, Knight Ridder, March 10, L/N)
Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy, and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan, and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations, and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile, said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster. In an effort to cool the regions tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asias capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime.
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Hegemony Hegemony Critical to East Asian Stability
US pullout from Asia would cause a power vacuum leading to multiple scenarios for conflict and instability LAKE Assistant to President Clinton for National Security Affairs 1996
[Anthony, U.S. Department of State Dispatch, The enduring importance of American engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, Volume 7, Issue 45, p. 545, November 4,] We will continue to be a Pacific power-not because we are sentimental moralists, but because we have cold, hard interests in a region that accounts for half the world's people, much of its resources, a quarter of its goods and services, and most of its biggest militaries. Our security and prosperity depend on our engagement where the interests of so many powers
converge-and where we fought three wars in the last half-century. An American withdrawal would create an unhealthy vacuum. It could kindle arms races from Northeast Asia to the South China Sea. It could make us more vulnerable to new threats like the spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorists who plot to blow up American airliners, and criminal gangs that export illegal aliens and import stolen cars. It could slow the proud march of Asia's newest democracies to a crawl. And it could shut us out of the world's most vibrant markets, harming 40% of our trade and over 2 million of our jobs, and hurting our chances to benefit from more than $1 trillion in Asian infrastructure projects alone over the next decade. In short, just as America's strength at home
continues to depend on our engagement in Europe, we also must be either a Pacific power or no power at all.
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Hegemony Necessary to Stop East Asian Proliferation
A. US is key to solve East Asia proliferation LIEBER Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University 2005
[Robert J., The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century, p. 174]
Taken together, these Asian involvements are not without risk, especially vis-a-vis North Korea, China-Taiwan, and the uncertain future of a nuclear-armed Pakistan. Nonetheless, the American engagement provides both reassurance and deterrence and thus eases the security dilemmas of the key states there, including countries that are America's allies but remain suspicious of each other. Given the history of the region, an American withdrawal would be likely to trigger arms races and the accelerated proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is thus no exaggeration to describe the American presence as providing the "oxygen" crucial for the region's stability and economic prosperity.37
B. East Asian proliferation leads to nuclear war CERINCIONE, 2000 (Joseph, Director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Foreign Policy, The Asian nuclear reaction chain, Issue 118, Spring, Proquest)
The blocks would fall quickest and hardest in Asia, where proliferation pressures are already building more quickly than anywhere else in the world. If a nuclear breakout takes place in Asia, then the international arms control agreements that have been painstakingly negotiated over the past 40 years will crumble. Moreover, the United States could find itself embroiled in its fourth war on the Asian continent in six decades-- a costly rebuke to those
who seek the safety of Fortress America by hiding behind national missile defenses. Consider what is already happening: North Korea continues to play guessing games with its nuclear and missile programs; South Korea wants its own missiles to match Pyongyang's; India and Pakistan shoot across borders while running a slow-motion nuclear arms race; China modernizes its nuclear arsenal amid tensions with Taiwan and the United States; Japan's vice defense minister is forced to resign after extolling the benefits of nuclear weapons; and Russia-whose Far East nuclear deployments alone make it the largest Asian nuclear power-struggles to maintain territorial coherence. Five of these states have nuclear weapons; the others are capable of constructing them. Like neutrons firing from a split atom, one nation's actions can trigger reactions throughout the region, which in turn, stimulate additional actions. These nations form an interlocking Asian nuclear reaction chain that vibrates dangerously with each new development.
If the frequency and intensity of this reaction cycle increase, critical decisions taken by any one of these governments could cascade into the second great wave of nuclear-weapon proliferation, bringing regional and global economic and political instability and, perhaps, the first combat use of a nuclear weapon since 1945
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Hegemony Necessary to Stop Taiwan War
A. American hegemony is near the brink any further decreases would cause China escalate military games and invade Taiwan. The US would get involved to maintain economic and strategic interests. PINR, 2004 (July 28, Erich Marquardt, Beijing Tests Washingtons Resolve in East Asia,
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=189&language_id=1)
Additionally, the failure of Washington to successfully pacify Iraq has demonstrated the limits of American power. While
Washington retains a tremendous military advantage over other states in the world, that advantage is primarily technological, and only extends to the point of when an occupation of a foreign country becomes necessary The perceived erosion of American power has led to a loss of U.S. power since other states potentially hostile to U.S. interests now believe that Washington will be less likely to directly challenge them. This belief is evident in China's recent posturing over Taiwan, where Beijing is challenging American resolve in East Asia by intensifying its threats toward Taipei. Taiwan, which China considers a renegade province, may become the location where China will conduct a test of U.S. resolve. Beijing has continued to direct some 500 short-range missiles toward the island. One objective of this missile deployment is to increase Beijing's chances of executing a successful "decapitation strike" where, in one opening salvo, China would be able to neuter Taipei's military and political structure, effectively forcing the island to comply with China's demands of reunificationTo highlight its seriousness, China last week conducted its eighth annual military exercises in the Taiwan Strait on an island only 174 miles from Taiwanese territory. The exercises consisted of some 18,000 Chinese troops, involving land, air and sea maneuvers. Beijing quite bluntly announced that the purpose of the exercises was to simulate an invasion of Taiwan. Even more candidly, Jiang Zemin, the chief of the Communist Party's Central Military Commission, promised that China would recover Taiwan by 2020, through the use of force if necessary.
Beijing's recent posturing reflects Taipei's continued flirts with independence. Chen Shui-bian, the Taiwanese president who was recently reelected, held as his central campaign theme the importance of an independent Taiwan. Chen also announced that he would be revising the Taiwanese constitution, a move that could attempt to institutionalize Taiwan as a sovereign state, permanently separated from the mainland.
Chen's reelection and subsequent controversial actions explain why Beijing is flaunting its military might; the one issue it does not seem capable of negotiating on is the status of Taiwan. Furthermore, in light of the U.S. being overburdened in the Middle East, China now considers it the ideal time to test Washington's resolve in the region . Certainly, the U.S. still retains the military
ability to engage Chinese forces should they attempt to invade Taiwan; nevertheless, the fact that U.S. forces are so embroiled in other areas of the world means that any such engagement would be risky for the United States, and therefore less likely to occurBeijing no doubt recognizes this and is now testing to see how far Washington will go to protect the
small Taiwanese island from invasion by a state as large and potentially powerful as China. Since China is becoming such a force to contend with in the region, it seems a natural development that Taiwan will soon be engulfed by the mainland; it is not clear how beneficial it
would be for the United States to risk a military engagement to impede such efforts. If Taiwan continues to flirt with independence, it is uncertain how long China will continue to refrain from taking serious action against the island. The best outcome for Beijing would be if Taiwan were to retreat from its talk of independence and continue to increase its economic
relations with China; China already purchases 40 percent of Taiwan's exports. Under this scenario, as time proceeds, it would become easier for China and Taiwan to reunite peacefully. Yet, even if this failed, in future years, the leaders of Beijing recognize that they would
have a better military capability to forcefully take Taiwan, which would demonstrate to the greater world that China was finally strong enough to assert itself as a major power in East Asia. For example, the Pentagon asserts that China is now spending between $50 and $70 billion a year on its military budget. While Beijing declares that its military spending is significantly lower, standing at $25 billion, it still admits that it increased its military budget 11.6 percent from 2003 to 2004. Furthermore, the money is being spent on more modern weapons, much of them being purchased from RussiaWhile Beijing would hope that a confrontation with Taipei would not occur until it had further advanced its military and economic might, it is preparing for such a confrontation now, should the need to invade Taiwan ariseThe invasion of Taiwan would have important
. Similar to how the United States effectively prevented European powers from exploiting the markets in the Americas by establishing the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, China will follow its own doctrine to prevent the United States from exploiting markets in East Asia.
implications for the rest of the region. Most importantly, it would show that China was beginning its attempts to supplant U.S. influence in East Asia with its own
It will be important for the United States, which benefits tremendously -strategically and economically -- from its immense influence in East Asia, to prevent China from gaining hegemony over the area. In order to stunt this possibility, Washington will need to devise methods and strategies to meet increased Chinese regional influence.
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Hegemony Necessary to Stop Taiwan War
B. War over Taiwan goes nuclear ending all civilization STRAITS TIMES, 2000 (The Straits Times (Singapore), No one gains in war over Taiwan, June 25, 2000, L/N)
THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China . If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable.
Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army
which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While
the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else. Gen Ridgeway recalled that the biggest mistake the US made during the Korean War was to
assess Chinese actions according to the American way of thinking. "Just when everyone believed that no sensible commander would march south of the Yalu, the Chinese troops suddenly appeared," he recalled. (The Yalu is the river which borders China and North Korea, and the crossing of the river marked China's entry into the war against the Americans). "I feel uneasy if now somebody were to tell me that they bet China would not do this or that," he said in a recent interview given to the Chinese press.
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Hegemony Stops Japanese Rearmament
US withdrawal from East Asia leads to Japan militarization LIEBER Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University 2005
[Robert J., The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century, p. 167]
An American withdrawal from East Asia could very well result in a Japanese decision to build a more robust conventional military capacity and to acquire nuclear weapons - a contingency that Chinese leaders implicitly acknowledge and that has muted their calls for U.S. disengagement. The potential for a Japanese decision to go nuclear is not just theoretical. The country operates a fast-breeder nuclear reactor as part of its civilian nuclear program for producing electricity. Japanese authorities describe the fast breeder program as merely a component of their comprehensive nuclear fuel cycle, but there is another implication. The fast-breeder reactor itself is costly and difficult to maintain and is of dubious economic value 27 However, the plutonium the reactor produces is not only available as fuel for nuclear reactors, but also has the potential to be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Moreover, there is an additional source of fissile material in the stock-piles of plutonium that have been reprocessed in Britain and France from Japan's used civilian nuclear reactor fuel and then returned to Japan.
Japanese Rearm collapses Japans economy KEDDEL, 1993 (Joseph P., Specialist in Japanese Politics, Faculty of Law at Tokyo University and Tohoku University,
Ph.D in Political Science, iThe Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures, page 165)
Japan's increased economic and technological strength raises the question of whether it will become a military power. The problem, however, is that this would require a decision that would upset the domestic political order and disrupt the existing international order. Domestic political consensus in the postwar era has been based on limited rearmament and economic development through dependence on the U.S. guarantee of external security. Rejecting this relationship of security dependence would force the Japanese to confront the divisive foreign policy and defense issues that they have so far avoided. A decision to become a military power would increase tensions with neighboring countries, as well as with the United States, possibly resulting in reduced access to the U.S. market, on which Japan depends heavily for its exports.
A new Japanese recession crushes the global economy THE NEW REPUBLIC, March 5th, 2001, (http://www.tnr.com)
You probably haven't heard much about the Japanese economy lately. But you probably will soon. Although Japanese officials boasted as recently as January that they had finally weathered a decade-long slump, they have proved severely mistaken. During the third quarter of last year, Japan's gross domestic product fell 0.6 percent. That means Japan might be heading back into recession. With stock prices falling and Japanese banks, which own many of these stocks, holding massive bad loans, the recession could evolve into something much worse, pulling much of Asia and the United States down with it. The global economy in general, and East Asia's economy in particular, relies on a viable Japan. Export-dependent economies like Malaysia's, Indonesia's, and Thailand's need Japanese consumers to buy their goods. Japan absorbs about one-fifth of Indonesia's exports and one-seventh of Thailand's, and last year exports from East Asia to Japan increased 22 percent, which helped those countries begin growing again after the calamity that began in 1997. A sudden drop in export earnings could push them back into crisis. East Asian countries also compete with Japan for export markets in Europe and the United States. If a weak Japanese economy sends the yen plummeting against the dollar, these countries, whose currencies are pegged to the dollar, will take a serious economic hit. The United States, meanwhile, continues to maintain a bizarre economic relationship with Japan: The U.S. buys far more from Japan than Japan buys from the U.S. At the same time, the U.S. depends heavily on Japan's export of capital--through direct investment and the purchase of U.S. Treasury bonds-- to finance its trade deficit. As of November 30, the U.S. owed the Japanese $340 billion. If Japan's investments in the U.S. slow as a result of its weakening economy, that could pressure the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates in order to attract foreign capital--confounding its efforts to keep rates low to avoid recession at home.
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Hegemony Protects Middle Eastern Stabilit
A) American Leadership is key to preventing future conflict in the Middle East CHRISTOPHER, 2004 (December 30, Warren, New York Times staff writer,
http://select.nytimes.com/search/restricted/article?res=FB0B14F93C5D0C738FDDAB0994DC404482)
America has always been the indispensable party for progress in the Middle East . The brilliant efforts of Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger in 1974 and 1975 brought about Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai and the peninsula's return to Egypt. President Jimmy Carter's legendary endeavors at Camp David in 1978 produced the Israel-Egypt peace treaty, which was supported by American financial assistance to both countries. That aid continues to yield returns today . And when Israel and Jordan negotiated a peace accord in July 1994, King Hussein, the present King's father, told me that the negotiations could not have succeeded without tangible support from the United States, which was forthcoming in the form of debt forgiveness and military equipment. But meaningful American involvement at this critical
time will require more than words and dollars -- it must take the form of action. It will not be enough for President Bush to make broad policy statements, however eloquent. It will also require something beyond telephone diplomacy by Secretary of State-designate Condoleezza Rice. Reliance on these hands-off methods promises a continuation of the past four years' failures.
B) Middle East instability causes nuclear escalation EVRON, 1994 (Yair, Professor of International Relations at Tel Aviv University, Israels Nuclear Dilemma, p. 123-124)
The potential risks involved in the functioning of the superpowers C3 may recur in the Middle East and, in some cases, with apparently greater intensity. The probability of erroneous decisions is therefore higher. These factors center on technical failures of warning systems, or the combination of technical failure and human error, deriving from misperception of the enemys behavior. There also exist processes of escalation that are totally distinct from technical failure, and which derive exclusively from human error. The latter case is most often the function of the erroneous interpretation of various enemy actions. These factors are liable to yield disastrous outcomes. The outcomes can be divided into two major categories of events: misperception of an enemy action that is mistakenly understood as a conventional or nuclear attack on the states nuclear bases or on the state in its entirety. Such a misperception could cause a rapid escalation. The second category comprises the escalation
from a conventional war to the use of nuclear weapons. The persistence of intense conflicts in the Middle East will of course contribute to the potential danger of misperceptions . Hence, for example, if the Arab-Israeli peace process fails to
advance and in particular were the situation to return to the level of conflict that preceded the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement, the intensity of the conflict could reinforce the potential for errors of perception among decision-makers. A high level of conflict tends to promote the tendency of decision-makers to view the other sides actions with great concern.
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Hegemony Sustains Balkan Stability
A) US hegemony is key to stability in the Balkans power now checks extremists BARDOS, 2006 (Assistant director of the Harriman Institute at Columbia University's School of International and Public
Affairs. He also serves as a Balkans analyst for Freedom House.Gordon N., Balkan Gains in Peril, Editorial; B07, Final Edition, The Washington Post, June 25, 2006, lexis.)
All of this suggests how easy it would be, absent strong U.S. leadership, for events to spin out of control and erase 10 years of efforts to stabilize the region. In such an unstable political climate, statements by U.S. policymakers about their eagerness to pull U.S. troops out of the Balkans and turn the job over to the Europeans only embolden extremists. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia are all gearing up for elections, and moderate political forces in these countries need U.S. support now to convince their electorates that the difficult choices being made to adopt economic and political reforms will pay off in the near future, not two or three electoral cycles down the line. The assassination of former Serbian prime minister Zoran Djindjic in March 2003 is a tragic reminder of the great personal risks reformers throughout southeastern Europe are taking. They need and deserve U.S. understanding and support. By visiting Baghdad this month, President Bush sent a strong personal message to Iraqis that the United States intends to support their country until its transition to democracy is completed. The administration should send a similar message to both extremists and moderates in the Balkans that the United States will actively lead the effort to integrate all the countries of southeastern Europe into both NATO and the European Union -- and that it won't pull out until the job is done.
B) Balkans instability leads to WWIII PARIS, 2002 (Roland, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at University of Colorado, Political
Science Quarterly, Kosovo and the metaphor war, Volume 117, Issue 3, Fall, Proquest)
At this early stage in the Kosovo crisis, Clinton's language was still somewhat coded and suggestive; in the months to come, he would spell out the implications of his historical allusions with much greater clarity. Nevertheless, the phrase "powderkeg in the Balkans" would have
carried historical significance for listeners who possessed even a casual knowledge of European history. Since the early part of the twentieth century, when instability in the Balkans drew in the great powers and provided the spark that ignited World War I, the region has been widely known as a powderkeg. In 1947, for instance, members of the
International Court of Justice noted that the Balkans had been "so often described as the `powder-keg' of Europe."51 Today, the term continues to be attached to the region's politics, conjuring up memories of the origins of World War I.52 The meaning of the powderkeg metaphor is straightforward: the Balkans can explode at any time, and the resulting conflagration can spread to the rest of Europe; preventing such an explosion is vital to the continent's, and perhaps even to American, security. When
Clinton described Kosovo as a powderkeg, he warned that the Kosovo conflict might spill over not only to surrounding Balkan states, but to Europe as a whole; and he insinuated that the United States could be compelled to fight in such a pan-European conflict, just as it did in World Wars I and II. "As we approach the next century,"
he stated on 12 October, during a discussion of the Kosovo situation, "we must never forget one of the most indelible lessons of this one we're about to leavethat America has a direct stake in keeping the peace in Europe before isolated acts of violence turn into large-scale wars."53 Translation: if you want to make sure American boys will not have to fight another world war, then support me in my efforts to extinguish the smoldering fire in the Balkan powderkeg, before it is too late.
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Hegemony Stops Indo-Paki Wars
US presence is key to India-Pakistan peace KHALILZAD AND LESSER,1998 (Zalmay and Ian, Ambassador to Afghanistan and Sr. analyst at RAND, Sources of
Conflict in the 21st Century, page 161)
The fifth driver is Indian, Pakistani, and Chinese perceptions of the role of extraregional powers in any future conflict. Although extraregional powers such as the United States will remain critical and influential actors in South Asia, the nature of their presence and the way their influence is exercised will remain important factors for stability in South Asia. The United States , in particular,
contributes to stability insofar as it can creatively use both its regional policy and its antiproliferation strategies to influence the forms of security competition on the subcontinent , the shape and evolution of Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs, and the general patterns of political interaction between India and Pakistan. The
nominally extraregional power, China, also plays a critical role here both because of its presumed competition with India and because Beijing has evolved into a vital supplier of conventional and nuclear technologies to Pakistan.
US influence forces negotiation and checks South Asian crisis escalation KHAN, 2003 (Feroz Hassan, Brigadier General and Former Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs in the
Strategic Plans Division of the Joint Services Headquarters in Pakistan, Arms Control Today, The Independence-Dependence Paradox: Stability Dilemmas in South Asia, Volume 33, Issue 8, October,)
In fact, it could be argued that the deterrence equation in South Asia now implicitly depends on U.S. intervention . In essence,
India's and Pakistan's nuclear policies involve what might be called the "independence-dependence paradox." These two proud countries have attempted to wean themselves from outside support by using nuclear weapons. But this strategy has ironically served to make them more dependent on other powers who are forced to mitigate the consequences of this arms race. No other country has played a more crucial role than the United States .
In many ways, this paradox does more to explain the difficulty in constraining conflicts that threaten to involve the two countries' nuclear arsenals than the much ballyhooed "stability-instability" paradox. That term originated during the Cold War when analysts such as Glenn Snyder and Robert Jervis sought to explain why, in the first nuclear age, the superpowers managed to avoid conventional armed conflicts that could have precipitated into nuclear exchange, instead using proxy wars to gain advantage over the other.1 In recent years, many theorists have sought to apply the Cold War term to the standoff between India and Pakistan.2 But that has only highlighted the crucial differences between the Cold War and the new, complex realities in South Asia. In the case of India and Pakistan, nuclear weapons are entangled with bitter regional disputes, exacerbating the instability half of the original stabilityinstability paradox. Yet, the other half-stability-is still evolving and has yet to mature.3 Because the issues concerned are critical to India's
and Pakistan's core national identities, the two states have exercised force and coerced each other several times, pushing crises to the brink. De-escalation has, more often than not, required successful, outside (read, U.S.) intervention. Having achieved requisite nuclear deterrence, neither side is prepared to concede to the other, each testing the vulnerability of the other in a game of "chicken." This brinkmanship strategy has placed the region into a delicate balance whose repeated crises have only made it more dependent on the United States.
Causes extinction major powers get drawn in CALDICOTT, 2002 (Helen, Founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility and Nominee for the Nobel Peace Prize, The
New Nuclear Danger: George W. Bushs Military-Industrial Complex, p. xiii)
The use of Pakistani nuclear weapons could trigger a chain reaction . Nuclear-armed India, an ancient enemy could respond in kind. China, Indias hated foe, could react if India used her nuclear weapons, triggering a nuclear holocaust on the subcontinent. If any of either Russia or Americas 2,250 strategic weapons on hairtrigger alert were launched either accidentally or purposefully in response, nuclear winter would ensue, meaning the end of most life on earth.
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A2: Decreased Hegemony Solves Proliferation (1/1)
US forces check nuclear proliferation in Asia and the EU MANDELBAUM Professor and Director of the American Foreign Policy Program at Johns Hopkins 2005
[Michael, The Case for Goliath: How America Acts As the Worlds Government in the Twenty-First Century, p. 39-41]
American forces remained in Europe and East Asia because the countries located in these two regions wanted them there, even if they did not always say so clearly or even explicitly. They wanted them there because the American presence offered the assurance that these regions would remain free of war and, in the case of Europe, free of the costly preparations for war that had marked the twentieth century. The American military presence was in both
cases a confidence-building measure, and if that presence were with-drawn, the countries in both regions would feel less confident that no threat to their security would appear. They would, in all likelihood, take steps to compensate for the absence of these forces. Those steps would surely not include war, at least not in the first instance. Instead, since the
American forces serve as a hedge against uncertainty, some of the countries of East Asia and Europe might well seek to replace them with another source of hedging. A leading candidate for that role would be nuclear weapons of their own.9 The possession of nuclear
weapons equips their owner with a certain leverage, a geopolitical weight that, unless somehow counterbalanced, can confer a political advantage in dealing with countries lacking them. Like the relationship between employer and employee, the one between a nuclear-weapon state and a non-nuclear-weapon state has inequality built into it, no matter how friendly that relationship may be. During the Cold War, the American military presence, and
the guarantee of protection by the mighty nuclear arsenal of the United States that came with it, neutralized the nuclear weapons that the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China accumulated. Russia and China retain nuclear stock-piles in the wake of the Cold War, and with the end of the American military presence in their regions, several of their non-nuclear neighborsGermany, Poland, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, for examplemight feel the need to offset those stockpiles with nuclear forces of their own. Perhaps the process of replacing American nuclear armaments with those of other countries, if this should take place, would occur smoothly, with Europe and East Asia remaining peaceful throughout the transition. But this is not what most of the world believes. To the contrary, the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already have them is widely considered to be
the single greatest threat to international tranquillity in the twenty-first century. The United States has made the prevention of nuclear proliferation one of its most important foreign policies , and its efforts to this end constitute, like
reassurance, a service to the other members of the international system.
The US solves proliferation Proliferation spreads quickly neighboring countries need protection MANDELBAUM Professor and Director of the American Foreign Policy Program at Johns Hopkins 2005
[Michael, The Case for Goliath: How America Acts As the Worlds Government in the Twenty-First Century, p. 45]
Some nuclear-weapon-free countries, however, have neighbors that already possess nuclear armaments and so would seem, whatever their reservations about these armaments, to have strong incentives to counterbalance the neigh-boring arsenals with nuclear weapons of their own , yet continue to eschew them. They have felt comfortable in these circumstances because the United States has provided them with a nuclear guarantee. By extending its umbrella of nuclear deterrence over their territories, it has , in effect, enlisted its own formidable nuclear arsenal in their defense.
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A2: Decreased Hegemony Solves Terrorism
A decline in primacy does not solve terrorism LIEBER Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University 2005
[Robert J., The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century, p. 29]
Realist views tend to rest on certain general assumptions about the nature of world politics, for example, that states with the capacity to use WMD or who make these weapons available to terrorists can be reliably deterred. And in the case of Iraq, realists believed Saddam Hussein could have been dissuaded from attacking his neighbors and that even if he eventually acquired nuclear weapons, he could have been deterred by the overwhelming power of the United States.37 Some in this group, in comparing the United States with other dominant powers of the past, invoke the
examples of great empires that came to grief through imperial overreach or through causing other powerful states to form coalitions against them.38 And because of the emphasis on system-level explanations, some realists downplay the traits of especially violent and fanatical individual leaders or groups. However, as Richard Betts notes, although American primacy is one of the causes of the terror war "There is no reason to assume that terrorist enemies would let America off the hook if it retreated."39
Decline in hegemony wont solve terrorism it only decreases the ability to kill terrorists quickly BROOKS AND WOHLFORTH, 2002 (Stephen, Assistant Professor, and William, Associate Professor in the Department
of Government at Dartmouth, Foreign Affairs, American Primacy in Perspective, Volume 81, Issue 4, L/N)
Some might question the worth of being at the top of a unipolar system if that means serving as a lightning rod for the world's malcontents. When there was a Soviet Union, after all, it bore the brunt of Osama bin Laden's anger, and only after its collapse did he shift his focus to the United States (an indicator of the demise of bipolarity that was ignored at the time but looms larger in retrospect). But terrorism has been a perennial problem in history, and multipolarity did not save the leaders of several great powers from assassination by anarchists around the turn of the twentieth century. In fact, a slide back toward multipolarity would actually be the worst of all worlds for the United States. In such a scenario it would continue to lead the pack and serve as a focal point for resentment and hatred by both state and nonstate actors, but it would have fewer carrots and sticks to use in dealing with the situation. The threats would remain, but the possibility of effective and coordinated action against them would be reduced.
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A2: Can't Deter Everyone
Even if the U.S. can't deter everyone, it still has a massive deterrent power. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007
["The Case For The American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 19]
Nevertheless, the military prowess of the United States does not mean that states or terrorist groups will not attack
it. Perfect deterrence of all attacks is not possiblethe United States may still be attacked at home or abroad and will always be vulnerable to some type of attack. The military and intelligence community are, and must always remain, vigilant because, although they succeed in protecting Americans the vast majority of the time, they are judged by failures like Pearl Harbor or 9/11. Moreover, although it is rare, history shows that weaker states do attack stronger ones, as Japan did in 1941, or as Egypt and Syria did when they attacked Israel in 1973. But if a country were foolish enough to attack the United States, it is very likely to be defeated soundly and absolutely defeated and this fact helps maintain the massive deterrent power of the United States .
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Counter-Balancing A2: China
China won't challenge the U.S. economic and political reasons. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007
["The Case For The American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 3233]
The Threat from China: Significant, but Reduced by the Dragons Demographics China is a major country undergoing a dramatic modernization process. It is where the United States was a hundred years ago or where most major European countries were one hundred and fifty years ago. Periods of modernization result in great economic growth as economies move from agrarian to an industrial or postindustrial information economy. Its economic growth rates are very impressivean 8 percent real increase in GDP in 2000, 7.3 percent in 2001, 8 percent in 2002, and 9.1 percent in 2003.42 So the trend of economic growth is clear and certainly will continue for the next few years, before falling off as economic efficiencies and returns on trade decline. Eventually, China will have economic growth rates of 1 percent, 2 percent, or 3 percent per year, which is typical for developed countries. Nevertheless, as a result of its rapid growth, China will be in a position to threaten the dominant role of the United States in world politics. According to the National Intelligence Council, China is projected to have about a $4.3 trillion GDP in 2016. That is equivalent to the 2003 GDP of Japan. About 2042, China is expected to have the GDP (about $10.9 trillion) that the United States possessed in 2003.
Although its continued economic growth is impressive, China faces major problems that will hinder its ability to replace the United States as the worlds hegemon. The first of these is a rapidly aging population beginning in 2020. Nearly 400 million Chinese will be over sixty-five years old by 2020. This could be a source of unrest and economic stagnation. Younger generations will be pressed to care for the older population. There will be a great discrepancy between the numbers of young people and the elderly, and China lacks the pension and health care infrastructure characteristic of Western societies. Many Chinese will have to work far into old age and will not be able to care for themselves should they fall sick or be too old to earn a wage. As we see with Japan, economic productivity will peak. This situation is the direct result of the one child policy adopted in 1979 to halt explosive population growth. When China took its first
countrywide census in 1953, its population was 600 million. By 1970, it was approximately 800 million. As a result of the one child policy, the Chinese birthrate has fallen from 5.8 children per woman in 1970 to fewer than 2 per woman in 2000. The one child policy is believed to have resulted in 300 million fewer Chinese.
A second big problem stemming from the one child policy is the imbalance between the sexes. For social and economic reasons, if only one child is permitted, most Chinese parents will choose a son. This has led to widespread abortion, female infanticide, and female adoption out of China. Simply put, there are too few females in China. The normal worldwide divergence between the number of boys to girls is about 103 males to 107 females. In China, about [end page
32] 119 boys are born for every 100 girls. In rural areas, where the preference for sons is the strongest, the imbalance is even greater, about 133 to 100. There are an estimated 40 million more men than women in Chinas population .
The declining birth rates that flow from this will hinder economic growth in the long run. China eventually will face other major economic and social problems as well, including those related to the economic fragility of its financial system and state-owned enterprises, economic malaise brought on by widespread corruption, ubiquitous environmental pollution, HIV/AIDS and other epidemic diseases like SARS, and the high energy costs, which stifle economic growth. In addition, unlike the United States, China is not a model for other countries. Chinese political values are inferior to those of the United States because China is repressive. The Chinese do not respect human rights, including religious and political freedom . There is also the wildcard of potential conflict over Taiwan. A war with Taiwan would retard Chinas economic progress and scare neighboring states. The fact that China has so many territorial and other disputes with its major neighbors, Japan, India, Russia, and Vietnam, means that many countries see it as a threat and will want to ally with the United States against Chinese power. The rise of China is ripe for potential conflict with its neighbors, and this constitutes a big danger in international politics .
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Counterbalancing A2: European Union
The EU won't challenge the U.S. political similarities. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007 ["The Case For The American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN
0415952034, p. 3/ ]
Yet unlike China, the EU simply does not pose a great danger to the American Empire for two major reasons
political and socioeconomic. The political similarities between the EU and the United States are enormous. In essence, the political values of EU are largely those of the United States. This is not a surprise, in many respects; the United States is the daughter of Europe, and that may be excellent news for future warm relations between them. In addition, if the clash of civilizations argument made famous by Samuel Huntington is correct (that is, that future major conflicts will be between civilizations), then as other civilizations become more powerfulsuch as the Chinese or Islamic Europe and the United States will be united again by the threat from those civilizations .46 They were united during the Cold War by the threat from the Soviet Union, and history teaches that an external threat can produce comity where once there was rivalry.
Economic concerns preclude the rise of the EU to challenge the U.S. this evidence isolates several reasons. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007
["The Case For The American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 3439]
In addition to the political reasons, there are three major socioeconomic reasons why the EU will not be able to challenge the United States. These are (1) the costs of expansion; (2) the different approach to work and the related costs of generous social welfare programs in the EU; and (3) the aging EU workforce and the risks of Muslim immigration to the EUs identity. The first factor retarding economic growth is the costs involved in the further expansion of the European Union. Expansion is hindered by the fact that Brussels has only a fraction of the structural funds (aid to regions or countries where GDP per capita is below 75 percent EU average, such as Portugal, Greece, Spain, and the former East Germany) needed to bring new members up to the standard of living found in the rest of the EU. Additionally, new members will receive no cohesion funds, which are given to build a countrys infrastructure. The simple fact is that there is too little money for too many new members (already about 35 percent of the EU budget goes to the structural and
cohesion funds). This situation stands in stark contrast to the 1970s and early 1980s when Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Greece joined. At that time, the number of rich members and the small number of new members meant that the funds were well focused. That is not true today. As a result, the EU will be
tiered: wealthier old members will continue to receive generous structural and cohesion funds, while new members occupy a second, poorer tier. The Common Agricultural Policy also hinders economic growth in the European Union. Almost half (about 45 percent) of the EUs budget is spent on agriculture mostly payments to farmers. The EU
provides about $120 billion [end page 34] in agricultural subsidies. In contrast, the U.S. government provides about $40 billion annually in agricultural subsidies. Each cow in the United States gets about $120 a year in federal subsidies. Each European cow gets $600 per year from the EU.47 These
subsidies are an enormous drain on the EU economy but are perpetuated because EU members do not want to lose them. The second economic reason is that EU is based on a different socioeconomic model than the United States. The American economy is as close as it gets to raw capitalism. You have to work to feed, house, and clothe yourself in America. The social safety net
does have large gaps in comparison to Europe, and there is great disparity in wealtha smaller number of people have control over more of the wealth of the country than in Europe. America is a great place to be rich. It is in Europe as well, but less so due to high taxes and greater income equality. The ratio between what the top tier of American CEOs earn and what the average manufacturing employee earns is 475:1. In Europe, the ratio is 24:1 in Britain, 15:1 in France, and 13:1 in Sweden. On the other hand, the American economy is fluid, so the guy who invents the better mousetrap is able to market it and make a million. There is relatively little government intervention in the economy, and capitalism is warmly embraced. America is the epitome of free market capitalism.
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Counterbalancing A2: European Union
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The European economy does not work that way. In contrast to America, there is much more government intervention in the economylaws that govern business practices and protect workers and the environmentand there is great ambivalence toward capitalism. Europeans prefer a closer distribution of wealth so that there is not an enormous gap between the richest and the poorest. In the United States, about 20 percent of adults are living in poverty, while the numbers are about 7.5 percent for France, 7.6 percent for Germany, 6.5 percent for Italy, and 14.6 percent for Britain. Europeans strongly prefer a social safety net. A system of cradle-to-grave welfare programs exists to help Europeans receive an education and to shelter people from the storms of life, even if they are tempests that affect health, housing, or employment. European unemployment rates are consistently higher than those in the United States because the costs of being unemployed are much lower due to the social safety net than in the United States, where modest unemployment benefits Soon are exhausted.
Americans also work much harder than Europeans . In 2003, Americans worked an average of 1,976 hours. German and French workers
averaged about 400 fewer hours per year. One American in three works more than 50 hours a week. It is the rare European who matches those hours. Vacations are generous for Europeans, about 5 weeks, as are holidays. Employees have 23 paid holidays in Britain, 25 in France, and Sweden has 30. In the United States, depending in which state you reside, you get 4 to 10 holidays.48 In sum, Americans work much harder than Europeans. [end page 35] But social welfare is expensive. It requires high taxes to support generous government spending. This, in turn,
hinders economic growth. So, too, does maintaining tight income equality. If you tell someone that he will be able to earn only a certain amount, and no more than that, he does not have an incentive to work hard (although he does have an incentive to move to America, where he can become rich). Slow economic growth and high unemployment is known as Eurosclerosis, and the disease shows no signs of being cured anytime soon. The lack of economic growth results in a lack of funds for research and development in comparison to the United States. And so, the problem feeds upon itself . The third reason for the EUs inability to challenge the United States is that the EU states suffer from an aging and changing workforce, and both elements have the potential to hobble its already slow economic growth. The major European economies of Britain, France, Germany, and Italy will need several million new workers over the next fifteen years to fill positions vacated by retiring ones. Presently, those workers do not exist because fewer European women are having children, and this baby bust ultimately will make it impossible to sustain the generous welfare benefits provided by European governments . In fact, declining European birthrates are affecting Europe as profoundly as any event in the past, even the Black Death of the 1300s or the World Wars. Simply put, Europeans are not replacing themselves . Europes total fertility rate is
about 1.4, far below the 2.1 births per female necessary to sustain a population (what demographers call the replacement level). In fact, no Western European country has a replacement-level birthrate. In 2004, Germanys birthrate was 1.3, Italys 1.2, Spains 1.1, and Frances 1.7 (and Frances high birthrate was largely due to its Muslim population).49 The difference between replacement-level birthrates and those of Germany, or Italy, or Spain is the difference between a stable population size and one that decreases by one-third with each generation. Nothing like this has occurred in Europe absent wars or plagues. It is truly without parallel in history. Consequently, present welfare benefits are unsustainable given the population growth estimates for European states. In Europe, there are now thirty-five people of retirement age for every one hundred of working age andbased on current trendsthere will be seventy five pensioners for every one hundred workersby 2050. As Table 1.6 shows, the United Nations estimates that by 2015, Europes population will decline by more than 11.3 million, and if Europes current fertility rate persists until 2020, this will result in 88 million fewer Europeans by the end of the century.5 Ethnic Europeans are dying out. There are two major solutions to this problem, but they are unlikely to be realized. The first is to generate greater economic growth. Of course, this is easier said than done . Germany, the largest economy, has restrictive labor laws that are difficult to change. Another boost to economic growth would be to [end page 36] reform their social welfare, education, and tax systems to encourage people to work longer hours and retire later. But, at this time, there is no indication that Europe will take these steps. Desire for change is not coming from the bottom upthe people are not demanding change in
governmental polities because such a change would require sacrifice by present workers, pensioners, and other benefit recipients. Similarly, it is not coming from the top down governments or Brussels imposing change because this would require that leaders break their promises of protection to their populations . Second, Europe could permit more legal immigration to provide workers, who then may be taxed to maintain welfare payments to Europes aging population. However, most of the immigrants are likely to be Muslims coming from North Africa and the Middle East. Europe has had difficulty assimilating the Muslims it has already allowed into Europe ,
principally as workers beginning the 1960s, with a second wave coming in the 1980s as economic and political conditions deteriorated in North Africa. There are some 1 million Muslims in the Netherlands, 6 million in France, and about 13 million in the EU as a whole.
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Counterbalancing A2: European Union
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The different political and cultural practices of Muslim immigrants, whether they are old or new, are a quandary for Europe. The murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in November 2004 by a Muslim fundamentalist, [end page 37] who nonetheless had lived in
the Netherlands for most of his life, was a great shock to Europe. In the Netherlands alone there have been constant threats by fundamentalists against other politicians like Geert Wilders, Amsterdam mayor Job Cohen, and Ayaan Hirsi Alla Somali-born member of parliament who collaborated with van Gogh on a film about Islams treatment of women. Indeed, a December 2004 report by the Dutch domestic intelligence service concluded that many thousands of Muslim youths in the Netherlands are already radicalized, and thus the pool of recruits for terrorist actions is so large that many future attacks may be expected.52 In October and November 2005, the widespread riots that plagued France in what has been called lintafada by some or the beginning of the Eurabian civil war by others was conducted mostly by sons and grandsons of Muslim immigrants. The French were wholly unprepared for the scale and potency of the unrest and this caused them to fear a Muslim fifth column in Europe. These threats and acts of violence point to the difficulty of matching the goals of European governments with the political realities of a young, Muslim population. Indeed, there are many Islamist movements operating and growing in Europe, including al Qaeda and Al-Takfir wa al-Hijra (excommunication and exile), a brutal terrorist organization active throughout Europe that is every bit as dangerous as al Qaeda.53 Consequently, there is a tension between sustaining European political and cultural values and economic growth
based on a Muslim workforce that is becoming more conscious of the political goals of Islamic fundamentalism. As their numbers grow, so will the political power of Muslims in Europe . In a December 2004 report, the National Intelligence
Council found that about fifteen out of one hundred Europeans are Muslims, and by 2020 it estimates that as many as thirty-five out of one hundred may be Muslim, or as few as twenty-three out of one hundred.54 In either case, whether Muslims are one-third or one-quarter of the population or somewhere in between, it would mean a fundamental change in European society. If these trends do not change, Europe will have a Muslim majority population by the end of the twenty-first century.
Even if the EU solves its economic and immigration problems, it remains hindered by its cumbersome decisionmaking process that retards united and collective action. There are strong tensions between centralized decision making in Brussels and the respective capitals of the member states Berlin, London, Madrid, Paris, or Rome. The interests of individual countries often do not overlap with Brusselss interests, and this is a major source of friction. Too much centralized decision making leads to a democracy gap in the EUthe key decision-making bodies in the EU are not directly elected by European citizens . In 2005, the overwhelming votes against the proposed EU Constitution in France and the Netherlands are indications of a major disconnect between Brussels and the European people. Increasingly, Europeans do not want to be told what to do by Brussels; Poland did not escape the grip of Moscows leaders [end page 38] to have it replaced by those in Brussels. But too little central control leads to disorganization, repetition of efforts, and policy confusion . Thus, for the EU to sustain positive growth ratesthe numbers that would allow it to have an economy that could challenge the United Statesit must steer between the Scylla of major economic, policy, and decisionmaking reforms and the Charybdis of Muslim immigration. Thus far, there is no evidence that the EU can conduct such a feat of navigation.
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Hegemony Causes Bandwagoning, Not Counterbalancing
Hegemony prompts bandwagoning history is on our side. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2006
[In Defense of Primacy, National Interest, Issue 86, November/December]
A remarkable fact about international politics today--in a world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display--is that countries want to align themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes--their own protection, or to gain greater influence. Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America--their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements--and they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies. U.S. primacy--and the bandwagoning effect--has also given us extensive influence in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation. You can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and actions of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates.
The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba--it is an anti-U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations.
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Isolationism Bad: Terrorism
U.S. ISOLATIONISM WILL TRIGGER TERRORISM
Thomas Donnelly, American Enterprise Institute, THE MILITARY WE NEED, 2005,
http://www.aei.org/books/filter.all,bookID.819/book_detail.asp
The danger is that, despite what is actually a remarkably success-ful series of counterinsurgency campaigns since the September 11 attacks, the United States will suffer from fatigue and withdraw from the region in the hope of a new stability. Such stability, how-ever, would be illusory and, at best, temporary; the enemy, which has been under constant pressure, will use any respite to rearm, reorganize, and plot new attacks. The status quo regimes will believe, as they want to believe (and history has given them good reason to believe), that the United States has again lost interest in the region. Our allies, including those in the region who yearn for a better, freer life, will draw similar conclusions.
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Off-Shore Balancing Bad Frontline (1/3)
Primacy is comparatively superior to off-shore balancingLayne's grand strategy would prompt global conflict. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007
["Reply to Christopher Layne: The Strength of the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 116-117]
Primacy Is the Right Grand Strategy for the United States There is no viable alternative grand strategy for the United States than primacy. Primacy is the best and most effective means to maintain the security and safety of the United States for the reasons I argued in chapter 1. However, it is also the best because every other grand strategic alternative is a chimera and can only weaken the United States, threaten the security and safety of the American people, and introduce great peril for the United States and for other countries. A large part of what makes primacy such a success is that other countries know where the United States stands, what it will defend, and that it will be involved in disputes, both great and small. Accordingly, other countries have to respect the interests of the United States or face the consequences. Offshore balancing incurs the risks of primacy without its benefits. It pledges that the United States will defend its interests with air power and sea power, but not land power. That is curious because we could defend our interests with land power but choose not to, suggesting our threat to defend is not serious, which weakens our credibility and invites challenges to the interests of the United [end page 116] States. Offshore balancing increases the probability of conflict for the United States. It raises the danger that the interests of the United States will be challenged not only from foes like China and Iran, but, perversely, also from countries now allied with the United States like Japan and Turkey.
The risks of off-shore balancing outweigh the benefits primacy is key. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007
["Reply to Christopher Layne: The Strength of the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 103-104 ]
To advance these goals, in this chapter I would like to respond to Laynes criticisms of the grand strategy of primacy made in chapter 2 and present some final reflections on the grand strategy of offshore balancing versus the grand strategy of primacy. I argue that primacy is the superior grand strategic
choice for the United States because it provides the greatest benefit for the United States with the least risk. Furthermore, to abandon the grand strategy of primacy at this time would entail enormous dangers for the United States and its allies. Why Laynes Critique of American Primacy Is Wrong Layne levels several major allegations against the grand strategy
of Primacy, and I want to respond to the two most important: first, that the pursuit of primacy makes the United States less secure; second, that Iraq serves as a test case for the American Empire, andhe submitsit is a test that the United States is failing. Before I reply, I would like to thank Layne for illuminating the risks associated with primacy. Although both of his charges are wrongin fact, the pursuit of hegemony makes the United States more secure and Iraq reflects some of the best principles of the United Stateshaving Layne present the case against the American Empire helps to advance this vital debate. Layne does not illuminate the risks associated with his preferred grand strategy of offshore balancing principally because those risks far outweigh any gain. Abandoning primacy in favor of offshore balancing would entail enormous dangers for the United States and its allies. Most importantly, it would cause the United States to abandon its dominant position in favor of inferiority for the first time in a century. Offshore balancing is a radical break with American tradition, statecraft, and policies which have allowed the United States first, to defeat four peer competitors Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union in World War II and the Cold War; second, by peaceful means, to replace the previously dominant stateGreat Britain; and third, to win greater security for the American people and their allies.
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Off-Shore Balancing Bad Frontline (2/3)
The fact that hegemony will one day end is not a reason to accelerate its decline Layne is wrong about the sustainability and desirability of primacy. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007
["Reply to Christopher Layne: The Strength of the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 104]
Each country knows it will never be perfectly secure, but that does not detract from the necessity of seeking security. International politics is a dangerous environment in which countries have no choice but to participate. Any involvementfrom the extensive involvement of the United States to the narrow activity of Switzerlandin this dangerous realm runs the risk of a backlash. That is simply a fact of life in international politics. The issue is how much participation is right. Thankfully, thus far the United States recognizes it is much better to be involved so that it may shape events, rather than to remain passive, having events shaped by other countries, and then adjusting to what they desire. In contrast to Laynes argument, maximizing the power of the United States aids its ability to defend itself from attacks and to advance its interests. This argument is based on its prodigious economic, ideological, and military power. Due to this power, the United States is able to defeat its enemies the world over, to reassure its allies, and to dissuade states from challenging it. From this power also comes respect and admiration, no matter how grudging it may be at times. These advantages keep the United States, its interests, and its allies secure, and it must strive to maintain its advantages in international politics as long as possible. Knowing that American hegemony will end someday does not mean that we should welcome or facilitate its demise; rather the reverse. The United States should labor to maintain hegemony as long as possiblejust as knowing that you will die someday does not keep you from planning your future and living today. You strive to live as long as possible although you realize that it is inevitable that you will die. Like good health, Americans and most of the world should welcome American primacy and work to preserve it as long as possible.
Primacy is key to U.S. and global security off-shore balancing would collapse the world order. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007
["Reply to Christopher Layne: The Strength of the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 105-106]
Second, U.S. power protects the United States. That sentence is as genuine and as important a statement about international politics as one can make. International politics is not a game or a sport. There are no time outs, there [end page 105] is no halftime and no rest. It never stops. There is no hiding from threats and dangers in international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats it confronts, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats. Simply by declaring that the United States is going home, thus abandoning its commitments or making half pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect its wishes to retreat. In fact, to make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true in the anarchic realm of international politics. If the United States is not strong and does not actively protect and advance its interests, other countries will prey upon those interests, and even on the United States itself.
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Off-Shore Balancing Bad Frontline (3/3)
Layne is wrong history proves that off-shore balancing would decimate global security. Gary J. SCHMITT, Director of the Program on Advanced Strategic Studies and Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 2007
["Pax Americana," The Weekly Standard, Posted Online March 5th, Published March 12th, Available Online at http://www.aei.org/publications/ pubID.25706,filter.all/pub_detail.asp]
An additional problem, perhaps tied to the way the book is structured, is that Layne spends the vast majority of his time criticizing the argument for primacy, without giving the reader much of a handle on his own preferred strategy's particulars. As a result, we don't know whether his model of "off-shore balancing" is more British in stylethat is, fairly active in playing the decisive power broker among the other competing statesor more passive in contenta la the United States in the 1920s and '30s. If the former, a key problem with the strategy is that it requires a far more calculating style of statecraft than the United States has ever engaged in before. And even if we had Henry Kissinger upon Henry Kissinger to carry it out, would the American public really be willing to let its government play this version of international politics--shifting partners based on power relations--rather than the character of the states themselves? Surely, the disappearance of the United States as security guarantor is likely to lead to more competition among states and the creation of a more chaotic and fluid international environment. Britain had a hard enough time playing this role in its day, and found itself in numerous conflicts in any case. If the latter, the passive "off-shore balancing" approach leads to the question of whether such a strategy results in the United States addressing a security problem at a time when it may be far more difficult to deal with. Layne's bet, at least in the case of Iran and China today, is that if the United States would only get out of the way, other powers would naturally begin to meet their challenge. Possibly. But doing so might create an even more destabilizing competition among neighbors, or lead those same neighbors to accept China or Iran's new hegemony, fueling their ambitions rather than lessening them. The history of international relations suggests that most great crises are the result of not addressing more minor ones initially. As Thayer argues, it is probably less costly to deal with these issues when one is in a better position to do so than to wait for them to become full-blown security problems.
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Off-Shore Balancing Bad China (1/2)
Off-shore balancing would enable the rise of China this is comparatively worse than U.S. heg. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007
["Reply to Christopher Layne: The Strength of the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 117-118]
General Douglas MacArthur said that there was no substitute for victory. Just as there is no substitute for victory, there is no alternative for leadership. For if the United States does not provide that leadership to its allies by pledging to use all of its power in their defense, then they will provide their own security. If the United States does not lead the world, another hegemon will rise to replace it. That hegemon will be China. China will then be in a position to dictate to the rest of world, including the United States. The United States would be far less secure in such a world. This is because, first, the physical security of the United States would be jeopardized. Due to its military superiority, China would have the ability to triumph over the United States in the event of war or an international crisis, like the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The United States would be forced to back down, thus placing Chinas interests before its own. China would be able to blackmail the United States, to coerce it to do Beijings bidding. The United States would be relegated to the role of pawn on the international chessboard. Second, the United States would lose its allies and global influence. As Chinas power grew, countries would look to Beijing to be their ally in order to gain security and assistance. It will be the case that countries long allied with the United States, such as Australia, will no longer be allies as their interests require them to look to Beijing and away from Washington. Third, the Chinese economy will dominate the global economy. Worldwide, both countries and businesses will look to China not simply as a market, as they do now, but the economic locomotive of the worlds economy, as the lender of last resort, and as the stabilizer of economic exchange and the international trade and monetary regimes. Countries will have to appease China economically or face the consequences of its wrath. Fourth, Chinese will be the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the Internet, world sport, and global culture. Additionally, China will dominate science and technology, in all of its formsthe life sciences, bioengineering, computer science, and even space exploration. It will be a great blow to the pride of the United States, greater than Sputnik in 1957, when China travels to the Moon, as they plan to do, and plants the communist flag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future. In sum, the United States will be far less influential and subjected to the role that China, not decision-makers in Washington or the American people, wants it to play. Fundamentally, the security of the United States would be dependent on the decisions made in China. That is the world of the future if the United States does not maintain its primacy. To abandon its leadership role would be a fundamental mistake of American grand strategy. Indeed, in the great history of the United States, there is no parallel, no previous case, where the United States has made such a titanic grand strategic blunder. It would surpass by far its great mistake of 1812, when the young and ambitious country gambled and declared war against a mighty empire, the British, believing London was too distracted by the tremendous events on the Continentthe formidable military genius of Napoleon and the prodigious threat from the French empire and its alliesto notice while it conquered Canada.The citizens of the United States cannot pretend that, by weakening ourselves, other countries will be nice and respect its security and interests. To suggest this implies a navet and innocence about international politics that would be charming, if only the consequences of such an opinion were not so serious. Throughout its history, the United States has never refrained from acting boldly to secure its interests. It should not be timid now
Many times in the great history of the United States, the country faced difficult decisionsdecisions of confrontation or appeasementand significant threatsthe British, French, Spanish, Germans, Italians, Japanese, and Soviets. It always has recognized those threats and faced them down, to emerge victorious. The United States should have the confidence to do so now against China not simply because to do so maximizes its power and security or ensures it is the dominant voice in the worlds affairs, but because it is the last, best hope of humanity. The United States faces a choice as significant as any in its history: To maintain leadership or to live in a world dominated by the Communist Chinese, the last significant representative of a cruel and failed ideology. A world dominated by the United States, the country Walt Whitman called essentially the greatest poem, is far superior for the whole of the worlds population than a world controlled by the Communist Chinese.6 In this book and in academic settings, we may debate the issues that concern that choice. Intellectually, that is entirely appropriate. But emotionally and instinctually, each of us knows that, should any country be dominant, the United States is the best choice to exercise such power. That recognition alone quite perfectly answers the debate over the American Empire.
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Off-shore Balancing Bad Primacy K2 Stability (1/2)
Primacy ensures global security U.S. security guarantees are key to peace. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007
["Reply to Christopher Layne: The Strength of the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 108-109]
The fourth critical fact to consider is that the security provided by the power of the United States creates stability in international politics. That is vitally important for the world, but easily forgotten. Harvard professor Joseph Nye often compares the security provided by the United States to oxygen. If it were taken away, a person would think of nothing else. If the security and stability provided by the United States were taken away, most countries would be much worse off, and arms races, vicious security competition, and wars would result. It would be a world without NATO or other key U.S. alliances. We can imagine easily conflict between traditional rivals like Greece and Turkey; Syria and Israel, India and Pakistan, Taiwan and China, Russia and Georgia, Hungary and Romania, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and an intense arms race between China and Japan. In that world, the breakup of Yugoslavia would have been a far bloodier affair that might have escalated to become another European war. In contrast to what might occur absent U.S. power, we see that the post-Cold War world dominated by the United States is an era of peace and stability. The United States does not provide security to other countries because it is altruistic. Security for other states is a positive result (what economists call a positive externality) of the United States pursuing its interests. Therefore, it would be a mistake to seek benevolence in great power politics. In international politics, states advance their self-interest and, most often, what might appear to be benevolent actions are undertaken for other reasons. To assist Pakistani earthquake refugees, for example, is benevolent but also greatly aids the image of the United States in the Muslim worldso self-interest is usually intertwined with a humanitarian impulse. The lesson here is straightforward: Countries align themselves with the United States because to do so coincides with their interests, and they will continue [end page 108] to do so only as long as their interests are advanced by working with Uncle Sam. In 1848, the great British statesman Lord Palmerston captured this point best when he said: We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.2
Primacy is best perspectives of other countries prove. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007
["Reply to Christopher Layne: The Strength of the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 105]
The value of U.S. power for the country itself as well as for most of the world is demonstrated easily by considering four critical facts about international politics. First, if you doubt that more power is better, just ask the citizens of a country that has been conquered, like the Czech Republic, Poland, Kuwait, or Lebanon; or the citizens of a country facing great peril due to external threats or terrorists, like Colombia, Georgia, Israel, Nepal, or Turkey. These countries would prefer to possess greater power to improve their security. Or query the citizens of a fallen empire. For the British, French, or Russians, having the power to influence the direction of international politics, having the respect and recognition that flows from power, and, most importantly, having the ability to advance and defend their countrys interests are elements of power that are missed greatly. In sum, the world looks very different from the perspective of these countries than it does from a powerful and secure United States.
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Off-shore Balancing Bad Primacy K2 Stability (2/2)
Primacy is key to security off-shore balancing would cripple the U.S. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007
["Reply to Christopher Layne: The Strength of the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 108-109]
It is important to know what other countries think of the United States, but, equally, it is a fundamental mistake to worry disproportionately about what the rest of the world thinks. Leaders lead. That may be unpopular at times, indeed, perhaps most of the time. A cost of leadership is that the leader will be criticized for doing too much, or for accomplishing too little. But at the same time, few states would want to replace the leadership of the United States with the leadership of China. The allies of the United States are precisely its allies because to be so serves the interests of these countries. One country does not align itself with another for reasons of sentiment or emotion. If the United States adopted offshore balancing, many of those allies would terminate their relationship with the United States. They would be forced to increase their own armaments, acquire nuclear weapons, and perhaps ally against the United States, even aiming their nuclear weapons at the United States. In those circumstances, the United States would be far less secure and much worse off than it is now. That might be the future if the United States changed its grand strategy. To be sure, at present the United States is a great ally. It is rich and powerful, with many allies all over the world. It wields enormous influence in international institutions as well. When a global problem arises, countries turn to the United States to solve it. When you reflect on all the countries who have been hegemons, the United States is the most accommodating and helpful the world has seen. That is a weighty point and must be emphasizedtoo frequently, it is not. The United States is so for many reasons, including its democratic ideology, the good-natured qualities of the American people, and geography; and the United States is far away from the Eurasian and African landmasses, which makes it a more attractive ally for a typical country in Eurasiasay, Poland or Turkeysince the United States must be invited in comparison to a great power like Russia. If Warsaw or Ankara were to invite the Russians in, they may never leave, and they might incorporate Poland or Turkey into Russia. There is no danger of that with the United States. And this simple fact alone helps us enormously in our relations with the rest of the world.
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*** Hegemony Good Impact Extensions ***
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Isolationism Bad: Asian Draw-Down Bad
U.S. FORCE WITHDRAWL FROM ASIA WILL CAUSE ASIAN ARMS RACES AND WARS
Zbigniew Brzezinski, famous geostrategist, former diplomat, Johns Hopkins & CSIS, THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, 2004, p. 110 Ultimately, war or peace in the Far East will be determined largely by how China and Japan interact with each other and with the United States. If the United St1tes were to withdraw its forces from the region, a repetition of the twentieth century European scenario would be very probable. Japan would have little choice but to rapidly unveil and accelerate its ongoing rearmament; China would be likely to engage in a rapid buildup of its nuclear forces, which till now have been designed to give China a minimal deterrent; the Taiwan Straits would become the locus of Chinese national selfassertion; Korea would most likely experience a violent end to its partition and perhaps emerge unified as a nuclear power; and the Chinese-Indian-Pakistani nuclear triangle could provide a dangerous umbrella for the resumption of open conventional warfare. A single match could then set off an explosion.
U.S. LEADERSHIP IS NEEDED TO STABLILIZE ASIA
Zbigniew Brzezinski, famous geostrategist, former diplomat, Johns Hopkins & CSIS, THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, 2004, p. 228 How the power dynamics in the Far East are shaped by the interrelationship among America, Japan, and China will also affect global stability. The United States should seek to translate the emerging equilibrium among itself Japan, and China into a more structured security relationship. Geopolitically, Asia roughly resembles Europe prior to World War I. America has stabilized Europe but it still faces a potential structural crisis in Asia, where several major powers still contend, though checked by America's peripheral strategic presence. That presence is anchored by the American-Japanese connection, but the rise of a regionally dominant China and the unpredictability of North Korea signal the need for a more active U.S. policy to promote, at a minimum, a triangular security relationship. As argued earlier, such a triangular equilibrium, to be enduring, will require a more internationally engaged Japan that will have gradually assumed a wider range of military responsibilities.
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Isolationism Bad: Asian Draw-Down Bad
HIGH RISK OF CONFLICT AMONG THE ASIAN STATES
Zbigniew Brzezinski, famous geostrategist, former diplomat, Johns Hopkins & CSIS, THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, 2004, p. 108 The grievances and resentments complicating relations among the Asian states are many. They are historical, territorial, and cultural. The Chinese resent the continued separation of Taiwan, for which they blame America, they fear and closely monitor Japan's rearmament and condemn the Japanese as insufficiently repentant for wartime misdeeds, and they have not forgotten the territories Russia seized from them during their period of historical weakness. The Japanese view China as a potential security threat and a rising rival to Japan's regional economic and political primacy, while Russia's continued retention of the southern Kurile Islands so rankles the Japanese that a formal Russo-Japanese peace treaty is yet to be signed more than fifty-five years after the end of World War II. The Japanese also increasingly view their dependence on the United States as a temporary strategic necessity dictated by the dangerously unresolved World War II partition of Korea, rather than as a desirable long-term condition. The Indonesians are apprehensive of China's rising power, while the Indians resent the arrogant refusal of the Chinese to view India as China's Asian peer and feel threatened by the implicit Chinese- Pakistani alliance.
AN ASIAN NAVAL ARMS RACE IS DEVELOPING
Zbigniew Brzezinski, famous geostrategist, former diplomat, Johns Hopkins & CSIS, THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, 2004, p. 109-10 No wonder, then, that an Asian naval arms race has been quietly gathering steam. The parallel to the European naval rivalry of the last century is quite striking. Without fanfare, all the major protagonists have been expanding their submarine fleets, acquiring surface vessels equipped to carry attack helicopters, exploring the possibility of obtaining aircraft carriers, and striving to extend the range of their air power. China and India have been seeking powerful blue water navies, with each country actively negotiating with Russia to obtain one of the large aircraft carriers the Soviet Union failed to finish building. Both of them have been modernizing their destroyer flotillas (including advanced models acquired from Russia) and expanding their submarine fleets as a key sea denial force. In their strategic literature, Chinese naval planners have argued for China to expand the perimeter of its naval reach southwestward, while their counterparts in India have increasingly been stressing not only India's special naval responsibility in the Indian Ocean but also the need for India to assert itself eastward in the Strait of Malacca.
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Isolationism Bad: Economic Collapse
U.S. ISOLATIONISM CAUSES WORLD WAR AND ECONOMIC DECLINE
Michael Mandlebaum, professor of American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins, THE CASE FOR GOLIAATH: HOW AMERICA ACTS AS THE WORLDS GOVERNMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 2006, pp. 186-7 If public pressure within the United States were to compel the American government to withdraw most or all of the military forces stationed beyond North America and to do far less than it had become accustomed to doing to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons, to cope with the consequences of fiscal crises outside its borders, and to help keep global markets open to trade, what impact would this have on the rest of the world? The last occasion on which the United States placed itself on the periphery rather than at the center of international affairs, the period between the two world wars, was not a happy one. Indeed, the antecedents of the American twenty- first-century role as the world's government lie in the fear, after World War II, that in the absence of an expansive American international presence the world would experience repetitions of the two global disasters of the 1930s and the I9940s-the Great Depression and World War II. It was to prevent a recurrence of these economic and political calamities that the United States assumed the. responsibilities it bore during the Cold War, which, modified and extended, comprise its post-Cold War role as the world's government. Although the history of the interwar era will not precisely repeat itself even if the United States takes a far less active part in international affairs, a substantial contraction of the American global role would risk making the world a less secure and less prosperous place.. No early twenty-first-century version of imperial Japan and Nazi Germany is likely to appear: The twentieth-century ideologies of conquest-fascism and communism-have been discredited and no comparable set of ideas, whose adherents could seize control of a powerful state and thus menace the world, are in circulation. The militant Islam of the early twenty-first century does bear a resemblance to the twentieth century's totalitarian ideologies' but does not pose a threat of the same kind or of the same magnitude as fascism and communism did. The Islamist ideology lacks appeal in the world's most powerful countries and has had little success in gaining control of even less powerful, predominantly muslim countries.
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Isolationism Bad: Economic Collapse
U.S. WITHDRAWL CAUSES GLOBAL ECONOMIC COLLAPSE
Michael Mandlebaum, professor of American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins, THE CASE FOR GOLIAATH: HOW AMERICA ACTS AS THE WORLDS GOVERNMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 2006, pp. 192-4 Although the spread of nuclear weapons, with the corresponding increase in the likelihood that a nuclear shot would be fired in anger somewhere in the world, counted as the most serious potential consequence of the abandonment by the United States of its role as the world's government, it was not the only one. In the previous period of American international reticence, the 1920s and 1930s, the global economy suffered serious damage that a more active American role might have mitigated. A twenty-first-century American retreat could have similarly adverse international economic consequences. The economic collapse of the 1930s caused extensive hardship throughout the world and led indirectly to World War II by paving the way for the people who started it to gain power in Germany and Japan. In retrospect, the Great Depression is widely believed to have been caused by a series of errors in public policy that made an economic downturn far worse than it would have been had governments responded to it in appropriate fashion. Since the I93os, acting on the lessons drawn from that experience by professional economists, governments have taken steps that have helped to prevent a recurrence of the disasters of that decade. In the face of reduced demand, for example, governments have increased rather than cut spending. Fiscal and monetary crises have evoked rescue efforts rather than a studied indifference based on the assumption that market forces will readily reestablish a desirable. economic equilibrium. In contrast to the widespread practice of the 1930s, political authorities now understand that putting up barriers to imports in an attempt to revive domestic production will in fact worsen economic conditions everywhere. Still, a serious, prolonged failure of the international economy, inflicting the kind of hardship the world experienced in the 1930s (which some Asian countries also suffered as a result of their fiscal crises in the I99os) does not lie beyond the realm of possibility. Market economies remain subject to cyclical downturns, which public policy can limit but has not found a way to eliminate entirely. Markets also have an inherent tendency to form bubbles, excessive values for particular assets, whether seventeenth century Dutch tulips or twentieth centunT Japanese real estate and Thai currency, that cause economic harm when the bubble bursts and prices plunge. In responding to these events, governments can make errors. They can act too slowly, or fall to implement the proper policies, or implement improper ones.
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Isolationism Bad: Economic Collapse
U.S. GLOBAL WITHDRAWL CAUSES AN ECONOMIC BREAKDOWN
Michael Mandlebaum, professor of American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins, THE CASE FOR GOLIATH: HOW AMERICA ACTS AS THE WORLDS GOVERNMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 2006, p. 195 The abdication by the United States of some or all of the responsibilities for international security that it had come to bear in the first decade of the twenty-first century would deprive the international system of one of its principal safety features, which keeps countries from smashing into each other, as they are historically prone to do. In this sense, a world without America would be the equivalent of a freeway full of cars without brakes. Similarly, should the. American government abandon some or all of the ways in which it had, at the dawn of the new century, come to support global economic activity, the world economy would function less effectively and might even suffer a severe and costly breakdown. A world without the United States would in this way resemble a fleet of cars without gasoline.
U.S. PRIMACY FACILITATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT
Stephen Walt, Harvard, TAMING AMERICAN POWER, 2005, p. 48 By fostering a more stable world, therefore, U.S. primacy also encourages global prosperity. Investors are more willing to send capital abroad when the danger of war is remote, and states worry less about being dependent on others when they have little reason to fear that these connections might be severed. When states are relatively secure, they will also be less concerned about how the benefits from cooperation are distributed. By this argument, U.S. primacy creates political conditions conducive to expanding international trade and investment.
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Unipolarity Good: Alternative is Apolarity
IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO WIN HEGEMONY BAD BECAUSE THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO U.S. LEADERSHIP. ABSENT THE PLAN, WE ARE LOOKING AT APOLARITY AND WAR, NOT MULTIPOLARITY
Mark Steyn, political analyst, AMERICA ALONE, 2006, p. 134
But the central fact of a new Dark Ages is this: it would be not a world in which the American superpower is succeeded by other powers but a world with no dominant powers at all. Today, lots of experts crank out analyses positing China as the unstoppable hegemon of the twenty-first century. but a world with no dominant powers at all. Today, lots of experts crank out analyses positing China as the unstoppable hegemon of the twenty-first century. Yet the real threat is not the strength of our enemies but their weaknesses. China is a weak power: its demographic and other structural defects are already hobbling its long-term ambitions. Russia is a weak power, a kind of greatest-hits medley of all the planets worst pathologies disease-wise, nuke-wise, Islamist-wise. Europe is a weak power, a supposed Greater France remorselessly evolving month by month into Greater Bosnia. Islam is a weak power: in the words of Dr. Mahathir bin Mohammed, the former prime minister of Malaysia, on e of the least worst Muslim nations in the world, We produce practically nothing on our own, we can do almost nothing for ourselves, we cannot even manage our wealth. Yet in Iran theyre working full-speed on nukes that will be able to hit every European city. North Korea is the weakest power of all. But on the Fourt of July 2006 its dictator gamely got in the spirit and held a fireworks display. Impresive stuff: the rockets read glare, the bombs burting in air though, as sometimes happens with your highest-priced firecracker, it was over sooner than expected. Kim Jong-I has No Dong. Please, no giggling. Its not a side effect of that counterfeit Viagra that North Korea manufacturers (seriously). No Dong is the name of the missile. Dong is Korean for dong, and no is Korean for big swinging, and thats how Kim-Jong-il sees himself on the freelance nuke scene. Anyway, on the Glorious Fourth, he decided to test the latest version of his No Dong. Thats a test in the sense that I test my new shotgun by firing it through your kitchen wind and seeing if it penetrates the living room. Kims dong went up and came straight down again forty seconds later. From the trajectory, experts calculated that it was headed to Hawaii. Instead, it fell in the Sea of Japan. And everyone had a big laugh. What a loser, what a bozo. Mister Nukes R Us talks that talk but he cant nuke the nuke. Ha ha, what a joke. But no, thats the point. Thats why hes dangerous. Hes not the United States, not the Soviet Union, not India, hes not even France. Hes an incompetent, but hes got nuclear weapons. In 2006, he aimed for Hawaii and just about cleared the perimeter fence. Next time, he might aim for Hawaii and hit San Diego. Or Oakland. Or Calgary, or Presque Isle, Maine. Or Beijing, Adis Ababa, Salzburg, or Dublin. Hes a self-taught nuclear madman and he hasnt quite gotten the hang of it. If youre on the New Jersey Turnpike and theres a confused ninetythree-year-old granny behind the wheel of a Toyota Corolla, thats mostly a problem for her. If shes in an eighteen wheeler and coming across the median, thats a problem for you. North Korea has millions of starving people; it has one of the lowest GDPs per capita on the planet, lower than Ghana, lower than Zimbabwe, lower than Mongolia. But its a nuclear power. The danger we face is not a Chinese superpower or an Islmaist superpower: if thers a new boss, you learn the rules and adjust the best you can. But the greater the likelihood is a world with no superpower at all in which unipolar geopolitics gives way to a non-polar geopolitics, a world without order in which pipsqueak thug states who cant feed their own people globalize their psychosis.
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Unipolarity Good: Human Rights
US SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VITAL IN AFRICA STILL HAVING AN IMPACT DESPITE ABU GHARIB Lorne W. Craner, Department of State, 2004, House Hearings: US Support of Human Rights and Democracy, Committee on International Relations, July 7, [http://wwwc.house.gov/international%5Frelations/108/94707.pdf], p. 7 This is why we continue to construct a legacy that promotes democracy and human rights overseas. In places like Darfur and Burma and Zimbabwe and Belarus and elsewhere, who would benefit and who would pay the price if we self consciously turned inward and ignored human rights abuses outside of our country? I am, therefore, very pleased today to formally present to Congress our report on supporting human rights and democracy. It provides examples of how we are engaged worldwide with people and institutions dedicated to answering the question: What are we doing about all those abuses in the Country Reports?
Isolationism turns infinite responsibility it is based on fear of the other
Charles Krauthammer, Essayist and Columnist for the Washington Post, Frequent Contributor to the Weekly Standard, the New Republic, and the National Interest, Winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy, Member of the Presidents Council on Bioethics, Board-Certified Psychiatrist and Received Medical Degree, Harvard Medical School, 2004 (Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World American Enterprise Institute) http://www.aei.org/publications/bookID.755/book_detail.asp Isolationism originally sprang from a view of America as spiritually superior to the Old World. We were too good to be corrupted by its low intrigues, entangled by its cynical alliances. Today, however, isolationism is an ideology of fear. Fear of trade. Fear of immigrants. Fear of the Other. Isolationists want to cut off trade and immigration, and withdraw from our military and strategic commitments around the world. Even isolationists, of course, did not oppose the war in Afghanistan, because it was so obviously an act of self-defenseonly a fool or a knave or a Susan Sontag could oppose that. But anything beyond that, isolationists oppose.
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Unipolarity Good: Stops War
LOSS OF US HEGEMONY THREATENS A REPEAT OF THE GREAT DISASTERS OF THE 20TH CENTURY THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND WORLD WAR II Michael Mandelbaum, Professor Foreign Policy Johns Hopkins, 2005, The Case for Goliath: How America acts as the worlds government in the 21st Century, p. 187-88 If public pressure within the United States were to compel the American government to withdraw most or all of the military forces stationed beyond North America and to do far less than it had become accustomed to doing to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons, to cope with the consequences of fiscal crises outside its borders, and to help keep global markets open to trade, what impact would this have on the rest of the world? The last occasion on which the United States placed itself on the periphery rather than at the center of international affairs, the period between the two world wars, was not a happy one. Indeed, the antecedents of the American twentyfirst century role as the worlds government lie in the fear, after World War II, that in the absence of an expansive American international presence the world would experience repetitions of the two global disasters of the 1930s and the 1940sthe Great Depression and World War II. It was to prevent a recurrence of these economic and political calamities that the United States assumed the responsibilities it bore during the Cold War, which modified and extended, comprise its post-Cold War role as the worlds government. Although the history of the interwar era will not precisely repeat itself even if the United States takes a far less active part in international affairs, a substantial contraction of the American global role would risk making the world a less secure and less prosperous place. In the interwar period, Germany and Japan came to be governed by people committed to the precepts of aggressive ideologies and determined to expand by force their countries spheres of imperial control. The Western democracies at first hoped that German and Japanese aspirations could be satisfied peacefully in ways consistent with their own safety. When this proved to be impossible, the result was the bloodiest and most destructive war in human history.
US IS AN EMPIRE AND IT PROMOTES GLOBAL SECURITY
Richard Crockatt, Professor American Studies, University of East Anglia, 2006, The United States Contested: American unilateralism and European discontent, ed. Sergio Fabbrini, p. 82-3 The final category of analysis to be considered here is the vogue for the idea of American empire, a concept which has been used to characterize not only American foreign policy but also the international order. The starting point for such analyses is the statement, which has assumed the status of a clich, that the United States dominates the world as no state has (Ikenberry 2004). This is not a new theme but in the past has generally taken the form of critiques from the left, most notably in the writings of William Appleman Williams. Such critiques still feature in the recent debate. Indeed, Andrew Bacevichs American Empire (2002) is in some respects an updated version of Williams argument. However, there is a new edge to the debate in that the term empire has been adopted, indeed embraced, by some analysts on the right. No longer arguing defensively that America is a nation with anti-imperial origins and in its growth as a republic anything but an empire, some conservatives point to a need for a pax Americana to secure global order. Empires have unfairly got a bad name, writes Deepak Lal, which is particularly unfortunate, as the world needs an American pax to provide both global peace and security (Lal 2003). British historian Niall Ferguson echoes these conclusions and adds the comment that America is in imperial denial, to the detriment of the global order (Ferguson 2004). In the debate as a whole, there is no longer a sense that the word empire is being employed as a metaphor or a debating tool but rather as a scientific, descriptive term. America really is an empire not just like an empire.
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EXERCISE OF LEADERSHIP AND HEGEMONY NECESSARY FOR GLOBAL ORDER
Michael Cox, International Relations Professor London School of Economics, 2006, The War on Terrorism and the American Empire after the Cold War, eds. A. Colas & R. Saull, p. 114 One of the more remarkable features of American intellectual life since the end of the Second World War has been its preoccupation with the issue of power and whether or not the United States continued to possess enough of this vital commodity to underwrite stability in the wider international system. This obsession should not particularly surprise us. After all, if Americans have been serious about anything since 1945, it has been about the uses of power on the not entirely unreasonable grounds that if international history taught anything it was that order was impossible without the deployment of a great deal of power by a single conscious hegemon. What history also revealed, these scholars argued, was that when great powers did not lead as the British had been unable to do by 1914 and the United States manifestly failed to do after 1918 then the inevitable outcome was chaos and disorder. The question of power, therefore, was not merely of academic interest but went to the heart of the central question in modern world politics: namely, under conditions of anarchy what policies would the United States have to pursue and what advantage of power would it have to possess in order to maintain the peace? Liberals no doubt might have found all this self-absorbed discussion about the capabilities of one particular state decidedly too realist for comfort, parochial even. A large number of Americans, not surprisingly, have not. Indeed, what could be more vital, they felt, than trying to measure how much power the country actually had, and whether or not it was exercising it with sufficient determination so as to deter enemies and reassure allies in a world where it remained (according to its own heady rhetoric) the truly indispensable nation. MULTIPOLARITY CAUSES NUCLEAR WAR Joseph Nye, THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER, 2002, p. 13 (PDNSS692) War was the constant companion and critical instrument of the multipolar balance of power. The classic European balance provided stability in the sense of maintaining the independence of most countries, but there were more wars among the great powers for 60 percent of the years since 1500. Rote adherence to the balance of power and multipolarity may prove to be a dangerous approach to global governance in a world where war could turn nuclear.
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PRIMACY DETERS & SOLVES MULTIPLE IMPACTS
Julia Sweigh, Council on Foreign Relations, FRIENDLY FIRE, 2006, p. 40 It may be lonely at the top, but the view is compelling. Having achieved a preeminent global position, US. leaders have been eager to preserve and protect it. They understand, as do most Americans, that primacy confers important benefits. Primacy makes other states less likely to threaten the United States or its vital interests, and it gives the United States the power to defend these interests if challenges do arise. By dampening Great Power competition and giving the United States the capacity to shape regional balances of power, primacy also contributes to a more tranquil international environment. That tranquility in turn fosters global prosperity, because investors and traders can operate more widely when the danger of war is remote. Primacy also gives the United States a greater capacity to work toward positive ends the advancement of human rights, the alleviation of poverty and disease, the control of weapons of mass destruction, etc.although it provides no guarantee of success.
PRIMACY DETERS CHALLENGERS
Stephen Walt, Harvard, TAMING AMERICAN POWER, 2005, p. 41 International politics is a dangerous business, and having more power is generally preferable to having less. Being the strongest state does not protect the United States from all dangers-September 11, 2001 certainly proved that-but it does give the United States a greater capacity to respond to dangers that do arise. Primacy also deters many challenges to US. interests, because potential adversaries know that the United States
PRIMACY REDUCES THE DANGER OF GREAT POWER RIVALRY
Stephen Walt, Harvard JFK School of Government, 2002 (NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Spring, http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2002/spring/art1-sp2.htm) A second consequence of U.S. primacy is a decreased danger of great-power rivalry and a higher level of overall international tranquility. Ironically, those who argue that primacy is no longer important, because the danger of war is slight, overlook the fact that the extent of American primacy is one of the main reasons why the risk of great-power war is as low as it is. For most of the past four centuries, relations among the major powers have been intensely competitive, often punctuated by major wars and occasionally by all-out struggles for hegemony. In the first half of the twentieth century, for example, great-power wars killed over eighty million people. Today, however, the dominant position of the United States places significant limits on the possib ility of great-power competition, for at least two reasons. One reason is that because the United States is currently so far ahead, other major powers are not inclined to challenge its dominant position. Not only is there no possibility of a hegemonic war (because there is no potential hegemon to mount a challenge), but the risk of war via miscalculation is reduced by the overwhelming gap between the United States and the other major powers. Miscalculation is more likely to lead to war when the balance of power is fairly even, because in this situation both sides can convince themselves that they might be able to win. When the balance of power is heavily skewed, however, the leading state does not need to go to war and weaker states dare not try.
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PRIMACY IS CRITICAL TO RESOLVE GLOBAL PROBLEMS
Stephen Walt, Harvard JFK School of Government, 2002 (NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Spring, http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2002/spring/art1-sp2.htm) Thus, anyone who thinks that the United States should try to discourage the spread of weapons of mass destruction, promote human rights, advance the cause of democracy, or pursue any other positive political goal should recognize that the nations ability to do so rests primarily upon its power. The United States would accomplish far less if it were weaker, and it would discover that other states were setting the agenda of world politics if its own power were to decline. As Harry Truman put it over fifty years ago, Peace must be built upon power, as well as upon good will and good deeds.
A GLOBAL LEADER IS STILL NEEDED FOR WORLD STABILITY
Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter, CSIS, SECOND CHANCE: THREE PRESIDENTS AND THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 192 America has a monopoly on global military reach, an economy second to none, and peerless technological innovation, all of which give it unique worldwide political clout. Moreover, there is a widespread, if unspoken, practical recognition that the international system needs an effective stabilizer, and that the most likely short-term alternative to a constructive American world role is chaos. An intelligent Global Leader IV should still be able to exploit that feeling to tap what's left of the reservoir of goodwill toward America. Though hostility toward the United States has risen to unprecedented levels and has not yet crested, an America aware of its responsibilities, measured in its presidential rhetoric, sensitive to the complexities of the human condition, and consensual rather than abrasive in its external relations (in brief, entirely different from its recent emanation) is an America that much of the world would still like to see at the global helm.
PRIMACY ENABLES THE U.S. TO RESOLVE GLOBAL CRISES
Stephen Walt, Harvard JFK School of Government, 2002 (NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Spring, http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2002/spring/art1-sp2.htm) Yet primacy also means that the United States can undertake tasks that no other state would even contemplate and can do so with reasonable hope of success. In the past decade, for instance, the United States played a key role in guiding the reunification of Germany; negotiated a deal to end North Koreas nuclear weapons program; and convinced Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to give up the nuclear arsenals they had inherited from the Soviet Union. It also rescued the Mexican economy during the peso crisis in 1994, brought three new members into the Nato alliance, defeated and defanged Iraq in 1991, and kept the Iraqi regime under tight constraints thereafter. The United States also played an important role in the recovery from the Asian financial crisis of 1997, led the coalition that defeated Serbia in the 1999 war in Kosovo, and used its economic power to encourage the ouster of Slobodan Milosevic and his prosecution for alleged war crimes. U.S. power probably helped prevent any number of events that might have occurred but at this writing have not-such as a direct Chinese challenge to Taiwan or a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan. Each of these achievements required resources, and Americas capacity to shape world events would be much smaller were its relative power to decline.
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PRIMACY INCREASES SECURITY AND DETERRENCE
Stephen Walt, Harvard JFK School of Government, 2002 (NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Spring, http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2002/spring/art1-sp2.htm) Perhaps the most obvious reason why states seek primacy-and why the United States benefits from its current position-is that international politics is a dangerous business. Being wealthier and stronger than other states does not guarantee that a state will survive, of course, and it cannot insulate a state from all outside pressures. But the strongest state is more likely to escape serious harm than weaker ones are, and it will be better equipped to resist the pressures that arise. Because the United States is so powerful, and because its society is so wealthy, it has ample resources to devote to whatever problems it may face in the future. At the beginning of the Cold War, for example, its power enabled the United States to help rebuild Europe and Japan, to assist them in developing stable democratic orders, and to subsidize the emergence of an open international economic order. The United States was also able to deploy powerful armed forces in Europe and Asia as effective deterrents to Soviet expansion. When the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf increased in the late 1970s, the United States created its Rapid Deployment Force in order to deter threats to the Wests oil supplies; in 1990-91 it used these capabilities to liberate Kuwait. Also, when the United States was attacked by the Al-Qaeda terrorist network in September 2001, it had the wherewithal to oust the networks Taliban hosts and to compel broad international support for its campaign to eradicate Al-Qaeda itself. It would have been much harder to do any of these things if the United States had been weaker. Today, U.S. primacy helps deter potential challenges to American interests in virtually every part of the world. Few countries or non-state groups want to invite the focused enmity of the United States (to use William Wohlforths apt phrase), and countries and groups that have done so (such as Libya, Iraq, Serbia, or the Taliban) have paid a considerable price. As discussed below, U.S. dominance does provoke opposition in a number of places, but antiAmerican elements are forced to rely on covert or indirect strategies (such as terrorist bombings) that do not seriously threaten Americas dominant position. Were American power to decline significantly, however, groups opposed to U.S. interests would probably be emboldened and overt challenges would be more likely. This does not mean that the United States can act with impunity, nor does it guarantee that the United States will achieve every one of its major foreign policy objectives. It does mean that the United States has a margin of security that weaker states do not possess. This margin of safety is a luxury, perhaps, but it is also a luxury that few Americans would want to live without.
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Unipolarity Good: Hard Power Impacts
US military power projection is needed to solve for a host of issues WMD proliferation, hotspots for conflict, and peace enforcement Ruth Wedgewood, Professor of Law @ Yale University, Winter 2001 (The Irresolution of Rome Law & Contemporary Problems) http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp/lcptoc64winter2001.html With the close of the Cold War, some political leaders in Europe and elsewhere have felt a heady independence, doubtful that U.S. power remains crucial in global security tasks. Deterring regional bullies and terrorist groups is seen by some as insufficient reason to accommodate American military needs, even with the tensions remaining between India and Pakistan, North and South Korea, Taiwan and the Peoples Republic of China. But a disdain for American power will have wide ranging consequences. In peace enforcement operations, whether in the Persian Gulf or Kosovo, the traditional U.S. tasks of airlift, logistics, intelligence, and air power cannot be delegated to countries that lack capacity. A new generation of smart weapons has not been purchased by Europe, and no country matches U.S. naval capacity . Even in regional peacekeeping, as in East Timor, a successful operation often depends on U.S. material and diplomatic support. In peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and counter-terrorism, the United States will continue to play a flagship role. There are other new threats to peace as well, including the proliferation of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.
Loss of a credible threat of force encourages hegemonic rivalry and rogue states empirically proven
Tobias Harris, Editor of Concord Bridge Magazine, 5/20/2003 (Gulliver Unbound Concord Bridge Magazine) http://people.brandeis.edu/~cbmag/Articles/2003%20May/Gulliver%20unbound-%20May%202003.pdf. With the pitfalls of multilateralism exposed following the jaunt into the United Nations prior to the Iraq war, what should be the new structure of Americas foreign and national security policy? As President Bush has made painstakingly clear, the world is rife with states that aspire (and conspire) to harm the United States and its global interests. This is by no means a new development, as the machinations of various rogue states during the 1990s revealed. The robust use of American power must remain the foundation upon which American foreign policy is based. The renunciation of power is not a possibility, as the Carter administration demonstrated. Ex-President Carter desired a world in which human rights were respected, but he foreswore the forceful exertion of American might that is the most certain means with whic h to guarantee human freedom worldwide. The failure to use the American military to challenge the Iranian revolution at its inception, and the simultaneous degradation of the militarys capabilities led America to the nadir of its influence during the cold war, as the success of Ayatollah Khomeini and the renewed wave of Soviet expansion revealed the extent of American decline. Clearly, then, the abnegation of force by the United States merely encourages Americas foes and potential challengers for hegemony. Any foreign policy that seeks to extend the unipolar moment must rest on the use of force to destroy or discourage apparent and rising threats. If the world is unwilling to stomach American power, then security multilateralism must be downgraded. American security must take precedence over the feelings of the international community.
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Unipolarity Good: Credible Hard Power key to Deterrence
CREDIBLE MILITARY THREAT REDUCES INTERVENTION, DETERS CONFLICTS, AND PROMOTES SUSTAINABLE LEADERSHIP Robert Kagan, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Columnist for the Washington Post, and Contributing Editor at the Weekly Standard and the New Republic, and William Kristol, Editor and Publisher of the Weekly Standard, Spring 2000 (The Present Danger National Interest) p. ebscohost A strong America capable of projecting force quickly and with devastating effect to important regions of the world would make it less likely that challengers to regional stability will attempt to alter the status quo in their favor. It might even deter them from undertaking expensive efforts to arm themselves for such a challenge. An America whose willingness to project force is in doubt , on the other hand, can only encourage such challenges. In Europe, in Asia and in the Middle East, the message we should be sending potential foes is: Dont even think about it. That kind of deterrence offers the best recipe for lasting peace, and it is much cheaper than fighting the wars that would follow should we fail to build such a deterrent capacity. OVERWHELMING HARD POWER AND RESOLVE NOT ONLY DETERS ENEMIES, BUT PREVENTS SECURITY COMPETITION THAT CAUSES BALANCING Walter Russell Mead, Senior Fellow for United States Foreign Policy, Council on Foreign Relations, 2004 (Power, Terror, Peace, and War) p. 30 Over time, there has been a distinct shift in American strategic thinking toward the need for overwhelming military superiority as the surest foundation for national security. This is partly for the obvious reasons of greater security, but it is partly also because supremacy can have an important deterrent effect. If we achieve such a degree of military supremacy that challenges seem hopeless, other states might give up trying. Security competition is both expensive and dangerous. Establishing an overwhelming military supremacy might not only go far to deter potential enemies from military attack, but it might also deter other powers from trying to match the American buildup. PERCEPTION OF RESOLVE AND WILLINGNESS TO USE FORCE IS KEY TO DETERRING US ENEMIES BIN LADEN PROVES Walter Russell Mead, Senior Fellow for United States Foreign Policy, Council on Foreign Relations, 2004 (Power, Terror, Peace, and War) p. 128 Force remains an important element of international relations ; America's enemies need to understand that the United States possesses more force than other powers and is, under the right circumstances, more than willing to use it. Frequently in the past other powers have misjudged the United States; we seem so feckless and indolent in peace that in both world wars and the Cold War our enemies seem to have discounted our will and ability to fight and persevere . Osama Bin Laden seems to have made this mistake; thanks to the Bush administration's response, others are less likely to repeat it.
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BRITAIN PROVES THAT THE DECLINE OF PRIMACY TRIGGERS WORLD WAR
Mackubin Thomas Owens, professor of National Security Affairs, Naval War College, ORBIS, Spring 2006, Pages 307325 A Balanced Force Structure To Achieve a Liberal World Order In this postCold War era, no matter what U.S. strategy has been declared to be, it is in practice best described as primacy, which is predicated on the idea that the key to future peace and prosperity is for the United States to maintain the power position it held at the end of the Cold War. The twin objectives of primacy are to underwrite a liberal world order by providing security while preventing the emergence of a new rival along the lines of the former Soviet Union. The basis of primacy is hegemonic stability theory, which holds that (1) order in world politics is typically created by a single dominant power, and (2) the maintenance of order requires continued hegemony. Under this theory, a decline in relative U.S. power could create a more disorderly, less peaceful world. The object lesson for the United States is the decay of Pax Britannica that many believe was the necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the two world wars. As British hegemony declined, smaller states that previously had incentives to cooperate with Britain defected to other powers, causing the international system to fragment and leading to depression and war. The decline of American power could lead to a similar outcome.
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Unipolarity Good: Asian Wars
STRONG U.S. MILITARY POWER PROJECTION IN ASIA DAMPENS REGIONAL COMPETITION AND PREVENTS THE OUTBREAK OF WAR Thomas J. Christensen is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2006, p. 81 Despite the differences in the positive-sum and zero-sum perspectives, one can find areas of common ground, particularly when analyzing the policy prescriptions that flow from both as the United States faces a rising China in Asia. In many instances, the positive-sum and zero-sum worlds are not polar opposites. A robust U.S. military role combined with U.S. alliances and security partnerships in East Asia deters aggression and prevents potentially intense intraregional security competitions in either world. As discussed above, the effort to maintain U.S. supremacy in East Asia is axiomatic from the zero-sum perspective. But U.S. military superiority in East Asia is important for many observers writing from the positive-sum perspective as well. For the United States to provide common security and reassure local actors who mistrust each other more than they mistrust Washington, the United States needs to be more powerful in the region than any other single regional actor. To do so, it must maintain strong regional alliances. REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS CANNOT SOLVE THE NEED FOR U.S. MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN ASIA Thomas J. Christensen is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2006, p. 81 Uncertainty about the future of China also provides another reason for overlap between the positive-sum and zero-sum logics. As mentioned earlier, Asia still looks far from fully stable even from a purely positive-sum point of view. Historical issues are still a cause for tensions between, for example, China and Japan, Japan and Korea, and Korea and China. Regime types still vary wildly around the region. Irredentist claims and sovereignty disputes still abound, especially at sea, even though many land border disputes have been settled since 1993. Even if one believes that the eventual acquisition of nuclear weapons would be a stabilizing factor, the process by which certain Asian countries, such as India, Pakistan, and North Korea, have tried to obtain them has caused greater instability in the near term. n92 Finally, the development of regional multilateral institutions seems impressive only when one uses the early 1990s as a comparative baseline. n93 ASEAN, the ARF, and ASEAN plus Three arguably do reduce regional tensions, but the limits of the organizations are evident whenever any positive security agenda issue, such as joint antipiracy or antiterrorism patrolling of the Malacca Strait, is pursued. In the economic realm, wealth differentials within and between countries are still high. Perhaps most important, China remains undemocratic and potentially domestically unstable even as it experiences impressive economic and military growth. So the United States has plenty of reasons to sustain a strong military presence in East Asia and maintain its alliances and security partnerships, even if one subscribes fully to a positive-sum approach to regional security dynamics. As a result, the policies flowing from such a theoretical viewpoint might not always look very different from the policies prescribed when employing the logic of a zero-sum struggle for power.
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Unipolarity Good: Asian Wars
THE U.S. IS STRONGLY ENGAGED IN EAST ASIA NOW
Thomas J. Christensen is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2006, p. 81 Even if one accepts a zero-sum perspective on Sino-American competition in East Asia, the news for the United States is not all bad. The United States has improved its strategic relations with several South Asian and Central Asian states since September 11, 2001. U.S. ties with India have improved markedly, even as the United States has maintained a limited strategic partnership with Pakistan in the war on terror. More important, the U.S.-Japan alliance is arguably stronger now than at any time since the end of the Cold War. The U.S. economy remains highly important to all of the regional actors, especially to the ASEAN states and to China itself. Although regional actors do not want to choose the United States over China, they do not want to be forced to choose China over the United States either.
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Unipolarity Good: Democracy Promotion
U.S. LEADERSHIP IS CRUCIAL FOR GLOBAL DEMOCRACY
Samuel Huntington, Professor of Political Science @ Harvard, International Security, Spring 1993, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-2889(199321)17%3A4%3C68%3AWIPM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T Second, the collapse of the Soviet Union leaves the United States as the only major power whose national identity is defined by a set of universal political and economic values. For the United States these are liberty, democracy, equality, private property, and markets. In varying degrees other major countries may from time to time support these values. Their identity, however, is not defined by these values, and hence they have far less commitment to them and less interest in promoting them than does the United States. This is not, obviously, to argue that these values are always at the forefront of American foreign policy; other concerns and needs have to be taken into consideration. It is, rather, to argue that the promotion of democracy, human rights, and markets are far more central to American policy than to the policy of any other country. Following in the footsteps of both Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton has committed himself to a foreign policy of democratic realism in which the central goal of the United States will be the promotion of democracy around the world. The maintenance of American primacy and the strengthening of American influence in the world are indispensable to achieving that goal. To argue that primacy does not matter is to argue that political and economic values do not matter and that democracy does not or should not matter. A world without U.S. primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any other country in shaping global affairs. The sustained international primacy of the United States is central to the welfare and security of Americans and to the future of freedom, democracy, open economies, and international order in the world.
DEMOCRACY SOLVES EXTINCTION, ECONOMY
Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, December, 1995; Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, http://www.carnegie.org//sub/pubs/deadly/diam_rpt.html // Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty and openness The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.
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Unipolarity Good: Nuclear Proliferation
US PRIMACY BEST WAY TO PROMOTE PEACE AND STEM PROLIFERATION
Bradley A. Thayer, Professor Defense & Strategic Studies, Missouri State University, 2006, The National Interest, November/December, p. 145 U.S. primacy--and the bandwagoning effect--has also given us extensive influence in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation.
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Unipolarity Good: Economy
AMERICAN PRIMACY IS KEY TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
Stephen Walt, Professor of International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government @ Harvard, Naval War College Review, Spring, 2002 , http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~swalt/files/art1-sp2.pdf Primacy Fosters Prosperity By facilitating the development of a more open and liberal world economy, American primacy also fosters global prosperity. Economic interdependence is often said to be a cause of world peace, but it is more accurate to say that peace encourages interdependence-by making it easier for states to accept the potential vulnerabilities of extensive international intercourse. Investors are more willing to send money abroad when the danger of war is remote, and states worry less about being dependent on others when they are not concerned that these connections might be severed. When states are relatively secure, they will also be less fixated on how the gains from cooperation are distributed. In particular, they are less likely to worry that extensive cooperation will benefit others more and thereby place them at a relative disadvantage over time. By providing a tranquil international environment, in short, U.S. primacy has created political conditions that are conducive to expanding global trade and investment. Indeed, American primacy was a prerequisite for the creation and gradual expansion of the European Union, which is often touted as a triumph of economic self-interest over historical rivalries. Because the United States was there to protect the Europeans from the Soviet Union and from each other, they could safely ignore the balance of power within Western Europe and concentrate on expanding their overall level of economic integration. The expansion of world trade has been a major source of increased global prosperity, and U.S. primacy is one of the central pillars upon which that system rests. The United States also played a leading role in establishing the various institutions that regulate and manage the world economy. As a number of commentators have noted, the current era of "globalization" is itself partly an artifact of American power.
THE IMPACT IS GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR
Chris H. Lewis Professor at UC Boulder, "The Coming Age of Scarcity" p. 56 1998 Most critics would argue, probably correctly, that instead of allowing underdeveloped countries to withdraw from the global economy and undermine the economies of the developed world, the United States, Europe, and Japan and others will fight neocolonial wars to force these countries to remain within this collapsing global economy. These neocolonial wars will result in mass death, suffering, and even regional nuclear wars. If first world countries choose military confrontation and political repression to maintain the global economy, then we may see mass death and genocide on a global scale that will make the deaths of World War II pale in comparison. However, these neocolonial wars, fought to maintain the developed nations' economic and political hegemony, will cause the final collapse of our global industrial civilization. These wars will so damage the complex economic and trading networks and squander material, biological and energy resources that they will undermine the global economy and its ability to support the earth's 6 to 8 billion people. This would be the worst case scenario for the collapse of global civilization
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Unipolarity Good: European Wars
HEGEMONY IS KEY TO PREVENT EUROPEAN WARS Edward Luck, president of the United Nations Association of the USA, FOREIGN POLICY, Winter 92/03, p. 139 Whether the neo-isolationists like it or not, the United States has been the quintessential global power for almost half a century. Our country possesses a unique combination of military, economic, and political assets acquired over time to protect and nurture our global interests. Some Americans chant that we are number one even as they complain that we cannot afford the costs of leadership; we cannot have it both ways. If we want to retain our status as a world leader, then we cannot walk away from our responsibilities simply because they entail risks and costs. There are also significant risks in forfeiting Americas leadership position to another country or countries, whether globally or regionally, in a world of such rapid and unpredictable change. Do we really want to encourage other states to fill the void left by an American retreat? Could we then easily and peacefully reassert our preeminence, should our interests be threatened? Subnational violence may be a much broader threat to international security than it would at first appear. Refugees, national minorities, and weapons proliferation may well trigger a 1990s version of the domino effect. Although it is not inevitable that ethnic, religious, or tribal violence in one country will spread to its neighbors, there are usually significant spill-over effects; The refugee flow from the Balkans and Eastern Europe provides a pretext for the revival of neo-Nazism in Germany for less-violent unrest elsewhere in Western Europe. THE IMPACT IS NUCLEAR WAR Charles Glaser, professor, Chicago, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 1993, p. 22 However, although the lack of an imminent Soviet treat eliminates the most obvious danger, U.S. security has not been entirely separated from the future of Western Europe. The ending of the Cold War has brought many benefits, but has not eliminated the possibility of major power war, especially since such a war could grow out of a smaller conflict in the East. And although nuclear weapons have greatly reduced the threat that a European hegemony would post to U.S. security, a sound case nevertheless remains that a major European war could threaten U.S. security. The United States could be draw into such a war, even if strict security considerations suggested it should stay out. A major power war could escalate to a nuclear war that, especially if the United States joins, could include attacks against the American homeland.
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Unipolarity Good: Free Trade
HEGEMONY IS KEY TO FREE TRADE Rep. Flloyd Spence, ROLL CALL, May 14, 2001, p. online Increasingly the economic health of an individual country may be greatly affected by other nations or even by events in other parts of the world. As a result of this burgeoning economic globalization, many of the finished goods and raw materials that move among countries are carried across the worlds oceans in ships. As the worlds sole remaining superpower, the United States has an interest in ensuring that the orderly flow of goods and materials constitute legal trade among nations is not disturbed. The ships of the U.S. Navy forward deployed around the world help ensure the stability that fosters this seaborne commerce. THE IMPACT IS GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR Michel Spice, British member of Parliament, THE CHALLENGE FROM THE EAST, 1996, p. 121 A world divided into rigid trade blocs will be a deeply trouble and unstable place in which suspicion and ultimately envy will possibly erupt into a major war. I do not say that the converse will necessarily be true, that in a free trading world there will be an absence of all strife. Such a proposition would manifestly be absurd. But to trade is to become interdependent, and that is a good stop in the direction of world stability. With nuclear wepons at two a penny, stability wil be at a premium in the years ahead.
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Unipolarity Good: India-Pakistan War
HEGEMONY IS KEY TO PREVENT CONFLICT BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN
Defense News, June 28, 2004, http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2005/2004speech-archive/keynote-address-prime-minister-goh-chok-tong In Asia, as in Europe, unease with Americas overwhelming dominance is high. But Asia is more keenly aware than Europe of the vital role that the U.S. plays in maintaining global stability. No matter what their misgivings, only a few Asian countries, and certainly no major U.S. ally, opposed the United States on Iraq. This is because Asia still faces many serious security challenges. Kashmir, North Korea, and cross-strait relations between Beijing and Taipei are potential flashpoints. If things to terribly wrong, the conflicts could even go nuclear. The United States is central to the management of all three potential flashpoints. The India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir is difficult to resolve because of religion and history. If a conflicts breaks out, it is not difficult to imagine Kashmir becoming a new theater for Jihad and a fertile breeding ground for terrorists.
THE IMPACT IS EXTINCTION
BUSINESS RECORDER, December 17, 2000 Pakistan has sought to match India bomb for bomb and missile for missile. And the great causes bell for warring between the two South Asian rivals is Kashmir, which has already sparked two such clashes. But they came before India and Pakistan could engage in nuclear volleys that could menace the entire planet with nuclear winter or a variation of that apocalypse. It is the potential for nuclear exchanges over Kashmir that has promoted President Bill Clinton and his national security advisers to characterize the disputed territory as the most dangerous place on earth.
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Unipolarity Good: Middle East Proliferation
U.S. LEADERSHIP IS KEY TO PREVENT WAR AND PROLIF IN THE MIDDLE EAST Khalilzad and Lesser 98
(Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND, Ian Lesser, RAND, Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR897/MR897.chap4.pdf) Finally, the most important extraregional variable for the future of regional security will be the United States itself. Our analysis highlights the enduring nature of U.S. interests in the Middle East. The level and character of our engagement and presence, and our capacity for power projection in times of crisis, will be dominant elements in the regional security equation for the foreseeable future. The influence of the United States on the strategic environment across the region under current conditions cannot be overemphasized. American withdrawalthe end of Americas role as preeminent security guarantorcould transform the security picture in profound terms and could affect the propensity for conflict and cooperation far beyond the region, as other extraregional actors move to fill the strategic vacuum. One of the many potentially disastrous consequences of U.S. withdrawal might be the much more rapid spread of weapons of mass destruction as regional powers strive to substitute for American deterrence or capitalize on their newfound freedom of action.
THE IMPACT IS GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR PROLIFERATION
Theodore Taylor, former deputy director of the Defense Nuclear Agency, PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, 2001, http://www.globalcommunity.org/breakthrough/book/pdfs/taylor.pdf Limited nuclear wars between countries with small numbers of nuclear weapons could escalate into major wars between superpowers. For example, a nation in an advanced stage of latent proliferation, finding itself losing a nonnuclear war, might complete the transition to deliverable nuclear weapons and, in desperation, use them. If that should happen in a region, such as the Middle East, where major superpower interests are at stake, the small nuclear war could easily escalate into a global nuclear war.
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Unipolarity Good: No Alternative
No realistic alternative to U.S. hegemony David P. Calleo, September 2007, Survival, p. 73-8 (David Calleo Dean Acheson Professor; Director of the
European Studies Program; University Professor of The Johns Hopkins University)
If the United States retreats, can anyone else pretend to the hegemonic role? At present, no substitute seems probable. China, for all its explosive growth, is still too self-centred and undeveloped. European states perhaps have remnants of an imperial mentality, but to focus its power the EU would have to turn itself into a tightly run federation, which it shows scant inclination to do. And with ecological constraints preventing growth on a scale sufficient to close the gap between Asia and the West, markets alone cannot be expected to provide a harmonious future. In short, this new century seems fated to a plural international order, with little prospect either of inner harmony or Hobbesian hegemony. In such a world, liberal imperialism leads to a dead end. The EU could collapse David P. Calleo, September 2007, Survival, p. 73-8 (David Calleo Dean Acheson Professor; Director of the
European Studies Program; University Professor of The Johns Hopkins University)
Europe still seems on a different path. Its Union aims not to rob its member states of sovereignty, but to enable them to accomplish ends they all need but cannot achieve singly. At present, the European project is not much appreciated in the United States. It is feared as a potential rival and despised for not rigorously pursuing hard power. Quite apart from the need to reorder relations with the United States and Russia, the Union faces several other severe challenges: determining the limits of enlargement, coping with instability in its own near-abroad, reconciling consensual decision-making with decisive action, and coping with the threat of global competition to domestic prosperity and welfare. Any of these challenges could prove fatal.
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Unipolarity Good: No Alternative
NO OTHER POWER IS CAPABLE OF GLOBAL LEADERSHIP
Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter, CSIS, SECOND CHANCE: THREE PRESIDENTS AND THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 191-2 In large measure that is so because no other power is capable of playing the role that America potentially can and should play. Europe still lacks the requisite political unity and will to be a global power. Russia cannot decide whether it wishes to be an authoritarian, imperialist, socially backward Eurasian state or a genuinely modern European 'democracy. China is emerging rapidly as the dominant Far Eastern mainland power, but it has a rival in Japan, and it is still unclear how China will resolve the basic contradiction between its freewheeling economic momentum and the bureaucratic centralism of its political system. India has yet to prove that it can sustain unity and democracy if its religious, ethnic, and linguistic diversity becomes politically charged.
JAPAN, INDIA, OR RUSSIA WILL NOT EMERGE AS SUPERPOWERS
John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 20 Other possible contenders for superpower status including Japan, India, and Russia all have their own sets of limitations. Japan may have the world's second largest national economy, and may be a technological leader, but it is not a military power, and it has not translated economic power into political influence. It also lacks cultural influence in the world, except indirectly through the promotion of new technology. For its part, India may have a population of more than one billion, and may be a nuclear power, but it is no more than a regional power with few short-term prospects of expanding its reach, and the majority of its people live in poverty. And Russia has been demoted since the end of the cold war to regional power status, too focused on domestic political and economic change to have much impact on broader international problems.
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Unipolarity Good: No Alternative
ONLY U.S. POWER CAN PROTECT THE WORLD ORDER
Colin Gray, political scientist specializing in national security policy, THE SHERIFF: AMERICAS DEFENSE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER, 2004, pp. 5-6 The United States is the, indeed is the only, essential protecting power for the current world order. Again, this is not to be deterministic. Although there are no other bidders for this crown at present, it does not follow that the United States is condemned to play this role. After all, American world leadership in Paris in 1919 was succeeded post haste by a scuttle from many potential international obligations. Americans today could elect to withdraw from the outside world, insofar as they could in political-military way s. They would hope that the civilizationa1 offense given by the soft power of their now globally beamed culture would not be found unduly provocative abroad. Whether The Great Satan, as Iranian spokespeople have delighted in calling the United States, would be allowed to hunker down in peaceful sanctuary in North America, we should doubt. Still, it could be tried. After September 11, 2001, isolationist sentiment temporarily has lost much We may not be much interested in terrorism, but it woulfd appear that terrorism is interested in us. For good or ill, we are what we are . Exactly what this is has been explained in no uncertain terms by Henry Kissinger in the opening lines of his book, Doer America Need a Foreign Policy? No prizes are awarded for guessing that his question is strictly rhetorical. Kissinger proclaims that At the dawn of the new millennium, the United States is enjoying a preeminence unrivalled by even the greatest empires of the past. From weaponry to entrepreneurship, from science to technology, from higher education to popular culture, America exercises an unparalleled ascendancy around the globe. During the last decade of the twentieth century, Americas preponderant position rendered it the indispensable component of international stability . The condition of unchallenged, indeed unchallengeable, primacy will not endure-it is not strategic history's "last move"-but while it does the United States is the only candidate for sheriff. If Americans should decline the honor, they are at least uniquely well equipped to ensure that no one else could possibly succeed in that informal office . As Donald Kagan provided our basic text, quoted under the first point above, so it is only fitting that he should also be allowed to sound the warning bell. Kagan advises that: Unexpected changes and shifts in power are the warp and woof of international history. The current condition of the world, therefore, where war among major powers is hard to conceive because one of them has overwhelming military superiority and no wish to expand, will not last." Quite so. However, historians, perhaps especially ancient historians, should be expected to take the long view. And in the long view, everything crumbles. But a suitable vision for the inspiration of policy, judicious choice of policy goals, and competence in strategy, should allow Americans to prolong their current strategic moment, as a later point makes explicit. To be the sheriff of the current world order is a thankless role. American power may be necessary to restore such order as may be restorable, but Americans will not be loved, or even much appreciated, as a consequence. The rest of the world will be envious, fearful, and resentful, all the while seeking to use the leverage of American power for local purposes. There is no term extant that precisely captures the emerging U.S. role as sheriff of world order. For the first time since the mid-1960s, it has begun to be fashionable to refer to American policy and tasks as imperial.
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Unipolarity Good: No Alternative
NO SUBSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN PRIMACY TO MAINTAINING GLOBAL ORDER
Bradley A. Thayer, Professor Defense & Strategic Studies, Missouri State University, 2006, The National Interest, November/December, p. Lexis There is no other state, group of states or international organization that can provide these global benefits. None even comes close. The United Nations cannot because it is riven with conflicts and major cleavages that divide the international body time and again on matters great and trivial. Thus it lacks the ability to speak with one voice on salient issues and to act as a unified force once a decision is reached. The EU has similar problems. Does anyone expect Russia or China to take up these responsibilities? They may have the desire, but they do not have the capabilities. Let's face it: for the time being, American primacy remains humanity's only practical hope of solving the world's ills.
THE U.S. IS THE ONLY GLOBAL POWER THAT CAN DEFEAT A VARIETY OF THREATS
Colin Gray, political scientist specializing in national security policy, THE SHERIFF: AMERICAS DEFENSE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER, 2004, p. 18 At present the United States is the only possible sheriff of world order with respect to the more testing of strategic threats to that order from any quarter and of several kinds, both regular and irregular.,' The three great American interventions in world conflicts in the twentieth century were all highly specific as to adversary. That is not the case today. The American sheriff must be ready to combat and defeat threats from whatever quarter they derive, and in whatever mode they appear. Islamic fundamentalists with transnational networks may be the menace of this decade, but that danger may not long persist as a lethal peril, notwithstanding its WMD dimension." It is too soon to say. Moreover, the contemporary war against terror, and similar linguistic abominations, highlights America's global role, it does not define and drive it. The United States is not the sheriff of the current world order because there are dangerous terrorists out there.. Many of the world's terrorists today choose to target Uncle Sam precisely because he is so imperial. As Robert Kagan has written, in words quoted in an epigraph to this book, "outlaws shoot sheriffs, not saloon keepers.
PEACEKEEPING FAILS WITHOUT A U.S. CONTRIBUTION
Colin Gray, political scientist specializing in national security policy, THE SHERIFF: AMERICAS DEFENSE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER, 2004, p. 79 Ask those who strove against culturally impossible odds in Somalia! Flawed but nonetheless essential, having the United States on the team, which usually had to mean leading the team, hugely improved the prospect for success. Without a more than token American military contribution, the ventures in peacekeeping, let alone peacemaking, of the UN, the European Union, and even NATO, were shown to be mere adventure.
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Unipolarity Good: No Alternative
NO ALTERNATIVE TO U.S. HEGEMONY EXCEPT MASSIVE CHAOS
Colin Gray, political scientist specializing in national security policy, THE SHERIFF: AMERICAS DEFENSE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER, 2004, pp. 63-4 At present the alternative to American hegemony is not hegemony by some other polity, though that will be a significant probability in the longer term. Modern history shows us That the world is like when there is no dominant state extant. World politics from 1900 until 1945 provide a fair example of a leaderless condition. Between the demise of Great Britain as the vital power balancer in the nineteenth century and the emergence of the United States as the superpower in a class of its own in mid-century, the course of world history demonstrated what can happen when international security is contested by rival teams of state.
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Unipolarity Good: No Alternative
THE U.S. IS CRITICAL TO GLOBAL ORDER & STABILITY
Colin Gray, political scientist specializing in national security policy, THE SHERIFF: AMERICAS DEFENSE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER, 2004, pp. 56-7 First, by any plausible definition the United States today is the sheriff of world order. Uncle Sam's is the number you call when truly "greater than expected threats" menace your neighborhood, and possibly all our neighborhoods. The world still does not have a police force. In a world of supposedly sovereign political actors, the members of the well-nigh universal UN, and particularly its great power dominated Security Council, can license action on their collective behalf. But, as the saying goes, "someone actually has to go and do it." The UN is both a blessing and a curse for world order and its American sheriff. Fortunately, my argument is not vulnerable to the range of readers' attitudes toward the UN. The organizing vision of American guardianship is inherently relaxed about UN, or other institutions', involvement in U.S. performance of the lawman's role. To coin a phrase, whatever works and is helpful should be used. Moreover, the United States may be obliged to have to resort to some multilateral diplomacy which, although it is likely to be more of a hindrance than a help in a technical sense, may still be politically valuable. Second, and to extend the first claim, for the better part of a hundred years the United States has already acted as the sheriff on occasions both great and small. The facts of ongoing war, certainly of a distinctly live balance of power, may obscure the historical reality. Ever since 1917, and notwithstanding its appalling military unreadiness, the United States has behaved more as a deaas ex machina, a savior from across the sea, than as just another country, albeit a powerful one. In the three world wars of the last century, the United States functioned in effect as sheriff Because of its resources, both material and moral, America played the lawman role. Since the end of the Cold War, particularly in Bosnia in 1995 and IOosovo in 1999, it was once again U.S. intervention that was decisive. A sheriff has to make a vital difference (if he does not, it is time to step down). He should not merely complicate an already bloody contest. Radical changes in political context have contributed to confusion over how the American role today compares with its role in times past. Of course, the contexts for American policy could hardly appear more different: in 1917, to choose to join in a great " ,at as an Associated Power (rather than an ally); in 1941, to be summoned to a two-ocean conflict and really to wage two distinct wars, one against the superpower of the moment (a moment which U.S. strength notably helped render relatively brief)"; in 1947, to balance the influence of Stalin's expanding empire (a term employed here in its precise technical meaning of rule over foreigners); and then, half a century later, occasionally to exercise muscle and exert leadership when alternatives were signally lacking.
AMERICAN HEGEMONY BETTER THAN THE ALTERNATIVES
Robert J. Lieber, Georgetown University, 2005, The American Era: power and strategy for the 21st century, p. 53-4 Based on past experience, the United States would almost certainly be drawn back into these areas, whether to defend friendly states, to cope with a humanitarian catastrophe, or to prevent a hostile power from dominating an entire region. Steven Peter Rosen has thus fittingly observed, If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive. Similarly, Niall Ferguson has added that those who dislike American predominance ought to bear in mind that the alternative may not be a world of competing great powers, but one with no hegemon at all. Fergusons warning may be hyerpbolic, but it hints at the perils that the absence of a dominant power, apolarity, could bring an anarchic new Dark Age of waning empires and religious fanaticism; of endemic plunder and pillage in the worlds forgotten regions of economic stagnation and civilizations retreat into a few fortified enclaves.
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NO EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO US HEGEMONY
Michael Mandelbaum, Professor Foreign Policy Johns Hopkins, 2005, The Case for Goliath: How America acts as the worlds government in the 21st Century, p. 218 For better or for worse, therefore, the world has, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, no substitute for the United States as the provider of governmental services to the international system. Rather than being home alone, the United States is, in this sense, abroad alone. Insofar as American foreign policy is unilateral, this is by default as well as by choice. The American government and the American public can, and will, decide whether, how far, and for how long to sustain the policies that amount, collectively, to bearing the burden of global governance. They will not have the option that, all other things being equal, they might well prefer: sharing that burden with others.
ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO US HEGEMONY IS WORLD GOVERNMENT
Michael Mandelbaum, Professor Foreign Policy Johns Hopkins, 2005, The Case for Goliath: How America acts as the worlds government in the 21st Century, p. 195-6 Their awareness, sometimes dim and almost never explicitly spelled out, of the political, military, and economic dangers that would come with the retreat of American power causes other countries to refrain from combining to try to displace the United States from its place at the center of the international system. Virtually all of them harbor some grievance or other against the twenty-first-century international order, but none would welcome the absence of any order at all, which is what the collapse of American power might well bring. Grudgingly, tacitly, silently, other countries support the American role as the worlds government out of the well-grounded fear that while the conduct of the United States may be clumsy, overbearing, and even occasionally insufferable, the alternative would be worse, perhaps much worse. If America should, for whatever combination of reasons, cease to function as the worlds government, some replacement would be needed to avoid the costs and dangers that would otherwise ensue. What could take the place of American power? The logical substitute is something that has occasionally been proposed but never actually created: a proper world government.
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Unipolarity Good: No European Alternative to U.S. Leadership
THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO U.S. LEADERSHIP
Maurice R. Greenberg is chairman and CEO of C. V. Starr & Co.,IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST, Winter 2005/6,
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And make no mistake, if the United States does not lead, who will? The future of the European Union is a question mark. The proposed constitution was not enthusiastically embraced by Europe's population. More and more Europeans are dissatisfied with the euro, which, I might add, seems less and less likely to replace the dollar as the leading currency for global trade and finance. American leadership is essential to put together the broad-based coalitions necessary to tackle these problems. Our national interest is served by continuing to build up our relations with other states, creating a network of mutual interdependence, rather than ignoring problems or isolating ourselves from the rest of the world.
THE EU IS NOT UNIFIED ENOUGH TO REPLACE U.S. LEADERSHIP
Sir Lawrence Freedman is Professor of War Studies and Vice Principal, Kings College London, SURVIVAL, Winter 2005-6, p. 31 In such circumstances the sterile debate on whether the task for Europe is to complement or qualify US power could be overtaken by the novelty of an American debate about whether to complement or qualify European power. The EU, however, lacks the inner coherence, resourcefulness and decisiveness to play a role comparable to the United States. The idea of the European pole reflects a world that is best understood in terms of alternative configurations of Great Powers. The pressures facing Europe, however, are not usefully understood in those terms. It suggests an independent ability to manoeuvre between the other poles, to get the optimum configuration, yet this independence does not exist. Most members of the EU now have little interest in a Europe that can define itself only in relation to the United States, even if this could be achieved. It is not even as if the United States poses the main or even the most difficult competitive challenge any longer. The new Europe is notable for its diversity, to the point where the possibilities for uniformity in foreign policy are bound to be limited. In practice, to the extent that there is a European foreign policy it will be set by the governments of the larger European states. The major current inhibitor may be less transatlantic than trans-channel differences. The precondition for any assertion of European power is that Britain, France and Germany are in basic agreement. Can these countries define a strategic vision for Europe? Policy to date has been largely reactive. The basic organising principle often appears to be to find the minimum necessary for a quiet life, especially with Washington. Many initiatives appear designed to discourage the Americans from taking bolder steps. This is why Europeans feel unable to denounce the idea of democracy promotion but are also unable to accept the idea that this can always be a fundamental organising principle for foreign policy. Given the limited stocks of hard and soft power available on both sides of the Atlantic, and uncertainty about whether the spread of democracy is really a strategic vision rather than a noble aspiration, there seems to be little choice but to deal directly with regimes of doubtful character and legitimacy.
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Unipolarity Good: No Effective Alternative to U.S. Unipolarity
NO OTHER COUNTRY IMAGINES A GLOBAL SECURITY STRUCTURE WITHOUT U.S. LEADERSHIP. FAILURE OF U.S LEADERSHIP CAUSES GLOBAL CONFLICT Zbigniew Brzezinski, famous geostrategist, former diplomat, Johns Hopkins & CSIS, THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, 2004, p. 124 America has played so central a role in world affairs during the last sixty years that currently it is almost impossible either for the Europeans or for the Asians to envisage any international arrangement that does not somehow politically involve America as well. For Europe, that reality has been enshrined in NATO, and in the years to come probably also will be cemented through the overlapping responsibilities of NATO and the EU's own slowly emerging military capabilities. In the Far East, American defense ties with Japan and South Korea, as well as informally with Taiwan, have made these three states' security inseparable from America's. Even China itself for decades critical of America's military presence in Asia, has in recent years moved to a recognition (as a PRC official put it) that "the purposes of China's policy and that of the United States on maintaining Asian stability are generally identical:'1s That condition could be un dermined if Europe and Asia were to be swept by a populist anti-American movement that defined itself as PanEuropeanism in the west and as Pan-Asianism in the east. Each has its forerunners, though neither has so far succeeded in mobilizing the hearts and minds of most Europeans or Asians. Both are nascent forms of supranationalist regionalism. In Europe, a Pan-European movement surfaced after the calamities of World War I, but it failed to overcome the nationalistic particularisms of the European peoples. During World War II, Hitler tried, especially during his attack on the Soviet Union, to enlist the loyalties of Fascist -minded Frenchmen, Belgians, Dutchmen, and Norwegians on behalf of the defense of a common "Europa" against the Bolshevist hordes. The effort met with minimal success. In the Far East, the Japanese militarists promoted the "Greater East Asian Co -Prosperity Sphere;' exploiting the idea of Pan-Asianism to appeal to the anti-colonial sentiments of the Chinese, Thais, Javanese, Burmese, and Indians. Again the effort foundered, though it did contribute marginally to the rise of anti-colonial passions. One cannot entirely dismiss the possibilityremote as it currently may be --of an anti-American reaction that cloaks itself in European and Asianist garbs. It could happen if Pan-Europeanism and Pan-Asianism become the rallying cries for those who view America as a common menace. Anti-Americanism would then be deliberately defined in regionally nationalistic terms, and the effort to reduce or even expel the American presence from the western and eastern extremities of Eurasia would serve as a common platform. In Europe, a Franco-German alliance-a resurrection of the state of Charlemagne--could become the standard bearer of a Pan- Europeanism that is defined as well as politically energized by resentment of American hegemony in general and of its role in the Middle East in particular. It would thus blend political, strategic, and cultural irritation with America in the larger cause of an autonomous Pan- Europe. Previews of such an extreme orientation surfaced in the European outcries against the war that the United States undertook against Iraq in 2003. In the Far East, with ideology waning and nationalism intensifying, China is beginning to redefine itself from a "revolutionary" power into Asia's putative leader. China already dominates the trade of most Southeast Asian states and is increasingly making its economic and political presence felt in the formerly Russian-dominated Central Asia. Chinese officials speak of Asia's rising role and link Asia's future with China's. The new president of China selected in March 2003, Hu Jintao, declared when visiting Malaysia as vice president in May 2002 that "Asia cannot become prosperous without China. History has proved and will continue to prove that China is an active force propelling Asian development:' References to China's Asian mission have also become increasingly frequent in Chinese foreign policy pronouncements, with an emphasis on China's special role. A distinctive Asian political orientation may already be emerging from the progressive institutionalization of purely Asian regional cooperation. China, Japan, and South Korea have annually been holding separate trilateral summits; there is movement toward an Asian economic bloc; and security cooperation on an Asian regional basis is under discussion. Some Asian leaders make no secret of the fact that Chinese are quite open about their design. ".. .setting up a cooperative organization in the East Asian region had become one of China's long-term strategic goals.. ..China has already realized that the integration of a region not only means social and economic integration, but political and security-oriented integration as well. At the same time, it also realized that in order to gain the trust of the nations on the periphery and to play the role that a large nation should assume in the region, then it must blend in with the society of the region in all respects, and together with other nations determine and follow a unified game plan. This trend has been noted by Japanese observers, some of whom have pointedly described the Chinese efforts as aiming at "a Greater Chinese Economic Sphere: 'They have also warned that "there is a danger that a Great China region may be I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of orange juice.
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created in Asia and in turn could lead to exclusionary regionalism." Japanese discussions of foreign affairs have signaled, furthermore, that the Japanese are becoming increasingly concerned that the existing security arrangements in the Far East may weaken and that Japan may face some basic choices. As noted earlier, the most likely reaction to a major destabilizing jolt to East Asia's metastability-such as an American failure to deal effectively and in a regional approach with the challenge posed by North Korea-would be for Japan to take an abrupt and isolated plunge into remilitarization. That by itself would then intensify China's inclination to assume more explicit leadership of an exclusionary continental Asianism. The volatile character of Japanese and Korean nationalisms presents a critical element of uncertainty. Both nations were subdued and sublimated in context of post World War II dependence on America. That dependence has been rationalized as a historical as well as strategic necessity. Should that acceptance give way to resentment, radical nationalisms in both countries could turn anti-American, igniting a regional Asianist identity that defines itself in terms of independence from American hegemony. The potential for that exist in both countries, and some unexpected but traumatic development could trigger it.
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Unipolarity Good: Free Trade/Military Hegemony Key to Global Democracy
FREE TRADE AND U.S. MILITARY LEADERSHIP PROMOTE GLOBAL DEMOCRATIZATION Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Professor of Political Science and director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania, THE NATIONAL INTEREST, WINTER 2005-6,
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Likewise, the U.S. military umbrella and its leadership in constructing an open, stable trading system permitted states like West Germany, Taiwan and South Korea to create the preconditions for stable democracy despite their nations being divided by the Cold War. A successful long-term project for promoting democracy globally by inducement would require the United States and Europe to work together. Separately, each has liabilities. The European Union, hobbled by its internal constitutional imperfections, has expansion fatigue and is balking at the inclusion of Turkey.
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Unipolarity Good: No Country Can Replace U.S. Leadership
NO OTHER COUNTRY OR GLOBAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATION CAN REPLACE U.S. LEADERSHIP
Zbigniew Brzezinski, famous geostrategist, former diplomat, Johns Hopkins & CSIS, THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, 2004, p. 11 The former major European powers-Great Britain, Germany, and' France-are too weak to step into the breach. In the next two decades, it is quite unlikely that the European Union will become sufficiently united politically to muster the popular will to compete with the United States in the politico-military arena. Russia is no longer an imperial power, and its central challenge is to recover socioeconomically lest it lose its far eastern territories to China. Japan's population is aging and its economy has slowed; the conventional wisdom of the 1980s that Japan is destined to be the next "superstate" now has the ring of historical irony. China, even if it succeeds in maintaining high rates of economic growth and retains its internal political stability (both are far from certain), will at best be a regional power still constrained by an impoverished population, antiquated infrastructure, and limited appeal worldwide. The same is true of India, which additionally faces uncertainties regarding its long-term national unity:
RUSSIA CANT REPLACE EUROPE AS A GLOBAL PARTNER
Zbigniew Brzezinski, famous geostrategist, former diplomat, Johns Hopkins & CSIS, THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, 2004, p. 87 For example, although deeper cooperation with Russia is strategically desirable and historically timely (fuller discussion follows in the next section), Russia still lacks tl1e economic, financial, and technological means for addressing the growing risks of large-scale social turmoil and political turbulence in the new Global Balkans. So does India. Neither of the two can replace Europe or Japan as America's partner in the long-haul effort to sustain a modicum of global order.
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Unipolarity Good: No Alternative Will Arise in Response to U.S. Decline
U.S. DECLINE WILL PRODUCE MASSIVE DESTRUCTION, NOT A NEW GLOBAL POWER STRUCTURE Zbigniew Brzezinski, famous geostrategist, former diplomat, Johns Hopkins & CSIS, THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, 2004, p. 2 The key question is: What will replace it? An abrupt termination of American hegemony would without doubt precipitate global chaos, in which international anarchy would be punctuated by eruptions of truly massive destructiveness. An unguided progressive decline would have a similar effect, spread out over a longer time. But a gradual and controlled devolution of power could lead to an increasingly formalized global community of shared interest, with supranational arrangements increasingly assuming some of the special security roles of traditional nation-states.
U.S. DECLINE WILL NOT LEAD TO MULTIPOLARITY OR ALTERNATIVE LEADERSHIP
Zbigniew Brzezinski, famous geostrategist, former diplomat, Johns Hopkins & CSIS, THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, 2004, p. 2-3 In any case, the eventual end of American hegemony will not involve a restoration of multipolarity among the familiar major powers that dominated world affairs for the last two centuries. Nor will it yield to another dominant hegemon that would displace the United States by assuming a similar political, military, economic, technological, and sociocultural worldwide preeminence. The familiar powers of the last century are too fatigued or too weak to assume the role the United States now plays. It is noteworthy that since 1880, in a comparative ranking of world powers (cumulatively based on their economic strength, military budgets and assets, populations, etc.), the top five slots at sequential twenty-year intervals :have been shared by just seven states: the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia, Japan, and China. Only the United States, however, unambiguously earned inclusion among the top five in everyone of the twenty year intervals, and the gap in the year 2000 between the top-ranked United States and the rest was vastly wider than ever before.
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Unipolarity Good: Unipolarity Best/Multipolarity Fails
Multipolarity wont solven global problems a leader is needed Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek International, 2008, The Post-American World, p. 244
The problem is that these rising powers do not have an obvious and immediate incentive to solve the common problems that this new system generates. National frictions, climate change, trade disputes, environmental degredation, and infectious disease might all fester until a crisis hits and then it might be too late. Solving such problems and providing global public goods requires a moderator, organizer, or leader.
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Unipolarity Good: Unipolarity Best/Multipolarity Fails
COLLAPSE OF HEGEMONY RESULTS IN APOLARITY AND WAR NOT MULTIPOLARITY
Nial Ferguson, history professor, NYU, FOREIGN POLICY, July/August, 2004, p. www.foreignpolicy.com/story/files/story2579.php Anyone who dislikes U.S. hegemony should bear in mind that, rather than a multipolar world of competing powers, a world with no hegemon at all may be the real alternative to U.S. primacy. Apolarity could turn out to be an anarchic new Dark Age, an ear of warring empires and religious fanaticism; of endemic plunder and pillage in the worlds forgotten regions; of economic stagnation and civilizations retreat into a few fortified enclaves. DECLINE IN HEGEMONY CAUSES MASSIVE WARS Nial Ferguson, history professor, NYU, FOREIGN POLICY, July/August, 2004, p. www.foreignpolicy.com/story/files/story2579.php So what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous roughly 20 times more so friction between the worlds disparate tribes is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, so it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. .The reversal of globalization which a new Dark Age would produce would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. .The worse effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the warring great powers. The wealthiest powers of the global economy from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evanglical Christianity imported by U.S. religious workers. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria could continue their deadly work. If the United States retreats from global hegemony, its fragile -- its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new area of multipolar harmony., or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder.
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Unipolarity Good: Unipolarity Best/Multipolarity Fails
NYE AGREES THAT MULTILATERALISM WILL NOT SOLVE
Joseph Nye, Dean, JFK School of Government, Harvard, 2002 (THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER, pp. 12-13) America's power-hard and soft-is only part of the story. How others react to American power is equally important to the question of stability and governance in this global information age. Many realists extol the virtues of the classic nineteenth-century European balance of power, in which constantly shifting coalitions contained the ambitions of any especially aggressive power. They urge the United States to rediscover the virtues of a balance of power at the global level today. Already in the 1970s, Richard Nixon argued that "the only time in the history of the world that we have had extended periods of peace is when there has been a balance of power. It is when one nation becomes infinitely more powerful in relation to its potential competitors that the danger of war arises. But whether such multipolarity would be good or bad for the United States and for the world is debatable. I am skeptical. War was the constant companion and crucial instrument of the multipolar balance of power. The classic European balance provided stability in the sense of maintaining the independence of most countries, but there were wars among the great powers for 60 percent of the years since 1500. Rote adherence to the balance of power and multipolarity may prove to be a dangerous approach to global governance in a world where war could turn nuclear.
UNIPOLARITY STOPS GREAT POWER RIVALRY HISTORICALLY, A source of major war Kupchan, Georgetown international relations professor, 03 [Charles, THE END OF THE AMERICAN ERA, Knopf, pp. 57-58
The scope and range of U.S. strength mean that there is presently only one pole in the world. It follows that there is no competition for primacy. It is precisely for this reason that unipolarity is more stable and less prone to war than all the alternatives. Unipolarity does not make for a particularly egalitarian world, as many countries often remind the United States-sometimes violently. But it does forestall great-power rivalry, a benefit to all. History's most destructive wars, after all, occurred when the great nations of the day took to the battlefield to contend for primacy. Consider the bloody record of the last century alone. World War I resulted from Germany's bid for hegemony in a multipolar Europe. World War II emerged from the same dynamic, except the rise of Japan meant that conflict also engulfed East Asia. The Cold War was about two major blocs jockeying for position. Nothing has more consistently bedeviled statesmen throughout history than the challenge of preserving peace among dueling centers of power. In contrast, unipolar moments correspond with some of the most peaceful periods in history. The superiority of Rome brought long centuries of peace to Europe and the Mediterranean Basin. The Roman legions certainly shed much blood as they expanded the empire's frontiers. But the scope of Rome's dominance then preempted potential contenders. Europe's economy and cultural life burgeoned as a result. British hegemony during the nineteenth century corresponded to a similar period of peace and prosperity. International rivalries were for the most part kept in check, the global economy grew more open and vibrant, science and industry forged ahead.
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Unipolarity Good: Unipolarity Best/Multipolarity Fails
NO NATION WILL CARRY ITS OWN WEIGHT IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD
Robert Kagan, Carnegie Endowment, 1998 (FOREIGN POLICY, Summer,http://www.foreignpolicy.com/Summer1998/articles/ART3.htm Yet, for all the bleating about hegemony, no nation really wants genuine multipolarity. No nation has shown a willingness to take on equal responsibilities for managing global crises. No nation has been willing to make the same kinds of shortterm sacrifices that the United States has been willing to make in the long-term interest of preserving global order.
THE WORLD RELIES ON THE U.S. TO ENFORCE TREATIES
ECONOMIST, 2002 (June 27, http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=1188787) The scale of the outrage on September 11th made it inevitable that this would be seen as an act of war rather than mere criminality, and that the response would prove the awesome determination of the American armed forces. Moreover, even before September 11th, there was a strong view in the Bush administration that the treaties and conventions governing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction had failed. If you needed proof of that, look at Iraq. That view became even more prominent after al-Qaeda's attacks. These norms of good behavior had to be enforced with the threat of military power and even, if necessary, the use of it. Treaties, after all, are not legal documents but political ones; they register commitments made by governments but threaten no sanctions if those commitments are broken or abrogated, apart from disapproval. On this view, the punishment has to be meted out by the American sheriff.
MULTILATERAL ACTION IS TOO SLOW TO PREVENT ESCALATION
Frank Schuller and Thomas Grant, Professors of Political Science, 2003, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, No. 79, p. 39 The opposing principle, that of multilateralism, equally miscasts international policy in a world where circumstances may indeed warrant unilateral decisiveness. In the 1920s and 1930s, the League of Nations nurtured multilateral discussions, producing only futility. Rather than mounting individual effective actions against the provocations of Japanese empirebuilding in China, Italian aggression against Ethiopia or Nazi trial runs for Blitzkrieg and Holocaust, European leaders endlessly consulted one another, grasping for a common denominator that no consultation would ever achieve. In current circumstances, some unilateral actions override soothing diplomatic nattering. The attacks of 11 September on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon count as an incident deserving of response regardless of the sentiments and sympathies of other nations. The United States, as the superior power in the world, must assume the responsibility of deploying its might for the benefit and welfare of itself and the rest of the world.
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Unipolarity Good: Unipolarity Best/Multipolarity Fails
MULTILATERALISM HAS FAILED AT EVERY STAGE
ECONOMIST, 2002 (June 27, http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=1188800) At every stage, the multilateral approach has failed, blocked by Iraq or by permanent members of the UN Security Council, chiefly France and Russia. Those countries, China and others have been circumventing the sanctions. Recently Russia has changed its ways, to a degree, and has at last agreed to a modified (so-called smart) sanctions regime. But what can be done now? All the options are terrible: 1) Continue with containment, ie, the status quo, allowing Iraq to blame America (to which the UN sanctions are ascribed) for children's deaths while rebuilding its weapons program. 2) Demand that Iraq submit to a new inspections regime. 3) Give up altogether and wait till Saddam does something aggressive or barbaric that he can be punished for. This would make him a hero to those Arabs who like the thought of him seeing off the West. 4) Try to get a UN consensus to support an American-led invasion, intended to depose Saddam and to bring in a new regime willing to abide by Iraq's past international commitments. 5) Just invade, hoping that success will convince others that it was a good idea. MULTILATERALISM IS TOO SLOW Alexander A. Pikayev, ceip, March, 2003 (NUCLEAR ISSUES IN THE POST SEPTEMBER 11TH ERA, http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/default.asp) The United States, given its overwhelming economic, political and military supremacy, is becoming increasingly dissatisfied with a need of looking for consensus among dozens of countries as it is required by multilateral mechanisms. Very often, such consensus is very difficult to achieve, it requires long and painful negotiations, and the nature of the achieved multilateral deal could be far away from the original US expectations. In other words, Washington perceives multilateral regimes as very slow and often incapable to provide with resolute and efficient response when needed.
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Unipolarity Good: Unipolarity Best/Multipolarity Fails MULTILATERAL MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS LESS EFFECTIVE
Ekaterina Stepanova, Senior researcher at the Center for International Security, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, 2003, UNILATERALISM AND US FOREIGN POLICY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, eds. Malone and Khong, p. 190-1 There are many technical problems associated with multilateral military actions: Multilateralism slows down the use of force and, in this sense, is not a force multiplier; it also exacerbates the problem of optimal division of labor between participants. In addition, in cases that involve (or might involve) large-scale combat, multilateral coalition is not just supportive of, but often relies on, the exclusive military capabilities of the United States which gives Washington one more argument for keeping the unilateral option open.
MULTILATERALISM HAS PROVEN TO BE A TOTAL FAILURE BUSINESS WEEK, 2003 (April 21, p. 38)
But if it is a mistake, it is an understandable one. The multinationalists have failed dismally to make a case for their approach to solving the world's problems. The truth is that the institutions and procedures of global multilateralism don't work very well. They rarely have. And it isn't just the Bush Administration, with its unilateral impulses, that thinks so. President Bill Clinton complained bitterly about the inability of the U.N. and NATO to act in Africa and the Balkans to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing. And British Prime Minister Tony Blair has complained about the failure of multilateral institutions to solve problems.
MULTILATERALISM FAILED DURING THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
Peter Huessy is President of GeoStrategic Analysis, a Maryland defense consulting firm. He is Senior Defense Associate at NDUF. He specializes in nuclear weapons, missile defense, terrorism and rogue states, IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST, December 24, 2003, http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol2Issue50/Vol2Issue50Huessy.html Iraq, Iran and North Korea have also brought the international community face to face with some serious and unpleasant realities. During the eight years of the Clinton administration, pretend arms control deals with North Korea failed to curtail its nuclear bomb making. In Iran, the mullahs were busy stockpiling plutonium, beginning the process of building nuclear weapons, while, in Iraq, Saddam repeatedly snookered UN inspectors about programs to develop chemical weapons and nukes. All three assisted, harbored and fundedboth directly and indirectlya terrorism campaign aimed at the West, and the United States in particular, that culminated in 9/11. Where was the much vaunted international community?
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Unipolarity Good: Unipolarity Best/Multipolarity Fails
MULTILATERALISM IS EMPIRICALLY PROVEN TO BE A FAILURE AND CANT REPLACE U.S. MILITARY EGEMONY Vance Serchuk is a research fellow at AEI, WALL STREET JOURNAL, August 26, 2005, http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.23085/pub_detail.asp With considerable numbers of American troops likely to remain in Iraq for the foreseeable future, and with Washington shouldering the mounting costs in blood and treasure largely on its own , Afghanistan has
emerged as a tempting alternative model of how to manage a postwar occupation--with an emphasis on multilateralism. From European peacekeepers to U.N. disarmament programs, Afghanistan's reconstruction has been parceled among an alphabet soup of international organizations and multinational entities. Even the Pentagon has embraced the multilateralist credo, gradually turning command of Afghanistan over to NATO. There's only one problem: Multilateralism in Afghanistan, especially when it comes to security, is often more cosmetic than real. And as much as the Bush administration might wish to free up troops from patrolling the Hindu Kush the peace and stability of Afghanistan still depend on America's military commitment to remain for the long haul. The multilateral myth is neatly encapsulated in the failure of the socalled "lead nation" concept in Afghanistan. Under this arrangement, responsibility for the different components of the country's security sector--army, police, judiciary, counternarcotics, and disarmament--was split among the U.S., Germany, Italy, Britain and Japan, respectively. The idea was that assigning ownership of a specific problem to a specific government would ensure accountability. What this approach failed to recognize, however, were the divergent interests and capabilities these "lead nations" brought to Afghanistan. This is not a new problem. To this day in the Balkans, multinational peacekeeping operations are compromised by divided lines of responsibility and the diverging rules of engagement among participating militaries. By applying a "lead nation" concept to security sector reform, however, these failings are both institutionalized and amplified. How should Britain fight drugs in Afghanistan when reforms of police, courts and jails fall outside its purview? Arguably the biggest disappointment in Afghanistan has been Germany, responsible for the Afghan police. In three years, Berlin's efforts have focused almost exclusively on rebuilding a single police
academy in Kabul, which will train a few thousand officers by 2010. It's a worthy effort, to be sure, but completely divorced from larger Afghan realities--in particular, the tens of thousands of ill-paid,
In the absence of German leadership, the U.S. has been forced to pick up the slack. When I visited an American firebase in Ghazni earlier this year, U.S. soldiers were busy training local cops and equipping them with everything from radios to squad cars. "I'm spending half my time on the police," the commander of the local Provincial Reconstruction Team confessed. This wasn't his job, but the poorly disciplined constabularies were too big an obstacle to ignore. The U.S. has since been
unreformed and often corrupt Afghan police that roam the countryside. authorized to reform the Afghan police and is working to dispatch 1,500 trainers for that purpose. This is an ambitious commitment that reflects a simple if unpalatable truth: Washington has a greater interest in a functioning Afghan police force than Berlin. The case for Afghan multilateralism falters in dollar diplomacy as well. Germany has pooled about $100 million for police through 2007. By contrast, the recent supplemental budget passed by Congress appropriated nearly four times that amount for Afghan police this fiscal year alone. And this is being repeated across the board. Pinning hopes on NATO's presence in Afghanistan is likewise quixotic. Even as the Atlantic alliance trumpeted its expansion into western Afghanistan this summer, the U.S. military quietly maintained a base of its own in the region. Why? As senior leaders in Kabul admit, NATO structures have proven ill-equipped to rapidly and flexibly disburse aid money, the lifeline of any stability operation. Rather than waiting for reform from Brussels, U.S. military leaders realized it was easier to act on their own.NATO's swing into southern Afghanistan next year is also likely to prove problematic. Besides the perennial problems with national caveats and intelligence , NATO member states bring conflicting understandings of counternarcotics and counterinsurgency to their operations. Simply put, NATO has yet to build an internal consensus--much less strategy--around what its mission in Afghanistan should be None of this is to suggest, of course, that Americans or Afghans would be better off without the manpower or fiscal contributions of their allies. And whether real or imagined, a veneer of multilateralism has helped lend legitimacy to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan,
Perhaps this is merely the clever way for the U.S. to manage its hegemony: American allies pretend to do something; Washington pretends that it matters. Germany, for instance, remains the lead on police, despite being marginalized. But while the Pentagon is
which appears to be rejoining the international community rather than an American empire .
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understandably eager to trim its commitments, the progress of postwar Afghanistan still rests foremost on the reality of American power.
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Unipolarity Good: Unipolarity Best/Multipolarity Fails Wont Stop Prolif
MULTILATERALISM HAS FAILED TO STOP IRAQI WMD DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIST, 2002 (June 27, http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=1188800) That, alas, has been the multilateralist approach. During the 1980s, Saddam sought to develop nuclear weapons (along with biological and chemical ones) despite having sworn not to do so by signing the NPT. He used chemical weapons during his long war against Iran, and then on his own people in Kurdish areas. In 1991, after Saddam had invaded Kuwait and then been defeated in the Gulf war, the United Nations voted in its Resolution 687, which required Iraq to disclose, destroy and abandon all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and associated research, as well as longrange missiles. It laid down a timetable for inspection and removal which was originally envisaged to last one year, durin g which economic sanctions were imposed as an enforcement mechanism. The sanctions permitted some exports of oil in return for imports of food and medicine. Yet Iraq did everything it could to thwart and evade such disarmament, stringing the process out for seven years before eventually kicking the UN inspectors out altogether. Although during that time much progress was made in detecting and destroying weapons materials, Iraq was also shown to have lied at every stagefor example, about having ever produced a deadly nerve agent called VX, a denial it then replaced with a claim it had made only 200 litres, until the UN inspectors proved it had made at least 3,900 litres. So even what was discovered and admitted to cannot be considered definitive. In the four years since the inspectors last visited Baghdad, four things have happened. First, Iraq rejected a much diluted new inspection regime, which offered a suspension of sanctions if it had been accepted. Second, Iraq succeeded in spreading the story that the sanctions have been responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi children-which they have, but the sanctions would have been gone long ago if Saddam had co-operated with the UN. Third, in 2001 Russia blocked a proposal to target the sanctions more specifically at particular imports while allowing more exports of oil. Fourth, while the UN's failed policy continued to be enforced by sanctions and by two no-fly zones policed by American and British aircraft in northern and southern Iraq, Saddam has been free to resume his weapons programs, funded by oil and other exports channeled through a thriving black market.
IRAQI INSPECTIONS WERE ONLY SUPPORTED WHEN THE U.S. THREATENED MILITARY ACTION
Fred Kagan, resident scholar in defense and security studies at the American Enterprise Institute, The Wilson Quarterly, Summer 2005 v29 i3 p57(9) . By the late 1990s, however, a growing American reluctance to use that power allowed the Iraqi dictator to eject UN inspectors. Saddam then began mothballing his WMD programs but was able to persuade the world that he still had them. The inspections effort in Iraq had been effective only when supported by the threat and occasional use of American military force. The IAEA enjoyed no such support in North Korea. By 1994, Hans Blix had discovered a number of violations of the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the North Koreans had begun to interfere with the work of the inspectors in critical ways. At first, the Clinton administration supported the IAEA in its struggle to force then-leader Kim Il Sung to come clean. As the crisis developed, however, the administration's concern over the danger from the North Korean army overwhelmed its desire to support the IAEA's efforts. The Clinton administration then brokered a deal with Kim Il Sung's son and successor, Kim Jong Il, that allowed North Korea to keep skirting the inspections program. As a result, the IAEA was unable to prevent the North Koreans from developing a nuclear weapon-and all indications are that they now possess one or two nuclear devices. Not surprisingly, recent negotiations, similarly unsupported by military force, have also failed to curb the North Korean nuclear program.
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Unipolarity Good: Multilateralism Bad Arms Sales
-- Turn - Arm Sales
A. Multilateral military needs are the prime reason for US arms sales
Lora Lumpe, Consulting Senior Associate with the International Peace Research Institute and Member of the Advisory Board for the Foreign Policy in Focus Project, and Jeff Donarski, Project Associate at the Arms Sales Monitoring Project @ the Federation of American Scientists, 1998 (The Arms Trade Revealed) http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/handbook/cover.html Unfortunately, in the seven years since the Persian Gulf war (and the cold war) ended, the US government and other major arms exporting governments have apparently decided that no fundamental re-evaluation of the role of military force in international relations is advisable. Instead of placing greater emphasis on the rule of law and non-military diplomacy during the past decade, the United States and other key military powers have increased their reliance on military force through UN operations and/or regional alliances. Multilateral military operations, and the need for interoperable fighting forces, now provide one of the principal justifications for arms exporting and military training-by the United States in particular.
B. US arm sales undermine US hard power, encourage WMD Proliferation, and cause massive regional conflicts
Lucien J. Dhooge, Assistant Professor of Business Law @ the University of the Pacific, Holds a LL.M. in International and Comparative Law from Georgetown, and is a Member of the Colorado and District of Columbia Bars, 1999 (We Arm the World: The Implications of American Participation in the Global Armaments Trade Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law) p. lexis There are numerous risks associated with these practices. Such transactions contribute to the creation of greater stockpiles of weaponry and weapons production capacity and substitute military production activities for more beneficial activities in foreign labor markets . In turn, the enhanced capacity of foreign countries to produce weapons diverts domestic jobs overseas in the short run and creates potential future competition in the long run. These transfers also encourage other arms exporters to introduce advanced weaponry and technology into the international marketplace. The transfers further encourage proliferation and disrupt regional stability by motivating governments unfriendly to U.S. military recipients to seek countervailing weaponry and technology. Some of these transfers may also disrupt regional stability by creating or enhancing the capacity of states to develop and utilize weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, as the lethality of the armaments subject to export grows, these weapons may impair U.S. foreign policy and national security interests by "significantly altering military balances, disrupting U.S. military operations and causing significant U.S. casualties."
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Unipolarity Good: Multilateralism Bad Arms Sales
A. Multilateral military needs are the prime reason for US arms sales
Lora Lumpe, Consulting Senior Associate with the International Peace Research Institute and Member of the Advisory Board for the Foreign Policy in Focus Project, and Jeff Donarski, Project Associate at the Arms Sales Monitoring Project @ the Federation of American Scientists, 1998 (The Arms Trade Revealed) http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/handbook/cover.html Unfortunately, in the seven years since the Persian Gulf war (and the cold war) ended, the US government and other major arms exporting governments have apparently decided that no fundamental re-evaluation of the role of military force in international relations is advisable. Instead of placing greater emphasis on the rule of law and non-military diplomacy during the past decade, the United States and other key military powers have increased their reliance on military force through UN operations and/or regional alliances. Multilateral military operations, and the need for interoperable fighting forces, now provide one of the principal justifications for arms exporting and military training-by the United States in particular.
B. US arms sales, through offsets, tank economic competitiveness and necessary defense industry transitions
Lucien J. Dhooge, Assistant Professor of Business Law @ the University of the Pacific, Holds a LL.M. in International and Comparative Law from Georgetown, and is a Member of the Colorado and District of Columbia Bars, 1999 (We Arm the World: The Implications of American Participation in the Global Armaments Trade Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law) p. lexis \However, the benefits associated with offset agreements may be illusory or outweighed by negative consequences. Contrary to industry assertions, critics charge that offset agreements have a negative impact upon employment in the domestic defense industry through the short-term diversion of jobs to offshore production facilities and the long-term risk of establishing and strengthening foreign competition. This long-term risk is also applicable to non-defense industries whose foreign competitors may be strengthened by indirect offsets . The perceived risk to the U.S. defense industry from the discontinuation of offsets may be exaggerated because the United States is the only arms supplier in the world that permits the combined use of offsets and government financing in armaments transactions. In addition, the interference of offsets with the operation of free market principles may delay the much-needed post-Cold War restructuring of the U.S. defense industry. Furthermore, it is impossible to ascertain any benefit accruing from foreign sales where the value of the offset agreement exceeds the actual value of the transferred weaponry. The current industry practice of viewing the value of offset agreements as proprietary information and the lack of sufficient governmental oversight preclude a thorough examination of the impact of offsets upon American industry and labor.
C. Economic competitiveness is key to US hegemony
Zalmay Khalilzad, Research Analyst at the RAND Institute, Spring 1995 (Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War Washington Quarterly) p. lexis To sustain and improve its economic strength, the United States must maintain its technological lead in the economic realm. Its success will depend on the choices it makes. In the past, developments such as the agricultural and industrial revolutions produced fundamental changes positively affecting the relative position of those who were
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able to take advantage of them and negatively affecting those who did not. Some argue that the world may be at the beginning of another such transformation, which will shift the sources of wealth and the relative position of classes and nations. If the United States fails to recognize the change and adapt its institutions, its relative position will necessarily worsen. To remain the preponderant world power, U.S. economic strength must be enhanced by further improvements in productivity, thus increasing real per capita income; by strengthening education and training; and by generating and using superior science and technology.
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Unipolarity Good: Multilateralism/International Cooperation Isnt Needed to Solve Global Problems
THE BENEFITS OF MULTILATERAL COOPERATION ARE ENTIRELY THEORETICAL THE CLAIM THAT MULTILATERALISM SOLVES ALL GLOBAL PROBLEMS IGNORES A SIGNIFICANT HISTORY OF FAILURE AND PARALYSIS Bruce Nussbaum, Editorial Page Editor for Business Week, 4/21/2003 (Building a New Multilateral World Business Week) p. lexis But if it is a mistake, it is an understandable one. The multinationalists have failed dismally to make a case for their approach to solving the world's problems. The truth is that the institutions and procedures of global multilateralism don't work very well. They rarely have. And it isn't just the Bush Administration, with its unilateral impulses, that thinks so. President Bill Clinton complained bitterly about the inability of the U.N. and NATO to act in Africa and the Balkans to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing. And British Prime Minister Tony Blair has complained about the failure of multilateral institutions to solve problems. If France and Germany want a multilateral approach to international problems, they must first concede that the multilateral machinery is in serious need of repair. What the world needs today is a tough, more muscular multilateralism. Despite French efforts to make the U.N. an arbiter of legitimacy in global conflicts, it has played no such role in its history. Indeed, France itself has been a serial preemptor in French-speaking Africa for decades, with no by-your-leave from the U.N. It has 3,000 troops in the Ivory Coast today, protecting its economic interests. The U.N., for its part, was paralyzed throughout the entire Cold War because of the veto power of each of the five permanent members of the Security Council. In the 1990s, the threat of a Russian veto stopped the U.N. from protecting Muslim women and children in Bosnia and Kosovo. The European Union, too, failed to act. At a World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, Switzerland, in February, the air was thick with condemnation of America for going ahead with what many considered an immoral war. But at one meeting, Mustafa Ceric, the Grand Mufti of Bosnia, reminded the mostly European audience that ''Europe and the world stood by for two years, and 10,000 of my people died.'' Only when U.S. President Clinton acted, said the Grand Mufti, did the killing stop. Multilateralism that leads to paralysis is not inherently moral, any more than unilateralism in service to good is necessarily immoral. In Africa, too, multilateralism has been a dismal failure. In Somalia in 1993, the U.N. was too weak to subdue the warlords who were stealing food it was trying to distribute to the country's hungry. It cost the lives of American soldiers when their Black Hawk helicopter crashed on a mission to stop one such warlord. In Rwanda, neither the U.N., the EU, nor NATO did much to stop the genocide . The same failure of multilateralism can be seen on the economic front. The recent round of trade talks at Doha has stalled over the issue of agricultural subsidies.
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Unipolarity Good: Multilateralism/International Cooperation Isnt Needed to Solve Global Problems
UNILATERALISM SOLVES FOR THE PROBLEMS OF THE MULTILATERAL SYSTEM IN TWO WAYS First, willingness to break from international pressure and demands exposes the flaws of multilateralism and encourages efforts to reform problems Michla Pomerance, Professor of International Law, Hebrew University, Spring 2002 (U.S. Multilateralism, Left and Right Orbis) Perceptions on the Right differ radically. As members of this camp see it, the Left has been afflicted in recent years with a bad case of "treaty-itis" and an "addiction to multilateralism." It has advocated adherence to vacuous treaties because of a well-intentioned but "near mystical belief in the power of parchment," and it has evinced a too ready willingness to kowtow to the "sanhedrins of hypocrisy" within the UN . Such policies, according to these critics on the Right, are unwise politically and indefensible morally. "The president of the United States," Condoleezza Rice observed, "was not elected to sign treaties that are not in Americas interest." Guarding ones own national interest is not only legitimate; it is a moral imperative. Besides, in the long run the servile and blind multilateralism of the Left ill serves the global interest it desires to foster. As William Safire put it, "Multilateral treaties that weaken the United States do not strengthen freedom abroad." In essence, the problem is not, as the Left would have it, that the best (or the unattainably perfect) is the enemy of the good. Rather, it is that the impostor of the good too often poses as the genuine article. Thus, the United States should not expect to improve the situation by signing bogus instruments that are "traps for the innocent and signposts for the guilty," as Austen Chamberlain described the 1920s League of Nations attempts to define aggression. Instead, it should set a good example by its own actions, and it should aim at renegotiating flawed instruments a goal often best achieved by abstention. For the United States, the Right multilateralists are convinced, remains even now an indispensable partner in the most important multilateral ventures, and change will be induced only when other states recognize that the United States means business.
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Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: Multilateralism Fails
CALL FOR SEEKING UN APPROVAL IS ANOTHER APPEASEMENT STRATEGY THE UN IS A JOKE Sean Hannity, Fox News, 2004, Deliver Us From Evil, p. 142-3
The posse, for Gore and others, means only one thing, the United Nations. But what exactly does the UN Bring to the table in a situation like this? As its track record suggests, not muchbesides a wretched legacy of ineffective policies and bungled operations. First of all, its important to remember what the United Nations is what it isnt. The UN is an international bureaucracy, in which the nations of the world debate and, on occasion, pass resolutions with respect to international issues. The UN has the power to send peacekeepers into areas of conflict, as it has done in the past. But the UN has no credible military force without the backing of the United States. And as a body it has proven highly reluctant to use its own troopsthe blue helmets, as theyre sometimes calledfor fear of offending any nation or group of nations on the Security Council or in the General Assembly. But that raises a very troubling issue, always overlooked by those who call for UN cooperation: Far from being a bastion of democracy, the UN often serves as a forum for rogue nations to cloak themselves in an air of legitimacy. Its membership includes an alarming number of tyrannies and dictatorships, whose leaders could never claim to represent the interests of the people they rule. This is an organization, after all, whose Human Rights Commission is chaired by Muammar Qaddafis Libya one of the worlds longest-lived and best-known violators of human rights. But surely the United States outweighs Libyas role on the commission? Nope, in May 2001 America, which has carried the banner of freedom for more than two centuries, was voted off of the commission. In practice, then, the United Nations has become a kind of organized forum for appeasement, anxious to obstruct the actions of law-abiding nations while rewarding rogue nations for their illegal behavior.
DEMOCRATIC EMBRACE OF MULTILATERALISM IS ANOTHER FORM OF APPEASEMENT Sean Hannity, Fox News, 2004, Deliver Us From Evil, p. 145-6
The Democratic multilateralists may be brazen in their critiques of President Bush. But their feigned toughness is pure fraud. In their willingness to defer matters of defense to so questionable a body as the UN they are neither hawkish nor sophisticated (except in the art of deception). In fact, their way of thinking poses a serious long-term danger to our nation, because the practical result of such multilateralism is inaction and endless appeasement. So the next time you hear the new appeasers utter the word unilateralist to denounce President Bush, and multilateralist to congratulate themselves as foreign policy gurus, think back to George Orwell and his lessons about the use of language to conceal meaning. The left may insist that their internationalist policy is one of strength and consensus, but in truth its one of weakness and paralysis. We can expect the Democratic Party to hold the multilateralist line, though; because it gives them one priceless escape valve, they seize the opportunity to talk big about foreign policy, exploiting the natural human hope for world peacebut all along giving themselves an excuse to evade all responsibility for the consequences of a failed policy. Eager to promise greater security under a Democratic administration, these consummate politicians are hoping to lure family-oriented middle Americans security norms, you might call themback to the party. After all, what have they got to worry about? If anything goes wrong, and America is unable to defend itself against some future terrorist threat, they can just chalk it up to slow-moving deliberations of the United Nations. From leftists at home to globalists in Europe, there are plenty of politicians out there eager to sign on to this new-appeasement policy. It sounded good for Senator Kerry in 1986; it still sounds good to Democrats today. But as long as the United Nations holds to its current makeupallowing nations like France, with their ulterior motives, to stand in the way of international justice these politicians will be jeopardizing the security of all Americans. I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of orange juice.
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Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: Multilateralism Fails
MULTILATERALISM NOT AN EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE MANY PROBLEM S
Robert J. Lieber, Georgetown University, 2005, The American Era: power and strategy for the 21st century, p. 34-6 Labels do not fully capture the range of views among liberal internationalists, and the boundaries between them and others can overlap. The logic of these multilateral approaches varies, but even the most coherent and nuanced tend to give insufficient weight to the implications of 9/11 and tend to underestimate the robustness and durability of Americas power and unipolar primacy. Multilateralists frequently do not come to grips with the weakness of the UN nor confront the stark choices that arise when it is all too often incapable of effective action. They also tend to minimize or overlook entirely the mixed motives of European states in their dispositions toward the United States and attribute to the European Union a coherence and capacity in foreign and security policy that is beyond the reach of that institution. The multilateralist outlook faces other daunting problems too. One of these concerns who speaks for the world community. Officials of international institutions are not democratically accountable, and even less so are those who staff the organizations and implement the policies. However, the leaders of these bodies are at least responsible to the member governments who put them in place and provide their
budgets. In contrast, non-governmental organizations do not have even that degree of accountability, yet they frequently claim to speak on behalf of the people of the developing world or the entire global
. Another obstacle to the multilateralist ideal is that individuals continue to direct their loyalty to states, ethnic groups, or tribes, rather than toward any global citizenship. In addition, the UN itself is dependent on its member states, and especially the permanent members of the Security Council, for its authority and capacity to act. Enforcement too remains a grave problem. Often, UN members are reluctant to act, since, with a handful of exceptions, most put their own national interests above those of the world community or the UN as an organization. And even when the UN Security Council passes a formal resolution, compliance by individual countries, powerful national leaders, and armed movements is often spotty or nonexistent. Noncompliance has been especially evident in recent cases of civil wars and ethnic cleansing, as for example in western Sudan, the Congo and Liberia. An additional and perennial problem concerns the distortion of international ideals and the use of evasive or even Orwellian language. A conspicuous example is the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), which has in recent years included among its members countries such as Algeria, China, Cuba, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Sudan, and Zimbabwe all notorious for human rights abuses and which at one point even elected Libya to a two- year term (2001-3) in the chairmanship. The UNHRC example could be less damming if it were anomalous; alas, it is simply one of the more visible manifestations of cynicism, ineptitude, and corruption as well as anti-Semitism that afflict the UN. The phenomenon
community even when their preferred course of action may be ill-advised or self-serving of virulent anti-Israeli bias accompanied by anti-Semitism has been described at length by the former UN ambassadors Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Jeane Kirkpatrick and by former Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, Richard Schifter. This problem is one of long standing, and it often takes the form of a disproportionate emphasis on Israels alleged abuses of human rights, while far more egregious cases are deliberately ignored. In 1975, the General Assembly passed a Zionism is racism resolution, which was not rescinded until 1991, and officially sponsored meetings have repeatedly equated Zionism with Nazism,
In the cases of the former Yugoslavia (1991-95), the Rwanda genocide (1994), and devastating civil wars in Sierra Leone, the Congo, Liberia, and Sudan, the consequences of the UNs inability or unwillingness to act effectively can be deadly. The story of the Srebrenica massacre in a UN safe zone is an especially tragic case in point. The incident took place during the bloody civil war and ethic cleansing in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia. Srebrenica, a Bosnian Muslim town, had been designated by the UN as a safe area where local inhabitants would be protected by the world body, but in July 1995, Serb militias overran the town while a Dutch army battalion in UN blue helmets stood by impotently. In the days that followed, the Serbs rounded up and systematically massacred some 7,000 Muslim men and boys. International organizations can be important as sources of legitimacy and stability, but in view of their limitations there is often no global alternative to the US role. No other country has both the stability and the will to deploy large forces abroad in order to cope with the most urgent and dangerous world problems. Nor is any regional or international organization able to do so. However, there are a number of negative consequences to the American role. For example, countries can avoid paying certain human or material costs that shared responsibility would otherwise entail because they believe the Americans will act regardless of whether or not they themselves contribute. And, not infrequently, other states may seek to use multilateral negotiations or institutions for the purposes of restraining the United States in a Gulliver-like web of constraints rather than for the purposes these bodies were meant to serve in the first place.
as in the 2002 UN Conference Against Racism, held in Durban, South Africa.
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Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: Multilateralism Fails
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ARE TOO SLOW AND RESULT IN TOO MANY COMPROMISES NEEDED TO SOLVE GLOBAL PROBLEMS Walter Russell Mead, Senior Fellow for United States Foreign Policy, Council on Foreign Relations, 2004 (Power, Terror, Peace, and War) p. 134 International institutions, at least as we know them, are oriented toward achieving consensus through a process of deliberation, usually a very slow and thorough process of deliberation. The decisions they take are likely to he based on compromise, and whether they are security alliances like NATO or political organizations like the United Nations, there is a tendency to move at the speed of the slowest and most reluctant member. Such institutions are very unlikely to provide the kind of rapid response that conditions in the twenty-first century will require. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS INEVITABLY FAIL TO CREATE GLOBAL CONSENSUS YOU HAVE TO ACT OUTSIDE OF THEM TO GET THINGS DONE Walter Russell Mead, Senior Fellow for United States Foreign Policy, Council on Foreign Relations, 2004 (Power, Terror, Peace, and War) p. 134-5 This is especially true of universal institutions like the UN or the WTO , institutions that aspire to include all states. The cultural and political divisions among human beings are too great for such institutions to be able to agree on more than a handful of issues, especially quickly. Inevitably, much of the work of the world will have to take place outside of-though not necessarily against-such institutions. The Clinton administration went outside the UN system to fight the Yugoslav war over Kosovo; future American administrations may eschew some of the rhetoric that the Bush administration has used about international institutions, but no American president can ever accept a situation in which France pretends to an ability to veto American actions deemed necessary to the national security.
Multilateralism fails Michael Gerson, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington Post, April 25, 2008, p. A25
But a vague commitment to multilateralism obscures one of the most difficult challenges the next president will face: While international institutions have never been more needed, they have seldom been less effective. The U.N. Security Council -- where China and Russia have emerged as reliable protectors of the oppressive and irresponsible -- has done little to distinguish itself on Kosovo, Rwanda, Darfur or Burma. And global nonproliferation efforts are about to shatter like a glass hammer on Iranian nuclear ambitions. It is easy to criticize the current administration -- or past administrations -- for lacking diplomatic magic that would somehow transform China or Iran into good global citizens. But many of the policies of the next administration are likely to be remarkably similar to what's in place now. On genocide or proliferation, the United States generally urges the international community to be more forceful and responsible. The international community generally engages in solemn discussions while avoiding sanctions or even the threat of force. Proliferators and genocidal regimes generally get the joke.
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Unipolarity Good: Multilateralism Fails: U.N. Fails
UN INCAPABLE OF REPLACING THE US IN RESPONDING TO IL VIOLATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL CRISES Robert J. Lieber, Georgetown University, 2005, The American Era: power and strategy for the 21st century, p. 80-1 Of course, there exist important realms in which multilateral institutions and even international law do operate successfully. Examples abound in economics, trade, communications, air and sea travel, health, and other areas. But on the most urgent and lethal dangers, existing law and institutions as well as the United Nations itself are frequently without the capacity or political will to act. Evidence from recent decades provides numerous examples: Iraqs invasions of Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990; Saddam Husseins flagrant defiance of UN Security Council resolutions; genocide in Rwanda, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo; North Koreas violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); Irans pursuit of nuclear weapons; contraband trade by countries knowingly engaged in violating UN sanctions; state complicity in drug-running, money-laundering, and terrorism; and the desperate problems created for their own populations and their neighbors by failed states (as in the Congo, Liberia, Sudan, and elsewhere.) In cases such as these, the use of state power and of military force by the United States or by other countries that have the ability to act is often the sine qua non. For example in the Kuwait crisis of 1990-91, without American leadership the UN Security Council Resolutions and sanctions would have been unable to prevent Iraqs incorporation of that UN member state as Iraqs nineteenth province. In the case of Bosnia, weapons embargoes, Security Council resolutions, the creation of UNprotected safe areas, and European intervention under UN auspices proved ineffective in halting murderous ethnic violence. Only after three years and 200,000 dead did the United States finally take the lead in ending the killing.
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Unipolarity Good: Multilateralism Fails: U.N. Fails
NATO AND UN RESPONSE IN BALKANS CONVINCED BUSH ADMINISTRATION NOT TO RELY ON THEM FOR ACTING IN IRAQ
Francis Fukuyama, Professor International Studies Johns Hopkins, 2006, America at the Crossroads, p. 98-9
The collective action problem perceived by many in the Bush administration lay with the United Nations and with the Europeans who wanted to work through it to solve serious security threats requiring military intervention. The Clinton administrations experience in the Balkans convinced many in the Bush administration that the United Nations was incapable of solving serious security challenges. In Bosnia, a UN-mandated arms embargo and the pretense of impartiality actually ended up benefiting the party clearly at the root of the problem, Serbia. The restricted rules of engagement used by the European-led UN peacekeeping force resulted in the spectacle of Dutch peacekeepers in Srebrenica, unable to defend themselves much less the Bosnians they were charged to protect, being taken hostage by the Serbs. Similarly, in the Kosovo crisis the Russian veto prevented the Security Council from acting at all. The United States in the mid-1990s would have been perfectly happy to let the Europeans handle a problem that was, after all, in their own backyard. But both the Bosnia and Kosovo crises were resolved only when the United States entered the picture and used its military power in a decisive way. The United States brokered the Dayton Accords that brought the Bosnian conflict to a close and led the military coalition that stopped Serbian aggression in Kosovo, ultimately paving the way for regime change in Belgrade. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld took a particularly jaundiced view of Europes ability to act. It is not clear whether he was enthusiastic from the start about the need for American intervention in the Balkans, and he believed the Clinton administrations desire to work through multilateral institutions like NATO tied its hands. General Wesley Clark, the NATO commander who led the intervention in Kosovo and later ran for president as a Democrat, recounts running into a senior member of the Bush administration after the 2000 election who told him, We read your bookno one is going to tell us where we can or cant bomb. What happened in the Balkans during the 1990s was only the latest iteration of a pattern of behavior that has been labeled by Stephen Sestanovich American Maximalism. It is a pattern that was established at the beginning of the Cold War, wherein Americans consistently pushed for goals that were more ambitious and outside the boundaries of conventional thinking than those of their European allies. European indecisiveness and inability to create robust decision-making institutions meant that the United States frequently had to step in to force important issues on the agenda. This was true in the case of deployment of medium-range missile sin the 1980s, in the Reagan administrations subsequent proposal to remove them entirely through a double-zero option, and in American pressure for a Europe whole and free in 1989.
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Unipolarity Good: Multilateralism Fails: U.N. Fails
Even multilateralists concede that the UN fails to fulfill even basic responsibilities and the Security Council is indecisive Joachim Krause, Professor of International Relations, University of Kiel and Member of the Council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring 2004 (Multilateralism: Behind European Views Washington Quarterly) http://www.twq.com/04spring/docs/04spring_krause.pdf Such frustration, in other words, is not unique to the Bush administration; most analysts of the major conflicts of the 1990s, both within and outside the United States, concluded that the Security Council did not fulfill its basic responsibilities during the major diplomatic crises of that decade, in the Arab-Israeli dispute, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Africa, or North Korea. Each of these were cases in which the Security Council failed to act decisively and the consequences were disastrous. At least four million victims of armed conflicts or atrocities could have been spared in the 1990s had the Security Council intervened in time and resolutely. Today, even a staunch multilateralist such as John G. Ruggie, who served as assistant UN secretary general from 1997 to 2001, echoes this criticism: It is no exaggeration to say the United Nations today lacks the capacity to act predictably on its core mission: to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. Even if the UN had the enforcement capabilities, the failure of the Security Council to act cohesively tanks effectiveness Joachim Krause, Professor of International Relations, University of Kiel and Member of the Council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring 2004 (Multilateralism: Behind European Views Washington Quarterly) http://www.twq.com/04spring/docs/04spring_krause.pdf U.S. critics of collective security do not just argue that the UNs lack of enforcement capabilities are the heart of the problem. The lack of unity among Security Council members is often cited as contributing to the UNs inability to ensure collective security, particularly in cases where astute dictators have managed to pit various major powers against one another. This problem was evident in the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, in which Russia made it clear that, irrespective of how serious Serb atrocities became, it would never authorize the use of military force against Serbia. Even in cases when the Security Council was able to agree on measures and sanctions against individual states, implementation usually was considered inconsequential and halfhearted. For example, in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Muslim towns of Srebenica and Zepa were declared safe areas, but the forces needed to protect them were not provided. Moreover, sanctions imposed on countries usually have been subject to heavy erosion. Violators have often been able to evade whatever sanctions are put in place, further undermining the credibility of collective security.
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Unipolarity Good: Multilateralism Fails: U.N. Fails
Legitimacy works both ways the UN legitimates the power of tyrants and dictators increasing the risk of conflicts and perpetuating tyranny Roger Scruton, Founder of the Conservative Philosophy Group, 6/5/2003 (The United States, The United Nations, and the Future of the Nation-State The Heritage Foundation) p. lexis Ambassadors sent to the U.N. are sent by the people who have obtained power, by whatever means, in the territories recognized by that body as sovereign. But the processes that raised these territories to sovereignty often made little or no reference to the historical loyalties of the people who lived there and usually did nothing to guarantee that the rulers of those territories would have any real claim to represent those people or any real interest in doing so. In effect, the U.N. simply legitimizes whatever elites and tyrants have gained power over the particular "nations" named in its list. This doesn't mean that the U.N. has no useful function and cannot serve as a peace-keeping institution. But it does mean that it can also help to perpetuate unpeaceful forms of social order, and therefore in the long run contribute to local and regional conflicts.
The UN creates appeasement strategies that legitimate repression Saddam proves
Center for Security Policy 11/17/1999 (Annans Latest Pandering to Ruthless Dictators Decision Brief No. 99D 134) http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=papers&code=99-D_134 Kofi Annan's revolting efforts to curry favor with despotic hosts -- in this case, by legitimating Chinese repression of a sect seeking the opportunity to practice the basic human right of freedom of religion -- is all too reminiscent of an earlier, appalling spectacle: the Secretary General's effort to "resolve conflicts" between Saddam Hussein and the rest of the world in February 1998, by treating with legitimacy the ruthless and bloodthirsty Iraqi dictator. At the time, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott properly castigated the Secretary General's pathetic diplomacy: "Let's look at what [Secretary General Annan] has said. 'Saddam can be trusted.' 'I think I can do business with [Saddam].' 'I think [Saddam] was serious.' These are all direct quotes. The Secretary General told reporters he spent the weekend building a 'human relationship' with Saddam Hussein .... These comments are outrageous. They reflect someone bent on appeasement -- not someone determined to make the United Nations inspection regime [in Iraq] work effectively."
China proves the UN panders to abusive regimes and condones human rights abuses
Center for Security Policy 11/17/1999 (Annans Latest Pandering to Ruthless Dictators Decision Brief No. 99D 134) http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=papers&code=99-D_134
Unfortunately, in at least some of those dangerous and distant places, the United Nations is decidedly not working in America's interests or, for that matter, in the interests of "confronting terrorism" and "preventing war." For example, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan told reporters after meeting with China's Foreign Minister Tang Xiaxuan in Beijing yesterday that, "I think I leave here with a better understanding of some of the issues involved [in the PRC's brutal crackdown on the Falun Gong movement. Mr. Tang had assured him] that in dealing with this issue, the fundamental rights of citizens will be respected and some of the actions they are taking are for the protection of individuals." The New York Times reported today however, that: "This morning, shortly before Mr. Annan's meeting with Mr. Tang, more than a dozen Falun Gong adherents were detained in Tiananmen Square as they unfurled a red banner and began
their ritual exercises, which are said to bring good health and spiritual salvation. Groups of believers from at least five regions of China have reportedly sent Mr. Annan letters asking for an official inquiry into
. Annan was clearly loath to offend China -- a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council." The Times then described the lengths to which the UN Secretary I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of orange juice.
why China has branded the group an illegal, 'evil cult.' "But in his brief public remarks today, Mr
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General kow-towed to his hosts: "Mr. Annan offered United Nations help in strengthening the government's legal procedures to deal with the Falun Gong problem 'in accordance with international norms,' Mr. Almeidae Silva [Annan's spokesman] said. Mr. Tang gave no response, he said."
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Unipolarity Good: Multipolarity Increases Terrorism
Turn a backslide to multipolarity would cause conflict and terrorism MORE than unipolarity
Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth; Assistant Professors in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. Foreign Affairs August 2002, p. www.foreignaffairs.org Some might question the worth of being at the top of a unipolar system if that means serving as a lightning rod for the world's malcontents. When there was a Soviet Union, after all, it bore the brunt of Osama bin Laden's anger, and only after its collapse did he shift his focus to the United States (an indicator of the demise of bipolarity that was ignored at the time but looms larger in retrospect). But terrorism has been a perennial problem in history, and multipolarity did not save the leaders of several great powers from assassination by anarchists around the turn of the twentieth century. In fact, a slide back toward multipolarity would actually be the worst of all worlds for the United States. In such a scenario it would continue to lead the pack and serve as a focal point for resentment and hatred by both state and nonstate actors, but it would have fewer carrots and sticks to use in dealing with the situation. The threats would remain, but the possibility of effective and coordinated action against them would be reduced.
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Unipolarity Good: Multilateralism Wont Solve Proliferation
Multilateralism cant deal with modern threats of WMD proliferation and terrorism unilateralism is needed
Tobias Harris, Editor of Concord Bridge Magazine, 5/20/2003 (Gulliver Unbound Concord Bridge Magazine) http://people.brandeis.edu/~cbmag/Articles/2003%20May/Gulliver%20unbound-%20May%202003.pdf. The Clinton administration acquiesced to demands for multilateralism at the dawn of the unipolar moment, advocating assertive multilateralism that would seek a consensus on the use of force. Thus at a time of unprecedented American power, America embraced a foreign policy that, while not actually altering power disparities, called for Americas submission to the international community. In the immediate postcold war world, the United States could afford the luxury of a foreign policy not driven by national interest. Democratization and liberalization, its major foreign policy aims, could be achieved adequately through multilateral institutions. September 11th raised the stakes of multilateralism considerably. The disparate but related problems of Islamist terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among rogue states could no longer be handled with the kid gloves of the Clinton administration. Urgency demanded the mailed fist. And as the Bush administration acquired new faith in the many possibilities inherent in American power, the multilateralists of the 1990s recoiled in horror. Gulliver was snapping the multilateral bonds he had so graciously accepted during more pacific times. Lilliputians saw the need to restrain him become more pressing as the Bush administration signaled its intention to destroy the regime of Saddam Hussein in order to remove a major rogue state while simultaneously enforcing a long string of UN Security Council resolutions. Despite the emergence of the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis of Lilliputians, the United States launched an attack without UN sanction but with a multitude of allies (the coalition of the willing), quickly reaching Baghdad and destroying the Hussein regime, with the war in its mopping- up phase at the time of this writing. Unilateral resolve and ability to credibly threaten force solves proliferation Libya proves Danielle Pletka, Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, American Enterprise Institute, 1/30/2004 (Pre-emption is Effective Tool American Enterprise Institute) http://www.aei.org/news/filter.foreign,newsID.19819/news_detail.asp. The rogues of the world are seeking or have developed WMD. Al-Qaeda has made clear repeatedly that it hopes to acquire and use WMD. These hateful regimes also firmly believe that possessing WMD would deter attacks from the United States and others. Iraq should have taught them that the reverse is true. Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi figured out that having WMD posed a greater danger to him than not having them. Bush's national security doctrine and the threat of pre-emption it contains are warnings to dictators and terrorists: WMD will not protect you. They could make you an intolerable risk to the international community.
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Unipolarity Good: Multilateralism Wont Solve Proliferation
WMD proliferation can only be addressed through unilateral options and use of preemptive force traditional deterrence no longer works Charles Krauthammer, Essayist and Columnist for the Washington Post, Frequent Contributor to the Weekly Standard, the New Republic, and the National Interest, Winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy, Member of the Presidents Council on Bioethics, Board-Certified Psychiatrist and Received Medical Degree, Harvard Medical School, Winter 2002 (The Unipolar Moment Revisited The National Interest) p. ebscohost What does this conjunction of unique circumstances--unipolarity and the proliferation of terrible weapons--mean for American foreign policy? That the first and most urgent task is protection from these weapons. The catalyst for this realization was again September 11. Throughout the 1990s, it had been assumed that WMD posed no emergency because traditional concepts of deterrence would hold. September 11 revealed the possibility of future WMD-armed enemies both undeterrable and potentially undetectable. The 9/11 suicide bombers were undeterrable; the author of the subsequent anthrax attacks has proven undetectable. The possible alliance of rogue states with such undeterrables and undetectables--and the possible transfer to them of weapons of mass destruction-presents a new strategic situation that demands a new strategic doctrine. Any solution will have to include three elements: denying, disarming, and defending. First, we will have to develop a new regime, similar to COCOM (Coordinating Committee on Export Controls) to deny yet more high technology to such states. Second, those states that acquire such weapons anyway will have to submit to strict outside control or risk being physically disarmed. A final element must be the development of antiballistic missile and air defense systems to defend against those weapons that do escape Western control or preemption.... There is no alternative to confronting, deterring and, if necessary, disarming states that brandish and use weapons of mass destruction. And there is no one to do that but the United States, backed by as many allies as will join the endeavor.
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Unipolarity Good: NATO Fails
US RELIANCE ON COALITIONS OF THE WILLING SIGNALS THE DEATH OF NATO
Thomas Risse, Professor International Politics Free University (berlin), 2004, American Power in the 21st Century, eds. David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, p. 225 Of course, these voice opportunities suffer the more US foreign policy pursues a unilateralist course or falls victim to imperial ambitions. US unilateralism violates fundamental norms of multilateralism that are constitutive for the transatlantic community. If unilateral tendencies which have always been a temptation in American foreign policy become the prevailing norms are endangered. The dominant discourse emanating from Washington concerning coalitions of the willing, which is now enshrined in the foreign policy doctrine of the United States, stands in sharp contrast to the idea of multilateralism on which the transatlantic alliance has been based over the past 50 years. NATO was so successful in the past as an instrument of alliance management precisely because it served as a clearinghouse for potential policy disputes before firm decisions were taken on either side of the Atlantic. The more consultations in the alliance framework are reduced to merely inform each other about decisions already taken, the more NATO becomes irrelevant for the future of the transatlantic relationship. This is why the North Atlantic alliance has taken such a toll in the past years, even before 9/11 and certainly before the Iraq crisis. In sum, if we are in a fundamental crisis of the transatlantic relationship, it primarily concerns in its institutions. If the US continues to build its foreign policy on coalitions of the willing, this constitutes unilateralism in disguise and is fundamentally at odds with the norms of the transatlantic security community.
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Unipolarity Good: Alliances Fail
Permanent alliances worsen relations, risk delay, undermine power projection, and dont add to US power projection Bruno Tertrais, Senior Research Fellow, the Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique and Associate Researcher, Center dEtudes et de Recherches Internationales, Spring 2004 (The Changing Nature of Military Alliances The Washington Quarterly) http://www.twq.com/04spring/docs/04spring_tertrais.pdf If commitments toward the United States are of lesser value for allied capitals, does the United States, for its part, still need permanent alliances? Permanent alliances appear to be of increasingly limited value for the United States, as the ratio of costs to benefits has changed to such an extent that conservative commentators have called for a radical reshuffling of U.S. commitments and bases abroad. Alliances have become more costly for Washington, as permanent deployments have increasingly created friction with local populations, with each incident involving U.S. forces and the local populations prompting a public outcry, as in Japan and in South Korea in the 1990s. Given todays pace of U.S. technological advances, particularly in the field of communications, allied forces are not as easily interoperable. In many cases, U.S. forces do not use the NATO Standardization Agreements as much as they did in the past. Washington complains that European forces are still ill equipped for rapid power projection (only 50 non-U.S. NATO brigades are reported to be deployable), which makes the planning and conduct of common military operations more difficult and time-consuming. Operations under the NATO banner bear a heavy political cost, relying on procedures that require constant negotiation to reach consensus. NATO was created to defend against a major threat; nations were expected to delegate command to the alliances military authorities at the first signal of Soviet attack. Reaching consensus thus was not expected to be a problem.
Alliance systems will inevitable break up deeper forces beyond unilateralism are causing it
Bruno Tertrais, Senior Research Fellow, the Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique and Associate Researcher, Center dEtudes et de Recherches Internationales, Spring 2004 (The Changing Nature of Military Alliances The Washington Quarterly) http://www.twq.com/04spring/docs/04spring_tertrais.pdf
The threats of terrorism and proliferation have strengthened many old alliances and have fos
tered the creation of new alignments. At the same time, Washingtons policies have also put some long-standing U.S. alliances under strain. There are also deeper historical forces at work that are forcing permanent alliances increasingly to give way to ad hoc coalitions and multilateral alliances to give way to bilateral ones. Most importantly, the ever more complex nature of the strategic environment and the diversity of security arrangements devised by contemporary nations test the very notion of alliance, causing one to wonder if it even remains a useful strategic concept .
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Unipolarity Good: Alliances Fail
Multilateral alliances are inevitably doomed and falling like dominos
Bruno Tertrais, Senior Research Fellow, the Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique and Associate Researcher, Center dEtudes et de Recherches Internationales, Spring 2004 (The Changing Nature of Military Alliances The Washington Quarterly) http://www.twq.com/04spring/docs/04spring_tertrais.pdf Conversely, permanent multinational alliances appear increasingly to belong to the past. In the 1950s, the United States created an impressive network of alliances against communism that have since fallen one by one into oblivion. The Agreement for Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina, involving the United States, France, and three Southeast Asian nations, did not survive war in the region as well as disagreement between Paris and Washington. In June 1977, the eight-member Southeast Asia Treaty Organization ceased to exist. In disagreement with U.S. policy, France and Pakistan stopped cooperating with the organization, which then lost much of its raison dtre following the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina. In May 1979, the Central Treaty Organization ( CENTO), a Middle Eastern anti- Communist alliance created in 1955, was inactivated by the United Kingdom and Turkey, its last remaining members after Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan defected due to disagreements with U.S. policies or domestic political changes. (The United States was not formally a CENTO member.) In September 1986, the AustraliaNew Zealand United States Treaty signed in1951 became a de facto bilateral alliance as Washington decided to suspend its obligations toward Wellington after New Zealand refused to allow nuclear-armed or nuclear-propelled U.S. ships to call on its ports. In September 2002, Mexico withdrew from the Inter-American Treaty of 1947.9 Historically, permanent multilateral alliances have thus proven difficult to maintain because their members have chosen to opt out when disagreeing with U.S. policy and because diminished threats have made their cohesion harder to maintain , with these two factors reinforcing each other.
Allied complaints unrelated to unilateralism will break alliances
Bruno Tertrais, Senior Research Fellow, the Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique and Associate Researcher, Center dEtudes et de Recherches Internationales, Spring 2004 (The Changing Nature of Military Alliances The Washington Quarterly) http://www.twq.com/04spring/docs/04spring_tertrais.pdf Two traditional complaints by U.S. allies are thus much more likely to strain alliances now than in the past. First, U.S. allies accuse the United States of expecting too much from them, confusing solidarity with alignment a dispute that escalated to almost unprecedented heights during the run-up to the 2003 war in Iraq. Although they are part of the war against terrorism, they generally do not see international terrorism as a threat to civilization and do not believe that combating terrorism requires systematic agreement with Washingtons policies. Secondly, allies frequently complain that the United States seeks a division of labor with its allies and, specifically, that Washington wants to limit its military commitment in most common operations to air power and command, control, and communications (C3) support, encouraging regional allies to provide the bulk of forces on the ground .
Alliance procedures arent being reformed
Bruno Tertrais, Senior Research Fellow, the Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique and Associate Researcher, Center dEtudes et de Recherches Internationales, Spring 2004 (The Changing Nature of Military Alliances The Washington Quarterly) http://www.twq.com/04spring/docs/04spring_tertrais.pdf
Despite the wishes of some in the U.S. Congress that
the alliances decisionmaking procedures should be reformed, with consensus giving way to majority ruling, this perspective remains a minority view both in Washington and in Brussels. At
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the same time, the increasing threats of terrorism and ballistic missiles make allied territories vulnerable, risking exposure of the United States to blackmail. Alliances have limited utility
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Unipolarity Good: Alliances Fail
The US can get all of its power from domestic sources
Thomas Donnelly, Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute, 2/1/2004 (The Proof of Primacy American Enterprise Institute) http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.19760,filter.foreign/pub_detail.asp. Speaking of alliances, Wohlforth is likewise penetrating about the limited utility of coalitions: " Alliances aggregate power only to the extent that they are reliably binding and permit the merging of armed forces , defense industries, [research and development] infrastructures, and strategic decision-making." A hegemonic power like the United States, meanwhile, "has only to make sure its domestic house is in order. In short, a single state gets more bang for the buck than several states in alliance . . . . Right away, the odds are skewed in favor of the unipolar power."[5]
Allied complaints unrelated to unilateralism will break alliances
Bruno Tertrais, Senior Research Fellow, the Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique and Associate Researcher, Center dEtudes et de Recherches Internationales, Spring 2004 (The Changing Nature of Military Alliances The Washington Quarterly) http://www.twq.com/04spring/docs/04spring_tertrais.pdf Two traditional complaints by U.S. allies are thus much more likely to strain alliances now than in the past. First, U.S. allies accuse the United States of expecting too much from them, confusing solidarity with alignment a dispute that escalated to almost unprecedented heights during the run-up to the 2003 war in Iraq. Although they are part of the war against terrorism, they generally do not see international terrorism as a threat to civilization and do not believe that combating terrorism requires systematic agreement with Washingtons policies. Secondly, allies frequently complain that the United States seeks a division of labor with its allies and, specifically, that Washington wants to limit its military commitment in most common operations to air power and command, control, and communications (C3) support, encouraging regional allies to provide the bulk of forces on the ground .
Alliance procedures arent being reformed
Bruno Tertrais, Senior Research Fellow, the Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique and Associate Researcher, Center dEtudes et de Recherches Internationales, Spring 2004 (The Changing Nature of Military Alliances The Washington Quarterly) http://www.twq.com/04spring/docs/04spring_tertrais.pdf Despite the wishes of some in the U.S. Congress that the alliances decisionmaking procedures should be reformed, with consensus giving way to majority ruling, this perspective remains a minority view both in Washington and in Brussels. At the same time, the increasing threats of terrorism and ballistic missiles make allied territories vulnerable, risking exposure of the United States to blackmail. ALLIANCES HAVE LIMITED UTILITY THE US CAN GET ALL OF ITS POWER FROM DOMESTIC SOURCES Thomas Donnelly, Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute, 2/1/2004 (The Proof of Primacy American Enterprise Institute) http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.19760,filter.foreign/pub_detail.asp. Speaking of alliances, Wohlforth is likewise penetrating about the limited utility of coalitions: " Alliances aggregate power only to the extent that they are reliably binding and permit the merging of armed forces , defense industries, [research and development] infrastructures, and strategic decision-making." A hegemonic power like the United States,
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meanwhile, "has only to make sure its domestic house is in order. In short, a single state gets more bang for the buck than several states in alliance . . . . Right away, the odds are skewed in favor of the unipolar power."
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Unipolarity Good: Creates False Multipolarity
Currently, the US maintains a preponderance of power known as unipolarity however, multilateral constraints create a false multipolarity where the US is constrained but others arent able to fill in Robert Kagan, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Columnist for the Washington Post, and Contributing Editor at the Weekly Standard and the New Republic, 7/22/1998 (The Benevolent Empire Foreign Policy) p. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=275 This insufficiency is the fatal flaw of multilateralism, as the Clinton administration learned in the case of Bosnia. In a world that is not genuinely multipolar where there is instead a widely recognized hierarchy of power multilateralism, if rigorously pursued, guarantees failure in meeting international crises . Those nations that lack the power to solve an international problem cannot be expected to take the lead in demanding the problem be solved. They may even eschew the exercise of power altogether, both because they do not have it and because the effective exercise of it by someone else, such as the United States, only serves to widen the gap between the hegemon and the rest. The lesson President Bill Clinton was supposed to have learned in the case of Bosnia is that to be effective, multilateralism must be preceded by unilateralism. In the toughest situations, the most effective multilateral response comes when the strongest power decides to act, with or without the others, and then asks its partners whether they will join. Giving equal say over international decisions to nations with vastly unequal power often means that the full measure of power that can be deployed in defense of the international community's interests will, in fact, not be deployed.
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Unipolarity Good: Creates False Multipolarity
Moreover, American power holds together the very international system multilateralists praise unilateral leadership is the only way to maintain international order Charles Krauthammer, Essayist and Columnist for the Washington Post, Frequent Contributor to the Weekly Standard, the New Republic, and the National Interest, Winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy, Member of the Presidents Council on Bioethics, Board-Certified Psychiatrist and Received Medical Degree, Harvard Medical School, 2004 (Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World American Enterprise Institute) http://www.aei.org/publications/bookID.755/book_detail.asp First, what holds domestic society together is a supreme central authority wielding a monopoly of power and enforcing norms. In the international arena there is no such thing. Domestic society may look like a place of self-regulating norms, but if somebody breaks into your house, you call 911, and the police arrive with guns drawn. Thats not exactly selfenforcement. Thats law enforcement. Second, domestic society rests on the shared goodwill, civility and common values of its individual members. What values are shared by, say, Britain, Cuba, Yemen and Zimbabweall nominal members of this fiction we call the international community? Of course, you can have smaller communities of shared interestsNAFTA, ANZUS, or the European Union. But the European conceit that relations with all nationsregardless of ideology, regardless of culture, regardless even of open hostilityshould be transacted on the EU model of suasion and norms and negotiations and solemn contractual agreements is an illusion. A fisheries treaty with Canada is something real. An Agreed Framework on plutonium processing with the likes of North Korea is not worth the paper it is written on. The realist believes the definition of peace Ambrose Bierce offered in The Devils Dictionary: Peace: noun, in international affairs, a period of cheating between two periods of fighting. Hence the realist axiom: The international community is a fiction. It is not a community, it is a cacophonyof straining ambitions, disparate values and contending power. What does hold the international system together? What keeps it from degenerating into total anarchy? Not the phony security of treaties, not the best of goodwill among the nicer nations. In the unipolar world we inhabit, what stability we do enjoy today is owed to the overwhelming power and deterrent threat of the United States. If someone invades your house, you call the cops. Who do you call if someone invades your country? You dial Washington . In the unipolar world, the closest thing to a centralized authority, to an enforcer of norms, is AmericaAmerican power. And ironically, American power is precisely what liberal internationalism wants to constrain and tie down and subsume in pursuit of some brave new Lockean world. Realists do not live just in America. I found one in Finland. During the 1997 negotiations in Oslo over the land mine treaty, one of the rare holdouts, interestingly enough, was Finland. The Finnish prime minister stoutly opposed the land mine ban. And for that he was scolded by his Scandinavian neighbors. To which he responded tartly that this was a very convenient pose for the other Nordic countriesafter all, Finland is their land mine. Finland is the land mine between Russia and Scandinavia. America is the land mine between barbarism and civilization. Where would South Korea be without America and its land mines along the DMZ? Where would Europewith its cozy arrogant communitybe had America not saved it from the Soviet colossus? Where would the Middle East be had American power not stopped Saddam in 1991? The land mine that protects civilization from barbarism is not parchment but power, and in a unipolar world, American power wielded, if necessary, unilaterally.
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Unipolarity Good: Creates False Multipolarity
Multilateralism inevitably seeks and requires the tying down of American power through international handcuffs that make the system multipolar Charles Krauthammer, Essayist and Columnist for the Washington Post, Frequent Contributor to the Weekly Standard, the New Republic, and the National Interest, Winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy, Member of the Presidents Council on Bioethics, Board-Certified Psychiatrist and Received Medical Degree, Harvard Medical School, Winter 2002 (The Unipolar Moment Revisited The National Interest) p. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_2002_Winter/ai_95841625/pg_8 Liberal internationalism seeks through multilateralism to transcend power politics, narrow national interest and, ultimately, the nation-state itself. The nation-state is seen as some kind of archaic residue of an anarchic past, an affront to the vision of a domesticated international arena. This is why liberal thinkers embrace the erosion of sovereignty promised by the new information technologies and the easy movement of capital across borders. They welcome the decline of sovereignty as the road to the new globalism of a norm-driven, legally-bound international system broken to the mold of domestic society. The greatest sovereign, of course, is the American superpower, which is why liberal internationalists feel such acute discomfort with American dominance. To achieve their vision, America too-- America especially--must be domesticated. Their project is thus to restrain America by building an entangling web of interdependence, tying down Gulliver with myriad strings that diminish his overweening power. Who, after all, was the ABM treaty or a land mine treaty going to restrain? North Korea? This liberal internationalist vision-- the multilateral handcuffing of American power- -is, as Robert Kagan has pointed out, the dominant view in Europe. (9) That is to be expected, given Europe's weakness and America's power. But it is a mistake to see this as only a European view. The idea of a new international community with self-governing institutions and self-enforcing norms--the vision that requires the domestication of American power--is the view of the Democratic Party in the United States and of a large part of the American foreign policy establishment. They spent the last decade in power fashioning precisely those multilateral ties to restrain the American Gulliver and remake him into a tame international citizen. (10) The multilateralist project is to use--indeed, to use up--current American dominance to create a new international system in which new norms of legalism and interdependence rule in America's place--in short, a system that is no longer unipolar.
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Unipolarity Good: Creates False Multipolarity
Multilateralism ties down American power in such a way as to render it no longer unipolar its the only and inevitable goal of multilateralists Charles Krauthammer, Essayist and Columnist for the Washington Post, Frequent Contributor to the Weekly Standard, the New Republic, and the National Interest, Winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy, Member of the Presidents Council on Bioethics, Board-Certified Psychiatrist and Received Medical Degree, Harvard Medical School, 2004 (Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World American Enterprise Institute) http://www.aei.org/publications/bookID.755/book_detail.asp At which point, liberal internationalists switch gears and appeal to legitimacyon the grounds that multilateral action has a higher moral standing. I have always found this line of argument incomprehensible. By what possible moral calculus does an American intervention to liberate 25 million people forfeit moral legitimacy because it lacks the blessing of the butchers of Tiananmen Square or the cynics of the Quai dOrsay? Which is why it is hard to take these arguments at face value. Look: We know why liberal internationalists demanded UN sanction for the war in Iraq. It was a way to stop the war. It was the Gulliver effect. Call a committee meeting of countries with hostile or contrary interestsi.e., the Security Counciland you have guaranteed yourself another twelve years of inaction. Historically, multilateralism is a way for weak countries to multiply their power by attaching themselves to stronger ones. But multilateralism imposed on Great Powers, and particularly on a unipolar power, is intended to restrain that power. Which is precisely why France is an ardent multilateralist. But why should America be? Why, in the end, does liberal internationalism want to tie down Gulliver, to blunt the pursuit of American national interests by making them subordinate to a myriad of other interests? In the immediate post-Vietnam era, this aversion to national interest might have been attributed to self-doubt and selfloathing. I dont know. What I do know is that today it is a mistake to see liberal foreign policy as deriving from anti- Americanism or lack of patriotism or a late efflorescence of 1960s radicalism. On the contrary. The liberal aversion to national interest stems from an idealism, a larger vision of country, a vision of some ambition and nobilitythe ideal of a true international community. And that is: To transform the international system from the Hobbesian universe into a Lockean universe. To turn the state of nature into a norm-driven community. To turn the law of the jungle into the rule of lawof treaties and contracts and UN resolutions. In short, to remake the international system in the image of domestic civil society. They dream of a new world, a world described in 1943 by Cordell Hull, FDRs secretary of statea world in which there will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power, or any other of the special arrangements by which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or promote their interests. And to create such a true international community, you have to temper, transcend, and, in the end, abolish the very idea of state power and national interest. Hence the antipathy to American hegemony and American power. If you are going to break the international arena to the mold of domestic society, you have to domesticate its single most powerful actor. You have to abolish American dominance, not only as an affront to fairness, but also as the greatest obstacle on the whole planet to a democratized international system where all live under selfgoverning international institutions and self-enforcing international norms.
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Unipolarity Good: Creates False Multipolarity
International institutions do not have the capabilities to deter aggression and maintain peace unilateral leadership is the only way Michael L. Smidt, Professor of International and Operational Law @ US Army Judge Advocate Generals School, March 2001 (The International Criminal Court: An Effective Means of Deterrence Military Law Review) p. lexis The United States has a vital leadership role in international peace and security. No other force has the same capability to protect the world from tyrannical regimes. It does not appear that the United Nations is capable of building the political will necessary in many cases to create a credible threat to aggressor regimes. According to one expert, it would be a mistake to place all the deterrence eggs in the basket of collective security. Therefore, the law must reflect the reality that the United States will provide unilateral leadership and bear the brunt of most international military operations to deter aggression. Unilateral American power maintains global order and security the UN fails and only the US can deal with threats like Korea and China Gary Schmitt, Executive Director of the Project for the New American Century, 3/23/2003 (Power & Duty: U.S. Action is Crucial to Maintaining World Order Los Angeles Times) p. http://www.newamericancentury.org/global032303.htm As the failure to back up its own resolutions on Iraq and to act decisively in the cases of Rwanda and Kosovo in the 1990s shows, the U.N. cannot be trusted to be the sole arbiter of these matters. No. The unavoidable reality is that the exercise of American power is key to maintaining what peace and order there is in the world today. Imagine a world in which the U.S. didn't exercise this power . Who would handle a nuclear-armed North Korea? Who would prevent the one-party state of China from acting on its pledge to gather democratic Taiwan into its fold? Who would be left to hunt down Islamic terrorists increasingly interested in getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction? The risk of multilateral constraints undermining US hard power is uniquely high our Casey and Rivkin evidence indicates that without continued unilateralism, the legitimacy of international constraints on US force is likely to be accepted And we have brink evidence - now is the key time to maintain credible threat of force or risk international disorder, proliferation, and genocide Michael J. Glennon, Professor of International Law, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, MayJune 2003 (Why the Security Council Failed Foreign Affairs) http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article? id=1905&page=5 However the war turns out, the United States will likely confront pressures to curb its use of force. These it must resist. Chirac's admonitions notwithstanding, war is not "always, always, the worst solution." The use of force was a better option than diplomacy in dealing with numerous tyrants, from Milosevic to Hitler. It may, regrettably, sometimes emerge as the only and therefore the best way to deal with WMD proliferation. If judged by the suffering of noncombatants, the use of force can often be more humane than economic sanctions, which starve more children than soldiers (as their application to Iraq demonstrated). The greater danger after the second Persian Gulf War is not that the United States will use force when it should not, but that, chastened by the war's horror, the public's opposition, and the economy's gyrations, it will not use force when it should. That the world is at risk of cascading disorder places a greater
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rather than a lesser responsibility on the United States to use its power assertively to halt or slow the pace of disintegration.
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And hard power is key to credibility and legitimacy
William T. Griffin, Weatherford Center Fellow 2001-2001 @ Harvard University, 5/28/2002 (The International Criminal Court: Panacea or Exercise in Futility) http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/fellows/papers01-02/griffin.pdf Huntington points out, however, that soft power is power only when it rests on a foundation of hard power. Increases in hard economic and military power produce enhanced self-confidence, arrogance, and belief in the superiority of ones own culture or soft power compared to those of other peoples and greatly increases its attractiveness to other peoples.
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Multilateral constraints on US action would permanently restrict US ability to credibly threaten the use of force other countries have inserted policy opposition into international law David B. Rivkin, Jr., Partner in the D.C. Firm of Baker & Hostetler LLP and Served in the Department of Justice, Reagan and H.W. Administrations, and Darin R. Bartram, Partner in the D.C. Firm of Baker & Hostetler LLP, Summer 2003 (Military Occupation: Legally Ensuring a Lasting Peace Washington Quarterly) p. http://muse.jhu.edu/login?uri=/journals/washington_quarterly/v026/26.3rivkin.html Unfortunately, the prospects for a broad accord between the United States and all of its traditional allies are not promising because the efforts of France, Belgium, and a few other members of "old" Europe have permutated beyond just occupation-related matters in an effort to limit U.S. freedom to use force. In addition to such jus ad bellum doctrinal musings, efforts have been made to constrain the way in which the U nited States can use force legitimately once the fighting starts. Such jus in bello doctrinal innovations deal with matters such as the extent of permissible collateral damage, targeting individual commanders as distinct from attacking enemy troops en masse, engaging dual-use targets (e.g., bridges and power stations), and a host of other combat-related issues. The overall underlying goal is to complicate U.S. efforts to practice its customary and successful way of war, which emphasizes speed and massive yet discriminate use of firepower. Not satisfied with advancing a set of policy arguments concerning the combination of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello issues, parallel efforts have been undertaken to assert, also allegedly as a matter of law, that a military occupation model or any efforts to change the political make-up of the defeated country in the aftermath of war are proscribed. Shortly after the war against Iraq began, France and Russia demonstrated their intent to make the U.S.-led military occupation of Iraq as burdensome as possible, with the Russian envoy to the UN asserting -- contrary to the entire set of international law bearing on occupying powers' rights and obligations -- that occupying belligerents must "make reparations for the damages caused in the conflict." Here again, policy arguments masquerade as law. If one were to assume the illegality of effecting a regime change in Iraq, this would vitiate all reasons for commencing the war. Having been presented with decades of repression and aggressive conduct by Saddam's regime and his defiance of various Security Council resolutions for years, the notion that all coalition forces could have done would be to disarm his regime and then withdraw is absurd on its face. Indeed, all of the doctrinal innovations related to the laws of armed conflict, even if followed in their somewhat milder version, would greatly complicate U.S. recourse to force , both against Iraq and in other conflict scenarios for the foreseeable future. In their most extreme version, these doctrinal innovations would permanently leash the U.S. use of force. Multilateralism slows down the use of force, exacerbates division of labor, and isnt needed since the US has all the capabilities Ekaterina Stepanova, Senior Research @ the Center for International Security, 2003 (Unilateralism and United States Foreign Policy edited by David M. Malone) p. 190-1 There are many technical problems associated with multilateral military actions: Multilateralism slows down the use of force and, in this sense, is not a force multiplier; it also exacerbates the problem of optimal division of labor between participants. In addition, in cases that involve (or might involve) large-scale combat, multilateral coalition is not just supportive of, but often relies on, the exclusive military capabilities of the United States, which gives Washington one more argument for keeping the unilateral option open.
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Unipolarity Good: Creates False Multipolarity
Multilateralism undermines the speed and decisiveness of hard power
Bruce W. Jentleson, Director of the Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy, Professor of Political Science, Duke University, Special Assistant to the Director of the State Departments Policy Planning Staff, and Senior Foreign Policy Adviser to President Al Gore, Winter 2004 (Tough Love Multilateralism Washington Quarterly) http://www.twq.com/04winter/docs/04winter_jentleson.pdf The very nature of the multilateral process, of so many countries with so many national interests trying to act jointly, is especially problematic, given the need for timeliness and decisiveness in decisions for the use of force. The rap against multilateralism on the use of force grew in part out of early 1990s cases such as Somalia and Bosnia. In both of these cases, the failures of U.S. policy were blamed on the UN and on the Clinton administrations own penchant for multilateralism.
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Unipolarity Good: Creates False Multipolarity
Multilateralism undermines the ability to threaten and use force the result is genocide, terrorism, and WMD proliferation use Bruce W. Jentleson, Director of the Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy, Professor of Political Science, Duke University, Special Assistant to the Director of the State Departments Policy Planning Staff, and Senior Foreign Policy Adviser to President Al Gore, Winter 2004 (Tough Love Multilateralism Washington Quarterly) http://www.twq.com/04winter/docs/04winter_jentleson.pdf For multilateralists, this shift away from force only as a last resort requires breaking out of the tendency to conflate conflict avoidance with security enhancement, making the former instead of the latter the criteria for success. In diplomacy, the desire to come to agreement and avoid conflict comes with the territory. It should, but as a preference, not a postulate. Certain situations and adversaries necessitate the willingness to threaten or use force. The international community will never be taken seriously if its position comes across as Please, dont make me do this. If adversaries or aggressors know that force will be used only as a last resort, only after the incremental pursuit of an array of options, they retain the strategic initiative and tactical advantage. This sequential last-resort approach forfeits any prospect of acting preventively . It would consign the world to wait until episodes of ethnic cleansing and genocide have run their horrific courses, terrorist networks have become deeply entrenched, or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have been further proliferated or even been used. MULTILATERALISM IS MEANT TO CONSTRAIN US POWER
US DOESNT NEED MULTILATERALISM JUST NEEDS DOMESTIC POLITICAL SUPPORT
Peter Beinart, Editor, The New Republic, 2006, The Good Fight: Why Liberalsand only liberalscan win the war on terror and make America great again, p. 107-8 But does any of this really matter? Those who favor unilateral exercise of US power sometimes acknowledge that others may not like it, but they quickly conclude that there is nothing that others can do about it. As former New Republic editor Andrew Sullivan puts it, the only things America needs is political will and public support. The only thing that can stop American now is American resistance, revolt or restraint. Or, as historian Niall Ferguson commented, The threat to Americas empire does not come from embryonic rival empires[But] it may come from the vacuum of power the absence of a will to powerwithin. As long as the United States is strong and resolute, so the argument runs, the fear of US power will keep everyone else in line. As Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz wrote several months before taking office, global leadership requires demonstrating that your friends will be prosecuted and taken care of, that your enemies will be punished, and that those who refuse to support you will live to regret having done so. If other nations cannot be cowed, in short, then they can be ignored or crushed. This view of US foreign relations assumes that hostile states can do little to harm us, so there is little reason to worry about anti-Americanism abroad. President Bush himself downplayed the danger of US isolation by noting that in the war on terror, at some point we may be the only ones left. Thats okay with me. We are America. From this perspective, the United States is strong enough to take on its remaining opponents and fashion a world that is conducive to US interests and compatible with US ideals, even if forced to act alone.
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Unipolarity Good: Creates False Multipolarity
The US can act militarily without any support from partners and multilateralism does not ensure things like base rights Bruno Tertrais, Senior Research Fellow, the Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique and Associate Researcher, Center dEtudes et de Recherches Internationales, Spring 2004 (The Changing Nature of Military Alliances The Washington Quarterly) http://www.twq.com/04spring/docs/04spring_tertrais.pdf Meanwhile, the benefits of alliances to the United States are decreasing. Washington is now capable of countering most potential military threats alone, in stark contrast with circumstances during the Cold War, when local allies were to provide the bulk of defense capabilities in case of Soviet aggression until U.S. reinforcements could arrive. In addition, the use of allied territory is no longer guaranteed in times of crisis. Rather, host countries reserve the right to say no to the United States, as Ankara and Riyadh did prior to the war in Iraq. At the same time, Washington is able to rely increasingly on long-range power projection for contingencies not involving a large deployment of ground forces and will be able to do so even more in the future as new-generation hypersonic weapons are developed. Moreover, alliances appear to be of limited political value if they do not help ensure that allies will refrain from actively opposing U.S. policy decisions, as some European countries did in early 2003 on issues regarding Iraq. The perception of benign leadership means other countries will never kick the US out or decline military support allies support our presence Charles Krauthammer, Essayist and Columnist for the Washington Post, Frequent Contributor to the Weekly Standard, the New Republic, and the National Interest, Winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy, Member of the Presidents Council on Bioethics, Board-Certified Psychiatrist and Received Medical Degree, Harvard Medical School, Winter 2002 (The Unipolar Moment Revisited The National Interest) p. ebscohost I would argue that unipolarity, managed benignly, is far more likely to keep the peace. Benignity is, of course, in the eye of the beholder. But the American claim to benignity is not mere self-congratulation. We have a track record. Consider one of history's rare controlled experiments. In the 1940s, lines were drawn through three peoples--Germans, Koreans and Chinese--one side closely bound to the United States, the other to its adversary. It turned into a controlled experiment because both states in the divided lands shared a common culture. Fifty years later the results are in. Does anyone doubt the superiority, both moral and material, of West Germany vs. East Germany, South Korea vs. North Korea and Taiwan vs. China. (11) Benignity is also manifest in the way others welcome our power. It is the reason, for example, that the Pacific Rim countries are loath to see our military presence diminished: They know that the United States is not an imperial power with a desire to rule other countries--which is why they so readily accept it as a balancer. It is the reason, too, why Europe, so seized with complaints about American high-handedness, nonetheless reacts with alarm to the occasional suggestion that America might withdraw its military presence. America came, but it did not come to rule. Unlike other hegemons and would-be hegemons, it does not entertain a grand vision of a new world. No Thousand Year Reich. No New Soviet Man. It has no great desire to remake human nature, to conquer for the extraction of natural resources, or to rule for the simple pleasure of dominion. Indeed, America is the first hegemonic power in history to be obsessed with "exit strategies." It could not wait to get out of Haiti and Somalia; it would get out of Kosovo and Bosnia today if it could. Its principal aim is to maintain the stability and relative tranquility of the current international system by enforcing, maintaining and extending the current peace.
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Unipolarity Good: Multilateralism Doesnt Make US Power More Effective
Iraq proves we can go it alone and dont need military support from allies
Richard Perle, Resident Fellow @ the American Enterprise Institute, 8/11/2003 (Lessons of Operation Iraqi Freedom American Enterprise Institute) http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.foreign,pubID.19017/pub_detail.asp Third, the war has demonstrated a really quite remarkable ability of the United States to operate more or less independently. Of course, we needed some space in Kuwait and elsewhere to amass some forces, but we were extraordinarily independent in this operation. When Turkey refused to allow access for a northern front , we adapted quickly. And without the availability of that real estate, we were nevertheless able to reshape and execute a very complex war plan. This independence meant that we could say to our allies: You can opt in or you can opt out. This is a coalition of the willing. You do not have to participate if you do not want.
Multilateral support for the use of military force isnt necessary the US has the resources to go-it-alone
Steven E. Miller, Director of International Security @ the Belfer Center, Winter 2002 (The End of Unilateralism or Unilateralism Redux Washington Quartlery) p. 16 More than any other state, the United States is able to operate militarily as a lone ranger (perhaps with Great Britain in the role of trusty sidekick). Its surfeit of military power gives it the luxury to operate from a position of superiority against any conceivable opponent, and its long-range striking power gives it unilateral military options available to no other state. Not all political problems are amenable to military solutions, but from a military perspective the United States does not need to renovate its foreign policy in order to assemble a large coalition of fighting forces.
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Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: Multipolarity Fails Net Worse
MULTIPOLARITY IS NOT AN EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO U.S. POWER CONDITIONS FOR ITS SUCCESS DONT EXIST YET Francis Fukuyama, International Relations Professor @ Johns Hopkins, AMERICA AT THE CROSSROADS: DEMOCRACY, POWER, AND THE NEOCONSERVATIVE LEGACY, 2006, pp. 10-11 On the other hand, we do not now have an adequate set of horizontal mechanisms of accountability between the vertical stovepipes we label states-adequate, that is, to match the intense economic and social interpenetration that we characterize today as globalization. The state retains a critical function that cannot be replaced by any transnational actor: it remains the only source of power that can enforce a rule of law. But for that power to be effective, it must be seen as legitimate; and durable legitimacy requires a much higher degree of institutionalization across nations than exists currently. A multi-institutional world that will meet these needs is gradually coming into being, but we are not there yet, and none of the existing schools of foreign policy provides adequate guidance to get us there.
MULTIPOLARITY IS MOST LIKELY TO GENERATE CONFLICT
Walden Bellow, Director of Focus on the Global South, DILEMMAS OF DOMINATION: THE UNMAKING OF AMERICAN POWER, 2005, p. 71 John Mearsheimer, in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, says that among balance-of-power systems, "bipolar" arrangements, such as the U.S.-Soviet face-off that dictated the dynamics of the Cold War period, are more stable and less likely to break down than "multipolar" systems, like the pre-World War II situation, which was marked by relative equality among a number of powerful states.' What he fails to tell us is that the situation most likely to generate conflict and instability is one in which a single, overwhelmingly dominant power is surrounded by midget powerstoday's world.
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Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: No European Alternative
EUROPE DOESNT HAVE THE RESOURCES OR MILITARY SUPPORT TO REPLACE U.S. LEADERSHIP Michael Mandlebaum, professor of American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins, THE CASE FOR GOLIATH: HOW AMERICA ACTS AS THE WORLDS GOVERNMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 2006, pp. 214-5 As in the United States, the changing age distribution of the European population, with more older and fewer younger people, made the delivery- of the benefits that the governments had promised their citizens after retirement an increasingly expensive proposition, leaving little appetite for new spending for other public programs. 41 Indeed, because of lower birthrates, fewer immigrants, and more generous benefits, the burdens the members of the European Union would have to try to sustain in the twenty-first century were proportionately even heavier than those of the United States.4' The second reason for the European disinterest in strong military forces is, at root, geographic. While the United States operates all over the world, and therefore in some turbulent and dangerous places, the relevant arena for the Europeans is Europe itself, the most peaceful, placid region of the planet. Societies muster military forces to respond to threats. At the beginning of the twenty-first, because of focus on their own region, Europeans did not, on the whole, feel threatened. Although they had suffered terrorist attacks for years, no single attack killed as many people, and none therefore had the psychological and political impact, as the September 11 assaults did in the United States. Whereas Americans saw the struggle against terrorism as a war to be fought and won by military means, the Europeans regarded the threat of terrorism as a problem to be managed, using political measures and police work. Consequently, despite the aspirations for (and sometimes the presumption of global influence about which its leaders routinely spoke, the EU did relatively little beyond Europe's borders. It directed its energy and attention inward." In the early years of the twenty-first century, its official rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding, Europe maintained a parochial outlook on the world.
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Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: No European Alternative
EUROPE WONT PREVENT GLOBAL POVERTY
Michael Mandlebaum, professor of American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins, THE CASE FOR GOLIATH: HOW AMERICA ACTS AS THE WORLDS GOVERNMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 2006, pp. 216-7 On the problem of global poverty, which European governments touted as demanding the serious attention of the rich countries, the European performance did not match its rhetoric. Europeans were fond of noting that their governments devoted higher proportions of their total national outputs to economic assistance to poor countries than did the United States." To the alleviation of poverty in countries with very low average incomes, however, the most valuable contribution the wealthy countries can make is not to donate a tiny fraction of their gross domestic products in the form of aid" but rather to open their home markets to the things that poor countries produce. On this score the European record was no better than the American one, and in some respects worse.''- The principal exports of the poorest countries are agricultural commodities: the European Union's Common Agricultural Policy obstructs agricultural imports. The United States engaged in agricultural protectionism as well, but not on quite the same scale as the EU or Japan . Even to the prevention of global warming, a textbook example of an international public good and one that Europe had taken the lead in hammering out an international agreement-the Kyoto Protocol-to achieve, Europe made a very modest, limited contribution. To be sure, in the production of the greenhouse gases that threaten to raise the planet's temperature, the United States was, by some distance, the world's worst offender.
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Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: No European Alternative
EUROPE CANNOT SUBSITUTE FOR THE U.S.
Michael Mandlebaum, professor of American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins, THE CASE FOR GOLIATH: HOW AMERICA ACTS AS THE WORLDS GOVERNMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 2006, p. 217-8 In providing to the world as a whole the kinds of services that governments within countries supply to the people they govern, the EU, for all its virtues, has remained largely on the sidelines. In this way Europe has lived up to its nineteenth-century designation as, in contrast to North America, the Old World. It resembles a retired person: still possessed of a lively mind, full of opinions based on long and rich experience, and ready, on the basis of that experience, to offer advice, much of it sound, on how the world should be organized and managed-but not available actually to do the work of organization and management. For better or for worse, therefore, the world has, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, no substitute for the United States as the provider of governmental services to the international system. Rather than being home alone, the United States is, in this sense, abroad alone. Insofar as American foreign policy is unilateral, this is by default as well as by choice. The American government and the American public can, and will, decide whether, how far, and for how long to sustain the policies that amount, collectively, to bearing the burden of global governance.
THE EU HAS COLLAPSED AS A SECURITY ORGANIZATION
Francis Fukuyama, International Relations Professor @ Johns Hopkins, AMERICA AT THE CROSSROADS: DEMOCRACY, POWER, AND THE NEOCONSERVATIVE LEGACY, 2006, pp. 172-3 Indeed, NATO itself could get a second wind as a security organization in the wake of the collapse of the drive toward a European constitution. The Euro-Gaullists have traditionally downplayed NATO in favor of the European Union and hoped that the latter would become a unified counterweight to American influence. But the striking "no" votes by France and Holland in mid-Z005 rejecting the European constitution have put the fur ther deepening of Europe on indefinite hold. The publics in these two core European countries seemed to be telling the political elites that they preferred a looser union based on national sovereignty and diversity within the European Union. This opens up new possibilities for reinvigorating the NATO alliance.
DEMOGRAPHIC PRESSURES MEANS EUROPE CANNOT BE A GLOBAL LEADER
Vaclav Smil, Distinguished Professor, University of Manitoba, POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 31(4): The Next 50 Years: Unfolding Trends, 605643 (DECEMBER 2005), p. 608 Other fundamental problems beyond Europes economic underperformance and its demography will prevent the region from becoming an old-new global leader. Europe cannot act as a cohesive force as long as its internal divisions and disagreements remain as acute as they are today. Yet the ruinous agricultural subsidies, national electorates alienated from remote bureaucracies, Brusselss rule by directive, and formulation of common foreign policy and military strategy are, in the long run, secondary matters compared with the issue of the Unions enlargement. Even an arbitrary exclusion of Russia from Europes aspirations leaves the challenges of dealing with the Balkans, Ukraine, and, foremost of all, Turkey. The European Unions gradual expansion has created pressures for serial enlargement that have now reached the boundaries of easy consensus.
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Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: No European Alternative
PREOCCUPATION WITH EXPANSION MEANS THE EU WILL NOT BE A GLOBAL LEADER
Vaclav Smil, Distinguished Professor, University of Manitoba, POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 31(4): The Next 50 Years: Unfolding Trends, 605643 (DECEMBER 2005), p. 609 The EUs conflicting attitudes toward Turkeyan eager (or at least welcoming, if always economically based) embrace and a fearful (culturally based) rejectioncapture the complexity and consequences of that challenge. Turkeys exclusion would signal, on many levels, unwillingness to come to terms with the realities of the southern hinterland. But if a Muslim Turkey (where even the prime ministers wife will not appear without hijab) is admitted, why not its neighboring ancient Christian kingdoms of Georgia and Armenia? And, indeed, why not Iraq, one of the three largest successor states of the Ottoman Empire, a country whose territory used to be a province of the Imperium Romanum (Mesopotamia)?5 No matter how far the expansion goes, what lies ahead is highly uncertain except for one obvious conclusion: an entity so preoccupied with its own constitution (and I do not mean a legal document: there the vox populi has spoken), so unclear about its eventual reach and mission, and so imperiled in terms of its population foundations cannot be a candidate for global leadership.
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Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: No Japan Alternative
STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS MEAN JAPAN CANNOT EMERGE AS A WORLD LEADER
Vaclav Smil, Distinguished Professor, University of Manitoba, POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 31(4): The Next 50 Years: Unfolding Trends, 605643 (DECEMBER 2005), p. 610 Complaints about the hollowing-out of the economy, heard strongly in the United States for the first time because of the countrys huge trade deficits with Japan during the 1980s, became common in Japan. And every passing year has failed to arrest Japans profound and long-lasting retreat from its aspirations to become the worlds leading technical innovator and from its ascent to the top of the global economic ladder (Yoda 2000; Callen 2003). Japans stagnation has produced many unprecedented signs (such as the previously unthinkable sight of homeless men living in cardboard boxes in railway stations) and dismal statistical indicators (multiplied unemployment, a rising suicide rate). And even greater changes are about to unfold. In 2007 the first large cohort of elderly baby boomers will launch the countrys mass retirement wave (typically at age 60); at the same time, increasing numbers of young people (already more than one million) have opted out of the labor market. This NEET generation (not in employment, education, or training), which prefers just hanging out in strange clothes and hairdos, can be seen as a sign both of Japans national decline and of its continuing personal affluence. Prospects are discouraging. Despite the prolonged economic shock, the country still has not made the adjustments to its peculiar banking, management, and decisionmaking systems that are generally considered to be preconditions of a new beginning (Carlile and Tilton 1998; Lincoln 2001; Grimond 2002; Tandon 2005). Prolonged recovery has become much harder because of a combination of economic and political factors: the relentless rise of China and its continued confrontational style of foreign policy, the increasingly precarious dependence on the grossly overextended United States, and the perennial danger of North Korea. Perhaps most fundamentally, the economic retreat has lasted so long that it is about to merge with the population retreat. By 2010 (perhaps as early as 2007) Japans population will begin a relentless slide that will bring it from 128 million in 2005 to just over 110 million by 2050unless the unthinkable (massive Canadian- or Australian-style immigration that would admit at least half a million people every year, mostly from the Philippines, South Korea, and China) takes place. Japan will become the most aged of all aging high-income societies. The countrys median age will reach 50 years by 2025, and while in 2005 one out of four of its people was 60 years or older, by 2050 the share will be two out of five and more than one out of seven will be 80 years or older, creating the worlds first geriatric society (United Nations 2005).
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Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: No NATO Alternative
CONSENSUS DECISION-MAKING UNDERMINES NATO AND MAKES FOR SLOW RESPONSES
Francis Fukuyama, International Relations Professor @ Johns Hopkins, AMERICA AT THE CROSSROADS: DEMOCRACY, POWER, AND THE NEOCONSERVATIVE LEGACY, 2006, p. 173 NATO has fewer legitimacy problems than the United Nations. All its members are genuine liberal democracies, and all share important core values and institutions. It is a body where the United States has a great many friends, particularly since it was expanded to include the new democracies of Eastern Europe. It is also a body from which Washington's chief critic, France, has largely excluded itself, and where Russian and Chinese vetoes do not app. Since NATO operates by consensus, it sacrifices a great deal of efficacy in decision making. As noted earlier, the cumbersomeness of the NATO machinery in the Kosovo war was one of the reasons why some members of the Bush administration opted for unilateralism
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Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: No Asian Alternative
ASIA CANNOT SUPPLANT U.S. LEADERSHIP
Michael Mandlebaum, professor of American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins, THE CASE FOR GOLIAATH: HOW AMERICA ACTS AS THE WORLDS GOVERNMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 2006, p. 206-7 Asia is destined to rise in importance in the course of the twenty-first century as Asian countries, especially the largest of them, China and India, become wealthier and more powerful. Yet the prospects for the kinds of international institutions found in Europe, and the cooperation that these institutions foster, are distant at best. Asia is a far more heterogeneous region: Its countries vary greatly in size; the distances between and among them are greater. Their economic circumstances vary widely: The differences in per capita income between, for example, Singapore and Japan, on the one hand, and Bangladesh and Burma, on the other, far exceed any such disparities found in Europe. The countries of Asia have more diverse cultural backgrounds than those of Europe, with Confucian, Buddhist, Hindu, and Muslim traditions represented in the region. Moreover, all members of the European Union are democracies, whereas Asian governments range from the similarly free political systems of India and Japan to the military dictatorships of Pakistan and Burma to Communist-ruled countries, notably China and Vietnam. Although an Asian version of the European Union would be desirable, therefore, the many and deep differences that mark the countries of the region make a close economic and political association among them unlikely. Nor is Asia likely- to establish, in the early years of the twenty-first century, a security community comparable to Europe's North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO rests on firmly peaceful relations among all its members, none of which has any reason even to contemplate war against any of the others. This is not the case in Asia, where China reserves the right to use force to gain control of Taiwan, the Communist regime of North Korea poses a standing threat to its neighbors, and India and Pakistan are deeply at odds over the status of the Indian province of Kashmir. The remaking of Asia, or indeed other parts of the world, in Europe's image does not, therefore, offer a promising way, in the short term, to replace the governmental services of the United States, should these cease to be available
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Unipolarity Good: No Islamic Alternative
AN ISLAMIC GLOBAL LEADER WILL NOT EMERGE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE U.S.
Vaclav Smil, Distinguished Professor, University of Manitoba, POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 31(4): The Next 50 Years: Unfolding Trends, 605643 (DECEMBER 2005), p. 624 As with every change of global leadership, Americas retreat will be widely felt. For some four generations the country has been the worlds dominant agent of change, an unselfish savior, a reluctant arbiter, and a brash trendsetter. At the same time, it has never been averse to realpolitik as attested by dtente with the Soviet Union, support of dictatorial regimes in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, and rapprochement with Communist China. But in its fundamentals, and very often in its execution, Americas foreign policy has been imbued with moral (and moralistic) convictions about the duty to act as a global promoter of freedom, a call to action that unites John F. Kennedy and George W. Bush. The call would be very different indeed if it were to come from the mullahs speaking for a resurgent Islam, from the narques running a United States of Europe, from the councils of a rejuvenated Russian military, or from confident politbureau strategists in Beijing. But the probability of any of these calls is not very high. By 2050 the Muslim world of some 2 billion people will almost certainly wield more influence than today, but its heterogeneity (going beyond the more than 1,300-year-old sunni shia rift), its internal troubles (oil production in some countries will be in steep decline, economic progress will be very uneven), and its many selfish national interests will prevent its coalescing into a new cohesive caliphate.17 Only wishful thinking can conjure the transmutation that would be required to remake aging Europe into a new consensual hegemon, and a resurgent (but still depopulating) Russia could not fill the multifaceted superpower niche.
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Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: No U.N. Alternative
THE U.N. WONT SOLVE SECURITY AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
Francis Fukuyama, International Relations Professor @ Johns Hopkins, AMERICA AT THE CROSSROADS: DEMOCRACY, POWER, AND THE NEOCONSERVATIVE LEGACY, 2006, p. 157 The American Left and many Europeans, on the other hand, overemphasize the importance of the United Nations and place too many hopes in its ability to solve the world's security and economic problems. The fact is that the United Nations, while useful for certain functions like peacekeeping and nation-building, is structurally limited with regard to both legitimacy and effectiveness, and it is doubtful that any set of reforms currently contemplated or politically feasible will solve the organization's problems.
THE U.N. HAS BEEN INEPT AT STOPPING CONFLICT
BUSINESS WEEK, 2003 (April 21, p. 38) Despite French efforts to make the U.N. an arbiter of legitimacy in global conflicts, it has played no such role in its history. Indeed, France itself has been a serial preemptor in French-speaking Africa for decades, with no by-your-leave from the U.N. It has 3,000 troops in the Ivory Coast today, protecting its economic interests. The U.N., for its part, was paralyzed throughout the entire Cold War because of the veto power of each of the five permanent members of the Security Council. In the 1990s, the threat of a Russian veto stopped the U.N. from protecting Muslim women and children in Bosnia and Kosovo. The European Union, too, failed to act. At a World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, Switzerland, in February, the air was thick with condemnation of America for going ahead with what many considered an immoral war. But at one meeting, Mustafa Ceric, the Grand Mufti of Bosnia, reminded the mostly European audience that ''Europe and the world stood by for two years, and 10,000 of my people died.'' Only when U.S. President Clinton acted, said the Grand Mufti, did the killing stop. Multilateralism that leads to paralysis is not inherently moral, any more than unilateralism in service to good is necessarily immoral. In Africa, too, multilateralism has been a dismal failure. In Somalia in 1993, the U.N. was too weak to subdue the warlords who were stealing food it was trying to distribute to the country's hungry. It cost the lives of American soldiers when their Black Hawk helic opter crashed on a mission to stop one such warlord. In Rwanda, neither the U.N., the EU, nor NATO did much to stop the genocide.
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Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: The U.N. Doesnt Increase Legitimacy
The UN doesnt provide international legitimacy even Europeans concede
Robert Kagan, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Monthly Columnist, Washington Post, and Worked at the State Department, 84-88, March/April 2004 (Americas Crisis of Legitimacy Foreign Affairs) p. ebscohost But is the Security Council really the ultimate depositary of international legitimacy, as Europeans insist today? International life would be simpler if it were. But it is not. Ever since the UN'S creation almost six decades ago, the Security Council has failed to function as the UN'S more idealistic founders intended. And it has never been accepted as the sole source of international legitimacy, not even by Europeans. Europe's recent demand that the United States seek tin authorization for the Iraq war, and presumably for all future wars, was a novel--even revolutionary--proposition. During the four decades of the Cold War, the Security Council was paralyzed by implacable hostility between its two strongest veto wielding members. Only after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War was it even possible to imagine that the Security Council might function as the sole source of international authority and legitimacy. Still, it has not. The Security Council did function on occasion, but most observers agree that its authority weakened rather than strengthened over the first decade after the Cold War . In 1994, for example, the Clinton administration sent troops to Haiti without the Security Council's authorization, which came only after the fact. In 1998, it bombed Iraq in Operation Desert Fox over the strong objections France and Russia expressed before the Security Council. By no means are Americans the only culprits in acting without UN approval: Europeans also bypass the Security Council when it suits their purposes. In Kosovo, for example, it was the Europeans who (along with the United States) went to war without obtaining the Security Council's legitimizing sanction. And that did not prevent them from arguing at the time, and since, that the Kosovo war was legitimate. They believed that they had a particular moral responsibility to prevent another genocide on the continent and a special license to go to war to stop it. According to Fisher, one of war's strongest proponents in 1999, in this case history and morality trumped traditional principles of state sovereignty and nonintervention.
The Cold War proves that acting through the UN doesnt increase legitimacy it had to do with self-interest
Robert Kagan, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Monthly Columnist, Washington Post, and Worked at the State Department, 84-88, March/April 2004 (Americas Crisis of Legitimacy Foreign Affairs) p. ebscohost Contrary to much mythologizing on both sides of the Atlantic these days, the foundations of U.S. legitimacy during the: Cold War had little to do with the fact that the United States helped create the UN or faithfully abided by the precepts of international law laid out in the organization's charter. For the first four decades of its existence, the UN Security Council was paralyzed by the stalemate between the two Cold War superpowers. The United States did not consider it necessary to seek the approval of the Security Council to make or threaten war, and Europeans did not expect or demand that it should. Nor did European nations seek such authorization for their own wars in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, or the southern Atlantic. When the United States did cite international law to justify its Cold War policies, it appealed to the catchall principle of collective self-defense . It argued that its actions whether military interventions or clandestine
overthrows of regimes in the Third World--were undertaken for the collective defense of the free world against an inherently aggressive international communism. It was not international law and institutions but the circumstances of the Cold War, and Washington's special role in it, that conferred legitimacy on the United States, at least within the West. In Europe, U.S. legitimacy rested on three pillars, all based on the existence of the Soviet communist empire. The sturdiest pillar was Europe's perception that the Soviet Union posed a strategic threat to the West--a reality made manifest by hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops parked in the center of Europe--and its understanding that only Washington possessed the power to deter Moscow. For most Europeans, and for most U.S. allies in Asia too, the United States' widely accepted role as principal defender against the Soviet threat gave it a very broad mantle of legitimacy. Even when they believed that the United States was acting foolishly or
. The legitimacy the United States enjoyed within the West during the Cold War derived in large part from its allies' self-interest.
immorally, as in Vietnam, most Europeans nevertheless continued to accept U.S. power and leadership
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Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: The U.N. Doesnt Increase Legitimacy
The Security Council doesnt provide legitimacy they act out of their on self interest
Charles Krauthammer, Essayist and Columnist for the Washington Post, Frequent Contributor to the Weekly Standard, the New Republic, and the National Interest, Winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy, Member of the Presidents Council on Bioethics, Board-Certified Psychiatrist and Received Medical Degree, Harvard Medical School, Winter 2002 (The Unipolar Moment Revisited The National Interest) p. ebscohost This logic is deeply puzzling. How exactly does the Security Council confer moral authority on American action? The Security Council is a committee of great powers , heirs to the victors in the Second World War. They manage the world in their own interest. The Security Council is, on the very rare occasions when it actually works, realpolitik by committee. But by what logic is it a repository of international morality? How does the approval of France and Russia, acting clearly and rationally in pursuit of their own interests in Iraq (largely oil and investment), confer legitimacy on an invasion?
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Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: War is Less Likely in Unipolar Worlds Than Any Other
UNIPOLAR WORLD MORE STABLE THAN MULTIPOLAR WORLD
William C. Wohlforth, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, AMERICA'S STRATEGIC CHOICES, Revised Edition, ed. Brown, Cote, Jr., Lynn-Jones and Miller, 2000, p. 292-3 Waltz argued that bipolarity is less war prone than multipolarity because it reduces uncertainty. By the same logic, unipolarity is the least war prone of all structures. For as long as unipolarity obtains, there is little uncertainty regarding alliance choices of the calculation of power. The only options available to second-tier states are to bandwagon with the polar power (either explicitly or implicitly) or, at least, to take no action that could incur its focused enmity. As long as their security policies are oriented around the power and preferences of the sole pole, second-tier states are less likely to engage in conflict prone rivalries for security or prestige. Once the sole pole takes sides, there can be little doubt about which party will prevail. Moreover, the unipolar leader has the capability to be far more interventionist than earlier system leaders. Exploiting the other states' security dependence as well as its unilateral power advantages, the sole pole can maintain a system of alliances that keeps second-tier states out of power.
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Unipolarity Good: No Alternative: Soros Specific
SOROS DOES NOT ARGUE WE SHOULD ABANDON OUR MILITARY MIGHT
George Soros, Global Financier and International Development Expert, THE BUBBLE OF AMERICAN SUPREMACY, 2004, pp. 167-8) To regain the identity it enjoyed during the Cold War, The United States ought to become the leader of a community of democracies and change its behavior accordingly. t ought to lead by building genuine partnerships and abiding by the rules that it seeks to impose on others. Since peaceful cooperative efforts do not necessarily succeed, the United States would still need to retain its military might, but this strength would serve to protect a just world order and would be seen as such by the rest of the world.
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Unipolarity Good: AT: Multilateralism Solves Anti-Americanism
Multilateralism would not assuage allied resentment of the US anti-American policies are inevitable
Jonathan Rauch, Senior Writer for National Journal Magazine and Correspondent for The Atlantic and Writer in Residence, Brookings Institution, 11/1/2003 (Bush is No Cowboy The National Journal) p. http://www.reason.com/topics/topic/157.xml The reality of American dominance is not about to change, and few Americans would favor changing it. Signing up for the International Criminal Court and other global ventures is no answer, because America would still be at odds with other member countries over the goals such organizations would pursue --witness the U.N. and the WTO, among others. People who say that Bush should tie the United States into a web of stabilizing alliances and global organizations, as Presidents Roosevelt and Truman did, miss the point. The old alliances worked not because they were multilateral but because of the West's common interest in resisting Communism. That common interest is gone.
The US always loses within multilateral institutions the UN proves
Suzanne Nossel, Former Senior Advisor to the United States Mission to the United Nations, Winter 2002 (Retail Diplomacy: The Edifying Story of UN Dues Reform National Interest) p. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_2001_Winter/ai_81765320/pg_3 The United States rarely wins arguments inside a multilateral meeting room. The impulse that leads rowdy back-benchers to rise up against heavy-handed prime ministers makes membership-wide meetings rallying points for resisting the powers that be. No country wants to be publicly seen to buckle under U.S. pressure. During the dues battle, formal meetings at the UN were bruising for the United States, with country after country taking the floor to demand that America pay its back dues "on time, in full, and without conditions." Even toward the end, as details of a compromise took shap e in private meetings, the public rhetoric remained feverish. Open meetings make good theater, but deals are cut in back rooms. For this reason, too, it was clear that by the time the U.S. delegation was winging its way to the Durban racism conference, the time to rally others to our cause had already passed.
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Unipolarity Good: Answers to: Hegemony Causes War
EVEN THOUGH THE U.S. WAGES WAR, THERE IS A NET INCREASE IN PEACE UNDER U.S. HEGEMONY Colin Gray, political scientist specializing in national security policy, THE SHERIFF: AMERICAS DEFENSE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER, 2004p. 63 A ccepting the risk of trying the reader's patience with repetition, the point of this discussion may be clearer if we cite again the golden thought of Donald Kagan, who -wrote that "what seems to work best, even though imperfectly is the possession by those states who wish to preserve the peace of the preponderant power and of the will to accept the burdens and responsibilities required to achieve that purpose."' Americans' motives may well be mixed, but the historical record is tolerably clear in support of Kagan's claim. U.S. hegemony, meaning only preeminence and leadership, not detailed direction of most aspects of political, economic, and social behavior, is by far the best prospect for world order in the twenty-first century. It cannot guarantee peace, because the U.S. superstate will, from time to time, need to wage war or at least apply coercion on behalf of order. Nonetheless, with global security the interest of peace will be advanced prodigiously for so long as the United States is willing and able to sustain its current position of preponderance. A good part of the contemporary difficulty into which American statecraft has stumbled derives from a lack of understanding at home- and abroad of the truth in Kagan's dictum. In addition, of course, there are critics who understand the theory of the benign hegemon and reject it. They may dispute its authority in historical experience,' as well as in logic and common sense, or they may find it all too credible, plausible, and distasteful'.. Many critics of American hegemonism, especiallyhen that hegemonism is expressed in a Texan accent, would seem to believe in a theory of international security and world order that is quite at variance with that which guides-this text and, indeed, is at variance with accessible historical experience. From the perspective of world order, there is no superior option for the twenty-first century to a preponderant United States acting as sheriff. Since there is no rival polity or coalition in the near term, the alternative to American hegemony is disorder on a haircurling scale. The American sheriff will not, and indeed cannnot prevent all disorder. But it can dissuade, deter, bribe, coerce, and sometimes physically defeat those who threaten to create conflagration in their neighborhood and beyond. As we shall see, the joys of hegemony are easily exaggerated until they are contrasted with the costs and risks.
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Unipolarity Good: Answers to: Unipolarity Causes Terrorism
TERRORISTS WILL OPPOSE THE U.S. WETHER OR NOT WE ARE A HEGEMON
Stephen Walt, Harvard, TAMING AMERICAN POWER, 2005, p. 70 Some say that by fighting the terrorists abroad since September the 11th, we only stir up a hornet's nest. But the terrorists who struck that day were stirred up already. If America were not fighting terrorists in Iraq, and Afghanistan, and elsewhere, what would these thousands of killers do, suddenly begin leading productive lives of service and charity ;""' From this perspective, opposition to the United States is an inevitable, and thus unavoidable, reaction either to the concentration of power in U.S. hands or the specific political and cultural values that the United States represents. And if that were the whole story, there would be little the United States could do about it.
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*** Unilateralism & Bush Doctrine Good ***
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Unilateralism Good: Preemption Bad Answers (Defense)
IRAQ DELEGITIMIZED PREEMPTION
James Kurth is the Claude Smith Professor of Political Science at Swarthmore, ORBIS,
Summer 2006
Each of the three central neoconservative concepts about U.S. foreign policy and national strategy has been invalidated and discredited by the war. First, the strategy of preemption required a high degree of accurate intelligence about the extent and physical location of a presumed threat to U.S. security. The clear debacle of U.S. intelligence about Saddam Hussein's presumed WMD will discredit any U.S. claims about similar threats for several years to come. This will make any future U.S. strategy for preemption so illegitimate that it probably wont even be tried.
NEOCONSERVATIVES HAVE NO POLITICAL POWER
James Kurth is the Claude Smith Professor of Political Science at Swarthmore, ORBIS,
Summer 2006
In any event, there are no longer any neoconservatives holding prominent administration positions. And in the next administration, be it formed by the Democrats or the Republicans, it is highly unlikely that the new president will see any political advantage or policy usefulness in appointing to important office anyone who is identified as a neoconservative.
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Unilateralism Good: Preemption Good: Frontline
THE BUSH DOCTRINE IS CRITICAL TO MAINTAINING GLOBAL STABILITY AND PREVENTING THE MOST PROBABLE SCENARIOS FOR WMD PROLIF, GLOBAL WAR, NUCLEAR ANNIHILATION AND TERRORISM. Donnelly 1-31-2003 (AEI Online, research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, Deputy Executive Director of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) (1999-2002); Director of the Policy Group, Committee on National Security (now the Committee on Armed Services), U.S. House of Representatives (1996-1999); and a professional staff member, Committee on National Security, U.S. House of Representatives (1995))
The Bush Doctrine, which is likely to shape U.S. policy for decades to come, reflects the realities of American power as well as the aspirations of American political principles. Does the Bush Doctrine represent a new course for American policy or simply an elaborate justification for the administration's actions? Why attack Iraq but not North Korea? What is the real role of preemption? What is wrong with the tried-and-true concepts of deterrence? If nothing else, the Bush Doctrine, articulated by the president over the past eighteen months in a series of speeches and encapsulated in the new National Security Strategy paper released in September, represents a reversal of course from Clinton-era policies in regard to the uses of U.S. power and, especially, military force. So perhaps it is no surprise that many Americans--and others in the rest of the world as well--are struggling to keep up with the changes. Indeed, it often appears that many in the administration cannot keep up with the president. But in fact the Bush Doctrine represents a return to the first principles of American security strategy. The Bush Doctrine also represents the realities of international politics in the post-cold-war, sole-superpower world. Further, the combination of these two factors--America's universal political principles and unprecedented global power and influence--make the Bush Doctrine a whole greater than the sum of its parts; it is likely to remain the basis for U.S. security strategy for decades to come. This does not mean that American leaders will be freed from the need to make unpleasant choices; North Korea's recent actions remind us of ways in which the possession by others of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles places limits on policy options. But the expansion of "the American perimeter"--those parts of the world where a liberal, democratic order is accepted as the norm--is likely to continue, even accelerate; having, at last, determined to reform the politics of the greater Middle East, we will find it difficult and dangerous to stop with half measures. The Bush Doctrine continues a tradition that can be traced to the Monroe and Truman doctrines. It is an attempt, in a new century and under new strategic circumstances, to "foster a world environment where the American system can survive and flourish," as Paul Nitze put it in 1950, in the famous "NSC 68" memorandum. A comprehensive history of U.S. national security strategy is well beyond the scope of this article, but let it be stipulated that Americans always have taken an expansive view of their security interests and been more than willing to exercise military power where the correlation of forces is favorable. Blessed now with a global balance heavily weighted in favor of the United States, the Bush administration has declared itself ready to remove the rogue regimes and terrorists it regards as uniquely dangerous. For Americans, normal power calculations of "threats" and "opportunities" have been colored by an abiding faith in a set of political principles believed to have universal application. Americans have come to regard the exercise of their power as not simply a force for national greatness but for human liberty. Today, at least four realities argue convincingly for the continued and vigorous exercise of American national power, to include "preemptive" military actions. First of all, the fact of unprecedented American power is hardly in dispute. Those who oppose it find themselves frustrated by the seeming invincibility of American "imperialism." The French, for example, both lament and wonder at American hyperpuissance. Even Paul Kennedy, who famously foresaw American "imperial overstretch," now marvels at the scope of U.S. power. In a recent essay, he confessed to having made some "recalculations" of American power "as measured by the standard social science criteria," and came away with "the overwhelming impression of how far this single nation stood above all possible contenders as the global hegemon." With less than 5 percent of world population, the United States generates about 30 percent of total world economic product, "a percentage that has actually increased in recent years." Indeed, Kennedy wrote, "even more remarkable is the size of the American military preeminence." The campaign in Afghanistan only impressed him further: Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing. . . . The Pax Britannica was run on
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the cheap, Britain's army was much smaller than European armies, and even the Royal Navy was equal only to the next two navies--right now all the other navies in the world combined could not dent American maritime supremacy. Charlemagne's empire was merely western-European in its reach. The Roman Empire stretched farther afield, but there was another great empire in Persia and a larger one in China. There is, therefore, no comparison. In other words, the fundamental premise of the Bush Doctrine is true: The United States possesses the means--economic, military, diplomatic--to realize its expansive geopolitical purposes. Further, and especially in light of the domestic political reaction to the attacks of September 11, the victory in Afghanistan and the remarkable skill demonstrated by President Bush in focusing national attention, it is equally true that Americans possess the requisite political willpower to pursue an expansive strategy. Second, the description of the threats to U.S. interests advanced in the National Security Strategy is also an accurate one. America faces no immediate great-power threat, no superpower doppelganger to replace the Soviet Union. The Russian empire has contracted to a 400-year "low," and Moscow has proven militarily incapable of subduing a single insurrectionist province. More importantly, Russia seems to have lost the appetite for empire, as it has become increasingly democratic and geopolitically inclined toward the West and the United States. The immediate post-cold-war fears of Russian revanche have not been realized. The two other candidates as great-power balancers to American primacy, the People's Republic of China and the European Union, likewise are not immediately up to the challenge. A few observers believe that, as Europe becomes more politically integrated, it will take issue with American geopolitical leadership. "It is now Europe's turn to ascend and break away from an America that refuses to surrender its privileges of primacy," writes Charles Kupchan, a former Clinton administration official now at Georgetown University. "Europe will inevitably rise up as America's principal competitor." Some regard the defiance of France and Germany over Iraq as an occasion of "soft balancing"--the use of so-called "soft power" to offset American military might, diplomatic determination, and ideological motivation. Yet it does not seem as if the Europeans will be successful in thwarting the Bush administration's march to war. It is far more likely that Europe will remain essentially content with its status as a junior partner in the current Pax Americana, demanding a certain amount of deference--and, after Iraq, perhaps very little deference--but still fundamentally unwilling to forge or employ the tools of "hard power" needed to create a genuinely multipolar international order. China's economic growth over the past decade has fueled a program of military modernization that poses some particularly severe problems for the United States, such as across the Taiwan Straits. Further, these localized challenges may cause larger problems for a brittle American-led regional order based upon bilateral security partnerships between the United States and its East Asian allies. But Beijing does not yet have the ability to mount a broader regional--let alone global--challenge or lead an anti-American coalition. Moreover, the weakening of communist ideology in China and the advance of capitalism pose an internal problem of legitimacy for a regime in the throes of a generational leadership change. In addition, there may be international consequences for promoting an intense and aggressive Han nationalism as a partial remedy for these domestic problems. Beijing cannot style itself, as the United States reasonably can, as a benign hegemon. Beyond potential great-power rivals there is good reason for continued concern over "rogue" states such as Iraq, North Korea, and Iran. These are modest powers with outsized ambitions that clearly see weapons of mass destruction as not simply a means to intimidate their immediate neighbors. They understand that, under a global security order headed by the United States, the first hurdle to becoming a regional hegemon is getting America out of the way. Nor are these regimes driven simply by external ambitions. Indeed, these regimes' internal position rests, in some measure, in having created hegemonic national ambitions--and their long-term survival in part rests upon seeming to satisfy them. Whatever the personal desires for glory among Saddam Hussein, Kim Jong Il, or the Iranian mullahs, they can also be driven by domestic political pressures to adopt a more aggressive posture. Where the immediate opportunity for aggrandizement is limited by American power, these states are increasingly attracted to weapons proliferation and flirtations with international terrorist organizations. What under normal circumstances the United States might simply ignore--and often has ignored, even in the recent past-looms as a greater problem for America, its allies, and the international system. While coalitions of convenience among rogue states and terrorists may have been limited in the past and may carry inherent dangers for leaders of the rogue states themselves, the difficulty of resisting the Pax Americana is likely to mean that cooperation will increase in the future. Indeed, as the Bush Doctrine is further realized in Afghanistan and Iraq, cooperation could become desperation. Similar concerns add urgency to the "war on terrorism," which is, in truth, not a global war on all terrorist organizations--so far, the FARC in Colombia and the Irish Republican Army seemed to have escaped much attention from the Bush administration-but principally upon "Islamism," that violent political movement antipathetic to modernity and to the West, and especially to their expression through American power. The motivating core of this movement appears to be more "Arab" than "pan-Islamic," and often stems from the Saudi-funded spread of Wahhabism. It is like communism in that it is, in some measure, an ideologically motivated international political movement, though it relies upon the means of military weakness--terrorism--where the
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Soviet Union deployed great tank armies and nuclear arsenals. Any comprehensive U.S. "threat assessment" would conclude that the normal constraints of international politics--counterbalancing powers--no longer immediately inhibit the exercise of American might. At the same time, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction promises to upset the "normal" rules of power among nation-states, devaluing the conventional military strength (and other kinds of power, as well) amassed by the United States. This undercuts the general peace won by the victory in the cold war and would complicate any future great-power competition or challenge to the American-led international order. Small "rogue" states and violent, but nevertheless weak, international movements like Islamic radicalism are coming to have a disproportionate "weight" in global security calculations. Moreover Islamism represents a kind of ideological threat to the Western political principles that made the end of the cold war against the Soviet Union also seem like the end of history. <CONTINUES> The opportunities to expand the Pax Americana also rest upon one of the few solid truths of social science: Democracies rarely war on other democracies. One of the reasons it is so hard to imagine the European Union becoming a genuine competitor to the United States is that there are no serious, direct transatlantic geopolitical disputes. Differences in the Middle East, for example, have no immediate relationship to the power balance between Europe and America--nothing today is analogous to the previous colonial competition. Nor is it easy to imagine a similar future struggle with Japan, Korea, India, or any Asian democracy. Those regions of the world that have, often because of the result of defeats in past wars, been brought into the American system do not require continued, heavy military occupation or imperial government. Pax Americana enjoys a "strategic rear" that is remarkably peaceful, prosperous, and free. What were once feuding great powers have more or less permanently, and apparently quite happily, ceded their security interests to American management. A thorough "opportunities assessment" would conclude that the prospects for an expanded, American-led liberal international order are clouded by a military balance complicated by weapons proliferation. Nuclear weapons, in particular, now pose a deterrent threat to the United States; hopes for a stable and democratized Islamic world, for example, may be short-lived if Iraq or Iran were to acquire such a capability. We see already how the tiny North Korean arsenal--and its proclivities to proliferate--could confound America's position as the guarantor of East Asian security and democracy. This suggests a fourth and final factor favoring the continued and vigorous exercise of American power: The realities of primacy, rising threats, and emerging opportunities combine to give the United States a "systemic" responsibility, that is, a responsibility for preserving the viability and legitimacy of the liberal international order of nation-states. A failure to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Baghdad--and indeed, a failure to continue the mission and replace the Ba'ath regime with at least a protodemocratic government-would materially change the global correlation of forces, to use Soviet-speak. Because power is measured everywhere in relation to the United States, regional events have greater global significance, beyond even the linkages supposed between cold war "dominoes." Taken together, American principles, interests, and systemic responsibilities argue strongly in favor of an active and expansive stance of strategic primacy and a continued willingness to employ military force. Within that context, and given the ways in which nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction can distort normal calculations of international power relationships, there is a compelling need to hold open the option of--and indeed, to build forces more capable of--preemptive strike operations. The United States must take a wider view of the traditional doctrine of "imminent danger," considering how such dangers might threaten not only its direct interests, but its allies, the liberal international order, and the opportunities for greater freedom in the world. <CONTINUES> The preservation of today's Pax Americana rests upon both actual military strength and the perception of strength. The variety of victories scored by U.S. forces since the end of the cold war is testament to both the futility of directly challenging the United States and the desire of its enemies to keep poking and prodding to find a weakness in the American global order. Convincing would-be great powers, rogue states, and terrorists to accept the liberal democratic order--and the challenge to autocratic forms of rule that come with it--requires not only an overwhelming response when the peace is broken, but a willingness to step in when the danger is imminent. The message of the Bush Doctrine--"Don't even think about it!"--rests in part on a logic of preemption that underlies the logic of primacy.
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Unilateralism Good: Preemption Good: Regime Change Good
REGIME CHANGE DETERS WMD DEVELOPMENT
Keith W. Mines , served for 22 years in U.S. Army Special Forces, a mix of active duty, National Guard, and reserve assignments, ORBIS, Fall 2005, Force Size for the Post-Westphalian World p. 661 First, there is regime change. The lesson of Iraq and Afghanistan is not that pursuing regime change is untenable, but that it is one of our most important tools and one we need to be able to do right. In addition to directly changing threatening regimes, it can be a deterrent that dampens enthusiasm for wmd and support for terrorism, as we have recently seen in Libyas renunciation of its plans to acquire wmd. But the deterrent is no better than the force that would carry it out. And there can be little doubt that the deterrent value of the U.S. force is less today than it was in 2001, before the display of our minimalist force structure took place.
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Unilateralism Good:
Preemption Good: Answers to: Pre-emption Sets a Precedent
THE BUSH DOCTRINE DOESNT CAUSE MODELINGINACTION SETS A WORSE MODEL
Victor Davis Hanson, editor, National Review Online, 9/20/02,
http://nationalreview.com/hanson/hanson092002.asp
But won't we set a bad precedent? Maybe India or Russia will do the same? This is the current conventional wisdom repeated ad nauseam. But Russia went into Chechnya regardless of our wishes or example. And India will make a decision to act on the basis of its own self-interest, not whether they can cite "precedent" on the part of the United States. Strong nations evaluate their options from calculations of self-preservation and morality choices not necessarily predicated on what the United States must do to ensure its own security. The invasion of Iraq will have a deleterious effect on world peace only if it is seen as gratuitous or unnecessary and neither presently happens to be true. So the danger is not preemption per se, but bellicosity for no good reason. We must get away from stereotyped generalizations and look at specifics. Being inactive in the face of unprovoked attacks on Americans the Iranian embassy takeover and the Marine barracks bombing are good examples can establish precedents just as pernicious. In that regard, President Carter's restraint in 1980, in combination with a failed raid, was a far more dangerous act than President Reagan's bombing of Libya and makes his present moral objections to preempting Saddam as disturbing as they are hypocritical.
THE PRE-EMPTION DOCTRINE DOESNT SET A PRECEDENT FOR OTHER STATES
Joshua Muravchik, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, December 2002, http://www.aei.org/ra/ramura0212.htm This is a definition that would readily apply to the three members of Bush's "axis of evil," and perhaps to Muammar Qaddafi's Libya--but to few, if any, others. One might challenge aspects of the enumerated criteria, but the claim that Bush has sought an unlimited writ for preemptive action is nonsense. More reasonable is the fear that others might borrow the doctrine of preemption for their own , less savory purposes. Some states, no doubt, will try to do precisely that. But (to anticipate somewhat the third objection) there is less cause for alarm here than meets the eye, for the fear rests on the assumption that international law acts as a substantial barrier to misbehavior by states . In truth, international law is not self-enforcing, and serves as a barrier only insofar as states, meaning usually the U nited States, are willing to enforce it. In practice, miscreant nations routinely cloak their actions in spurious claims of self-defense or of other rights enshrined in law. It is not the cleverness of their arguments but rather the willingness of others to bear the burdens of counteracting them that determines what they will get away with
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Unilateralism Good: Preemption Good: Prolif
PREEMPTION IS NECESSARY TO DETER WMD DEVELOPMENT
Charles Krauthaumer, DEMOCRATIC REALISM: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN A UNILATERAL WORLD, April 2004, http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040227_book755text.pdf Now, those uneasy with American power have made these two means of wielding itpreemption and unilateralismthe focus of unrelenting criticism. The doctrine of preemption, in particular, has been widely attacked for violating international norms. What international norm? The one under which Israel was universally condemnedeven the Reagan administration joined the condemnation at the Security Council for preemptively destroying Iraqs Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981? Does anyone today doubt that it was the right thing to do, both strategically and morally? In a world of terrorists, terrorist states and weapons of mass destruction, the option of preemption is especially necessary. In the bipolar world of the Cold War, with a stable nonsuicidal adversary, deterrence could work. Deterrence does not work against people who ache for heaven. It does not work against undeterrables. And it does not work against undetectables: nonsuicidal enemy regimes that might attack through clandestine meansa suitcase nuke or anonymously delivered anthrax. Against both undeterrables and undetectables, preemption is the only possible strategy. Moreover, the doctrine of preemption against openly hostile states pursuing weapons of mass destruction is an improvement on classical deterrence. Traditionally, we deterred the use of WMDs by the threat of retaliation after wed been attackedand thats too late; the point of preemption is to deter the very acquisition of WMDs in the first place. Whether or not Iraq had large stockpiles of WMDs, the very fact that the United States overthrew a hostile regime that repeatedly refused to come clean on its weapons has had precisely this deterrent effect. We are safer today not just because Saddam is gone, but because Libya and any others contemplating trafficking with WMDs, havefor the first timeseen that it carries a cost, a very high cost.
DETERRENCE DOESNT WORK WHEN YOU CANT LOCATE A TARGET - PREEMPTION IS NEEDED
Philip Bobbitt is A.W. Walker chair at the University of Texas School of Law, and author of The Shield of Achilles, 2002 (NEW PERSPECTIVES QUARTERLY, Fall, http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2002_fall/bobbitt.html) I think it is quite legitimate. Deterrence worked against the Soviet Union because we knew who they were and where they lived. If a missile was launched from a Soviet silo, we saw it instantly. We are entering a period where weapons of mass destruction can be used against us by groups against whom we cannot retaliate. We still don't know where Bin Laden is. If you can't retaliate against a target, you can't deter, and then you have got to move to something like preemption.
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Unilateralism Good: Preemption Good: Wont Snowball
U.S. MILITARY PREEMPTION WILL NOT SNOWBALL
Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay, Brookings, 2002 (THE BUSH NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: AN EVALUATION, http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb109.htm) In contrast, the Strategy envisions a much narrower role for preemption. It discusses preemption in the specific context of defeating terrorists and rogue states. It never suggests preemption has a role to play with respect to a rising China or any residual threat posed by Russia. Nor is the argument for preempting terrorists controversial. Law enforcement, covert operations, and intelligence gathering have always sought to preempt terrorist attacks, and such preemptive activities are well-established in international law. Clinton administration officials partially justified the 1998 cruise missile attacks on targets in Afghanistan and Sudan on preventative grounds. Instead, the debate in the United States has always been about whether the U.S. government is doing enough to stop terrorists preemptively, not whether it has to wait for them to attack before acting.
PREEMPTION IS A LEGITIMATE MEANS OF SELF-DEFENSE
Jack Spencer is Policy Analyst for Defense and National Security in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation, 2002 (THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: AN EFFECTIVE BLUEPRINT FOR THE WAR ON TERROR, http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/WM149.cfm) Preemptive action is a legitimate defensive measure given the threats America faces today. The nation has an inherent right to self-defense and this includes the right to take preemptive action against imminent threats. According to the NSS, As a matter of common sense and self defense, Americ a will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. The fact is that the United States, like all other sovereign states, has long maintained the right to defend itself through preemption and centuries of recognized international law supports this right. Such action may be able to prevent another September 11like attack. Moreover, a nation may be deterred from pursuing weapons of mass destruction or working with terrorists if the U.S. threat to strike is credible. More importantly, if the President acts on sound information that the American people will be attacked, he will save American lives.
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Unilateralism Good: Preemption Good: General
PREVENTIVE WAR NECESSARY TO CONTROL TERRORISM, PREVENT WMD PROLIFERATION, HALT GENOCIDAL KILLING, AND STOP THE SPREAD OF DISEASE Ivo H. Daalder, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, James B. Steinberg, Vice President
and Director, Foreign Policy Studies, The Los Angeles Times, December 4, 2005, http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/Daalder/20051204_preemption.htm, Preventive War, A Useful Tool
It would be unfortunate if President Bush's doctrine of preemption were a casualty of the Iraq war. We should avoid waging unilateral preventive wars of regime change. But circumstances will probably arise in which the option of using force preventively should be availablewhether to kill terrorists, prevent weapons proliferation, halt genocidal killing or stop the spread of deadly disease.
MANY REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE INCAPBABLE OF HANDLING MANY THREATS
Ivo H. Daalder, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, James B. Steinberg, Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy Studies, The Los Angeles Times, December 4, 2005, http://www.brookings.edu/views/oped/Daalder/20051204_preemption.htm, Preventive War, A Useful Tool Regional organizations are no panacea, however. Global threats are beyond the purview of any one regional organization to handle. In other cases, there may be no meaningful regional organization to authorize force. Which leaves the alternative of creating a coalition of like-minded states. One such coalition could be composed of democracies, because democracies should have an interest in upholding the norm of state responsibility. Because these governments are elected, their collective decision to use force would carry more legitimacy than a decision of any one of them.
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Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Generally Good
BUSH FOREIGN POLICY HAS HAD MANY SUCCESSES The San Francisco Chronicle, 2006, (California), August 27, Pg. A1
Libya abandoned terrorism and weapons of mass destruction after the Iraq invasion. The A.Q. Khan nuclear arms network in Pakistan, dedicated to sharing weapons secrets, was dismantled. The administration defused a nuclear showdown between Pakistan and India and strengthened relations with both, especially India, a vital emerging power. Relations with Japan are at a high point. There have been no big missteps on China. The administration has elevated attention to Africa with new development and AIDS initiatives. Democratic movements have taken hold in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. Alliances with Europe have largely been repaired. And there still have been no terrorist attacks on U.S. soil since Sept. 11, 2001.
BUSH PREEMPTION DOCTRINE BEST RESPONSE TO TERRORIST THREAT Sean Hannity, Fox News, 2004, Deliver Us From Evil, p. 154
President Bush has often spoken of how Americans can keep the peace by redefining war on our terms, said Cheney. That means that our armed services must have every tool to answer any threat that forms against us. It means that any enemy conspiring to harm America or our friends must face a swift, a certain and a devastating response. As we face this prospect, old doctrines of security do not apply. In the days of the Cold War, we were able to manage the threat with strategies of deterrence and containment. But its a lot tougher to deter enemies who have no country to defend. And containment is not possible when dictators obtain weapons of mass destruction, and are prepared to share them with terrorists who intend to inflict catastrophic casualties of the United States. We will not live at the mercy of terrorists, Cheney told his audience. And his message was seconded by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld the following month in a speech to the Metro Atlanta Chamber of Commerce. As Rumsfled noted, the Soviet era policy of deterrence could no longer be our only recourse. The policy of preemption, he said, recognizes that this is a different security environment than before. In the past, the major threat was from conventional weapons. Today, rogue states could supply weapons of mass destruction to terror groupsHow do you defend yourself against a terrorist? Do you absorb the attack and then decide to do something about it? The conventional weapons of the past, Rumsfeld noted, threatened casualties in the hundreds of thousands. Today, said Rumsfeld, the question people are debatingis how do you feel about absorbing a blow with a weapon of mass destruction, and its not hundreds or thousands of people killed, but its tens of thousands? With a nation like Iraq, which not only possessed chemical and biological weapons, but had shown a willingness to use them against its own people, the dangers of acting were outweighed by the risks of not doing anything.
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Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Generally Good
BUSH DOCTRINE RELIANCE ON MILITARY THREATS KEY ASPECT OF EFFECTIVE PROLIFERATION CONTROL
Michael A. Levi & Michael E. OHanlon, Brookings Institute, 2005, The Future of Arms Control, p. 13
This is not by any stretch meant as a blanket endorsement for preemptive or preventive military strikes by the international community. Nor should military force be the first coercive instrument to which nations turn when confronting a dangerous state. It should generally be a last resortor at least a resort turned to only when other possible measures are unpromising or when waiting would be too dangerous. But with these caveats noted, the central pointthat enforcement must be integral to arms controlremains valid. States that refuse to provide the transparency described earlier and to refrain from unacceptably dangerous or ambiguous behavior must be held to account. That is true whether their offending behavior extends over a long period or whether they suddenly seek to abandon previous nonproliferation commitments, for example, by withdrawing from the NPT. Nor should participation in key accords be seen as optional; it is critical that the United States and other countries promote and reaffirm the generally prevailing belief that nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction is an obligation on all states, not a choice. The details of how to respond to any violators should be determined by the likely costs and benefits of the situation at hand. But all options, up to and including regime change, should be on the table in extreme cases. Arms control should thus serve both to establish high standards of transparency and behavior and to allow ample time for the international community to confront a noncompliant regime before it can obtain or use the most dangerous weaponry. By agreeing on those standards in advance, the international community is far more likely to be able to agree on when coercive enforcement has become necessary. If it can convey its resolve to potential proliferators, arms control can have the even more desirable effect of deterring proliferation in the first place.
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Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: Emphasis on Democracy Promotion Good
BUSH DOCTRINE SHOULD BE TAILORED NOT ABANDONED EMPHASIS ON DEMOCRACY PROMOTION GOOD Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 139 President Bush came up with a partial answer to this challenge in his second inaugural address, with its focus on the promotion of democracy. It was a good speech as far as it went. While hardly a panacea, and hardly a radical notion in the history of Americas foreign policy, promoting democracy should be part of Americas long-term counterterrorism policy. Democracy is consistent with not only American values but universal human aspirations. Promoting democracy is consistent with Americans longstanding view that values should help share their nations foreign policy, and with other countries historical tendency to look to the United States for leadership and inspiration. An emphasis on democracy, human rights, and values helped with the Cold War; it has also inspired democracy movements over the years from East Asia to Latin America to Eastern Europe, to the benefit of the vast majority of peoples in those regions. By contrast, where America has placed less value on democracy over the years, largely in its dealings with many countries of the broader Middle East, it has built relationships on sandas demonstrated most vividly in the US estrangement from Iran after the fall of the Shah and the actions of 15 Saudi hijackers on September 11, 2001. Democracy promotion is a sound pillar for American foreign policy. What is needed is not to discard Bushs framework, but to apply it sagelyand to complement it with other policies.
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Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: Middle East Democratization Succeeding Now
DEMOCRACITZATION EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST SUCCEEDING
Bradley A. Thayer, Professor Defense & Strategic Studies, Missouri State University, 2006, The National Interest, November/December, p. Lexis Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive.
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Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: PSI Effective Against Proliferation
BUSH POLICY AGAINST PROLIFERATION PSI HAS BEEN EFFECTIVE
Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 218 The Bush administration did create one totally new type of arms-control initiative during its time in office: the Proliferation Security Initiative. Involving neither a new treaty nor a governing board, it is nonetheless an effort to use multilateral mechanisms to limit the spread of dangerous weaponry and as such can be defined as arms control. The idea is to use existing national law from participating countries, which include a core of about 15 major players plus another 40 or more nations supportive of the idea, to target suspicious ships that come into their territorial waters. For example, a North Korean ship in Japanese or Australian seas could be stopped for a routing safety inspection, as existing legislation and existing norms on territorial waters permit. If that ship were then found to have illicit weapons components abroad, or contraband such as narcotics or counterfeit currency, its cargo could be seized. In fact, there have been a couple of successes along these very lines to date. Most notably, it was the sort of activity envisioned and encouraged by the PSI, together with traditional intelligence, that led to the rolling up of Libyas nuclear-related programs as well as much of Pakistans A.Q. Khan proliferation network. Unfortunately, to take another case, the unwillingness of South Korea and China to participate in the PSI has limited its effectiveness against North Korea.
BUSHS PSI CRITICAL TO PREVENTING IRANIAN NUCLEARIZATION
Ilan Berman, American Foreign Policy Council, 2005, Tehran Rising: Irans challenge to the United States, p. 117-8 Thankfully, such a time has not yet arrived. The US still has the opportunity to blunt the Islamic Republics atomic ambitions, as well as its regional maneuvers. Doing so requires that Washington work on four distinct but related fronts. In May 2003, on a visit to Poland, President George W. Bush unveiled a groundbreaking new plan to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The United States and a number of our closer allies, including Poland, have begun working new agreements to search planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and to seize illegal weapons or missile technologies, the President revealed in a public address at the Wawel Royal Castle in Krakow. Over time, we will extend this partnership as broadly as possible to keep the worlds most destructive weapons away from our shores and out of the hands of our common enemies. Since then, that effort the US led-Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) has become a pivotal international partnership. Building on the principles outlined in the Bush administrations National Security Strategy, it embraces the notion that preventive action is necessary to keep rogue states and terrorists from acquiring catastrophic capabilities. From its original eleven core members Australia, France, Germany, Italy Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the US-led PSI is now supported in one form or another by over sixty nations, including Russia. Its activities, ranging from aggressive intelligence sharing to the interdiction and seizure of suspect vessels, have succeeded in effectively curtailing much of North Koreas illicit proliferation activities, including not only its active missile trade the single largest source of revenue for the regime of North Korean dictator Kim Jong-Ilbut its drug trafficking and commercial smuggling as well.
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Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: PSI Effective Against Proliferation
LIBYA PROVES EFFECTIVENESS OF PSI
Ilan Berman, American Foreign Policy Council, 2005, Tehran Rising: Irans challenge to the United States, p. 118 Even more significantly, the PSI can be credited with Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafis abrupt about-face on weapons of mass destruction. The successful September 2003 interception of a German-flagged ship, the BBC China, carrying nuclear centrifuges bound for the North African stateand the subsequent, credible threat of punitive action from the US convinced Tripoli to reverse course and give up its pursuit of nuclear and ballistic missile know-how. In the process, it has handed the Bush administration its greatest counterproliferation success to date.
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Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: PSI Effective Against Proliferation
PSI CRITICAL TO STEMMING IRANIAN NUCLEARIZATION
Ilan Berman, American Foreign Policy Council, 2005, Tehran Rising: Irans challenge to the United States, p. 118-9 The White House has moved to capitalize on these gains. In February 2004, in an address before the National Defense University in Washington, President Bush outlined a series of counter-proliferation proposals designed in part to expand the PSIs role and functions. As part of the Presidents vision, the PSI will continue to grow in scope to target both WMD networks and proliferation facilitators, such as the notorious A.Q. Kahn nuclear cartel in Pakistan. Members of the Initiative will also step up law enforcement coordination and strengthen their respective domestic legal authorities to better address illegal proliferation activities. These priorities suggest that the PSI (as well as other, related counterproliferation initiatives) can and should be adapted to more comprehensively address the contemporary threat from the Islamic Republic. Through closer coordination with like-minded states in the Persian Gulf and Eastern Mediterranean, the US has the opportunity to replicate its counter-proliferation successes in the Middle East. With the help of regional allies, the US can stem Irans acquisitions of WMD and missile technology from foreign suppliers, and constrain its proliferation of these technologies to both aspiring weapons-states and terrorist groups.
THREATS TO USE FORCE PART OF THE PSI
Michael Mandelbaum, Professor Foreign Policy Johns Hopkins, 2005, The Case for Goliath: How America acts as the worlds government in the 21st Century, p. 51 The efforts by the United States to deny nuclear weapons to the members of the axis of evil went beyond the construction of a missile defense system to contemplating, and ultimately to carrying out, more active measures. In 2003, the American government organized the multinational Proliferation Security Initiative to intercept, by seizing vessels on the high seas and searching aircraft while on the ground, shipments of nuclear-relevant equipment, or even bombs themselves, to and from the targeted countries. And it made clear that it was prepared to use force to deny nuclear armaments to the rogues, or to remove from power the regimes ready to put them to dangerous uses, or both. In 1994, the United States came close to war with North Korea over its nuclear weapon program. In attempting to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of both North Korea and Iran, the United States and other countries came, although not by design, to play complementary roles. These roles corresponded to the methods by which policemen sometimes attempt to obtain information from suspected criminals by a combination of sympathy and menace.
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Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: PSI Effective Against Proliferation
USHAS DEMONSTRATED PROLIFERATION LEADERSHIP THROUGH THE PSI
Thomas Sanderson & Mary Beth Niktin, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, CSIS, 2006, Five Years After 9/11: An Assessment of Americas War on Terror, eds. Julianne Smith & Thomas Sanderson, [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/five_years_after_9-11smallsize.pdf], p 39-40 In light of these state proliferation challenges and their potential links to non-state actors, as well as the heightened perception of the risk of WMD terrorism since 9/11, the United States has jump-started a number of international coordinating mechanisms to bolster WMD counterproliferation and proliferation prevention programs. Improving capacity for WMD interdiction and export controls has been given increasing attention, although it remains difficult to measure results. In May 2003, the United States introduced a program of coordinated land, sea, and air interdictionthe Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)in response to the growing threat posed by the spread of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials. Initially, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom agreed to the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles. Today, more than 70 countries have endorsed the initiative and promised their voluntary participation. The PSI retains no explicit legal authority, emphasizing instead the need for states to strengthen existing laws and regulations regarding interdiction. The PSI Operational Experts Group, which includes military, law enforcement, intelligence, and legal experts, meets to plan joint interdiction-training exercises, share expertise, and expand cooperation to key industries. While interdiction cooperation between the United States and other countries occurred before PSI existed, the exercises and regular dialogue are meant to make such interactions routine and strengthen capacities in other countries. The seizure of the German-owned vessel, the BBC China, in October 2003, in which authorities found 1,000 centrifuges of Pakistani origin destined for Libya, illustrated the importance and potential impact interdictions can have on interrupting illegal WMD trade. After years of quiet talks between the United States, United Kingdom, and Libya, the BBC China capture catalyzed Muammar Qadhafis decision to acknowledge and allow the verified destruction of Libyas WMD programs in December 2003.
PSI SLOWS DEVELOPMENT OF NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS Michael A. Levi & Michael E. OHanlon, Brookings Institute, 2005, The Future of Arms Control, p. 70
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), announced by the Bush administration in May 2003, began as an effort to work with a relatively small group of allies to intercept shipments of WMD-related materials to or from extremist states. The initiative, which essentially imposes coercive export controls on states that do not cooperate with WMD export control regimes, leverages international norms against the spread of weapons of mass destruction to gain support for its actions. (According to some participants, the PSI also seeks to cut off illicit export revenues, for example, from illicit drug sales, to states of concern. This aspect of it has more in common with sanctions than with export controls.) Contrary to some suggestions, the PSI would have a very limited chance of detecting transfers of fissile materials, but it could be used to thwart sales of bulky equipment for producing weapons or weapon materials. Therefore, it could be used to slow development of nuclear weapon and other WMD programs and to deter would-be customers, who would face a greater probability of being unmasked. It provides an important example of how arms control standards can be effectively mated with more coercive tools of security policy.
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Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: Key to stop Iranian Prolif
US SHOULD SEEK PARTNERSHIP WITH RUSSIA TO COUNTER IRANIAN EXPANSION
Ilan Berman, American Foreign Policy Council, 2005, Tehran Rising: Irans challenge to the United States, p. 123-5 None of these efforts are likely to succeed without international support. If the difficult diplomatic experience of the recent past is any indication, however, rallying Europe to the side of a hard-line American approach toward the Islamic Republic is likely to be a tall order. Instead, the United States would do well to look elsewhere in its efforts to fashion an international policy consensus in favor of Irans isolation. The most critical element of such an approach is undoubtedly Moscow. Since the start of the Russo-Iranian entente over a decade ago, Russia has been the country most directly responsible for Irans reemergence as a major player in the Middle East. For just as long, American officials have been attempting to engage, cajole, and pressure the Kremlin into rolling back its assistance to Irans ayatollahs. So far, these efforts have been spectacularly ineffective; officials in Moscow have consistently preferred to nurture their strategic ties with Tehran over cooperating with Washington. Now, however, new signs suggest that the United States could find great benefit in renewed engagement with Russia on the issue of Iran. For one thing, Russian WMD proliferation to Iran over the past decade has been driven in large part by the belief in the Kremlin that such activity was essentially a cost-free exercise. This is no longer the case; Tehrans heavy investments in nuclear and ballistic missile technologies have reaped substantial rewards, and dramatically expanded the threat to the Islamic Republic now poses to Russia. According to informal estimates, at its current rate of development Iran is on track to field a nuclear-capable medium-range rocket by 2006making it capable of threatening some twenty million people in the south of Russia Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. This threat is becoming recognized by a growing number of Russian politicians, who have begun to speak publicly about the Iranian strategic threat to Russia. For another, Irans strategic ambitions increasingly jeopardize Russian interests in the Middle East. With the removal of Saddam Husseins regime, Tehran has invested considerable sums of money in perpetuating instability in Iraq via an insurgency that has in part threatened Russian citizens now working within the country. Iran has also demonstrated growing designs over Iraqs energy sector, and has announced plans to exploit shared resources with or without the acquiescence of the new Iraqi government. This is sure to adversely affect Russian companies, which are now negotiating with the Iraqi leadership for a reestablishment of their role within the former Baathist state. Finally, the Russian-Iranian understanding in the post-Soviet space could soon become a thing of the past. Worries over the possibility of Iranian support for radical separatism in Russias turbulent Southern Rim were at the core of Russian-Iranian contracts a decade ago. Back then, Moscow moved quicklyand successfullyto secure Tehrans good behavior in exchange for arms and nuclear assistance. But Irans hands-off approach in the Caucasus cannot be assumed to be indefinite. The Islamic Republic might be tempted to use the possibility of support for Chechen insurgents (or other regional radicals) as a blackmail tool against Russia, particularly if it feels threatened by Russias strides toward Europe or the US, or if it would like to blunt international pressure over its nuclear program. Someday, therefore, Moscow might no longer find itself in the drivers seat of its relationship with Tehran. As a result of these dynamics, Washington soon could notice a much more constructive tenor to its long-running dialogue with Moscow over the Iranian nuclear program. The Bush administration is well positioned to capitalize on these changes, provided it can avoid the mistakes made over Iraq. In the run-up to that conflict, senior American statesmen and government officials tried repeatedly, and unsuccessfully, to secure Russias support for US military action. These policy makers had reason to be optimistic; after years of heavy investment, Russia has emerged as the largest shareholder in Iraqs energy sector, with concessions estimated at between $7and $30 billion. Kremlin officials also had not given up hope on recovering Iraqs massive Cold War-era debt to Moscow (as much as $12 billion, when adjusted for inflation). Policy makers in Washington therefore, believed Russia had a hefty financial stake in security a seat at the post-Saddam planning table.
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Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: Key to stop Iranian Prolif
BUSH DOCTRINE GOAL OF REGIME CHANGE FOR IRAN VITAL TO GLOBAL SECURITY
Ilan Berman, American Foreign Policy Council, 2005, Tehran Rising: Irans challenge to the United States, p. 141-2 Ever since its publication in September 2002, the Bush administrations National Security Strategy has generated an extraordinary amount of controversy. Critics of White House policy from across the political spectrum have attacked the soundness of the documents strategic centerpiece, the doctrine of preemption, and raised questions about its first practical application, the war in Iraq. Yet it is in another arena entirely that of democracy promotionthat the Bush doctrine could have its most far-reaching successes. The United States, the National Security Strategy proudly proclaims, must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere. No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them. America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity; the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worships; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private propertyEmbodying lessons from our past and using the opportunity we have today, the national security strategy of the United States must start from these core beliefs and look outward for possibilities to expand liberty. Nowhere is such an approach more desperately needed, or more attainable, than in Iran. For the Islamic Republic today resembles nothing quite so much as the Soviet Union in the final, dismal days of the Cold War. Clear, unequivocal support of Irans opposition forces in their resistance to the current regimeand the provision of the needed political backing and economic resources to empower their strugglecould decisively tip the scales in favor of democracy in the Islamic Republic. The stakes are enormous. Not only would a change of the Iranian system constitute the greatest victory yet in the US-led War on Terror, it would also dovetail with the aspirations of the vast majority of Iranians. In the words of one astute observer of Iranian politics, the geopolitical interests of the United States coincide with the interests of the majority of Iranians: a fundamental change in the nature of the regime in Tehran. The overthrow of the Islamic Republic of Iran is good for America and good for the Iranian people. Such a convergence should be a tantalizing possibility for an administration that, in its formative strategy document, has proclaimed its commitment to promoting a balance of power that favors freedom.
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Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: Nuclear proliferation Alternatives Fail to Deter Prolif
DETERRENCE DOESNT PREVENT WMD ACQUISITION James Steinberg has recently been appointed Dean of the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, SURVIVAL, Winter 2005-6, p. 55 (PDCL4026) Deterrence against acquisition is more problematic. Given the track record to date (the international communitys acquiescence in the case of the Indian, Pakistani and now North Korean nuclear programmes, compounded by the international backlash against the intervention in Iraq), it would be reasonable for a would-be acquirer to assume that there is little likelihood that force would be used to forestall or eliminate nuclear, biological or chemical weapons capabilities. Moreover, the sanctions fatigue, and collateral humanitarian costs associated with sanctions in Iraq, suggest that coercive measures short of force may not be very effective.
BUSH DOCTRINE INCLUDES DEMOCRACY PROMOTION
Robert J. Lieber, Georgetown University, 2005, The American Era: power and strategy for the 21st century, p. 49 The Bush NSS was not just about power and security. It also committed the United States to spread democracy worldwide and to promote the development of free and open societies on every continent. To this end, the document called for a comprehensive public information campaign a struggle of ideasto help foreigners, especially the Muslim world, learn about and understand America and the core ideas it stands for.
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Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: General Answer to harms not unique in its embrace of unilateralism or preemption
BUSH DOCTRINE DID NOT USHER IN UNIQUE ERA OF UNILATERALISM WAS ALWAYS OUR POLICY William H. Thornton, Professor Cultural Studies National Cheng Kung University, 2005, New World Empire, p. 47 The message of the Bush Doctrine to the non-globalized world was no longer the standard globalist exhortation to join us and profit, but rather the neoglobalist join us or else. This ultimatum, however, was only new in its openness. Caspar Henderson detects its presence, for example, in Madeleine Albrights famous walk tall speech, which cast the United States as the indispensable nation. She was more than hinting that the wishes of the rest of the world were quite dispensable. BUSH DOCTRINE OF PREEMPTION NOTHING NEW HAS BEEN US POLICY SINCE THE COLD WAR Simon Bromley, Lecturer International Political Economy Open University, 2006 , The War on Terrorism and the American Empire after the Cold War, eds. A. Colas & R. Saull, p. 60-1 In the absence of states capable of and willing to coordinate with the capitalist core, the United States had no operating principles to guide its interventions, save the obvious attempt to control or protect strategically important sources of raw materials and, by extension, the regimes that facilitated access to them. This was an expensive and risky policy of crisis management based on regimes that were liable, at best, to generate more opposition to US interests, and at worst, to be overthrown by even less palatable forces. It was not a realistic basis for a durable international order that guaranteed US economic interests. Pre-emption, followed by nation-building, appeared to offer the possibility of constructing the requisite stability and common interests. That, at least, was the theory. What this might mean in practice and how, or even if, it can be implemented is not at all clear. It is imperialism more in the manner of Marx and Luxemburg that is, the variable political moment of incorporation into international markets than Bukharin and Lenin. It is an attempt to impose a new dispensation of power, such that the resulting states and economies can be successfully coordinated with the rest of the capitalist world, rather than a prize to be won by the United States at the expense of rival core imperialisms. It is imperialism but it is not, primarily, inter-imperialist rivalry. Thus far, its bearers have been the military forces of the United States and the United Kingdom. Even if Afghanistan and Iraq are not a one-off enterprise (some kind of military action against Syria and Iran cannot be discounted), a composite response made possible by the events of 11 September 2001 and the corresponding (yet probably temporary) shifts of public opinion in the United Sates itself, this turn of policy does not represent a significant departure, let alone a new doctrine for global order. The United Statess definition of self-defense to include, in certain circumstances, pre-emptive attacks may have shocked the pieties of the UN, but if this is an innovation at all, it was only one in the declared politics of military strategy consonant with a strand of US thinking that has existed since considerations of pre-emptive nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union in the early 1950s and the string of interventions in the South throughout the Cold War.
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Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: General Answer to harms not unique in its embrace of unilateralism or preemption
BUSH DOCTRINE NOTHING NEW
William H. Thornton, Professor Cultural Studies National Cheng Kung University, 2005, New World Empire, p. 52 The Bush Doctrine, however, is not so novel as its critics suggest. In many respects it represents the full expression rather than negation of pre-9/11 globalism. This of course is vehemently denied by neoliberals with closer ties to the Democratic Party. Former Clinton staffers Ronald Asmus and Kenneth Pollack insist that necon power strategies, and preemptive strikes in particular, should never have been raised to the status of normal tools of intervention. They duly note that the real challenge in Afghanistan and Iraq was not so much victory in war as in peace. The Bush Administration was so averse to that task that as of August 2003 it had spent only about $300 million of the $3.3 billion assistance package appropriated by Congress in the fall of 2001 for Afghanistan. Notice, however, that Asmus and Pollack do not reject the neocon goal of reshaping the world along Washington Consensus lines. Their invective is more directed toward the means than the ends of the Bush Doctrine. As the editors of The New Republic point out, few neocons would insist upon a preemptive strike as a first option. And many, such as Wolfowitz, have been advocates of tendentious nation building. These right-wing idealists had to restrain themselves, however, for they had to coexist with a wide spectrum of Republican realists, including a phalanx of Nixonian neocons such as Cheney and Rumsfeld.
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Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: AT Violates International Law
PREEMPTION TO PREVENT TERRORIST ACQUISITION OF WMD STRATEGICALLY SOUND AND LEGAL Robert J. Lieber, Georgetown University, 2005, The American Era: power and strategy for the 21st century, p. 44 The NSS advocated the preemptive use of military force against terrorists or state sponsors of terrorism that attempt to gain or use WMD. These are the most lethal dangers facing the United States and, according to the document, as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. The preemptive use of force in the face of imminent attack makes strategic sense and is supported by international law and the just war tradition. This principle expressed by the NSS is highly controversial, however; as it broadens the meaning of preemption to encompass military action even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemys attack. Critics argue that this attempt to include preventive military action under the category of preemption has no legal or practical basis, and thus see the Bush doctrine as a worrisome break from tradition. In practice, the United States has sometimes walked a fine line between preemption and prevention. The NSS declaration that our best defense is a good offense reflected a long-standing willingness to threaten the use of military action without an attack being imminent. In addition to a number of cases of US-supported regime change during the Cold War; a prominent example is President Kennedys naval quarantine of Cuba in 1962 to force the removal of Soviet nuclear missiles. In another case, the American campaign to oust Iraq from Kuwait in 1991 was partly justified among US policymakers on the grounds of a future WMD danger from Iraq. In addition, the 1994 Agreed Framewor k with North Korea was negotiated under the implicit threat of American military action to prevent North Korea from developing a nuclear arsenal. PREEMPTION IS A LEGITIMATE MEANS OF SELF-DEFENSE Jack Spencer is Policy Analyst for Defense and National Security in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation, 2002 (THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: AN EFFECTIVE BLUEPRINT FOR THE WAR ON TERROR, http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/WM149.cfm) (PDBF1896) Preemptive action is a legitimate defensive measure given the threats America faces today. The nation has an inherent right to self-defense and this includes the right to take preemptive action against imminent threats. According to the NSS, As a matter of common sense and self defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. The fact is that the United States, like all other sovereign states, has long maintained the right to defend itself through preemption and centuries of recognized international law supports this right. Such action may be able to prevent another September 11-like attack. Moreover, a nation may be deterred from pursuing weapons of mass destruction or working with terrorists if the U.S. threat to strike is credible. More importantly, if the President acts on sound information that the American people will be attacked, he will save American lives.
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Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: AT Violates International Law
THE UN CHARTER CANNOT COMPROMISE THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE Joshua Muravchik is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and the author of Exporting Democracy and, most recently, Heaven on Earth: The Rise and Fall of Socialism, 2002 (COMMENTARY, December, http://www.commentary.org/muravchik.htm) (PDBF1897) LEGAL NICETIES aside, common sense likewise tells us that the right of self-defense cannot be compromised by the adoption of the UN Charter, if only because chapter seven has, in sad reality, proved to be a dead letter. It envisions a UN general staff and a commitment of substantial military resources by all member states to a mighty international force, to be deployed as needed by the Security Council in order to enforce the peace. In practice, the UN has managed to fulfill this role exactly twice in its history: in Korea in 1950 and in the Persian Gulf in 1991. Both were unusual moments of Security Council comity not readily replicated (in the former case, the U.S. was able to take advantage of the fact that the Soviet delegate was boycotting the session). And in both cases, the assembled military forces, although they flew a UN flag, were largely American. With the UN having failed to develop into a genuine rampart of peace and security, the preexisting right of states to provide their own security must be assumed to remain intact.
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Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: AT Endless Military Involvements for the US
TURN: PREEMPTION DECREASES LEVEL OF MILITARY RESPONSE
John Yoo, law professor, Berkeley, FORWARD.COM, January 27, 2006, http://www.forward.com/articles/7271 (PDCL4022) Take the threat posed by Al Qaeda. Despite the fact that terrorists generally have no territory or regular armed forces from which to detect signs of an impending attack, weapons of mass destruction could allow them an ability to inflict devastation that once only laid in the hands of a nation-state. In order to forestall another September 11 attack, or to take advantage of a window of opportunity to strike a terrorist cell, the executive branch needs flexibility to act quickly, possibly in situations in which congressional consent cannot be obtained in time to act on the intelligence. By preempting a terrorist attack, the president might also be able to engage in a more limited, more precisely targeted use of force. PUBLIC SUPPORT AND ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY LIMITS THE NUMBER OF MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS THE US CAN BECOME INVOLVED IN Robert J. Lieber, Georgetown University, 2005, The American Era: power and strategy for the 21st century, p. 56 Domestic support. This may be the area of greatest long-term uncertainty. Decision-making ability is one factor. Washingtons political and institutional capacity to manage multiple foreign commitments is limited. Intense crises such as those involving Iraq, Afghanistan, and North Korea command the attention of the President, his top advisers, and key cabinet members, but the ability to deal skillfully with several major foreign crises simultaneously puts exceptional burden on those involved. This problem is not unique to the post-9/11 world. In the late 1970s, the administration of President Jimmy Carter had difficulty coping with nearly simultaneous crises involving Iran (the fall of the Shah, the Khomeini revolution, and the US embassy hostage crisis), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua. And in the early 1990s, Clinton foreign policymakers became preoccupied with the crisis in Bosnia to the detriment of priorities elsewhere. In addition, popular discontent with costs or casualties can undercut the willingness and ability to exercise power abroad. Sophisticated analyses of public opinion have shown that the public will tolerate casualties if they perceive these to be in the cause of resisting aggression and protecting vital national interests, but far less so for the purposes of nation-building. The existence of an all-volunteer army provides some insulation from the Vietnam syndrome, but as negative reaction to the Blackhawk Down casualties in Somalia in September 1993 and more recently as the insurgency and its casualties in Iraq have demonstrated, a sense of purpose and the prospect of ultimate victory is essential in maintaining domestic confidence. A study of public reaction to American military interventions has found that domestic support has been greater when the purpose was to coerce restraint by an aggressor state, when there was a clear military strategy, and when the policy had been made a priority by the President and Congress. In any case, the Bush reelection in November 2004 seemed to demonstrate sufficient public support for the administration to continue its Iraq policy.
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Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: AT Violates International Law
DEMOCRACIES WILL CHECK PREVENTIVE WARS
Michael Mandelbaum, Professor Foreign Policy Johns Hopkins, 2005, The Case for Goliath: How America acts as the worlds government in the 21st Century, p. 60-1 Furthermore, public support for the application of the doctrine of preventive war to Iraq was less than wholehearted in the United States and even thinner in Great Britain, for several reasons. For one thing, the conflicts in Iraq qualified for the United States, as a war of choice. Saddam Hussein had not attacked the United States, or any other country, as he did to provoke the 1991 war. The 2002 conflict could not, therefore, be justified on the grounds of self-defense, which is the rationale that most strongly disposes democracies to fight and provokes Western democracies to overcome their powerful twenty-first century bias against war. Moreover, a preventive war has a self-canceling quality to it. If it is successful it removes the threat that, were it to grow to menacing proportions, would clearly justify military action. It removes, in effect, the evidence that would convince people of the wisdom of waging war. In addition, acting to prevent a misdeed before it takes place violates the commonsense notion of justice that is basic to democratic societies. In democracies, people may be punished for what they do but not for what they might do or for what and who they are. Yet preventive war against rogue regimes punishes countries on precisely these grounds.
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Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: AT Endless Military Involvements for the US
Unilateralism is no more interventionist than multilateralism Clinton era proves Charles Krauthammer, Essayist and Columnist for the Washington Post, Frequent Contributor to the Weekly Standard, the New Republic, and the National Interest, Winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy, Member of the Presidents Council on Bioethics, Board-Certified Psychiatrist and Received Medical Degree, Harvard Medical School, 2004 (Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World American Enterprise Institute) http://www.aei.org/publications/bookID.755/book_detail.asp And yet, quite astonishingly, when liberal internationalism came to power just two years later in the form of the Clinton administration, it turned almost hyperinterventionist. It involved us four times in military action: deepening intervention in Somalia, invading Haiti, bombing Bosnia, and finally going to war over Kosovo. How to explain the amazing transmutation of Cold War and Gulf War doves into Haiti and Balkan hawks? The crucial and obvious difference is this: Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo were humanitarian venturesfights for right and good, devoid of raw national interest. And only humanitarian interventionismdisinterested interventionism devoid of national interestis morally pristine enough to justify the use of force. The history of the 1990s refutes the lazy notion that liberals have an aversion to the use of force. They do not. They have an aversion to using force for reasons of pure national interest. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY PAPER PRECISELY DEFINES ROGUE STATES - THE DOCTRINE WILL NOT SNOWBALL Joshua Muravchik is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and the author of Exporting Democracy and, most recently, Heaven on Earth: The Rise and Fall of Socialism, 2002 (COMMENTARY, December, http://www.commentary.org/muravchik.htm) (PDBF1721) All three objections are debatable, if not downright specious. The first simply misrepresents the statement. Contrary to Time, and contrary to Gores plaint that Bush has arrogated to himself the right to preemptively attack whomsoever he may deem represents a potential future threat, the document makes plain that the policy of preemption is aimed at terrorists and rogue states alone. The latter term, coined in the Clinton administration, is here given precise definition perhaps for the first time. Rogue states, says the strategy paper, have a number of identifiable characteristics. They brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the personal gain of the rulers; display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they are party; are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the[ir] aggressive designs; sponsor terrorism around the globe; and reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands. This is a definition that would readily apply to the three members of Bushs axis of evil, and perhaps to Muammar Qaddafis Libya-but to few, if any, others. One might challenge aspects of the enumerated criteria, but the claim that Bush has sought an unlimited writ for preemptive action is nonsense.
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U.S. MILITARY PREEMPTION WILL NOT SNOWBALL Ivo H. Daalder & James M. Lindsay, Brookings, 2002 (THE BUSH NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: AN EVALUATION, http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb109.htm) (PDBF1876) In contrast, the Strategy envisions a much narrower role for preemption. It discusses preemption in the specific context of defeating terrorists and rogue states. It never suggests preemption has a role to play with respect to a rising China or any residual threat posed by Russia. Nor is the argument for preempting terrorists controversial. Law enforcement, covert operations, and intelligence gathering have always sought to preempt terrorist attacks, and such preemptive activities are well-established in international law. Clinton administration officials partially justified the 1998 cruise missile attacks on targets in Afghanistan and Sudan on preventative grounds. Instead, the debate in the United States has always been about whether the U.S. government is doing enough to stop terrorists preemptively, not whether it has to wait for them to attack before acting.
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BUSH DOCTRINE DOES NOT UNDERMINE INTERNATIONAL LAW OR CAUSE A SNOWBALL TO OTHER COUNTRIES EMPLOYING PREEMPTION Robert J. Lieber, Georgetown University, 2005, The American Era: power and strategy for the 21st century, p. 45 Other critics have argued that the NSS went well beyond even the right to anticipatory self-defense that has been commonly interpreted to flow from Article 51 of the UN Charter, and hence the doctrine would undermine international law and lead other states to use US policy as a pretext for aggression. They assert that too broad an interpretation of legitimate preemption could lead China to attack Taiwan, or India to attack Pakistan. This logic is not compelling, however, as there is little reason to believe that these states would be emboldened to take specific action merely because of a shift in US policy that is as much rhetorical as doctrinal. In practice, Iraq has been the sole case of post-9/11 preemptionthough it can also be described as a preventive war and the grueling experience there is likely to make any administration leery of future preemptive war unless there is compelling evidence of imminent threat. In addition, action against the two most prominent targets, Iran and North Korea, would almost certainly be even more difficult and dangerous than has been the case in Iraq. Finally, countries such as China and India have their own weighty lists of pros and cons in assessing whether to unleash the dogs of war, and in that calculation the precedent of American behavior is unlikely to be a decisive factor. OTHER STATES WILL NOT BE EMBOLDENED BY RHETORICAL SHIFTS IN U.S. POLICY Keir A. Lieber, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Notre Dame and Robert J. Lieber Professor of Government and Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 2002 (THE BUSH NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1202/ijpe/pj7-4lieber.htm) (PDBF1891) Some analysts believe that it is counterproductive to make explicit the conditions under which America will strike first, and there are compelling reasons for blurring the line between preemption and prevention. The attacks of September 11th demonstrate that terrorist organizations like al Qaeda pose an immediate threat to the United States, are not deterred by the fear of U.S. retaliation, and would probably seize the opportunity to kill millions of Americans if WMD could effectively be used on American soil. A proactive campaign against terrorists thus is wise, and a proclaimed approach toward state sponsors of terrorism might help deter those states from pursuing WMD or cooperating with terrorists in the first place. Other critics have argued that the Bush NSS goes well beyond even the right to anticipatory self-defense that has been commonly interpreted to flow from Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, and thus the Bush strategy will undermine international law and lead other states to use U.S. policy as a pretext for aggression. The most common examples are that the broad interpretation of legitimate preemption could lead China to attack Taiwan, or India to attack Pakistan. This logic is not compelling, however, as these states are not currently constrained from taking action by any norm against preemption, and thus will not be emboldened by rhetorical shifts in U.S. policy.
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INTERNATIONAL LAW WILL NOT CONSTRAIN PREEMPTION BY OTHER STATES NOW Joshua Muravchik is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and the author of Exporting Democracy and, most recently, Heaven on Earth: The Rise and Fall of Socialism, 2002 (COMMENTARY, December, http://www.commentary.org/muravchik.htm) (PDBF1893) More reasonable is the fear that others might borrow the doctrine of preemption for their own, less savory purposes. Some states, no doubt, will try to do precisely that. But (to anticipate somewhat the third objection) there is less cause for alarm here than meets the eye, for the fear rests on the assumption that international law acts as a substantial barrier to misbehavior by states. In truth, international law is not self-enforcing, and serves as a barrier only insofar as states, meaning usually the United States, are willing to enforce it. In practice, miscreant nations routinely cloak their actions in spurious claims of self-defense or of other rights enshrined in law. It is not the cleverness of their arguments but rather the willingness of others to bear the burdens of counteracting them that determines what they will get away with.
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BUSH DOCTRINE DOES NOT ESCHEW MULTILATERALISM AND COOPERATION
Donald Neuchterlein, former US Foreign Service Officer and Professor at Virginia, 2005, Defiant Superpower?, p. 62-3 On strengthening alliances to defeat terrorism, the strategy paper asserted, The United States will continue to work with our allies to disrupt the financing of terrorism. It pledged to identify and block the sources of funding for terrorism, freeze the assets of terrorists and those who support them, deny terrorists access to the international financial system, protect legitimate charities from being abused by terrorists, and prevent the movement of terrorists assets through alternative financial networks. The strategy also took account of the reality that preventive action cannot be successful without the cooperation of many other countries: While our focus in protecting America, we know that to deter terrorism in todays globalized world we need support from our allies and friends. Where possible, Bush said he would rely on regional organizations and other countries to fight terrorism; in cases where the task was beyond their capacities, the United States would be willing to assist with whatever help we and our allies can provide.
BUSH DOCTRINE INCLUDES A COMMITMENT TO MULTILATERALISM
Robert J. Lieber, Georgetown University, 2005, The American Era: power and strategy for the 21st century, p. 47-8 The commitment to multilateralism has received the least attention, though the NSS contains a ringing commitment that we are guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations. The United States is committed to lasting institutions. The document goes on to say, While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone. Some interpreted this as a doctrine of unabashed unilateralism befitting a Lone Ranger; or as simply the rhetorical velvet glove covering the mailed fist of brute American power. While the NSS was clear about the benefits and necessity of cooperation, especially with other great powers, it set out a policy that in principle was often more multilateral than some of the Bush administrations own practices. Even so, prior to the Iraq War; and together with the British government of Prime Minister Tony Blair, the Bush administration spent considerable time and political capital working within the UN Security Council to secure passage of Resolution 1441 and an additional four months in an unsuccessful effort to obtain a resolution specifically authorizing use of force. What is different is that the Bush administration appears to reject the pursuit of multilateralism for its own sake; that is, as something inherently necessary for international legitimacy or morality. The document held that a basic willingness to go it alone was consistent with productive multilateral cooperation. Here again, the break from the past can be exaggerated. For example, at the end of the Cold War, the administration of President George H. W. Bush pursued rapid unification of Germany and in doing so opposed the major European powers (other than Germany) ignored their views, got its way, and gave them almost nothing in return. Condoleezza Rice, who then served on the National Security Council, described these events in a well-received book. She makes clear that at a time when Francois Mitterand, Margaret Thatcher, and Mikhail Gorbachev had other ideas, American policy was based on pursuing optimal goals rather than delaying in pursuit of an elusive consensus.
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BUSH DOCTRINE DOES NOT ABANDON MULTILATERALISM AND GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS
Thomas Risse, Professor International Politics Free University (berlin), 2004, American Power in the 21st Century, eds. David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, p. 229-30 The presidential National Security Strategy of September 2002 as well as the focus on Iraq constituted expressions of this new domestic balance of power in Washington. Nevertheless, both examples also show that neoconservative unilateralists of the offensive realist and the liberal variety both had to make concessions to the traditional conservatives and their allies in Congress and in Europe. As to the National Security Strategy document, for example, it does express a liberal vision of world politics: Finally, the United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world. Incorporating the foreign policy views of the neoconservatives, the document commits the US to: --preemptive, if not preventive, warfare against terrorism and rogue states with weapons of mass destruction; --unilateralism when our interests and unique responsibilities require, and --military superiority to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military buildup in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States. None of these statements as such is new. However, it is the combination of a liberal vision with unilateral action if necessary (but who decides?) that represents quite a shift from previous foreign policy strategies of the United States. Yet, the document also contains quite a few paragraphs expressing the standard repertoire of the traditional conservatives, such as the commitment to NATO, the EU, and other allies. It also commits the US to active engagement in regional crises and to a substantial increase in foreign aid. Finally and significantly, the US remains committed to a multilateral and liberal international economic order. This latter point is often overlooked in Europe, but it is of utmost importance for the future world order. In sum, the much criticized National Security Strategy document actually represents a policy compromise between neoconservative unilateralists and traditional conservatives in the Bush administration. PREEMPTION DOES NOT ABANDON MULTILATERALISM U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, 2003 (January 13, p. 35) (PDBF1728) But does the assertion of American pre-eminence represent the abandonment of multilateralism? Again, the doctrine would suggest not. It is replete with affirmations of the importance of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and other alliances. But this multilateralism is definitely of the FDR variety and not of the Woodrow Wilson strain: It embraces cooperation without the loss of sovereignty. It will not sign on to all international agreements or wait for international bodies to take action on urgent matters, such as the threat of Iraq. Indeed, says a senior administration official, "Iraq is now an example of what happens when the United States puts something on the agenda and then brings the rest of the world to that position by, in this case, reinvigorating the most important multilateral institution, which is the [U.N.] Security Council
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US WONT ABANDON MULTILATERALISM DESPITE BUSH DOCTRINE ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE G. John Ikenberry, Politics Professor Princeton, 2004, American Power in the 21st Century, eds. David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, p. 102-3 American support for multilateralism is likely to be sustainedeven in the face of resistance and ideological challenges to multilateralism within the Bush administration in part because of a simple logic: as global economic interdependence grows, the need for multilateral coordination of policies also increases. The more economically interconnected that states become the more dependent they are for the realization of their objectives on the actions of other states. As interdependence rises, Robert Keohane argues, the opportunity costs of not co-ordinating policy increase, compared with the costs of sacrificing autonomy as a consequence of making binding agreements. Rising economic interdependence is one of the great hallmarks of the contemporary international system. Over the postwar era, states have actively and consistently sought to open markets and reap the economic, social, and technological gains that derive from integration into the world economy. If this remains true in the years ahead, it is easy to predict that the demands for multilateral agreements even and perhaps especially by the United States will increase and not decrease.
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TRANSATLANTIC RIFT IS INEVITABLE CANT BE REVERSED BY CHANGING FOREIGN POLICY, US SHOULD REORIENT INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS TO ASIA Donald Neuchterlein, former US Foreign Service Officer and Professor at Virginia, 2005, Defiant Superpower?, p. 199-200 The new long-term war against Islamic-sponsored terrorism resembles the Wests forty-year Cold War struggle against the spread of Soviet-sponsored communism. That reality is forcing the US government to rethink its strategic goals as the worlds only superpower. Alliances concluded during the early period of the Cold War to contain Soviet power are not adequate for the new challenges of the twenty-first century. Islamic extremists who use sophisticated methods of terrorism to change the foreign policies of nation-states pose a new kind of global danger. Unlike with the Soviet threat, the menace posed by Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network may not be containable and will require, as the 9/11 Commission suggested, eradication by force. President Bushs decision to eliminate Saddam Husseins regime caused a major breach in the Atlantic Alliance, forcing its members to decide whether or not they would support his view of the threat in the Middle East. Some did, but many key membersFrance, Germany, Belgium, Canada, and Turkeydid not. Spain joined them in opposition in 2004. The probability now looms that this split in NATO is a fundamental, not a temporary, parting of the ways. The crisis results from significant differences in the way many European states view their interests in the twenty-first century, which are not the same as those they held during the Cold War years. This change is exacerbated by the recent movement toward a more tightly knit EU in which foreign and defense policy is a major issue among its members. I believe it is more likely than not the EU will increasingly pursue an independent foreign policy, different from and frequently opposed to that preferred by Washington. Iraq is only the most dramatic example of this trend. The reality is that NATO is no longer an organization that shares Americas vision of how to create a stable world order. European countries today are less willing than is America to challenge forcefully Islamic extremists abroad, in part because of preoccupation with Muslim immigrants at home. Another factor is that, after enduring an entire century of devastating continental wars and fear of another during the Cold War, most Europeans are exhausted emotionally and simply do not have the will to engage in conflicts outside Europe. In fact, pacifism among young people is growing in most Western European countries. As a result of these realities, Europeans and Americans are, after sixty years of fighting fascism and communism, now parting company on the issue of sharing responsibility for defending a new world order against the threat of extremist Islamic fundamentalism. Even though NATO agreed in 2002 to take on a major security responsibility in Afghanistan, its financial aid and troop support for that effort was still seriously deficient in 2004. Similarly, despite US and British success in persuading the UN Security Council in 2004 to play a role in implementing Iraqi national elections in 2005, French objections made it difficult for NATO to launch a large police-training program to provide security for them. In fact, most Europeans did not see any need for their governments to send troops or spend money on Middle East security programs. Even Britain bowed to this sentiment when the Blair government announced in July significant reductions in its armed forces and defense budget. Britain too may eventually be persuaded to move away from its close strategic relationship with the United States and adopt policies that are closer to the emerging EU policies favored by France, Germany and Spain. Henry Kissinger, one of Americas best known Atlanticists,
acknowledged in July 2004 that Europe may no longer be a reliable strategic partner of the United States. In a remarkable commentary in the Washington Post, the former secretary of state and noted historian observed that Europe finds itself suspended between institutions not yet sufficiently cohesive for a strategic foreign policy and nations sufficiently advanced on the road toward European unification to have lost
observed, the structural estrangement of America from Europe is taking place as the center of gravity of international politics is shifting to Asia. Kissinger proposed that America should rethink its strategic policy and focus attention on the emerging powers of Asia, specifically China, Japan, India and Russia. Though they reject what they consider hegemonic aspects of US policy, they do so on a case-by-case basis via traditional diplomacy. To them, Iraq is not a litmus test of American moral fitness to lead but of American endurance in pursuit of strategic insights.
their historic conviction about a national foreign policy. Paradoxically, Kissinger
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MANY DOMESTIC POLICIES UNDERMINE US/EU RELATIONS
David M. Andrews, Professor Politics Scripps College, 2005, The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress, ed. David M. Andrews, p. 25 But a deep split is developing even in this area of traditional cooperation between the United States and western Europe. Now, rather suddenly, Americans are increasingly blamed by Europeans not for what they do, but for who they are. The United States is alleged to be morally retrograde for failing to respect international law abroad (as Trachtenberg laments in chapter 9 of this volume), for practicing the death penalty at home, for its sometimes violent opposition to abortion, and for a gun culture that most Europeans find senseless. The country is likewise castigated as socially retrograde for its neglect of the poor, the inner cities, and public infrastructure. It is supposedly culturally retrograde as it gorges itself on fatty fast food, wallows in tawdry mass entertainment, starves the arts and prays only to one God, which is Mammon. In opposition to all this stands Europe, with its alleged tolerance, sense of community, taste, and manners.
TRANSATLANTIC RIFT INEVITABLE GIVEN THE END OF THE COLD WAR
David M. Andrews, Professor Politics Scripps College, 2005, The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress, ed. David M. Andrews, p. 69-71 Of course, strains within the Alliance were evident prior to the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, and even prior to George W. Bushs election. The Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, and other initiativesmany of them emanating largely from Europe were bound to test the Atlantic framework regardless of the American administration of the day. These, however, were exacerbating circumstances, not the source of the transatlantic crisis of 2002-3. During the weeks and months following the end of major hostilities in Iraq, there was ample opportunity for governments, regardless of their initial support for or opposition to the warto reflect on just what those underlying sources were. To begin with, Paris and Berlin realized (much to their dismay) that their threats to undermine European public support for American policy had lost much of their previous traction. Absent the interlocking concerns that once united Washington and Moscow in supporting a substantial armed American presence in Germany, Europe is no longer the centerpiece of American grand strategy. As a consequence, even the active opposition of some leading European states to the Iraq War, though damaging, was not fatal. As Helga Haftendorn has noted, the United States no longer requires European support in the same way it did during the Cold War. During these forty years, the implementation of American grand strategy required German (and to a lesser degree French) concern precisely because the strategy was focused on keeping the Germans down in order to keep the Russians out. But that logic no longer obtained, and in its absence neither the Franco-German threat to oppose the war nor the execution of that threat was serious enough to deter American action in Iraq. But a learning process was likewise underway in the United States. There, at least among the chattering classes, lingering triumphalism regarding the Soviet Unions demise was slowly replaced with the realization that in the post-Cold War environment, European support for US foreign policy was likely to be much more conditional
than had previously been the case. Despite the focus of both the media and the White House on disagreements with Paris, it was the articulation of a German critique of American policy that was most striking. While difficult relations with France had come to be expected (and largely accepted), it was a new experience to have a central feature of US foreign policy forcefully rejected by a German government. From a structural perspective, the key change in postwar European politics is Germanys newfound capacity for policy maneuver. As Hubert Zimmermann argues in this volume, Germany is now an important net security exporter rather than, as was the case during the Cold War, a substantial exporter rather than, as was the case during the Cold War, a substantial net security importer. This fact alters the underlying politics of the bilateral relationship with the United States. For example, while governments of the Federal Republic may not follow the lead of Gerhard Schoreder in actually courting confrontation with Washington, it is evident that they are capable of doing so.
Thus the Cold Wars end has ushered in a new era of permissiveness for Germany that parallels the changes experienced by the United States. The ability of governments from these two states to disregard the consequences of their actions for the Atlantic alliance even if that capacity for neglect remains unexercised represents a fundamental change in transatlantic relations.
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US/EU DIVERGENCE ON THE CAUSES OF AND SOLUTIONS TO GLOBAL TERRORISM INEVITABLE DO NOT UNDERMINE BASIC GOOD COOPERATIVE RELATIONS Sergio Fabbrini, Political Science Professor, University of Trento, 2006, The United States Contested: American unilateralism and European discontent, ed. Sergio Fabbrini, p. 22-4 America and Europe, then, look at the world from different points of view nationalistic in the first case, supra-national or post-national in the second (Cooper 2003); or Westphalian in the first case and post-Westphalian in the second case, as Richard Crockett argues in Chapter 4. This difference has led the two sides of the Atlantic to different evaluations of the causes of global disorder and its possible solutions, although both recognize global terrorism as the main international threat. For unilateralist America, global terrorism constitutes a challenge to liberty and democracy, and particularly to the ways in which these are represented in America (Kagan 2003). For this reason, faced with a terrorist threat, America must recover its freedom to act, that is to
say its decisional autonomy, if it does not want to surrender to anti-Western fundamentalism. Ultimately, the democratic nature of its domestic political process is a sufficient guarantee that its discretionary
. Military and economic power is considered, by unilateralist America, the necessary resource to promote democracy globally. The unilateralist interpretation is certainly right to recognize that the current international system is not adequate to quickly and effectively respond to new terrorist threats (Newhouse 2003). The organization of that system in fact, reflects the necessity of regulating Cold War relations between two super-powers, a condition which no longer exists. There are, however, weaknesses with this interpretation, because it entrusts only the military means of the hyper-power (and its willing allies) with the task of neutralizing terrorism (Nye 2003). Unilateralist America resembles one who, having a hammer in hand, sees problems only as nails (Garton Ash 2004). Yet, terrorism is not a traditional territorial state, which one can defend against using only military strength.
decisions do not become arbitrary. As such, the US can pursue power politics in the international system on the grounds that power will be at the service of democracy While it is not directly motivated by poverty or ignorance (Bin Laden is rich and educated), terrorism cannot be circumscribed and weakened without a complex series of structural policies that confront the
using only a problem-solving approach is ineffective in the case of terrorism; indeed, using only a hammer aggravates the problem instead of solving it. Without interventions that are legitimated by multilateral international organizations (such as the UN or NATO), it is unrealistic to think that the hearts and minds of others can be won over in countries with sympathies for anti-Western terrorism. In sum, legitimacy does not coincide with the use of force, and legitimacy continues to be monopolized by multilateral institutions (including the EU), as even unilateralist America is forced to recognize (Kagan 2004). For multilateralist Europe, on the contrary, global terrorism has to be considered as the outcome of a global context crippled by injustice and resentment. Terrorism cannot be defeated militarily but only through a concerted and complex array of international policies carried out by nations within the frame of the UN. Acting outside that frame could make things worse rather than better. For the 2004 Pew Global Project Attitudes, in Britain, France, and Germany,
diffusion of these problems in the world. As Scott Thomas argues in Chapter 10, contrary to the US, a majority of people say the war in Iraq has hurt the fight against terrorism more than it has helped. The European interpretation is certainly convincing when it acknowledges the complexity of the social, economic and cultural factors which feed anti-Western terrorism (including unresolved international crises, such as the one between Israel and Palestine). The European strategy of promoting an international system based on norms, rules, agreements, and formalized procedures represents an important counter-weight to the militaristic tendencies present in the international system (Kupchan 2002). However, it too has its weaknesses (Fabbrini 2004). This is not only because positing an EU civil power in contrast to US military power is destabilizing, but also because it seems to underestimate the fact that law without power can become mere rhetoric. Legal power is necessary but may not be sufficient to stabilize the world after September 11. This is also due to the fact that existing international law, based on the
the transatlantic differences are not based on contingent factors; rather, they reflect the projection onto the international scene of radically divergent visions nationalist, in the American case, and post- or supra-national in the European case. This also explains why a growing number
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a country, can preserve the status quo favorable to existing non-democratic regimes. In conclusion, of Europeans want the EU to develop into a superpower that can act independently of the US in world affairs. In the Transatlantic Trends 2004 (which consider, on the European side, countries as diverse as Great Britain, Italy, Poland, Germany, France, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain), 71 percent of European leaders believe the US should become a superpower like the US. Although, when those Europeans who favor an EU superpower were asked if they would favor it even if it required higher levels of military spending, nearly half 47 percent withdrew their support. This view of the EU as a countercheck to
That difference notwithstanding, the two sides of the Atlantic are linked by historical ties and friendship (Wallace 2001), by highly interdependent economic systems (Risse 2002), and by a political culture that is liberal and democratic. Moreover, the difference is not only between the two sides of the Atlantic, but also within each of them. And that makes the transatlantic tension more complex and less frightening.
the US has also been largely shared by the European peace activists, as Carlo Ruzza and Emanuela Bozzini show in Chapter 6.
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US/EU RELATIONSHIP FUNDAMENTALLY SOUND DESPITE EUROPEAN DISLIKE OF BUSH AND HIS POLICIES Klaus Korhonen, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006, Transatlantic Relations and Global Governance, ed. Kari Mottola, p. 5 There is a chance to catch up politically in the EU-US relationship. The basis of transatlantic relations remains sound although there is deep public disapproval of the Bush administration. Both sides continue to emphasize common values and close economic and cultural ties as the cornerstones and shared interests in promoting democracy, human rights, economic liberalization and in responding to new cross-border threats and instabilities. Due to world events and conscious efforts on both sides of the Atlantic in defining security strategies, there is a convergence of perceptions of the main threats to international security: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failing states, poverty, lack of health and development, signs of protectionism and intolerance, organized crime and trafficking, as well as massive atrocities committed against civilian populations. There is no fundamental divergence in responses either, although the US recourse to the military as a first choice from their tool box reflects different approaches. Unilateralism isnt the cause of poor US/European relations Thomas Donnelly, Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute, 5/1/2004 (Learning to Live without Europe American Enterprise Institute) http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.20520,filter.foreign/pub_detail.asp. Despite the best efforts to resurrect the transatlantic bonhomie of the Cold War era, the limitations of any strategic partnership between the United States and Europe are growing increasingly clear. This is not merely a function of fallout over Operation Iraqi Freedom or animosity toward the Bush administration per se. Rather, the split between Europe and the United States reflects a more fundamental clash of strategic cultures.
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Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: Doesnt Undermine Relations
ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE STABILIZES US/EU RELATIONS DESPITE POLITICAL DISAGREEMENTS Miles Kahler, Professor International Relations, UC San Diego, 2005, The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress, ed. David M. Andrews, p. 88-9 A dense network of politically powerful economic interests serves as a second key stabilizer in transatlantic relations. Even during the years of US isolation in the 1920s and 1930s, economic ties between the United States and Europe were strong: financial centers were closely linked by American lending to Europe during the 1920s, and central bank cooperation persisted during a period of relative diplomatic disengagement. After World War II, the defi americain of the 1960s US multinational investment in Europebecame a flood of foreign direct investment in both economies are now more deeply intertwined through trade and investment than any other economies that do not share regional economic institutions. In contrast to the often stormy economic relations between the United States and Japan, transatlantic economic exchange is firmly based on large-scale cross-investment. That economic island of crossinvestment is unique in its scale within the world economy. Transatlantic investment not only dwarfs US-Japanese investment; it has become relatively symmetric, as more European firms have invested in North America. This economic base also has important political ramifications; the representatives of multinational corporations constitute a potent business lobby in Washington, in US state capitals, and in Brussels. For example, Peterson and Cowls identify the EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce as one of the most effectively organized groups in Brussels, serving as an important window on European decision-making for US business as well as ensuring that the interests of resident US firms are incorporated into EU policy. Such business lobbies exert influences in both directions: shaping EU policies toward foreign investors as well as American policy toward Europe. More novel than the US presence in Europe is the powerful European investor presence in such regions as the American South, where European manufacturing plants have provided important offsets to the loss of more traditional manufacturing employment (such as textiles). How this internationalization of regional economies in the United States will be reflected in American politics remains an important question for the future of transatlantic relations. Overall, the scale of US-European investment and the political power of the multinational corporations that drive investment flows have served as a powerful stabilizer in transatlantic relations. The economic relationship has typically been undisturbed by conflict in other arenas reciprocal investments tend to dampen the conflict that has often surrounded trade disputes. The relative symmetry of the relationship has also served to restrain temptations to seek unilateral advantage. Even in the climate of distrust following the Iraq War, the economic relationship has remained relatively unthreatened. The combined weight of this economic stabilizer and (relatively passive) internationalist public opinion, may not serve to offset other, more disruptive trends in domestic politics, however: the polarization of political conflict in the United States and, with more uncertain effects, the shifting balance of ethnicities in both the United States and Europe.
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Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: Doesnt Undermine Relations
EU AND US WILL ALWAYS MAINTAIN RELATIONS DESPITE SHORT-TERM DISTRACTIONS NEED EACH OTHER TOO MUCH Stephen Eric Bronner, Political Science Professor Rutgers, 2005, Planetary Politics: human rights, terror, and global society, ed. Stephen Eric Bronner, p. 108 Relations between Europe and the United States will undoubtedly improve: it makes no sense for them to engage in an ongoing confrontation with the other. Both are too politically important, too economically powerful, andalsotoo alike. The rifts remaining within the European Union require mending, which is only possible through a rapprochement with the United States, while the need for reliable allies has become obvious on the part of the hegemon. The United Nations for its part has now passed a resolution supporting American policy in Iraq. That, too, only makes sense. The United Nations cannot remain at loggerheads with its most powerful member: such a course would spell financial disaster and instability for the organization. Some degree of international cooperation over the future of Iraq, moreover, was probably inevitable. But tensions still remain: symbolic is different than military support and, while it is becoming ever more apparent that the United Sates cannot bear the costs of peace by itself, the billions in aid sought by the Bush administration are still not forthcoming. The European Union has offered $230 million and the administration will be lucky to raise an extra few billion dollars form its other allies.
NO CHANCE OF US/EU DIVORCE
Robert J. Lieber, Georgetown University, 2005, The American Era: power and strategy for the 21st century, p. 94 For the foreseeable future, Europe does not have a viable alternative. The United States is too preponderant, the countries of the EU are too divided, Europe lacks the means of its own defense, and there is no real alternative to the security tie with the United States. At the same time, Europe does possess a comparative advantage in postwar peacekeeping and nation-building. Both Europe and the United States have a vital interest in the viability and institutions of the existing economic order, and only through their cooperation can they have any possibility of addressing broader world problems. In addition, they share far more in common than appears from the cacophony of Atlantic debate. In sum, however ardently it may be predicted or desired by disgruntled critics, divorce is not on the horizon.
US/EU SPLIT ONLY EXISTS AMONG THE ELITES
Thomas Risse, Professor International Politics Free University (berlin), 2004, American Power in the 21st Century, eds. David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, p. 223 In sum, it is hard to construct a widening gap in the overall worldviews, general foreign policy outlook, and a strong decline in mutual sympathy and we-feeling between Americans and Europeans, even though the latters views have been affected negatively by the Iraq War. It is in the evaluation of the Bush administrations foreign policy that US and European public opinions differ sharply. Yet, while we do not see widening cleavages in mass public opinion on either side of the Atlantic, elite opinion appears to be a different matter, particularly regarding the foreign policy elites now in charge in Washington. I will comment on this aspect later in this article.
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Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: AT Hurts EU Relations Will Never Collapse-Economic Interdependence
US AND EUROPEAN COOPERATION AND CONFLICT INEVITABLE
Sergio Fabbrini, Political Science Professor, University of Trento, 2006, The United States Contested: American unilateralism and European discontent, ed. Sergio Fabbrini, p. 5 The cultural and political hegemony of conservative America will continue to generate contestation by Europeans for two reasons. First, because if it is true that unilateralism is the result of deep changes within American society, then it is possible to claim that the conservative nationalism which supports it is not destined to disappear easily from the international scene. Second, and simultaneously, because if it is true that the process of European integration has reached a point of no-return, whether or not the constitutional treaty on the future of Europe will be finally approved by the EU member states, it is also possible to claim that the European project of supra-nationalism is not destined to disappear from the international scene easily either. Thus, America and Europe are likely to continue to be allies and partners in many aspects of the international system, but they are also destined to clash because one partner looks at the world from a nationalist point of view (charged, moreover, with missionary components) while the second views it from a postnationalist perspective (which expresses itself primarily in juridical terms).
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Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: AT spurs immoral or unjustified military interventions
JUSTIFICATION FOR PREVENTIVE WAR SIMILAR TO HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
Michael Mandelbaum, Professor Foreign Policy Johns Hopkins, 2005, The Case for Goliath: How America acts as the worlds government in the 21st Century, p. 69-71 For all their differences, however, preventive war and humanitarian intervention have some basic similarities, like fraternal twins who may not look or act alike but who share fundamental characteristics. Both count as radical innovations in international affairs because, whereas the frequent intrusions of the strong upon the weak throughout history violated the norm of absolute sovereignty in practice, the post-Cold War American interventions posed a direct challenge to that norm as a constitutive principle of international order. The proponents of each assert that some circumstances other than pure self-defense justify overriding a countrys sovereign prerogatives. Although this contention did not originate in the wake of the Cold War the UN Charter makes provision for intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states in the event of threats to international peace and securitythese two doctrines propounded it more insistently and for more clearly defined conditions than ever before. The conditions prevailing in the world after the Cold War made both preventive war and humanitarian intervention possible. The United States undertook both on behalf of the values that came to have wide currency: preventive war to thwart the designs of rogue states that did not honor these values, humanitarian intervention to rescue people from government that, in violation of the global consensus, were oppressing them. The existence of a global consensus in favor of peace, democracy, and free markets meant that almost no-country objected strongly enough to these American interventions to try to stop them. The wide margin of military superiority that the United States enjoyed over all other countries meant that even if any had so objected, none would have had the power to make contesting them seem advisable. From the American point of view, preventive war and humanitarian not only defended American interests and protected American values, they also served the wider international community. Indeed, these practices did more for others than for Americans, who were not exposed to the depredations of the regimes the United States removed from power and to whom the rogue states that were the objects of the doctrine of preventive war posed lesser threats than they did to their immediate neighbors. Americans certainly believed that they were acting on behalf not only of themselves but also of other countries for the purpose making the world they shared a safer and more humane place. The practices of preventive war and humanitarian intervention had one other feature in common: Neither was likely to establish itself as a permanent, prominent feature of American foreign policy and twenty-first-century international relations.
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Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: AT Grounded in Realism
BUSH FOREIGN POLICY SHIFTING FROM REALISM TO IDEALISM DEMOCRACY PROMOTION INSTEAD OF PREEMPTION Jonathan Herbert, Lecturer American Studies Keele University, 2006, Developments in American Politics, eds. G. Peele, C Bailey, B Cain & B. Peters, p. 246 The fundamental presumptions of Bushs War on Terror remain intact. His approach to foreign policy is still rooted in the concept of the nation-state and particularly in the control of rogue states. However, the democratization of the Middle East has also become a central pillar, of the War on Terror, replacing the doctrine of pre-emption . Arguably, the democratization project could even be considered a second Bush doctrine. Bush is now evoking classic US values of liberty and democracy. This rhetorical shift toward idealism has been matched by some degree of action. Rices direct and critical speeches pressing autocratic allies toward democratic reforms have been notable, both for their genuine strand of idealism, and for their delivery despite the harm that they might do to US strategic interests by weakening or alienating potential allies. In this respect, the blunt realism of Bushs first term appears to have receded.
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Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: AT Props Up Capitalism
BUSH DOCTRINE DOES NOT PROMOTE THE GOALS AND NEEDS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM
Alejandro Colas & Richard Saull, International Relation Lecturers, Birbeck College & U. of Leicester, 2006, The War on Terrorism and the American Empire after the Cold War, eds. A. Colas & R. Saull, p. 17-8 It would be fair to say that most other contributors in this book share such a view of the current conjuncture. As we have seen, they emphasize different aspects of change and continuity in US foreign policy, but they all agree that the election (and re-election) of George W. Bush and the 9/11 attacks have at the very least accentuated and facilitated the assertion of unilateral, militarist tendencies latent within the US polity. Pieterses chapter argues that the reorganization of US foreign policy-making in favor of the Pentagon during the 1980s survived the two Clinton administrations and has been revived under the Bush II regime. Indeed, Pieterse suggests that The Bush II administration is in many ways a Regan replay with its reinvention of rollback under post-Cold war conditions, its reliance on experienced Cold War staffers, and its endorsement of policies involving less government, more market, and evangelical patriotism built on a Reaganite social base of the Christian right, the white South plus a portion of Jewish voters, wedded through Christian Zionism and the fundamentalist Christian rendezvous with Israel. Interestingly, however, Pieterse also suggest that the Bush administrations double nostalgia for first and second Cold War politics is at odds with the US business elite: Its economic policies are biased and contradictory, and tax cuts and deficit spending are opposed by CEOs, blue-ribbon business councils and to some extent even the Federal Reserve, so it is not a typical policy of the capitalist class. Politics trumps economics in that the fundamental calculus appears to be political (in the sense of party and state-driven) and ideological rather that economic. Unlike neoliberal globalization, policy is not driven by the Treasury, Wall Street and international institutions.
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Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: Appeasement Bad
APPEASEMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MOST DESTRUCTIVE WAR IN WORLD HISTORY Sean Hannity, Fox News, 2004, Deliver Us From Evil, p. 87-8
The human capacity for evil is a frightening thing, whether its Nazism, communism, or Saddam Husseins personality cult. But appeasement of evil in its own way is equally frightening. Winston Churchill called World War II the unnecessary war because he witnessed the appeasement that caused it. He recognized that the largest and most destructive war in history could have been prevented if Britains leaders had awakened sooner from what Churchill called their pacifist dream. Although the Western allies were eventually able to achieve victory, it came only after tremendous loss. Millions of lives could have been saved had Britains weak leaders been strong from the start. ACCOMMODATION AND DIPLOMACY HAVE NEVER AND WILL NEVER BE AN ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE TO TYRANNY
Sean Hannity, Fox News, 2004, Deliver Us From Evil, p. 150-1
I wonder, too, whether they really believe diplomacy cant turn out to be a trap. Perhaps theyve forgotten about Stalins pact with Hitler, or Clintons arms treaties with North Korea. And do they think that force can always be avoided? That may be the most disturbing thought of all. If one of Americas most widely read news magazines is taking the position that military force is never necessaryand this in a time of wartheyve not only lost touch with the American people, theyve betrayed their fundamental misunderstanding of human nature. The lessons of modern history are clear: Accommodation only leads to escalation. Tyranny cannot be defeated by diplomacy. No brutal dictator will ever be persuaded to give up his dreams of universal power simply because its the right thing to do.
MUST EVALUATE RISKS OF BUSH DOCTRINE AGAINST THE RISKS OF APPEASEMENT
Robert J. Lieber, Georgetown University, 2005, The American Era: power and strategy for the 21st century, p. 143 Yet the human, material, and political costs of the war have to be weighed against the likely consequences of not acting. Those opposed to the use of force implicitly assumed that the Iraqi situation would revert to a more or less benign status quo ante. But past experience as well as the insights of complexity theory, suggest that this kind of presumption was unwarranted. War involved risks, but so did inaction in the face of Saddams non-compliance and false WMD declarations of December 2002. Saddam had long since expressed his belief in the lack of US staying power and his contempt for the UN. International failure to enforce the serious consequences stipulated in Security Council Resolution 1441 would have emboldened the Iraqi leader. Nor should it be forgotten that had Saddam remained in power, the continued operation of the US-British no-fly zones and the American military presence in Saudi Arabia would have remained subjects of intensifying resentment. Were the sanctions to have collapsed, which was likely given the erosion of support for them, Saddam would have been free to resume his weapons programs. Thus there was the prospect of a more dangerous and unrestrained Saddam and ultimately the specter of a wider war when Iraqs actions became impossible to appease or ignore. Perhaps most seriously of all, on the part of those opposed to the use of force, there was a failure of imagination: a stark unwillingness to conceive of what weapons of mass destruction in the hands of monstrous figures such as a Saddam Hussein or an Osama bin Laden could ultimately do. Given the balance of risk, it was preferable to act
decisively rather than wait in the uncertain hope that no major threat would emerge or could be deterred if it did. Thus, in the words of British Prime Minister Tony Blair, a year after the fall of Badhdad: It is possiblethat Saddam would change his ambitions; possible he would develop the WMD but never use it; possible that terrorists would never get their hands on WMD, whether from Iraq or elsewhere. We
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cannot be certainBut do we want to take the risk?...My judgment then and now is that the risk of this new global terrorism and its interaction with states or organizations or individuals proliferating WMD is one. I simply am not prepared to runThis is not a time to err on the side of caution.
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Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: AT- Iraq Proves Bush Doctrine Bad
IRAQ DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT THE BUSH DOCTRINE RESULTS IN UNJUSTIFIED AND UNCONTROLLED MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IT WAS JUSTIFIED Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 83 Some fear American military strength. But the United States is far from omnipotent. Past historical eras such as those during which European colonial powers could easily conquer distant lands are gone. In todays world, the United States may have impressive ability to wage traditional warfare, but it also has a great deal of trouble contending with many land-based conflicts, particularly those that involve irregular resistance fighters. This has been underscored in Iraq (and Somalia, Lebanon, and Vietnam). Americas high sensitivity to casualties limits its inclination to use military force. And given its highly open and democratic political system, it need not be so feared. Even in Iraq, where the legality of the invasion was shaky, the Bush administration acted only when it could point to more than a dozen UN Security Council resolutions that Iraq had violated, and it only sought regime change in a place where the existing government had slaughtered more than a million people during the previous two decades. American power is, we would argue, generally a force for god in the world, and one not likely to be systematically overused.
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Unilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Good: Bush Doctrine Not Responsible for Reversing Libyan Nuclear Program
LIBYA GAVE UP ITS NUKES BECAUSE OF CARROTS AND INDUCEMENTS NOT A VICTORY FOR HARDLINE MEASURES Fareed Zakaria, Editor Newsweek, 2006, October 23, p. 42 The long history of negotiations with Libya tells a more complex story. In an exhaustively researched analysis in the journal International Security, Bruce Jentleson and Christopher Whytock detail how Libya came to give up its weapons. By the late 1970s Libya was a major sponsor of terror and determined to acquire nuclear, chemical and biological weapons--far more aggressive in its actions than North Korea today. In the 1980s Libya was involved in the seizure of the Achille Lauro, the bombing of a discotheque in Berlin and the destruction of Pan Am 103. The Reagan administration was determined to coerce, harass and destabilize Kaddafi. It bombed Kaddafi's family compound in 1986. It launched covert operations against the regime. And, of course, it sanctioned the country. These policies were initially thought to have been successful, but it is now documented--in a study by the Defense Department--that they produced a marked increase in Libyan state-sponsored terror. George H.W. Bush's administration concluded that this strategy was actually helping Kaddafi, who used it to gain domestic support. So the United States, along with Britain, laid out conditions for Libya to resolve outstanding disputes--acknowledgment and compensation for Pan Am 103, ending support for terror groups--with no hint of regime change. This shift got the Libyans engaged and began a process that moved forward. In 1999, when negotiations with the Clinton administration were getting close, Kaddafi asked Nelson Mandela and Kofi Annan to guarantee that the United States and Britain would not try "to undermine the Libyan regime." After consulting with Washington, Annan wrote a letter confirming this to Kaddafi. In mid-2001, the Bush administration continued the talks with Libya, along the same lines but placing a greater focus on Libya's weapons of mass destruction. In 2002, after conferring with Bush, Tony Blair reaffirmed in a letter to Kaddafi that a deal on WMD would result in the normalization of relations with America and Britain. Throughout the last phase of these negotiations, the Bush administration and the British enticed Libya into the accord with the prospect of normal relations with the West, the lifting of sanctions and the free flow of trade and investment. This is a short, selected version of the story. There were other factors at play. But undeniably, direct negotiations and the carrots that Washington and London offered played a pivotal role in changing Kaddafi's mind. The Libyan example shows that you need both sticks and carrots to get results. It also shows that you cannot get a government to make a big policy reversal if you aren't talking directly to it and if it believes that you are simultaneously attempting to overthrow that regime. The Bush administration has never resolved this fundamental contradiction--between policy change and regime change. And until it does, we will never know what an intelligent sanctions policy may produce with North Korea.
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Unilateralism Good: Hard Balancing Answers
TURN: A DECLINE IN HEGEMONY ENSURES BALANCING
STEPHEN WALT, PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS @ HARVARD, AMERICAN UNRIVALED, 2002, p. 134-5 Thus, the United States has long enjoyed a hegemonic position in the Western Hemisphere, both because its immediate neighbors have been too weak to challenge it directly and because other great powers have been preoccupied by events in their own regions. This argument implies that other states might be more likely to balance against the United States were its power to decline, which in turn suggests that the United States has ample incentive to preserve its material superiority
NO EFFECTIVE COUNTERBALANCING FOR AT LEAST 10 YEARS
Christopher Layne, Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A & M, The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Fall 2006, p. 39 The United States enjoys no privileged exemption from the fate of past hegemons. American primacists conflate balancing (a grand strategy pursued by individual states) with the attainment of balance in the international system (a more or less equal distribution of power among the great powers). That others' balancing efforts have not yet produced a balance of power does not mean they are not trying to offset U.S. hegemony, although these balancing efforts will require time to bear fruit. Thus, contrary to my 1993 prediction, the United States probably will not be challenged by great power rivals as early as 2010.
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Unilateralism Good: Hard Balancing Answers
COUNTER-BALANCING FAILS; U.S. DOWNTURN RISKS REGIONAL NUCLEAR WARS
Zbigniew Brzezinski, famous geostrategist, former diplomat, Johns Hopkins & CSIS, THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, 2004, pp. 3-4) Even a coalition among the above-a most unlikely prospect, given their historical conflicts and clashing territorial claimswould lack the cohesion, muscle, and energy needed to both push America off its pedestal and sustain global stability. Some leading states, in any case, would side with America if push came to shove. Indeed, any evident American decline might precipitate effort to reinforce America's leadership. Most important, the shared resentment of American hegemony would not dampen the clash of interest among states. The more intense collisions-in the event of America's decline:could spark a wildfire of regional violence, rendered all the more dangerous by the dissemination of weapons of mass destruction.
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Unilateralism Good: Hard Balancing Answers
U.S. PRIMACY HAS NOT PRODUCED HARD BALANCING
Gary Rosen, Managing Editor of Commentary, "Bush and the realists." Commentary, September 2005, p. 31 Yet on this point he fails to produce the goods. By Walt's own admission, U.S. power under Bush has not generated the countervailing alliance--the "hard" balancing--that realist theory would predict. Other nations have resisted specific American policies and imposed real costs on U.S. action, but, as Walt concedes, they have not contemplated the sort of "encircling coalitions that Wilhelmine Germany or the Soviet Union provoked." To explain this "anomalous" situation, Walt recites a catalog of factors, only to note in passing that the U.S. is not seen as "an especially aggressive country," having never sought "to conquer and dominate large sections of the globe." Putting the point more explicitly, one might say instead that, in contrast to most other ascendant powers in the history of the world, the U.S. has not aspired to empire, and has lacked such ambitions largely because it is a liberal democracy whose own identity springs from a declared commitment to the right of self-government and to the independence of nations.
OTHER COUNTRIES DONT FEAR THAT THE U.S. IS AN IMPERIAL POWER Gary Rosen, Managing Editor of Commentary, "Bush and the realists." Commentary, September 2005, p. 31
ORTHODOX "NEOREALISM" frowns on such "unit-level analysis" (as it is known in the jargon of the field); the character of a particular state is not supposed to matter as compared with the quantum of raw power at its disposal. But America's well-known aversion to dominion is the key to understanding how other nations gauge its intentions. As it happens, most countries, even those deeply unhappy with the Bush administration's policies, do not appear to share Walt's view that neoconservative Washington hopes "to govern vast areas of the world by force."
NO EVIDENCE OF COUNTERBALANCING NOW
Robert J. Lieber, Georgetown University, 2005, The American Era: power and strategy for the 21st century, p. 201-2 In sum, despite a very real climate of critical opinion abroad, assessments of actual counterbalancing appear quite overstated. Steven Peter Rosen has noted, A surprising number of major states are not now engaging in the self-help that Waltz says is at the heart of inter-state relations, but are relying instead on the United States for their security. Note that one explanation may be that while Waltzs well-known description of the organizing principle of the international system as anarchical is widely accepted by other realist authors and even a number of more practical neo-liberals, there are elements of the current international system that, because of American primacy, are actually hierarchical. Authors such as Rosen and John Owen have made this point, and Owen has explained the absence of counterbalancing against the United States by Europe and Japan by observing that the extent to which a state counterbalances against American is a function of how liberal that state is, because liberal states treat each other benignly. Insight into why this is the case can be found in the remark of a leading member of the governing German Social Democratic Party. In his words, There are a lot of people who dont like the American policemen, but they are happy there is one.
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Unilateralism Good: Hard Balancing Answers
NO EFFORT TO COUNTER US POWER PEOPLE AROUND THE WORLD DISTINGUISH BETWEEN POLICIES OF BUSH AND US GLOBAL ROLE Michael Mandelbaum, Professor Foreign Policy Johns Hopkins, 2005, The Case for Goliath: How America acts as the worlds government in the 21st Century, p. 162 Furthermore, the broad goals on behalf of which the United States sought to exercise its power in the world were widely shared in other countries. By and large, people around the world believed democracy to be the most desirable and appropriate form of government, even perhaps especiallyin places that were undemocratically governed. Also by large margins, people outside the United States endorsed the free market as the optimal method of economic organization and approved of the increasing connections, including the economic connections known as globalization, among different countries. Other governments had no basis for mobilizing their citizens to overturn the global military, political, and economic arrangements that rested ultimately on American values because their citizens shared these values. The global consensus in favor of those values was evident in the same opinion surveys that registered discontent with the United States. They showed that non-Americans routinely distinguished between the policies of the American government, which they often opposed, and the defining features of American society, which they generally admired. They also distinguished between the policies of a particular American administration and the global role of the United States.
NO EVIDENCE OF ANY BALANCING EVEN OPPOSITION TO IRAQ HASNT SPARKED REACTION
G. John Ikenberry, Politics Professor Princeton, 2004, American Power in the 21st Century, eds. David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, p. 88-90 In characterizing American power, it is useful to make five general observations. First, it is important to note that despite the rise of American unipolar power, the other major states are not making systematic choices to pull away fro the balance against the United States. This is interesting, History suggests that states do not like to live in world of a single dominant state. Balancing is a deeply rooted, reaction to concentrated state power. Charles V, Louis XIV, Napoleon I, and post-Bismarck Germany all these hegemonic aspirants were eventually brought down by coalitions of states that were determined to rebalance the distribution of power. Yet this sort of dynamic has not emerged. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union and huge shifts in the distribution of power in favor of the United States, other states have not made moves toward geopolitical balance. United States relations with Western Europe and Japan after the Cold War have remained relatively stable. Deep shifts have not surfaced. The advanced democratic countries have reaffirmed their alliance ties, contained political conflict, expanded trade and investment across the continents, and avoided a return to strategic rivalry. Indeed, despite the crisis in 2002-3 over Americas invasion of Iraq, Western Europe and Japan have not articulated visions of world order based on geopolitical balancing against the United States. France has been the most resistant to American unipolar power, but it has not attempted to organize a counterbalance coalition based on independent and opposing military power. Even more surprisingly, rather than try to balance against United States power, China and Russia have moved closer to the United States, integrated into the Western security framework. Remarkably, China has also dropped its rhetoric of anti-American hegemonism and worked with the United States in the fight against terrorism and the diplomatic engagement of North Korea. As Michael Mastanduno has argued: Rather than edging away from the United States, much less balancing against it, Europe and Japan have been determined to maintain the pattern of engagement that characterized the Cold War. Neither China nor Russia, despite having differences with the United States, has sought to organize a balancing coalition against it. Rather than edging away, much less balancing against it, the other great powers have maintained a pattern of engagement with the United States. Indeed, the main security concern in Europe and Asia is not how to distance from an all-too-powerful United States, but how to prevent the United States from drifting away. Interestingly, the end of the Cold War has not eliminated the cohesion among the advanced industrial democracies. In both economic and military spheres, the United States leads its nearest rivals by a larger margin than has any other leading state in the last three centuries. Yet despite this concentration of American power, there is very little evidence that other states are actively seeking to balance against it or organize a counter-hegemonic coalition.
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Unilateralism Good: Hard Balancing Answers: Russian/China
NO RISK OF A RUSSIA-CHINA AXIS Stephen G. Brooks is an Assistant Professor and William C. Wohlforth an Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, 2002 (FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July-August, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/articles/brooks0702.html) (PDBF1806) Consider the Sino-Russian "strategic partnership," the most prominent instance of apparent balancing to date. The easy retort to overheated rhetoric about a Moscow-Beijing "axis" would involve pointing out how it failed to slow, much less stop, President Vladimir Putin's geopolitical sprint toward Washington in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. More telling, however, is just how tenuous the shift was even before it was thrown off track. At no point did the partnership entail any costly commitment or policy coordination against Washington that might have risked a genuine confrontation. The keystone of the partnership -- Russia's arms sales to China -- reflects a symmetry of weaknesses, rather than the potential of combined strengths. The sales partially offset China's backward military technology while helping to slow the decline of Russia's defense industries. Most of the arms in question are legacies of the R&D efforts of the Soviet military-industrial complex, and given Moscow's paltry R&D budget today, few of these systems will long remain competitive with their U.S. or NATO analogues. NEITHER RUSSIA NOR CHINA WILL BANDWAGON AGAINST THE U.S. MOSCOW TIMES, November 11, 2002, p. Lexis-nexis (PDBF1922) Both the Chinese and Russian leaders have reached the same conclusion and have adopted similar policies toward Washington. "If you can't beat them, join them," says it simply. American foreign policy enjoys strong support in many areas from these two former enemies and reduced opposition in others. Their acquiescence to a tough UN Security Council resolution on Iraq -- albeit softened by the French - is only the latest show of accommodation with the United States. This support and reduced opposition are not because China and Russia approve of all American policies -- they even support U.S. policies they disapprove of -- but a reflection of their own national interests. Both have strong interests in getting Washington not to make big trouble for them as they tend to their more important issues. NO RISK OF A RUSSIA-CHINA ALLIANCE OR GLOBAL ALLIANCES DIRECTED ATO THE U.S. Zbigniew Brzezinski, famous geostrategist, former diplomat, Johns Hopkins & CSIS, THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, 2004, 149 (PLANETDEBATE1352) The contemporary world may not like American preeminence, may distrust it, resent it, even at times others conspire against it. But as a practical matter, it cannot oppose it directly. The last decade has seen occasional attempts at such opposition, but to no avail. The Chinese and the Russians flirted with a strategic partnership to promote global "multipolarity," a term easily decoded as "anti-hegemony:' Not much came of that, given Russia's relative weakness visa-vis China, as well as China's pragmatic recognition that right now, most of all, it needs foreign capital and technology. Neither of these would be forthcoming if China's relations with the United States were antagonistic. In the last year of the twentieth century, the Europeans, and especially the French, grandly announced that Europe would shortly acquire "an autonomous global security capability:' The war in Afghanistan quickly revealed this commitment to be reminiscent of the once famous Soviet assertion that the historical victory of Communism "is on the horizon;' an imaginary line that recedes as one walks toward it.
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Unilateralism Good: Hard Balancing Answers: Russian/China
MANY OBSTACLES TO RUSSIA AND CHINA FORMING AN ANTI-AMERICAN BLOC Dr. Weitz is a senior staff member of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Washington, D.C. In recent years he has published on international security issues in Parameters, Strategic Review, and the Journal of Strategic Studies, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Autumn, 2003, http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2003/Autumn/art3a03.htm (PLANETDEBATE598) Since the Cold Wars end, many analysts have expected China and Russia to cooperate vigorously to counter U.S. geopolitical superiority.1 Although Chinese and Russian leaders have collaborated on some issues, substantial obstacles have impeded their forming an anti-American bloc. This failure of the two strongest countries with both the capacity and (arguably) incentives to counterbalance U.S. power and influence in world affairs suggests why the United States continues to enjoy unprecedented global preeminence. This article analyzes why Russia and China have not allied against the United States and offers policy recommendations on how to avert such an anti-U.S. bloc in the future.
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Unilateralism Good: Hard Balancing Answers: Only Soft Balancing
OTHER COUNTRIES LIMIT BALANCING TO SOFT BALANCING
Peter Beinart, Editor, The New Republic, 2006, The Good Fight: Why Liberalsand only liberalscan win the war on terror and make America great again, p. 126-7 Instead of forming formal alliances to contain the United States, other states generally have opted for soft balancing. Hard balancing focuses on the overall balance of power and seeks to assemble a countervailing coalition that will be strong enough to keep the dominant power in check. By contrast, soft balancing does not seek or expect to alter the overall distribution of capabilities. Instead, a strategy of soft balancing accepts the current balance of power but seeks to obtain better outcomes within it. In the current era of US dominance, therefore, soft balancing is the conscious coordination of diplomatic action in order to obtain outcomes contrary to US preferences outcomes that could not be gained if the balances did not give each other some degree of mutual support. By definition, soft balancing seeks to limit the ability of the United States to impose its preferences on others. To practice soft balancing, therefore, other states must coordinate their actions with this aim explicitly in mind.
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Unilateralism Good: Hard Balancing Answers: European Balancing Answers
EUROPEAN COUNTERBALANCING HAS FAILED
Sir Lawrence Freedman is Professor of War Studies and Vice Principal, Kings College London,, SURVIVAL, Winter 2005-6, p. 39 Indeed, on the evidence of the second term alone, ignoring the first, President Bush would appear as a model of cautious, consultative pragmatism. Meanwhile, attempts to develop a European pole to counter, and qualify the influence of, the US pole have foundered along with the political touch of the French president and in the face of indifference by the bulk of the new members of the EU.
NO GRAND ALLIANCE HAS FORMED AGAINST THE U.S.
Gary Rosen, Managing Editor of Commentary, "Bush and the realists." Commentary, September 2005, p. 31 No grand alliance has formed against the U.S., one might also add, because the world increasingly shares the Bush administration's urgency in fighting Islamist terrorism. Although Walt dismisses the American effort as a "crusade," it is one in which many countries now have a serious and growing stake. Trans-Atlantic cooperation on this front is already substantial and, in the wake of the London bombings, will surely intensify (to say nothing of such recent wonders as France's active collaboration with the U.S. in confronting Syria). As for the Islamic world itself, the red-hot center of anti-American sentiment, barbarous assaults in Sharm el-Sheikh, Baghdad, Jakarta, Istanbul, and elsewhere have finally prompted second thoughts about the piety of the jihadists. In the fatwas of clerics and in Islamic public opinion, suicide attacks are starting to win condemnation. Even the UN is preparing, at long last, to call terrorism by its proper name. More of the world, in short, seems to be coming around to the view that the indiscriminate slaughter of civilians, far from being (as Walt would have it) a "strategy" for reversing hated policies, poses a nihilistic threat to any kind of civilized order.
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Unilateralism Good: Hard Balancing Answers: Brooks & Wolforth Are Wrong
BROOKS AND WOLFORTHS NON-COUNTERBALANCING CLAIMS DONT ASSUME THAT THE U.S. ACTS AS AN AGGRESSIVE POWER THAT IS WHAT CAUSES COUNTER-BALANCING Robert A. Pape is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 7 This article advances three propositions that challenge the prevailing view that major powers cannot balance against the United States. First, the most consequential effect of the Bush strategy will be a fundamental transformation in how major states react to future uses of U.S. power. The United States has long been a remarkable exception to the rule that states balance against superior power. Aside from the Soviet Union, major powers have rarely balanced against it. The key reason is not the United States' overwhelming power relative to that of other major powers, which has varied over time and so cannot explain this nearly constant pattern. Rather, until recently the United States enjoyed a robust reputation for nonaggressive intentions toward major powers and lesser states beyond its own hemisphere . Although it has fought numerous wars, the United States has generally used its power to preserve the established political order in major regions of the world, seeking to prevent other powers from dominating rather than seeking to dominate itself. The Bush strategy of aggressive unilateralism is changing the United States' long-enjoyed reputation for benign intent and giving other major powers reason to fear its power.
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Unilateralism Good: China Counterbalancing Answers
A FIRM SECURITY POSTURE TOWARDS CHINA REDUCES THE RISK OF A MISCALCULATED WAR
Thomas J. Christensen is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2006, p. 81 This article outlines a moderate U.S. strategy toward China and the region that mixes elements of positive-sum and zero-sum thinking. In such a strategy, a firm security posture toward China would not only hedge against a potential turn for the worse in Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy; it would also help shape long-term Chinese political and diplomatic evolution in directions that reduce the likelihood of unwanted conflict and instability between China and its neighbors and reduce the likelihood of dangerous miscalculations and unnecessary spirals of tension in SinoAmerican relations.
CHINA IS NOT COUNTER-BALANCING AND BANDWAGONING AGAINST THE U.S.
Rosemary Foot, International Relations Professor, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, v. 1, 2006, pp. 87-8 Overall, this strategy could be interpreted as soft bandwagoning with the United States. But it is counterbalanced by a stronger Chinese global and regional presence, expressed through multilateral fora, global regimes and formalized bilateral ties, in which Chinese officials retain the option to promote their own interests even where these might cut across those promoted by Washington. In this sense, while Beijings strategy can be viewed as accommodation with the current US-dominated global order, it also contains an important hedging element, or insurance policy, through which China seeks to secure its future. If it should become necessary, that is, China could try to use its newly formed bilateral and multilateral relationships to offset any serious deterioration in relations with America. The strong ties it has sought to establish around the world help to ensure that Cold War-style containment of China simply could not occur in this era of interdependence. Such ties also help to ensure secure access to the resources that are vital to its position as workshop of the world, a role that underpins its intertwined domestic political and development goals. Yet, if it cannot entirely be described as bandwagoning, neither is Chinas strategy the same as soft balancing through the formation of antihegemonic coalitions. True, China has put effort into developing the Asian-only APT, and the intention is to hold an East Asian Summit at the end of 2005, without US participation. In addition, its relationship with Moscow has matured to the point where the two regimes are embarking on joint military exercises. In July 2005, the SCO members called on the United States to set a timetable for the closing of American military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. But Beijing also realizes that many of the Asian states within the APT and SCO are likely to retain close ties with the US for military and economic reasons. Nor can Russia be entirely relied uponas witness its initial attempts to strike a deal with the US to limit missile defence schemes, and its negotiation of an oil pipeline agreement with Japan rather than China. Russia remains uneasy about the rise of Chinese influence and material power, and these reservations inhibit the deepening of their relationship and limit the impact of the interests they share. As Shi has bluntly put it, there will be for a very longterm no possibility to form and maintain an international united front consolidated enough, strong enough, effective enough and permanent enough to balance against this [US] preponderance. This perspective reinforces the assumption that America cannot be balanced, bolstering the views of those Chinese who argue from a more optimistic standpoint that there may be some potential for China to engage in long-term cooperation with the United States, and that Americas long-standing presence in the region should be recognized as a stabilizing factor.
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Unilateralism Good: China Counterbalancing Answers
CHINA IS NOT DIRECTLY CHALLENING THE U.S.
Rosemary Foot, International Relations Professor, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, v. 1, 2006, pp. 89-90 Furthermore, there is little substance as yet to the argument that China is engaged in directly challenging US military power, for two main reasons: first, it accepts that the US military lead is so great that it will be surpassed either never or only in some far-distant future; and second, Chinas concern with domestic development has ruled out Soviet-era-style arms racing. Undoubtedly there has been an acceleration in the Chinese conventional military buildup since 1999, entailing double-digit increases in spending and changes in doctrine in order to put China in a position to fight high-tech local wars and to project power in the AsiaPacific region. Weapons purchases from Russia have been a regular feature of Chinas military procurement. However, several commentators seem to agree that in the short to medium term, the main prompt for strengthening military capability is the issue of Taiwan, the specific goal being to coerce the island into reunifying with the mainland while deterring the United States from intervening on Taipeis side, were China to decide to use force in response to a formal Taiwanese declaration of independence. The longer term is less certain. China may in time seek to challenge other states such as India, Japan, Russia and the United States itself; but I would argue that the outcome is not preordained, being contingent on events and on Chinese interpretations of how best to reach their goals and, of course, on how other countries reach theirs.
CHINA NOT ESTABLISHING A COUNTER-BALANCE TO U.S. HEGEMONY
Rosemary Foot, International Relations Professor, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, v. 1, 2006, p. 93 China is neither part of, nor determinedly seeking to build, anti-hegemonic coalitions. Consequently, other emerging states such as Brazil, India or Russia should not expect too much in the way of sustained cooperation from China on this front, assuming they are interested in forming such coalitions. It is unlikely to stick out for negotiating positions that the US would see as seriously detrimental to its interests. This approach seems likely to change only were China to become convinced that it faced sustained US hostility. Beijings leaders remain preoccupied with their relationship with the US, Hu Jintao reportedly describing.
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Unilateralism Good: Russia/India Counterbalancing Answers
RUSSIA HASNT ALIGNED WITH IRAN TO CHALLENGE U.S. POWER Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth; Stephen G. Brooks is Assistant Professor and William C. Wohlforth is Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 72 Hard Times for Soft Balancing Analysts commonly interpret great power support for states that are opponents of the United States as soft balancing. Russia's relationship with Iran is the most prominent case in point. Russia has assisted Iran's nuclear program, cooperated in space technology and other high-technology areas, sold large quantities of military hardware (Iran is Russia's third largest customer, after China and India), and pursued a general policy of engagement with Iran. Such policies helped to buttress Iran against pressure from Washington for nearly a decade. There is scant evidence, however, that a desire to balance U.S. power explains the relationship. Regional security concerns and economic incentives have remained consistently at the forefront. Russia has numerous reasons besides balancing U.S. power to seek good relations with Iran. Nuclear sales, technology transfers, and other moves that appear to bolster Iran serve as part of an engagement strategy that is itself driven by Moscow's need for Iranian cooperation in resolving a complex nexus of regional issues surrounding the exploitation of petroleum and other natural resources in the Caspian. Even regional analysts who stress the importance of geopolitics do not accord balancing the United States a significant role in explaining the MoscowTehran connection. As in the China case, Moscow has no incentive to alienate Tehran. At the same time, the two states remained at loggerheads on local issues throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, placing limits on the scope and depth of their cooperation. Russia's arms sales to Iran buttress this general strategy of engagement. But, as in the China and India cases, economic incentives loom large for all the reasons noted above. The issue of nuclear cooperation attracts the most attention from analysts. From the early 1990s on, Russia was the only major power openly cooperating with Iran in this area, defying occasionally intense pressure from Washington. The chief problem with a soft-balancing interpretation is that Russia experts are virtually unanimous in regarding the Moscow-Tehran nuclear connection as driven principally by economic concerns. No one in Russia is able to develop a plausible argument for how the country's security would benefit from Iran's nuclearization. Russia's official policy is that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction "is the main threat of the 21st century." The commercial interests in play are substantial enough, however, to induce Moscow to set a relatively high bar for proof of the relationship's proliferation risks. Nuclear technology is a declining asset inherited from the Soviet Union that figures importantly in Russia's small share of high-technology exports. With abundant hydrocarbon-fueled electrical generation capacity and declining demand compared to Soviet times, the domestic market for nuclear technology has dried up. Foreign sales are vital to sustaining essentially half of the atomic energy ministry's activities, and Iran is a major market. Viktor Mikhailov, Russia's atomic energy minister when the agreement with Iran was initiated, summed up the motivation succinctly: "What could Russia have brought onto world markets? We only had one strength: our scientific and technical potential. Our only chance was broad cooperation in the sphere of peaceful nuclear energy."
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Unilateralism Good: Russia/India Counterbalancing Answers
RUSSIA WOULD SELL ARMS TO INDIA EVEN IF THE U.S. MASSIVELY CUT ITS WEAPONS EXPENDITURES Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth; Stephen G. Brooks is Assistant Professor and William C. Wohlforth is Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 72 Hard Times for Soft Balancing In sum, the evidence concerning Russia's major arms relationships overwhelmingly indicates that Moscow's eagerness to sell weaponry to Beijing and New Delhi is only indirectly and marginally connected to the issue of U.S. hegemony. If the United States were to cut its defense outlays by two-thirds tomorrow, Moscow's interest in arms sales would be undiminished, as would India's demand. To be sure, China's demand for Russian military hardware is partly a response to U.S. military support for Taiwan, but China's desire to enhance its bargaining position over the Taiwan Strait has been a constant since 1949 and hence is not causally related to the advent of unipolarity after 1991 or recent U.S. security behavior. And what makes the soft-balancing argument superficially applicable to the case is not that China wants to import weapons. If the Chinese obtained weaponry from Israel or South Africa, it would hardly attract the attention of soft-balancing proponents. The arms sales seem so significant because they come from Russia, suggesting interstate cooperation to balance U.S. capabilities. Yet the evidence strongly indicates that it is regional security needs in conjunction with economic concerns, not soft balancing, that explain Russian military sales to both China and India.
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Unilateralism Good: European Counterbalancing Answers
NO US/EU SPLIT EU LACKS WILL AND CAPABILITY TO COUNTERBALANCE THE US
Robert J. Lieber, Georgetown University, 2005, The American Era: power and strategy for the 21st century, p. 92-3 Could Europe and the United States nonetheless one day come to an irreversible parting of the ways and even become great power antagonists? Momentous events often arrive by surprise, so the question deserves attention. In essence, a fundamental rupture would require the combination of two elements. One of these is capability, the capacity of Europe to act as a great power opponent of the United States. The other is willthat is, whether Europeans or Americans the desire this to happen and seek to bring it about. Despite the rhetoric of conflict neither of these elements now exists nor seems likely, but under what conditions could they ultimately occur? In terms of capability, the EU would need to achieve an unprecedented breakthrough in which member countries did not just talk about relinquishing fundamental political sovereignty, but actually did so. But the existing ability of each of the twenty-five members to exercise a veto necessarily limits EU foreign policy. In contrast, a true European federation, a United States of Europe, would possess the institutional prerequisites for acting as a single great power in defense and foreign policy. Even then, the EU countries would also need to make the politically difficult decision to allocate scarce resources in order to build a powerful military and to choose competition rather than partnership with the United States. French leaders have tended to favor such a course of action, but theirs is not the prevailing view. Could these changes ever take place? Theoretically, the answer is yes, though the likelihood remains remote. Some scholars of international relations and history argue that reaction to Americas extraordinary predominance will lead to such an outcome, but for the combination of reasons cited above, there is little reason to anticipate such a transformation. Motivation and will also are key. Were the Europeans to find themselves facing some unprecedented threat to their survival in circumstances where the United States was no longer able or willing to provide security, then the political impetus for Europe to provide its own security could emerge. On the other hand, the alternative of EU political fragmentation or breakdown cannot be ruled out, either. By itself a growing European-American divergence in values and beliefs of the kind to which Robert Kagan and others have pointed is unlikely to sustain this kind of change. Instead, a steadily worsening climate of political dispute that finally reached a breaking point on both sides of the Atlantic would have to occur, and with it a collapse in either the will or ability of the United States to sustain its own world role, for example, in reaction to a military quagmire or some devastating series of attacks on a scale far greater than those of September 11. DESPITE EU DISAGREEMENTS WITH US FOREIGN POLICY THEY WILL NEVER UNITE TO COUNTERBALANCE THE US David M. Andrews, Professor Politics Scripps College, 2005, The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress, ed. David M. Andrews, p. 29 Thus, while the relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic has cooled considerably, it is simply not possible to unite Europe in a policy of confrontation with the United States. Too many countries are too dependent upon the United States government, and have too much residual respect for its people, for that to occur. A more united Europe will therefore have to maintain fairly close ties with the United States; a more divided Europe will mean than at least some European countries will be maintaining even closer ties with Washington. Either way, some continuation of present arrangements seems likely. But the golden years of Atlantic cooperationalthough never as golden as now presumed are gone forever.
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Unilateralism Good: European Counterbalancing Answers
NO EU COUNTERBALANCING MANY REASONS
Robert J. Lieber, Georgetown University, 2005, The American Era: power and strategy for the 21st century, p. 64-5 Notwithstanding a long list of disputes and numerous predictions of political divorce, it remains premature to write the epitaph for the European-American partnership. Despite its historic expansion, the EU is not about to emerge as a formidable superpower, let alone take on the role of balancer against the United States. The enlarged EU lacks sufficient central authority and the military capacity for an effective common defense policy. In addition, a community of twentyfive countries now includes member states from Eastern Europe, whose history provides strong motivation for maintaining close ties with the United States. This perspective was evident in the support of the ten governments of the Vilnius group for American policy toward Iraq. Indeed, the intra-European divide over Iraq policy provided evidence that the member states of the EU will not reach a consensus on balancing against the United States. Moreover, domestic politics, economic problems, and the demographic profile of aging populations are much more likely to produce reductions in defense spending than the increases that would be required to provide the EU with the military capability of a major world power. In sum, Europes lack of unanimity on foreign and security policy, the inability to provide for its own security, and shared interests in trans-Atlantic economic cooperation and institutions require a continuing partnership with America. Moreover, despite what Freud called the narcissism of small difference, the legacy of common values remains fundamental. Europe has neither the will nor the capability for a real break, and the interests of the United States work against a divorce as well. Nonetheless, the sources of disagreement are deep seated and have been increasing, and they deserve close attention. THE U.S. IS SPLITTING EUROPE INTERNALLY WITH POLICIES THAT FOCUS ON INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES Heisbourg, Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, Director, April 2003 [Francois, How should America respond to the new America? The Prospect, http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/grant_prospect_apr03.pdf, July 14, 2003] Whats the problem with that, you may respond, beyond making a few old federalists a bit melancholy? Similarly, the irrelevance of Nato is not necessarily a matter of great distress: after all, it is at heart the US security guarantee towards individual European allies, not the multilateral Nato commitment, which counts. This, at any rate, seems to be the view of the new Europeans, who have had no qualms in following Rumsfelds deliberate attempt to split the alliance. The fact remains that this is a wholly new vision of the transatlantic relationship; and we still have to decide what we do next with the EU.
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Unilateralism Good: European Counterbalancing Answers
TURN: STRONG EUROPEAN DEFENSE CAPABILITY CRITICAL TO THE FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE Financial Times July 11, 2003 (http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer? pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=105756 2321531) Admittedly, to become a complete security partner, Europe will have to become militarily capable a condition that may remain beyond reach so long as most of its members (except Britain and, to an extent, France) fail to spend more, and so long as all of them fail to make the institutional adjustments needed to spend better. Unless Europe spends more and spends better, the many gaps that separate them from each other as well as from the United States will continue to expand: capabilities gaps, technology gaps, governance gaps, policy gaps, credibility gaps, and much more. In other words, while the crisis in Iraq has confirmed that divisions within the Alliance breed divisions within Europe, there cannot be more unity between the United States and Europe without more unity within Europe. Achieving
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EUROPEAN AND ASIAN COUNTRIES ARE NOT COUNTER-BALANCING THE U.S.
Charles A. KUPCHAN is an associate professor of government in the School of Foreign Service and Government Department of Georgetown University, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Summer 2003 v118 i2 p205(28) Anti-American sentiment may be on the rise in many parts of the world. But it is hard to imagine that the United States would engage in behavior sufficiently aggressive to provoke an opposing alliance of industrialized countries. Europeans, South Koreans, and others may not welcome U.S. troops in their neighborhoods as they have for decades, but there are no signs that countries in Europe or Asia are contemplating balancing against the United States in military terms.
EUROPES DEFENSE POLICY WONT EVOLVE IN A WAY THAT IS ANTITHETICAL TO THE U.S.
Christopher J. Makins, President of the Atlantic Council of the United States, RENEWING THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP: WHY AND HOW?, June 11, 2003 http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/108/mak0611.htm In the heat of the crisis of transatlantic confidence over Iraq the former course may seem irresistible, especially as many Europeans are already convinced that the U.S. administration is doing precisely that. To this observer, however, that would be a misguided conclusion. Better by far to calculate that the United States has enough friends within the EU, including many of the soon-to-be new members, to be confident that the CFSP will not evolve in such a way as to make the EU an adversary of U.S. interests and to realize that a more coherent Europe represents a potential asset to the pursuit of those interests.
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Unilateralism Good: Soft Balancing Answers
SELF-INTEREST MEANS COUNTRIES WONT ALIGN AGAINST US
Julia Sweigh, Council on Foreign Relations, FRIENDLY FIRE, 2006, p. 211 Despite our flaws, the same countries that have sought to profit from complaints about U.S. power continue to have a stake in working with-or at least not against-the United States, whether in diffusing major security threats or seeing that as China emerges into a world power, it does so within an institutional framework. Partnership with the United States can still yield tangible benefits, as countries such as Colombia and India, or even still, Turkey; South Korea, and Germany, can attest. The strategic challenge for countries bristling over but still aspiring to benefit from U.S. power is to decide whether allowing Anti-America to fester and grow can really enhance their own prosperity, security, or power over the long term. From the perspective of those countries that by and large still count themselves as America's friends or partners, and even among those that see the United States largely as an obstacle, it is hard to imagine a scenario in which an isolated, reactive, and hostile United States would represent a net international gain >Just as the nation will have to manage a chronic perception problem by answering fundamental questions about how Americans wish to be received abroad, America's international interlocutors need to ask themselves what kind of United States they would like to contend with and how best to elicit those qualities from it.
SOFT BALANCING WONT CONSTRAIN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY CHOICES
Stephen Walt, Harvard, TAMING AMERICAN POWER, 2005, pp. 131-2 Yet the diplomacy of the Iraq war also illustrates the limits of soft balancing. Defeat in the Security Council did not prevent the United States from going to war, and the Bush administration was able to obtain political support (as well as symbolic military participation) from Great Britain, Spain, Italy, Japan, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and a number of other countries." These successes remind us that NATO expansion has made it easier for the United States to use a divide-and-conquer strategy within the alliance, because expansion has brought in a set of new members who are more interested in close ties with the United States than NATO's more established members are. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's dismissive remarks about "old Europe" and his praise for "new Europe" were needlessly provocative, but his comment contained more than a grain of truth.
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BINDING EMPIRICALLY FAILS
Stephen Walt, Harvard, TAMING AMERICAN POWER, 2005, pp. 145-6 As the full extent of U.S. primacy has become apparent, and as the Bush administration has used U.S. Power more unilaterally, efforts to "bind" the United States have become both more explicit and less successful. The most obvious example, of course, was the French, German, and Russian effort to use the institution of the United Nations Security Council to prevent the United States from invading Iraq in early 2003. The heart of the dispute was a disagreement about policy: The Bush administration favored preventive war against Iraq while most other states preferred containment. Equally important, however, was a basic disagreement about the role of norms and institutions in legitimating the use of force by Great Powers. As a number of foreign leaders made clear, they sought to reinforce the general principle that the use of force should be regulated by international law and by existing institutions. Not surprisingly, weaker states prefer a world where the dominant world power cannot invade other countries without the formal approval of the Security Council (or some other equally authoritative international body), even if the cause is just. As Jean-Marie Colombani wrote in L,e Monde, "While there may be good reasons for wanting to deal with the Iraqi problem swiftly, the manner in which the United States is trying to achieve this-as a chance to disengage itself from the obligations incurred by a newborn international order-is simply not acceptable."` Thus, the protracted contest in the Security Council was both an example of soft balancing and an explicit attempt to bind U.S. behavior within an existing international institution. America's opponents sought to prevent the use of force in this particular instance, while simultaneously strengthening the authority of the UN system.
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SUCCESSFUL BLACKMAIL IS RARE
Stephen Walt, Harvard, TAMING AMERICAN POWER, 2005, p. 158 Blackmail can be an effective strategy in some circumstances, but (fortunately) not very often. Successful blackmail is rare because it only works under unusual conditions and because all states are reluctant to acknowledge that they can in fact be coerced into making major concessions. Blackmail is also a high-risk strategy; you can't get the United States to make significant concessions unless you threaten important U.S. interests, but if you do, the United States may decide it would rather fight than pay. Among other things, this means that the fear that rogue states might use nuclear weapons (or other WMD) to "blackmail" the United States is far-fetched." In order for this form of blackmail to work, the blackmailer must make it clear that it is willing to use its weapons if it does not get its way. But this strategy is feasible only if the blackmailer has WMD and neither the target state nor its allies
FEW EXAMPLES OF BANDWAGONING
Stephen Walt, Harvard, TAMING AMERICAN POWER, 2005, p. 184-5 Yet contrary to these predictions, there are in fact relatively few examples of genuine bandwagoning, even in the current situation of American primacy. The United States has demonstrated its superior power on a number of occasions in the past decade, yet the targets of these threats-Iraq, North Korea, Serbia-and to a lesser extent Syria, Iran, and China-have not been visibly cowed. Moreover, earlier displays of U.S. prowess did not convince these states to abandon their policy preferences and bandwagon with Washington. The stunning U.S. victory over Iraq in 1991 did not convince Saddam Hussein to kowtow to the United States and did not make leaders such as Slobodan Milosevic and Hafez el-Assad more compliant with U.S. demands. Similarly, Saddam's ouster in 2003 did not trigger the wave of pro-American shifts that advocates of "big-stick" diplomacy forecast. Although a number of neighboring countries muted their anti-American rhetoric temporarily, there are no clear-cut cases where states abandoned well-established policy positions because they feared U.S. pressure. Syria did not abandon its claims to the Golan Heights (or its continued espousal of the Palestinian cause), and as discussed below; the Bush administration's hints that Syria might be next in line after Iraq merely led Damascus to stop giving the United States valuable intelligence about al Qaedas. North Korea did not become substantially more forthcoming in the multiparty negotiations over its nuclear programs; if anything, the invasion of Iraq probably increased North Korea's desire for a deterrent of its own and gave Pyongyang a bigger window of opportunity in which to pursue this goal.'
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NO SIGNIFICANT COUNTERBALANCING
Stephen Walt, Harvard, TAMING AMERICAN POWER, 2005, p. 122-3 If one is looking for signs of balancing against U.S. power, in short, they are not difficult to find. Yet it is striking how limited these efforts have been. Responses to US. primacy pale in comparison to the encircling coalitions that Wilhelmine Germany or the Soviet Union provoked, where most of the other major powers made formal or informal alliances to defeat or contain these powerful expansionist states. U.S. allies have long resented their dependence on the United States and the unsubtle hand of U.S. leadership, but the old cry, "Yankee, Go Home," is still largely unheard in Europe and Asia. Instead, the United States is still formally allied with NATO (whose membership has grown to twentysix, with other aspirants in the wings), and it has renewed and deepened its military relationship with Japan. Its security ties with South Korea, Taiwan, and several other ASEAN countries remain intact, even though opinions of the United States have declined sharply in recent years, and an announcement that the Pentagon was planning major troop redeployments in Europe and Asia provoked a decidedly mixed reaction in both regions." U.S. relations with Russia are sometimes contentious but still far better than they were during the Cold War, and relations with China improved as soon as the United States started worrying more about terrorism and less about China's possible emergence as a future peer competitor. Similarly U.S. ties with India are warmer and deeper than ever before, despite America's continued embrace of General Pervez Musharraf's Pakistan. To date, at least, no one is making a serious effort to forge a meaningful antiAmerican alliance.
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Unilateralism Good: Soft Balancing Answers
MANY REASONS COUNTRIES SOFT BALANCE OTHER THAN SECURITY Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth; Stephen G. Brooks is Assistant Professor and William C. Wohlforth is Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 72 Hard Times for Soft Balancing How does one identify soft balancing? The answer matters greatly for both policy and theory, yet it remains elusive because soft-balancing proponents have not supplied the conceptual tools to distinguish behavior that is an outgrowth of the systemic balancing imperative from what we might call "unipolar politics as usual." Crucially missing from the literature is sufficient recognition that other explanations besides soft balancing exist for state actions that constrain the United States. As a result, analysts tend to treat nearly any behavior that complicates U.S. foreign policy as soft balancing. We remove this bias by setting out four alternative explanations.
ECONOMIC INTERESTS PRECLUDE SOFT BALANCING
Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth; Stephen G. Brooks is Assistant Professor and William C. Wohlforth is Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 72 Hard Times for Soft Balancing States may undertake actions that hamper the conduct of U.S. foreign policy not principally because they wish to do so, but rather to advance economic gains, either for the state as a whole or for powerful interest groups or business lobbies. A government's interest in fostering economic growth or obtaining revenue for itself or its constituents may be unrelated to the presence of a hegemon on the horizon or the potential security threat it poses.
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REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS MEAN COUNTRIES DONT ALWAYS AGREE WITH THE U.S. Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth; Stephen G. Brooks is Assistant Professor and William C. Wohlforth is Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 72 Hard Times for Soft Balancing States routinely pursue policies to enhance local security that are unrelated to constraining U.S. hegemony. For a variety of reasons, there is a greater demand for regional policy coordination than existed in the past: a vast increase in the number of states; a consequent increase in the overall number of weak or failed states; and the rise of transnational security challenges such as organized crime, terrorism, drug trafficking, and refugee flows. Major powers frequently face incentives to enhance their capabilities -- often through collaboration with other regional states -- in response to these local or regional concerns. These efforts may result in shifts in relative power -- and perhaps in reduced U.S. freedom of action -- even if constraining U.S. hegemony is not an important driver of them.
SOFT BALANCING HAS NOT SUCCEEDED OR PRODUCED MULTIPOLIARITY
Christopher Layne, Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A & M, The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Fall 2006, p. 28 The current unipolar distribution of power in the international system is unprecedented. For the first time since the Roman Empire at its zenith, the international system is dominated by an extant hegemon. As discussed above, U.S. hegemony means that other states have incentives to bandwagon with the United States because they can benefit from its primacy. At the same time, because of the United States' overwhelming hard-power capabilities, other states find it difficultand possibly dangerousto engage in traditional counterbalancing (hard balancing) against the reigning hegemon. In a unipolar world, states must adapt to U.S. hegemony by finding balancing strategies that avoid direct military confrontation with the hegemon. Notwithstanding the paucity of hard balancing against the United States, other states have sought alternative methods of balancing against it, especially soft balancing. To date, these efforts have failed to create a new constellation of power in the international system.
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POLICY DISPUTES AND BARGAINING MEAN COUNTRIES DONT ALWAYS ALIGN WITH THE U.S. Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth; Stephen G. Brooks is Assistant Professor and William C. Wohlforth is Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 72 Hard Times for Soft Balancing Other states may undertake actions that constrain the United States not in response to the security threat presented by U.S. hegemony, but rather because they sincerely disagree with specific U.S. policies. Governments may resist a given U.S. policy because they are convinced that it is ill suited to the problem at hand or otherwise inappropriate, and not because they think it directly threatens their security or that opposition to it will reduce U.S. power over the long term. If so, then soft balancing is a misnomer, for the behavior concerned is unrelated to maximizing security under anarchy by checking a dangerous systemic concentration of power. In short, other states may push back against specific U.S. policies (pushing back because they disagree) and not against U.S. power in general (pushing back because they fear or wish to challenge U.S. hegemony). Given the reasonable expectation of future policy differences on various issues, and therefore the expectation of future policy bargaining, it follows that states may take actions intended to increase, or at least maintain, bargaining leverage over the long term. This is where policy bargaining takes forms that most closely resemble what analysts mean by soft balancing. As we show below, there are crucial analytical differences between long-term bargaining enhancement strategies and real soft balancing.
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THREE BARRIERS TO SOFT-BALANCING
Andrew Hurrell, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 2006, p. 137 The critics of soft balancing are correct in arguing that not all behaviour that looks like balancing is in fact driven by balance-of-power motivations. There may be many good economic, regional or domestic political reasons why secondtier states seek to collaborate with each other. Unless their actions are in some way responses to US power, then it certainly does not make sense to invoke balance-of-power theory. It is also important to highlight both the degree of accommodation with the United States (as noted in the previous section), the limits to the cooperation among second-tier states (as in Chinas resistance to reform of the Security Council or the relative thinness of the allegedly strategic ties between India and Brazil), and the continuation of underlying suspicion among such states (as in the case of Russia and China). DOMESTIC POLITICAL INCENTIVES MEAN COUNTRIES DONT ALWAYS ALIGN WITH THE U.S. AFF CANT SOLVE/NEG CANT OVERCOME THAT Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth; Stephen G. Brooks is Assistant Professor and William C. Wohlforth is Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 72 Hard Times for Soft Balancing
Opposing the United States on a particular issue may be a winning strategy domestically even for leaders with no general interest in constraining U.S. power. Only domestic opposition that is an outgrowth of the security threat flowing from U.S. power can be thought of as a manifestation of soft balancing. All other ways in which the domestic politics of other countries may feed actions that complicate matters for the U.S. government fall outside the logic of soft balancing. Specifically, soft balancing does not encompass opposition to the United States that is a manifestation of the unpopularity of a particular U.S. policy. In addition, opposing the United States may be strongly compatible with long-standing historical, political, or cultural understandings -- either for the nation as a whole or for individual political parties -- that predate any recent shift in U.S. foreign policy, or indeed the rise of unipolarity.
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NO EVIDENCE FOR THE SOFT BALANCING THESIS Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth; Stephen G. Brooks is Assistant Professor and William C. Wohlforth is Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 72 Hard Times for Soft Balancing
The development of the concept of soft balancing is an attempt to stretch balance of power theory to encompass an international system in which traditional counterbalancing among the major powers is absent. There are two fundamental flaws, however, in current treatments of soft balancing: the failure to consider alternative explanations for state actions that have the effect of constraining the United States, and the absence of empirical analysis of the phenomenon. A comparison of soft balancing and four alternative explanations in the main cases highlighted by proponents of the concept -- Russia's strategic partnerships with China and India, Russian assistance to Iran's nuclear program, the European Union's efforts to enhance its defense capability, and opposition to the U.S.-led Iraq war in 2003 -- reveals no empirical support for the soft-balancing explanation. The lack of evidence for the relevance of balancing dynamics in contemporary great-power relations indicates that further investments in adapting balance of power theory to today's unipolar system will not yield analytical dividends.
COUNTRIES DONT BARGAIN AGAINST THE U.S. TO COUNTER-BALANCE
Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth; Stephen G. Brooks is Assistant Professor and William C. Wohlforth is Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 72 Hard Times for Soft Balancing We conclude that although states do periodically undertake actions that end up constraining the United Sates, the softbalancing argument does not help to explain this behavior. There is no empirical basis for concluding that U.S. power, and the security threat that potentially inheres in it, has influenced recent constraint actions undertaken by the other major powers. Our examination therefore provides further confirmation of the need for analysts to move beyond the familiar but misleading precepts of balance of power theory. Instead, new theorizing is needed that is more appropriate for understanding security relations in today's unipolar era. For a discussion of this so-called new unilateralism, see Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment Revisited," National Interest, No. 70 (Winter 2002/2003), pp. 5-18.
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Unilateralism Good: Soft Balancing Answers: Opposition to the Iraq War Wasnt Driven by Counterbalancing
OPPOSITION TO THE IRAQ WAR IS NOT DRIVEN BY COUNTERBALANCING
Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth; Stephen G. Brooks is Assistant Professor and William C. Wohlforth is Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 72 Hard Times for Soft Balancing Unlike Russia's Asian partnerships, opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq did not entail measurable shifts in hard power. It nonetheless seemed tailor-made for the soft-balancing argument. On a policy it declared vital to its national security, the United States faced opposition from key allies. The opposition was not haphazard but coordinated in elaborate diplomatic exchanges. And the leaders of France, the linchpin of the "coalition of the unwilling," made a point of describing their policy as part of an overall preference for a multipolar world. Not surprisingly, such efforts propelled the soft-balancing argument to the forefront. Nevertheless, this argument dramatically oversimplifies and misrepresents what occurred. Soft balancing played no discernable role for some of the principal actors in the drama. For others, strategic calculations that superficially resemble soft balancing, but actually stem from a different logic, interacted in complex ways with other incentives that also pushed strongly toward constraining the United States. Even a generous rendering of the soft-balancing argument would accord it at best a minor role. GERMAN AND TURK OPPOSITION TO THE IRAQ WAR WAS DRIVEN BY DOMESTIC POLITICAL FACTORS, NOT SOFT BALANCING Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth; Stephen G. Brooks is Assistant Professor and William C. Wohlforth is Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 72 Hard Times for Soft Balancing In sum, the behavior of both Germany and Turkey can be traced to domestic political incentives unrelated to the concentration of power in the United States. Russia and France are far more complex actors in this case because both had stated preferences for multipolarity, general policies of buttressing the role of the UN Security Council and thus the bargaining value of their veto power in that body, economic interests in play in Iraq, strong domestic incentives for standing up to Washington, and sincere policy differences with the United States over costs and benefits of a war in Iraq and its relation to the war on terrorism. The interaction among these dynamics was complicated. How did soft balancing fit into this mosaic?
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Unilateralism Good: Soft Balancing Answers: Opposition to the Iraq War Wasnt Driven by Counterbalancing
IRAQ WAR EVIDENCE OFFERED IN SOFT BALANCING IS FALSE
Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth; Stephen G. Brooks is Assistant Professor and William C. Wohlforth is Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 72 Hard Times for Soft Balancing The soft-balancing argument holds that the United States increasingly poses a direct security challenge to other states, which they respond to by seeking to constrain U.S. power and the attendant threat. Our review of the events leading up to the invasion of Iraq shows how mistaken this argument is. For France -- the linchpin of the diplomatic coalition that confronted the Bush administration -- policy preferences, longer-term bargaining incentives, and domestic and European politics all pushed toward constraining the United States. Even though the French leadership strongly disagreed with the Bush administration over the sagacity of invading Iraq on strategic grounds, the most precedent-breaking aspect of French behavior -- the intense campaign against the United States and Britain in the UN Security Council -- was something President Chirac tried to avoid. The second UN resolution, and the attendant debate, went forward only because of complex domestic incentives acting on Prime Minister Blair. The soft-balancing argument is thus wrong to attribute the novel elements in French policy mainly to a shift in how France viewed U.S. power or the potential security threat it poses. What is true for France also applies to the other key players. The most salient and novel behavior in the Iraq case -- especially Chancellor Schroder's fateful decision to oppose the Bush administration categorically -- cannot be seen as a response to the security challenges emanating from the underlying power of the United States. Great power behavior during the past two years since the invasion of Iraq provides further evidence against the soft-balancing argument. In particular, far from seeking to further distance themselves from the United States, France and Germany have rushed to pursue a rapprochement with the Bush administration during this period. Significantly, this move had already gathered substantial momentum even before President Bush extended a diplomatic olive branch after gaining reelection. This article shows that the soft-balancing argument has no traction. The only reason some analysts have concluded otherwise is because they have failed to consider alternative explanations.
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Unilateralism Good: Answers to: Need Soft Power to Reduce Global Opposition and Terror Recruiting
U.S. POLICIES DID NOT PRODUCE TERRORISM IN AFGHANISTAN
Thomas Henricksen, Hoover Institute, 2002 (THE BLOWBACK MYTH, http://wwwhoover.stanford.edu/publications/digest/021/henriksen. html) Washington alone, however, is not responsible for the terror nest that is Afghanistan today. Moscows intervention ignited the tragic downward spiral in that country. Yet the chain of events leading to the emergence of Osama bin Laden is far too complex to attribute to a single spark of causation. Not the establishment of Israel, the Gulf War, or even the current cause clbre-the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia-can singly explain the rise of militant Islam. It is but one offshoot of the far wider force of contemporary Arab nationalism. Like nationalistic impulses elsewhere, the Arab manifestation quickened in the nineteenth century. Before World War I, it was directed against Ottoman rule in the Levant and later against British and French colonialism. Now, America-and its perceived enclave, Israel-is one focal point. The image of the Muslim worlds rejection of modernization, secularism, and globalization is offset by a more complex picture in which large numbers of people in the Middle East aspire to a higher standard of living and genuine democracy.
AMERICAN VALUES WILL TRIGGER TERRORISM EVEN IF WE ARE ISOLATIONIST
Joseph Nye, Dean, JFK School of Government, Harvard, 2002 (THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER, pp. x-xi) Some Americans are tempted to believe that we could reduce these hatreds and our vulnerability if we would withdraw our troops, curtail our alliances, and follow a more isolationist foreign policy. But we would not remove our vulnerability. Not only are the terrorists who struck on September 11 dedicated to reducing can power, but in the words of Jordan's King Abdallah, "they want to break down the fabric of the U.S. They want to break down what America stands for." Even if we had a weaker foreign policy, such groups would resent the power of the American economy, which would still reach well beyond our shores. American corporations and citizens represent global capitalism, which is anathema to some.
AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE WILL TRIGGER TERRORISM EVEN IF WE ARE ISOLATIONIST
Joseph Nye, Dean, JFK School of Government, Harvard, 2002 (THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER, p. xi) American popular culture has a global reach regardless of what we do. There is no escaping the influence of Hollywood, CNN, and the Internet. American films and television express freedom, individualism, and change (as well as sex and violence). Generally, the global reach of American culture helps to enhance our soft power-our cultural and ideological appeal. But not for everyone: Individualism and liberties are attractive to many people but repulsive to some, particularly fundamentalists. American feminism, open sexuality, and individual choices are profoundly subversive: of patriarchal societies. One of the terrorist pilots is reported to have said that he did not like the United States because it is "too lax. I can go anywhere I want and they can't stop me." Some tyrants and fundamentalists will always hate us because of our values of openness opportunity, and we will have no choice but to deal with them through more effective counterterrorism policies.
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Unilateralism Good: U.S.-European Relations Advantage Answers/AT -Turn
THE U.S. AND EUROPE HAVE A SELF-INTEREST IN COOPERATING TO SUSTAIN ECONOMIC POWER Mohammed Ayoob is University Distinguished Professor of International Relations and Matthew Zierler is a visiting assistant professor of international relation at James Madison College, World Policy Journal, Spring 2005 v22 i1 p31(12) The Unipolar Concert: the North-South divide trumps transatlantic differences . First, the Concert of the North Atlantic--with the United States in the lead--maintains its power in the international system by exploiting the multilateral regimes in the financial, trade, and security realms it has worked so hard to create and maintain over the last 50 years. It is therefore unlikely that the United States or the major European powers will eviscerate a mechanism that has served them so well for so long.
INDIVIDUAL POLICY ISSUES WONT UNDERMINE RELATIONS
Mohammed Ayoob is University Distinguished Professor of International Relations and Matthew Zierler is a visiting assistant professor of international relation at James Madison College, World Policy Journal, Spring 2005 v22 i1 p31(12) The Unipolar Concert: the North-South divide trumps transatlantic differences . Second, disagreements within the concert are often over policy choices, as opposed to fundamental rules of the system or basic objectives. Deterring and punishing "rogue" states and denying unconventional capabilities to those outside the club are shared objectives from which no member of the concert dissents. This was very clear in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. A reading of the U.N. Security Council debates on Iraq from 1991 to 2003 makes it obvious that there were hardly any differences among the club of powerful states on taking steps that would severely derogate Iraq's sovereignty and eventually bring about a regime change. The imposition of no-flight zones and invasive inspections under U.N. auspices between 1991 and 2003 clearly demonstrated this unity of purpose. The differences were over the tactics to achieve these ends. The same applies to the concert's objectives regarding Iran. The shared objective is to deny Iran nuclear weapons capabilities and to curb its regional influence; the debate is about how best to attain these goals. .
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NATO HAS SURVIVED CRISES IN THE PAST AND COMMON IDEOLOGIES AND THREATS WILL KEEP IT TOGETHER ARMED FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 2/12/05, p.
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2005/n02122005_2005021204.html, accessed 2/12/05.
Though differences exist among NATO allies on Iraq, the alliance "has navigated through some choppy seas over the years," Rumsfeld said. Among other serious disagreements, he cited France's withdrawal from the alliance and expulsion of NATO troops in the 1960s, disagreements on Pershing II missile deployments in the 1980s, and differences in approaches on how to handle the Middle East peace process. He also noted that as U.S. ambassador to NATO in the 1970s, he had to testify before the Senate on a proposal that the United States withdraw all of its forces from Europe. "Think of it in the middle of the Cold War," he said. "What if we had lost our will?" Still, he said, NATO always has managed to resolve the toughest issues it has faced. "And I submit that is because there is so much that unites us: common values, shared histories and an abiding faith in democracy," he added. Something else the allies have today, he said, is a common enemy.
EUROPEANS WILL STAND BEHIND US AS MILITARY ALLIES
Andrew Moravcsik is a professor of politics at Princeton University, where he is the director of the European Union Program, The American Prospect, March 2005 v16 i3 p30(4) We have seen that in almost every military action between the tall of the Berlin Wall and the election of George W. Bushand currently in Afghanistan--Europeans have been our most steadfast military allies. And whereas most European governments are skeptical of U.S. actions in Iraq, they do not support the French rhetorical goal of balancing the United States. It is unclear that even the French actually seek this.
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Unilateralism Good: U.S.-European Relations Advantage Answers/ AT Turn
EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION IS NOT DESIGNED TO COUNTER-BALANCE THE UNITED STATES Andrew Moravcsik is a professor of politics at Princeton University, where he is the director of the European Union Program, The American Prospect, March 2005 v16 i3 p30(4) In reality, European defense cooperation is not aimed at balancing the U.S. hegemony but at mustering troops for humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. Current and prospective EU members contribute 10 times as many soldiers to UN peacekeeping and policing operations as does the United States. In trouble spots around the globe, European nations take the lead, as did the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone, France in the Ivory Coast, Italy in Albania, and Germany in Afghanistan. Eighty-four percent of the peacekeepers in Kosovo and more than half of those in Afghanistan are nonAmerican.
HISTORICAL TIES PREVENT THE DEMISE OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE
Bob Kerrey is the president of New School University, WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Winter 2004/5, p. We need to recall that there is nothing new in frosty attitudes concerning America on the part of European democracies. During the critical years 193940, the besieged citizens of France and Great Britain felt even as they faced Hitlers legions that they had been abandoned by an indifferent United States. In fact, although America was formally neutral, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and his White House aides and cabinet officers, were scarcely indifferent to the Nazi menace. They contended with widespread popular reluctance to become entangled in a European war, and as important, the virus of xenophobia among American political leaders who sought to close our gates to refugees. In this struggle, the New School for Social Research played an important supporting role. It welcomed Europes endangered scholars to a University in Exile, still a central part of our university, now known as the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science, one of the eight divisions of what is today New School University. They and their families fled from the European continent to the United States and England, despite the existence of shameful yet shamefully popular quotas that made emigrating to America more difficult. That memory and our ideals give me confidence that we will not succumb to historical amnesia, or permit the intimidating powers of conformity to silence our voices when critical thinking and active debate are in such obvious demand. It also gives me confidence that the Western alliance will survive the insults and taunts of its belittling critics.
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ENGAGEMENT PREVENTS PROBLEMS WITH EUROPE FROM DEVELOPING
Rob de Wijk is a professor of strategic studies and international relations as well as director of the Clingendael Center for Strategic Studies in the Netherlands, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter 2003-4p. 206) Europe has already taken significant concrete steps toward creating a credible military component in Europe, specifically through the EUs European Capabilities Action Program (2001) and NATOs Prague Capabilities Commitment (2002). At the recommendation of representatives at the EUs 2002 Laeken summit, a task force is producing a defense book that looks into questions related to using hard power. In addition, in 2003 the EUs high representative for common foreign and security policy, Javier Solana, presented a draft of a strategic concept, which is the equivalent of the U.S. national security strategy. Solanas strategy paper spells out Europes interests and the threats it faces and explicitly calls for expeditionary capabilities to protect those interests, stabilize regions, and combat terrorists. Significantly, the paper argues that [p]reemptive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future, a position welcomed by the Bush administration. Indeed, Solana agreed that fighting terrorists abroad can increase security at home. The strategy paper could play an important role in helping reconcile Europe and the United States and facilitate a sorely needed joint U.S.European declaration of strategic partnership.
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Unilateralism Good: Answers to: Intl Coop/Multilat Reduces Hatred/Terrorism Toward the U.S.
THE ATTACKS WERE PLANNED IN A MULTILATERAL WORLD
Charles Krauthammer, Columnist, NATIONAL INTEREST, Winter 2002/3, p. 17 A third critique comes from what might be called pragmatic realists, who see the new unilateralism I have outlined as hubristic, and whose objections are practical. They are prepared to engage in a pragmatic multilateralism. They value great power concert. They seek Security Council support not because it confers any moral authority, but because it spreads risk. In their view, a single hegemon risks far more violent resentment than would a power that consistently acts as primus inter pares, sharing rule -making functions with others. I have my doubts. The United States made an extraordinary effort in the Gulf War to get un support, share decision-making, assemble a coalition and, as we have seen, deny itself the fruits of victory in order to honor coalition goals. Did that diminish the anti-American feeling in the region? Did it garner support for subsequent Iraq policy dictated by the original acquiescence to the coalition? The attacks of September 11 were planned during the Clinton Administration, an administration that made a fetish of consultation and did its utmost to subordinate American hegemony and smother unipolarity. The resentments were hardly assuaged. Why? Because the extremist rage against the United States is engendered by the very structure of the international system, not by the details of our management of it.
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Unilateralism Good: No Value to Anti-Terror Cooperation
THE ANTI-TERROR COALITION WILL CONSTRAIN U.S. FREEDOM OF ACTION
Steven E. Miller is director of the International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2002 (THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter, http://www.twq.com/02winter/miller.pdf) Washington is likely to view the coalition as a source of support and an instrument of U.S. policy, but others are likely to see it as a mechanism for influencing U.S. decisions or restraining U.S. action-a possibility that is mirrored in Bush administration concerns that the coalition might shackle the United States. Further, the United States will not find it easy to push its coalition partners to do things they
do not want to do or feel that they cannot do. Managing this coalition will be a demanding, messy, vexing, and occasionally fruitless exercise. The United States will undoubtedly continue the diplomatic maneuverings it thinks are necessary or desirable to permit and support its war against terrorism. This ungainly coalition, however, if it will be a true coalition, is unlikely to be so potent or so appealing an instrument that Washington is certain to sacrifice other policies comprehensively for its sake.
PAST INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION DID NOT PREVENT TERRORISM Benjamin Barber, Sociologist, FEARS EMPIRE, 2003, p. 202 Despite intelligence efforts and increased cooperation among national police and military intelligence services, in the period between the Afghanistan and Iraq operations there were deadly terrorist attacks against a synagogue in Bjerba, Tunisia , the Sheraton Hotel in Karachi, the American consulate in Karachi, a nightclub in Bali, and a hotel and an airplane in Kenya, killing 236 people in total and wounding many more while spreading fear in the ubiquitous world of soft targets.
TOO MUCH EMPHASIS ON TERRORISM COOPERATION COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO NATIONAL SECURITY
Sean Hannity, Fox News, 2004, Deliver Us From Evil, p. 139
Of course, in an era of terrorism there is an obvious, genuine need for global cooperation. But the new appeasers take their vision of engagement far beyond simple cooperation. The new appeasers insist on UN authorization as a precondition to American military action. In other words, they would emasculate the United States, and delegate our most vital decisions about self defense and national security to other nations. In practice, this can lead only to limited, inadequate action. And in principle, it is intolerable. The day America cedes its defenses to a foreign power is the day we cease to be a sovereign nation. Unilateralism does not undermine multilateral cooperation over terrorism things are actually getting better Jonathan Stevenson, Senior Fellow for Counterterrorism @ the International Institute for Strategic Studies, March/April 2003 (How Europe and America Defend Themselves Foreign Affairs) p. lexis The good news for Washington is that Europe's lethargy in cooperating on homeland security has more to do with a difference in the way it perceives threats than with any deeper political or social divide. True, Europeans and Americans have recently clashed over particular strategic matters, such as the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, regime change in Iraq, perceived American unilateralism, and various social policies. No doubt they will continue to do so in the months to come. But these broader discrepancies between European and American approaches, profound as they may be, are unlikely to damage day-to-day, nonmilitary counterterrorism cooperation. Indeed, transatlantic coordination in the pursuit and apprehension of those who threaten the United States does not seem to have diminished, and differences in threat perceptions actually appear to be narrowing. I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of orange juice.
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Ad-hoc coalitions allow for sustainable terrorism cooperation while still practicing unilateral leadership
Jonathan Stevenson, Senior Fellow for Counterterrorism @ the International Institute for Strategic Studies, March/April 2003 (How Europe and America Defend Themselves Foreign Affairs) p. lexis As for the "values gap" between Europe and the United States, it has not seriously jeopardized day-to-day transatlantic counterterrorism cooperation, and many of the problems it raises can be finessed. Differences over the death penalty do complicate extradition of suspects from Europe to the United States. Divergent data-protection standards also impede intelligence sharing. Washington and Brussels are committed to reaching general accord on these issues, but progress is likely to be slow. Although they have agreed to exchange general analytic information on terrorism and crime via Europol, an impending agreement on sharing personal data relating to terrorist suspects foundered in November 2002 due to concerns over civil liberties and legal liability. Such problems, however, are manageable on a caseby-case basis, even if this is not the ideal solution. For example, after withholding from Washington requested information on Zacarias Moussaoui, the suspected "20th hijacker," for several months, French and German authorities finally agreed in November 2002 to provide it after Washington assured them that it would not be used as evidence to support a death sentence. Similarly, the EU's counterterrorism task force and the FBI have exchanged personal data on those suspected of involvement in the September 11 attacks on the basis of a special EU exemption from datasharing restrictions covering "life-threatening situations." Incipient U.S.-European cooperation prompted by American homeland-security concerns -- such as U.S. Customs Service container inspections at European ports -- also constitutes a solid foundation for more robust transatlantic cooperation . Unilateralism is key to effective use of hard power against terrorism multilateralism results in delays Frank A. Biggio, J.D. and M.B.A @ Case Western Reserve University, Fall 2002 (Neutralizing the Threat: Reconsidering the Existing Doctrines in the Emerging War on Terrorism Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law) p. lexis Finally, unilateral action is the most feasible course of action due to the sensitivity and timeliness of such measures. Waiting for Security Council approval or the permission of other nations for fly-through authority could negate the effectiveness of a mission and jeopardize the welfare of those conducting it. Although future strikes against terrorist targets may continue to be unilateral actions or actions with only limited assistance from other nations, other nations may begin to understand the necessity of such action and support those nations who do take such unilateral action.
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Unilateralism Good: No Value to Anti-Terror Cooperation
GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION WILL NOT HELP THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM Steven E. Miller is director of the International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2002 (THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter, http://www.twq.com/02winter/miller.pdf) (PDBF1778) No one can dispute that the campaign against terrorism will profit from the accumulation of relevant information from as many useful sources as are available. In the aftermath of September 11, additional information from additional sources will likely contribute to operations against terrorism. Nevertheless, for several reasons, this factor may have been exaggerated as a motivation for fundamental change in U.S. policy. For one thing, the barriers to intensive intelligence collaboration are considerable. U.S. agencies are reluctant to share information with each other, much less with foreign governments and foreign intelligence bureaucracies. When sensitive information is involved, the police are out of the loop, Congress is eyed warily, and other federal agencies are not routinely on the distribution list. Assessing the intimacy of information-sharing arrangements between governments is impossible for outsiders, but intelligence professionals suggest that the United States does not share everything even with its closest allies and that even states with close ties to the United States may not be enthusiastic or generous about turning over information to their U.S. counterparts. Washington was deeply frustrated, for example, that the government of Saudi Arabia was not more forthcoming in assisting the investigation of the 1996 terrorist attack on U.S. military personnel at Khobar Towers. Moreover, the current loose coalition that has formed in support of the U.S. battle with terrorism includes a motley collection of states-some that are close to the United States but many that are not. Indeed, many of the states that might be in the best position to possess and provide information about terrorist activities in the Middle East or South Asia-such as Iran, Libya, and Syriaare states that have uneasy, or even hostile, relations with the United States. States truly be prepared to pay a high price in terms of its foreign policy in order to gain problematic information from dubious sources?
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Unilateralism Good: Doesnt Hurt Democracy
Coalitions of the willing are key to democracy and protection of sovereignty relying on multilateralism means undemocratic institutions Clive Crook, Columnist for the National Journal and Deputy Editor of the Economist, 1/3/2004 (American Diplomacy and the New Shape of the World The National Journal) p. lexis Suppose, for the sake of argument, that intelligence and good faith prevailed around the world, and that different countries' goals and priorities were sufficiently well aligned to make formal and institutionalized multilateral approaches at least feasible. Would that clinch the argument? Not at all, because the multilateralists' second fatal error is to suppose that structured multilateralism is intrinsically superior to the unilateralist alternative of ad hoc "coalitions of the willing." Why is this a mistake? Because the kind of institutionalized multilateralism that the U.N.'s champions dream of is inescapably undemocratic. America's government can be ultimately accountable to the American people or ultimately accountable to the U.N.; it cannot be accountable to both. Of course, America's critics regard the country's obsession with sovereignty and self-government as anachronistic and pathological. I regard it as admirable. That may be because on my side of the Atlantic, I am witnessing possibly the boldest peacetime attempt in history to dismantle national sovereignty and self-government and replace it with a formal order of rule by bureaucracy. The European Union lacks nothing for ambition, but, as its citizens are finally coming to realize, this grand project of the elites has very little interest in their democratic rights. Take a good look at Europe. There you see multilateralism in full bloom. Give me democratic unilateralism any day.
Multilateralism yields legitimacy to a host of undemocratic regimes
Richard Perle, Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute and Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, 3/21/2003 (Coalitions of the Willing Are Our Best Hope American Enterprise Institute) http://www.aei.org/news/filter.foreign,newsID.16666/news_detail.asp. If any institution or coalition other than the UN Security Council uses force, even as a last resort, "anarchy," rather than international law, would prevail, destroying any hope for world order. This is a dangerously wrong idea, an idea that leads inexorably to handing great moral--and even existential politico-military decisions--to the likes of Syria, Cameroon, Angola, Russia, China and France. When challenged with the argument that if a policy is right with the approbation of the Security Council, how can it be wrong just because communist China or Russia or France or a gaggle of minor dictatorships withhold their assent, they fall back on the primacy of "order" versus "anarchy."
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Unilateralism Good: Doesnt Hurt Democracy
Unilateralism supports the promotion of democracy and balancing against regional aggressors Charles Krauthammer, Essayist and Columnist for the Washington Post, Frequent Contributor to the Weekly Standard, the New Republic, and the National Interest, Winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy, Member of the Presidents Council on Bioethics, Board-Certified Psychiatrist and Received Medical Degree, Harvard Medical School, Winter 2002 (The Unipolar Moment Revisited The National Interest) p. ebscohost The new unilateralism defines American interests far beyond narrow self-defense. In particular, it identifies two other major interests, both global: extending the peace by advancing democracy and preserving the peace by acting as balancer of last resort. Britain was the balancer in Europe, joining the weaker coalition against the stronger to create equilibrium. America's unique global power allows it to be the balancer in every region. We balanced Iraq by supporting its weaker neighbors in the Gulf War. We balance China by supporting the ring of smaller states at its periphery (from South Korea to Taiwan, even to Vietnam). Our role in the Balkans was essentially to create a microbalance: to support the weaker Bosnian Muslims against their more dominant neighbors, and subsequently to support the weaker Albanian Kosovars against the Serbs. Of course, both of these tasks often advance American national interests as well. The promotion of democracy multiplies the number of nations likely to be friendly to the U nited States, and regional equilibria produce stability that benefits a commercial republic like the United States. America's (intended) exertions on behalf of pre-emptive non-proliferation, too, are clearly in the interest of both the United States and the international system as a whole.
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COUNTRIES WILL COOPERATE WITH US OUT OF THEIR OWN SELF INTEREST
Charles Krauthammer, Columnist, NATIONAL INTEREST, Winter 2002/3, p. 17 Countries will cooperate with us, first, out of their own self-interest and, second, out of the need and desire to cultivate good relations with the world's superpower. Warm and fuzzy feelings are a distant third. Take counterterrorism. After the attack on the USS. Cole, Yemen did everything it could to stymie the American investigation. It lifted not a finger to suppress terrorism. This was under an American administration that was obsessively accommodating and multilateralist. Today, under the most unilateralist of administrations, Yemen has decided to assist in the war on terrorism. This was not a result of a sudden attack of good will toward America. It was a result of the war in Afghanistan, which concentrated the mind of heretofore recalcitrant states like Yemen on the costs of non-cooperation with the United States.14 Coalitions are not made by superpowers going begging hat in hand. They are made by asserting a position and inviting others to join. What "pragmatic" realists often fail to realize is that unilateralism is the high road to multilateralism. When George Bush senior said of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, "this will not stand", and made it clear that he was prepared to act alone if necessary, that declaration-and the credibility of American determination to act unilaterally-in and of itself created a coalition. Hafez al-Asad did not join out of feelings of good will. He joined because no one wants to be left at the dock when the hegemon is sailing. UNILATERALISM HASNT INHIBITED MULTILATERAL COOPERATION ON TERRORISM IN THE STATUS QUO Philip Zelikow, Director of the Miller Center of Public Affairs, Professor of History, University of Virginia, NATIONAL INTEREST, Spring 2003, p. 31 Everything that America does in the world is done multilaterally. That emphatically includes the policies the Bush Administration considers most important, and even those that are the most "military" in character. The global war against terrorism is being conducted through an elaborate, often hidden, network of multilateral cooperation among scores of governments. A large number of players are interacting on intelligence, law enforcement, military action, air transportation, shipping, financial controls and more. Ongoing military operations in Afghanistan involve several countries, and were multilateral even at the height of American military activity, as the United States relied heavily on relationships with Pakistan, Russia, three Central Asian governments and a variety of Afghan factions .
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Unilateralism Good: Answers to: Military Power Projection/War Triggers Animosity Toward the U.S.
ANIMOSITY TO MILITARY AGGRESSION IS FLEETING
FREDERICK W. KAGAN is a resident scholar in defense and security studies at the American Enterprise Institute, The Wilson Quarterly, Summer 2005 v29 i3 p57(9) . Though the use of force may stir anger and resentment in an enemy population and damage a state's position in the world community, history suggests that both the animosity and the damage may be more fleeting than many suppose, and that their scale and duration may depend on many elements other than the mere fact that force was used. By far the most important element is the acceptability of the peace conditions imposed by the victor after the struggle. If the victor can devise terms that most of its foes and the rest of the international community can accept, then the animosity is likely to fade quickly. And if acceptable terms are coupled with continued military power, then the prospects for a lasting and stable peace are excellent.
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Unilateralism Good:
Answers to: Unilateralism Causes U.S.-China War
U.S.-CHINESE RELATIONS ARE STABLE OVER THE LONG-TERM BECAUSE NEITHER WILL INTERFERE IN THE OTHERS SECURITY ZONE Shannon Tow, currently a Research Assistant at the School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland in Brisbane, Australia, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Dec 2004 v26 i3 p434(26) Robert Ross. In his article "The Geography of Peace", Ross argues that as the two most geopolitically dominant regional actors, China and the United States preside over their own separate but complementary spheres of regional influence. He asserts that continental Southeast Asian states have aligned with China and maritime Southeast Asian states have aligned with the United States. The geographic position of China and the United States, and the evolution of their interests and military capabilities accordingly, make it unlikely that either country would seek to project power into the other's respective sphere. Ross therefore postulates that the emerging bipolar structure is likely to be a stable and enduring one. This portrayal of Sino-U.S. relations has been acknowledged by recent literature on Asia-Pacific security. A MUTUAL DESIRE FOR A STABLE SOUTHEAST ASIA STABILIZES RELATIONS AND CONFRONTATION PREVENTS ESCALATION Shannon Tow, currently a Research Assistant at the School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland in Brisbane, Australia, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Dec 2004 v26 i3 p434(26) A stable Southeast Asia is also desired by the United States. Americans are aware that China's cooperation is needed in areas of counterterrorism and missile proliferation. Washington, moreover, remains wary of U.S. engagement in any Asian land war. Thus while China and the United States compete for influence in each other's sphere by use of nonmilitary means, neither has an incentive to resort to conflict. Sino-American compromises on regional issues of mutual interest throughout the 1990s play to Ross' argument that the Sino-U.S. relationship is an essentially stable one.
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Answers to: Unilateralism Causes U.S.-China War
CHINA AND THE U.S. WONT INTERFERE IN EACH OTHERS AREA OF INFLUENCE AND CHINAS NAVY IS AGING Shannon Tow, currently a Research Assistant at the School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland in Brisbane, Australia, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Dec 2004 v26 i3 p434(26) Third, though the Sino-U.S. relationship is a competitive one, Ross argues that China and the United States' complementary geopolitical strengths simultaneously prevent them from forcefully interfering in one another's respective sphere of influence. Chinese naval capabilities remain limited due to ageing weapons systems, inferior technology and inadequate training of personnel. Furthermore, China is principally concerned with modernizing its economy and therefore desires regional stability in Southeast Asia.
CHINA WANTS TO AVOID CONFLICT WITH THE U.S.
Peter Van Ness is a visiting fellow in the Contemporary China Centre and lectures on security in the Department of International Relations at Australian National University, WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Winter 2004/5, p. Clearly, China wants to avoid a conflict with the United States. The Japanese journalist Funabashi Yoichi quotes one Chinese think tank researcher as saying: We are studying the origin of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War. Why did it happen? Was there no way to prevent it? Some see that a U.S.-China cold war is inevitable, but what can we do to prevent it? Chinas strategic response to the Bush Doctrine is not confrontational toward the United States and does not require Chinas Asian neighbors to choose between Beijing and Washington, something none of them wants to have to do.26 Though it is not a design for what realists would call balancing against the United States, it challenges Washington to think and act in ways quite different from the policies prescribed by the Bush Doctrine when trying to resolve problems in international relations.
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NO RISK OF DIRECT U.S.-CHINESE CONFRONTATION
Peter Van Ness is a visiting fellow in the Contemporary China Centre and lectures on security in the Department of International Relations at Australian National University, WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Winter 2004/5, p . China, for its part, is concerned about Japanese participation in the U.S. missile defense system, new legislation to permit Japanese forces to play a larger supporting role in Bush initiatives, and the possible revision of Japans constitution to facilitate a more substantial military modernization but except for possible miscalculation over the issue of Taiwan, there appears to be little likelihood of direct confrontation between the United States and China. Beijing and Washington understand each other much better today than they did in 199596 when China launched its missile exercises in a failed effort to influence the presidential elections in Taiwan, and since then, they have established a variety of communication links in order to avoid misperception and miscommunication if tensions in the Taiwan Strait should reemerge.
CHINA KNOWS IT DOESNT HAVE A CHANCE TO COMPETE WITH US MILITARILY
PROSPECT, February 17, 2005 With a surging economy, an elite wanting a larger role in the world and resentful of the US, a more adroit political leadership and a global environment in which America has been distracted, China has its chance. The leadership realises that it cannot challenge the US military for decades-China spends $ 20bn a year on defence compared to America's $ 416bn budget, and does not yet have a blue water navy to speak of. Instead, Beijing is focusing on what it calls "comprehensive national power": a combination of international prestige, diplomacy, economic power, cultural influence and, to a lesser extent, military force.
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Unilateralism Good: Answers To: Hegemony = Militarism
ITS TRY OR DIE CONFLICT PREVENTS TRANSITION AWAY FROM THE SYSTEM
Andrew Linklater, Senior Lecture in Politics @ Monash University, BEYOND REALISM AND MARXISM, 1989, p. 32 It is necessary to conclude that a post-Marxist critical theory of international relations must concede that technical and practical orientations to foreign policy are inescapable at least at this juncture. Such an approach must appreciate the need for classical realist methods of protecting the state under conditions of insecurity and distrust, and recognize the importance of the rationalist defense of order and legitimacy in the context of anarchy. It is important to take account of the rationalist claim that order is unlikely to survive if the major powers cannot reconcile their different national security interests. In a similar vein, a critical approach to international relations is obliged to conclude that the project of emancipation will not make significant progress if international order is in decline. One of its principal tasks would then be to understand how the community of states can be expanded so that it approximates a condition which maximizes the importance of freedom and universality. In this case, a critical theory of international relations which recognizes the strengths of realism and Marxism must aim for a political practice which deals concurrently with the problem of power, the need for order, and the possibility of emancipation through the extension of human community.
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Unilateralism Good: Answers to: Hegemony Means Empire
AMERICAN PUBLIC WONT SUPPORT US EMPIRE
Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 137-8 Another problem for those who urge that we accept the idea of an American empire is that they misunderstand the underlying nature of American public opinion and institutions. Even if it is true that unilateral occupation and transformation of undemocratic regimes in the Middle East and elsewhere would reduce some of the sources of transnational terrorism, the question is whether the American public will tolerate an imperial role for its government. Neoconservative writers such as Max Boot argue that the United States should provide troubled countries with the sort of enlightened foreign administration once provided by self-confident Englishmen in jodhpurs and pith helmets, but, as the British historian Niall Ferguson points out, modern America differs from nineteenth-century Britain in our chronically short time frame. Although an advocate of empire, Ferguson worries that the American political system is not up to the task, and, for better and for worse, he is right.
US PRIMACY DOES NOT MEAN EMPIRE WE DO NOT HAVE IMPERIALISTIC POWER
Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 135-6 In many ways the metaphor of empire is seductive. The American military has a global reach with bases around the world and its regional commanders sometimes act like proconsuls and are even called proconsuls in the press. English is a lingua franca like Latin. The American economy is the largest in the world, and American culture serves as a magnet. But it is a mistake to confuse the politics of primacy with the politics of empire. Though unequal relationships certainly exist between the United States and weaker powers, and can be conducive to exploitation, absent formal political control, the term imperial can be misleading. Its acceptance would be a disastrous guide for American foreign policy because it fails to take into account how the world has changed. The United States is certainly not an empire in the way we think of the European overseas empires of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries because the core feature of such imperialism was direct political control. The United States has more power resources than Britain had at its imperial peak. On the other hand, the US has less control over the behavior that occurs inside other countries than Britain did when it ruled a quarter of the globe. For example, Kenyas schools, taxes, laws and electionsnot to mention external relationswere controlled by British officials. Even where Britain used indirect rule through local potentates, as in Uganda, it exercised far more control than the United States does today. Some try to rescue the metaphor by referring to informal empire or the imperialism of free trade, but this simply obscures important differences in degree of control suggested by comparisons with real historical empires. Yes, the Americans have widespread influence, but in 2003, the United States could not even get Mexico and Chile to vote for a second resolution on Iraq in the UN Security Council. The British Empire did not have that kind of problem with Kenya or India. Devotees of the new imperialism say, Dont be so literal. Empire is merely a metaphor. But the problem with the metaphor is it implies a control from Washington that is unrealistic, and reinforces the prevailing strong temptations toward unilateralism that are present in Congress and parts of the administration. As we saw in Chapter 1, the costs of occupation of other countries has become prohibitive in a world of multiple nationalisms, and the legitimacy of empire is broadly challenged.
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US IS NOT AND WILL NOT BECOME AN EMPIRE
Alexander J. Motyl, Director Harriman Institute, Columbia University, 2006, Foreign Affairs, July/August, Volume 85, No. 4, p. 190 Not only is the United States not an empire, but it probably could not become one today. Several decades ago, the political scholar Rein Taagepera -- who, distressingly, is not mentioned by any of the authors in the books under review -plotted the life spans of empires, graphically demonstrating what is now the conventional wisdom: empires have been among the most durable, stable, and successful political entities of all time. Empire actually works -- or, rather, worked -quite well. Despite empire's long and venerable track record, however, there are strong reasons to think that empire building is no longer a viable political project. Imperial states have acquired territory in three ways: by marriage, by purchase, and by conquest. Marriage no longer works, as no contemporary ruler (not even a dictator) claims to own the territory he rules. Purchase is a dead end, as all the world's land is divided among jealous states and oftentimes empowered populations. Conquest is still possible in principle, and the twentieth century is full of instances in which it was attempted in practice. But the limits of conquest are clear, in the aftermath of Iraq if not before. International and most national norms, for example, now hold that the conquest of foreign nations and states almost certainly involves violations of human rights and the principles of self-determination and cultural autonomy, and is therefore illegitimate. Moreover, nation-states are unusually effective vehicles of mass mobilization and resistance, making sustained conquest harder now than in the past. And a growing aversion to violence militates against the ruthlessness that overcoming resistance requires. The international community may look the other way if mass murder is confined to a localized area of the developing world, such as Darfur, but it is hard to imagine that repeated genocidal policies in the service of imperialist expansion would not provoke severe condemnation and some countermeasures. In sum, while history suggests that being or having an empire is a guarantee of longevity, it also shows that acquiring an empire is probably no longer possible. EMPIRE NOT A GOOD GUIDE FOR US FOREIGN POLICY UNATTAINABLE AND UNWORKABLE Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 139 In fact, the problem of creating an American empire might better be termed imperial understretch. Neither the public nor Congress has proved willing to invest seriously in the instruments of nation building and governance as opposed to military force. The entire budget for the State Department (including AID, the Agency for International Development) is only 1 percent of the federal budget. The United States spends nearly 17 times as much on its military as it does on foreign affairs, and there is little indication that this is about to change in an era of tax cuts and budget deficits. Moreover, our military is designed for fighting rather than police work, and the Pentagon under Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld initially cut back on training for peacekeeping operations. The US has designed a military that is better suited to kick down the door, beat up a dictator, and then go home rather than stay for the harder imperial work of building a democratic polity. For a variety of reasons, both about the world and about the United States, Americans should avoid the misleading metaphor of empire as a guide for our foreign policy. Empire is not the narrative we need to help us understand and cope with the global information age of the twenty-first century.
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Unilateralism Good: Answers to: Hegemony Means Empire
NEOCONSERVATIVE AGENDA INHERENTLY DOOMED RELIES UPON THE SOFT POWER IT DISMISSES TO MEET ITS AGENDA Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 141 Ironically, however, the only way to achieve the type of transformation that the neoconservatives seek is by working with others and avoiding the backlash that arises when the United States appears on the world stage as an imperial power acting unilaterally. What is more, since democracy cannot be imposed by force and requires a considerable time to take root, the most likely way to obtain staying power from the American public is through developing international legitimacy and burden sharing with allies and institutions. For Jacksonians such as Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, this may not matter. They would prefer to punish the dictator and come home rather than engage in tedious nation building. In September 2003, Rumsfeld said of Iraq, I dont believe it is our job to reconstruct the country. But for serious neoconservatives, such as Deputy of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, their impatience with international institutions and allies may undercut their own objectives. They understand the importance of soft power, but fail to appreciate all its dimensions and dynamics.
US HEGEMONY IS NOT IMPERIALISTIC
Donald Neuchterlein, former US Foreign Service Officer and Professor at Virginia, 2005, Defiant Superpower?, p. xi-xii This book opens with a discussion of what distinguishes the terms empire and hegemony in the conduct of foreign policy. It concludes that although the United States exhibits many of the attributes of empire, its actual exercise of political, economic, and military power since World War II resembles the exercise of hegemonic influence rather than imperial control over other countries. Two chapters review the historic changes in American foreign policy that resulted from the attacks of September 11, 2001, and from the Bush administrations decisions to invade Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. Another chapter analyzes President George W. Bushs 2002 National Security Strategy for the United States, a document that spelled out in great detail his vision for implementing a more expansive use of American hegemonic power than any previous president had enunciated. Also included are four chapters that examine four basic US national interests: defense of the US homeland, economic well-being of the American people, establishment of a favorable world order, and promotion of freedom and American values abroad. The rising costs of implementing President Bushs vision of Americas world hegemony is the subject of one chapter, and two alternative strategies for conducting future police collaborative or unilateral internationalismare analyzed in another. A final chapter, Limits to the Exercise of Hegemonic Power examines lessons that may be learned from the Bush administrations conduct of foreign policy since 9/11.
US HEGEMONY NOT DRIVEN BY IMPERIAL AMBITIONS
Donald Neuchterlein, former US Foreign Service Officer and Professor at Virginia, 2005, Defiant Superpower?, p. 155 During the sixty years that elapsed between the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and Al Qaedas attack on the World Trade Center, the US government showed a fierce determination not to be intimidated by the Soviet Union, China, or Iraqs Saddam Hussein. The United States may not consciously have set out to establish an American hegemony in the world, but its economic and military power seemed to propel it in that direction. If Washington appeared in the 2000s to be exercising an increasingly coercive hegemonic influence worldwide, this was more a consequence of its power than a prime objective of its foreign policy. The enormous increase in Americas ability to project its power worldwide was a major contributing factor.
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US HEGEMONY NOT A DRIVE TO EMPIRE
David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, Politics & Government London School of Economics, 2004 , American Power in the 21st Century, eds. David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, p. 5-6 Most contributors to this volume are skeptical about the idea that the world is moving toward a new imperial order. This development is considered unlikely because they see the United States as lacking the motivation and/or the capacity to establish an empire. Ikenberry emphasizes the lack of motivation: America is unlikely in the future to reject multilateralism and a rule-based international order, essentially for three reasons. First, as global economic interdependence grows, the need for multilateral coordination of policies also grows. Second, it is rational for dominant powers to accept some limitations to their freedom of action in the form of multilateral institutions; if the stronger state accepts the form of multilateral institutions; if the stronger state accepts some restrictions on how it can use its power, weaker states are more likely to cooperate willingly and have less reason to resist the hegemony of the stronger state. Finally, American political culture stresses the importance of the rule of law as a foundation of political order; and this tradition provides significant support for a multilaterally oriented foreign policy. Further, in chapter 8 Risse indicates the role of domestic coalitions and values in constraining foreign policy. In the current Bush administration, neoconservatives nurturing an imperial ambition are to some extent balanced by traditional conservatives who are wary of undermining alliances and multilateralism. Whether the US pursues imperialist policies is not determined by inexorable structural factors but by a domestic political game whose outcome is far from certain. Moreover, Risse argues that economic interdependence between America and Europe and a commitment to shared values work against US unilateralism.
AMERICAN EMPIRE UNIQUE DOES NOT SEEK TERRITORIAL DOMINATION
Alejandro Colas & Richard Saull, International Relation Lecturers, Birbeck College & U. of Leicester, 2006, The War on Terrorism and the American Empire after the Cold War, eds. A. Colas & R. Saull, p. 5-6 Unlike previous empires, the US neither controls nor directly administers foreign territories and peoples for its own benefit. The US plainly visited its own imperial violence upon Native Americans, Cubans, Filipinos, Nicaraguans among others prior to World War II, and after 1945 displayed an extensive record of foreign military interventions (through overt or covert means)in support of allied states and the social forces they represented. Indeed, from Korea through to Afghanistan, with Vietnam and Central America in between, Washington has consistently sided with anti-democratic and reactionary political forces across the world. But its geopolitical aim during this period has been to liberate, not permanently occupy foreign territories. As Panitch and Gindin point out in the volume, the post-war US empire is characterized by the penetration of borders, not their dissolution. This preference for global domination through rather than over states and peoples is, as will be shortly pointed out, historically unique. It has, furthermore, significant implications for both the understanding of the Cold War as a formative component of US global power and for democratic strategies against American empire.
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US EMPIRE DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF PREVIOUS EMPIRES NOT MOTIVATED BY LANDGRABBING DESIRES Richard Crockatt, Professor American Studies, University of East Anglia, 2006, The United States Contested: American unilateralism and European discontent, ed. Sergio Fabbrini, p. 83 Such views are much disputed on the grounds that a large element of distortion is required to fit the United States into the mould of empires such as those of Greece, Rome, and Britain. James Chace, a firm (though critical) advocate of the view that America is now an empire, asks who would now deny that America is an imperial power? The American response to the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon was swift and merciless. Thousands of troops swept down upon Afghanistan in an effort to capture or kill the terrorists and their protectors. (Chace 2003). However, in the aftermath of 9/11 and in the many other examples of American interventions in the past 40 years there are visible limits, not merely to American power itself but on the willingness to deploy that power and these are in part self-imposed. From Vietnam through the many interventions in the following years the US held back from the use of all-out military force. Indeed, insistence of Lyndon Johnson on fighting a limited war in Vietnam is commonly given by those on the political right as a reason for Americas failure to win the war. Constraints on American action are supplied by domestic opinion, by Americas native ideology of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, by global opinion, by anxiety about triggering war with another major power, and by accepted norms of international behaviorindeed by the total context in which American power is deployed. America may possess the material might necessary to be an empire but, as Martin Walker writes, The United States does not rule, and it shrinks from mastery (Walker 2003). In fact, arguably it was more clearly an imperial power during the Cold War when its hold over allies and clients was firmer because of the need to meet the challenge of the common enemy of Communism. Furthermore, as one specialist in ancient empires notes, Athenians, Romans, Ottomans, and the British wanted land, colonies, treasure, and grabbed all they could get when they could. The United States hasnt annexed anyones soil since the Spanish-American War (Hanson 2003). There is, needless to say, the rejoinder to this argument that, whatever the case after 1898, the territorial growth of the US during the nineteenth century was a story of classic imperialist land-grabbing (Cox 2004).
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AMERICAN ECONOMIC POWER NOT PROMOTING IMPERIALISM
Michael Mann, Sociology Professor UCLA, 2004, American Power in the 21st Century, eds. David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, p. 63 These are very mixed powers, though not greatly changed under the Bush administration. They permit US leadership and some financial hegemony, but neither domination not legitimacy across much of the world. There are no effective Great Power economic rivals, for the other Northern economies also benefit from the main thrust of US policy. But US economic powers have not been systematically engaged in the new imperialism. Public opinion is also a restraint on committing more of the national treasure to imperialism. The US did attempt ad hoc threats and economic inducements in 2001-3. New bases were brought from poor countries like Uzbekistan and Djibouti, and Pakistani and some Eastern European cooperation was more expensively bought. A second ad hoc thrust came with the attempt to buy Security Council votes over Iraq in 2003, but this lamentably failed. American economic power, though relatively declining, is still formidable, but it has not been systematically used in the new imperialism, and it is doubtful it can be.
US HEGEMONY NOT ANALAGOUS TO PAST DRIVES FOR EMPIRE AND IMPERIALISM
Michael Mandelbaum, Professor Foreign Policy Johns Hopkins, 2005, The Case for Goliath: How America acts as the worlds government in the 21st Century, p. 76 The worlds strongest state did poorly at the imperial undertaking because several of the conditions that historically had made empires possible no longer existed. The will to empire had faded. The United States was considerably less willing, and in some cases less able, to supply governance to foreign people than traditional imperial powers had been. Unlike the European imperial powers of the nineteenth century, for example, the United States did not welcome, take pride in, or in any way draw its national identity from governing far away territories. Nor did Americans believe, as had the imperial states of Europe and of other times and places, that their own security depended on preventing other powerful states from seizing the territories that they had come to control. Unlike empires of the past, the United States eagerly sought to share responsibility for administering the societies it found itself governing.
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Unilateralism Good: Stops Terrorism
NO ALTERNATIVE TO PREVENTION AGAINST TERRORISM
James Steinberg has recently been appointed Dean of the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin; the position will begin on 1 January 2006. Currently, he is Vice President and Director of the Foreign Policy Studies Program at The Brookings Institution, SURVIVAL, Winter 2005-6, p. 67 The alternatives to preventive use of force against committed terrorists, especially those prepared to resort to suicide tactics, are very limited. Almost The alternatives to preventive use of force against committed terrorists, especially those prepared to resort to suicide tactics, are very limited. Almost little to address the near-term danger.
DETERRENCE WONT STOP WMD ACQUISITION
James Steinberg has recently been appointed Dean of the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of
Texas at Austin; the position will begin on 1 January 2006. Currently, he is Vice President and Director of the Foreign Policy Studies Program at The Brookings Institution, SURVIVAL, Winter 2005-6p. 69
Deterrence against acquisition is more problematic. Given the track record to date (the international communitys acquiescence in the case of the Indian, Pakistani and now North Korean nuclear programmes, compounded by the international backlash against the intervention in Iraq), it would be reasonable for a would-be acquirer to assume that there is little likelihood that force would be used to forestall or eliminate nuclear, biological or chemical weapons capabilities. Moreover, the sanctions fatigue, and collateral humanitarian costs associated with sanctions in Iraq, suggest that coercive measures short of force may not be very effective.
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Unilateralism Good: Stops Terrorism
HEGEMONY IS CRUCIAL TO AVOID TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, MULTIPOLARITY FAILS
Brooks and Wohlforth 02
(Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, Associate Professors in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, Foreign Affairs, July, 2002 / August, 2002) Some might question the worth of being at the top of a unipolar system if that means serving as a lightning rod for the world's malcontents. When there was a Soviet Union, after all, it bore the brunt of Osama bin Laden's anger, and only after its collapse did he shift his focus to the United States (an indicator of the demise of bipolarity that was ignored at the time but looms larger in retrospect). But terrorism has been a perennial problem in history, and multipolarity did not save the leaders of several great powers from assassination by anarchists around the turn of the twentieth century. In fact, a slide back toward multipolarity would actually be the worst of all worlds for the United States. In such a scenario it would continue to lead the pack and serve as a focal point for resentment and hatred by both state and nonstate actors, but it would have fewer carrots and sticks to use in dealing with the situation. The threats would remain, but the possibility of effective and coordinated action against them would be reduced. U.S. WOULD RETALIATE AGAINST NUCLEAR TERROR KILLING MILLIONS Greg Easterbrook, senior editor with THE NEW REPUBLIC, November 2001, p. www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0111/01/gal.00.html. Terrorists may not be held by this, especially suicidal terrorists, of the kind that al Qaeda is attempting to cultivate. But I think, if I could leave you with one message, it would be this: that the search for terrorist atomic weapons would be of great benefit to the Muslim peoples of the world in addition to members, to people of the United States and Western Europe, because if an atomic warhead goes off in Washington, say, in the current environment or anything like it, in the 24 hours that followed, a hundred million Muslims would die as U.S. nuclear bombs rained down on every conceivable military target in a dozen Muslim countries.
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THE WORLD IS UNITED WITH THE U.S. AGAINST AL QAEDA DEFENSE NEWS, February 28, 2005, pg. 21 (DRGCL/B1034) Even as critics have deplored Bush's "with-us-or-against-us" rhetoric as simplistic and alienating, the fact remains that in grand strategic terms, almost the entire planet has chosen to be with us. Moscow, despite some grumbling, has acceded to U.S. counterterrorism alliances with former satellite states like Georgia; Washington has been able, miraculously, to strengthen its strategic partnerships with archrivals India and Pakistan simultaneously. U.S. POLICIES DID NOT PRODUCE TERRORISM IN AFGHANISTAN Thomas Henricksen, Hoover Institute, 2002 (THE BLOWBACK MYTH, http://wwwhoover.stanford.edu/publications/digest/021/henriksen. html) (PDBF1765) Washington alone, however, is not responsible for the terror nest that is Afghanistan today. Moscows intervention ignited the tragic downward spiral in that country. Yet the chain of events leading to the emergence of Osama bin Laden is far too complex to attribute to a single spark of causation. Not the establishment of Israel, the Gulf War, or even the current cause clbre-the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia-can singly explain the rise of militant Islam. It is but one offshoot of the far wider force of contemporary Arab nationalism. Like nationalistic impulses elsewhere, the Arab manifestation quickened in the nineteenth century. Before World War I, it was directed against Ottoman rule in the Levant and later against British and French colonialism. Now, America-and its perceived enclave, Israel-is one focal point. The image of the Muslim worlds rejection of modernization, secularism, and globalization is offset by a more complex picture in which large numbers of people in the Middle East aspire to a higher standard of living and genuine democracy. AMERICAN VALUES WILL TRIGGER TERRORISM EVEN IF WE ARE ISOLATIONIST Joseph Nye, Dean, JFK School of Government, Harvard, 2002 (THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER, pp. x-xi) (PDBF1766) Some Americans are tempted to believe that we could reduce these hatreds and our vulnerability if we would withdraw our troops, curtail our alliances, and follow a more isolationist foreign policy. But we would not remove our vulnerability. Not only are the terrorists who struck on September 11 dedicated to reducing American power, but in the words of Jordan's King Abdallah, "they want to break down the fabric of the U.S. They want to break down what America stands for." Even if we had a weaker foreign policy, such groups would resent the power of the American economy, which would still reach well beyond our shores. American corporations and citizens represent global capitalism, which is anathema to some.
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U.S. ISOLATIONISM WILL TRIGGER TERRORISM Thomas Donnelly, American Enterprise Institute, THE MILITARY WE NEED, 2005, http://www.aei.org/books/filter.all,bookID.819/book_detail.asp (PDCL2410) The danger is that, despite what is actually a remarkably successful series of counterinsurgency campaigns since the September 11 attacks, the United States will suffer from fatigue and withdraw from the region in the hope of a new stability. Such stability, however, would be illusory and, at best, temporary; the enemy, which has been under constant pressure, will use any respite to rearm, reorganize, and plot new attacks. The status quo regimes will believe, as they want to believe (and history has given them good reason to believe), that the United States has again lost interest in the region. Our allies, including those in the region who yearn for a better, freer life, will draw similar conclusions.
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Unilateralism Good: Doesnt Increase Terrorism
ISOLATIONISM WILL NOT REDUCE OUR VULNERABILITY Joseph Nye, Dean, JFK School of Government, Harvard, 2002 (THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER, p. 154) (PDBF1768) How should we engage with other countries? There are three main approaches: Isolation, unilateralism, and multilateralism. Isolationism persists in public opinion, but it is not a major strategic option for American foreign policy today. 'While some people responded to the September 2001 terrorist attacks by suggesting that we cut back on foreign involvements, the majority realized that such a policy would not curtail our vulnerability and could even exacerbate it.
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Unilateralism Good: Doesnt Increase Capitalism
AGGRESSIVE BUSH MILITARY STRATEGY NOT DRIVEN BY NEO-LIBERALISM AND CORPORATE INTERESTS Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Sociology Professor University of Illinois, 2006, The War on Terrorism and the American Empire after the Cold War, eds. A. Colas & R. Saull, p. 188-9 What pleads against this scenario is that the Bush II administrations base is narrow and comprises mainly energy and military sectors. Its economic policies are biased and contradictory, and tax cuts and deficit spending are opposed by CEOs, blue-ribbon business councils and to some extent even the Federal Reserve, so it is not a typical policy of the capitalist class. Politics trumps economics in that the fundamental calculus appears to be political (in the sense of party- and state-driven) and ideological rather than economic. Unlike neoliberal globalization, policy is not driven by the Treasury, Wall Street and international institutions. Corporate partners seem to be co-pilots, and economic agendas, which are sketchy in the first place, seem to play a supporting rather than a leading role. The militarys overwhelming role outflanks other sectors. The risks entailed in a strategy of offensive war are so momentous that they outstrip corporate capabilities and horizons. Corporations cannot afford to be risk-takers on this scale. If we would further try to read this as a military adjustment of structural adjustment, the obvious hurdles are that structural adjustment has not been faring well and its logic does not lend itself to military adjustment.
NO NECESSARY LINK BETWEEN CAPITALISM AND IMPERIALISM
Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Sociology Professor University of Illinois, 2006, The War on Terrorism and the American Empire after the Cold War, eds. A. Colas & R. Saull, p. 189 The Leninist theory according to which imperialism is the highest stage of capitalism fails to explain when imperialism does not occur and therefore fails to explain when it does. It declares imperialism a general disposition of advanced capitalism, which doesnt match general experience or the experience of neoliberal globalization. There are no compelling reasons why in the era of deterritorialized hi-tech capitalism and remote control by means of financial discipline (and in the case of Iraq a regime of containment and sanctions), offensive territorial war would suddenly be a bright idea.
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Unilateralism Good: Answers to: Realism Flawed
STATE-CENTERED CONFLICT WILL RETURN Colin Gray, political scientist specializing in national security policy, THE SHERIFF: AMERICAS DEFENSE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER, 2004, p. 15 (PDNS3077) For the next few years the challenge of the era may be al Qaeda and 'its ilk. But come the 2010s, or at the latest the twenties, the peril of the decade for world order is probably going to be the return of old-fashioned, state-centric great power geo politics and geostrategy, as China challenges the regional security order of East Asia, or perhaps as "Old Europe" and Russia attempt to clip the American eagle's wings. TERRORISM IS NOT THE ONLY THREAT AND FUTURE THREATS WILL BE STATE CENTRIC Colin Gray, political scientist specializing in national security policy, 2004, THE SHERIFF: AMERICAS DEFENSE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER, p. 9 (PDNS3078) For all its recognition of the challenge posed by post-modern and significantly transnational terrorism, American policy and strategy remains firmly anchored in a worldview that is traditional and geopolitical. Terrorism is the problem of the moment, probably of the decade, but the role of guardian of world order carries the duty- to oppose and thwart potent threats of disorder from any source, be they state-centric or transnational. The United States has clearly grasped that its ability to see off the leading menaces of the period, whatever their source and character, depends vitally upon the maintenance of a useable margin of superior power and influence. Stated in the most direct way possible, America recognizes that it needs to stay Number One for as long as is feasible, including affordable. But how is that highly desirable, indeed necessary, condition to be sustained and prolonged? NATION-STATES STILL DOMINATE THE WORLD Carol Gluck, history professor, Columbia, THE NEW AMERICAN EMPIRE: A 21ST CENTURY TEACH-IN ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, Edited by Lloyd C. Gardner, 2005, pp. 209-10 (PDNSS706) And not to forget habits of the nation, which are perhaps the most deeply ingrained of all. The simplest answer to the question of what ordinary Americans think about the war is that they think their country was attacked. The terrorism of September 11 was almost instantly packaged as a national calamity (perhaps somewhat less in New York, where for a while human beings rather than flags held the center of attention). Those announcing -Attack on the World Trade Center" soon gave way to those pronouncing "Attack on America:" The inapt references to Pearl Harbor were immediate-within thirty minutes-and they came from everyone from movie stars to Henry Kissinger. Then came the rhetoric of resolve, the patriotism, the flags-endless, countless flags-and the narrative of "A Nation Challenged," the title of the New York Times special daily section on the war and terrorism. The nationalizing of global terrorism was itself a global phenomenon. Most countries saw, the events in national terms; Japan is but one example. The fact is that, despite the forces of globalization, we live in a world of nation-states. And nation-states operate in terms of national interest, national defense, and national power. Thus the coalition that the U.S. government sought to form in the days after the attacks was a product of a series of bilateral negotiations between two leaders looking after the interests of their respective nations. This was old-fashioned diplomacy and certainly not the way to combat collectively and cooperative the network of global terrorism.
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Unilateralism Good: Multilateralism Decreases Soft Power
Americas soft power is already high yielding to multilateralism erodes US power and only increases resentment since allies resent our influence on the inside Clive Crook, Columnist for the National Journal and Deputy Editor of the Economist, 4/13/2002 (Should the Worlds Only Superpower Pretend that it Isnt? The National Journal) p. lexis Most of America's already-enormous soft power comes from its lifelong commitment to political freedom and from its extraordinary economic success-exactly the same things that repel its enemies. It is debatable how much a commitment to multilateralism would add to that mighty fund of soft power, and whether it would even be noticed. Moreover, if America engages in processes such as Kyoto and the ICC-while recognizing (as Nye admits) that they pose threats to American interests-it is entirely possible that the effect on soft power will be zero, or even negative. America's would-be partners in multilateral projects may find a veto exercised from inside even less attractive than a politely declined invitation at the outset. Remember too that those partners are not interested in adding to any kind of American power, soft or hard. They are chiefly interested in doing the opposite. For them, the whole point of multilateralism is to deal with the "problem" of American hegemony-to contain and to check. This is a matter not of interpretation, but merely of listening to what they say. Nye wants the United States to embrace multilateralism and then insist, somehow, on having its way. Its partners will hate that. This course yields no great soft-power premium.
EFFECTIVE SOFT POWER REQUIRES HARD POWER
Robert Cooper, Council of the European Union, 2004, American Power in the 21st Century, eds. David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, p. 176 It is a mistake, however, to think that soft power is a natural strength of Europe although the EU seems in some respects the apotheosis of soft power. Internally it operates by law; externally it uses force largely in peacekeeping mode. But soft power goes with hard power internationally as it does domestically. A country may be respected and trusted, as for example Norway is; this will bring it influence but not, when the chips are down, power. American supremacy in hard power on the other hand gives it equally enormous potential for soft power. If you want to exercise soft power you must have something to offer a recipe for success, resources to help others get there, and probably armed force to protect them on the way. Hard power begets soft power.
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Unilateralism Good: No Isolationism
STRONG SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN POLICY ENGAGEMENT
Walter Russell Mead, Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, ORBIS, Fall 2005, p. 592 Since 9/11, that has changed. There may be disagreement with what Bush has done on various elements of foreign policy, but there is very little disagreement that America needs to be doing something and to be doing it quite vigorously. There is little complaining about the size of the military or intelligence budgets. Also, the size of the foreign-aid budget is considerably larger than it was in the 1990s. Unilateralism Good: International Institutions Fail
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ARE DYSFUNCTIONAL
Walter Russell Mead, Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, ORBIS, Fall 2005, p. 596 Finally, the administration understands that international institutions are by and large dysfunctional. The intelligence community proved unable to provide useful information on the issue of the proliferation of wmd. But neither does the international communitys systeminspections, endless committee meetings, and decades of talk followed by largely symbolic actionwork. U.S. concerns about proliferation in an era of mass terrorism are so great that a way to combat proliferation has to be found, whether that means rebuilding the institutions from the ground up or reforming and improving them. But Washington cannot just sit still and let the limits of institutions constrain its foreign policy options.
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Unilateralism Good: Unilateralism Leads to Effective Multilateralism
IF MULTILATERAL ACTION IS GOOD THEN UNILATERALISM IS THE SOLUTION - AMERICAN UNILATERALISM LEADS TO COALITION BUILDING, HARD POWER IS KEY TO SUCCESSFUL MULTILATERALISM Charles, Krauthammer, IR expert, "The Unipolar Moment Revisited" THE NATIONAL INTEREST, Winter 2002/2003, p. Lexis The prudent exercise of power allows, indeed calls for, occasional concessions on non-vital issues if only to maintain psychological good will. Arrogance and gratuitous high-handedness are counterproductive. But we should not delude ourselves as to what psychological good will buys. Countries will cooperate with us, first, out of their own self-interest and, second, out of the need and desire to cultivate good relations with the world's superpower. Warm and fuzzy feelings are a distant third. Take counterterrorism. After the attack on the USS Cole, Yemen did everything it could to stymie the American investigation. It lifted not a finger to suppress terrorism. This was under an American administration that was obsessively accommodating and multilateralist. Today, under the most unilateralist of administrations, Yemen has decided to assist in the war on terrorism. This was not a result of a sudden attack of good will toward America. It was a result of the war in Afghanistan, which concentrated the mind of heretofore recalcitrant states like Yemen on the costs of non-cooperation with the United States.14 Coalitions are not made by superpowers going begging hat in hand. They are made by asserting a position and inviting others to join. What "pragmatic" realists often fail to realize is that unilateralism is the high road to multilateralism. When George Bush senior said of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, "this will not stand", and made it clear that he was prepared to act alone if necessary, that declaration-and the credibility of American determination to act unilaterally-in and of itself created a coalition. Hafez al-Asad did not join out of feelings of good will. He joined because no one wants to be left at the dock when the hegemon is sailing
US COMMITMENT TO UNILATERALISM NOT INCONSISTENT WITH WORKING WITH COALITIONS
Ekaterina Stepanova, Senior researcher at the Center for International Security, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, 2003, UNILATERALISM AND US FOREIGN POLICY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, eds. Malone and Khong, p. 190 US military strategy, stressing consistently that the United States must possess the capability to act unilaterally, strongly emphasizes coalition operations as essential to protecting and promoting US interests. Such operations can be conducted either by an ad hoc coalition of the willing or in cooperation with regionally based security forces. US involvement in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in the Kosovo crisis, demonstrates that NATO has become Washington's first instrument of choice when the United States wants to be engaged militarily, at least in Europe and adjacent areas.
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Unilateralism Good: Global Nuclear War
INTERVENTION IS INEVITABLE HEGEMONY IS CRUCIAL TO PREVENT GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR Michael Hirsh, Newsweek Editor, AT WAR WITH OURSELVES, pp. 10-11 What if we could all be granted, like Jimmy Stewarts George Baliey, a look at the world without us? It think its useful to apply the same conceit to one-uberpower world. Suppose, with the end of the Soviet Union,
American had mysteriously disappeared as well or, more realistically, had retreated to within its border, as it had wanted to do ever since the end of World War II. What would a Jeffersonian American, withdrawn behind its oceans, likely see unfolding overseas? Probably a restoration of old power jostle that has sent mankind back to war for many millennia. One possible scenario: Japan would have reacquired a fullscale military and nuclear weapons, and would have bid for regional hegemony with China. Europe would have had no counterbalance to yet another descent into intraregional competition, and, lacking the annealing structure of the postwar Atlantic alliance, may never have achieved monetary union. Russia would have bid for Eurasian dominance, as it has throughout its modern history. Most important of all, the global trading system, which the United States virtually reinvented after World War II (with some help from John Meynard Keynes and others), would have almost certainly have broken down amid all these renewed rivalries, killing globalization before it even got started. That in turn would have accelerated many of the above developments. A war of some kind would have been extremely likely. And given the evidence of the last century, which shows that American has been increasingly draw into global conflicts, the U.S. president would be pulled in Again, but this time in a high-tech, nuclearized, and very lethal age of warfare. America has a unique opportunity to thwart historys most ruthless dictate: that nations are ever fated to return to a state of anarchy and war. It has a unique opportunity to do what no great power in history has ever done to perpetuate indefinitely the global system we have created, to foster an international community with American power at its center that is so secure that it may never be challenged. But this can be done only through a delicate balancing of all our tools of power and influence.
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Unilateralism Good: Global Nuclear War
RETREAT FROM US UNILATERAL LEADERSHIP SPURS WMD PROLIFERATION AND INCREASES RISK OF WAR Stephen Peter Rosen, Professor of National Security and Military Affairs, Harvard, THE NATIONAL INTEREST, Spring, 2003, p. http://www.thefreelibrary.com/An+empire,+if+you+can+keep+ita099377575 Rather than wrestle with such difficult and unpleasant problems, the United States could give up the imperial mission, or pretensions to it, now. This would essentially mean the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the Middle East, Europe and mainland Asia. It may be that all other peoples, without significant exception, will then turn to their own affairs and leave the United States alone. But those who are hostile to us might remain hostile, and be much less afraid of the United States after such a withdrawal. Current friends would feel less secure and, in the most probable post-imperial world, would revert to the logic of self-help in which all states do what they must to protect themselves. This would imply the relatively rapid acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Iraq and perhaps Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Indonesia and others. Constraints on the acquisition of biological weapons would be even weaker than they are today. Major regional arms races would also be very likely throughout Asia and the Middle East. This would not be a pleasant world for Americans, or anyone else. It is difficult to guess what the costs of such a world would be to the United States. They would probably not put the end of the United States in prospect, but they would not be small. If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive.
US UNILATERALISM CAN DEESCALATE CONFLICTS - BOSNIA PROVES
David M. Malone, president of the International Peace Academy, 2003, UNILATERALISM AND US FOREIGN POLICY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, eds. Malone and Khong, p. 21-2 The US policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina provides a case in point. During 1992-1995, the United States caviled from the sidelines, contribution to the notorious ineffectiveness of UN decisions. The fighting came to an end in late 1995, only when the United States chose to exercise strong and decisive leadership, most notably at Dayton, Ohio, where Washington allowed its European allies virtually no voice - as related with some asperity by the senior UK delegate there. (In fact, the United States might have averted several critical problems in the implementation of the Dayton accords had it made some use of European experience.) Subsequently, the United States proved willing to lead innovative, NATO-organized enforcement operations in the Balkans, including the International Force and the Stabilization Force in Bosnia and the Kosovo Force in Kosovo.
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Unilateralism Good: Global Nuclear War
STRONG UNITED STATES HEGEMONY CAN DETER WARS
David Abshire, President of the Center for Strategic International Studies, Spring 1996, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, p. 39 I have in mind, too, a strategy that would return to classical formulations of the proper uses of power to influence the behavior of U.S. opponents, and indeed allies. A sound strategy is proactive, not reactive, and seeks to be anticipatory and crate the desire strategic environment. The perfect victory in most classical military treatises, from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz, was to win without fighting. This fundamental seems to have been ignored in the post-cold war debate over policy, a debate that has too often misdiagnosed the issue as when and when not to use force. Such a narrow focus guarantees a reactive policy. The United States brilliantly fought and won the Gulf war; but how much better it would have been to have deterred it. For 42 years, NATO deterred the Kremlin without firing a shot. It achieve Sun Tzu's perfect victory by the strength of its cohesion despite the Kremlin's attempts to divide the alliance. In the process NATO used not force but power. Hitler faced no such united alliance of democracies in developing his power-prior to World War II; nor did Slobodan Milosevic in the former Yugoslavia until late in the game. Yale historian Donald Kagan, in his recent book On the Origins of War and the Preseation of Peace, argues correctly that "peace does not keep itself": A national wishing to preserve peace much not only maintain strength sufficient to make its deterrent power credible, but also "act realistically while there is time" as opposed to avoiding the burden "until there is no choice by war." Power and influence are proactive; force is inherently reactive, coming into play when the peace is lost due to the failure effectively to use power.
AMERICAN UNILATERALISM PREVENTS WARS
Charles, Krauthammer, IR expert, "The Unipolar Moment Revisited" THE NATIONAL INTEREST, Winter 2002/2003, p. Lexis Less can be said about the destiny of unipolarity. It is too new. Yet we do have the history of the last decade, our only modern experience with unipolrity, and it was a decade of unusual stability among all major powers. It would be foolish to project from just a ten-year experience, but that experience does call into question the basis for the claims that unipolarity is intrinsically unstable or impossible to sustain in a mass democracy. I would argue that unipolarity, managed benignly, is far more likely to keep the peace. Benignity is, of course, in the eye of the beholder. But the American claim to benignity is not mere self-congratulation. We have a track record. Consider one of history's rare controlled experiments. In the 1940s, lines were drawn through three peoples-Germans, Koreans and Chinese-one side closely bound to the United States, the other to its adversary. It turned into a controlled experiment because both states in the divided lands shared a common culture. Fifty years later the results are in. Does anyone doubt the superiority, both moral and material, of West Germany vs. East Germany, South Korea vs. North Korea and Taiwan vs. China?11 Benignity is also manifest in the way others welcome our power. It is the reason, for example, that the Pacific Rim countries are loath to see our military presence diminished: They know that the United States is not an imperial power with a desire to rule other countries-which is why they so readily accept it as a balancer. It is the reason, too, why Europe, so seized with complaints about American high-handedness, nonetheless reacts with alarm to the occasional suggestion that America might withdraw its military presence. America came, but it did not come to rule. Unlike other hegemons and would-be hegemons, it does not entertain a grand vision of a new world. No Thousand Year Reich. No New Soviet Man. It has no great desire to remake human nature, to conquer for the extraction of natural resources, or to rule for the simple pleasure of dominion. Indeed, America is the first hegemonic power in history to be obsessed with "exit strategies." It could not wait to get out of Haiti and Somalia; it would get out of Kosovo and Bosnia today if it could. Its principal aim is to maintain the stability and relative tranquility of the current international system by enforcing, maintaining and extending the current peace. I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of orange juice.
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Unilateralism Good: Global Proliferation
HEGEMONY IS CRUCIAL TO PREVENT RAPID WMD PROLIFERATION Stephen Peter Rosen, Professor of National Security @ Harvard, National Interest, Spring, 2003
Rather than wrestle with such difficult and unpleasant problems, the United States could give up the imperial mission, or pretensions to it, now. This would essentially mean the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the Middle East, Europe and mainland Asia. It may be that all other peoples, without significant exception, will then turn to their own affairs and leave the United States alone. But those who are hostile to us might remain hostile, and be much less afraid of the United States after such a withdrawal. Current friends would feel less secure and, in the most probable post-imperial world, would revert to the logic of self-help in which all states do what they must to protect themselves. This would imply the relatively rapid acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Iraq and perhaps Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Indonesia and others. Constraints on the acquisition of biological weapons would be even weaker than they are today. Major regional arms races would also be very likely throughout Asia and the Middle East. This would not be a pleasant world for Americans, or anyone else. It is difficult to guess what the costs of such a world would be to the United States. They would probably not put the end of the United States in prospect, but they would not be small. If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive.
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Unilateralism Good: Transition Wars
HEGEMONY IS CRUCIAL TO PREVENT TRANSITION WARS WHICH GO NUCLEAR
Barry Posen, Professor of Political Science @ MIT, Andrew Ross, Professor of International Security @ The US Naval War College, International Security, Winter, 1997 The United States can, more easily than most, go it alone. Yet we do not find the arguments of the neo-isolationists compelling. Their strategy serves U.S. interests only if they are narrowly construed. First, though the neo-isolationists have a strong case in their argument that the Untied States is currently quite secure, disengagement is unlikely to make the United States more secure, and would probably make it less secure. The disappearance of the United States from the world stage would likely precipitate a good deal of competition abroad for security. Without a U.S. presence, aspiring regional hegemons would see more opportunities. States formerly defended by the United States would have to look to their own military power; local arms competitions are to be expected. Proliferation of nuclear weapons would intensify if the U.S. nuclear guarantee were withdrawn. Some states would seek weapons of mass destruction because they were simply unable to compete conventionally with their neighbors. This new flurry of competitive behavior would probably energize many hypothesized immediate causes of war, including preemptive motives, preventive motives, economic motives, and the propensity for miscalculation. There would likely be more war. Weapons of mass destruction might be used in some of these wars, with unpleasant effects even for those not directly involved.
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Unilateralism Good: Global Peace
AMERICAN UNILATERALISM IS THE EXCEPTION TO GLOBAL NORMS - UNILATERALISM IS KEY TO PEACE
Robert Kagan, Senior Associate at Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2003, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER, p. 75-76 The United States is already operating according to Cooper's double standard, for the very reasons he suggests. American leaders, too, believe that global security and a liberal order - as well as Europe's "postmodern" paradise cannot long survive unless the United States does use its power in the dangerous Hobbesian world that still flourishes outside Europe. What this means is that although the United States has played the critical role in bringing Europe into this Kantian paradise, and still plays a key role in making that paradise possible, it cannot enter the paradise itself. It mans the walls but cannot walk through the gate. The United States, with all its vast power, remains stuck in history, left to deal with the Saddams and the ayatollahs, the Kim Jon Ils and the Jiang Zemins, leaving most of the benefits to others. U.S. UNILATERALISM IS KEY TO GLOBAL LEADERSHIP AND MILITARY ACTION MULTILATERALISM THREATENS IT Ekaterina Stepanova, Research Associate at Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2003, Unilateralism & US FOREIGN POLICY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, ed. Malone and Khong, p. 183-184 Retaining the capability to apply force unilaterally and demonstrating periodically the willingness to use it remains a cornerstone of the U.S. military strategy. For the United States, unilateralism in the use of force is first and foremost and essential element and a compelling demonstration of U.S. strategic independence and global leadership. Given U.S. military superiority and the significant technological gap that exists between the United States and even its closest Western allies, the U.S. political-military leadership often views unilateralism as a technical prerequisite for effective command and control of military action. More important, in a world more complex that the bipolarity of the Cold War, the political interests of countries tend to be diverse and fragmented, even within the Western community of nations. For the United States, even partial accommodation to these interests, which is essential for any multilateral cooperation, presents a number of serious political, military, and technical constraints in the use of force.
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Unilateralism Good: Answers to: Need Soft Power for International Cooperation
TURN: A COLLAPSE OF LEADERSHIP ISNT DESIRABLE THE U.S. IS THE ONLY COUNTRY THAT CAN LEAD COLLECTIVE SOLUTIONS TO GLOBAL PROBLEMS George Soros, Global Financier and International Development Expert, THE BUBBLE OF AMERICAN SUPREMACY, 2004, p. 30) The United States is the only country that ca take the lead in addressing problems that require collective action: preserving peace, assuring economic progress, protecting the environment, and so on. Fighting terrorism and controlling weapons of mass destruction also fall into this category. The United States cannot do whatever it wants, but nothing much can be done in the way of international cooperation without the leadership or at least active participation of our nation.
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS FAIL WITHOUT THE U.S.
George Soros, Global Financier and International Development Expert, THE BUBBLE OF AMERICAN SUPREMACY, 2004, p. 82) We need to take a radically different approach. We must lead a cooperative effort to improve the world order, because we are the only ones in a position to do so. As both the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol on Global Warming demonstrate, international arrangements are much less effective when the United States stands aside. Given our dominant position, we have the most to gain from making the prevailing world order function better.
THE WORLD WANTS LEADERSHIP FROM THE U.S. TO ENCOURAGE COLLECTIVE SECURITY
George Soros, Global Financier and International Development Expert, THE BUBBLE OF AMERICAN SUPREMACY, 2004, p. 172-3 The American public is currently preoccupied with issues of security, and rightly so. The terrorist threat is real, and the prospect of chemical, biological, or even nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists cannot be dismissed. The right frame in which to think about security is collective security. Neither nuclear proliferation nor international terrorism can be successfully addressed without international cooperation. It is incumbent on us, as the dominant power, to take the lead. Terrorism and weapons of mass destruction have become threats to our national security because we occupy such a dominant position. The right way to respond is by strengthening our collective security arrangements. Our definition of collective security ought to be broad enough to include the kind of constructive, affirmative actions described earlier. The world is looking for us for that kind of leadership. We have provided it in the past, and one of the main reasons for such strong anti-American feelings in the world today is that we are not providing it at present.
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Unilateralism Good: Democracy Promotion
INCREASING US HEGEMONY CAUSES INCREASED DEMOCRACY PROMOTION Jonathan Monten, Department of Government at Georgetown University, 2005
[The Roots of the Bush Doctrine Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy, International Security vol. 29 no. 4, Spring, MUSE, p. 112-156] Vindicationism also contains an underlying claim about the efficacy of U.S. power to produce democratic change. According to this school, the expansion of U.S. power tends to correlate positively with the expansion of democracy internationally. Huntington, for example, argues that "any increase in the power or influence of the U.S. in world affairs generally results... in the promotion of liberty and human rights in the world." Vindicationists are comparatively less concerned about the potential for abuse inherent in any missionary exercise. American power is less likely to be misused or corrupted than that of any other government, both because American leaders are generally committed to liberaldemocratic values and because of the constraints impose by the American political system's institutional dispersion of power
US DOMINATION CAUSES WIDESPREAD DEMOCRACY PROMOTION Jonathan Monten, Department of Government at Georgetown University, 2005
[The Roots of the Bush Doctrine Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy, International Security vol. 29 no. 4, Spring, MUSE, p. 112-156] My argument is that periods of activist democracy promotion can be explained by both the expansion of material capabilities and the presence of a nationalist domestic ideology that favors vindicationism over exemplarism. While power is an important factor, long-term variation in the United States' democracy-promotion strategy also turns on subtle but significant ideational shifts in the doctrine of liberal exceptionalism. The founders, grounded in a political-realist and Calvinist view of politics, were skeptical toward the capacity of the United States to effect democratic change abroad, distrusted the concentration of power necessary to implement an activist foreign policy, and resolved to limit the U.S. liberal mission to demonstrating the success of an experiment in self-government. The character of liberal exceptionalism began to shift in the late nineteenth century. Various reform movements such as Progressivism and the Social Gospel, both political reactions to post-Civil War industrialization and modernization, produced a different set of normative and instrumental beliefs about the nature of progress and the efficacy of U.S. power to create a more perfect social and political order. If persuasive, this argument contributes to two sets of debates, one theoretical and one substantive. Theoretically, it conceptualizes "nationalism"which, in the U.S. case, is inextricably linked with a liberalexceptionalist ideology and identityboth as a source of political preferences and as an intervening variable that mediates how states respond to the incentives and constraints created by the international political environment. A "neoclassical" line of realist argumentation contends that the mechanisms by which the effects of relative power are translated into state behavior are not as smooth or determinate as structural
realist theories assume, and must be supplemented with unit-level variables. U.S. democracy promotion illustrates the utility of this approach: if, according to Kenneth Waltz, "international political theory deals with the pressures of structure on states and not how states will respond to those pressures," my argument privileges ideological changes in the doctrine of liberal exceptionalism as a domestic political process that
, shaping how states respond to external constraints and incentives. With respect to the Bush Doctrine, if relative power shapes the basic parameters of a state's foreign policy, unipolarity has created a permissive environment in which an aggressive ideology of democracy promotion can flourish. Power and ideas are not mutually exclusive explanations, but interact to produce foreign policy outcomes of interest.
determines the latter
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Unilateralism Good: Democracy Promotion
US HEGEMONY FORCES GLOBAL DEMOCRACY PROMOTION EMPIRICALLY PROVEN
John M. Owen, IV, Assistant Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, 20 02 [International Organization, vol. 56 no. 2, The Foreign Imposition of Domestic Institutions, Spring, p. 391-2] In the period covered by Table 3 (1901-today), great powers also participated in a majority of the 71 impositions. The United States has been a great power throughout the period and imposed institutions in 25 cases. The Soviet Union, a great power from 1917 until its disintegration in 1991, imposed institutions in 20 cases. Germany, a great power until 1945, imposed institutions in six cases (plus the two Balkan cases in the 1990s). Great Britain and France, great powers until the 1940s and arguably to the present day, each imposed institutions in twelve cases. In contrast to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, minor states such as North Korea, North Vietnam, Cuba, and Syria imposed institutions by themselves (although with Soviet support in the case of the first three). In all three periods, then, the most powerful states were responsible for the great majority of forcible institutional promotion. A related point is that imposing states tend to be much stronger militarily than target states. 44 This is especially true during the second and third waves of institutional imposition. France was the predominant intervenor between 1790 and 1815, a period when it was Europe's most powerful state. During the Concert of Europe period, when the five powers were roughly equal, each invariably promoted institutions only in much weaker states. In the twentieth century, almost all imposers targeted weaker states. HEGEMONY IS NEEDED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY ABROAD EUROPEAN SUPPORT IS KEY
John Calabrese, Assistant Professor of US Foreign Policy at American University, 2005
[Freedom on the March in the Middle East And Transatlantic Relations on a New Course? Mediterranean Quarterly vol. 16, no. 4, Fall, p. 42-64] In fall 2004with the stock of US soft power diminished due to a ballooning deficit and a falling dollar, the American military stretched thin in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a fiercely contested presidential campaign entering its last lapthe Bush administration sought to mend fences with Europe and to energize the Middle East democratization effort. Indeed, the transatlantic and democracy agendas became inextricably entwined. The Bush administration had extended a hand across the Atlantic to French officials before the November 2004 US presidential election and to German officials shortly thereafter. In a postelection news conference, President Bush stated, "Whatever our past disagreements, we share a common enemy." In his second inauguration address (20 January 2005), Bush melded the goals of spreading democracy and reinvigorating transatlantic relations, stating, "The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world. . . . And all the allies of the United States can know: we honor your friendship, we rely on your counsel, and we depend on your help. Division among free nations is a primary goal of freedom's enemies. The concerted effort of free nations to promote democracy is a prelude to our enemies' defeat."
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Unilateralism Good: Democracy Promotion
HEGEMONY IS KEY TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST John Calabrese, Assistant Professor of US Foreign Policy at American University, 2005
[Freedom on the March in the Middle East And Transatlantic Relations on a New Course? Mediterranean Quarterly vol. 16, no. 4, Fall, p. 58-9, MUSE] The continuing military occupation of Iraq and US military posture elsewhere in the region has also inflamed suspicion that is difficult to extinguish. Compounding this problem have been the disclosures of coercive interrogations, the practice of "renditioning," prisoner abuse at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib as well as in Afghanistan, and reported US efforts to suppress the publication of passages in the third AHDR highly critical of Israel and of American policy. Some US officials appear to doubt that this has harmed America's reputation abroad.30 But the searing criticism by figures such as Tunisian human rights activist Moncef Marzouki suggests otherwise. Writing in Al-Hayat, Marzouki decried "the total lack of credibility of the US policy to promote democracy in the Arab world." Does the poor image and damaged credibility of the messenger fatally compromise the message? Hardly. But it does play into the hands of incumbent regimes. And it makes reformers somewhat wary of being tarred by association with the United States. As Fareed Zakaria put it, albeit rather strongly, in an op-ed piece in the Detroit Free Press, "American support today is the kiss of death." This also goes some way toward explaining why, though Europeans have joined the democracy bandwagon, they are keen to distance themselves from the United States.
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Unilateralism Good: Democracy Promotion
ONLY A WORLD OF U.S. PRIMACY RESULTS IN DEMOCRACY PROMOTION
John M. Owen, IV, Assistant Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, 20 02 [International Organization, vol. 56 no. 2, The Foreign Imposition of Domestic Institutions, Spring, p. 375-409, MUSE] Pattern 2 suggests a serious limitation of neo-Marxist explanations of U.S. democracy promotion. Such explanations have little or nothing to say about the vast majority of institutional promotion in the past 450 years, but must rather treat U.S. (or democratic-capitalist) foreign policy as unique. Before declaring any country's policies unique, however, we must try to subsume such policies under a more general phenomenon involving non-democratic, non-capitalist states. Pattern 2 also may be inconsistent with a finding of Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson that democracies are more likely than dictatorships or monarchies to impose new institutions upon a defeated enemy. My finding would be consistent with theirs only if democracies were significantly less likely than dictatorships or monarchies to be war victors. I do not control for the total number of war victories by each regime type, but it is worth noting that a scholarly consensus has emerged recently that democracies are as likely as other regime types to be involved in wars, and more likely to win the wars they fight. Presumably, their finding differs in part because their data begin only in 1816 and they use a higher threshold for violence. My finding calls into question their claim that democratic governments are under greater domestic pressure than non-democratic ones to impose institutions. Either non-democratic states are likewise under such domestic pressure; external pressure is partly responsible for institutional promotion, a possibility explored below; or both.
HEGEMONY ALLOWS THE UNITED STATES TO FORCIBLY PROMOTE DEMOCRACY
William I. Robinson, professor of sociology at the University of California, 1996
[Promoting Polyarchy - Globalization, US intervention and hegemony, http://www.chez.com/bibelec/publications/international/polyarchy.html] Another central feature of the new political intervention was in organizing and advising political parties ("party building') to establish an elite hegemony, i.e. a "consensus building process". This includes a support of trade unions to destabilize governments (Solidarity in Poland), penetration of the media, nurturing of women, youth, or peasants' movements, and even sometimes a shift from sustaining right parties to center parties. "Democracy promotion' is also implemented through electoral Intervention. To bring about long-term stability around free-market economics and social order, can be created an elaborate machinery for 'electoral assistance' (civic training, parallel vote counts, and so on). The US policy makers claim that they are interested in processes (free and fair elections) not in outcome (the results of these elections). In fact, the main concern Is the outcome.
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Unilateralism Good: Democracy Promotion
US WORLD POWER IS NEEDED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY Jonathan Monten, Department of Government at Georgetown University, 2005
[The Roots of the Bush Doctrine Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy, International Security vol. 29 no. 4, Spring, MUSE, p. 112-156] Although these contending approaches have coexisted throughout U.S. political history, they have also prevailed at different times. Students of U.S history generally agree on the direction of change: whereas the first few generations of U.S. political leaders believed that the United States was exceptional for the example it set, vindicationism largely prevailed in the twentieth century, culminating in a Bush doctrine in which the activeand even coercivepromotion of democracy is a central component of U.S. grand strategy. The central puzzle addressed in this article is: what explains this shift in democracy-promotion strategy, from the concept of the United States as example [End Page 114] to the concept of the United States as mission? What explains the long-term shift from exemplarism to vindicationism? Whence this peculiarly American faith in what has been called "global social engineering," or the belief in the capacity of U.S. power to effect major social and political change abroad?
US WORLD POWER IS NECESSARY TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY OVERSEAS Jonathan Monten, Department of Government at Georgetown University, 2005
[The Roots of the Bush Doctrine Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy, International Security vol. 29 no. 4, Spring, MUSE, p. 112-156] It could be argued that broad variation in the U.S. approach to democracy promotion is explained entirely by power. Political realism predicts that, due to the incentives and pressures created by the international political environment, the expansion and contraction of a state's political interests tend to correspond with changes in relative power. In fact, the broad change from exemplarism to vindicationism correlates with a massive increase in relative power: as the United States acquired the capability to use intervention as a mechanism of democratic change, it exercised it. This hypothesis is advanced independent of variation at the domestic level; its conceptual implication is that ideology and nationalist ideas are either epiphenomenal of material structure, or cannot account for any variation independent of changes in a state's relative power position. But is early exemplarism explained entirely by the fact U.S. political leaders presided over a weak and disunited state, and now inapplicable to the conduct of U.S. hegemony? To appropriate Robert Kagan's pithy formulation, is exemplarism just a "weapon of the weak?
US POWER IS A PRECONDITION TO DEMOCRACY PROMOTION
Jonathan Monten, Department of Government at Georgetown University, 2005
[The Roots of the Bush Doctrine Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy, International Security vol. 29 no. 4, Spring, MUSE, p. 112-156] Relative power is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for explaining variation in the United States' democracypromotion strategy. The capability to project political and military power is clearly a precondition to actively promoting democracy abroad, but not all states with this capability necessarily pursue a policy of democracy promotion. Realism can explain the broad contours of political expansion, but it cannot capture within the terms of the factors it privileges variation in the specific content of interests or policy choice. Realist behavioral expectations are overly general; they follow from a positional logic, independent of the properties or intentions unique to states. The conceptual frame of nationalism and national identity help to explain why the United States defines its political interests in terms of democracy promotion.
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Unilateralism Good: Shouldnt Kick Us Off the Planet
THE US HAS MADE AN UNPRECEDENTED CONTRIBUTION TO THE WELFARE, RIGHTS, FREEDOM, AND SURVIVAL OF PEOPLE AROUND THE WORLD
Ralph Peters, Retired Army Officer, 2005, New Glory: Expanding Americas Global Supremacy, p. 14-5
Begin with the United States of America, the greatest force for freedom and change in history. We, the American people, are humankinds pioneers. Our ancestors cultivated a natural wilderness. Americans of the twenty-first century confront a wilderness of flesh and blood in a world terrified by the virtues that we treasure, from religious intolerance to the rule of law, from the dignity of every man and woman to the rejection of hereditary power. Erupting with freedom, America challenges the world. We expose lies that justified thousands of years of tyrannies, proving that birth need not determine destiny. We demonstrate freedoms potential for all. And those we robbed of authority will not forgive us. Each day we expand the frontiers of human possibility. Those who insist on limits are our enemies. It is their choice, not ours. The great struggle of the twenty-first century will rage between those, led by America, who believe that men and women have the right to shape their own lives, and those who believe themselves entitled to shape the lives of others. We will prevail, but the rearguard actions fought on behalf of decayed traditions and murderous beliefs will rage beyond our lifetimes. Without the sacrifices of our forebears, most human beingsperhaps allwould live under tyranny. Without the Americans of today and our English-speaking brethren, dictators would again rise without hindrance. Because of us, freedom and the dignity of the common man and woman have become the ideal of a reordered humanity. We have lifted the weight of history from the shoulders of many millions. And we are far from finished. Our country is a force for good without precedent. We embody the revolutionary proposition that men and women can govern themselves from below, to the benefit of all, instead of being governed from above, to the benefit of a few. Our pride does not rely upon purity of blood or religious monopoly, but upon what multiple races and creeds have built with sweat and sacrifice. Our ancestors were not children of privilege, but men and women who refused to accept the limits of the lands they left behind. The new Americans who arrive to increase our Americans rejected the safety of submission for a chance to stride upright. And we have learned to live together without hatred, if not without passing rancor. It is an achievement few other lands can claim and none could claim it but for our example. Our progress has not been easy. Some of our ancestors fled chains. Others arrived in chains. Some wore chains as they lived upon our soil. Our past has been imperfect. But unlike others, we do not deny our mistakes. That alone sets us apart from the rest of the world. When Americans stumble, we get back up. We do not wallow in a self-made mire and call it the will of God or the hand of fate. To err may be human, but to roll up your sleeves and fix what went wrong is American. We bear within us all the faults that humanity can manifest. But we do not surrender to those faults. While others cling to past glories, we know that our greatest days still lie ahead. For all the complaints we must bear about America the price of our success and the product of human jealousy only imagine what this world would be like without us. Some may answer that proposition smugly, mocking us from foreign realms of failure. But their children line up to apply for US visas. And those who complain about their American birthright rarely leave to live their lives abroad. All men and women dream. Americans forge their dreams into reality. CONTINUES Few of those hardworking Americans think of themselves as revolutionaries. Yet we live in the most revolutionary society in history. We upset oppressive traditions that endured, unchallenged, for millennia. Defiantly, we created new possibilities. The average American with a social security number, a drivers license and a mortgage is a revolutionary to the degree that reveals Karl Marx and Che Guevara as dilettantes. While revolutionaries elsewhere sought to impose arid philosophies on humankind at the cost of hundreds of millions of innocent lives we created a perpetual revolution of the people, by the people, and for the people.
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Unilateralism Good: U.S. Exceptionalism Bad Answers
GLOBAL SECURITY DEMANDS US EXCEPTIONALISM
Robert Kagan, Carnegie Endowment, 2004, American Power in the 21st Century, eds. David Held & Mathias Koenig- Archibugi, p. 163 The problem lies neither in American will or capability, then, but precisely in the inherent moral tension of the current international situation. As is so often the case in human affairs, the real question is one of the intangibles of fears, passions, and beliefs. The problem is that the United States must sometimes play by the rules of a Hobbesian world, even though in doing so it violates European norms. It must refuse to abide by certain international conventions that may constrain its ability to fight effectively in Robert Coopers jungle. It must support arms control, but not always for itself. It must live by a double standard. And it must sometimes act unilaterally, not out of a passion for unilateralism but, given a weak Europe that has moved beyond power, because the United States has no choice but to act unilaterally. Few Europeans admit, as Cooper does implicitly, that such American behavior may redound to the greater benefit of the civilized world, that American power, even employed under a double standard, may be the best means of advancing human progressand perhaps the only means. Instead, many Europeans today have come to consider the United States itself to be the outlaw, a rogue colossus. Europeans have complained about President Bushs unilateralism, but they are coming to the deeper realization that the problem is not Bush or any American president. It is systemic. And it is incurable.
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*** Hegemony Bad ***
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Hegemony Bad: Frontline
We control uniqueness collapse of primacy is inevitable by 2030.
Christopher LAYNE, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, 2007 ["The Case Against the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 64-65 BATMAN]
//
Can the United States Be Caught? Up to a point, the primacists are correct. In terms of hard power, there is a yawning gap between the United States and the next-ranking powers. It will take some time before any other state emerges as a true peer competitor of the United States. Nevertheless, at some point within the next decade or two, new great power rivals to the United States will emerge. To put it slightly differently, American primacy cannot be sustained indefinitely.
The relative power position of great powers is dynamic, not static, which means that at any point in time some states are gaining in relative power while others are losing it. Thus , as Paul Kennedy has observed, no great power ever has been able to remain permanently ahead of all others, because that would imply a freezing of the differentiated pattern of growth rates, technological advance, and military developments which has existed since time immemorial.36 Even the most ardent primacists know this to be true, which is why they concede that American primacy wont last forever. Indeed, the leading primacists acknowledge, thatat bestthe United States will not be able to hold onto its primacy much beyond 2030. There are indications, however, that American primacy could end much sooner than that. Already there is evidence suggesting that new great powers are in the process of emerging. This is what the current debate in the United States about the implications of Chinas rise is all about. But China isnt the only factor in play, and transition from U.S. primacy to multipolarity may be much closer than primacists want to admit. For example, in its survey of likely international developments up until 2020,
the CIAs National Intelligence Councils report Mapping the Global Future notes: The likely emergence of China and India as new major global playerssimilar to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the United States in the early 20th centurywill transform the geopolitical landscape, with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two. In the same way that commentators refer to the 1900s as the American Century, the early 21st century may be seen as the time when some in the developing world led by China and India came into their Own. In a similar vein, a recent study by the CIAs Strategic Assessment Group projects that by 2020 both China (which Mapping the Global Future pegs as by any measure a first-rate military power around 2020) and the European Union will come close to matching the United States in terms of their respective shares of world power.38 For sure, there are always potential pitfalls in projecting current trends several decades into the future (not least is that it is not easy to convert economic power into effective military power). But if the ongoing shift in the distribution of relative power continues, new poles of power in the
international system are likely to emerge during the next decade or two. The real issue is not if American primacy will end, but how soon it will end.
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Hegemony Bad: Frontline
A transition to offshore balancing is inevitable the only question is whether the U.S. will accept limits on its power or if it will go down fighting. The affirmatives attempt to preserve primacy only delays the inevitable transition while escalating conflicts our evidence is most comparative. Christopher LAYNE, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, 2006
["The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment," International Security, Volume 31, Number 2, Fall, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project Muse, p. // BATMAN]
The United States has a hegemony problem because it wields hegemonic power. To reduce the fear of U.S. power, the United States must accept some reduction in its relative hard power by adopting a multipolarand essentially unilateraloffshore balancing strategy that accommodates the rise of new great powers . 130 It also must rein in the scope of its extravagant ambitions to shape the international system in accordance with its Wilsonian ideology. The United States does not need to be an extraregional hegemon to be secure. Its quest for hegemony is driven instead by an ideational, deterritorialized conception of security divorced from the traditional metrics of great power grand strategy: the distribution of power in the international system and geography. 131 Thus, to reduce others' concerns about its power, the United States must practice self-restraint (which is different from choosing to be constrained by others by adopting a multilateral approach to grand strategy). An America [End Page 40] that has the wisdom and prudence to contain itself is less likely to be feared than one that begs the rest of the world to stop it before it expands hegemonically again . If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint, it probably will, at some point, have to fight to uphold its primacy, which is a potentially dangerous strategy. Maintaining U.S. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle, especially given that U.S. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion. Paradoxically, attempting to sustain U.S. primacy may well hasten its end by stimulating more intensive efforts to balance against the United States, thus causing the United States to become imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power. Rather than risking these outcomes, the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. Unilateral offshore balancing, indeed, is America's next grand strategy.
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Hegemony Bad: Frontline
A UNIPOLAR POWER IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD WILL SPREAD CONFLICT, NOT CONTAIN IT
Steven Weber, Director of the Institute for International Studies, Berkeley, Foreign Policy, Jan/Feb 2007., p. 48 That's nice work if you can get it. But the United States almost certainly cannot. Not only because other countries won't let it, but, more profoundly, because that line of thinking is faulty. The predominance of American power has many benefits, but the management of globalization is not one of them. The mobility of ideas, capital, technology, and people is hardly new. But the rapid advance of globalization's evils is. Most of that advance has taken place since 1990. Why? Because what changed profoundly in the 1990s was the polarity of the international system. For the first time in modern history, globalization was superimposed onto a world with a single superpower. What we have discovered in the past 15 years is that it is a dangerous mixture. The negative effects of globalization since 1990 are not the result of globalization itself. They are the dark side of American predominance. THE DANGERS OF UNIPOLARIT A straightforward piece of logic from market economics helps explain why unipolarity and globalization don't mix. Monopolies, regardless of who holds them, are almost always bad for both the market and the monopolist. We propose three simple axioms of "globalization under unipolarity" that reveal these dangers. Axiom 1: Above a certain threshold of power, the rate at which new global problems are generated will exceed the rate at which old problems are fixed Power does two things in international politics: It enhances the capability of a state to do things, but it also increases the number of things that a state must worry about. At a certain point, the latter starts to overtake the former. It's the familiar law of diminishing returns. Because powerful states have large spheres of influence and their security and economic interests touch every region of the world, they are threatened by the risk of things going wrong-anywhere. That is particularly true for the United States, which leverages its ability to go anywhere and do anything through massive debt. No one knows exactly when the law of diminishing returns will kick in. But, historically, it starts to happen long before a single great power dominates the entire globe, which is why large empires from Byzantium to Rome have always reached a point of unsustainability. That may already be happening to the United States today, on issues ranging from oil dependency and nuclear proliferation to pandemics and global warming. What Axiom 1 tells you is that more U.S. power is not the answer; it's actually part of the problem. A multipolar world would almost certainly manage the globe's pressing problems more effectively. The larger the number of great powers in the global system, the greater the chance that at least one of them would exercise some control over a given combination of space, other actors, and problems. Such reasoning doesn't rest on hopeful notions that the great powers will work together. They might do so. But even if they don't, the result is distributed governance, where some great power is interested in most every part of the world through productive competition Axiom 2: In an increasingly networked world, places that fall between the networks are very dangerous places-and there will be more ungoverned zones when there is only one network to join The second axiom acknowledges that highly connected networks can be efficient, robust, and resilient to shocks. But in a highly connected world, the pieces that fall between the networks are increasingly shut off from the benefits of connectivity. These problems fester in the form of failed states, mutate like pathogenic bacteria, and, in some cases, reconnect in subterranean networks such as al Qaeda. The truly dangerous places are the points where the subterranean networks touch the mainstream of global politics and economics. What made Afghanistan so dangerous under the Taliban was not that it was a failed state. It wasn't. It was a partially failed and partially connected state that worked the interstices of globalization through the drug trade, counterfeiting, and terrorism Can any single superpower monitor all the seams and back alleys of globalization? Hardly. In fact, a lone hegemon is unlikely to look closely at these problems, because more pressing issues are happening elsewhere, in places where trade and technology are growing. By contrast, a world of several great powers is a more interest-rich environment in which nations must look in less obvious places to find new sources of advantage. In such a system, it's harder for troublemakers to spring up, because the cracks and seams
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of globalization are held together by stronger ties Axiom 3: Without a real chance to find useful allies to counter a superpower, opponents will try to neutralize power, by going underground, going nuclear, or going "bad. Axiom 3 is a story about the preferred strategies of the weak. It's a basic insight of international relations that states try to balance power. They protect themselves by joining groups that can hold a hegemonic threat at bay. But what if there is no viable group to join? In today's unipolar world, every nation from Venezuela to North Korea is looking for a way to constrain American power. But in the unipolar world, it's harder for states to join together to do that. So they turn to other means. They play a different game. Hamas, Iran, Somalia, North Korea, and Venezuela are not going to become allies anytime soon. Each is better off finding other ways to make life more difficult for Washington. Going nuclear is one way. Counterfeiting U.S. currency is another. Raising uncertainty about oil supplies is perhaps the most obvious method of all Here's the important downside of unipolar globalization. In a world with multiple great powers, many of these threats would be less troublesome. The relatively weak states would have a choice among potential partners with which to ally, enhancing their influence. Without that more attractive choice, facilitating the dark side of globalization becomes the most effective means of constraining American power The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity, and the United States is bearing most of the burden. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. There's effectively a market out there for proliferation, with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon). The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand, to the detriment of U.S. national security.
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Hegemony Bad: Frontline
MULTIPOLARITY CRITICAL TO SOLVE PROLIFERATION, DISEASE, TERRORISM
Steven Weber, Director of the Institute for International Studies, Berkeley, Foreign Policy, Jan/Feb 2007., p. 48 How would things be different in a multipolar world? For starters, great powers could split the job of policing proliferation, and even collaborate on some particularly hard cases. It's often forgotten now that, during the Cold War, the only state with a tougher nonproliferation policy than the United States was the Soviet Union. Not a single country that had a formal alliance with Moscow ever became a nuclear power. The Eastern bloc was full of countries with advanced technological capabilities in every area except one-nuclear weapons. Moscow simply wouldn't permit it. But today we see the uneven and inadequate level of effort that non-superpowers devote to stopping proliferation. The Europeans dangle carrots at Iran, but they are unwilling to consider serious sticks. The Chinese refuse to admit that there is a problem. And the Russians are aiding tan's nuclear ambitions. When push comes to shove, nonproliferation today is almost entirely America's burden. The same is true for global public health. Globalization is turning the world into an enormous petri dish for the incubation of infectious disease. Humans cannot outsmart disease, because it just evolves too quickly. Bacteria can reproduce a new generation in less dian 30 minutes, while it takes us decades to come up with a new generation of antibiotics. Solutions are only possible when and where we get the upper hand. Poor countries where humans live in close proximity to farm animals are the best place to breed extremely dangerous zoonotic disease. These are often the same countries, perhaps not entirely coincidentally, that feel threatened by American power. Establishing an early warning system for these diseases-exactly what we lacked in the case of SARS a few years ago and exactly what we lack for avian flu today-will require a significant level of intervention into the very places that don't want it. That will be true as long as international intervention means American interference. The most likely sources of the next ebola or HIV-like pandemic are the countries that simply won't let U.S. or other Western agencies in, including the World Health Organization. Yet the threat is too arcane and not immediate enough for the West to force the issue. What's needed is another great power to take over a piece of the work, a power that has more immediate interests in the countries where diseases incubate and one that is seen as less of a threat. As long as the United States remains the world's lone superpower, we're not likely to get any help. Even after HlV, SARS, and several years of mounting hysteria about avian flu, the world is still not ready for a viral pandemic in Southeast Asia or sub-Saharan Africa. America can't change that alone. If there were rival great powers with different cultural and ideological leanings, globalization's darkest problem of all-terrorism-would also likely look quite different. The pundits are partly right: Today's international terrorism owes something to globalization. Al Qaeda uses the Internet to transmit messages, it uses credit cards and modern banking to move money, and it uses cell phones and laptops to plot attacks. But it's not globalization that turned Osama bin Laden from a small-time Saudi dissident into the symbolic head of a radical global movement. What created Osama bin Laden was the predominance of American power. A terrorist organization needs a story to attract resources and recruits. Oftentimes, mere frustration over political, economic, or religious conditions is not enough. Al Qaeda understands that, and, for that reason, it weaves a narrative of global jihad against a "modernization," "Westernization," and a "JudeoChristian" threat. There is really just one country that both spearheads and represents that threat: the United States. And so the most efficient way for a terrorist to gain a reputation is to attack the United States. The logic is the same for all monopolies. A few years ago, every computer hacker in the world wanted to bring down Microsoft, just as every aspiring terrorist wants to create a spectacle of destruction akin to the September 11 attacks inside the United States. Al Qaeda cells have gone after alternate targets such as Britain, Egypt, and Spain. But these are not the acts that increase recruitment and fundraising, or mobilize the energy of otherwise disparate groups around the world. Nothing enhances the profile of a terrorist like killing an American, something Abu Musab al-Zarqawi understood well in Iraq. Even if al Qaeda's deepest aspirations lie with the demise of the Saudi regime, the predominance of U.S. power and its role supporting the house of Saud makes America the only enemy really worth fighting. A multipolar world would surely confuse this kind of clear framing that pits Islamism against the West. What would be al Qaeda's message if the Chinese were equally involved in propping up authoritarian regimes in the Islamic, oil-rich Gulf states? Does the al Qaeda story work if half its enemy is neither Western nor Christian? RESTORING THE BALANCE The consensus today in the U.S.
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foreign-policy community is that more American power is always better. Across the board. For both the United States and the rest of the globe. The National security Strategy documents of 2002 and 2006 enshrine this consensus in phrases such as "a balance of power that favors freedom." The strategy explicitly defines the "balance" as a continued imbalance, as the United States continues "dissuading potential competitors ... from challenging the United States, its allies, and its partners." In no way is U.S. power inherently a bad thing. Nor is it true that no good comes from unipolarity. But there are significant downsides to the imbalance of power. That view is hardly revolutionary. It has a long pedigree in U.S. foreignpolicy thought. It was the perspective, for instance, that George Kennan brought to the table in the late 1940s when he talked about the desirability of a European superpower to restrain the United States. Although the issues today are different than they were in Kennan's time, it's still the case that too much power may, as Kennan believed, lead to overreach. It may lead to arrogance. It may lead to insensitivity to the concerns of others. Though Kennan may have been prescient to voice these concerns, he couldn't have predicted the degree to which American unipolarity would lead to such an unstable overlap with modern-day globalization. America has experienced this dangerous burden for 15 years, but it still refuses to see it for what it really is. Antiglobalization sentiment is coming today from both the right and the left. But by blaming globalization for what ails the world, the U.S. foreign-policy community is missing a very big part of what is undermining one of the most hopeful trends in modern history-the reconnection of societies, economies, and minds that political borders have kept apart for far too long. America cannot indefinitely stave off the rise of another superpower. But, in today's networked and interdependent world, such an event is not entirely a cause for mourning. A shift in the global balance of power would, in fact, help the United States manage some of the most costly and dangerous consequences of globalization. As the international playing field levels, the scope of these problems and the threat they pose to America will only decrease. When that happens, the United States will find globalization is a far easier burden to bear
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Hegemony Bad: Frontline
U.S. HEGEMONY CAUSES GLOBAL WAR; ISOLATIONISM WILL PRODUCE A NET INCREASE IN PEACE Gabriel Kolko, historian of modern warfare, THE AGE OF WAR: THE UNITED STATES CONFRONTS THE WORLD, 2006, p. 173-6 At the beginning of the twenty-first century, only the United States has the will to maintain a global foreign policy and to intervene everywhere it believes necessary. Today and in the near future, the United States will make the decisions that will lead to war or peace, and the fate of much of the world is largely in its hands. It possesses the arms and a spectrum of military strategies all predicated on a triumphant activist role for itself. It believes that its economy can afford interventionism and that the American public will support whatever actions necessary to set the affairs of some country or region on the political path it deems essential. This grandiose ambition is bipartisan, and details notwithstanding, both parties have always shared a consensus on it. The obsession with power and the conviction that armies can produce the political outcome a nation's leaders desire is by no means an exclusively American illusion. It is a notion that goes back many centuries and has produced the main wars of modern times. The rule of force has been with humankind a very long time, and the assumptions behind it have plagued its history for centuries. But unlike the leaders of most European nations or Japan, US leaders have not gained insight from the calamities that have so seared modern history. Folly is scarcely a US monopoly, but resistance to learning when grave errors have been committed is almost proportionate to the resources available to repeat them. The Germans learned their lesson after two defeats, the Japanese after World War II, and both nations found wars too ehausting and politically dangerous. The United States still believes that if firepower fails to master a situation, the solution is to use it more precisely and much more of it. In this regard it is exceptional past failures have not made it any wiser. Wars are at least as likely today as any time over the past century. Of great importance is the end of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and Moscow's restraining influence elsewhere. But the proliferation of nuclear technology and other means of mass destruction have also made large parts of the world far more dangerous. Deadly local wars with conventional weapons in Africa, the Balkans, Middle East, and elsewhere have multiplied since the 1960s. Europe, especially Germany, and Japan, are far stronger and more independent than at any time since 1945, and China's rapidly expanding economy has given it a vastly more important role in Asia. Ideologically, communism's demise means that the simplified bipolarism that Washington used to explain the world ceased after 1990 to have any value. With it, the alliances created nominally to resist communism have either been abolished or are a shadow of their original selves; they have no reason for existence. The crisis in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), essentially, reflects this diffusion of all forms of power and the diminution of US hegemony. Economically, the capitalist nations have resumed their rivalries, and they have become more intense with the growth of their economies and the decline in the dollarwhich by 2004 was as weak as it has been in over fifty years. These states have a great deal in common ideologically, but concretely they are increasingly rivals. The virtual monopoly of nuclear weapons that existed about a quarter-century ago has ended with proliferation.?, Whether it is called a "multipolar" world, to use French president Jacques Chirac's expression in November 2004, in which Europe, China, India, and even eventually South America follow their own interests, or something else, the direction is clear. There may or may not be "a fundamental restructuring of the global order," as the chairman of the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) National Intelligence Council presciently reflected in April 2003, but the conclusion was unavoidable "that we are facing a more fluid and complicated set of alignments than anything we have seen since the formation of the Atlantic alliance in 1949." Terrorism and the global economy have defied overwhelming US military power: "Our smart bombs aren't that smart."' Wars, whether civil or between states, remain the principal (but scarcely the only) challenge confronting humanity in the twenty-first century. Ecological disasters relentlessly affecting all dimensions of the environment are also insidious because of the unwillingness of the crucial nationsabove all the United Statesto adopt measures essential for reversing their damage. The challenges facing humanity have never been so complex and threatening, and the end of the Cold War, although one precondition of progress, is scarcely reason for complaceriby or optimism. The problems the world confronts far transcend the communist-capitalist tensions, many of which were mainly symptoms of the far greater intellectual, political, and economic problems that plagued the world before 1917and still exist. Whatever the original intention, US interventions can lead to open-ended commitments in both duration and effort. They may last a short time, and usually do, but unforeseen events can cause the United States to spend far more resources than it originally anticipated, causing it in the name of its credibility, or some other doctrine, to get into disastrous I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of orange juice.
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situations that in the end defeat the United States. Vietnam is the leading example of this tendency, but Iraq, however different in degree, is the same in kind. Should the United States confront even some of the forty or more nations that now have terrorist networks, then it will in one manner or another intervene everywhere, but especially in Africa and the Middle East. The consequences of such commitments will be unpredictable. The United States has more determined and probably more numerous enemies today than at any time, and many of those who hate it are ready and able to inflict destruction on its shores. Its interventions often triumphed in the purely military sense, which is all the Pentagon worries about, but in all too many cases they have been political failures and eventually led to greater US military and political involvement. Its virtually instinctive activist mentality has caused it to get into situations where it often had no interests, much less durable solutions to a nation's problems, repeatedly creating disasters and enduring enmities. The United States has power without wisdom and cannot, despite its repeated experiences, recognize the limits of its ultrasophisticated military technology. The result has been folly and hatred, which is a recipe for disasters. September 11 confirmed that, and war has come to its shores. That the United States end its self-appointed global mission of regulating all problems, wherever, whenever, or however it wishes to do so, is an essential precondition of stemming, much less reversing, the accumulated deterioration of world affairs and wars. We should not ignore the countless ethical and other reasons it has no more right or capacity to do so than any state over the past century, whatever justifications they evoked. The problems, as the history of the past century shows, are much greater than the US role in the world: but at the present time its actions are decisive, and whether there is War or peace will be decided far more often in Washington than any other place. Ultimately, there will not be peace in the world unless all nations relinquish war as an instrument of policy, not only because of ethical or moral reasoning but because wars have become deadlier and more destructive of social institutions. A precondition of peace is for nations not to attempt to impose their visions on others, adjudicate their differences, and never to assume that their need for the economic or strategic resources of another country warrants interference of any sort in its internal affairs. But September 11 proved that after a half-century of interventions the United States has managed to provoke increasing hatred. It has failed abysmally to bring peace and security to the world. Its role as a rogue superpower and its promiscuous, cynical interventionism has been spectacularly unsuccessful, even on its own terms. It is squandering vast economic resources, and it has now endangered the physical security of Americans at home. To end the damage the United States causes abroad is also to fulfill the responsibilities that US politicians have to their own people. But there is not the slightest sign at this point that voters will call them to account, and neither the AMerican population nor its political leaders are likely to agree to Rich far-reaching changes in foreign policy. The issues are far too grave to wait for US attitudes and its political process to be transformed. The world will be safer to the extent that US alliances are dissolved and it is isolated, and that is happening for many reasons, ranging from the unilateralism, hubris, and preemptory style of the Bush administration to the fact that since the demise of communism, the world's political alignments have changed dramatically. Communism and fascism were both outcomes of the fatal errors in the international order and affairs of states that World War I spawned. In part, the Soviet system's disintegration was the result of the fact it was the aberrant consequence of a destructive and abnormal war, 11,);t at least as important was its leaders' loss of confidence in socialism. And suicidal Muslims are, to a great extent, the outcome of a half-century of US interference in the Middle East and Islamic world, which radicalized so many young men and women ready to die for faith. Just as the wars of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 created Bolsheviks, the repeated grave errors of the United States, however different the context or times, have produced their own abnormal, negative reactions. The twenty-first century has begun very badly because the United States continues with its aggressive policies. They are far more dangerous than those of the twentieth century. The destructive potential of weaponry has increased exponentially, and many more people and nations have access to it. What would once have been considered relatively minor foreign policy problems now have potentially far greater consequences. It all augurs very badly. The world has reached the most dangerous point in recent, or perhaps all of, history. There are threats of war and instability unlike anything that prevailed when a Soviet-led bloc existed. Even if the United States abstains from interference and tailors its actions to fit this troubled reality, there will be serious problems throughout much of the world. Internecine civil conflicts will continue, as well as wars between nations armed with an increasing variety of much more destructive weapons available from outside powers, of which the United States remains, by far, the most important source. Many of these conflicts have independent roots, and both principles and experiences justify the United States staying out of them and leaving the world alone. Both the American people and those involved directly will be far better off without foreign interference, whatever nation attempts it. US leaders are not creating peace or security at home or stability abroad. The reverse is the case: its interventions have been counterproductive, and its foreign policy is a disaster. Americans and those people who are the objects of successive administrations' efforts would be far better off if the United States did nothing, closed its bases overseas and withdrew its fleets everywhere, and allowed the rest of world to find its own way. Communism is dead, and Europe and Japan are
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powerful and both can and will take care of their own interests. The United States must adapt to these facts. But if it continues as it has over the past half-century, attempting to satisfy its vainglorious but irrational ambition to run the world, then there will be even deeper crises and it will inflict wars and turmoil on many nations as well as on its own people. And it will fail yet again, for all states that have gone to war over the past centuries have not achieved the objectives for which they sacrificed so much blood, passion, and resources. They have only produced endless misery and upheavals of every kind.
THE MERE POSESSION OF HEGEMONY WILL TRIGGER COUNTERBALANCING
Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Freier is Director of National Security Affairs at the US Army War Colleges Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), PARAMETERS, August 2006, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06autumn/freier.htm Finally, with respect to the third source of strengthan American population inured to the high cost of primacyit is important to remember that great power, latent or otherwise, will invariably engender some general resistance from the less powerful. This is less a matter of theologygood versus evilthan it is one of natural or social lawthe instincts of fight or flight, or the conflict between haves and have-nots. In particular, an activist great power like the United States, no matter its motives, can expect that even modest employment of its enormous capacity will provoke substantial physical and political resistance from some quarters. Additionally, it is inevitable that a continuing perception of American unilateralism among some will trigger active balancing behavior as well. Friend and foe alike who perceive dangerous inequity in the global distribution of power or who sense in the current distribution of power a more fundamental, existential challenge will seek to effectively limit American influence through recourse to active resistance and obstruction. Thus, the mere possession and retention of dominant influence, as well as its active employment, will engender some substantial cost. Americans and those who are decisive in shaping their beliefs need to become accustomed to these costs. Without some recognition of them, the United States hazards popular repudiation of international activism.
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Hegemony Bad: Frontline
GREAT POWER FOREIGN POLICY ACTIVISM IS UNSUSTAINABLE
Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Freier is Director of National Security Affairs at the US Army War Colleges Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), PARAMETERS, August 2006, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06autumn/freier.htm With regard to Iraq specifically, there are real indications that the broad costs associated with American great-power activism there are increasingly prohibitive to many Americans. Indeed, this appears to be translating into a more generalized rejection of those activist foreign and security policies that might be essential to the retention of dominant great power into the indefinite future. If one accepts that the nations unique position of strength relies on continued activism, then it is safe to assume that increased popular sentiment against activism places that position in some significant jeopardy. Allowed to continue, this trend is certain to affect the strategic decisionmaking of those vulnerable at the ballot box. Collective self-doubt, excessive caution, and self-deterrence are natural by-products of a popular rejection of activism. Thus, as a result, the active retention of the nations position and influence may at some point become unsustainable.
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Hegemony Bad: Frontline
TURN U.S. HEGEMONY PREVENTS US FROM EMERGING AS AN OFFSHORE BALANCER HEGEMONIC DECLINE IS INEVITABLE IT IS BETTER TO LET IT DECLINE NOW SO WE CAN CHOOSE OUR STRATEGIC POSITION IN THE WORLD
Christopher Layne, Visiting Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, 1998
[World Policy Journal, Rethinking American grand strategy: Hegemony or balance of power in the twenty-first century? vol. 15 iss. 2, Summer, proquest] My argument for adopting an alternative grand strategy is prospective: although it may be sustainable for perhaps another decade, American hegemony cannot be maintained much beyond that period. The changing distribution of power in the inter- national system--specifically, the relative decline of U.S. power and the corresponding rise of new great powers-will render the strategy of preponderance untenable. This strategy is also being undermined because the credibility of America 's extended deterrence strategy is eroding rapidly. Over time, the costs and risks of the strategy of preponderance will rise to unacceptably high levels. The time to think about alternative grand strategic futures is now-before the United States is overtaken by events. In advocating an offshore balancing strategy, I do not deprecate those who believe that bad things (increased geopolitical instability) could happen if the United States were to abandon the strategy of preponderance. Indeed, they may; however, that is only half of the argument. The other half, seldom acknowledged by champions of preponderance, is that bad things--perhaps far worse things--could happen if the United States stays on its present strategic course. Grand strategies must be judged by the amount of security they provide; whether they are sustainable; their cost; the degree of risk they entail; and their tangible and intangible domestic effects. Any serious debate about U.S. grand strategy must use these criteria to assess the comparative merits of both the current grand strategy and its competitors. The time is rapidly approaching when the strategy of preponderance will be unable to pass these tests. The suggestion that the days of American hegemony are numbered no doubt will be met with disbelief by advocates of the current grand strategy. This is unsurprising. Having fulfilled their hegemonic ambitions following the Soviet Union 's collapse, the advocates of preponderance want to keep the world the way it is. American grand strategists view the prospect of change in international politics in much the same way that British prime minister Lord Salisbury did toward the end of the nineteenth century. "What ever happens will be for the worse," Salisbury said, "and therefore it is in our interest that as little should happen as possible." However, it is the very fact of the Soviet Union 's collapse that has knocked the props out from under the strategy of preponderance. The United States could be hegemonic only because the Soviet threat caused others to accept American preeminence as prefer- able to Soviet domination. The United States could enjoy the relative predictability and stability of the bipolar era only be- cause of the effects of bipolarity itself. Simply put, without the Cold War, America will not be able to preserve its Cold War preponderance or stability. International politics is dynamic, not static. As Paul Kennedy has observed, "It simply has not been given to any one society to remain permanently ahead of all the oth- ers...." The conditions that made American preponderance possible are changing rapidly. Make no mistake: sometime in the early decades of the twenty-first century, America 's grand strategy will no longer be preponderance. If the United States does not choose now to begin making the transition to a new grand strategy better suited to the new century's emerging international realities, events will force it to do so.
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Hegemony Bad: Frontline
MULTIPOLARITY SOLVES IT PREVENTS CONFLICT ESCALATION AND NUCLEAR WARMAKING Andreatta Filippo, adjunct professor of international relations, faculty of political science, University of Bologna, Forli, Daedalus, 2001 [Italy at a crossroads: The foreign policy of a medium power after the end of bipolarity Find Articles, Spring] Because the absence of a bipolar conflict severs the link between global and local equilibrium, multipolar systems tend to produce fragmented security arrangements, organized around various regional subsystems. Since threats and responses to them are no longer global in their implications, outside powers can afford to ignore distant conflicts that do not threaten their interests directly. In these circumstances, perceptions of a threat may depend upon geographic position, ideological orientation, or political preference, rather than merely upon membership in an alliance. Furthermore, even if the threat to a state's security is significant, the diffusion of power allows any state to balance this risk with external alliances rather than exclusively with internal rearmament. Reactions can be less automatic and more selective than in a bipolar system. The tendency of regional conflicts to blow up into global crises is therefore reduced, delayed, or eliminated. Regional powers with aggressive agendas can produce more local instability without necessarily triggering a superpower response. The absence of a nuclear deterrent is likely to produce a higher number of conventional wars. Conflicts in different regions will take different courses, depending on regional alliances and the relative strength of regional aggressors. Rather than a single global balance in which, according to Pierre Hassner, "peace is impossible, war unlikely," multipolar systems produce segmented systems in which "both peace and war" are likely to coexist in different places at the same time.
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Hegemony Bad: Frontline
US HEGEMONY LEADS TO A NEVER ENDING CYCLE OF WARS IN AN ATTEMPT TO CREATE A STABLE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AS AN OFFSHORE BALANCER WE COULD PREVENT THIS
Christopher Layne, Visiting Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, 1998
[World Policy Journal, Rethinking American grand strategy: Hegemony or balance of power in the twenty-first century? vol. 15 iss. 2, Summer, proquest] Indochina and Bosnia demonstrate how the strategy of preponderance expands America 's frontiers of insecurity. The posited connection between security and economic interdependence requires the United States to impose order on, and control over, the international system. To do so, it must continually enlarge the geographic scope of its strategic responsibilities to maintain the security of its already established interests. As the political scientist Robert H. Johnson observes, this process becomes self-sustain- ing because each time the United States pushes its security interests outward, threats to the new security frontier will be apprehended: "Uncertainty leads to self-extension, which leads in turn to new uncertainty and further self-extension." 16 Core and periphery are interdependent strategically; however, while the core remains constant, the turbulent frontier in the periphery is constantly expanding. One does not overstate in arguing that this expansion is potentially limitless. Former na- tional security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski recently has suggested, for example, that NATO expansion is just the first step toward creating an American-dominated "Trans Eurasian Security System" {TESS}, that ulti- mately will embrace Russia, China, Japan, India, and other countries-- a security struc- ture "that would span the entire {Eurasian} continent." 17 There is a suggestive parallel between late Victorian Britain and the United States today. The late- nineteenth-cenury British statesman Lord Rosebery, clearly recognized that economic interdependence could lead to strategic overextension: Our commerce is so universal and so penetrating that scarcely any question can arise in any part of the world without involving British interests. This consideration, instead of widening, rather circumscribes the field of our actions. For did we not strictly limit the principle of intervention we should always be simultaneously engaged in some forty wars. 18 Of course, it is an exaggeration to sug-gest that the strategy of preponderance will involve the United States in 40 wars simultaneously. It is not, however, an exag- geration to note that the need to defend America 's perceived interest in maintaining a security framework in which economic interdependence can flourish has become the primary post-Cold War rationale for expanding its security commitments in East Asia and in Europe. To preserve a security framework favorable to interdependence, the United States does not, in fact, intervene everywhere; however, the logic underlying the strategy of preponderance can be used to justify U.S. intervention anywhere.
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Collapse By 2030 2nd Line A2: Sustainable Collapse Inevitable (1/1)
(___) They say hegemony is sustainable, but: ____ Our 1nc Layne evidence answers this claim
History and the CIA are both on our side primacy is fundamentally unsustainable in a world of dynamic power relationships.
____
The question is not if but when primacy will inevitably collapse by 2030. Christopher LAYNE, Associate Professor of International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, 2006
[Impotent Power?, National Interest, Issue 85, September/October, Available Online via Academic Search Premier // BATMAN]
There already are indications that things are changing: American hegemony is beginning to wane and new great powers already are in the process of emerging . This is what the current debate about the implications of China's rise is all about in the United States. But China isn't the only factor in play, and transition from U.S. primacy to multipolarity may be much closer than primacists want to admit . For example, in its survey of likely international developments up until 2020, the CIA's National Intelligence Council's report Mapping the Global Future notes : The likely emergence of China and India as new major global players--similar to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the United States in the early 20th century--will transform the geopolitical landscape, with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two centuries. In the same way that commentators refer to the 1900s as the American Century, the early 21st century may be seen as the time when some in the developing world led by China and India came into their own .( n3) In a similar vein, a recent study by the CIA's Strategic Assessment Group projects that by 2020 both China (which Mapping the Global Future pegs as, "by any measure a first-rate military power" around 2020), and the European Union will come close to matching the United States in terms of their respective shares of world power .( n4) For
sure, there are always potential pitfalls in projecting current trends several decades into the future (not least that it is not easy to convert economic power into effective military power). But if the ongoing shift in the distribution of relative power
continues, new poles of power in the international system are likely to emerge during the next decade or two. The real issue is not if American primacy will end, but how soon it will end .
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Hegemony Bad: Doesnt Solve Global War
Primacy does not prevent a global nuclear exchange or create regional stability
Nina Hachigan and Monica Sutphen, Stanford Center for International Security, 2008, The Next American Century, p. 168-9 In practice, the strategy of primacy failed to deliver. While the fact of being the worlds only superpower has substantial benefits, a national security strategy based on suing and ratiaing primacy has not made America more secure. Americas military might has not been the answer to terrorism, disease, climate change, or proliferation. Iraq, Iran, and North Korea have become more dangerous in the last seven years, not less. Worse than being ineffec tive with transnational threats and smaller powers, a strategy of maintaining primacy is counterproductive when it comes to pivotal powers. If America makes primacy the main goal of its national security strategy, then why shouldnt the pivotal powers do the same? A goal of primacy signals that sheer strength is most critical to security. American cannot trumpet its desire to dominate the world military and then question why China is modernizing its military.
Unipolar hegemony is unsustainable and doesnt solve the terminal impacts David P. Calleo, September 2007, Survival, p. 73-8 (David Calleo Dean Acheson Professor; Director of the
European Studies Program; University Professor of The Johns Hopkins University)
Given our future's high potential for discord and destruction, having a hegemonic superpower already installed might seem a great good fortune. Yet, recent experience also reveals that America's global predominance has been seriously overestimated. Put to the test, American power counts for less than expected. While the United States is lavishly outfitted for high-technology warfare, pursuing a hegemonic agenda in today's world requires different capabilities for more primitive forms of combat, like countering guerrilla warfare and suicidal terrorism. The American military loathes this kind of fighting and, to date, has not been very good at it Greater success would seem to require a different sort of military - with more and cheaper troops, trained for intimate contact with the enemy, and prepared for high casualties. Controlling hostile populations will demand extensive linguistic and policing skills. The United States is now spending heavily to compensate for its deficiencies, but is still far short of the resources needed to prevail. This current shortage of means is a further blow to America's hegemonic expectations. Financial experience during the Cold War accustomed the United States to abundant credit from the world economy, with a good part of the exchange costs of America's world role eventually covered by others who accumulated the surplus dollars. During the Cold War, however, these others were allies dependent on American military protection. Today, while the United States' external deficit is bigger than ever, credit to finance it no longer depends on allies in urgent need of protection. Instead, credit comes increasingly from states whose indefinite accumulation of dollars seems contrary to their own long-term interests. China, for example, by continuing to add to its already immense reserves of surplus dollars, subsidises its own imports, together with American consumption and investment, but at the expense of its own more balanced internal development. Given the growing protectionism against its exports, it seems unreasonable to expect China to continue this practice indefinitely. If credit from China is restricted, the United States will face the tougher choices between guns and butter it has long been able to avoid. In the face of this unaccustomed constraint, how long will America's enthusiasm for hegemony endure?
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Hegemony Bad: Doesnt Solve Global War
U.S. decline has not produced hegemonic rivalry because the U.S. is not perceived as a threat, nor do other powers want to challenge the status quo
Richard N. Haass, President, Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs , May/June 2008 ,
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html?mode=print
The fact that classic great-power rivalry has not come to pass and is unlikely to arise anytime soon is also partly a result of the United States' behavior, which has not stimulated such a response. This is not to say that the United States under the leadership of George W. Bush has not alienated other nations; it surely has. But it has not, for the most part, acted in a manner that has led other states to conclude that the United States constitutes a threat to their vital national interests. Doubts about the wisdom and legitimacy of U.S. foreign policy are pervasive, but this has tended to lead more to denunciations (and an absence of cooperation) than outright resistance. A further constraint on the emergence of great-power rivals is that many of the other major powers are dependent on the international system for their economic welfare and political stability. They do not, accordingly, want to disrupt an order that serves their national interests. Those interests are closely tied to cross-border flows of goods, services, people, energy, investment, and technology -- flows in which the United States plays a critical role. Integration into the modern world dampens great-power competition and conflict. U.S. global leadership is no longer needed Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek International, 2008, The Post-American World, p. 244
In certain areas the South China Sea, for example U.S. military force is likely to be less relevant than that of China. In international negotiations, America will have to bargain and compromise with the others. Does all this add up to instability and disorder? Not necessarily. Two hundred years of Anglo-American hegemony has in fact created a system that is not as fragile is it might have been in the 1920s and 1930s. (When British power waned, American power was unwilling to stip in, and Europe fell through the cracks). The basic conception of the current system an open world economy, multilateral negotiations has wide acceptance. And new forms of cooperation are growing. Ann-Marie Slaughter has written about how legal systems are constructing a set of standards without anyones forcing them to do socreating a bottom-up, networked order. Not every issue will lend itself ot such stabilization, but many will. In other words, the search for a superpower solution to every problem may be futile and unnecessary. Small work-arounds might be just as effective.
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Hegemony Good Impact Answers
Khalizad is empirically false hegemony has not solved any global problems
Nina Hachigian is a senior fellow at the California office of the Center for American Progress. Mona Sutphen is a managing director at Stonebridge International LLC, a Washington-based international business consulting firm, Fall 2008, Washington Quarterly, http://www.twq.com/08autumn/docs/08autumn_hachigian.pdf When U.S. interests frame the analysis, the benefits that the rise of these powers delivers for the United States become clear. Although the United States will hold predominant power for a long time to come, that power is no longer sufficient to keep Americans safe and prosperous. Primacy has not been the answer to stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq, denuclearizing North Korea or Iran, defeating al Qaeda, addressing climate change, or resurrecting global trade. Only with other nations can the United States combat the true threats and best realize new opportunities.
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Hegemony Good Impact Answers
American unipolarity doesnt solve any impacts, Obama wont restore likablity David P. Calleo, Dean Acheson Professor; Director of the European Studies Program; University Professor of The Johns Hopkins UniversitySurvival, October 2008, p. 61-78 Americans have had trouble realising how revolutionary their unipolar vision can appear to others. A world system dominated by one superpower is a bold and radical programme. If successful, it would mean, for the first time in modern history, a world without a general balance of power. Pursuing such a goal implies numerous confrontations with other nations. It antagonises both states that fear decline and those that anticipate improve-ment. Nevertheless, the American political imagination now finds it difficult to entertain any other view of the world. Americans have been slow to see, let alone accept, what to many others seems a more probable and desirable future - a plural world with everal centres of power. Recent experience suggests that America's aggressive geopolitical stance is proving not merely unpopular but also dysfunctional. Washington's hegemonic pursuits have aroused a swarm of antagonists. Americans now find themselves not only at war in the Middle East, but alienating the Russians in Eurasia, the Chinese in the Far East, and the Europeans in Europe. Surveys of public opinion throughout the globe show an alarming popular hostility towards America. Used to thinking of their nation as a friend and benefactor of all mankind, Americans now see themselves resented and even hated in much of the world. It is tempting to believe that America's recent misadventures will discredit and suppress the country's hegemonic longings and that, following the presidential election of 2008, a new administration will abandon them. But so long as the nation's identity is intimately bound up with seeing itself as the world's most powerful country, hegemony is likely to remain the recurring obsession
of its official imagination, the id e fixe of its foreign policy. America's hegemonic ambitions have, after all, suffered severe setbacks before. Less than half a century has passed since the 'lesson of Vietnam'. But that lesson faded without forcing Americans to abandon the old fantasies of omnipotence. These merely went into remission, until the fall of the Soviet Union provided an irresistible occasion for their return. Arguably, the Soviet Union proved a greater danger to America's equilibrium in its collapse than in its heyday. Dysfunctional imaginations are hardly a rarity: 'reality' is never a clear picture that imposes itself from without. Imaginations need to collaborate. They synthesise old and new images, concepts and ideas, and fuse language with emotions, all according to the inner grammar of the human mind. These synthetic constructions become our reality, our way of depicting the world in which we live. Inevitably, our imaginations present us with only a partial picture. As Walter Lippmann once put it, our imaginations create a 'pseudoenvironment between ourselves and the world'.
Every individua ltherefore has his own particular vision of reality, and every nation tends to arrive at a favoured collective view that differs from the favoured views of other nations. When powerful and interdependent nations hold visions of the world severely at odds
. Today, with the world rapidly growing more plural in its distribution of power and wealth, a lingering unipolar world view isolates the United States from the reality to which it should be adapting. Accordingly, the country becomes a danger to itself and the world.
with one another, the world grows dangerous. Periods of fundamental geopolitical change are particularly challenging, charged, as they usually are, with fanatical projects and frightening possibilities. Comprehending and mastering big shifts in historical forces requires creative leaps of national imagination
When a nation as powerful as the United States defies, Canute-like, the onrushing historical tide, all the makings of a grand historical tragedy are at hand. Adding the United States to the world's list of failed hegemons would be a depressing outcome for America's
long and rich experiment with federal constitutionalism. But avoiding such a fate requires a resolute reshaping of the country's geopolitical imagination. This is a work of genuine national patriotism, requiring a firm turning away from the bombastic chauvinism of recent years. It means a tranquil acceptance of other great nations and sympathy for their accomplishments and sorrows, along with a lively sensitivity to the rich potential of the original sin that we share among ourselves. Like other great Western democracies, the United States has a healthy tradition of self-criticism that, with luck, will rouse it to save both itself and the world from egregious folly. In the present circumstances, Americans should start their collective examination of conscience by reflecting on why they have come to commit themselves so deeply to the unipolar world view, and why they have been so oblivious to its manifest inadequacy.
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Hegemony Bad: War
Primacy causes resentment and the rise of hostile great powers the risk of conflict is comparatively greater. Benjamin SCHWARZ, Correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly, AND Christopher LAYNE, Visiting Scholar at the
Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California and a MacArthur Foundation Fellow in Global Security, 2002 [A New Grand Strategy, Atlantic Monthly, Volume 289, Issue 1, January, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Premiere // BATMAN]
The rise of new great powers is inevitable, and America's very primacy accelerates this process. If Washington continues to follow an adult-supervision strategy, which treats its allies as irresponsible adolescents and China and Russia as future enemies to be suppressed, its relations with these emerging great powers will be increasingly dangerous, as they coalesce against what they perceive as an American threat . But that is not even the worst conceivable outcome. What if a sullen and resentful China were to align itself with Islamic fundamentalist groups? Such a situation is hardly beyond the realm of possibility; partners form alliances not because they are friends, or because they have common values, but because they fear someone else more than they fear each other.
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Hegemony Bad: Doesnt Solve Global War
ANTI-AMERICANISM MEANS THE U.S. NO LONGER STABILIZES THE WORLD
Julia Sweigh, Council on Foreign Relations, FRIENDLY FIRE, 2006, p. 36 Power thinkers-people who contemplate lofty-sounding concepts like America's "grand strategy"-may still, after Iraq, regard the United States as the centrifugal force of world stability, cooperation, and peace, and there may be many voices in the West who grudgingly or even readily agree, but the rise of Anti-America forces the question of whether U.S. power has itself caused instability, discord, and conflict. Of course, there are many other sources of global instability that have nothing to do with U.S. power But Anti-Americanisms strength today is now- tethered to the nation's collective mistake of having confused its power with leadership and legitimacy in a bloody, costly war of painful human toll. As it turns out, though, for all of the power, we do not possess a corresponding amount of leverage or influence-not with our allies, our dependents, the markets, the dollar, and certainly not with our enemies. Democrat and Republican White Houses long fueled the perception that the United States could be the world's panacea: the reality behind this myth-autocrats remain in power in the Middle East; Iraq is a mess; funding for democracy promotion has been cut; conflict, even genocide continues; poverty, disease, and misery define the lives of entire populations in Africa and Latin America that look to the United States for a lifeline-fueled anti-American resentment as it became clear that despite all of its power and highminded rhetoric, the United States has yet to deliver on the expectations its 1989 triumphalism created. US HEGEMONY NOT AS IMPORTANT AS IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD NO THREAT TO GLOBAL PEACE TODAY EQUIVALENT TO JAPAN AND GERMANY THEN Michael Mandelbaum, Professor Foreign Policy Johns Hopkins, 2005, The Case for Goliath: How America acts as the worlds government in the 21st Century, p. 189 No early twenty-first century of Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany is likely to appear. The twentieth-century ideologies of conquest fascism and communismhave been discredited and no comparable set of ideas, whose adherent could seize control of a powerful state and thus menace the world, are in circulation. The militant Islam of the early twentyfirst century does bear a resemblance to the twentieth centurys totalitarian ideologies but does not pose the same kind or the same magnitude as fascism and communism did. The Islamist ideology lacks appeal in the worlds most powerful countries and has had little success in gaining control of even less powerful, predominantly Muslim countries. LOSS OF US HEGEMONY WILL NOT CREATE DISORDER OTHER MECHANISMS FOR GLOBAL STABILITY EXIST Michael Mandelbaum, Professor Foreign Policy Johns Hopkins, 2005, The Case for Goliath: How America acts as the worlds government in the 21st Century, p. 201-2 The establishment of a world government is therefore no more likely to occur in the twenty-first century, even if the United States lowers its international profile considerably, than in the centuries preceding. Still, a substantial retraction of American power without the advent of a global authority to replace it would not necessarily plunge the world into deadly and costly disorder because government, whether formally constituted or supplied de facto by the United States, is not the only source of order in the international system.
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Hegemony Bad: Doesnt Solve Global War
EU CAN MAKE UP FOR LOSS OF US HEGEMONY
Michael Mandelbaum, Professor Foreign Policy Johns Hopkins, 2005, The Case for Goliath: How America acts as the worlds government in the 21st Century, p. 207 The remaking of Asia, or indeed other parts of the world, in Europes image does not, therefore, offer a promising way, in the short term, to replace the governmental services of the United States, should these cease to be available. Europes distinctive array of political and economic strengths do, however, make the EU itself a plausible candidate to assume some of the responsibilities of global governance.
EVERY EMPIRE HAS USED THE SAME JUSTIFICATION
Carl Boggs, Social Science Professor National University (L.A.) , 2005, Planetary Politics: human rights, terror, and global society, ed. Stephen Eric Bronner, p. 85 The US preemptive move into Iraq has ironically shown the entire word just how fragile the military juggernaut can be. The historical record is clear: armed force can achieve a string of military victories but it cannot sustain legitimacy in the form of popular support for imperial ambitions. Technowar, moreover, cannot serve as a viable tool of occupation. When the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, hoping to quell unrest and upsurge of anti-Communist ferment in other words to maintain its Great-Power controlthe aggression backfired terribly, doing egregious damage to Soviet interests. The superpower could impose its coercive rule briefly, but the action was internationally condemned, the Brezhnev regime emerged from the crisis as a pariah state, and the USSR suffered a loss of legitimacy across Eastern Europe from which it would never recover. In the 1980s the Afghanistan quagmire turned out to be the final blow against Soviet bloc hegemony. As with the French in Algeria, the Japanese in China, the Nazis in Russia, and the Americans in Vietnam, national chauvinism combined with militarism and imperial overreach turned out to be brutally self-defeating. Of course, the American political and media systems work indefatigably to convince the nation and the world that the US brand of imperial and military power is fundamentally different from anything in the past, embracing the most noble, democratic ends possible. As Edward Said writes:Every empire tells itself and the world that it is unlike all the other empires, that its mission is not to plunder and control but to liberate. These ideas are by no means shared by the people who inhabit that empire, but that hasnt prevented the US propaganda and policy apparatus from imposing its imperial perspective on Americans, whose sources of information about Arabs and Islam are woefully inadequate. Such an apparatus, however, will never be enough to guarantee the kind of ideological hegemony the United States will require to sustain its global domination over the coming decades. IRAQ FIASCO DEMONSTRATES THE DANGER ON BASING GLOBAL SECURITY ON AMERICAN BENEVOLENT HEGEMONY Francis Fukuyama, Professor International Studies Johns Hopkins, 2006, America at the Crossroads, p. 193-4 But the fact that these errors were made by the worlds sole superpower exposes the fatal flaw lying at the heart of a world order based on American benevolent hegemony. The hegemon has to be not just well-intentioned but also prudent and smart in its exercise of power. It was not Condoleezza Rice but Bill Clintons secretary of state Madeleine Albright who once asserted that Americans deserve to lead because they can see further than other people. If this were consistently true and widely acknowledged, the world would still only grudgingly concede primacy to the American judgment and wishes. If American judgment turns out to be more shortsighted than that of others, then our uniploar world is in for a rough ride.
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AMERICAS COLD-WAR LEADERSHIP CANNOT BE TRANSLATED INTO BENEVOLENT HEGEMONY MANY REASONS Francis Fukuyama, Professor International Studies Johns Hopkins, 2006, America at the Crossroads, p.
111-2
The notion that the American Cold War leadership role could be transformed into a posture of benevolent hegemony vis-vis the rest of the world contains within it a number of structural flaws and contradictions that make it untenable as a long-term basis for conceptualizing American foreign policy. First, benevolent hegemony rests on a belief in American exceptionalism that most non-Americans simply find not credible. The idea that the United States behaves disinterestedly on the world stage is not widely believed because it is for the most part not true and, indeed, could not be true if American leaders fulfill their responsibilities to the American people The United States is capable of acting generously in its provision of global public goods, and has been most generous when its ideals and self-interests have coincided. But the United States is also a great power with interests not related to global public goods. American presidents have to protect the often narrow economic interests of particular constituents; they have to worry about the security of energy supplies; they have to respond to the demands of various ethnic constituencies within the United States; and they need cooperation from a variety of countries regardless of how those countries treat their own citizens. There are plenty of global public goods, from African peacekeeping to abating carbon emissions, that the United States finds too burdensome to provide. The second problem with benevolent hegemony is that it presupposes an extremely high level of competence on the part of the hegemonic power. Many critics of the Bush administration in Europe and the Middle East before the Iraq war did not question the war on abstract normative grounds (that is, that it was not blessed by a second UN Security Council resolution). Rather, they wondered whether the administration really understood what was involved in the political transformation of the Middle East that it was undertaking. In these concerns, they were quite prescient. The final problem with benevolent hegemony lies in domestic American politics. There are sharp limits to the American peoples attention to foreign affairs and willingness to fund projects overseas that do not have clear benefit to US interests. September 11 changed that calculus in many ways, providing popular support for two wars in the Middle East and large increases in defense spending. But the durability of the support is uncertain: although most Americans want to do what is necessary to make the project of rebuilding Iraq succeed, the aftermath of the war did not increase public appetite for further costly interventions. A deeper problem lies in the fact that Americans are not, at heart, an imperial people. Even benevolent hegemons sometimes have to act ruthlessly, and they need a staying power that does not come easily to people who are reasonably content with their own lives and society.
EVEN BENEVOLENT EMPIRE FAILS LEGITIMIZES VIOLENCE
John Brady Kiesling, State Department Diplomat who resigned over 2003 Iraq War, 2006, Diplomacy Lessons: realism for an unloved superpower, p. 45 The nation-state may turn out to have been a passing fad, to be replaced by some more efficient and humane way of mobilizing people and their resources around the collective long-term goal of human survival. If so, the change will not be made during this generation, nor will America lead the process. Our own politicians are too insular, too content to make cheap use of Americans own powerful nationalist instincts. Nor is restored imperialism an option. Americans are correctly skeptical of using military might to maintain an empire, even the benevolent one proposed by imperial dreamers such as Max Boot and Niall Ferguson. The intervention of foreigners in the inner workings of a struggling state hands the most violent faction in that state, Hamas for example, a source of legitimacy violent resistance to outsiders more powerful than any its more humane competitors can generate to compete with it. The superpower soon discovers that in resisting such violence it has forfeited any credibility of its aspirations to impose government by the consent of the governed. Benevolent empire becomes a prohibitively expensive exercise in national vanity.
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U.S. HEGEMONY DOES NOT ENABLE THE U.S. TO COMPEL ACTION AND STABILIZE SOCIETIES
Christopher Layne, National Interest, Fall 2006, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_85/ai_n16832448 During the last several years it seems as if every major book or article on American grand strategy contains the observation that the United States is more powerful than any international actor since the Roman Empire was at its zenith. At the same time, however, the U.S. failures to suppress the insurgency in Iraq and to stabilize Afghanistan have caused many foreign policy analysts to ask, "Why is it that the United States with all its hegemonic power cannot seem to get its way and attain its objectives in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, and in its disputes with powers like Iran and North Korea?" There is a paradox between the magnitude of American power and Washington's inability to use that power to always get what it wants in international politics. There are many factors that limit the exercise of U.S. power. Some of these are obvious, others less so. By all accepted measures the United States is an extraordinarily powerful global actor. The United States dominates the global economy with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of about $11 trillion. China, usually cited as America's most likely future great power rival, has a GDP of approximately $1.4 trillion. Not only is the U.S. economy big, it is also at the forefront technologically. The dollar remains the primary reserve currency for the international economic system--a huge advantage for the United States, since other nations keep propping up the dollar for fear that a major drop in its value would negatively affect their own investment portfolios. U.S. economic power is also reflected in Washington's dominance of key international economic institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Economic strength and technological prowess go a long way toward explaining America's military dominance. The sheer magnitude of the U.S. economy means that Washington is easily able to spend over $500 billion annually on defense. This is more than the rest of the world combined spends on defense, but only about 4 percent of the U.S. GDP, which means that even at this enormous absolute level of expenditure, defense spending is far less of a burden on the American economy than was the case during the Cold War. The United States, indeed, is a global hegemon and has formidable tools at its disposal, and it can wield its power effectively to attain important policy objectives. For example, the sheer magnitude of America's lead in military power over its closest would-be rivals has a potent effect in dissuading them from trying to emerge as great powers and to challenge the United States's dominant role in a unipolar world. Events since 9/11 have illuminated other ways in which the United States has been able to utilize its hegemonic power. Thus, American military prowess was showcased by the quick collapse of the Taliban and Saddam's Iraq. Moreover, the economic incentives the United States could proffer were vitally important in persuading a reluctant Pakistan to allow itself to ally with the United States in the battle against Al-Qaeda. Central Asian states offered the United States the opportunity to establish military bases--and Putin's Russia acquiesced to this. And the very fact that the United States could defy the United Nations (and major powers such as France, Germany, Russia and China) and carry out the invasion of Iraq (essentially) unilaterally proved--if proof is needed--that the rest of the world could not do much to constrain the United States. But hegemony is not omnipotence. Back in the 1960s, Thomas C. Schelling made an important distinction in the purposes for which power could be used: He differentiated between deterrence and compellence. Deterrence involves the use of power to persuade another state to refrain from taking an action that the United States does not want it to take. Compellence, on the other hand, involves the coercive use of American power to compel another state (or substate actors) to act, against its own preferences, in ways that Washington wants it to act. The United States has had a high degree of success using its military power to deter other states from attacking the American homeland, or U.S. allies abroad, even though deterring terrorists is much harder than deterring states. It has been far less successful at compellence. This helps to explain, for example, why American military power stops North Korea and Iran from attacking their neighbors but is seemingly ineffective in persuading them to give up their nuclear weapons programs. Viewed from this perspective, it is not a surprise that the United States is foundering today in the Iraqi morass and failing in Afghanistan. Occupying and pacifying another country once it has been defeated is a difficult task for two reasons. First, as the United States learned in Vietnam and now is learning again in Iraq (and Afghanistan), wars pitting indigenous insurgents against outside occupiers are marked by an important asymmetry that works to the external power's disadvantage. The stakes always matter more to the indigenous forces, and they are more highly motivated. They need not win militarily because all they need to do is to survive and prolong the conflict in order to wear down the
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external power's political will. As counterinsurgent wars drag on, and their costs rise, political debate in the external power inevitably focuses on the issue of why it should continue expending its blood and treasure in a war that is not vital to its security. As Andrew Mack has written, in the external power, "A war with no visible payoff against an opponent who poses no direct threat will come under increasing criticism as battle casualties rise and economic costs escalate." The second reason occupiers have difficulty imposing their will on foreign societies is that they invariably find themselves on the wrong side of one of the most powerful factors in international politics: nationalism. And in the Middle East, America's ability to use its power to successfully achieve its objectives is also limited by the religious and cultural divides that separate the Islamic world from the West. This explains why the United States has failed to achieve its broader political ambitions there. The United States is not trying to deter Iraqi insurgents or Afghan warlords from attacking the United States. Instead, it is trying to compel them to accept the imposition of a sweeping domestic political and economic--and cultural--transformation. Iraq and Afghanistan are illustrative of an important reason that America's hegemonic power appears illusory: because it is often employed in the pursuit of objectives that are unattainable, such as nation-building and democracy promotion. Both neoconservatives and so-called liberal imperialists seem to believe that the world is like a piece of clay and that the United States can remake other nations--and cultures --in its own image. Although the United States has a long list of failure in such efforts, it keeps trying--most recently in Afghanistan and, of course, Iraq. Before the invasion, administration officials pretty much believed that the processes of democratization and nation-building in Iraq would be a piece of cake. They frequently invoked the examples of post-1945 Germany and Japan as "proof" that the United States could export democracy to Iraq without undue difficulty. For at least three reasons, they should have known better: the use of military force by outside powers to impose democracy rarely works; military occupations seldom are successful; and the preconditions for a successful democratic transformation did not exist in Iraq. Those who have studied military occupations know that the odds of success are stacked against occupying powers. As David Edelstein observes: ""Military occupations usually succeed only if they are lengthy, but lengthy occupations elicit nationalist reactions that impede success. Further, lengthy occupation produces anxiety in imperialist occupation powers that would rather withdraw than stay. To succeed, therefore, occupiers must both maintain their own interest in a long occupation, and convince an occupied population to accept extended control by a foreign power. More often than not, occupiers either fail to achieve those goals, or they achieve them only at a high cost.2"" The United States has long been addicted to Wilsonian crusading to remake the world, but as realists long--and rightly--have argued, it lacks the material, psychological and spiritual resources to succeed in this effort. It is naive to imagine that America's democratic values can flourish in countries that have no indigenous democratic tradition, and that lack the social, cultural and economic foundations upon which the United States's own democratic institutions rest. America's inability to refashion other states does not mean it is not a hegemon
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LEASH-SLIPPING MEANS HEGEMONY DOESNT PREVENT THE IMPACT
Christopher Layne, Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A & M, The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Fall 2006, p. 29-30 The United States' hard power poses a nonexistential (or soft) threat to others' autonomy and interests. By acquiring the capability to act independent of the United States in the realm of security, however, other states can slip free of the hegemon's leash-like grip and gain the leverage needed to compel the United States to respect their foreign policy interests. As Posen writes, other major states are expected "at a minimum [to] act to buffer themselves against the caprices of the U.S. and will try to carve out the ability to act autonomously should it become necessary." 81 Leashslipping is not traditional hard balancing because it is not explicitly directed at countering an existential U.S. threat. At the same time, it is a form of insurance against a hegemon that might someday exercise its power in a predatory and menacing fashion. As Robert Art puts it, a state adopting a leash-slipping strategy "does not fear an increased threat to its physical security from another rising state; rather it is concerned about the adverse effects of that state's rise on its general position, both political and economic, in the international arena. This concern also may, but need not, include a worry that the rising state could cause security problems in the future, although not necessarily war." If successful, leashslipping would result in the creation of new poles of power in the international system, thereby restoring multipolarity and bringing U.S. hegemony to an end.
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LEASH-SLIPPING ENDS U.S. PRIMACY
Christopher Layne, Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A & M, The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Fall 2006, p. 31 To be sure, contrary to the predictions of Waltzian balance of power theorists, unipolarity persists. No new great powers have emerged to restore equilibrium to the balance of power by engaging in hard balancing against the United Statesat least, not yet. This has led primacists to conclude that there has been no balancing against the United States. However, the primacists' focus on both the failure of new great powers to emerge and the absence of hard balancing distracts attention from other forms of behaviornotably leash-slippingby major second-tier states that ultimately could lead to the end of unipolarity. Unipolarity is the foundation of U.S. hegemony and, if it ends, so will U.S. primacy.
SUBSERVIENCE NOW MEANS MORE AGGRESSION LATER
Walden Bellow, Director of Focus on the Global South, DILEMMAS OF DOMINATION: THE UNMAKING OF AMERICAN POWER, 2005, p. 71-2 Instability and unchallenged hegemony have often gone hand in hand when backed up by overwhelming force, unchallenged hegemony is a transient state. As was the case in Napoleonic Europe, lesser powers may calculate that a posture of compliance might be necessary in the short term, but they know that it is disastrous as a long-term strategy. Subservience is simply an invitation to more aggression .
WITHDRAWAL IMPACTS ARE WRONG ABANDONING PREPONDERANCE WONT CAUSE GREAT WARS Christopher Layne, Visiting Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, 1998
[World Policy Journal, Rethinking American grand strategy: Hegemony or balance of power in the twenty-first century? vol. 15 iss. 2, Summer, proquest] <A related argument is that U.S. "isolationism" in the 1920s and 1930s had disastrous consequences and would have a similar effect in the future. Here, two points should be made. First, recent work by diplomatic historians has debunked the notion that the United States followed an isolationist policy during the 1930s. 29 Second, and more important, the United States became involved in the Pacific War with Japan not because it followed an isolationist policy but rather because it assertively defended its perceived East Asian interests (especially in China) from Japanese encroachment. It should
also be noted that U.S. strategy toward Europe in 1939-41 was not isolationist but rather a shrewd example of offshore balancing. In 1939-40, the United States stood on the sidelines in the reasonable expectation that Britain and France could successfully hold Germany at bay. When France was defeated stunningly in the brief May-June 1940 campaign, the United States hoped to continue following an offshore balancing strategy based on providing military equipment and economic assistance to Britain and (after June 1941) to the Soviet Union, and fighting a limited liability naval war against German U-boats in the Atlantic. Had
, the historical record does not support the claim that European and Asian wars invariably compel the United States to intervene. Wars are not a force of nature that magnetically draws states into conflict. States, that is policymakers, have volition; they decide whether to go to war. The insurance argument advanced by proponents of the strategy of preponderance is also problematic. Great power war is rare because it is always an uncertain undertaking: war is, therefore, to some extent its own deterrent. It is, however, an imperfect deterrent: great power wars do happen and they will happen in the future. Although the likelihood of U.S. involvement in future great-power conflict may be small, in a world where nuclear weapons exist the consequences of
Germany not declared war on the United States, Washington might have persisted in that strategy indefinitely. In short
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U.S. involvement in such a conflict could be enormous. The strategy of preponderance purports to ensure the United States against the risk of war.
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ATTEMPTS TO MAINTAIN HEGEMONY MAKE THE TRANSITION TO MULTIPOLARITY VIOLENT Renmin Ribao, 1997
[BBC, April 26] The new model of security instituted by the five nations tallies with the spirit of the five principles of peaceful coexistence and other norms governing international relations. This new security concept is not only in the basic interest of the aforementioned nations and peoples but also meets the tide of the times and the needs of the international situation and development of international relations in the post Cold War world. It is good for international cooperation and development; it is good for world peace and tranquillity; and it is good for the establishment of a just and equitable new international political and economic order. However, there are still people today who are used to the "Cold War mentality" and are bent on expanding military blocs. They frequently impose sanctions, and even resort to the use or threat of force in an attempt to establish a single-polar world by means of power politics. This will, obviously, harm trust among the nations, aggravate regional and world tensions, and even lead to a new arms race. This all runs counter to the tide of the times. Time goes on, history is developing and people want peace. The world is rapidly developing towards multipolarity. Mutual respect, equality and mutual benefits, not hegemony or power politics; dialogue and cooperation, not confrontation or conflicts - this has become the common, increasingly loud call of people all over the world. Governments of all countries must go along with the popular wishes, forsake confrontation, develop cooperation and make common efforts for the establishment of a peaceful and stable new world.
NO IMPACT COLLAPSE OF HEGEMONY WONT CAUSE VIOLENCE Barbara Conry, Foreign Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute, 1997
[U.S. Global Leadership: A Euphemism for World Policeman, Policy Analysis #267, February 5, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-267.html ]In other words, if America abdicates its role as world leader, we are condemned to repeat the biggest mistakes of the 20th century--or perhaps do something even worse. Such thinking is seriously flawed, however. First, to assert that U.S. leadership can stave off otherwise inevitable global chaos vastly overestimates the power of any single country to influence world events. The United States is powerful, but it still can claim only 5 percent of the world's population and 20 percent of world economic output. Moreover, regardless of the resources Americans might be willing to devote to leading the world, today's problems often do not lend themselves well to external solutions. As Maynes has pointed out, Today, the greatest fear of most states is not external aggression but internal disorder. The United States can do little about the latter, whereas it used to be able to do a great deal about the former. In other words, the coinage of U.S. power in the world has been devalued by the change in the international agenda. Indeed, many of the foreign policy problems that have confounded Washington
since the demise of the Soviet Union are the kinds of problems that are likely to trouble the world well into the next century. "Failed states," such as Somalia, may not be uncommon. But, as the ill-fated U.S. and UN operations in that country showed, there is very little that outside powers can do about such problems. External powers usually lack the means to prevent or end civil wars, such as those in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, unless they are willing to make a tremendous effort to do so. Yet those types of internecine conflicts are likely to be one of the primary sources of international disorder for the foreseeable
. Despite the doomsayers who prophesy global chaos in the absence of U.S. leadership, however, Washington's limited ability to dampen such conflicts is not cause for panic. Instability is a normal feature of an international system of sovereign states, which the United States can tolerate and has tolerated for more than two centuries. If vital American interests are not at stake, instability itself becomes a serious problem only if the United States blunders into it, as it did in Somalia and Bosnia.
future
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HEGEMONY FAILS U.S. POWER PROJECTION PROMOTES GEOPOLITICAL BLOWBACK, KILLING ANY BENEFIT Christopher Layne, Associate Professor in the School of International Studies at the University of Miami, 2002 [U.S. RESPONSES TO THE LOOKING GLASS: Offshore Balancing Revisited, Washington Quarterly, Spring, p. Lexis] In concrete terms today, Western Europe, China, Russia, and Japan are aligned with the United States to deal with the common threat of terrorism. Because the coalition partners have differing interests, the coalition may fragment if the United States acts unilaterally to expand the war on terrorism. Even if the coalition should hold together until the war on terrorism is terminated, the conflicting geopolitical interests that divide the United States and its partners will then surely resurface because coalitions and alliances are never more than marriages of convenience. Western Europe again will seek to counterbalance U.S. "hyperpower." The Europeans, Russia, and China will oppose U.S. missile defense deployment. Russia will be suspicious of NATO expansion into the Baltic States and the projection of U.S. power into Central Asia. China will continue to pursue its great-power emergence and will contest the United States for supremacy in East Asia. The war on terrorism, in other words, is merely an interlude in international politics, not the harbinger of everlasting global harmony based on acceptance of U.S. primacy. Although U.S. policymakers have convinced themselves that the United States is a benign hegemon, no such animal exists in international politics. A hegemon is a threat to the security of others simply because it is so powerful. The United States is not immune to the kind of geopolitical blowback experienced by previous hegemonic aspirants. Thus, in a self-help world the United States must perform the strategic equivalent of threading a needle. It cannot abrogate its freedom to act unilaterally to defend its interests, but Washington needs simultaneously to find a grand strategy that reduces fears of U.S. preponderant power, thereby reducing incentives to engage in counterhegemonic balancing directed at the United States. A good starting point is the war on terrorism itself.
NO IMPACT TO A LOSS OF HEG MULTIPLE FACTORS PREVENT ANOTHER GREAT POWER WAR Gopal Balarishnan, New Left Review Author, 2003
[Algorithms of War, New Left Review 23, Sept-Oct, http://www.newleftreview.net/NLR25701.shtml] But this very freedom from external balance-of-power constraints contains the danger of a wilful exaggeration of threats and a casual underestimation of obstacles. The discipline that a nuclear-armed Soviet Union once imposed on Americas rulers has evaporated. The rhetoric of the Republican Administration is an ominous anticipation of what might happen in the event of a world economic downturn. Yet even an escalation of hostilities between the US and China or Russia, or Europe or Japan, would be unlikely to reverse one of the central sociological trends of the post Second World War era: the decline of mass militarism in Western Europe and Japan after forty years of heavy casualty warfare, a process that eventually reached the US during the high point of its Indochinese operations. The enormous conscript citizen armies of the Great Power nation-state were either destroyed in the immediate aftermath of the War or discredited in the last decades of colonialism. The raising of overarching nuclear umbrellas, the advent of consumerism, the cultural neutralization of nationalist pathos in public life, the final collapse of rural social strata from which both officers and soldiers were recruited and the break-up of traditional gender roles sealed the fate of an older Great Power politics. The only military interventions now capable of soliciting domestic acclamation are those that demand no heavy sacrifices of the home front. It is now well understood, as ballooning American deficits testify, that under no circumstances can the social segment extending from the wealthy to the super-rich be asked to bear the costs of empire.
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U.S. INTERVENTION IS A NOT A VIABLE OPTION FOR SOLVING CONFLICTS Barbara Conry, Foreign Policy Analyst at Cato, 1994
[Policy Analysis 209, May 19, http://ww.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-209.html] In reality, U.S. military intervention is generally not a viable solution to regional conflicts and should not be undertaken except in the rare instances in which American national security is at stake. In most cases regional conflicts cannot be helped--and may well be exacerbated--by the intervention of outside parties. U.S. intervention can be especially counterproductive, since it often intensifies smaller, less powerful countries' (the very nations most likely to be involved in regional conflicts) fears of America's hegemonic intentions. Militarily, too, the United States is ill-suited to suppress regional conflicts, in which warring forces frequently rely on guerrilla warfare, street fighting, and other tactics that are not easily met by America's high-tech war machine.(3) Retired British diplomat Jonathan Clarke has pointed out that America's adversaries know full well that they are uncompetitive on a "First World" battlefield. Their response, like that of the Massachusetts Minuteman confronting that British Redcoat, is to lower the threshold of war to prevent the full range of American advanced weaponry and electronic wizardry from operating. The result is that Americans enter today's messy Third World battles not as odds-on favorites but on level terms.(4) Indeed, it was precisely that type of warfare that prevented the United States from achieving its objectives in both Vietnam and Somalia--proving that the most powerful military in the world is far from invincible.
U.S. LEADERSHIP IS EMPIRICALLY NOT KEY TO PEACE
Eugene Gholz and Daryl Press, Doctoral Candidates in Political Science at MIT, and Harvey Sapolsky, Professor of Public Policy and Organization in Political Science at MIT, 1997 [International Security, Spring, Come Home America, p. 38-9] In fact, some evidence suggests that Americas overseas presence was not the principal cause of great power peace during the Cold War; nuclear weapons and the presence of a unifying threat played a greater role. The Sino-Soviet dispute has been one of the bitterest in the world since the 1960s. The Soviets and the Chinese have had all the ingredients for a great power war border disputes, hostile ideologies, and occasional military clashes along their frontier yet they managed to keep things from getting out of hand. Maybe the presence of nuclear weapons damped the conflict; maybe having a common foe (the United States) tempered their hostility toward each other. But it is clear that U.S. engagement was not necessary for peaceful great power relations during the Cold War.
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Hegemony Bad: Doesnt Solve Global War
US WITHDRAWAL DOESNT CAUSE CONFLICT Eugene Gholz and Harvey Sapolsky, Department of Political Science at MIT, 1997
[International Security, v.21 n.4, p. 30-2] Several prominent analysts favor a policy of selective engagement. These analysts fear that American military retrenchment would increase the risk of great power war. A great power war today would be a calamity, even for those countries that manage to stay out of the fighting. The best way to prevent great power war, according to these analysts, is to remain engaged in Europe and East Asia. Twice in this century the United States has pulled out of Europe, and both times great power war followed. Then America chose to stay engaged, and the longest period of European great power peace ensued. In sum, selective engagers point to the costs of others' great power wars and the relative ease of preventing them. The selective engagers' strategy is wrong for two reasons. First, selective engagers overstate the effect of U.S. military presence as a positive force for great power peace. In today's world, disengagement will not cause great power war, and continued engagement will not reliably prevent it. In some circumstances, engagement may actually increase the likelihood of conflict. Second, selective engagers overstate the costs of distant wars and seriously understate the costs and risks of their strategies. Overseas deployments require a large force structure. Even worse, selective engagement will ensure that when a future great power war erupts, the United States will be in the thick of things. Although distant great power wars are bad for America, the only sure path to ruin is to step in the middle of a faraway fight. Selective engagers overstate America's effect on the likelihood of future great power wars. There is little reason to believe that withdrawal from Europe or Asia would lead to deterrence failures. With or without a forward U.S. presence, America's major allies have sufficient military strength to deter any potential aggressors. Conflict is far more likely to erupt from a sequence described in the spiral model. The danger of spirals leading to war in East Asia is remote. Spirals happen when states, seeking security; frighten their neighbors. The risk of spirals is great when offense is easier than defense, because any country's attempt to achieve security will give it an offensive capability against its neighbors. The neighbors' attempts to eliminate the vulnerability give them fleeting offensive capabilities and tempt them to launch preventive war. But Asia, as discussed earlier, is blessed with inherent defensive advantages. Japan and Taiwan are islands, which makes them very difficult to invade. China has a long land border with Russia, but enjoys the protection of the East China Sea, which stands between it and Japan. The expanse of Siberia gives Russia, its ever-trusted ally, strategic depth. South Korea benefits from mountainous terrain which would channel an attacking force from the north. Offense is difficult in East Asia, so spirals should not be acute. In fact, no other region in which great powers interact offers more defensive advantage than East Asia. The prospect for spirals is greater in Europe, but continued U.S. engagement does not reduce that danger; rather, it exacerbates the risk. A West European military union, controlling more than 21 percent of the world's GDP, may worry Russia. But NATO, with 44 percent of the world's GDP, is far more threatening, especially if it expands eastward. The more NATO frightens Russia, the more likely it is that Russia will turn dangerously nationalist, redirect its economy toward the military, and try to re-absorb its old buffer states.[72] But if the U.S. military were to withdraw from Europe, even Germany, Europe's strongest advocate for NATO expansion, might become less enthusiastic, because it would be German rather than American troops standing guard on the new borders. Some advocates of selective engagement point to the past fifty years as evidence that America's forward military presence reduces the chance of war. The Cold War's great power peace, however, was over determined. Nuclear weapons brought a powerful restraining influence. Furthermore, throughout the Cold War, European and Asian powers had a common foe which encouraged them to cooperate. After an American withdrawal, the Japanese, Koreans, and Russians would still have to worry about China; the Europeans would still need to keep an eye on Russia. These threats can be managed without U.S. assistance, and the challenge will encourage European and Asian regional cooperation.
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Hegemony Bad: Doesnt Solve Global War
NO RISK OF A VACUUM POWER ABHORS Kazi Anwarul Masud, Bangladesh Foreign Ambassador to Germany, 2004
[What if there is global power vacuum? http://www.thedailystar.net/2004/08/17/d40817150197.htm] Power, like nature, abhors a vacuum. Throughout the history of mankind, periods of apolarity have been short lived. Greek civilisation was succeeded by Roman civilisation that shaped the subsequent world history for the next two thousand years. The British ruled the waves and the sun never set in the British Empire for centuries. Concurrently with the British rule, albeit in smaller degree, there was French, Spanish, and Dutch colonisation. However in the enumeration of the history of civilisations, generalisation of the term "civilisation" has been contested. German philosopher Oswald Spengler described civilisations as living organisms, each of which passes through identical stages at fixed periods. Arnold Toyenbee also described a uniform pattern in the history of civilisations whose life can be extended by successfully responding to internal and external challenges that constantly confront it. Toyenbee, writes Samuel Huntington, identified twenty-five major civilisations out of which six exist in the contemporary world. Huntington defines civilisation as a cultural entity that finds commonality in language, history, religion, custom, and in the subjective self-identification of people. By his measure existing civilisations consist of Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and African civilisations. The present discourse is not so much on cultural identification of civilisations as it is on the possible shape the past and present global power structure can take.
CHINA WOULD RISE UP TO FILL THE POWER VACUUM Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Senior Analyst at Power and Interest News Report, 2004
[The New Regionalism: Drifting Toward Multipolarity, http://www.pinr.com/report.php? ac=view_printable&report_id=178&language_id=1] Multipolarism is only a theory unless it is backed by military power. The primary indicator of a tendency toward multipolarism is the military policies of the regional powers. The two most important -- China and Russia -- have publicly stated that they are committed to building state-of-the-art militaries. India is similarly committed to militarization, as is Pakistan, so far as its limited resources permit. Europe presents a more complex picture. Faced with opposition to its attempt to assert leadership in Europe, the Franco-German combine remains bound into N.A.T.O. and is left with its economic and diplomatic cards. By taking advantage of the internal conflict within the European Union ("Old Europe and New Europe"), the United States has helped to block the emergence of a full-fledged regional power center. It is not able to do the same elsewhere. China and Russia will lead the move toward multipolarism and other powers around the world will follow them whenever it is in their interest to do so. The major point for the emergence of multipolarism is East Asia. What drives the New Regionalism is a partial power vacuum caused by recognition of the limits of American projection of military power and the loss of American political credibility as an ally and collaborator. The regional power positioned most favorably to take advantage of the vacuum is China.
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RUSSIA WILL FILL THE POWER VACUUM Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Senior Analyst at Power and Interest News Report, 2004
[The New Regionalism: Drifting Toward Multipolarity, http://www.pinr.com/report.php? ac=view_printable&report_id=178&language_id=1] The second major site for the emergence of the New Regionalism is Russia. Under Vladimir Putin, Russia has returned to its traditional strategic doctrine of containing encirclement and, if possible, expanding its cordon sanitaire (in this case, restoring it). Putin has made it explicit that Russia has to take care of its own economy and society, pursue an independent foreign policy, and aggressively militarize. The strategic aim of those principles is to regain control over Russia's periphery: to draw Ukraine and Belarus firmly into its orbit and to re-exert influence over the former Soviet republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Specifically, Russia's goals are to edge American bases out of Central Asia and to gain some control over Caspian Sea oil.
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Hegemony Bad: U.S. Leadership Doesnt Avoid the Impacts
U.S. HEGEMONY HAS NOT SOLVED GLOBAL CONFLICT
Gabriel Kolko, historian of modern warfare, THE AGE OF WAR: THE UNITED STATES CONFRONTS THE WORLD, 2006, p. 88-90 The mere fact that the 1999 war in Yugoslavia alienated both Russia and China deeply, making some form of strategic alliance between them increasingly probable, meant that the reemergence of bipolar confrontation and a return to the Cold War in another, nonideological formessentially the classic conflict of national interestswill also affect future international relations profoundly. When the twentieth century ended, the United States still could not master most of the world's complex political problems. On the contrary, its attempts to do so only aggravated them. Its universal pretensions and obsessions, which began during World War I and matured after 1945, were more dangerous than everboth to itself and to the complex world. War was no longer a question of conflicts between states that were roughly equal, as it had been for the first four decades of the twentieth century, but increasingly a matter of US interventions, whether for rational economic or simply idiosyncratic reasons. War has increasingly become synonymous with the problem of the United States, its ambitions and pretensions, its intellectual moods, and its supercomplex military equipment, and to solve the problem of war one had to address this presumptuous nation in all its dimensions. THE U.S. IS NOT EXERCISING HEGEMONY IN A WAY THAT WILL AVOID THE IMPACTS THEY IDENTIFY Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Freier is Director of National Security Affairs at the US Army War Colleges Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), PARAMETERS, August 2006, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06autumn/freier.htm The post-Cold War reality is unfortunately quite different. Over a half decade of blue-ribbon panels, think-tank research, and expert commentary have made it quite clear that, since the end of the Cold War, the nation has had no grand strategy.4 Nor, for that matter, does it have the capacity for meaningful net assessment and planning. 5 There is no riskinformed grand strategy or consensus strategic vision guiding American great power or enforcing discipline over the employment of those instruments of power so critical to securing American primacy most effectively. There is no standing design chartering broad, integrated American political, military, and economic action to secure the states position and influence in a rational and deliberate way.6 Frankly, the exercise of American influence is not, as many imagine and as Thomas Barnett quips about in the quotation at the beginning of this article, the product of some deliberative, whole-of-government process enforcing unity, order, and focus on the nations instruments of power. Instead, American power is employed against discrete challenges in isolation as they arise with neither detailed nor comprehensive, whole-of-government consideration of the broader implications or risks associated with either action or inaction.
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Hegemony Bad: U.S. Leadership Doesnt Avoid the Impacts
THE U.S. WILL NOT EMPLOY POWER IN WAYS THAT WILL AVOID GLOBAL CONFLICT
Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Freier is Director of National Security Affairs at the US Army War Colleges Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), PARAMETERS, August 2006, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06autumn/freier.htm I propose an alternative perspective that calls the assumption that closed the previous section into serious question. This view accepts that the nations absolute power, in classically realist terms, may be unassailable for the foreseeable future; in short, its material capacity may in fact be somewhat secure from fundamental dislocation. However, its relative position of power and influence may at the same time be increasingly vulnerable to some conscious, internal repudiation of the high costs and risks associated with maintaining American primacy. Thus, though the United States may have all the potential power necessary to maintain its position, the will to employ that power most effectively may be at increasing risk. The framers of NSC 68 feared the same in 1950 when they observed: We run . . . the added risk of being confused and immobilized by our inability to weigh and choose, and pursue a firm course based on a rational assessment of each. The risk that we may thereby be prevented or too long delayed in taking all needful measures to maintain the integrity and vitality of our system is great. The risk that our allies will lose their determination is greater. And the risk that in this manner a descending spiral of too little and too late, of doubt and recrimination, may present us with even narrower and more desperate alternatives, is the greatest risk of all.18 The events of 9/11 changed only our perspective on the world, not our approach to it. The realities of post-modern great power and primacy were suddenly at the nations doorstep, seemingly unannounced and without the benefit of advanced consideration of how to both protect our physical security while, at the same time, securing and extending our long-term strategic position across Morgenthaus elements of power. American great power relies on three key but vulnerable sources of strength for its continued vitality: a homeland secure from fundamental dislocation or disruption,19 a strong and vibrant network of alliances and partnerships founded on common interests and values,20 and a population and its opinion elites inured to the inherent costs of primacy.21 The events of 9/11 and subsequent experience have made clear the inherent vulnerability of all three. From the end of the Cold War to 9/11, there had been an obvious and natural erosion of common interest and discipline in the nations traditional alliances and partnerships. Further, many had begun warning that the political, economic, and physical security of the American homeland itself was increasingly vulnerable to attack by sub-state and transnational actors less constrained by the norms and conventions that govern international relations. Finally, all Americans had grown comfortable with the benefits of primary influence, but had done so with little appreciation for the substantial fiscal, material, human, psychological, and political burdens that could be associated with its continued maintenance over time. Thus, many were caught quite unaware by the steady accumulation of real cost that began suddenly with the 9/11 attacks and that has continued unabated ever since. With respect to the latter source of strength in particulara population inured to the costs associated with primacythere continues to be some genuine shock among average and elite Americans alike that ubiquitous American influence breeds resistance and unease. This dangerous naivet ignores a central maxim of international politicsgreat power engenders respect but it also foments fear, envy, and venom as well. Worse, it hazards a persistent underappreciation of the accumulating costs associated with maintaining American primacy in a world increasingly marked by open resistance to and mistrust of US power and motivations. It is difficult for many Americans to reconcile in their own minds the idea that the United States can be admired, revered, and relied on, while at the same time actively resisted, balanced against, and hated as well.22 This cognitive dissonance can result in imprudent denial of political realism where some in the American strategy elite are captured by unachievable, risk-untested political rhetoric at the expense of real strategic calculation.
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Hegemony Bad: U.S. Leadership Doesnt Avoid the Impacts
U.S. DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION MEANS ITS LEADERSHIP CANNOT PREVENT THE IMPACTS John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 123-4
'Only US leadership', claims Richard Haass, 'has the potential to be forceful and generous enough to persuade the other major powers to come together and build a more integrated world that can take on challenges to the common peace and prosperity' . But a state cannot lead while it is acting unilaterally, or following a different path from those it claims to lead. Leadership demands inclusion, confidence building and a sense of common purpose, but the United States has become so isolated on so broad a range of issues that we now find it described as a 'rogue state', and out of touch with world public opinion, which Patrick Tyler calls 'the second superpower'. Pei notes the role of American nationalism in explaining both the way the United States acts and the way that it is perceiver. He believes that America is a nationalistic society in spite of the fact that Americans swear off nationalism, and that the United States has a poor record of understanding the importance and effect of nationalism in other countries. This paradox helps explain why US foreign policy can sometimes appear hypocritical to others: this is especially true when the US appears to be trying to undermine global institutions or rejecting multilateral agreements in the interests of defending American sovereignty, and there is a tension between the universalistic appeals of American political ideals and its pursuit of parochial national interests.
U.S. DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION MEANS ITS LEADERSHIP CANNOT PREVENT THE IMPACTS John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 123-4
'Only US leadership', claims Richard Haass, 'has the potential to be forceful and generous enough to persuade the other major powers to come together and build a more integrated world that can take on challenges to the common peace and prosperity' . But a state cannot lead while it is acting unilaterally, or following a different path from those it claims to lead. Leadership demands inclusion, confidence building and a sense of common purpose, but the United States has become so isolated on so broad a range of issues that we now find it described as a 'rogue state', and out of touch with world public opinion, which Patrick Tyler calls 'the second superpower'. Pei notes the role of American nationalism in explaining both the way the United States acts and the way that it is perceiver. He believes that America is a nationalistic society in spite of the fact that Americans swear off nationalism, and that the United States has a poor record of understanding the importance and effect of nationalism in other countries. This paradox helps explain why US foreign policy can sometimes appear hypocritical to others: this is especially true when the US appears to be trying to undermine global institutions or rejecting multilateral agreements in the interests of defending American sovereignty, and there is a tension between the universalistic appeals of American political ideals and its pursuit of parochial national interests.
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Hegemony Bad: U.S. Leadership Doesnt Avoid the Impacts
ATTEMPTING TO BE A GLOBAL SOCIAL ENGINEER JUST INCREASE CONFLICT
Doug Bandow, Vice President of Policy Research for Citizen Outreach, FOREIGN FOLLIES: AMERICAS NEW GLOBAL EMPIRE, 2006, p. 37 'Moreover, the attempt to play global social engineer has created many enemies who, sadly, are able and willing to attack America. Backing Israel against the Palestinians, seeking to enforce a broken peace against Iraq ten years on, allying with Saudi Arabia, supporting various ethnic groups, governments, and guerrilla forces in the Balkans, and U.S. was supporting a weak Colombian regime against drug dealers and communist insurgents all thrust the U.S. into violent, hate-filled conflicts.
GLOBAL LEADERSHIP HAS NOT PRODUCED GLOBAL SECURITY
Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter, CSIS, SECOND CHANCE: THREE PRESIDENTS AND THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 182 Looking back, America's overall performance in the three central missions of its global leadership fell short of what was attainable. Insecurity has become more pervasive even though the total number of ongoing conflicts worldwide has actually dropped since the end of the Cold War. Nuclear capability has spread to four additional countries, two overtly and two ambiguously. Progress on human welfare issues has been sporadic and environmental concerns have not gained high priority. Partly as a result of these failures, American leadership has lost much of its legitimacy, the worldwide credibility of the American presidency has been undermined, and the moral standing of America has been tarnished. _s
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Hegemony Bad: U.S. Leadership Doesnt Solve Middle East Conflict
U.S. ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE MIDDLE EAST CRISES CAUSES MASSIVE CONFLICT
Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter, CSIS, SECOND CHANCE: THREE PRESIDENTS AND THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 153-6 In brief, the United States faces, but on a much larger scale, the same dilemma that Israel faces regarding its Arab neighbors: each lacks the means to impose an enduring unilateral solution dictated entirely by its own definition of goals and interests. The British wisely understood this and left the Middle East without a prolonged conflict; the French came to understand it only after a protracted and debilitating war in Algeria. America is reluctantly assimilating the same lesson through its current involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and potentially elsewhere as well if those two conflicts, throughout the region. . The notion that the solution to the dilemma confronting America is to impose accelerated democracy in the region is equally misconceived. Democracy historically has emerged through a prolonged process of enhancement of human rights, first from the economic and then to the political, first among some privileged classes and then on a wider scale. That process in turn entails the progressive appearance of the rule of law, and the gradual imposition of legal and later constitutional rules over the structures of power. In that context, the adoption of free elections leads progressively to the emergence of a system of rule based on fundamental notions of compromise and accommodation, with rules of the game respected by political opponents who do not see their contest as a zero-sum game. In contrast, when democracy is rapidly imposed in traditional societies not exposed to the progressive expansion of civil rights and the gradual emergence of the rule of law, it is likely to precipitate intensified conflict, with mutually intolerant extremes colliding in violence. That is exactly what shortsighted American efforts to promote democracy have yielded, not only in Iraq but also in Palestine, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. The result has not enhanced prospects for stability but intensified social tensions. The best such efforts are likely to produce is a fervent but intolerant populism, ostensibly democratic but in fact a tyranny of the majority. One cannot entirely dismiss the suspicion that the most fervent advocates of "democracy" for the Middle East know this, but see in the promotion of democracy an expedient tool for the eventual imposition of force. Democracy becomes a subversive tool for destabilizing the status quo, leading to an armed intervention that is justified retroactively by the argument that the democratic experiment has failed and that the extremism it produced legitimates the one-sided employment of raw power.
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Hegemony Bad: U.S. Leadership Doesnt Solve Global Environmental Problems
U.S. LEADERSHIP HAS NOT SOLVED GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter, CSIS, SECOND CHANCE: THREE PRESIDENTS AND THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 173-4 America's long-term interests also have been hurt by the lack of U.S. leadership on issues pertaining to the global commonweal. From 2001 to 2006, the unfolding human tragedy in Darfur was largely treated with indifference by the United States. The U.S. not only dismissed the International Criminal Court as a threat to its sovereignty but used its political leverage to obtain from friendly countries special legal exemptions for U.S. military personnel. The Kyoto Protocol became a whipping boy for White House skeptics of the global warming phenomenon, though much of the American public seems to share the administration's aversion to this subject. In an international poll among those who have heard about global warming, only 19 percent of American respondents said they gave the issue much thought, in contrast to 46 percent in France, 66 percent in Japan, 65 percent in India, and 34 percent in Russia. With public indifference abetted by official skepticism, it is no wonder that a comprehensive comparative study by Yale and Columbia Universities, released early in 2006 by the World Economic Forum, placed the United States behind most advanced countries in meeting critical environmental goals.
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Hegemony Bad: Extinction
HEGEMONY THREATENS HUMAN SURVIVAL
Noam Chomsky, Linguists Professor @ MIT, HEGEMONY OR SURVIVAL, 2003, pp. 231-2 Throughout history it has been recognized that such steps are dangerous. By now the danger has reached the level of a threat to human survival. But as observed earlier, it is rational to proceed nonetheless on the assumptions of the prevailing value system, which are deeply rooted in existing institutions. The basic principle is that hegemony is more important than survival. Hardly novel, the principle has been amply illustrated in the past half-century. For such reasons, the US has refused to join the rest of the world in reaffirming and strengthening the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 to reserve space for peaceful purposes. The concern for such action, articulated in UN resolutions calling for "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space," is motivated by widespread recognition that Washington intends to breach this barrier, so far maintained. The US was joined in its abstention in 1999 by Israel, in 2000 by Micronesia as well. As noted earlier, immediately after it was learned that the world had barely been saved from a war that might have "destroyed the Northern Hemisphere," the Bush administration effectively vetoed yet another international effort to prevent the militarization of space. For the same reasons, Washington blocked negotiations at the UN Conference on Disarmament during the sessions that opened in January 2001, rejecting the call of SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan that member states overcome their lack of "political will" and work toward a comprehensive accord to bar militarization of space. "The U.S. remains the only'one of the 66 member states to oppose launching formal negotiations on outer space," Reuters reported in February. In June, China again called for banning of weapons in outer space, but the US again blocked negotiations." Again, that makes good sense if hegemony, with its short-term benefits to elite interests, is ranked above survival in the scale of operative values, in accord with the historical standard for dominant states and other systems of concentrated power..' One can discern two trajectories in current history: one aiming toward hegemony, acting rationally within a lunatic doctrinal framework as it threatens survival; the other dedicated to the belief that "another world is possible ," in the words that animate the World Social Forum, challenging the reigning ideological system and seeking to create constructive alternatives of thought, action, and institutions. Which trajectory will dominate, no one can foretell. The pattern is familiar throughout history; a crucial difference today is that the stakes are far higher. Bertrand Russell once expressed some somber thoughts about world peace : After ages during which the earth produced harmless trilobites and butterflies, evolution progressed to the point at which it has generated Neros, Genghis Khans, and Hitlers. This, however, I believe is a passing nightmare; in time the earth will become again incapable of supporting life, and peace will return . No doubt the projection is accurate on some dimension beyond our realistic contemplation. What matters is whether we can awaken ourselves from the nightmare before it becomes all-consuming, and bring a measure of peace and justice and hope to the world that is, right now, within the reach of our opportunity and our will.
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Hegemony Bad: Extinction
A WEAKENED EMPIRE PROMOTES PEACE
Walden Bellow, Director of Focus on the Global South, DILEMMAS OF DOMINATION: THE UNMAKING OF AMERICAN POWER, 2005, p. 217 There is no blueprint for sustained peace. But we can say, nevertheless, that a weakened empire is a precondition for the effective functioning of the United Nations as a true community of nations relating to one another as equals. Under imperialism, the rules favoring one group of countries at the expense of the majority breed instability and resentment. A weakened imperial center would create the conditions for the phasing out of global double standards. Such hypocrisy-for instance, the tacit understanding that it is legitimate for the United States and the other big powers to maintain nuclear arsenals but it is illegitimate for others to do so-is a fundamental cause of international conflict. In the medium and long term, equality and peaceful intercourse among nations go together. But the crisis of the empire bodes well not only for the rest of the world. It may also benefit the people of the United States. It opens up the possibility of Americans relating to other peoples as equals and not as masters. Failure of the empire is, moreover, a precondition for the reemergence of a democratic republic. That was the American promise before it was hijacked by imperial democracy.
HEGEMONY IS UNSUSTAINABLE AND TEMPTS THE U.S. INTO OVERSTRETCH AND OPPOSITION Christopher Layne, National Interest, Fall 2006
The United States is a very powerful state, and will remain so even if it no longer is a hegemon. Hegemony is not only a costly grand strategy, but also one that ultimately is unsustainable. America's real realists--George F. Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, Walter Lippmann and Kenneth Waltz--always warned of the dangers that a hegemonic United States would over-reach itself and, by asserting its power heavy-handedly, provoke opposition to it. They understood that the world is not malleable and will not respond to American-imposed social engineering. They not only recognized that a wise grand strategy must balance ends and means, but also that it must differentiate between desirable objectives and attainable ones. Most of all, the real realists have understood the true paradox of American power: Precisely because of its power and geography, there is very little the United States needs to do in the world in order to be secure; yet the very fact of its overwhelming capabilities has been a constant temptation for American policymakers to intervene abroad unwisely in the pursuit of unattainable goals (nation building or democracy promotion). Real realists like Lippmann, Kennan, Morgenthau and Waltz have highlighted the dangers that await if the United States gives in to the temptations of hegemonic power and have counseled instead that the United States pursue a grand strategy based on prudence and selfrestraint. Americans would do well to pay heed to these admonitions as they debate how the United States should alter its grand strategy as the unipolar era inexorably draws to a close.
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Hegemony Bad: Threatens Global Peace
US PURSUIT OF MILITARISM AND EMPIRE THREATENS PLANETARY SURVIVAL
Carl Boggs, Social Science Professor National University (L.A.) , 2005, Planetary Politics: human rights, terror, and global society, ed. Stephen Eric Bronner, p. 80-1 A potentially explosive contradiction of empire is the built-in conflict between global dimensions of power associated with the world hegemon and a range of distinctly national interests and agendas that elites want to pursuea predicament embedded in the Middle East cauldron today. A strong patriotic mobilization that feeds into domestic legitmation needs quickly evaporates beyond American borders, where it breeds contempt, hostility, and resistance; nationalism by its very logic cannot serve general interests on the global terrain, even as it seeks universal justification. The single hegemon predictably works against diversity, independent centers of power, and peaceful balance, favoring coercive methods in support of a single neoliberal order, enforced along lines of an American-style fundamentalism. Empire rests on a logic of perpetual expansion: the global managers can never accrue sufficient power of enough mastery of the universe, just as billionaires can never accumulate enough wealth. Despite the onset of a supposedly postnational globalization, distinct national agendas lie behind US pursuit of international global double standards: breaking treaties, violations of the UN Charter and international law, refusal to accept inclusive disarmament processes, rejection of the World Criminal Court, seizing hold of space militarization for itself, launching of preemptive wars, hectoring of other nations for human rights abuses the United States itself commits on an even larger scale (and more regularly) around the globe. Further, to even speak of globalization as some kind of objective, abstract, benign historical process is mystified nonsense, largely a cover for American corporate, geopolitical, and military interests that have little in common with a balanced, multipolar globalism in which single-power domination becomes obsolete. As the cycle of militarism and terrorism intensifies as the world moves ever closer to barbarismthe very premise of warfare as a method of advancing national goals has become bankrupt and irrational, for reasons having less to do with democracy or worldwide diffusion of liberal values than with the brutal nature of contemporary warfare itself. The proliferation of WMDsand the growing prospect that such horrific weapons will be used only underscores the insanity of militarism in a world where deep social polarization is the norm and universal disarmament seems a distant fantasy. Put differently, American designs for implementing full-spectrum dominance across a global system where anti-US sentiment flourishes are bound to jeopardize planetary survival. We stand at a juncture where large-scale military action tends to aggravate national, religious, and other conflicts, a point doubly applicable to the lone superpower as it takes measures to secure global domination. The classic strategic view that war unfolds as an extension of politics thus makes no sense for twenty-first century realities. As the Iraq disaster shows, war (and its aftermath) is the vehicle of senseless death and destruction, destroying civilian infrastructures, violating established rules of engagement, and destabilizing entire countries and regions. Civilian populations are deeply and irrevocably drawn into the horrors of modern warfare. As Istvan Meszaros argues, if the efforts of the only superpower to maintain total armed supremacy persist long into the future, the result is sure to be a recipe for military suicide. As the militarization of society proceeds, the confluence of the domestic war economy and global empire generates popular attitudes inconsistent with a vibrant, democratic public sphere: fear, hatred, jingoism, racism, and aggression. We have arrived at a bizarre mixture of imperial arrogance and collective paranoia, violent impulses and retreat from norms of civic engagement and obligation that patriotic energies furnish only falsely and ephemerally. Further, the celebration of guns and violence in American society, cavalier attitudes toward war and military escapades abroad, and widespread indifference to established moral and legal codes gives elites wider autonomy to pursue their global schemes. As war becomes more acceptable, often the preferred instrument to fight ubiquitous enemies, we can expect further erosion of the domestic infrastructure and culture. For elites this could well be tolerable, but the long-term consequences for US imperial hegemonyboth domestically and globally are certain to be disastrous.
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Hegemony Bad: Threatens Global Peace
US HEGEMONY DANGEROUS IT REPRESENTS A FUSION OF CAPITALISM, RACISM, AND IMPERIALISM Carl Boggs, Social Science Professor National University (L.A.) , 2005, Planetary Politics: human rights, terror, and global society, ed. Stephen Eric Bronner, p. 72 The fusion of capitalism, racism, and imperial expansion is deeply rooted in US history. With recent developments we have not so much a loss of national innocence or betrayal of democracy, much less any departure from American values, as an intensification of old patterns in a profoundly changed historical matrix. Traditions and ideals frequently associated with the American experiencedemocracy, freedom, rights, and so forthappear at the start of the twentyfirst century in largely truncated, distorted, partial form, eroded b y the harsh effects of corporate, government, and military power swollen by the dictates of empire. Such traditions and ideals, assimilated by large sectors of the population, can be viewed as sources of legitimation that help sustain unprecedented concentrations of wealth and power. As in the past, empire cannot long survive without mass belief systems (nationalism, religion, political ideologies) that justify burdensome adventures and deflect public attention away from the terrible costs, pain, and material hardships that inescapably accompany militarism. For most of US history, in fact, widespread acceptance of hegemonic discourses and practicesinvolving an organic linkage between elites and masseshas endowed the imperial project with popular energies. In foreign policy more than other realms, US political leaders have enjoyed a great measure of autonomy, latitude, and credibility even in the face of costly failures such as Vietnam.
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Hegemony Bad: Capitalism
US USES PRIMACY TO ENSURE GLOBAL SUPPORT FOR CAPITALISM
Alejandro Colas & Richard Saull, International Relation Lecturers, Birbeck College & U. of Leicester, 2006, The War on Terrorism and the American Empire after the Cold War, eds. A. Colas & R. Saull, p. 9-10 In his contribution, Peter Gowan eschews notions of empire or imperialism in favor of the term primacy: that is, an activist policy of US global management of world politics: something like an American global government. Building on distinctions offered by Posen and Ross, Gowan argues that primacy has trumped other options (isolationism, collective engagement and cooperative security) as the principal driver of US grand strategy after the Cold War. On this account, Primacymeans that the US takes on responsibility for a community of states above all for the main core capitalists states, the chief problem zone that primacy is there to address. For Gowan, it is this enduring concept of US grand strategy that best illuminates the Bush turn in US foreign policy. The aggressive militarism of the Bush turn is on this reading not about combating the threat from al-Qaeda or the Taliban or combating terrorism or overthrowing the Baathist regime in Iraq but rather about domestic challenges and the structure of Americas political relations with other main mature and emergent centers of capitalism. Bushs tactical targets are instruments for reshaping its relations with other; core power centers. This strategy for primacy, then, is not one invented, but rather one implemented by the Bush turn: the latter represents a tactical, rather than a strategic shift in US global power projection.
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Hegemony Bad: Proliferation
The pursuit of primacy is self-defeating it creates a cycle of interventionism that dramatically increases WMD proliferation and risks catastrophic conflict. Ivan ELAND, Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, 2002
[The Empire Strikes Out: The "New Imperialism" and Its Fatal Flaws, Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 459, November 26, Available Online at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa459.pdf, Accessed 04-25-2007 // BATMAN] The answer is probably no. Over the long run the strategy of empire will likely prove unsustainable and ultimately self-defeating. Certainly, the United States currently has the worlds most powerful military, and it spends much more on its defense than all its rivals combined. But it costs far more for the United Statesa relatively secure nation separated
from most of the world by two vast oceansto project its power across the seas than it does for states located on other landmasses to project their power regionally. In other words, proximity matters, which raises what John
Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago has called the stopping power of water, the belief that the presence of oceans on much of the earths surface makes it impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony. Whats more, the strategy of empire necessarily leads to a devaluation of other states sovereignty . Thats
because accepting the principle of noninterference is an impediment to a dominant state seeking to make other nations conform to its will. State sovereignty also allows for the formation of multiple loci of power and the prospect of power balancing, which are things an empire cannot accept if it is committed to maintaining supremacy. The echo of Rome is clear. As political scientist Frank Russell once wrote: Rome . . . never was interested . . . in preserving a balance of power. A balance of power system is essentially a device for keeping the power of different states within limits by a system of checks and balances. Rome certainly was not interested in a balance of power for the very reason she was interested in a monopoly of power. From this perspective, the strategy of empire is unlikely to function if all sorts of states are allowed to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a deterrent against the power projection of the United States. The logic of empire therefore dictates that as few states as possible should be allowed to gain a defensive footing with the United States. In practice this idea will bring preventative efforts, including war, to make sure WMD proliferation is stopped at all costs. In its National Security Strategy, the Bush administration notes: These weapons may . . . allow [end
page 13] these states to attempt to blackmail the United States and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue states. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States. 91 In his June 2, 2002, speech to West Points graduating class, President Bush laid out his vision of a future in which the United States more or less monopolizes global military power through preemption if necessary: America has, and intends to keep, [its] military strengths beyond challenge, said Bush, and we have to be ready for preemptive action because if we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long. 92 (Although the president used the word preemptive, working on WMD, such as Iraq, obtains them.)
That approach is consistent with the strategy of empire. But supporting preventative or preemptive action could shift the rules of the world order against peace and stability. 93 Indeed, if other nations, such as India and Pakistan, adopted preemption as their official policy, the risk of nuclear war could actually rise . One of the reasons
which means taking military action before an imminent attack by an adversary, in many cases the United States might launch a preventive attack to stop an incipient threat before it is even realized , for example, before a nation
there is not a constant state of war, says a skeptical Bush administration official, is that we all expect certain rules. We just have to be careful that if we create exceptions to those rules, the exceptions justify itlest we establish precedents that others will emulate. 94 Theres no question that great powers like the United States [can] launch preventative wars or preemptive strikes whenever they conclude its in their interests, adds Mearsheimer. But the $64,000 question is whether or not it makes sense to stand on the rooftops and announce loudly to the world that this is your doctrine. I think it would be better not to do that. I favor the Teddy Roosevelt approach to foreign policy: Speak softly and carry a big stick. 95 The strategy of empire, however, is to speak loudly (extended deterrence) and cut up and scatter Washingtons inadequate stick all over the place. Thats a blueprint for trouble if there ever was one . It will also increase the likelihood of war. Thats
because the doctrine of prevention or preemption is predicated on the ideology of the offensive, which says
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that striking early is less difficult than striking later. The Bush administrations National Security Strategy boldly asserts
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Hegemony Bad: Proliferation
(continued from previous page nothing cut)
Consequently, offense-minded states are apt to be war-prone because they believe the prospects for victory are very favorable to them. Whats more, offense-minded states have a tendency to incite security dilemmas, whereby the efforts of weaker states to increase their relative security undermines, or appears to undermine, the security of the offense-minded state, thus triggering a spiral of security competition that can culminate in confrontation or war. 97 For example, as Chinas economy grows, it may want more ability to control its security
environment within East Asia. The expansion of Chinese influence in that region may run afoul of a United States, which has a defense perimeter that is far forward and a military doctrine that is very preventive or preemptive.
The other major problem with the doctrine of prevention or preemption is that in the absence of actual aggression against the United States, how will Washington prove that an attack might have happened? Surely some foreign and domestic critics will discount the threat afterward. Inevitable mistakes will lead to recrimination and suspicions about Americas motives. And other states will worry that the doctrine could be used against them. 98 Hence there is a paradox. The doctrine of prevention or preemptive intervention could actually create a greater incentive for other states to try to acquire WMD secretly as an insurance policy against American military might, which could in turn spur even more U.S. prevention or preemption . (Yet as President
Clinton [end page 14] found out in 1998 during Operation Desert Fox, preventive attacks on installations associated with those superweapons often founder on a lack of intelligence on the location of such clandestine small mobile, or deeply buried facilities.) The unintended consequence of interventionism, in other words, could be more interventionism.
Failed states are already an example of those self-reinforcing phenomena. Failed states matter to todays advocates of empire because the existence of such states raises the specter that interventionist foreign policies in one place can have a deadly price tag made possible by individuals willing to take advantage of the situation in another place. Accordingly, the security threat posed by failed states is really a second-order issue; that is, the danger posed by failed states is a consequence of something other than state failure per se. The primary danger is from an interventionist foreign policy that makes enemies who are resourceful and willing move into and exploit failed states. The very problem of failed states, in other words, shows, not that interventionism necessarily solves problems, but that interventionism can create altogether new ones . Nevertheless, todays
advocates of empire are unable to break out of their consolidating logic. Thus, the fact that so many people in the Muslim world dislike Americas meddling is not seen as an argument for rethinking U.S. policy or assuming a lower profile. Instead, those advocates see it as an argument for deeper involvement; that is, for ramping up U.S. economic aid, promulgating foreign educational and health care programs, telling other states and aspiring states who their leaders should be, and launching wars to transform countries like Iraq into a beacon of hope. 99 Yet it was such nation building that led to the attack on U.S. forces in Somalia. Thus, like the proverbial man who finds himself stuck in a hole, todays advocates of empire recommend
more digging. But digging will neither get the man out of the hole nor make the United States safer. America and its citizens will become an even greater lightning rod for the worlds political malcontents . As former Reagan adviser and Cato Institute senior fellow Doug Bandow warns: With the growing ability of small political movements and countries to kill U.S. citizens and to threaten mass destruction, the risks of foreign entanglements increase. . . . In coming years, the United States could conceivably lose one or more large cities to demented or irrational retaliation for American intervention. The strategy of empire could make the United States less secure in another major way as wellby dispersing and overtasking its military personnel and equipment. In fact, a recent
top-secret Pentagon war game, code named Prominent Hammer, has revealed that, even now, expanding the campaign against terrorism to a country like Iraq would place severe strains on personnel and cause deep shortages of certain critical weapons. According to the New York Times, The war game measured how the strains of new commitments to domestic defense, the demands of long-term deployments in places like the Balkans and South Korea, southwest Asia and the Sinai, and the stress of ongoing operations in Afghanistan, would affect the militarys ability to wage and win a new regional war. 101 The conclusion was that the American military would be stretched very thin. The Joint Chiefs of Staff subsequently recommended postponing an attack against Iraq. And over the longer term there is the issue of being ready to fight a major theater war if necessary. Empires get into trouble because they get bogged down fighting protracted small wars in the
hinterland, garrisoning myriad outposts, and accumulating manifold security and treaty commitments they are obliged to honor. 102 The strategic implications are potentially enormous. One of the primary reasons Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain appeased Adolf Hitler at Munich in 1938 was that much of Britains strength was diffused throughout its far-flung empire; that is, London was not in a position to rebuff a rising Nazi Germany early on because Britain was overstretched. 103 According to British historian P. M. H. Bell: [end page 15]
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The fundamental problem was the disparity between Britains commitments and her resources. The commitments were almost literally worldwide. The Dominions, though asserting their independence of the mother country, still relied on her for protection. Australia and New Zealand, Malaya and Singapore, the Middle East and Mediterranean, Western Europe and the British Isles were all under some kind of threat as the 1930s went on. 104 (continued on next page)
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Hegemony Bad: Proliferation
In 1937, Britains chiefs of staff produced a gloomy assessment of Londons security prospects. Their conclusion was that England should not make new enemies. The policy of appeasement should never be appraised without recalling this sternly realistic recommendation, says Bell. To reach an accommodation with Italy in the Mediterranean; to avoid confrontation with the Axis powers over the Spanish Civil War; to find the basis of a settlement with Germany; to make only the most cautious response to Japanese aggression in Chinaall this followed in large part from the need to diminish the number of ones enemies. 105 Empire, in short, reduced Britains options in the face of a horrible danger .
Similarly, the United States may find that its alliances and commitments around the world may sap its strength for dealing with any rising powerperhaps China.
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Hegemony Bad: Proliferation
Unipolarity makes countering proliferation impossible only a multipolar world can solve.
Steven WEBER, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute for International Studies at the University of California-Berkeley, ET AL., with Naazneen Barma, Matthew Kroenig, and Ely Ratner, Ph.D. Candidates at the University of California-Berkeley and Research Fellows at its New Era Foreign Policy Center,
2007
[How Globalization Went Bad, Foreign Policy, Issue 158, January/February,]
The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity, and the United States is bearing most of the burden. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. Theres effectively a market out there for proliferation, with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon). The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand, to the detriment of U.S. national security .
It has become fashionable, in the wake of the Iraq war, to comment on the limits of conventional military force. But much of this analysis is overblown. The United States may not be able to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. But that doesnt matter much from the perspective of a government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights. In Tehran, Pyongyang, and many other capitals, including Beijing, the bottom line is simple: The U.S. military could, with conventional force, end those regimes tomorrow if it chose to do so. No country in the world can dream of challenging U.S. conventional military power. But they can
certainly hope to deter America from using it. And the best deterrent yet invented is the threat of nuclear retaliation. Before 1989, states that felt threatened by the United States could turn to the Soviet Unions nuclear umbrella for protection. Now, they turn to people like A.Q. Khan. Having your own nuclear weapon used to be a luxury. Today, it is fast becoming a necessity .
North Korea is the clearest example. Few countries had it worse during the Cold War. North Korea was surrounded by feuding, nuclear-armed communist neighbors, it was officially at war with its southern neighbor, and it stared continuously at tens of thousands of U.S. troops on its border. But, for 40 years, North Korea didnt seek nuclear weapons. It didnt need to, because it had the Soviet nuclear umbrella. Within five years of the Soviet collapse, however, Pyongyang was pushing ahead full steam on plutonium reprocessing facilities. North Koreas founder, Kim Il Sung, barely flinched when former U.S. President Bill Clintons administration readied war plans to strike his nuclear installations preemptively. That brinkmanship paid off. Today North Korea is likely a nuclear power, and Kims son rules the country with an iron fist. Americas conventional military strength means a lot less to a nuclear North Korea. Saddam Husseins great strategic blunder was that he took too long to get to the same place.
How would things be different in a multipolar world? For starters, great powers could split the job of policing proliferation, and even collaborate on some particularly hard cases . Its often forgotten now that, during the Cold War, the only state with a tougher nonproliferation policy than the United States was the Soviet Union. Not a single country that had a formal alliance with Moscow ever became a nuclear power. The Eastern bloc was full of countries with advanced technological capabilities in every area except onenuclear weapons. Moscow simply wouldnt permit it. But today we see the uneven and inadequate level of effort that non-superpowers devote to stopping proliferation. The Europeans dangle carrots at Iran, but they are unwilling to consider serious sticks. The Chinese refuse to admit that there is a problem. And the Russians are aiding Irans nuclear ambitions. When push comes to shove, nonproliferation today is almost entirely Americas burden.
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Hegemony Bad: Terrorism
Terrorists dont hate us because of who we are, they hate us because of what we do primacy prompts blowback. Christopher LAYNE, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, 2007
["The Case Against the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 70-71] After 9/11, many foreign policy analysts and pundits asked the question, Why do they hate us? This question missed the key point, however. No doubt, there are Islamic fundamentalists who do hate the United States for cultural, religious, and ideological reasons. And, for sure, notwithstanding American neoconservatives obvious relish for making it so, to some extent the War on Terrorism inescapably has overtones of a clash of civilizations. Still, this isntand should not be allowed to becomea replay of the Crusades. As Scheuer says, one of the greatest dangers for Americans in deciding how
to confront the Islamist threat lies in continuing to believeat the urging of senior U.S. leadersthat Muslims hate and attack us for what we are and think, rather than for what we do. The United States may be greatly reviled in some quarters of the Islamic world, but were the United States not so intimately involved in the affairs of the Middle East, its hardly likely that this detestation would have manifested itself as violently as it did on 9/11. Experts on terrorism understand the political motives that drive the actions of groups like al Qaeda . In his
important recent study of suicide terrorists, Robert A. Pape found that what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland.56 Pape found that even at Qaeda fits this pattern: although Saudi Arabia is not under American military occupation per se, a principal objective of Osama bin Laden is the expulsion of American troops from the Persian Gulf and the reduction of Washingtons power in the region. This finding is seconded by Scheuer, who describes bin Ladens objectives as: the end of U.S. aid to Israel and the ultimate elimination of that state; the removal of U.S. and Western forces from the Arabian Peninsula; the removal of U.S. and Western military forces from Iraq, Afghanistan, and other Muslim lands; the end of U.S. support for oppression of Muslims by Russia, China, and India; the end of U.S. protection for repressive, apostate Muslim regimes in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, et cetera; and the conservation of the Muslim worlds energy resources and their sale at higher prices. Simply put, it is American primacy, and the policies that flow from it, that have made the United States a lightning rod for Islamic anger .
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Hegemony Bad: Terrorism
U.S. LEADERSHIP MAKES IT A TERRORIST TARGET
Doug Bandow, Vice President of Policy Research for Citizen Outreach, FOREIGN FOLLIES: AMERICAS NEW GLOBAL EMPIRE, 2006, p. 62 The tragic bombing of two U.S. embassies in Africa obviously illustrates the danger of serving a country, any country, abroad. But there is another, more important lesson directed at America. Even a superpower like the U.S. cannot intervene abroad without cost. Unfortunately, the price of attempting to run the world is ruined buildings and mangled bodies. President Clinton acknowledged the connection in his radio addressthough, of course, he didn't admit responsibility. He argued: "Americans are targets of terrorism, in part, because we have unique leadership responsibilities in the world, because we act to advance peace and democracy." To pull back would exhibit weakness, he claimed, so the U.S. has no choice but to "continue to take the fight to terrorists." However, Washington doesn't "have" leadership responsibilities; it chooses leadership responsibilities. Few duties are absolute. Today's world is one in which almost every other country wants America to defend, subsidize, support, or otherwise aid them. If the definition of leadership responsibilities was what other nations desired, Washington would do, well, what it is doing nowdefending, subsidizing, supporting, and aiding virtually every other state. INTERVENTION BEGETS TERRORISM Doug Bandow, Vice President of Policy Research for Citizen Outreach, FOREIGN FOLLIES: AMERICAS NEW GLOBAL EMPIRE, 2006, p. 63 The embers glow in other regions. Somalia demonstrated that not everyone wants to be "saved" by Washington. American policy-makers publicly dismiss democracy when Islamic fundamentalists win elections in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey. Hypocrisy in the Balkanscondemning ethnic cleansing by Serbs while ignoring it by Croatshas left many people believing the U.S. stands for something other than "peace and democracy." Arrogant demands by Washington rankle in China, Russia, and elsewhere. For good reason, then, Charles Englehart of Kroll-Ogara, a business security firm says "There are a whole lot of people who hate America." Of course, unpopularity is not necessarily a sign of being wrong. But U.S. policy is often' glaringly misguided. Even when it isn't, Washington still needs to decide whether U.S. interests are important enough to warrant intervention. And that requires remembering that intervention begets terrorism.
TERRORISTS STRIKE-BACK AT AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THEIR LANDS
Doug Bandow, Vice President of Policy Research for Citizen Outreach, FOREIGN FOLLIES: AMERICAS NEW GLOBAL EMPIRE, 2006, p. 69 Terrorism is evil. But it is the chief weapon of weak movements and states which have no other way to strike back. They attack for a reasonin response to American involvement in their lands and struggles. Whoever brought down the twin towers of the World Trade Center did not do so because of irritation with American culture. They did so because of rage over Washington's intervention in what they saw as their affairs.
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Hegemony Bad: Terrorism
US HEGEMONY AT THE END OF THE COLD WAR RESPONSIBLE FOR MOST GLOBAL TERRORIST THREATS TODAY Richard Saull, Lecturer International Relations University of Leicester, 2006, The War on Terrorism and the American Empire after the Cold War, eds. A. Colas & R. Saull, p. 83 This chapter has argued that the contemporary sources of terrorist-political violence and, in particular, those sources identified with reactionary political and ideological currents can be seen as products of the endings of the Cold War. The ends of the Cold War have been uneven in time and form but also paradoxical, in that the defeat/collapse of the communist challenge has led to, and in some cases was based upon, the rise of militant and reactionary forces. It was the combined failure and undermining/destruction of the radical nationalist-communist project that has provided the context of the emergence of new, reactionary sources of opposition and resistance to the projection of US global power. Although this failure and defeat appeared clear after 1989 with the collapse of the communist Rome, the demise of the actually existing alternative to the American-led global order was a more gradual and variable phenomenon than a focus on events in east-central Europe between 1989 and 1991 would suggest. The ends of the Cold War, particularly in the South, suggest a heteronomy to the conflicts within world politics from the 1980s, if not before. Although the Cold War had not officially come to an end, and although the United States and its allies identified the USSR and the international communist movement as the primary threat to global order, as evidenced in the new Cold War of the 1980s, social and political conflict in many parts of the world were, or had already emerged, outside of the dynamic of inter-systemic conflict. These new sources of opposition and conflict were about something other than the struggle between communism and capitalism, notwithstanding their relationship to each of the socio-political phenomena, involving other social and political forces organized in a different way, mobilizing different people according to new ideological dogmas. Thus, opposition to the projection of American global power heteronomous of the Cold War conflict, either from the perspective of the affiliation or alliance with the USSR and/or the political and ideological basis and objectives of such resistance movements, was evident in parts of the South sometime before 1989. Such developments highlight the uneven ends of the Cold War in that the social-systemic conflict founded upon the two rival systems of capitalism and communism, and based on mobilizations of particular social groups organized into distinct forms of political agency the party cadre or revolutionary guerrilla had come to an end in large swathes of the world, not only the South, sometime before 1989. Consequently the dynamic of social and political conflict was also different, in terms of those who were contesting the social order, how they were challenging it and the objectives they sought.
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Hegemony Bad: Terrorism
U.S. HEGEMONY SPURS TERRORISM G. John Ikenberry, Foreign Affairs, 2004
[New York: Mar/Apr, Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order, Vol. 83 Iss. 2, p. 144, Proquest] Michael Mann also warns of a dangerous, and ultimately unsustainable, imperial turn in U.S. foreign policy. This "new imperialism," he argues in Incoherent Empire, is driven by a radical vision in which unilateral military power enforces U.S. rule and overcomes global disorder. Mann believes that this "imperial project" depends on a wildly inflated measure of American power; the United States may have awesome military muscle, but its political and economic capabilities are less overwhelming. This imbalance causes Washington to overemphasize the use of force, turning the quest for empire into "overconfident and hyperactive militarism." Such militarism generates what Mann calls "incoherent empire," which undermines U.S. leadership and creates more, not fewer, terrorists and rogue states. In his distinguished scholarly work on the history of social power, Mann, a sociologist, has argued that four types of power drive the rise and fall of states, nations, empires, regions, and civilizations: military, political, economic, and ideological. Applying these categories to the United States, Mann concludes that it is, in a jumble of metaphors, "a military giant, a back-seat economic driver, a political schizophrenic, and an ideological phantom."
HEGEMONY WILL CAUSE ANOTHER TERRORIST ATTACK, KILLING MILLIONS Ivan Eland, Director of Defense Policy Studies at CATO, 1998
[Protecting the Homeland: The Best Defense Is to Give No Offense, CATO Policy Analysis, May 5, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-306.html] The U.S. military has been asked to intervene anywhere and everywhere for a bewildering array of purposes. Those numerous interventions--for example, in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia--have nothing to do with America's national security. Such a casually interventionist foreign policy only provokes hostility from factions or groups within other countries. A terrorist attack with WMD--almost impossible to deter, prevent, or mitigate--against a target in the United States could make the World Trade Center bombing, or even the Oklahoma City bombing, seem minor by comparison. Casualties could range from the tens of thousands to the millions. The only viable way to reduce the very real threat of such an attack is to reduce U.S. interference in the disputes and conflicts of other nations. Military intervention should be confined to the rare instances in which American vital interests are at stake.
INTERVENTION INCITES TERRORISM Journal of Commerce, October 7, 1998
Because terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruction are extremely difficult to prevent or mitigate, the administration needs to concentrate its efforts on minimizing the motivation for such attacks in the first place. The United States should resist the temptation to intervene overseas in situations not critical to its vital interests. This temptation will be especially great when humanitarian arguments are offered for intervention. But even when it is not a cover for other motives, intervention for humanitarian purposes is usually not perceived as neutral by all parties to a conflict. Some of
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those parties may eventually seek revenge for U.S. intervention they resent. In short, U.S. policy-makers should get back to basics and remember that a nation's security policy should first protect its own citizens, both overseas and at home. Americans should not have to live in fear of terrorism just so Washington's foreign policy elite can attempt to achieve amorphous and ephemeral gains on the world chessboard.
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Hegemony Bad: Terrorism
OVERT HEGEMONY CAUSES A WMD TERRORIST ATTACK Ivan Eland, Director of Defense Policy Studies at CATO, 1998
[Protecting the Homeland: The Best Defense Is to Give No Offense, CATO Policy Analysis, May 5, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-306.html] A study completed for the U.S. Department of Defense notes that historical data shows a strong correlation between U.S. involvement in international situations and terrorist attacks against the United States. Attacks by terrorist groups could now be catastrophic for the American homeland. Terrorists can obtain the technology for weapons of mass terror and will have fewer qualms about using them to cause massive casualties. The assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs maintains that such catastrophic attacks are almost certain to occur. It will be extremely difficult to deter, prevent, detect, or mitigate them. As a result, even the weakest terrorist group can cause massive destruction in the homeland of a superpower. Although the Cold War ended nearly a decade ago, U.S. foreign policy has remained on autopilot. The United States continues to intervene militarily in conflicts all over the globe that are irrelevant to American vital interests. To satisfy what should be the first priority of any security policy--protecting the homeland and its people--the United States should adopt a policy of military restraint. That policy entails intervening only as a last resort when truly vital interests are at stake. To paraphrase Anthony Zinni, the commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East, the United States should avoid making enemies but should not be kind to those that arise.
HEGEMONY CAUSES TERRORISM EMPIRICALLY PROVEN Ivan Eland, Director of Defense Policy Studies at CATO, 1998
[Protecting the Homeland: The Best Defense Is to Give No Offense, CATO Policy Analysis, May 5, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-306.html] As noted earlier, the National Defense Panel, in arguing for a reemphasis on homeland defense, asserted that "protecting the territory of the United States and its citizens from 'all enemies both foreign and domestic' is the principal task of government." Yet it was also noted that the Defense Science Board admits that "historical data show a strong correlation between US involvement in international situations and an increase in terrorist attacks against the United States" and that "US policies in the Middle East have become the basis for violent retaliation from many groups." That effect may have been less of a problem when great powers regarded the threat from terrorists as a peripheral security issue--that is, as merely a pinprick. Yet the same report notes that the proliferation of WMD and information warfare technology and changes in the motives of terrorists allow such previously weak groups to threaten great powers with massive destruction.
MILITARY ACTIVISM CAUSES TERRORIST RETALIATION Ivan Eland, Director of Defense Policy Studies at CATO, 1998
[Protecting the Homeland: The Best Defense Is to Give No Offense, CATO Policy Analysis, May 5, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-306.html]
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Official reports seem oblivious to the obvious conclusion: The "activist" foreign policy itself is the problem. To avoid catastrophic terrorist attacks on the American homeland in this new and dangerous strategic environment, the United States must abandon its policy of being a military nanny in every area of the world. The nation must adopt a policy of military restraint. The foremost objective of the national security policy of any nation should be to protect its territory and the lives and well-being of its citizens. Instead, Washington's excessively interventionist foreign policy undermines that objective in order to reap amorphous gains by "enhancing stability" or "promoting democracy" in faraway places. U.S. foreign policy invites consequences equivalent to a major military conflict on U.S. soil without any compelling need to do so.
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Hegemony Bad: Terrorism
U.S. HEGEMONY CAUSES TERRORISM Ivan Eland, Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, 2002
[The Empire Strikes Out: The New Imperialism and its Fatal Flaws, Nov 26, p.18] Finally, those who argue that America should emulate the 19th-century British Empire ignore the fact that todays world bears little resemblance to the one over which Britain once presided. Two differences should be obvious: First, the world is far more interconnected today, which makes the consequences of sanctimonious, arrogant, or clumsy international behavior riskier politically, diplomatically, and economically. Second, the potential costs associated with making enemies today are far greater than they were for empires past. Indeed, the British and Romans were the targets of assassinations, arson, and other forms of antiimperial backlash, but that activity was typically small-scale and took place far away from the mother country. In contrast, forms of backlash against the U.S. role as globocop today could be large-scale and longrange and may be directed at Americas homelandas shown by the attacks on September 11, which were launched by Osama bin Laden in retaliation for the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia, U.S. support for Israel, U.S.-led economic sanctions against Iraq, and U.S. backing of corrupt regimes in the Middle East. In the future, terrorists retaliating for U.S. actions overseas could use more powerful weapons against the U.S. homelandfor example, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Thus, the resentment of U.S. neoimperialism could provoke catastrophic terrorism against the United States itselfthereby dramatically reducing U.S. security.
HEGEMONIC DOMINANCE CAUSES TERRORISM Ivan Eland, Director of Defense Policy Studies at CATO, 1998
[Protecting the Homeland: The Best Defense Is to Give No Offense, CATO Policy Analysis, May 5, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-306.html] U.S. officials need to be far more cognizant of the potential adverse responses to Washington's policy initiatives. For example, U.S. military and economic aid to certain nations--such as Israel and Egypt--may cause nations unfriendly to those countries to covertly sponsor terrorism using WMD in the United States. Independent groups--for example, fundamentalist Islamic cells--could also sponsor acts of mass terror in opposition to those policies. That scenario has already occurred. The World Trade Center bombing was perpetrated by an Egyptian fundamentalist group unhappy with U.S. support for the governments of Israel and Egypt.
INTERVENTION SPURS TERRORIST BACKLASH Ivan Eland, Director of Defense Policy Studies at CATO, 1998
[Protecting the Homeland: The Best Defense Is to Give No Offense, CATO Policy Analysis, May 5, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-306.html] With the best of intentions--enhancing stability--the United States has conducted a number of ill-advised interventions in the post-Cold War environment, most notably in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. Instability in such far-flung and nonstrategic areas has always been and will continue to be a fact of life in the international system. In none of those cases did the intervention have any
significant relationship to U.S. security. Furthermore, such interventions rarely increase stability or make things better, even in the target country. Somalia's armed factions have continued to fight long after U.S. forces withdrew. In Haiti, the intervention was supposed to ameliorate the pervasive corruption and poverty; it has done neither. Bosnia is no closer to ethnic reconciliation and becoming a viable nation, despite
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the continuing presence of U.S.-led NATO forces. The NATO occupation will only delay the resumption of bitter fighting between ethnic groups that have a long history of animosity and abhor living in the same
In response to those types of interventions, a disgruntled faction could sponsor a terrorist attack using WMD or information warfare on U.S. soil. As the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs noted in Proliferation Primer, the United States is now, like Gulliver, a vulnerable giant. Are such questionable interventions really worth the potential catastrophic consequences to the American people? The answer is a resounding no.
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Hegemony Bad: Economy
BEING THE SOLE HEGEMONIC POWER IS DETRIMENTAL TO THE ECONOMY Christopher Layne, writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington, 1993
[The Unipolar Vision, p. 4] A hegemon tends to overpay for security, which eventually weakens the internal foundation of its external position. Other states underpay for security, which allows them to shift additional resources into economically productive investments. Moreover, benign hegemony facilitates the diffusion of wealth and technology to potential rivals. As a consequence, differential growth rates trigger shifts in relative economic power that ultimately result in the emergence of new great powers.
US HEGEMONY HURTS THE ECONOMY Ivan Eland, Director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute, 2002
[CATO Institute, Policy Analysis No. 459- The Empire Strikes Out: The New Imperialism and Its Fatal Flaws, November 26, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa459.pdf] Against that backdrop, the strategy of empire allows other states to free ride militarily and economically, thus enhancing their ability to catch up with the hegemon. It does so from two directions: it speeds up the economic growth of other countries by reducing what they would otherwise have to spend on their own defense and slows the hegemons economic growth by putting an enormous tax burden on its economy. As political scientist Christopher Layne correctly points out:
U.S. HEGEMONY IS EXTREMELY EXPENSIVE Ivan Eland, Director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute, 2002
[CATO Institute, Policy Analysis No. 459- The Empire Strikes Out: The New Imperialism and Its Fatal Flaws, November 26, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa459.pdf] In the empires of old the center exploited the periphery to seize resources, ensure captive markets for its goods, and generate taxes for its imperial adventures; Americas neoempire has none of those advantages and instead incurs very high costs. Those costs include heavy spending on defense, the associated drag on the U.S. economy, and retaliatory terrorism in response to the U.S. overseas military presence and intervention needed to police the empire (a calculation based on data from the U.S. State Department indicates that anti-U.S. attacks account for 63 percent of all international terrorist incidents).73 U.S. friends and allies pass on the costs of their own security to the United States without giving anything in returnfor example, opening their markets to U.S. products and services.
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Hegemony Bad: Economy
U.S. SPENDING TO MAINTAIN HEGEMONIC POWER IS HUGE Ivan Eland, Director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute, 2002
[CATO Institute, Policy Analysis No. 459- The Empire Strikes Out: The New Imperialism and Its Fatal Flaws, November 26, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa459.pdf] The United States accounts for about 40 percent of total worldwide defense spending, up from 28 percent in the mid1980s, the height of the Reagan military buildup. Thats two and a half times the combined spending of all its potential rivals.79 But, as an indication of its overextension, the United States accounts for only 29 percent of the worlds GDP. Another comparison indicates that U.S. allies are free riding: although the U.S. economy is larger than the next three largest economies on the planetthose of Japan, Germany, and the United KingdomU.S. defense spending is larger than that of the next 15 highest defense spending nations, most of which are rich U.S. allies.
U.S. SPENDING INCREASING ON DEFENSE Ivan Eland, Director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute, 2002
[CATO Institute, Policy Analysis No. 459- The Empire Strikes Out: The New Imperialism and Its Fatal Flaws, November 26, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa459.pdf] With the war on terrorism, the Bush administration has already requested an additional $45.5 billion for 2003, bringing the total to $396 billion, an increase of 13 percent. In all, the administration plans to spend $2.1 trillion on the military over the next five years, which will raise annual U.S defense spending 15 percent above the Cold War average. How much more the strategy of empire will cost is unclear. Also, foreign aid, nation building, and other activities related to the strategy are not free. The Bush administration recently pledged to substantially increase Americas core development assistance by 50 percent. And American efforts at nation building in tiny Bosnia and Kosovo have cost U.S. taxpayers an estimated $21 billion so far. The more dependents and protectorates Washington takes on, the greater the burden on the U.S. economy will be. U.S. DOESNT BENEFIT FROM THE MONEY IT GIVES OTHER COUNTRIES, CAUSING ECONOMIC CRISIS
Ivan Eland, Director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute, 2002
[CATO Institute, Policy Analysis No. 459- The Empire Strikes Out: The New Imperialism and Its Fatal Flaws, November 26, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa459.pdf]
Some advocates of an expansive U.S. foreign policy have argued that actual expenditures on a worldwide U.S. military presence are less than the potential costs to the United States of future wars resulting from the absence of such U.S. global policing. Two academics, Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press, debunk this myth by using empirical data from major warsWorld War I and the Iran- Iraq Warto demonstrate that
neutral countries incur only small costs, or actually profit, from even large conflicts. Because the world economy especially in an age of globalization of trade and investmentis flexible and resilient, neutral countries can profit from war by selling to belligerents, by taking over markets that warring nations have previously served, by lending money at high rates of return to the fighting countries, and by buying up assets cheaply that have been liquidated by belligerents to fight the war. In addition, Gholz and Press found that the United States pays much more attempting to ensure global security than it would lose from instability and war (and that even with the generous implicit assumption that all U.S. military interventions promote rather than detract from global stability). In short, Gholz and Press demonstrate that the current U.S. policy of being the worlds policeman does not pass the cost/benefit test. Such empirical data confirm the
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conclusions of the much earlierintuitive cost/benefit analysis done by Earl Ravenal, a former distinguished research professor of international affairs at Georgetown University.
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Hegemony Bad: Economy
U.S. HEGEMONY IS VERY EXPENSIVE Ivan Eland, Director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute, 2002
[CATO Institute, Policy Analysis No. 459- The Empire Strikes Out: The New Imperialism and Its Fatal Flaws, November 26, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa459.pdf] Certainly, the United States currently has the worlds most powerful military, and it spends much more on its defense than all its rivals combined. But it costs far more for the United Statesa relatively secure nation separated from most of the world by two vast oceansto project its power across the seas than it does for states located on other landmasses to project their power regionally. In other words, proximity matters, which raises what John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago has called the stopping power of water, the belief that the presence of oceans on much of the earths surface makes it impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony.
US HEGEMONY WILL CRASH THE ECONOMY Niall Ferguson, Professor of History at Harvard, 2003
[The True Cost of Hegemony: Huge Debt, The New York Times, April 20, http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/crisis/2003/0420hyper.htm] But today, as America overthrows "rogue regimes," first in Afghanistan and now in Iraq, it is the world's biggest debtor. This could make for a fragile Pax Americana if foreign investors decide to reduce their stakes in the American economy, possibly trading their dollars for the increasingly vigorous euro. Foreign investors now have claims on the United States amounting to about $8 trillion of its financial assets. That's the result of the ever-larger American balance-of-payments deficits - totaling nearly $3 trillion - since 1982. Last year, the balance-of-payments deficit, the gap between the amount of money that flows into the country and the amount that flows out, was about 5 percent of gross national product. This year it may be larger still.
HEGEMONY WILL BANKRUPT THE US Zlatica Hoke, VOANews, 2006
[June 8th, http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-06/AmericasRole2006-06-08-voa60.cfm? CFID=31442881&CFTOKEN=75492258] But U.S. services to the rest of the world are not cheap. According to the Congressional Research Service, for example, the U.S. cost of war and reconstruction in Iraq is approaching 200 billion dollars. The United States gave more than 16 billion dollars in aid to developing countries in 2003, almost twice as much as the next biggest donor, Japan. And in 2004, the U.S. budget deficit exceeded 400 billion dollars, reaching an all-time high. So the question for many observers is whether America can continue to afford its leadership role in world affairs. Robert Guest, Washington Bureau Chief for The Economist magazine, suspects it may not. "There is nothing unforeseen about this whatsoever. When empires run out of money, they either run out of the will to fight or they tend to retreat into themselves. And the looming gap that you see with the retirement of the 'baby boomers' [i.e., Americans born between 1946 and 1964], bringing Medicare, Social
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Security and, to a lesser degree, Medicaid fairly rapidly into bankruptcy is the single greatest threat to American global hegemony," says Guest.
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Hegemony Bad: Proliferation
U.S. HEGEMONY CAUSES GLOBAL PROLIFERATION
Gabriel Kolko, historian of modern warfare, THE AGE OF WAR: THE UNITED STATES CONFRONTS THE WORLD, 2006, p. 170-1 In a world where the United States threatens preemption against countries that harbor terrorists or allegedly possess WMD, every incentive exists for those nations in the "axis of evil" to develop nuclear weapons as quickly as possible as a deterrent. The United States never signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, it is developing a whole spectrum of new nuclear weapons, it wants to weaponize space, and it opposes the verification provisions other states think essential to an effective international treaty on enriching key nuclear weapons materials. It also opposes a verification regime for the Biological Weapons Convention and additional monitoring and inspection measures for the May 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty with Russia, which was unenforceable and immediately ignored by both sides. But Washington's threats greatly encourage potential victims to build nuclear weapons. It is only a question of time until Iran and North Korea obtain nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have them already (both now have missiles). Ambiguity, as the Israelis have shown, keeps possible attackers guessing and is itself a powerful deterrent. South Korea has mastered the basic technology, Brazil will not allow inspectors look at its nuclear power installations, and Iran is quite aware that Brazil is permitted to ignore the rules. Once Iran's possession of nuclear bombs is beyond doubt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are likely to obtain their own to deter Iran's domination of the region. Japan has the technical knowledge and funds to quickly build a bomb, and an arms race in East Asia may occur. In due course, many more nations will possess nuclear weapons. They may admit it but are more likely to use ambiguity as a deterrentand develop nuclear weapons. As for "dirty bombs" based on freely accessible radioactive waste used with ordinary explosives, which cause far less damage but creates panic, they can easily be constructed by small groups and set off anywhere. Sooner or later, such groups may also acquire real nuclear bombs.
U.S. HEGEMONY IS FACILITATING WMD PROLIFERATION
Noam Chomsky, Linguists Professor @ MIT, HEGEMONY OR SURVIVAL, 2003, pp. 37-8 ' Several leading figures of the foreign policy elite have pointed out that the potential targets of America's imperial ambition are not likely simply to await destruction. They "know that the United States can be held at bay only by deterrence," Kenneth Waltz has written, and that "weapons of mass destruction are the only means to deter the United States." Washington's policies are therefore leading to proliferation of WMD, Waltz concludes, tendencies accelerated by its commitment to dismantle international mechanisms to control the resort to violence. These warnings were reiterated as Bush prepared to attack Iraq: one consequence, according to Steven Miller, is that others "are likely to draw the conclusion that weapons of mass destruction are necessary to deter American intervention." Another well-known specialist warned that the "general strategy of preventive war" is likely to provide others with "overwhelming incentives to wield weapons of terror and mass destruction" as a deterrent to "the unbridled use of American power." Many have noted the likely impetus to Iranian nuclear weapons programs. And "there is no question that the lesson that the North Koreans have learned from Iraq is that it needs a nuclear deterrent," Selig Harrison commented."
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Hegemony Bad: Middle East War
U.S. HEGEMONY CAUSES MIDDLE EAST INSTABILITY Leon Hadar, Research Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at Cato Institute, 2006
[All Hell Breaks Loose in the Middle East, 6/21, http://www.antiwar.com/orig/hadar.php?articleid=9372) If anything, as the recent developments in the region are demonstrating, Bush's policies have made the Middle East safer not for democracy but for ethnic and religious strife. His policies have helped to shift the balance of power in the region in the direction of Iran and Shi'ite and Sunni radicals. What Iraq seems to be exporting to the Middle East is war and instability, a lot of it. Just this week in Iraq, Arab-Shi'ites and Arab-Sunnis were massacring each other in several parts of the country, which is in the process of degenerating into a civil war that could split it into Shi'ite, Sunni, and Kurdish mini-states. In Baghdad, the secular regime of Saddam has been replaced through an open election by a coalition of Shi'ite religious parties (with links to the ruling Shi'ites in Iran) that have taken steps to limit the rights of women and religious minorities. MIDDLE EAST INSTABILITY INEVITABLY RESULTS IN NUCLEAR WAR
John Steinbach, Analyst at the DC Iraq Coalition, 2002
[Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html] Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, should war break out in the Middle East again or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable exceed as a last resort, would now be a strong probability, and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said, The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional. Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicated disarmament and arms control negotiations and. at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familiar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration."
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Hegemony Bad: Middle East War
U.S. HEGEMONY HURTS THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS Leon Hadar, Research Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at Cato Institute, 2006
[All Hell Breaks Loose in the Middle East, 6/21, http://www.antiwar.com/orig/hadar.php?articleid=9372) And the road from Baghdad didn't lead to Jerusalem. The Bush administration has failed to revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and has increased U.S. backing for Israel. At the same time, the Americans, resisting advice from Israelis and moderate Palestinians, insisted on holding free elections in the West Bank that led to the victory of Hamas, an antiIsraeli, anti-American, radical Sunni group that is opposed to holding peace negotiations with Israel. Hamas is also an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, which aims at replacing the current regimes in Egypt and Jordan with antiAmerican religious parties. Israel and the United States refused to talk with the new Hamas government and took steps to strangle the economy of the occupied West Bank and Gaza.
U.S. HEGEMONY PROMOTES ANTI-AMERICANISM WHICH DESTROYS THE PEACE PROCESS Cuneyt Gurer, Professor of Political Science at Kent State University, 2006
[Why the U.S. cannot be the holder of balance in recent Middle East Crises?, 7-25, http://www.turkishweekly.net/articles.php?id=142] Those are the immediate causes determining US foreign policy preferences in the latest Middle East Crises, however more can be found by looking at the different levels of analysis (systemic, state/societal and individual) and by opening the black box of the state and the institutions, as well as congress and presidency.[5] For example a recent news article indicates that Bush and Congress gave Israel the green light to pummel Lebanon for a while because "Israel is fighting a brave battle in a dangerous front in the War on Terror." Even other theories such as liberalism (they would argue that the conflict is as result of the lack of cooperation among states against the aggressor, and the lack of effective norms to encourage cooperation among states) and constructivism (the conflict is a result of religious identities) provides valuable explanations for the fact. This is a point where we can go in detail, however, I want to stick here with the idea of balancer and argue that the US lost its position as a balancer in the region as a result of foreign policy preferences and should support an international response to solve the problem. Preventing UN Security Council declaration for a cease fire call by vetoing the decision last week was critical mistake which caused further aggression and provided no gain for the US policies in the region except the clarification of the support for Israel and increasing anti-Americanism in Europe and other parts of the world.
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Hegemony Bad: Middle East War
U.S. HEGEMONY DESTROYS EUROPEAN COOPERATION WHICH IS KEY TO THE PEACE PROCESS
Dalia Dassa Kaye, Political Scientist and Member of the Research Staff in the Center for Middle East Public Policy at the RAND Corporation, 2003-2004 [Bound to Cooperate? Transatlantic Policy in the Middle East The Washington Quarterly vol. 27 no. 1, Winter, p.179-195, MUSE] Many Europeans are increasingly frustrated that the Quartet has transformed into an ineffective body, which has neutralized a European voice on peace process issues while failing to produce concrete results on the ground. Some segments of the U.S. administration never took this coordinating mechanism seriously. Consequently, many policy elites are questioning the value of continuing the Quartet process. Even if the Middle East road map ultimately fails, however, the Quartet can still serve as a useful mechanism for U.S.-European dialogue and cooperation on Arab-Israeli issues. An independent European approach is unlikely to produce better results in the current political context and will only serve to aggravate transatlantic relations further. Those in the United States who worry about making the peace process a multilateral one would do well to keep in mind that EU positions in the Quartet are much closer to U.S. positions than a unilateral French or British position might be. Although completely shutting the Europeans out of the process might sound appealing to some, it is no longer an option; at the very least, a European role will be essential to implementing any peace agreement and perhaps even to negotiating it in the first place. The days of the United States running the peace process unilaterally are numbered, if not over, even if it will still play the lead role.
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Hegemony Bad: Counterbalancing
A) U.S. HEGEMONY CAUSES COUNTERBALANCING THAT CRUSHES THE GLOBAL ECONOMY AND RESULTS IN WARFARE Robert Pape, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, 2005
[Robert, International Security, Soft Balancing against the United States, Summer, p. lexis] This article advances three propositions that challenge the prevailing view that major powers cannot balance against the United States. First, the most consequential effect of the Bush strategy will be a fundamental transformation in how major states react to future uses of U.S. power. The United States has long been a remarkable exception to the rule that states balance against superior power. Aside from the Soviet Union, major powers have rarely balanced against it. The key reason is not the United States' overwhelming power relative to that of other major powers, which has varied over time and so cannot explain this nearly constant pattern. Rather, until recently the United States enjoyed a robust reputation for nonaggressive intentions toward major powers and lesser states beyond its own hemisphere. Although it has fought numerous wars, the United States has generally used its power to preserve the established political order in major regions of the world, seeking to prevent other powers from dominating rather than seeking to dominate itself. The Bush strategy of aggressive unilateralism is changing the United States' long-enjoyed reputation for benign intent and giving other major powers reason to fear its power. Second, major powers are already engaging in the early stages of balancing behavior against the United States. In the near term, France, Germany, Russia, China, Japan, and other important regional states are unlikely to respond with traditional hard-balancing measures, such as military buildups, war-fighting alliances, and transfers of military technology to U.S. opponents. Directly confronting U.S. preponderance is too costly for any individual state and too risky for multiple states operating together, at least until major powers become confident that members of a balancing coalition will act in unison. Instead, major powers are likely to adopt what I call "soft-balancing" measures: that is, actions that do not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but that use nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral U.S. military policies. Soft balancing using international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements has already been a prominent feature of the international opposition to the U.S. war against Iraq. Third, soft balancing is likely to become more intense if the United States continues to pursue an aggressively unilateralist national security policy. Although soft balancing may be unable to prevent the United States from achieving specific military aims in the near term, it will increase the costs of using U.S. power, reduce the number of countries likely to cooperate with future U.S. military adventures, and possibly shift the balance of economic power against the United States. For example, Europe, Russia, and China could press hard for the oil companies from countries other than the United States to have access to Iraqi oil contracts, which would increase the economic costs of U.S. occupation of the country. Europeans could also begin to pay for oil in euros rather than in dollars, which could reduce demand for the dollar as the world's reserve currency and so increase risks of inflation and higher interest rates in the United States. Most important, soft balancing could eventually evolve into hard balancing. China and European states could also increase their economic ties with Russia while the Kremlin continues or even accelerates support for Iran's nuclear program, a step that would negate U.S. economic pressure on Russia while signaling the start of hard balancing against the United States.
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Hegemony Bad: Counterbalancing
B) COUNTERBALANCING CAUSES A VIOLENT RETALIATION FROM THE UNITED STATES Robert Pape, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, 2005
[Robert, International Security, Soft Balancing against the United States, Summer, p. lexis] Scholars of international politics are used to thinking about the problem of collective action in the context of a multipolar system, where buck-passing is the main obstacle to the formation of a counterbalancing coalition. Balancing is risky business. Strong states rarely welcome others standing in their way and can impose harsh penalties on those that do. In a multipolar system, major powers have a reasonable chance of defending themselves individually against even the strongest state in the system, and so each can try to make others pay the price for confronting the revisionist state. For this reason, states in a multipolar system are often slow to balance against powerful rivals, and the formation of a balancing coalition is generally an incremental process in which new members are added over time.14 The dynamics of balancing are different in a unipolar system. Balancing against a unipolar leader cannot be done by any one state alone; it can only be done by several second-ranked states acting collectively. This means that buckpassing is not an option. Because no one stateby definitionis powerful enough to balance a sole superpower, no state is available to catch the buck. Instead, the main problem of states wanting to balance against the unipolar leader is fear of collective failure. An individual state may fear that there are not enough states to form an effective countercoalition, that it will take too long for a sufficient number to organize, or that the unipolar leader will single it out for harsh treatment before the balancing coalition has coalesced. Thus, the logic of balancing against a sole superpower is a game of coordination in which assuring timely cooperation is the principal obstacle. In this situation, each member of a potential balancing coalition is best off cooperating with others to balance the unipolar leader. At the same time, each members decision to balance depends on the expectation that others will also balance, which in turn depends on the others expectations of its balancing behavior. As Thomas Schelling articulated, the outcome of coordination games. In cases of hegemonic challengers in multipolar international systems, buck-passing was a problem. Before both world wars, Great Britain, France, and Russia were slow to cooperate against the German challenge and paid stiff penalties for their foot-dragging. Members of the international coalition, however, were able to solve their buckpassing problems, with the result that balancing was late but did eventually occur. depends on the process of converging expectations a process that is especially likely to delay hard balancing. Directly confronting the preponderant military capability of a sole superpower before the full coalition has assembled would likely lead to a quick defeat and the loss of valuable members of an effective balancing coalition. Hence, the formation of a hard-balancing coalition against a unipolar leader is likely to occur abruptly, or not at all, rather than by incrementally adding members to a balancing coalition over time.
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Hegemony Bad: Proliferation
A) U.S. HEGEMONY CAUSES PROLIFERATION John Steinbrunner, Senior Fellow at Brookings, 1996
[Brookings Review, Fall, http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/press/review/stenfa96.htm] For the citizens of the United States and those of allied countries, this appears to be a comfortable situation and has been broadly popular. Virtually all Americans believe in a strong national defense, and believe as well that our own intentions are benign. Few of us imagine that our superiority would be a valid problem for anyone else. For those who live outside the U.S. alliance relationships, however, and who perceive a risk of serious political disagreement, American military power is inherently intimidating. Their potential reactions give us reason for concern. Even for the large societies in question - Russia and China - it would not be feasible to match the American standard of military development in less than two decades, and a formal alliance between them would not provide an interim solution. It would provoke a sense of confrontation and further stimulate American military investment without actually balancing either the immediate or the potential capabilities of the U.S. alliance system. For Iraq, Iran, and North Korea there is no realistic prospect of acquiring an equitable balance at any foreseeable time. All these countries have an incentive, therefore, to develop means to negate the sophisticated military capabilities they cannot match. Nuclear weapons are the most effective option in that regard. Just a few of them would be sufficient to wreck a conventional force operation of the sort that the United States mounted in the Persian Gulf War. Since Russia and China can make provisions for such a contingency without any major visible change in their force posture and hence without risking immediate provocation, that can be expected to be their principal reaction to the superior potential of U.S. conventional forces. For the others, however, nuclear weapons are not currently available and effort to acquire them have already and will continue to provoke active resistance. To the extent that they feel categorically excluded and immediately threatened, as Iraq and Iran both certainly do, their reactions are likely to involve preparations for clandestine sabotage of U.S. forces and deterrent retaliation against the United States itself. Systematic pursuit of offsetting strategies of this sort intersects the realm of terrorism and could seriously aggravate that already serious problem.
B) PROLIFERATION CAUSES NUCLEAR WAR AND MASS EXTINCTION
Victor A. Utgoff, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses, 2002 [Survival, vol.44, no.2, Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions, Summer, p.85-102] In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shootouts will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear six-shooters on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.
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Hegemony Bad: Proliferation
U.S. HEGEMONY LEADS TO THE UNCONTROLLED PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONRY
Gavan McCormack, research professor of East Asian history at the Australian National University, 2003 [February 23, http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=3111] It signals its intent to pursue nuclear hegemony including the domination of space; deploys as "conventional weapons" newly developed weapons of terror and mass destruction including cluster bombs, "daisy cutters," and nuclear "bunker busters;" holds its enemies indefinitely without legal warrant, representation, or rights, not only in the "no-man's-land" of Guantanamo but in the United States itself; proclaims its right to assassinate its enemies or launch preemptive war against them, and refuses to recognize the jurisdiction of any international court to try its actions or those of its citizens. This is not, however, "roguish" or "evil" because it is covered by imperial prerogative.
HEGEMONY CANT SOLVE PROLIFERATION WE DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTERNALLY Global News Wire, 2006
[Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, February 8th, p. Lexis] Kudos to the Government on calling the bluff of some of its coalition partners on domestic and external fronts, on policies relating to Iran and the modernization of airports. We are living in a world of double standards. The West is interested in preserving its hegemony in nuclear missiles, while controlling their proliferation in other countries. It is certainly not in the interest of India for one more country to join the nuclear club. Hence its vote in the IAEA against Iran is understandable
FREQUENT MILITARY ACTIONS SPEED UP THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Robert L. Paarlberg, Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College and Associate at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, 2004 [Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Knowledge as Power, Science, Military Dominance, and U.S. Security, Summer, p. Lexis] Policy judgment and restraint are the second key to containing asymmetric threats. Science-based dominance has made the use of conventional force much easier for U.S. officials to contemplate, which brings a danger of more frequent and more careless use of force in circumstances where the conventional military results may be positive, but the political results negative. If a conventional military "victory" creates new and determined political enemies, one unintended consequence can be an increase in asymmetric threats, either to deployed U.S. forces (as in Iraq), or U.S. citizens and commercial assets abroad, or even to the homeland. More frequent and more aggressive U.S. military actions might also speed the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities among states hoping to deter U.S. conventional might.
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Hegemony Bad: Proliferation
HEGEMONY DOESNT DETER PROLIFERATION COUNTERPROLIFERATION WILL CAUSE A NUCLEAR ATTACK Eugene Gholz and Daryl Press, Doctoral Candidates in Political Science at MIT, and Harvey Sapolsky, Professor of Public Policy and Organization in Political Science at MIT, 1997 [International Security, Spring, Come Home America, p. 38-9] The spread of nuclear weapons to hostile countries is not good news. Certain countries may use nuclear weapons in irrational attacks on Americans or their friends. Accidental nuclear wars are not likely but are possible, especially if new nuclear states lack technical safeguards for their weapons. Continued military engagement, however, will not help stop proliferation to Americas enemies. In 1981 Israel attacked the Iraqi nuclear facilities near the city of Osirak, setting back the Iraqi nuclear program by at least a decade. The raid taught Iraq and other countries with nuclear ambitions an important lesson: nuclear weapons facilities must be hidden and dispersed. In the decade following the Israeli attack, Iraq rebuilt its nuclear weapons program, and efforts to hide its size and progress were very effective. In 1990, as American military planners designed the Gulf War air campaign, they knew of only two major Iraqi nuclear weapons facilities. In the months following the war, UN inspectors on the ground discovered sixteen additional major sites. Until troops and inspectors were on the ground and searching warehouses, factories, and military installations for clandestine nuclear facilities, the world was almost completely in the dark about Iraqs weapons program. A military counterproliferation operation against a regional power with a dispersed, concealed weapons program would require weeks or months of ground operations. Stopping an Iranian weapons program, for example, would not be a precision strike. Irans armed forces would have to be neutralized and its major military and industrial areas occupied. In other words, Iran would have to be conquered. Counterproliferation operations would be long, complex, and costly, but more to the point, these operations would multiply, not reduce, the risk that America will be the target of nuclear attacks. The reason to attack an Iranian nuclear program is that Iran might, in some fit of irrationality, use nuclear weapons against the United States. But during an attack, Iran would be forced to defend itself. It would not face the difficulty of delivering a warhead against a distant U.S. homeland, because American troops would be on its shore. Even worse, the Iranian government might believe it had little to lose. Nuclear proliferation among hostile states would not be a pleasant development, but an activist security policy does not reduce the danger. To the contrary, the best the United States may be able to do is to stay out of hostile countries disputes and maintain a powerful nuclear deterrent. Fortunately, that is probably good enough. Military restraint would not increase the danger of rogue states developing nuclear weapons, because even an activist policy could not halt their efforts.
HEGEMONY SPURS PROLIFERATION IN IRAN
Sherle R. Schwenninger, Editor of the World Policy Journal from 1983 to 1991, Senior Fellow at the World Policy Institute and Codirector of the Global Economic Policy Program at the New America Foundation, 2003 [World Policy Journal, vol. 20 iss. 3 p. 25, Fall]
The Bush administration seems to believe that if coercive diplomacy fails it can further isolate and punish both Iran and North Korea. But there are two problems with such a strategy. First, it requires the full support of Europe and Russia in the case of Iran, and of South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia in the case of North Korea. While the European Union has moved somewhat closer to American policy with respect to Iran, it is not clear that it would be willing to risk strengthening Iranian hard-liners, thus giving up the fruits of its decade-long policy of constructive dialogue. Second, such a strategy of punishing and isolating North Korea and Iran may only further accelerate their efforts to secure nuclear weapons in the hope of not only deterring the United States but also gaining the cooperation of other countries. In short, one of the dangers of muscular dominance is not just an increase in terrorism but also an increase in the number of potentially hostile countries determined to acquire nuclear weapons.
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Hegemony Bad: Imperialism
Hegemonic powers inevitably turn imperialist Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek International, 2008, The Post-American World, p. 115
The political scientist Robert Gilpin notes that as a nation's power increases, it "will
be tempted to try to increase its control over its environment. In order to increase its own security, it will try to expand its political, economic, and territorial control, it will try to change the international system in accordance with its particular set of interests." The crucial point here is that, throughout history, great powers have seen themselves as having the best intentions but being forced by necessity to act to protect their ever- expanding interests.
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Hegemony Bad: Democracy Promotion Bad
TURN DEMOCRACY PROMOTION A) U.S. HEGEMONY IS KEY TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY OVERSEAS Jonathan Monten, Department of Government at Georgetown University, 2005
[The Roots of the Bush Doctrine Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy, International Security vol. 29 no. 4, Spring, MUSE, p. 112-156] The promotion of democracy is central to the George W. Bush administration's prosecution of both the war on terrorism and its overall grand strategy, in which it is assumed that U.S. political and security interests are advanced by the spread of liberal political institutions and values abroad. In an approach variously characterized as "democratic realism," "national security liberalism," "democratic globalism," and "messianic universalism," the Bush administration's national security policy has centered on the direct application of U.S. military and political power to promote democracy in strategic areas. In a summer 2004 interview, Bush expressed his "deep desire to spread liberty around the world as a way to help secure [the United States] in the long-run."1 According to Bush, "As in Europe, as in Asia, as in every region of the world, the advance of freedom leads to peace."2 This generic statement of cause and effect is also applied specifically to terrorism: "democracy and reform will make [Middle Eastern states] stronger and more stable, and make the world more secure by undermining terrorism at its source."3 More broadly, the Bush administration proposes a liberal international order grounded in U.S. military and political power; as its 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) contends, the unparalleled U.S. position of primacy creates a "moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe... [the United States] will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world." This view appears to be contingent on the belief that U.S. power is "the sole pillar upholding a liberal world order that is conducive to the principles [the United States] believes in.
B) DEMOCRACY PROMOTION CAUSES VIOLENT TRANSITION WARS
Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Associate Professor of Political Science at Columbia and Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, 1995 [Democratization and War Foreign Affairs, May/June] It is probably true that a world in which more countries were mature, stable democracies would be safer and preferable for the United States. But countries do not become mature democracies overnight. They usually go through a rocky transition, where mass politics mixes with authoritarian elite politics in a volatile way. Statistical evidence covering the past two centuries shows that in this transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war prone, not less, and they do fight wars with democratic states. In fact, formerly authoritarian states where democratic participation is on the rise are more likely to fight wars than are stable democracies or autocracies. States that make the biggest leap, from total autocracy to extensive mass democracy -- like contemporary Russia -- are about twice as likely to fight wars in the decade after democratization as are states that remain autocracies. This historical pattern of democratization, belligerent nationalism, and war is already emerging in some of today's new or partial democracies, especially some formerly communist states. Two pairs of states -- Serbia and Croatia, and Armenia and Azerbaijan -have found themselves at war while experimenting with varying degrees of electoral democracy. The electorate of Russia's partial democracy cast nearly a quarter of its votes for the party of radical nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Even mainstream Russian politicians have adopted an imperial tone in their dealings with neighboring former Soviet republics, and military force has been used ruthlessly in Chechnya.
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Hegemony Bad: U.S.-EU Relations
A) HEGEMONY HURTS US-EU RELATIONS Christopher Layne, writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington, 2003
[Cato Reports, August 13, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6001] Major combat operations in Iraq ended in April but the transatlantic rupture between the US and "old" Europe triggered by the war has not healed. This is because American hegemony remains the cause of the rift. The struggle for supremacy has been a feature of US-European relations since America emerged as a great power in the late 19th century. During the 20th century, the US fought two large wars in Europe to stop a hegemonic Germany from threatening America's backyard. After the second world war, America's strategic ambitions - based primarily on economic self-interest, not cold-war ideology - led it to establish its own hegemony over western Europe. There is a well-known quip that Nato was created to keep the Russians out, the Germans down and the Americans in. It is more accurate to say that America's commitment to the Atlantic alliance is about staying on top - and keeping the Europeans apart.
B) RELATIONS KEY TO SOLVE DISEASE BREAKOUT James B. Steinberg, Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy Studies, 2003
[The Brookings Institution, Survival, vol. 45 no. 2, Summer, p. 113-46] Both the United States and Europe face new global threats and opportunities that, in almost every case, can be dealt with far more successfully if we act together. Transnational threats, from terrorism and international crime to environmental damage and disease pose an increasing danger to our well being. Porous borders and the extraordinary global flows of goods, money, people and ideas facilitate the spread of economic opportunity - but also foster the proliferation of technology for weapons of mass destruction. Weak states threaten our security as much as powerful ones. Ocean and land barriers offer little protection. Non-state actors - from business and NGOs to terrorists and money-launderers - play an increasingly influential role. In the place of geopolitics, a new global politics is required to address the threats and opportunities that affect us all. If we can work together, we are likely to be far more successful at meeting the new global threats, and preserving our freedom and prosperity, than if we try to achieve these goals alone.
C) DISEASE BREAKOUT CAUSES EXTINCTION WORSE THAN WAR HOBART MERCURY, October 14, 2000, p. 11d
Infectious diseases are a bigger threat to human survival than war, medical experts meeting in Hobart were told yesterday. University of Sydney clinical professor of surgery Sydney Nade said the growing resistance of infectious diseases to antibiotics could result in epidemics the likes of which have not been seen for generations. The World Health Organisation had documented how once life-saving medicines were increasingly having as little effect as a sugar pill. There are just a few organisms which remain sensitive to penicillin, he told a meeting of the Australian Orthopaedic Association.
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Hegemony Bad: U.S.-EU Relations
HEGEMONY WILL WORSEN US-EU RELATIONS Christopher Layne, writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington, 2003
[Cato Reports, August 13, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6001] The real source of transatlantic conflict is Americas role as a global hegemon, and the concomitant power imbalance between the United States and Europe. Unless and until Americas foreign policy elites adopt a new foreign policy vision, one that does not presume that the United States will retain its hegemonic position in perpetuity, relations between the United States and its European allies will only continue to worsen. The eventual rupture arising from this longsimmering dispute may ultimately prove damaging to security on both sides of the Atlantic.
HEGEMONY HAS FORCED AN INEVITABLE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE US AND THE EU Christopher Layne, writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington, 2003
[Cato Reports, August 13, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6001] The struggle for supremacy has been a feature of US-European relations since America emerged as a great power in the late 19th century. During the 20th century, the US fought two large wars in Europe to stop a hegemonic Germany from threatening America's backyard. After the second world war, America's strategic ambitions - based primarily on economic self-interest, not cold-war ideology - led it to establish its own hegemony over western Europe.
US HEGEMONY UNDERMINES EU STABILITY Christopher Layne, writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington, 2003
[Cato Reports, August 13, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6001] Unsurprisingly, Washington has tried to hamper the EU's moves towards political unity and strategic self-sufficiency. Washington is trying to derail the EU's plans to create, through the European Security and Defence Policy, military capabilities outside Nato's aegis. It has encouraged the expansion of Nato and the EU in the hope that the new members from central and eastern Europe will keep in check Franco-German aspirations for a counterweight to American power. More generally, the Bush administration is playing a game of divide and rule to undermine the EU's sense of common purpose.
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Hegemony Bad: U.S.-EU Relations: Russian Aggression
US-EU RELATIONS ARE KEY TO PREVENTING RUSSIAN AGGRESSION IN CENTRAL ASIA Zbigniew Brzezinski, Former Diplomat at Johns Hopkins & CSIS, 2003-2004
[Hegemonic Quicksand, The National Interest, iss. 75, Winter, Proquest] While Russia has not stood in the way of any decisive U.S. military efforts to alter the strategic realities of the region, the current geopolitical earthquake in the Persian Gulf could jeopardize America's efforts to consolidate the independence of the Caspian Basin states. American preoccupation with the mess in Iraq, not to mention the cleavage between America and Europe as well as the increased American-Iranian tensions, has already tempted Moscow to resume its earlier
pressure on Georgia and Azerbaijan to abandon their aspirations for inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic community and to step up its efforts to undermine any enduring U.S. political and military presence in Central Asia. That would make it more difficult for the United States to engage the Central Asian states in a larger regional effort to combat Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A resurgence of Muslim extremism of the Taliban variety could then even acquire a regional scope. These risks could be lessened by closer U.S.-EU strategic collaboration with regard to Iraq and Iran. That may not be easy to achieve, given divergent American and European perspectives, but the benefits of cooperation outweigh the costs of any compromise.
For the United States, a joint approach would mean less freedom of unilateral action; for the European Union, it would mean less opportunity for self-serving inaction. But acting together-with the threat of U.S. military power reinforced by the EU's political, financial and (to some degree) military support-the Euro-Atlantic community could foster a genuinely stable and possibly even democratic post-Saddam regime.
THE IMPACT IS GLOBAL INSTABILITY AND WMD CONFLICT Ariel Cohen, Senior Policy Analyst at the Heritage Foundation, 1996
[The New Great Game: Oil Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia, January 25, http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1065.cfm] Much is at stake in Eurasia for the U.S. and its allies. Attempts to restore its empire will doom Russia's transition to a democracy and free-market economy. The ongoing war in Chechnya alone has cost Russia $ 6 billion to date (equal to Russia's IMF and World Bank loans for 1995). Moreover, it has extracted a tremendous price from Russian society. The wars which would be required to restore the Russian empire would prove much more costly not just for Russia and the region, but for peace, world stability, and security. As the former Soviet arsenals are spread throughout the NIS, these conflicts may escalate to include the use of weapons of mass destruction. Scenarios including unauthorized missile launches are especially threatening. Moreover, if successful, a
reconstituted Russian empire would become a major destabilizing influence both in Eurasia and throughout the world. It would endanger not only Russia's neighbors, but also the U.S. and its allies in Europe
and the Middle East. And, of course, a neo-imperialist Russia could imperil the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf. Domination of the Caucasus would bring Russia closer to the Balkans, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Middle East. Russian imperialists, such as radical nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, have resurrected the old dream of obtaining a warm port on the Indian Ocean. If Russia succeeds in establishing its domination in the south, the threat to Ukraine, Turkey, Iran, and Afganistan will increase. The independence of pro-Western Georgia and Azerbaijan already has been undermined by pressures from the Russian armed forces and covert actions by the intelligence and security services, in
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addition to which Russian hegemony would make Western political and economic efforts to stave off Islamic militancy more difficult.
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Hegemony Bad: U.S.-EU Relations: Terrorism
RELATIONS WITH EU ARE KEY TO SOLVE TERRORISM Stephen Holmes, NYU Law School Professor, 2003
[AMERICAN PROSPECT, p. 21] The September 11 attacks were partly planned, organized and financed in Europe. The Muslim diaspora communities into which terrorist cells can invisibly blend remain the likeliest staging grounds for future al-Qaeda attacks on the United States. In other words, Europe remains a frontline region in the war against terrorism just as it was in the war against communism. As daily press reports also reveal, the European police have been acting in a perfectly Hobbesian manner, arresting scores of suspected terrorists. In other words, despite his pose as a no-nonsense realist, Kagan has apparently failed to realize the degree to which the contours of American national security have been redrawn since 9-11. The home front and the foreign front have now been disconcertingly blurred. National-security strategy must now operate in a domain where soldiering and policing have become of coequal importance. This profound change helps us understand the erroneous premise of Bushs foreign policy. In our new security environment, despite the prevailing cliche, the United States is not the worlds only superpower. The war on transnational terrorism depends essentially on information gathering and policing, and in these respects the Europeans are anything but security pygmies. Their capacities to respond effectively to todays greatest security threats easily rival those of the United States. Europeans linguistic skills and cultural knowledge alone ensure that they can make indispensable contributions to U.S. security. They can perform essential tasks of monitoring, infiltration, disruption and apprehension for which our own unrivaled military machine is patently inadequate.
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Hegemony Bad: Space Weapons
A) HEGEMONY CAUSES A BUILDUP OF SPACE WEAPONS
Michael E. OHanlon, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the House Armed Services Committee, 2006 [The State of Space: From Strategic Reconnaissance to Tactical Warfighting to Possible Weaponsization ed. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, June 21, p. 13] Non-American opponents of weaponizing space make many of the same arguments. They also worry about a unilateralist America pursuing its own military advantage at the expense of other countries, most of which do not favor putting weapons in space. This dispute has much of its origins and motivation in the history of the ballistic missile defense debate, as well as the ASAT debate of the 1980s. But it has taken on a new tone in what many view as an era of American unipolarity or hegemony. In recent years, China and Russia have been consistently vocal in their opposition to the weaponization of space and their desire for a treaty banning the testing, deployment, and use of such capabilities. So have a number of U.S. allies, including Canada, which in 1998 proposed that the United Nations convene a committee on outer space in its Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The UN General Assembly has continued to pass resolutions, for more than twenty straight years, opposing the weaponization of space. In December 2001 it called for negotiations on a treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space at the Geneva Conference. (The vote passed by 156 to 0; the United States, Micronesia, Israel, and Georgia abstained.) In 2001 China presented an incomplete draft treaty banning the weaponization of space, and in 2002 China and Russia jointly presented another draft that included bans on weapons based in space and on any use of weapons against objects in space.
B) A SPACE WEAPON BUILDUP CAUSES NUCLEAR WAR Washington Times 2005
[Nuclear War Threat Still Very Real, http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/200505518-125926-1740r.htm] Russia and China have both said for some years that if the United States puts weapons into space they will super-saturate any and all U.S. anti-ballistic missile systems and space-based weapons by building thousands more nuclear weapons each to counter any U.S. missile-defense system.<CONTINUES> This is the most urgent issue facing the human race. If America ever launched its 5,000 nuclear missiles and Russia its 2,500 nuclear missiles it would probably be enough to create a nuclear winter or "dark fall." So much dust, smoke, debris and burned carbon material would be thrown into the atmosphere that plants would be unable to carry out photosynthesis. Most species of life would slowly freeze to death in the dark. Q. You paint a horrifying scenario. Why do we not see more discussion about this? A. What alarms me most of all is that nobody is talking any more about all this. The new reports on Wednesday about the latest plans for space militarization will dangerously escalate tensions with Russia and China. President Bush won re-election by running on what he called the moral issues like banning abortion and gay marriage. But the real moral issue for all people and all religions is whether creation itself will continue to survive, and the possibility that total catastrophe could happen is not low.
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Hegemony Bad: Global Economy
A) U.S. HEGEMONY CRUSHES THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
Chalmers Johnson, professor emeritus of political science @ the University of California, San Diego, President and cofounder of the Japan Policy Research Institute, 2000 [The Consequences of Empire excerpted from the book Blowback The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Blowback_CJohnson/CostsConsequences_BCJ.html ] Once the Cold War had ended and the United States had decided to try to convert its "slipping preeminence into an exploitative hegemony," it set out to compel every significant economy on earth to remodel itself along American lines. This ignorant project has not only failed but has brought discredit to the very idea of free trade and raised serious questions in the minds of economists in East Asia and throughout the Third World about the motives of the United States in the global economy. The world remains poised on the edge of a possible, United States-induced recession, although the United States itself has thus far been the least affected by the economic crisis. Even if a collapse of global demand is avoided, misguided American economic policies have set back thirty years of economic progress in Southeast Asia and laid the foundation for unpredictable forms of economic, political, and military retaliation by the devastated nations. Ashok Nath, executive director of the Asialink Advertising Corporation and a strong voice in Asian business affairs, asks about the United States' push for globalization: "Is there no way to go but a generic world order in which every country is forced to have the same interpretation of democracy as the U.S." "Will speculators, the non-value-adding but crisisproviding segment of 'modem society,' continue their activities unbridled?" "Is the U.S., boosted by consumer spending but lacking strong savings, the next bubble economy?" Such questions have become ubiquitous in East Asia in the wake of the near economic meltdown. They constitute an anti-globalization time bomb that, if it explodes, could lead to mutually destructive protectionism and a huge contraction of global economic activity. The world economy needs leadership to re-create something comparable to the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944 to 1971, with fixed exchange rates and controls over the movement of capital. Instead of attempting to homogenize the global economy, we should be championing results-oriented trade of mutual benefit to nations that do not have identical economic systems. Foreign countries with entirely different legal, economic, and political systems do not need the International Monetary Fund to forcibly impose on them what is a dubious form of capitalism even in the United States. The IMF has already shelled out about $200 billion in a futile attempt to repair the damage that the United States' globalization schemes caused, even as its own meddling in these sick economies has often ended up making them sicker.
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Hegemony Bad: Global Economy
B) THIS CAUSES MASS EXTINCTION T.E. Bearden, LTC U.S. Army (Retired), 2000
[The Unnecessary Energy Crisis: How to Solve It Quickly, http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a3aaf97f22e23.htm, June 24] History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China-whose long-range nuclear missiles (some) can reach the United Statesattacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on site within the United States itself. The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.
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Hegemony Bad: Japanese Rearmament
A) HEGEMONY CAUSES JAPAN TO REARM
Richard Tanter, Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, and Senior Research Associate at the Nautilus Institute in San Francisco and RMIT, 20 05 [Confronting the Bush Doctrine: Critical Views from the Asia-Pacific, Nautilus Institute at RMIT, With Eyes Wide Shut: Japan, Hensei Militarization, and the Bush Doctrine, Page 153-180, http://nautilus.rmit.edu.au/publications/japanesemilitarization.html] In the existing world system, normalization of this kind necessarily means militarization, and that is precisely what Japan has undertaken, a process accelerated, but not caused, by the demands of the Bush Doctrine. Indeed, all of the political, legal and military-technical processes of Heisei militarization which have developed within the US alliance also greatly increase the basis of an autonomous foreign and security policy beyond that alliance. The chances of Japan soon becoming involved in further militarization on the basis of meeting its own perceived security needs, irrespective of the consequences of further demands from the US imperium, are now very high, as with all such normal states, especially when they are economic superpowers. Like France and Britain, this will very likely involve Japan in military interventions abroad-to protect citizens and crucial economic interests deemed threatened by existing conflicts. The Malacca Straits, Aceh and the Philippines come to mind as possibilities under certain circumstances. Similarly, the likelihood of Japan moving from latent nuclear power to actual nuclear power is now considerably greater than a decade ago. For all that such developments would be highly undesirable, such an outcome of Heisei militarization would not be a reversion to the old stereotype of Japan as addicted to militarism, but rather the common and dangerous behavior of a normal state in a militarized world. Not surprisingly, given the degree of incoherence and even irrationality of imperial US policy under the Bush administration, the acceleration of the process of Heisei militarization provided by the Bush Doctrine has also diminished rather than increased Japanese security. Japan has allowed itself to become technologically bound to an ongoing conflict with China through missile defense. And the enthusiastic participation of the Koizumi cabinet in the ongoing war of occupation in Iraq will lead inevitably, not only to the first Japanese deaths in a foreign war since 1945, but also to the first killing of foreigners by Japanese troops in five decades. And with that will come an inevitable re-assessment of Japan by all countries.
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Hegemony Bad: Japanese Rearmament
B) THIS CAUSES A SHOOTOUT WITH NORTH KOREA, ESCALATING TO NUCLEAR WAR Ted Galen Carpenter, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at Cato, 2003
[Options for Dealing with North Korea, January 6, http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb73.pdf] There is one other possibility that ought to be explored. North Korea's motives for pursuing a nuclear weapons capability cannot be determined with certainty. But one possible explanation is that Pyongyang believes that it could then intimidate its nonnuclear neighborsprimarily Japan and South Koreainto making political and economic concessions. Washington ought to convey the message that Pyongyang may be making a serious miscalculation if it assumes that it will have a nuclear monopoly in northeast Asia. North Korea's rulers are counting on the United States to prevent Japan and South Korea from even considering the option of going nuclear. U.S. officials should inform Pyongyang that, if the North insists on crashing the global nuclear weapons club, Washington will urge Tokyo and Seoul to make their own decisions about acquiring strategic deterrents. Even the possibility that South Korea and Japan might do so would come as an extremely unpleasant surprise to North Korea. The United States does not need to press Tokyo and Seoul to go nuclear. That would be inappropriate. A decision on nuclear weapons would be difficult and politically sensitive in both Japan and South Korea, and the United States should not exert pressure one way or the other. It is sufficient if Washington informs the South Korean and Japanese governments that the United States would not object to their developing nuclear weapons. That by itself would be a major change in U.S. policy. In addition, U.S. officials should inform their Japanese and South Korean partners that, if they choose to remain nonnuclear, they cannot count on the United States to risk its own security to shield their countries from a nuclear-armed North Korea. Within a decade, Pyongyang may have ballistic missiles capable of reaching targets in the continental United States. Putting American cities at risk to deter attacks on East Asian allies by a volatile and unpredictable adversary would be far too dangerous, and we need to be candid with Japan and South Korea about that point. Faced with those realities, Japan or South Korea (or perhaps both countries) might well decide to build a nuclear deterrent. Additional nuclear weapons proliferation in northeast Asia is obviously not an ideal outcome, but offsetting the North's illicit advantage may be the best of a set of bad options. Bribery is unlikely to induce North Korea to return to a nonnuclear status. Economic sanctions are not likely to achieve that goal either. And preemptive military strikes are clearly too dangerous. The one chance of getting the North to abandon its current course is to make it clear that Pyongyang may have to deal with nuclear neighbors and would, therefore, not be able to intimidate them. If the United States does not adopt that approach, it is almost certain to be stuck with the responsibility of shielding nonnuclear allies from a volatile, nuclear-armed North Korea. More proliferation may be a troubling outcome, but it beats that nightmare scenario.
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Hegemony Bad: Iran Strikes
A. US MILITARY DECLINE PREVENTS ATTACK ON IRAN
Paul Kennedy, Professor of History and the Director of International Security Studies at Yale University, 20 03 [The Perils of Empire: This Looks Like Americas Moment, History Should Give Us Pause, Washington Post, April 20, http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0420-02.htm] This brings us to the broadest question of all, that of defining America's position in the world over the years to come. The clear victor of the Cold War, it no longer feels constrained from intervening in sensitive areas like the Middle East or Central Asia, should national security interests demand it. The United States is unchallenged militarily and sees no rival Great Power in sight. Yet it has taken little comfort from this. Since 9/11, it feels less secure and is spending massive amounts on armaments. It possesses the world's single largest national economy but faces huge trade and budget deficits and economic rivalries from an equally large European Union and a fast-growing China. It has taken on military commitments all over the globe, from the Balkans and Kuwait to Afghanistan and Korea. Its armed forces look colossal (as did Britain's in 1919), but its obligations look even larger. It is small wonder that while liberals protest soaring defense expenditures, the U.S. military repeatedly warns of overstretch and is dismayed at the hawkish calls for further adventures; in the recent war on Saddam Hussein's regime, part or all of eight of the 10 U. S. Infantry divisions were tied down in Iraq or standing by to go there. With all that is crying out for attention -- from our inner cities to the slaughters in central Africa -- can we really afford this missionary zeal to remake the Middle East in our own image? We could end up merely creating for ourselves ever more crumbling frontiers of insecurity. Successful in our Iraq military campaign, is it not time to rein in our own "forward" school and be a little more modest in our aims, language, spending and relations with the international community? Just a few days ago, I was shocked when a Dutch journalist told me that many of his countrymen were now "scared" of America. The Dutch. Scared. Is that a good long-term policy for the number one power in the democratic world? The Dutch aren't alone, of course. Most countries in the world, including members of the current anti-Saddam coalition, are dumbfounded at the threats against Syria and Iran made by influential members of the Bush administration. Still, despite the fears of liberals at home and abroad, there are at least four reasons to think we will not be marching on Damascus or Tehran -- at least not now. The first is the announced recall of some of the U.S. Navy's carrier groups and the return of other military units for rest and overhaul. The second is that, during the prime minister's question time in the House of Commons last week, Tony Blair insisted that there were "no plans" for invading Syria. The third is that an aggressive move against the governments in Damascas or Tehran would probably provoke the wholesale resignation of the U.S. foreign service, including its boss, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell. And the fourth is that even the present supine Congress would bestir itself and demand that the brakes be applied. "Big stick" warnings to Syria and Iran may continue, but neither the Marines nor the Army are about to embark on another war.
B. ATTACK ON IRAN RISKS NUCLEAR WAR WITH RUSSIA AND CHINA Heather Wokusch, Freelance Writer, work featured internationally, 2006
[WWIII or Bust: Implications of a US Attack on Iran, Feb 20, DissidentVoice]
Attacking Iran could also tip the scales towards a new geopolitical balance, one in which the US finds
itself shut out by Russia, [and] China, Iran, Muslim countries and the many others Bush has managed to piss off during his period in office. Just last month, Russia snubbed Washington by announcing it would go ahead and honor a $700 million contract to arm Iran with surface-to-air missiles, slated to guard
Iran's nuclear facilities. And after being burned when the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority invalidated Hussein-era oil deals, China has snapped up strategic energy contracts across the world, including in
It can be assumed that China will not sit idly by and watch Tehran fall to the Americans. Russia and China have developed strong ties recently, both with each other and with Iran. Each possesses nuclear weapons, and
Latin America, Canada and Iran.
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arguably more threatening to the US, each holds large reserves of US dollars which can be dumped in favor of euros. Bush crosses them at his nation's peril.
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Hegemony Bad: AT: Empirically Denied
THE CURRENT SITUATION IS UNIQUE ONLY NOW IS THE DANGER OF HEGEMONY ENOUGH TO THREATEN HUMAN SURVIVAL. HISTORY IS ON OUR SIDE PAST WARS ONLY DEMONSTRATE THE BRINK OF OUR IMPACTS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE
Noam Chomsky, Linguists Professor at MIT, 2003
[HEGEMONY OR SURVIVAL, p. 231-2] Throughout history it has been recognized that such steps are dangerous. By now the danger has reached the level of a threat to human survival. But as observed earlier, it is rational to proceed nonetheless on the assumptions of the prevailing value system, which are deeply rooted in existing institutions. The basic principle is that hegemony is more important than survival. Hardly novel, the principle has been amply illustrated in the past half-century. For such reasons, the US has refused to join the rest of the world in reaffirming and strengthening the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 to reserve space for peaceful purposes. The concern for such action, articulated in UN resolutions calling for "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space," is motivated by widespread recognition that Washington intends to breach this barrier, so far maintained. The US was joined in its abstention in 1999 by Israel, in 2000 by Micronesia as well. As noted earlier, immediately after it was learned that the world had barely been saved from a war that might have "destroyed the Northern Hemisphere," the Bush administration effectively vetoed yet another international effort to prevent the militarization of space. For the same reasons, Washington blocked negotiations at the UN Conference on Disarmament during the sessions that opened in January 2001, rejecting the call of Secretary General Kofi Annan that member states overcome their lack of "political will" and work toward a comprehensive accord to bar militarization of space. "The U.S. remains the only one of the 66 member states to oppose launching formal negotiations on outer space," Reuters reported in February. In June, China again called for banning of weapons in outer space, but the US again blocked negotiations." Again, that makes good sense if hegemony, with its short-term benefits to elite interests, is ranked above survival in the scale of operative values, in accord with the historical standard for dominant states and other systems of concentrated power..'One can discern two trajectories in current history: one aiming toward hegemony, acting rationally within a lunatic doctrinal framework as it threatens survival; the other dedicated to the belief that "another world is possible," in the words that animate the World Social Forum, challenging the reigning ideological system and seeking to create constructive alternatives of thought, action, and institutions. Which trajectory will dominate, no one can foretell. The pattern is familiar throughout history; a crucial difference today is that the stakes are far higher. Bertrand Russell once expressed some somber thoughts about world peace: After ages during which the earth produced harmless trilobites and butterflies, evolution progressed to the point at which it has generated Neros, Genghis Khans, and Hitlers. This, however, I believe is a passing nightmare; in time the earth will become again incapable of supporting life, and peace will return . No doubt the projection is accurate on some dimension beyond our realistic contemplation. What matters is whether we can awaken ourselves from the nightmare before it becomes all-consuming, and bring a measure of peace and justice and hope to the world that is, right now, within the reach of our opportunity and our will.
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Hegemony Bad: AT: Preemption Solves
TURN UNILATERAL PREEMPTION ENCOURAGES WMD DEVELOPMENT Zbigniew Brzezinski, Former Diplomat at Johns Hopkins & CSIS, 2004
[THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, p. 34] Last but not least, a policy of unilateral compulsion would breed an international state of mind in which the surreptitious acquisition of WMD would become a high priority for states unwilling to be intimidated. Such states would then have an additional incentive to assist terrorist groups, which, fueled by a thirst for revenge, would be even more likely to anonymously unleash weapons of mass destruction against America. Survival of the fittest, always inherent to some degree in international politics (though gradually mitigated by international conventions guiding the conduct of states), would thereby become the law of the global jungle. In the long run, that could prove to be the fatal undoing of America's national security.
PREEMPTIVE ATTACKS ENCOURAGE HOSTILE STATES TO ACQUIRE WMDS
Dr. Timothy A. McElwee, Plowshares Associate Professor of Peace Studies at Manchester College, 2003 [Cross Currents, Summer, v 53 i2 p148(24)] The approach also risks exacerbating one of the most troubling problems faced by the international community, that of the proliferation of WMDs. Using Cold War reasoning, states that fear they may be the next victim of a U.S. preemptive attack, may reasonably conclude that the U.S. did not attack the Soviet Union because of the rough parity of the two superpowers' nuclear arsenals. Therefore, as Ikenberry points out, a policy of preemptive war could lead hostile states to accelerate programs to acquire deterrent mechanism in the form of WMDs. In short, pursuit of the doctrine of preemptive war could lead to the unintended consequence (a new version of blowback) of a new and more deadly round of arms races. From the vantage point of a distinguished historian, Schlesinger explains that preemptive war is "based on the proposition that it is possible to foretell with certainty what is to come. [However,] the possibilities of history are far richer and more varied than the human mind is likely to conceive--and the arrogance of leaders who are sure they can predict the future invites retribution."
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Hegemony Bad: Counter-Balancing 2nd Line A2: U.S. Is A Benevolent Hegemon (1/2)
(___) They say no counter-balancing the U.S. is a benevolent hegemon, but: ____ Our 1nc Layne evidence is responsive to this claim
History disproves their argument empirically, there is no such thing as a sustainable hegemon.
____
The benevolent hegemon argument is wrong U.S. power is up-close-andpersonal, over-concentration of power makes resentment inevitable, and reassurances fail theres simply no such thing as a benevolent hegemon. Christopher LAYNE, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, 2007
["The Case Against the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 68 BATMAN]
//
For sure, many states do benefit both economically and in terms of security from American primacy. And it also is true that not all other states will feel threatened by U.S. hard power. Eventually, however, some of the other states in the
international political system are going to believe that they are menaced by American primacy. For example, far from being off-shore as the primacists claim, U.S. power is very much on shoreor lurking just beyond the coastlineand very much in the faces of China, Russia, and the Islamic world. And, in this sense, international politics is not a lot different than basketball: players who push others around and get in their faces are likely to be the targets of a self-defensive punch in the nose . Doubtless, American primacy has its dimension of benevolence, but a state as powerful as the United States can never be benevolent enough to offset the fear that other states have of its unchecked power. In international politics, benevolent hegemons are like unicornsthere is no such animal. Hegemons love themselves, but others mistrust and fear themand for good reason. In todays world, others dread both the overconcentration of geopolitical weight in Americas favor and the purposes for which it may be used. After all, No great power has a monopoly on virtue and, although some may have a great deal more virtue than others, virtue imposed on others is not seen as such by them. All great powers are capable of exercising a measure of self-restraint, but they are tempted not to and the choice to practice restraint is made easier by the existence of countervailing power and the possibility of it being exercised." While Washingtons self-proclaimed benevolence is inherently ephemeral, the hard fist of American power is tangible. Others must worry constantly that if U.S. intentions change, bad things may happen to them. In a one-superpower world, the overconcentration of power in Americas hands is an omnipresent challenge to other states security, and Washingtons ability to reassure others of its benevolence is limited by the very enormity of its power .
____
Benevolent hegemons dont exist fear of power shapes perceptions of intent.
Christopher LAYNE, Member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, 2003
[The Cost of Empire, The American Conservative, October 6, Available Online at http://www.amconmag.com/10_06_03/cover.html, Accessed 04-25-2007 // BATMAN] These are not compelling arguments. In international politics, benevolent hegemons are like unicornsthere are no
such animals. Hegemons love themselves, but others mistrust and fear them. Others dread both the overconcentration of geopolitical weight in Americas favor and the purposes for which it may be used. Washingtons (purportedly) benevolent intentions are ephemeral, but the hard fist of American power is tangibleand others worry that if U.S. intentions change, they might get smacked . As for the argument that the U.S. is too mighty to be counter-balanced, history reminds us that things change fast in international politics. The British found out toward the end of the 19th century that a seemingly unassailable international power position can melt away with unexpected rapidity.
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Hegemony Bad: Counter-Balancing 2nd Line A2: U.S. Is A Benevolent Hegemon (2/2)
____ Prefer our evidence states react to the potential for harm, not to the harm itself even if U.S. actions are benevolent, the perception of the U.S. isnt.
Ivan ELAND, Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, 2002
[The Empire Strikes Out: The "New Imperialism" and Its Fatal Flaws, Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 459, November 26, Available Online at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa459.pdf, Accessed 04-25-2007 // BATMAN] But that logic presumes that states will be lastingly indifferent to the fluid nature of politics and inherent uncertainty about the future. As political scientist Joseph Grieco notes, however, because states worry that todays
ally can become tomorrows rival, they pay close attention to how cooperation might affect relative capabilities in the future. 53 In other words, states react, not to other states intentions, but to their capacity to do harm should things change. That kind of thinking would help explain why the United States, which was not directly threatened by the world-spanning British Empire in the late 19th and early 20th centuries nevertheless eventually built up its own capabilities.
Columbia University political scientist Robert Jervis cuts to the heart of the uncertainty issue: Minds can be changed, new leaders can come to power, values can shift, new opportunities and dangers can arise. 54 Unless states are
willing to put their fate in the hands of others, they must be prepared to help themselves in the eventuality that things turn sour. Indeed, no state can guarantee that a hegemon will not someday become intrusive and domineering, in which case other states would no longer be safe and secure. Prudence therefore dictates that states prepare for that eventuality, which means striving to have as much power as possible in case a friendly neighbor turns into the neighborhood bully; in other words, even though you trust the person holding the matches, you should keep a fire extinguisher handy.
____
The Iraq war shattered any residual impressions of the U.S. as a benevolent hegemon their authors dont assume the Bush Administration.
Christopher LAYNE, Visiting Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, 2003
[America as European Hegemon, The National Interest, Summer, Available Online via Lexis-Nexis // BATMAN]
Many throughout the world now have the impression that the United States is acting as an aggressive hegemon engaged in the naked aggrandizement of its own power. The notion that the United States is a "benevolent" hegemon has been shredded. America is inviting the same fate as that which has overtaken previous contenders for hegemony. In the sweep of history, the Bush Administration will not be remembered for conquering Baghdad, but for a policy that galvanized both soft and hard balancing against American hegemony. At the end of the day, what the administration trumpets as "victory" in the Persian Gulf may prove, in reality, to have pushed NATO into terminal decline, given the decisive boost to the political unification of Europe (at least the most important parts of it), and marked the beginning of the end of America's era of global preponderance .
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Hegemony Bad: Counter-Balancing 2nd Line A2: U.S. Is A Status Quo Power (1/1)
(___) They say no counter-balancing the U.S. is a status quo power, but: ____ Our 1nc Layne evidence answers this claim
U.S. primacy threatens other countries they will respond by balancing against the U.S. this is empirically proven.
____
Not true the U.S. is an expansionist power Iraq proves. Christopher LAYNE, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, 2007
["The Case Against the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 67 BATMAN]
//
The truth, however, is that the United States is not at all a status quo power. Now, for sure, the American primacists are content with the prevailing unipolar status quo. That is, they want the make sure that the United States retains its role as the sole superpower. But in a more fundamental sense, the United States is the antithesis of a status quo power. Rather, it is an
expansionist power that constantly is attempting to add to its lead in relative power vis--vis potential rivals; extend the territorial reach of its military power (for example, by acquiring new bases in Central Asia); and enlarge its influence ideologically by spreading democracy worldwide. Indeed, the whole debate about the new American Empire underscores the expansionist impulses driving U.S. grand strategy today. If any doubt existed on this point, the American invasion of Iraq in March 2003 dispelled it. Around the world, Iraq removed the veil of American benevolence and revealed to the rest of the world the aggrandizing and self-interested nature of U.S. grand strategy.
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Hegemony Bad: Counterbalancing
US HEGEMONY RISKS A GEOPOLITICAL BACKLASH. COUNTER-BALANCING WILL QUICKLY ERODE US DOMINANCE
Christopher Layne, Member of Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, 2003
[The American Conservative, The Cost of Empire, October 6 2003, http://www.amconmag.com/10_06_03/cover.html] As for the argument that the U.S. is too mighty to be counter-balanced, history reminds us that things change fast in international politics. The British found out toward the end of the 19th century that a seemingly unassailable international power position can melt away with unexpected rapidity. Perhaps the proponents of Americas imperial ambitions are right and the U.S. will not suffer the same fate as previous hegemonic powers. Dont bet on it. The very fact of Americas overwhelming power is bound to produce a geopolitical backlashwhich is why its only a short step from the celebration of imperial glory to the recessional of imperial power. Indeed, on its present course, the United States seems fated to succumb to the hegemons temptation. Hegemons have lots of power and because there is no countervailing force to stop them, they are tempted to use it repeatedly, and thereby overreach themselves. Over time, this hegemonic muscle-flexing has a price. The cumulative costs of fighting or preparing to fightguerilla wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, asymmetric conflicts against terrorists (in the Philippines, possibly in a failed Pakistan, and elsewhere), regional powers (Iran, North Korea), and rising great powers like China could erode Americas relative power especially if the U.S. suffers setbacks in future conflicts, for example in a war with China over Taiwan.
HEGEMONY IS NOT SUSTAINABLE IT INEVITABLY CAUSES COUNTERBALANCING Christopher Layne, Member of Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, 2003
[The American Conservative, The Cost of Empire, October 6 2003, http://www.amconmag.com/10_06_03/cover.html] Traditional realists like Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, and Walter Lippman reject the logic of offensive realism because they believe that when one state becomes too powerful all the others fear for their security. They respond by building up their own military capabilities or by forming alliances with others to act as a counterweight against a hegemons power (or both). This is what students of international politics refer to as balancing. And, indeed, the historical record pretty conclusively shows that hegemony is a self-defeating grand strategy, not a winning one. Every hegemonic aspirant in modern international historythe Hapsburg Empire under Charles V, Spain under Philip II, France under Louis XIV and Napoleon, and Germany under Hitlerhas been defeated by counter-hegemonic balancing.
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Hegemony Bad: Counterbalancing
US POWER DOESN'T INCREASE OUR LEADERSHIP IT ONLY CAUSES OTHER NATIONS TO COUNTER BALANCE
Robert Pape, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, 2005
[Robert, International Security, Soft Balancing against the United States, Summer, p. lexis] Concerns over indirect threats are likely to be greater in unipolar systems than in other balance of power systems. A unipolar leader is so strong that it may engage in military actions in distant regions of the world that are often likely to have real, if inadvertent, consequences for the security of major powers that are geographically close or have important economic ties to the region. For instance, how the unipolar leader wages a war on transnational terrorism can reduce or improve the security of other major powers, giving them a powerful security interest in how such a war is waged. Further, there is less ambiguity in a unipolar than a multipolar world about which state can make a bid for global hegemony, and even minor steps in this direction by a unipolar leader can create a common fear among second-ranked powers. Hence, other states may have reason to oppose military action by a unipolar leader, even if it has no intention of harming them directly. This logic implies that perceptions of the most powerful state's intentions are more important in unipolar than in multipolar worlds. Because a unipolar leader is already stronger than all individual second-ranked powers, additional increments of power are unlikely to significantly increase its ability to become a global hegemon. For this reason, although the leading state's relative power gains are viewed with suspicion, they are ultimately of secondary importance in the politics of unipolarity.
HEGEMONY AUTOMATICALLY ELICIT COUNTER-BALANCING Christopher Layne, Member of Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, 2003
[The American Conservative, The Cost of Empire, October 6 2003, http://www.amconmag.com/10_06_03/cover.html] First, although not actually great powers, one or more states throughout most of international history have clearly been candidates for that status because of their latent power. The threat posed to their security by a rising hegemon has served as the catalyst for these candidates to adopt the necessary policies to mobilize their resources and transform their latent power into actual great-power capabilities. Two prior "unipolar moments" in international history illustrate this point. When France under Louis XIV briefly attained hegemony in
Europe, both England and Austria rose from candidate status to great-power status and used their newly acquired capabilities to end France's geopolitical preeminence. Similarly, England's mid-nineteenth-century global preponderance (the fabled Pax Britannica) spurred the United States, Germany, and Japan to emerge as great powers, largely to offset British supremacy. In each of these instances, for reasons of selfdefense, states that were candidate great powers were impelled to come forward and emerge as full-fledged great powers in order to ensure that they would not fall victim to the reigning hegemon. Second,
hegemons invariably are defeated because other states in the international system, frequently spearheaded by newly emerged great powers, form counterbalancing coalitions against them. Thus, the English and the Dutch defeated Philip II. Various coalitions anchored by Holland, the newly emerged great powers of England and Austria, and an established great power in Spain undid Louis the XIV. A coalition composed of England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia rebuffed Napoleon's bid for hegemony. Instead of war, the enervating economic effects of trying to maintain primacy against the simultaneous challenges of the United States, Russia, France, and Germany undermined British hegemony in the nineteenth century. The wartime grand alliance of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union defeated Hitler. Commenting on this historical record, Henry Kissinger has rightly observed, "Hegemonic empires almost automatically elicit universal resistance, which is why all such claimants sooner or later exhausted themselves." A simple fact explains this pattern: left unbalanced, hegemonic power threatens the security of the other major states in the international system. In the first few decades of the twenty-first century, U.S. primacy will likely prompt the same response that previous hegemonic aspirants provoked: new great powers will emerge to offset U.S. power, and these new great powers will coalesce to check U.S. hegemonic ambitions.
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Hegemony Bad: Counterbalancing
THE WORLD PERCEIVES THE U.S. AS THREATENING, CAUSING THEM TO COUNTER-BALANCE AGAINST US Christopher Layne, Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A & M, The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Fall 2006, p. 7-41 In this article I address three fundamental questions. First, is the United States insulated from challenge because of its alleged status as a nonthreatening, or benevolent, hegemon? Second, since the Cold War's end, have other states balanced against the United States? The answers to these two questions hold the key to answering a third: How long is U.S. hegemony likely to last? My central arguments are threefold. First, there are strong reasons to doubt the claim that other states view U.S. primacy as nonthreatening. Second, unipolarity has not altered the fundamental dynamics of international politics: other states always have compelling incentives to offset the preponderant capabilities of the very powerful, even if the hegemon does not pose an existential threat to them. Third, because the United States' expansionist grand strategy reinforces other states' perceptions that U.S. unipolar power is threatening, the United States must adopt a different grand strategy: an offshore balancing strategy of self-restraint.
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Hegemony Bad: Counterbalancing -- Europe Will Counterbalance
EUROPEAN INFIGHTING WONT PREVENT CHALLENGES TO U.S. HEGEMONY
Christopher Layne, Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A & M, The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Fall 2006, p. 21-2 Another argument that scholars frequently invoke to support the claim that U.S. hegemony will not be challenged is that the major Eurasian powers will be too busy competing against each other to worry about the United States, and will want to enlist it as an ally against their regional rivals. Although superficially plausible, this argument overlooks two key points. First, the history of the modern international state system until 1945 demonstrates that when faced with a bid for hegemony, rival great pow ers put their own enmities on the back-burner and formed temporary alliances to defeat it. For example, during the Napoleonic Wars, England made common cause with Russia (with which it competed for influence in the Baltic and the Near East, and on India's Northwest Frontier) to defeat France. At the turn of the twentieth century, England set aside its rivalries with France and Russia and joined with them in containing Wilhelmine Germany. Similarly, following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, London entered into an alliance with Moscow. Explaining Britain's willingness to ally with the Soviet Uniontheretofore regarded by British policymakers as threatening geopolitically and ideologicallyPrime Minister Winston Churchill said, "If Hitler invaded Hell, I should at least make a favorable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons." Second, although regional balancing could work to the United States' advantage, it would be more likely to do so in a future multipolar system rather than in a unipolar one. The Cold War illustrates this point. During the Cold War, the United States was hegemonic in the non-Soviet world. Although deeply ambivalent (or worse) about U.S. hegemony, the West Europeans nonetheless acceptedreluctantlyU.S. primacy because the United States protected them from the Soviet threat. In the absence of a hostile countervailing pole (or poles) of power in today's unipolar world, however, there is a higher risk that otherseven erstwhile U.S. allieswill come to see U.S. hegemony as a greater threat than U.S. preponderance during the Cold War.
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Hegemony Bad: Counterbalancing -- Answers to: The U.S. is a Benevolent Power States Wont Counterbalance That
IRAQ HAS SHATTERED THE IDEA THAT THE U.S.IS A BENOVOLENT POWER
Christopher Layne, Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A & M, The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Fall 2006, p. 24 Prophylatic multilateralism cannot inoculate the United States from counterhegemonic balancing. The reality of the United States' enormous power cannot be hidden by the veil of multilateralism. Moreover, what the feisty Brooklyn Dodgers' manager Leo Duroucher said about baseball is also true in international politics: nice guys finish last. The United States did not attain hegemony by being nice, but rather by assertivelyand, occasionally, aggressivelyusing its power. Although the United States may profess its regard for others' interests and its commitment to multilateralism, it can use its power unilaterally to others' detriment whenever it chooses. If other states did not understand this before (though many of them did), the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq dispelled any illusion. For much of the world, the invasion shattered one of the most important foundations upon which the notion of benevolent U.S. hegemony is based: the perception that the United States is a status quo power. Since the Cold War's end, notes Walt, "The United States has not acted as a 'status quo' power: rather, it has used its position of primacy to increase its influence, to enhance its position vis--vis potential rivals, and to deal with specific security threats."
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Hegemony Bad: Counterbalancing -- Answers to: Other States Wont Fear Us Because We are a Democracy
THE DEMOCRATIC NATURE OF U.S. INSTITUTES DOES NOT PREVENT COUNTERBALANCING
Christopher Layne, Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A & M, The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Fall 2006, p. 26 The mere fact that the United States is a democracy does not negate the possibility that other states will fear its hegemonic power. First, theories that posit a special democratic (or liberal) peace are contradicted by the historical record. When important geopolitical interests are at stake, realpolitiknot regime typedetermines great power policies. Contrary to liberal theory, democracies (and liberal states) have threatened to use military force against each other to resolve diplomatic crises and have even gone to the brink of war. Indeed, democracies have not just teetered on the brink; they have gone over it. The most notable example of a war among democracies occurred in 1914 when democratic Britain and France went to war against democratic Germany. Today, the gross imbalance of U.S. power means that whenever the United States believes its interests are threatened, it will act like other hegemons typically have acted, notwithstanding that it is a democracy. DIFFERING DEFINITIONS OF DEMOCRACY MAKE THE COUNTERBALANCING ANSWER MEANINGLESS Christopher Layne, Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A & M, The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Fall 2006, p. 27 Second, the term "democracy" itself is subjective; democracy has many differentcontestedmeanings. To say that two states are democracies may conceal more than it reveals. Take the U.S. relationship with Europe, for example. Although liberal international relations theory stresses that democracies are linked by shared norms and values, in recent years and especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001polling data suggest that the United States and Europe share few common values. A September 2004 survey of 8,000 respondents on both sides of the Atlantic, cosponsored by the German Marshall Fund and the Compagnia di Sao Paolo of Turin, Italy, found that 83 percent of Americans and 79 percent of Europeans concurred that the United States and Europe have different social and cultural values. 73 On a host of important domestic and international issues, including attitudes toward the role of international law and institutions, Americans and Europeans hold divergent views. Although this split may be less pronounced among transatlantic elite opinion than it is among mass opinion, if, over time, the gulf continues at the public level, it will eventually influence foreign policy behavior on both sides of the Atlantic.
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Hegemony Bad: Counterbalancing -- Answers to: U.S. Seen as Benevolent
NO POWER IS SEEN AS BENEVOLENT
Christopher Layne, Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A & M, The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Fall 2006, p. 27-8 In international politics there are no benevolent hegemons. In today's world, other states dread both the overconcentration of geopolitical influence in the United States' favor and the purposes for which it may be used. As Paul Sharp writes, "No great power has a monopoly on virtue and, although some may have a great deal more virtue than others, virtue imposed on others is not seen as such by them. All great powers are capable of exercising a measure of self-restraint, but they are tempted not to and the choice to practice restraint is made easier by the existence of countervailing power and the possibility of it [End Page 27] being exercised." While Washington's self-proclaimed benevolence is inherently ephemeral, the hard fist of U.S. power is tangible.
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Hegemony Bad: Counterbalancing Impacts
COUNTRIES WILL COUNTER-BALANCE THE U.S. WITH WMDS Hugo Paemen, European Political Scientist, 2003
[TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS: A VIEW FROM EUROPE, June 17, http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/108/pae0617.htm] The position of the U.S. on this issue will be decisive. Its monopoly of military power allows it to satisfy the requirements of a global strategic reach. But solitary action has become difficult in a unifying world and politically risky. Even if this unique position of strength can be maintained in the foreseeable future, it will encourage others to look for recognition based on the same standards and using the same elements of power. With the transfer of technology becoming increasingly fluid, monopolistic positions will be more and more short-lived. One does not need to be a doomsayer to predict that without a genuine effort to curtail the production and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction every country in the world that wants to do so will soon dispose of such weapons.
COUNTERBALANCING RESULTS IN CONFLICT Norman Graebner, Political Scientist, 2001
[VIRGINIA QUARTERLY REVIEW, Fall, p. 565] Europe responded to American unilateralism with a quest for a renewed multilateralism to diminish U.S. dominance. France assumed the lead in the new pursuit. French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine dwelled on the need for Europe to counterbalance the United States. He instructed the French International Relations Institute: "We cannot accept either a politically unipolar world, nor a culturally uniform world, nor the unilateralism of a single hyperpower. And that is why we are fighting for a multipolar, diversified and multilateral world." He informed French ambassadors in August 1997: "Today there is one sole great power the United States of America .... [T]his power carries in itself, to the extent that there is no counterweight, a unilateral temptation [and] the risk of hegemony." France, he assured the ambassadors, intended "to contribute.., to the emergence of several poles in the world capable of being a factor of equilibrium." Addressing the French Institute of International Relations, he wondered whether the United States could accept having real partners. Europe's opposition to American unipolarism reached far beyond France to include spokesmen of Germany, the Netherlands, and other members of the European Union. Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok declared, in March 1998, that the EU should increase Europe's power in the world and make it "a counterweight to the United States."
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Hegemony Bad: Counterbalancing Wolforth Answers
WOHLFORTH'S CLAIM THAT NO ONE WILL CHALLENGE AN EXTREMELY POWERFUL U.S. IS WRONG
Stephen Walt, JFK School of Government, 2000
[KEEPING THE WORLD OFF-BALANCE: SELF-RESTRAINT AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP00-013/$File/rwp00_013_walt.pdf] As discussed at greater length below, this argument contains a number of important insights. Because the United States is so far ahead, it is more dangerous for other states to oppose it openly and more tempting for some states to continue to rely on U.S. protection. Yet there are at least two problems with Wohlforth's confident claim that no state (or group of states) would dare to challenge U.S. preponderance. First, Wohlforth's analysis does not discuss the possibility that secondary states might try to constrain the United States without engaging in overt efforts to build a balancing coalition. Secondary states may be reluctant to openly combine against the United States (for fear of losing its protection or attracting its "focused enmity") but there are a host of lesser actions they can still undertake in order to complicate U.S. calculations and constrain its freedom of action. For example, Russia may be too weak to pose much of a danger to the United States, yet its reluctance to cooperate in the wake of NATO's decision to expand eastwards made it more difficult for the Clinton Administration to handle its recurring confrontations with Iraq and Serbia. Indeed, had Moscow been less eager to show Washington that ignoring Russian interest was not cost-free, it might have joined the West in pressuring Baghdad and Belgrade and helped the United States avoid the collapse of UNSCOM in 1998 and the Kosovo War in the spring of 1999. Different Western policies might also make Moscow more amenable to U.S. requests that it limit the sale of nuclear technology to countries like Iran, and put a damper on the emerging Sino-Russian rapprochement. Wohlforth may be correct in saying that unipolarity discourages active balancing against the United States, but that does not mean that other states will not engage in low-level efforts to impede and obstruct U.S. initiatives. Second, and following from the first point, Wohlforth's structural explanation does not consider whether the propensity to balance against the United States could be affected by the specific military forces that the United States acquires or the ways that the United States chooses to use them. The omission is significant, because today's unipolar structure imposes very few external constraints on what the United States might decide to do. The Cold War imposed a certain discipline on the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, but the absence of any serious rivals makes it easier for foreign and defense policy to be influenced domestic interest groups, foreign lobbies, or ideological whims. Wohlforth is primarily worried that the United States might reduce its overseas role (which could encourage other states to catch up), and he downplays the possibility that the United States will overreach. Apart from exhorting U.S. leaders to preserve the U.S. lead and maintain existing U.S. overseas commitments (in order to keep the unipolar structure intact), Wohlforth's otherwise impressive analysis does not offer much in the way of practical policy guidance. Institutions and the Western Order
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Hegemony Bad: Khalizad Indites
KHALILZADS VIEWS ARE SINGLE MINDED
Isaam M. Nashashibi, Frequent Writer on Arab Issues, US-Based Director of Deir Yassin Remembered, 2003 [The Neocons Bagman to Baghdad, Counterpunch, April 17, http://www.counterpunch.org/issam04172003.html] More importantly, perhaps, Khalilzad's impeccable credentials make him a natural for membership in the neoconservatives cabal which is the driving force behind Washington's Iraq policy. "He has a narrow of view of the Middle East and South Asia," his former associate stressed. "[Zalmay thinks of] security to the exclusion of everything else. He tends to look at military solutions as the first, not the last policy option."
KHALILZADS THEORIES ARE USUALLY WRONG
Isaam M. Nashashibi, Frequent Writer on Arab Issues, US-Based Director of Deir Yassin Remembered, 2003 [The Neocons Bagman to Baghdad, Counterpunch, April 17, http://www.counterpunch.org/issam04172003.html] His many critics point out, however, that Khalilzad has been wrong as often as he has been right-going back to the days when he advocated arming the same Afghani groups that later spawned the Taliban. "If he was in private business rather than government," said Anatol Lieven, an analyst with the Carnegie Endowment for Peace in Washington, "he would have been sacked long ago."
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Hegemony Bad: Ferguson Wrong About The Value of Empire/Imperialism
FERGUSON IGNORES THE EXPERIENCES OF THE COLONIZED
Chalmers Johnson, author and professor emeritus of the University of California, San Diego, NEMESIS: THE LAST DAYS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 2006, p. 74-5 Apologists for imperialism like Ferguson never consult the victims of the allegedly benificient conquerors. As the American historian Kevin Baker points out, The idea of Rome or the British empire as liberal institutions of any sort would have come as a surprise to, say, the Guals or the Carthaginians, or the Jews of Masada; or, respectively, the Zulus or the Boers or the North American Indians or the Maoris of New Zealand." Eric Foner, the historian of American race relations, similarly reminds us that "the benevolence of benevolent imperialism lies in the eye of the beholder." What can be said, however, is that the British were exceptionally susceptible to believing in the "goodness" of their empire and, in this, the United States has indeed proved a worthy imperial successor. In his analysis of Jane Austen's 1814 novel Mansfield Park, which depicted a wealthy English family whose comforts derived from a sugar plantation in Antigua built on slave labor, Edward Said observed, "European culture often, if not always, characterized itself in such a way as simultaneously to validate its own preferences while also advocating those preferences in conjunction with distant imperial rule
FERGUSON IGNORES THE FACT THAT IMPERIALISM PROMOTED HOLOCAUSTS AND FAMINES
Chalmers Johnson, author and professor emeritus of the University of California, San Diego, NEMESIS: THE LAST DAYS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 2006, p. 84 After all their arguments have been deployed, how do analysts like Ferguson and Friedman explain the nineteenthcentury poverty of India and China, the several dozen Holocaust-sized famines in both countries while food sat on the docks waiting to be exported, and their current status as "late developers"? Students of communism will not be surprised by the answer. In India, Ferguson argues, the British did not go far enough in enforcing their ideas. "If one leaves aside their fundamentally different resource endowments, the explanation for India's underperformance compared with, say, Canada lies not in British exploitation but rather in the insufficient scale of British interference in the Indian economy." When Mao Zedong introduced Soviet-style collective farms into China and did not get satisfactory results, he did not abandon them but turned instead to truly gigantic collectives called "communes." This Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s produced a famine that took some thirty million Chinese lives, a monument to communist extremism similar to the extremes of laissez-faire that the British dogmatically imposed on their conquered territoriesand that Ferguson would have preferred to be yet more extreme. The historical evidence suggests a strong correlation exists between being on the receiving end of imperialism and immisseration. The nations that avoided the fates of India, China, Mexico, and the Philippines did so by throwing off foreign rule earlyas did the United Statesor by modernizing militarily in order to hold off the imperialists (and ultimately join them)as did Japan.
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Hegemony Bad: Ferguson Wrong About The Value of Empire/Imperialism
THE BRITISH EMPIRE PROVIDED NO ECONOMIC BENEFITS TO THE CONQUERED
Chalmers Johnson, author and professor emeritus of the University of California, San Diego, NEMESIS: THE LAST DAYS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 2006, p. 82-3 The idea that the British Empire conferred economic benefits on any groups other than British capitalists is pure ideology, as impervious to challenge by empirical data as former Soviet prime minister Leonid Brezhnev's MarxismLeninism or George Bush's belief that free markets mean the same thing as freedom. At the apex of those who profited from British-style "free trade" at the end of the nineteenth century was the Rothschild Bank, then by far the world's largest financial institution with total assets of around forty-one million pounds sterling. It profited enormously from the warssome seventy-two of themduring Queen Victoria's reign, and financed such exploiters of Africa as Cecil Rhodes. Ferguson, who wrote a history of the House of Rothschild, knows these things and does not deny them when he turns from imperial panegyrics to history. "In the age before steam power," he writes, "India had led the world in manual spinning, weaving, and dyeing. The British had first raised tariffs against their products; then demanded free trade when their alternative industrial mode of production had been perfected." The result was poverty and dependence for India. As Oxford historian Tapan Raychaudhuri puts it, "Early in the nineteenth century India lost its export trade in manufactures and became a net importer of manufactured goods and a supplier of mainly agricultural products to Britain for the first time in its history. . . . In India the favorable terms granted to British exporters and the doctrine of laissez-faire meant that Indian industries received no protection and hardly any encouragement-until the mid-1920s, and then only in response to persistent Indian pressure." Precisely at the time that the British were preparing India for its poverty-stricken modern fate, two other nations were laying the foundations for their own contemporary status as the world's first and second most productive nationsthe United States, protected from its inception to about 1940 by tariffs on manufactured imports that averaged 44 percent; and Japan, which kept itself free of imperialist domination and copied the economic practices of Britain, the United States, and Germany rather than paying much attention to their economic treatises on free markets. What we are talking about here is, in Mike Davis's phrase, "the making of the third world," the poverty-stricken southern hemisphere that is still very much with us today. "The looms of India and China," Davis writes, "were defeated not so much by market competition as they were forcibly dismantled by war, invasion, opium, and a Lancashire-imposed system of one-way tariffs."89 In a well-known formulation, the social theorist Karl Polanyi wrote in his seminal work The Great Transformation (1944): "The catastrophe of the native community is a direct result of the rapid and violent disruption of the basic institutions of the victim (whether force is used in the process or not does not seem altogether relevant). These institutions are disrupted by the very fact that a market economy is foisted upon an entirely differently organized community; labor and land are made into commodities, which, again, is only a short formulator the liquidation of every and any cultural institution in an organic society. . . . Indian masses in the second half of the nineteenth century did not die of hunger because they were exploited by Lancashire; they perished in large numbers because the Indian village community had been demolished." Ferguson agrees; it is just that he, like Marx, sees all this chrs as "creative destruction," the birth pangs of a new world order, Lenin's famous willingness to break eggs in order to make an omelet. ("But how many eggs must you break," one wag famously asked, "to make a two-egg omelet?") "No doubt it is true that, in theory, open international markets would have been preferable to imperialism," Ferguson argues, "but in practice global free trade was not and is not naturally occurring. The British empire enforced it.
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Primacy Causes U.S.-Sino War 1st Line (1/2)
(___) Turn China: A) Primacy puts us on a collision course with China absent a shift in grand strategy, conflict is certain. Christopher LAYNE, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, 2007
["The Case Against the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 73-74 // BATMAN] To be sure, the United States should not ignore the potential strategic ramifications of Chinas arrival on the world stage as a great power. After all, the lesson of history is that the emergence of new great powers in the international system leads to conflict, not peace . On this score, the notionpropagated by Beijingthat Chinas will
be a peaceful rise is just as fanciful as claims by American policy-makers that China has no need to build up its military capabilities because it is unthreatened by any other state. Still, this does not mean that the United States and China inevitably are on a collision course that will culminate in the next decade or two in a war. Whether Washington and Beijing actually come to blows, however, depends largely on what strategy the United States chooses to adopt toward China, because the United States has the last clear chance to adopt a grand strategy that will serve its interests in balancing Chinese power without running the risk of an armed clash with [end page 73] Beijing. If the United States continues to aim at upholding its current primacy, however, Sino-American conflict is virtually certain.
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Primacy Causes U.S.-Sino War 1st Line (2/2)
B) The impact is extinctionescalation is guaranteed.
Straits Times (Singapore), 2000
[Regional Fallout: No one gains in war over Taiwan, June 25, Available Online via Lexis-Nexis // BATMAN]
THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a fullscale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war.
Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire.
And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order.
With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq . In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase.
Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war?
According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat.
In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons.
If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons . The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it . He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention.
Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of orange juice.
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There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else .
And heres more evidence that primacy makes a U.S.-Sino war likely.
Christopher LAYNE, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, 2007 ["The Case Against the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 75 // BATMAN] So what should the United States do about China? If the United States persists with its strategy of primacy, the odds
of a Sino-American conflict are high. Current American strategy commits the United States to maintaining the geopolitical status quo in East Asia, a status quo that reflects American primacy. The United States desire to preserve the status quo, however, clashes with the ambitions of a rising China . As a rising great power, China has its own ideas about how East Asias political and security order should be organized. Unless U.S. and Chinese interests can be accommodated, the potential for future tensionor worseexists. Moreover, as I already have demonstrated, the very fact of American primacy is bound to produce a geopolitical backlashwith China in the vanguardin the form of counter-hegemonic balancing. Nevertheless, the United States cannot be completely indifferent to Chinas rise.
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Primacy Causes U.S.-Sino War 2nd Line Offshore Balancing Solves (1/1)
(___) Offshore balancing solves their impact turns regional rivals will step up to the plate and balance against an expansionist China. Christopher LAYNE, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, 2007
["The Case Against the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 76 // BATMAN]
The key component of a new geopolitical approach by the United States would be the adoption of an offshore balancing strategy. Under this approach, a regional East Asian power balance would become Americas first line of defense against a rising China and would prevent Beijing from dominating East Asia. The other major powers in AsiaJapan, Russia, Indiahave a much more immediate interest in stopping a rising China in their midst than does the United States, and it is money in the bank that they will step up to the plate and balance against a powerful, expansionist state in their own neighborhood. It is hardly surprising (indeed, it parallels in many ways Americas own emergence as a great power) that Chinathe largest and potentially most powerful state in Asia is seeking a more assertive political, military, and economic role in the region, and even challenging Americas present dominance in East Asia. This poses no direct threat to U.S. security, however . Doubtless, Japan, India, and Russia (and, perhaps, Korea) may be worried about the implications of Chinas rapid ascendance, because a powerful China potentially would be a direct threat to their security. This is precisely the point of offshore balancing: because China threatens its neighbors far more than it threatens the United States, these neighborsnot the United Statesshould bear the responsibility of balancing against Chinese power .
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Primacy Causes U.S.-Sino War 2nd Line U.S.-Sino War Impacts (1/1)
(___) China will use nuclear and chemical weapons and theyll use them quickly to prevent a US-backed Taiwan military build-up theyre betting the US wont sacrifice Los Angeles for Taiwan and theyre willing to let millions die. Richard L. RUSSELL, Prof. at the National Defense Univ.s Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, 2001
[What if China attacks Taiwan!, Parameters, Volume 31, Issue 3, Autumn, Available Online via ProQuest
// BATMAN]
Beijing might calculate that a surprise attack-one including the use of chemical and tactical nuclear weaponswould catch the United States off-balance and compel Washington to rethink the wisdom of American military intervention given the risks that Beijing is willing to run to achieve its national interests .' The Chinese remember the
nuclear threats that the United States used during crises over Quemoy and Matsu in the 1950s. Beijing has made thinly veiled threats that it now has nuclear weapons that will deny the United States similar coercive ability in any future crisis. During a 1995 visit to China by a former high-ranking Defense Department official, the Chinese military's deputy chief of staff
said that China was prepared to sacrifice millions of people in a nuclear exchange to defend its interests in preventing Taiwan's independence. He implied that Chinese nuclear capabilities would hold in check the United States' nuclear power: "You will not sacrifice Los Angeles to protect Taiwan."" The detonation of a few tactical nuclear weapons in a campaign against Taiwan would dramatically underscore that danger . In the event of a real cross-Strait attack, the Chinese imperative would be to strike Taiwan fast and hard. Beijing would want to avoid a US military buildup in the region -similar to that dispatched in the 1996 crisis-and lessen the prospects of an early US intervention that could prevent Chinese forces from gaining footholds on Taiwan. The use of tactical nuclear weapons and chemical munitions might work to delay a US response even more than the initial shock of a bold cross-Strait attack. The scenario is not impossible. The Chinese might want to resort to force in the near to medium terms before Taiwan has time to strengthen its defenses under US tutelage. In short, storm clouds are gathering in Asia, and war over the Taiwan Strait could come sooner rather than later. Only if we consider the possibility can we prudently prepare to discourage it or to deal with it.
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Primacy Causes U.S.-Sino War 2nd Line Most Probable Scenario For Conflict (1/1)
(___) Taiwan is the most likely scenario for war.
Richard HALLORAN, Asian Security Specialist, former NYT Foreign Correspondent in Asia, former Director of the Program in Journalism and Communications at the East-West Center, A.B. from Dartmouth, M.A. in East Asian Studies from the University of Michigan, and Ford Foundation Fellowship in the East Asia Institute at Columbia University, 2003 [Taiwan, Parameters, Volume 33, Issue 1, Spring, // BATMAN]
Of all the threats to security and US interests in Asia, the confrontation across the Taiwan Strait is surely the most perilous over the long run and has the greatest potential for erupting into a war between the United States and China. As Kurt Campbell and Derek Mitchell of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington wrote in the summer of 2001, "Perhaps nowhere else on the globe is the situation so seemingly intractable and the prospect of a major war involving the United States so real ."1 Today, that outlook is even more dire as China, Taiwan, and the United States have hardened their positions , even if the rhetoric has been less harsh for the most part recently. China has new leaders who cannot afford to be less than adamant on the Taiwan question. Taiwanese leaders have been pushing their island further away from the mainland, drawing Chinese warnings that military force would be employed if Taiwan goes too far. The United States, under President Bush, has demanded that any settlement of the Taiwan question be peaceful and in accord with the wishes of the people of Taiwan. Beyond that, the Administration has repeatedly reminded the Chinese of US obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 to help Taiwan defend itself . All of this has reduced diplomatic maneuvering room and made for a situation in which a miscalculation could cause an eruption.Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, Commander of US Pacific Command, told a gathering last summer at the East-West Center, a research organization in Hawaii, that among the issues concerning him was "a miscalculation between strategic rivals, and I'm talking about China and Taiwan and India and Pakistan here." 2 Earlier, the Admiral told Congress that among the "fundamental challenges" he would confront was "the potential for accelerated military competition or, worse, gross miscalculation between India and Pakistan, China and Taiwan, or some other strategic rivals."3 His predecessors, Admirals Dennis Blair and Joseph Prueher, are known to have been
concerned about the same possibilities.4
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Primacy Causes U.S.-Iran War 1st Line (1/1)
(___) Turn Iran: A) Primacy causes conflict with Iran. Christopher LAYNE, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, 2007
["The Case Against the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 76-77 // BATMAN] Iran Because of the strategy of primacy and empire, the United States and Iran are on course for a showdown . The main source of conflictor at least the one that has grabbed the lions share of the headlinesis Tehrans evident determination to develop a nuclear weapons program. Washingtons policy, as President George W. Bush has stated on several occasionsin language that recalls his prewar stance on Iraqis that a nuclear-armed Iran is intolerable. Beyond nuclear weapons, however, there are other important issues that are driving the United States and Iran toward an armed confrontation. Chief among these is Iraq. Recently, Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, has accused Tehran of meddling in Iraqi affairs by providing arms and training to Shiite militias and by currying favor with the Shiite politicians who dominate Iraqs recently elected government. With Iraq teetering on the brink of a sectarian civil war between Shiites and Sunnis, concerns about Iranian interference have been magnified. In a real sense, however, Irans nuclear
program and its role in Iraq are merely the tip of the iceberg. The fundamental cause of tensions between the United States and Iran is the nature of Americas ambitions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. These are reflected in current U.S. grand strategywhich has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine. The Bush Doctrines three
key components are rejection of deterrence in favor of preventive/preemptive military action; determination to effectuate a radical shake-up in the politics of the Persian Gulf and Middle East; and gaining U.S. dominance over that region. In this respect, it is hardly coincidental that the administrations policy toward Tehran bears a striking similarity to its policy [end page 76] during the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, not only on the nuclear weapons issue butominouslywith respect to regime change and democratization. This is because the same strategic assumptions that underlay the administrations pre-invasion Iraq policy now are driving its Iran policy . The key question today is whether these assumptions are correct.
B)
The impact is extinction.
Jorge HIRSCH, Professor of Physics at the University of California--San Diego, 2006
[Nuking Iran, ZNet, April 10, Available Online at http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=10071, Accessed 04-29-2007 BATMAN]
//
Iran is likely to respond to any US attack using its considerable missile arsenal against US forces in Iraq and elsewhere in the Persian Gulf. Israel may attempt to stay out of the conflict, it is not clear whether Iran would target Israel
in a retaliatory strike but it is certainly possible. If the US attack includes nuclear weapons use against Iranian facilities, as I believe is very likely, rather than deterring Iran it will cause a much more violent response. Iranian military forces and
militias are likely to storm into southern Iraq and the US may be forced to use nuclear weapons against them, causing large scale casualties and inflaming the Muslim world . There could be popular uprisings in other countries in
the region like Pakistan, and of course a Shiite uprising in Iraq against American occupiers. Finally I would like to discuss the grave consequences to America and the world if the US uses nuclear weapons against Iran. First, the likelihood of terrorist attacks against Americans both on American soil and abroad will be enormously
enhanced after these events. And terrorist's attempts to get hold of "loose nukes" and use them against Americans will be enormously incentivized after the US used nuclear weapons against Iran .
Second, it will destroy America's position as the leader of the free world . The rest of the world rightly recognizes that nuclear weapons are qualitatively different from all other weapons, and that there is no sharp distinction between small and large nuclear weapons, or between nuclear weapons targeting facilities versus those targeting armies or civilians. It will not condone the breaking of the nuclear taboo in an unprovoked war of aggression against a non-nuclear country, and the US will become a pariah state. I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of orange juice.
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Third, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will cease to exist, and many of its 182 non-nuclear-weapon-country
signatories will strive to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent to an attack by a nuclear nation. With no longer a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons, any regional conflict may go nuclear and expand into global nuclear war. Nuclear weapons are million-fold more powerful than any other weapon, and the existing nuclear arsenals can obliterate humanity many times over. In the past, global conflicts terminated when one side prevailed. In the next global conflict we will all be gone before anybody has prevailed .
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Primacy Causes Demo Promo 1st Line (1/1)
(___) Turn Democracy Promotion: A) Primacy prompts aggressive democracy promotion empirically proven. Christopher LAYNE, Associate Professor of International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, 2006
[Impotent Power?, National Interest, Issue 85, September/October, Available Online via Academic Search Premier // BATMAN]
Iraq and Afghanistan are illustrative of an important reason that America's hegemonic power appears illusory: because it is often employed in the pursuit of objectives that are unattainable, such as nation-building and democracy promotion. Both neoconservatives and so-called liberal imperialists seem to believe that the world is like a piece of clay and that the United States can remake other nations--and cultures --in its own image. Although the United States has a long list of failure in such efforts, it keeps trying--most recently in Afghanistan and, of course, Iraq. Before the invasion, administration officials pretty much believed that the processes of democratization and nation-building in Iraq would be a piece of cake. They frequently invoked the examples of post-1945 Germany and Japan as "proof" that the United States could export democracy to Iraq without undue difficulty. For at least three reasons, they should have known better: the use of military force by outside powers to impose democracy rarely works; military occupations seldom are successful; and the preconditions for a successful democratic transformation did not exist in Iraq . Those who have studied military occupations know that the odds of success are stacked against occupying powers. As David Edelstein observes: Military occupations usually succeed only if they are lengthy, but lengthy occupations elicit nationalist reactions that impede success. Further, lengthy occupation produces anxiety in imperialist occupation powers that would rather withdraw than stay. To succeed, therefore, occupiers must both maintain their own interest in a long occupation, and convince an occupied population to accept extended control by a foreign power. More often than not, occupiers either fail to achieve those goals, or they achieve them only at a high cost.( n2) The United States has long been addicted to Wilsonian crusading to remake the world, but as realists long--and rightly--have argued, it lacks the material, psychological and spiritual resources to succeed in this effort. It is naive to imagine that America's democratic values can flourish in countries that have no indigenous democratic tradition, and that lack the social, cultural and economic foundations upon which the United States's own democratic institutions rest. America's inability to refashion other states does not mean it is not a hegemon. It does mean that it is not omnipotent: U.S. power is not infinite, but the United States is still positioned to have a preponderant effect on international politics. How long the United States can retain its hegemony, however, is an open--and important--question.
B)
The transition to democracy is violent demo promo fans the flames of ethnic conflict and war. Edward D. MANSFIELD, Hum Rosen Professor of Political Science and director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania, AND Jack SNYDER, Robert and Rene Belfer
Professor of International Relations in the Political Science Department and the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, 2005/2006 [Prone to Violence, National Interest, Issue 82, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Premier // BATMAN] THE BUSH Administration has argued that promoting democracy in the Islamic world, rogue states and China will enhance America's security, because tyranny breeds violence and democracies co-exist peacefully. But recent experience in Iraq and elsewhere reveals that the early stages of transitions to electoral politics have often been rife with violence .
These episodes are not just a speed bump on the road to the democratic peace. Instead, they reflect a fundamental problem with the Bush Administration's strategy of forced-pace democratization in countries that lack the political institutions needed to manage political competition. Without a coherent state grounded in a
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consensus on which citizens will exercise self-determination, unfettered electoral politics often gives rise to nationalism and violence at home and abroad .
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Absent these preconditions, democracy is deformed, and transitions toward democracy revert to autocracy or generate chaos. Pushing countries too soon into competitive electoral politics not only risks stoking war, sectarianism and terrorism, but it also makes the future consolidation of democracy more difficult .
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Primacy Causes Demo Promo 2nd Line Demo Promo Causes War (1/2)
(___) Democracy promotion shortcircuits their modeling arguments nations simply arent ready to adopt electoral democracies and promoting a U.S. model will result in transition wars and ethnic violence empirically proven. Eric J. HOBSBAWM, Emeritus Professor of Economic and Social History at Birkbeck, University of London, 2004
[The World's Most Dangerous Ideas: Spreading Democracy, Foreign Policy, Issue 144, September/October, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Premier // BATMAN]
We are at present engaged in what purports to be a planned reordering of the world by the powerful states. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are but one part of a supposedly universal effort to create world order by "spreading democracy." This idea is not merely quixotic--it is dangerous. The rhetoric surrounding this crusade implies that the system is applicable in a standardized (Western) form, that it can succeed everywhere, that it can remedy today's transnational dilemmas, and that it can bring peace, rather than sow disorder. It cannot .
Democracy is rightly popular. In 1647, the English Levellers broadcast the powerful idea that "all government is in the free consent of the people." They meant votes for all. Of course, universal suffrage does not guarantee any particular political result, and elections cannot even ensure their own perpetuation--witness the Weimar Republic. Electoral democracy is also unlikely to produce outcomes convenient to hegemonic or imperial powers. (If the Iraq war had depended on the freely expressed consent of "the world community," it would not have happened.) But these uncertainties do not diminish the appeal of electoral democracy. Several other factors besides democracy's popularity explain the dangerous and illusory belief that its propagation by foreign armies might actually be feasible. Globalization suggests that human affairs are evolving toward a universal pattern. If gas stations, iPods, and computer geeks are the same worldwide, why not political institutions? This view underrates the world's complexity. The relapse into bloodshed and anarchy that has occurred so visibly in much of the world has also made the idea of spreading a new order more attractive. The Balkans seemed to show that areas of turmoil and humanitarian catastrophe required the intervention, military if need be, of strong and stable states. In the absence of effective international governance, some humanitarians are still ready to support a world order imposed by U.S. power. But one should always be suspicious when military powers claim to be doing favors for their victims and the world by defeating and occupying weaker states. Yet another factor may be the most important: The United States has been ready with the necessary combination of
megalomania and messianism, derived from its revolutionary origins. Today's United States is unchallengeable in its techno-military supremacy, convinced of the superiority of its social system, and, since 1989, no longer reminded--as even the greatest conquering empires always had been--that its material power has limits . Like President Woodrow Wilson (a spectacular international failure in his day), today's ideologues see a model society already at work in the United States: a combination of law, liberal freedoms, competitive private enterprise, and regular, contested elections with universal suffrage. All that remains is to remake the world in the image of this "free society." This idea is dangerous whistling in the dark. Although great power action may have morally or politically desirable consequences, identifying with it is perilous because the logic and methods of state action are not those of universal rights. All established states put their own interests first. If they have the power, and the end is considered sufficiently vital, states justify the means of achieving it (though rarely in public)--particularly when they think God is on their side. Both good and evil empires have produced the barbarization of our era, to which the "war against terror" has now contributed. While threatening the integrity of universal values, the campaign to spread democracy will not succeed. The 20th century demonstrated that states could not simply remake the world or abbreviate historical transformations. Nor can they easily effect social change by transferring institutions across borders. Even within the ranks of territorial nation-states, the conditions for effective democratic government are rare: an existing state enjoying legitimacy, consent, and the ability to mediate conflicts between domestic groups. Without such consensus, there is no single sovereign people and therefore no legitimacy for arithmetical majorities. When this consensus--be it religious, ethnic, or both--is absent, democracy has been suspended (as is the case with democratic institutions in Northern Ireland), the state has split (as in Czechoslovakia), or society has descended into permanent
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civil war (as in Sri Lanka). "Spreading democracy" aggravated ethnic conflict and produced the disintegration of states in multinational and multicommunal regions after both 1918 and 1989, a bleak prospect . Beyond its scant chance of success, the effort to spread standardized Western democracy also suffers from a fundamental paradox. In no small part, it is conceived of as a solution to the dangerous transnational problems of our day. A growing part of human life now occurs beyond the influence of voters--in transnational public and private entities that have no electorates, or at least no democratic ones. And electoral democracy cannot function effectively outside political units such as nation-states. The powerful states are therefore trying to spread a system that even they find inadequate to meet today's challenges .
(continued on next page)
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Primacy Causes Demo Promo 2nd Line Demo Promo Causes War (2/2)
(continued from previous page nothing cut)
Europe proves the point. A body like the European Union (EU) could develop into a powerful and effective structure precisely because it has no electorate other than a small number (albeit growing) of member governments. The EU would be nowhere without its "democratic deficit," and there can be no future for its parliament, for there is no "European people," only a collection of "member peoples," less than half of whom bothered to vote in the 2004 EU parliamentary elections. "Europe" is now a functioning entity, but unlike the member states it enjoys no popular legitimacy or electoral authority. Unsurprisingly, problems arose as soon as the EU moved beyond negotiations between governments and became the subject of democratic campaigning in the member states. The effort to spread democracy is also dangerous in a more indirect way: It conveys to those who do not enjoy this form of government the illusion that it actually governs those who do. But does it? We now know something about how the actual decisions to go to war in Iraq were taken in at least two states of unquestionable democratic bona fides: the United States and the United Kingdom. Other than creating complex problems of deceit and concealment, electoral democracy and representative assemblies had little to do with that process. Decisions were taken among small groups of people in private, not very different from the way they would have been taken in nondemocratic countries. Fortunately, media independence could not be so easily circumvented in the United Kingdom. But it is not electoral democracy that necessarily ensures effective freedom of the press, citizen rights, and an independent judiciary.
(___) And heres more evidence that the transition to democracy causes war statistically proven.
Edward D. MANSFIELD, Hum Rosen Professor of Political Science and director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania, AND Jack SNYDER, Robert and Rene Belfer Professor of International Relations in the Political Science Department and the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, 2005/2006 [Prone to Violence, National Interest, Issue 82, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Premier // BATMAN]
THE NATIONALIST and ethnic politics that prevails in many newly democratizing states loads the dice in favor of international and civil war. The decade following the end of the Cold War witnessed some peaceful transitions to democracy in countries where the preconditions for democracy were in place. Elsewhere, however, turbulent experiments with democratic politics led to bloody wars. In 1991 Yugoslavia broke up into separate warring nations within six months of elections in which ethnic nationalism was a powerful factor. In the wake of the Soviet collapse, popular nationalist sentiment expressed in the streets and at the ballot box fueled warfare between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. As Peru and Ecuador democratized fitfully during the 1980s and 1990s, troubled elected governments gained popularity by provoking a series of armed clashes that culminated in a war in the upper Amazon in 1995. Several years after the collapse of Ethiopia's Dergue dictatorship, the country's elected government fought a bloody border war from 1998 to 2000 with Eritrea, which had just adopted, though not yet implemented, a democratic constitution . In an especially worrisome case, the nuclear-armed elected regimes of India and Pakistan fought the Kargil War in 1999. After the 1988 death of Pakistani military dictator Zia ul-Haq, a series of revolving-door elected civilian governments
had presided over a rise in militant Islamic efforts to liberate majority-Muslim Kashmir from Indian control. In Kashmir itself, the restoration of elections after Indira Gandhi's period of "emergency" authoritarian rule (1975-77) had polarized politics and led to violent conflict between Muslims and the state. These turbulent processes culminated in the 1999 war, when Pakistani forces infiltrated across the mountainous frontier in northern Kashmir. The war broke out as Pakistan was taking steps toward greater democratization, including constitutional changes in 1997 that were intended to strengthen the powers of elected civilian rulers.
Democratization also played a catalytic role in the horrible slaughters that engulfed central Africa. The 1993 elections in Burundi--even though they were internationally mandated, free and fair--intensified ethnic
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polarization between the Hum and Tutsi ethnic groups, resulting in some 200,000 deaths. In neighboring Rwanda, an internationally orchestrated power-sharing accord that was intended to usher in more pluralistic and open politics instead created the conditions for the 1994 genocide that killed nearly a million Tutsis as well as some moderate Hutus. In all of these varied settings, the turbulent beginning phase of democratization contributed to violence in states with weak political institutions. Statistical studies show that countries with weak institutions undergoing an incomplete democratic transition are more than four times as likely to become involved in international wars than other states, and that incomplete democracies are more likely to experience civil wars than either pure autocracies or fully consolidated democracies. Democratic transition is only one of many causes of war, but it can be a potent one.
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Primacy Causes Demo Promo 2nd Line Next Wave Uniquely Bad (1/1)
(___) Even if democratization was good in the past, the next wave of emerging democracies will transition violently. Edward D. MANSFIELD, Hum Rosen Professor of Political Science and director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania, AND Jack SNYDER, Robert and Rene Belfer
Professor of International Relations in the Political Science Department and the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, 2005/2006 [Prone to Violence, National Interest, Issue 82, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Premier // BATMAN]
THERE IS no reason to believe that the longstanding link between democratization and nationalist war is diminishing. Many of the countries that are still on the Bush Administration's "to do" list of democracy promotion lack the institutional infrastructure needed to manage the early stages of a democratic transition. The "third wave" of democratization in the 1980s and 1990s consolidated democratic regimes primarily in the richer countries of eastern Europe, Latin America, southern Africa and East Asia. A fourth wave would involve more challenging cases: countries that are poorer, more ethnically divided, ideologically more resistant to democracy, with more entrenched authoritarian elites and a much frailer base of governmental institutions and citizen skills . Many Islamic countries that figure prominently in the Bush Administration's efforts to promote democracy are particularly hard cases. Although democratization in the Islamic world might contribute to peace in the very long run, Islamic public opinion in the short run is generally hostile to the United States, ambivalent about terrorism and unwilling to renounce the use of force to regain disputed territories. Although the belligerence of the Islamic public is partly fueled by resentment of the U.S.-backed authoritarian regimes under which many of them live, renouncing these authoritarians and pressing for a quick democratic opening is unlikely to lead to peaceful democratic consolidations. On the contrary, unleashing Islamic mass opinion through sudden democratization might raise the likelihood of war. ALL of the risk factors are there. The media and civil society groups are inflammatory, as old elites and rising oppositions try to outbid each other for the mantle of Islamic or nationalist militancy. The rule of law is weak, and existing corrupt bureaucracies cannot serve a democratic administration properly. The boundaries of states are mismatched with those of nations, making any push for national self-determination fraught with peril. Per capita incomes, literacy rates and citizen skills in most Muslim Middle Eastern states are below the levels normally needed to sustain democracy. The richer states' economies are based on oil exports, which exacerbate corruption and insulate regimes from accountability to citizens . In the Arab world, every state has at least one risk factor for failed, violent democratization: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, the Palestinian territories, Syria and Yemen have annual per capita national incomes under $2,000. Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen have rates of illiteracy above 20 percent among adults over the age of 15 . The best bet for democratization by these
indicators is Lebanon, a state that does not produce petroleum and where illiteracy stands at 13.5 percent and the average income is $4,040. However, Lebanon is deeply divided among distrustful, armed ethnic and religious groups. Its electoral power-sharing institutions provide a rigid system for managing these divisions that locks in ethnic identity as the political trump card and prevents the formation of groups based on non-ethnic platforms.
Iran's experience over the past 25 years should serve as a cautionary tale. The theocratic, illiberal semidemocracy established by the popular Iranian Revolution relentlessly pressed the offensive in a bloody war of attrition with Iraq after 1981 and supported violent movements abroad. A quarter of a century later, Iranian electoral politics still bears the imprint of incomplete democratization . With liberal democratic reformers barred from
running for office, in 2005 Iranian voters looking for a more responsive government elected as president the religiously fundamentalist and populist mayor of Tehran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a staunch proponent of the Iranian nuclear program.
When elites manipulate the weak mechanisms of electoral accountability to rule out liberal alternatives, nationalism is often the only game in town.
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Primacy Causes Demo Promo 2nd Line Impact Chinese Demo Promo Causes War (1/1)
(___) Democratization in China will spur nationalism and conflict. Edward D. MANSFIELD, Hum Rosen Professor of Political Science and director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania, AND Jack SNYDER, Robert and Rene Belfer
Professor of International Relations in the Political Science Department and the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, 2005/2006 [Prone to Violence, National Interest, Issue 82, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Premier // BATMAN]
Islamic democratization is hardly the only such danger on the horizon. A future democratic opening in China, though much hoped for by advocates of human rights and democratization, could produce a sobering outcome. China's communist rulers have presided over a commercial expansion that has generated wealth and a potentially powerful constituency for broader political participation. However, given the huge socio-economic divide between the prosperous coastal areas and the vast, impoverished hinterlands, it seems unlikely that economic development will lead as smoothly to democratic consolidation in China as it has in Taiwan. China's leadership cracked down on student pressures for democratic liberalization at Tiananmen Square in 1989, but party elites know that they need a stronger basis of popular legitimacy to survive the social and ideological changes that economic change has unleashed. Nationalism is a key element in their strategy. China's demand to incorporate Taiwan in the People's Republic of China, its animosity toward Japan, and its public displays of resentment at U.S. slights are themes that resonate with the Chinese public and can be used to rally national solidarity behind the regime. At the same time, newly rising social forces see that China's leaders permit more latitude to expressions of nationalism than liberalism. Thus, some of the same intellectuals who played a role in the Tiananmen pro-democracy protests turned up a few years later as authors of a nationalist text, The China That Can Say No . Like many other established elites who have made use of popular nationalist rhetoric, China's party leadership has walked a fine line, allowing only limited expressions of popular nationalist outrage after such perceived provocations as the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, anti-Chinese pogroms in Jakarta, the U.S. spy plane incident of 2001 and the Japanese bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2005. They realize that criticism of external enemies can quickly become transformed into popular criticism of the government for not being sufficiently diligent in defense of Chinese national interests. It is doubtful that they could maintain fine-tuned control over an aroused nationalist public if an incompletely democratizing China becomes embroiled in a future crisis with Taiwan.
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Primacy Causes Demo Promo 2nd Line Impact ME Demo Promo Causes War (1/2)
(___) Democracy promotion in the middle east is bad three reasons. Christopher LAYNE, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, 2007
["The Case Against the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 94-95 // BATMAN] The Bush administration and the neoconservative imperialists believe that by democratizing the Middle East, the
United States will solve the problem of terrorism and bring stability to the region. There are three things wrong with this vision of American Empire in the Middle East. First, democratization is not the magic bullet cure for terrorism. A policy of regime changeusing U.S. overt military power or covert capabilities to oust governments in the Middle East and install new regimes that will clamp down on radical Islam is misdirected and will not make the United States safer. Radical Islam is fueled by resentment against American primacy; specifically, the U.S. military presence in the region. The expansion of that presence for the purpose of overthrowing regimes does not make America more secure from terrorist attacks . On the contrary, it simply adds fuel to terrorist groups like al Queda . As
Robert Pape observes:
Spreading democracy at the barrel of a gun in the Persian Gulf is not likely to lead to a lasting solution against suicide terrorism. Just as al-Qaedas suicide terrorism campaign began against American troops on the Arabian Peninsula and then escalated to the United States, we should recognize that the longer that American forces remain in Iraq, the greater the threat of the next September 11 from groups who have not targeted us before. Even if our intentions are good, the United States cannot depend on democratic governments in the region to dampen the risk of suicide terrorism so long as American forces are stationed there.138 [end page 94] Second, the United States lacks the capabilities to democratize the region . As Brent Scowcroft has said: The reason I part with the neocons is that I dont think in any reasonable time frame the objective of democratizing the Middle East can be successful. If you can do it, fine, but I dont think you can, and in the process of trying to do it you can make the Middle East a lot worse.39 Third, the administration and its neoconservatives should be careful what they wish for in the Middle East.
Even if the American Empire does bring about regime change and democratization in the Middle East, we probably will rue the consequences. As Katarina Delacoura points out, democratization in the Arab world may have a number of outcomes unpalatable for the US.140 The electoral victory of the radical Hamas organization in the February 2006 Palestinian electionscoupled with the strong showing of the fundamentalist Islamic Brotherhood in Egypts 2005 parliamentary electionsproves the point: the United States is likely to be very displeased with the outcomes of democratic elections in the region. Indeed, the Bush administration was so upset with the victory of Hamas that it reportedly discussed with Israel a policy to destabilize the Palestinian Authority in order to force Hamas out of power.141 The
overthrow of autocratic regimes will make the region even less stable than it currently is. Governments like Saudi Arabias may be distasteful, but there is truth to the adage that the devil one knows is better than the devil one does not know. For all of Americas Wilsonian traditions, the wisest of U.S. statesmen have accepted that the real world is not neatly divided between good regimes and bad ones , and that sometimes American interests are best served by dealing with nondemocratic regimes . This is especially true in a region like the Middle East where, as Lawrence Freedman reminds us, the real alternatives are chaos or autocracy.42
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Primacy Causes Demo Promo 2nd Line Impact ME Demo Promo Causes War (2/2)
(___) Democracy promotion in the middle east increases the risk of war and terrorism. Christopher LAYNE, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, 2007
["The Case Against the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 95-96 // BATMAN] Simply put, American efforts to export democracy easily may backfire. Why? Because ill-liberal democracies usually are unstable and often adopt ultranationalist and bellicose external policies .143 As Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder have pointed out, Pushing countries too soon into competitive electoral politics not only risks
stoking war, sectarianism and terrorism, but it also makes the future consolidation of democracy more difficult . Far from leading to the touted (but illusory) democratic peace that is so near and dear to the hearts of American imperialists, unleashing Islamic mass opinion through sudden democratization might raise the likelihood of war . Moreover, in a volatile region like the Middle East, it is anything but a sure bet that newly democratic regimes which, by definition would be sensitive to public opinionwould align themselves with the United States. And, if new democracies in the region should fail to satisfy the political and economic aspirations of their citizensprecisely the kind of failure to which new democracies are pronethey easily could become a far more dangerous breeding ground for terrorism than are the authoritarian (or autocratic/theocratic) regimes now in power in the Middle East.
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Hegemony Ineffective 2nd Line Domestic Politics (1/1)
(___) Domestic politics prevent effective use of hegemony internal divisions hamstring policymakers. Caitlin TALMADGE, staff writer for the Harvard International Review, 2002
["The Restrained Hegemon: Political Limits to US Military Power," Intelligence, Volume 24, Issue 3, Fall, Available Online at http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/print.php?article=1057, Accessed 04-25-2007 // BATMAN] First, the domestic politics of the United States limit its international freedom of action. Although the president
may have the worlds finest military at his command, he often lacks the combination of public and congressional support he needs to maximize its advantages. Foreign policy surveys show that US citizens remain casualtyaverse unless vital US interests such as preventing terrorism seem to be at stake. And except for a brief period of bipartisanship after September 11, the notion of politics stopping at the waters edge now seems as quaint and obsolete as Cold War air raid drills. Internal divisions frequently prevent the United States from acting as quickly, decisively, or forcefully as its material resources would allow. This reality does not go unnoticed by other nations: what seems like democratic debate to US citizens may appear to others as a lack of resolve or an opportunity for political manipulation, further complicating the execution of US foreign policy .
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Hegemony Ineffective 2nd Line International Politics (1/1) (___) International politics prevent effective use of hegemony dependence on allies checks preponderance. Caitlin TALMADGE, staff writer for the Harvard International Review, 2002
["The Restrained Hegemon: Political Limits to US Military Power," Intelligence, Volume 24, Issue 3, Fall, Available Online at http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/print.php?article=1057, Accessed 04-25-2007 // BATMAN] Second, the complexity of international politics poses a serious challenge to the exercise of US power. Despite its
military prowess, the United States remains fundamentally dependent on support from local allies when it operates abroad. The geographic position of a weak state may endow it with a powerful bargaining chip when the United States needs basing rights or access to airspace. This leverage requires diplomatic finesse and sensitivity to those foreign leaders own domestic constraints. Political skill turns out to be just as important as military strengthand, unfortunately for the United States, much more evenly distributed. Even relatively weak states can often exploit political cracks in the United States relationships with its allies, providing third parties with leverage over the United States despite their material inferiority .
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Hegemony Ineffective 2nd Line Paradox of Hegemony (1/1)
(___) The paradox of hegemony ensures that it is ineffective in order to prevent a crippling backlash, hegemons have to exercise self-restraint. Caitlin TALMADGE, staff writer for the Harvard International Review, 2002
["The Restrained Hegemon: Political Limits to US Military Power," Intelligence, Volume 24, Issue 3, Fall, Available Online at http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/print.php?article=1057, Accessed 04-25-2007 // BATMAN] Third, even when the United States is capable of capturing an advantage by acting unilaterally, it often finds itself trapped in what Bruce Conin has called the paradox of hegemony. The United States certainly has the ability to act as a great power and pursue its short-term interest in a particular case : for example, by intervening in a foreign country to secure oil. Actually doing so, however, would undermine its role as a hegemon trying to lead the international system according to a set of rules (in this case, the UN Charter) which benefit its long-term interests and help legitimize its power. Moreover, in pursuing its short-term interest of securing oil, the hegemon would undermine its provision of the public good of law and order that helps other states tolerate the hegemons power. Other states might
then begin to balance more actively against the hegemon, hastening its decline. To stave off this type of backlash, which would damage broader US interests, the United States often imposes limits upon its own actions or gives in to the demands of weaker states. In order to remain the sole superpower, the United States avoids acting like one.
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Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line Solves Conflicts General (1/2)
(___) offshore balancing solves conflicts best prefer our comparative evidence. Christopher LAYNE, Visiting Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, AND Benjamin SCHWARZ, Literary Editor of the Atlantic Monthly, 2002
[A Lower Profile Would Make the United States a Smaller Target, Los Angeles Times, November 12, Available Online via Lexis-Nexis // BATMAN] The Bush administration's recently enunciated National Security Strategy revolves around maintaining or augmenting America's overwhelming military, economic and political preponderance. But the United States needs to come to grips
with an ironic possibility: The very preponderance of power may now make us not more secure but less so, and a diminished global presence might actually achieve more of our ultimate foreign policy goals .
Hegemony is a seductive goal. In the abstract, it makes sense that the U.S. should seek to amass as much power as possible to enjoy something close to absolute security. But as history shows, hegemonic empires almost automatically elicit universal resistance, which is why all such aspirants have eventually exhausted themselves .
So instead of the Bush doctrine -- which is a prescription for hegemony -- how about an alternative: offshore balancing? Whereas the Bush doctrine opposes the rise of new power centers in international politics, an offshore balancing strategy is predicated on the inevitability of their emergence and turns this to U.S. advantage. Offshore balancing would rely on a balance among many states to maintain U.S. security. All the potential great powers -- Germany or the European Union, China, Russia, India, Japan -- are in neighborhoods populated by other would-be powers or dangerous regional foes. In contrast to a world dominated by the United States, in which the U.S. is a magnet for others' resentments, a multipolar world would deflect others' attention toward threats nearer to home. Self-imposed U.S. restraint would further negate others' incentives to balance against American power. Offshore balancing is based on burden shifting, not burden sharing. It would transform the U.S. from a regional stabilizer into a balancer of last resort by passing to others the primary responsibility for maintaining regional power balances and stabilizing Europe, East Asia and the Middle East . An offshore balancer can afford to be a bystander in the opening stages of conflicts. Because others' security is more immediately at risk, it makes more sense to let them take the first crack at dealing with trouble-making states. Usually they will do so promptly and successfully. If they do not, an offshore balancer can always step in to defeat an aggressor. Recognizing the legitimacy of other great powers' spheres of influence offers potential strategic advantages to the U.S. For example, the difficulties that Washington has encountered in trying to stabilize Afghanistan are just a foretaste of
what the U.S. will face if it has to occupy a defeated Iraq. Yet all the potential great powers have their own strategic concerns with oil and Islam in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia.
If the U.S. passed the buck, these powers would have no choice but to take on the burdens of pacifying those regions because their security and economic interests were greater. And better them than us . By abandoning the Bush doctrine's extravagant geopolitical objectives, the U.S. can minimize the risk of open confrontation with the new great powers. And only by forsaking hegemony's temptations can the U.S. hope to enjoy respectful and cooperative relations with them.
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Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line Solves Conflicts General (2/2)
(___) Instability is inevitable but offshore balancing best prevents conflicts other powers will prevent outbreaks. Benjamin SCHWARZ, Correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly, AND Christopher LAYNE, Visiting Scholar at the
Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California and a MacArthur Foundation Fellow in Global Security, 2002 [A New Grand Strategy, Atlantic Monthly, Volume 289, Issue 1, January, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Premiere // BATMAN]
A strategy of preponderance is burdensome, Sisyphean, and profoundly risky. It is therefore time for U.S. policymakers to adopt a very different grand strategy: one that might be called offshore balancing. Rather than fear multipolarity, this strategy embraces it. It recognizes that instability-caused by the rise and fall of great powers, great-power rivalries, and messy regional conflictsis a geopolitical fact of life. Offshore balancing accepts that the United States cannot prevent the rise of new great powers, either within the present American sphere (the European Union, Germany, Japan) or outside it (China, a resurgent Russia). Instead of exhausting its resources and drawing criticism or worse by keeping these entities weak the United States would allow them to develop their militaries to provide for their own national and regional security. Among themselves, then, these states would maintain power balances, check the rise of overly ambitious global and regional powers, and stabilize Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf. It would naturally be in their interests to do so .
(___) Multipolarity is key to solve conflicts it creates regional firebreaks.
Ted Galen CARPENTER, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, 2002 [Fixing Foreign Policy: How the U.S. should wage the war on terror, Reason, October 1, Available Online at http://www.cato.org/research/ articles/carpenter-021001.html, Accessed 04-27-2007 // BATMAN] Encourage multiple centers of power. Many officials appear afraid of a global environment with several economic and military great powers and an assortment of mid-sized regional powers. But rather than resisting a return to a more historically
normal condition of multipolarity a process that is occurring gradually in any case, regardless of American preferences Washington should accept that change and turn it to Americas advantage. The presence of other significant political and military players in the international system can provide us with important security buffers, especially if those players are stable and democratic . Ideally, such states would forge effective regional security organizations a more robust European Union, for example. In most cases, though, regional multipolarity would involve more-informal balance-of-power arrangements. Even that outcome would usually serve American interests. Indeed, the mere existence of multiple powers even if some of them are not especially friendly to the United States makes it less likely that a hegemonic threat comparable to the Soviet Union could arise again. Regional powers would be the principal firebreaks against disorder and aggression in their respective spheres of influence, a development that would provide significant indirect security benefits to the United States .
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Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line Solves Conflicts Regional (1/1)
(___) Offshore balancing solves regional conflicts multipolarity is key to effective balance of powers. Benjamin SCHWARZ, Correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly, AND Christopher LAYNE, Visiting Scholar at the
Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California and a MacArthur Foundation Fellow in Global Security, 2002 [A New Grand Strategy, Atlantic Monthly, Volume 289, Issue 1, January, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Premiere // BATMAN]
The same dynamics applyor would, if the United States gave them a chancein regional conflicts, although not quite as dramatically. Great powers that border restive neighbors, or that are economically dependent on unstable regions, have a much larger interest than does the United States in policing those areas. Most regional power balances (the relative positions of, say, Hungary and Romania, or of one sub-Saharan state and another) need not concern the United States. America must intervene only to prevent a single power from dominating a strategically crucial areaand then only if the efforts of great powers with a larger stake in that region have failed to redress the imbalance. So for an offshore balancing strategy to work, the world must be multipolar that is, there must be several other great powers, and major regional powers as well, onto which the United States can shift the burden of maintaining stability in various parts of the world .
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Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line Solves Conflicts Great Power (1/1)
(___) Offshore balancing prevents great power wars.
Benjamin SCHWARZ, Correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly, AND Christopher LAYNE, Visiting Scholar at the Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California and a MacArthur Foundation Fellow in Global Security, 2002 [A New Grand Strategy, Atlantic Monthly, Volume 289, Issue 1, January, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Premiere // BATMAN] For America the most important grand-strategic issue is what relations it will have with these new great powers. In fostering a
multipolar worldin which the foreign and national-security policies of the emerging great powers will be largely devoted to their rivalries with one another and to quelling and containing regional instabilityan offshore balancing strategy is, of course, opportunistic and self-serving. But it also exercises restraint and shows geopolitical respect. By abandoning the preponderance strategy's extravagant objectives, the United States can minimize the risks of open confrontation with the new great powers .
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Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line Solves Conflicts ME and Asia (1/1)
(___) Offshore balancing solves mid-east, central asian, and southwest asian security only a multipolar world can prevent conflicts. Benjamin SCHWARZ, Correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly, AND Christopher LAYNE, Visiting Scholar at the
Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California and a MacArthur Foundation Fellow in Global Security, 2002 [A New Grand Strategy, Atlantic Monthly, Volume 289, Issue 1, January, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Premiere // BATMAN] The complexities involved in that job are numerous. Washington's very strategy of primacy, and America's
concomitant military presence in the region, are in themselves a source of instability, especially for the regimes on which the United States relies. The regimes in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan , for instance, face doubtful prospects precisely because their close connection to Washington intensifies radical nationalist and Islamic fundamentalist opposition within those countries. For this reason none of the regional regimes in the current coalition can be especially dependable allies. Only with enormous pressure did a few of them even allow American forces to conduct
offensive strikes on Afghanistan from bases on their territory. And fearing that popular anger at the U.S. military campaign will trigger domestic political explosions, many of these states pressed Washington to bring an early end to the war.
If America remains in the region indefinitely, it will have to prop up these unpopular or failing regimes. In Saudi Arabia the United States could easily find itself militarily involved if internal upheaval threatens the monarchy's hold on power. To forestall economic collapse in Pakistan, Washington will have to donate billions of dollars in direct and indirect assistance. Finally, if the United States continues to play the role of regional gendarme, it will assume the thanklessand probably hopelessburden of trying to put Afghanistan together again. Divided along ethnic, linguistic, and clan fault lines, the various factions inside Afghanistan cannot agree on that country's future political organization. (The forces making up the anti-Taliban contingent seem only to agree that they resent U.S. bombing of their country.) That the outside powers have conflicting goals for Afghanistan's future further complicates any sorting out of Afghanistan's political structure. If ever there was a place where America should devolve security responsibilities to others, it is the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia region . Again, Western Europe, Japan, Russia, China, and India all have greater security and economic interests in the region than does the United States, and if America pulls out, they will police it because they must . Rather than attempt to impose a Pax Americana on this endemically turbulent area, the United States should devote the resources it currently spends on this costly and dangerous job to rendering the region economically and strategically irrelevant. That is, America should pursue a national energy policy that would develop alternative sources of energy for the United States and, more important, the rest of the industrialized world. This colossal scientific and industrial effort should be our highest national-security priority (see Mideast Oil Forever?, by Joseph J. Romm and Charles B. Curtis, April, 1996, Atlantic). If the United States shifts responsibility for stabilizing the region to the other great powers, the real price of Persian Gulf oil will become extremely high for them. It would then be in their interests to pool resources and expertise with America in what would amount to an international Manhattan Project to obviate the need for that oilthus dramatically reducing the revenue streams to the regimes in Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Doing so is surely a common international interest. If Washington were to spend the approximately $106 billion thataccording to Earl Ravenal, a former Pentagon analystit is devoting this year to defending the Persian Gulf region, and if Western Europe, Japan, China, and Russia were to kick in what they would otherwise spend on policing the region, it's hard to imagine that this goal couldn't be achieved.
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Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line Solves Conflicts U.S. Draw-In (1/1)
(___) Off-shore balancing prevents drawing the U.S. into conflicts unrelated to national security. Charles V. PEA, Senior Fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, adviser to the Straus Military Reform Project, and analyst for MSNBC television, 2006
["A Smaller Military To Fight the War on Terror," Orbis, Volume 50, Issue 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via ScienceDirect // BATMAN]
By definition, a balancer-of-last-resort strategy means that other countries would take primary responsibility for their own security and for regional security in their area of the world. Therefore, the United States could shed entangling alliances, NATO being the obvious first choice. Since the Soviet military threat no longer exists, neither does the need for NATO. Nonetheless, the United States is obligated under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty to come to the defense of other NATO countries. One of the newest members of NATO is Latvia , which was
admitted to the alliance in April 2004. Russia has expressed its concern that more than 460,000 Russian-speaking Latvians were barred from voting in March 2005 municipal elections. If Russia and Latvia were to come to blows over the issue
of ethnic Russian Latvians, U.S. security would clearly not be at stake, but U.S. forces might be compelled to intervene. That is exactly the kind of situation in which the United States must avoid entangling itself .
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Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line Solves Conflicts A2: Countries Wont Start (1/1)
(___) Hegemony prompts other countries to spark violence in order to draw the U.S. in only offshore balancing solves. Ivan ELAND, Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, 2002
[The Empire Strikes Out: The "New Imperialism" and Its Fatal Flaws, Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 459, November 26, Available Online at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa459.pdf, Accessed 04-25-2007 // BATMAN] The strategy of empire could prove counterproductive in other ways as well. For starters, Washington's self-assumed
responsibility to keep order could be exploited by all sorts of states wanting to advance their own goals. Taiwan could declare its independence with the expectation that the United States would protect it from China's reaction; Pakistan could exploit its new strategic importance by successfully challenging India [end page 10] on Kashmir; rebel groups everywhere could intentionally provoke crackdowns like the Kosovo Liberation Army did in southern Serbia in 1999with the presumption that the United States would step in and internationalize their cause; and Arab countries, knowing that the Bush administration needs their support for any invasion of Iraq, are withholding
it, unless the United States can show progress in its efforts to mediate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
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Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line Solves Burden-Sharing (1/1)
(___) Offshore balancing prompts burden-shifting that solves conflicts better than burden-sharing. Benjamin SCHWARZ, Correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly, AND Christopher LAYNE, Visiting Scholar at the
Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California and a MacArthur Foundation Fellow in Global Security, 2002 [A New Grand Strategy, Atlantic Monthly, Volume 289, Issue 1, January, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Premiere // BATMAN] Taken together, the experiences of Britain and America highlight the central feature of the offshore balancing strategy: it
allows for burden shifting, rather than burden sharing. Offshore balancers can afford to be bystanders in the opening stages of conflict. Because the security of others is most immediately at risk, an offshore balancer can be confident that those others will attempt to defend themselves. Often they will do so expeditiously, obviating the offshore balancer's intervention. If, on the other hand, a predominant power seems to be winning, an offshore balancer can intervene decisively to forestall its victory (as Britain did against Philip II, Louis XIV, and Napoleon). And if the offshore balancer must intervene, the state aspiring to dominance will already have been at least somewhat bloodied, and thus not as formidable as it was for those who had the geopolitical misfortune to constitute the first line of defense.
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Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line Solves Terrorism (1/1)
(___) Offshore balancing solves terrorism in central asia and the middle east it is key to get russia, china, and india on-board. Benjamin SCHWARZ, Correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly, AND Christopher LAYNE, Visiting Scholar at the
Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California and a MacArthur Foundation Fellow in Global Security, 2002 [A New Grand Strategy, Atlantic Monthly, Volume 289, Issue 1, January, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Premiere // BATMAN]
Recognizing the legitimacy of other great powers' spheres of influence offers the United States a further strategic advantage. The Persian Gulf and Central Asia show why. Russia and China both are profoundly concerned about the spread of Islamic fundamentalism on their peripheries. In Chechnya, in Central Asia (where Russian troops help to defend the former Soviet republics of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan), and in the Caucasus, Moscow has fought major military campaigns to protect its southern flank against militant Islam. China , too, is combating terrorism fomented by Islamic separatists, in the Xinjiang province. Last June, Beijing and Moscow entered into a security relationship, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (which also embraces three of the former Soviet republics in Central Asia), to coordinate efforts to combat the common threat to their security posed by these Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groupsgroups linked to the Taliban and Osaina bin Laden. Similarly, India, a possible future great power, has been battling Islamic terrorists who are waging a proxy war on Pakistan's behalf to wrest the disputed province of Kashmir away from New Delhi. Simply put, for reasons of security and access to oil, Russia, China, India, Western Europe, and Japan have strong reasonsstronger than America'sto pacify Central Asia and the Persian Gulf. By adopting an offshore balancing strategy, the United States will compel them to do so .
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Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line A2: Isolationism Bad (1/3)
(___) They say isolationism bad, but: ____ This is not responsive
Our argument is not that the U.S. should withdraw from the world, but that it should adopt a grand strategy of offshore balancing their argument does not assume our Layne evidence.
____
Offshore balancing is not isolationism it is a form of strategic engagement. Stephen M. WALT, Academic Dean and the Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2005
["In the National Interest: A new grand strategy for American foreign policy," Boston Review, February/March, Available Online at http://bostonreview.net/BR30.1/walt.html, Accessed 04-12-2007 // BATMAN] There is a broader lesson here: as the worlds only superpower, the United States has an incentive to play hard-toget. It also has the luxury of being able to do so. Instead of bending over backward to persuade the rest of the world that the United States is 100-percent reliable, American leaders should be encouraging other states to bend over backward to keep the United States as an ally. Other states are more likely to do this if they believe that American support is conditional on their cooperation. If other states were not entirely sure that the United States would come to their aid if asked, they would be willing to do much more to make sure that we would. Americas Asian and Persian Gulf allies illustrate this dynamic perfectly: whenever they begin to fear that the American role might decline, they leap to offer Washington new facilities and access agreements and go to greater lengths to conform their foreign policy to ours.
To reiterate: offshore balancing is not isolationist. The United States would not withdraw from world affairs under
this strategy, and it would still retain potent power-projection capabilities. Playing hard-to-get simply means intervening only when overt aggression occurs and Americas vital interests are directly threatenedand intervening with the clear intention of coming home quickly, and with a clear strategy for doing so .
____ Offshore balancing is not isolationism modest use of power doesnt mean no use of power. Benjamin SCHWARZ, Correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly, AND Christopher LAYNE, Visiting Scholar at the
Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California and a MacArthur Foundation Fellow in Global Security, 2002 [A New Grand Strategy, Atlantic Monthly, Volume 289, Issue 1, January, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Premiere // BATMAN] Finally, although some might characterize an offshore balancing strategy as isolationist, it emphatically is not.
Rather, its guiding principle is a clear-eyed realism. It is a workaday policypragmatic, flexible, and opportunistic. But it will also bring America into a more respectful and natural relationship with the other great powers, as the United States forsakes the temptations of hegemony. A mature great power will make measured and limited use of its power;' Walter Lippmann wrote in 1965. It will eschew the theory of a global and universal duty, which not only commits it to unending wars of intervention, but intoxicates its thinking with the illusion that it is a crusader for righteousness I am in
favor of learning to behave like a great power, of getting rid of the globalism, which would not only entangle us everywhere, but is based on the totally vain notion that if we do not set the world in order, no matter what the price, we cannot live in the world safely In the real world, we shall have to learn to live as a great power which defends itself and makes its way among other great powers .
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Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line A2: Isolationism Bad (2/3)
____ No one defends isolationism anymore their turns are just scaremongering that prevent necessary debates over U.S. grand strategy.
Andrew J. BACEVICH, Professor of International Relations at Boston University, 2006
[What Isolationism?, Los Angeles Times, February 2, Available Online at http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0202-27.htm, Accessed 04-25-2007 // BATMAN] In his state of the Union address on Tuesday, President Bush worked himself into a lather about the dangers of "retreating within our borders." His speech bulged with ominous references to ostensibly resurgent isolationists hankering to "tie our hands" and leave "an assaulted world to fend for itself." Turning inward, the president cautioned, would provide "false comfort" because isolationism inevitably "ends in danger and decline." But who exactly are these isolationists eager to pull up the drawbridges? What party do they control? What influential journals of opinion do they publish? Who are their leaders? Which foundations bankroll this isolationist cause? The president provided no such details, and for good reason: They do not exist. Indeed, in present-day American politics, isolationism does not exist. It is a fiction, a fabrication and a smear imported from another era .
Isolationism survives in contemporary American political discourse because it retains utility as a cheap device employed to impose discipline. Think of it as akin to red-baiting conjuring up bogus fears to enforce conformity in the realm of foreign policy. In that regard, the beleaguered Bush, his standing in public opinion polls
tumbling, is by no means the first president to sound the alarm about supposed isolationists subverting American statecraft.
The problem is that scaremongering about nonexistent isolationists preempts a much-needed debate over the principles that ought to inform our behavior as a world power. Call that debate George Washington versus Woodrow
Wilson.
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Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line A2: Isolationism Bad (3/3)
____ Their impact turns are smear tactics that oversimplify the debate and justify dangerous neoconservative ideology. Justin LOGAN, Foreign Policy Analyst and Member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, 2006
[The Isolationism Canard, San Diego Union-Tribune, February 9, Available Online at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php? pub_id=5547, Accessed 04-25-2007 // BATMAN] During his State of the Union address, President Bush warned Americans about the lure of isolationism. The president mentioned isolationism or isolation four times, warning that the strategy offered only false comfort that would result in danger and decline. By contrast, the president explained his own position clearly: The future security of America depends onthe end of tyranny in our world. But who are these isolationists, and what is it that they are proposing? Its tough to tell. The term isolationist didnt arise until the late nineteenth century, when it was made popular by Alfred Thayer Mahan, an ardent militarist, who used the term to slur opponents of American imperialism. As historian Walter McDougall has pointed out, Americas vaunted tradition of isolationism is no tradition at all, but a dirty word that interventionists, especially since Pearl Harbor, hurl at anyone who questions their policies. Thats pretty consistent with the way the president used the term. During the speech, he presented the choice on Iraq in the bipolar manner that has become his trademark: On Iraq, either youre with the president, or youre with the isolationists. Responsible criticism, according to the president, comes from within the first faction, whereas defeatism, hindsight, and second-guessing come from the latter. In the real world, the choice is much more complex than simply between the reckless and militant interventionism of Bushs forced democracy policy and the head-in-the-sand posture of isolationism. Setting up the isolationist straw man was a cynical tactic used to frame the debate over Iraq, not a serious characterization of a real position on foreign policy. True enough, there are a few on the national stage who embrace something akin to isolationism. Pat Buchanan, for one, would like to see the United States less involved militarily, culturally, and economically with foreign countries. But there is little
groundswell at the grassroots for this worldview and almost no genuine isolationism in Congress or the punditocracy.
Unfortunately, Bush is not the only one to conjure up that phony specter. The term isolationism has been cropping up with increasing frequency. A November Pew poll found that 42 percent of Americans believe that the United States should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own. For the Pew pollsters, this was evidence of an isolationist sentiment. But what is the contrary position? That the United States should not mind its own business internationally? That we should attempt to direct foreign countries ourselves? Is it isolationist to believe that the United State s should seek security by defending its vital interests abroad, but balk at messianic projects to transform foreign governments? In reality, there is a wide spectrum of views on Americas role in the world, and it is not adequately
characterized by a Bush supporters vs. isolationists dichotomy. Many of us believe that the Bush administrations definition of the national interest is absurdly broad ; for instance, when the president claims that the security of Americans is contingent on the end of tyranny in our world. But our disagreement is not based on a desire to retrench ourselves in some walled commune, avoiding the world around us and ignoring the perils there. It is not isolation we seek, but a more discriminating view of the national interest . The irony is that while the president is radically out of touch with the American foreign policy tradition, he accuses his opponents of following an extreme ideology. Bushs belief that our security is contingent on congenial political arrangements in all foreign countries, no matter how obscure or strategically irrelevant they may be, is both wrong and dangerous. George F. Kennan, perhaps the senior American statesman of the 20th century, remarked in 1999 that this whole
tendency to see ourselves as the center of political enlightenment and as teachers to a great part of the rest of the world strikes me as unthought-through, vainglorious and undesirable. By contrast, Kennan argued that American foreign policy is at its best when it is very modest and restrained. Perhaps the president believes Kennan, the intellectual architect of Americas containment policy, was just an isolationist.
President Bushs foreign policy is causing the Republic great harm, besmirching our reputation in the world and dragging his popularity down at home. Tarring his many (and varied) critics with the isolationist epithet will not change any of those phenomena. Recently, columnist George Will pleaded for an adult hour in this years State of the Union. Instead, the president decided to play politics with the discussion of Iraqand of foreign policy generally. Wills adult hour will not come until the president takes off his ideological blinders and acknowledges that the worldand foreign affairsare much more complicated than white hat vs. black hat. Or Bush vs. the isolationists .
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Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line A2: Still Need Military (1/1)
(___) They say the U.S. still needs a stronger military, but: ____ Not true
A drawdown would remove the need for forward deployed troops the reason we are experiencing the effects of a weakened military is because of strategic overextension offshore balancing solves the root cause of their harms.
____ Offshore balancing obviates the need for a larger military, deploying it only against specific threats. Stephen M. WALT, Academic Dean and the Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2005
["In the National Interest: A new grand strategy for American foreign policy," Boston Review, February/March, Available Online at http://bostonreview.net/BR30.1/walt.html, Accessed 04-12-2007 // BATMAN]
A key element in the strategy of offshore balancing is reducing the overall footprint of U.S. military power and beginning to play hard-to-get when dealing with various regional powers. Instead of insisting that the United States be responsible for solving all global-security problems, and instead of accepting (or seeking) the job of running large areas of the world, offshore balancing seeks to take advantage of Americas hegemonic position in the Western hemisphere and its distance from the other key centers of world power . As discussed above, the United States would stand ready to deploy its power against specific threats to Americas vital interests but would otherwise refrain from large-scale, quasi-permanent military engagements overseas .
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Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line A2: U.S. Still Needs Influence (1/1)
(___) Offshore balancing wouldnt leave the U.S. on the sidelines it can still lead by example to secure its interests even when it chooses not to intervene. Stephen M. WALT, Academic Dean and the Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2005
["In the National Interest: A new grand strategy for American foreign policy," Boston Review, February/March, Available Online at http://bostonreview.net/BR30.1/walt.html, Accessed 04-12-2007 // BATMAN]
What is needed instead is greater confidence in Americas fundamental principles and institutions and greater wisdom in understanding what its power can and cannot accomplish. Americas core values of liberty and opportunity provide the energy upon which our economic prosperity is built. That prosperity, in turn, provides the sinews of our military power and the core of our international influence. But our ability to defeat other armies and our influence over the world economy does not give the United States either the right or the ability to impose these principles on others, and it hardly gives five percent of the worlds population the capacity to govern vast areas of the world by force. Instead of telling the world what to do and how to live a temptation that both neoconservative empire-builders and liberal internationalists find hard to resist the United States should lead the world primarily by its example. If we have faith in our principles, we will expect to win hearts and minds because others will see how we live and see what we have, and they will want those things too .
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Offshore Balancing Good 2nd Line A2: Too Modest / Pessimistic (1/1)
(___) Offshore balancings modesty is its greatest strength power politics are inevitable and attempts to remake the world will inevitably backfire. Benjamin SCHWARZ, Correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly, AND Christopher LAYNE, Visiting Scholar at the
Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California and a MacArthur Foundation Fellow in Global Security, 2002 [A New Grand Strategy, Atlantic Monthly, Volume 289, Issue 1, January] Some will assert, correctly, that if it abjures a strategy of preponderance, America will sacrifice some of the awe with which it is viewed by the world. But less awe and less influence will bring the United States more security . Some will object that the policy we advocate shuns the inspiring role of America as the indispensable nation. But such a grandiose vision, while pleasing to our image of ourselves, is the antithesis of statecraft, which must be guided by discrimination on the basis of power, interest, and circumstance. Historically, the most imaginative statesmen and policies have hardly been
visionary. For centuries, with flexibility and subtlety, British diplomats pursued a grand strategy that aimed at nothing more inspiring than ensuring a balance of power among the states of Western Europe. This was really just tactical fine-tuning on a grand scale, and so aroused the consternation of idealists of every stripe. For their part, America's nineteenth-century statesmen could not have been less idealistic or more pragmatic as they, by adroitly exploiting European great-power rivalries, maneuvered the British, the French, and the Spanish out of North America and established American predominance in the Western Hemisphereprobably the most stunning diplomatic achievement of modern history, and the very model of a successful multipolar strategy . The policy we advocate is informed by the conviction that history is just one damned thing after another; we see no end to power politics. And we hold that the purpose of grand strategy isn't the pursuit of new world orders but simply making the best of bad choices to use the political philosopher Michael Oakeshott's metaphor, keeping afloat in a boundless and bottomless sea; there is neither harbor for shelter nor floor for anchorage, neither starting point nor appointed destination. Ours is a grand strategy for the long hauland so, by the lights of visionaries who see foreign policy as a means of pursuing millennialist goals, not a very grand one. But the grander its foreign-policy vision, the more a state is trapped in the tyranny of its own construct: although recent administrations display an odd compulsion to devise and promulgate such visions of America's role in the world, those visions are in fact incompatible with the push and pull of strategy .
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*** Hegemony Bad Europe Turn Scenario ***
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Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn -- 1NC
BOOSTING U.S. POWER THREATENS EUROPEAN POWER THERE IS A ZERO-SUM POWER COMPETITION
John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 9
Chapter 6 compares and contrasts European and American values, arguing that the two actors now differ so greatly on so broad a range of social issues that they offer quite distinctive personalities to the rest of the world. It argues that brand image is central to notions of power, and that while the United States is still a cultural hegemon, the EU is catching up. Anti-Americanism has grown, taking multiple different forms, but there has been no corresponding rise of antiEuropeanism. Europeans and Americans see themselves and are seen by others in quite different ways, and offer distinctive interpretations about what they each represent. The chapter looks in detail at transatlantic contrasts in the role of religion, at competing social models, and at the manner in which Europe has begun to take the lead on addressing environmental problems. In the competition in the marketplace for ideas, European post-modern attitudes are building advantages over the values associated with American power.
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Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn -- 1NC
EU LEADERSHIP WILL SOLVE GLOBAL PROBLEMS AND AVOID MILITARISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 32-33 If there is one point on which almost everyone can agree, it is that the EU will never be a global actor along the old cold war-style military lines of the United States and the Soviet Union. But the age of the military superpower is over. Instead, the EU has rejected realist interpretations of the international system, and has emerged as a post-modem superpower. There is a close association between modernism, militarism, and environmental devastation the European post-modern view, by contrast, is better suited to the rise of the global economy, new levels of personal mobility, the increasing irrelevance of borders, the shift from manufacturing to service economies, new attitudes towards the role of science, the anti-war movement, a preference for social spending over military spending, mass communications, multiculturalism, the emergence of a new global culture, sustainable development, and a concern for the environment. For 'post-modern', we could as easily insert `post-national' or `post-material' these are all related concepts. While the European Union is adapting to the new international system indeed, even shaping that system American policymakers are having difficulty leaving behind their realist, statist cold war thinking. Richard Cooper writes of a world divided into three zones: a pre-modern zone of chaos (mainly Africa and Asia) where the rule of law has failed and which acts as a source of modern terrorism; a modern zone with an emphasis on national interests and national security, and a belief in force as a means of protecting them (he includes in this group the United States, China, and India); and a post-modern zone (including the EU and Japan) that has the luxury of abhorring war and the use of force as a primary instrument of policy. In a related argument, Mary Kaldor argues that while the United States still holds to realist views of the world, the European Union has moved away from a desire to impose its will, and has instead embraced what she calls `cosmopolitanism': a mix of idealism and multilateralism, a belief in containment through political and legal means, and a commitment to a liberal world economy and global social justice. There is a role in this view for military means, but mainly for the protection of civilians, the arrest of war criminals, and the achievement of humanitarian goals, and always with the authorization of appropriate multilateral procedures. In the post-modern era, the kind of economic and political influence that the EU enjoys is more pertinent to the resolution of the most urgent international problems than the military options so often pursued by the United States. This is not to say that the military option will not always be necessary, and that it should not at least be kept in reserve, but it is of little value and may even be counterproductive when governments are faced with problems to which there is no military solution. In short, the changing nature of power has allowed the EU to become a new kind of superpower, exerting influence based not on its military firepower, but on its economic, political, and diplomatic influence. Out of a combination of its intrinsic advantages, the disadvantages of the cold war model of American power, and changes in the international system, the EU has emerged as a post-modern superpower. The bipolar system of the cold war era where Americans and Soviets competed on ideological grounds using military tools has been replaced with the bipolar system of the post-modern era where Europeans and Americans offer competing sets of values, competing definitions of global problems, and competing sets of prescriptions for addressing those problems.
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Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe is the Global Leader
OLD STYLE POWER-POWER POLITICS NO LONGER RELEVANT; THE EU IS THE NEW SUPERPOWER
John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 2
This book challenges the conventional thinking. It rejects the traditional view that the greatest powers are states with large militaries that consciously pursue national interests, and argues instead that power can transcend states, can be expressed without resort to force, and can just as likely be latent and implied as it can be active and explicit. It also argues that globalization and interdependence have undermined old-style power politics and replaced it with a more complex and nuanced set of international relationships, in which ownership of the means of production is more important than ownership of the means of destruction, and cooperation is more effective than coercion. In this new post-modern environment, the qualities cultivated and projected by the European Union have made it a new breed of superpower.
EU GLOBAL INFLUENCE IS UNDERESTIMATED John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 30
We also find hints that the global influence of the EU has for too long been underestimated, and that the global influence of the US has for too long been overestimated. In 1998, William Wallace and Jan Zielonka warned that the United States should not be so sanguine about its powers and abilities, and in particular that US policymakers misunderstood the potential of Europe. 'Smug assumptions of American supremacy are wildly overdone,' they argued, in part because of the robustness of European economies and the increasingly productive patterns of cooperation in Europe, and in part because of the inconsistencies of US foreign policy. They also suggested that some of the anti-Europeanism then being heard in Washington DC was based on fear and ignorance: American policymakers were concerned about the potential for the EU to become a global rival, but there had been a reduction in the amount of information and expertise on Europe that was available to American policymakers and public opinion.
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Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe is the Global Leader
AMERICAN SCHOLARS CONCEDE THAT EUROPEAN POWER IS INCREASING John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 30-1
Ironically, much of the support for the idea of European global power comes from American analysts. Samuel Huntington, while criticizing talk of American decline in the late 1980s, admitted that the most probable challenge to predictions of continued American dominance would come from a united Europe. With political cohesion, he argued, it 'would have the population, resources, economic wealth, technology and actual and potential military strength to be the pre-eminent power of the 21st century'. It might even have an 'ideological appeal' comparable to that of the United States. In 1990, Ronald Steel predicted the rise of the European superpower based on the rise of European economic power, the growth of European nationalism, the need to find a place for a unified Germany in Europe, and the erosion of Atlanticismi. More recently, Charles Kupchan has written of `the end of the American era' and argues that the next challenge to the United States might come not from an ascendant China or from the Islamic world but from a rising Europe emerging as a counterweight to the United States.
THE EU IS PURSUING NON-MILITARY POLICIES TO ESTABLISH ITSELF AS A SUPERPOWER John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 6
\Then there has been the replacement of the security challenges of the cold war with the more complex international challenges of the post-cold war era. At the same time, options pursued by its policymakers have left the United States increasingly isolated; it takes positions that regularly put it at odds with almost every other industrialized country, it has pursued unilateral initiatives in the face of a near-universal preference elsewhere for multilateral options, and it defines threats and their potential solutions on its own terms. It has been argued that the Americans use their military because they can, and that the Europeans prefer diplomacy because it is all they have.? But the reality is more complex: the EU has made a conscious decision to pursue non-military options, and the nature of the international system today is more suited to a new model of superpower, one that prefers to avoid military solutions to problems, that prefers to achieve its objectives through influence rather than coercion, and that prefers to lead by example.
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Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe is the Global Leader
EUROPEAN POLITICAL INFLUENCE IS HIGH John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 6
Along the way, Europe has also offered a new set of values and priorities that has resonated with many of those who worry about the costs and implications of American leadership. The result has been a resurgence of European global influence, which has had the effect of replacing the cold war bipolar system with a post-modern bipolar system. The cold war system was characterized by geopolitical and ideological competition between two superpowers that relied heavily on military options as their primary bargaining tools, that engaged in an arms race, that pursued intimidation and propaganda and assassination, and that developed networks of allies to act as both a source of support and a market for influence. In the post-modern system there is no prospect of war between the two superpowers, which instead compete for economic, political and cultural in influence, and offer two distinctive sets of methods, values, and norms
THE EU IS REPLACING THE U.S. AS THE GLOBAL LEADER John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 34
The European Union was the most successful product of the post-war era of generalized peace and economic change guaranteed and promoted by the United States. Europeans owe a great deal to Americans for underwriting the post-war international system, within whose structures European governments were able to achieve a new durability, and European economies were able to build new wealth and competitiveness. It is all the more ironic, then, that US policy should have paved the way for the development of a postmodern European Union that has so pointedly and effectively illustrated the declining relevance of the American model of great power politics, and that is itself now taking the lead in redefining the international system.
THE EU OFFERS A CONTRASTING MODEL OF GLOBAL LEADERSHIP John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 36
Today's Atlantic Alliance is a beast of a different stripe. No longer does the United States have so clear an advantage on economic and political matters, and its military power is no longer so convincing or so politically effective as it once was. Meanwhile, Europe has become the biggest capitalist marketplace in the world, its moral authority has grown, its political influence has spread as the reach of its economy has expanded, its foreign policies are achieving new consistency, and it is building a modest common military and the foundations of a common security policy. In short, Europe's aspirations to become a global power have been achieved, and the old, realist cold war order has been replaced by a new post-modern arrangement in which a resurgent Europe offers policies and priorities that leave it standing in clear distinction from that of the United States, to which it owes so much but with which it no longer always agrees.
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Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe is the Global Leader
THE EU IS A GLOBAL CIVILIAN POWER John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 79
Others hold on to the civilian thesis, arguing that the EU could use military tools and still be regarded as a civilian power, just so long as non-military means are put first and the military is only used as a safeguard of last resort; the critical issue is the question of the ends that are pursued. So Maull, for example, argues that even though Germany used its military force outside the NATO area during the 1990s, and took part in the 1999 bombing of Serbia, it is still a civilian power. Jorgensen argues that the EU has retained its civilian qualities because questions of defence and nuclear capability remain with NATO. Stavridis argues that thanks to its militarization, the EU might finally act as a real civilian power: an international force for the promotion of democratic principles. In other words, the EU is in the position to become a civilian power 'by design' rather than a mere civilian presence 'by default', as he believes is now the case.
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Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: European Leadership Model Better
THE EU HAS A MORE SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL MODEL John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 156-7 The EU has recently developed a reputation as a leader on the environmental front, but herein lies an irony. Europe was the birthplace of the industrial revolution and was generally slow to pick up on early pressures to clean up the environment and better manage natural resources. It was the Americans who introduced the idea of national parks, and many of the philosophical concepts and practical solutions behind environmentalism were introduced by Americans such as George Perkins Marsh, John Muir, and Gifford Pinchot. The United States was later at the forefront of legal and institutional responses to environmental problems: it began passing national clean air and clean water legislation in the 1950s and 1960s, created the federal Environmental Protection Agency in 1970, and was years ahead Competing in the Market for Ideas of the Europeans in introducing lead-free fuel. But the Reagan administration did its best to gut national environmental initiatives, the Bush administration has been famously unsupportive of attempts to deal with climate change and America's looming energy problems, and whatever their advances on the regulatory front, and in spite of how much they have championed green lifestyles, Americans as a whole have ultimately failed to change their habits in such a way as to make much positive difference. It is not that Americans are less sympathetic than Europeans to the need for effective environmental management. When asked in 2003 if people should be willing to pay higher prices in order to protect the environment, more Americans (70 per cent) agreed than Europeans (53-60 per cent in the Big Four countries), and the statement 'Protecting the environment should be given priority even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs' had 69 per cent support in the US, slightly more than in France (66 per cent), and not much less than in Italy, Britain and Germany (78-82 per cent). But when Europeans talk about paying more or about managing economic growth in order to protect the environment, they are doing so from the perspective of people living in small, crowded and expensive countries where public transport is a way of life for many, and resource consumption is already relatively low. For Americans, whose resource demands are substantial, who are more aggressive consumers, and where public transport is the choice of the minority, making sacrifices is of an altogether different order. At the heart of transatlantic differences is the concept of sustainable development. Usually defined as development that 'meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs', sustainable development has been one of the core principles of EU environmental policy since the 1986 Single European Act. Debates continue about just how much difference it has made in practice there is much talk in Brussels, but less evidence of real change in policy. But with or without policy change, Western Europeans in particular have altered their consumption habits to fit with the goals of sustainable development. They are conscious of the limitations on natural resources, and of the links between cause and effect, and they are less demanding consumers. Some of the results are reflected in the data: Europeans produce about half as many emissions of greenhouse gases as Americans, they generate about two-thirds as much waste, and they consume less than one-third as much water and about half as much energy
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Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe is the Global Leader: Soft Power
THE EUROPEAN UNION IS ESTABLASHING ITSELF AS A SUPERPOWER THROUGH SOFT POWER John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 6-7
In this new system, the European Union is a superpower that relies upon soft power to express itself and to achieve its objectives, and that finds itself at a moral advantage in an international environment where violence as a means of achieving influence is increasingly detested and rejected, and at a strategic advantage because its methods and priorities fit more closely with the needs and consequences of globalization. The EU has become influential by promoting values, policies and goals that appeal to other states in a way that aggression and coercion cannot. In so doing, it has redefined our understanding of the meaning of power, as well as fundamentally and irrevocably changing the balance of influence in the international system.
EUROPEAN SOFT POWER WILL ENABLE IT TO RUN THE 21ST CENTURY John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 31
Jeremy Rifkin contrasts the American emphasis on economic growth, personal wealth, individual self-interest, and the use of military power with the European emphasis on sustainable development, quality of life, community, and political cooperation, and concludes that Europe is developing a new social and political model better suited to the needs of the globalizing world of the new century." The journalist T. R. Reid offers an economic perspective on the rise of the EU, arguing that the emergence of Europe has meant the end of American global supremacy. Rockwell Schnabel, former US ambassador to the EU, offers his support to the idea of Europe using its soft power to influence world events, and warns of the challenge it poses to the United States. Arid from the other side the Atlantic, Stephen Haseler has looked at developments intrinsic to the EU including monetary union, an integrated legal system, trade, and common diplomacy and has written of 'Europe's hour', arguing that the EU is already 'well along the road to becoming the world's second superpower'. Mark Leonard argues that Europe will 'run the 21st century', and writes of the 'invisible hand' of Europe exerting a new kind of influence based less on military power than on offering a long-term model of economic and political transformation. The end of the American era is nigh, he concludes.
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Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe is the Global Leader: Soft Power
THE EUROPEAN UNION HAS ESTABLISHED ITSELF AS A GLOBAL CIVILIAN POWER John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 60-1
During the cold war, the United States was by virtue of its overwhelming military and economic power the clear leader in the Atlantic Alliance, no matter what reservations European political leaders and their publics may have sometimes had about the details of US foreign policy. But much has since changed. The Soviet threat to international security has gone, its place taken by problems to which a military response is not always appropriate. And in those cases where a military response is appropriate, it is typically of a different scale and nature than the scenarios for which NATO prepared itself during the cold war. Finally, since the collapse of the USSR, the Europeans have been freed from their reliance on American security, and have become more willing and able to promote their own distinctive, nonmilitary, interpretations of international problems and solutions. Kagan tells us that while the United States believes that security and defence still depend on the possession and use of military power, Europe has moved into a world of laws, rules, and international cooperation. While Europeans see a complex global system, and prefer to negotiate and persuade rather than to coerce, the United States is less patient with diplomacy, and sees the world as divided between good and evil, and between friends and enemies. The differences, Kagan concludes, are a reflection of the relative positions of the two actors in the world. When European states were great powers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they were more ready to use violence to achieve their goals. Americans, by contrast, appealed to rules and laws as a means of resolving disagreements, when it suited them. Now that Europeans and Americans have traded places, they have also traded perspectives. The differences can be seen in the contrasting roles that the military plays in American and European culture. Americans tend to laud and lionize the military, perhaps because it is the most visible expression of American power. In the American national psyche, the flag, patriotism, military service, and national identity are all but indistinguishable. American leadership in military technology is proudly projected as proof of American economic might and inventiveness, more so today than ever. Veterans are honoured and rewarded for their public service, military experience is almost de rigueur for any serious candidate for the US presidency, and questions about the quality of that experience (or lack thereof) can be enough to derail a campaign. In Europe, by contrast, military service is so understated as to be almost invisible. War has unpleasant associations with nationalism, and has been decoupled from definitions of national identity. And while veterans are honoured annually at remembrance ceremonies, the link between military service and public service is minimal. Indeed, to run for office in Europe on a background of military experience can be a positive handicap. The United States and the EU now offer two distinctive models of the role of military power in international relations. While the former is more ready to opt for a military response to terrorism, for example, and to talk of a 'war' on terrorism, the latter prefers to examine and address the problems that have led to the rise of terrorism, and to approach the matter as a question of law enforcement. While the Bush administration has refused to rule out the option of force against 'rogue states' such as Iran, the European Union prefers to explore non-military solutions. While Americans are more willing to act alone, refusing even to allow their soldiers to wear the blue helmets of the UN, Europeans prefer multilateral approaches to security problems backed by UN resolutions. Kagan is wrong when he argues that this is largely down to capability, and that those who have the weapons will be inclined to use them. On the contrary, Europe has identified a new approach to international relations which relies less on military power," and in so doing has become a civilian superpower.
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Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe is the Global Leader: Soft Power
EUROPEAN POWER CONSISTENT WITH GLOBAL NORMS John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 120
But whatever the divisions between Europeanists and Atlanticists, between old Turope and new Europe, and between europhobes and europhiles, they have all missed one critical point: Europe has achieved political influence in spite of itself. Unlike the United States, which has sought and exercised power since 1945, the EU has accumulated power and influence without always trying. The rise of the European marketplace has combined with changes in the international system since the end of the cold war and the slowness of the United States to adapt to globalization to create a leadership vacuum into which the EU has steadily been pulled. While US foreign policy is increasingly out of step with the new needs and demands of the post-modern world, the EU is more attuned to those needs and demands, and finds itself filling the vacuum
EUROPEAN SOFT POWER INCREASING John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 138
But the balance is changing. Starbucks, Tommy Hilfiger, Disney, Xerox, Microsoft and Ford may figure prominently in the global popular consciousness, but so for many years have Philips, Siemens, BASF, Adidas, Mercedes, Renault and Fiat, and they have been joined more recently by trade names such as Allianz, Benetton, Ericsson, HSBC, Nokia, and Vodafone. Europeans are more willing to express their differences with the US on everything from abortion to capital punishment and gun control. As military power loses its validity in the eyes of many, so cold war bipolarity has been replaced with a post-modem bipolarity where Americans and Europeans compete in the international market not just for commodities and services but also for ideas. Military power still enters the equation as a tool by which political change might be wrought or security threats headed off in third countries. But today's international system is increasingly driven by values, which generate competing interpretations of the most pressing problems, and generate different recipes for dealing with those problems. It is a new variation on the old idea of the race to win hearts and minds. In the market for ideas, the two new superpowers are competing as much for philosophical and moral influence as they are for political advantage and economic profit.
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Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe is the Global Leader: Soft Power
EUROPES SOFT POWER REDUCES GLOBAL ANTI-EUROPEANISM
John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 142 There are several possible reasons for the relative lack of anti-Europeanism. Europe's global influence is less visible, and so there is less for potential critics to be concerned about. (In this respect, the importance of latent power is even more obvious.) Europe benefits from the reflected glow of the fires of anti-Americanism; with so much vitriol directed at US policy in recent years, Europe cannot help but come out looking better. Europe is not seen as threatening. While doubts have grown about American foreign policy motives, its reliance on military options, and the impact of American culture, Europe's motives are rarely questioned, it does not have a large military, and there is little evidence that Europe is a cultural powerhouse. Petiteville writes about the EU's advantages in the field of soft diplomacy (the use of economic, financial, legal and institutional means to export values, norms and rules and achieve long-term cultural influence'), notes that it has been used to good effect by Canada and the Scandinavian countries, but believes that it has added value in the EU because its weight in the world is now comparable to that of the United States.
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Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe is the Global Leader: Economic Power
EUROPE HAS ESTABLISHED ITSELF AS A GLOBAL ECONOMIC POWER John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 8-9
Chapter 4 makes the argument that whatever doubts there may be about Europe's global military power, there are few about its economic power. After assessing the remarkable achievements of the European single market, the chapter looks at three particular indicators of European economic power. First, there is the euro and its prospects for replacing or taking its place alongside the US dollar as the world's leading international currency. A combination of the success of the euro, the rise of the European marketplace and improvident US economic policies has boosted its prospects. Second, the EU has become the world's biggest trading power, and has used its common trade policy to take a more aggressive position on trade issues, actively using the dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization. Third, the single market has been at the foundation of a boom in mergers and acquisitions, which has helped build European corporations that compete more vigorously with their American and Japanese counterparts. For doubters about Europe's economic prospects, demographic changes point to potential future problems. But if economic growth is the servant of quality of life, then Europeans who work shorter hours but produce more with those hours have the advantages) .Chapter 5 looks at the changing balance of political power in the world. It reviews Europe's learning curve on foreign policy, noting that while there were missteps and embarrassments along the way, Europe's role in the world has become both more confident and more distinctive. Policy cooperation has become habit-forming, Europe has exploited its advantages in the use of soft power and diplomacy, and there has been growing public support for greater cooperation and independence on foreign policy. Much has changed as a result of a sharpening of the identity of Europe, but much has also changed because of a reaction to US foreign policy leadership. Particularly during the Bush administration, the US has adopted debatable interpretations of international problems and has pursued controversial policies. In many cases it has found itself alone or in a small minority. Meanwhile, the lure of the European model has strengthened, and Europe has exploited its economic advantages to become the most effective force in the world for the promotion of democracy and capitalism. Nowhere have its magnetic attractions been felt more strongly than among its neighbours, including those countries that may one day qualify for membership, and those that simply want access to the EU marketplace.
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Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe is the Global Leader: Soft Power
EUROPES MOVE TOWARD A FREE MARKET HAS REVIVED ITS ECONOMY
John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 85-6 Meanwhile, the removal of Europe's internal trade barriers has helped spark a revival of entrepreneurial innovation and corporate ambition. From its original base in six member states with a population of 160 million, the European marketplace has expanded to absorb 25 member states with a population of more than 450 million. In spite of fears that the EU's decision-making system could not keep up with the addition of new member states, it has managed remarkably well. Europe has played a critical role in helping push aside Eastern European state socialism, replacing the stagnation of central planning with the openness and creativity of capitalism. The most obvious changes have come in the eight former iron curtain countries that are now members of the EU, and whose entry in 2004 expanded the European market by nearly 75 million consumers. But the gravitational pull of the EU has also been felt in more than 30 neighbouring states that are home to nearly 600 million additional consumers (see Chapter 5), as well as in the many other countries that have developed economic and trade ties with the EU. Throughout the cold war, the United States was an economic behemoth without equal. Its economy was several times bigger than its nearest competitor, its corporations dominated almost every field of business activity, its consumers had the most disposable income, its presence in global trade was unrivalled, and it had the world's pre-eminent currency. But the rise of Europe has changed everything. It is now a massive economic presence on the world stage, building on the foundations of its home market, its wealthy (and healthy) consumers, its trading clout, and its single currency. It has survived the forecasts of the dismal economists who see the glass as half empty rather than half full, and has taken maximum advantage of the new opportunities offered by globalization. In economic terms, at least, we are now clearly living in a bipolar world.
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC PRODUCTIVITY WILL INCREASE John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 108-9
But if we look at the qualitative elements of population trends, a different picture emerges. Reductions in the labour force will continue to increase the pressure for technological change, which will in turn help make European workers more efficient. Workers will also be able to negotiate higher salaries, providing them with more disposable income. They will be able to spend more, helping boost the European marketplace. They will be able to save and invest more, helping strengthen European economies. They will pay more in taxes, helping governments raise the funds needed to take care of retirees, and the number of people living in poverty will likely decline. So while Europe's population growth may slow, the quality of life for Europeans will continue to improve. And we should not forget the impact of immigration on the European economy; more new immigrants will boost population growth and cancel out some of the numerical imbalances between workers and retirees. Finally, if demography does turn out to be a problem, then the US.
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Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: U.S. Decline Has Boosted Europe
U.S. DECLINE HAS TRANSFORMED THE EU INTO A GLOBAL LEADER John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 7
The end of the cold war may have created a brief `unipolar moment', during which the United States had no peer and Europe stumbled from one foreign policy embarrassment to another, but the EU was expanding and was using its economic power more effectively. Then came the rollercoaster of the Bush years, which took the Alliance from its moment of greatest agreement (following the September 2001 terrorist attacks) to its moment of greatest disagreement (over the March 2003 invasion of Iraq). Armed with strategic advantages and a closer fit with the realities of the new international system, and benefiting from the reduced credibility of American power, the EU found itself transformed as a global actor.
THE EU HAS GREATER ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL POWER
John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 81-2 Europe will not match the United States in military power any time soon. This is not because it lacks the resources, but because it lacks a common security policy and a unified command and control structure. More importantly, it also has a different attitude towards the use of the military in international affairs, and many qualities that the United States either lacks, or chooses not to use. The Americans have the firepower, but they lack the political follow-through. The Europeans lack the firepower, but they can bring political skills and economic pressures to the table. The Europeans have enormous influence over international trade and investment, and they also account for more than half of the world's overseas development assistance. They are building experience in the field of peacekeeping, their troops helped by a credibility advantage over their American counterparts; while European soldiers are associated with peace, American soldiers are associated (rightly or wrongly) with war
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Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: European Power Turn: U.S. Decline Has Boosted Europe
STATUS QUO U.S. DECLINE HAS BOOSTED EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 27.
Chapter 1 reviews the changing nature of power in the international system. It argues that the age of the military superpower is over, and that influence in the era of globalization is best achieved by the use of diplomacy, the provision of economic opportunity and political incentives, and the exercise of soft power all qualities that the EU has become adept at employing. The chapter challenges widely held assumptions about the unmatched global power of post-cold war America, argues that its exceptionalist and realist perspectives often hinder its interpretation of international trends and challenges, that its emphasis on military means is counterproductive and expensive, and that the declining credibility of American leadership particularly since Iraq has amplified the qualities and advantages that the European Union brings to the interpretation of global problems.
EUROPE HAS GAINED FROM THE U.S. DECLINE John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 100
But that was the 1990s, when the bandwagon of doubt was filled to overflowing. A decade later, much has changed. Europe may not yet have a comprehensive common foreign policy, but it has learned from its mistakes, and its positions on international affairs have achieved more clarity and consistency. Those positions may not yet carry the weight of their American counterparts, but the European voice is increasingly heard at the high table of international debate, and the EU also enjoys two strategic advantages that are often overlooked, but that have helped redefine its role in the world. First, it has benefited from the declining credibility of the kind of unilateralism and hard power with which the United States has been associated. As noted in Chapter 2, Europeans were rarely in the position during the cold war to counter US policy, or the American view that it should strive to be strong in a weak Europe.6 But Europe today has a new confidence, is no longer so willing always to defer to the Americans, offers a new set of interpretations of the international system, and brings a new style and a contrasting set of values and tools to bear on policy problems. Where American policymakers still emphasize realist self-interest, their Europeans counterparts tend towards a liberal worldview that is more universal, inclusive and multilateral.
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Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe Supports Multilateralism Now
EUROPEAN CIVILIAN POWER WILL SUPPORT GLOBAL MULTILATERALISM John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 7-8 Chapter 3 surveys the changing character and value of military power in the post-modern system. Because military power is so much a part of claims that the United States is the world's only remaining superpower, the chapter begins with an assessment of the limitations on American military power: its mixed record on achieving political goals, the handicaps imposed by unilateralism, the practical limits faced by even the greatest armies, the diversion of valuable resources, the effects of inefficient spending, and questions about the value of war as a tool of policy. This is followed by an assessment of the progress that Europe has made on building a common security policy and the tools to back it up. Critics of Europe as a global actor will often quote the examples of the Balkans and the Gulf wars, but European military cooperation has allowed the EU to become a civilian power that is ready and willing to invest in and commit its military, but with a preference for multilateralism and for peacekeeping rather than for unilateralism and war-making. The chapter concludes that Europe offers the world a new model for the political role of the military and the achievement of security, one in which troops and arms can be used to encourage and support rather than to coerce and threaten.
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Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe A Unified Global Power
THE EU HAS ADOPTED COMMON POLICIES AND ESTABLISHED A SINGLE IDENTITY John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 4-5
The evidence of change can be found in three overlapping arenas. First, to have been developments internal to the EU that have given it greater strength and a sharper identity. With the single market programme all but complete, and expansion to 25 member states with a total population of 454 million, the EU has become the world's biggest economy. Most of its wealthiest members have adopted a single currency that threatens the dominant position of the US dollar. The EU has pursued a common commercial policy that has made it the colossus of international trade negotiations. The EU has adopted common policies in a wide variety of areas, and in spite of difficulties it has made progress on the development of a common foreign and security policy. There is also majority public support in almost every member state for the idea of the EU playing an assertive new international role and becoming independent of the US lead. Combined, these developments have not only encouraged the EU to become more assertive as a global actor, but have allowed it to become more assertive. Second, there have been developments internal to the United States that have compromised and undermined its abilities to exploit its power. They include long-term domestic economic problems, the diversion of copious public spending into the military, internal social and political divisions, a breach in values between the United States and much of the rest of the liberal democratic world, and limits to the efficacy of the US military juggernaut. The US is without question a military, economic, political and cultural superpower, but the plaudits that are heaped on American achievements and capabilities must be seen alongside the handicaps that the United States has largely imposed upon itself, which have often frustrated its ability to achieve its foreign policy objectives, and have compromised America's leadership role in the world. Nothing generates so many searching questions about the old model of power as the remarkable failures of US foreign policy since September 2001, a state of affairs which has led to a worldwide surge of anti-Americanism, has undermined America's claims to global leadership, and has enlarged the ranks of those standing behind non-military responses to international problems.
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Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe A Unified Global Power
THE EU IS DEVELOPING COLLECTIVE POWER PROJECTION John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 32
Tony Blair, too, has been a supporter of European power. In a speech in Warsaw in October 2000, he suggested that the member states of the EU could work together on core policy areas, including foreign policy, and that in its economic and political strength, it could be `a superpower, not a superstate'. In an interview with T. R. Reid, he said: `We are building a new world superpower. The European Union is about the projection of collective power, wealth and influence. That collective strength makes individual nations more powerful and it will make the EU as a whole a global power. 'Meanwhile, Spanish prime minister Jose Luis Zapatero was arguing in 2004 that `Europe must have faith in the prospect of becoming the most important global power in 20 years, because it has the best opportunities to do so
THE EU IS A SELF-CONSCIOUS AND AMBITIOUS ACTOR
John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 79-80 Andrew Moravcsik has dismissed the idea of a large, independent European military as 'incoherent'. The logic of the view that Europe should build a large military may be seductive to the public and politicians alike, he says, but it would incur the kind of budgetary costs that European public opinion would not tolerate. And it would be an ineffective response to US unilateralism, because it would encourage just the kind of withdrawal from Europe advocated by American policy hawks. Rather than criticizing US military power or hankering after it or competing with it, Moravcsik believes, Europe would be better advised to complement US military power and to invest its political and budgetary capital in exploiting its comparative advantages as a 'civilian and quasi-military power'. Those advantages, he believes, include the attractions of EU membership, the EU' s leadership in providing development aid, its skills in peacekeeping and monitoring, and its greater abilities in the effective deployment of civilian power. This is no new argument. NATO itself recognized the changing environment as long ago as 1956, when it acknowledged that security was much more than a military matter: 'The strengthening of political consultation and economic cooperation, the development of resources, progress in education and public understanding, all these can be as important, or even more important, for the protection of the security of a nation, or an alliance, as the building of a battleship or the equipping of an army. Duke argued in 1994 that the EU had an important role to play in promoting awareness of the nonmilitary aspects of security, particularly those with an economic bias. Bailes has since argued that with the weakening of the exclusive nature of USEuropean ties since the end of the cold war, Europe has strategic values of its own, such as a multilateral and multifunctional approach to global problems, a preference for minimizing and legitimizing the use of force, and a readiness to absorb past enemies. The new strategy makes the EU a more self-conscious and ambitious actor, which will mean a deepening of its effect on transatlantic relations.
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Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe A Unified Global Power
NEW ORGANIZATIONAL TOOLS MAKE THE EU A COHESIVE ACTOR John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 115
Developments in the Balkans provided the EU with a valuable set of lessons. Europe looked instinctively to the US to provide leadership, while the US looked to the Europeans to take responsibility, and opinion was divided over the role of NATO. The EU lacked either the policies or the tools or the unity of purpose to provide leadership or to deal with large foreign policy challenges so soon after the end of the cold war, but the learning curve began to tighten. New organizational tools evolved, which were used with growing confidence: a series of 'joint actions' were taken under the terms of the CFSP (observing and providing logistical support for the 1993 Russian parliamentary elections, support for humanitarian aid convoys in Bosnia that same year, and preparation for the 1995 conference on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons), and in 1999-2000 the EU developed a series of `common strategies' (on democracy in Russia, on the Ukraine, on the Mediterranean, and on Europe's plans for space). Finally, the EU agreed `common positions' on relations with the Balkans, the Middle East, Burma and Zimbabwe, and on problems such as combating terrorism and how to deal with the International Criminal Court.
EUROPEANS SUPPORT A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 117-8
The warning signs had long been clear in the results of European public opinion surveys. Since 1993, Eurobarometer polls have found about two-thirds of Europeans in favour of a common foreign policy (see Figure 5.1). By 2005, 83 per cent supported the EU having a common position in the event of an international crisis, 82 per cent supported the development of a European foreign policy independent of the United States, 69 per cent believed that the EU should have its own seat on the UN Security Council, and 67 per cent backed the idea of having a European foreign minister who could act as a voice for EU foreign policy.
THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SUPPORTS BECOMING A GLOBAL SUPERPOWER John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 118
In parallel, there has been growing support for the EU becoming a superpower in the mould of the United States. A 2002 survey taken in six countries found 65 per cent of respondents in favour of the EU becoming a superpower, while just 14 per cent felt that the United States should remain the sole superpower. Majorities felt that becoming a superpower would help the EU 'cooperate more effectively with the United States in dealing with international problems', while only a minority saw it as a path to competing with the US. Although enthusiasm for the new role fell off when respondents were asked if they would still support the idea if it meant greater military expenditure by their governments, a majority was still in favour in most countries. Illustrating the different views of how to deal with international problems, large I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of orange juice.
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majorities in all the countries surveyed saw economic power as more important than military power in determining a country's overall level of influence in the world.
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Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Zero-Sum Competition
EUROPE IS A COMPETITIVE SUPERPOWER TO THE U.S.
John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 174 The European superpower has an important role to play in redefining our understanding of the intemational system, and in helping its American counterpart adjust its perceptions and values. At no time since it became a superpower has the United States been faced with so compelling a set of alternatives as it does today from Europe. The Soviets offered only military and ideological competition; the Europeans offer economic, political, ideological, social, cultural and moral altematives. Europe not only offers another interpretation of how international affairs might be managed, and of how threats to the international community might be defined and resolved, but it also poses limits to the ability of the United States to mould that community according to its priorities and principles. The European Union is a superpower, and the new pole in a post-modern bipolar international order. It is time to acknowledge this, and to better understand the implications
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Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: AT: Europe Doesnt Have Military Power
THE EU HAS AN EXTENSIVE MILITARY CAPABILITY
John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 71-2 In terms of weaponry and manpower, the EU is better armed and equipped than most people appreciate. Through Britain and France it has a significant nuclear capability, and the armed forces of its member states bring together substantial firepower: it has more active service military personnel than the United States, backed up by 12,000 artillery pieces, 3,430 combat aircraft, more than 150 surface naval vessels (including five aircraft carriers), and 82 submarines (including eight tactical nuclear submarines). If there were a single European military, with a unified budget, all weapons and personnel pooled under a single command system, and governed by a single security policy, the EU would be the second biggest military power in the world. And this is not a military that stays at home Britain and France have been engaged in multiple conflicts since 1945, and almost all EU member states have committed troops to peacekeeping operations. Finally, more progress has also been made on developing a common European security policy than most people realize. When Kagan argued in 2003 that efforts to build a European security policy had been 'an embarrassment', and that the EU was 'no closer to fielding an independent force, even a small one, than it was three years ago. He was quite wrong.
EU ACTION WAS CRITICAL TO THE RESOLUTION OF THE BALKANS John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 76
Those who dismiss the case for European global power tend to focus on the weaknesses in the case for a distinctive European security identity and capability. The Europeans, they point out, come nowhere close to the Americans in being able to quickly commit massive firepower and large invasion forces. The Europeans are far from being able to claim the agreement of a common security policy, as the dissension over Iraq made only too clear. The Europeans may now have a better grasp on how to deal with geographically and politically limited problems such as the Balkans, or their former African colonies, but they still have only a marginal impact on events in the Middle East, where US influence albeit controversial reigns supreme. The US still has a critical advantage over the EU in that it can take a two-pronged approach to international problems (civilian and military), while the Europeans have a cellar full of carrots, but very few sticks. And it has even been argued that the ESDP poses a threat to transatlantic relations and to the EUNATO partnership. But there has been a clear trend since the 1990s toward the EU giving more definition to its policy goals, and building the resources needed to shoulder a greater share of defence and security burdens. The political will for Europe to take more of the responsibility for dealing with security threats is stronger than it was even a decade ago, given a boost by events in the Balkans, and by growing concerns for the implications of allowing the United States to define both the problems and the responses. The Balkans underlined one kind of problem (the inability of Europe to deal with problems in its own backyard), and the 2003 invasion of Iraq underlined another (the willingness of the United States to take preemptive unilateral action). A strengthened European defence capacity helps address both these problems, as well as giving the EU more well rounded claims to global power
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Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: AT: Europe Doesnt Have Military Power
THE EU HAS INCREASED MILITARY POWER PROJECTION John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 78-9
What does all this mean for the identity of Europe? Is the EU still a civilian power, or is it a proto-military power, or is it something in between? Can it be understood and defined only in relationship to the United States (America fights, Europe funds, the UN feeds63), or is it something more distinctive, the model of a new kind of international actor? Some argue that it is now too late for the EU to be a civilian power. After all, it has the makings of a common security policy, it has the Eurocorps, it has a growing record of military engagements, and it has the Rapid Reaction Force and multiple battle groups in the pipeline.64 And European public opinion is changing against a background of growing concerns about post-9/11 American militarism. Even so, Europe's move away from a purely civilian role in the world has taken many by surprise; European governments collectively have doubled the number of troops deployed abroad with little national or European debate on the implications.
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Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe Doesnt Need Military Power
EUROPE DOESNT NEED TO USE FORCE TO ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 15
Most debates about power assume that it must be based on concrete behaviour, activity and intentional decisions, that states are rational actors that set out to acquire, keep and use power for narrow national interests, and even that conflict is needed in order to provide an experimental test of the capacity to exert power. Other countries listen to the United States, runs the logic, because it has a large store of both sticks and carrots, and since World War II has been willing to wield them, to influence the international economic agenda, and to provide leadership on the most troubling security problems. Europe has none of these advantages, we are told, and even when it talks it is not always listened to. But Steven Lukes suggests that we should go beyond the study of observable behaviour and concrete decisions, and look also at latent or covert power, or the way in which an actor can influence, shape or determine the wants of another actor. In other words, strength, magnetism, wealth and diplomatic skills might provide an actor with power even when they are not deployed. In contrast to the kind of explicit, active or manifest capacity that has been associated with great powers and superpowers in the past, we now have evidence in the European case of power by example. Militarily, the Europeans threaten noone. This has been interpreted by realists as a sign of weakness (witness Europe's record in the two Gulf wars and the Balkans, they say), but it could as easily be interpreted as a sign of strength. Europe does not need to use force or the threat of force to encourage change; instead, it offers the incentive of opportunities.
WAR IS NO LONGER THE DOMINANT INTERNATIONAL ISSUE John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 79
But perhaps we should be tossing out the old civilian vs. military debate and looking instead at how the European Union has broken the mould of traditional conceptions of great power politics. Most political and economic rivalries until the twentieth century were maintained or resolved by military power. Then two great global conflicts took tens of millions of lives and raised elemental questions about the value and morality of war. The cold war may have been a competition over ideas; without direct military confrontation between its major protagonists, but the balance was maintained by the threat of war, and of mutually assured destruction. Wars continue to blot the international landscape even today, and military spending makes up a large part of the budgetary calculations of most national governments. But the nature of international rivalry and cooperation is changing, and there is a rising chorus that points to the declining utility of force, the new importance of economic interdependence, and the strategic advantage of trading states over political-military states. Consider also the evidence provided by the rise of international organizations and law, the globalization of trade, investment, immigration, education, technology, and culture, the revolutions in international travel and communication, and the internationalization of policy problems as diverse as poverty, drugs, and environmental decay. They all point to the growing irrelevance of war, and the increased need to understand and exploit economic and diplomatic tools as a means to resolving differences. In terms of international relations, perhaps the EU is the shape of things to come.
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Hegemony Bad: Europe Turn: Europe Can Resolve Global Conflicts
EU IS A QUIET SUPERPOWER THAT OFFERS EFFECTIVE CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND PREVENTION John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 30 But while there have undoubtedly been crises, the EU has survived and indeed has prospered. And while some find it easy and tempting to amplify the significance of the crises, others take the longer view and argue that the EU is proclaiming itself in a rather different way than that which we associate with conventional great powers. For Rummel, the EU is 'a silent global player' rather than an openly assertive one. For Padoa-Schioppa, the EU is a 'gentle power' that emphasizes the rule of law and democracy over the violence of military and police instruments, that unites without conquering, and that organizes without subjugating. For Moravcsik, the EU is a 'quiet superpower' that does not rely on guns and bombs but focuses instead on the promotion of peace and democracy through economic opportunity, trade, peacekeeping, and foreign aid. For the Party of European Socialists, the EU can use the soft foreign policy instruments it has at its disposal to act as a 'rational counterweight' to those who rely excessively on military force. The EU, they argue, is in a unique position to be able to offer a broad range of crisis management instruments, although it should also possess a 'credible military option' albeit a limited one and not leave hard security options to the United States.
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Europe Supports Multilateralism
THE EU WILL SUPPORT GLOBAL MULTILATERALISM
John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 115-6 Along the way, European foreign policy also developed a distinctive style, which stood in contrast to that of the United States. If Americans still reserved the right to use coercion and the threat of force, Europeans emphasized diplomacy and negotiation. If Americans sometimes tended towards a unilateral approach to policy problems, Europeans preferred multilateral responses. If Americans defined problems according to the distinctive quasi-missionary worldview of the United States, Europeans took a more inclusive and less imperative view. If that hoary old chestnut of isolationism sometimes reared its head in discussions about US policy, there was never any doubt that the EU was engaged and connected. And if Americans saw a world divided by traditional state boundaries, the EU moved across those borders and looked at universal problems. For David Calleo, 'promiscuous Europe sees a world where everybody is a potential friend, [while] martial America lives in a world where every independent power is a potential enemy.' For Leonard, the changes in Europe were easy to miss, because where US power was broadcast through 'bold declarations and blueprints', the European project had been both incremental and understated. Discussions about the EU model have focused on the idea of 'effective multilateralism', or a belief that 'international relations should be organized through strong, negotiated, and enforceable multilateral regimes'
THE EU SUPPORTS REGIONAL COOPERATION AND GLOBAL MULTILATERALISM John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 116-7
The softly-softly approach is most obvious in the EU's lack of a common military, but it is also reflected in the core foreign policy objectives of the EU: encouraging regional cooperation and integration, promoting human rights, advancing democracy and good governance, preventing violent conflict, and fighting international crime. It is also reflected in the EU's preferred foreign policy tools, including declarations, high-level visits, diplomatic sanctions, diplomatic recognition, peace proposals, preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping, trade agreements, tariff and quota reductions and increases, embargoes, and boycotts. These are all options available to traditional states as well, and in the hands of Europe might occasionally err on the side of waffle and fudge, but the big stick of Europe's economic clout ultimately backs up any soft talking. We may not be able (or want) to punish our enemies with the human and economic costs of a war, the EU seems to say, but we can withdraw the economic opportunities provided by access to our wealth and our marketplace. For policy doves, the soft power approach is the best one for dealing with a potentially violent international environments.
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Unilateralism Destroys U.S.-European Relations
UNILATERALISM DESTROYS RELATIONS WITH EUROPE John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 172-3
Meaningful future cooperation is unlikely without a change in attitude and approach from both sides of the Atlantic. The United States must realize that the world has changed since 1990 and that the policies and interpretations that came out of the cold war do not always any longer apply. In particular, it must understand that power is not irredeemably associated with the military and with nation-states, and that civilian international organizations or clusters of states working together can also wield power, and can do so peacefully. It must also understand that exceptionalism does noone any favours; it isolates American thinking, prompts reactionary thinking from abroad, and places American interests above those of the internationalcommunity that the United States claims to lead. Huntington has argued that the United States is blind to the fact that it no longer enjoys the pre-eminent position that it occupied at the end of the cold war, and that it must relearn the game of international politics, make compromises, and make rational recalculations of power rather than pursuing 'a wish list of arrogant, unilateralist demands'
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U.S.-European Relations Impact: Iraq
TRANSATLATIC COOPERATION CRITICAL TO RESOLVE IRAQ John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 171
Dorfman argues that the United States needs a cooperative relationship with Europe in order to solve the dilemma of Iraq as well as a host of other Middle Eastern problems: European political support would add to the credibility of US efforts, and would have played an invaluable role in Iraq with debt forgiveness, financial support for rebuilding infrastructure, the training of police and the military, and advice on how to deal with the historical, economic, cultural and political realities that Europeans better understood because of their long association with the region. Bereuter and Lis argue that common interests including free trade, democracy, and the struggle against terrorism and weapons proliferation suggest that transatlantic cooperation is as imperative today as it was at the height of the cold war. They also need each other as they face the challenge of China,'
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*** Multilateralism Good ***
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Multilateralism Good: U.S. Leadership
COOPERATIVE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IS CRITICAL TO LEADERSHIP
Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter, CSIS, SECOND CHANCE: THREE PRESIDENTS AND THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 215 The basic requirements of global leadership are now vastly different from what they were during the British empire. No longer is military power, reinforced by economic prowess and exercised by a superior elite pursuing ophisticated strategy, sufficient to sustain imperial domination. In the past, power to control exceeded power to destroy. It to k less effort and cost to govern a million people than to kill a illion people. Today the opposite is true: power to destroy exceeds the power to control. And the means of destruction are becoming more accessible to more actors, both states and political movements. Consequently, with absolute security for a few (notably America itself) becoming only relative security for all, collective vulnerability puts a premium on intelligent, cooperative governance, reinforced by power that is viewed as legitimate
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Multilateralism Good: UN Is Effective/Good
DESPITE AMERICAN CRITICISM UN IS EFFECTIVE AND PROMOTES US LEADERSHIP
John Brady Kiesling, State Department Diplomat who resigned over 2003 Iraq War, 2006, Diplomacy Lessons: realism for an unloved superpower, p. 59 Today, the worlds main source of transnational legitimacy is the UN, a large, unwieldy, inconsistent body that American are taught by their nationalist politicians to despise. At any given moment, a tiny but well-publicized percentage of poorly supervised UN officials are gossiping over coffee, groping their subordinates, procuring underage prostitutes, diverting funds, committing espionage, parking illegally in fire lanes, or drafting speeches grossly inimical to US national interests. We should remember, however, that a roughly proportionate number of US officials is doing the same. A much larger UN group, less well publicized, is inoculating children against deadly diseases, feeding starving refugees, intervening between two groups of heavily armed Sudanese tribesmen, shaming governments into cleaning up crossborder pollution, or policing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treatys ban on producing nuclear weapons. The largest group, thousands of mild-mannered bureaucrats, is condemned by the internal politics of 191 member governments, often led by the United States, to move paper from one pile to another as a substitute for bold initiatives to promote the peace and prosperity of the planet. UN employees perform many necessary and praiseworthy tasks around the world, tasks the US government has no desire or standing to perform itself. It was not for that reason, however, that the United States created the UN during World War II. Even if the UN stopped performing those good tasks and was ten times more corrupt than America believes, its existence would still be justified by US national interests. America is indebted to the UN as the one institution that can legitimize American leadership in policing the planet.
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Multilateralism Good: Key to Solving Global Problems
MULTILATERALISM IS KEY TO SOLVE GLOBAL WARMING, DISEASES, WMD PROLIF, THE ECONOMY, FREE TRADE, AND TERRORISM
Nye, Dean of the JFK School of Government, Intl Herald Tribune 6/13/02
Some transnational issues are inherently multilateral and cannot be managed without the help of other countries. Climate change is a perfect example. The United States is the largest source of greenhouse gases, but three-quarters of the sources originate outside its borders. Without cooperation, the problem is beyond American control. The same is true of a long list of items: the spread of infectious diseases, the stability of global financial markets, the international trade system, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, narcotics trafficking, international crime syndicates, transnational terrorism. In addition, multilateralism is a meansto get others to share the burden of providing pub-lic goods. Sharing also helps foster commitmentto common values.
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Multilateralism Good: Solves War
THE US MUST EXERCISE POSITIVE MULTILATERAL LEADERSHIP TO MAINTAIN PEACE AND STABILITY
World Policy Journal, Charles William Maynes president of the Eurasia Foundation, Spring 1999, p. 64
For most of the postwar period the United States offered what might be termed positive leadership in multilateral diplomacy. It led by positive example and encouraged others by taking the first positive step, usually in the form of a new initiative backed by money. Since 1980, it has reverted primarily to what might be called negative leadership. Rather than leading others by its own positive example, it has threatened to punish others if they did not accept the American lead. It has withheld its dues from various institutions when others did not agree with the American position. Other countries have grown tired and resentful of these tactics . Even faced with financial blackmail in the form of the withholding of America's U.N. dues, other members have been unwilling to accept the American position on U.N. reform, which would severely cripple the organization's potential for development as an important international institution. As Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan has pointed out, America's original contribution to international relations has been precisely in its support for the development of international organizations and international law so as to tame the harsh realities of balance-of-power politics. Henry Kissinger, in his book Diplomacy, acknowledges the point in a different way. He notes that there was a possibility at the beginning of the century that Theodore Roosevelt might have persuaded Americans to adopt the ways of other states in dealing with international realities, that is by placing an emphasis on military might and balance-of-power politics. Instead, Woodrow Wilson, with his commitment to international organizations and international law, won the day, and Wilsonianism became a permanent feature of America's approach to the world. Even conservatives regularly dip into this stream. Richard Nixon, for example, described himself as a Wilsonian. America will not repair its relations with the United Nations and other international organizations until their supporters succeed in convincing conservative internationalists that the relentless campaign against these institutions threatens the commitment of the larger population to internationalism generally. The United States is too diverse a country to develop a fixed view of its national interest. Too many special interests are at work for such a set of beliefs to develop. It needs the glue of a positive ideology to bind the country together and convince it to remain engaged in the world. Public opinion polls demonstrating that the United Nations enjoys strong support among the American people is evidence of this glue at work. Those committed to internationalism must also recognize that they must be prepared to fight for their beliefs. The Clinton administration announced in January 1999 that it intended to support increases in U.S. defense spending of $110 billion over the coming five years. Defenders of internationalism were largely silent on the obvious disparity between the administration's commitment to defense spending and its failure to press Congress for adequate funding for the other elements in the international budget, such as foreign assistance or support for international institutions. The hope for a more orderly and peaceful world lies in the commitment to progressive multilateralism. That hope will never be fulfilled unless the most powerful country in the world does its share. The highest priority on the internationalist agenda in the coming years will be to persuade America's leaders of that reality.
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Multilateralism Good: Key to Global Survival
GLOBAL SURVIVAL REQUIRES MULTILATERALISM AND COOPERATION US PRIMACY UNDERMINES SUSTAINABILITY John Brady Kiesling, State Department Diplomat who resigned over 2003 Iraq War, 2006, Diplomacy Lessons: realism for an unloved superpower, p. 273 The planet is scarier than even the unloveliest superpower. Unprecedented population densities mean that traditional environmental challenges tsunamis, earthquakes, hurricanes, climate variation, and the evolution of epidemic diseases now routinely overwhelm national borders and capabilities. The nationalism that has dominated human political behavior over the past century can mobilize resources against human rivals but not against rising sea levels or price increases for fossil fuels. Relatively small environmental changes are likely to slam shut, or at least shift across oncefirm national borders, ecological niches that have until now supported hundreds of millions of human beings. Humans are not lemmings, foredoomed to periodic population booms and die offs. Improved technology and evolving human institutions make it possible to imagine keeping alive indefinitely a global population of 9 billion people, the level the world population is supposed to reach in 2050. Survival of so large a population of scarce water, energy, and arable land. Without that social evolution, even the sustainability of earths current 6.5 billion people is open to question. MULTILATERALISM IS KEY TO US SECURITY
Joseph S Nye, dean of JFK govt school, The National Interest, winter 01/02
That is why the United States should aim to work with other nations on global problems in a multilateral manner whenever possible. It is plainly in our national interest to do so, most of the time. The recent bipartisan commission on U.S. national security, chaired by former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, was right to conclude that "emerging powers-either singly or in coalitionwill increasingly constrain U.S. options regionally and limit its strategic influence. As a result we will remain limited in our ability to impose our will, and we will be vulnerable to an increasing range of threats." Borders will become more porous, rapid advances in information and biotechnologies will create new vulnerabilities, the United States will become "increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on the American homeland, and the U.S. military superiority will not entirely protect us." This means we must develop multilateral institutions that constrain others and provide a framework for cooperation. In the Commission's words, "America cannot secure and advance its own interests in isolation." <CONTTINUES> The upshot of all this is that the United States should use its power now to shape institutions that will serve its longterm national interest in promoting international order. Action to shape multilateralism now is a good investment for the future. Problems may arise; as John Ikenberry has observed, "worried states are making small adjustments, creating alternatives to alliance with the United States. These small steps may not look important today, but eventually the ground will shift and the U.S.-led postwar order will fragment and disappear."26 But these tendencies are countered by the very openness of the American system. The pluralistic and regularized way in which foreign policy is made reduces surprises. Opportunities for foreigners to raise their voices and influence the American political and governmental system are not only plentiful, but constitute an important incentive for alliance.27 Ever since Athens transformed the Delian League into an empire, smaller allies have been torn between entrapment and anxieties over abandonment. The fact that American allies can effectively voice their concerns helps to explain why U.S. alliances have persisted so long after Cold War threats receded.
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Multilateralism Good: Key to US Hegemony
ENGAGING IN MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS IS KEY TO SOFT POWER, LEADERSHIP, AND TERRORISM PREVENTION
Nye, dean of JFK gocvt school, 5/11/02 NPR, All Things Considered, p. online
The United States is by far the most powerful nation on Earth. Its stature in the world arena is more dominant perhaps than any other since the Roman Empire. But like Rome, our seemingly imperial power will at some point be relegated to history. We are not invincible. As we wend our way deeper into this struggle against terrorism, it becomes increasingly apparent that there are many things that are outside of US control. We cannot hunt down every suspected al-Qaeda leader hiding in remote regions of the globe. We cannot track the entire flow of tainted money and dangerous weapons everywhere in the world on our own, nor should we. Instead we must learn to share the stage with other countries. We will need to work closely with both longtime allies and sometime foes to better control the non-state actors such as terrorists, who will increasingly clash with nation-states. By participating in multilateral institutions, the United States can make its disproportionate power more legitimate and acceptable to others. Listening to others and defining our national interests broadly to include global interests will be crucial to the longevity of American power. We may not be invincible, but the power of the values that are the kingpins of our democracy are unassailable. As Henry Kissinger has argued, the test of history for this generation of American leaders will be whether it can effectively utilize its dominance on the world stage to convince other nations to embrace the values and norms that have proven so critical to our success as a democracy. This cannot be accomplished unilaterally.
International institution building is key to US leadership Nye, Dean of the JFK school of govt at Harvard, Political Science Quarterly, Winter 2002/2003, p. 41
Britain in the nineteenth century and America in the second half of the twentieth century enhanced their power by creating liberal international economic rules and institutions that were consistent with the liberal and democratic structures of British and American capitalism-free trade and the gold standard in the case of Britain, the International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, and other institutions in the case of the United States. If a country can make its power legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others more willingly follow. If it can establish international rules that are consistent with its society, it will be less likely to have to change. If it can help support institutions that encourage other countries to channel or limit their activities in ways it prefers, it may not need as many costly carrots and sticks. In short, the universality of a country's culture and its ability to establish a set of favorable rules and institutions that govern areas of international activity are critical sources of power. The values of democracy, personal freedom, upward mobility, and openness that are often expressed in American popular culture, higher education, and foreign policy contribute to American power in many areas. In the view of German journalist Josef Joffe, America's soft power "looms even larger than its economic and military assets. U.S. culture, lowbrow or high, radiates outward with an intensity last seen in the days of the Roman Empire-but with a novel twist. Rome's and Soviet Russia's cultural sway stopped exactly at their military borders. America's soft power, though, rules over an empire on which the sun never sets."
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Multilateralism Good: Solves counterbalancing
MULTILATERALISM PREVENTS COUNTERBALANCING Nye, Dean of the JFK School of Government, Intl Herald Tribune 6/13/ 02, http://www.iht.com/articles/2002/06/13/ednye_ed3_.php International rules bind America and limit its freedom of action, but they serve U.S. interests by binding others as well. And opportunities for foreigners to raise their voice and influence American policies constitute an important incentive for alliance. U.S. membership in a web of multilateral institutions ranging from the United Nations to NATO reduces U.S. policy autonomy. But, seen in the light ofa constitutional bargain, the multilateralism of U.S. preeminence reduces the incentives for constructing alliances against America. Multilateralism is a matter of degree, and not all multilateral arrangements are good. Like other countries, the United States should occasionally use unilateral tactics. So how to choose? MULTILATERALISM PREVENTS COUNTERBALANCING Joseph S Nye, dean of JFK govt school, The National Interest, winter 01/02, http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G181765310.html The other element of the American order that reduces worry about power asymmetries is U.S. membership in a web of multilateral institutions ranging from the UN to NATO. Some call it an institutional bargain. The price for the United States was a reduction in Washington's policy autonomy, in that institutional rules and joint decision-making reduced U.S. unilateralist capacities. But what Washington got in return was worth the price. America's partners also had their autonomy constrained, but were able to operate in a world in which U.S. power was more restrained and reliable.28 Seen as a sort of a constitutional bargain, the multilateralism of American pre-eminence is a key to its longevity because it reduces the incentives for constructing alliances against us. And to the extent that the European Union is the major potential challenger in terms of capacity, the idea of a loose constitutional framework between the United States and the societies with which we share the most values makes even more sense.
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Multilateralism Good: Key to Solve Terrorism
NEW MULTILATERALISM IS THE ONLY WAY TO PREVENT THE DECLINE OF SOFT POWER AND MAINTAIN THE WAR ON TERRORISM Joseph S. Nye, Jr, Dean on the JFK school of government, Financial Time, December 28, 2002, http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2002/nye_ballgame_ft_122802.htm
The willingness of other countries to co-operate on the solution of transnational issues depends in part on their own self interest, but also on the attractiveness of American positions. That power to attract and persuade is what call soft power. It means that others want what you want, and there is less need to use carrots and sticks to make others do what you want. Hard power grows out of a country's military and economic might. Soft power arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, ideals, and policies. Hard power will always remain important in a world of nation states guarding their independence, but soft power will become increasingly important in dealing with the transnational issues that require multilateral cooperation for their solution. Yet a recent Pew Charitable Trust poll finds that American policies have led to lowered favourability ratings for the US over the past two years in 19 of 27 countries, including particularly the Islamic countries so important to the war on terrorism. The new unilateralist wing of the administration is urging policies that squander our soft power No large country can afford to be purely multilateralist, and sometimes the United States must take the lead by itself as it did in Mghanistan. And the credible threat of a unilateral option was probably essential to get the UN Security Council to pass resolution 1441 that brought the inspectors back to Iraq. But the US should incline toward multilateralism whenever possible as a way to legitimise its power and to gain broad acceptance of its new strategy. Pre-emption that is legitimised by multilateral sanction is far less costly and a far less dangerous precedent than when we assert that we alone can act as judge, jury and excecutioner. Granted, multilateralism can be used by smaller states to restrict American freedom of action, but this does not mean that it is not generally in American interests. Learning to listen to others and to define the national interests broadly to include global interests will be crucial to the success of the new strategy and whether others see the American preponderance it proclaims as benign or not.
MULTILATERAL ACTION IS CRITICAL TO PREVENTING GLOBAL TERRORISM Center on International Cooperation, 2002
[THE UNITED STATES IN A GLOBAL AGE: THE CASE FOR MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT, http://www.cic.nyu.edu/pdf/US_Global_Age.pdf] Engagement can take many forms, however, and the decisions that the United States makes will determine its ability to shape a world consistent with its objectives and cherished values. One of the main lessons of the campaign against terrorism is the necessity for sustained multilateral engagement in confronting transnational challenges. Before September 11, one of the main debates in U.S. foreign policy was whether the U.S. should go it alone or with others. The attacks exposed the unreality of this debate. To deal with the terrorist threat, there was no alternative to assembling a broad international coalition uniting, in the words of Secretary of State Colin Powell, virtually every country in the world. These multilateral investments paid hand some dividends, providing invaluable assistance in prosecuting the war, gathering intelligence, policing terrorist networks, tracing financial transactions, mobilizing reconstruction funds, and deploying peacekeepers to Afghanistan.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IS CRITICAL TO DEFEATING TERRORISM Business Week, 2003
[April 21, p. 48]
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The White House knows, too, that it needs full European cooperation in its fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. ''The U.S., with all its might, requires allies. If you want to fight money laundering, you need help from Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, and Switzerland,'' says Karl-Heinz Kamp, head of the international pla nning staff at Berlin's Konrad Adenauer Institute.
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Multilateralism Good: Cosmopolitanism
MULTILATERALISM NECESSARY FOR COSMOPOLITANISM TO EMERGE
Mary Kaldor, Professor Governance, London School of Economics, 2004, American Power in the 21st Century, eds. David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, p. 205 At the heart of the cosmopolitan position is the notion that a new form of political legitimacy needs to be constructed, which offers an alternative to various forms of fundamentalism and exclusivism. The cosmopolitan position is idealist and multilateralist. It draws its inspirations from Immanuel Kants Perpetual Peace project published in 1795. Kant argued that perpetual peace could be achieved in a world of states, based on republican (democratic) constitutions, where these states sign a permanent peace treaty with each other (the principle of nonintervention) but where cosmopolitan right (human rights) overrides sovereignty. He argued that cosmopolitan right need only be confined to the right of hospitality that strangers should be tolerated and respected. It was Kant who pointed out that the global community had shrunk to the point where a right violated anywhere could be felt everywhere. Thus, the cosmopolitan ideal combines a commitment to humanist principles and norms, an assumption of human equality, with a recognition of difference, and indeed a celebration of diversity. To be idealist does not mean to be unrealistic. In a world where compellance no longer works, the only alternative is containment. And this has to be done through political and legal means. Politically, the cosmopolitan ideal has to offer an alternative that can undercut support for extremists. Religious fundamentalism and ultranationalism are rarely popular; their support depends on the weakness of alternatives. These exclusive ideologies are bred primarily built not only in weak of failing states, out of the despair of the excluded. In legal terms, the cosmopolitan ideal has to be situated within a multilateralist set of rules and procedures that applies equally to all individuals and can be seen to be fair.
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Multilateralism Good: Israeli Strikes
A. Multilateralism is key to solve Israeli strikes on Iran.
Clifford Kupchan, deputy coordinator of US assistance to the NIS at the Department of State, 11-25, 4 /US Diplomacy Needed on Iran Nuclear Crisis. Boston Globe/ But the president needs to recognize that US-led
multilateral diplomacy is the last, best chance to reach an acceptable outcome. A surgical military strike against Iran, now much discussed in the United States and Israel, likely will only slow Tehran's nuclear program; we may not know the location of some Iranian equipment, and even if we do it is probably dispersed, protected, and relatively easy to rebuild. An Iraq-like ground war against Iran would not be politically sustainable in the United States, would unite Iranians behind the regime in Tehran, spawn Middle Eastern terrorism, and devastate transAtlantic relations. Pitfalls face US efforts to impose sanctions on Iran. The Chinese may oppose the move, and the sanction with the most teeth - a boycott of Iranian oil - stands scant chance of approval given world oil prices and growing demand. The stark fact is that the alternatives to US-led multilateral diplomacy are poor and would do little to impede Iran's enrichment capability. Finally, the United States is engaging in multilateral efforts with the only other remaining "axis of evil" country, North Korea. Reports indicate that Pyongyang, unlike Tehran, already has several bombs, and North Korea blatantly violated previous agreements. Yet the administration's approach there is correct. Why hasn't President Bush talked to Iran? The Europeans have opened the door for multilateral diplomacy to achieve a vital US interest. Bush must seize the brass ring, engage Iran, and give negotiation a try.
B. Strikes lead to World War Three.
Alan Simpson, nominated President of the National Press Club, Royal Air Force Intelligence Aircrew, September 27, 4 /Prelude to World War III. ComLinks Intel Magazine. http://www.comlinks.com/polintel/pi040927.htm/
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Israel reserves the right to threaten it's neighbors with nuclear annihilation, and expects the world to sit by and, under the military umbrella of the United States, allow it to attack anyone, anywhere who tries and create their own nuclear deterrent. Now Iraq had only obsolete Scud missiles to aim in the general direction of Israel, and hope they landed near some target or other. Iran on the other hand has Shahab-3 missiles with a range of 810 miles. Thanks to President Clinton's love affair with the Chinese the chances are that the Iranians have got their hands on advanced GPS guidance technology, and can carry out their threat to strike at the Israeli Dimona Nuclear Facility. They would probably lob a few missiles at US Command and Control Centers in Iraq, Qatar, Kuwait, and the other Arab countries a few minutes flying from Iran. They could of course just sit back and take it on the chin like Saddam. Or they could send swarms of heavily armed suicide killers across the borders to attack US troops in Iraq, join up with the Iraqi people and go all out war with the United States, the Paymaster of Israel. For those who want graphic details of what I mean look at the battles between Iran and Iraq over the last few years. Brutal! Looking ahead to after the re-election of President Bush, the United States, with the reintroduction of the Draft has the manpower to allow a slaughter on the scale required to roll back the advancing armies of Iran, assisted by Iraq and Muslims from around the world. Now fighting a real War, the US could invade Iran and eventually sacrifice enough young men and women to overwhelm the Iranians. The US military power is that significantly superior. The assumption up to now is that Russia has stood by and watched it's Bushehr nuclear project pummeled to dust by the Israelis, and weathered the fallout from nuclear explosions, real or dirty, contaminate it's southern borders. The scenario laid out now has American military attacking and occupying a country, on the borders of Russia, facing Russian troops. True the Caspian Sea is in between, but the Oilfields are within striking range should the US decide it wants to grab the worlds Oil supply.
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Multilateralism Good: Sino-Franco Alliance
A. UNILATERALISM DRIVES CHINA AND FRANCE INTO AN ALLIANCE, LEADING TO WAR OVER THE TAIWAN STRAIT. UPI, 10-13, 4
"France and China "meeting the new challenges of the new century side by side ... China and France refuse aWe want to build a world order of peace and prosperity in which, within the framework of the United Nations of which France and China are founding members, states freely accept that force should be subject to international rules," he told the students of Tongji University in Shanghai. (This was a clear reference to the Bush administration's decision to go to war against Iraq without a clear U.N. mandate.) Chirac did not refer directly to the Iraq war, nor to the prospect of a clash of civilizations between Islam and the West, but his message was clear enough. Again from his speech at Tongji University, he spoke of ny fatalism about the confrontation or the chaos that would result from the uncontrolled play of the global forces now in motion." One does not have to be a paranoid American neo-conservative to discern within those oblique phrases a Chiracian vision of a new world order in which China and Europe (led by France) work as a counterweight to the United States, supporting multilateralism and the United Nations against the unilateral "with us or against us" approach of the Bush administration. It is normal that a group of nations like the EU should wish to have the very closest relations with China, in such a way as to be able to build together the multipolar world which is in the process of being designed for tomorrow," Chirac went on during an interview with China TV. Even more directly, during his trip to Vietnam immediately before his arrival in China, President Chirac spoke of "the necessity of combating the American approach on supporting culture, or sitting back to watch the spread of a global subculture across the world." In particular, Chirac presented himself to the Chinese as the man who wanted to end the EU arms embargo, and start putting some military hardware into the heart of his vaunted new "strategic partnership." "We cannot treat China as a partner while continuing to marginalize her on the military and strategic levels," Chirac said. Assume that Chirac had succeeded, and managed to lift the EU arms embargo, to sell French Rafale fighters and Agosta stealth submarines and advanced avionics. Assume further that China, thus equipped, took a far more aggressive attitude toward Taiwan and defied the inevitable warnings from the United States. The prospect of China fighting the Americans with European weapons would make last year's Transatlantic rows over the Iraq war look like a minor spat. Chirac is playing with fire.
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Multilateralism Good: Sino-Franco Alliance
B. THAT LEADS TO NUCLEAR EXTINCTION. The Strait Times 6/25/2000 p. lexis
THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. <continued> There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.
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Multilateralism Good: Sino-Russia Relations
A. UNILATERALISM LEADS TO A SINO-RUSSIA ALLIANCE. The Guardian 5/28/2003' p. lexis
The new president of China, Hu Jintao, has joined President Vladimir Putin of Russia in a call for a "multipolar world" while condemning "the use of force", as he begins a foreign tour designed to revitalise Chinese diplomacy. After a week in Russia Mr Hu will attend the G8 conference in France, where China has been given observer status for the first time. The two presidents are trying to establish a better Sino-Russian understanding which will offset, if not counterbalance, the predominance of the US in the post-Iraqi-war world. Meeting in Moscow yesterday, they said that they stood for "a multipolar, just and democratic world order" on the basis of international law. In another thrust at US unilateralism, they called for a peaceful solution on the Korean peninsula, saying scenarios "of forceful pressure or use of force are unacceptable". They also said that the UN should be given the "central role" in Iraq's reconstruction. Significantly, before he left home Mr Hu called for more military modernisation of China. His senior military advisers appear to have been impressed - and shocked - by the White House's pre-emptive strategy, and now believe that China must do more to hold its own. But Chinese diplomacy is still based on seeking good relations with the US, at least in the medium term, and its criticism of the occupation of Iraq has been muted.
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Multilateralism Good: Naval Power
A. MULTILATERAL COOPERATION IS KEY TO US NAVAL POWER.
James J. Tritten, chief of the Training and Inspection Division of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 2002' /Globalization and Maritime Power, Implications for Multinational Naval Doctrine, 12-2, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_2002/Globalization_and_Maritime_Power_Dec_02/15_ch14.htm/ The implication for navies in such an environment is to shift to a capabilities-based fleet that maximizes its flexibility to respond to a wider range of wars than the heretofore canonical MTW scenarios. The U.S. Navy and all of the U.S. Armed Forces are now in an international security environment that mandates the participation of other nations if we are to succeed in any actions taken at the MTW/MRC levelif for no other reason than the need for host nation support. SSCOs/LRCs might be undertaken unilaterally but would naturally benefit from the contributions and legitimacy afforded by the participation of other nations.
B. NAVY POWER IS KEY TO PREVENT WMD USE Daniel Goure, defense analyst @ Lexington Institute, August 2003
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/navalstrike/SeaBasedMissile.pdf These new threats pose new challenges for field commanders too. The joint force commanders now must plan for adversaries potentially armed with WMD, long- range delivery systems and anti-access capabilities. This confronts them with the need to act more rapidly, at longer ranges and with greater decisiveness than ever before. In order to project power inland, U.S. forces need to be able to establish dominance of the air and sea environs around and over the zone of hostilities. Air and sea dominance supports the secure basing of joint forces at sea both during the initial phase of a conflict and as forces are moved into theater. Power projection deep inland is also necessary to ensure that an adversary does not employ any WMD.
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Multilateralism Good: US/Brazil Relations
A. COMMITMENT TO MULTILATERALISM SOLVES A COLLAPSE OF US-BRAZILIAN RELATIONS Marcela Sanchez, writer for the Washington Post, 8-19, 2004'
In Haiti, A New Multilateral Face, Washington Post At the end of the day, accidental or convenient multilateralism is clearly better than unilateral military action, something the United States hasn't done in the Americas since the invasion of Panama in 1989. But the lack of unilateralism does not multilateralism make. Without a firm commitment to multilateralism from the top, security itself is at risk. Consider the conundrum faced by Presidents Lula of Brazil and Ricardo Lagos of Chile. Both leaders are interested in playing a more prominent role in international cooperation. In Lula's case, Brazil wants a permanent seat at the U.N. Security Council and can only aspire to get it by demonstrating its regional leadership. For Chile, whose economy is fully dependent on free trade, helping protect crucial waterways such as the Panama Canal demands an expanded role for its navy. But both find themselves hamstrung by a populace that would rather oppose any collaboration with Washington than support it -- despite their countries' best interests. As long as Washington is perceived as a unilateralist wolf in multilateral clothing, Lula and Lagos and other Latin American leaders current and future will be caught between popular anti-American sentiment at home and the anti-Washington rhetoric they'll have to employ to stay in power. It's no coincidence that these countries went out of their way to couch their role in Haiti in response to a request from the U.N. -- and not the United States.
B. RELATIONS ARE KEY TO PREVENT COUNTER-BALANCING AND NUCLEARIZATION FROM BRAZIL. Frank Esquivel, Defense Intelligence Analyst at National Defense
University, National War College, 2001' /National War College Reports, http://www.ndu.edu/library/n2/n01Best5604EaquivelUS.html/ Donald E. Schulz, in his comprehensive March 2000 monograph entitled, The United States and Latin America: Shaping an Elusive Future, suggests that it may be useful to raise the issue of whether, two or three decades from now, the United States might have to deal with a regional hegemon or peer competitor. He identifies Brazil as that possible competitor, arguing it already accounts for almost half of Latin Americas economic production and has by far the largest armed forces in the region. He cites as further evidence the Brazilian militarys secret pursuit of nuclear weapons in the 1970s and 1980s before Brasilia decided to commit to nuclear non-proliferation. He cautions, if changes in political leadership were instrumental in redirecting Brazils nuclear program towards peaceful purposes, future political upheavals could still produce a reversion to previous orientations, then adds if the nuclear plant at Angra dos Reis [Angra I] were only producing at 30 percent capacity, it could produce five 20-kiloton weapons a year. If production from other plants were included, Brazil would have a capability three times greater than India or Pakistan. Furthermore, its defense industry already has a substantial missile producing capability.http://www.ndu.edu/library/n2/n01Best5604EaquivelUS.html - _edn42 According to the US State Department, a second Angra dos Reis was, after years of delays, about to come on line, as of July 2000. Moreover, an Angra III is planned. When completed, the three reactors would have combined capacity of 3,000 megawatts.http://www.ndu.edu/library/n2/n01Best5604EaquivelUS.html - _edn43 Using the Amazon as a rallying point against foreign intervention would fit a scenario where Brazil played the part of a peer competitor. One high ranking I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of orange juice.
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Brazilian military officer, former chief of the Military Command of the Amazon General Antenor de Santa Cruz Abreu, already alluded to this possibility, when he suggested in 1991 that Brazil would transform the region into a new Vietnam if developed countries tried to internationalize the Amazon.http://www.ndu.edu/library/n2/n01Best5604EaquivelUS.html - _edn44
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Multilateralism Good: Space Militarization
A. MULTILATERALISM IS KEY TO AVOID A SPACE ARMS RACE WITH CHINA.
Joan Johnson-Freese, Chair, National Security Decision Making Department, United States Naval War College, 1/13/04' ("Chinese Chess in Space" Yale Global, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/article.print?id=3128) Specifically, a US proposal to multilaterally review and expand the future of manned space exploration - from the ISS to another lunar voyage or even a Mars mission - on an incremental, inclusive basis would allow Washington to revitalize American space leadership. Crucially, it would also give the US a means to influence the future direction of the Chinese space program. This option would counter the prevailing view of the US as a unilateralist hegemon and allow for a focus on infrastructure development that does not require unrealistic budget burdens. While there is the risk of international politics intruding into the process over time, that is counterbalanced by the vested interest such a program would give participants in system stability. To be sure, there would be resistance to working with China. Washington is replete with individuals adamantly objecting to cooperation with China on grounds from human rights to its status as the largest remaining communist country. Isolating China, however, is increasingly a stance counterproductive to US interests, as a world without China is simply not possible. US and Chinese interests frequently overlap, on North Korea and the Global War on Terror, for example, not to mention economics. The United States has a window of opportunity to step in and use space cooperation to its advantage. Because space is considered so critical to the futures of both the US and China, any activity by one has been considered zero-sum by the other, triggering an action-reaction cycle and threatening escalation into an arms race of technology and countermeasure development. That direction can be changed. A inclusive vision will give the US an opportunity to assume the mantle of leadership on a mission that could inspire the world and shift Chinese activities into areas more compatible with US interests. On the geostrategic Wei Qi board, cooperation is the best "next move" for the US.
B. us-China space arms race would lead to war over the Taiwan Strait.
William C. Martel, professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College, and Toshi Yoshihara, research fellow at the Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis, Autumn, 2003', /Washington Quarterly, Averting a Sino-U.S. Space Race, p. 23/ Second, the military use of space has profound implications for the uneasy stalemate in the Taiwan Strait, which has always presented the possibility of a major confrontation between Washington and Beijing. One argument is that U.S. capabilities allow the United States to project power near Taiwan, while the space-based sensors and weapons for missile defense could blunt China's arsenal of ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan. Moreover, the prospect of transfers of missile defense systems to Taiwan, which could usher in a period of unprecedented military cooperation between Taipei and Washington, no doubt deeply troubles Beijing. China, for its part, will increasingly need military space capabilities if it is to improve its ability to coerce Taiwan in a conflict and counter U.S. intervention to defend the island in a crisis or conflict.
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Multilateralism Good: Space Militarization
C. THAT LEADS TO NUCLEAR EXTINCTION
The Strait Times 6/25/2000 p. lexis THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. <continued> There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.
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Multilateralism Good: US/Russia Relations
A. UNILATERALISM THREATENS COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA PUTIN CANNOT SUSTAIN COOPERATION WITH A UNILATERAL AMERICA
John Farmer, National Political Correspondent for The Star-Ledger of Newark, 4/25/2003 (Newhouse News Service) p. lexis If Putin disappointed Bush when he joined the French opposition at the United Nations, he had little choice. Opposition elements in Russia have been increasingly vocal about his failure to resist U.S. unilateralism around the globe, even his willingness to accommodate it. In a way, he has been an Eastern European Tony Blair, with the same kind of home-front problem.
B. US MULTILATERAL CREDIBILITY WITH RUSSIA IS KEY TO PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM
Graham Allison, Professor of Government and Former Director of the Belfer Center, Harvard University, and Andrei Kokoshin, Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences and Member of the Board of Directors, NTI, Fall 2002 ("The New Containment" the National Interest) p. lexis As former Senator Sam Nunn has noted: "At the dawn of a new century, we find ourselves in a new arms race. Terrorists are racing to get weapons of mass destruction; we ought to be racing to stop them." Preventing nuclear terrorism will require no less imagination, energy and persistence than did avoiding nuclear war between the superpowers over four decades of Cold War. But absent deep, sustained cooperation between the United States, Russia and other nuclear states, such an effort is doomed to failure. In the context of the qualitatively new relationship Presidents Putin and Bush have established in the aftermath of last September 11, success in such a bold effort is within the reach of determined RussianAmerican leadership. Succeed we must.
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Multilateralism Good: US/Russia Relations
C. NEW BREED OF TERRORISM WILL CAUSE HUMAN EXTINCTION
Pacotti 03 Sheldon, Salon.com, March 31 http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2003/03/31/knowledge/index.html A similar trend has appeared in proposed solutions to high-tech terrorist threats. Advances in biotech, chemistry, and other fields are expanding the power of individuals to cause harm, and this has many people worried. Glenn E. Schweitzer and Carole C. Dorsch, writing for The Futurist, gave this warning in 1999: "Technological advances threaten to outdo anything terrorists have done before; superterrorism has the potential to eradicate civilization as we know it." Schweitzer and Dorsch are so alarmed that they go on to say, "Civil liberties are important for a democratic society; the time has arrived, however, to reconfigure some aspects of democracy, given the violence that is on the doorstep."The Sept. 11 attacks have obviously added credence to their opinions. In 1999, they recommended an expanded role for the CIA, "greater government intervention" in Americans' lives, and the "honorable deed" of "whistle-blowing" -- proposals that went from fringe ideas to policy options and talk-show banter in less than a year. Taken together, their proposals aim to gather information from companies and individuals and feed that information into government agencies. A network of cameras positioned on street corners would nicely complement their vision of America during the 21st century. If after Sept. 11 and the anthrax scare these still sound like wacky Orwellian ideas to you, imagine how they will sound the day a terrorist opens a jar of Ebola-AIDS spores on Capitol Hill. As Sun Microsystems' chief scientist, Bill Joy, warned: "We have yet to come to terms with the fact that the most compelling 21st-century technologies -- robotics, genetic engineering, and nanotechnology -- pose a different threat than the technologies that have come before. Specifically, robots, engineered organisms, and nanobots share a dangerous amplifying factor: They can self-replicate. A bomb is blown up only once -- but one bot can become many, and quickly get out of control." Joy calls the new threats "knowledge-enabled mass destruction." To cause great harm to millions of people, an extreme person will need only dangerous knowledge, which itself will move through the biosphere, encoded as matter, and flit from place to place as easily as dangerous ideas now travel between our minds. In the information age, dangerous knowledge can be copied and disseminated at light speed, and it threatens everyone. Therefore, Joy's perfectly reasonable conclusion is that we should relinquish "certain kinds of knowledge." He says that it is time to reconsider the open, unrestrained pursuit of knowledge that has been the foundation of science for 300 years. " Despite the strong historical precedents, if open access to and unlimited development of knowledge henceforth puts us all in clear danger of extinction, then common sense demands that we reexamine even these basic, long-held beliefs."
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Multilateralism Good: US/Turkey Relations
A. MULTILATERALISM IS THE ONLY WAY TO PREVENT COLLAPSE OF US-TURKEY RELATIONS
Jake Gunderson, Writer, The Daily Utah Chronicle, 9/24/2003 ("Prof Analyzes U.S.-Turkey Relations" The Daily Utah Chronicle, Internal Qualifications, Hakan Yayuz, Political Science Professor Discusses U.S.-Turkey Relations at Hinckley Institute of Politics) http://www.dailyutahchronicle.com/news/2003/09/24/News/ProfAnalyzes.U.Turkey.Relationsh ip-474164.shtml Historically, Turkey and the United States have had good relations. Turkey was never colonized and so it didn't develop some of the anti-Western, anti-American sentiments that many other Muslim countries have. Even with a Muslim majority, Turkey is considered a secular nation. "Turkey and the United States have never had a major problem," Yavuz said. During the Cold War, communism and the Soviet Union were a major threat to Turkey, Yavuz added. "The Cold War enhanced the negative relationship with the Soviet Union. Turkey became very proNATO, pro-American, pro-Europe," Yavuz said. The United States was an important ally in the conflict between the Soviet Union and Turkey. Currently, however, the tension is because of a number of factors that influence antiAmerican sentiment in Turkey. "The [American] unilateralism caused major fear in Turks , [and the potential] attack on Syria and Iran," he said. Turkey is trying to join the European Union and is siding with France and Germany on many issues, creating another factor that increases anti-American sentiment in Turkey, Yavuz said. He also suggested that in order to improve the relationship with Turkey, the U.S. needed to be more humble and adopt a multilateral policy.
B. US/Turkey relations are key to Middle Eastern stability
USA TODAY 11/6/2003 (Internal Qualifications, James Steinberg, Analyst, Brookings Institution) p. lexis We still have a big stake," said James Steinberg, of the Brookings Institution, a think tank in Washington, D.C. "No one else is seen as the gateway to the Middle East and a source of stability." Other reasons the alliance is important: * It may help the U.S. improve its influence in Muslim nations in Central Asia, where radical Muslim groups are gaining in popularity. When Turkish troops were in Afghanistan, they provided intelligence and historical perspective for other NATO troops. * Turkey has a strong alliance with Israel and growing ties with India, Iraq and Pakistan. The United States considers these ties important foundations for regional stability. Additionally, U.S. officials have also used Turkey to carry backchannel messages to Iran and other countries with which it has no official relations. * It is a true secular Muslim democracy. While the March troop decision was a short-term inconvenience to the Pentagon, experts said it sent a powerful signal that a Muslim nation could be a strong democracy and stand up to the United States without jeopardizing its future -- a key signal the United States needs to have in the region.
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Multilateralism Good: US/Japan Alliance
A. Unilateralism destroys the US-Japan Alliance sustainability. The Daily Yomiuri, 12-17, 2004' While the U.S. government proceeds with its plan to reorganize its forces stationed in Japan, differences in opinion between the Japanese and U.S. public may affect future negotiations. Bush 'catalyst on public opinion' On seeing the survey results, a senior Foreign Ministry official said, "I think the basis of Japanese people's trust in the United States has not faltered." "But the results might have been affected by views of the United States that soured due to President Bush's stance on unilateralism," the official said. The official said the Japan-U.S. relationship should have exemplified Bush's comments in which he said no other nation was a closer ally to the United States than Japan. But in the survey, most Japanese respondents said they did not trust the United States.
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Multilateralism Good: Trade Blocks
A. Unilateralism results in regional and trade blocs similar to the early 1900s
John B. Judis, Senior Editor of the New Republic, 8/12/2002 ("Two Steps Backward: Unilateralism Revisited" The American Prospect) p.lexis Bush's unilateralism can have even more dire consequences in the long term. The administration's disdain for international treaties will make it impossible for the world's nations to meet threats such as global warming or the spread of disease that can only be addressed through international accords. American unilateralism will also encourage the emergence over the next decades of rival power blocs in Asia and Europe. There are already stirrings in Europe, although any action would have to await the completion of European Union enlargement. If Europe and a China-led Southeast Asia arrayed themselves against the United States, that could bring back the international disorder that prevailed before World War I. The result would not necessarily mean a world war, but regional trading blocs and bitter proxy disputes that could lead to regional wars in those parts of the world that remain mired in autocracy and poverty.
B. Those trade blocs risk major war and nuclear instability Spicer, The Challenge from the East and the Rebirth of the West, 1996, p. 121
The choice facing the West today is much the same as that which faced the Soviet bloc after World War II: between meeting head-on the challenge of world trade with the adjustments and the benefits that it will bring, or of attempting to shut out markets that are growing and where a dynamic new pace is being set for innovative production. The problem about the second approach is not simply that it won't hold: satellite technology alone will ensure that he consumers will begin to demand those goods that the East is able to provide most cheaply. More fundamentally, it will guarantee the emergence of a fragmented world in which natural fears will be fanned and inflamed. A world divided into rigid trade blocs will be a deeply troubled and unstable place in which suspicion and ultimately envy will possibly erupt into a major war. I do not say that the converse will necessarily be true, that in a free trading world there will be an absence of all strife. Such a proposition would manifestly be absurd. But to trade is to become interdependent, and that is a good step in the direction of world stability. With nuclear weapons at two a penny, stability will be at a premium in the years ahead.
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Multilateralism Good: US/Europe Relations
ABANDONING UNILATERALISM IS A NECESSARY PRECONDITION TO RESTORING RELATIONS WITH EUROPE John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 172-3 Meaningful future cooperation is unlikely without a change in attitude and approach from both sides of the Atlantic. The United States must realize that the world has changed since 1990 and that the policies and interpretations that came out of the cold war do not always any longer apply. In particular, it must understand that power is not irredeemably associated with the military and with nation-states, and that civilian international organizations or clusters of states working together can also wield power, and can do so peacefully. It must also understand that exceptionalism does noone any favours; it isolates American thinking, prompts reactionary thinking from abroad, and places American interests above those of the internationalcommunity that the United States claims to lead. Huntington has argued that the United States is blind to the fact that it no longer enjoys the pre-eminent position that it occupied at the end of the cold war, and that it must relearn the game of international politics, make compromises, and make rational recalculations of power rather than pursuing 'a wish list of arrogant, unilateralist demands'
A. Unilateralism is root cause of US/European disputes a return to multilateral credibility is essential to restore relations
The Atlantic Community Initiative 5/11/2004 ("Unilateralism and Transatlantic Relations" - Summary of the Chapter on U.S. Power and Influence in Europe published in June 2004 by the Georgetown Institute for the Study of Diplomacy) http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/aci%2003-11-04%20editorial.html The alliance between the United States and Europe was at the heart of the Cold War strategy against the Soviet threat and remains a vitally important political, economic and security relationship in the post-Cold War era. However, the large capabilities and threat perception gaps between the United States in Europe have in recent years grown increasingly problematic for the alliance. Now, widespread European perceptions that the United States intends to have its way in international relations regardless of the views of allied countries or the standards of international law have seriously undermined the trust in and respect for the United States. The troubled relationship between the United States and Europe has already directly affected US interests, producing strong European resistance to the US war against Iraq, limiting international involvement in the process of stabilizing and reconstructing post-war Iraq, undermining European governments that did support US policy in Iraq, raising credibility issues about US intelligence resources and political judgment, and weakening the ability of the United States to use its soft power to influence attitudes and policies in European countries. A continued pattern of perceived or actual US unilateralism could produce significant costs for US foreign policy. The long-established democratic governments in Western Europe all carry forward a strong commitment to the values on which international cooperation, law and organization has been based since the Second World War. Many of these governments and peoples instinctively feel that the system is not owned just by the United States. They believe their democracies played a role in creating and sustaining the system. When the United States attempts to change underlying aspects of that system, and particularly when the US government attempts to do so unilaterally based on overwhelming US power, they are inclined to question and perhaps even oppose such US efforts. If the United States continues to be seen by majorities in most European countries as an overbearing, hegemonic power, it will be increasingly difficult for European political parties to take positions that are openly warm and friendly toward the United States. Over time, the United States could find it increasingly difficult to line up support behind its policies.
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Multilateralism Good: US/Europe Relations
B. THE U.S. CANNOT STOP GLOBAL WARS WITHOUT GOOD RELATIONS WITH EUROPEALL THEIR DISADS ARE INEVITABLE.
Ivo H. Daalder, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and James M. Goldgeier, associate professor of political science at George Washington University, Spring 2001, Survival, vol. 43, no. 1 The Bush administration enters office at a time when flash-points around the globe from the Middle East to Colombia and from the Persian Gulf to the Taiwan Straits threaten to explode. This contrasts starkly with a Europe that today is relatively quiescent. The violence that bloodied south-eastern Europe throughout much of the 1990s has ended. Slobodan Milosevic, the man most responsible for Europes recent instability, has been swept from office. Except for isolated pockets like Belarus, democracy is ascendant throughout the continent. Americas oldest friends are creating an evercloser union amongst themselves based on a single currency and a common defence and security policy. And Russia, though still struggling to emerge from decades of disastrous economic and political mismanagement, no longer threatens Europes stability and security. As Europe remains quiet and increasingly capable of taking care of itself, the new administration in Washington may be tempted to concentrate American efforts elsewhere around the globe. Bushs national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, suggested as much towards the end of last years presidential campaign. She said that Bush favoured a new division of labour that would leave extended peacekeeping missions in Europe, such as those in the Balkans, to the Europeans so that the United States could focus its energies elsewhere. The United States is the only power that can handle a showdown in the Gulf, mount the kind of force that is needed to protect Saudi Arabia and deter a crisis in the Taiwan Straits, Rice stated.1 Rices remarks caused quite a stir in Europe, and there were immediate efforts by the Bush campaign to downplay the suggestion of an early withdrawal of US troops from the Balkans.2 Since then, Bush, Rice and Secretary of State Colin Powell have reaffirmed the US commitment to the Balkans and assured that an American troop withdrawal would be subject to extensive consultations and would not be precipitous.3 Largely missing from the public reactions to Rices call for a new division of labour was the other side of the proposed division: the idea that the United States alone should bear responsibility for dealing with flash-points in the Middle East and Asia. Yet this idea has major drawbacks. Although America today enjoys unrivalled military, economic and political power, it lacks the capacity to deal with many of the critical global challenges ranging from weapons proliferation and terrorism to environmental degradation and the rapid spread of infectious disease without support from allies. There are also fundamental political problems with such an approach. The unilateralism implied by assigning primary responsibility for global security and stability to the United States without support from or regard for the perspective of regional allies and other countries is hardly consistent with the desire, repeatedly emphasised by the incoming team, to exercise American power without arrogance and to pursue its interests without hectoring and bluster.4 At a time when the United States is already regarded by much of the world as an overbearing hyperpower, insisting on a division of labour that assigns Washington the main international security role to the exclusion of others is unlikely to be popular among its allies. Such a posture is also unlikely to be popular at home. In recent years, it has become very clear that the American public will support the use of US military forces overseas only if other countries share the burden. This is not only in the case of so-called humanitarian interventions, but also when it involves the defence of such vital national interests as the worlds supply of crude oil. In either case, international legitimacy of action and a commitment by other nations to share the costs will be a political prerequisite for gaining public support. Despite Europes internal weaknesses and divisions, no part of the world offers the United States a better prospect for becoming a strong partner in taking on global challenges and opportunities. Europe combines actual economic strength with potential military and diplomatic capacity to be Americas strategic partner, if not today, then tomorrow. And rather than assigning Europe a limited, albeit still important role, of handling its own affairs in ways that do not require US participation, as the new division of labour suggests, American interests are best served by developing a genuine partnership with a Europe that is both capable and willing to share the burdens of maintaining and strengthening international security. Regardless of pressing developments in other parts of the world, the United States cannot afford to ignore Europe. The Bush administration appears to recognise this, notwithstanding the rhetoric about a new division of labour. Candidate Bush and incoming policy-makers consistently pointed to the need for strengthening US alliances as one of the first items of business, reflecting at least a concern for maintaining Americas strong bonds within NATO.5 Even more importantly,
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the many Europe-related issues requiring decisions in the near-future including NATO enlargement, the future of Europes defence policy, national missile defence, US troops in the Balkans and relations with Russia will make it impossible for the new administration to ignore Europe. The question for the new administration, therefore, is not whether Europe still matters, but rather, what should be Americas strategy for addressing the array of issues on the European agenda. These issues, and the US approach to them, will determine the nature and depth of the USEuropean relationship. Some, including many in the Bush administration, will argue that a strategy based on American leadership in NATO will be needed for the years ahead. They will contend that the main problems facing USEuropean relations are the result of recent efforts to dilute NATO and thereby undermine the main vehicle for realising Americas continued strategic interests in Europe. Others are more concerned that developments in Russia will determine Europes future, and they accordingly counsel a policy that gives Moscows interests and perspective a critical role in resolving the issues on the European agenda. Neither a NATO-first nor a Russia-first policy towards Europe will best serve American interests, however. A strong NATO and amicable relations with Russia are, of course, important. But they are means to a desired end, not ends in themselves. The end is a strong Europe that is capable of being a strategic partner of the United States in meeting the multitude of global challenges. The means to that end is a Europe that is at peace, undivided and democratic; that is, a Europe that no longer requires intensive American involvement to secure its future and, instead, is able and willing to involve itself in world affairs politically, economically, and, if necessary, militarily. Such a Europe requires that the new administration continue where the Clinton administration left off, which is by pursuing a strategy towards the region that puts Europe not NATO or Russia first.
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Multilateralism Good: U.S.-European Relations Impact: Clash of Civilizations
U.S.-EUROPEAN TIES CRITICAL TO AVOID A CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS
Tony Blankley, THE WESTSS LAST CHANCE, 2005, pp. 184-5 The best strategy to fend off and reverse the Islamist threat is to strengthen the alliance between the United States and Europe. Of course, Christian Southern Africa (390 million of Africa's approximately 850 million people), Hindu India, non-Muslim Southeast Asia, Christian Latin America, and Russia all have important roles to play in defeating the Islamist jihadists. But a defense of the West without the birthplace of the West-Europe-is almost unthinkable. If Europe becomes Eurabia, it would mean the loss of our cultural and historic first cousins, our closest economic and military allies, and the source of our own civilization. It would be a condition Americans should dread, and should move mountains to avoid. It bears repeating: An Islamified Europe would be as great a threat to the United States today as a Nazified Europe would have been to the United States in the 1940s. Even before Pearl Harbor, Franklin Roosevelt understood that a Nazi-dominated Europe would be more than a fearsome military and industrial threat; it would be a civilizational threat. Now we face another civilizational threat in insurgent Islam. Unfortunately, some Americans take Europe's future as an Islamic Eurabia for granted, citing the declining birthrates and church attendance rates of ethnic Europeans. Particularly in conservative circles, there is even a scorn for Europe's future, fueled by resentment of France and Germany's refusal to back us in the Iraq War. France's aggressive effort to block United Nations support for us is a particular source of irritation. At the time, I wrote a few anti-French columns myself-and felt much better for it.
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Multilateralism Good: US-Canada Relations
MULTILATERALISM IS THE WAY TO RESTORE US-CANADA RELATIONS Hamilton Spectator, 4-22, 2003, Lexis
While the new prime minister will have to make clear that Canadian decisions on relations with the United States will depend on how Canada defines its interests, it's clear that relations can be conducted in a more civil manner than appears to have been the case recently. For example, Canada attaches much importance to multilateralism, but it needs to be able persuade the United States to work through multilateral institutions as well.
INCREASED COOPERATION DETERS QUEBEC SECESSION The Economist, October 6, 2001 /Quebec Thinks Continentally. Lexis
But the impact of the attacks on the collective psyche may have greater repercussions for the sovereignty movement than the economic fall-out. Continentalism, the term Canadians use for closer relations with the United States, is enjoying something of a renaissance thoughout the country, in the form of calls for "a perimeter wall" around North America and joint immigration, customs and defence policies. That runs counter to the emotional impulse for secession. Less tangibly, the attacks may have made voters cling to the familiar from fear of the unknown.
SECESSION LEADS TO DISINTEGRATION OF CANADA AND WAR WITH RUSSIA New World Order Intelligence, May, 96'/http://www.survivalistskills.com/quebec.htm/
Lamont's forecasts, based upon all of this input? Canada will disintegrate shortly after Quebec separates via a Unilateral Declaration of Independence [Bouchard threatened to do this on April 28th, 1996]. Quebec will become a socialist, somewhat aberrant and unpredictable state which will ultimately be refused entry to NAFTA by the US and Canada. The Canadian provinces will seize more and more power from a weakened Federal government, become individual or regional "mini-states" themselves, and turn their eyes southward. BC and Alberta will withdraw into "Cascadia", a union of those two provinces with California, Oregon, Washington State, Idaho and Alaska, forming a bloc with the ninthlargest economy in the world. BC and Alberta will apply for admission into the US, and be accepted immediately.
Manitoba will hook up with Minnesota around a Red River union. Saskatchewan will join with Montana, Colorado, and Wyoming in the Rocky Mountain Corridor. Manitoba and Saskatchewan would be given associate status with the US, depending - among other things - on how cooperative they are in facilitating the export of Canadian water to the United States. Ontario would sink into the embrace of the US Great Lakes states. Canada's Atlantic Provinces would form an "association" with New England. The US federal government, Lamont asserts, will not be "happy" with this turn of events - it will complicate security and defense arrangements, multiply the difficulties in observing and fulfilling a wide range of current bi-lateral agreements and treaties, etc. But it will be "persuaded" by the addition of vast water resources, wood, immense mineral troves, multi-billion barrel oil and tar-sand reserves, etc, to America's economic base and strategic reserves. The Russians, who have always regarded Canada as a less-belligerent "buffer" across the Arctic between the U.S. and themselves become increasingly resentful of Canada's absorbtion into a Continental Union. The hardline communist/nationalist faction having triumphed in Moscow, they begin armed "probing" flights across the Arctic divide in an attempt to test out the effectiveness of the NORAD radar earlywarning system after Quebec's separation and Canada's slow collapse. Feeling even more threatened by the growing American colossus, the Russians become even more aggressive and "trigger happy". The same treaties that reduced US/USSR missile forces permitted the Russians to increase their terrain-hugging bomber-launched cruise-missile stockpiles, and they take full advantage of this. Canada, the "international diplomatic buffer", has ceased to exist.
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Multilateralism Good: WTO
A. COMMITMENT TO MULTILATERALISM IS KEY TO STRENGTHENING THE WTO
Dr. Supachai Panitchpakdi, 03 new Director General of the World Trade Organization [http://www.southcentre.org/info/southbulletin/bulletin42/bulletin42-05.htm#TopOfPage] The reality of globalization is an increasingly interdependent world. The title of this roundtable, "The Future of Multilateralism", is an apt one. Leadership in our increasingly global and interdependent world is about the art of cooperation and consensus. It is about defining common goals and interests, and of coherently managing the complex interdependence of global issues. This can only be successfully achieved through the full and effective participation of all countries. The world needs a reaffirmation of our choice of multilateralism over unilateralism; stability over uncertainty; consensus over conflict; rules over power. This Summit, which comes at an important time, is an essential reaffirmation of these values. At Doha last November, in a climate of dangerous international uncertainty, WTO members showed the determination to make multilateralism work. It is salutary that this Summit has recognised trade as one vital component to achieving sustainable development. I greatly welcome the political reaffirmation that Heads of State and Government at this Summit have given to the negotiations launched at Doha last November. Your call for WTO Members to fulfil the commitments made in the Doha Declaration adds further impetus to our work. At Doha, Ministers launched a new Round of trade negotiations. At this Summit, Leaders have called on WTO Members to bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion. It is through the Doha Development Agenda negotiations that difficult issues of tariff peaks, tariff escalation, subsidies and other trade distorting measures can be resolved and new areas progressed.
B. THAT STOPS NUKE OMNICIDE
Copley News Service, 1999, Lexis For decades, many children in America and other countries went to bed fearing annihilation by nuclear war. The specter of nuclear winter freezing the life out of planet Earth seemed very real. Activists protesting the World Trade Organization's meeting in Seattle apparently have forgotten that threat. The truth is that nations join together in groups like the WTO not just to further their own prosperity, but also to forestall conflict with other nations. In a way, our planet has traded in the threat of a worldwide nuclear war for the benefit of cooperative global economics. Some Seattle protesters clearly fancy themselves to be in the mold of nuclear disarmament or anti-Vietnam War protesters of decades past. But they're not. They're special-interest activists, whether the cause is environmental, labor or paranoia about global government. Actually, most of the demonstrators in Seattle are very much unlike yesterday's peace activists, such as Beatle John Lennon or philosopher Bertrand Russell, the father of the nuclear disarmament movement, both of whom urged people and nations to work together rather than strive against each other. These and other war protesters would probably approve of 135 WTO nations sitting down peacefully to discuss economic issues that in the past might have been settled by bullets and bombs. As long as nations are trading peacefully, and their economies are built on exports to other countries, they have a major disincentive to wage war. That's why bringing China, a budding superpower, into the WTO is so important .As exports to the United States and the rest of the world feed Chinese prosperity, and that prosperity increases demand for the goods we produce, the threat of hostility diminishes. Many anti-trade protesters in Seattle claim that only multinational corporations benefit from global trade, and that it's the everyday wage earners who get hurt. That's just plain wrong. First of all, it's not the military-industrial complex benefiting. It's U.S. companies that make high-tech goods. And those companies provide a growing number of jobs for Americans. In San Diego, many people have good jobs at Qualcomm, Solar Turbines and other companies for whom overseas markets are essential. In Seattle, many of the 100,000 people who work at Boeing would lose their livelihoods without world trade. Foreign trade today accounts for 30 percent of our gross domestic product. That's a lot of jobs for everyday workers. Growing global prosperity has helped counter the specter of nuclear winter. Nations of the world are learning to live and work together, like the singers of anti-war songs once imagined. Those who care about world peace shouldn't be protesting world trade. They should be celebrating it.
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Multilateralism Good: Multilateralism Key to WTO
MULTILAT KEY TO GROWTH IN THE WTO Walden Bello May 12-13, 2003.[ http://www.focusweb.org/popups/articleswindow.php?id=320]
- Bush's political economy is very wary of a process of globalization that is not managed by a US state that ensures that the process does not diffuse the economic power of the US. Allowing the market solely to drive globalization could result in key US corporations becoming the victims of globalization and thus compromising US economic interests. Thus, despite the free market rhetoric, we have a group that is very protectionist when it comes to trade, investment, and the management of government contracts. It seems that the motto of the Bushites is protectionism for the US and free trade for the rest of us.- It is wary of multilateralism as a way of global economic governance since while multilateralism may promote the interests of the global capitalist class in general, it may, in many instances, contradict particular US corporate interests. The Bush people's growing ambivalence towards the WTO stems from the fact that the US has lost a number of rulings there, rulings that may hurt US capital but serve the interests of global capitalism as a whole. - For the Bush people, strategic power is the ultimate modality of power. Economic power is a means to achieve strategic power. This is related to the fact that under Bush, the dominant faction of the ruling elite is the military-industrial establishment that won the Cold War. The conflict between globalists and unilateralists or nationalists along this axis is shown in the approach toward China. The globalist approach put the emphasis on engagement with China, seeing its importance primarily as an investment area and market for US capital. The nationalists, on the other hand, see China mainly as a strategic enemy, and they would rather contain it rather than assist its growth. 6. So among the key components of Washington's unilateralist economic strategy are: - Control over oil, a move strategically directed not only against the EU but also against oil-poor China; - Aggressive protectionism in trade and investment matters; - Aggressive manipulation of the dollar's value to stick the costs of economic crisis on rivals among the center economies and regain competitiveness for the US economy. - Aggressive manipulation of multilateral agencies to push the interests of US capital-something we see not only in the WTO but also in the International Monetary Fund, where the US Treasury recently torpedoed the IMF management's proposal for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism to enable developing countries to restructure their debt while giving them a measure of protection from creditors. Already a very weak mechanism, the SDRM was vetoed by US Treasury in the interest of US banks. 7. The great advantage of multilateralism as a system of global political and economic governance was that it dispersed the defense of the system to many allies and created a degree of legitimacy and consensus among the masses that did not benefit from it. The great problem for unilateralism is overextension, or a mismatch between the goals of the United States and the resources needed to accomplish these goals.
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Multilateralism Good: Unilateralism Fails
TERRORISM AND WMD PROLIFERATION CANNOT BE SOLVED UNILATERALLY
Michle A. Flournoy is a senior adviser in the International Security Program at CSIS, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Spring 2006, p. 80 Similarly, in the new security environment, international allies and partners are more instrumental than ever to the U.S. ability to achieve its national security objectives. Building the capacity of partner countries emerged as a key theme in the 2006 QDR. No matter how powerful the United States is as the worlds sole superpower, in an era of globalization it cannot fight terrorism or stop WMD proliferation and use alone. The United States needs other countries to be willing and capable partners, whether they are European allies to operate alongside U.S. forces in operations or indigenous forces to prevent local and regional situations from becoming crises that require international intervention. Building their capacity is in the U.S. interest.
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Multilateralism Good: Key to Sustained US Support for Global Leadership
MULTILATERALISM INCREASES US PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS
Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 65-6 By and large, the American public has supported US involvement in multilateral institutions and appreciated the legitimacy that participation has conferred on US foreign policy. As we will see in chapter 3, support for the United Nations has had its ups and downs over the past 50 years, but in the aftermath of the Iraq War, two-thirds of Americans still voiced favorable opinions of the United Nations. Before the war, polls consistently showed that public support for military action was strongest if the US acted with the backing of the Security Council. There is further evidence that unilateralism makes a majority of Americans uncomfortable; after the war, two-thirds (67 percent) said that the tendency to go it alone was an important threat to the United States over the next ten years. 70% OF AMERICANS REJECT HARD-LINE UNILATERALISM OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION Steven Kull, Program on International Policy Attitudes, 2006, What Kind of Foreign Policy Does the American Public Want?, October 20, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/oct06/SecurityFP_Oct06_rpt.pdf, p. 4 In the upcoming Congressional race seven in ten Americans are looking for candidates who will pursue a new approach to U.S. foreign policy. Large majorities are dissatisfied with the position of the United States in the world today and say that current U.S. foreign policy has increased the likelihood of terrorist attacks and decreased goodwill toward the United States. Overwhelming majorities consider it important for people in other countries to feel goodwill toward the United States. Most Americans think that the negative attitudes toward the United States expressed by publics in the Middle East reflect their dislike of U.S. policies, not their rejection of Americas values.
PUBLIC SUPPORTS MULTILATERAL GOALS AS THE DRIVERS OF US FOREIGN POLICY
Steven Kull, Program on International Policy Attitudes, 2006, What Kind of Foreign Policy Does the American Public Want?, October 20, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/oct06/SecurityFP_Oct06_rpt.pdf, p. 14 When Americans think about what would be best for U.S .foreign policy, a majority of Americans tend to view the United States as a constituent part of a larger whole. Respondents were offered two principles and asked which they thought was the more important one. Only 16 percent endorse the view that the United States should use its power to make the world be the way that best serves U.S. interests and values. Seventy-nine percent opt for the view that the U.S. should coordinate its power together with other countries according to shared ideas of what is best for the world as a whole. Within this context, large majorities say the United States should be willing to make some sacrifices for the collective good. Seventy-five percent say that sometimes the U.S. should be willing to make some sacrifices if this will help the world as a whole, while only 22 percent say the United States should not make such sacrifices.
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Multilateralism Good: Key to Decrease Terrorism
MULTILATERALISM KEY TO REDUCING THREATS FROM TERRORISM Joseph Nye, Harvard, 2003, Foreign Affairs, July, Volume 82, Issue 4, EBSCO
Although the new unilateralists are right that maintaining U.S. military strength is crucial and that pure multilateralism is impossible, they make important mistakes that will ultimately undercut the implementation of the new security strategy. Their first mistake is to focus too heavily on military power alone. U.S. military power is essential to global stability and is a critical part of the response to terrorism. But the metaphor of war should not blind Americans to the fact that suppressing terrorism will take years of patient, unspectacular civilian cooperation with other countries in areas such as intelligence sharing, police work, tracing financial flows, and border controls. For example, the American military success in Afghanistan dealt with the easiest part of the problem: toppling an oppressive and weak government in a poor country. But all the precision bombing destroyed only a small fraction of al Qaeda's network, which retains cells in some 60 countries. And bombing cannot resolve the problem of cells in Hamburg or Detroit. Rather than proving the new unilateralists' point, the partial nature of the success in Afghanistan illustrates the continuing need for cooperation. The best response to transnational terrorist networks is networks of cooperating government agencies.
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Multilateralism Good: Presumptively Best
PRESUMPTION WITH MULTILATERALISM Joseph Nye, Harvard, 2003, Foreign Affairs, July, Volume 82, Issue 4, EBSCO
No large country can afford to be purely multilateralist, and sometimes the United States must take the lead by itself, as it did in Afghanistan. And the credible threat to exercise the unilateral option was probably essential to getting the UN Security Council to pass Resolution 1441, which brought the weapons inspectors back into Iraq. But the United States should incline toward multilateralism whenever possible as a way to legitimize its power and to gain broad acceptance of its new strategy. Preemption that is legitimized by multilateral sanction is far less costly and sets a far less dangerous precedent than the United States asserting that it alone can act as judge, jury, and executioner. Granted, multilateralism can be used by smaller states to restrict American freedom of action, but this downside does not detract from its overall usefulness. Whether Washington learns to listen to others and to define U.S. national interests more broadly to include global interests will be crucial to the success of the new strategy and to whether others see the American preponderance the strategy proclaims as benign or not. To implement the new strategy successfully, therefore, the United States will need to pay more attention to soft power and multilateral cooperation than the new unilateralists would like.
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Multilateralism Good: Russia Isnt a Threat
RUSSIA-U.S. RELATIONS STRONG NOW
Charles Pena, senior fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, an adviser to the Straus Military Reform Project, , and author of Winning the Un-War: A New Strategy for the War on Terrorism, ORBIS, Spring 2006, Pages 289-306 A Smaller Military To Fight the War on Terror Russia comes closest to being able to pose a military threat to the United States, but the Washington-Moscow relationship remains firm despite differences over Iraq. Indeed, Russia now even has observer status with NATO, and in May 2002, Russia and the United States signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads each by December 2012.
EVEN IF RELATIONS TURN SOUR, RUSSIA CANNOT PRESENT A THREAT TO THE U.S.
Charles Pena, senior fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, an adviser to the Straus Military Reform Project, , and author of Winning the Un-War: A New Strategy for the War on Terrorism, ORBIS, Spring 2006, Pages 289-306 A Smaller Military To Fight the War on Terror Even if Russia were to change course and adopt a more hostile position, it is not in a position to challenge the United States. In 2003, Russia's gross domestic product of 1.3 trillion was little more than a tenth of the United States 10.9 trillion GDP. Although a larger share of Russia's GDP went on defense expenditures (4.9 percent vs. 3.7 percent), in absolute terms the United States outspent Russia by more than 6:1, spending 404.9 billion. So Russia would have to devote more than 20 percent of its GDP to defense to equal the United States, which would be higher than Soviet defense spending during the height of the Cold War.
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Multilateralism Good: Regionalism Good
LOOSE REGIONALISM BOOSTS U.S. POWER
Andrew Hurrel, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, v. 1, 2006, p. 9 Third, the dominant power in the system may take the opportunity to exploit regional conflicts to its own advantage and to engage in offshore balancing in precisely the way in which neo-realist theory would predict. A similar, but less often noted, logic applies to regional arrangements: the United States maximizes its power by promoting forms of regionalism so loosely institutionalized that they do not tie down or constrain the US but, at the same time, work to undercut or forestall the emergence of other, smaller regional groupings that could emerge as effective challengers to the US. This pattern has been visible in the cases of both the Asia-Pacific region and the Americas.
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Multilateralism Good: China
CHINA EMBRACES MULTILATERALISM
Rosemary Foot, International Relations Professor, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, v. 1, 2006, p. 80 Nevertheless, it would be unwise to overplay these continuities. Recently, Chinese officials and scholars have investigated and embraced newer concepts such as globalization, multilateralism and cooperative security, connecting them to standpoints more familiar in Beijing. These connections seem to have been made only in the past three or four years, as will be discussed below, influenced strongly by developments since the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the beginning of war in Iraq in 2003.
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Multilateralism Good: Unilateralism Not Key to Primacy
PRIMACY DOES NOT DEPEND ON UNILATERALISM
Mackubin Thomas Owens, professor of National Security Affairs, Naval War College, ORBIS, Spring 2006, Pages 307-325 A Balanced Force Structure To Achieve a Liberal World Order A strategy of primacy through U.S. global leadership does not require unilateral U.S. action everywhere. Realistic primacy depends on the interaction of Churchill's sinews of peace, arms and alliances. To employ a common analogy, the United States is not so much the world's policeman as it is the world's sheriff, who organizes the posse to maintain order: alliances, coalitions, and the various international institutions that create, at least in some parts of the world, an international society, the sine qua non of cooperative security .And it does not mean that all regions of the world are of equal importance to the United States.
ALLIES AND FRIENDS ARE THE CORNERSTONE OF PRIMACY
Mackubin Thomas Owens, professor of National Security Affairs, Naval War College, ORBIS, Spring 2006, Pages 307-325 A Balanced Force Structure To Achieve a Liberal World Order Primacy's central requirement is having the ability to shape the security environment in order to defeat Islamist terrorists, sustain a stable, liberal international order, and prevent the emergence of a hostile global competitor. Geography is the main constraint on the United States in meeting this requirement. Since most threats to international order have arisen on the Eurasian land mass, the United States must be able to influence actors there. To do so requires dealing with the tyranny of distance. Therefore, a cornerstone of primacy is to maintain bilateral and multilateral relations with allies and friends on the littorals of Eurasia.
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Multilateralism Good: Perceptions of Legitimacy Key to Primacy
THE U.S. WILL SUSTAIN ITS POWER IF ITS POLICIES ARE PERCEIVED AS LEGITIMATE
David Lake, UC San Diego, INTERNATIONAL STUDIES PERSPECTIVES, February 2006, American Hegemony and the Future of East-West Relations, p. 29 This suggests that even in an authoritative order, there will be hard bargaining between the United States and China, perhaps most visibly over the issue of Taiwan, but really about the division of the costs and benefits of an American-led regional order. Nonetheless, if the United States invests in authority and works to maintain the legitimacy of its policies, it can build a community of states that will enhance its ability to succeed in the world and that will continue to follow its lead even as its hard power wanes.
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Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: Militarism
THE BUSH DOCTRINE IS GROUNDED IN MILITARISM
Andrew Bacevich, professor of international relations at Boston University, THE NEW AMERICAN MILITARISM: HOW AREMERICANS ARE SEDUCED BY WAR, 2005, p. 147 THE BUSH doctrine of preventive war represents the clearest articulation to date of the new American militarism . As a statement of intent, the doctrine is unambiguous: in an age when deterrence "means nothing" and containment "is not possible," the United States will exercise the prerogative of striking first. "In the world we have entered," George W Bush has declared, "the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act." BUSH DOCTRINE USES MILITARISM TO DRIVE IMPERIAL AMBITIONS THAT THREATEN PLANETARY SURVIVAL Carl Boggs, Social Science Professor National University (L.A.) , 2005, Planetary Politics: human rights, terror, and global society, ed. Stephen Eric Bronner, p. 71-2 The new militarism refers to far-reaching changes in the U.S. armed forces and their role in the world: high-tech innovations, weaponization of space, new global flexibility, overall growth of the war economy, a bolstering empire through economic globalization. More crucially, it is the product of a specific conjuncture in the post-Cold War era where the United States has emerged as the lone superpower and the Pentagon has forged more aggressive strategies in the context of international terrorism, 9/11 and its aftermath, a flexible nuclear doctrine, the concept of preemptive strike, and the urgency of resource wars presently focused on the Middle East and central Asia. U.S. willingness to subvert or bypass international treaties, conventions, and laws including those embedded in the UN Charter, though hardly novel, when taken together also corresponds to a new phase of militarism. The increasing American obsession with military power as a means of asserting national interests, taken to new levels with President George Bush II, has opened up a potentially ominous new era of world politics. A question that needs to be posed here is: Can the United States sustain long-term global domination mainly on the basis of overwhelming force? Are there modes of ideological legitimization available to American ruling elites that could help solidify their supremacy in the face of mounting contradictions and dispersed forms of resistance, both domestic and worldwide? The contemporary resurgence of militarism in the service of US global domination hangs over the world like a horrific nightmare that promises never to go away. Over a period spanning many decades American superiority has been reached through a combination of economic, political, diplomatic, and cultural as well as military power, but in the post-Cold War period the military dimension has taken on new significance. Of course there is little that is absolutely novel about an aggressive US foreign and military policy: it has been central to the imperial legacy from the very outset. As a result of a variety of domestic and international trends at work, however, we are witnessing something of a historic turn in the scope, intensity, and probable long-term consequences of Pentagon interventionism. Old limits and restraints are superseded by intensified growth of the war economy, mounting resource pressures, the information revolution, and the plain hubris of imperial power. The result could be new levels of barbarism that the planet will not be able to withstand.
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Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: Militarism
BUSH DOCTRINE IS A UNIQUE THREAT TO GLOBAL ORDER IMPERIALIST AND RADICAL
Mel Gurtov, Political Science Professor, Portland State University, 2006, Superpower on Crusade: the Bush doctrine in US foreign policy, p. 209 Bush has out-Reaganed Reagan, and conservative realists have noticed it just as have other critics. Clyde Prestowitz was on the mark when he wrote that the Bush Doctrine, even when measured against a long tradition of US interventions, huge military budgets, and other abuses of national security, is a radical agenda, one that conservatives no less than liberals must reject. In his words: The imperial project of the so-called neoconservatives is not conservatism at all but radicalism, egotism and adventurism articulated in the stirring rhetoric of traditional patriotism. Real conservatives have never been messianic or doctrinaire. The very essence of conservatism, which the neoconservatives constantly preach, is limited government. Yet the imperial project they are proposing will greatly increase the role of government both at home and abroad. The imperial project: Bush leads is more than a replay of the early years of the Cold War, and the PNAC is more than a reincarnation of the Committee on the Present Danger. The September 11, 2001, attacks enabled the neocons to take over and transform the nations political agenda, replacing a supposed lack of national purpose in the 1990s with an international crusade. Without 9/11, the balance of foreign policy thinking in Washington would not have shifted from power politics as usual to a doctrine that might makes right. By Bushs second term, there was no hiding the administrations ambitions. As one senior aide to Bush is quoted as telling journalists, Were an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while youre studying that realityjudiciously, as you will well act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and thats how things will sort out. Were historys actors and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.
BUSH DOCTRINE RISKS GLOBAL FASCISM AND PERPETUAL WAR
Mel Gurtov, Political Science Professor, Portland State University, 2006, Superpower on Crusade: the Bush doctrine in US foreign policy, p. 220 The United States can sometimes be its own worst enemy. The war on terror is one of those times, and this reality may be its most important long-term consequence. The extensive use of violence committed and condoned by the United States, its disdain for international law and institutions, and the tendency to regard as enemies any party that refuses to accept its rules in the war are precisely the beliefs of global terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda. Thus the great danger of the Bush Doctrine goes well beyond weakening US influence in world affairs, undermining the rule of law and the principle of proportionality in responding to others violence, and assisting the cause of terrorism as a just response to US hegemony. As an endless, boundary-less war recall Bushs speech of September 2001 warning that the war on terror will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeatedit poses a threat of global fascism that has awful implications for US democracy.
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Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: Militarism Will attack other countries
BUSH ADMINISTRATION IRRATIONALLY BENT ON WAR WILL ATTACK NORTH KOREA OR IRAN TO DIVERT CRITICISM FROM IRAQ Stephen Eric Bronner, Political Science Professor Rutgers, 2005, Planetary Politics: human rights, terror, and global society, ed. Stephen Eric Bronner, p. 110 There is nothing worse than a fearful bully: feint and retreat have supplanted any sustained foreign policy. Suspended between bellicose rhetoric and uncertain aims, the foreign policy of the Bush administration is adrift. Some half-cracked officials and advisors of the administration think that the cure, the best way to soften the impact of a failed policy in Iraq, is to gamble on a spectacular victory elsewhere. A bombing of North Korea or an invasion of, say, Iran will probably not take place while the United States is stuck in an Iraqi quagmire that is solely of it own making. But you never know. The influence of the lunatic right should not be underestimated andas Machiavelli and Sun Tzu understoodit is always better to prepare for the worst.
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Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: Undermines U.S. Hegemony
BUSH DOCTRINE HAS INCREASED OPPOSITION TO US HEGEMONY
Sergio Fabbrini, Political Science Professor, University of Trento, 2006, The United States Contested: American unilateralism and European discontent, ed. Sergio Fabbrini, p. 8 Never before in history has a victorious power undertaken so strongly, as the US has, to constitutionalize its own hegemony (in the Western sphere), setting in motion relations of reciprocal recognition between the interest of the leading hegemon (namely, the US) and those of the hegemonized (countries of Western Europe, but also Japan). This has given life to an American hegemony defined by commentators as benign or reluctant. Still, this hegemony has never been translated into a nationalistic predominance, as happened between the Soviet Union and its satellites in Eastern Europe. Western Europeans, who had to pay appalling costs (in terms of human life and material destruction) for expansionistic and militaristic nationalism, ended up seeing in the US an example of aggregating separated units into a common project (et pluribus unum). After all, America was by definition a multinational melting-pot fed by a continuous flow of million of immigrants coming from all parts of the world; was the country of constitutional patriotism rather than of identity or ethnic nationalism (King 2004); was a political nation which accommodated and tolerated different cultures and different interests (Walzer 1997). It is not so astonishing, then, that the dramatic shift in American foreign policy (seen first in Congress in the 1990s and then in the presidency beginning in 2000) generated such a widespread and deep reaction among Europeans. BUSH DOCTRINE EMBRACES EXCEPTIONALISM AS EXEMPTIONALISM UNDERMINES GLOBAL LEADERSHIP Mel Gurtov, Political Science Professor, Portland State University, 2006, Superpower on Crusade: the Bush doctrine in US foreign policy, p. 200 Sharing the costs, risks, and sacrifices that are necessary to combat problems of global dimensions have found the Bush administration consistently wanting. American exeptionalism has made the United States exemptionalist too often prepared to exempt itself, that is, from the requirements of international law, standards for protecting the environment and human rights, well-established needs for improving the lives of impoverished peoples, and the logic of arms reductions. Instead of being a leader in establishing and strengthening rules and institutions that promote international peace, social justice, and environmental sustainability, the Bush Doctrine places the United States in opposition to them and hypocritically professes its adherence. Apparently, the tangible benefits of international cooperation to the US ability to manage climate change, cope with outbreaks of new diseases, budget for non-military needs, prevent terrorist attacks, protect imprisoned US military and civilian personnel, and enhance the US reputation abroad, for example are less valuable than sustaining a stubborn nationalism.
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Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: Undermines U.S. Hegemony
BUSH DOCTRINE UNDERMINES US INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP
Mel Gurtov, Political Science Professor, Portland State University, 2006, Superpower on Crusade: the Bush doctrine in US foreign policy, p. 213 The purpose of US power today seems to be to lead, not by example oR by multilateral cooperation, but by unilateral action, in the achievement of both an unchallengeable power position and a predominant economic position in the world. Multilateralism, in Bushs definition, means enlisting other countries in support of US policies, as with North Korea and not engaging their cooperation in genuine partnership. As John Ikenberry has written, The prevailing view [in the Bush administration] is that the United States seems prepared to use its power to go after terrorists and evil regimes, but not to use it to help build a more stable and peaceful world orderTo the rest of the world, neo-imperial thinking has more to do with exercising power than exercising leadership.
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Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: Bush Doctrine Violates International Law
BUSH DOCTRINE OF PREVENTIVE WAR VIOLATES INTERNATIONAL LAW
Michael Mandelbaum, Professor Foreign Policy Johns Hopkins, 2005, The Case for Goliath: How America acts as the worlds government in the 21st Century, p. 63-4 As a prospective staple of American foreign policy, the doctrine of preventive war had yet another drawback: It is, strictly speaking, illegal. The basic precept of international law is, and has been for three hand half centuries, the inviolability of national sovereignty. The violation of internationally recognized borders and the forcible interference in the internal affairs of other countries is prohibited except in self-defense. The precept is enshrined in the UN Charter according to which, in Article 2(4), All Members shall refrainfrom the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state and that prohibits, in Article 2(7), intervention in maters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. BUSH DOCTRINE OF PREVENTIVE WAR VIOLATES INTERNATONAL LAW THREATENS TO UNLEASH MANY WARS Mel Gurtov, Political Science Professor, Portland State University, 2006, Superpower on Crusade: the Bush doctrine in US foreign policy, p. 191-2 Preemption is a two-edged sword: It is a transparent argument for toppling undesirable governments, an act clearly contrary to international law; and it is permissive, inviting other states to do the same on the claim of self defense. The Russian, Israeli, Chinese, and some Central Asian governments have used preemption in just that manner, as previously noted; Iran, North Korea, India and Pakistan could do the same. Besides setting an example that can have catastrophic consequences, as Jimmy Carter warned, preventive war would shift us away from the UN system and towards an anarchical world dominated by raw power, shifting alliances, and desperate attempts by vulnerable states to acquire the capacity to deter.
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Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: Nuclear Proliferation
BUSH DOCTRINE LIKELY TO INCREASE PROLIFERATION Michael A. Levi & Michael E. OHanlon, Brookings Institute, 2005, The Future of Arms Control, p. 4
Most controversially, the Bush administration adopted the option of preventive war for thwarting the proliferation of weapons of mass destructionoften promoted as a doctrine of preemption. But preventive war, while occasionally appropriate, is a tool that can do as much to spur proliferation as to contain it. The administrations doctrine also appears to have weakened Washingtons ability to build strong international coalitions to deal with security problems like proliferation.
BUSH PREEMPTION DOCTRINE COUNTERPRODUTIVE TO HALTING PROLIFERATION Michael A. Levi & Michael E. OHanlon, Brookings Institute, 2005, The Future of Arms Control, p. 97-8
Before analyzing individual cases, it is instructive to contrast the basic approach outlined above with the Bush administrations preemption doctrine as codified in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS), which has been promoted as the key to enforcing nonproliferation standards. While there is much that is logical in the thinking behind that strategy, it is at best an incomplete guide for dealing with proliferation crises, and in some important ways it is counterproductive. Preemption defined as the anticipatory use of force in the face of an imminent attack has long been accepted as legitimate and appropriate under international law and by American presidents. In the 2002 NSS, however, the Bush administration broadened the meaning to encompass preventive war as well, in which force may be used even without evidence of an imminent attack to ensure that a serious threat to the United States does not gather or grow over time. The so-called preemption doctrine is thus something of a misnomer, because its sweep is even broader than the term suggests. The strategy also elevated the importance and visibility of preventive war as a tool of US foreign policy. CONTINUES Elevating preemption to a matter of doctrine and including the preventive option within the doctrine can have serious negative consequences, whether it is applied broadly or for more narrow arms control purposes. It reinforces the image of the United States as too quick to use military force and to do so outside the bounds of international law and legitimacy, for its own purposes based on its own judgment. This can make it more difficult for the United States to gain international support for its use of force, complicating its pursuit of a necessarily muscular approach to arms control; it can also provoke some adversaries to seek the very weapons the United States wishes to deny them.
BUSH DOCTRINE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO HALTING WMD PROLIFERATION
Carl Boggs, Social Science Professor National University (L.A.) , 2005, Planetary Politics: human rights, terror, and global society, ed. Stephen Eric Bronner, p. 84 Even the famous US crusade against WMDs is hypocritical in the extreme, reinforcing the very trend (proliferation) it claims to oppose while reserving for itself the right to manufacture and deploy far more WMDs than all other nations in the world combined. Invoking the rhetoric of democracy and human rights, US leaders have made a mockery of international order, helping reinforce a Hobbesian state of nature fully at odds with all their stated intentions. The longer
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such condition persist, the more the United States relies on military force to ensure its global domination, the more precarious becomes its legitimacy within the world system.
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Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: Nuclear Proliferation
BUSH DOCTRINE INCREASES NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
Mel Gurtov, Political Science Professor, Portland State University, 2006, Superpower on Crusade: the Bush doctrine in US foreign policy, p. 197-9 At the precise moment when as many as forty countries are believed capable of developing nuclear weapons, the Bush administration upgraded the weapons importance. Right from the start, and very much in line with the PNACs longstanding position, Bush scrapped the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, which limited nuclear defenses, and refused to resubmit the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the Senate for approval. Instead, Bush opted for missile defense and (see below) new guidelines on the way terrorists attacked on September 11, 2001, not to mention the huge number of US nuclear weapons (over 7,000 strategic weapons in 2002), and the unmatched ability to deliver them on target. Rather than advance the process of actual strategic arms reductions begun by his father, George W. Bush significantly retarded it and thus contributed to the global problem of nuclear weapons proliferation by accenting the perceived advantages of possessing such weapons and resisting the strengthening of international controls on them. He thus joined a long list of US presidents who failed to meet the promise contained in article VI of the NPT to work toward the elimination of nuclear arsenals. First, as pointed out in Chapter 2, the Bush administrations Nuclear Posture Review seemed to expand the possible uses of nuclear weapons, making them an active component of war fighting. It is not out of the question that under Bush the United States might use nuclear weapons first in an ongoing or impending conflict. Second, Bush is eroding nonproliferation norms in is policies on international arms-control agreements. An example is a previously mentioned agreement with India in 2005 to sell it technology for civilian nuclear reactors. If the sale goes through, India promises to allow international inspections and stop further nuclear testing. But it will not be obligated to sign the NPT and assume its obligations. To the contrary, the effect of the agreement will be to recognize India as a nuclear weapon state, thus giving an incentive for other states that possess or may possess nuclear weapons (starting with Pakistan) to seek the same privileged status. Not only is Bushs agreement therefore a further devaluing of controls on WMD, it contradicts the US position in its nuclear dispute with North Korea and its disagreements with Russia and China over their nuclear sales. The Moscow Treaty (officially, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, or SORT) signed by Bush and Putin in May 2002 undermines nuclear arms control in a different way. The treaty commits the United States and Russia
to reduce strategic warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200. But the treaty is deceptive; it will actually enable both countries to restore strategic nuclear weapons levels to those of several years earlier. Since the treaty calls for the warhead reductions to take place by 2012 but without a particular schedule, and permits withdrawal with three months notice, actual reductions can be postponed until the last moment. Thus, the Nuclear Posture Review, while acknowledging a cap of 2,200 strategic weapons by 2012, said that the US arsenal would actually have 3,800 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by 2007. Washington got its way, moreover, by insisting that reduction of warheads should not necessarily mean destruction. The treaty is really a warehousing agreement: It allows deployed nuclear weapons to be put in
. Thus the treaty does not actually require the destruction of a single strategic warhead. Nor is it verifiable. In short, from a global security point of view, the Moscow Treaty revives a tradition of sacrificing real nuclear weapons reductions and movement toward nuclear disarmament for national advantage. Likewise, Bushs policies on the security and production of nuclear weapons materials have been incredibly shortsighted. His decision in the spring of 2002 to cut funding for the 1991 Nunn-Lugar initiative, which provides for storage or destruction of the former Soviet Unions nuclear
storage, which the Bush administration had indicated is exactly what will be done with most of the offloaded warheads weapons, was overturned by cooperative Senate action. Actually, extending cooperative threat-reduction programs such as Nunn-Lugar to include other states would be one way to send a different message namely, that the security of nuclear weapons, and their ultimate destruction, is a sound investment, all the more so at a time when many experts are convinced that the most likely use of a nuclear weapon is by a terrorist group. Then, in an extraordinary reversal of previous US policy, Bush in mid-2004 refused to support conclusion of a Fissile Materials Treaty, which bans production of weapons-grade HEU and plutonium and provides for international inspection and verification. The treaty, ten years in the making, was negotiated under the auspices of the UN Conference on Disarmament. Evidently and Bushs budgeting certainly goes along with this view, as does a decision in 2005 to restart plutonium 238 production at the Idaho National Laboratory preserving the secrecy of US nuclear weapons facilities and having plenty of plutonium on hand are more urgent than bringing nuclear weapons materials under international control. Yet the latter objective would create obstacles both to the acquisition of weapons-grade materials
The message on nuclear weapons that the Bush administration is sending to the world is that such weapons have utility. Its support of ballistic missile defense, its seeming indifference to the growing Japanese interest in nuclear weapons, and its hesitancy to provide security assurance to North Korea against nuclear attack all add value to nuclear weapons and undermine prospects for a nuclear-free world.
by terrorist groups and their use by countries seeking to become nuclear weapons states.
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Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: Nuclear Proliferation
MANY PROBLEMS WITH BUSH DOCTRINE AS AN NON-PROLIFERATION STRATEGY Francis Fukuyama, Professor International Studies Johns Hopkins, 2006, America at the Crossroads, p. 90-2
Indeed, the broader question that should have been raised then and that should be discussed now is whether preventive war ought to be a key instrument in dealing with nuclear proliferation now that the earlier restraints posed by the Nonproliferation Treaty regime have broken down. There are several reasons for thinking that preventive war is no longer a good option. First, it has become over time increasingly difficult in operational terms to preemptively destroy building nuclear programs. The very success of the Israeli strike against Osirak has meant that a similar strike in the future would be much more difficult as proliferating states move their facilities underground or harden or disperse them. The miserable failure of American intelligence to accurately identify WMD capabilities in Iraq, and its inability to assess the truth of current North Korean claims to have a bomb, suggest the difficulties that will face future preemptive strikes. The second problem is that while preemption or the threat of preemption may indeed deter proliferation (as some have argued was the case with Libya), it could in other cases serve as a stimulus to proliferation. Neither North Korea nor Iran seems to have concluded that it must give up its nuclear weapons program and disarm as a result of the Iraq war; Pyongyang, indeed, appears to have accelerated the North Korean program with the idea that possession of a nuclear weapon would be a strong deterrent to US attack. Preemption in any event only slows, but does not stop proliferation. The third problem is that if the United States seeks to use not just precision air strikes but regime change as a means of stopping rogue state proliferators, it has to be able to manage the process of regime change successfully. The American experience in Iraq has now probably scotched the kind of casual talk that could be heard before the war about planning to take down Pakistana country with eight times the population of Iraqin the event it was taken over by radical Islamists. Finally, the value of the delay gained by using military force to stop proliferation needs to be weighed against the political damage that such action might entail. This dilemma is evident in Iran today: a significant part of the Iranian population opposes the regime of the mullahs in Teheran and is well disposed toward the United States. But part of this opposition is also quite nationalistic, and might actually favor a more liberal Iran that possessed nuclear weapons. An American military strike at Iranian facilities would probably undercut this opposition and set back prospects for internal reform.
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Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: Nuclear Proliferation
BUSH DOCTRINE FAILS TO STOP PROLIFERATION STRIKES INEFFECTIVE AGAINST NORTH KOREA AND IRAN Jonathan Herbert, Lecturer American Studies Keele University, 2006, Developments in American Politics, eds. G. Peele, C Bailey, B Cain & B. Peters, p. 248-50 In both the Iranian and North Korean cases, the administrations strategy has had to adjust to the inability of the US to change other nations behavior. Military strikes against either nation look a poor option. The location of any weapons program is unclear, which necessarily limits strikes effectiveness. Strikes also risk inducing retaliation. The North Koreans could destroy the South Korean capital of Seoul with conventional weaponry, while the Iranians could step up the activities of their proxies in Iraq or attack Israel. Unilateral US sanctions would have a limited impact upon either proliferators, but broader sanctions on the part of the international community have proved hard to achieve. Many of the developing countries are very reluctant to set a precedent of restricting allegedly peaceful nuclear programs. Instead, the US is attempting to coopt other nations influence over the proliferators. Other powers, most notably China, have power over Iran and North Korea, through trade, aid and energy. China and Russia are keen to stop North Korea becoming a nuclear threat, so they have an interest in cooperating with the Americans at the six-nation talks. The multilateral route, though, has problems. First, proliferators may be playing for time by negotiating. Weapons programs may be completed over the years spent in negotiations, leaving the international community facing a fait accompli. Second, the US has to be tolerant of others interests to coopt their power. The interests of Koreas neighbors may include a non-nuclear North Korea, but they also like in trade and a good relationship with the power of other nations involved in the talks, without taking positions that sacrifice their co-negotiators assistance. Ultimately, the Americans aim has become to present proliferators with a choice. Either North Korea and Iran must negotiate, and sacrifice large parts of their nuclear program, or they must show commitment to that program and incur their neighbors wrath. The US calculates that, if the negotiating process demonstrates the inherent unreliability of the proliferators, political support for further actions will grow. As yet, the two series of talks have not yielded results.
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Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: Nuclear Proliferation
ARMS CONTROL MORE EFFECTIVE THAN MILITARY ACTION AT HALTING PROLIF Michael A. Levi & Michael E. OHanlon, Brookings Institute, 2005, The Future of Arms Control, p. 6
The alternatives to some sort of arms control interdiction, blockades, and military action, carried out unilaterally or by coalitions of the willing are not up to the task of controlling dangerous arms. Each of these activities may be necessary at some point, but aloneand even as a groupthey will be insufficient. Limited attacks to disarm countries will often prove impossible because of insufficient intelligence about the location of key enemy assets. All-out invasions to overthrow offending regimes are hugely difficult and risky; in some cases they would be even more so than in Iraq in 2003. More fundamentally, were the set of countries pursuing advanced weapons of mass destruction to significantly expand, even the United States and its close allies would not have the financial, human, or political capital necessary to forcibly restrain them. Coercive instruments of policy can work only in a small number of cases, given the diplomatic and military difficulty of employing them. Arms control cannot provide absolute guarantees that countries will not acquire or sell dangerous materials. But it can provide disincentives to such actions, make it more difficult to carry them out, and make it easier to detect illicit activity. By doing so, it can provide disincentives to such actions, make it more difficult to carry them out, and make it easier to detect illicit activity. By doing so, it can help to establish predicates, if necessary. For coercive action. Indeed, arms control can and should be viewed as a complement to coercive action, not as a substitute for it.
DETERRENCE OF NEW PROLIFERANTS MORE DIFFICULT THAN THE COLD WAR
Michael Mandelbaum, Professor Foreign Policy Johns Hopkins, 2005, The Case for Goliath: How America acts as the worlds government in the 21st Century, p. 49-50 If any of the rogue states were to become declared nuclear-weapon states, the initial consequence would be to thrust upon the United States the military mission that is carried out toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War: deterrence. The purpose would be not only to protect the rogues neighbors but also to try to persuade them not to acquire nuclear weapons themselves. The new mission would not require wrenching changes in either the foreign policy or the military deployments of the United States. American forces were already stationed on the Korean peninsula to deter a non-nuclear attack southward by North Korea, and the United States had long assumed responsibility for protecting the oil-rich but militarily weak sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf that an Iraqi or Iranian nuclear arsenal would threaten. The task of deterring nuclear-armed rogues would, in one sense, be an easier one than deterrence had been during the Cold War, since none could accumulate the huge stockpiles of nuclear arms that the Soviet Union assembled. In another way, however, post-proliferation deterrence would present a more difficult challenge. The threat of retaliation did successfully deter the Soviet Union, but the three rogue regimes seemed sufficiently detached from the normal constraints of decency and prudence that American officials wondered whether it would be possible to prevent them from using nuclear armaments in their possession by the same method. Moreover, even if the familiar technique of deterrence could prevent an actual nuclear attack by any of the axis countries, the mere possession of armaments of this type might embolden these regimes to blackmail or assault their neighbors, on the assumption that their nuclear arsenals would deter the United States from retaliating.
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Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: Nuclear Proliferation AT Libya
BUSH POLICIES COUNTERPRODUCTIVE FOR NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION DESPITE APPARENT SUCCESS OF LIBYA Mel Gurtov, Political Science Professor, Portland State University, 2006, Superpower on Crusade: the Bush doctrine in US foreign policy, p. 214 The invasion of Iraq was a leadership failure on another front, that of nuclear nonproliferation policy. Although US strategists might think that North Korea, Iran, and Syria got the message delivered by the invasion that seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction invites severe US countermeasures, subsequent developments showed that what North Korea and Iran actually got was the importance of having a nuclear weapons option as a practical matter of self defense. Libya did give up its quest for a nuclear weapon, but probably not mainly due to US pressure. In fact, the Libya case actually proves the opposite of the lesson drawn by the Bush administration. Besides hurting economic sanctions, Qaddafi called it quits in 2000 because of UN inspections, good intelligence, and the high cost of continuing a nuclear weapons program. The same factors were working against Iraq in 2003 until Bush, sensing an easy victory, went to war. Despite Libya, Bushs policies outlined in Chapter 6 suggest that the United States has foreclosed a precious opportunity created by the end of the Cold War to move toward a decisive reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons and the means to produce and deliver them. Such leadership should have started with the Moscow (SURE) treaty and dramatic, immediate, and verifiable reductions and destruction of US and Russian strategic arsenals. Bush should also be leading the way in plugging the loopholes in the NPT, strengthening the IAEAs ability to carry out inspections of nuclear facilities, reducing production of fissile materials and preventing international trafficking in them, prohibiting research, testing, and development of mini-nukes and other refinements, and promoting international cooperation (while spending more) to secure nuclear plants and prevent nuclear materials as well as weapons from falling into terrorists hands. US leadership in these areas may increase pressure on unrecognized nuclear weapons states outside the NPT and the CTBT (Israel, India and Pakistan) to place their facilities under international inspection. Lastly, the Bush administration should be giving high priority to creating security and economic incentives, in cooperation with its Asian and European partners, that will persuade North Korea and Iran to abandon the nuclear weapon option.
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Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: Undermines Multilateralism
BUSH DOCTRINE EMBRACES UNILATERALISM
Sergio Fabbrini, Political Science Professor, University of Trento, 2006, The United States Contested: American unilateralism and European discontent, ed. Sergio Fabbrini, p. 13-4 The US military invasion of Iraq in Spring 2003 was the foremost expression of this unilateral approach; it was pursued notwithstanding its unequivocal opposition by a majority of the members of the UN Security Council (and particularly by two strategic European allies, France and Germany, both members of the UN Security Council in 2003, although only the first has a permanent seat). The US was unable to make a case for the war, failing to convince the UN Security Council of the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and of a connection between the terrorists of September 11 and Saddam Husseins regime. Notwithstanding the opposition to the war by the majority of the UN Security Council members, the US decided to proceed anyway in invading Iraq with only the support of Great Britain and a few other countries. The invasion testifies to the seriousness of the new, grand strategy that President Bush made public on September 20, 2002, a new strategy based on four main principles (Ikenberry, 2002). First, America has the moral duty to keep its military superiority over all great powers in the world (including, implicitly, the European countries). The international system is militarily unipolar and so it must remain. Second, America has to free itself from the multilateral constraints of the previous era. Its power needs to be free to pursue and guarantee its national interests, and the interests of its allies and partners, according to its own determination. Third, in facing the new borderless challenge of international terrorism, America claims the right to intervene anywhere in the world to anticipate a plausible threat to its own security. As Bush argues to forestall or preventhostile acts by our adversaries, the United States, will, if necessary, act preemptively [] The United States, cannot remain idle while dangers gather. According to this new world order, Washington, DC gets to decide whether or not a country is an international threat, thus giving its own national sovereignty more weight than that of all other countries in the world. Furthermore, America alone will decide who are its legitimate partners or allies. As Defense Secretary Rumsfeld specified: The mission must determine the coalition; the coalition must not determine the mission. If it does, the mission will be dumbed down to the lowest common denominator, and we cant afford that. Fourth, America should not work for the promotion of the stability of the international status quo because that stability does not prevent apocalyptic violence. That is, America will have to be more militant and less respectful of existing global alliances and balances, as neoconservative thinkers were suggesting long before September 11 (Kaplan 2001). A unilateral militancy devoted to diffusing freedom in the world, or better, to exporting democracy, because democracies do not fight each other is evidence that a new-Wilsonian rhetoric has been put at the service of a Jacksonian strategy (Mead 2002). However, while Woodrow Wilson tried to make the world safe for democracy through multilateral institutions like the League of Nations (Smith 1994), George W. Bush, is trying to export democracy in the world through the unilateral exercise of American power.
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Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: Undermines Multilateralism
BUSH DOCTRINE HOSTILE TO TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION NEEDED TO ADDRESS MANY GLOBAL PROBLEMS Mel Gurtov, Political Science Professor, Portland State University, 2006, Superpower on Crusade: the Bush doctrine in US foreign policy, p. 181 Global citizenship should mean that governments strive to act in ways that promote planetary well-being the welfare of the vast majority of humanity, the conservation of its precious natural resources and ecology, the sanctity of its cultures, the strength of internationally accepted institutions and standards, and peaceful and equitable relations between states and peoples. When governments act as global citizens, they do so in recognition that national interests are sometimes best served by promoting the interests of the global communityfor example, by setting and meeting agreed-upon standards of human rights and environmental protection, contributing to peacekeeping missions, and alleviating poverty. These are the kinds of large-scale issues that cannot be managed by one or a few countries; their scope requires transnational and global cooperation to address. The notion of global citizenship is, unfortunately, at odds with the philosophy that informs the Bush Doctrine. Its insistence on an American internationalism inevitably limits support for international law and organizations except when those fall in line with US preferences. The United States has a long history of going it alone on global issues, though often that is due less to an administrations decision than to the influence of domestic forces such as lobbies, congressional committees, and large corporations. In the George W. Bush administration, however, international cooperation has been deliberately downplayed in favor of US interests and values. This chapter provides numerous examples drawn from five areas of global concern: human rights, poverty, the environment, international law and organizations, and weapons proliferation.
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Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: EU Relations-AT Relations Resilient
ENOUGH PROBLEMS HAVE PILED UP THAT THE RELATIONSHIP CANNOT TAKE ANY MORE STRESSES Peter Dombrowski & Andrew L. Ross, Professors Strategic Studies Naval War College & Political Science University of New Mexico, 2006, Changing Transatlantic Security Relations, eds. Hallenberg & Karlsson, p. 161 It is important to remember that many of the disagreements between the United States and the European Union, the United States and European members of NATO, and the United States and various individual states are simply part of the give and take of partners operating within a close and long-standing relationship under stress. In and of themselves they should not lead anyone on either side of the Atlantic to ponder the ultimate fate of the Western alliance. Yet the accumulation of petty grievances and the breach that developed over Iraq resulted in the most significant crisis in transatlantic affairs since the end of the Cold War. The chronic unwillingness of senior leaders in the Bush administration to acknowledge their mistakes and treat allies with respect and dignity drove a wedge between the United States and Europe. That then-national security advisor, and now Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice could in April 2003 remark that the way to deal with three prominent recalcitrants was to Forgive Russia. Ignore Germany. Punish France reveals the depths to which US relations with its European and Russian partners had sunk. Efforts to repair the relationship have not been especially successful. Even as French, German, and American leaders pay ritual homage to the importance of transatlantic relations, there has been little give on outstanding issues. Although European states assumed a leading role in the Balkans, a much greater role in contributions were much less than members of the Bush administration foreign policy team had hoped for. Part of this is an artifact of lesser European capabilities, but part also stems from the reluctance to join what is perceived to be a losing battle. Relations were less contentious on the economic front, although outstanding trade and financial issues remained to be dealt with.
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Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: EU Relations-AT Economic Interdependence Means No Impact
BUSH UNILATERALIST FOREIGN POLICY IS UNDERMINING EU-US RELATIONS DESPITE ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE Miles Kahler, Professor International Relations, UC San Diego, 2005, The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress, ed. David M. Andrews, p. 99-100 A second stabilizer has been the deepening and largely symmetric economic interdependence between Europe and the United States. The growth in foreign direct investment across the Atlantic, which implicates the largest corporations in each economy, has particular political significance. Skeptics will point to the persistent stream of trade conflicts that divide the European Union and the United States, from beef hormones to steel tariffs. Such conflicts are a constant, however, and the institutions of the World Trade Organization have no so far assisted in their management, if not their resolution. Before any of those conflicts are allowed to endanger the economic relationship, the political stabilizers of corporate power will be brought to bear in Washington and Brussels. These longstanding stabilizers are now under considerable pressure from changes in American politics, particularly the ideological and partisan polarization that has grown over the past three decades. That polarization does not directly implicate the transatlantic relationship or institutions such as NATO: no powerful political force in the United States (or in Europe) aims to undermine the relationship. Instead, transatlantic cooperation has suffered collateral damage from the growing weight of unilateralist and nationalist policies in the Republican Party. The Republican mainstream that emerged in the 1990s sharply disagrees with the European mainstream on a range of foreign policy issuesfrom global environmental agreements (Kyoto accord) and human rights violations (the International Criminal Court) to the value of the United Nations in dealing with threats such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Although disagreement surrounds the substance of many of these issues, the sharpest disagreements have emerged over the instruments that are chosen: military versus diplomatic or economic, unilateral versus multilateral. Conflict is heightened by the absence of a clear political analogue to conservative Republican ideology in the European political spectrum. The Conservative Party once led by Margaret Thatcher is a shadow of its former self; even those European politicians who align themselves with the Bush administration, such as Berlusconi in Italy and Aznar in Spain, seldom share the combined Republican attachments of religiosity, nationalism, and unfettered capitalism.
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Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: American Exceptionalism
BUSH DOCTRINE IS THE MOST OBVIOUS EXAMPLE OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM PROVOKED NEGATIVE GLOBAL RESPONSE Francis Fukuyama, Professor International Studies Johns Hopkins, 2006, America at the Crossroads, p. 101 The reasons why the Iraq war provoked such an upsurge of anti-Americanism are complex and will be explored at greater length below. But there was a short-term reason for this resistance that was built into the National Security Strategy doctrine of preventive war: its implicit recognition of American exceptionalism. Clearly, a doctrine of preventive war is not one that can be safely generalized throughout the international system. Many countries face terrorist threats and might be inclined to deal with them through preemptive intervention or the overturning of regimes deemed to harbor terrorists. Russia, China, and India all fall into this category, yet if any of them announced a general strategy of preemptive/preventive war as a means of dealing with terrorism, the United States would doubtless be the first country to object. The fact that the United States granted itself a right that it would deny to other countries in based, in the NSS, on an implicit judgment that the United States is different from other countries and can be trusted to use its military power justly and wisely in ways that others powers could not.
CONSERVATIVES EMBRACE AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
Peter Beinart, Editor, The New Republic, 2006, The Good Fight: Why Liberalsand only liberalscan win the war on terror and make America great again, p. 199-200 Todays conservatives are not against persuasion. They simply reject the notion that Americas ability to persuade relies on its willingness to be persuaded. And that is why they distrust international institutions, because while the UN and NATO do not ignore the realities of power the United States is first among equals in both bodies they imply some level of reciprocity. For the Bush Administration, by contrast, moral progress is a one-way conversation. The United States calls on other countries to embrace democracy; we even aid them in the task. But if they call back proposing some higher standard that might require us to modify our actions, we trot out John Bolton. When other countries deny due process, it is barbaric, but when we do so, it is necessary. When other countries build nuclear weapons, they constitute a threat to international peace, but when we build a whole new class of nuclear weaponsnot for deterrence but for potential battlefield usewe are taking prudent steps in our defense. For the rest of the world, security and freedom require infringements upon national sovereignty. But for the United States, sovereignty trumps all. To be sure, America will never be in perfect harmony with international opinionwe have our own interests and sometimes even our own values. But liberals reject the rights claim that American actions, simply by virtue of being American, are beyond moral judgment. In the fight against totalitarianism, the world needs independent organizationsdedicated to human rights and beholden to no nationable to challenge governments in the name of freedom. And if they are doing their job, those organizations will sometimes challenge us. Rather than pretending our democratic credentials exempt us from scrutinyas the Bush administration did when Amnesty International condemned its secret, indefinite credentials with renewed meaning. And it is that internal effortprecisely because it is difficult, precisely because it requires us to confront our own capacity for injusticethat can build solidarity with the embattled democrats beyond our shores. The most useful place to look for the inspirations that drive Arab democracy activists these days, writes the Lebanese journalist Rami Khouri, is not the speeches of President George W. Bush, but rather the protest movements among American civil rights activists in the period 1956-1964. There may be no struggle in todays America with the capacity to so fully capture the imagination of the world. But in a global fishbowl, where non-Americans have vast exposure to what happens within our shores and our prisons, Americas willingness to honor the principles that we evangelize for abroad can help invest our power with the legitimacy it badly needs.
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Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: American Exceptionalism
NEOCONSERVATISM HAS EMBRACED AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
Mario Del Pero, History Professor University of Bologna, 2006, The United States Contested: American unilateralism and European discontent, ed. Sergio Fabbrini, p. 43 Thus, the exceptionalism idea, that has accompanied the US from its inception and which had undergone a deep crisis in the turbulent 1960s and 1970s, was relaunched in the following years by the neoconservatives. American exceptionalism, as Australian historian Ian Tyrrel brilliantly illustrated some years ago, is based upon the prehistoric idea of the United States as a special case outside the normal patterns and laws of history. More than an idea, it is an ideology that conveniently overlooks the many interactions that have always existed between the US and the rest of the world, Europe is particular. Neoconservatisms vision of the world, and its idea of Americas role and mission in the international arena, stemmed from this current of exceptionalist nationalism; an ideology of national greatness, based upon the premise that the US will not fall, whatever might happen. Cold War liberalism had adhered to such belief, and had contributed to a de facto globalization of American nationalism. But this nationalist/universalist creed had been radically shaken by the Vietnam defeat, internal consensus on which the universalist assumptions of Cold War liberalism had rested. Neoconservatism was therefore the last remake of US exceptionalist nationalism. It affirmed the intrinsic uniqueness of America. It asserted the superior quality of the American nation and the benign nature of the overwhelming power that the US had come over time to possess (Lieven 2004). However, exceptionalist nationalism could not, by itself, provide a sufficient intellectual and political exit strategy from the crisis, real or perceived, that the US underwent in the 1960s and early 1970s. An exit strategy from the abrupt disappearance of those moral and political certainties that had provided the pillars of US Cold War policies and discourse. This strategy, however, was constructed in negative and oppositional terms. A neoconservative was originally defined as a liberal mugged by reality. Reality and realism were therefore brandished against the many political and philosophical utopias to which Americans had fallen prey. Utopias which liberals had contributed to generate totalitarian projects or, as in the case of nave liberals, has made them blind to the perils that the existential threat of Communism was still posing to the US. NEO-CONSERVATIVES SEE AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AS LICENSE TO DO WHATEVER WE WANT SINCE WHATEVER WE DO IS GOOD Sergio Fabbrini, Political Science Professor, University of Trento, 2006, The United States Contested: American unilateralism and European discontent, ed. Sergio Fabbrini, p. 20-1 This religious and militant nationalism is the engine which powered the unilateralist turn in foreign policy since the 1990s (in the Congress) and since 2000 (in the presidency). It is the core of the new conservative nationalism, which of course comprises other conservative currents. This conservative nationalism has tried successfully to appeal to the tradition of American exceptionalism, interpreted however in cultural rather than political terms. To conservative nationalists, America is exceptional because of its cultural past more than for its political future. This past confirms that America is exceptional for its enduring faith in democracy and freedom. But if America is exceptionally good, then it also can be exceptionally powerful, because its power will be only used in the pursuit of good . To neoconservatives, America is necessarily good whatever she does internally and externally. Thus, the new conservative exceptionalism has recovered America from the contrition of liberal nationalism of the 1960s. It has rehabilitated the myth itself of American exceptionalism, which had been seriously brought into question (externally) by the defeat in Vietnam and (internally) by the criticism of the civil rights movement. For conservative nationalism, America has to rely on itself, domestically and internationally. It has the moral quality and the military power to shape itself and the world in accordance with its founding (cultural and religious) values.
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Multilateralism Good: American Exceptionalism Bad: Undermines US Security
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO US SECURITY INTERESTS TO EXEMPT ITSELF FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW John Brady Kiesling, State Department Diplomat who resigned over 2003 Iraq War, 2006, Diplomacy Lessons: realism for an unloved superpower, p. 59 The problem with denying the application of international law to the United State is it makes international law less compelling as a political excuse for foreigners to behave decently. The United States does not have to depend on the Geneva Conventions to protect captured US service members. It can threaten massive military retaliation and often that threat will succeed. By doing so, however, the United States incurs substantial foreign policy costs. Appealing to the Geneva Convention, by contrast, is free and even admirable, provided America pays the negligible extra cost of having to abide by them itself. AMERICAN EXCPETIONALISM COUNTERPRODUCTIVE STRENGTHENS APPEAL OF THE HOSTILE OTHER John Brady Kiesling, State Department Diplomat who resigned over 2003 Iraq War, 2006, Diplomacy Lessons: realism for an unloved superpower, p. 141 American politicians self-congratulatory assertions of American uniqueness are a mistake because they play into the narrative of the hostile Other. President Clinton had a rare gift for expressing American values in a way that recognized that foreigners had them too. President Bush prefers, for domestic political reasons, to imply that America is a uniquely virtuous and legitimate purveyor of freedom and democracy. The original context of his statements was the intended war to the death against Muslim zealots allegedly intent on Americas extermination. When the president changed his tune to emphasize democracy building rather than weapons of mass destruction, his hoped-for democratization of the Arab world was already firmly embedded into a narrative of methodological, long-term efforts by the selfish Other to destroy a traditional, virtuous, and beleaguered society. The best service the United States can provide Arab democrats who wish to avoid being gunned down in the streets of Baghdad is to keep firmly silent while they themselves point out that the roots of democratic decision making can be found centuries ago in their own society. US claims of moral superiority are easy enough to rebut, and the world is full of people who feel it their moral obligation to rebut all such claims. Historical lapses such as slavery aside, foreigners usually focus on localized US oddities, such as infatuation with the death penalty, attachment to handguns, and public displays of sectarian fervor, to prove that America is out of the moral mainstream. But sometimes the rebuttal is more pointed.
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Multilateralsim Good: American Exceptionalism Bad: Undermines Legitimate US Leadership
LEGITIMATE HEGEMONY REQUIRES THE US TO PLAY BY THE MULTILATERAL RULES
Michael Mann, Sociology Professor UCLA, 2004, American Power in the 21st Century, eds. David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, p. 57 We must remain skeptical of American claims that the New Empire would be completely benevolent. Imperialists always say this but never are. But an Empire to which the ruled routinely consent is not unusual. This is what we call hegemony, a word which indicates that the imperial power establishes the rules of the game by which others routinely play. They may come to also approve of the rules as well, so that hegemony becomes genuinely legitimate. But the basis of hegemony is more a matter-of-fact acceptance of things as they are. Then peoples own everyday actions help reproduce the dominance without much thought. I will instance the roll of the dollar as the worlds reserve currency below. Hegemony should be an invisible hand, lying behind the accepted rules of the game. The catch is that to be hegemonic, the US might have to play by the rules. As Empire based on highly visible militarism abandons the rules and so risks losing hegemony. Joseph Nye expressed this as the pursuit of hard power threatening Americas soft power. But the new imperialists went ahead, saying that success would bring legitimacy afterwards. AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM UNDERMINES EFFECTIVE FOREIGN POLICY AND LEGITIMACY OF US POWER Peter Beinart, Editor, The New Republic, 2006, The Good Fight: Why Liberalsand only liberalscan win the war on terror and make America great again, p. 100 A hypocritical foreign policy creates several problems for the United States, especially given its dominant world role. First, instead of demonstrating that the United States is a principled nationthat is, a nation whose conduct is guided by certain ethical principles and whose word can be counted uponhypocritical behavior casts doubt on Americas moral stature and the credibility of US promises. It makes US primacy less legitimate in the eyes of other countries, for they will regard it as especially unfair when the worlds most powerful county lacks virtue. Second, when the United States ignores norms that it expects other states to observe, it is suggesting that the United States is unwilling to be bound by rules and more likely to use its considerable power without restraint. In addition to fostering foreign resentment, such behavior is likely to add to underlying fears about US power itself.
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Multilateralsim Good: American Exceptionalism Bad: Undermines Legitimate US Leadership
US EXCEPTIONALISM HYPOCRISY UNDERMINES US LEADERSHIP Phyllis Bennis, Institute for Policy Studies, 2006, Challenging Empire, p. 138-9
Beyond the specifics of US strategy in the Middle East and surrounding regions, there is a particularity to US foreign policy that engenders antagonism around the world, from Washingtons closest European and Canadian allies to the poorest countries of the impoverished global South. More than any single policy or even onset of policies, it is the arrogance with which US policy is imposed that is so infuriatinginternational law dismissed, UN requirements ignored, and internationally supported treaties abandoned. While the US demands that other governments strictly abide by UN resolutions, treaties, and international law, and threatens or imposes sanctions or even military assault in response to violations, it holds itself accountable only to its own separate law of empire. Every empire in history has created its own set of laws for managing its far-flung possessions and colonies. As mentioned earlier, Athens had separate laws for its colony Mylos than for itself. The Roman empire had one set of laws for Rome itself, another for its far-flung possessions. The Ottoman, Russian, British empires did much the same thing. Finally, toward the end of the 20 th Century, having scaled once unimaginable heights of military, economic, and political power, it was Washingtons turn. This American law of empire exuded extraordinary arrogance, the arrogance of absolute power unchallenged by any other global force.
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Multilateralism Good: American Exceptionalism Bad: Undermines International Law
TRUMPETING OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM INTERNALLY CONTRADICTORY WEAKENS THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IT PRESUMES TO RULE Carl Boggs, Social Science Professor National University (L.A.) , 2005, Planetary Politics: human rights, terror, and global society, ed. Stephen Eric Bronner, p. 82-3 The very idea of global hegemony exercised by a lone superpower turns ought to be problematic given the inherent conflict between general and particular interests along with severe dysfunctions of neoliberal globalization itself: class polarization, growing world poverty, decline of public services, coercive practices of international agencies, recurrent financial crises. The absence of governing or planning mechanisms, usually available to national elites, permits these contradictions in the global system to veer out of control. Elites may be tempted to resolve conflict through military force, a frequent modus operandi of post-Cold War US foreign policy. In this milieu, US attempts to contain anarchic features of the world system are likely to aggravate the dialectic of militarism and terrorism, as the increasing superpower reliance on force simultaneously reflects and intensifies the superpower weakness in other spheres. As Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly Silver write: The declining hegemon is thus left in this anomalous situation that it faces no credible military challenge, but it does not have the financial means needed to solve system-level problems that require system-level solutions. One might add that the deficit involves not only financial but political and ideological resources as well. Meanwhile, militarization itself breeds chaos and disruption that helps destabilize a global economy dependent on the smooth flow of capital, materials, and information. It follows that the Bush II foreign policy, with its emphasis on patriotic mobilization and US exceptionalism, could subvert its own global agendas, weakening the very international system over which it rules or presumes to rule.
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Multilateralism Good: American Exceptionalism Bad: American Exceptionalism Can Repair Damage to US leadership
CAN REPAIR DAMAGE TO US LEADERSHIP MUST EMBRACE MULTILATERALISM AND REPUDIATE AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM John Brady Kiesling, State Department Diplomat who resigned over 2003 Iraq War, 2006, Diplomacy Lessons: realism for an unloved superpower, p. 277 Between 2001 and 2004 the United States squandered much of its diplomatic capital to pursue an irresponsible war in Iraq. The US President lost his title of the leader of the free world. Many former friends wrote America off as an amoral, superstitious empire in decline. The damage is reparable because the United States still has enormous power for good and because no sensible person is comfortable with the power vacuum Americas retreat to isolationism would create. Americas most precious diplomatic capital is other peoples faith that the interests of a justice-loving America are compatible with their own. To make it politically possible to rebuild that capital, it helps to embrace the optimistic side of the diplomats cynical worldview: morality and self-interest are inseparable, provided we persuade our politicians to take a long enough view of those interests. In the long run, security cannot be purchased at the expense of justice. Good diplomacy situates US interests in the shared, humane values of the rational Enlightenment. Those values, as articulated by the Founding Fathers, once made the United States the acknowledged, admired leader of the progress-minded people all around the world. Those values will make America a respected superpower again.
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Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: North Korea
BUSH DOCTRINE INCREASED PROLIFERATION INCENTIVES FOR NORTH KOREA
Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 220-1 On Iran, the verdict is still out. Unfortunately, on North Korea, the outcome has been quite poor. The George W. Bush administration was paralyzed for much of its first term in trying to choose between a hard-line preference for facilitating regime change and a more flexible yet still tough conditioned-engagement strategy. On balance, its focus on Iraq and its doctrine of preemption created a set of circumstances that made it much harder to prevent Pyongyang from roughly quadrupling its nuclear arsenal in the last half decade. HARD POWER IMBALANCE, REGIME CHANGE GOAL PUSHED NORTH KOREA TO DEVELOP AND TEST NUKES Robert S. Ross, Professor Political Science Boston College, 2006, The Nikkei Weekly (Japan), November 20, p. Lexis North Korea's detonation of a nuclear device has alarmed countries throughout East Asia. Pyongyang defied the interests and warnings of the great powers and all of its Northeast Asian neighbors, suggesting that East Asia's "rogue state" is determined to destabilize the region and risk heightened tension and even hostilities. But the implications of North Korea's nuclear test are anything but clear. The impact of the test will ultimately depend on the region's understanding North Korea's intentions and on its impact of the test on underlying trends in great power relations. For all of North Korea's reputation as a reckless state determined to risk war to acquire nuclear weapons, there is little regional apprehension that Pyongyang will rely on its nuclear capability to launch a war. Rather, the U.S., China, and South Korea understand that North Korean defiance of the international community is an act of desperation reflecting its strategic isolation in the face of overwhelming South Korean and U.S. military supremacy and apparent U.S. determination to destabilize the North Korean regime. Indeed, North Korea launched its nuclear program as its Soviet ally was collapsing, its Chinese ally was abandoning Communism, and both Moscow and Beijing were developing economic and political relations with South Korea. The assumption of North Korean insecurity is reflected not only in South Korean complacency following the North Korean test, but also in U.S. acquiescence to a nuclear North Korea. If there were an expectation of North Korean use of force, the U.S. and South Korea's response would have been far more bellicose.
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Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: North Korea
US HAS LOST LEADERSHIP ON KOREAN PENINSULA BECAUSE OF ITS EMPHASIS ON HARD POWER AND COERCION Robert S. Ross, Professor Political Science Boston College, 2006, The Nikkei Weekly (Japan), November 20, p. Lexis Foremost, Pyongyang's nuclear test underscores and signals the significant decline of U.S. leadership on the Korean Peninsula. The George W. Bush administration's effort to use coercive diplomacy to compel North Korea to abandon its nuclear program has failed. This failure reflects Washington's inability to develop support from China and South Korea. Indeed, Beijing and Seoul have actively cooperated against U.S. policy. Whenever the U.S. has threatened use of force, South Korea declared that Washington could not use its territory to attack North Korea. Whenever the U.S. called for tighter economic sanctions against Pyongyang, South Korea and China declared that they would not interrupt trade with North Korea. And whenever the U.S. escalated tensions and threatened war, South Korean leaders traveled to Beijing for consultations, further undermining U.S. coercive diplomacy. Growing U.S. isolation on the Korean Peninsula has been under way for many years. It reflects the rise of China. As China's military power has grown and its market has come to dominate South Korean economic stability, the South Korean leadership has moved Seoul toward cooperation with Beijing at the expense of U.S.-South Korean cooperation. This is not only apparent regarding policy toward North Korea, but also regarding U.S.-South Korean defense cooperation. South Korea has refused to adjust U.S.-South Korean defense ties to accommodate the Pentagon's policy of U.S. "strategic flexibility." It does not want to cooperate with Washington regarding a possible military emergency involving China. Similarly, South Korea has demanded that Washington relinquish war-time joint-command authority over South Korean forces.
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Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: North Korea: Policy Fails to Stem North Korean Proliferation
HARD-LINE STRATEGIES HAVE FAILED TO STEM NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM Jawhar Hassan, CEO of ISIS Malaysia, 2006, New Straits Times, (Malaysia), October 8, 2006; Pg. 23
It also follows, therefore, that the strategies directed against North Korea require a fundamental re-think, especially on the part of the US. These strategies have only served to compound the problem, not resolve it. They have helped militarise the situation further and forced North Korea down the nuclear path. Threats and sanctions have not worked. They have impoverished the people further, and forced greater diversion of scarce sources to the overwhelming imperative of maintaining and strengthening defence. Fifty years of relentless harassment and pressure have, not surprisingly, led to extreme paranoia. They have helped prop up a brutal totalitarian system, not weakened it.
HARD-LINE RESPONSE TO NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM COUNTERPRODUCTIVE Scott Snyer, CSIS, 2006, The Korea Herald October 17, p. Lexis
The collateral risks of pushing too hard and making a bad situation worse include the possibility that sanctions could induce political destabilization and thereby jeopardize North Korean command and control over "loose nukes" in the context of a regime change, trigger a worsening humanitarian crisis or renewed famine where the North Korean people would bear the brunt of suffering. Perhaps worst of all, a cornered Kim Jong-il might conclude that his only choice is to pursue a suicide option designed to take his enemies with him. DIPLOMACY ONLY WAY TO RESPOND TO NORTH KOREAN NUKES FORCE AND PUNISHMENT WILL FAIL
Scott Snyer, CSIS, 2006, The Korea Herald October 17, p. Lexis
The most difficult challenge is to find a formula by which a diplomatic approach can be reconstituted, given the unacceptability to North Korea's closest neighbors of either military conflict or regime failure. To illustrate the contradictions at hand, the U.N. Security Council resolution under discussion considers a travel ban on North Korean diplomats; on the other hand, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. John Bolton has said earlier this week that "If (the North Koreans) want to talk to us, all they have to do is buy a ticket to Beijing." The prospect of renewed diplomacy essential to any prospect for a peaceful solution - is made even more difficult by Pyongyang's public defiance of Beijing resulting from the missile and nuclear tests. There is no longer a serious prospect for neutral mediation, but the likelihood that North Korea will make a unilateral "strategic decision" prior to returning to negotiations without a face-saving mechanism to obscure the North's humiliation is even harder to imagine given the psychological boost to North Korea's self-image as a nuclear power. The task of defining the agenda, scope, and purpose of renewed talks in any format will surely be complicated by North Korea's presumption that it come back to talks as a recognized nuclear weapons state. The international consensus must be strengthened to reject North Korea's claims to such a status. The agenda for any renewed diplomacy must remain the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. North Korea will not stop knocking on the door of the nuclear club, yet the dangers and costs of further escalation seem excessively high. Punishment alone does not provide an effective path to escape the current dangers, especially at a time when the few available diplomatic
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measures are dismissed or equated with appeasement. But the seriousness of the threat will require unprecedented diplomatic coordination and convergence of strategic aims among North Korea's neighbors if the worst scenarios are to be avoided, or at least managed effectively.
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Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Bad: North Korea: Policy Fails to Stem North Korean Proliferation
HARDLINE APPROACH TO NORTH KOREAN PROLIFERATION COUNTERPRODUCTIVE U.S. Newswire, 2006, October 9, p. Lexis
The U.S. government and some in Congress will point the finger at North Korea as the problem and call for national and international sanctions, naval blockades or perhaps military threats. Sanctions and blockades will primarily impact the North Korean people, not the leaders who made these decisions. Further, we do not know how North Korea might respond to a new diplomatic initiative, but we do know that war, threats of war or escalating confrontation through naval blockades will virtually guarantee that North Korea will continue to pursue nuclear weapons.
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Multilateralism Good: Unilateralism Fails
IRAQ AND LEBANON PROVE FUTILITY OF UNILATERAL MILITARY CAMPAIGNS
Eli Fried, Policy Analyst, School of Government, Tel Aviv University, 2006, Jerusalem Report, October 16, p. 62 If there is one big lesson to be learned from the war in Lebanon and Iraq, it is that both Israel and the United States can gain as much, if not more, from international cooperation as from the unilateral use of naked power. America's experience in Iraq has demonstrated that no amount of military power can make up for a lack of vital international support. Indeed, as a result of its aggressive and unilateralist post-September 11 policies, Washington found itself unable to play the role of regional broker early on in the Lebanon fighting. However, it went on to pursue a sustainable cease-fire through a process of multilateral engagement, and, with the passing of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, significantly enhanced its persuasive capacity - or " soft power " - in the region. Its pursuit of an agreed-upon policy enabled the United States to co-opt the international community without sacrificing President Bush's paradigmatic division between the forces of good and evil. In other words, it is not the U.S.'s moral partitioning that the world opposes, but rather its perceived neo-colonialist policies and unilateralist tendencies. Israel, which has traditionally opposed multilateral forums as being inherently counter to its national interests, must now take a leaf out of the American book. Similar to the lessons the U.S. is in the process of learning in Iraq, the Lebanon war should teach Israel the limits of "hard power" in achieving its long-term objectives, and the benefits of exploring policies seen as legitimate by the international community and moderate Muslim states, and to engage in multilateral dialogue.
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Multilateralism Good: Soft Balancing Now
COUNTRIES ARE ALREADY ACTING TO RESTRAIN U.S UNILTERAL. POWER THROUGH MULTILATERAL SOFT BALANCING
Robert A. Pape is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 7
The George W. Bush administration's national security strategy, which asserts that the United States has the right to attack and conquer sovereign countries that pose no observable threat, and to do so without international support, is one of the most aggressively unilateral U.S. postures ever taken. Recent international relations scholarship has wrongly promoted the view that the United States, as the leader of a unipolar system, can pursue such a policy without fear of serious opposition. The most consequential effect of the Bush strategy will be a fundamental transformation in how major states perceive the United States and how they react to future uses of U.S. power. Major powers are already engaging in the early stages of balancing behavior against the United States, by adopting "soft-balancing" measures that do not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but use international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements to delay, frustrate, and undermine U.S. policies.
MAJOR POWERS ARE ALREADY BALANCING AGAINST THE U.S.
Robert A. Pape is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 7 Second, major powers are already engaging in the early stages of balancing behavior against the United States. In the near term, France, Germany, Russia, China, Japan, and other important regional states are unlikely to respond with traditional hard-balancing measures, such as military buildups, war-fighting alliances, and transfers of military technology to U.S. opponents.
MAJOR POWERS WILL ENGAGE IN SOFT BALANCING
Robert A. Pape is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 7 Directly confronting U.S. preponderance is too costly for any individual state and too risky for multiple states operating together, at least until major powers become confident that members of a balancing coalition will act in unison. Instead, major powers are likely to adopt what I call "soft-balancing" measures: that is, actions that do not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but that use nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral U.S. military policies. Soft balancing using international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements has already been a prominent feature of the international opposition to the U.S. war against Iraq.
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Multilateralism Good: Soft Balancing Now
SOFT BALANCING AGAINST THE U.S. HAS INCREASED
Robert A. Pape is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 7 Although some observers might have thought that major powers would easily mend fences with the United States after the conquest of Iraq, in fact there are signs of growing soft balancing against it. Perhaps the most important indicator concerns U.S. allies. Key countries that sided with the United States during the war are working with France and Germany in a manner that works against further U.S. military adventures. Following the March 2004 election, Spain's newly elected prime minister, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, declared, "I want Europe to see us again as pro-European. The war in Iraq has been a disaster and the occupation continues to be a great disaster. Spain is going to see eye to eye with Europe again. Spain is going to be more pro-Europe than ever." In September 2003 the United Kingdom joined France and Germany in an effort independent of the United States to use diplomacy and economic statecraft to persuade Iran to limit its nuclear ambitions. In February 2005 these European efforts compelled the Bush administration to declare that it would not use force against Iran "at this point in time" and to support a multilateral approach to the issue, at least temporarily.
THE WORLD IS STARTING TO BALANCE AGAINST U.S. UNILATERALISM
Robert A. Pape is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 7 Such widespread opposition is virtually unprecedented in U.S. history, especially by European and other major powers allied with the United States since World War II. The world is pushing back in response to the Bush administration's strategy of aggressive unilateralism. For the first time, the United States has adopted a national strategy to conquer countries that are not attacking it or its allies, at a time of its choosing, whether other states agree with U.S. policies or not. That Iraq and most other announced possible targets of this preventive war strategy are important to the control of Persian Gulf oil only makes matters worse. That the Bush strategy simultaneously calls for other aggressive unilateral military policies that will increase U.S. nuclear advantages over major powers indicates the administration's lack of concern about a backlash from these states.
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Multilateralism Good: Unilateralism Soft Balancing
INCREASING UNILATERALISM INCREASED HARD AND SOFT BALANCING
Robert A. Pape is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 7 If the Bush administration continues to pursue aggressive unilateral military policies, increased soft balancing could establish the basis for hard balancing against the United States. To avoid this outcome, the United States should renounce the systematic use of preventive war, as well as other aggressive unilateral military policies, and return to its traditional policy governing the use of force -- a case-by-case calculation of costs and benefits.
AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM INCREASES SOFT BALANCING
Robert A. Pape is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 7 Third, soft balancing is likely to become more intense if the United States continues to pursue an aggressively unilateralist national security policy. Although soft balancing may be unable to prevent the United States from achieving specific military aims in the near term, it will increase the costs of using U.S. power, reduce the number of countries likely to cooperate with future U.S. military adventures, and possibly shift the balance of economic power against the United States. For example, Europe, Russia, and China could press hard for the oil companies from countries other than the United States to have access to Iraqi oil contracts, which would increase the economic costs of U.S. occupation of the country. Europeans could also begin to pay for oil in euros rather than in dollars, which could reduce demand for the dollar as the world's reserve currency and so increase risks of inflation and higher interest rates in the United States. Most important, soft balancing could eventually evolve into hard balancing. China and European states could also increase their economic ties with Russia while the Kremlin continues or even accelerates support for Iran's nuclear program, a step that would negate U.S. economic pressure on Russia while signaling the start of hard balancing against the United States.
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Multilateralism Good: Unilateralism Soft Balancing
U.S. UNILATERALISM WILL INCREASE SOFT BALANCING
Robert A. Pape is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 7 None of these moves directly challenges U.S. military power, but they all make it more difficult for the United States to exercise that power. They impose immediate costs and constraints on the application of U.S. power by entangling the United States in diplomatic maneuvers, reducing the pressure on regional states to cooperate with its military plans, and bolstering the claims of target states that U.S. military threats justify the acceleration of their own military programs. They also establish a new pattern of diplomatic activity: cooperation among major powers that excludes the United States. If the United States remains committed to its unilateral military policies, such soft-balancing measures are likely to become more common. Balancing against a sole superpower such as the United States will have a logic of its own, one perhaps not wholly unique, but one that is nonetheless distinctive to the condition of unipolarity.
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Multilateralism Good: Unilateralism Soft Balancing
INCREASED UNILATERALISM CAUSES OTHER COUNTRIES TO ACT TO CONSTRAIN THE U.S.
Robert A. Pape is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 7 Serious opposition to U.S. military policies is only likely to increase if the United States continues along its present course of aggressive unilateralism. Traditional hard balancing -- military buildups, war-fighting alliances, and transfers of military technology to U.S. opponents -- may not occur soon in today's world, dominated as it is by the United States' overwhelming military power. But states can dilute the U.S. advantage and contain the United States' power in other ways. Even without directly confronting U.S. military might, major powers can use soft balancing tools -- international institutions, economic statecraft, and ad hoc diplomatic arrangements -- to limit the use of U.S. power in the short term and establish the crucial conditions for more ambitious balancing efforts in the long term. Without broad international support, the Bush strategy for stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction to rogue states using preventive war and aggressive nuclear policies does not serve U.S. national security interests. Keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of authoritarian regimes is important, but even the world's only superpower cannot afford to provoke -- and, more significantly, to frighten -- a majority of the major powers at once. Immediately after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States' NATO allies unanimously declared that the attacks were an act of aggression, and they offered to assist in joint defense. Indeed, many nations -- including Germany and France -- have military forces still serving in Afghanistan. But, unless the United States radically changes its avowed national security strategy, it risks creating a world in which a broad, if loose, coalition of major powers (including most of its nominal allies) is more motivated to constrain the United States than to cooperate with it.
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Multilateralism Good: Bush Doctrine Soft Balancing
THE BUSH-DOCTRINE IS THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND COUNTER-BALANCING
Robert A. Pape is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 7 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth contend that opposition to the Bush strategy among various European states and Russia was driven not by incentives to balance the United States, but by the coincidence of two main factors: domestic politics, especially in the case of Germany; and hard bargaining, particularly for Russia. Their evidence, however, shows that neither alternative factor provides much explanatory power independent of the key international pressures generated by the Bush Doctrine. Brooks and Wohlforth note that in the summer of 2002 Chancellor Schroder started to use opposition against the United States for domestic political advantage, but gained no increased German public support until Vice President Dick Cheney's public call for preventive war on Iraq on August 26. They also confirm that Russia gave up a great deal (oil contracts worth $ 8-$ 20 billion) to oppose Iraq, which should not have happened if hard bargaining to make absolute gains had been the main motive behind Russia's behavior. See Brooks and Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 72-108. On its face, the rhetoric of the Bush strategy may appear to present few reasons for major powers and other states to change their view of U.S. intentions. Its chief objective is to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to rogue states, principally Iran, Syria, Libya, North Korea, and Iraq (before March 2003). To achieve this aim, the United States asserts the right to destroy a rogue state's military power "unilaterally if necessary," to build a national missile defense to defeat efforts by rogue states to develop long-range ballistic missiles capable of hitting the United States, and to maintain the primacy of U.S. military power to keep other states from "surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States." The main concern of other states is not with the goals of U.S. policy, but with the means, especially with the Bush administration's willingness to use unilateral military action to achieve its otherwise acceptable goals. Such action violates long-standing international norms against the use of preventive war as a legitimate policy tool, provides important relative gains for the United States in a region of the world crucial to the economic growth of major states, and increases the United States' already considerable military advantages over major nuclear powers. PREVENTIVE WAR. Iraq is the United States' first preventive war. Although the United States has used force to defend allies from military attack, to stop the spread of ethnic and ideological insurgencies, and to protect oppressed peoples, it had never before conquered a country to stop that state from gaining military power. Until now, many analysts have thought that democratic values and institutions would make classic territorial aggrandizement to conquer, occupy, and transform another country that does not pose an imminent military threat impossible. The U.S. conquest of Iraq, however, challenges one of the most important norms in international politics -- that democracies do not fight preventive wars -- and so undermines the assurance that comes from the expectation that democratic institutions can keep a sole superpower from altering the status quo to its advantage.
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Multilateralism Good: Preventive War Soft Balancing
PREVENTIVE WAR INCREASES BALANCING AGAINST THE U.S.
Robert A. Pape is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 7
The Bush strategy of preventive war against rogue states and aggressive unilateral military policies in general are increasing the incentives for major powers to balance against the United States. Since 2002, scholars, journalists, and diplomats have witnessed the result: a profound change in the world's response to American power. They have seen not simply the reluctance of traditional allies to join the U.S. war effort against Iraq, but active efforts by many of the world's major powers to delay, frustrate, and undermine U.S. war plans and reduce the number of countries that would fight alongside the United States.
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Multilateralism Good: Preventive War Bad: Deterrence Works
DETERRENCE WORKS AGAINST ROGUE REGIMES
James Steinberg has recently been appointed Dean of the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin; the position will begin on 1 January 2006. Currently, he is Vice President and Director of the Foreign Policy Studies Program at The Brookings Institution, SURVIVAL, Winter 2005-6, p. 68 For rogue regimes, in some cases, there do appear to be viable alternatives. There is reason to believe that deterrence continues to have value against most states, however roguish, in particular with regard to nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. It most likely also applies to the willingness of rogue states to transfer nuclear, biological or chemical weapons to terrorists: although such transfer might take place clandestinely, the risk that the transfer will be either detected as it takes place, or attributed after the fact, leading to the use of force against the provider, is likely to outweigh the benefits of the transfer, particularly since any regime that might be tempted to transfer would also worry about the weapons being used against it! This deterrent effect can be enhanced by improving the technology of attribution (the ability to trace the source, for example, of fissile material or pathogens) and by deemed attribution (i.e. announcing in advance that a particular state will be held responsible by acts of particular group of terrorists even in the absence of specific evidence of transfer) .
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Multilateralism Good: Preventive War Fails
FAILURE TO ACCURATELY PREDICT MAKES SUCCESSFUL PREVENTIVE WAR IMPOSSIBLE
Francis Fukuyama, International Relations Professor @ Johns Hopkins, AMERICA AT THE CROSSROADS: DEMOCRACY, POWER, AND THE NEOCONSERVATIVE LEGACY, 2006, p. 85-6 One of the reasons why preventive war has always been regarded as prudentially problematic, however, is that it depends on being able to accurately predict the future. We know in retrospect what people in 1936 did not fully understandnamely, that Hitler would go on to dismember Czechoslovakia and plan a war against Poland. Perhaps they should have known and were being criminally naive, but that is a judgment easier to make after the fact. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden in 1956 believed he was in a Rhineland-type situation when he went ahead with the Suez war, failing to foresee that Egypt's President Nasser would not ultimately present the same threat to world security as Hitler. The Germans in the first decade of the twentieth century feared the weakest member of the Concert of Europe, Russia; based on projections of Russian power out into the future and prepared for war against the country before it became too strong. It is perhaps not surprising that the great German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck labeled preventive war "committing suicide for fear of death."" Ken Jowitt puts the problem in the following terms: So the logic behind an anticipatory strategy is powerful. However, its strategic application demands the combined wisdom of Pericles and Solomon. To begin with, the premise for an anticipatory attack posits a hostile leader and regime platonically impervious to any environmental changes whether domestic or international. This is not always a mistake ---Hitler and Pol Pot are cases in point, but it is almost always mistaken. Over time, most regimes do change substantially if not essentially. One has only to look at the Soviet Union after 1995 and China after 1978.
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Multilateralism Good: Preventive War Fails
THREE REASONS PREVENTIVE WAR FAILS
Francis Fukuyama, International Relations Professor @ Johns Hopkins, AMERICA AT THE CROSSROADS: DEMOCRACY, POWER, AND THE NEOCONSERVATIVE LEGACY, 2006, pp. 90-1 There are several reasons for thinking that preventive war is no longer a good option. First, it has become over time increasingly difficult in operational terms to preemptively destroy budding nuclear progra ms. The very success of the Israeli strike against Osirak has meant that a similar strike in the future would be much more difficult as proliferating states move their facilities underground or harden or disperse them. The miserable failure of American intelligence to accurately identify WMD capabilities in Iraq, and its inability to assess the truth of current North Korean claims to have a bomb, suggest the difficulties that will face future preemptive strikes . The second problem is that while preemption or the threat of preemption may indeed deter proliferation (as some have argued was the case with Libya), it could in other cases serve as a stimulus to proliferation. Neither North Korea nor Iran seems to have ( concluded that it must give up its nuclear weapons program and disarm as a result of the Iraq war; Pyongyang, indeed, appears to have accelerated the North Korean program with the idea that possession of a nuclear weapon would be a strong deterrent to U.S. attack. Preemption in any event only slows, but does not stop, proliferation. The third problem is that if the United States seeks to use not ping rogue state proliferators, it has to be able to manage the process of regime change successfully. The American experience in Iraq has now probably scotched the kind of casual talk that could be heard before the war about planning to "take down" Pakistan-a country with eight times the population of Iraq-in the event it was taken over by radical Islamists. Finally, the value of the delay gained by using military force to stop proliferation needs to be weighed against the political damage that such action might entail.
PREVENTIVE WAR FAILS
Stephen Walt, Harvard, TAMING AMERICAN POWER, 2005, pp. 234-5 Supporters of this new doctrine argued that this preventive war might be needed to prevent "rogue states" from obtaining WMD, based on the fear that such regimes would give them to anti-American terrorists and thus expose the United States to the threat of surprise attack. Yet the danger that rogue regimes will give away WMD is extremely remote. After incurring all the costs and risks of obtaining these weapons, would any leader either give or sell them to terrorists, when he could not control how the terrorists might use them and could not be sure that the transfer would not be detected? Indeed, a rogue state that obtained WMD could not be sure that the United States would not retaliate if it merely suspected that they had transferred weapons to a terrorist group. For this reason, among others, new WMD states will go to great lengths to make sure that their arsenals do not find their way into terrorists' hands. No foreign government is going to give up the weapons they need for deterrence and allow them to be used in ways that would place their own survival at risk. The invasion and occupation of Iraq offers abundant evidence of the inherent unworkabilitv of a policy of preventive war. The failure to find any Iraqi WMD demonstrates that going to war merely on the basis of suspicions is fraught with peril-especially -,,,-,hen leaders who want to go to war are able to distort the intelligence process to produce the "answers" that they want. Furthermore, when you invade a foreign country in order to disarm and oust a hostile regime, you end up owning the entire society and must therefore deal with all of its internal problems. As the United States has discovered in Iraq, trying to occupy and rebuild a divided and hostile society, is costly and difficult. For both these reasons, preventive war will rarely (if ever) be a viable policy option!
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Multilateralism Good: Preventive War Fails
PREVENTIVE WAR DESTROYS U.S. CREDIBILITY
Stephen Walt, Harvard, TAMING AMERICAN POWER, 2005, pp. 225-6 Equally important, making preventive war the centerpiece of U.S. national-security policy did considerable damage to America's international image. All nations retain the option of using force if their survival or vital interests are threatened, and America's enemies are well aware that the United States might use force first if its own security were at risk. But putting preventive war at the heart of U.S. national-security policy- made the world's most powerful country seem eager to use force-at times and places of its own choosingwhether or not a genuine threat of attack was actually present. Not surprisingly, this policy was alarming to most countries, because no state could be entirely sure that they would not end up in America's crosshairs, or be confident that their interests would not be adversely affected by a unilateral U.S. decision for war. It also set a dangerous precedent: If preventive war made sense for the United States, then it could be equally legitimate for China, India, Pakistan, Syria, Russia, or any other country that concluded it could improve its strategic position by using force against a weaker adversary. In short, adopting a declaratory policy that emphasized preemption damaged America's global image without enhancing U.S. securiry, and repudiating this policy_ is the obvious first step in rebuilding America's reputation.' Second, instead of emphasizing "preemption," the United States should strive to reassure its allies that it will use force with wisdom and restraint. In particular, the United States can reduce the fear created by its superior power by giving other states a voice in the circumstances in which it will use force. Although exceptions may arise from time to time, the United States should be willing to use a de facto "buddy system" to regulate the large-scale use of its military power-whether by NATO, the UN Security Council, or other international institutions. The point is not to cede control over U.S. foreign policy to foreign powers or to an international institution like the United Nations; the point is to use other states or existing institutions to reassure others about the ways the United States will use its power. Conservative critics of the UN and other multilateral institutions have mistakenly focused on the rather modest restrictions that these organizations might impose on the United States, and they have ignored the role these institutions could play in legitimating U.S. policy and reducing the risk of an anti-American backlash.
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Multilateralism Good: Multilateralism Reduces Soft Balancing
EMBRACING MULTILATERALISM REDUCES SOFT BALANCING
Robert A. Pape is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 7 Soft balancing, however, is not destiny. The Bush administration's national security strategy of aggressive unilateralism is the principal cause of soft balancing and repudiating this strategy is the principal solution. In practice, this would mean an explicit rejection of the strategy's most extreme elements (e.g., unilateral preventive war), renouncement of the most serious reasons to doubt U.S. motives (e.g., unilateral control over Iraqi oil contracts), and reestablishment of the U.S. commitment to solve important international problems multilaterally (e.g., a renewed commitment to the UN). The reputation of the United States for benign intent would slowly return, and the incentives for balancing against it would markedly decline. Although rare circumstances may require the unilateral use of U.S. power in the future, the security of the United States would be significantly enhanced if the Bush administration abandoned its policy of aggressive unilateralism.
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Multilateralism Good: Soft Balancing Bad: Readiness
SOFT BALANCING UNDERMINES U.S. SECURITY IN MULTIPLE WAYS Robert A. Pape is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 7
Soft balancing may not stop the United States from conquering a rogue state or from pursuing a vigorous nuclear buildup, but it can have significant long-term consequences for U.S. security. In the months leading up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, soft balancing had already encouraged millions of Europeans and hundreds of thousands of Americans to protest the impending war. Such protests can have important consequences for governments that support U.S. policy -- or refuse to. In recent elections, German, Turkish, and even South Korean political leaders have already learned that anti-Americanism pays. Indeed, vigorous opposition to the Bush doctrine of preventive war in September 2002 was likely the pivotal factor enabling German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder to recover from a position of almost certain defeat to win a new term. Even if the leaders of Britain and other members of the "coalition of the willing" against Iraq can avoid domestic backlash, few are likely to be willing to cooperate with future U.S. military adventures.
SOFT BALANCING IMPOSES DIRECT MILITARY COSTS
Robert A. Pape is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 7
Soft balancing can also impose real military costs. The United States may be the sole superpower, but it is geographically isolated. To project power in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, it depends greatly on basing rights granted by local allies. Indeed, all U.S. victories since 1990 -- Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan -- relied on the use of short-legged tactical air and ground forces based in the territory of U.S. allies in the region. Without regional allies, the United States might still be able to act unilaterally, but it would have to take higher risks in blood and treasure to do so. Turkey's refusal to allow U.S. ground forces on its soil reduced the amount of heavy ground power available against Iraq by one-third, thus compelling the United States to significantly alter its preferred battle plan, increasing the risk of U.S. casualties in the conquest of Iraq, and leaving fewer forces to establish stability in the country after the war.
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Multilateralism Good: Soft Balancing Hard Balancing
SOFT BALANCING ESTABLISHES A BASIS FOR HARD BALANCING
Robert A. Pape is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 7 Most important, soft balancing can establish a basis of cooperation for more forceful, hard-balancing measures in the future. The logic of balancing against a sole superpower is about coordinating expectations of collective action among a number of second-ranked states. In the short term, this encourages states to pursue balancing strategies that are more effective at developing a convergence of expectations than in opposing the military power of the leading state. Building cooperation with nonmilitary tools is an effective means for this end.
U.S. ACTION AGAINST OTHER ROGUE STATES WILL TURN SOFT BALANCING TO HARD BALANCING
Robert A. Pape is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 7
Most important, soft balancing could eventually evolve into hard balancing. Now that the United States has conquered Iraq, major powers are likely to become quite concerned about U.S. intentions toward Iran, North Korea, and possibly Saudi Arabia. Unilateral U.S. military action against any of these states could become another focal point around which major powers' expectations of U.S. intentions could again converge. If so, then soft balancing could establish the basis for actual hard balancing against the United States.
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AT: International Institutions Constrain U.S. Hegemony
International institutions boost U.S. leadership Stephen G. Brooks & William Wohlforth, government professors, Dartmouth, Foreign Affairs; March/April 2009, p49-63 Even a ruthlessly self-interested United States should want a robust framework of international institutions, which include not just formal organizations and treaties but also informal rules and standards of legitimacy. Why? Because institutions facilitate the United States' own global leadership. Clearly, it is far easier to manage the world economy with an effective World Trade Organization (WTO). Less obvious but just as significant are the manifold ways that international institutions help the United States advance its security interests. Marshaling "coalitions of the willing" is an inefficient approach. Each new coalition requires striking a new set of bargains with different partners and offering them new carrots and sticks. Within an established institution, in contrast, states develop habits for working together. Having an institution in place to facilitate cooperation on one issue also makes it easier for the participating states to rapidly achieve cooperation on a related issue. NATO'S intelligence-sharing network was designed in the Cold War to gather information on the Soviet Union, for example, but later was quickly adapted to deal with the unforeseen issue of global Islamist terrorism. International institutions prevent a backlash against U.S. hegemony Stephen G. Brooks & William Wohlforth, government professors, Dartmouth, Foreign Affairs; March/April 2009, p49-63 Institutions can also reduce the need for states to actively manage the international system, thereby lessening the sometimes irksome perception that U.S. power is being exercised. The U.S. government has a strong interest in gaining as much information as possible about Iran's nuclear program, for example. Conveniently for Washington, the International Atomic Energy Agency is directing the effort; absent the IAEA, the United States would be forced to burn up resources and political capital to procure such information and would likely be much less successful. In short, the more the network of global institutions protects the interests of the United States, the less Washington needs to employ its power in ways that provoke resentment among other governments. Institutions enable the burden of cooperation to be shared Stephen G. Brooks & William Wohlforth, government professors, Dartmouth, Foreign Affairs; March/April 2009, p49-63 Institutions are no panacea. They do not obviate the need for tough negotiating between states. But they do tend to center the bargaining on how the burden of cooperation should be shared rather than on whether cooperation should occur at all--a focus that is preferable for the United States. The United States maybe frustrated that other members of NATO are not contributing more to the mission in Afghanistan, but it is far better to have this particular conversation than to debate whether countries such as France and Germany should make any contribution at all.
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Multilateralism Critical to Solve Global Problems
Global problems cannot be solved unilaterally Stephen G. Brooks & William Wohlforth, government professors, Dartmouth, Foreign Affairs; March/April 2009, p49-63 As interdependence among countries intensifies and the list of global problems that the United States cannot resolve on its own grows, the benefits of international institutions will increase. Many current problems require continuous attention rather than one-shot solutions. To prevent terrorism, for example, the world will need to establish a reliable and efficient set of controls for monitoring borders. Such an effort will work only if appropriate standards are widely adopted and cooperation in implementing them becomes routine. Even if it turns out that the United States is less vulnerable than other states to new global problems-- such as the augmented threat of infectious diseases and greater flows of refugees from conflicts in Africa--it is clearly better off in a world with institutional structures that establish standards to address them. The world's growing complexity means that governments place a premium on accumulating information in order to meet today's challenges. Although the United States is able to gather a great deal of information on its own, it sometimes wastes resources by unknowingly duplicating the efforts of its allies. And when it possesses only partial information, its work must be combined with that of other countries. Routinizing the sharing of data within global institutions can help with both problems. Moreover, information about topics such as nuclear programs, which are sensitive, may only be available via international organizations, whose perceived impartiality and wider inspection access often put them in a better position to secure it . International institutions promote the national interest Stephen G. Brooks & William Wohlforth, government professors, Dartmouth, Foreign Affairs; March/April 2009, p49-63 Realists tend to appreciate the use of power but are skeptical of the importance of institutions. (Liberals, for their part, appreciate the importance of institutions but are frequently skeptical of using power to reshape them.) But the benefits of international institutions are grounded in realism: it will be harder for the United States to advance its national interests if it does not invest in them. It was only by ignoring the benefits of institutions and overestimating their costs that neoconservatives in the Bush administration were able to dismiss the role that they can play in fostering U.S. global leadership. Unencumbered by these doubts about the usefulness of institutions, the United States is likely now to push for reform. And that is no small matter. Institutional change is much more likely when there is a dominant state with the legitimacy to lead and the capabilities necessary to help overcome problems of collective action. The question is, Does the United States have the power and the legitimacy today to succeed?
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Multilateralism Good: Soft Balancing Bad: Readiness
SOFT BALANCING UNDERMINES MILITARY READINESS
Robert A. Pape is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 7 States can also seek to equalize the odds through soft balancing. Balancing can involve the utilization of tools to make a superior state's military forces harder to use without directly confronting that state's power with one's own forces. Although soft balancing relies on nonmilitary tools, it aims to have a real, if indirect, effect on the military prospects of a superior state. Mechanisms of soft balancing include territorial denial, entangling diplomacy, economic strengthening, and signaling of resolve to participate in a balancing coalition. All of these steps can weaken the military power that the superior state can bring to bear in battle. SOFT BALANCING UNDERMINES READINESS IN MULTIPLE WAYS Robert A. Pape is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 7 Thus, soft balancing differs from everyday international diplomacy, which often seeks to resolve disputes through compromise rather than through changes in the balance of power or the use of policies that limit a strong state's military power. TERRITORIAL DENIAL. Superior states often benefit from access to the territory of third parties as staging areas for ground forces or as transit for air and naval forces. Denying access to this territory can reduce the superior state's prospects for victory, such as by increasing the logistical problems for the superior state or compelling it to fight with air or sea power alone, constraints that effectively reduce the overall force that a stronger state can bring to bear against a weaker one. ENTANGLING DIPLOMACY. Even strong states do not have complete freedom to ignore either the rules and procedures of important international organizations or accepted diplomatic practices without losing substantial support for their objectives. Accordingly, states may use international institutions and ad hoc diplomatic maneuvers to delay a superior state's plan for war and so reduce the element of surprise and give the weaker side more time to prepare; delay may even make the issue irrelevant. Especially if the superior state is also a democracy, entangling diplomacy works not only by affecting the balance of military capabilities that can be brought to bear in the dispute but also by strengthening domestic opposition to possible adventures within the superior state. ECONOMIC STRENGTHENING. Militarily strong, threatening states that are the targets of balancing efforts usually derive their military superiority from possession of great economic strength. One way of balancing effectively, at least in the long run, would be to shift relative economic power in favor of the weaker side. The most obvious way of doing this is through regional trading blocs that increase trade and economic growth for members while directing trade away from nonmembers. If the superior state can be excluded from the most important such blocs, its overall trade and growth rates may suffer over time. SIGNALS OF RESOLVE TO BALANCE. Second-ranked powers seeking to act collectively against a sole superpower confront intense concern that the needed collective action will not materialize. Soft balancing, in addition to its direct usefulness in restraining aggression by a unipolar leader, may also address this problem by helping to coordinate expectations of mutual balancing behavior. If multiple states can cooperate, repeatedly, in some of the types of measures listed above, they may gradually increase their trust in each other's willingness to cooperate against the unipolar leader's ambitions. Thus, a core purpose of soft balancing is not to coerce or even to impede the superior state's current actions, but to demonstrate resolve in a manner that signals a commitment to resist the superpower's future ambitions. Accordingly, the measure of success for soft
balancing is not limited to whether the sole superpower abandons specific policies, but also includes whether more states join a softbalancing coalition against the unipolar leader.
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*** Unilateralism Bad ***
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Unilateralism Bad: Undermines Leadership
US UNILATERALISM COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO EFFECTIVE GLOBAL LEADERSHIP AND POWER
John Brady Kiesling, State Department Diplomat who resigned over 2003 Iraq War, 2006, Diplomacy Lessons: realism for an unloved superpower, p. 2 But isolationism is not a moral or even a sensible selfish option for a state uniquely endowed with the rare power including military powerto save lives thousands of miles from its shores. The United States uses its power most effectively in strengthening states and governments, not in subverting or supplanting them. When we harness the international institutions we created for the purpose, our power is multiplied. When we act on our own, we weaken an international system that, in the long run, offers the only realistic hope of locking struggling new nations into rules of conduct that will someday bring freedom and dignity to their people.
UNILATERALISM UNDERMINES HEGEMONY LEADS TO ISOLATIONISM
Mel Gurtov, Political Science Professor, Portland State University, 2006, Superpower on Crusade: the Bush doctrine in US foreign policy, p. 213 Being alone in not acting can be equally as damaging as acting alone. John Ruggies study of US foreign policy in the 1940s and 1950s concludes that unilateralism opened the door to isolationism because of failures to act when an overriding human interest demanded it. Particularly for an administration that wants to narrow the range of US interests it is prepared actively to defend, one would think that increased multilateral involvement would be welcome burden sharing in humanitarian crises. Under Clinton, US leadership was found wanting in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Rwanda, and hundreds of thousands of needless deaths resulted. When the Bush administration did take the lead in the humanitarian crisis that deepened with the ouster of Aristide in Haiti, it proved more concerned with keeping Aristide out than with improving the lot of ordinary Haitians. France, Brazil, and a few other countries sent peacekeeping troops but precious little money for economic development or rehabilitation.
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Unilateralism Bad: Fails
MANY FACTORS WORK AGAINST US PURSUIT OF UNILATERALISM
G. John Ikenberry, Politics Professor Princeton, 2004, American Power in the 21 st Century, eds. David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, p. 107-8 There are at least three sources of rule-based multilateralism in American foreign policy that serve as counterpressures to unipolar unilateralism. One is simply the functional demands of cooperation in the face of growing economic interdependence . American support for multilateralism can also stem from a grand strategic interest in preserving power and creating a stable and legitimate international order. A final source of American multilateralism emerges from the United States polity itself. The United States has a distinctive self-understanding about the nature of its own political orderand this has implications for how it thinks about international political order. These considerations allow us to specify a variety of mechanisms that reinforce restraint in the exercise of American unipolar power. One restraint mechanism is simply the by-product of functional bargaining with other states. The United States may be preeminent but it is not omnipotent. It needs other states, and so the United States and the other major states will seek bargains that allow them to achieve mutual gains. Another restraint is a byproduct of the sensitivity of the United States to its international legitimacy. The United States has a great incentive for other states to willingly accept Americas preeminent position rather than resist it. It is not in Americas interest to be the lead state in a coercive order built around the exercise of naked power. The decision by the Bush administration to go back to the UN Security Council to get support for its confrontation with Iraq shows how even an administration that is skeptical of the UN understands the benefits that ensue from the legitimate use of force. A third mechanism of restraint comes from the intergovernmental pulling and hauling which is facilitated by democracy and global institutions. Even a unipolar state is embedded in a larger structure of ongoing political relations and interactions. A final mechanism of restraint resides in the deeper processes of modernization. States are not simply interacting power packages, they are also societies undergoing longterm transformation driven by the forces of industrialization and modernization. In this regard, the functionality between the United States and the wider evolutionary developments in the international system will be critical in determining the degree of congruence and incongruence between it and the other major states. To the extent that the United States continues to be at the leading edge of modernization, the other major states will ultimately find reasons to work with and engage the United States. If the United States falls off the cutting edge of modernization and becomes a huge backwater that seeks only to protect its existing gains, great power conflicts will likely re-emerge. American unipolar power built on a twenty-first century version of the iron and rye coalition will have a different foreign policy and global presence than one built on leading edge, internationally oriented socioeconomic interests and coalitions. Which is another way of saying that the world reacts not just to American power but also to its purpose and functionality within the larger system.
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Unilateralism Bad: Fails
IRAQ PROVES THE NECESSITY OF GETTING OTHER COUNTRIES ON BOARD BEFORE ENGAGING IN PREEMPTIVE ATTACK THEY WONT CHANGE THEIR MINDS LATER
Donald Neuchterlein, former US Foreign Service Officer and Professor at Virginia, 2005, Defiant Superpower?, p. 186 An important lesson to be learned from Americas war in Iraq is this. When democratic governments like those in Britain and America decide to make war on a country where the direct danger is not clear, it is prudent to obtain the consent of key allies and, if possible, the United Nations, and not proceed immediately to war on the assumption that others will eventually be persuaded of the correctness of the decision. Such an assumption proved wrong for the Johnson administration in the Vietnam War, and it was increasingly the case with Iraq. The fallout in Britain from the duration and the mounting costs of the occupation of Iraq became so marked in mid-2004 that Tony Blair was in danger of losing the leadership of his Labour Party. George Bush also saw his approval ratings plunge. By the end of the summer, however, Bush had regained a small lead over Kerry in the polls and Blairs leadership also had strengthened. In November American voters would have a chance to decide whether the country was in better hands with the incumbent president, or whether the wars large costs made it desirable to change leadership and follow a more collaborative internationalism in foreign policy.
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Unilateralism Bad: Undercuts Democracy Promotion
UNILATERALISM UNDERMINES EFFECTIVE DEMOCRACY PROMOTION
Kenneth Wollack, President, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 2004, House Hearings: US Support of Human Rights and Democracy, Committee on International Relations, July 7, [http://wwwc.house.gov/international %5Frelations/108/94707.pdf], p. 56-7 As one of the organizations that has implemented a number of these programs, I would like to briefly share some of the lessons we have learned in the course of our work in more than 50 countries, raising a few themes that impact democracy support efforts by groups like NDI. The first is the development of a new internationalism in promoting democracy. The promotion of democracy does not lend itself to unilateralism. At a time when there is growing recognition of the interconnectedness between economic prosperity and democracy, more and more other nations, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations and even international financial institutions are beginning to engage in democracy promotion and human rights activities. Literally dozens of government funded foundations have been formed or have expanded in Europe, Asia and Africa. Intergovernmental bodies, such as the UNDP, the OAS and the OSCE have units dedicated to democratic institution building. Donor aid agencies are increasingly committing funds to democracy promotion and even
. There is a growing global movement to support networks of democrats and to build the democratic institutions that provide the ultimate protection against human rights abuses. Such increased support validates the United States longstanding leadership in the promotion of democracy and should encourage an even stronger commitment to such programs. We have been most successful at NDI when we have joined with others to share democratic skills. As a practical matter, peoples making the transition to democracy required diverse experiences. Cooperative approaches also convey a deeper truth to nations attempting a transition to democracy: That they are not ceding something to the United States when they develop democratic institutions. Rather, they are joining a community of nations that democracies can count on natural allies and an active support structure. This cooperation was evident in Istanbul, Turkey at a recent gathering of leading democratic reformers from predominantly Muslim countries. The Congress of Democrats from the Islamic World was sponsored by NDI, the UNDP and the Turkish Democracy Foundation, with the support of 16 governments and foundations from the United States, Europe and the Middle East.
the World Bank and other international financial institutions have begun to recognize the linkages between political development and economic reform
MULTILATERAL NATION BUILDING MORE EFFECTIVE THAN UNILATERAL US EFFORTS
Peter Beinart, Editor, The New Republic, 2006, The Good Fight: Why Liberalsand only liberalscan win the war on terror and make America great again, p. 198 As Iraq shows, unilateral nation building is impossible except under the best conditions. Yet nation buildingdefined as the use of armed force in the aftermath of a crisis to promote a transition to democracyremains central to American security, and to liberalisms hopes for a better world. Had the United States and its allies not deployed large numbers of troops and large sums of money to Afghanistan and the Balkans after the bombing stopped, the Taliban might be back in power and Bosnia and Kosovo might no longer exist. And although Iraq has soured Americans on nation building, the historical record is far better than generally recognized. Without such efforts, according to an exhaustive RAND Corporation study, most countries emerging from conflict slip back into it. Of the eight countries or regions where the UN has led nation-building missions, by contrast, seven are today at peace and six are at least partial democracies. Nation building, in other wordslike developmentcan effectively combat state failure, as long America realizes the limits of what it can do alone. Before the Iraq war, conservatives derided the UN and Americas Western European allies as less idealistic and less capable than the United States. But Germany and France proved more prescient than the Bush administration about the aftermath of Saddams fall. British troops were often better trained than their US counterparts for the civil-military missions that post-Saddam Iraq required. UN envoys were wiser about Iraqs political transition. And as the RAND study illustrates, the UNs overall nation-building record is actually better than Americas.
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Unilateralism Bad: AT- Multilateralism constrains US power
GIVEN US DOMINANCE OF MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS MULTILATERALISM INCREASES ITS POWER Michael Mann, Sociology Professor UCLA, 2004, American Power in the 21st Century, eds. David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, p. 66-7 American political power might be restrained by either international political institutions or by resistance from the countries in which it intends to intervene. There is little restraint from the former. Though the international order is premised formally on the sovereign equality of states, some are more equal than others. The United Nations Security Council still embodies inequalities of the late 1940s, allowing five permanent members (the US, the USSR/Russia, China, Britain, and France) veto powers. But in reality two Superpowers, and then only one, dominated the Council. During the 1990s the US dominated UN resolutions, sanctions, and military interventions. It used its veto more than all force, there was no force; and until 2003 whenever the US wanted force, it secured it. American power explains why Iraq was never offered carrots, as well as sticks, to disarm. The US sometimes had to pursue laborious arm-twisting and bribing, but it almost always worked. From the Soviet collapse until late 2002 no powers got together to thwart the American will. The thought did not often occur to them, since American power was fairly hegemonicroutinized and mostly legitimate. It could rely on support from Britain and usually France on the Security Council, plus the rest of Western Europe and the other Anglo-Saxon countries, and Japan and other East Asian allies, plus most of Latin America. The US and not the UN had offered security to most of the world. The other states of the North had been under American protection since 1945, unable to themselves against communism without American help. America dominated security organizations like NATO and SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organization). Whatever their jealousies and resentments, states in the free world believed that they had common interests with the US. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO was expanded eastward and former communist countries scrabbled for American favors., If this is called multilateralism why should the US want unilateralism? US intervention without the political mandate of the United Nations incurs costs in military, economic, and ideological power. The mandate brings unconditioned permissions to use foreign bases, allied troops, the cash to fund the venture, and above all, legitimacy. Europe, not the US paid most of the costs of rebuilding the former Yugoslavia; Germany, Japan and the Arab oil states paid for most of the 1991 Gulf War. UN legitimacy particularly allows states to support actions which are unpopular with their own people. They hide behind UN authority and say we are reluctant, but it is the will of the world. Intervention goes well for the US when formally multilateral. SHIFT IN POLICY WILL RESTORE US HEGEMONY REST OF THE WORLD KNOWS THEY NEED US LEADERSHIP Michael Mann, Sociology Professor UCLA, 2004, American Power in the 21st Century, eds. David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, p. 79-80 It would be overoptimistic to expect the US to do all of this. Yet some reaction against the disastrous imperial policies can be expected. They need not leave too harmful a legacy, for the realities of global power remain. The US would remain the global economic leader and the global political leader in multilateral organizations. It might easily regain global ideological leadership by reasserting traditional American virtues. It is also the only Power capable of projecting military power around the world. Any vigorous, concerted, global action in any of these policy directions requires American leadership. Little constructive can be done without it. The new imperialists pressured and then ignored their Great Power rivals, but they did not do them actual harm. Nor have they done harm to most countries of the world. If the US shifts policy, they will accept its leadership again, though some will do so grudgingly. Informal, indirect, imperial powers will return, with at least partial hegemony soon following.
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Unilateralism Bad: AT- Multilateralism Constrains US Power
PLEDGING SUPPORT FOR MULTILATERALISM INCREASES SUCCESSFUL US POLICY OUTCOMES
G. John Ikenberry, Politics Professor Princeton, 2004, American Power in the 21st Century, eds. David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, p. 104 American support for multilateralism can also stem from a grand strategic interest in preserving power and creating a stable and legitimate international order. The support for multilateralism is a way to signal restraint and commitment to other states, thereby encouraging the acquiescence and cooperation of weaker states. This has been a strategy that the United States has pursued to a greater or lesser degree across the twentieth century and it explains the remarkably durable and legitimate character of the existing international order. From this perspective, multilateralism and the search for rule-based agreements should increase rather than decrease with the rise of American unipolarity. It predicts that the existing multilateral order, which itself reflects an older multilateral bargain between the United States and it suggests that the current administration should respond to general power management incentives and limit its tilt toward unilateralism.
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*** Military Readiness Good ***
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Military readiness Advantage Answers
Military has plenty of resources for Iraq & Afghanistan conflicts
Congressional Quarterly Weekly, March 15, 2009, p. online Among Pentagon officials and independent military analysts, though, there is broad agreement that U.S. forces will have the funds they require to carry out their continuing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan -- the military's principal commitments -through the end of fiscal 2010, Sept. 30 of that year. They note that for the remainder of fiscal 2009, Obama will ask for $75.5 billion in supplemental war funding, bringing the total for this fiscal year to about $141 billion. Congress approved $65.9 billion in fiscal 2009 war funding in the most recent supplemental spending law. For fiscal 2010, Obama will request $130 billion in war funding, with details to follow in April, when he presents the full version of his $533.7 billion request for the Pentagon's base budget. Michael O'Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and an authority on defense and foreign policy, says Obama's war funding requests break down to about $1 million per soldier deployed in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters. With Obama planning to draw down U.S. forces in Iraq to between 35,000 and 50,000 troops by the end of August 2010 -- and to increase troop strength in Afghanistan by 17,000 over the next few months -- defense analysts say his war funding request will adequately meet the military's needs. "All in all," said Gordon Adams, the senior White House defense budget official in the Clinton administration and now a professor at American University's School of International Service, "as the military goes forward with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it's pretty well funded."
U.S. not overstretched, U.S. can deter China in the Taiwan Strait
Congressional Quarterly Weekly, March 15, 2009, p. online The United States could have a confrontation with Iran over its nuclear program, which could threaten Israel and the Persian Gulf, and might have to intervene should Pakistan's government collapse. A face-off with China over Taiwan is not out of the question: Just last week, Chinese naval forces chased off a U.S. auxiliary ship apparently conducting undersea surveillance 75 miles off the South China coast. Even with such potential dangers, though, independent military analysts say the United States has sufficient force at hand. "Don't forget that after we've drawn down in Iraq, we've still got a 1.1-million-member military," said Adams. "That's a lot of force for other conflicts."
Bad economy makes it easy for the military to recruit
Congressional Quarterly Weekly, March 15, 2009, p. online While the government eyes ways to scale back the defense budget, military recruiting is getting easier, in large part due to the struggling economy. In these tough times, the armed forces are finding they can be more selective and can reduce enlistment and retention bonuses that have ballooned in recent years. The Defense Department released figures in February showing that all branches of the active-duty military met or exceeded their recruiting goals for January. Furthermore, they all met or exceeded their goals for re-enlistments. Both the active-duty Army and the Army Reserve -- both hard-hit by the extended conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan -- exceeded recruiting goals from October through January, which hasn't been done since before the Iraq War began. Over the past several years, as the Army struggled to fill its barracks, it was forced to lower standards for new recruits. In many cases, the Army took in recruits without high school diplomas, with the lowest scores on the armed forces qualification test, or with criminal histories. But with the struggling economy, the Defense Department is getting better troops for less money.
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Military Readiness Advantage Answers
Obama not pushing defense cuts now
Congressional Quarterly Weekly, March 15, 2009, p. online The administration is likely to scale back or end some weapons programs when it sends the details of its fiscal 2010 budget proposal to Congress next month, but will probably put off the biggest cuts for another year at least -- because it doesn't want to lay off a lot of defense workers in the middle of a recession and because the Quadrennial Defense Review won't be finished until next year.
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Readiness Good: Troop Overstrech
U.S. MILITARY READINESS IS ON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE DUE TO TROOP OVERSTRETCH CICAGO SUN TIMES, December 11, 2006
Experts who served on the study group's "working groups" explain why: The military is running out of troops and equipment. The cold, hard facts about military readiness and a 1.4 million-strong active- duty force rule out a big increase in the size of the U.S. footprint in Iraq. "We don't have enough is the short answer," said Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert at Georgetown University who served on the military and security working group of the bipartisan commission. And, he argued, advocating a big increase in troop levels now is just political theater. "This is the beginning of the who-lost-Iraq debate," he explained. "No one wants to be a charter member of the club." Though the new report articulates a dark picture of U.S. readiness, some politicians, including leading Republican Sen. John McCain of Arizona, continue to argue that a significant increase in troops in Iraq is needed to save the country from sinking into the abyss. Some advisers to the study group expressed considerable frustration that the White House never lifted a finger to prevent the predictable degradation in the readiness of U.S. ground forces, now painfully apparent. Among other things, the White House could have worked early on to greatly increase the size of the Army and Marine Corps. " We've been whistling by the graveyard without doing anything to solve this problem," said Michael Eisenstadt, a study group adviser from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Paul Hughes, another adviser to the Iraq Study Group and a senior program officer at the United States Institute of Peace, noted with disdain how the White House basically ignored the impact the pace of war has had on U.S. ground forces. "What the debate has been lacking is an honest assessment of American military power," Hughes said. The Iraq Study Group did consider whether a major increase in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq -- perhaps by as much as 100,000 or 200,000 troops -- might help. But the panel explicitly ruled out a large, continual boost in U.S. forces. "America's military capacity is stretched thin," the group found. "We do not have the troops or equipment to make a substantial, sustained increase in our troop presence." The commission report suggests that serious problems have already arrived. "U.S. military forces, especially our ground forces, have been stretched nearly to the breaking point by repeated deployments in Iraq, " it says. Second and third combat tours are grinding away at personnel and equipment to the point where now, less than one- third of Army units are "currently at high readiness levels."
IRAQ HAS LEFT THE U.S. MILITARY WITHOUT RESERVE FORCES Iraq Study Group, THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT, November 2006, http://66.28.70.57/isg.pdf
Many military units are under significant strain. Because the harsh conditions in Iraq are wearing out equipment more quickly than anticipated, many units do not have fully functional equipment for training when they redeploy to the United States. An extraordinary amount of sacrifice has been asked of our men and women in uniform, and of their families. The American military has little reserve force to call on if it needs ground forces to respond to other crises around the world.
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Readiness Good: Global Nuclear War
Barnes, 1998 [Wyatt, partner at Roney and Co., Strategic Review, Fall]
Olsen would have us move the fulcrum of our military posture to Hawaii and Guam, from which we could defend our sovereign territory and leave active defense to the littoral states alone. There are clear implications here for U.S. policy throughout the world. The rationale prescribing American withdrawal from Northeast Asia would apply to Europe and the Middle East also. Western Europe can defend itself against even a resurgent Russia, let alone the debilitated survivor of the core of the former Soviet Union, and the Middle East could also be protected by Europe alone. We could leave NATO and withdraw our forces. Olsen does not advocate this step. It is beyond his articles scope, but it seems to reflect the thrust of his ideas. The Libertarian/Isolationist View Those ideas have been a recurring theme since the end of World War II and were dominant before the war. The Libertarian/Isolationist view prescribes an essential withdrawal from world affairs. We can foster trade, undertake humanitarian endeavors, and practice moral leadership. However, if war looms somewhere that affects our interests we apply diplomatic pressure or economic inducements to dampen the fires. At home, our retaliatory power intact, we are unassailable by foreign foes. Let other countries fight out their disputes if the issues are so important to them. Spare us the costs, the disruption, and the dead. Such a policy has great appeal. If the United States could disinterest itself from foreign events, except at the margins, we Americans could devote our resources to solving our many domestic problems, like the national debt, itself partly the result of our ill-conceived meddling in world affairs. Could we sustain this policy in all circumstances? Consider the following: Some nations have democratic values and traditions equal to our own, but lack our resources. What would we do if New Zealand, say, is confronted by a mortal threat? Nothing, it seems, except to offer sympathy and apply the remedy of diplomatic pressure and economic inducements to war off and bribe New Zealands tormentors. And what would be our resource if the Middle East oil states are subverted by an outside power? Most of our oil is imported, much of it from that fragile region. Those diplomatic and economic solutions would not work, nor would domestic conservation. In the first case, an emotional pull of visceral intensity could move America to military action; in the second, an oil drought could force the same step. In both, thanks to the withdrawal of nearly all our forces to within our cozy fortress, we would suffer profound military disadvantages, similar to those in the early years of World War II, and without the strong allies who bore the brunt of the struggle while we got our act together. A world order in which the United States practices, as Olsen puts it, a more rational set of scaled back global commitmentsand a sharper focus on the real threats faced by the United States, would be a throwback, in a way, to a 19th century power distribution. The United States would be, at most, the first among equals in a constellation of major powersBritain, France, China, Russia, Japan, India, and ourselves. They cherish different hopes and illusions. The United States, Britain, France, probably Japan, are wedded to a status quo conservatism. The other three, to varying degrees, are less benign. They exhibit hegemonic urges in their regions, presenting possibilities for future strife. Indias 50-year dispute with Pakistan, newly escalated by nuclear arms, is an example, as well as Indian urges toward control of the Indian Ocean. China has irredentist claims on Taiwan, and wants control of oil reserves in the South China Sea, claims which Vietnam and the Philippines dispute. Russia has tense relations with some of the ex-republics of the former Soviet Union and is troubled by Afghan turmoil and Muslim pressure from elsewhere in the south. The list goes on. There is another array of incendiary problems that do not directly involve the major powers , although some are caught up in one way or another. A partial list includes the Korean Peninsula, disputes within the Arab world, the intractable strife in the formed Yugoslavia, the Greek-Turkish troubles over Cyprus, and, of course, Sub-Saharan Africa, whose mix of failed states torment themselves and each other with their deadly near-anarchy. These issues, as well as others not mentioned, which affect one or more of the seven major powers directly or indirectly, can explode into war. If the war is confined, it will run its course and the rest of the world may not be seriously affected. But it may not be confined; it may draw in participants who see their interests under siege and adopt military solutions. A mere regional conflict will become World War III. This is
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not fanciful; World War I began that way, and its horrors did not include ICBMs, nuclear arms, and bacteriological and advanced chemical weapons. Can the United States, at most the first among equals in the great power system, forestall such a calamity? It cannot. Diplomatic pressure not backed by military strength is of little value. The United Nations is useful as an aid to diplomacy, but ineffective in preventing major strife. Instead, the United States, almost inevitably, will be drawn in with incalculable consequences. The Cold War had the virtue of simplicity, a quality probably not perceived at the time. We had one principal opponenttwo, including China. There was more or less constant outward pressure by the Soviet Union and its surrogates on Western strongholds and on the non-aligned areas, usually by political and revolutionary means, occasionally by military action. We were able to stop most of the assaults until our opponent, overextended, began to implode. General war loomed on at least two of these occasions, but since both sides were truly averse to war, thanks largely to the concept and the fact of Mutual Assured Destruction, it did not happen. Another fact of those times was also criticalwith the exceptions of North Korea and North Vietnam, both sides kept their clients in line. Our democratic allies needed no such restraints, but even here there were exceptions: Israel in 1956 and 1967 and Britain and France in 1956; there were strong provocations in these three incidents. The Soviets encouraged and actively supported their surrogates in their campaigns of disruption, subversion, and revolt against their presumed oppressors. But they never permitted them to threaten vital Western interests that might provoke massive response, especially from United States. The result of this bilateral restraint was that, with the exceptions noted, the wars that occurred in those decades were minor, contained, and menaced no important interest of either side. The restraints imposed by the former Soviet Union no longer exist , nor do those levied by the macabre discipline of the Cold War itself, which tended to concentrate the minds of some of the worlds rulers. In the absence of those rulerssimilar to the decades that preceded World War I. Then, the great expansion of industry, an explosive increase in population, the rise of Germany as a Great Power, the chronic persistence of ancient rivalries all joined to create tensions certain, in the end, to ignite general war. A few saw it coming but could not stop it. We may now be in the early stage of a similar prospect. And it is not only on the fringes of Europe that a new prewar situation exists, but in Central, Southern, and Eastern Asia, in the Middle East, and in Africa. The Western Hemisphere will be drawn, sooner or later, into expanding conflicts in the rest of the world. Those wars will have a lethality unimagined in 1914, perhaps unimagined even toady. We might regard the Cold War, with its perverted discipline and fragile order, with nostalgia. This new international anarchy, with its probable consequences, must be controlled. The practical withdrawal of the United States from the world that the Libertarian/Isolationists advocate will mean that we can not exert any useful influence over world affairs. Our moves will be read, accurately enough, as signs of a lack of will to use our power effectively in our own broader interests, and nothing we can say in justification can change that perception. The malefactors in North Korea, in Iraq, and other places have noted early indications, and some of our friends have dawn the obvious conclusions. Of course, if such a policy could exempt us from the worlds tribulations, it might have a practical, if perverse and amoral, merit.. But we cannot leave the world. Our trade, our economy, our emotions, are all inextricably involved with the rest of the planet. That pre-World War I period, from the end of the Franco-Prussian War to 1914, is worth another look. The wars origins essentially involved the failure of Britains Balance of Power policy, which had prevented a major war by supporting the weaker side in a dispute, deterring the stronger. But her power had limits. Germany more than matched Britain in many fields. Britain was forced to seek allies. The Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente faced each other, more or less evenly matched. The old policy became an artifact of history. Britain, while still very powerful, did not have the overwhelming strength at the turn of the century to damp down European passions and avert the war she faced. British leaders in the 19 th Century were wise and perceptive. Suppose they had been even more gifted. Suppose, in 1871, after Prussias stunning defeat of France and the establishment of the German Empire, they had foreseen the shape of the European arena 40 years later. They would have recognized that Britain and her old enemy, France, would be in mortal danger from a dynamic and powerful Germany. They could have allied themselves with France, forced Germany to disgorge her conquests, and might even have caused the dissolution of the Empire, the only tenuously established. An aggressor would have been strangled at birth, at the cost of a war limited in time and carnage, and perhaps without a war at all. The consequences would have been beyond imagining. There might not have been a Russian Revolution and World War I, or even a Great Depression. Lesser dangers could have been managed, like the incendiary Balkan wars, the rapacious Japanese, and the heirs of the crumbling Turkish Empire. For the British leaders to have acted this way would have required insights of genius, as well as great energy and political will. Even so, they would have failed, not in the European arena but at home. Their society would have rejected such an effort based on a hypothesis, a fantastic doomsday scenario. Yet it could have been done at a cost infinitely less than the pain that that society endured in 1914-1918, apart from the even more dreadful other I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of orange juice.
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consequences of those years. The problem was less intractable in the countdown to World War II. Britain and France, or either, could have crushed Germany and deposed Hitler up to 1936 at near-bloodless cost. But they drew back, giving poignant effect to the title Churchill offered to Roosevelt some years later for World War II, The Unnecessary War. The British and French leaders of the 1930s were as parochial in their outlook as they were skilled in their nations politics and they were men of good will besides. But they could not inspire their nations to act in the interest of mankind, as well as their own lands. At the turn of the millennium, the world is more turbulent and dangerous than in the periods before the two World Wars. But now there is a factor that has never been present before. The United States is immensely more powerful than any other nation; it is stronger than almost any combination of states. We are far stronger, in relation to the world system, than Britain was in the 19 th Century, with her failing industrial leadership and narrow population and geographic base. Americas relative power has no parallel in history since the Roman Empire of the First Century. What role should the United States play in this world of the 21st Century? The Libertarian/Isolationist prescription has been outlined above. It calls for a withdrawal from world affairs, except at the margins, exerting where necessary diplomatic pressure and economic inducements. Between our broad oceans, defended by our retaliatory power, we would be secure. As a matter of fact, we followed such a policy in the late 1920s and 1930s, when the isolationist view reigned supreme. Then our relative power was almost as great as it is now. It was potential, not actual; our navy was strong, but our army was feeble, and our industry, mighty in the 1920s, was inert to the Great Depression. During those decades the United States alternated periods of aloofness and spasmodic participation in world affairs. We took part eagerly in naval disarmament talks. We helped devise the agreement known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact, joining the powers in renouncing war as an instrument of policy; we took this charade seriously and greeted its promulgation with solemn relief. In the 1930s we tried by moral suasion and diplomatic pressure to curb the rapacity of the dictatorships. Italy was excoriated for invading Ethiopia, as was Japan for actions against China in 1931 and 1937. Germany was condemned for anti-Semitism, her threats, and her rearmament in violation of the Versailles Treaty. Our diplomats were active and zealous. As a nonmember of the League of Nations, we lacked that convenient forum, but our views were well-known. Praised by Europes democracies, large and small, they were rejected with contempt and derision by the Axis powers. So much for diplomatic pressure. By 1945, the lessons of the war were obvious; clearly, our role in the new peacetime world had to change. But the isolationists, beleaguered, fought back. Nothing had really changed, they insisted. We had been attacked, we waged war, we won. We could spend money for overseas relief, but apart from that we must retreat into our remote continent. Perhaps, due to the Soviet threat, our military readiness might be less exiguous. After all we now had the Bomball the more reason to resume isolation. Fortunately, America rose to the challenge, guided by leaders of vision. The people, reluctantly, accepted the new role, no doubt because of the stark clarity of the Soviet threat. New initiatives emerged: The Truman Doctrine, NATO, The Marshall Plan, among others, all under the umbrella of the Containment policy. But we took other, less dramatic, steps that were no less effective. We were aggressive members of the United Nations and developed a sensible attitude toward it. We used the UN as a powerful diplomatic force multiplier, and mobilized allies to advance broad mutual interests. Those interests were simply to attain a reasonably peaceful and placid world fortified by active and unimpeded trade. We invoked the UNs lofty claim to be a panacea for the worlds ills for propaganda reasons here and abroad, but we were actually practicing a forthright Realpolitik. The Soviet Union used the UN for its own purposes as well, but Soviet blunders often let us confuse and disconcert her while we seized the moral high ground. We also joined all possible international groups, using our active role to establish a political, as well as a military, offset to Soviet power. We strove to suppress and its role in avoiding World War III is its legacy. Any regional power could have done the same things, but the effort would have failed. Only the United States could supply the indispensable degree of state power military, political, and economicthat not only deterred the Soviet Union but emboldened our allies to stand fast. For once, we did not let our armed forces fall into desuetude, although there were slippages that were rectified, often just in time. It was that state power, massive and credible, that made peace and Cold War victory possible. That victory, that triumph of American strength and will, creates a new set of threats of equal force and greater complexity. There are the malignant trouble points: the Bosnias, the Kosovos, the Macedonias; and the Iraqs, the Irans, the Afghanistans; and the Cambodias, the Myanmars, the Koreas; the restive Timorese, the contentious Chechnians, the Disputatious Caucasus states. Any of them can ignite a conflagration that may spread and merge with others, as can such festering crises as India-Pakistan and China-Taiwan. Other nations sullenly quiescent may decide to realize their destinies to recover lands previously lose, while still others may feel their security threatened by adjacent turmoil. Violence will engulf the world. The state power of the United States that won the long Cold War is still in being , even though its military component has seriously attenuated. That must be strengthened and adjusted to deal with the new and different I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of orange juice.
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threats that have emerged. A continental missile defense is essential and must be urgently pursued. Chemical and biological warfare defenses must be energetically advanced. Terrorism must be dealt with relentlessly with every means. And we must cauterize the decay afflicting our forces and reverse current trends. All this is essential, but equally imperative is the need to act proactively when some trouble spot flares that might spread. And to do that properly requires American will to act, and that will must be clearly perceived by the world, friends as well as actual and potential miscreants. Threats to peace can arise from probable or actual aggression by a nation against another that can endanger regional or world peace, an internal upheaval that can spill over into nearby nations, exported terrorism that the nations hosting the perpetrators cannot or will not suppress, or any similar contingency. Acting against such dangers is vital, but it will be extraordinarily difficult and require resolve. It will also be expensive, in money and American lives. Diplomatic measures should be undertaken first, either alone, with allies, through the United Nations, or through all three channels. Economic steps can be taken, with safeguards to ensure effectiveness. But histories of such moves to restrain dangerous behavior are discouraging because they were not backed by credible consistently applied, and decisive strong military power; thus potentially rampant states or organizations had no real incentive to abandon their ways. The lesson is clear; we must act militarily anywhere in the world if peaceful pressure is seen to fail. A mantra of a segment of American opinion intones that we must not be the worlds policeman, a slogan tediously repeated as a substitute for policy. But that role may be essential; only the United States has the power to prevent a world cataclysm. To be sure, it would be useful to have allies to this crusade to keep the peace. And allies will only come forward if they perceive that we have both the means and the will to deal decisively with threats to pace. Allies, if they appear, can be difficult, but they must be under American leadership, with due regard for their sensitivities and legitimate interests. They can come from the principal democracies and they will be welcome.
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Readiness Good: Readiness Key to Leadership
MILITARY READINESS KEY TO U.S. LEADERSHIP AND PREVENT NUCLEAR TERRORISM
Colin Gray, political scientist specializing in national security policy, THE SHERIFF: AMERICAS DEFENSE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER, 2004, p. 16 ' The United States , as the guardian power, requires a military posture with global reach. That posture should be capable of defeating any adversary or combination of adversaries. As sheriff of the world order, the United States is not interested in balancing power with regional trouble-makers. Instead, it needs to be able to defeat them decisively. It is a near certainty that this new century will see the United States challenged in warfare of many kinds-regular and irregular, symmetrical and asymmetrical. Large-scale regular warfare between states appears to be in retreat at present, in part, at least, because of the unmatchable prowess of American conventional arms..As the ultimate, though not quite sole, defender of world order for decades to come, the United States must be able to prevail in warfare of all kinds. In particular, the country will have to be able to resist forcefully the neutralization of its policy and strategy by enemies who can pose risks that Americans would judge unacceptable in the context of the modest political stakes at issue. Overall, U .S defense policy must be geared to defeat efforts to deter American military intervention. Such efforts could take the form of air and missile threats to forward- deployed U.S. forces and to local friends and allies, or of the posing of a W'MD menace to North America itself. That menace could take the highly irregular form of catastrophe terrorism, with terrorists resorting to WMD.
U.S. MILITARY DOMINANCE CRITICAL TO GLOBAL LEADERSHIP
Colin Gray, political scientist specializing in national security policy, THE SHERIFF: AMERICAS DEFENSE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER, 2004, p. 90 Fourth, it should go without saying that America's performance in the role of sheriff of world order can endure no longer than i ts military preeminence . This is not to deny that military power rests upon economic strength, social attitudes, and political culture. How - ever, wealth and sensible attitudes are of little use if they are not mobilized and organized into usable military capabilities. In the political context outlined above under points one and two, a judicial combination of sustained, unmatched financial allocations to defense functions, along with an sustained, commitment to modernization, should preserve the U.S. military lead for as long as is feasible. It s important to recognize that the character of a meaningful military lead must be distinctly enemy and scenario specific. The United States requires military power both so formidable that would-be enemies are greatly discouraged from attempting to compete, as well as flexible, adaptable, and decisively useable as to carry the highly plausible promise of being able to impose prompt defeat upon any enemy. So much for aspirations. In practice, the enemies of America ' world order will assuredly seek to compete militarily in practicable ways. It is to be hoped that American military prowess will be so broad and flexible that neither rogues nor traditional foes will find military paths for effective competition, svmmetrical or asymmetrical. The military power of the American sheriff must imply reassurance to many and contingent menace to a few. For some years to come, at least pending the emergence of a serious geopolitical rival, the threats inherent in the U.S. military establishment carry no specific address label .
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Readiness Good: Readiness Key to Leadership
MILITARY POWR CRITICAL TO LEADERSHIP MILITARY COLLAPSE WILL CRUSH OUR SOFT POWER Colin Gray, political scientist specializing in national security policy, THE SHERIFF: AMERICAS DEFENSE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER, 2004pp. 98-9 Sheriffs are sheriffs because they can shoot, not because they are rich, erudite, or popular. Naturally, life is easier for a state-sheriff if it is extraordinarily wealthy, if it is governed by wise people with a sound grasp of what is required for policing world order, and if it can carry much of global opinion with it due to the skill of its diplomacy. Ultimately , however, the sheriff of world order can only function as such if it is a military superstate . History records the deeds of very few such powers. The leading state of an era has typically been primarily continental or maritime in orientation, each with different implications for order, and almost invariably has found its preeminence checked by the collective efforts of fearful rivals.' Largely- by geopolitical accident, the United States now finds itself the "last polity standing" from the great powers of modern times. Moral force is not to be despised and diplomatic cunning is always useful, but in the final analysis world order needs protecting by a state. or coalition that is willing and able to exercise superior coercion: Of course, there is much more to the guarding of world order than the readiness to inflict pain upon those who would disturb the norms of civilized behavior. But if the military dimension of the ordering role is ineffective, it is not usually possible to find adequate compensation elsewhere-at least not for long . Revolutionary powers, would-be hegemons, regional bullies, transnational terrorists, and other troublemakers cannot long be held in check by bribes or imaginative diplomacy, let alone by appeals from decent international opinion or nose counts in the United Nations. The extant world order needs someone willing and able to stand up for it in the face of the ultimate threat --the threat of war. If the United States gets the military dimensions seriously wrong in its commitment to international security , nothing else will matter very much. Military humiliation and defeat could. cancel the benefits from "soft power" and from a globalized, open world trading system. Crude and old fashioned though it may be, military power in its manv forms is an enduring threat to order. It can only be dissuaded from appearing when it is challenged on its own terms.
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Readiness Good: Readiness Key to War on Terror
A LARGE FORCE IS LIMITING GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT, WHICH IS CRITICAL TO THE WAR ON TERROR Keith W. Mines , served for 22 years in U.S. Army Special Forces, a mix of active duty, National Guard, and reserve assignments, ORBIS, Fall 2005, Force Size for the Post-Westphalian World, p. 656-7 Elsewhere the United States is also losing less dramatic but no less important opportunities. We have all but stopped our engagement with host country forces in the new democracies of Central Europe, and those we conduct with our new allies in Central Asia and the Caucasus are only done on a limited scale, since there are not enough U.S. forces to conduct exercises. Engagement with traditional allies has also ground to a halt, and our attempt to outsource our engagement with African militaries has been unsuccessful. Joint exercises are a key piece of alliance building, and interoperability has been crucial to our ability to work with and develop allies. For decades they have been a major factor in keeping other countries engaged in operations of interest to the United States, while promoting the Western model of civil-military relations in emerging democracies. Engagement is also key to the next phase of the war on terror, much of which will be fought not through large-scale regime changing campaigns as in Afghanistan and Iraq, but in the shadows, and generally by host-country forces. Current force levels will not permit the United States to conduct traditional exercises and engagement for many years. ANOTHER SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST ATTACK AGAINST THE U.S. CAUSES US TO PRECIPITATE NUCLEAR WAR John L. Petersen, and founder of The Arlington Institute, 10/3/2002, The Next Sound You Hear, http://www.wfs.org/mmpetersen.htm But there seems to be a rather specific objective behind all of this. There is an end-game that these terrorists seem to have in mind, and it is not just to kill a bunch of Americans. The analysis that I read points to all of this being the Islamic radicals first assault in a war aimed at elevating Islam to being the major influential religion and political system in the world. How might they do that with the relatively limited resources that they have? Again, the most salient thinking that Ive found suggests that theyd like to turn America against Islam, and vice-versa. A holy war between Islam and the West. How do you do that? Get the U.S. to overreact. Focus the unhappiness of the vast numbers of desperately poor Muslims around more high-profile injustice visited on them indiscriminately by American retaliation for the September 11 attacks. Mobilize them around a gross inequity . . . the same way that Americans (and the West) have mobilized around a great inequity. The third principle is therefore: Provoke Over-Reaction. Get the West to seemingly strike out against "Islam" again. Give them the basis for moving their religious war into high-gear. If this is the framework for a second strike, then where should we look? We should look for places where a relatively small, sophisticated effort can produce inordinate social pain and anger. Produce an event that will cause Americans, in the fury of the aftermath, to look with hate upon every Arabic-looking person they see and strike out in vengeance . (That, of course, is the predictable way in which things work in many places on the planet.) The best of all worlds would be a nuclear counter-strike that wiped out a bunch of innocent Muslims that would start the war for sure. Where are our vulnerabilities in this kind of scenaric world? Obviously, there is the possibility of a nuclear or biological attack, and that is where we will immediately put up our defenses .
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Readiness Good: Deterrence
Strong U.S. military power necessary for deterrence Bruce Jentleson, Survival, September 2007, p. 179-200 (Professor of Public Policy and Political Science at Duke
University)
While the United States cannot be a provider of global security to the extent that it was during the Cold War, it does need to be a 'security enhancer', bolstering critical security factors for allies and global order more broadly. American military power remains crucial for strong defence and credible deterrence against both state and non-state aggressors, reassurance for friends and allies, and victory in those wars that may need to be fought. Diplomacy needs to be used more and military power, when necessary, better. CONVENTIONAL MILITARY READINESS DETERS CONFLICT
JEFFREY RECORD, Jeffrey Record is a professor of strategy at the Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama, and the author of six books, including Dark Victory: Americas Second War Against Iraq and Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo ., Parameters, Winter 2005-06, pp. 16-31, http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/05winter/record.htm Why the Strong Lose None of the foregoing is to argue against continued conventional military perfection. US conventional military primacy is inherently desirable because it deters enemy attack in kind and effectively eliminates conventional warfare as a means of settling disputes with the United States. These are no mean accomplishments. Conventional primacy also enables the United States to crush the conventionally weak and incompetent, like the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Baathist government in Iraq. Primacy, at least the kind sought by Pentagon transformationists, also permits increasing substitution of technology for blood, which in turn has reduced US casualty rates to historic lows and arguably increased public tolerance for the use of force overseas (a very mixed blessing, to be sure). The same primacy that has yielded conventional deterrence, however, has pushed Americas enemies into greater reliance on irregular warfare responses that expose the limits of conventional primacy.
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Readiness Good: Power Project Solves Nuclear War
HEGEMONY SOLVES MULTIPLE SCENARIOS FOR NUCLEAR WAR
Zalmay Khalilzad, Former Prof of Political Science at UC San Diego and Columbia and Former Dir. of the Strategy, Doctrine and Force Structure program for RANDs Project Air Force, Washington Quarterly, Spring, 1995 What might happen to the world if the United States turned inward? Without the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), rather than cooperating with each other, the West European nations might compete with each other for domination of East-Central Europe and the Middle East. In Western and Central Europe, Germany --especially since unification -- would be the natural leading power. Either in cooperation or competition with Russia, Germany might seek influence over the territories located between them. German efforts are likely to be aimed at filling the vacuum, stabilizing the region, and precluding its domination by rival powers. Britain and France fear such a development. Given the strength of democracy in Germany and its preoccupation with absorbing the former East Germany, European concerns about Germany appear exaggerated. But it would be a mistake to assume that U.S. withdrawal could not, in the long run, result in the renationalization of Germany's security policy. The same is also true of Japan. Given a U.S. withdrawal from the world, Japan would have to look after its own security and build up its military capabilities. China, Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia already fear Japanese hegemony. Without U.S. protection, Japan is likely to increase its military capability dramatically -- to balance the growing Chinese forces and still-significant Russian forces. This could result in arms races, including the possible acquisition by Japan of nuclear weapons. Given Japanese technological prowess, to say nothing of the plutonium stockpile Japan has acquired in the development of its nuclear power industry, it could obviously become a nuclear weapon state relatively quickly, if it should so decide. It could also build long-range missiles and carrier task forces. With the shifting balance of power among Japan, China, Russia, and potential new regional powers such as India, Indonesia, and a united Korea could come significant risks of preventive or proeruptive war. Similarly, European competition for regional dominance could lead to major wars in Europe or East Asia. If the United States stayed out of such a war -- an unlikely prospect -- Europe or East Asia could become dominated by a hostile power. Such a development would threaten U.S. interests. A power that achieved such dominance would seek to exclude the United States from the area and threaten its interests-economic and political -- in the region. Besides, with the domination of Europe or East Asia, such a power might seek global hegemony and the United States would face another global Cold War and the risk of a world war even more catastrophic than the last. In the Persian Gulf, U.S. withdrawal is likely to lead to an intensified struggle for regional domination. Iran and Iraq have, in the past, both sought regional hegemony. Without U.S. protection, the weak oil-rich states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would be unlikely to retain their independence. To preclude this development, the Saudis might seek to acquire, perhaps by purchase, their own nuclear weapons. If either Iraq or Iran controlled the region that dominates the world supply of oil, it could gain a significant capability to damage the U.S. and world economies. Any country
that gained hegemony would have vast economic resources at its disposal that could be used to build military capability as well as gain leverage over the United States and other oil importing nations. Hegemony over the Persian Gulf by either Iran or Iraq would bring the rest of the Arab Middle East under its influence and domination because of the shift in the balance of power. Israeli security problems would multiply and the peace process would be fundamentally undermined, increasing the risk of war between the Arabs and the Israelis. The extension of instability, conflict, and hostile hegemony in East Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf would harm the economy of the United States even in the unlikely event that it was able to avoid involvement in major wars and conflicts. Higher oil prices would reduce the U.S. standard of living.
that total imports and exports are equal to a quarter of U.S. gross domestic product, the cost of necessary adjustments might be high. The higher level of turmoil in the world would also increase the likelihood of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and means for their delivery. Already several rogue states such as North Korea and Iran are seeking nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. That danger would only increase if the United States withdrew from the world. The result would be a much more dangerous world in which many states possessed WMD capabilities; the likelihood of their actual use would increase accordingly. If this happened, the security of every nation in the world, including the United States, would be harmed.
Turmoil in Asia and Europe would force major economic readjustment in the United States, perhaps reducing U.S. exports and imports and jeopardizing U.S. investments in these regions. Given
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Readiness Good: Power Project Solves Nuclear War
U.S. POWER PROJECT & SECURITY STOPS PROLIF AND REGIONAL NUCLEAR WARS Marc Dean Millot, RAND, Washington Quarterly, Summer, 1994
The outcome of this refusal to face the emerging reality of regional nuclear adversaries is that the United States is not preparing seriously for the possibility of having to fight in a regional nuclear war. If it continues down this path, it will be unable to cope with the potential threat of nuclear aggression against its allies. If it cannot assure the security of its allies against this threat, the result is likely to be further proliferation among these allies, highly unstable regional military situations, a severe reduction of the United States' international influence, and a growing probability of regional nuclear wars involving U.S. forces. Readiness Good: Diplomacy NEED STRONG MILITARY POWER TO SUSTAIN DEPLOMACY FREDERICK W. KAGAN is a resident scholar in defense and security studies at the American Enterprise Institute, The Wilson Quarterly, Summer 2005 v29 i3 p57(9) . "You have no idea how much it contributes to the general politeness and pleasantness of diplomacy when you have a little quiet armed force in the background, the diplomat-historian George F. Kennan declared in 1946. With his customary wit, Kennan enunciated a profound general principle: War and diplomacy are inextricably linked, and it is as great a mistake to conduct diplomacy without considering military means as it is to wage war without diplomacy.
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Readiness Good: Stops Allied Prolif, Deterrence
A WEAK U.S MILITARY WILL DESTROY OUR ABILITY TO REASSURE OUR ALLIES
Dr. Conrade Crane, Strategic Studies Institute, FACING THE HYDRA: MAINTAINING A STRATEGIC BALANCE WHILE PURSUING A GLOBAL WAR AGAINST TERROR, http://www.e11thhour.org/archives/hydra.html Future Army missions like those in Bosnia and Kosovo should not be accepted lightly. However, there will be times even in the midst of the war against terrorismwhen national interests will require humanitarian assistance, nationbuilding, and secure peace operations that only American military forces can provide. Effective and efficient "peacebuilding" efforts must remain an important element of any national security strategy. The current situation in Afghanistan highlights again that post-conflict societies can become breeding grounds for crime and terrorism if some sort of order is not imposed. Influential members of Congress have already called for American peacekeepers there, and major newspapersirrespective of their political inclinationsare advocating a significant U.S. role in nation-building. One project they have proposed is the reconstruction of Afghanistan's "ring road," which is so vital to the restoration of trade. This task, especially in such a precarious security environment, is perfectly suited to the capabilities of the U.S. Army and its engineers.27 To prevent peacekeeping assignments from dragging on and tying up scarce assets, the Army and supporting agencies must become better at nation-building. Though the Bush administration, as well as the Army leadership, remain reluctant to accept such a mission, long-term solutions to create a more stable world will require the United States to perform it. Only the Armynot the Air Force, Navy, or Marinescan really do it in an environment of questionable security. Success in stabilization operations and strategic success in the war against terrorism will be closely linked because of the cause-effect relationship that exists between them. The Army should be daunted byand prepare forthe responsibilities it might assume to help stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan and other countries after bin Laden and his supporters are rooted out. This effort should be accompanied by the development of appropriate doctrine for such peace-building missions. Though the U.S. burden in these operations can be lessened by relying as much as possible on allied participation, there is no substitute for the presence of ground forces from the most powerful nation in the world to reassure friends, sustain coalitions, and deter potential adversaries. If stability in a region such as the Balkans is determined to be a vital American interest, then it cannot be allowed to return to chaos because of the distractions of the war on terrorism. Months before September 11, the Center for Army Analysis predicted the United States would face a future of 25 to 30 ongoing SSCs each month.28 Though it discusses SSCs only briefly, the QDR Report does state "DoD will ensure that it has sufficient numbers of specialized forces and capabilities to ensure that it does not overstress elements of the force when it is involved in smaller-scale contingencies." Achieving this goal will require modifying the AC Army force structure, and will almost certainly involve increasing its size. In a recent speech, Rumsfeld admitted that the existence of low-density, high-demand assets that have been so overworked by SSCs signified that "our priorities were wrong, and we didn't buy enough of what we need." He advocated adding them as part of his transformation efforts. There is no reason still to have such force shortfalls, and they must be addressed. Major Combat Operation The Army must also retain its ability to deter and fight other wars besides the global war on terrorism. Cross-border wars of aggression are not the most likely type of conflict predicted for the future, but they are certainly not impossible and clearly require forces ready to fight them. In fact, it is precisely because U.S. forces are so ready to fight them that they are so unlikely. Even in the war on terrorism, where major ground forces have initially had only limited utility, they will still be essential if operations expand to take on other states that support terrorism and are more robust than Afghanistan. The most powerful military force on the planet remains a joint force based around a heavy corps, and these units must not be allowed to atrophy. Cross border incursions remain a threat in Asia and the Middle East. The Bush administration's stern warning to Iraq not to take advantage of America's concentration on terrorism would not be an effective deterrent without the joint force, including landpower, to back it up. The primary focus of the QDR Report is on dissuading and deterring potential adversaries from threatening the interests of America and its allies, and on winning wars if deterrence fails. The document's new force-sizing paradigm still envisions swiftly defeating attacks in two theaters of operation in overlapping timeframes, but only one of those campaigns will involve a decisive defeat
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including the occupation of territory or a possible regime change.30 Combined with the perception of some Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) officials that the campaign in Afghanistan was won by airpower and allies, this new forcesizing construct has the potential to bring calls for a reduction of heavy land combat forces. 31 Critics may accept the need to keep such forces for the decisive defeat, but will argue for Army force structure cuts in the allocation for the second conflict. However, the larger Army that fought and won Operation DESERT STORM is already long gone. The current active force is probably too small to fight a major land war against a state like Iraq without even more coalition landpower augmentation than was received in the Gulf War. Additionally, adequate funding must be found to modernize the legacy forces which will have to fight near and mid-term wars. And the paradox of deterrence is that the weaker a nation's armed forces are perceived to be, the more likely it is to have to employ them . In the long run, taking risk in this mission area has the most significant impact on the ability of the United States to protect its interests and achieve the goals outlined in the QDR Report.
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Readiness Good: Taiwan
LOSS OF DETERRENCE AGAINST CHINA CAUSES A CHINESE INVASION OF TAIWAN Frederick Kagan, FINDING THE TARGET, 2006, p. 375
If, however, a Chinese government became convinced, rightly or wrongly, that the U.S. might not defend Taiwan, or might not do so promptly, and if internal Chinese politics and conditions were such to press for an attack, it is quite possible that Beijing might launch any number of more or less limited strikes against its island neighbor. A restrained missile salve might send a message without destroying Taipei; the dispatching of a fleet with an invasion force, possible coupled with paratrooper landings, might be undertaken in the hopes of driving Taipei to capitulate out of fear.
STRONG U.S. MILITARY READINESS IS CRITICAL TO DETER A CHINESE ATTACK ON TAIWAN
Thomas Donnelly, American Enterprise Institute, THE MILITARY WE NEED, 2005,
http://www.aei.org/books/filter.all,bookID.819/book_detail.asp
It is also the case that Chinas aggregate military power is far less than that of the United States. Nonetheless, Beijing now has capabilitiesparticularly quick-strike forces opposite Taiwan that make the immediate, local balance of military power far less certain. The combination of short-range ballistic and cruise mis-siles, select naval forces, strike aircraft, and special-operations forces make a decapitating strike against Taipei an increasingly viable option. And even should Taiwan successfully upgrade its defensesa very uncertain process and one that will take the bet-ter part of a decade, at bestthe key question under such a scenario is the response of U.S. forces, especially naval and air forces. The mission for U.S. forces is to have the credible capacity to respond to Chinese action against Taiwan within a very short time, preferably to stem a crisis short of war but certainly to act if hostilities begin. The rapidity of the response can only be fully judged in political terms: What would China perceive as a credi-ble response? How would Taiwanese political leaders react? Measuring what constitutes an adequate response is naturally imprecise. However, if an initial Chinese strike goes unanswered for three or four days, it may be difficult to save the situation. Steaming naval forces from distant stations may not be quick enough. The U.S. response must be not only rapid but also sustained. Having once begun an attack, Beijing will not have very many attractive options for retreat, and the domestic consequences for the communist regime might well be very great. Chinese leaders must be convinced that further military operations would be entirely futile, resulting in catastrophic failure. By the same token, long-range aircraft based in the United States will be able to contribute only marginally. B-2 bombers or other strike aircraft have no direct air-defense role; their value would be in striking Chinese targets. Because these targets would be located on the Chinese mainland, such strikes might well be viewed as an escalation of the conflict; certainly Chinese leaders would regard them as such. There would be operational questions as well. For example, should counteroffensive strikes concentrate on hard-to-find mobile missile launchers, forward airfields, or command and control nodes? In sum, any successful defense of Taiwanand thus a credible deterrent to Chinese attacks or coercive diplomacy requires a significant commitment of U.S. forces, including naval forces con-stantly within range or directly on station. The Taiwan Strait occu-pies something equivalent to the Fulda Gap during the Cold War; it is a key geographical feature with great operational significance but even greater strategic and political significance. This spot requires a robust forward defensemeaning that, ideally, U.S. land-based air forces, missile defense units, and command facilities should be placed on the island. Unfortunately, our outdated China policy pre-vents that, and thus, for a host of reasons, this mission is a key ele-ment in sizing, shaping, and posturing the U.S. Navy for the future.
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Readiness Good: Taiwan
CHINA IS DEVELOPING ITS STRIKE AIR CRAFT ABILITIES PACIFIC FORWARD DEPLOYMENT CRITICAL TO PREVENT AN ATTACK ON TAIWAN
Thomas Donnelly, American Enterprise Institute, THE MILITARY WE NEED, 2005, http://www.aei.org/books/filter.all,bookID.819/book_detail.asp Chinas advances in strike-aircraft technologies are also notable. Even as it continues to build missiles designed to target Taiwan, the PLA air force recognizes the need to sustain opera-tions beyond the effects possible by missile attacks of any realistic size. As in American doctrine, these capabilities are understood to be complementary and reinforcing. In addition to hitting key command nodes and political targets, a Chinese missile strike would also be intended as an air-defense suppression effort, to allow the improving-but-still-limited Chinese air force to prose-cute a more extended air campaign against Taiwan. Thus, the deterrentor combattask for U.S. forces under such a scenario is increasingly challenging. No longer can the U.S. Seventh Fleet simply sail through the Taiwan Strait. Perhaps the key to the entire campaign would be U.S. response time; noting that in the missile blockade crises of 1995 and 1996 two weeks elapsed before the first U.S. naval forces arrived on the scene, China has strived to create a set of capabilities that would maximize the effect of bolt-from-the-blue strikes. Response time is not simply a measure of speed of transit, but proximity of initial dispositions. In other words, a Taiwan Strait scenario increases the importance of having forward-deployed U.S. forces in the western Pacific. Improved Chinese capabilities have also increased the size of the battlespace in which any U.S. response force must operate. A key factor in this scenario must be the ability to immediately target sites on the Chinese mainland, and perhaps deep inland. The decisive phase might well be the one after an initial Chinese missile barrage, and the decisive act, in both political and operational terms, may be the ability to prevent the PLA air force from conducting an extended air campaign. In sum, the United States must be able to put a significant force in the theater almost from the moment of the initiation of hostilities or at the first serious note of warning. This reaction is essential not only to deter a Chinese strike or to defend Taiwan in the event of such an attack but also to rally regional allies to support U.S. operations. A failure to react in a timely and strong way would cede the initiative to Beijing and invite defeat. MILITARY POWER PROJECTION IN ASIA IS NECESSARY TO DETER A CHINESE ATTACK ON TAIWAN Susan Shirk, served as deputy assistant secretary for China at the U.S. State Department from 199 to 2000.CHINA: FRAGILE SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 263 Keeping U.S. forces deployed in the Asia-Pacific region to deter potential aggression is all the more necessary once we are aware of the domestic pressures that could drive China's leaders to behave rashly. We want Chinese decision makers, when faced with a crisis, to look out to the Pacific and see a U.S. military with the will and capacity to defend Taiwan., our allies in Japan and South Korea, and our other Asian friends. Because restraining themselves may cost Chinese leaders domestic popularity, we need to balance that cost with the even greater cost they will pay if they act belligerently internationally and are defeated by our forces. To quote Henry Kissinger again, "The challenge to American foreign policy is how to deal with Chinese nationalism without inflaming it while standing firm when it turns to threats." i Maintaining our overwhelming military supe riorit y also helps the doves in China argue that if the country tries to compete militarily with the United States just as the Soviet Union did, then it will collapse from within just as the Soviet Union did.
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Readiness Good: Taiwan War Impact Extensions
U.S.-CHINA WAR OVER TAIWAN GOES NUCLEAR
James Hsiung, professor of politics and international law at NYU, 21 ST CENTURY WORLD ORDER AND THE ASIA PACIFIC, 2001, p. 359-60 But decision-makers cannot afford such luxury. Lee Kuan Yew, Singapores Senior Minister, issued a grave warning presumably directed at all government leaders, including the United States, that the Taiwan power kege could ignite a conflagaration that would engulf the entire region. It might even embroil the United States in a nuclear holocaust that nobody wants. Often-times, well-meaning analysts raise the question whether China, with its present military capability and modest defense expenditures (about U.S. $15 billion annually0, can or cannot take Taiwan by forces. But this is the wrong question to pose. As the late patriarch Deng Xiapoing put it, We rather have it proven that we trade but failed [to stop it[ even by force, than be accused [by our disgruntled compatriots and posterity] of not trying to stop Taiwan from going independent. Earlier, I raised the issue of stability within the U.S.-China-Japan triad, precisely with the U.S.Japan alliance in view. Apparently, many in Japan have apprehensions about the stability. Japanese Nobel laureate (for literature) Ohe Kenzaburo, for instance, once told a pen pal that he was fearful of the outcome of a conflict between the United States and China over the question of Taiwan. Because of its alliance relationship, Japan would be embroiled in a conflict that it did not choose that might escalate into a nuclear holocaust. From the ashes of such a nuclear conflict, he figured, some form of life may still be found in the combatant nuclear giants, China and the United States, But, Kohaburo argued, there would be absolutely nothing left in Japan or Taiwan or in the conflicts wake. CHINESE AGGRESSION AGAINST TAIWAN COLLAPSES U.S. LEADERSHIP IN THE REGION, CAUSES DICATORSHIP IN CHINA, AND COLLAPSES THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE Thomas J. Christensen is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2006, p. 81 The two worldviews should also overlap on U.S. policy toward cross-strait relations between Taiwan and the mainland. From either perspective, the United States should deter mainland aggression against Taiwan. From the zero-sum perspective, the island's absorption into the PRC would increase China's material power, eliminate a great source of distraction in Beijing's alleged quest for regional domination, and foreclose the possibility of a future alliance between Taiwan, Japan, and the United States. From the positive-sum perspective, Washington should seek to deter PRC aggression because conflict over Taiwan, especially if it were provoked by the mainland, could raise severe security dilemmas between China and its neighbors. U.S. acquiescence to PRC aggression could also damage Washington's reputation for resolve in the region, without which the U.S. military presence in East Asia cannot play its reassurance role. Moreover, successful Chinese aggression against Taiwan would almost certainly have a negative effect on the evolution of China's domestic politics. The successful use of force by an authoritarian China to subdue Taiwan's democracy would carry regressive lessons about what works and what fails in promoting China's national strength
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Readiness Good: North Korea
STRONG U.S. MILITARY POWER IS CRITICAL TO DETER NORTH KOREA
David Mosler, lecturer, University of Adelaide, GLOBAL AMERICA, 2000, p. 143-4 (PDNSS766) Second, a strong U.S. military presence is similarly the best means of dealing with a relatively new element in the peninsular military equation the threat posed by possible North Korean WMD and particularly nuclear weapons. Although the nuclear dimension of this threat appears to be under control after the agreement reached in 1994 involving an effective U.S. financial bribe, the North may retain some chemical and biological weapons capabilities. The U.S. military presence needs to include facilities for dealing with this potential threat. Finally, deterrence through presence is an effective means of supporting and encouraging new political and diplomatic developments of the inter-Korean situation. The United States needs to demonstrate that it is engaged for the long haul and is an enduring, consistent presence that remains relatively well insulated from political currents in either the United States or South Korea. WAR ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA WOULD COST MILLIONS OF CIVILIAN LIVES AND RISK REGIONAL ESCALATION Kevin Y. Kim, interviewer, and Bruce Cumings, University of Chicago International Relations Professor, LA WEEKLY, August 29, 2003, p. 24. (DRG/D167) [Q:] What would a war with North Korea look like? [A:] Catastrophe. The U.S. military estimates 100,000 Americans dying. Millions of civilians dead. The war would extend to Japan if not more widely, because North Korea would probably fire Rodong missiles at U.S. bases there. Theres no guarantee, really, that war would solve the problem. I have this nightmare: North Koreans enter the South quickly, in huge numbers. Soldiers all over the South, like in the Korean War, while the peninsula gets pummeled by American firepower. Just think where you were during the blackout. Imagine Seoul with 11 million people, with the lights off, an invading army and bombs.
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Readiness Good: Iraq
A LACK OF AN APPROPRIATELY-SIZED MILITARY FORCE COLLAPSES OUR ABILITY TO STOP THE INSURGENCY IN IRAQ Keith W. Mines , served for 22 years in U.S. Army Special Forces, a mix of active duty, National Guard, and reserve assignments, ORBIS, Fall 2005, Force Size for the Post-Westphalian World, pp. 654-5 (PDNSS767)
In Iraq, the United States similarly opted, this time against uniformed advice, to fight with a minimalist force. This reduced force posture could initially have been viable, had the populace welcomed the coalition, or had other partners filled out the coalition in large numbers. Additionally, there was the open question about what precisely needed to be done, which could only be answered by getting on the ground. But by summer 2003 it was clear that a larger force was needed to manage the occupation. Many key tasks were simply not being accomplished, leading to higher coalition casualties and providing an opening for insurgents. Securing borders. I served in the province of Al Anbar, which comprises one-third of Iraq and the key Saudi, Jordanian, and Syrian borders. A single cavalry regiment of about 10,000 troops was charged with covering the entire province from May to September 2003. This highly skilled unit conducted a holding action that set the standard for economy of force in an operation. But no amount of skill could compensate for the lack of manpower, and large swaths of the border were left unwatched. The arrival of the 82nd Post-Westphalian World Airborne Division in fall 2003 helped, but even that was inadequate to cover the provinces vast terrain. Sensors and surveillance were employed aggressively, and every possible force economizer was put into play. But U.S. forces were and remain insufficient. The border is not yet well-defended, and as a result the routes through which foreign fighters aiding the insurgents enter have not been fully closed. Garrisoning cities. The posting of troops in Iraqi cities was destined to be controversial in Al Anbar, with its large Sunni population. While the Sunnis would not have endured a lengthy occupation under any circumstance, there was a window of opportunity in the immediate aftermath of the invasion when they watched to see which way the new Iraq would go. Iraqis probably could have endured a large occupation force that rapidly provided security, rebuilt the infrastructure, and facilitated jobs through the middle of 2004, and the force might have won over a large enough portion of the society to squeeze out the insurgents. Instead, the coalition wound up in a sitting occupation that garnered resentment. Training Iraqi security forces. Training the new Iraqi police and security forces was never a primary task for which the coalition budgeted resources or manpower. Considering the much lower cost of putting in place an Iraqi soldier or policeman compared to an American soldier, this would appear to be a major oversight. Defense analyst F. J. West once remarked that In the Cold War, our policy was we pay, you fight; in Gulf i it was you pay, we fight. In Iraq, apparently the policy has been we pay, we fight, given that we have lost our Cold War capacity for employing and training proxies. The training of the Iraqi Army was handed off to contractors, who worked very effectively given their limited mandate, but on a timeline that would not permit the new force even to begin to deploy until 2006. The police training program was even slower to materialize. Civilian police trainers and mentors of the kind that worked effectively in the Balkans and other transitions eschewed the dangers of working in Iraq, and coalition planners had no experience managing a major police program. Coalition military units thus were forced to use their own personnel to conduct ad hoc training programs. In Al Anbar, the absence of sufficient forces to conduct police training meant that by summer 2004, a full year into the occupation, not a single new Iraqi police officer had had more than three weeks of training. The creation of the Iraqi Civil Defense Force was a further ad hoc effort to create security forces that was hampered by the unavailability of dedicated trainers. Securing the roadways. Travel has accounted for a high proportion of the wars casualties. Engineering personnel in Iraq were stretched thin managing the construction of base camps and implementing infrastructure projects considered essential to the hearts and minds campaign to win over the Iraqi people. Similarly, few special units were available to conduct operations against those attacking the roads. In the absence of enough forces to neutralize the threat of Improvised Explosive Devices, soldiers were often given the task of trolling for ieds on the roads. Hundreds of coalition casualties can be attributed to the insecurity of roads, something a stronger engineering effort could, in part, have prevented. Prisoner of war management. The reports on Abu Ghraib suggest a guard force that was overwhelmed and exhausted, whose actions handed Al Qaeda its biggest propaganda victory ever. A larger force dedicated to pow duty would not by itself have solved the problems of leadership, morale, and discipline, but it would have gone a long way to ensuring the proper conduct of these facilities. Consolidation of ammunition depots. In Al Anbar, the Iraqi ammunition depots often extended for dozens of kilometers, a smorgasbord of artillery and mortar shells from which to fashion ieds plus a vast assortment of rocket propelled grenades, small arms, and ammunition. Consolidating and destroying these weapons, like everything else, was done through the heroic efforts of individual units that conducted the operation as an additional duty, on top of their key job of carrying out stabilization and security missions, for which they were already underresourced. To do this properly would have required entire brigades of ammunition handlers charged with securing and then disposing of the munitions. Without manpower to deal with it, the ammunition often remained available to insurgents for the taking. Apportionment of civil affairs units.
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Readiness Good: Iraq
THE SPREAD OF INSTABILITY IN IRAQ WILL TRIGGER A GLOBAL ECONOMIC DOWNTURN
James Phillips, Research Fellow in Middle Eastern Studies, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, HERITAGE WEBMEMO #770, June 23, 2005, p. http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/wm770.cfm accessed 5/20/2006. (DRGNS/E276) Even if Kurdish and Shiite forces were able to maintain control of the oil reserves in the north and south, an Iraq plunged into chaos would not be able to freely export its oil. The loss of Iraqs 2 million barrels of daily oil production would push world oil prices higher. This would impose a heavy long-term cost on the economies of the U.S. and other oil importers and possibly trigger a world economic recession that could destabilize many of our allies in the war against terrorism, including Pakistan.
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Readiness Good: Iraq
ECONOMIC DECLINE LEADS TO NUCLEAR WAR
Chris H. Lewis Professor at UC Boulder, "The Coming Age of Scarcity" p. 56 1998 Most critics would argue, probably correctly, that instead of allowing underdeveloped countries to withdraw from the global economy and undermine the economies of the developed world, the United States, Europe, and Japan and others will fight neocolonial wars to force these countries to remain within this collapsing global economy. These neocolonial wars will result in mass death, suffering, and even regional nuclear wars. If first world countries choose military confrontation and political repression to maintain the global economy, then we may see mass death and genocide on a global scale that will make the deaths of World War II pale in comparison. However, these neocolonial wars, fought to maintain the developed nations' economic and political hegemony, will cause the final collapse of our global industrial civilization. These wars will so damage the complex economic and trading networks and squander material, biological and energy resources that they will undermine the global economy and its ability to support the earth's 6 to 8 billion people. This would be the worst case scenario for the collapse of global civilization
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Readiness Good: War on Terror
A LACK OF APPROPRIATE FORCES IS LIMITING GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT, WHICH IS CRITICAL TO THE WAR ON TERROR Keith W. Mines , served for 22 years in U.S. Army Special Forces, a mix of active duty, National Guard, and reserve assignments, ORBIS, Fall 2005, Force Size for the Post-Westphalian World, p. 656-7 (X) Elsewhere the United States is also losing less dramatic but no less important opportunities. We have all but stopped our engagement with host country forces in the new democracies of Central Europe, and those we conduct with our new allies in Central Asia and the Caucasus are only done on a limited scale, since there are not enough U.S. forces to conduct exercises. Engagement with traditional allies has also ground to a halt, and our attempt to outsource our engagement with African militaries has been unsuccessful. Joint exercises are a key piece of alliance building, and interoperability has been crucial to our ability to work with and develop allies. For decades they have been a major factor in keeping other countries engaged in operations of interest to the United States, while promoting the Western model of civil-military relations in emerging democracies. Engagement is also key to the next phase of the war on terror, much of which will be fought not through large-scale regime changing campaigns as in Afghanistan and Iraq, but in the shadows, and generally by host-country forces. Current force levels will not permit the United States to conduct traditional exercises and engagement for many years. ANOTHER SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST ATTACK AGAINST THE U.S. CAUSES US TO PRECIPITATE NUCLEAR WAR John L. Petersen, and founder of The Arlington Institute, 10/3/2002, The Next Sound You Hear,
http://www.wfs.org/mmpetersen.htm (X)
But there seems to be a rather specific objective behind all of this. There is an end-game that these terrorists seem to have in mind, and it is not just to kill a bunch of Americans. The analysis that I read points to all of this being the Islamic radicals first assault in a war aimed at elevating Islam to being the major influential religion and political system in the world. How might they do that with the relatively limited resources that they have? Again, the most salient thinking that Ive found suggests that theyd like to turn America against Islam, and vice-versa. A holy war between Islam and the West. How do you do that? Get the U.S. to overreact. Focus the unhappiness of the vast numbers of desperately poor Muslims around more high-profile injustice visited on them indiscriminately by American retaliation for the September 11 attacks. Mobilize them around a gross inequity . . . the same way that Americans (and the West) have mobilized around a great inequity. The third principle is therefore: Provoke Over-Reaction. Get the West to seemingly strike out against "Islam" again. Give them the basis for moving their religious war into high-gear. If this is the framework for a second strike, then where should we look? We should look for places where a relatively small, sophisticated effort can produce inordinate social pain and anger. Produce an event that will cause Americans, in the fury of the aftermath, to look with hate upon every Arabic-looking person they see and strike out in vengeance . (That, of course, is the predictable way in which things work in many places on the planet.) The best of all worlds would be a nuclear counter-strike that wiped out a bunch of innocent Muslims that would start the war for sure. Where are our vulnerabilities in this kind of scenaric world? Obviously, there is the possibility of a nuclear or biological attack, and that is where we will immediately put up our defenses .
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Readiness Good: Diplomacy
STRONG MILITARY POWER IS CRITICAL TO DIPLOMACY
FREDERICK W. KAGAN is a resident scholar in defense and security studies at the American Enterprise Institute, The Wilson Quarterly, Summer 2005 v29 i3 p57(9) (PDCL2401) "You have no idea how much it contributes to the general politeness and pleasantness of diplomacy when you have a little quiet armed force in the background, the diplomat-historian George F. Kennan declared in 1946. With his customary wit, Kennan enunciated a profound general principle: War and diplomacy are inextricably linked, and it is as great a mistake to conduct diplomacy without considering military means as it is to wage war without diplomacy.
STRONG DIPLOMACY IS CRITICAL TO PREVENT GLOBAL WAR
Wyatt Barnes, former General, STRATEGIC REVIEW, Fall 1998, p. 31 All this is essential, but equally imperative is the need to act proactively when some trouble spot flares that might spread. And to do that properly requires American will to act, and that will must be clearly perceived by the world, friends as well as actual and potential miscreants. Threats to peace can arise from probable or actual aggression by a national against another that can endanger regional or world peace, an internal upheaval that can spill over into nearby nations, exported terrorism that the nations hosting the perpetrators cannot or will not suppress, or any similar contingency. Acting against such dangers is vital, but it will be extraordinarily difficult and require resolve. It will also be expensive, in money and American lives. Diplomatic measures should be undertaken first, either alone, with allies, through the United Nations, or through all three channels. Economic steps can be taken, with safeguards to ensure effectiveness. But histories of such moves to restrain dangerous behavior are discouraging because they were not backed by credible, consistently, applied, and decisively strong military power, thus potential rampant states or organizations had no real incentives to abandon their ways. The lesson is clear: we must act militarily anywhere in the world if peaceful pressure is seen to fail. A mantra of a segment of American opinion intones that we must not be the worlds policeman, a slogan tediously repeated as a substitute for a policy. But that role may be essential; only the United States has the power to prevent a world cataclysm. To be sure it would be useful to have allies in this crusade to keep the peace. And allies will only come forward if they perceive that we have to deal decisively with threats to peace. Allies, if they appear, can be difficult, but they must be under American leadership, with due regard for their sensitivities and legitimate interests. They can come from the principal democracies and they will be welcome. Discrimination is essential for a policy of active interventions. We would not act if a war is local, unlikely to spread, and threatens no American interest. The incessant wars in Sub-Saharan Africa are examples of this peripheral issue. We can reduce African agonies by humanitarian aid, UN mediation, and whatever and whatever diplomacy can do. Real dangers lie along cultural, religious, and geopolitical fault lines. Here is where wars begin, soon to spread with devastating effect. America must act, and be seen to be ready to act, with decisive force against these dangers. Our forces must be equipped and manned to undertake these missions, and our people must be ready to pay the prices in lives and money to sustain them. Edward Olsens prescription of retreat from the world will lead to tragedy. Only the United States can prevent that tragedy, the holocaust of war.
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Readiness Good: Global Democracy
U.S MILITARY POWER PROJECTION SUPPORTS GLOBAL DEMOCRATIZATION
Edward Mansfield, Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for International Politics, Penn, Jack Snyder, Professor of International Relations, and the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University. "Prone to violence: the paradox of the democratic peace." NATIONAL INTEREST, Winter 2005, p. 37 (PDNSS758) The same incentives helped consolidate Turkey's democracy and improve the position of its ethnic Kurds, notwithstanding the rise to power of an Islamic party--although these achievements may or may not endure if the likelihood of EU membership fades. Likewise, the U.S. military umbrella and its leadership in constructing an open, stable trading system permitted states like West Germany, Taiwan and South Korea to create the preconditions for stable democracy despite their nations being divided by the Cold War. DEMOCRACY SOLVES NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, GENOCIDE AND ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, December, 1995; Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, http://www.carnegie.org//sub/pubs/deadly/diam_rpt.html // Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty and openness The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.
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Readiness Good: Global Economy
U.S. MILITARY POWER IS CRITICAL TO PRESERVING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
Art, professor of political science, Brandeis, A GRAND STRATEGY FOR AMERICA, 2003, p. 220 (PDNSS765) The ultimate economic case for projecting American military power to Eurasia, then, is to share the political-military environment in ways that advance, and do not harm, Americas economic interests. Todays globalization is not an inevitable force that overwhelms all other factors; instead, it is a product of fifty years of steady progress toward economic openness, which would not have come about without the sustained exercise of American power economic, political, military. The United States is both the state most responsible for creating globalization and the one that has benefited the most from it. It has undertaken the responsibility because of the benefits. Consequently, if the United States leaves Eurasia, its economic interests are likely to be worse off because globalization might sputter and slow to a halt. ECONOMIC DECLINE LEADS TO NUCLEAR WAR
Chris H. Lewis Professor at UC Boulder, "The Coming Age of Scarcity" p. 56 1998 Most critics would argue, probably correctly, that instead of allowing underdeveloped countries to withdraw from the global economy and undermine the economies of the developed world, the United States, Europe, and Japan and others will fight neocolonial wars to force these countries to remain within this collapsing global economy. These neocolonial wars will result in mass death, suffering, and even regional nuclear wars. If first world countries choose military confrontation and political repression to maintain the global economy, then we may see mass death and genocide on a global scale that will make the deaths of World War II pale in comparison. However, these neocolonial wars, fought to maintain the developed nations' economic and political hegemony, will cause the final collapse of our global industrial civilization. These wars will so damage the complex economic and trading networks and squander material, biological and energy resources that they will undermine the global economy and its ability to support the earth's 6 to 8 billion people. This would be the worst case scenario for the collapse of global civilization
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Readiness Good: U.S. Military Power Checks Global Aggression
U.S. POWER CHECKS GLOBAL AGGRESSION
Steven J. Nider is director of the Defense Working Group at the Progressive Policy Institute, 2000 (BLUE PRINT MAGAZINE, January, http://www.ndol.org/ndol_ci.cfm?kaid=124&subid=158&contentid=1331) Through overseas deployments, U.S. forces are shaping events all around the world. They serve to maintain the balance of power in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. They degrade Saddam Hussein's ability to deploy weapons of mass destruction and threaten his neighbors. They force Slobodan Milosevic and his army to stay out of Kosovo. In short, we must maintain the strongest, best trained, best equipped military in the world because U.S. strength is the ballast of the new international system.
THE REST OF THE WORLD DEPENDS ON U.S. MILITARY MIGHT
Roeber Tracinski is a fellow, writer, teacher and analyst with the Ayn Rand Institute and speaks regularly at conferences and on college campuses about the philosophy of the late novelist Ayn Rand, 2002 (CAPITALISM MAGAZINE, February 11, http://capmag.com/article.asp?ID=1405) A recent news report on the president's budget cites a revealing statistic. Next year's proposed increase in U.S. defense spending, $48 billion, is larger than the total defense budget of any other single nation. The rest of the civilized world sleeps under the protection of a Pax Americana. They are able to avoid massive defense spending or crippling wars thanks to the security provided by our wealth, our military technology, and, most of all, our moral backbone.
U.S DETERRENCE AND POWER HOLDS THE WORLD TOGETHER
Charles Krauthaumer, DEMOCRATIC REALISM: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN A UNILATERAL WORLD, April 2004, http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040227_book755text.pdf What does hold the international system together? What keeps it from degenerating into total anarchy? Not the phony security of treaties, not the best of goodwill among the nicer nations. In the unipolar world we inhabit, what stability we do enjoy today is owed to the overwhelming power and deterrent threat of the United States. If someone invades your house, you call the cops. Who do you call if someone invades your country? You dial Washington. In the unipolar world, the closest thing to a centralized authority, to an enforcer of norms, is AmericaAmerican power. And ironically, American power is precisely what liberal internationalism wants to constrain and tie down and subsume in pursuit of some brave new Lockean world.
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Readiness Good: U.S. Military Power Checks Global Aggression
US POWER & LEADERSHIP KEY TO GLOBAL SECURITY
Donald Kagan, Professor of History, Yale University, ORBIS, Spring 1997, p. 188-9. The last three-quarters of the twentieth century strongly suggest the opposite conclusion: major war is more likely to come when satisfied states neglect their defenses and fail to take an active part in the preservation of peace. It is vital to understand that the current relatively peaceful and secure situation is neither inevitable nor immutable. It reflects two conditions built up with tremendous effort and expense during the last half century: the great power of the United States and the general expectation that Americans will be willing to use that power when necessary. The diminution of U.S. power and credibility, which would follow on a policy of reduced responsibility, would thus not be a neutral act that would leave the situation as it stands. Instead, it would be a critical step in undermining the stability of the international situation. Calculations based on the absence of visible potential enemies would immediately be made invalid by America's withdrawal from its current position as the major bulwark supporting the world order. The cost of the resulting upheaval in wealth, instability, and the likelihood of war would be infinitely greater than the cost of continuing to uphold the existing international structure.
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Readiness Good: TROOPS Key to Readiness
TROOP DEPLOYMENTS ARE KEY TO READINESS
Walden Bellow, Director of Focus on the Global South, DILEMMAS OF DOMINATION: THE UNMAKING OF AMERICAN POWER, 2005, p. 215 Militarily, there is no doubt that Washington will retain absolute superiority in all the gross indices of military might, such as nuclear warheads, conventional weaponry, and aircraft carriers. But the ability to transform military power into effective intervention will decline. The Iraq syndrome is here to stay. Both nuclear and conventional power, including airpower, will be as useful as a sledgehammer in swatting flies. Ground troops will continue to be the key, and troop deployments against motivated insurgents in far-flung reaches of the empire will simply not fly with an increasingly skeptical public.
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Readiness Good: US Military Action/WOT Effective: Afghanistan
US MILITARY CAMPAIGN AGAINST AFGHANISTAN VERY SUCCESSFUL SIGNIFICANTLY DEGRADED AL QAEDAS ABILITY TO CARRY OUT OPERATIONS Daniel Benjamin & Aidan Kirby, Senior Fellow & Research Associate, CSIS, 2006, Five Years After 9/11: An Assessment of Americas War on Terror, eds. Julianne Smith & Thomas Sanderson, [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/five_years_after_9-11smallsize.pdf], p. 1-2 The invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 culminated in al Qaedas loss of its operational base. Consequently, the ability of bin Laden and his deputies to manage their network and direct attacks has been significantly degraded. The military campaign in Afghanistan was hardly perfect: the United States and its Afghan allies missed key opportunities to capture or kill terrorists, and the fact that bin Laden, his chief lieutenant Ayman al-Zawahiri, and others escaped represents a major failure. The al Qaeda leadership, which is believed to be hiding out in the rugged PakistanAfghanistan border region, must now contend with a persistent threat to its security, which has undoubtedly had a cost for the terrorists. But bin Ladens ability to evade the United States has enhanced his standing in the broader Muslim world, seeming to confirm his claim to be spearheading a divine plan. It is widely believed that the ability of the core al Qaeda group to carry out long-distance operations has been further reduced by the arrest or death of a number of highlevel members. Early indications from the recently disrupted conspiracy to bomb American commercial aircraft flying out of London suggest that a formidable threat remains, though how directly al Qaeda individuals were involved has yet to be disclosed. Whatever the case, the group remains a threat, since the survival of only a small number of cells would allow it to carry out potentially spectacular attacks. Among the most notable cases of key al Qaeda operatives being put out of commission include the apprehension of 9/11 conspirators Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, perhaps the most innovative and dangerous terrorist planners in history, and the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq. Due to the remarkable coordination of intelligence services around the world, many cells of the original al Qaeda have been disrupted. US FOREIGN POLICY MUST PUT US NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS FIRST WAR IN IRAQ WAS JUSTIFIED FOR THE LARGER THREAT IT AVOIDED
Sean Hannity, Fox News, 2004, Deliver Us From Evil, p. 146-7
Ask yourself this: what would have happened if President Bush had listened to the voices of accommodation, hunkered down Clinton style, and waited indefinitely for Saddam to cooperate fully with the UN inspections? If the UN had simply refused to enforce its own resolutions, as they did throughout the 1990s? At best Saddam would simply have fooled the inspectors until they returned with some spotty, inconclusive evidence, leaving him to continue his bloodthirsty reign for years to come. And at worse, he would have stepped up his proven campaign to procure WMDs, collude with terroristsand eventually make good on his threats to dominate the entire Middle East. Would President Bush have been off the hook? Perhaps, at least in the short term. But as Bill Clinton is learning now, a presidents legacy may depend more on the world he leaves behind than on the legislation he created while in office. An unchecked Saddam Hussein, in control of nearly two thirds of the worlds oil supply, protected by an arsenal of weapons no one dared provoke him to use; that is what we avoided by going to war when we did. Its an image worth remembering as we choose not only our current political leaders, but those in the future as well. Yes, the United Nations has a place in the world. But every American president must take careful measure of just how much actual responsibility America can share with the UN, while still retaining control of Americas national security interests. After all, the US Constitution makes clear that protecting the nation is the number one responsibility of the federal government. It is not the job of any international body. Conservatives understand that. George W. Bush certainly does. And in the uncertainty of these times, that is no small comfort.
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Readiness Good: US Military Action/WOT Effective: Afghanistan
IRAQ WAR HAS BEEN A SUCCESS IN REDUCING PROLIFERATION AND TERRORIST THREATS Robert J. Lieber, Georgetown University, 2005, The American Era: power and strategy for the 21st century, p. 144-5 First, viewed through the prism of WMD and terrorism, there are reasons to render a positive verdict. Saddams Iraq is no longer a long-term strategic threat to the region nor to Americas allies or interests Iraqs WMD programs are gone, with the weapons apparently having been removed at Saddams order as an interim measure and the programs, scientists, and facilities mostly dispersed or destroyed in the war or its aftermath. Even in the worse circumstances, it will be a long time before any successor regime has the capacity and the will to resume a serious WMD effort. The American-led ouster of Saddam, along with the defeat of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, has also had a palpable effect on regional proliferation efforts. As a case in point, the Libyan regime of Muammar Qaddafi acted to dismantle its WMD facilities and programs and to open them to US British and IAEA inspection. Some have claimed that Qaddafis decision was a result not of Afghanistan and Iraq but of five years of talks with Britain and the United States. However, Qaddafi himself is reported to have told Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi in September 2003, I will do whatever the Americans want, because I saw that happened in Iraq, and I was afraid. Moreover, the sequence of events and timing of the Libyan decision seems a good deal more than coincidental. Added to this, there are the actions by Pakistan to halt the extensive role of its own scientists and firms in nuclear weapons proliferation. Nuclear proliferation in Iran does, however, remain a very serious potential risk. In the terror war more broadly, al-Qaeda lost not only its critical operational base in Afghanistan, but also the haven provided to a number of its key operatives by Iraq. Much of the al-Qaeda leadership has been killed or captured, and the remaining figures, though still very dangerous, may be more preoccupied with avoiding capture or attack than with carrying out large-scale operations of their own. On the other hand, the insurgency in Iraq has acted as a magnet for terrorists throughout the region. In addition, the fragmenting of al-Qaeda and related groups represents a serious peril of its own. Local groups operating in loose relationship to al-Qaeda seek to carry out their own terror attacks, as evidently was the case with the Madrid train bombing of March 11, 2004, which killed 191 Spanish commuters. --AL QAEDA LIKE TERRORISM AGAINST US INEVITABLE Peter Beinart, Editor, The New Republic, 2006, The Good Fight: Why Liberalsand only liberalscan win the war on terror and make America great again, p. 70 For some commentators, the problem is who we are. According to President Bush, America was targeted for attack because were the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. Or, as he later explained, The terrorists who attacked our country on September the 11th 2001 were not protesting our policies. They were protesting our existence. Some say that by fighting the terrorists abroad since September the 11 th, we only stir up a hornets nest. But the terrorists who struck that day were stirred up already. If America were not fighting terrorists in Iraq, and Afghanistan, and elsewhere, what would these thousands of killers do, suddenly begin leading productive lives of service and charity? From this perspective, opposition to the United States is an inevitable, and thus unavoidable, reaction either to the concentration of power in US hands or the specific political and cultural values that the United States represents. And if that were the whole story, there would be little the United States could do about it.
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IRAQ HAS DEMONSTRATED THE NECESSITY OF PREEMPTION Ralph Peters, Retired Army Officer, 2005, New Glory: Expanding Americas Global Supremacy, p. 77-8
Since our transformation of Iraq became more difficult than its sponsors predicted, we have been assured by the efforts opponents that preemptive war is now a discredited concept, practically and morally. Thats nonsense. The next time a preemptive strike becomes desirable, it will be easier for us, not harder. The old rules have been shattered, and good riddance. Preemptive wars and other preventive exercises of military power now constitute one more useful option for a president and Congress faced with mortal threats. This does not mean that preemptive war will always be our preference. More often we will wander down the traditional, confused paths to the outbreak of hostilities. But the precedent established in Iraq signals that we no longer feel obliged to allow a known enemy to strike first or a tyrant to escape justice as long as he butchers selectively. In an age of weapons of mass destruction, long-range missile proliferation, global terrorism, shifting alliances, and international mobility, retaining the option of preemptive war is common sense. If a man threatening me with a knife I am not obliged to allow him to cut into my flesh before responding. Nor am I therefore inclined to attack a man who has not brandished a knife. The rhetorical trickery of those who oppose any use of the US military implies that once we have embraced the right of preemptive action we will not know when to stop, but will go on to invade Switzerland. But our problem has been the opposite in the recent past: We have stood by while mass murderers worked their will upon the innocent, while oppressive regimes harbored and abetted terrorists, and while entire countries were ravaged by presidents-for-life. Americans know when to stop. But we also must recognize when to start before it grows too late.
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Readiness Good: Doesnt Threaten Soft Power
HARD POWER DOESNT TRADE OFF WITH SOFT POWER
William H. Thornton, Professor Cultural Studies National Cheng Kung University, 2005, New World Empire, p. 6-7 9/11 changed all that in a flash. The 1990s turned out to have been at best a respite between two warring ages. It was made abundantly clear that order would not simply unfold, but would have to be imposed. In the White House this revelation was so far from bad news that the challenge was not smiling too broadly in front of the cameras. At home and abroad, security took full priority over all the things the administration wanted to dispose of anyway. Securitization also enhanced the comparative advantage of Americas military supremacythis is at a time when its economic supremacy was flagging. That gain in hard power was not offset by any major loss in soft power, since America was still swimming with the global tide. Just to make a point however, Washington let the fact be known that it could go it alone or even swim against the tide if need be. NATO responded to 9/11 by invoking for the first time a provision of its founding treaty that construes an attack on any member as an attack on all. But, as if to put multilateralism in mothballs, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz curtly vetoed that collective action, saying that if the United States needed help, it would ask for it.
SOFT POWER IS MORE ABOUT INFLUENCE THAN ATTRACTIVENESS OF THE US MODEL
Carnes Lord, Professor, Naval War College, 2006, Losing Hearts and Minds? Public diplomacy and strategic influence in the age of terror, p. 19-20 All of this can lead one to raise a more fundamental question concerning the adequacy of Nyes understanding of soft power in terms (largely if not wholly) of attraction. Perhaps the term influence is better after all at capturing the overall phenomenon we are dealing with here. The French, for example, may be repulsed more than they are attracted by the United States; but this does not necessarily mean that American soft power is ineffective in France. To the extent that the widely discussed process of globalization is fundamentally a manifestation of American soft power, it can be argued that American soft power is inexorably shaping the behavior of peoples and governments around the world whether or not they are especially sympathetic to the United States or indeed, whether or not they are fully aware of the ways in which they are being influenced. Consider in this regard the undeniable success the United States has had since its invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq in promoting democracy and societal reform (particularly reform of education) throughout the Middle East, in spite of what polling data seem to reveal about the virulent hostility of much of the region to the United States and all it stands for. More generally, soft power for Nye seems a fundamentally passive instrument. But public diplomacy, to be truly effective, must be about the active projection of soft power in order to reinforce American influence or to generate it where otherwise absent.
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Readiness Good: Hard Power Key to Soft Power
HARD POWER IS KEY TO SOFT POWER LOSS OF MILITARY POWER WEAKENS OUR SOFT POWER INFLUENCE Daniel Okimoto, Analyst @ the Asia/Pacific Research Center, January 1998 (The Japan-America Security Alliance: Prospects for the 21st Century) http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/okd02/ To borrow a metaphor from international finance, military power is a convertible currency functioning under a floating exchange rate regime; it can be converted into substantial influence in other issue areas . The hard and soft sides of power are connected; if one side (hard power) suffers a setback, there is inevitably some erosion on the other side (soft power), leading to a net loss of national power. As U.S. power recedes, that of other nations rises, at least in relative terms.
Soft power is meaningless without credible hard power
David Gompert, Analyst @ RAND Europe, April 2002 (United States Unilateralism Versus Multilateralism: Getting Some Perspective) http://www.usembassy.de/cologne/bpb2002gompert.htm We hear that the United States relies too heavily on hard power and not enough on soft power, such as diplomacy and commercial engagement, in dealing with irresponsible and dangerous regimes. Of course, the first lesson of trying a soft approach toward untrustworthy regimes is that it has to be backed up by hard power or it simply wont work or, worse, will lead to appeasement. Who wouldnt prefer to stress soft power as long as someone else is willing to provide the hard power that backs it up and gives it a chance of working?
Hard power is not out-dated. Its still key to leadership Nye, Dean of the JFK school of govt at Harvard, Political Science Quarterly, Winter 2002/2003
As mentioned above, none of this is to suggest that military force plays no role in international politics today. For one thing, the information revolution has yet to transform most of the world. Many states are unconstrained by democratic societal forces, as Kuwait learned from its neighbor Iraq, and terrorist groups pay little heed to the normal constraints of liberal societies. Civil wars are rife in many parts of the world where collapsed empires left power vacuums. Moreover, throughout history, the rise of new great powers has been accompanied by anxieties that have sometimes precipitated military crises. In Thucydides' immortal description, the Peloponnesian War in ancient Greece was caused by the rise to power of Athens and the fear it created in Sparta.24 World War I owed much to the rise of the Kaiser's Germany and the fear that it created in Britain. Some foretell a similar dynamic in this century arising from the rise of China and the fear it creates in the United States. Geoeconomics has not replaced geopolitics, although in the early twenty-first century there has clearly been a blurring of the traditional boundaries between the two. To ignore the role of force and the centrality of security would be like ignoring oxygen. Under normal circumstances, oxygen is plentiful and we pay it little attention. But once those conditions change and we begin to miss it, we can focus on nothing else. Even in those areas where the direct employment of force falls out of use among countries-for instance, within Western Europe or between the United States and Japan-nonstate actors such as terrorists may use force. Moreover, military force can still play an important political role among advanced nations. For example, most countries in East Asia welcome the presence of American troops as an insurance policy against uncertain neighbors. Moreover, deterring threats or ensuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf increases America's influence with its allies. Sometimes the linkages may be direct; more often they are present in the back of statesmen's minds. As the Defense Department describes it, one of the missions of American troops based overseas is to "shape the environment."
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Readiness Good: Deter WMD Use
MILITARY READINESS IS NEEDED TO DETER WMD USE
Ashton B. Carter, chair of the International Relations, Science and Security area at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. William J. Perry is a professor at Stanford's Institute for International Studies. Both are co-directors of the Preventive Defense Project, a research collaboration of Harvard and Stanford Universities, NATIONAL INTEREST, March/April 2007, p. 88 Next, the military must still be prepared to fight "traditional" major theater wars in North Korea and the Middle East, perhaps simultaneously. This requires a relatively large conventional force structure. Finally, continuing threats from WMD underscore the need for deterrent forces (nuclear and non-nuclear) of reasonable size and survivability, and for protective measures ranging from chemical suits to missile defenses.
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Readiness Useless: General
MILITARY POWER WONT PROTECT AGAINST UNCONVENTIONAL ENEMIES
Colin Gray, political scientist specializing in national security policy, THE SHERIFF: AMERICAS DEFENSE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER, 2004, p. 129 Third and finally, as the lone superpower functioning as the sheriff of world order, the United States is at exceptional risk to the machinations of cunning foes who will need to contrive asymmetric s styles of warfare if they are to compete at all. 16 While it is true that the role of sheriff exposes the country to particular dangers, it is also true that the world wi11 be increasingly dangerous for a super-wealth, superstate over the next several decades, regardless of its global stance. It is far from clear that Americans will greatly enhance their safety turning in their sheriff's badge. America's basic offense in the eyes of many is simply what it is and what it represents: it is a kind of existential insult. A danger peculiar to great strength is what has long been known as the victory disease. An America universally acknowledged as unchallengeable in regular forms of war, at least for some time to come, is an America that is likely to exaggerate its military prowess. It is difficult to know how good America's armed forces really are when they have not been tested in combat against a worthy, albeit highly asymmetric enemy , for nearly thirty years.'' Some of the consequences of that sad, instructive, and contentious episode remain extant even today.
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*** Military Readiness Bad ***
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A2: Military Power Good 1st Line (1/1)
(___) A large military is obsolete deterrence prevents nation-state threats and conventional warfare is useless against terrorists. Charles V. PEA, Senior Fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, adviser to the Straus Military Reform Project, and analyst for MSNBC television, 2006
["A Smaller Military To Fight the War on Terror," Orbis, Volume 50, Issue 2 , Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via ScienceDirect // BATMAN]
The United States is in a uniquely safe geostrategic position against traditional, nation-state threats. No nearby foreign power is capable of projecting power to attack the United States, while the U.S. nuclear arsenal is a powerful deterrent against any countries with long-range nuclear capability. So the United States does not need a large, conventional military to defend the homeland against nation-states . Today, the major threat to the homeland comes from transnational networks of Islamist terrorists, and in the war on terror, large-scale military operations will be the exception rather than the rule. Al Qaeda does not command a military force, and as a transnational terrorist organization, it does not have physical infrastructure and high-value targets that can be easily identified and destroyed by military force . The military's role in the war on terror mainly involves Special Operations Forces in discrete missions against specific targets, not conventional warfare aimed at overthrowing entire regimes (such as Operation Iraqi Freedom). The rest of the war to dismantle and degrade Al Qaeda will largely be the task of unprecedented international intelligence and law enforcement cooperation. Therefore, an increasingly large defense budget the Department of Defense projects the budget to grow to more than Image492 billion by fiscal year 20101is not necessary either to fight the war on terror or to protect America from traditional nation-state military threats .
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A2: Military Power Good 2nd Line - A2: Key To War On Terrorism (1/1)
(___) The military is not key to the war on terrorism ground forces are obselete.
Charles V. PEA, Senior Fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, adviser to the Straus Military Reform Project, and analyst for MSNBC television, 2006 ["A Smaller Military To Fight the War on Terror," Orbis, Volume 50, Issue 2 , Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via ScienceDirect // BATMAN]
The defense budget can be reduced and the U.S. military downsized because (1) the nation-state threat environment is markedly different than it was during the Cold War, and (2) a large military is not necessary to combat the terrorist threat. In fact, the military can only play a limited role in homeland defense against terrorism, since the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits its use for domestic policing actions. (It does, however, remain an
important source of intelligence information that must be analyzed and integrated with other sources of intelligence to anticipate and defeat terrorist attacks.)
The shorthand phrase war on terror can be misleading . As to whom the enemy is, President Bush has recently made
more clear that the war is really one on what some call evil Islamic radicalism; others, militant jihadism; and still others, Islamo-fascism.39 As to how this struggle is waged, the term war implies the use of military force as the primary
instrument, whereas traditional military operations should be the exception rather than the rule in the conflict with Al Qaeda. The arduous task of dismantling and degrading its network will largely be the task of unprecedented international intelligence and law enforcement cooperation, not the application of large-scale military force. To the extent the military is involved in the war on terror, it will be special forces in discrete operations against specific targets rather than large-scale military operations .
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A2: Military Power Good 2nd Line - A2: Key To U.S. Interests (1/1)
(___) A smaller military can still effectively deploy overwhelming force the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq prove that defense transformation solves. Charles V. PEA, Senior Fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, adviser to the Straus Military Reform Project, and analyst for MSNBC television, 2006
["A Smaller Military To Fight the War on Terror," Orbis, Volume 50, Issue 2 , Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via ScienceDirect // BATMAN]
Defense transformation is another reason U.S. military forces can be downsized. Technological advances act as force multipliers that allow U.S. forces to achieve equal or greater combat effectiveness with fewer troops . For example, both Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) and Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrated that the U.S. military could engage and defeat on the battlefield the military forces of adversaries using significantly smaller force size than required in previous conflicts. If fewer soldiers are needed to fight wars, a smaller military can be a capable and effective fighting force. And although it seems counterintuitive, even a smaller U.S. military would still be able to apply the Powell Doctrine of overwhelming force, because of superiority achieved via advanced technology rather than sheer numbers.
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A2: Military Power Good 2nd Line - A2: Key To Allied Defense (1/1)
(___) The U.S. military is not key to defend allies they are capable of defending themselves and are economically strong enough to sustain higher defense spending. Charles V. PEA, Senior Fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, adviser to the Straus Military Reform Project, and analyst for MSNBC television, 2006
["A Smaller Military To Fight the War on Terror," Orbis, Volume 50, Issue 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via ScienceDirect // BATMAN]
Not only does the postCold War threat environment give the United States the luxury of allowing countries to take responsibility for security in their own neighborhoods, but the economic strength of Europe and East Asia means that friendly countries in those regions can afford to pay for their own defense rather than relying on the United States to underwrite their security.
In 2003, when the United States total defense expenditures were 3.7 percent of its 10.9 trillion GDP, the 15 EU countries defense spending was less than 2 percent of their combined GDP of10.5 trillion. Without a Soviet threat to Europe, the
United States does not need to subsidize European defense spending and the European countries have the economic wherewithal to increase military spending, if necessary . Likewise, America's allies in East Asia are capable of defending themselves . South Korea outspends North Korea on
defense nearly 3:1, 4.6 billion vs. 5.5 billion (North Korea's GDP in 2003 was 2 billion compared to South Korea's 5 billion). Japan's GDP was 4.34 trillion and its defense spending 2.8 billion, almost eight times that of North Korea. So South Korea defense.38
and Japan certainly have the economic resources to adequately defend themselves against North Korea. They even have the capacity to act as military balancers to China, which had a GDP of 1.43 trillion and spent 22.4 billion on
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A2: Military Power Good 2nd Line - A2: Forward Deployment Good (1/2)
(___) Forward deployment is not key to effective responses airpower is key and forward deployment is empirically unnecessary. Charles V. PEA, Senior Fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, adviser to the Straus Military Reform Project, and analyst for MSNBC television, 2006
["A Smaller Military To Fight the War on Terror," Orbis, Volume 50, Issue 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via ScienceDirect // BATMAN]
A balancer-of-last-resort strategy would still allow the United States to project power if vital U.S. national security interests were at risk, but the requirement to project power would be reduced because other countries would be acting as balancers-of-power in their respective regions, thereby eliminating the need for the U.S. military to have large numbers of troops stationed in foreign countries. Instead of permanent bases and large numbers of troops deployed at those bases, the ability to rapidly project power if necessary would be made easier by prepositioning of supplies and equipment (for example, at Diego Garcia) to allow the U.S. military to respond more rapidly (troops can be deployed faster if their associated equipment does not have to be deployed simultaneously) and negotiating access and base rights with friendly countries .
Although it is counterintuitive, forward deployment does not significantly enhance the U.S. military's ability to fight
wars. The U.S. military's comparative advantage is airpower, which can be dispatched relatively quickly and at very long ranges. Indeed, during Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S. Air Force was able to fly missions from the United
States. Some B-2s flew 44-hour missions to Afghanistan directly from the Whiteman (Missouri) Air Force Base.35
In a balancer-of-last-resort strategy, the United States would emphasize its long-range airpower capabilities as the first response in the rare case of a necessary military intervention . Eland argues that most of the ground forces should be provided by the nations benefiting from U.S. intervention .36 If U.S. ground forces are needed to fight a major war, they could be deployed using strategic airlift and sealift, sized appropriately for a smaller force structure.
It is worth noting that Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom were both conducted without significant forces already deployed in theater. In Enduring Freedom, the U.S. military had neither troops nor bases adjacent to Afghanistan, yet military operations commenced less than a month after 9/11. In the case of Iraqi Freedom, even though the U.S. military had more than 6,000 troops (mostly Air Force) deployed in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi government had to forbid, at least publicly, the use of its bases to conduct military operations from that country. Instead, the United States used Kuwait as the headquarters and the jumping-off point for military operations. Similarly, the Turkish government prevented the U.S. Army's 4th Infantry Division from using bases in that country for military operations in northern Iraq, forcing some 30,000 troops to be transported via ship through the Suez Canal and Red Sea to the Persian Gulf, where they arrived too late to be part of the initial attack. Despite these handicaps, U.S. forces swept away the Iraqi military in less than four weeks.
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A2: Military Power Good 2nd Line - A2: Forward Deployment Good (2/2)
(___) Off-shore balancing prevents the need for a large military forward deployment is unnecessary. Charles V. PEA, Senior Fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, adviser to the Straus Military Reform Project, and analyst for MSNBC television, 2006
["A Smaller Military To Fight the War on Terror," Orbis, Volume 50, Issue 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via ScienceDirect // BATMAN] Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the total number of U.S. active-duty military personnel was more than 1.4 million troops, of which 237,473 were deployed in foreign countries.10 Assuming twice as many troops need to be deployed in the United States in order to rotate those deployments at specified intervals,11 then more than 700,000 active-duty troops, along with their associated force structure, are required to maintain a global military presence. Since the United States does not in fact
have to maintain its current worldwide deployments, U.S. security against nation-state threats can be achieved at significantly lower costs. Instead of a Cold Warera extended defense perimeter and forward-deployed forces, today's nation-state threat environment affords the United States the opportunity to adopt a balancer-of-last-resort strategy. Such a strategy would place greater emphasis on allowing countries to build regional security arrangements, even in important areas such as Europe and East Asia. In 2001, Ivan Eland argued:
The regional arrangements could include a regional security organization (such as any newly formed defense subset of the European Union), a great power policing its sphere of influence, or simply a balance of power among the larger nations of a region. Those regional arrangements would check aspiring hegemonic powers and thus keep power in the international system diffuse.12 Ted Galen Carpenter at the Cato Institute also argues in favor of a balancer-of-last-resort strategy:
The United States no longer faces a would-be hegemonic rival, nor is any credible challenger on the horizon. That development should fundamentally change how we view regional or internecine conflicts. In most cases such disorders will not impinge on vital U.S. interests. Washington can, therefore, afford to view them with detachment, intervening only as a balancer of last resort when a conflict cannot be contained by other powers in the affected region and is expanding to the point where America's security is threatened.13
Stephen Walt of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University echoes Eland and Carpenter in his argument for an offshore balancing strategy: The final option is offshore balancing, which has been America's traditional grand strategy. In this strategy, the United States deploys its power abroad only when there are direct threats to vital American interests. Offshore balancing assumes that only a few areas of the globe are of strategic importance to the United States (that is, worth fighting and dying for). Specifically, the vital areas are the regions where there are substantial concentrations of power and wealth or critical natural resources: Europe, industrialized Asia, and the Persian Gulf. Offshore balancing further recognizes that the United States does not need to control these areas directly; it merely needs to ensure that they do not fall under the control of a hostile great power and especially not under the control of a so-called peer competitor. To prevent rival great powers from doing this, offshore balancing prefers to rely primarily on local actors to uphold the regional balance of power. Under this strategy, the United States would intervene with its own forces only when regional powers are unable to uphold the balance of power on their own.14 Therefore, instead of being a first responder to every crisis and conflict, the U.S. military would only intervene when truly vital U.S. security interests were at stake. That would allow U.S. forces to be expeditionary i.e., mostly stationed in the United States, rather than being forward-deployed in other countries around the world. Such a posture might require prepositioning of supplies and equipment and negotiating access and base rights, but would not require large numbers of troops to be stationed in foreign countries. I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of orange juice.
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A2: Military Power Good 2nd Line Drawdown Of Armed Forces Solves (1/1)
(___) Offshore balancing would allow a drawdown of U.S. forces this solves.
Charles V. PEA, Senior Fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, adviser to the Straus Military Reform Project, and analyst for MSNBC television, 2006 ["A Smaller Military To Fight the War on Terror," Orbis, Volume 50, Issue 2 , Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via ScienceDirect // BATMAN]
Since the Korean War, the U.S. military has maintained a significant overseas presence (see Figure 3), which accounts for a large percentage of U.S. defense spending. If the United States adopted a balancer-of-last-resort strategy, virtually all U.S. foreign military deployments (excepting, for example, U.S. Marine Corps personnel assigned to embassies) and twice as many U.S.-based troops could be cut. Applying this rule of thumb to the various services would result in the following active-duty force size : U.S. Army: 189,000 (a 61 percent reduction)
U.S. Navy: 266,600 (a 31 percent reduction) U.S. Marine Corps: 77,000 (a 56 percent reduction) U.S. Air Force: 168,000 (a 54 percent reduction) Total: 699,000 (a 50 percent reduction) Admittedly, this is a very top-level approach, assuming as it does that the current active-duty force mix is
appropriate. But it is one way to assess how U.S. forces and force structure could be reduced by adopting a balancer-of-last-resort strategy.
The fiscal 2006 Department of Defense budget request was 19.9 billion, which does not include funding for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The personnel budget for active-duty forces is 1.7 billion (out of a total of 8.9 billion for military personnel). If forces were reduced as suggested above, the overall savings in the active-duty budget would be 2.1 billion, and total military personnel spending would fall from 8.9 billion to 6.8 billion .15
If U.S. active-duty forces are substantially reduced, the associated force structure could be similarly reduced, resulting in lower operations and maintenance (o&m) costs. Using the same percentage reductions applied to activeduty forces above, the total savings would be billion and the total spent on o&m would fall from 7.8 billion to 3.8 billion. The savings in military personnel and o&m costs combined would be 6.1 billion, or about 21 percent of the total defense budget. Military personnel and o&m are the two largest portions of the defense budget , at 26 percent and 35 percent, respectively, so significant reductions in defense spending can only be achieved if these costs are reduced. And the only way to reduce these costs is to downsize active-duty military forces .
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Military Power Bad: Useless (No Wars, Mandlebaum-Style)
MILITARY POWER NO LONGER HAS ANY UTILITY; IT DOESNT RESOLVE OR PREVENT CONFLICTS John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 13 The most conspicuous change of the modern era has been the declining value of military power. Three conventional assumptions have been made about power. The first, in the traditional view of most scholars of international relations, has been that great powers must be able to wage war.11 But critics of the state system have repeatedly pointed to the destructive association between states and violence, which reached a new nadir during the twentieth century when two world wars and a cold war showed how states seemed unable to guarantee the safety of their citizens except through the threat of aggression against other states. Since 1945 there has been more effort to build peace through cooperation rather than competition, a trend that has been reinforced more recently by globalization and by revolutions in communications and technology. The world has become smaller, and the dangers posed by military force have become both more immediate and more potentially destructive. At no time in history has peaceful diplomacy been more preferred over the use of military force than in the modern age. Asking whether or not major war has become obsolete, Mandelbaum points to the striking increase in its human and physical price and the steep decline in its rewards. Mueller argues that war has achieved a state of 'terminal disrepute because of its perceived repulsiveness and futility'. While nuclear weapons once drove the rhetoric of war and influenced defence budgets and planning, he suggests, they have not been necessary to deter major war, and the absence of such war in the lives, most notably, of the French, the Germans and the Japanese since 1945 has been more remarkable than its presence. Only two types of war remain: unconventional civil wars in the world's poorest countries, and policing wars launched by developed countries in order to impose order on civil conflicts or remove thuggish regimes from power
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Military Power Bad: Useless (Wont Solve)
MILITARY POWER WONT SOLVE GLOBAL PROBLEMS John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 14
Military capability remains important, to be sure, but it has many limitations. Most of today's most serious threats to international peace and security including poverty, terrorism, environmental degradation, natural disasters, international crime, the drug trade, illegal immigration, forced labour, trade disputes, and public health crises such as the spread of HIV and AIDS have sources that demand non-military solutions. The merits of military power are still championed by many American policymakers particularly those realists who see a world full of threats but Europeans have tired of violence and conflict, and have chosen instead to emphasize the economic, political, cultural, technological, and moral dimensions of power. For them, ownership of the means of production has become more important than ownership of the means of destruction. Real ongoing influence in the post-modern world say the Europeans must be measured not in terms of the size and the firepower of a national defence force, but in terms of the role of corporations in the global trading system, the strength and influence of currencies and banking systems, the control of budget deficits and trade balances, and the availability of resources for foreign direct investment. As Rosecrance puts it, where states once had no choice but to pursue military power, they now have a choice; they may remain political-military states, or they may instead pursue economic power and become trading states. Military capacity will probably always be needed in some form for defence and deterrence if not for compliance, but size is not everything. American military power helped bring lasting change in Germany and Japan, and ensured a nervous balance of peace during the cold war, but its limits were revealed in Vietnam, Haiti, Somalia, and Lebanon, and continue to be clear in Iraq today. Americans may seek comfort in the security provided by so much firepower, but it may in fact be leaving them less secure: it sends questionable messages about the priorities of US foreign policy, encourages many to think of the United States as a threat to world peace rather than as its guardian, feeds into growing anti-Americanism, compromises US economic power by diverting valuable resources from other economic and social sectors, and may no longer be relevant to helping us solve the most troubling international problems. Instead of being seen as a benevolent economic and political power in the word, the United States has become infamous in the minds of many for its association with militarism and state-sponsored violence.? In short, US military power rather than promoting security and stability may make the world more dangerous and unstable.
THE WORLD IS LESS, NOT MORE, DANGEROUS
Doug Bandow, Vice President of Policy Research for Citizen Outreach, FOREIGN FOLLIES: AMERICAS NEW GLOBAL EMPIRE, 2006, p. 51-2 In this case, America's strength, represented by its global pervasive presence, is America's weakness. The solution is not more military spending, but greater military caution. The risk of terrorism must be added to the other costs of intervening in foreign quarrels with little relevance to U.S. security. Should America's military be strengthened? Yes: problems with readiness, recruiting, and retention should be addressed and missile defenses should be constructed. But outlays could still be slashed by shrinking force levels to match today's more benign threat environment. The world is less, not more dangerous, than a decade ago. America is relatively stronger today than ever before, notwithstanding the misguided claims of Messrs. Bush and McCain.
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Military Power Bad: Useless
AMERICAN MILITARY POWER FAILED IN VIETNAM John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 62
But such confident declarations tend to overlook the many examples of American military failure. Ferguson asks, 'What is power?', and gives us the quick answer `America'. But if we ask, 'What symbolizes the limits on power?', then the quick answer is surely 'Vietnam'. Even the richest country in the world, with the biggest defence budget and the largest and most technologically advanced military, was unable to overcome a deadly triple cocktail: a war fought almost alone, against a backdrop of divided public opinion at home and abroad, and against an enemy willing to fight to the death. The US invested billions of dollars in Vietnam, and at its peak committed more than half a million personnel to the war. It could carpet bomb acres of jungle with squadrons of massive B-52 bombers that each carried up to 70,000 pounds of ordnance. It could pound North Vietnamese cities and factories with near impunity. And yet, after eight years of war, and after the deaths of 58,000 American military personnel, about 1.1 million North Vietnamese military personnel, as many as 300,000 Cambodians, and as many as 2 million Vietnamese civilians, the United States withdrew in 1973, its core objectives unmet.
A LACK OF MILITARY POWER WASNT THE PROBLEM IN VIETNAME John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 62
Apologists for Vietnam will usually argue that not enough resources were committed to the war, and that the necessary political will was missing. But history tells us that military Goliaths are often laid low by Davids (in what is known technically as 'asymmetric warfare'). The Greeks held off superior numbers of Persians at Thermopylae in 480 BC, Hannibal prevailed over the Romans in 218-216 BC, the French crumbled at the sharp end of English longbows at Agincourt in 1415, the Americans defeated the British during the revolutionary war, the French left Indochina and Algeria with mud on their faces, and the Afghan mujahadin (albeit with Western aid) held off the invading Soviets. Most recently, the Americans have found in Iraq that massive military spending and advanced technology cannot always bring order and stability. Moravcsik's quick victory has failed to materialize, casualties have been high, domestic fallout has grown, and once again the limitations of great force have been clearly illustrated. There are many reasons why claims that overwhelming American military power is peerless do not always hold up in the field.)
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Military Power Bad: Useless
MILITARY POWER ALONE FAILS John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 62-3
First, military action alone is not always enough. The United States has an enviable reputation for confronting and dealing with conventional foes in the open field, and for fighting and winning wars in days or weeks with minimal losses; the first Gulf Waf was over in 42 days with less than 150 battle-related casualties, the war in Kosovo was won with no coalition fatalities, and the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan was completed in a matter of weeks with less than 120 battlerelated casualties. But the US also has a regrettable record of overlooking plans for post-war peace and stability. As Winston Churchill once quipped, 'America is very powerful but very clumsy.' In Iraq, despite all their abilities and resources, American soldiers have been unable to make Iraq the beacon of democracy that George W. Bush has so often said they could, in part because of failure to predict and plan for post-invasion problems, and in part because US policy has surrendered the moral high ground. Claims by Bush that the US has sought only to promote democracy have been tarnished by the pre-emptive strike, by disregard for allies and international organizations, by the scandalous treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay and at Abu Ghraib, and by rumours of secret CIA flights taking prisoners to third countries where they could be tortured. The United States rather than being acclaimed as a purveyor of ideas is widely seen by its critics as a purveyor of violence. It has overlooked the advice of the Financial Times: 'to win the peace ... the US will have to show as much skill in exercising soft power as it has in using hard power to win the war'.
MILITARY INTERVENTION DOES NOT SUPPORT GLOBAL DEMOCRACY
John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 63-4 American policymakers have routinely used the defence of freedom and democracy as an explanation for their military interventions since World War II, but the record of success has been surprisingly modest. A recent Carnegie Endowment study found that of 16 nation-building efforts in which the United States engaged militarily during the twentieth century, only four were successful in that democracy remained ten years after the departure of US forces: these were Germany and Japan (enormous achievements, to be sure), and Grenada and Panama. In cases where the US engaged alone, not a single American-supported surrogate regime made the transition to democracy. The study concluded that the odds of success would only be raised in future if the US supported a multilateral reconstruction strategy under UN auspices. Another study looking at more than 35 post-World War II US interventions, including those in Grenada, Haiti, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Panama and Thailand found that in only one case (the war on drugs in Colombia from 1989) did the intervention result within ten years in a full-fledged democracy with limits on executive power, universal adult suffrage and competitive elections. Such failures are not unique to the US: Britain and France have shown no better average returns in their military interventions, and countries neighbouring those in which interventions have occurred have often shown more progress towards democracy than the target countries. Why so? The authors of the study blame US, British and French policy, which they argue 'has been motivated less by a desire to establish democracy or reduce human suffering than to alter some aspect of the target state's policy'. Despite official claims, promoting democracy is rarely the most important goal.
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Military Power Bad: Useless
MILITARY POWER FAILS WITHOUT INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 64
A second problem with military power is that there is a limit to how much it can achieve within a vacuum of international political support. The contrast between the first and second Gulf wars is clear. George H. W. Bush went into Kuwait in 1991 with the backing of the UN Security Council and the participation of a 34-nation coalition, and succeeded in his aims: Iraq was expelled. Ten years later, his son successfully pulled together a multinational coalition for the 2001 attack on Afghanistan, but when faced with resistance to his plans for Iraq, petulantly declared that he would attack with or without support from the UN or other countries. Once committed, it not only became clear that the United States needed access to bases and airfields in some of those countries in order to launch a substantial military operation, but widespread international opposition to the war hobbled American efforts. The Bush administration later failed to encourage other countries to forgive their debt to Iraq, and to encourage NATO partners to commit troops to Iraq in more than a reconstructive or peacekeeping role. Bush might have learned from Joseph Nye's assertion that thanks largely to the technological revolution in information and communications there are limits to what the United States can do alone.19 He might also have learned from the wistful recollections of former US Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in the 2003 documentary The Fog of War: We are the strongest nation in the world today, [but] I do not believe we should ever apply that economic, political or military power unilaterally. If we'd followed that rule in Vietnam, we wouldn't have been there. None of our allies supported us. If we can't persuade nations with comparable values of the merit of our cause, we'd better re-examine our reasoning. And finally, Bush might have heeded the words of the new NATO secretary-general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer when he argued during his first visit to the United States in 2004 that events in Iraq had shown that the idea that the United States could and should act alone on security issues was a 'dangerous illusion'
MILITARY POWER WONT HELP IN THE FIGHT AGAINST INSURGENTS NATIONAL JOURNAL, May 19, 2007, p. 1
"We're discovering," Haass said in an interview, "that the conventional military power for which the United States is best known is most relevant to classic battlefields like the first Iraq war [in 1991], but the struggles we're engaged in now and for the foreseeable future are anything but classic." Fighting guerrilla insurgencies and propping up failing states such as Iraq and Afghanistan with nation-building, he notes, are not skills at which the U.S. government has excelled. "So we're finding it very hard to translate classic military superiority into stability in these struggles."
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Military Power Bad: Useless
MILITARY POWER HAS PRACTICAL LIMITS John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 64-5
A third problem with military power is that even the biggest military establishment finds itself coming up against practical limits. At the height of activities in the Middle East in 2004, there were 135,000 American troops in Iraq and 15,000 in Afghanistan. This was only about 10 per cent of the total US military establishment, but in order to sustain this presence while preserving those in other parts of the world, tours of duty were being extended and more reinforcements were being pulled in from the National Guard. Recruitment to the armed services was also falling as public opinion in the United States turned against the war in Iraq. And when hurricane Katrina devastated the coasts of Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana in August 2005, it became clear that the United States did not have enough National Guard units nearby to respond quickly to the subsequent breakdown in law and order, and that it would have to go deeper into debt in order to meet the costs of the clean-up. (Undeterred, Bush was asking Congress in February 2006 for another $120 billion to commit to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Questions were meanwhile asked throughout the Iraqi conflict about the ability of the United States to commit troops to trouble spots in other parts of the world. Unless it could withdraw militarily from Iraq, the Pentagon would have been unable to respond to another serious international crisis. A fourth problem is posed by the effects of large military spending on the foundations of the American state. Ferguson argues that the 'revolution in military affairs' in the 1990s was possible because rapid American economic growth made increases in defence spending seem insignificant in relative terms, and because the US federal government was able to convince taxpayers to continue contributing 15 cents in every dollar to its military. But this is shaky economic logic. The remarkable level of US defence spending projected to grow from nearly $400 billion in 2003 to nearly $440 billion in 200722 has not only contributed to record federal budget deficits and a massive national debt, but also diverts resources away from schools, hospitals, transport networks, scientific research, anti-poverty programmes, and new infrastructure (including levees in New Orleans). The US also has less to invest abroad in economic and social development, undermining its ability to compete in the global economy, and reducing its political and economic influence. There are those who argue the sustainability of defence spending, claiming that there is no plausible challenger to American economic leadership, and that US economic health is underpinned by technological dynamism, flexibility, and openness to trade. But how does this square with the persistence of domestic poverty, declining educational standards, the national debt quagmire, decaying infrastructure, and a looming social security and national health crisis.
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Readiness Useless: Terrorism
STRONG U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE INCREASES TERROR
Vassilis K. Fouskas , Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Stirling, The New AMERICAN IMPERIALISM: BUSHS WAR ON TERROR AND BLOOD FOR OIL, 2005, p. 75 In fact, the widespread presence of the U.S. military was a major cause of terrorism against the United States in the first place. In 1997, the Defense Science Board-a panel of experts that advises the Secretary of Defense-noted the link between an activist American foreign policy and terrorism against the United States: As part of its global position, the United States is called upon frequently to respond to international causes and deploy forces around the world. America's position in the world invites attack simply because of its presence. Further, an examination of historical data show a strong correlation between U.S. involvements in international situations and an increase in terrorist attacks against the United States.
MILITARY POWER PROJECTION WILL NOT ELIMINATE TERROR
Vassilis K. Fouskas , Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Stirling, The New AMERICAN IMPERIALISM: BUSHS WAR ON TERROR AND BLOOD FOR OIL, 2005, pp. 128-9 Bush and the neocons know that they cannot defeat terrorists as they would defeat a failed state. They cannot eliminate terrorists by using state-political violence and state terror. Besides being counterproductive, state terrorism and the projection of overwhelming military power, however technologically advanced, cannot eliminate the phenomenon of suicide attacks and tribal warfare. Enormous resources in personnel and machinery are now needed to police tribal areas. In a memo to General Dick Myers, Paul Wolfowitz, Doug Feith, and General Pete Pace dated October 16, 2003, Donald Rumsfeld asked: "Today we lack the metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror. Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?"
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Readiness Useless: Terrorism
MILITARY POWER PROJECTION IS THE ROOT CAUSES OF TERROR
Vassilis K. Fouskas , Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Stirling, The New AMERICAN IMPERIALISM: BUSHS WAR ON TERROR AND BLOOD FOR OIL, 2005, pp. 130-1 The real cause of Islamic terrorism is America's overwhelming projection of power over poor and deprived populations in regions rich in raw materials such as oil and gas that are vital for America's declining economy and insecure financial situation.
WAR CAUSES A TERRORIST BACKLASH
Doug Bandow, Vice President of Policy Research for Citizen Outreach, FOREIGN FOLLIES: AMERICAS NEW GLOBAL EMPIRE, 2006, p. xviii But military action should be a last rather than a first resort. Washington should deploy coercive tools, such as sanctions, only when significant national interests are at stake. Military action lies at the very end of the continuum of force. War is costly, risky, and uncertain; its prosecution undermines liberties at home. Moreover, in an age of terrorism it encourages more, and more deadly, attacks on Americas homeland.
U.S. MILITARY MEDDLING CAUSES GLOBAL ANTI-AMERICANISM
Doug Bandow, Vice President of Policy Research for Citizen Outreach, FOREIGN FOLLIES: AMERICAS NEW GLOBAL EMPIRE, 2006, p. 27 Capt. Ken Golden, commander of an Amphibious Readiness Group attached to the Sixth Fleet, says While a lot of Americans back home seem to think we dont have enemies anymore, I can tell you theres a lot of hatred out there. The world as we see it out here is a very unsettling and unstoppable place. Yes, but Americas enemies such as Cuba and North Korea are simply pathetic. And most of the hatred would not be directed at the U.S. if Washington did not meddle in all sorts of faraway, irrelevant conflicts.
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Military Power Bad: Terrorism
CONTINUED INTERVENTION INCREASES TERRORISM
Doug Bandow, Vice President of Policy Research for Citizen Outreach, FOREIGN FOLLIES: AMERICAS NEW GLOBAL EMPIRE, 2006, p. 42 More troops should be brought home more quickly from Asia and Europe. U.S. forces, now at 140,000, must be withdrawn from Iraq as well. Continuing American particpation in civil strife and guerilla war creates more antagonism and encourages more terrorism at the cost of more body bags coming home.
DECENTRALIZATION MAKES MILITARY POWER USELESS AGAINST TERRORISM
Gabriel Kolko, historian of modern warfare, THE AGE OF WAR: THE UNITED STATES CONFRONTS THE WORLD, 2006, p. 106 This enemy is highly decentralized, and the weaponry suited for combat in Europe is useless against people without uniforms hidden in houses and caves and spread out over impenetrable vast deserts and mountainous terrain. The logistical problems of fighting enemies of this sort are far greater, least of all because no one is fully certain who the enemy is or even what they look like. Worse yet, the very process of seeking out such amorphous enemies creates even more of them. At least 70,000 and perhaps as many as 120,000 people have been trained by Al-Qaida over time, a significant number during the US-backed war against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and they exist all over: Bosnia, Indonesia, Chechnya, the Philippines, Iraq, and many other Muslim nations. Many of their leaders have been captured or killed, but they have an impressive regenerative capacity, and they have adapted, mainly by decentralization. Their philosophyand terrorismis more charismatic and powerful among alienated Muslims than ever. Most of bin Laden's inner circle was not caught, and he is still freeand far more popular in the Arab world than ever. The Iraq War was a catalyst. Indeed, by late 2004 bin Laden had ceased to be a leader of a specific organization and had become a symbol of an international jihad to preserve the Muslim faith by fighting US imperialism.
ELIMINATING AL QAEDA WONT SOLVE
Gabriel Kolko, historian of modern warfare, THE AGE OF WAR: THE UNITED STATES CONFRONTS THE WORLD, 2006, p. 106 Even if Al-Qaida's leaders are eliminated, the structural causes of terrorism virtually guarantee they will be replaced. There are now many organizations, some with links and others autonomous, more diffuse and dangerous than they were in 2001. Jihad has grown larger and become more attractive. Islam is being radicalized, according to a leading CIA expert, and the struggle with it will endure for years because the faith itself is being challenged. What the Americans call terrorism is for Muslims a struggle for the very survival of their religion. The struggle has nothing to do, as President Bush has often claimed, with bin Laden's hatred of American freedom; it has everything to do with US policies and actions in the Muslim worldabove all, its support of Israel.
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Military Power Bad: Middle East
THE U.S. CANNOT MOBILIZE SUFFICIENT DOMESTIC WILL TO IMPOSE ITSELF ON THE MIDDLE EAST Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter, CSIS, SECOND CHANCE: THREE PRESIDENTS AND THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 152-3 There is some rationality to such an argument, provided a fundamental precondition is met: that one has sufficient might and treasure to apply force until the other side is crushed. It is also reasonable to argue that the weaker side may at some point realize it is facing utter destruction by a determined, resolute, and more powerful opponent, and that abject capitulation is the better course of action. The problem for America is that while its power is incomparably greater than that of any state or religious group in the region, it cannot, for domestic reasons, mobilize on a sufficient scale to impose its will by force throughout the Middle East and beyond. COMPLETE NATIONAL MOBILIZATION WOULD BE NEEDED FOR MILITARY FORCE TO SOLVE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter, CSIS, SECOND CHANCE: THREE PRESIDENTS AND THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 153 I have elsewhere described the region from Suez to Xinjiang as the new "Global Balkans": a geopolitically important region of intense ethnic and religious violence driven by a growing political resentment against outside domination, especially when imposed by military forces from religiously and culturally alien societies. The region has a suction effect on major powers. Given that the Global Balkans are inhabited by about 500 million people and that the conflicts in the Middle East are igniting religious and political passions throughout the region, the United States would have to undertake total national mobilization in order to prevail solely through military power. In brief, the United States faces, but on a much larger scale, the same dilemma that Israel faces regarding its Arab neighbors: each lacks the means to impose an enduring unilateral solution dictated entirely by its own definition of goals and interests. The British wisely understood this and left the Middle East without a prolonged conflict; the French came to understand it only after a protracted and debilitating war in Algeria. America is reluctantly assimilating the same lesson through its current involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and potentially elsewhere as well if those two conflicts, throughout the region
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Military Power Bad: Overstretch
AN OBSESSION WITH MILITARY POWER CAUSES OVERSTRETCH
Gabriel Kolko, historian of modern warfare, THE AGE OF WAR: THE UNITED STATES CONFRONTS THE WORLD, 2006, p. 95 The US obsession with power and its failure to create the world order it idealizes has been its defining characteristic for at least a half-century, and the problemsand dangerswith the Bush administration emerge directly from those that preceded it. All presidents, whether Democrats or Republicans, have sought to shape the contours of politics worldwide. This global mission and fascination with military power has entangled its priorities and stretched its resources over and over again.
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Readiness Bad: US Military Action/WOT Fails Military success in Afghanistan Irrelevant
SUCCESS AGAINST AL QAEDA IRRELEVANT TERRORIST IDEOLOGY IS SPREADING
Daniel Benjamin & Aidan Kirby, Senior Fellow & Research Associate, CSIS, 2006, Five Years After 9/11: An Assessment of Americas War on Terror, eds. Julianne Smith & Thomas Sanderson, [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/five_years_after_9-11smallsize.pdf], p. 2 For all it counterterrorism accomplishments, however, the United States faces the unnerving fact that the ideology of jihad is spreading: A new generation of terrorists is emerging with few ties to al Qaeda but a worldview that derives from Osama bin Ladens vision of an unending war against the West. New areas of the globe are increasingly falling under the shadow of this growing threat. So much is clear from the 2004 bombings in Madrid, the 2005 bombings in London, and the murder of Dutch artist Theo van Gogh by a young Dutch Muslim militant in the same year. These incidents demonstrate the rise of the new breed of self-starter terrorists, who are self-recruited and often self-trained, using the vast wealth of instructional materials available on the Internet. In contrast with the 19941995 Bojinka plot, in which a small group, probably numbering about six, planned to use liquid explosives in an attempt to blow a dozen U.S. airliners out of the sky over the Pacific, the 2006 Heathrow conspiracy appears to have involved 24 or more individuals. Unlike the Bojinka conspirators, they were not itinerant terrorists but primarily British citizens. Self-starters have appeared not only in Europe but also in Morocco, where they carried out a string of bombings in Casablanca in 2003, and in Pakistan, a country with a well-established jihadist infrastructure that some new recruits have deemed insufficiently aggressive. Attacks such as these undermine the Bush administrations claim that the United States would fight terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan so it would not have to face them, as Vice President Dick Cheney put it, in Washington or London or anywhere else in the world. Geographically, the picture is one of jihadist metastasis. With more than 30 failed plots across the continent in roughly five years, Europe has become a central battlefield. In Australia, meanwhile, a major dragnet caught 18 conspirators who appear to have been plotting an attack on the countrys one nuclear power plant. And in South Asiaas the recent bombings in Mumbai and a rash of violence in Bangladesh demonstratethe incidence of Islamist violence has grown dramatically.
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Readiness Bad: US Military Action/WOT Fails Military success in Afghanistan Irrelevant
US MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ HAVE INCREASED THE THREAT FROM IRAN Ilan Berman, American Foreign Policy Council, 2005, Tehran Rising: Irans challenge to the United States, p. xvii For their part, Iranian leaders have begun to wake up to a startling reality. Quite suddenly, their country has become one of the biggest beneficiaries of the War on Terror. The Coalition campaign against Saddam Husseins regime eliminated the threat posed by Tehrans most immediate military adversary, thereby cementing Irans dominant regional standing. To Irans east, US successes against the Taliban have removed an ideological competitor for Muslim hearts and minds, while factionalism and tribal rivalries have allowed Iran to perpetuate Afghanistans instability. Saddam Husseins overthrow also has at least partially defanged a stubborn threat to Tehran: the Mujahideen-e Khalq (MKO). Since the spring of 2003, Coalition forces under a US-imposed cease-fire have curtailed the Iranian opposition groups operations in Iraq. A subsequent decree by the nascent Iraqi government has labeled the MKO, tolerated and even supported under the old Baathist regime, as a terrorist organization, and prompted local efforts to uproot it from Iraq. In short, by breaking up the old order in neighboring countries, the United States has given the Islamic Republic unimagined opportunities to influence the region. As Iranian policymakers are quick to point out, all the signs suggest that Iran is now destined to become the centre of international power politics in the post-Saddam Middle East. Irans ayatollahs have not wasted any time putting their vision into practice. Over the past several years, their regime has mobilized massive technological, financial, and political resources as part of an ambitious campaign to dominate the greater Middle East. In the Persian Gulf, Iran has begun to implement a new, aggressive strategic doctrine. It has launched a massive, multimillion dollar clandestine effort in Iraq aimed at radicalizing and destabilizing its western neighbor, with notable results. Irans financial and political support has expanded the Iraqi insurgency, and allowed terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas to put down roots in the post-war political vacuum that now dominates the former Baathist state.
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Readiness Bad: US Military Action/WOT Fails Military success in Afghanistan Irrelevant
FAILURE TO ADDRESS THE GROWING IRANIAN THREAT POSES MAJOR DANGERS TO US SECURITY Ilan Berman, American Foreign Policy Council, 2005, Tehran Rising: Irans challenge to the United States, p. xix What is clear, however, is that the United States can no longer afford the luxury of protracted inaction. Perhaps more than any other issue, the fate of Iran will dictate the direction of the Middle East. Should a reasonably moderate, pluralistic, post-totalitarian government take power in Tehran, the United States would gain a new friend in the Persian Gulf and a valuable ally in the War on Terror. But if the current Iranian regime manages to realize its strategic ambitions, the region could very well see the rise of a radical order deeply antagonistic to the United States. If that happens, there can be little doubt that Americas interests in promoting democratic change and combating international terrorism will take a giant step backward.
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Readiness Bad: AT: WOT Successful No Attacks on the US Since 9/11
--IT IS STILL A GOAL AND PRESENTS A MAJOR THREAT Daniel Benjamin & Aidan Kirby, Senior Fellow & Research Associate, CSIS, 2006, Five Years After 9/11: An Assessment of Americas War on Terror, eds. Julianne Smith & Thomas Sanderson, [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/five_years_after_9-11smallsize.pdf], p 6 The United States has been fortunate not to have been struck again since 9/11, and a number of reasons can be adduced for this. The American Muslim community has thus far been largely immune to the jihadist virus. It is more difficult for radicals from abroad to gain entry to the country. Al Qaeda is on the one hand not as capable and on the other hand determined that its next attack will top its last one in drama and impact. And, of course, it is easier for jihadists to kill Americans in Iraq than it is in the United States, and those casualties provide the radicals with the proof they need to show the global community of Muslims of their devotion to their cause. Over the long term, however, the terrorists will inevitably seek to rebuild their networks and capabilities to attack the United States at home. This is the gold standard for them, and if the overall strength of the movement is growing, reestablishing the capacity to carry off spectaculars will be on their agenda.
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Readiness Bad: Undermines Soft Power
US ECONOMIC HARD POWER STRENGTHENS ITS SOFT POWER
Carnes Lord, Professor, Naval War College, 2006, Losing Hearts and Minds? Public diplomacy and strategic influence in the age of terror, p. 19-20 A second issue concerns the relationship between soft and hard power. Nye admits that this relationship is a complex one. Hard and soft power sometimes reinforce and sometimes interfere with each other. A country that courts popularity may be loath to exercise its hard power when it should, but a country that throws its weight around without regard to its effects on its soft power may find others placing obstacles in the way of its hard power. No country likes to feel manipulated, even by soft power. At the same timehard power can create myths of invincibility or inevitability that attract others. But it is not clear whether Nye has thought through sufficiently the ways in which hard power may be said to function like soft power that is, to cast an aura of attraction. This is especially true in the economic area, where it becomes especially difficult to distinguish between compulsion and choice in the economic decisions made by individuals or states. The American economic model is surely one of the great sources of its international attractiveness (or in some quarters, opprobrium); this is quite distinct from the question of how the US government uses its economic resources to wield power over others. Even in the case of military force, however, there would seem to be an important soft power dimension that calls for further analysis. Heroic or romantic myths can strongly color the way national (or transnational) military forces are viewed by others, for example, and exercise a strong attraction (consider the continuing flow of would-be martyrs to the banner of AL Qaeda in Iraq today). In the case of the United States, its armed forces have for many years conducted what one might describe as military diplomacy in the multi-faceted interactions with foreign militaries as well as in their peacetime presence throughout the world.
US MILITARISM AND DRIVE FOR EMPIRE UNDERMINE IDEOLOGICAL HEGEMONY
Carl Boggs, Social Science Professor National University (L.A.) , 2005, Planetary Politics: human rights, terror, and global society, ed. Stephen Eric Bronner, p. 73-4 The global system, shaped by US economic and military supremacy, requires a strong modicum of ideological hegemony to reproduce the conditions of that supremacy: automatic mechanisms of corporate globalization, a relatively open network of communications and trade, free markets, consumerism, sufficiently popular apathy to permit elite flexibility. Widespread chaos and disorder endemic to the ongoing cycle of militarism and terrorism, while possibly favorable to the power aspirations of specific elites, works against a smoothly functioning new world order, including any system of consensual governance. Alternatives to Hobbesian scenario look bleak in the post-9/11 setting, in the wake of US military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the prospect of new military ventures, and what promises to be an endless war on terrorism. As noted, moreover, hegemonic discourses readily available to elites on the home front (nationalism, consumerism, etc.) are likely to be ineffective outside American borders; they will more likely subvert hegemony as the United States mobilizes its resources to shore up its global supremacy. In the postwar years the United States has enjoyed something of a precarious hegemony, built upon liberal democracy, economic successes, consumerism, and diffusion of its cultural products, but in recent years there sources have begun to atrophy. At the same time, to ensure world domination today the United States retains a wide repertoire of ruling devicesnot only its military superiority but its corporate and financial power and capacity to manipulate international structures like the United Nations, World Trade Organization, World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. The predicament today derives from the fact that such domination does not inevitably translate into hegemony.
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Readiness Bad: Undermines Soft Power
MILITARY/HARD POWER COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO ESTABLISHING EFFECTIVE HEGEMONY
Carl Boggs, Social Science Professor National University (L.A.) , 2005, Planetary Politics: human rights, terror, and global society, ed. Stephen Eric Bronner, p. 75-6 In the tracks of Machiavelli and Benedetto Croce, Gramsci wrote that power structures need a supportive ethicopolitical element to sustain effective governance. Coercive methods can work in the short term, but durable order necessitates a shift to popular, consensual footing, an equilibrium of force and consent. As for Machiavelli, politics for Gramsci involved the winning of popular support that would endow leaders with two crucial resources: stability and flexibility. Thus: But to fix ones mind on the military model is the mark of a fool: politics here too must have priority over the military aspect, for only politics creates the possibility for maneuver and movement. Such resources were never available to military power alone, whatever its might and scope because it can never establish firm hegemony. At the same time, to build legitimacy, a power structure must achieve not only consensual but national-popular presence, sinking roots in particular (that is, national) traditions, myths and ways of life. Thus only politics, here regarded as the distinct sphere of creative action, historical vision, and legitimation, could organize and manage the various complex expressions of social lifethe ensemble of relations. It follows that in matters of governance military power is usually trapped within limits of its own authoritarian rigidity, its deep attachment to discipline and rules, its penchant for violent solutions. The eclipse of hegemony means a severe crisis of authority, an erosion of governing capacity that no a mount of coercive power or bureaucratic controls can reverse. Imposition of dictatorial or military rule in the absence of consensual supports Gramsci refers at different points to Caesarism, Bonapartism, and Cadorismis sure to be counterproductive, leading to dysfunctions, breakdowns, and resistance. In the case of present-day capitalism, hegemony serves to compensate for systemic contradictions in the economy: nationalism, religion, and Fordism, for example, furnish ideological cohesion in a world where people face terrible material hardships, dislocations, and a sense of powerlessness. A strong consensual base, moreover, reduces the need for political coercion and military violence, precisely what Machiavellli had anticipatedcontrary to the common misconceptions about this work.
HARD POWER/MILITARISM KILLS SOFT POWER
Carl Boggs, Social Science Professor National University (L.A.) , 2005, Planetary Politics: human rights, terror, and global society, ed. Stephen Eric Bronner, p. 84-5 As the war machine strengthens its hold over American society, political elites face increased global hostility, trapped in a predicament where massive power begets equally massive countervailing forces: terrorism and sabotage, guerrilla insurgencies as in Iraq and Afghanistan, nation-state rivalries, hostile groups or nations laying hold on WMDs, popular movements against corporate globalization and US imperialism. These developments, taken together, will eventually work against US efforts to maintain global supremacy, all the more so with each resort to military action. Moreover, hopes for sustaining hegemony by means of economic success and cultural influence historically a strong suit for US leaders will flounder in the world of neoliberal excesses, US militarization, and imperial overreach.
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Readiness Bad: Undermines Soft Power
HARD POWER DECREASES EFFECTIVE SOFT POWER
Simon Bromley, Lecturer International Political Economy Open University, 2006 , The War on Terrorism and the American Empire after the Cold War, eds. A. Colas & R. Saull, p. 45-6 Others are less impressed by US power tout ensemble and less confident about the fungibility of military power. It has largely fallen to the non-Marxist analysts to point out the inherent limitations of military power in a post-colonial world in which economic power is dispersedand fast dispersingas never before: Michael Mann writes of an incoherent empire that is incapable of producing durable political rule or even widespread economic order; Emmanuel Todd charts the sharp economic and demographic constraints of US global power and speaks of a theoretical micromilitarism that is less and less convincing; Joseph Nye and other liberals point to myriad ways in which the exercise of coercive power (hard power) undermines the role of the United States as a target of imitation and pole of attraction (soft power) and the ways that multilateral arrangements can serve to augment as well as limit US power; a host of conservative critics question the domestic sustainability of unilateral militarism and bemoan the adverse role of special interests in the making (and frustrating) of US foreign policy; and Niall Ferguson laments the ways in which the nature of American domestic politics precludes a coherent imperial foreign policy.
US RELIANCE ON HARDPOWER AND UNILATERALISM UNDERMINES SOFT POWER
Carnes Lord, Professor, Naval War College, 2006, Losing Hearts and Minds? Public diplomacy and strategic influence in the age of terror, p. 16 At the same time, voices both at home and abroad have expressed concern that the United States, with its increasing reliance on unilaterally exercised military power, is in danger of forgetting the lessons of its own past by failing to safeguard its soft power resources. Such critics call attention not only to the current low standing of the United States in public opinion in many parts of the world, particularly following its invasion of Iraq, but more fundamentally, the apparent insensitivity of the US government to foreign perceptions of a range of current American policies domestic (such as adhering to the death penalty) as well as international. In particular, the United States stands accused of failing to take sufficient account of the views and interests of its traditional allies and of international institutions such as the United Nations. The result, it is argued, is what might be described as a crisis of legitimacy in the exercise of American power and the American global role more generally.
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Readiness Bad: Undermines Soft Power
US EMPHASIS ON HARD POWER AND MILITARY INTERVENTION IN IRAQ SQUANDERING ITS SOFT POWERAND EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP Michael Cox, International Relations Professor London School of Economics, 2006, The War on Terrorism and the American Empire after the Cold War, eds. A. Colas & R. Saull, p. 125-6 The simplest and indeed the most satisfactory way of resolving this apparent conundrum lies in distinguishing between the immediate and the structural: that is, between the factors that continue to support US hegemony (the size of its market, the still central position of the dollar in the world economic system, its productively levels, its extensive international alliances and military wherewithal) and those factors that are gradually beginning to limit (and have probably limited for some time) what it is able to do. The situation is thus complex and cannot be easily summed up by either asserting the United States is bound to lead for ever or is inevitably bound to decline, America still has a great deal of power. That much is obvious. However, as Max Weber and Lord Acton have taught us, power is not the same thing as authority, and unlimited power is always likely to corrupt those who exercise it. And this, it would seem, is precisely what has happened to the United States under Bush over the past few years. Possessed of vast capabilities following a decade of renewal that left the US in an unrivalled position in a unipolar world, Bush proceeded to wield American power in a fashion that was bound to cause disquiet at best and deep resentment at worst. This all began to manifest itself in various forms before 9/11, but took off with a vengeance of the US prepared and then went to war with Iraq. As one American commentator admitted, never had the country gone into battle (with the sole exception of Vietnam back in the 1960s) with so few allies actually prepared to back it enthusiastically. In fact, never had such a war, even before it began, generated so much global opposition, the overwhelming bulk of it caused less by any sympathy that people might have had towards Americas intended target, and more by what many regarded as the dangerously aggressive policies of an over-powered state led by a president with a little concern for global opinion. As one friendly European critic remarked, rarely in history had one nation mobilized so much hard power in such a short space of time: and never had it lost so much soft power in the process. The first problem facing the United States, therefore, revolves around the issue of power and the extent to which its own imperial behavior is already beginning to generate various forms of resistance. This in turn raises a second question about the conditions under which the United States exercises its power. As Nye amongst others has pointed out, America may be the worlds only superpower, but this does not necessarily mean it can always go it alone, and at the same time hope to maintain friendly or amicable relations with other countries. Coalitions are wonderful things, and coalitions of the very willing even better. But when coalitions are compelled into being by fear rather than consent, then something is not quite right. Of course, the new hegemonists in Washington take a typically hard-nosed view of all this. As they point out, the US still managed to build an alliance of sorts against Iraq; former critics meanwhile are now running for cover, so why all the fuss? The answer should be obvious: because the more secure empires in history are those which can lead rather than coerce, inspire more than its fair share of friends around the world, it is currently testing their loyalty to the utmost.
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*** Supwerpower Syndrome Kritik ***
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Superpower Syndrome Kritik
A. THE DRIVE FOR GLOBAL MILITARY AND ECONOMIC CONTROL IS SUPERPOWER SYNDROME
Robert J. Lifton, Pscyhologist @ Harvard, SUPER POWER SYNDROME: AMERICAS APOCALYPTIC CONFRONTATION WITH THE WORLD, 2005, pp. 187-8 In speaking of superpower syndrome, I mean to suggest a harmful disorder. I use this medical association to convey psychological and political abnormality. I also wish to emphasize a confluence of behavioral patterns: in any sybndrome there is not just a single tendency but a constellation of tendencies. Though each can be identified separately, they are best understood as manifestations of an overarching dynamic that controls the behavior of the larger system, in this case the American national identity. The dynamic takes shape around a bizarre American collective mindset that extends our very real military power into a fantasy of cosmic control, a mindset all too readily tempted by an apocalyptic mission. The symptoms are of a piece, each consistent with the larger syndrome: unilateralism in all-important decisions, including those relating to war-making; the use of high technology to secure the ownership of death and of history; a sense of entitlement concerning the right to identify and destroy all those considered to be terrorists or friends of terrorists, while spreading "freedom" and virtues seen as preeminently ours throughout the world; the right to decide who may possess weapons of mass destruction and who may not, and to take military action, using nuclear weapons if necessary, against any nation that has them or is thought to be manufacturing them; and underlying these symptoms, a righteous vision of ridding the world of evil and purifying it spiritually and politically. We are talking about a serious syndrome, one that is profoundly harmful, even fatal, to the national body it inhabits as well as to the world in which that body lives. Yet the syndrome can be countered-if not "cured," at least modified, altered, eventually overcome.
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Superpower Syndrome Kritik
B. SUPERPOWER SYNDROME FACILITATES NUCLEAR USE
Robert J. Lifton, Psychologist @ Harvard, SUPER POWER SYNDROME: AMERICAS APOCALYPTIC CONFRONTATION WITH THE WORLD, 2005, p. 187 At issue is weapons are they will be their effects. Embracing that double illusion, the American superpower becomes especially menacing because of its nuclear dominance, its impulse toward use, and its quest for world control. All of these nuclear contradictions are closely bound up with superpower syndrome. They derive from it and also exacerbate it. c. ALTERNATIVE: REJECT SUPERPOWER DYNDROME AND U.S. DOMINANCE Robert J. Lifton, Psychologist @ Harvard, SUPER POWER SYNDROME: AMERICAS APOCALYPTIC CONFRONTATION WITH THE WORLD, 2005, pp. 190-1 To renounce the claim to total power would bring relief not only to everyone else, but, soon enough, to citizens of the superpower itself. For to live out superpower syndrome is to place oneself on a treadmill that eventually has to break down. In its efforts to rule the world and to determine history, the United States is, in actuality, working against itself, subjecting itself to constant failure. It becomes a Sisyphus with bombs, able to set off explosions but unable to cope with its own burden, unable to roll its heavy stone to the top of the hill in Hades. Perhaps the crucial step in ridding ourselves of superpower syndrome is recognizing that history cannot be controlled, fluidly or otherwise. Stepping off the superpower treadmill would also enable us to cease being a nation ruled by fear. Renouncing omnipotence might make our leaders-or at least future leaders-themselves less fearful of weakness, and diminish their inclination to instill fear in their people as a means of enlisting them for military efforts at illusory world hegemony.
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Superpower Syndrome Link Extensions
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM IS GROUNDED IN THE BELIEF THAT WE ARE DIFFERENT FROM, AND SUPERIOR TO, THE REST OF THE WORLD Robert J. Lifton, Psychologist @ Harvard, SUPER POWER SYNDROME: AMERICAS APOCALYPTIC CONFRONTATION WITH THE WORLD, 2005, pp. 126-7 We have seen ourselves as not only separate from but different from the rest of the world, a special nation among nations. That sense of American exceptionalism was intensely observed by Alexis de Tocqueville, the brilliant French politician and writer, in the early nineteenth century. In de Tocqueville's view of America, "A course almost without limits, a field without horizon, is revealed: the human spirit rushes forward and traverses [it] in every direction." American exceptionalism has always been, as the sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset has pointed out, "a double-edged sword." In the psychological life of Americans it has been bound up with feelings of unique virtue, strength, and success. But this has sometimes led Americans to be "utopian moralists, who press hard to institutionalize virtue, to destroy evil people, and eliminate wicked institutions and practices." That subjective exceptionalism has been vividly expressed in the historian Richard Hofstadter's observation, "It has been our fate as a nation not to have ideologies, but to be one."
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Superpower Syndrome Alternatives
RESTRAINT IS NEEDED TO ESCAPTE VICTIMIZATION AND VIOLENT DOMINATION
Robert J. Lifton, Psychologist @ Harvard, SUPER POWER SYNDROME: AMERICAS APOCALYPTIC CONFRONTATION WITH THE WORLD, 2005, pp. 195-6 That danger of totalized victim consciousness looms large in connection with 9/11. America was attacked. More than 3,000 people were murdered, whether at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, or in crashed airplanes. In response, fierce feelings of victimization have been poured into unrestrained but narrowly on survival missions. For a superpower in particular, the mindset of victimization can readily be seized upon and turned into a sense of unlimited entitlement. Justification is then felt in drawing from a broad repertoire of violence to reassert a sense of hegemony, of control over world events, and the need to do so can become so great that an enemy is required. Significantly, there is a parallel mindset of victimization among Islamist terrorists. They see Islam as having been victimized historically by the West, as well as by its own despotic leaders, and they see themselves and their coreligionists undergoing continuing victimization by the United States. In both cases, victimization by others becomes the persistent leitmotif, a continuous source of motivation for eliminating the evil forces responsible for that humiliation, and by means that readily extend to apocalyptic purification. In this vicious circle of victimization and violence, superpower syndrome looms large. For just as a superpower extends its sense of potency into omnipotence, so is it inclined to extend its sense of victimization into total, abject violation. Yet a superpower is also in a unique position to interrupt this dangerous psychological interaction. Its extraordinary power can permit restraint. The irony is that to call forth such restraint, to curb its aggressive message of victimization, it must cease to be a superpower, at least in its omnipotent form.
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Superpower Syndrome Alternatives
WE MUST ACCEPT SOME DEGREE OF VULNERABLITY
Robert J. Lifton, Psychologist @ Harvard, SUPER POWER SYNDROME: AMERICAS APOCALYPTIC CONFRONTATION WITH THE WORLD, 2005, p. 198 To live with ambiguity is to accept vulnerability. American aspirations toward superpower invulnerability have troubling parallels in Islamist visions of godly power. Surrendering the dream of invulnerability, more enlightened American leaders could begin to come to terms with the idea that there will always be some danger in our world, that reasonable and measured steps can be taken to limit that danger and combat threats of violence, but that invulnerability is itself a perilous illusion.
WE MUST ACCEPT THE INEVITABILITY OF DEATH
Robert J. Lifton, Psychologist @ Harvard, SUPER POWER SYNDROME: AMERICAS APOCALYPTIC CONFRONTATION WITH THE WORLD, 2005, pp. 199 More broadly, were Americans to reject superpower syndrome, they would also reject a claim to an exclusive American power over life and death. We could then rejoin the world as fellow mortals and in the process rediscover our all too fallible and fragile humanity for the precious gift it is. As Albert Camus, the French writer who struggled with these issues throughout his life put it, to live and to die as humans we need "to refuse to be a god," which means embracing "thought which recognizes limits.
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Superpower Syndrome Impacts
SUPER POWER SYNDROME WILL DESTROY THE WORLD
Robert J. Lifton, Pscyhologist @ Harvard, SUPER POWER SYNDROME: AMERICAS APOCALYPTIC CONFRONTATION WITH THE WORLD, 2005, p. 3-4 The murderous events of 9/11 hardened that sense of entitlement as nothing else could have. Superpower syndrome did not require 9/11, but the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon rendered us an aggrieved superpower, a giant violated and made vulnerable, which no superpower can permit. Indeed, at the core of superpower syndrome lies a powerful fear of vulnerability. A superpower's victimization brings on both a sense of humiliation and an angry determination to restore, or even extend, the boundaries of a superpower-dominated world. Integral to superpower syndrome are its menacing nuclear stockpiles and their world-destroying capacity.
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Definition of Superpower Syndrome
SUPERPOWER SYNDROME DEFINED
Robert J. Lifton, Psychologist @ Harvard, SUPER POWER SYNDROME: AMERICAS APOCALYPTIC CONFRONTATION WITH THE WORLD, 2005, p. 2-3 The American apocalyptic entity is less familiar to us. Even if its urges to power and domination seem historically recognizable, it nonetheless represents a new constellation of forces bound up with what I've come to think of as "superpower syndrome." By that term I mean a national mindset-put forward strongly by a tight-knit leadership groupthat takes on a sense of omnipotence, of unique standing in the world that grants it the right to hold sway over all other nations. The American superpower status derives from our emergence from World War II as uniquely powerful in every respect, still more so as the only superpower left standing at the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s.'
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*** No Solvency for Anti-Americanism ***
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No Solvency for Anti-Americanism Anti-Americanism Solvency Answers
Globalization and demographic changes drive Anti-Americanism? Mitchell B. Reiss ,Vice Provost of International Affairs at the College of William & Mary bSurvival, October 2008 , pages 99 - 114 If American military power doesn't worry people, then the economic reach of the United States does. It is no secret that many find globalisation enormously disruptive and threatening to traditional cultures and long-established ways of life. Whether it is the unsentimental demands of free-market capitalism, the influence of instant global communications and mass media, the control of plant, animal and human characteristics through genetic engineering, the potential of human beings to play God and build new biological structures atom by atom, the doubling and even tripling of human life spans and the ensuing social pressures this creates - all these elements of globalisation are redefining our lives, a process that, for many people, is disturbing and disorienting. Of all the countries of the world, the United States is most closely associated with these forces of modernity, and globalisation is seen by many as 'Americanisation'. The United States has developed economic policies that make it especially well positioned to take advantage of increasing global interconnectedness. The international economic system was designed by Washington after the Second World War, the US dollar is the world's currency of choice, and the US market is the world's largest, richest and most open. For all of these reasons, anti-globalisation efforts single out the United States; anti-globalisation protests are often indistinguishable from anti- American rants. A final contributor to anti-Americanism may be found in the global demographic shift. The post-war generation in Europe, Korea, Japan and Australia is leaving centre stage. The impact of the passing of the generational torch cannot be underestimated. Previously, governing elites in Western Europe and the United States all shared the historical experience of the Second World War and the Berlin airlift. Europeans had positive feelings toward the United States, rooted in America's wartime bravery and power, as well as its postwar generosity. Older Koreans and Japanese also experienced first-hand America's compassion in rebuilding their homelands.
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Plan Cant Solve U.S. Unilateralism
MANY EXAMPLES OF UNILATERALISM THE PLAN DOESNT SOLVE
Julia Sweigh, Council on Foreign Relations, FRIENDLY FIRE, 2006, pp. 57-8 The Bush administration revealed its unilateralist impulse soon after the 2000 elections when it signaled a departure from international norms and disdain for collective approaches to global (and once decidedly U.S.) concerns like the environment, human rights, and arms control. Kyoto, the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: The signal achievements perceived by opinion outside and many within the United States to collectively address environmental degradation, human rights, and weapons proliferation met with chilling derision from the Bush II White House. Even as the administration championed its support for women's education and franchise in Afghanistan, for example, the repeal of U.S. support for reproductive health and HIV/AIDS initiatives that include family planning and abortion risked adding women to the growing coalition of those offended by the United States. Well before the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration signaled a belief that U.S. power alone was adequate to the task of addressing what many at home and in the international community regarded as the critical global challenges of the twenty-first century. DRAMATIC POLICY REVERSALS THAT THE PLAN DOESNT DO ARE NEEDED TO SOLVE ANTIAMERICANISM Julia Sweigh, Council on Foreign Relations, FRIENDLY FIRE, 2006, p. 213-4 The United States cannot lead in a vacuum, with fewer and fewer followers, reliant on power, GDP, and throw weight to have its way. The critical component the country needs to give the international community cause to desire and respect its leadership is legitimacy`1 In the absence of solid evidence that the United States genuinely understands and ratifies the importance of being seen as a member, not an outsider, of the international community, progress on global issues will remain painfully slow. One answer for the United States is to contemplate some dramatic policy reversals: joining the Kyoto Protocol, embracing the International Criminal Court, immediately dropping agricultural subsidies and other barriers to trade, and plowing unconditioned
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Can Solve Anti-Americanism By Changing Policies
SPECIFIC POLICIES DRIVE ANTI-AMERICANISM
Julia Sweigh, Council on Foreign Relations, FRIENDLY FIRE, 2006, pp. 69-70 America's global ethos today holds that the United States will be safer if the world emulates its model of democracy and capitalism. After the 2004 elections, polls showed that global publics were increasingly inclined to hold the United States to account for its international trespasses; responses in fifteen of sixteen countries surveyed rated the United States behind Australia, Canada, Great Britain, or Germany as a country they would recommend a young person go to "lead a good life."46 Much of the recent outpouring of disenchantment with the United States has been related to specific policies. And yet there is also a danger that in addition to what we do, who we are becoming as a body politic may well reinforce the momentum toward a search by historic U.S. allies for alternatives not only in international leadership but also in domestic political and economic ways of being.
DIPLOMACY ALONE WILL NOT SOLVE ANTI-AMERICANISM POLICY CHANGE IS NEEDED
Julia Sweigh, Council on Foreign Relations, FRIENDLY FIRE, 2006, p. 23 At the start of his second term, President Bush indicated that he was committed to giving better explanations of Americas decisions to the world. But public diplomacy has a bad name these days, and not because America is misunderstood. More explanations, however handsomely crafter the message is or how accessable or pleasant the messengers, wont help temper anti-American attitudes or interrupt hostile Anti-American actions. Public diplomacy during the Cold War, especially in Europe through random programs, cultural exchanges, libraries, and a whole host of informational efforts was an effective complement or force multiplier to the U.S. strategy of containment, because the United States was a credible messenger of desirable values and because the alternative to the United States revealed itself to be so much worse. Until the United States has a coherent and positive set of priorities it can make manifest in international policies, money spent on public diplomacy may generate lucrative contracts for the communications, polling, and public relations industries, but it is not likely to substantially improve America's image. It may even make it worse. We can expect public diplomacy to help recover the credibility and trust we have lost as a country only when we give thought to how we use our power and to the potential impact of our policies. In the interim, treating public diplomacy as a political campaign, in which the daily message crafted to create a particular perception may be light-years from the reality on the ground, will only reinforce international suspicion of the United States. .
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Can Solve Terrorism By Changing Policies
U.S. POLICIES, NOT VALUES, TRIGGER TERRORISM Stephen Walt, Harvard, TAMING AMERICAN POWER, 2005, pp. 86-7 In particular, the most violent forms of anti-American terrorism seem to be inspired primarily by reactions to U.S. actions and policies rather than by a fundamental animosity to US. values or culture or even US. power itself. For example, a 1997 study by the Defense Science Board found "a strong correlation between U.S. involvement in international situations and increased terrorist attacks on the United States . Prominent examples of these essentially reactive attacks include Libya's hijacking of Pan Am flight 73 in September 1987 and the December 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103, the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, and a rocket attack on U.S. militarv facilities in Japan in 1991. Similarly; the terrorist attack on the Madrid subway system in 2004 was not inspired by antipathy toward Spanish values or Spanish culture; it was a deliberate response to Spain's support for the U.S. invasion of Iraq and its continued presence among the occupying forces. In other words, international terrorists have not attacked the United States or its allies because they are opposed to U.S. values, or even primarily because they are worried about US. power. Instead, they have targeted the United States because they oppose its global military presence and the policies that presence is supporting.'' And even here, the vast majority of terrorist groups are not attacking the United States directly; rather, they are primarily motivated by local grievances and target Americans only when U.S. power is actively engaged in their neighborhoods. It is not just "who we are," in short, it is what we do and where we do it.'' Third, the claim that foreign opposition stems solely from "who we are,, is simply too convenient. Americans find it an appealing thesis, of course, because it absolves us of any responsibility for the fear, hatred, or resentment that others direct at the United States. In this view, it is not our fault that we are so powerful, and we have nothing for which to apologize if our democratic values pose a threat to corrupt and oppressive dictatorships around the world. The appeal of this interpretation was repeatedly demonstrated in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, when government spokesmen (and especially the president) repeatedly portrayed them as an assault on "liberty," and anyone who suggested that the attacks might also be a reaction to prior U.S. activities was likely to be condemned for being unpatriotic." The tendency to join forces against U.S. power reached a new peak in early 2003, when a loose coalition of France, Germany, Russia, and several small states combined to deny UN Security Council authorization for America's preventive war against Iraq. Not surprisingly, the ouster of Saddam Hussein also encouraged increased security cooperation between Syria and Iran, especially after prominent U.S. officials made threatening statements toward both countries." And when U.S. President George W Bush was reelected in November 2004, French President Jacques Chirac responded by saying, "European cohesion is naturally the right way to deal with . . . the worries or concerns" of the election, adding, "Europe today has more need than ever to reinforce its unity and dynamism.""
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The U.S. Needs to Follow International Norms and Rules
THE U.S. NEEDS TO RESPECT INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND RULES TO PROTECT LEGITIMACY
Julia Sweigh, Council on Foreign Relations, FRIENDLY FIRE, 2006, p. 215-6 Rules and Fairness. The United States may never be a "permission slip" society, but there will come a day when it will need the help of the international community." Because the world is increasingly transparent, governments from which the United States will need cooperation, especially regarding the use of force to deal with transnational security threats, will need to demonstrate to their populations that such military action is grounded in legality and thus is legitimate. Likewise, to the extent that the war on terror remains one long-term feature of the U.S. and international community's focus, the United States will need to ground its treatment of suspected terrorists in international law, not only to protect our own service personnel and those of other countries involved in such efforts but also to reduce the recruitment capacity of terrorist organizations. New stories circulating the globe about death or torture or sexual or psychological humiliation of Muslims and their symbols at the hands of U.S. soldiers may be less a deterrent than a call to arms against the United States and against the governments and political forces that are seen as working on America's behalf.
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Answers to: Terrorism Proves Realism Useless
STATE-CENTERED CONFLICT WILL RETURN
Colin Gray, political scientist specializing in national security policy, THE SHERIFF: AMERICAS DEFENSE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER, 2004, p. 15 For the next few years the challenge of the era may be al Qaeda and 'its ilk. But come the 2010s, or at the latest the twenties, the peril of the decade for world order is probably going to be the return of old-fashioned, state-centric great power geo politics and geostrategy, as China challenges the regional security order of East Asia, or perhaps as "Old Europe" and Russia attempt to clip the American eagle's wings. ,
TERRORISM IS NOT THE ONLY THREATE AND FUTURE THREATS WILL BE STATE CENTRIC
Colin Gray, political scientist specializing in national security policy, THE SHERIFF: AMERICAS DEFENSE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER, 2004, p. 9 For all its recognition of the challenge posed by post-modern and significantly transnational terrorism, American policy and strategy remains firmly anchored in a worldview that is traditional and geopolitical. Terrorism is the problem of the moment, probably of the decade, but the role of guardian of world order carries the duty- to oppose and thwart potent threats of disorder from any source, be they state-centric or transnational. The United States has clearly grasped that its ability to see off the leading menaces of the period, whatever their source. and character, depends vitally upon the maintenance of a useable margin of superior power and influence. Stated in the most direct way possible, America recognizes that it needs to stay Number One for as long as is feasible, including affordable. But how is that highly desirable, indeed necessary, condition to be sustained and prolonged?
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Cant Solve Unilateralism Bad
MANY EXAMPLES OF U.S. UNILATERALISM
Gabriel Kolko, historian of modern warfare, THE AGE OF WAR: THE UNITED STATES CONFRONTS THE WORLD, 2006, p. 121 From the day the Bush administration took office, it sounded unilateralist and was proud of it. Examples abound, from renouncing the Kyoto Protocol on global warming and the Biological Weapons Convention to publicly downgrading the role of the United Nations in world affairs. But nothing better illustrates this tendency than its relations with Russia, its former enemy and nuclear superpower. It showed that however large the ideological consensus between the nuclear powers on "market" economics, their national interests still transcend such abstractions. As soon as the Bush administration took office, it indicated that the 1972 Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of AntiBallistic Missile Systems would soon be nullified and it stated that it wanted Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia admitted to NATO, taking it right to Russia's borders. The nations along Russia's borders regard NATO purely as protection against Russia. The new administration wanted to annul the ban on underground nuclear testing, which was essential to arms control. Bush also greatly accelerated the development of an antiballistic missile system, which would (if it worked) give the United States a first-strike capacity and which China and Russia justifiably regard as threatening to renew the nuclear arms race. In March 2001 the Americans expelled fifty Russian diplomats from the United Statesan action intended to show that the president was committed to a new "realism" with its former enemy
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*** Etc ***
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Pivotal Power Cooperation Good
Pivotal powers prevent security threats to the U.S.
Nina Hachigian is a senior fellow at the California office of the Center for American Progress., Mona Sutphen is a managing director at Stonebridge International LLC, a Washington-based international business consulting firm, Autumn 2008, Washington Quarterly, p. 43 Furthermore, the pivotal powers can deliver tangible benefits to the United States . Americans care first and foremost about personal safety, and they expect the government to protect them from external threats. Surveying every threat from North Korea to narco-trafficking, only two outside lethal agents have the potential to kill hundreds of thousands of Americans or more here at home and in the near term: terrorists, especially if armed with a radiological device, and a pandemic of contagious disease. Pivotal powers are essential partners to keep Americans safe from these clearest present dangers. All of the pivotal powers are highly motivated to collaborate on counterterrorism efforts, and U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies have cooperated with their counterparts in each of these countries. Because the United States cannot have an adequate intelligence presence in every country in which terrorists plot, it is highly reliant on the capabilities of others. British vigilance, for example, uncovered and foiled the August 2006 plot to blow up 10 airplanes bound for the United States with liquid bombs. The third-largest Muslim population in the world and Pakistan still a key terrorism hub next door, India has monitored and countered radical Islamic groups for decades and has emerged to be an important source of information on a number of extremist groups now targeting the United States . Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a hard-line radical Sunni Muslim group based in Lahore, has carried out major attacks in India, including on its parliament. It has now turned its attention from Kashmir to training people "to wage war against nonbelievers, and especially the United States." 5 In June 2003, 11 American Muslims, called the "paintball terrorists" after a favorite pastime of theirs, were charged in Virginia with training with and fighting for LeT. Six of the men eventually pleaded guilty, and three were convicted at trial. In June 2005, India and the United States signed a 10-year defense pact that promises continued counterterrorism operations.
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Pivotal Power Cooperation Good
Cooperation with pivotal powers solves climate change and wmd proliferation
Nina Hachigian is a senior fellow at the California office of the Center for American Progress., Mona Sutphen is a managing director at Stonebridge International LLC, a Washington-based international business consulting firm, Autumn 2008, Washington Quarterly, p. 43 Pivotal powers are also necessary partners on a range of less immediate threats, such as global warming and hostile states seeking nuclear weapons. The potential security implications of climate change seem to get worse by the month: disease transmission to new locales, regional disputes fueled by food and water scarcity, chronic energy and resource shortages, and humanitarian disasters with waves of climate refugees. Although China is now the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases, as of 2002 the United States was responsible for nearly 30 percent of the carbon in the atmosphere. 10 Current U.S. inaction on climate change gives China and India a free pass. There is a widespread feeling in emerging economies that the developed world, which grew rich burning carbon with abandon, has to take substantial responsibility for the climate crisis. Its likely devastations can only be mitigated, however, with all of the pivotal powers, as well as everyone else, moving to lower-carbon economic models.
Pivotal power cooperation necessary to strength the NPT and solve disease outbreaks
Nina Hachigian is a senior fellow at the California office of the Center for American Progress., Mona Sutphen is a managing director at Stonebridge International LLC, a Washington-based international business consulting firm, Autumn 2008, Washington Quarterly, p. 43 Only with pivotal-power buy-in can the world remake the NPT and strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency, without which the world could have had 30 nuclear powers today instead of nine. Their participation is needed to empower the WHO to monitor disease outbreaks better and coordinate a response. Only together could we create a new mechanism, such as Council on Foreign Relations president Richard Haass has suggested, to encourage cross-border investment flows by establishing common rules about transparency, conditions under which national security interests can prevent foreign investment, and dispute resolution. 11 What is missing altogether from today's international architecture is a forum in which pivotal powers can come together to discuss how all this work will get done, as discussed further below.
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Naval Power Counterplan
The U.S. should expand its naval power to play the role of a constructive, distant, and declining hegemon Robert D. Kaplan, National Correspondent for The Atlantic and a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2009, Center Stage for the Twenty-First Century, pp. 16-31 So how exactly does the United States play the role of a constructive, distant, and slowly declining hegemon and keep peace on the high seas in what Fareed Zakaria, the editor of Newsweek International, has called "the post-American world"? Several years ago, Admiral Michael Mullen, then the chief of naval operations (and now chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), said the answer was a "thousand-ship navy comprised of all freedom-loving nations--standing watch over the seas, standing watch with each other." The term "thousand-ship navy" has since been dropped for sounding too domineering, but the idea behind it remains: rather than going it alone, the U.S. Navy should be a coalition builder supreme, working with any navy that agrees to patrol the seas and share information with it. Already, Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150), a naval force based in Djibouti and comprising roughly 15 vessels from the United States, four European countries, Canada, and Pakistan, conducts antipiracy patrols around the troubled Gulf of Aden. In 2008, about a hundred ships were attacked by pirates in the region, and over 35 vessels, with billions of dollars worth of cargo, were seized. (As of the end of 2008, more than a dozen, including oil tankers, cargo vessels, and other ships, along with over 300 crew members, were still being held.) Ransom demands routinely exceed $1 million per ship, and in the recent case of one Saudi oil tanker, pirates demanded $25 million. Last fall, after the capture of a Ukrainian vessel carrying tanks and other military equipment, warships from the United States, Kenya, and Malaysia steamed toward the Gulf of Aden to assist CTF-150, followed by two Chinese warships a few weeks later. The force, which is to be beefed up and rechristened CTF-151, is likely to become a permanent fixture: piracy is the maritime ripple effect of land-based anarchy, and for as long as Somalia is in the throes of chaos, pirates operating at the behest of warlords will infest the waters far down Africa's eastern coast. The task-force model could also be applied to the Strait of Malacca and other waters surrounding the Indonesian archipelago. With help from the U.S. Navy, the navies and coast guards of Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia have already combined forces to reduce piracy in that area in recent years. And with the U.S. Navy functioning as both a mediator and an enforcer of standard procedures, coalitions of this kind could bring together rival countries, such as India and Pakistan or India and China, under a single umbrella: these states' governments would have no difficulty justifying to their publics participating in task forces aimed at transnational threats over which they have no disagreements. Piracy has the potential to unite rival states along the Indian Ocean coastline. Packed with states with weak governments and tottering infrastructure, the shores of the Indian Ocean make it necessary for the United States and other countries to transform their militaries. This area represents an unconventional world, a world in which the U.S. military, for one, will have to respond, expeditionary style, to a range of crises: not just piracy but also terrorist attacks, ethnic conflicts, cyclones, and floods. For even as the United States' armed forces, and particularly its navy, are in relative decline, they remain the most powerful conventional military on earth, and they will be expected to lead such emergency responses. With population growth in climatically and seismically fragile zones today placing more human beings in danger's way than at almost any other time in history, one deployment will quickly follow another.
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Sea Power Emphasis Solves Hegemony Bad Arguments
Shifting to sea power reduces perception of a U.S. threat Robert D. Kaplan, National Correspondent for The Atlantic and a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2009, Center Stage for the Twenty-First Century, pp. 16-31 Sea power has always been less threatening than land power: as the clich goes, navies make port visits, and armies invade. Ships take a long time to get to a war zone, allowing diplomacy to work its magic. And as the U.S. response to the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean showed, with most sailors and marines returning to their ships each night, navies can exert great influence on shore while leaving a small footprint. The more the United States becomes a maritime hegemon, as opposed to a land-based one, the less threatening it will seem to others.
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China is a Threat
China developing aggressive military capabilities that threaten the U.S.
Investor's Business Daily, March 6, 2009, p. A10 National Security: As China announces yet another double-digit increase in its military budget, and as this and other threats continue to grow, President Obama plans to spend just 3% of GDP on defense by 2016. Almost unnoticed in January was the presence of Chinese warships deployed in the Gulf of Aden, south of the Saudi peninsula, to assist in the international anti-piracy mission. The deployment of naval vessels 4,000 miles from home is significant and historic. It demonstrates that China now has a blue-water navy. China has announced in advance of the annual meeting of the National People's Congress that it intends to increase its 2009 defense budget by 14.9%. This follows increases of 17.8% in 2007 and 17.6% in 2008. The actual increase may be higher, as China has traditionally kept many things, including major arms purchases, off budget. China's military budget has grown at an average rate of 16% the past decade. China's military buildup is clearly aimed at acquiring the ability to overwhelm the defenses of, and successfully attack, U.S. carrier battle groups that might come to the aid of Taiwan in a crisis. The mainland is building a fleet of silent and deadly attack submarines that may soon outnumber our own. A recent Congressional Quarterly article warned that China by itself would possess twice as many submarines as the U.S. by 2010, and would likely have a larger fleet by 2015, possibly including at least one carrier of its own. The capabilities and proficiency of the Chinese submarine fleet was demonstrated on Oct. 26, 2006, when another Song-class attack sub surfaced undetected within weapons distance of the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk in the East China Sea off Okinawa. China now possesses 12 Kilo-class Russian attack submarines. It also has deployed the Type 094 ballistic missile submarine, equipped with the JL-2 ballistic missile, a sublaunched version of its land-based DF-31 ICBM. The JL-2 is equipped with multiple warheads and penetration aids that could reach the U.S. mainland from Chinese coastal waters. Last December, the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun reported Chinese plans to begin construction of two aircraft carriers. They are scheduled to be launched in 2015. We have reported Chinese efforts to refurbish a former 55,000-ton, Soviet-built Kuznetsov-class carrier, the Varyag, at the Yellow Sea port of Dalian. The Varyag will become the flagship of the new Chinese navy as it trains the first generation of Chinese naval aviators. Jane's Defense Weekly reported last September that 50 students had begun carrier flight training at the Dalian Naval Academy. The Pentagon's 2008 report on Chinese military power noted that "China has an active aircraft carrier research and design program." The Russian press recently reported that China was negotiating to purchase as many as 48 SU-33 fighter aircraft. They are built to operate from carriers and can be refueled in flight. China is deploying an impressive surface fleet as well, one that with an aircraft carrier could form an impressive battle group. China received the second of two Russian-built Sovremenny-class guided-missile destroyers in 2006. They come equipped with supersonic seaskimming SS-N-22 Sunburn cruise missiles designed for one purpose: attack American carrier battle groups. The U.S. Navy, which reached 568 ships in the late 1980 s, struggles today to sustain a fleet of 279. The Navy is roughly the size it was on the eve of World War I. New naval construction is near or below replacement level. On the target list for cuts by Rep. Barney Frank and other Democrats are needed ships like the Virginia-class (SSN-744) attack submarine and the DDG 1000 Zumwaltclass destroyer. While the fiscal 2009 U.S. defense budget shows a nominal uptick, which we applaud, the Obama budget also projects that by 2016 the defense spending will be just 3% of GDP -- or less than half the 50-year Cold War average.
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China is A Threat
Measures China undertakes to increase its soft power make it seem more menacing
Dr John Lee is a visiting fellow at the Centre for Independent Studies, April 4, 2009, Sydney Morning Herald, p. 4 It's China's paradox: the more it tries to please, the more it looks suspicious, writes John Lee. Chinese soft power - getting its way through persuasion rather than carrots and sticks - has a long way to go, especially in Australia. To Beijing's frustration, the harder it tries to engage and impress the world - $US40 billion ($56 billion) spent on the Olympics - the more threatening China appears.
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China Threat Answers
Even if U.S. power recedes, it will be adequate to deter China Robert D. Kaplan, National Correspondent for The Atlantic and a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2009, Center Stage for the Twenty-First Century, pp. 16-31 Moreover, precisely because India and China are emphasizing their sea power, the job of managing their peaceful rise will fall on the U.S. Navy to a significant extent. There will surely be tensions between the three navies, especially as the gaps in their relative strength begin to close. But even if the comparative size of the U.S. Navy decreases in the decades ahead, the United States will remain the one great power from outside the Indian Ocean region with a major presence there--a unique position that will give it the leverage to act as a broker between India and China in their own backyard. To understand this dynamic, one must look at the region from a maritime perspective.
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China Threat Answers
China threat exaggerated
Ivan Eland, 4-11, 9, http://original.antiwar.com/eland/chinas-threat-to-the-us-is-exaggerated/ The Pentagons annual publication, "Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China 2009," accused China of stocking its military with weapons that can be used to intimidate or attack Taiwan and mitigate U.S. air and naval superiority near its territory. Even if the Department of Defenses report has not exaggerated the threat from China unlikely since the department has an inherent conflict of interest in evaluating threats and building weapons to counter those threats the report is good news. You would never know it by the statement of Ike Skelton, Democratic Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, who warned that "Chinas military budget continues a trend of double-digit increases and questions remain about Chinas strategic intentions." Unfortunately, no questions exist about U.S. strategic intentions, even under a new more liberal president. The United States will seek to continue its military dominance of East Asia and the world and will seek to keep China contained by a system of bilateral alliances, military bases in East Asia, and far-forward military deployments all left over from the Cold War. In addition, the gap between U.S. and Chinese defense spending remains vast. The massive U.S. defense spending is equal to almost half the total defense expenditure for the entire world. Although Chinas defense spending has increased by double digits in recent years, this increase followed a period of slack spending and starts from a much lower base level than the gargantuan U.S. defense budget. U.S. yearly spending on defense is $711 billion, whereas Chinas is only 17 percent of that at $122 billion annually. Furthermore, the U.S. military deploys far forward around China; Chinas general military forces do not deploy in the Western Hemisphere and do not threaten the United States. The most important finding in the Pentagons report was that China could not deploy and sustain even small military units far away from its borders before 2015. The report continued that China would not be able to deploy and sustain large units in combat far away from China until well into the decade after that. Instead, the Pentagon concluded that China is modernizing its military for short conflicts around its borders. In other words, Chinas capability to project conventional power is and will remain pathetic far into the future thus making most of Chinas neighbors relatively safe, and the faraway U.S. very safe, against a Chinese attack. But what about Taiwan? Right now it is doubtful that China could conduct a successful amphibious invasion against Taiwan, which is an island. Island nations are easier to defend than other countries, because amphibious landings are one of the most difficult military operations to undertake. In Taiwans case, it has a very good air force that could probably sink any Chinese amphibious force, because Chinese ships are deficient in good air defenses. The greatest threat to Taiwan would be Chinese intimidation or actual attack with a growing number of short-range ballistic missiles. But the real question is whether Taiwan is strategic militarily to the United States. The small island nation is not, and the United States shouldnt risk escalation with a nuclear-armed China to defend it. Even as the Chinese military gets stronger, the rich Taiwanese can use a porcupine strategy. They dont have to be able to win a war with China; they just need to be able to inflict enough damage to dissuade China from invading or attacking. In contrast, Taiwan is strategic to China, because any major foreign power with aircraft could transfer them to the island and have an offshore base to bomb China. Even though China has far fewer nuclear weapons than the United States, the Chinese are emotional about the Taiwan issue; thus, any nuclear showdown over the island would be fraught with risk. Therefore, the United States should declare that it will no longer defend Taiwan and retract the American Navys threat to China from U.S. forward bases and deployments in East Asia. Now that the Cold War is long over, these forward forces are not needed for U.S. security and are needlessly provocative to China. Such deployments and bases, and the U.S. containment policy toward China, contribute to the perceived Chinese need for double-digit defense budget increases. Thus, in a time of world economic meltdown, the U.S. could retract its expensive, unaffordable, and out-of-date empire and make its citizens safer at the same time.
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Soft Power Answers
Soft has failed to stop North Korean nuclearization
PrairiePundit April 6, 2009, p. online Soft power - the emphasis on nonmilitary elements of national power in the conduct of foreign policy - is much beloved by the Obama administration. But North Korea has been perfumed with soft power for years to no effect. Under the 1994 Agreed Framework, which was the product of talks between Kim Jong-il and Jimmy Carter, North Korea promised to scale back its nuclear program in exchange for economic and other assistance. This broke down by 2002, when it was clear the North was not keeping its part of the bargain. The Six Party Talks that began in 2003 have produced nice-sounding words and joint statements, but during that time, North Korea successfully tested nuclear weapons and pushed ahead on missile development. Meanwhile, its people continue to suffer under one of the most oppressive and bizarre regimes in history. The prevailing U.S. approach seems to be to ignore Pyongyang's provocations. Many reason that because North Korea is "contained," there is no reason to respond vigorously to bluff and bluster - or weapons tests. But North Korea is not contained. Pyongyang has been working with Iran and Syria on nuclear and missile technology.... The Washington Times, April 6, 2009, p. A16 North Korea's launch Sunday of a long-range missile is a direct challenge to President Obama and his "soft power" foreign policy. While the president was on his humility tour of Europe, Pyongyang demonstrated its willingness to defy the international community and dared the United Nations to respond, stating it would consider any "presidential statement or statement to the press" on the launch a "violent, hostile act."
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Western Decline
THE WEST IS IN DECLINE
R o b e r t M e r r y, P r e s i d e n t & P u b l i s h e r o f t h e C o n g r e s s i o n a l Q u a r t e r l y, S A N D S O F E M P I R E : M I S S I O N A RY Z E A L , A M E R I C A N F O R E I G N P O L I C Y, A N D T H E H A Z A R D S O F G L O B A L A M B I T I O N , 2 0 0 5 , p. 66 The West is in decline. True, the West still dominates geopolitics and certainly international economics, says Huntington, and will continue to do so for a long time. But a broad historical perspective indicates a downward trend, manifest in the shrunken proportion of the earth's land and population under Western domination and also in the West's diminishing ability to hold sway over other regions. As the West attempts to assert its values and protect its interests in the face of this decline, non-Western societies will face a choice as to whether they want to emulate the West or build up their own economic and military power as a counterweight. "A central axis of post-Cold War world politics is thus the interaction of Western power and culture with the power and culture of nonWestern civilizations."
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U.S. Hard Power Increases Chinese Soft Power
US HARD POWER ADVANTAGE IN ASIA CAUSED CHINA TO ADOPT A POLICY OF EXPANDING SOFT POWER Thomas J. Christensen, Professor International Affairs Princeton, 2006, International Security, Summer, p. 81 There is a second and theoretically more interesting reason to call into question the width of the divide between the positive-sum and zero-sum approaches in the policy arena. Relatively assertive U.S. policies sometimes promote goals that are consistent with positive-sum analysts' prescriptions for China and the region, whereas relatively accommodating policies toward China and its neighbors may at times be the most effective way for the United States to vie with China in a zero-sum competition. U.S. policies derided in Beijing as examples of containment of China have helped catalyze Beijing's adoption of proactive and constructive diplomacy, which has facilitated stability in the region to the benefit of all. By maintaining a strong military presence and a firm deterrent commitment to the security of Taiwan while upgrading its bilateral alliance with Japan in the mid-1990s, the United States helped channel China's competitive energies into positive-sum areas such as multilateral confidence-building and economic accords. In other words, by making Chinese security elites worry about the possibility of U.S. encirclement if Beijing's relations with its neighbors were to remain tense, Washington helped Chinese government elites recognize that cooperation with China's neighbors appears wise as a hedge against such an encirclement campaign. After all, it was just after the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-96 and the Clinton-Hashimoto joint communique announcing plans to upgrade the U.S.-Japan alliance that Beijing began its most serious pursuit of regional multilateralism. If this logic is right, the prospect of potentially worsening relations with the United States under the security dilemma not only failed to cause regional spirals of tension but encouraged bursts of Chinese cooperation with regional actors. As Men Honghua of the influential Central Party School argued in 2003, China should avoid "falling into the trap of U.S. encirclement [Meiguo de baoweiquan]" by adopting measures such as "strengthening contacts with countries along [China's] periphery; promoting the construction of a China-ASEAN free trade area," and so on. After putting military pressure on the Philippines over territorial disputes in the Mischief Reef area in 1995, Beijing tried to shape Taiwan's political posture toward the mainland through coercion in 1995-96. Beijing's policy arguably backfired on both fronts. In 1995-96 ASEAN states adopted a tough stance toward China's position on sovereignty disputes, and certain members (i.e., Singapore and the Philippines) sought closer military ties from a receptive United States. n103 China's efforts to bully Taiwan arguably also had negative results for China. The U.S. commitment to Taiwan's security was concretely manifested in the dispatch of two carrier battle groups in March 1996 to the Taiwan area in response to the People's Liberation Army's provocative missile and naval exercises aimed at the island. For its part, Japan became much more wary about China's military intentions and more receptive of existing U.S. requests for Tokyo to take on greater and clearer security-related responsibilities, such as base access, logistics support, and intelligence gathering, under the Nye Initiative. This effort culminated in the 1997 revisions to the Defense Guidelines and in the 1998 Japanese decisions to jointly develop theater missile defense systems. In 1996-97 the United States also reasserted its security relationship with Australia in ways that were noted with concern in Beijing. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States improved bilateral military cooperation with both Japan and India. It also collaborated more actively with allies and security partners in Southeast Asia, including the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. All of these events contributed to Chinese concerns about an encircling alliance designed to contain it, and which might be used to permanently wrest Taiwan away from the Chinese nation. Many international, bureaucratic, and psychological factors undoubtedly contributed to China's change from multilateral skeptic to multilateral champion in the second half of the 1990s, but there is ample evidence to suggest that one of the major catalysts in this evolution was the sense that multilateralism provided a potential hedge against worrisome trends in U.S.bilateral diplomacy in the region. China's first big push for multilateral engagement and reassurance came in 1996-97, and the process only accelerated in the years following September 11. In 1996 China created the institutional foundations in Central Asia for what would later become the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In 1997 China inaugurated the New Security Concept in its diplomacy with Southeast Asia and began adopting a much less belligerent posture on various disputes with ASEAN states. The first meeting of the ASEAN plus Three was held in that year The Chinese scholar Xia Liping points out that in 1996 Chinese elites developed the New Security Concept and promoted the Shanghai
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Cooperation Organization and China's entrance into the World Trade Organization as a response to what they saw as "Cold War thinking" and "power politics" (a thinly veiled reference to U.S. behavior in the Taiwan Strait and the strengthening of bilateral U.S. alliances). n108 Yan Xuetong states clearly that 1996 was a "watershed year" in Chinese multilateralism and that Chinese multilateral initiatives in that period were desirable as a hedge against U.S. regional hegemony. The influential government scholar Zhang Yunling similarly portrays China's constructive approach to regional multilateral institutions as a way to counter the "China threat theory" and encirclement by U.S. alliances. Other civilian and military scholars similarly emphasize the role of Chinese multilateralism in countering U.S. encirclement and international interference in China's sovereignty disputes. In an excellent article, Michael Glosny cites multiple works by Chinese authors that view improved relations with ASEAN as a means to avoid those states' linking up in an encircling alliance with a revitalized U.S.-Japan alliance. Along the same lines, Allen Carlson argues that the first motivation for China to become less rigid about territorial claims and sign the November 2002 Code of Conduct with ASEAN for naval activities in the South China Sea was Washington's "renewed military commitment in Southeast Asia (a development further cemented in the post-9/11 strategic context of fighting terrorism). As this move appeared driven in part by increased concerns in the region with Beijing's territorial ambitions in the South China Sea, it behooved Chinese leaders to allay such worries by being less aggressive." Avery Goldstein agrees, stating that such "active multilateralism was expected to foster the general perception of a more responsible China and undercut the force of the China threat arguments." Tang Shiping and Zhang Yunling write, "Understanding that the Sino-U.S. relationship will always have its ups and downs, China has pursued a strategy of maintaining amicable relationships with its neighbors [mulin youhao, wending zhoubian] to hedge against the bad times in Sino-U.S. relations . . .
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U.S. Hard Power Increases Chinese Soft Power
US HARD POWER POLICY TOWARD CHINA CAUSED THEM TO SHIFT TO A STRATEGY OF INCREASING SOFT POWER Thomas J. Christensen, Professor International Affairs Princeton, 2006, International Security, Summer, p. 81 At the same time, China itself might be adopting many accommodating strategies in the region not as a reward for American and allied moderation, but at least in part as a way to counter U.S. influence. Beijing wants to make it more difficult and painful for regional actors to choose the United States over China in any future standoff. So, by maintaining a strong presence in the region, the United States has done more than provide collective goods in security and economic affairs; it may have provided a major catalyst for Beijing to help provide such collective goods as well. To the degree that Beijing's new influence does not lead the United States to become fully extruded from the region, the end result of the competition for influence in the region may be a more stable and prosperous region in which actors in East Asia do not want to choose sides in a U.S.-China conflict and Beijing and Washington lack any real pretense for starting one.
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China Threatens Hegemony
CHINA AND INDIA WILL SUPPLANT U.S. HEGEMONY
Christopher Layne, Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A & M, The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Fall 2006, p. 37-8 U.S. hegemony cannot endure indefinitely. Even the strongest proponents of primacy harbor an unspoken fear that U.S. hegemony will provoke the very kind of geopolitical backlash that they say cannot happen (or at least cannot happen for a very long time). In fact, although a new geopolitical balance has yet to emerge, there is considerable evidence that other states have been engaging in balancing against the United Statesincluding hard balancing. U.S. concerns about China's great power emergence reflect Washington's fears about the military, as well as economic, implications of China's rise. Other evidence suggestsat least by some measuresthat the international system is closer to a multipolar distribution of power than primacists realize. In its survey of likely international developments through 2020, the National Intelligence Council's report Mapping the Global Future notes: "The likely emergence of China and India as new major global playerssimilar to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the United States in the early 20th centurywill transform the geopolitical landscape, with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two centuries. In the same way that commentators refer to the 1900s as the American Century, the early 21st century may be seen as the time when some in the developing world led by China and India came into their own." n a similar vein, a recent study by the Strategic Assessment Group projects that by 2020 both China (which Mapping the Global Future argues will then be "by any measure a first-rate military power") and the European Union could each have nearly as much power as the United States. Projecting current trends several decades into the future has its pitfalls (not least because of the difficulty of converting economic power into effective military power). But if this ongoing shift in the distribution of relative power continues, new poles of power in the international system are likely to emerge in the next decade or two.
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Allies are Bad Hurt the U.S.
ALLIES ARE UNNECESSARY AND LIMIT U.S. MILITARY RESPONSES
Doug Bandow, Vice President of Policy Research for Citizen Outreach, FOREIGN FOLLIES: AMERICAS NEW GLOBAL EMPIRE, 2006, p. 40 Moreover, allies often limit Washingtons options. France would not even grant overflight rights to Washington to retaliate against Libya for the Berlin disco bombing. Seoul and Tokyo would be unlikely to allow Washington to use their bases in a war with China, at least unless they were directly attacked. After all, neither wants to become a permanent enemy of the Peoples Republic of China. Finally, changing technology has reduced the value of propinquity. As President Bush observed, our forces are more agile and more lethal, theyre better able to strike anywhere in the world over great distances on short notice. The U.S. can use precision weapons to strike from American territory or international waters; quickly insert special forces for covert action or cooperation with allied forces; and bring naval air power to bear with local land bases. A major conflict like that in Iraq would require an extended build-up, irrespective of where the forces were located.
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Alliances Are Bad
ALLIANCES ARE A MAJOR CAUSE OF WARS
Gabriel Kolko, historian of modern warfare, THE AGE OF WAR: THE UNITED STATES CONFRONTS THE WORLD, 2006, p. 128-9 Beginning with the presidency of George W. Bush, there have been innumerable crises between the United States and its former allies and friends. Although such dramatic shifts have been common enough in the past, they occurred with increasing frequency after 2001, until now the entire international system is being shaken to its foundations. The predictability that existed before 1990 has disappeared, and the US claims to leadership no longer have justification. The dilemma its former partners confronted was made plain by the protracted discussion throughout 2002 of a possible US attack on Saddam Hussein's Iraq and other countries. Not only did NATO split, becoming functionally useless, but nations that had once been friendly to the United States, like Turkey, effectively asserted their independence, and world public opinion became alienate by US plans and then its action. To an extent that had never been the case before, whether political leaders followed Washington's dictates or maintained their independence became decisive in elections. The Iraq War was not the major turning point, which had begun to occur a decade or so earlier. It was, however, a threshold that isolated a unilateralist megapower to an extent that had no precedent, that brought together festering issues and ended an era, ushering in the new world of unpredictability and conflict in which we now live. Alliances have been a major cause of wars throughout modern history, removing inhibitions that might otherwise have caused Germany, France, and countless other nations to reflect much more cautiously before embarking on death and destruction. The dissolution of all alliances is a crucial precondition of a world without wars US strength, to an important extent, has rested on its ability to convince other nations that it was in their vital interests to see the United States prevail in its global role. With the loss of that ability will come a fundamental change in the international system, a change whose implications and consequences may ultimately be as far-reaching as the dissolution of the Soviet bloc. The unlimited scope of the US world role is now far more dangerous and ambitious than when communism existed, if only because it believes there is no power that can thwart it. But it was fear of the Soviet Union alone that gave NATO its raison d'tre and provided Washington with the justification for its global pretensions. Enemies have disappeared, and new onesmany once former allies and congenial stateshave taken their places. The United States, to a degree to which it is itself uncertain, needs alliances. But even friendly nations are less likely than ever to be bound into complaisant "coalitions of the willing."
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Alliances Are Bad
U.S. DOMINANCE IS NEEDED TO PREVENT THE DOMINANCE OF ASIA AND EUROPE
Doug Bandow, Vice President of Policy Research for Citizen Outreach, FOREIGN FOLLIES: AMERICAS NEW GLOBAL EMPIRE, 2006, p. 85 The U.S. is better than any other state at war fighting. It possesses the finest military on earth. America could defeat any other power or combination of powers. Which means Washington's most important international role is to prevent a hostile hegemonic power from dominating the Asian or European continents. No other state is capable of doing so. There is no more important foreign policy objective
CHINA, INDIA, AND A UNITED EUROPE ALL THREATEN U.S. POWER
Doug Bandow, Vice President of Policy Research for Citizen Outreach, FOREIGN FOLLIES: AMERICAS NEW GLOBAL EMPIRE, 2006, p. 207 The U.S. might be today's hyper-power, but future challenges can be seen on the horizon. China is the most obvious eventual peer competitor to America. India could follow. A united Europe conceivably still could become another.
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*** Author Indicts ***
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Indict: Kristol
KRISTOL TRYS TO PROLONG WAR AND VIOLENCE
Cenk Uygur, Graduate of the University of Pennsylvania - Wharton School of Business and Columbia University Law School, host of a nation-wide radio show, July 16th 2006 Bill Kristol has never seen a war he didn't like. No, that's too soft. A war he didn't love and lust after. Here's a wolf in sheep's clothing pretending to be serious, sober minded analyst on television when in reality he is trying to get us sucked into horrific wars that other people will die fighting. Will he ever put on a uniform and fight any of the wars he so desperately wants to start? Hell no. Will anyone in his family or friends? Hell no. They love to start wars, not fight them. That's for the poor schmucks who don't know any better and sign up to run the fool's errands Kristol wants to send them on. On Thursday, we had Ben Barnes, the former Lt. Governor of Texas on our show talking about how he got all the rich kids of Texas out of the Vietnam War, including George W. Bush. There was something about hearing him say it that struck me. It isn't just theoretical; they really do get their kids out of war while they send poor kids to get ground up by the war machine. There is something infinitely sick about that
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Indict: Brooks & Wohlforth
THEIR AUTHOR IS WRONG RUSSIA AND CHINA ARE BALANCING NOW Robert J. Art, Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University, 2005-2006
[Correspondence Striking the Balance, International Security 30.0, 177-196 MUSE] The Brooks-Wohlforth treatment of China comes in the context of their analysis of Russia's arms sales to the Chinese military. Their core argument is that these arms sales are motivated not by a Russian desire to balance the United States, but by Russia's need to deal with the massive excess capacity of its defense industry through foreign sales so as to keep that industry alive (p. 87). Indeed, this may be so, and they make a strong case to that effect. Still, I would not discount any balancing motive whatsoever. After all, Russia is aware of the effects of its arms sales on China's military capability, and it knows about U.S.-China differences over Taiwan. The issue here, however, is not Russian motives for arms sales to China, but China's motives for purchasing Russian arms. Here is what Brooks and Wohlforth say about those motives: "To be sure, China's demand for Russian military hardware is partly a response to U.S. military support for Taiwan, but China's desire to enhance its bargaining position over the Taiwan Strait has been a constant since 1949 and hence is not causally related to the advent of unipolarity after 1991 or recent U.S. security behavior" (ibid.).4 This is a curious way to treat a clear case of hard military balancing against the United States. It makes no sense to dismiss China's balancing motives in purchasing Russian arms by arguing that these motives predate unipolarity and that they are unrelated to recent U.S. security behavior. The first assertion is irrelevant; the second, just plain wrong. After all, if one state upgrades its military capability to be better able to deal with another state's military capability and the threats it poses, that is hard balancing regardless of when it started, what provoked it, or whether it is intended to knock that power off its global superpower perch or not.
CHINA BALANCING NOW Robert J. Art, Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University, 2005-2006
[Correspondence Striking the Balance, International Security 30.0, 177-196 MUSE] China's drive to upgrade its military capability is directed in the short term principally, although not exclusively, against the United States because no country, except the United States, can challenge China over Taiwan. For example, China's Kilo-class submarines are designed to keep the U.S. Seventh Fleet away from the Taiwan theater; its Su-27 and Su-30 aircraft are designed both to provide for coastal defense against U.S. aircraft and to threaten Taiwan. Arms purchases from Russia have been a primary means to upgrade China's capability. The 2005 Pentagon report documents that "Russia has supplied 85% of all of China's arms imports since the early 1990s and has been a significant enabler of China's military modernization."6 China is particularly interested in acquiring what it calls "leap ahead" technologies and "informationalized" capabilities, its terms for the U.S. revolution in military affairs. China's 2004 Defense White Paper confirms that the "technological gap resulting from the revolution in military affairs" is having a "major impact on China's security."7 As the Pentagon report puts it: "China observes closely foreign military campaigns and defense modernization initiatives. The United States factors heavily in these observations as a model of how a modern military engages in modern warfare."8 Currently, China's military modernization is specifically designed both to deter Taiwan from declaring independence and to improve China's performance should it find itself in a shooting war with the United States over Taiwan. Thus, the United States presents a clear security threat in China's eyes. Otherwise, why would it be upgrading its armed forces in ways designed to counter the United States' military advantages and to defend itself against a U.S. attack?9
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Indict: Brooks & Wohlforth
CHINA BALANCING IN SQ Robert J. Art, Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University, 2005-2006
[Correspondence Striking the Balance, International Security 30.0, 177-196 MUSE] Moreover, it is wrong to dismiss China's military balancing against the United States on the grounds that it should be much greater than it is if the United States actually posed a direct threat, as Lieber and Alexander argue (p. 122). Although China is devoting [End Page 179] a growing percentage of its gross domestic product to its military, it makes little sense to engage in a full-court military press against the United States at the current moment. For now, China needs access to the U.S. market and to U.S. direct foreign investment if it is to continue its rapid economic growth. Diverting huge sums to defense so as to whittle the U.S. military advantage down to a manageable size would undercut its "peaceful rise" strategy and harm the economic growth that will enable it one day, should it so choose, to contest the United States' global military might.10 China is balancing enough to complicate the United States' defense of Taiwan should a war occur and to be better able to defend its own territory in such a war, and it can be expected to continue to do so as long as the Taiwan issue remains unresolved.11 For the longer term, China will continue to improve its military position vis--vis the United States in preparation for the eventuality that other conflictual issues will arise between them.
EU BALANCING NOW Robert J. Art, Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University, 2005-2006
[Correspondence Striking the Balance, International Security 30.0, 177-196 MUSE] The European Security and Defense Policy is a more complex and nuanced case, and the Europeans are at an earlier stage of balancing against the United States than China [End Page 180] and have less to show for it. Brooks and Wohlforth argue that regional security concerns, not balancing motives, are driving Europe's desire to have a more effective and weighty military force. By "regional security concerns," I believe they mean that Europeans are worried the United States might not come to their defense the next time a serious security issue arises within Europe or on its periphery and, therefore, that they had better generate the military capability to act on their own (pp. 91-93). For their part, Lieber and Alexander argue that ESDP has currently amounted to little and has suffered a major setback with the French and Dutch rejections of the proposed EU constitution (p. 124). Both arguments are not persuasive. Brooks and Wohlforth wrongly dismiss the balancing motives in Europe's initial launch of ESDP, and both sets of authors ignore the balancing consequences of ESDP if the European Union achieves its stated objectives with this enterprise.
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Indict: Brooks & Wohlforth
EU BALANCING THE US Robert J. Art, Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University, 2005-2006
[Correspondence Striking the Balance, International Security 30.0, 177-196 MUSE] The "influence motive" for ESDP is clearly a case of balancing. It is wrong to argue that the Europeans are not balancing against the United States because they have not dramatically increased their defense budgets. Instead, they are balancing through external alignment: they are working steadily and deliberately to pool and integrate their resources and to fashion a more effective Europe-wide military force. They have created a military staff at the EU and have earmarked national military headquarters to conduct independent operations; they are developing indigenous European airlift, satellite reconnaissance and navigation systems, and precision-guided munitions capabilities; they have created a European defense agency to rationalize military procurement; and since the end of the Cold War and the advent of unipolarity, they have made the most dramatic strides in a generation to build what Seth Jones terms "an increasingly integrated and technologically-advanced defense industry" on a Europe-wide basis.16 If the Europeans succeed fully in standing up their EU rapid reaction force (ERRF), they will be able to deploy 60,000 troops in the field within a month and sustain them for a year.17 This is in fact a commitment to build a force that could total up to 100,000 troops when air and sea assets and rotation of forces are taken into account. The ERRF is not a trivial force; by comparison, the United States has had 130,000-150,000 troops deployed in Iraq. Finally these forces are not intended merely for humanitarian and rescue missions and peacekeeping, but also for peacemaking (waging war). Thus, when assessing the EU's efforts toward achieving greater defense autonomy, do not look for increases in military budgets; look instead for a more integrated, coordinated, and pooled use of current resources.
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Indict: Kagan
KAGANS REASONING IS FLAWED George Avery, Washington Post, 2005
[Its Not About Worth, Its About Lies, June 25, Lexis] Robert Kagan's justification for the Iraq war effectively ignores the elephant in the room ["Whether This War Was Worth It," op-ed, June 19]. Initiating a war is the most important decision that a society or nation can make. For a democracy like ours, a clear moral necessity, perceived by our leaders and supported by the people, is essential to taking that step. Kagan says that "the most sensible argument for the invasion" was that "containment could not be preserved indefinitely." That is now a factual conjecture that can never be proved or disproved. Our leaders did not offer that justification, and we as a nation never passed on its validity. Our leaders, who certainly had Kagan's hypothesis before them, chose instead to proffer arguments of an immediate threat: weapons of mass destruction in Saddam Hussein's hands, ties to al Qaeda, etc. It can only be concluded that they recognized the kind of case that was, in fact, morally required, a case that we now know was never there. It would always be easy to justify the harsh consequences of a dubious course of action if we were free, after the fact, to postulate an unprovable set of consequences that would have followed a failure to act. That easy path out of the nation's unease is not worthy of those who value our role of moral leadership in a difficult world.
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Indict: Ferguson
FERGUSON IS WRONG - HEGEMONY IS AN ORGANIZING MYTH IN OUR CULTURE - BELIEF IN INEVITABLE US DOMINANCE AS NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE GLOBE IS BASED ON INACCURATE IR ASSUMPTIONS AND SANITIZES VIOLENCE TO PROTECT OUR REGIME
Scott Preston, B.A. Honours, Communications, University of Regina, 2005
[DarkAge, 2/22, http://www.darkage.ca/blog/_archives/2005/2/22/363696.html] The recent history of American interventions around the globe doesn't suggest that Mr. Ferguson's thesis has much merit. Central America, America's erstwhile neglected "backyard" and the site of much US military and political meddling, still lies outside the umbrella of American benevolence, languishing in the Hobbesian gloom of that dark age that Mr. Ferguson's thesis suggests should not exist under the hegemony of the tutelary power. Nor does the history of US military intervention in Southeast Asia inspire much confidence in the thesis, designed as it was to bomb North Vietnam "back into the stone age", as one ferocious military planner put it -- an objective almost realised. American government efforts to roll back or preclude social revolution and the struggle against history in some of the darkest areas of the world seems to fly directly counter to Ferguson's (mis)representation of affairs. What bothers me about Ferguson's damn fool either/or treatment of the situation is that all-too-typical tendency of the modern mentality to aspire to grand abstractions of history in the famous "25 words or less". "We tend to assume that power, like nature, abhors a vacuum" and therefore "the struggle for mastery is both perennial and universal". That human beings might be something more than Newtonian forces of nature living on the brink of a Hobbesian condition of "the war of all against all" just never seems to cross their minds. They call this their "realism" and they are proud of their little realities. Mr. Ferguson relies on the precedents of history to support his contention that "a world with no hegemon at all.... could turn out to mean a new Dark Age of waning empires and religious fanaticism; of endemic rapine in the world's no-go zones; of economic stagnation and a retreat by civilisation into a few fortified enclaves" (presumably something like "Fortress America" and the gated communities of entrenched mentality in North American suburbia, paranoiac survivalist refuges from the largely fantasised gathering Hobbesian gloom of the surrounding world and society). However, the precedents of history offer no guide to the unprecedented condition in which we find ourselves today, and therefore the past is no certain guide to the present or the future (thank God). We now live in an interconnected world. This is unprecedented. Our perceptions of reality are (at least in part) no longer guided by official gatekeepers and authorised guardians of conscience keeping watch at the portals of the mind, despite the considerable barrage of propaganda we are daily subjected to designed to counteract this emergent globalism of one world and one humanity (like the whole "clash of civilisations" creed). In some ways, it truly is a Global Village, even if from inside the walls of Fortress America it might look like the proverbial "jungle out there" (while to those of us on the outside of Fortress America peering in, it's beginning to look virtually medieval inside those walls). Human beings are not, after all, forces of nature -- or at least, not entirely so. They speak, and speech is super-natural. Speech is already effective power and the organisation of power, amongst other things. Into the "vacuum of power" may global dialogue flow! Human beings may have different interests, but they are also creatures with identical interests too, and those identical interests are what makes dialogue possible at all. It always strikes me as suspicious how the modern "mentality" simply overlooks human speech as if it just wasn't there. It seems to offend their "realism". Yet it is speech, and not power relations, that defines us as human beings. Where speech does not exist, in fact, only violence can restore order amongst human beings, and a truly Hobbesian state of nature would indeed prevail. Violence is a disease of speech. Mr. Ferguson's "power vacuum" is actually a "speech vacuum".But the real mendacity of Ferguson's either/or proposition is the way he overlooks the situation in the US itself. The notion that American imperialism might itself precipitate the Dark Age, which he presupposes is already lurking beyond the walls of Fortress America, never intrudes to stain the spotlessness of his cogitations. What he has described as the Hobbesian condition in the absence of a hegemon is really a condition of speechlessness -- the absence of dialogue. Yet, in the US today, the Bush Administration's emphasis on unilateralism, pre-emption, rejection of dialogue, contempt for dissenting views, the cooking of intelligence, resort to propaganda, dismissal of scientific evidence not in conformity with policy, subordination of the universities to political objectives, the Inquisitions of the Patriot Act, and intimidation of the press all conspire to produce the very conditions of darkness and speechlessness and atrophy of dialogue that Ferguson claims belong only to the Hobbesian darkness "outside"! Like Robert Kaplan, who warns of The Coming Anarchy and
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prescribes US imperialism, "warrior politics" and a return to the good old "pagan ethos" of the Roman emperor Tiberius, the proposed solution conspires to produce the very barbarism and Dark Age it is alleged to ameliorate. It's a selfdevouring logic and a tautology. What lunacy! It's like the Dance of St. Vitus (and in that sense Ferguson is right. History can indeed be a guide to the present, at least in terms of the universal madness of groupthink). The cookie-cutter minds of the modern mentality seem to have no inkling and no self-consciousness at all of their self-devouring tautological mentations and ruminations. They all possess in common what I call a "mentality" -- the gated community of the contemporary mind. They have become an obsolete type. Neoliberal, neoconservative, and neosocialist are virtually indistinguishable. They look alike. They sound alike. Ferguson and Fukuyama, Messrs. Roberts Cooper, Kaplan, Kagan, and Michael Ignatieff, or Blair and Bush themselves, seem to have been cast from a single mould, oblivious to their own petty tyrannies and hypocrisies and duplicities and the deep nihilism they seem determined to pin and blame on others. I once thought this duplicity, hypocrisy, and nihilism was the result of a deliberate propaganda of obfuscation. I have since come to see it as the pathological condition of the late modern "mentality" itself. The modern mentality has become selfdevouring, and these men don't have the slightest consciousness of their condition.
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A2: Thayer 1st Line (1/1)
(___) They say Thayer, but: ____ Their evidence is heavy on assertion and light on warrants
A laundry list of scenarios does not constitute an argument Thayer doesnt provide justifications for his assertions about primacy.
____
Offshore balancing solves the impact
Thayers worst-case assertions about what would happen if the U.S. withdrew from the world dont assume offshore balancing the U.S. can still act to prevent outbreaks of conflicts and the transition to multipolarity is inevitable, so its only a question of the nature of the transition.
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Thayer is a cheerleader for the Iraq war he puts too much faith in preemption and ignores the publics distaste for empire. Gary J. SCHMITT, Director of the Program on Advanced Strategic Studies and Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 2007
["Pax Americana," The Weekly Standard, Posted Online March 5th, Published March 12th, Available Online at http://www.aei.org/publications/ pubID.25706,filter.all/pub_detail.asp // BATMAN] As someone who has been called a neoconservative, I suppose one would expect me to read Thayer's argument in a more friendly light--which I do. Nevertheless, his presentation suffers from its own problems. First, in response to Layne's argument that Iraq has been an unmitigated disaster, Thayer tries too hard to put a
happy face on the problem. The reality is, a strategy of primacy doesn't rest on success in Iraq. It may tell us how prepared or unprepared we are as a government for that role, but it doesn't necessarily vitiate the strategy's general validity. That said, having a strategy dedicated to maintaining primacy does, in fact, put a premium on preemptionnot necessarily or even primarily military preemption, but certainly a strong impetus to use all the tools of statecraft to shape both the security environment and other states' behavior. As such, it is an inherently active and somewhat open-ended strategy that requires heading off challenges before they become threatening ones. Obviously, that can lead to misjudgments about what really needs doing and what only appears to need doing .
But that is less a problemsince it is no less a problem for those who want to engage in balance-of-power politicsthan the fact that the American public is not especially willing to dedicate significant treasure or blood to deal with threats that are over the horizon. As someone who argued that there was a remarkable strategic opportunity available to the United States and its democratic allies in the wake of the Soviet empire's collapse, I can honestly say that, until the attacks of 9/11, the post-Cold War public was hardly seized with a determination to make the most of that opportunity. So, while Layne's preferred strategy of sitting above the world's fray is not likely to fit well with the universalistic character of American liberalism, Thayer's problem is sustaining his strategy in the face of the other side of American liberalism, with its decided focus on the pursuit of happiness . Contrary to what Layne imagines, the issue of sustainability is not one of material resources, or even the rise of great power competitors supposedly generated as a response to U.S. primacy. As Thayer notes, America has never been more powerful, and never has a country been able to call so many of the nations of the world friends or allies. No, the real issue is public will and the quality of leadership necessary to sustain that will in the face of both difficulties, and the enervating consequences of primacy's own success .
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A2: Thayer 2nd Line Extension Unwarranted (1/1)
(___) Their Thayer evidence is warrant-light
He provides a laundry list of scenarios for conflict that doesn't constitute an argument. Prefer the rigorous analysis of our evidence to the neoconservative rants of theirs.
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A2: Thayer 2nd Line Extension Offshore Balancing Solves (1/1)
(___) Offshore balancing solve the impact
Thayer's worst-case scenarios won't happen the U.S. would step-in to prevent escalation of violence. Our argument is that multipolarity is inevitable and attempts to preserve primacy make the transition to multipolarity more violent and more devastating to the U.S. we control uniqueness to Thayer's scenarios.
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A2: Thayer 2nd Line Extension Schmitt Evidence (1/1)
(___) Extend our Schmitt in 2007 evidence -Thayer is a cheerleader for the Iraq war who places too much faith in the feasibility of preemption. The public will not tolerate Thayer's imperial project this feeds our sustainability arguments because the collapse of public support will inevitably force a drawdown. A transition to multipolarity now is best it prevents a violent transition.
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A2: Mandelbaum 1st Line (1/2)
(___) They say Mandelbaum, but: ____ Their evidence is not specific to primacy
Mandelbaums assertion is that economic hegemony prevents an economic collapse, not unipolarity this is not relevant to a debate about primacy.
____
Mandelbaums argument is an apologia for hegemony, not a serious argument his economic and geopolitical analysis is based on faith, not reason. David RIEFF, Senior Fellow at the World Policy Institute at the New School for Social Research, Fellow at the New
York Institute for the Humanities at New York University, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Board Member of Human Rights Watch, and Board Member of the Central Eurasia Project of the Open Society Institute,
2006
[We Are the World, The Nation, June 14 (July 3 edition of print magazine), Available Online at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060703/rieff/3, Accessed 04-27-2007 // BATMAN] That the Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies sees fit to indulge in such childish rhetoricand then I'll be dead and they'll be sorry!"is not an insignificant illustration of the extent to which we are once more living in an age of faith. Of course, if one is talking seriously about history, such a contention is not only astonishingly self-regarding; it is also almost pure speculation. For there is no way of knowing at this point whether the United States will be regarded, after the passing of its hegemony, as a particularly benevolent hegemon, assuming onerous burdens largely for the sake of the greater global good. Mandelbaum writes with astonishing self-confidence about the three "dominant twenty-first century ideas" free markets, peace and democracy. But in doing so, he behaves as if the history of the twenty-first century could, at century's beginning, already be known. Imagine the same argument being made in 1806 about the nineteenth century or in 1906 about the twentieth. This is not historical argument but rather special pleading for American hegemony. Above all,
Mandelbaum's "case for Goliath" is based on a particularly pernicious sort of circular reasoning. On the one hand, he claims that the global dominance of the ideas of peace, democracy and free markets "owed a great deal to the power of the United States, which embraced and espoused them." But, he quickly adds, "the reverse was also true: American power rested in no small part on the dominance of these ideas." This is pure Hegelian claptrapAmerica as the incarnation of the world spirit. We have grown accustomed to the authority such ideas enjoy in neoconservative circles . "The 'real movement' of history, it turns out," wrote one of the
movement's godmothers, Gertrude Himmelfarb, in the umpteenth essay proclaiming Marxism dead and buried, "is fueled not by matter but by spirit, by the will to freedom." The neocons apparently discerned that will to freedom in Ahmad Chalabi and expected to find it in the streets of Baghdad and Basra. That they did not might be thought to suggest that there was more left to Marx's assertion that "life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life" than they might have wished to believe. Finding political analysis grounded, whether explicitly or implicitly, in the romantic twaddle of Weltgeist and Zeitgeist is bad enough coming from the utopian wing of the Bush Administration. But it seems even more incongruous when one encounters it embedded in the otherwise stolid prose of a scholar like Mandelbaum, who clearly prides himself on his hardheaded analytical approach to international relations. But there are times in The Case for Goliath when Mandelbaum seems to have more a bad case of idolatry than self-love, as, for example, when he writes that America's role in the world "has something in common with the sun's relationship to the rest of the solar system. Both confer benefits on the entities with which they are in regular contact. The sun keeps the planets in their orbits by the force of gravity and radiates the heat and light that make life possible on one of them. Similarly, the United States..." Well, you get the idea. Such purple passages aside, Mandelbaum's inspiration in writing the book seems to have been to examine the claim, frequently voiced on the streets of virtually every capital city on the globe (but, as Mandelbaum rightly points out, not in those capital's chanceries), that the world would be better off without the United States serving as the guarantor of global security and prosperity--or, as Mandelbaum puts it, as the world's government. It is a reasonable question. The problem is, from the book's
opening page to its concluding one, The Case for Goliath so skews the analysis in America's favor that its conclusions seem all but foreordained. No matter how playfully they may have been intended, even Mandelbaum's choice
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of epigrams for many of his chapters, like W.S. Gilbert's "A policeman's lot is not a happy one" or Hilaire Belloc's "Always keep a-hold of nurse, for fear of finding something worse," serve to confirm that he has written an apologia for American hegemony rather than a serious anatomy of it. (continued on next page)
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A2: Mandelbaum 1st Line (2/2)
(continued from previous page nothing cut) Paradoxically, even after having weighted the scales to the extent he does, Mandelbaum's ultimate justification for believing in the benefits of continued US dominance of the global system is more negative than positive. In his book, he brandishes the fact that there has so far been no serious effort by other states to band together to create a counterweight to the United States as conclusive evidence that other countries realize how much they benefit from the current system and how much they would lose were America no longer to play its current role. Of course, a skeptic might reasonably retort that the century is still young. But even if Mandelbaum is right, it is hardly a ringing endorsement of American stewardship. As he concedes, "a proper judgment [of the Goliath role] depends ultimately not on whether this or that American foreign policy could be improved--many undoubtedly could--but rather on whether that role is preferable to the plausible alternative." And this, Mandelbaum asserts, "is not considerably better global governance but considerably less of it, and the consequences of less governance are not likely to be pleasant." So it really is "always keep a-hold of nurse, for fear of finding something worse" and certainly not "Ain't nanny doing a swell job?" What Mandelbaum seems not to understand is that the snapshot he provides of "how America acts as the world's government in the 21st century" (to quote his subtitle) is based on a static image of a world that, in reality,
is rapidly changing. While it once may have been true that it was up to the American public to decide whether or not the United States would act as a hyperpower, today such decisions are no longer exclusively within America's grace and favor. The rise of Asia, above all China, upon which the United States is already dependent for the stability of its own financial markets; the limits, well exhibited by events in both Iraq and North Korea, of what US military power can actually accomplish; and the challenge posed by the euro to the dollar's primacy as the world's reserve currencyall of these developments insure that the American-dominated system Mandelbaum extols, and about which his principal anxiety is that the American public will cease supporting it, is in fact coming apart at the seams already, only six years into the century in which America was to perform its historic role as "the world's government."
Of course, there may eventually be a domestic "mutiny" against America's world role based on competing domestic demands for resources. But Mandelbaum is sadly mistaken if he really imagines that the United States is still in a position to
guarantee economic rule sets. Historically, this is not a role long accorded to debtors, and there is no reason to believe things have changed in this regard. On the geopolitical side, things are little better. Besides being an incontestable argument for proliferation for any state that is unprepared to do America's bidding, what the debacle in Iraq has demonstrated is how fragile American hegemony really is. America won the battles. Iran won the war. Such are the limits of hegemony these days. It also ducks a larger question that neither Mandelbaum nor Democratic policy analysts like Ivo Daalder and Anne-Marie Slaughter seem willing to consider, which is: Why do they believe the United States is and will continue to be the exception to what seems like one of the few iron laws of historythat a nation with overwhelming power at its disposal rarely behaves with forbearance and moderation for very longwhen it has enjoyed such power for more than half a century already? It would seem that it is waters of Nepenthe time in Washington these days. In other words, we are back to American exceptionalism... again. And there is a word for that, and that word is self-regardan attitude that rarely turns out well for those unable to get past it.
____
Mandelbaum does not assume offshore balancing
He is comparing a world of U.S. hegemony with a world of isolationism this is a false choice that is unresponsive to our position.
____
Mandelbaum is wrong the U.S. does not have the power to function as a world government only a drawdown solves. Anatol LIEVEN, Senior Research Fellow at the New America Foundation, 2006
[Realism and Reality: Michael Mandelbaum is the new incarnation of Louis XIV, The American Prospect, January 5, Available Online at http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint&articleId=10762, Accessed 04-27-2007 // BATMAN] But then again, why bother with omissions when the whole world-government thesis is gimcrack? The Bush experience has
shown that the United States does not remotely have the power or will to function as a world government. On
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economic matters, it functions mainly through negotiation and cooperation with other major players. On environmental matters it barely functions at all.
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And on security matters, Mandelbaums choice of poor old Goliath as a symbolic figure was doubtless in part intentionally ironic, but it was also more ironic than he knew. For despite all his strength, Goliath was , of course, defeated by a much smaller opponent, as the United States is being defeated in Iraq , even if like the Vietcong the insurgents can never win on the battlefield. Goliath would have done well to have been lighter on his feet, less ambitious and, above all, less arrogant.
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A2: Mandelbaum 2nd Line Extension Not Specific To Primacy (1/1)
(___) Mandelbaum's analysis is not specific to primacy
The assertion he makes is that economic hegemony prevents a global economic collapse, not unipolarity just because they cut their cards from a book about primacy doesn't mean they're relevant to this debate.
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A2: Mandelbaum 2nd Line Extension Rieff Evidence (1/1)
(___) Extend our Rieff in 2006 evidence
Mandelbaum's book is just an apology for U.S. hegemony, not a serious political argument his prose quickly dissolves into vacuous and self-serving circular reasoning. Rieff's analysis is devastating Mandelbaum's economic and political arguments are faith-based, not reality-based, and they ignore the developments of the past decade. Counter-balancing, globalization, and Iraq have put U.S. hegemony on the brink of collapse prefer the grounded historical analysis of our evidence to their naive claims.
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A2: Mandelbaum 2nd Line Extension Doesnt Assume Offshore Balancing (1/1)
(___) Mandelbaum doesn't assume offshore balancing
Even if they win that his economic analysis is relevant to a debate about primacy, he doesn't assume offshore balancing there is no reason that adopting a multipolar grand strategy would collapse the economy.
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A2: Mandelbaum 2nd Line Extension Lieven Evidence (1/1)
(___) Extend our Lieven in 2006 evidence
Mandelbaum's dream of the U.S. acting as a global government just isn't possible there is no international support for that assertion. Especially in the context of the economy, Mandelbaum is just wrong the U.S. can't use its power to maintain the global economy.
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A2: Mandelbaum 2nd Line Thesis Is Wrong (1/1)
(___) Mandelbaums thesis is wrong he relies on a flawed solar system analogy, takes hierarchy for granted, ignores soft power and self-interest, and defies the lessons of history. Llewellyn D. HOWELL, International Affairs Editor of USA Today and Director and Senior Research Fellow at the Asia Pacific Risk Institute at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2006
[The case for David, USA Today (Society for the Advancement of Education), March, Available Online at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/ mi_m1272/is_2730_134/ai_n16108093/print, Accessed 04-27-2007 // BATMAN]
Mandelbaum's case for Goliath is well put. It contains, however, a fatal flaw: Mandelbaum has presented a statecentric scenario as the only possibility for order in the system. He shifts from the central Goliath-David analogy to a solar system configuration, with the U.S. playing the sun. The only other players are the individual planets. The problem with the solar system is that it has no human intention and deviation, social system, or morality. Gravity and centrifugal force have no learning ability, angst, terror, or hunger to motivate planets to change position, crash into the sun, or break away. There are no suicide bombers in the solar system .
Let's imagine that David is not a country or an organization or a planet, rather a social forcea social force in America. Simple population dynamics are having their impact on the U.S. As the baby boom population has moved not into retirement but into the health care age, there are more Americans than ever before who are demanding that government better manage health care. Moreover, life in the land directly governed by Goliath is degrading. Where once the life expectancy data showed the U.S. as the place simply to have life, now Asian and Latin Americanas well as almost all Western Europeancountries offer a more hospitable climate. UN data show the U.S. sustaining 6.9 infant deaths per 100,000 population. Singapore checks in at 2.2; Japan, 3.0; Sweden, 3.1; Spain, 3.9; Canada, 5.4: and Cuba, 6.3. Life expectancy in the U.S. is 80 years for women and 75 for men. Virtually all Western European countries are doing better. So are Martinique (82 and 75), Canada (82 and 77), Israel (82 and 78), Japan (85 and 78), Hong Kong (85 and 79), and Costa Rica (81 and 76). The list goes on and on. In the land of Goliath, pollution of air and water is increasing rapidly; congestion on the highways is up; most people are overweight, with all of the associated health problems that arise from that fact; the prison population is high and rising; educational output is degrading; health care is on an emergency basis only for tens of millions; the poverty rate is increasing; and government is intruding into private lives with greater frequency and more muscle. The U.S. population easily could be David for this Goliath. Mandelbaum only gives recognition to this possibility in his section on "Costs." The costs of being the world's policeman may "be unacceptable to the American public because they entail a greater measure of austerity than [it] will tolerate." Mandelbaum implies, though, that more social costsincluding reduced benefits in Social Security and a greater tax burdenare a function of global social order and have to be borne.
Mandlebaum's thesis is filled with potential challenges. Perhaps most critical is that it assumes the international system not only is hierarchical and patriarchal, but that it always will be. It completely ignores what Joseph Nye of Harvard University has termed "soft power," the power of the American ideal and the ideal America. Mandlebaum's thesis ignores the possibility that there would be efforts by Goliath to keep the hierarchy intact simply because it benefits him, not because it's good for most of the players in the social network or the network itself. It ignores the fact that, historically, all similar structures have dissolved violently, sooner or later, in the ages before weapons of mass destruction.
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A2: Mandelbaum 2nd Line Iraq Disproves (1/1)
(___) A2: Mandelbaum Iraq proves Mandelbaum is wrong. Anatol LIEVEN, Senior Research Fellow at the New America Foundation, 2006
[Realism and Reality: Michael Mandelbaum is the new incarnation of Louis XIV, The American Prospect, January 5, Available Online at http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint&articleId=10762, Accessed 04-27-2007 // BATMAN] Michael Mandelbaums latest book is a superficial symptom of a grave, even potentially deadly disease: the
inability of the overwhelming majority of the U. S. establishment to contemplate a limited scaling down of Americas struggle for world dominance, even when the maximalist version of that goal has been clearly shown to be unsustainable. The neoconservatives represent only an extreme and crude version of this ambition. To a greater or
lesser extent, it is shared by the leaders of both political parties and by a large majority of American politicians, soldiers, bureaucrats, and Washington policy intellectuals. Unlike the neoconservatives, Mandelbaum has always been thought to belong to the realist tradition. Indeed, while in the Democrat camp in the 1990s he clashed bitterly with the Clinton administrations professed commitment to nation building and the spread of democracy, summing up his critique in the damning phrase foreign policy as social work. The realist side of Mandelbaum is still evident in the emphasis that he gives to order, trade, and the prevention of security threats, relative to humanitarian intervention and the spreading of democracy and human rights. Yet in the name of these goals Mandelbaum makes a claim more breathtakingly ambitious than any advanced by any previous realist, from any country -- assuming, that is, that Lenin, Stalin, and Hitler are to be classified as ideological fanatics rather than extreme realists. His argument is that the United States not only ought to be, but actually is in vital respects the government of the whole planet. He chooses as his symbolic figure for this power the biblical giant Goliath. In Mandelbaums words, As portrayed in the pages that follow, [Americas world role] has something in common with the suns relationship to the rest of the solar system. Both confer benefits on the entities with which they are in regular contact. The sun keeps the planets in their orbits by the force of gravity and radiates the heat and light that make life possible on one of them. Similarly, the United States furnishes services to other countries, the same services, as it happens, that governments provide within sovereign states to the people they govern. The United States therefore functions as the worlds government. Actually, there was a realist who once made a similar claim, though about himself rather than his country: I was forgetting Louis XIV, the Sun King of France.
Mandelbaums vision dangerously extends the common realist argument that the international system benefits from the existence of a hegemon, or superpower, capable of imposing a certain degree of order. Although there is a great deal to be said for U.S. leadership, the Iraq disaster should have made absolutely clear long before Mandelbaum finished this book that the level of global domination aspired to by the Bush administration, and by thinkers like Mandelbaum, is not only beyond Americas resources but, if pursued, will bring even the beneficial aspects of Americas global role to an early end .
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A2: Mandelbaum 2nd Line Doesnt Assume Bush (1/1)
(___) Mandelbaum doesnt account for the incompetency of the Bush Administration this disproves his core thesis. Anatol LIEVEN, Senior Research Fellow at the New America Foundation, 2006
[Realism and Reality: Michael Mandelbaum is the new incarnation of Louis XIV, The American Prospect, January 5, Available Online at http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint&articleId=10762, Accessed 04-27-2007 // BATMAN]
Mandelbaums book is forcefully and sometimes wittily argued, and has some good points. Taken as a whole, however, it is specious. His central argument does not work whichever way you look at it. If you accept his thesis and believe that the United States is, in fact, the worlds government, the Bush administration had better pray that no interplanetary commission of enquiry comes calling any time soon. For on a whole range of critical functions of government and stewardship, the United States has in recent years been grossly negligent .
This is, above all, true of global warming, which Mandelbaum addresses not so much to assess the seriousness of the threat to our civilization as to score points against the EU. On a range of other issues as well, from preventable disease through poverty reduction to resolving some of the worlds most bloody and dangerous conflicts, the United States under George W. Bush does not qualify as a responsible government.
Mandelbaum and like-minded analysts seem incapable of understanding that much criticism of the United States today is motivated not by hostility to the idea of America leading, but by profound alarm at the quality of its leadership. Even soldiers who may fully accept the principle of military subordination may yet come to hate, fear, and disobey a particular general whom they regard as incompetent and rash .
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A2: Mandelbaum 2nd Line Economic Assumptions Wrong (1/1)
(___) Mandelbaum is wrong about the relative strength of the U.S. economy debt gives only the illusion of strength. Marshall AUERBACK, International Strategist with David W. Tice & Associates, LLC, a money management firm, 2005
[The other side of prosperity, San Francisco Chronicle, February 20, Available Online at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi? file=/chronicle/ archive/2005/02/20/INGG9BBCVK1.DTL, Accessed 04-27-2007 // BATMAN]
Just as a haystack soaked in kerosene appears relatively benign until somebody strikes a match, so too, could today's seemingly benign economic picture be masking impending disaster. Although America's long-standing economic problems have not yet led to financial Armageddon, this in no way invalidates the threat .
For economy watchers in 2005, the key is to imagine which event or combination of them represents the match that could set this "haystack" alight.
The Achilles heel of the American economy is debt. When debt levels are as high as the United States is carrying today, further increases in debt created by credit expansion can act as a burden on demand . Signs of this are
already in the air, or rather in what has been by historic standards only feeble economic growth during President Bush's years in office.
Think of the mountain of national debt as the policy equivalent of steroids. It has so far managed to create a reasonably flattering picture of economic prosperity, much as steroid use in baseball has flattered the batting averages of some of game's stars during the past decade. But unlike major league baseball, forced to act by scandal and Senate threats, America's monetary and financial officials refuse to implement policies designed to curb the growth of a steroidal debt burden . If anything, credit addiction has set in, and policy has increasingly appeared designed to encourage ever larger doses of indebtedness. Each bailout or promise of a government safety net has only led to more of the same . Then there's the persistent reluctance of U.S. officials to regulate the country's increasingly speculative financial system, which has led not only to fiascos like Enron the 21st century poster child for what ails the U.S. economy but also speaks to the dangers of excessive debt, corrupt financial practices, highly dubious accounting and endless conflicts of interest. The result of this reluctance to confront the consequences of credit excesses is a federal debt of $7.5 trillion . Of
this, $1 trillion is ancient history. The other $6.5 trillion has built up during the past three decades, the last $2 trillion in the past eight years and the last $1 trillion in the past two years. According to the economist Andre Gunder Frank, "All Uncle Sam's debt, including private household consumer credit card, mortgage etc. debt of about $10 trillion, plus corporate and financial, with options, derivatives and the like, and state and local government debt comes to an unvisualizable, indeed unimaginable $37 trillion, which is nearly four times Uncle Sam's (gross domestic product)."
This rising level of indebtedness will become a huge deflationary weight on economic activity if debt growth should seriously slow which is the economic equivalent of a Catch-22 . The situation of the American economy becomes yet more precarious when you consider that the country's major creditors are foreigners. The U.S. economy is being kept afloat by enormous levels of foreign lending, which allow American consumers to continue to buy more imports, which, in turn, increase already bloated trade deficits .
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A2: Khalilzad 1st Line (1/1)
(___) They say Khalilzad, but: ____ There is no warrant in this evidence
A laundry list of potential flashpoints or a one-paragraph concluding assertion does not meet the minimum standard of evidence quality necessary to evaluate their claims prefer our evidence.
____
It is not comparative to offshore balancing
Their evidence describes a move to isolationism, not offshore balancing it assumes a complete withdrawal of the U.S. from the world, something that would never happen.
____
Khalilzad is a neoconservative hack
He was a member of the Project For A New American Century paid by the RAND Corporation to tote the company line the article they cite is not scholarly analysis but self-serving publicity that eventually got him in with the White House.
____ Khalilzad is not an argument his defense of hegemony is outdated and doesnt assume the current geopolitical situation. Frank SEAVER, Director of Forensics at Woodward Academy and Vice President of the National Debate Coaches Association, 2007
[Rumsfeld, Khalilzad and Concerns Over Recycling Debate Arguments from Topic to Topic, Rostrum, Volume 81, Number 6, February, Available Online at http://www.nflonline.org/uploads/Rostrum/0207_074_076.pdf, Accessed 02-12-2007 // BATMAN] We also continue to recycle old evidence, which is a manifestation of this same syndrome. I will indulge in one example the continued reliance on the Khalilzad evidence to support US hegemony good arguments from his 1995 Washington Monthly article.4 Last summer, for the eleventh year in a row, every summer debate institute that I am aware of produced this evidence again as part of its evidence set. Yet, this article assumes (a) national security threats that dramatically
changed after 9/11; (b) a forward deployment base strategy that was completely altered after 9/11; (c) a concern about US troops being kicked out of US bases stationed in foreign countries that has been subsequently directly addressed in Rumsfelds lilly pad strategy of establishing more American bases abroad with fewer troops assigned to each base; (d) peacetime and how the United States then, rather than during a period where we have around 150,000 troops fighting a war in the Middle East. While I understand why this is popular evidence in very few
words it references seven major war scenarios from which U.S. hegemony could provide protection, thus facilitating debaters to efficiently advance this line of argument there comes a point where evidence is simply outdated . Unfortunately, I suspect that at least 75% of the affirmative cases that defend US hegemony at the NFL and NDCA Championship Tournaments will rely on this Khalilzad evidence to help make their case. Worse, the quality of this Khalilzad evidence has taken on mythical proportions. Literally, Khalilzad has become a warrant as in a debater claiming our plan produces a net advantage in military readiness, this distinction is critical, pull Khalilzad (to provide an anecdote, this was the rationale in a post round critique I listened to from the panel of judges of an extremely complicated late elimination round at one of the most competitive national tournaments of this season). As Khalilzad has become a warrant for debaters and judges [end page 74] in our community, I cannot help but wonder how many of us have read that actual article, particularly if you were not involved in debate when that particular Washington Monthly issue was published. There are plenty of defenses for American Hegemony post 9/11. They are just not really represented in what
Khalilzad was arguing in 1995. It seems that via repetition, our debate community has been ingrained to believe that saying Khalilzad necessarily continues to provide pertinent reasons to defend U.S. military power . I wonder
how Khalilzad, currently the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, would feel about his eleven-year-old article being used as the ultimate rationale to defend U.S. hegemony in the post-9/11 world? I wonder whether or not Donald Rumsfeld would feel that high school debaters are really learning about American foreign policy considerations as they relate to our military? Is the debate
community living in a fantasy world, pretending the real world is something it is not merely because it is convenient to retain these repeated assumptions?
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A2: Khalilzad 2nd Line Extension Unwarranted (1/1)
(___) Their Khalilzad evidence is unwarranted
A laundry list of assertions about potential flashpoints for conflict does not amount to a warrant -- their evidence is just an assertion, not an argument.
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A2: Khalilzad 2nd Line Extension Doesnt Assume Offshore Balancing (1/1)
(___) Khalilzad is not responsive to offshore balancing
He is indicting isolationism, not a drawdown a complete withdrawal from the world is impossible and it's not what our authors advocate prefer the specificity of our evidence.
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A2: Khalilzad 2nd Line Extension Neo-Conservative Hack (1/1)
(___) Khalilzad is a neo-con hack
His article was publicity for the Project For A New American Century he is not an unbiased observer of grand strategy but rather an active participant in the neoconservative agenda. Prefer our authors' outsider analysis Khalilzad's arguments cannot be separated from his personal political ambitions.
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A2: Khalilzad 2nd Line Extension Seaver Evidence (1/1)
(___) Extend our Seaver in 2007 evidence
Don't fall into the trap of unthinkingly granting weigh to "extend Khalilzad we outweigh" their evidence has nothing to say about the current geopolitical climate. Seaver isolates four warrants for the claim that Khalilzad is outdated: first, national security threats have dramatically changed since 9/11; second, forward deployment has been completely altered after 9/11; third, concerns about basing have been addressed by Rumsfeld's "lilly pad" strategy; and fourth, Khalilzad was writing during peacetime and does not assume a world where 150,000 U.S. troops are deployed overseas. This evidence should be granted absolutely zero weight granting any credence to their evidence requires that you emigrate to a fantasy world.
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*** Soft Power & Smart Power***
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Smart Power Good
Smart power & diplomacy critical to global conflict resolution
The Statesman (India), January 28, 2009, p. online With smart power, diplomacy will be the vanguard of foreign policy, Clinton said. To protect the country from international terrorism, which continues to be a major foreign policy objective, America needs a strategy of deeper and multilevel engagement with the world. This can be done by providing international economic aid, helping build up democratic institutions and strengthening weaker states so that they dont become safe havens for terrorists. The United States of America cannot depend only upon its overwhelming military power to contain violent, unruly people. America cannot solve the most pressing
problems on its own, and the world cannot solve them without America... I believe American leadership has been wanting, but is still wanted, she said. Obviously, the USA is not going to give up its global role regardless of the economic downturn. The best way for the USA to exercise its influence is through the use of the power of persuasion, mutual cooperation, and commonality of national interests such as economic growth, fighting terrorism and improving education. Diplomatic power arises from the attraction of a nations culture and values, apart from its economic and military might. The culture of Hollywood including pop music, blockbuster movies and exciting television programs is universally enjoyed by audiences. But thats only a part of the American story. American society embodies a culture of entrepreneurship, transparency and freedom, necessary for the development of open marketplace. The rise of Barack Obama, a man from elsewhere, should leave no doubt that the USA is a culture of openness and optimism that holds the prospect of self-renewal and expanding human horizons. Openness is the essence of the USA. By opening itself to Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea in the Cold War era and later on to China, the USA exercised its cultural and diplomatic power and transformed the whole region. A once-upon-a-time hostile nation such as China has been turned into a friendly if competitive global power. But the rapid economic growth of China has created new problems for which a different kind of engagement is needed. We want a positive and cooperative relationship with China, one where we deepen and strengthen our ties on a number of issues. But this is not a one-way effort ~ much of what we will do depends on the choices China makes about its future at home and abroad, Clinton said. On her visit to China in 1995, she told the Fourth World Conference on Women: It is time for us to say here in Beijing, and the world to hear, that it is no longer acceptable to discuss womens rights as separate from human rights. Now we have to see how far she can pursue her human rights agenda especially with regard to Tibet when the USA needs Chinas cooperation in stemming the global financial crisis. Once again the issue of currency manipulation by China to boost its exports at the expense of other developing nations is being raised. But the immediate focus of the matrix of smart power ~ diplomacy, development and defence ~ are of course Afghanistan-Pakistan and Israel-Palestine. As we focus on Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan, we must also actively pursue a strategy of smart power in the Middle East that addresses the security needs of Israel and the legitimate political and economic aspirations of the Palestinians, Clinton said during her confirmation hearing. In pursuit of this objective, the Obama administration has appointed two seasoned international negotiators: Former senator George Mitchell as a special envoy for Israel-Palestine; and career diplomat Richard Holbrook for Pakistan-Afghanistan, who although not covering India, nonetheless, might pay friendly visits to the country. Eliminating the Taliban, AlQaida and their training camps in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region will need enhanced US (and NATO) hard power, which of course must be accompanied by economic and educational development of the region. But the biggest challenge in Afghanistan is to free the country not only from the Taliban but also from the drug trade. Incorporating the soft power of development into the matrix of new foreign policy is a challenge. Joseph Nye of Harvards Kennedy School of Government was the first to develop the concept of soft power. According to him, a country can become attractive by co-opting people rather than coercing them. International influence comes from an effective aid and information program abroad, he said. What is needed is increased investment in soft power, the complex machinery of interdependence, rather than in hard power ~ that is, expensive new weapons system. Fighting terrorism certainly requires both hard and soft power. But soft power is much cheaper than coercion, and an asset that needs to be nourished. Just as trade with China and rising prosperity has changed the Chinese people and has given them new hopes and new dreams, a similar policy might transform Iran too, it is argued. Global communication can play an important role in changing peoples perceptions, especially when outside information challenges their assumptions and makes them think afresh. The USA should encourage corporate America, through economic incentives and other means, to invest in poor but aspiring countries to raise hopes and dreams of a prosperous future. That should be the ultimate goal of smart power. (The author is Professor of Communications at Norwich University.)
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Soft Power Solvency Answers
Georgia conflict proves soft power wont restrain aggression
Daily Telegraph, August 17, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/georgia/2571274/Georgiaconflict-Moscow-has-blown-away-soft-power.html
South Ossetia may be tiny, but it has become the scene of an event of colossal proportions: the return of great-power politics. Tanks once again decide what happens. Soft power, on which so many hopes had been pinned, has just been exposed as irrelevant. The Russians clearly dont care. Their tanks have rolled in, and nothing except a bigger, more powerful force can stop them. The huge change follows inevitably from Russias regression to its own historic version of empire, which existed under the tsars and was revived by Stalin. It is based on a tacit bargain: the Russians accept authoritarian rule and the loss of personal freedom in exchange for an imperial role on the global scene, which starts with the near abroad countries such as Georgia, which used to belong to the Soviet Union.
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Soft Power Solvency Answers
Russia proves that soft power and global legal multilateralism will not restrain aggression
Globe & Mail, August 27, 2008, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080827.wwcowar27/BNStory/International/home
But the odd thing is that, when the crisis broke, those who rushed to defend the new international norms were not the global legalists but the national democrats - in particular, the Polish and Baltic leaders who came to Tbilisi to show solidarity with the Georgians. The global legalists were very quiet about Russia's breaking of the rules. The EU mission to Moscow led by France's Nicolas Sarkozy operated on the premise that it was necessary to avoid condemning Russia in order to be a successful mediator. Yet, Mr. Sarkozy and his EU team were bamboozled into accepting and promoting a ceasefire agreement that contained loopholes through which the Russians drove entire tank battalions. And that diplomatic failure was made easier precisely because the Russians were not put in the dock. In the end, the EU argument that pooling sovereignty leads to greater real power proved to be a sham - and worse than a sham. It led in practice to collective impotence and self-deception. And there is a reason why that will always happen. Global legalism rests on the delusion that powers with the ability to assert their interest in some vital matter can be prevented from doing so solely by rules in which every state has a modest long-term theoretical investment. But as soon as a real crisis erupts, the global legalists realize that their legal restraints are incapable of restraining the rule-breaker. To maintain their legalist fiction, therefore, they have to deny or obfuscate the fact that the rules have been broken or that any particular state is responsible for the conflict. If they have to take sides, they tend to support the stronger power, since that makes it easier to solve the dispute in a way that seemingly conforms to the rules. Might is cloaked with right to save the blushes of the "international community." If the rules are to have real impact, they must be backed by more than a legalist fiction. In the Georgia crisis, those nation-states and international bodies that defended the global rules, that condemned Russia for breaking them, and that used the soft power of public diplomacy to restore their effectiveness were all forces that could ultimately call on hard power and/or serious national selfinterest to support their words. Practitioners of hard power were able to use soft power; advocates of soft power ended up wielding no power. Neither NATO nor the EU covered itself with glory in this crisis. But the EU actively appeased Russia, while NATO at least resisted feebly. NATO can exert real pressure on Russia, in part because it disposes of real military power, in part because it includes states, notably Poland, that have a real stake in Russia's not winning outright in Georgia. Moreover, Poland and its New Europe allies have an additional motive for their defence of Georgia: They are still conscious of the value of their own democratic sovereignty. More elderly democracies in Western Europe seem to have forgotten the pleasures of self-government.
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*** Soft Power Good ***
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Soft Power Good 1AC Card
The U.S. will remain the leading economic and military power in the status quo, no counterbalancing, but soft power is eroding due to poor policy choices, such soft power is critical to resolve global problems, and more isolationist alternatives won't solve the impacts Joseph S. Nye, Jr, Harvard,
Survival | vol. 50 no. 1 | FebruaryMarch 2008 | pp. 5568
Because of its leading edge in the information revolution and its past investment in traditional power resources, the United States will likely remain the world's single most powerful country in military, economic and so-power terms well into the twenty-first century . While potential coalitions to check American power could be created, countries like Russia, China and India have differing goals and priorities, and it is unlikely that they would become from military allies unless the United States used its hard, coercive power in an overbearing, unilateral manner that undermined its soft or attractive power. Because soft power is particularly important in dealing with issues arising from the boom chessboard of transnational relations, America's resources in this area are increasingly important. While polls show that American so power has declined in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, they also show that the cause of the decline is government policies, not American culture and values. This is important because policies can change relatively quickly, while culture and values change more slowly. In the early s, American policies in Vietnam led to low ratings in polls, but the country regained much of its so power within a decade. (continued) Americans cannot achieve all their international goals alone. For example, international financial stability is vital to the prosperity of Americans, but the United States needs the cooperation of others to attain it. Likewise, global climate change will affect Americans' quality of life, but the United States cannot manage the problem by itself.Last year China, which adds two new coal-fired generating plants each week, may have overtaken the United States as the largest emitter of greenhouse gases. And in a world where borders are becoming more porous than ever to everything from drugs to infectious diseases to terrorism, Washington must work with others and mobilise international coalitions to address these new security threats. Isolationism and unilateralism after Iraq? The dramatically decreased cost of communication, the rise of transnational domains (including the Internet), and the 'democratisation' of technology that puts massive destructive power, once the sole preserve of governments, into the hands of groups and individuals all add new dimensions to global politics. In the last century, men like Hitler, Stalin and Mao needed the power of the state to wreak great evil. Today, if transnational terrorists were to obtain nuclear materials and use them to cause great destruction or great disruption of society, they could bring about enormous changes to the United States and the world, though the direction of such change is difcult to predict. Faced with such a threat, a certain degree of unilateral action, such as the war in Afghanistan, is justified if it produces global goods. Afer all, the British navy reduced the scourge of piracy well before international conventions were signed in the middle of the nineteenth century. But isolationism or extreme unilateralism are not promising options for the world's largest state. In light of these new circumstances, how will the only superpower
guide its foreign policy aer the experience of the Iraq war? Will it provide global leadership or conclude that the best course in world afairs is to remain uninvolved? Some Americans are tempted to believe that the United States could reduce its vulnerability if it withdrew its troops, curtailed its alliances and followed a more isolationist foreign policy. But isolationism would not remove the vulnerability. Even if Washington had a more inwardlooking foreign policy, radical groups would resent the power of the American economy that would still reach well beyond its shores.
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Soft Power Good -- Multiple Scenarios
Soft power solves prolif, terrorism, disease, the environment, and resolves Afghanistan and Iraq Stanley 7
[Elizabeth, of Sandia National Laboratories, International perceptions of U.S. Nuclear Policy http://www.prod.sandia.gov/cgibin/techlib/access-control.pl/2007/070903.pdf]
Such reputation
effects can have significant impact in terms of gaining international cooperation in addressing global issues contrast to a states hard power (military and economic might), soft power (a states culture, values and institutions) provides an indirect way to influence others. Soft power is an
require multilateral solutions and given the interdependent nature of the world today, most issues fall into this category. In invaluable asset to: (1) keep potential adversaries from gaining international support and winning moderates over to their causes; (2) influence neutral and developing states to support US leadership; and, (3) convince allies to support and share the international security burden. The high ground) to
that
United States needs soft power assets (including the moral solve these problems multilaterally and proactively. For example, one of the wicked problems (problems having complex, adaptive, unpredictable components) that US nuclear policy and posture is trying to address is global proliferation of WMD. Yet, WMD proliferation is not a problem that the United States can address effectively alone. To address global proliferation concerns, the United States needs the rest of the world to participate in the process. Given how
complex the WMD proliferation problem is, this requires not only other international actors to commit to solving the problem with us but that they have a similar understanding of what the problem is. This common problem definition is not possible when the rest of the world has negative perceptions of the United States, when US policies and actions (in the nuclear and non-nuclear arenas) are perceived as unilateral and hypocritical. Indeed, this paper suggests that many international actors appear to view US policy and actions as one of the contributors to the WMD proliferation problem. In other words, US actions actually affect how other states define the problem, and how they define the problem affects what they believe the right solution is. Given their different understanding, it is not surprising that the wicked problem becomes even thornier to address. In short, how other international actors perceive US
policies and actions matters a great deal in their decisions about how much they will cooperate on the US policy goal of non-proliferation. (continued) How important is soft power, anyway? Given its vast conventional military power, does the United States even need soft power? Some analysts argue that US military predominance is both possible and desirable over the long term, and thus soft power is not important. But a growing consensus disagrees. These analysts argue that soft power is critical for four reasons. First, soft power is invaluable for keeping potential adversaries from gaining international support, for winning the peace in Afghanistan and Iraq, and for convincing moderates to refrain from supporting extremist terrorist groups. Second, soft
power helps influence neutral and developing states to support US global leadership. Third, soft power is also important for convincing allies and partners to share the international security burden.14 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, given the increasing interdependence and globalization of the world system, soft
power is critical for addressing most security threats the United States faces today. Most global security threats are impossible to be countered by a single state alone. Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, failed and failing states, conflicts over access to resources, are not confined to any one state. In addition, disease, demographic shifts, environmental degradation and global warming will have negative security implications as well.15 All of these potential threats share four traits: (1) they are best addressed proactively, rather than after they
develop into full-blown crises; (2) they require multi-lateral approaches, often under the umbrella of an international institution; (3) they are not candidates for a quick fix, but rather
Given these four traits, soft power is critical for helping to secure the international, multi-lateral cooperation that will be necessary to address such threats effectively.
require multi-year, or multi-decade solutions; and, (4) they are wicked problems.
Terrorism causes extinction Sid-Ahmed 4
[Mohamed, Al-Ahram Weekly, "Extinction!" 8/26, no. 705, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm]
What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.
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Environmental degradation causes extinction Diner 94
[Major David N. Diner , JAG US Army, MILITARY LAW REVIEW, Winter 1994, http://www.stormingmedia.us/14/1456/A145654.html]
By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems.
As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem
failure.
The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend
continues. Theoretically, each
new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly perceived and intertwined effects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the
rivets from an aircraft's wings, mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.
Disease spread causes extinction South China Morning Post 96
[Leading the way to a cure for AIDS, quoting Dr. Avi Ben-Abraham, called "one of the 100 greatest minds in history" by Mensa, 1-4-1996, lexis]
Despite the importance of the discovery of the "facilitating" cell, it is not what Dr Ben-Abraham wants to talk about. There
is a much more pressing medical crisis at hand - one he believes the world must be alerted to: the possibility of a virus deadlier than HIV. If this makes Dr Ben-Abraham sound like a prophet of doom, then he makes no apology for it. AIDS, the Ebola outbreak which killed more than 100 people in Africa last year, the flu epidemic that has now affected 200,000 in the former Soviet Union - they are all, according to Dr Ben-Abraham, the "tip of the iceberg". Two decades of intensive study and research in the field of virology have convinced him of one thing: in place of natural and man-made disasters or nuclear warfare, humanity could face extinction because of a single virus, deadlier than HIV. "An airborne virus is a lively, complex and dangerous organism," he said. "It can come from a rare animal or from anywhere and can mutate constantly. If there is no cure, it affects one person and then there is a chain reaction and it is unstoppable. It is a tragedy waiting to happen."That may sound like a far-fetched plot for a Hollywood film, but Dr Ben -Abraham said history has already proven his theory. Fifteen years ago, few could have predicted the impact of AIDS on the world. Ebola has had sporadic outbreaks over the past 20 years and the only way the deadly virus - which turns internal organs into liquid - could be contained was because it was killed before it had a chance to spread. Imagine, he says, if it was closer to home: an outbreak of that scale in London, New York or Hong Kong. It could happen anytime in
the next 20 years - theoretically, it could happen tomorrow.The shock of the AIDS epidemic has prompted virus experts to admit "that something new is indeed happening and that
the threat of a deadly viral outbreak is imminent", said Joshua Lederberg of the Rockefeller University in New York, at a recent conference. He added that the problem was "very serious and is getting worse". Dr Ben-Abraham said: "Nature isn't benign. The survival of the human species is not a preordained evolutionary programme. Abundant sources of genetic variation exist for viruses to learn how to mutate and evade the immune system." He cites the 1968 Hong Kong flu outbreak as an example of how viruses have outsmarted human intelligence. And as new "mega-cities" are being developed in the Third World and rainforests are destroyed, disease-carrying animals and insects are forced into areas of human habitation. "This raises the very real possibility that lethal, mysterious viruses would, for the first time, infect humanity at a large scale and imperil the survival of the human race," he said.
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Afghanistan is on the brink of collapse University Wire 2/6/2008
[http://media.www.cw.ua.edu/media/storage/paper959/news/2008/02/06/Opinion/U.s-Must.Maintain.Focus.In.Afghanistan-3190660.shtml ]
Afghanistan is on the brink of collapse. A determined resurgence of Taliban and Qaeda militants has stifled democratic progress, and an explosive growth in the opium crop, political turmoil in neighboring Pakistan and an ineffectual, squabbling central government have transformed the paradigm of Western-influenced democracy into a logistical and political nightmare.
Despite the Pentagon's decision to deploy a contingent of 3,200 Marines to Afghanistan next spring, recent reports reveal that without a concerted effort by the United States and its allies to refocus their efforts in Afghanistan, the state is doomed to failure. The Afghanistan
Study Group, an independent research branch of the Center for the Study of the Presidency, released a scathing indictment of international policy in Afghanistan, starting with the ominous line, "Make no mistake, NATO is losing in Afghanistan." Oxfam, an international development charity, released an equally venomous
assessment of the situation in Afghanistan, calling it "disastrous" and urging British Prime Minister Gordon Brown to take immediate action.
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Strength of the Taliban in Afghanistan will cause regional spillover and a Pakistani coup The Nixon Center 2
[August 8, "Afghanistan and Pakistan: Is the Glass Half Empty or Half Full?", The Nixon Center, http://www.nixoncenter.org/Program %20Briefs/vol8no13Afghanistan.htm]
Still, according to Paula Newberg Interim President Hamid Karzai also has limited support. "Karzai does not have support in the west of the country," she said. Moreover, as Strmecki noted, the majority of the ministerial positions, including key posts such as Defense Minister, head of the Security Intelligence Service, and Foreign Minister, went to the Northern
disparity creates a danger of the return of chaos to Afghanistan. "This imbalance is not sustainable in the long run," he argued, and it could easily lead to renewed chaos and renewed opportunities for al Qaeda. External Forces Paula Newberg emphasized that the nature of Afghanistan and Pakistans relationship makes them very sensitive to one anothers domestic problems. In fact, she argued that "Afghan security is necessary for Pakistani peace and vice versa." A major concern for the panelists was that the instability in Kabul could spill over to Pakistan and create major problems for the current Pakistani leadership. Strmecki argued that such instability could shift the domestic balance of power against General Pervez Musharraf, who aligned
Alliance. Anatol Lieven suggested that this himself with the United States following September 11th, and in favor of the Wahabbi fundamentalists in Pakistan, including radical elements within the governments own InterServices Intelligence (ISI) that previously had supported the Taliban regime. charged that the ISI continues its support for Taliban and Al Qaeda elements: "We see a great number of Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders migrating across the border into Pakistan and there they are protected by elements of the ISI.
And a coup would give radicals nuclear weapons to launch at the United States and India Albright 2
[David, President and Founder of the Institute for Science and International Security, www.922investigations.net./IMG/pdf/doc-320.pdf]
Several observers have suggested that if Pakistan suffers a coup by forces hostile to the United States, the U.S. military should be ready to provide security over the nuclear weapons (or even to take the weapons out of Pakistan entirely) without the permission of Pakistani authorities.12 Others have raised the possibility of asking President Musharraf to allow the United States or China to take possession of Pakistan's nuclear weapons during a coup. Although such responses appear possible in theory, their implementation could be extremely difficult and dangerous. A U.S. military action to seize or cripple Pakistan's strategic nuclear assets may encourage India to take similar action, in essence to finish the job. Even if India does nothing, a new Pakistani government may launch any remaining nuclear weapons at U.S. forces or against India.
That causes extinction Fai 1
[Ghulam Nabi Fai, Executive Director, Kashmiri American Council, WASHINGTON TIMES, September 8, 2001, p. 1]
The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move from the lackadaisical and distant (with India crowned with a unilateral veto power) to aggressive involvement at the vortex. The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no
sanctuary.
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Iraq civil war will lead to a regional war, trigging genocide and collapsing U.S. leadership Kagan 7
[Kagan, American Enterprise Institute, CHOOSING VICTORY: A PLAN FOR SUCCESS IN IRAQ, January 5, 2007, http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25396/pub_detail.asp ]
American forces in Iraq today are engaged in the pivotal struggle of our age. If
the United States allows Iraq to slide into full-scale civil war, characterized by the collapse of the central government and the widespread mobilization of the population in internal conflict, the consequences will be epochal. Internal strife in Iraq has already generated a large displaced population within the country and significant refugee flows into neighboring lands. Those neighbors, both Sunni and Shia, have already made clear their determination to enter Iraq and its struggles
if America withdraws and the conflict escalates into greater sectarian violence or civil war. Iraqs diverse neighbors, however, have opposing interests in how the conflict is settled. Consequently, failure
in Iraq now will likely lead to regional war, destabilizing important states in the Middle East and creating a fertile ground for terrorism. Success in Iraq, on the other hand, would transform the international situation. Success will give the United States critical leverage against Iran, which is now positioning itself to become the regional hegemon after our anticipated defeat. It will strengthen Americas position around the world, where our inability to contain conflict in Iraq is badly tarnishing our stature. And success will convert a violent,
chaotic region in the heart of the Middle East and on the front line of the Sunni-Shiite divide into a secure state able to support peace within its borders and throughout the region. There can be no question that victory in Iraq is worth considerable American effort or that defeat would be catastrophic. Some now argue that victory is beyond our grasp. America cannot (or should not) involve itself in civil, sectarian conflicts, they say, and the troops required to control such conflicts are larger than the U.S. military could possibly deploy. Neither of these arguments is valid. The
United States has faced ethno-sectarian conflict on at least five occasions in the past fifteen years. In Somalia, Afghanistan, and Rwanda, successive American administrations allowed the conflicts to continue without making any serious attempts to control or contain them. The results have been disastrous. Inaction in Afghanistan in the 1990s led to the rise of the Taliban and its support for Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda
and therefore indirectly to the 9/11 attacks. Inaction, indeed humiliation, in Somalia led to a larger civil war in which radical Islamists took control of most of the country by the end of 2006. In late December, the conflict took a new turn as Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia in support of the internationally recognized transitional government. A civil war has become a regional war, as civil wars often do. In Rwanda, civil war and genocide also spread, involving Congo and, indeed, much of sub-Saharan Africa in widespread conflict and death. One clear lesson of postCold War conflicts is that ignoring civil wars is dangerous and can generate grave, unintended consequences for Americas future security. The United States has recently intervened, along with its allies, to control ethnically and religiously motivated civil wars on two occasions, however: in 1995 in Bosnia and in 1999 in Kosovo. Both efforts were successful in ending the violence and creating the preconditions for peace and political and economic imperfect: much of the ethnic cleansing had already been accomplished in both areas before the United States intervened with armed force. In the Balkans, however, the levels of violence and death as a proportion of the population were much higher than they have been in Iraq. Additionally, the armed forces of the states neighboring Bosnia and Kosovo were much more directly involved in the struggle than those of Iraqs neighbors. Above all, the
introduction of U.S. and European forces in strength in Bosnia and Kosovo has ended the killing and prevented that conflict from spreading throughout the region, as it threatened to do in the 1990s. It is possible to contain ethno-sectarian civil wars, but only by ending them. The United States has the military power necessary to control the violence in Iraq. The main purpose of the report that follows is to consider in detail what amount of armed force would be needed to bring the sectarian violence in Baghdad
down to levels that would permit economic and political development and real national reconciliation. Before turning to that consideration, however, we should reflect on the fact that the United States between 2001 and 2006 has committed only a small proportion of its total national strength to this struggle.
There are more than 1 million
soldiers in the active and reserve ground forces, and only 140,000 of them are in Iraq at
Middle East wars go nuclear Steinbach 2
[John Steinbach, DC Iraq Coalition, ISRAELI WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: A THREAT TO PEACE, March 2002, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html]
Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should Iraqis did, a
war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability." and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional ." Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of
Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familiar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening
Middle East conflict could trigger a
world conflagration."
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Prolif causes extinction Utgoff 2
[Victor Utgoff, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis, SURVIVAL, Fall,2002, p. 87-90]
In sum, widespread proliferation
is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.
I need a phillie right before I get loose Poor excuse, money please, I get loose off of orange juice.
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A decline in U.S. soft power has collapsed U.S. influence with Russia, collapsing democracy, and causing a snowball of global human rights violations Mendelson 7
[Sarah Mendelson, Senior Fellow, Russia And Eurasia Program, Center For Strategic And International Studies (CSIS), May 24, 2007]
It's a pleasure to be here. Today I want to focus on three issues. First, how the
decline of U.S. soft power and the increase of Russian insolence is affecting human rights in the international arena. Two, I do want to touch on the disturbing trends inside Russia. And three, I want to talk about some specific
recommendations for U.S. policy. At this time, I'd like to submit my prepared statement for the record, and for the remainder of my time I want to summarize the main points. During the Cold War, the United States represented an alternative for those oppressed by the Soviet Union. By 2007, the vision of the United States as a countervailing weight associated with human rights has been greatly damaged. Republicans
and Democrats alike now recognize the United States has experienced a steep decline in what Joe Nye has termed soft power, the ability to persuade and inspire through non-military means. In Russia, this decline began back in the 1990s, but since 2001 it has snowballed, until the United States has lost almost all leverage concerning abuses in Russia, and particularly in the North Caucuses. Why this is important is because what happened in and around Chechnya has had such an important impact on the rest of Russia. Now, internationally, Russia has increasingly taken advantage, as you've noted, of the leadership gap left by the decline in U.S. soft power. You're well aware of the attempts to change the rules and norms governing OSCE election observations. In the U.N. Security Council, Russia, along with China, has blocked international responses to evidence of grave human rights violations in Darfur and Burma. If U.S. soft power continues to decline, or if there is no change in the current configuration over the next decade, Russia, together with China, can essentially set the table on human rights issues. Now, human rights abuses
inside Russia are not news. I testified before this commission almost seven years ago to the day, and what I wrote then reads as if it were written for this hearing. The situation inside Russia is, however, in many ways more troubling today because the public demand for something different appears to be so muted. It's important to understand why this is so,
Putin is popular, and he continues to be seen as up to the West, presiding over a sort of order. The economy is doing well. And of course, as has been noted today, there is no critical reporting of politics within the Kremlin. There are no investigative reporters writing about corruption or botched counterterrorism operations, and the few that do risk their lives, and it's important to honor them. Meanwhile, there is also no protest by the public of the media situation,
because it often leads outsiders erroneously to think there is nothing to be done or that we should, in fact, do nothing about it. the un-Yeltsin: Sober, standing and I think it's because of how Russians viewed the media in the 1990s. In focus groups in Russia, I hear Russians say, "Look, state control of the media is not ideal, but I trust the government more than I trust the oligarchs who seem to control the media back in the '90s." But Putin's
order is more fragile, I want to argue, when one looks closely
inside of Russia. Important public institutions are not functioning as they should. I could be talking about the police or the army, but I want to spend a moment on health. Russia today has multiple health crises. The U.S. government has tended to focus on HIV/AIDS. But we know from a CSIS survey that we did of 1,200 Russian doctors, all of whom have treated HIV-infected patients. Only 15 percent of them said HIV was the most important health crisis. I don't mean to minimize what is going on in terms of HIV inside of Russia. But I think it's important to listen to the Russian doctors. And there we see non-communicable diseases -- alcoholism, cardiovascular ailments, cancer -- as the top health threats. Elsewhere, in places like the North Caucuses, where we've also surveyed, we found the unemployment rate among young men to be three times the rest of the
it's also important to point out that there is a particular kind of anti-American sentiment that we see developing inside Russia, and it's quite disturbing. I was
country. And we think that's very disturbing, given the violence in that part of the region, and we also found very poor social services. I think recently sent a brochure from a Kremlin-friendly youth group, Nashi, and it is truly frightening. It's addressed to the Putin generation, the young people who've grown up in the last seven years. And it's filled with rhetoric of traitors, language about Georgia as an American colony, American invaders into Russia, fascists and traitors getting ready to invade and
The decline of U.S. soft power has enabled the authoritarian drift, and it has left human rights defenders inside Russia isolated.
break up Russia. So what, if anything, can we do about this situation?
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The Russian transition to democracy is backsliding, risking a return to authoritarianism Shevtsova 7
[Lilia Shevtsova, co-chairs the Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Project U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: IS CONFLICT INEVITABLE?, Summer 2007, http://www.hudson.org/files/pdf_upload/Russia-Web%20(2).pdf ]
Russia presents the perfect case of a failed transition from totalitarianism to democracy, yet at the same time Russia is an example of an
amazingly successful attempt to build a strange political animalthe superpower petro-stateoperating in the orbit of the West, and even being part of certain Western structures, while at the same time remaining an entity alien to the West. In short, we are dealing with an unusual civilizational phenomenon. Russia
has undermined quite a few scholarly beliefs and regime classifications; forcing analysts to think not in terms of a transition to democracy but in terms of a democratic collapse and an imitation of democracy. Those who evaluated Russia through the prism of electoral democracy, assuming that an immature democracy would sooner or later turn into a full-fledged democracy, have been compelled to redefine Russia as an autocracy. Still others view Russia as a country that falls into the political gray zone between democracy and dictatorship; a recognition that the empirical reality in this country was messier than expected. II. Bureaucratic capitalism as the key impediment to economic development The economy Putin is leaving to Russia looks impressive. Gross domestic product has risen during his presidency from $200 billion in 1999 to $920 billion in 2006 (in current dollars); the gold and currency reserves have risen from $12.7 billion in 1999 to $ 303.86 billion in February 2007. The reserves of the Stabilization Fund, into which oil revenues are deposited, have reached $70 billion. In 2006 the trade profit was over $120 billion, and the budget profit is 7.5 percent of gross domestic product. The Russian economy is now the twelfth largest in the world. Although since 2005 economic growth has been slowing down (from 10 percent in 2000 to 6.8 percent in 2006) it still looks fairly impressive. A boom is continuing not only in the extractive sectors of the economy but also in construction, trade, and the
service and banking sectors. Russian business has shown it is able to organize large scale production, successfully competing against international corporations. Russia, which in the 1990s had humiliatingly to beg for loans, repaid her debt to the Paris Club ahead of time. The number of major businessmen in Russia is increasing more than twice as fast as in the U.S.: in 2005 the number of dollar millionaires in Russia grew by 17.4 percent as against 6 percent in the U.S. However, like everything else in Russia, the
economy has a false bottom. The causes of the economys success give no grounds for optimism, mainly because it is associated with high oil prices and has partly been achieved by sectors protected from foreign competition. A collapse of the oil price could plunge the Russian economy into recession, and people remember what a fall in the oil price means. Yegor Gaidar has repeatedly reminded us that the sixfold decrease in the oil price in 1986 led to the collapse of the USSR, and the twofold fall in 1998 caused a financial crisis that almost finished off the barely breathing Russian economy.
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A return of hard-line authoritarianism will destroy relations and trigger war Isdraelyan 98
[Victor Isdraelyan, former Soviet Ambassador, THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter, 1998, p. 47 ]
The first and by far most dangerous possibility is what I call the power scenario. Supporters of this option would, in the name of a "united and undivided Russia," radically change domestic and foreign policies. Many would seek to revive a dictatorship and take urgent military steps to mobilize the people against the outside "enemy." Such steps would include Russia's denunciation of
the commitment to nofirst-use of nuclear weapons; suspension of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I and refusal to ratify both START II and the Chemical Weapons
reinstatement of a full-scale armed force, including the acquisition of additional intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, as well as medium- and short-range missiles such as the SS-20. Some of these measures will demand substantial financing, whereas others, such as the denunciation and refusal to ratify arms control treaties, would, according
Convention; denunciation of the Biological Weapons Convention; and to proponents, save money by alleviating the obligations of those agreements. In this scenario, Russia's military planners would shift Western countries from the category of strategic partners to the category of countries representing a threat to national security. This will revive the strategy of nuclear deterrence -- and indeed, realizing its unfavorable odds against the expanded NATO, Russia will place new emphasis on the first-use of nuclear weapons, a trend that is underway already.
The power scenario envisages a
hard-line policy toward the CIS countries , and in such circumstances the problem of the Russian diaspora in those countries would be greatly magnified.
Moscow would use all the means at its disposal, including economic sanctions and political ultimatums, to ensure the rights of ethnic Russians in CIS countries as well as to have an influence on other issues. Of those means, even the use of direct military force in places like the Baltics cannot be ruled out. Some will object that this scenario is implausible because no potential dictator exists in Russia who could carry out this strategy. I am not so sure. Some Duma members -- such as Victor Antipov, Sergei Baburin, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and Albert Makashov, who are leading politicians in ultranationalistic parties and fractions in the parliament -- are ready to follow this path to save a "united Russia." Baburin's "Anti-
One cannot help but remember that when Weimar Germany was isolated, exhausted, and humiliated as a result of World War I and the Versailles Treaty, Adolf Hitler took it upon himself to "save" his country. It took the former corporal only a few years to plunge the world into a second world war
NATO" deputy group boasts a membership of more than 240 Duma members. that cost humanity more than 50 million lives. I do not believe that Russia has the economic strength to implement such a scenario successfully, but then again, Germany's economic
economics will not deter the power scenario's would-be authors from attempting it. Baburin, for example, warned that any political leader who would "dare to encroach upon Russia" would be decisively repulsed by the Russian Federation "by all measures on heaven and earth up to the use of nuclear weapons." In autumn 1996 Oleg Grynevsky, Russian ambassador to Sweden and former Soviet arms control negotiator, while saying that NATO expansion increases the risk of
situation in the 1920s was hardly that strong either. Thus, I am afraid that nuclear war, reminded his Western listeners that Russia has enough missiles to destroy both the United States and Europe. Former Russian minister of defense Igor Rodionov warned
Russia's vast nuclear arsenal could become uncontrollable. In this context, one should keep in mind that, despite dramatically reduced nuclear arsenals -- and tensions -- Russia and the United States remain poised to launch their missiles in minutes. I cannot but agree with Anatol Lieven, who wrote, "It may be, therefore, that with all the new Russian order's many problems and
several times that weaknesses, it will for a long time be able to stumble on, until we all fall down together."
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U.S.-Russian conflict will trigger a global war Karganov 7
[Sergei Karaganov, Doctor of Science (History), professor, is Dean of the World Economics and International Affairs Faculty of the State UniversityHigher School of Economics; OCTOBER DECEMBER 2007, http://www.globalaffairs.ru/docs/2007_english4.pdf ]
Global challenges, which are currently not being countered due to the acute competition of the NEC, will require close cooperation. A new
round of such cooperation may be more stable than it was in the 1990s. In those years, interaction between states was conducted according to the rules dictated by the victors in the Cold War, which doomed those efforts to failure. But an epoch of closer cooperation will arrive only if the global community, including Russia, avoids a systemic mistake, that is, structuring and militarizing the new competition. Furthermore, there must be no new military confrontation, which would most likely occur in the Greater Middle East. The evolution of the competition to the point of systemic confrontation may ultimately bring about a series of large wars and even a new world war.t help but remember that when Weimar Germany was isolated, exhausted, and humiliated as a result of World War I and the Versailles Treaty, Adolf Hitler took it upon himself to "save" his country. It took the former corporal only a few years to plunge the world into a second world war that cost humanity more than 50 million lives. I do not believe that Russia has the economic strength to implement such a scenario successfully, but then again, Germany's economic situation in the 1920s was hardly that strong either. Thus, I am afraid that economics will not deter the power scenario's would-be authors from attempting it. Baburin, for example, warned that any political leader who would "dare to encroach upon Russia" would be decisively repulsed by the Russian Federation "by all measures on heaven and earth up to the use of nuclear weapons." In autumn
1996 Oleg Grynevsky, Russian ambassador to Sweden and former Soviet arms control negotiator, while saying that NATO expansion increases the risk of nuclear war, reminded his Western listeners that Russia has enough missiles to destroy both the United States and Europe. Former Russian minister of defense Igor Rodionov warned several times that Russia's vast nuclear arsenal could become uncontrollable. In this context, one should keep in mind that, despite
dramatically reduced nuclear arsenals -- and tensions -- Russia and the United States remain poised to launch their missiles in minutes.
Continued loss of U.S. soft power means Russia sets the standards on global human rights, collapsing those standards Mendelson 7
[Sarah Mendelson, Senior Fellow, Russia And Eurasia Program, Center For Strategic And International Studies (CSIS), May 24, 2007] U.S. influence on the internal processes of Russia will remain marginal under all three scenarios, but if U.S. soft power continues to decline despite the change in administration in 2009, then it will be almost nonexistent. Russia, together with China, could increasingly set the table on human rights issues in ways that favor hyper-sovereign interpretations of international legal frameworks and noncompliance by states concerning human rights.
Sacrificing human rights risks genocide Hoffman 4
[Paul Hoffman is the Chair of the International Executive Committee of Amnesty International. He is a civil rights and human rights lawyer with the Venice-based law firm of Schonbrun, DeSimone, Seplow, Harris & Hoffman LLP, Human Rights Quarterly, Nov 2004, p. 932-955 ]
History shows that when societies trade human rights for security, most often they get neither . Instead, minorities and other marginalized groups pay the price through violation of their human rights. Sometimes this trade-off comes in the form of mass murder or genocide, other times in the form of arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, or the suppression of speech or religion. Indeed, millions of lives have been destroyed in the last sixty years when human rights norms have not been observed.''
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Soft Power Good Russia Scenario
Protection of human rights prevents war Burke-White 4
[William W. Burke-White, Lecturer in Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, THE HARVARD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW, Spring 2004, p. 265-266]
By ensuring a minimum treatment of the unrepresented, human
rights protections prevent the government from externalizing the costs of aggressive behavior on the unrepresented. In human rights respecting states, for example, unrepresented individuals cannot be forced at gunpoint to fight or be bound into slavery to generate low-cost economic resources for war, and thus restrain the state from engaging in aggressive action. On the other hand, in a state where power is narrowly concentrated in the hands of a political elite that systematically represses its own people, the state will be more able to bear the domestic costs of war . By violating the human rights of its own citizens, a state can force individuals to fight or support the military apparatus in its war-making activities. Similarly, by denying basic human rights, a state may be better able to bear the political costs of war.
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Soft Power Good Democracy Scenario
Despite initial global democratic gains, a global democratic reversal is underway
Thomas Carothers is vice president for studiesinternational politics and governance at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. A leading authority on democratization and democracy promotion, he has researched and worked on democracy-building programs around the world for 20 years with many U.S., European, and international organizations, August 2007, Democracy Promotion After Bush, , http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/democracy_promotion_after_bush_final.pdf This has been a difficult decade for democracy in the world. As recent Freedom House surveys indicate, democracy has basically not advanced in the world since the late 1990s. Moreover, democracy is under stress in many places. As discussed above, significant parts of Latin America find themselves in troubled political waters, characterized by high levels of citizen discontent, challenges to democratic institutions, and heightened polarization. Russias movement toward semiauthoritarian rule has cast a pall over the already weak prospects for democracy in many parts of the former Soviet Union, especially Central Asia and the Caucasus. Asia continues to experience serious democratic deficits with political deliberalization in China, a military coup in Thailand, marked political deterioration in Bangladesh, continued military rule in Pakistan, entrenched nondemocratic rule in Burma, Cambodia, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam. Even in Central and Eastern Europe, the most successful region for democratization in the 1990s, political illiberalism, polarization, and conflict have surged, for example, in Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Democracys troubled state has multiple causes. To some extent a loss of forward momentum after a period of rapid democratic expansion of the sort that occurred from the early 1980s through the mid-1990s is almost inevitable. The third wave of democratization involved the establishment of at least formally democratic systems in many countries lacking many of the facilitating factors that help democracy succeed, such as a high level of economic development, significant previous experience with political pluralism, and no strong identity-based societal divisions. Not surprisingly, many of these countries have struggled to make democratization work and have ended up in an uncomfortable gray zone between democracy and dictatorship. In addition, those autocratic regimes that survived the third wave of democracy are the well-entrenched, adaptive ones that are good at resisting pressure for change. In the 1990s Western liberal democracy had no apparent ideological rivals with potentially wide appeal, but a decade later rivals are on the rise. Chinas continued economic success and Russias notable economic growth of recent years have given new life to the stronghand model of development, that is, a system that combines aggressive capitalist growth with tight, centralized political control, and significant protected pockets of crony capitalism. This model is attractive to powerholders in many parts of the world (especially the former Soviet Union, East and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and sub-Saharan Africa) and is
increasingly held by them as an alternative to a Western-prescribed democratic model. In Latin America, Hugo Chvez proclaims Bolivarian democracy a preferable political alternative, and his line has been taken up by politicians in various places. The surge in oil and gas prices in this decade is another factor contributing to democracys travails. With many oil-rich or gas-rich countries being nondemocratic, or at best only partially democratic, the heightened flow of revenues from energy resources is not strengthening the democratic side of the global ledger. Governments in Angola, Azerbaijan, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela are among the main beneficiaries, and many energy-poor, weak democracies are hit with punishingly high energy bills. Moreover, heightened concern about access to reliable energy supplies reduces the willingness of Western governments to push energy-rich
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governments on their democratic shortcomings. The efforts by some countries notably Iran, Russia, and Venezuelato counter U.S. political influence in their regions with political export work of their own type is financed by the surging oil and gas proceeds.
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Soft Power Good Democracy Scenario
The collapse of U.S. soft power means that the U.S. no longer has influence to prevent these reversals through diplomacy
Korean Times, 9-16-07, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2007/09/137_10245.html
Samantha Power, the Pulitzer Prize winning commentator, said that as the best way to measure power in the 21st century is not through dollars or bullets, but by influence, then
U.S. power is on the wane
at a precipitous pace.
US ``hard power'' and its economic might are still intact, but it is ``soft power'' and influence that is truly winning the hearts and minds in today's arena of global politics. According to Power, to see how American influence has declined, one only has to look at a missile test in North Korea, a defiant nuclear Iran, and an unstable Iraq. The waning of US power has sparked a second trend, in that freedom is backsliding in nations, which once showed democratic promise. This is becoming ever more prominent in oil-rich countries such as Russia and
American criticisms are beginning to have the hollow ring of hypocrisy. Power claims that
Venezuela, where human rights abuses are reported with ever more intensity but ``petro-authoritarianism'' is getting little of the international scrutiny the United States may have once demanded. Indeed, the war on Iraq has had a large if indirect influence on the human rights situation in Russia. Russia's human rights abuses against the Chechnyans were often ignored in a post-9/11 era when it had supported the Bush administration's War on Terror, using the term ``counter-terrorism'' to justify its own actions. The backdoor diplomacy that the U.S. once used to persuade other countries to toe the line is no longer feasible, and in Latin America a defiant Hugo Chavez is filling the void left by the discrediting of U.S. authority.
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Soft Power Good Democracy Scenario
Democratic setbacks will increase global authoritarianism Carl Gensham, President of the National Endowment for Democracy, 1991 (JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY, Spring, p. 19) For the moment, no united antidemocratic "bloc" has developed, but this could still happen, especially if there are more setbacks in countries undergoing democratic transitions and the view takes hold that economic discipline and success go hand in hand. A reverse snowballing will spread Samuel Huntington, Harvard, 1991 (JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY, Spring, p. 19) Second, a shift to authoritarianism by any democratic or democratizing great power could trigger reverse snowballing. The reinvigoration of authoritarianism in Russia or the Soviet Union would have unsettling effects on democratization in other Soviet Republics. It could send the message to would-be despots everywhere: "You can get back into business."
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Soft Power Good Democracy Scenario
Global democratization solves every disad impact
DEMOCRACY SOLVES NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, GENOCIDE AND ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, December, PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE 1990S, 1995, p. http://www.carnegie.org//sub/pubs/deadly/diam_rpt.html // Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty and openness. The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments.
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Soft Power Good Relying on Hard Power Collapses Hegemony
US leadership is failing reliance on hard power alone will collapse hegemony focusing on a complete integration of soft power and hard power allows us the proper tools to project power and solve global problems Armitage & Nye, 12/16/2007
Richard L., Deputy Secretary of State from 2001 to 2005 and Joseph S., former assistant secretary of defense, teaches political science at Harvard, they co-chaired the Center for Strategic and
http://tennessean.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article? AID=/20071216/NEWS08/712160370/1025/NEWS
International Studies Commission on Smart Power, The Tennessean, Time for Smart Power,
The world is dissatisfied with American leadership. Shocked and frightened after 9/11, we put forward an angry face to the globe, not one that reflected the more traditional American values of hope and optimism, tolerance and opportunity.This fearful approach has hurt the United States' ability to bring allies to its cause, but it is not too late to change. The nation should embrace a smarter strategy that blends our "hard" and "soft" power our ability to attract and persuade, as well as our ability to use economic and military might. Whether it is ending the crisis in Pakistan, winning the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, deterring Iran's and North Korea's nuclear ambitions, managing China's rise or improving the lives of those left behind by globalization, the United States needs a broader, more balanced approach.Lest anyone think this approach is weak or naive, remember that Defense Secretary Robert Gates used a major speech on Nov. 26 "to make the case for strengthening our capacity to use `soft' power and for better integrating it with 'hard' power." We one Republican, one Democrat have devoted our lives to promoting American pre-eminence as a force for good in the world. But the United States cannot stay on top without strong and willing allies and partners. Over the past six years, too many people have confused sharing the burden with relinquishing power. In fact, when we let others help, we are extending U.S. influence, not diminishing it. Since 9/11, the war on terrorism has shaped this isolating outlook, becoming the central focus of U.S. engagement with the world. The threat from terrorists with global reach is likely to be with
us for decades. But unless they have weapons of mass destruction, groups such as al-Qaeda pose no existential threat to the United States unlike our old foes Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.In fact, al-Qaida and its ilk hope to defeat us by using our own strength against us. They hope we will blunder, overreact and turn world opinion against us. This is a deliberately set trap, and one whose grave strategic consequences extend far beyond the costs this nation would suffer from any small-scale terrorist attack, no matter how individually tragic and collectively painful. We cannot return to a nearsighted pre-9/11 mindset that underestimated the al-Qaida threat, but neither can we remain stuck in a narrow post-9/11 mindset that alienates much of the world.More broadly, when our words do not match our actions, we demean our character and moral standing. We cannot lecture others about democracy while we back dictators. We
The United States has long been the big kid on the block, and it will probably remain so for years to come. But its staying power has a great deal to do with whether it is perceived as a bully or a friend. States and non-state actors can better address today's challenges when they can draw in allies; those who alienate potential friends stand at greater risk.
cannot denounce torture and waterboarding in other countries and condone it at home. We cannot allow Cuba's Guantanamo Bay or Iraq's Abu Ghraib to become the symbols of American power.
The past six years have demonstrated that hard power alone cannot secure the nation's long-term goals. The U.S. military remains the best in the world, even after having been worn down from years of war. We will have to invest in people and materiel to maintain current levels of readiness; as a percentage of gross domestic product, U.S. defense spending is actually well below Cold War levels. But an extra dollar spent on hard power will not necessarily bring an extra dollar's worth of security.After all, security threats are no longer simply military threats. China is building two coal-fired power plants each week. U.S. hard power will do little to curb this trend, but U.S.-developed technology can make Chinese coal cleaner, which helps the environment and opens new markets for American industry. In a changing world, the United States should become a smarter power by once again investing in the global good by providing things that people and governments want but cannot attain without U.S. leadership. By complementing U.S. military and economic strength with greater investments in soft power, Washington can build the framework to tackle tough global challenges. We call this smart power.
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Smart power is not about getting the world to like us. It is about developing a strategy that balances our hard (coercive) power with our soft (attractive) power. During the Cold War, the United States deterred Soviet aggression through investments in hard power. But as Gates noted late last month, U.S. leaders also realized that "the nature of the conflict required us to develop key capabilities and institutions many of them non-military." So the United States used its soft power to rebuild Europe and Japan and to establish the norms and institutions that became the core of the international order for the past half-century. The Cold War ended under a barrage of hammers on the Berlin Wall rather than a barrage of artillery across the Fulda Gap precisely because of this integrated approach.
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Soft Power Critical to Hegemony
Soft Power is critical to 21st century development of hegemony Yoo Jae-woong, 12/30/2007
Director of the Korean Overseas Information Service, Korea.net, http://www.kois.go.kr/News/News/NewsView.asp?serial_no=20071224024
Its a competition between "smart powers." The United States was leading in that department since the Cold War followed by Japan. Lately, the United Kingdom, Germany and China have joined the race. soft power stands at the core of smart power and is eagerly pursued by many nations. The national power of a country depends on how well one takes advantage of that soft power.
Smart power refers to enhanced development of "soft power" to be harmonized well with hard power symbolized through military and economic factors. Thus
Soft power strengthens through interaction with public diplomacy. If a country has much soft power, its public diplomacy will be strengthened. In reverse , if a country performs well in its public diplomacy, it will add more strength to its soft power. This shows that effective public diplomacy is the true power of the 21st century. It is no exaggeration that a countrys future image will depend on how well it facilitates its soft power strategy and vision.
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Soft Power Necessary to Stem Terrorism
SOFT POWER IS IMPORTANT TO DEFEAT TERRORISM IT UNDERMINES TERRORIST RECRUITING Joseph S. Nye Jr. is distinguished service professor at Harvard University and author, THINK AGAIN: SOFT POWER, 2006, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3393 Soft Power Is Irrelevant to the Current Terrorist Threat False. There is a small likelihood that the West will ever attract such people as Mohammed Atta or Osama bin Laden. We need hard power to deal with people like them. But the current terrorist threat is not Samuel Huntingtons clash of civilizations. It is a civil war within Islam between a majority of moderates and a small minority who want to coerce others into an extremist and oversimplified version of their religion. The United States cannot win unless the moderates win. We cannot win unless the number of people the extremists are recruiting is lower than the number we are killing and deterring. Rumsfeld himself asked in a 2003 memo: Are we capturing, killing, or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrasas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training, and deploying against us? That equation will be very hard to balance without a strategy to win hearts and minds. Soft power is more relevant than ever. LOSS OF AMERICAN SOFT POWER EMBOLDENS ENEMIES AND INCREASES TERRORISM RISKS Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 129-30 It is not smart to discount soft power as just a question of image, public relations, and ephemeral popularity. As we argued earlier, it is a form of powera means of obtaining desired outcomes. When we discount the importance of our attractiveness to other countries, we pay a price. Most important, if the United States is so unpopular in a country that being pro-American is a kiss of death in that countrys domestic politics, political leaders are unlikely to make concessions to help us. Turkey, Mexico, and Chile were prime examples in the run-up to the Iraq War in March 2003. When American policies lose their legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of others, attitudes of distrust tend to fester and further reduce our leverage. For example, after 9/11 there was an outpouring of sympathy from Germans for the United States an Germany joined a military campaign against the Al Qaeda network. But as the United States geared up for the unpopular Iraq War, Germans expressed widespread disbelief about the reasons the US gave for going to war such as the alleged connection of Iraq to 9/11 and the imminence of the threat of weapons of mass destruction. German suspicions were reinforced by what they saw as biased American media coverage during the war, and by the failure to find weapons of mass destruction or prove the connection to 9/11 in the aftermath of the war. The combination fostered a climate in which conspiracy theories flourished. By July 2003, according to a Reuters poll, one-third of Germans under the age of 30 said that they thought the American government might even have staged the original September 11 attacks. Absurd views feed upon each other, and paranoia can be contagious. American attitudes toward foreigners harden, and we begin to believe that the rest of the world really does hate us. Some Americans begin to hold grudges, to mistrust all Muslims, to boycott French wines and rename French fries, to spread and believe false rumors. In turn, foreigners see Americans as uninformed and insensitive to anyones interests but their own. They see our media wrapped in an American flag. Some Americans in turn succumb to residual strands of isolationism, and say that if others choose to see us that way, To hell with em. If foreigners are going to be like that, who cares whether we are popular are not. But to the extent that Americans allow ourselves to become isolated, we embolden our enemies such as Al Qaeda. Such reactions undercut our soft power and are self-defeating in terms of the outcomes we want.
Soft Power Necessary to Stem Terrorism
SOFT POWER IS CRITICAL TO WINNING THE WAR ON TERROR BEST WAY TO ENSURE THAT THE MODERATES DEFEAT THE EXTREMISTS
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Joseph S. Nye, Professor Harvard, 2006, The Boston Globe, August 19, p. A15 Lebanon provides larger lessons for the United States about how to conduct a war against jihadist terrorism. The current struggle is not a clash of Islam Answers to: the West, but a civil war within Islam between a minority of terrorists and a larger mainstream of more moderate believers. America cannot win unless the mainstream wins, and needs to use hard power against the hard core like Al Qaeda because soft power will never attract them. But soft power is essential to attract the mainstream and dry up support for the extremists. As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld once said, the measure of success in this war is whether the number our side is killing and deterring is larger than the number that the terrorists are recruiting. By his measure, we are doing badly. In November 2003, the official number of terrorist insurgents in Iraq was 5,000. This year it was 20,000. SOFT POWER KEY TO REDUCING PROLIFERATION AND TERRORIST THREATS Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. x The United States may be more powerful than any other polity since the Roman Empire, but like Rome, America is neither invincible nor invulnerable. Rome did not succumb to the rise of another Empire, but to the onslaught of waves of barbarians. As the world wends it way deeper into a struggle with terrorism, it becomes increasingly apparent that many factors lie outside American control. The United States cannot alone hunt down every suspected Al Qaeda leader hiding in remote regions of the globe. Nor can it launch a war whenever it wishes without alienating other countries and losing the cooperation it needs for winning the peace. The four-week war in Iraq in the spring of 2003 was a dazzling display of Americas hard military power that removed a tyrant, but it did not resolve our vulnerability to terrorism. It was also costly in terms of our soft powerour ability to attract others to our side. In the aftermath of the war, polling by the Pew Research Center showed a dramatic decline in the popularity of the United States compared to a year earlier, even in countries like Spain and Italy, whose governments had provided support for the war effort, and Americas standing plummeted in Islamic countries from Morocco to Turkey to Southeast Asia. Yet the United States will need the help of such countries in the long term to track the flow of terrorists, tainted money, and dangerous weapons. In the words of the Financial Times: To win the peace, therefore, the US will have to show as much skill in exercising soft power as it has in using hard power to win the war. SOFT POWER WILL HELP COMBAT TERRORISM INCREASE COOPERATION FROM COUNTRIES LIKE PAKISTAN Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 129 It is true that the new threat of transnational terrorism increased American vulnerability, and some of our unilateralism after September 11 was driven by fear. But the United States cannot meet the new threat identified in the national security strategy without the cooperation of other countries. They will cooperate up to a point out of mere self-interest, but their degree of cooperation is also affected by the attractiveness of the United States. Take Pakistan for example, President Musharraf faces a complex game of cooperating with the United States in the war on terrorism while managing a large anti-American constituency at home. He winds up balancing concessions and retractions. If the United States were more attractive to the Pakistani populace, we would see more concessions in the mix.
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Soft Power Necessary to Stem Terrorism
SOFT POWER ESSENTIAL TO FIGHT GLOBAL TERRORISM Charles B. Curtis, president and chief operating officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, September 2006, p. 29 A global coalition against catastrophic terrorism will require a greater degree of international collaboration than anything ever witnessed, involving more allies and an unprecedented understanding of a far different enemy. Deterrence is no longer a policy option; at best it is a very limited one. The enemy that we face does not have borders to defend, people to protect, or territory to control. And, as the 9/11 Commission noted, collateral damage is not in their vocabulary (National Commission of Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004, xvi). Moreover and perhaps more fundamentally, even if we effectively make the case for collaboration against catastrophic terror, the United States will not receive the cooperation it needs unless government leaders enjoy sustained public support for such cooperation. States will not garner that support if their people are hostile to the United States. Just as an effective nonproliferation strategy is not possible without the active cooperation of Russia, so too will it require the active cooperation of Muslim states and the Muslim majorities in those states. And we will never earn their cooperation in addressing our concerns unless they see us cooperating to address their concerns. The past five years have taught us that isolating and weakening this brand of Islamist extremism is a diplomatic challenge of the first order. But we must be precise about what constitutes a threat and what does not. The peaceful practice of Islam poses no threat; no clash of civilizations is at hand (Sen 2006). The threat comes from those who hijack the Islamic faith to demonize the West; declare the United States and its allies enemies of Islam; blame them for the ills that befall Muslim nations; spread this view to as many Muslims as possible; and incite violence against America, its people, its property, and its allies. We must find a way to defuse this perception of the United States and its role in the world. People experienced in national security analysis know that these issues have often been associated with the notion of soft power, or "the use of influence, example, and persuasion" to shape the conduct of adversaries (Ignatieff 2003). Those who discount the importance of soft power have traditionally believed that hard power--notably the military--is all that is required to enhance national security. People who fear you will not challenge you, proponents of hard power generally believe. They sometimes point to the words of Machiavelli, who famously noted in The Prince that it safer to be feared than loved. But hard power advocates should read on, as Machiavelli also wrote that it is best to be feared and loved. And if you cannot be loved, he noted, you should avoid being hated. It is admittedly beyond U.S. capacity to be universally loved, but we should and must do much more to counter the spread of anti-American hatred. When it comes to exercising soft power, the first order of business is to understand our enemies and their sympathizers. A closer look at the phenomenon of anti-Americanism reveals, I believe, that much of the Muslim world's hostility toward the United States is based on the perception that our policies are hostile to the Muslim world. To them, it is not who we are, but what we do. The Muslim world too often sees us solely through the dual prisms of the Arab-Israeli and Iraq conflicts. And then when truly regrettable incidents such as the Abu Ghraib scandal occur, they become a symbol of U.S. foreign policy, reinforcing the beliefs that are already entrenched throughout the majority of the population. Polling in the region indicates that Muslim views of the United States are unfavorable, and the trends are mixed at best. Favorability ratings in some countries have increased, notably in post-Tsunami Indonesia, where figures leapt from a dismal 15 percent to a disappointing 38 percent. On the other hand, the United States is losing ground in traditional strongholds in the region, including Turkey, a NATO ally (Pew 2005). These figures suggest that we need to study and understand how the Muslim world views our actions so we that we can better explain and defend our policies--not just our principles. As Barry Rubin (2002) observed, the United States has spent considerable blood and treasure saving Muslims in Afghanistan from the Soviets, in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia from a secular Iraq, and in Bosnia and Kosovo from Christian Croatians and Serbs. It has supported Muslim Pakistan against India and Muslim Turkey against Greece. Those stories need to be told and retold. At the same time, public diplomacy is not tantamount to an advertising campaign. In the years since 9/11, American public diplomacy efforts have seemed more like the latter. Indeed, it is revealing that several of the American officials chosen to lead American public diplomacy efforts have come from the advertising sector or political campaigns. Furthermore, U.S. efforts and resources have been overwhelmingly focused on starting up Arab-speaking television and radio channels to broadcast pro-Western stories, rather than working through existing media outlets that Muslims trust. The results of these efforts have been unsatisfactory, as American-run Arabic news sources are far less popular than their Arab counterparts (Wright 2005). This leads us to a second lesson
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learned. Not only do need we need to understand the universe of extremist views, we also need to understand the dynamics of how those views are spread--in mosques, in schools, in textbooks, in newspapers, on the Internet, and especially via satellite television. Regarding the latter, Thomas Friedman (2002) once wrote of his experience in Dubai watching the Arab News Network. The channel kept running what Friedman called the "'greatest hits' of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict: nonstop film of Israelis hitting, beating, dragging, clubbing, and shooting Palestinians" (p. 15). During the first Gulf War, no Arab satellite stations were eager to show video that would enflame passions against America; now, dozens of such channels broadcast in the region. Finally, the years since 9/11 have revealed an unfortunate paradox of public diplomacy: we are not always the best messengers of our very own message. To put it simply, we must identify and support third parties who, for their own reasons, are willing and able to serve as voices of moderation within their own communities. Earlier, I noted that a clash of civilizations is not a correct diagnosis of the problem. But I do believe, as many commentators frequently note, that we are witnessing a battle within Islam. The United States is faced with a major diplomacy challenge: to work with the people and the governments in predominantly Muslim nations to isolate and weaken the brand of Islamic extremism that is a fertile breeding ground for terrorism. So we must aim to separate violent extremists from the vast majority of the Islamic community, while insisting that responsible Arab and Muslim states do the same. As the proceeding discussion has shown, the direction of the Middle East over the next ten years is absolutely crucial to our efforts to curb the demand for catastrophic terrorism. If the region can move toward more open, stable societies, its member states can be irreplaceable partners in confronting the threat of catastrophic terrorism. If the region continues to deny freedom and opportunity to its citizens, the anger and resentment will increase. We do not need to re-create the Marshall Plan, but a generous effort, targeted at pivotal states in the region, will improve the freedom and opportunity in those states and also show Muslims that American wealth and power can make their lives better, not worse. Conclusion This is not the first time in our nation's history that soft power has played a role in enhancing our security. Harry Truman understood the value of soft power. In a speech to the National War College, President Truman said, "Behind the shield of military strength, we must help people improve their conditions of life--to create a world in which democracy and freedom can flourish." He backed up those words with the Marshall Plan, and even earlier with emergency assistance to keep Greece and Turkey from falling into the communist orbit. President Eisenhower--a general and true champion of hard power--also understood the value of soft power. He simply called it leadership. Leadership, Eisenhower believed, is the ability to persuade others to want to do what you want them to do. Unlike the days of Truman and Eisenhower, however, we face a new strategic reality--one in which "the amount of discontent in the world is becoming a highly significant national security variable" (Wright 2002). As advances in technology increasingly put in the hands of the discontented the capacity to harm larger and larger numbers of people, anti-American hatred has become a serious national security concern. To have a future, we have to survive the present. Today, we must address the urgent risk by locking down the supply of nuclear materials. But that is a near-term action and a near-term solution. In the long run, WMD, particularly chemical and biological weapons, are going to become easier to make, not harder--so the urge to use them must become less, not more. We can no longer protect ourselves solely by the strength of our arms and the strength of our alliances or even with new partnerships with old adversaries. We have to learn how to diminish hatred. It is admittedly beyond U.S. capacity to be universally loved, but we should and must do much more to counter the hatred directed against us.
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Soft Power Necessary to Stem Terrorism
REJECTION OF REALISM NOT THE SOLUTION TO TERRORISM MUST SHIFT FOCUS TO SOFT POWER William H. Thornton, Professor Cultural Studies National Cheng Kung University, 2005, New World Empire, p. 23-4 Present US unilateralismrealism with a neoconservative twistalso fans the flames of terrorism through its tunnel vision regarding the nature of US interests. Realism per se is not the problem. Nor is full retreat from national interests the solution. What is urgently needed is a moral-realist redefinition of those interests. Any genuine realism must come to terms with soft power, thereby bridging the chasm that divided twentieth-century realism and idealism. That dichotomy prevents the Left and Right alike from realistically confronting the insecurities that hit home on 9/11. US SOFT POWER SOLVES TERRORISM John F. Murphy, Professor of Law, Villanova University, 2002 International Lawyer, Spring
Al Qaeda has also scored a number of victories in this struggle for hearts and minds because of strong U.S. support for Israel, which even Islamic reformers passionately resent. If the United States is to do better in this struggle for hearts
and minds than it has in the past (witness Vietnam), it will have to make effective use of what Nye has termed "soft power." According to Nye, "[a] country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness." For purposes of the effort to combat terrorism, one might substitute "people" for "countries" in Nye's statement. Nye further suggests: "Soft power is not merely the same as influence, though it is one source of influence ... Soft power is also more than persuasion or the ability to move people by argument. It is the ability to entice and attract. And attraction often leads to acquiescence or imitation." To enhance its soft power, Nye calls for the United States to invest much more in such instruments of soft power as information and cultural exchange programs.
SOFT POWER IS CRITICAL TO SOLVING TERRORISM AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT John Hyatt, United States Army 2003 Military Law Review
The essence of Nye's argument in Paradox is that the United States is on course to maintain its leading position in the world, but to do so it must acknowledge and take advantage of global changes elevating the importance of so-called "soft" power and diminishing the
importance of more traditional "hard" power. Hard power, as Nye uses this term, is a nation's ability to coerce or force a change through sources such as military might and economic strength. It does not have to be negative; a nation can exercise such power through inducements as well as threats. Soft power, on the other hand, refers to a nation's ability to get other countries to want what that nation wants, to co-opt, rather than coerce. If other countries respect, admire, and want to be like a nation, they will likely work for outcomes favorable to that nation. The reason "number one ain't gonna be what it used to be," and why Nye describes America's position vis--vis it's global power as a "paradox," is that the very process of acknowledging and harnessing soft power requires the United States to refrain from unilateral, "arrogant" policies--in short, to give up some of the benefits of being number one. Nye does not argue that soft power is more important than hard power. Rather, he argues that soft power is gaining in importance because America cannot solve many of the problems it faces today, at acceptable cost, by resort to hard power alone. For instance, imagine the difficulty of solving any of the following problems without the cooperation of other states: the spread of infectious disease, the flow of illegal migrants, international industrial pollution, habitat destruction, drug smuggling, or terrorism. The list could continue, but the point is that even America, with the most powerful military and the strongest economy in the world, needs the cooperation of other states to address many significant issues it faces. Therefore, America must pay heed to the opinions, concerns, and perceptions of other countries and peoples in the conduct of its affairs.
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Soft Power Necessary to Stem Terrorism
SOFT POWER KEY TO SOLVE TERROR Nye, Startribune.com 9/04 If a campaign to suppress terrorism is based on broad coalitions that focus on de-legitimizing attacks on innocent noncombatants, it has some prospect of success. Indeed, one lesson of the efforts since 2001 is that there is no way to avoid broad cooperation. In that sense, the metaphor of war -- with its emphasis on military force -- is misleading. The metaphor of war was understandable in the aftermath of the 2001 attacks, but it creates as many problems as it solves. How long will the war last and how does it relate to civil liberties at home and to alliances abroad? Bombing is not an option for fighting terrorist cells in Hamburg, Singapore or Detroit. Only close civilian cooperation in intelligence sharing, police work across borders, tracing financial flows, and working to pre-clear cargo manifests and passenger lists can cope with such a threat. Countries cooperate out of self-interest, but a country's soft or attractive power, not only its military might, affects the degree of cooperation. Multilateralism and soft power are key to winning the war on terrorism Nye, Dean of JFK School of Government, IHT, 2/14/03 Skeptics say that whatever the merits of soft power, it has little to do with the current war on terrorism. Osama bin Laden and his followers are repelled, not attracted, by American culture, values and policies. Military power was essential in defeating the Taliban government in Afghanistan, and soft power will never convert Saddam Hussein. True, but the skeptics mistake half the answer for the whole answer. Look again at Afghanistan. Precision bombing and special forces defeated the Taliban, but the allies wrapped up less than a quarter of Al Qaeda, a transnational network with cells in 60 countries. You cannot bomb its cells in Hamburg, Kuala Lumpur or Detroit. Success depends on close civilian cooperation such as intelligence sharing, police work across borders and tracing financial flows. Cooperation from others is partly based on their self-interest, but the degree of cooperation is affected by the attractiveness of American policies. Equally important, the current war on terrorism is not a clash of civilizations, it is a civil war inside Islamic civilization between moderates and extremists. The West will win only if moderate Muslims win, and the ability to attract the moderates is a critical factor. How will a war in Iraq affect moderate Muslims around the world? Hawks reply that the successful exercise of hard power can also attract, and they point to the rise of American prestige in the Middle East after the first Gulf War. But it is important to remember that the first Gulf War was fought by a coalition with a UN blessing. The political effects of a second Gulf War will depend in part on whether it is short and involves few civilian casualties. American hard power is probably sufficient to win a short war, but the costs for soft power would be far less if the United States went again as part of a broad coalition. America the unilateral imperialist is far less attractive than America the leader of a coalition that is enforcing UN resolutions and preventing the organization from following on the path of the ill-fated League of Nations. That is why Security
Council Resolution 1441 is so important, and why the inspection system matters. The question is not whether the United States will win, but at what price. The same argument applies to how America behaves after hostilities end. A largely American occupation of Iraq and control of its oil fields will only confirm those who suspect the United States of imperial ambitions. It will be crucial to develop a multinational force and administration to manage what may be a prolonged transition to a stable, pluralistic Iraq. What America loses in efficiency it more than gains in legitimacy and the reduction in damage to its soft power. It is worth noting that allies of the United States have borne a large part of the burden and casualties in the stabilization of Afghanistan. Also important is the development of policies that align the United States with the aspirations of ordinary citizens in poor countries outside the immediate zone of conflict. President George W. Bush's commitment in his State of the Union address last month to spend an additional $10
Machiavelli advised princes in Italy that it was more important to be feared than to be loved. In today's world, it is best to be both. To win the fight against terrorism, the United States has to learn better to combine its soft and hard power.
billion to combat AIDS in Africa and the Caribbean is not only right for humanitarian reasons, it is also a wise investment in American soft power. More than four centuries ago, Niccolo
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Soft Power Necessary to Stem Terrorism
A balance between hard and soft power is critical to fighting terrorism and preventing conflict Nye, dean of the JFK school of Government, LAT, 2/17/03 But like Rome, we are not invincible. As we wend our way deeper into this struggle against terrorism, it becomes increasingly apparent that there are many things outside of U.S. control. We cannot hunt down every suspected Al Qaeda leader hiding in remote regions of the globe. Nor can we launch a war on Iraq without United Nations endorsement and not alienate some of our allies. We will need the help of these allies in the long term to track the flow of tainted money and dangerous weapons everywhere in the world. In short, we must win friends through the use of our "soft power" instead of relying solely on "hard power." Hard power works through coercion, using military sticks and economic carrots to get others to do our will. Soft power works through attraction. If we can persuade others to want what we want, we save having to spend on expensive carrots and sticks. Our attractiveness rests on our culture, our political values and our policies by taking into account the interests of others. At a recent world gathering, Secretary of State Colin Powell correctly reminded Europeans that although we won World War II using hard power, we followed it with the Marshall Plan and support for democracy. And soft power was essential to our victory in the Cold War. There are times when hard power is essential, but our success in the long term depends on balancing the two. SOFT POWER VITAL TO THE SOLUTION FOR MANY GLOBAL PROBLEMS: CLIMATE, AIDS, DISEASE, AND TERRORISM Joseph S. Nye, Harvard K-School, 2004, American Power in the 21st Century, eds. David Held & Mathias KoenigArchibugi, p. 131 Because of its leading edge in the information revolution and its past investment in military power the United States will likely remain the worlds single most powerful country well into the twenty-first century. But as Josef Joffe has written, unlike centuries past, when war was the great arbiter, today the most interesting types of power do not come out of the barrel of a gunToday there is a much bigger payoff in getting others to want what you want, and that has to do with cultural attraction and ideology and agenda setting and economic incentives for cooperation. Both hard and soft power are relevant to getting desirable outcomes on all three chessboards, but many of the transnational issues such as climate change, the spread of infectious diseases, and international crime and terrorism cannot be resolved by military force alone. Representing the dark side of globalization, these issues are inherently multilateral and require cooperation for their solution. Thus soft power is particularly important in dealing with the issues that arise from the bottom chessboard of transnational relations. Unless the United States learns to see the war on terrorism in this broader analytical context, and to appreciate the crucial role of soft power, it will find victory elusive.
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Soft Power Necessary to Stem TerrorismTerrorists Using Soft Power
TERRORISTS ARE INCREASING THEIR SOFT POWER Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 24-5 The new terrorism is not like the 1970s terrorism of the IRA, the ETA (the military wing of the Basque separatist movement), or Italys Red Brigades, nor is the vulnerability limited to any one society. A business as usual attitude toward curbing terrorism is not enough. Force still plays a role in world politics, but its nature has changed in the twenty-first century. Technology is increasing terrorists access to destructive power, but they also benefit greatly from increased capacities to communicatewith each other across jurisdictions, and with global audiences. As we will see in Chapter 3, many terrorists groups also have soft as well as hard power. The United States was correct in altering its national security strategy to focus on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction after September 11, 2001. But the means the Bush administration chose focused too heavily on hard power and did not take enough account of soft power. And that is a mistake, because it is through soft power that terrorists gain general support as well as new recruits.
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Soft Power Necessary to Stem Terrorism -- Hard Power Response Undermines Critical Soft Power
EXCESSIVE USE OF HARD POWER COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AGAINST TERRORISM SQUANDERS VITAL SOFT POWER Joseph S. Nye, Professor Harvard, 2006, The Boston Globe, August 19, p. A15 The manner in which we use our hard military power affects Rumsfeld's ratio. In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, there was a good deal of sympathy and understanding around the world for the American military response against the Taliban government that had provided bases for Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Our invasion of Iraq, which was not connected to 9/11, squandered that good will, and the attractiveness of the United States in Muslim countries such as Indonesia plummeted from 75 percent approval in 2000 to 15 percent in May 2003. As we have found in Iraq, occupation of a divided nation is messy and bound to lead to episodes, such as Abu Ghraib and Haditha, that undercut our soft power. By failing to be smart about how we combine our hard and soft power in the struggle against jihadist terrorism, we fall into the trap set by Al Qaeda's Osama bin Laden and Hezbollah's Hassan Nasrallah, who want to cast the conflict as a clash of civilizations. But Islamists, much less all Muslims, have a diversity of views. America needs to be wary of strategies that help its enemies by uniting disparate forces behind one banner. The United States has a good narrative, but its failure to combine hard and soft power into a smart strategy means that, too often, it steps on its own story, and that can be fatal.
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Soft Power Necessary to Stem Proliferation
US POLICY TOWARD IRANIAN & NORTH KOREAN PROLIFERATION IS A FAILURE NOW EXERCISE OF SOFT POWER LEADERSHIP VITAL TO ANY SUCCESSFUL SOLUTION Mark Fitzpatrick, IISS Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation, 2006, Survival, Vol. 48, No.1, Spring, p. 77 North Koreas duplicity and Irans belligerence made it easier for Washington to justify a posture of relative passivity to date, letting the Europeans address Iran and hoping for China to wield its influence with North Korea. Washington has been torn between impulses toward regime change and a strategy of deterrence and reassurance.40 The Bush administrations laudable Proliferation Security Initiative and its successes in closing down the A.Q. Khan network are directed not at rolling back the proliferation threat posed by North Korea and Iran but at containing them, to prevent onward proliferation. The administrations policy on Iran has focused almost exclusively on bringing the case to the UN Security Council, as though that were an end in itself. The United States has coalesced world opinion on its nonproliferation goals for Iran and North Korea, but has not succeeded in enunciating a realistic strategy for achieving those goals. If Iran reassesses its belligerent behaviour and becomes amenable to negotiations and it appears US engagement is the missing ingredient that would persuade Iran to forego fissile material production capabilities, then there is more likelihood the Bush administration will do so.41 Washington should be willing to engage with its European allies on a strategy of when and how to bring the full weight of Americas potential carrots into the negotiation process with Iran. Meanwhile, the Europeans will need to be willing to deploy the full weight of the potential sticks they and the United States have at their disposal that may be necessary to persuade Iran to accept a long-term arrangement to foreclose a nuclear-weapons capability. Similarly, a willingness to employ a full range of incentives will be a necessary condition if the Korean Peninsula is ever to be nuclear weapons free. Bringing greater consistency to US policies will be a useful ingredient AMERICAN ENGAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP VITAL TO STEM PROLIFERATION Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 213-4 Proliferation can only be stopped if countries that worry about their own security have some alternative way of protecting themselves against plausible threats. Only America has the global system of credible military alliancesand deployable military powerto help other countries protect themselves in key unsettled regions such as East Asia and the Middle East. Historically, its security umbrella made it far easier for friends and allies such as Germany, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan not to pursue their own nuclear deterrents, and the same logic generally applies in todays world for many states. The importance of maintaining strong and credible American alliances as an anchor for the global security order is a major reason why future candidates for office will have to work to keep America engaged abroad. There may be a temptation to retreat into a more isolationist approach to the world, given the difficulties of the Iraq operation in particular, to say nothing of Americas twin budget and trade deficits. But for reasons of preventing nuclear proliferation, among many others, it is important that candidates resist this impulse.
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Soft Power Necessary to Stem Proliferation
SOFT POWER NECESSARY TO STEM PROLIFERATION THREATS AND MAKE HARD POWER RESPONSES EFFECTIVE IF SOFT POWER FAILS Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 234-5 Getting proliferation policy right requires the kind of approach that Hard Power Democrats and other moderates naturally offer. Too often, those on the left place excessive reliance on arms control, as if international law and treaties will stop outlaws such as Kim Jong Il. Too often, those on the right dismiss any role for formal arms control. They forget that Americas ability to devise coercive strategies to deal with problems like North Korea requires international consensus and cooperationwhich in turn can only be created if proliferators are seen to be violating principles and rules that the rest of the world accepts and that are codified in some meaningful way. Put differently, countering proliferation requires a mix of hard and soft power. If for no other reason, the soft power is needed even in dealing with the likes of tyrants such as Kim Jong Il to set up the conditions for strongly pressuring them after engagement strategies fail. In other words, even in dealing with the worlds worst regimes, soft power is needed to set up the framework for the application of hard power. The Bush administration has belatedly come to this conclusion, it appears, in regard to Iran, but has never managed to do so in regard to North Korea. Americas policy debate needs strong camps of proponents of such a blend, ideally, within both main political parties, if it is to deal successfully with the most serious threat to its security in the years to come.
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Soft Power Necessary to Stem Proliferation
NEED A MIX OF HARD POWER AND SOFT POWER TO ADDRESS NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION THREAT Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 211-2 Policymakers sometimes talk about proliferation as if one straightforward conceptdeployment of missile defense, or more money for cooperative threat reduction, or a more multilateralist approach toward treatieswould solve much of the problem. Indeed, each of these policies has its place. But conservatives and neo-conservatives often talk as if arms control is generally a waste of time, and that only hard power (often of unilateralist variety) matters. Those on the left, by contrast, often sound ready to rely exclusively on arms control, international law, and patient multilateral diplomacy when addressing the spread of dangerous weapons. Neither position is right. Stopping proliferation is perhaps the classic case where it is essential to blend a hard and soft power, or decisive American leadership with consensus building diplomacy, of attempts to use treaties with a willingness to resort to military or economic coercion if they fail. This issue thus provides a golden opportunity for Hard Power Democrats as well as for mediocre Republicans and independents to pose a more viable way forward for the country that either the far left or far right often counsel. Handling specific cases correctly will always require calibration for the circumstances at handand will always be difficult. That said, the general goal of addressing the nuclear proliferation problem effectively requires the United States to vigorously develop and employ several different types of foreign policy tools: --strong military alliances to deter adversaries and reassure friends that they need not pursue nuclear weapons of their own --continuation of cooperative-threat-reduction efforts beyond their current scope and beyond Russia --de-emphasis of nuclear weapons in American security policy and reinvigoration of certain aspects of arms control --individually tailored policies for the key problem states, most notably North Korea and Iran, with the ultimate goal being to achieve the sort of success that the Bush administration was able to accomplish in regard to Libya. The last of these is the most complex to implement. The next to last about de-emphasizing nuclear weapons and reinvigorating some type of arms control may be the most intellectually demanding but is ripe for a major breakthrough by a new administration not carrying the baggage or the anti-arms control prejudices of the Bush administration. Cooperative threat reduction requires more work but is moving in the right direction, albeit too slowly; again, a new administration can add some vigor (though, in fairness, the Bush administration has improved its approach after an initial reluctance). The first point is the easiest in one sense, since a solid foundation of American alliances has been laid in the decades since World War II. But sustaining this good state of affairs requires constant attentionand repairing some of the damage of recent years will take considerable effort.
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Soft Power Necessary to Stem Proliferation
MIX OF HARD AND SOFT POWER BEST APPROACH FOR NORTH KOREA US CANT CONVINCE CHINA TO APPLY SANCTIONS UNTIL IT HAS SERIOUSLY ENGAGED NORTH KOREA FIRST Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITY, p. 233 If pressure from the United States and other countries made the status quo untenable, Kim could be forced to choose between reform and slow strangulation of his state. Making such a choice seem inescapable will require remarkable diplomacy from the next US president, given how unwilling South Korea and China would not be to apply coercion against the DPRK under virtually any circumstances. But by making it clear that Washington is willing to have a better relationship with Pyongyang under the right conditions, the next American president may be able to convince Seoul and Beijing to accept the other side of the coin toothreatening real punishment of North Korea if it does not denuclearize and otherwise reform. This is the kind of juxtaposition of hard power with soft powerand sincere effort at negotiation with more Machiavellian strategic planning should negotiation failthat can distinguish hard power Democrats and moderate Republicans from the more ideological view of conservatives and neo-cons on North Korea. It does not mean assuming that Kim Jong Il can be dealt with successfully, if we only talk to his regime bilaterally, as some on the left sometimes seem to imply. Rather, it is inspired in large part by the recognition that a strategy of coercion cannot work under the present circumstances and that it will only be available to Washington after a more sincere effort at engagement has been vigorously attempted and shown to fail.
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Soft Power Key to Global Stability
US POWER VITAL TO GLOBAL STABILITY SHOULD EMPHASIZE SOFT AND HIDDEN POWER OVER HARD MILITARY POWER Francis Fukuyama, Professor International Studies Johns Hopkins, 2006, America at the Crossroads, p. 188 What the Bush administration and its neoconservative supporters failed to appreciate before the Iraq war was the fact that the kind of lopsidedly unipolar world that emerged after the Cold War had stoked broad new currents of antiAmericanism. Signs of this were clearly evident well before the 2000 election. What recognition of this fact should have led the administration to do was not to abjure the use of American power but to be more cautious in it, to use soft rather than hard power, and to devise more subtle and indirect ways of shaping the world. American power remains critical to world order; the United States is not just a giant version of Sweden or Switzerland on the world stage. But American power is often the most effective when it is not seen. US forces in East Asia and the US-Japanese alliance permit Japan to maintain a relatively weak military establishment, thereby avoiding remilitarization that would be threatening to China, Korea, or other states in Asia. By having large forces, and more important, technology, mobility, and logistical networks that allow them to be deployed around the world, the United States discourages middle-range powers from seeking to militarily dominate their regions. American power is often more useful when it is latent. Despite the fact that the United States spends roughly as much on its military as the rest of the world put together, the Iraq war has demonstrated that there are clear limits to the US Militarys effectiveness. It is not well configured for fighting prolonged insurgencies; the strains of the Iraq war have already forced the Pentagon in the Bush administrations secondterm Quadrennial Review to question the ability of the United States to fight to simultaneous regional wars. MULTIPOLARITY CAUSES NUCLEAR WAR SOFT POWER ALLOWS FOR SUSTAINABLE UNIPOLARITY Nye, Dean of the JFK school of govt at Harvard, Political Science Quarterly, Winter 2002/20 03, http:// www.psqonline.org/cgi-bin/99_article.cgi?byear=2002&bmonth=winter&a=01free&format=down War was the constant companion and crucial instrument of the multipolar balance of power. The classic European balance provided stability in the sense of maintaining the independence of most countries, but there were wars among the great powers for 60 percent of the years since 1500. Rote adherence to the balance of power and multipolarity may prove to be a dangerous approach to global governance in a world where war could turn nuclear. Many regions of the world and periods in history have seen stability under hegemony-when one power has been preeminent. Margaret Thatcher warned against drifting toward "an Orwellian future of Oceania, Eurasia, and Eastasia-three mercantilist world empires on increasingly hostile terms. . . . In other words, 2095 might look like 1914 played on a somewhat larger stage." Both the Nixon and Thatcher views are too mechanical because they ignore soft power. America is an exception, says Josef Joffe, "because the 'hyperpower' is also the most alluring and seductive society in history. Napoleon had to rely on bayonets to spread France's revolutionary creed. In the American case, Munichers and Muscovites want what the avatar of ultra-modernity has to offer."
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Soft Power Key to Global Stability
SUPERIOR SOFT POWER IS THE REASON NATO DEFEATED THE WARSAW PACT Robert Cooper, Council of the European Union, 2004, American Power in the 21st Century, eds. David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, p. 173-5 It is interesting to consider how the Warsaw Pact failed. It was not through want of hard power. The Soviet Union could undoubtedly have suppressed Solidarity and the Polish Round Table and could have closed the Hungarian border. But it didnt want to. It was not a failure of hard power but a failure of will and confidence. Probably this should be considered as an element of soft power. The Soviet system ultimately lost legitimacy even in the eyes of the people that owned it. That is because, in a way, they were rather decent people. Evil empire was definitely the wrong phrase. Gorbachev wanted to do the right thing by the Russian people and was honest enough to see the lack of success of the Soviet system. If he had been in the game purely for power or for profit, then he might still be there today. But the Soviet system lost legitimacy because of its lack of success in economic terms and lack of an external threat that might have legitimized the use of hard power. In terms of threat reduction the European Union may also have played a part. NATO certainly did too. What mattered above all was that Germany was not perceived as threatening. But the real drama was on the Soviet side where there was a radical failure of legitimacy a failure, that is, of soft power. In comparison with the Warsaw Pact, NATO looks like a soft organization; but in practice there was quite a lot of hard power involved too. It was after all a military organization that, right up to the end, was seen as a threat, at least by the Soviet military. There must be a good chance that, without the threat of force that NATO, or perhaps the USA, represented, the Soviet Union would at some time have taken the opportunity to deal with the Berlin problem. If that had succeeded, or if there had been no security guarantees at all, it might have developed larger ambitions. So NATOs hard power was important too. But the real battles of the Cold War were intra-alliance battles, the attempt to find compromise between different sets of interests and different points of views. Keeping the Alliance together was what mattered, through the long debates on the Harmel report, on the two-track decision, and many others. These you could say were the devices by which NATOs soft power (its legitimacy) was maintained. On the other side the use of Soviet hard power undermined the Warsaw Pacts legitimacy almost from the beginning. It is worth noting in passing that it was important that success was defined in terms of prosperity. This was not an achievement for the soft power of the capitalist system; economic success was also the promise of the Soviet system. That, in a way, was one of the things that helped make the Cold War winnable; both sides were playing on the same field. The difficulty in dealing with countries such as North Korea may be precisely that Kim Jong-il and Western governments have quite different notions of what constitutes success. NATO was a success for soft power. It was cheaper for the USA to secure cooperation from West European allies by being friendly and giving them some say in the system than it would have been if it had tried to operate like the Soviet Union. It is also questionable whether the American people would have permitted that. The USA may not have chosen soft power consciously nor did the USSR choose hard power consciously: that is just the way that they were. Within the Soviet Union, Stalins terror came close to achieving the ultimate horror of a pure hard power system where people were disoriented and even normal social life ceased to function. Earlier, however, it has seemed that the Soviet Union had quite a lot of soft power at its disposal. For a period it seemed to represent some attractive ideals, to be a force for modernization (I have seen the future and it works a sentence that has outlived the memory of its author Lincoln Steffens), and in the 1930s communists seemed to be the only people who were resisting Hitler. But in fact it didnt work and just as tanks can break down and airplanes can crash if the hardware fails, so states can break down if the software is badly designed. What looked attractive turned out to be a failure.
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Soft Power Key to Hegemony
Soft power is high now and it's key to hegemony. Bradley A. THAYER, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2007
["The Case For The American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, p. 26]
The soft power of the United States is considerable. We are able to persuade many countries to work with us, whether in military actions like Iraq, or in the economic realm, such as in the World Trade Organization. Why do other countries often
want to work with the United States? This is so for two major reasons.
The first reason is self-interest. Countries may help the United States because they want to seek favor from Washington. For example, by participating in the occupation of Iraq, a country like El Salvador earns good will in Washington. At some point in time, El Salvador will remind U.S. officials of that when it needs a favor from Washington. This is what political experts call logrolling, or, put another way, If you scratch my back, Ill scratch yours. The second reason is soft power. Other countries want to work with the United States because they share its goals and want what the United States wants. This is not logrolling. They help because they really want to, not with the expectation that they will receive some specific reward. At some point, the soft power of the United States has changed their opinion, so that individuals or countries that once opposed the United States now understand its actions, and, most often, support them. The soft power of the United States goes far in explaining why the United States has so many allies and so much support in other countries .
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Soft Power Key to Leadership
SOFT POWER CRITICAL TO U.S. LEADERSHIP Andrew Hurrell, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 2006, p. 136 US predominance will be stable to the extent that Washington plays to its soft power strengths and its reputation for nonexpansionist intentions. Thus the US will get more of what it wants if it recognizes the extent and potential of its soft power and acts judiciously on that recognition. SOFT POWER HAS PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN US ACHIEVING AND MAINTAINING POSITION OF GLOBAL DOMINANCE Carnes Lord, Professor, Naval War College, 2006, Losing Hearts and Minds? Public diplomacy and strategic influence in the age of terror, p. 15-6 Soft power, a concept popularized in recent years by the political scientist Joseph Nye, is useful for understanding the larger context in which public diplomacy functions. Soft power has been a strong suit for the United States virtually from its inception certainly long before the country became a recognized world power in the 20th century. American exceptionalism the nations devotion to freedom, the rule of law, and republican government, its openness to immigrants of all races and religions, its opposition to traditional power politics and imperialism has had a great deal to do with the rise of the United States to its currently dominant global role. But other great powers throughout history have also been adept at exploiting the advantages of soft power. The Roman and British empires, for example, were both able to control vast territories with very limited military forces through the appeal of the civilization they spread before them and the relatively benign character of their rule. Today, there are signs that a number of countries besides of the United States are becoming more conscious of their own soft power resources and seeking more actively to take advantage of them. Perhaps the best example is the Peoples Republic of China, which has undertaken a major effort over the last few years to improve its image as a responsible member of the international community and to promote Chinese culture and Chinese language instruction around the world. But comparable developments have been taking place as well in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Russia, not to speak of minor states such as Norway or Venezuela or indeed of terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda.
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PRESERVING SOFT POWER IS CRITICAL TO CONTINUED US DOMINANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY Nye, Dean of the JFK school of govt at Harvard, Political Science Quarterly, Winter 2002/20 03 Power in the global information age is becoming less tangible and less coercive, particularly among the advanced countries, but most of the world does not consist of postindustrial societies, and that limits the transformation of power. Much of Africa and the Middle East remains locked in preindustrial agricultural societies with weak institutions and authoritarian rulers. Other countries, such as China, India, and Brazil, are industrial economies analogous to parts of the West in the mid-twentieth century. In such a variegated world, all three sources of power-military, economic, and softremain relevant, although to different degrees in different relationships. However, if current economic and social trends continue, leadership in the information revolution and soft power will become more important in the mix. Table 1 provides a simplified description of the evolution of power resources over the past few centuries. Power in the twenty-first century will rest on a mix of hard and soft resources. No country is better endowed than the United States in all three dimensions-military, economic, and soft power. Its greatest mistake in such a world would be to fall into one-dimensional analysis and to believe that investing in military power alone will ensure its strength. HEGEMONY IS NON SUSTAINABLE WITHOUT SOFT POWER Joesph Nye, Dean of the JFK School of Government at Harvard, Boston Globe, Apr 14, 2002, http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2002/nye_unilateralism_bg_041402.htm With signs of economic recovery and our military success in Afghanistan, some Americans are drawing the wrong foreign policy conclusions. In their eyes, the United States is number one in a unipolar world and can do as it pleases. Some celebrate this as the "new unilateralism." In their view, we have shown that we do not need the rest of the world to succeed. We are strong enough to go it alone. But this approach is based on an inadequate analysis of power in contemporary world politics. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 ended bipolarity. Since then analysts have debated whether the world is unipolar or multipolar. Both images are right to some degree, and both are wrong, because each refers to a different dimension of global power. It would be more accurate to describe the distribution of power among countries today as a pattern resembling a complex three- dimensional chess game. On the top chessboard, military power is largely unipolar. The United States is the only country with both intercontinental nuclear weapons and large state-ofthe-art air, naval, and ground forces capable of global deployment. But on the middle chessboard, economic power is multipolar, with the United States, Europe, and Japan representing two-thirds of world product, and with China's dramatic growth likely to make it a major player early in this century. On this economic board, the United States is not a "hegemon." For example, the Bush administration must bargain as an equal with Europe to obtain a new trade round, and General Electric was unable to merge with Honeywell when the European Commission objected. But the situation is even more complicated and difficult for the traditional concepts to capture. The bottom chessboard is the realm of transnational relations that cross borders outside of government control. This realm includes actors as diverse as bankers electronically transferring sums larger than most national budgets, terrorists transferring weapons, and hackers disrupting Internet operations. On this bottom board, power is widely dispersed, and it makes no sense to speak of unipolarity, multipolarity, or hegemony. Those who recommend a unilateralist American foreign policy based on such traditional descriptions of American power are relying on woefully inadequate analysis . When you are in a three dimensional game, you will lose if you focus only on the military board and fail to notice the other boards and the vertical connections among them.
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MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO EXERCISE US POWER TODAY IS THROUGH SHAPING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS Francis Fukuyama, Professor International Studies Johns Hopkins, 2006, America at the Crossroads, p. 190-1 The most important way that American power can be exercised at this juncture is not through the exercise of military power but through the ability of the United States to shape international institutions. John Ikenberry has argued that this was precisely the way that the United States exercised its then-dominant power in the years immediately following World War II. The neoconservatives had a true insight that American ideals and self-interests are often aligned, but they failed to understand that that alignment most often occurred through Americas ability to create durable political frameworks through which it could achieve long-term cooperation with like-minded nations. The deficit of workable international institutions is plainly evident in the wake of the Iraq war. Realistic institutions for world order in the post-September 11 period require two things that are often mutually inconsistent; power and legitimacy. Power is needed to deal with threats not just from rogue states but from the new non-state actors that may in the future employ weapons of mass destruction. It must be capable of being deployed quickly and decisively; its use will in some cases require the violation of national sovereignty and may in some cases require preemption. International legitimacy, on the other hand, requires working through international institutions that are inherently slow-moving, rigid, and hobbled by cumbersome procedures and methods. Legitimacy is ultimately based on consent, which is in turn a by-product of a slow process of diplomacy and persuasion. International institutions exist in part to reduce the transaction costs of achieving consent, but under the best of circumstances they necessarily move less quickly than security requires. HARD POWER HAS NEVER BEEN SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT LEADERSHIP Donald Neuchterlein, former US Foreign Service Officer and Professor at Virginia, 2005, Defiant Superpower?, p. 6-7 An American political scientist, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., writing before the collapse of the Soviet Union, observes in his book Bound to Lead that even though hegemony refers to the domination of one state over others, it has been used in confused ways. Part of the problem, he says, is an unequal distribution of power in the world and the absence of a general agreement on what types of power constitute hegemony: All too often hegemony is used to refer to different behaviors and degrees of control, he observes, which obscures rather than clarifies the analysis. Nye concludes that no modern state has been able to develop sufficient military power to transform the balance of power into a long-lived hegemony in which one state could dominate the world militarily.
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SOFT POWER IS KEY TO THE FUTURE OF US LEADERSHIP Nye, Dean of the JFK school of govt at Harvard, Political Science Quarterly, Winter 2002/20 03 In my view, if the United States wants to remain strong, Americans need also to pay attention to our soft power. What precisely do I mean by soft power? Military power and economic power are both examples of hard command power that can be used to induce others to change their position. Hard power can rest on inducements (carrots) or threats (sticks). But there is also an indirect way to exercise power. A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness. In this sense, it is just as important to set the agenda in world politics and attract others as it is to force them to change through the threat or use of military or economic weapons. This aspect of power-getting others to want what you want-I call soft power. It coopts people rather than coerces them. Soft power rests on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences of others. At the personal level, wise parents know that if they have brought up their children with the right beliefs and values, their power will be greater and will last longer than if they have relied only on spankings, cutting off allowances, or taking away the car keys. Similarly, political leaders and thinkers such as Antonio Gramsci have long understood the power that comes from setting the agenda and determining the framework of a debate. The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible power resources such as an attractive culture, ideology, and institutions. If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to force you to do what you do not want to do. If the United States represents values that others want to follow, it will cost us less to lead. Soft power is not merely the same as influence, though it is one source of influence. After all, I can also influence you by threats or rewards. Soft power is also more than persuasion or the ability to move people by argument. It is the ability to entice and attract. And attraction often leads to acquiescence or imitation . Soft power arises in large part from our values. These values are expressed in our culture, in the policies we follow inside our country, and in the way we handle ourselves internationally. The government sometimes finds it difficult to control and employ soft power. Like love, it is hard to measure and to handle, and does not touch everyone, but that does not diminish its importance. As Hubert Vedrine laments, Americans are so powerful because they can "inspire the dreams and desires of others, thanks to the mastery of global images through film and television and because, for these same reasons, large numbers of students from other countries come to the United States to finish their studies." Soft power is an important reality.
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HARD POWER DOES NOT TRANSLATE INTO LEADERSHIP WITHOUT SOFT POWER Daniel S. Hamilton, Professor SAIS Johns Hopkins University, 2006, Transatlantic Relations and Global Governance, ed. Kari Mottola, p. ix Harnessing transatlantic potential effectively means paying attention to both power and legitimacy. Over much of the past century, the widely perceived legitimacy of US leadership was vital to American success. It remains essential if we are to wield our unprecedented power effectively today. The US cannot lead unless others choose to follow, and they will not make that choice over and over again unless they believe it to be in their own best interests to do so. This means not just twisting arms but shaping preferencesgetting others to conceive of their goals in ways compatible with ours. As the EUs Javier Solana reminds us: Getting others to want what you want can be much more efficient than getting others to do what you want. SOFT POWER IS KEY TO LEADERSHIP Joseph S. Nye, Dean of the JFK School of govt at Harvard, Boston Globe, 8/6/99 Now that the bombs have stopped falling on Serbia, many analysts are celebrating the success of America's military power. They are correct, but military prowess is only part of the story. It would be a serious mistake if Americans came to believe that the lesson of Kosovo is that we can simply bomb the world into becoming a better place. While it is important not to ignore
the continuing necessity of military force for some purposes, it is equally important for Americans not to be misled by the temptations of having the world's mightiest armed forces into thinking that US power is
. The United States is a preponderant but not dominant power -- that is, America is bigger than all the other players overall, but it does not possess overwhelming superiority in all key areas. Instead, power today is
greater than it is in other, nonmilitary, dimensions distributed in what amounts to a three- dimensional chess game. The top military board is unipolar, with the United States far outstripping other countries. The middle, economic board is multipolar, with the United States, Europe, and Japan accounting for two-thirds of world product. The bottom board of transactional relations that cross borders outside the control of governments has a more dispersed structure. This
playing on several boards at once. Another important distinction is the one between "hard power" -- a country's economic and military power to coerce -- and "soft power," the ability to attract through cultural and ideological appeal. It is important that a half-million students want to study in the United States each year; that Europeans and Asians want to watch American films and TV; and that American liberties are attractive in many parts of the world. Our values are significant sources of soft powe r. Both hard and soft power are vital, but in today's "information age," soft power is becoming even more so than in the past. Massive flows of cheap information have expanded the channels of contact across national borders. Global markets and nongovernmental actors play a larger role. Nations are more easily penetrated and less like billiard balls bouncing off one another. As a result, political leaders find it more difficult to maintain a coherent set of foreign policy priorities and more difficult to articulate a single overarching national interest. Yet the United States, with its democratic society, is well placed to benefit from the rapidly developing information age. Although the coherence of government policies may diminish because of these many penetrations, our institutions will be attractive, and the openness of our society will enhance our credibility, which is a crucial resource in an information age. Thus we will be better placed to make use of soft power. At the same time, the soft power that comes from being a "city on a hill" whose example shines forth does not provide the coercive capability that hard power does. Alone it does not support a very venturesome foreign policy. Soft power works by persuading others to follow or getting them to agree with us on values and institutions that produce behavior we want. Soft power can rest on the appeal of our ideas and culture or our ability to set the agenda through standards and institutions that shape the preferences of others. It depends largely on the persuasiveness of the free information we transmit. If America can make its power legitimate in the eyes of other countries and maintain international institutions that encourage others to define their interests in ways compatible with ours, we may not need to expend as much on costly traditional economic or military sources of power. Hard and soft power are related, but they are not the same. Material success makes a culture and ideology attractive, and economic and military failure lead to self-doubt and crises of identity.
complexity makes policy making more difficult. It means
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GROWING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR ISOLATIONISM The Economist, 2006, February 9, http://www.economist.com/world/na/displaystory.cfm?story_id=5499501 Although Mr Bush was hardly fair when he described all advocates of a less muscular foreign policy as isolationist, he has correctly identified one of the strongest currents against which he must swim. Many Americans wish to disengage from the world in one or more of four ways: by fighting fewer wars, by trading less freely, by allowing fewer foreigners into their country or by giving less foreign aid. RISK OF ISOLATIONIST SHIFT IN THE US UNIQUELY HIGH NOW The Economist, 2006, February 9, http://www.economist.com/world/na/displaystory.cfm?story_id=5499501 Optimists point out that America has always had a vocal isolationist minority. And surely globalisationmore travel, ever deeper economic integration, common threats (such as global warming and terrorism)mean that America cannot go it alone. Francis Fukuyama, a famously optimistic professor at Johns Hopkins University, even thinks the Muhammad cartoon row could pull America and Europe closer together, as Europeans realise they have more in common even with Texans than with Islamists. So the most likely outcome is surely that the current isolationist surge will fade away. But consider two things. First, greater integration and the war on terror have hardly brought the two sides of the Atlantic together. Meanwhile, despite his proud words in the state of the union, isolationism, broadly defined, has already tempered Mr Bush's policy. The public's exhaustion with Iraq makes it harder for the president to tackle Iran. He will also have to retreat on immigration if he is going to get something through. PUBLIC SUPPORTS US ENGAGEMENT THROUGH MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS OVER PRIMACY AND HEGEMONY World Public Opinion.org, 2006, Americans continue to support international engagement despite frustration over the war in Iraq, October 10, http://worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brunitedstatescanadara/256.php? nid=&id=&pnt=256&lb=brusc Asked what international role they would like the United States to play, Americans say they want their country to remain engaged overseas without trying to dominate world affairs. Only 12 percent say the United States should withdraw from most efforts to solve international problems, a proportion that has remained statistically unchanged since 2004 (10%). However, Americans do not want the United States to remain the dominant power and believe that it should try to refrain from unilateral efforts to police international conflicts. Only 10 percent say that as the sole remaining superpower the United States should continue to be the preeminent leader in solving world problems. Three-fourths (76%) say that the United States too often plays the role of world policeman. But Americans support U.S. participation in multilateral efforts . Seventy-five percent say that the United States should do its share in efforts to solve international problems together with other countries. A substantial majority (60%) believe the United States should try to make decisions within the United Nations, even if this means making compromises. An even larger majority (73%) thinks the United States should generally comply with rulings by the World Trade Organization. Americans also support a wide range of international agreements and treaties, including those rejected by the U.S. government, such as the pact to create an International Criminal Court (71%) and the Kyoto agreement to reduce global warming (70%).
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US PUBLIC OPPOSES IDEA THAT US HEGEMONY IS THE BEST FRAMEWORLD FOR WORLD PEACE World Opinion.Org, 2006, Poll of 9 Major Nations Finds All, including US, Reject World System Dominated by Single Power in Favor of Multipolarity, June 12, http://worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/views_on_countriesregions_bt/208.php?nid=&id=&pnt=208&lb=brusc Despite their status as the worlds sole super power today, Americans also rejected the model of a world order based on a single world power. Nor did they want to return to a world dominated by two great powers. Instead, they indicated that they would prefer an international system where power was shared among nations. A majority (52%) thought a balance of regional powers was the best framework but a third (33%) said they would like the United Nations to lead the world. Only ten percent favored either a system led by a single power (6%) or two powers (4%).
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Soft Power Solves Counterbalancing
Nye, Dean of the JFK school of govt at Harvard, Political Science Quarterly, Winter 2002/20 03 Nonetheless, if American diplomacy is unilateral and arrogant, our preponderance would not prevent other states and nonstate actors from taking actions that complicate American calculations and constrain its freedom of action.45 For example, some allies may follow the American bandwagon on the largest security issues but form coalitions to balance American behavior in other areas such as trade or the environment. And diplomatic maneuvering short of alliance can have political effects. As William Safire observed when Presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush first met, "Well aware of the weakness of his hand, Putin is emulating Nixon's strategy by playing the China card. Pointedly, just before meeting with Bush, Putin traveled to Shanghai to set up a regional cooperation semi-alliance with Jiang Zemin and some of his Asian fellow travelers."46 Putin's tactics, according to one reporter, "put Mr. Bush on the defensive, and Mr. Bush was at pains to assert that America is not about to go it alone in international affairs." Pax Americana is likely to last not only because of unmatched American hard power but also to the extent that the United States "is uniquely capable of engaging in 'strategic restraint,' reassuring partners and facilitating cooperation."48 The open and pluralistic way in which U.S, foreign policy is made can often reduce surprises, allow others to have a voice, and contribute to soft power. Moreover, the impact of American preponderance is softened when it is embodied in a web of multilateral institutions that allow others to participate in decisions and that act as a sort of world constitution to limit the capriciousness of American power. That was the lesson the United States learned as it struggled to create an antiterrorist coalition in the wake of the September 2001 attacks. When the society and culture of the hegemon are attractive, the sense of threat and need to balance it are reduced. 49 Whether other countries will unite to balance American power will depend on how the United States behaves as well as the power resources of potential challengers. MULTILATERAL SOFT POWER SOLVES COUNTERBALANCING AND PRESERVES HEGEMONY Nye, Dean of the JFK School of Government at Harvard, Boston Globe, Apr 14, 2002 The good news for Americans is that the United States will likely remain the world's single most powerful country well into this new century. While potential coalitions to check American power could be created, it is unlikely that they would become firm alliances unless the United States handles its hard coercive power in an overbearing unilateral manner that undermines our attractive or soft power. As the German editor Joseph Joffe has written, "unlike centuries past, when war was the great arbiter, today the most interesting types of power do not come out of the barrel of a gun . . . Today there is a much bigger payoff in `getting others to want what you want,' and that has to do with cultural attraction and ideology and agenda setting . . ." On these measures, China, Russia, Japan, and even Western Europe cannot match the influence of the United States. The United States could squander this soft power by heavy-handed unilateralism.
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SOFT POWER PREVENTS COUNTERBALANCING Richard N. Haass; Vice President, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, and Sydney Stein, Jr., Chair in International Security at the Brookings Institution, Foreign Affairs Sept/Oct 99 Certain costs will accompany such a cooperative arrangement. The United States will need to relinquish some freedom of action and modulate the tone of its rhetoric. Sanctions should cease to dominate policy; incentives need to be employed instead, or in tandem. Carrying out unilateral preemptive strikes on suspected weapons facilities, as the United States did in Sudan last August, would become more difficult. The barrier against intervening in internal conflicts would be higher. The pace and extent of additional NATO enlargement would most likely be restrained. The United States would have to limit the scale of any national missile defenses if Russia and China were to cap their strategic forces. Although the benefits would outweigh such costs, bringing about a world that would justify such restraint will be difficult. In fact, three main obstacles lie in the path toward establishing and maintaining an international society to America's liking. First and most obvious is the opposition of other power centers, major and minor alike. Some resistance is inevitable, at times from France or other European states or Japan, more often from China and Russia. China in particular will oppose any limit on its ability to use force to resolve the Taiwan issue. China is also determined to increase its strategic arsenal. Both China and Russia will feel threatened by American deployment of defensive systems. In response, they may sell technology that could bolster another state's unconventional weapons program. Russia (to some extent) and China (especially) will view humanitarian intervention as a pretext for unwelcome interference in their internal affairs. Japan holds to a more closed view of the ideal economy. Few if any major powers would support preventive attacks on the fledgling unconventional weapons programs of what the United States views as rogue states; as a rule, the United States tends to find itself isolated when emphasizing sanctions and military attacks instead of commerce and other forms of unconditional engagement. A host of smaller but still considerable powers, including India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and others, are likely to view an American-led world as discriminatory, threatening, or both. How, then, might the United States persuade others of the desirability of such a world? The operative word here is "persuade." Areas of consensus will begin to emerge only following strategic dialogues -- intense conversations with other governments and opinionleaders in various societies. If negotiations were at the center of Cold War diplomacy, consultations must form the core of post -- Cold War foreign policy. The goal is to build or strengthen global institutions that buttress the basic principles of order. Optimally, this would include a revamped U.N. Security Council willing and able to counter aggression, whether by one state against another or by a government against its own people; a more comprehensive WTO better able to promote open trade; smaller nuclear arsenals and a reduced chance of nuclear conflict; supplier clubs that restrict the spread of advanced weapons technology; and a stronger International Atomic Energy Agency to police nuclear proliferation and similar organizations to enforce chemical and biological weapons bans. Why would other states go along with U.S. preferences? In some cases, they will see the same inherent benefits as America. This applies best to Europe, already America's most frequent partner. More generally, economic openness tends to be its own reward. Most major powers also have a stake in avoiding large-scale conflicts, slowing the spread of technologies that threaten them, and maintaining a free flow of oil and gas. Cooperation with the United States will bring benefits in the form of shared technology and capital. At least as important is the status that the United States can confer on its partners. Both Russia and China clearly want to be seen as great powers, as members of the inner circle shaping international relations. Only by working with the United States can they and the U.N. Security Council avoid being regularly bypassed.
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Soft Power Solves Many Problems
US SOFT POWER IS KEY TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, NONPROLIFERATION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS Richard N. Haass; Vice President, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, and Sydney Stein, Jr., Chair in International Security at the Brookings Institution, Foreign Affairs Sept/Oct 99 THE WORLD described here will not come about solely from its inherent appeal. To the contrary, building and maintaining such an order requires sustained effort by the world's most powerful actor, the United States. Its ultimate success, in turn, demands that Americans properly handle their country's role as sole superpower of the world. American foreign policy must project an imperial dimension, although not in the sense of territorial control or commercial exploitation; such relationships are neither desirable nor sustainable today. Rather, the United States must attempt to organize the world along certain principles affecting both relations between states and conditions within them. The U.S. role should resemble that of nineteenth-century Great Britain, the global leader of that era. U.S. influence would reflect the appeal of American culture, the strength of the American economy, and the attractiveness of the norms being promoted. Coercion and the use of force would normally be a secondary option. The United States seeks a world based on peaceful relations, non-proliferation, respect for human rights, and economic openness. It must therefore convince other great powers to join with it to promote these ends, thereby constructing a stronger and more durable order that protects the bulk of U.S. interests and reduces the foreign policy burden -- in financial and human terms alike -- on the United States.
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Soft Power Best for Democracy and Human Rights Promotion
SOFT POWER MORE EFFECTIVE THAN HARD POWER AT DEMOCRACY PROMOTION Francis Fukuyama, Professor International Studies Johns Hopkins, 2006, America at the Crossroads, p. 133 As Americas experience in Iraq has shown quite vividly, democratic regime change via military intervention and occupation is extremely costly and uncertain, and it is not an instrument that is every likely to be used routinely in the future. On the other hand, the United States and other developed democracies played important and in some cases decisive roles in helping along many of the democratic transitions that occurred from the early 1970s on. These were all the product of soft rather than hard power that is, they were brought about by instruments like diplomatic pressure, funding to prodemocracy groups, public diplomacy, training, and the like. SOFT POWER IS KEY TO INTERNATIONAL MODELING OF US NORMS INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS Maynes, charles William, president of the Eurasia Foundation, World Policy Journal, Fall 97, p. 147 Is such an approach realistic? How far can the United States go in the post-Cold War world in imposing its own vision of society? What does past practice tell us about such efforts? One reason for believing that the United States can impose a certain ethical order on the international system is that there are historical precedents. That is to say, throughout history certain states have captured the imagination of others because of their power or their success or their wealth or all three. Their patterns of political and economic organization were then seen as the path for others to power or wealth or both. The royalist France of Louis XIV
assumed this role in the seventeenth century for most of Europe, as did first Revolutionary and then Napoleonic France in the early nineteenth century. Britain assumed this role in the last half of the nineteenth
More recently, during the interwar period, many states copied the fascist models of Nazi Germany and Italy because the new fascist powers seemed to be more successful in coping with the economic problems of the Great Depression than the democratic states. Fascism subsequently lost currency as it failed in its bid for world mastery. After the Second World War, the two most successful states successful because they had proven victorious in that bitter struggle-were the Soviet Union and the United States. As a result, even if the Soviet Union had not compelled many states through occupation to follow its path and the United States had not lured many states into its embrace through its postwar largess, I suspect the political debate in many countries after 1945 would nonetheless have centered on which successful model to followthe American or the Soviet. For all of America's flaws and Americans themselves know they are many and seem to be growing-it is today the most successful state in the world. We can expect therefore that as was the case with successful states in the past, its political and economic forms will be emulated. In this sense, American hegemony has an ethical and ideological dimension whether we wish it to or not. America's behavior is the standard against which the behavior of others is judged. <CONTINUES> This abysmal record notwithstanding, it is the West that has striven-perhaps partly out of its own guilt-to promote universal values that hold out the promise of a more humane international order. And among Western states, no state has done more to push the agenda of human rights than the United States . Beginning with the revulsion over the Holocaust, there has been a growing belief since the end of the Second World War that states should not be allowed to regard their citizens as property to be treated as the government might wish. Over the last 50 years, the international community, largely under American leadership, has developed a corpus of international law that attempts to set some universally recognized limits on state behavior. As a former assistant secretary general for the United Nations, who is now teaching law at
century. China and India have played this role in Asia at certain points in the past. London University, recently pointed out regarding the effort to bring to trial individuals accused of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia: At Nuremberg, it was argued that some of the defendants' impugned conduct had not been criminal at the time it took place. But there is no taint of retroactivity in the current trials of accused war criminals in the Bosnian conflict in the Hague: since 1945, humanitarian law has been
. The United States in particular has shown increasing restraint in the conduct of war because of human rights considerations. There is, for example, an enormous
much consolidated, and the indictments in the former Yugoslavia have a familiar legal tone.1 There is another piece of evidence suggesting new and higher standards difference in how America conducted air operations during the Second World War and in the Gulf War. In the former conflict, the objective was often to produce civilian casualties, whereas in the latter struggle the greatest effort was taken to avoid targeting civilian populations. Of course, some of the restraint America has recently shown in its use of power may not reflect a higher morality but better weapons. In the
Through precision, the U.S. military was able to be more humane. But it is also true that the U.S. military is also much more sensitized to the need to restrict so-called collateral damage than it once was.
Second World War, it took a reported 9,000 gravity bombs to hit one target; in Vietnam, it took nearly 200; in the Gulf War, it sometimes took only one.
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Soft Power Solves Mid East Conflict
US SOFT POWER IS CRITICAL TO SOLVING MIDDLE EAST PEACE Harold Hongju Koh, Professor of International Law, Yale Law School; Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 1998-2001, 2003 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1479 Since then, the situation has dramatically deteriorated. Left in the hands of Ariel Sharon, Yasir Arafat, and parties beyond either of their control, the peace process has crumbled. New, multiple spasms of violence have broken out that have greatly multiplied the challenges of mediation in the Middle East. When the Bush Administration finally reengaged diplomatically, its initiatives proved singularly unsuccessful. And even while now finally committing itself to a new "road map" for negotiations, the United States has engaged in an ambitious military assault on Iraq that threatens to turn much of the Middle East against us and perhaps to disable us from playing the indispensable role of honest broker in a Middle East peace process. So again, the irony: Even as the United States directs exceptional energy toward Iraq, the greater danger is that that effort will undermine our capacity to do enough elsewhere in the Middle East. Exceptional United States leadership in one place may diminish American soft power to mediate the broader Middle East controversy, in which the United States is undeniably the indispensable player.
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Soft Power Solves North Korea Conflict
INCREASED US SOFT POWER IS CRITICAL TO ENGAGING NORTH KOREA AND PREVENTING NUCLEAR ESCALATION Harold Hongju Koh, Professor of International Law, Yale Law School; Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 1998-2001, 2003 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1479 America's "hard power" alternative - disarming North Korea militarily - raises such a threat to the people of South Korea and the 100,000 U.S. troops stationed there as to be effectively unusable. Yet the passive alternative initially chosen by the Bush Administration would have let North Korea go nuclear, while seeking to isolate and contain it in hopes of bringing about the eventual collapse of the North Korean regime. Yet an isolationist approach seems most unlikely to affect what is already the most isolated country on earth. Under intense pressure from Seoul and Tokyo, the administration has now finally shifted back to a diplomatic alternative: to reinitiate talks on the condition - rejected by the North - that the North first abandon its effort to develop a highly enriched-uranium program. Meanwhile, Kim Dae Jung has retired, having made little headway with his Sunshine Policy during the last years of his presidency. Our diplomatic ties with South Korea and its new president, Roh Moo Hyun, have been strained. The North Koreans continue to build nuclear weapons and could have six or seven in a year or two, enough to test, sell, and target Seoul and Tokyo, while still holding three or more weapons in reserve as bargaining chips in case serious talks ever do begin. nAnd President Bush has found himself in precisely the same position as his father in 1989 and President Clinton in 1993, concluding reluctantly that America has no real option but to reengage diplomatically, with soft power, having lost both critical time and valuable ground. NORTH KOREAN CONFLICT WOULD GO NUCLEAR RISKING MILLIONS OF DEATHS. ENGAGEMENT IS NECESSARY TO SOLVE DAVID H. HACKWORTH, Military affairs writer for King Features, 12/23/1993 The San Francisco Examiner Korea II would make the first war look like a pillow fight. North Korea has an army superior to that of South Korea, not only in numbers of soldiers and combat gear but also in fighting ability. The only way that South Korea could stop an attack would be to ask for U.S. nuclear weapons to be used. The Reds probably would respond with chemical warfare. The prevailing wind in the region blows south. Radiation and poisonous gases would hit both Koreas and southern Japan. Millions of people would die. Within two weeks Korea would look like the inside of a blast furnace. We would not be treated to a replay of Desert Storm. Air power would fail. Smart weapons wouldn't work against a country that has secretly buried all vital materiel under mountains. American reinforcements wouldn't arrive until after the massacre, as it would take up to 90 days to move sufficient forces to Korea. It's doubtful there would be airfields or ports to receive them because the Reds have 100, 000 Special Forces troops trained to blow things up behind the lines. Everyone involved in this madness should chill out and take a longer view. The answer is not the military solution that failed in Somalia but the political solution that worked against the Soviet "Evil Empire." Intelligence experts suspect North Korea already has the atomic bomb. Time is on our side. North Korea is in the same shape the former Soviet Union was in before it bellied up. North Korea, like Cuba, is on the verge of economic collapse. Without one shot being fired, President Kim's regime will fold, and the two Koreas will reunite as did the two post-Cold War Germanys. Talk is the way to go, not a war in which the consequences would be so horrific . And besides, what's the rush? North Korea has been a wild card for decades. A few more years, with the bomb or without it, won't make a lick of difference. President Clinton should ask Kim to join him for talks during the holiday season. Let the White House take the initiative to put a peace gift under the tree.
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Soft Power Solves Trade
SOFT POWER IS KEY TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TRADE NETWORKS Kal Raustiala, Visiting Assistant Professor of Politics and Fellow in the Program in Law & Public Affairs, Princeton University, 2002 Virginia Journal of International Law A striking aspect of transgovernmental cooperation is that many jurisdictions appear eager to replicate U.S. and EU regulatory approaches as they increasingly interact with their counterparts in other nations. The result is the diffusion of regulatory rules and practices around the world. As the term "diffusion" suggests, when networks promote regulatory change, change occurs more through persuasion than command. This does not mean that power is absent in transgovernmental cooperation. Rather, as the case studies demonstrate, power plays a critical role. But power is exercised more in the guise of what Joseph Nye calls "soft power" than in traditional hard power. Soft power is the power to attract; hard power the power to coerce. In networks, soft power is exercised by traditionally dominant states--no state has more soft power than the U.S.--and the dominant direction of diffusion is clearly from the U.S. (and EU) and toward less advanced economies. But as a result the mechanism by which networks alter domestic policies and practices is distinctive. Regulatory convergence is important for two chief reasons: convergence can permit deeper cooperation over time and can decrease tensions in the trade arena . The trade tensions created by regulatory divergence are legion; indeed, they are "what the trade policy agenda increasingly has come to be about." Trade agreements are often seen as the most powerful lever of regulatory change, and in many agreements governments negotiate specific harmonized rules or create systems of mutual recognition. But networks may be an alternative source of convergence. Moreover, networks appear to promote convergence in a distinctive manner. Rather than a formal, multilateral process of negotiation, convergence is fostered through a decentralized, incremental process of interaction and emulation.
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Soft Power Reduces Soft Balancing
SOFT POWER PREVENTS SOFT BALANCING Robert A. Pape is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2005, p. 7
Soft balancing differs from "soft power," which refers to the ability of (some) states to use the attractiveness of their social, cultural, economic, or political resources to encourage other governments and publics to accept policies favorable toward their state, society, and policies. Although uses of soft power are not limited to security issues, in principle a state with excellent soft-power resources might be in a better than average position to organize a balancing coalition (or to prevent the formation of one against it). Favorable perceptions of a unipolar leader's intentions are thus an important soft-power asset. If a unipolar leader's aggressive unilateralism undermines favorable perceptions of its intentions, this also has the effect of reducing its soft power to block the formation of a counterbalancing coalition. In general, however, soft power is an attribute of a state, whereas soft balancing involves the nonmilitary policies that states can use to limit and offset the leading state in the international system.
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Soft Power Key to Effective Democracy Promotion
SOFT POWER MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO PROMOTE TRUE DEMOCRACIES G. John Ikenberry & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Princeton Project on National Security, 2006, Forging A World of Liberty Under the Soft Power Good: Soft Power Good: Law: US national security in the 21 st century, September 27, Final Paper, PPNS, http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/report/FinalReport.pdf, p. 20 In a world of Popular, Accountable, and Rights-regarding governments, the United States would have many more, and more effective, partners in our efforts to fight terrorism, nuclear proliferation, pandemic disease, economic crises, and a host of other threats. Popular government requires both popular participation in government institutions and sufficient pluralism to allow for the representation of the spectrum of different voices across the population. PAR governments are more transparent, due to the checks and balances that naturally result from pluralist, participatory systems. They are more effective, because accountability reduces corruption and increases competence. And they are more trustworthy, because they are constrained by the laws governing their behavior toward their own citizens. Further, PAR governments provide many more opportunities for their citizens to achieve their goals through ordinary political processes and to make better lives for themselves through economic opportunity. Providing such political and economic opportunities is the best hope of harnessing the energies and passions of the hundreds of millions of young people around the world for example, 68 percent of Saudi Arabias population is under thirty into far more constructive channels than ideologies of violence and revolution. The best way to help bring governments up to PAR is to connect them and their citizens in as many ways as possible to governments and societies that are already at PAR and to provide them with incentives and support to follow suit. Creating these myriad points of contact, in turn, requires focusing precisely on the common interests shared by the United States and any particular country or group of countries and then devising the policies and mechanisms necessary to pursue those interests.
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Soft Power Key to Effective Democracy Promotion
SOFT POWER MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGY THAN THE BUSH DOCTRINE/HARD POWER APPROACH G. John Ikenberry & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Princeton Project on National Security, 2006, Forging A World of Liberty Under the Law: US national security in the 21st century, September 27, Final Paper, PPNS, http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/report/FinalReport.pdf, p. 19-20 More recently, however, we have promoted liberty under the banner of democracy, and too often at the point of a gun, making it possible for anti-democratic forces to equate democracy with American imperialism. Democracy is the best instrument that humans have devised for ensuring individual liberty over the long term, but only when it exists within a framework of order established by law. The legal framework that orders a successful democracy, in turn, must apply equally to all citizens, guarantee basic human rights for individuals and minority groups, and provide the means for citizens to hold their governors accountable. Without such order, democracy becomes chaos or a mad scramble for power by competing factions conditions that invite a return to tyranny. America has sought to promote democracy in the world for decades and even centuries. Not only as a matter of values, but also because history and social science give us good reason to believe that Americans would be safer, richer, healthier, and happier in a world of mature liberal democracies. However, in standing for democracy, we must be far more attentive to our own history and to the ways in which our system and others combine liberty with the rule of law. We must develop a much more sophisticated strategy of recognizing and promoting the deeper preconditions for successful liberal democracy preconditions that extend far beyond the simple holding of elections.5 It must be a strategy of promoting liberty under law, not only for individual nations in accordance with their distinctive history, culture, and stages of development, but also for the international system as a whole. Over the past few years, the Bush administration has identified the absence of democracy as a key driver of evil around the world and made promoting democracy the centerpiece of its national security strategy. Yet focusing exclusively on tyranny can lead us to overlook the dangers posed by hostile ideologies and belligerent nationalism threats every bit as lethal to human liberty. Democracy per se will not cure these dangers. On the contrary, recent research indicates that belligerent nationalism and religious extremism may thrive in emerging democracies and modernizing states respectively.6 Indeed, some of our most intractable problems, including the Iranian nuclear program, may well be problems of nationalism that would remain, and might even be exacerbated, if democracy took hold tomorrow. Labeling countries as democracies or non-democracies, much less as good or evil, also needlessly complicates our relations with many nations and often undermines the very goals we seek to achieve. Promoting liberty under law, by contrast, requires sufficient economic prosperity to give individuals a stake in the existing legal and political order. It requires a legal system capable of enforcing individual rights from the right of contract to the right of free expression. It requires sufficient transparency and integrity in government to ensure that the legal system exists in practice as well as on paper. Each of these dimensions of liberty under law offers a positive point of contact between the U.S. government or an international or regional institution in which the United States plays a role and a foreign government. Elections remain important as a long-term goal, but a grand strategy of forging a world of liberty under law means broadening our approach by bolstering the many elements that underpin a stable and sustainable democratic government and by countering the multiple ills that may destroy it. The United States cannot implement this strategy alone; nor indeed could any one country working on its own. Liberty under law within nations is inextricably linked with a stable system of liberty under law among them, a system that provides effective restraints in some areas and enables effective cooperation in others. Finally, building and maintaining a world of liberty under law requires a mix of sticks and carrots. Liberty requires order, and order, at some level, must be able to harness force.
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Soft Power Key to Effective Democracy Promotion
SOFT POWER KEY TO DEMOCRACY PROMOTION CANNOT BE IMPOSED THROUGH HARD POWER Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 120-1 Democracy is more than mere voting, which can lead to one man, one vote, once if done too hastily. Since the autocratic regimes in the Middle East have destroyed their liberal opposition, radical Islamists often represent the only alternative dissent in many countries. The radical Islamists feed on resistance to corrupt regimes, opposition to American policies, and popular fears of modernization. They portray liberal democracy as represented by corruption, sex, and violence, and American films and television sometimes reinforce that portrait. At the same time, modernization also produces education, jobs, more opportunities, and better health care. Fortunately, polls show that the majority of the populations in the region desire the benefits of trade, communications, and globalization. As we saw in Chapter 2, American technology is widely admired. Given the ambivalence among the moderates in the Arab cultures, there is still a chance of isolating the extremists. Democracy cannot be imposed by force. The key to success will lie in policies that open regional economies, reduce bureaucratic controls, speed economic growth, improve educational systems, and encourage the types of gradual political changes that are taking place in small countries like Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, and Morocco. The developments of intellectuals, social groups, and eventually countries that demonstrate their liberal democracy can be consistent with local cultures could have beneficial effects similar to the ways that Japan and Korea demonstrated that democracy can be combined with indigenous values in Asia. But that takes time, as well as skillful application of American soft-power resources.
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Soft Power Key to Effective Democracy PromotionBush Doctrine for Democracy Promotion Fails Because it Doesnt Incorporate Soft Power
BUSH DOCTRINE FAILS IN DEMOCRACY PROMOTION GOAL EMPHASIZES HARD POWER AND ELECTIONS RATHER THAN SOFT POWER SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND STRUCTURES Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 144-5 Equally distressing, the surprise victory of Hamas in 2006 elections in the Palestinian Authority, which gave the group outright control of the parliament and the prime ministership, constitutes a major setback for the Palestine-Israel peace process and for the momentum of the Bush administrations democracy-promotion agenda. The Hamas victory is a huge setback for President Bush and the United States, and it shows that a more sophisticated, patient doctrine is needed. Democracy promotion should never be equated with simple support for electionswhich can translate into a tyranny of the majority. It is essential to build respect for minority and individual rights as well as for nonviolence. As Martin Indyk, former assistant secretary of State for the Near East and former US ambassador to Israel, put it, Democracy cannot be the antidote to terror if the terrorists use democracy to gain advantages against us, and yet that is what is happening. Promoting democracy, in the end, means asking people who hold absolute or near-absolute power to take steps that may diminish their power or create risks that may lead to their losing it altogether. As such, it requires extremely adept diplomacy, patience, and a subtle touch (to avoid discrediting reformers in a region where association with the United States is often seen as more bad than good). It also requires firm and principled use of carrots and sticks, an arena in which the Bush administration has been better suited. But in countries where immediate alternatives to current regimes are nonexistent or unacceptable to American interests, and where stark economic or military punishment is not practical, patience and soft power must be married with principle and hard power if the United States is to be effective.
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Soft Power Key to Effective Democracy PromotionBush Doctrine for Democracy Promotion Fails Because it Doesnt Incorporate Soft Power
BUSH IDEA OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION GOOD HIS IMPLEMENTATION IS FLAWED Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 146-7 Direct support for political reform within the Islamic world is critical as President Bush has recognized. The idea that the West could continue to buy Saudi oil and provide for the Kingdoms security while ignoring its internal practices has been invalidatedby Saudi support for the Taliban in the past, by Saudi funding of extremist mosques and madrassas, and by the fact that fifteen of the nineteen September 11 hijackers originated from that country. Despite the arguments of some critics, it was therefore appropriate for the president to promote democracy as the broad, unifying, and idealistic theme of his second inaugural address. It may have given a boost to reformers in places such as Lebanon in ensuing months. Moreover, the presidents encouragement of democracy is consistent with the Clinton administrations strategy of engagement and enlargement, which sought to solidify the zone of democratic peace in Europe and elsewhere using tools such as NATO enlargement and Madeleine Albrights idea for a community of democracies. And although President Bushs speech did not immediately win converts around the world, and his idea for a G7 Broader Middle East Initiative met with skeptical reactions in June 2004, the Middle East Partnership Initiative has apparently become more popular throughout much of the Arab worldas indicated, for example, by the numbers of groups applying for MEPI grants. But the Bush vision has been flawed. To begin, it has not been sufficiently conditional. In fact, while democracy promotion has often been the bumper sticker used by American presidents of both parties to describe part of their foreign-policy platforms, in fact the United States does not believe in just any kind of democracy. We do not support the tyranny of the majority. We also do not support elections that usher in governments that then terminate the future democratic process in their own countries, and essentially allow themselves to be voted into positions of autocracy. The United States supports constitutional democracy with protection for individual and minorities. It also supports democracies that try to resolve their differences with other countries peacefully. In the specific case of the Middle East, where Islamist parties are clearly both popular among citizens and often inimical to core US interests, simple majority rule can lead to oppression of losers, violence against other countries in the region, support for terrorism, and the possibility of one person, one vote, one time (i.e., singular democratic elections followed by constitutional changes that work against future exercises in democracy). Where political reform has worked acceptably well, as in the cases of Turkey and, to lesser extents, Lebanon and Jordan, it has been in situations where Islamists were forced to moderate their agendas by relatively strong political systems involving significant forces besides a single, oppressive ruling party. That is not to say that Islam must be kept out of policies to create true democracy; most Muslims would insist on having their religion influence their political views to an extent. But genuine, peaceful political competition with protections for minorities and for electoral losers is of paramount importance.
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Soft Power Key to Effective Democracy PromotionBush Doctrine for Democracy Promotion Fails Because it Doesnt Incorporate Soft Power
BUSH DEMOCRACY PROMOTION LIMITED VIEWS ELECTIONS AS THE END RATHER THAN ONE PART OF THE STRATEGY Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 148-9 Another limitation of the Bush vision of democracy promotion has been a lack of appreciation of the fact that, by themselves, efforts to seek more elections cannot effectively rebuild societies. A healthy democracy requires a robust civil society that produces good candidates with serious platforms, and a citizenry aware of the challenges and tradeoffs that are inevitable in governing. Developing a healthy democracy requires programs that are expensive, multifaceted, and long term in nature. The Bush administration has made several small steps in helping a number of Mideast states strengthen their economies and their societies. Most notable, perhaps, has been the promotion of free-trade pacts with Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. But much more is required. For one thing, the concept of free-trade pacts with Middle East countries should be broadened to become a larger initiative that would include Egypt, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Indonesia. Through the lifting of textile quotas and other measures, this initiative could increase employment and expand income in these states by $40 billion a year, according to economist Edward Gresserhardly a panacea, but the kind of direct support for the working poor that can greatly help the economic health of the region. In addition, policy should go beyond existing ideas to complement the top-level push for political reform and free-trade pacts with stronger human talent and capacity. Rather than rely on a top-down approach, we should also work from the bottom up and build stronger societies and economies where possible. In this regard, educational reform is a critical challenge and opportunity. And there is a major role for outside donors, including the United States and a group of moderate but credible Muslims, to play in overseeing and guiding curriculum reform. We must support educational reform in the Islamic world wherever countries are prepared to put aid resources to good use in creating schools public or privatewith more nuanced curricula and a smaller role for firebrand clerics. A number of experts have pointed out that better education (or higher income) hardly guarantees less terrorismafter all, many of the 9/11 hijackers had studied in their home countries, and in the United States at an advanced level. But it is also true that societies lacking strong educational systems and thus the solid underpinnings of vibrant economies tend not to be health societies. As a result, cynicism and extremism are more likely to take root. At an individual level, better education and more money do not prevent terrorism. But the regions of the world that are busy educating their children, developing their economies, and otherwise building up their societies are generally not cauldrons of the Islamic extremism today.
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Soft Power Critical to Mid East Democracy Promotion
DECLINE OF US SOFT POWER IN MIDDLE EAST INCREASES ATTRACTIVENESS OF ISLAMIST ALTERNATIVES Joshua Kurlantzick, Visiting Scholar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005 , Current History, December, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Kurlantzick.pdf, p. 422 In the Middle East, declining American soft power may contribute to the growing attractiveness of Islamist alternatives. In several Muslim countries where the United States has given heavily promoted aid to civil society and womens rights groups, anti-Americanism is more muted than in other parts of the region. US SOFT POWER VITAL TO SUCCESSFUL DEMOCRACITIZATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 119-20 After 9/11, the Bush administration launched an ambitious new approach. Drawing on the analogy of the Cold War and the American role in the transformation of Europe, the administration decided that the United States should commit to a long-term transformation of the Middle East. The removal of Saddam Hussein was only a first step. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice argued that much as a democratic Germany became the linchpin of a new Europe that is today whole, free and at peace, so a transformed Iraq can become a key element in a very different Middle East in which the ideologies of hate will not flourish. But the exercise of hard power in the four-week campaign that toppled Saddam Hussein was the easy part. Germany (and Japan) were postwar success stories, but both were relatively homogenous societies with significant middle classes and no organized resistance to American occupation. Moreover, Iraqs possession of oil is a mixed blessing, since few oil-based economies have proven hospitable for liberal democracy. And, as we saw in chapter 2, democratization after World War II took years and was greatly assisted by American soft power. The long-run strategy for the transformation of Iraq and the Middle East will not succeed without a similar role for American (and others) soft power. EFFORTS TO INCREASE SOFT POWER WILL FAIL AS LONG AS OUR POLICIES ARE PERCEIVED TO BE HYPOCRITICAL WITH OUR VALUES Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 122-3 Much of the work of developing an open civil society can be promoted by corporations, foundations, universities, and other nonprofit organizations, as well as by governments. Companies and foundations can offer technology to help modernize Arab educational systems and take them beyond rote learning. American universities can establish more exchange programs for students and faculty. Foundations can support the development of institutions of American studies in Arab countries, or programs that enhance the professionalism of journalists. Governments can support the teaching of the English language and finance student exchanges. In short, there are many strands to an effective longterm strategy for creating soft-power resources and promoting conditions for the development of democracy. But, as I argued earlier, none will be effective unless the style and substance of American policies are consistent with the larger democratic message.
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Soft Power Critical to Mid East Democracy Promotion
BARRIERS TO DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST NOT INSURMOUNTABLE Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 120 The Cold War analogy is useful in suggesting the need for a long-term strategy, but it can also mislead. Soft power depends on willing receivers, and the cultural differences between the United States and Europe were not as great as those between the United States and the Middle East. Thus Europe was more susceptible to American soft-power resources. On the other hand, cultural differences did not prevent democracy from taking root in Japan or South Korea, albeit with a four-decade lag in the latter case. And democracy works in other Muslim countries such as Turkey and Bangladesh. The cultural barriers are far from insurmountable. VARIETY OF WAYS US CAN APPLY SOFT POWER TO PROMOTE BETTER RELATIONS WITH ARAB AND ISLAMIC WORLD Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 155 Although summits and exchanges are more naturally part of the realm of diplomacy than that of hard power, high-level diplomacy can play a role in the long-term war on terrorism. Former president Clinton provided an example of how effective such exchanges can be in a very well-received speech he gave to a set of American and Muslim world leaders in Qatar in January 2004. Clinton expressed admiration for Islams culture and history. He noted its common roots with Christianity and Judaism. He acknowledged the Wests tendency to be ignorant of the many aspects and characteristics and countries of the Islamic worldwhile at the same time challenging the common misperception among Muslims that the United States is indifferent to their well-being and always opposed to their interests. Of course, greater interaction between Western and Islamic societies should not depend exclusively or even primarily on the speeches of current or former officials. University, think tank, and other collaborations, some of them televised, can make a contribution as well. Government funding, delivered through an independent organization, may be useful for some such efforts, but may if not mostshould be unofficial, unabridged, and uncensored. Debate should be as prevalent as agreement, and it should cover a range of issues from religious doctrine to historical grievances and legacies to the role of women in society to the media to foreign-policy issues. Indeed, following the recommendations of the Djerejian Report, a 2003 task-force study focused on public diplomacy toward the Islamic world, a center for US-Arab/Muslim studies and dialogue might be created for this purpose. It could serve as the focal point for many such events in the United States, as well as for the ongoing scholarship, research, writing, and exchanges. In addition to a physical center, the United States and other donors should also establish a Middle East foundation to support these and other exchange activities.
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SHOULD EXERCISE SOFT POWER IN OUR DEALINGS WITH RUSSIA Joseph Nye, Harvard Professor, 2006, Financial Times (London, England), April 11, http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/publication.cfm?program=CORE&ctype=article&item_id=1428 There may not be as much conflict between these two agendas as first appears. If the US were to turn its back on Russia, we would not advance the growth of liberal democracy in Russia. Most Russian liberals I spoke to believed such isolation would accelerate the xenophobic and statist tendencies long present in Russian culture and make the liberal democratic cause even more difficult. In their view, the US should look to the long run, use our soft power of attraction, expand exchanges and contacts with Russia's new generation, support Russia's entry into the World Trade Organisation and address Russian deficiencies with specific criticisms rather than general harangues or counter-productive isolation. The sources of change in Russia will remain rooted in Russia, and American influence will be limited no matter what we do. But petulant actions that play well in American domestic politics may hinder rather than help Russians who share our values.
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Soft Power Key to Middle East Peace
MIDDLE EAST PEACE REQUIRES A COMBINATION OF HARD AND SOFT POWER Eli Fried, Policy Analyst, School of Government, Tel Aviv University, 2006, Jerusalem Report, October 16, p. 62 In an era of escalation of fundamentalist forces backed and heavily financed by Iran, military and economic tools are critical weapons in the arsenal of democratic states. However, no state, not the United States and certainly not Israel, can achieve its strategic objectives without recruiting willing partners to its cause. Only by combining "hard power" with " soft power " can states find the right mix of inducement, coercion and attraction in achieving their policy goals. The Lebanon conflict demonstrated that the moderate Muslim world is willing to play a cooperative role in achieving regional stability. It did not automatically side with its Shi'ite brothers against its Jewish cousins, at least not until Lebanese civilian casualties began to mount. And if Resolution 1701 - supported by the Arab League - is any indication, then it did not in the final analysis either. LEBANON WAR PROVED THAT SOFT POWER MATTERS MORE THAN HARD POWER Joseph S. Nye, Professor Harvard, 2006, The Boston Globe, August 19, http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/publication.cfm?program=CORE&ctype=article&item_id=1543 IN TRADITIONAL international conflicts, the side with the stronger military force tended to win. In today's information age, it is often the party with the stronger story that wins. Thus in addition to their shooting and killing, Israel and Hezbollah are struggling to shape the narrative that will prevail as the fighting stops. They are locked in a struggle over soft power the ability to get what you want by attraction rather than coercion. The ability to combine hard and soft power into a winning strategy is smart power and, thus far, Hezbollah seems ahead on that score. All that Hezbollah needs to win is not to lose, and to be able to tell the story that it was the only Muslim force brave enough to stand up to Israel. Sadly, the struggle over soft power did not have to turn out this way. When Hezbollah kidnapped Israeli soldiers and launched rockets across the border, the actions were condemned by many Lebanese and criticized by Sunni Arab governments such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Today that public criticism has vanished, and Hezbollah is lauded for resisting Israel. Israel used its hard military power in a manner that bolstered Hezbollah's soft power and legitimacy in Arab eyes, including many Sunnis who were originally skeptical of a Shi'ite organization with ties to nonArab Iran. We know that terrorist organizations most often lose popular support by their own excesses witness the drop among Jordanians in the soft power of Al Qaeda in Iraq, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, after the organization bombed a wedding in an Amman hotel.
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Soft Power Good: US Faces Stiff Competition for Soft Power Leadership in the Middle East
IRAN INCREASING SOFT POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST Dr. Mills, Brenthurst Foundation, 2006, Africa News, August 22, http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/topstories.aspx?ID=BD4A254241 The real winner in the war in Lebanon is Iran. But the extent of its victory is not yet public or clear. In the battle of public perceptions, its victory was assured in the Islamic world and further afield the moment Israel launched what many saw as a disproportionate military response to the abduction of its soldiers. But Tehran's real victory will come in the aftermath of battle, during reconstruction. While the international community spends a fortune on inserting a peacekeeping force, Iran will fund the rebuilding of Hezbollah communities, dishing out aid, captivating communities and ensuring religious patronage. While the Iranians reportedly assisted in arming Hezbollah with advanced wire- and laser-guided antitank weaponry and large numbers of relatively crude ground-to-ground missiles, their real advantage will come after the sound of gunfire through the use of " soft power ". Where the west will have elaborate procedures to ensure its aid money is spent properly, the Iranians will resort to much blunter but likely more effective, and certainly faster, tactics. While the west speaks of "effects-based operations" in post-conflict societies, in reality it conducts valuebased operations, focusing on the delivery of assistance in line with western liberal governance norms and standards of transparency and accountability. The term soft power, as opposed to military hard power, is American, created by those who wanted the US to exploit its advantages of economic and cultural power better in winning the contest for hearts and minds. But while the phrase may be American it is others, notably Iranians, who show mastery at putting it into practice, and not just in places like Lebanon. LOTS OF COMPETITION FOR EXERCISING SOFT POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST Dr. Mills, Brenthurst Foundation, 2006, Africa News, August 22, http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/topstories.aspx?ID=BD4A254241 Neither are the Iranians alone in using soft power to win over communities. Elsewhere in the Muslim world, the Brotherhood has been doing it for years in Egypt. Where communities lack medical care, the Brotherhood uses doctors to offer free consultations as a condition for membership. These opportunities are doled out in disadvantaged communities, strengthening lines of patronage and support for the Brotherhood's aims. It uses lack of government delivery to its advantage. Aid delivery in a country such as Afghanistan is a tortuous affair. Bureaucratic procedures and security ensure the ratio of expenditure (on security forces, consultants, administration and other forms of bureaucracy) versus aid delivered is much lower and slower. Because the west delivers by its own rules, local actors can seldom use the money to their own advantage and in the way their system operates and understands, as patronage and for political power as much as the goal of socioeconomic development. Another feature of western aid is how little credit donors receive from recipients for what is genuinely massive assistance. The link between the new school or mini power station, and the white aid workers in their white four-wheel-drives is rarely made, while many in the aid community regard aid as essentially neutral. This is not how Hezbollah and their backers see it, and they want and make sure they receive every drop of political credit going Such effective use of soft power is also hard to object to, let alone counter. Arguing against the supply of guns to terrorist organisations is one thing, but, whatever their motives, if the Iranians also seek to influence societies by funding reconstruction, how can we protest? In the global contest for hearts and minds, policy makers may be overfocusing on their opponents' guns rather than their butter.
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Soft Power Good: US Faces Stiff Competition for Soft Power Leadership in the Middle East
IRAN USING SOFT POWER TO NEUTRALIZE US AND ISRAELI HARD POWER ADVANTAGES Dr. Mills, Brenthurst Foundation, 2006, Africa News, August 22, http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/topstories.aspx?ID=BD4A254241 How Iran will use its victory remains to be seen. It is unlikely, however, to be encouraged to seek compromise with the west over its nuclear issues. It probably now fears less the military advantage enjoyed by Israel, the US and others. Whatever tactical damage they can mete out will pale in comparison to the public diplomatic advantage Iran would gain as a result -- a David and Goliath contest with the weak exploiting the enemy's strength. But Tehran is not weak, just very astutely playing the game to its own rules.
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Soft Power Best for Russian Democratization
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Soft Power Good: North Korea: Soft Power Necessary for North Korean Prolif Resolution
SOFT-POWER APPROACH ONLY SOLUTION TO NORTH KOREAN NUKES MOVING AWAY FROM ARROGANT AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM ONLY WAY TO ACHIEVE IT Jawhar Hassan, CEO of ISIS Malaysia, 2006, New Straits Times, (Malaysia), October 8, 2006; Pg. 23
The failed strategies have left the US and the international community with few viable options to stop North Korea from going nuclear and inducing responses that could spiral out of control. What then, can be done? Put in a nutshell, the US should abandon its extreme posture and adopt the South Korean, Chinese and Russian approach to the problem. It should soften its hard line, eschew name-calling and desist from its demonisation of North Korea. It should cease talk of regime change and stop demanding economic and political reform. They will come eventually. In the absence of an external threat, the regime must either change or die. No rulers of a society where 37 per cent of its children are stunted, 23 per cent underweight, and seven per cent "wasted" (as the World Food Programme puts it), can survive for long without dramatically improving matters, unless they are propped up by an external threat. Instead, the US should go into direct negotiations, either independently or within the framework of the six-party talks. All parties should work without pre-conditions which have hitherto frozen progress. The package should contain generous economic and other inducements to North Korea to abandon its nuclear programme. They should not be viewed as appeasement, capitulation or "rewards" to North Korea for "bad behaviour". They should be viewed as pragmatic options to induce North Korea to abandon its nuclear programme. Above all, North Korea must be assured of its security. It will not abandon the quest for nuclear weapons unless it is given a firm assurance. This the US can easily provide through a bilateral or multilateral peace pact that includes countries like Japan, South Korea, China and Russia, to replace the 1953 armistice agreement. The peace pact must contain solemn undertakings for respect of sovereignty, non-interference, non- use of force or threat of force, and mutual non-aggression. In return, North Korea must abandon its nuclear weapons programme, re-join the non- proliferation regime and open itself to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. If a peace pact can be successfully inked, the US and its allies can terminate their annual military exercises off the Korean peninsula. As confidence returns and the environment for peace solidifies, there will also be less need for the US to station as many forces in the region. All this requires a radical, even revolutionary, transformation in American strategic culture and mindset. It can begin by the leaders shedding some of their self-perception of moral elitism because it breeds arrogance and intolerance. Though there is much to admire in some of America's values, its double standards abroad disqualify such notions. The US will also need to employ less coercion and more persuasion. There must be less militarism in foreign policy, and its postures be driven less by intolerant and extreme ideology and more by tolerant pragmatism. It must be less inflexible and more accommodating. It must engage more and retain lines of communication with foes, not sever them. Respect for international law and recourse to global institutions should be a norm rather than an option only when convenient. Such a radical change is not impossible. It may be unthinkable for the neo-conservatives and the Cheneys, Rumsfelds and Boltons, but not impossible for some of the State Department-types and the likes of Madeleine Albright and Colin Powell. The impending change in administration provides an opportunity for change. If the US is able to transform its strategies for peace, not only on the Korean peninsula but also in West Asia, South America and elsewhere, then it can regain some of its moral lustre, replenish its depleted soft power, and become a more humane and benevolent force for global good. A gentler, more even-handed and pragmatic America will be able to promote its national interest more effectively this way.
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Soft Power Good: North Korea: Soft Power Necessary for North Korean Prolif Resolution
SOFT POWER APPROACH ALLOWS THE US AND CHINA TO COOPERATE TO NEUTRALIZE THE NORTH KOREAN THREAT The Business Times Singapore, 2006, October 11, p. Lexis Moreover, creative US diplomacy could probably seek to work with China, South Korea and Japan to transform the current crisis into an opportunity for establishing an informal security system in the region to deter North Korea while trying to weaken and subvert the regime in Pyongyang and prepare for its eventual collapse. DIPLOMACY EMPIRICALLY SUCCESSFUL WITH NORTH KOREA Yonhap (South Korea), 2006, November 29, p. Lexis Cirincione used the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework as an example of how an agreement is possible with North Korea. Pyongyang at the time pledged a freeze in its nuclear activities in return for a set of light-water reactors financed by an international consortium. The pact fell through with the U.S. accusation that the North was hiding another secret nuclear weapons program using uranium But Cirincione argued the differences between then and now are "empirical evidence" that negotiations do work with North Korea. "During the 1990s, North Korea did not produce a single gram of plutonium," he said. BUSH REGIME CHANGE APPROACH SPARKED THE CURENT CRISIS NEED A DIPLOMATIC RESPONSE Yonhap (South Korea), 2006, November 29, p. Lexis He blamed outgoing Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld for leading the country in the wrong direction. "One of the worst parts of Rumsfeld's tenure in office was the support he gave to this regime change option and the view that we did not have to negotiate with these regimes, that we can overthrow the regimes," he said. The new secretary-designate, Robert Gates, is by comparison a pragmatist, he said. "When we coerce North Korea, their program accelerates and advances," Cirincione said. Chances for negotiations are "still there," he stressed. "It's waiting for us. It depends on the decision of this administration of President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney, whether they are serious of negotiating that deal or not." The key is to make the deal attractive enough, said Cirincione. "It's not too late. At the very least, we have to make one final genuine effort to negotiate an end to the North Korean program," he said.
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Soft Power Good: North Korea: Soft Power Necessary for North Korean Prolif Resolution
RE-ESTABLISHING MORAL HIGH GROUND ONLY SOLUTION TO NORTH KOREAN NUKES Jonathan B. Penn, Attorney, 2006, Aviation Week & Space Technology, October 23, Volume 165, No. 16, p. 78 If the U.S. is to have any hope of putting the North Korean genie back in the bottle--much less keeping one corked that seems likely to emerge soon in Iran--it must drastically change its approach to its own nuclear weapons and those of its allies. Sanctions alone are not apt to work. Only after occupying the moral high ground will the U.S. have any chance of success. No one disputes that everything about the North Korean regime is repugnant. From the Orwellian mindcontrol exerted by the "Dear Leader" on his people to the Soviet-style gulags and the bone-crushing poverty he inflicts on millions, nothing about Kim Jong Il's rule can be condoned. However, our repugnance should not be allowed to interfere with a constructive approach to an ongoing problem--and one that could easily spread to other nations. The U.S. faces this crisis with a severely depleted store of options. Looking at military avenues, air power alone will not suffice. The U.S. has little idea where all of North Korea's nuclear weapons are stored, and what is known suggests much is buried deep in hardened facilities. With the bulk of U.S. ground forces engaged in, preparing for or recovering from deployment in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. cannot viably threaten a ground campaign against North Korea. And even if the U.S. were willing to launch a strike, Pyongyang's response would be devastating to South Korea and disruptive to the world economy. On the diplomatic front, given the intelligence disaster underlying assertions about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, there will be a reluctance to accept at face-value Washington's assessment of the size of North Korea's arsenal or intentions. Given Washington's de facto endorsement of India's nuclear weapons program and its tacit approval of Pakistan's and Israel's, U.S. diplomatic options for thwarting proliferation are dangerously vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy. The U.S. needs some innovative thinking at this juncture. The place to look for that is in the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT). Although Washington is attempting to use the NPT as a club against both North Korea and Iran, the NPT was not meant to be a one-sided agreement only to keep non-nuclear powers from crossing that line. Rather, the NPT was premised on a quid pro quo: the declared nuclear powers (the U.S., Soviet Union, Britain, France and China) would work toward the elimination of their arsenals while other nations would forgo development of such weapons. One has to look no further than the stories featured on this week's cover (see p. 56) to see that the five nuclear powers have failed in any significant way to live up to their end of the bargain. If the U.S. wants and expects support from the rest of the world to eliminate the North Korean nuclear threat and, by extension the potential nuclear threat from Iran, it needs to offer unambiguous evidence of its own commitment to eliminating--or vastly reducing--nuclear weapons across the board.
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Soft Power Good: North Korea: Loss of Soft Power Spurred North Korean Proliferation
LOW SOFT POWER ASSOCIATED WITH BUSH UNDERMINES ANY SOLUTION FOR NORTH KOREAN PROLIF Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 249 In the international arena, we make the case for a more vigorous and robust approach to tackling proliferation in North Korea and elsewhere around the globe. Here, the goal has to be sharpen the stark choice offered would-be proliferators more engagement with the world on the one hand, or punishment and coercion by a united international front on the other. The Bush administration has failed in this effort because its international standing is so low that it cannot credibly threaten the stick and often lacks imagination and sincerity in how it employs carrots. NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR THREAT DUE TO A FAILURE OF SOFT POWER LEADERSHIP Jawhar Hassan, CEO of ISIS Malaysia, 2006, New Straits Times, (Malaysia), October 8, 2006; Pg. 23 THE crisis looming in Northeast Asia is another unfortunate example of the failure of diplomacy and political accommodation in the post-World War Two era. From Palestine to Cuba, Kashmir, Iraq, Iran and North Korea, the story is the same: An inability to pursue interests and resolve issues through moderate approaches, even-handed mediation and pragmatic accommodation. While the blame has to be borne by all sides, the greater share lies primarily with the Western powers. Driven sometimes by uncompromising dogma, and always by a tendency to leverage upon the area where they enjoy the greatest comparative advantage, namely the capacity to apply military and economic pressure, issues become intractable. The potential for virulent confrontation and violent conflict then increases. NORTH KOREAN TEST DEMONSTRATES FAILURE OF US LEADERSHIP AND LOSS OF SOFT POWER U.S. Newswire, 2006, October 9, p. Lexis But North Korea's test demonstrates more than a failure of U.S. policy toward North Korea. Like the India and Pakistan nuclear test explosions in the last few years, this test reflects a failure of U.S. leadership in protecting and strengthening the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Senate rejected ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999, and now the Bush administration, which has refused to support ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, bear a special responsibility for this failure. The failure of the Bush administration to support international non-proliferation initiatives or to support effective diplomacy to strengthen the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has put us all at risk. The United States should not respond to the reports of a North Korean nuclear test by escalating the level of threats. North Korea should be and will be condemned for breaking the nuclear testing moratorium. But North Korea does not pose an imminent nuclear threat to South Korea, Japan, the United States or any other country. The U.S. should work with the international community, and particularly with all the countries of East Asia, to develop peaceful, diplomatic initiatives to overcome the consequences of the failure of coercive diplomacy. One key component of this new strategy should be direct, bilateral talks.
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Soft Power Good: North Korea: AT: Bush Wont Employ Soft Power Approach Toward North Korea Even if we have Credible Soft Power
BUSH SHIFTING TOWARD MORE PRAGMATIC RESPONSE TO NORTH KOREA EMBRACING SOFT POWER AND MULTILATERALISM SOLUTIONS The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 2006, October 22, Pg. 1E Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice took an unusually conciliatory approach as she toured Asian capitals this weekend to shore up support for sanctions against North Korea. In Seoul she called on Asian leaders to use their leverage to get North Korea to return to six-party talks, adding that Washington "wants to leave open the path to negotiations" and doesn't "want the situation to escalate." The rhetoric was in sharp contrast to the administration's tough talk and action in Iraq, where ultimately faulty evidence of weapons of mass destruction was cited as the major motivation for going to war in 2003. With North Korea now unmistakably part of the nuclear club, Rice's careful diplomatic tone in Asia represents a quiet shift toward pragmatism in some areas of foreign policy by the Bush administration over recent months, experts around the world said. Increasingly, "the unilateralist approach is seen as the wrong way to go in Washington," said Jia Qingguo, vice dean of Peking University's School of International Studies. "It's undermining U.S. soft power and influence in the Asia region and around the world. "It's more and more necessary for the U.S. to cooperate with other countries," Jia added. As more than 140,000 American soldiers in Iraq try to quell the ongoing insurgency, Washington is searching for a new way forward, or a way out. Like North Korea, Iran continues to pursue its nuclear ambitions, despite U.S. efforts to push the U.N. Security Council to enact punishing sanctions. The difficulty of going it alone in the world has convinced some administration policy-makers that it is time to shift course. In April, President Bush formed the Iraq Study Group, a bipartisan panel headed by former Secretary of State James Baker, to recommend Middle East policy changes. US AND NORTH KOREA HAVE AGREED TO RETURN TO TALKS Yonhap (South Korea), 2006, November 30, p.Lexis North Korea and the United States agreed Wednesday to resume the six-way talks over Pyongyang's nuclear program as soon as possible, China's Foreign Ministry was quoted as saying. China's official Xinhua news agency quoted the ministry as saying the top negotiators of China, the North Korea and the U.S. agreed to make joint efforts to resume the six-party talks at an early date. The three parties also agreed to strive for the progress of the talks, it added. No other details were provided, however. DEMOCRATIC VICTORY IN THE MIDTERMS IMPROVES PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL DIPLOMATIC RESOLUTION Yonhap (South Korea), 2006, November 29, p. Lexis The success of nuclear negotiations with North Korea hinges on the George W. Bush administration, which can still strike a viable deal with the regime, a U.S. nonproliferation expert argued Tuesday. Joseph Cirincione, senior vice president of the Center for American Progress, said he was optimistic of successful talks, given the Democrats' victory in this month's mid-term elections and the U.S. foreign policy focus on Iraq. Compared to the situation in the Middle East, the North Korea issues are "least difficult," he said at a luncheon talk sponsored by the South Korean embassy. After staying away for nearly a year, Pyongyang agreed last month to the six-party talks aimed at denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. South and North Korea, the U.S., China, Russia and Japan are members of the talks.
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Soft Power Good: North Korea: AT: Turn: US Soft Power Pressure on China Risks War with North Korea
CHINA HAS ALREADY USED COERCIVE MEASURES AGAINST NORTH KOREA Evan Medeiros & M. Taylor Fravel, Rand, 2003, Asian Wall Street Journal, The Changing Face of Chinese Diplomacy, http://www.rand.org/commentary/112503AWSJ.html Chinese diplomats were instrumental in bringing about a first round of tripartite discussions and six-party talks. Since then, senior Chinese officials have shuttled between Pyongyang and Washington to maintain momentum for the next round. Beijing has also used coercive measures such as a reported temporary suspension of oil supplies, an inspection of a North Korean ship in a Chinese port and shifting troop deployments on the China-North Korean border. ONLY WAY US COULD PERSUADE CHINA TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA IS TO CHANGE ITS NEGOTIATION POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA FIRST Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 232-3 Failing that, China and South Korea in particular should curb their investment activities in North Korea as well as their trade relations. They are the two countries keeping the DPRK afloat. While humanitarian aid is desirable under any circumstances, types of assistance that prop up the regime only make sense if the regime is behaving in an acceptable or at least a promising and improvingmanner. That is, for the most part, not happening at present (on this point, Bush administration hardliners are right). But Washington has been unable to convince Seoul and Beijing to move to a policy of coercion so far. Its only chance of doing so in the future requires that it seriously attempt negotiations with North Korea first, with an eye towards inducing Pyongyang to attempt the path followed by Vietnam and China itself.
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Soft Power Good: North Korea: AT: Turn: US Soft Power Pressure on China Risks War with North Korea
CHINA HAS ALREADY AGREED TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA Susan L. Shirk, Professor, Pacific Studies, UCSD, 2006, The Statesman (India), October 31, p. Lexis In the future, people may point to the North Korean nuclear crisis as a turning point that brought China on the same side as the USA and Japan, instead of creating two hostile blocs in Asia. To keep China onboard, the Bush administration must convince Beijing along with Pyongyang of its good faith that it uses sanctions to pull North Korea back to the negotiating table and not put a noose around its neck. The conventional wisdom was that Beijing would never pressure North Korea for two reasons: It is more afraid of destabilising its neighbour and driving thousands of refugees across the border into North-east China a region troubled by massive unemployment and labour unrest than it is of a North Korea armed with nuclear weapons, and it wants to prevent Korean reunification under a government led by Seoul that could place US armed forces right on China's border. This time, however, China, defied expectations. It voted 'yes' on a muscular UN Security Council resolution that, while ruling out the use of force for the time being, is much stronger than anything that China a long-time opponent of sanctions especially in its own neighbourhood has been willing to swallow in the past. China's ambassador to the UN was misquoted by the Press to say that China would not enforce inspections of North Korean freight as required by the resolution. But in fact, he only ruled out interdicting ships at sea, a dangerous mission that even gives the USA a military pause. Trucks carrying cargo from North Korea are inspected at the Chinese border. The Chinese government has gone beyond the resolution's requirements to order at least some banks to halt transactions with North Korea, a stern measure that devastates the nation's ability to conduct foreign trade. Chinese banking regulators have been queasy about handling money from North Korea ever since the USA identified a bank in Macao, the former Portuguese colony now part of the People's Republic of China, as a conduit allegedly used by Pyongyang to launder counterfeit US dollars. The Chinese entrepreneurs who invested money in North Korean mines and factories don't need an explicit order from the government to put their projects on ice. Beijing has signalled a change in attitude, and the risks of doing business in North Korea drastically increased as a result. Even before North Korea's nuclear blast, China had raised the price it charged Pyongyang for oil. If North Korea refuses to return to talks or tests again, China may close the pipeline temporarily as it did in 2003. China's propaganda authorities allow Chinese tabloids and internet news sites to criticise North Korea's actions freely, a sure sign that they are building popular support for a tough response. China's own interests motivate the tough stance with its erstwhile ally: For one thing, China's pride is involved. North Korean leader Kim Jong Il violated minimum standards of the traditional friendship between the two Communist countries last summer when he refused to meet a high-level Chinese envoy sent to Pyongyang to discuss the missile tests or with Mao Zedong's son during an annual visit to the grave of his brother killed during the 1950-1953 Korean War. Beijing sees the timing of the nuclear test during the Chinese Communist Party's most important annual meeting, the day after the new Japanese Prime Minister, Mr Shinzo Abe visited Chinese President Hu Jintao, and just following its week-long National Day holiday as a deliberate slap in the face. The government's statement following the test was the most sharply worded of any country's, reflecting genuine anger. China is more concerned about its own international reputation than it used to be. It took pride in the Six Party Talks, its unprecedented effort to mediate the conflict that Pyongyang now has spoiled. Beijing seeks to show the world that it is a responsible power by distancing itself from North Korea's roguish violation of international norms. China also has an interest in preserving the global non-proliferation regime, teetering on the brink of collapse, and not seeing its status as a member of the elite club of acknowledged nuclear powers diluted. Although Americans may not yet recognise it, the newest and most important factor driving China's response is its relationship with Japan. China's highest foreign-policy priority in Asia is repairing its troubled relations with Japan, and the Chinese realise that the North Korean nuclear crisis can help them do that. A common enemy can unite even countries that don't like each other much. Public opinion in China and Japan had grown mutually hostile as Chinese leaders pumped up nationalism as a way to bolster support for the Communist Party. Former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, which honours Japanese martyrs from World War II, including 14 convicted war criminals, outraged Chinese citizens. Student protests against Japan erupted in 25 cities in spring, 2005. Chinese politicians didn't dare invite Mr Koizumi to China or meet him outside the country. Mr Hu and Mr Koizumi never picked up the telephone to call each other after
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North Korea tested missiles this summer, although each man consulted leaders of every other country in the region. Their territorial dispute over the possibly oil-rich waters in the East China Sea intensified. Most worrisome from the standpoint of the Chinese politicians was the possibility of patriotic students taking to the streets against their own weakkneed government the next time a Japanese Prime Minister visited Yasukuni. Many of the Chinese political elite blame the dangerous deterioration of relations with Japan on former Chinese President Jiang Zemin, whose Patriotic Education Campaign had stirred historical memories of Japan's occupation of China during the 1930s and 1940s. Mr Jiang's harping on history to senior officials, even the emperor, when he visited Japan in 1998 further estranged the Japanese public and its politicians. Mr Hu is eager to contrast his diplomatic skills with those of his predecessor. His administration worked out a pragmatic understanding with Mr Abe to get relations back on track. China announced an 'agreement to eliminate the political obstacle' while Mr Abe remained publicly noncommittal about whether he intended to visit Yasukuni. Mr Abe made Beijing rather than Washington the destination of his first foreign trip. The diplomatic breakthrough was a triumph for Mr Hu until North Korea spoiled it. Showing backbone against North Korea also discourages Tokyo from following Pyongyang down the nuclear path. From the Chinese perspective, a nuclear Japan is a nightmare more horrifying than a nuclear North Korea. The Japanese, directly threatened by North Korean missiles, are more likely to open the question if they see the Chinese passively accept North Korea's nuclear weapons. The North Korean nuclear test, by driving China to become part of the solution and averting conflict between China and Japan, shifted strategic ground in Northeast Asia. Paradoxically, it may have made Northeast Asia less dangerous, not more so.
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Soft Power Good: North Korea: AT: Turn: US Soft Power Pressure on China Risks War with North Korea
SOFT POWER ALLOWS US TO PERSUADE OTHERS TO NOT DO BUSINESS WITH NORTH KOREA AND IRAN DOES NOT REQUIRE IMPOSITION OF FORMAL SANCTIONS The Washington Post, 2006, October 12, p. A27 North Korea has, in its own inimitable fashion, paid tribute to a little-noticed U.S. push to get the world's bankers to isolate regimes that promote nuclear proliferation and terrorism. Who else would claim to have conducted a nuclear weapons test and then threaten more blasts to get their way in a $24 million banking dispute? Don't they have any good lawyers in Pyongyang? North Korea's efforts to blame its crossing of the nuclear-testing threshold on U.S. "economic hostility" would be laughable if the regime weren't led by world-class paranoids and fantasists capable of believing their own odious propaganda. Americans do not have to believe it, however. Such a regime may be beyond reasoning with or, even worse, deterring in a conventional sense, as the Bush administration seems to believe. But Pyongyang's threats -- if not its excuses -- must be taken seriously and met with new forms of containment and pressure. The same is true of Iran, the other major target of the Treasury Department's efforts "to isolate bad actors from the global financial system" by calling attention to their use of banks for rogue operations. That description comes from Stuart Levey, Treasury undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence. I happened to call on him yesterday a few hours after Pyongyang had threatened more nuclear and verbal blasts if the United States continued its "sanctions" policy. "If the objective was to put pressure on North Korea, well, we succeeded," said Levey, who has joined Deputy Treasury Secretary Robert Kimmitt in traveling the globe to persuade other governments to examine and, where appropriate, cut financial links to the two remaining members of President Bush's "axis of evil." But the purpose of this effective new effort at using soft power as pressure is much broader. According to Levey, Treasury is targeting people who are eminently deterrable: "People who are in business are very concerned about their reputations and do not want to get involved in illicit activity that is under scrutiny. They will make the decisions about whether they continue doing business or not. We don't make the decision for them." So Levey disputes North Korea's characterization of U.S. policy as being one of politically driven "sanctions." Treasury's efforts are targeted at specific illicit transactions, such as the counterfeiting of U.S. currency; the transfer of funds involved in the smuggling of drugs, arms or even nuclear-weapons components; and the financing of terrorist operations.
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Soft Power Good: North Korea: AT: Turn: US Soft Power Pressure on China Risks War with North Korea
US NOT PRESSURING CHINA TO ADOPT TOUGH SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA CHINA WONT DO IT EVEN IF WE DO Michael Green, CSIS, 2006, CSIS Press Briefing, Federal News Service, November 10, p. Lexis The U.S.-China cooperation on North Korea has improved dramatically, and the Chinese are taking concrete steps to implement Security Council Resolution 1718, freezing bank accounts. Don't look for the Chinese to close the border or end all trade -- that's never been part of the plan. But they are doing specific things to hurt the North Koreans. The president will meet with Abe, the new Japanese Prime Minister, for an extended lunch. Essentially, they're all on the same page on North Korea. The difficult one will be with Roh Moo- Hyun of South Korea. President Roh has said he's all for 1718 security council resolutions, but in fact the Republic of Korea is doing virtually nothing to impose a cost on the north. That will be a difficult discussion. It's my view that the shift from Secretary Rumsfeld to presumably Secretary Gates, is actually going to help that meeting because there were certain issues where Secretary Rumsfeld was pushing the Koreans hard, like transferring wartime operational command, where Bob Gates is going to be much more your father's Republican. Much more focused on stability and alliance maintenance. But it's nevertheless the most difficult on North Korea the president will have. US CANT GET SOUTH KOREA AND CHINA ON BOARD FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA UNTIL IT HAS SERIOUSLY PURSUED NEGOTIATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 234 Should negotiations fail, the option of coercive action would be the natural recourse. On the economic front, the goal should be to convince South Korea and China that their current level of economic engagement would be inappropriate if North Korea refused a reasonable deal. Moreover, with a new US president in place, North Korea could no longer blame the Bush administrations preemption doctrine or axis-of-evil construct for its behavior. It would lose the excuse that it was in Americas crosshairs, reducing whatever sympathy the world had occasionally felt for it during the Bush years. Military options would not be totally off the table, especially if North Korea either threatened to sell nuclear materials abroad or continued construction on its large reactors. One possibility, though hardly a panacea, would be a surgical military strike against the large reactors. Even though it is too late to prevent North Korea from having the plutonium for perhaps eight bombs, it is not too late to prevent North Korea from becoming an industrial-scale producer of weapons. An all-out war would run too high a chance of causing the very outcome that it was designed to preventdetonation of at least one nuclear weapon in a major city, be it Seoul or Washington or Seattle. That said, the United States and the Republic of Korea would have to be braced for possible war after any limited use of airpower, since they would not be able to predict how North Korea might respond. The punitive option that would make the most sense after failed talks, however, would center on economics. Economic coercion may well become feasible if North Korea refused the model of Vietnam and insisted on retaining its nuclear weapons and its Stalinist ways. But the viability of a strategy of economic coercion, designed to so pressure Pyongyang that it would fear regime collapse and therefore have to reassess its earlier decision to have nuclear weapons, will depend not only on the outcome of the South Korean presidential elections in 2007 but on the willingness of the United States to first attempt the type of engagement strategy we propose ahead.
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Soft Power Good: North Korea: AT: Turn: US Soft Power Pressure on China Risks War with North Korea
CHINA AND SOUTH KOREA WANT US TO ADOPT SOFT POWER APPROACH TOWARD NORTH KOREA The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 2006, October 22, Pg. 1E Potential fallout. The talks haven't stopped Pyongyang from pursuing its nuclear arsenal, but some analysts now say North Korea's nuclear test may have galvanized the United States and its partners. Others see an enduring ideological streak running through even that effort at multilateral cooperation. Beijing and Seoul would like Washington to "take a softer line" toward North Korea, but the Bush administration "has an evangelical attitude on the basis of its political ideologies," said Jaebum Kim, a professor of diplomacy at Yonsei University in Seoul. "I don't see any possibility of change toward a more practical line." RESPONSE TO NORTH KOREAN TEST HAS BEEN ONE OF MEASURED DIPLOMACY WORKING NOW Kurt Campbell, CSIS, 2006, CSIS Press Briefing, Federal News Service, November 10, p. Lexis Now, when you ask yourself, does all that matter very much? It matters on the margins a little bit. You've got to try to isolate North Korea and create incentives for them to come back to the table. But the most important thing to do is to stop further damage. Further damage to me means other countries thinking crazy things about, look, let's really go out and think about nuclear weapons ourselves; let's think about new military strategies. I don't see any sign of that. And in fact, as I said before, you could not ask for better diplomacy since the detonation of the nuclear weapon in North Korea than what you've seen from the United States, China, Japan, and even, to a lesser extent, South Korea. CHINA AND SOUTH KOREA WILL RESIST PRESSURE FROM THE US TO USE THREATS AGAINST NORTH KOREA The Business Times Singapore, 2006, October 11, p. Lexis But China and South Korea are expected to resist threatening North Korea with the use of military force. Similarly, US proposals to impose an air and naval blockade on North Korea will probably also be considered by the Chinese as reckless. A blockade is considered an act of war under international law and the North Korean leadership might well consider it a prelude to a US-led attack and react accordingly.
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Soft Power Good: North Korea: AT: Turn: US Soft Power Pressure on China Risks War with North Korea
UNLIKELY TO CONVINCE CHINA TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON NORTH KOREA AGAINST ITS NATIONAL INTERESTS Cox News Service, 2006, October 20, p. Lexis For Washington, however, convincing Beijing and other states to step up pressure beyond what is in their own national interests is increasingly difficult - another reason that the Bush administration has adopted a conciliatory approach. Chinese leaders fear that too hard a line against North Korea could destroy decades of goodwill between the nations and possibly lead to the collapse of the North Korean government, creating an exodus of refugees into China's poor northeastern provinces and possibly allowing the United States to establish a "puppet state" along China's border, said Jin Canrong, a foreign policy expert at People's University in Beijing. China also considers North Korea to be an important buffer against U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, a strategically important consideration if Beijing were to attack Taiwan, a democratically run island that China says it eventually will reclaim. REGIME CHANGE IS NOT AN OPTION ON THE TABLE FOR NORTH KOREA NOW Mike Green, CSIS, 2006, CSIS Press Briefing, Federal News Service, November 10, p. Lexis If the North Koreans continue on this path, we can contain, we can work this issue, but the most important diplomacy will be with China and with the ROK in Japan. And I think if the North Koreans keep on this path, the Chinese thinking will continue to evolve in ways where we have more options, frankly. Regime change is not an option right now -couldn't make it happen. I was never aware when I was in the administration of anyone actively putting in place regime change strategies on North Korea. But if the Chinese, after two or three years of seeing the North Koreans destabilize the neighborhood and start changing their tune, they may start changing thinking in the other capitals as well. We're not there now, but that's one possibility. SOUTH KOREA HAS OUTLINED A SOFT POWER/DIPLOMACY APPROACH TO NORTH KOREA Yonhap (South Korea), 2006, November 30, p.Lexis South Korea's former unification minister urged the United States to launch high-level ministerial talks with North Korea to build the mutual trust necessary to resolving the nuclear issue. Chung Dong-young, a presidential contender in next year's election, said the U.S. should conclude its investigation of a bank that is at the center of financial sanctions on Pyongyang and release all licit funds. Speaking at a lecture arranged by the U.S.-Korea Institute, the former minister said there are ways to open opportunities for solving the North Korean nuclear dilemma. Washington could appoint a North Korea policy coordinator or send someone like Christopher Hill, chief U.S. nuclear negotiator, to Pyongyang, he said. "I would also like to see the launching of ministerial-level talks in addition to the six-party talks," he said South and North Korea, the U.S., China, Russia and Japan are members of the six-nation forum aimed at denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. After nearly a year of boycott, Pyongyang agreed last month to return to the talks it left after the U.S. Treasury took punitive actions against Macau's Banco Delta Asia (BDA). The bank is accused of laundering money for the North and abetting the country's illicit activities such as the counterfeiting of American currency and drug smuggling. The Treasury's investigation of BDA accounts has yet to be concluded. "The U.S., first of all, must announce its findings on BDA accounts. It must publicly show which of the accounts are from illegal, illicit activities," said Chung. "The U.S. must lift sanctions on accounts proven to be clean." He said Washington should prioritize the issues, putting the nuclear resolution at top of the agenda. Sanctions and pressure strengthen regimes rather than weaken it, he said.
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Soft Power Good: North Korea: AT: Chinese Soft Power Lead Good Better at Resolving North Korean Prolif
CHINESE SOFT POWER LEAD NOT A BETTER SOLUTION TO NORTH KOREAN PROLIF THEY DONT WANT TO PREVENT IT Ashok Kapur, Professor University of Waterloo, Asian Nuclear Issues specialist, 2006, The Record (Kitchener-Waterloo, Ontario), November 21, Pg. A7 What's going on? What's China's role in the North Korean situation? What does Pyongyang expect to achieve by the renunciation of its acceptance of the NPT, its conducting of nuclear weapons and missiles test, and its subsequent agreement to return to the six-nations talks to disarm North Korea? What is its negotiating strategy? North Korea's nuclear and missile actions in recent months were a brazen defiance of its international obligations -- and cause for concern in the world community. But those tests demonstrate that a small power can secure leverage by its strategic location, and its ability to participate in a complex set of relationships involving China on the one hand, and Japan and the U.S. on the other. China is the key, in two ways, as the promoter of North Korea's nuclear and missile program, and as a negotiator acting on behalf of the U.S. and Japan. In Chinese thinking, its relationship with Pyongyang is between the lips and the teeth. It is an old relationship and it is well orchestrated. China is North Korea's main supplier of oil and food It is in the context of China's policy that the North Koreans have international leverage. Beijing's policy is driven not by a desire to de-nuclearize North Korea, but rather it is to use the North Korean nuclear and missile card to diminish U.S. influence in the region and to weaken the American-Japanese and the American-South Korean alliances by showing that Washington is helpless against North Korea's missile and nuclear development, and that the world needs Chinese mediation to dampen Pyongyang nuclear ambition. Beijing has a dual strategy. Since the 1990s it promoted North Korean nuclear and missile development by facilitating North Korean missile exports to Pakistan and Iran, by its tolerance of Pyongyang military development, and by urging the world to exercise restraint towards its threatening actions. CHINESE SOFT POWER LEADERSHIP ON NON-PROLIFERATION NOT EFFECTIVE DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY ARE A RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDER Aaron Friedberg, Professor Politics & International Affairs, Princeton, 2006, Press Conference: US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, September 14, Federal News Service, p. Lexis Just briefly on responsible stakeholderhood, or -dom, I think it's been very useful to introduce this concept, but it's necessary to go further and to ask, as you have, what are the measures? How do we know when we see that China is becoming a responsible stakeholder? I would say there are a variety of issues. Obviously today we're talking about proliferation, and clearly that's extremely important, maybe the most important issue before us. And the question in my mind would be to what extent is China going to be helpful in resolving, in a satisfactory way, the dangers that we currently face, both from North Korea and Iran, and long-term danger of further proliferation? And I have to say, on both Iran and North Korea, it doesn't seem to me that they've done all that they could. And if either one or the other of those situations turns out badly, it will perhaps, if things continue as they are now, be because China did not do everything in its power, and maybe even, for example, if there's a veto in the U.N. of measures to bring sanctions against Iran, maybe even actively prevented greater pressure from being applied. On the question of whether it's active or acquiescence, well, think of the analogy to responsible citizenship. You want people to obey the rules. You expect them to do so. And countries should as well. But you would also hope that they participate in enforcing those rules when only states are -the states are the only powers that can enforce them. So simply going along, I think, isn't quite enough. You'd like to see China play a more active role in trying to enforce these rules that are embodied in the case of proliferation in the NPT.
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Soft Power Good: Chinese Soft Power Leadership on North Korea Undermines US/South Korean Ties
CHINA USING ITS LEADERSHIP ROLE IN DEALING WITH NORTH KOREA TO WEAKEN THE US/SOUTH KOREA ALLIANCE Aaron Friedberg, Professor Politics & International Affairs, Princeton, 2006, Press Conference: US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, September 14, Federal News Service, p. Lexis At the same time, the way I have described it, and I think it's accurate, the Chinese have taken advantage of this crisis to continue to move towards their longer-term goals. And certainly on the question of the relationship between the United States and South Korea, the nuclear issue has been a boon to the Chinese. We are in continual tension with our South Korean allies about how to proceed on this issue. And it's true, Beijing's position and approach is more similar to the South's than it is to ours.
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Soft Power Good: Iranian Proliferation: US Soft Power/Engagement Only way to Stop Iranian Prolif
US SUPPORT FOR ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY ONLY POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO IRANIAN PROLIFERATION Mark Fitzpatrick, IISS Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation, 2006, Survival, Vol. 48, No.1, Spring, p. 74-5 Bush opposition to engagement with Iran has more complex policy connections and historical antecedents, but is equally non-conducive to any hopes for a negotiated solution. Irans alleged connections with the al-Qaeda terrorists who bombed three foreign housing compounds in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on 12 May 2003, killing 23 people, including nine Americans, made it politically impossible for the pragmatists in the Bush administration to take up Irans engagement probe that same month. Even without that complication, any attempt to engage Iran would be freighted by the heavy shadow cast by the 1980s IranContra scandal and Irans troublemaking in Iraq and marginalisation of reformers at home. Other factors weighing against engagement with Iran were the ascendancy of neoconservatives at that point, and the high-water mark of US perceived power and influence in Iraq. A renewed effort by National Security Council and State Department officials in autumn 2005 to consider options for opening up direct channels of communication with Iranian leaders was leaked by hard-line opponents and subsequently shelved. Ahmadinejads outbursts against Israel were a gift to those in the US administration who see regime change in Iran as the only good solution to Irans nuclear threat. They believe that engagement might only confer legitimacy on the Iranian regime, whose own subjects see it as illegitimate, without increasing prospects for a negotiated end to Irans enrichment programme. Washingtons willingness to take this risk by engaging with Pyongyang may be because North Korea is seen as a dead-end regime, preoccupied with its own survival. Iran is more of a dynamic threat to US interests.36 Most in the administration presumably recognise, however, that any realistic timeline for regime change lags too far behind the timeline for Iran developing nuclear weapons. If Iran threw caution to the wind and began a crash programme of uranium enrichment, without regard to international reaction, it could conceivably produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon by the end of the decade. That 2010 estimate must be viewed as a rolling deadline (and assumes that Iran does not already have covert enrichment facilities operating in undeclared locations). As long as Iran did not resume its enrichment programme and begin producing more centrifuges and enriching uranium, the deadline estimate would be pushed back. Up until 10 January 2005, the EU-3s fitful negotiations with Iran bought some time by prolonging the suspension of the main enrichment activity, again assuming no ongoing covert effort. Nevertheless, it is hard to envision how Iran could be induced to make the suspension permanent, or even to prolong it, without the additional incentives that US engagement could bring to the EU-3 incentive package. Sanctions are the only other route, but Russia, China and India are unlikely to join sanctions until every other diplomatic option, including US engagement and incentives, is tried and found wanting.
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Soft Power Good: Iranian Proliferation: Hard-Line Position Fails to Stem Iranian Prolif
US SECURITY ASSURANCES VITAL PART OF ANY SOLUTION TO IRANIAN PROLIF Mark Fitzpatrick, IISS Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation, 2006, Survival, Vol. 48, No.1, Spring, p. 76 In the case of Iran, the United States has refused to consider any similar expression of explicit security assurances, for the same reasons of political sensitivity and interconnected objectives on terrorism, human rights and IsraelPalestine peace talks that have prevented Washington from engaging with Tehran. If Iran gave reason for the Bush administrations Iran policy to evolve further along the pragmatic lines that have prevailed since March 2005, those obstacles eventually could be overcome. Almost any unbiased observer who looks seriously at what it would take to persuade Iran to forgo enrichment realises that the United States will have to be involved in a solution that addresses Irans security concerns. If the United States can do that for North Korea, surely it can do it for Iran. Tehrans defiant resumption of enrichment activity in January 2006, however, renders this a moot point. Soft Power Good: China Scenario China Challenging US For Soft Power Lead CHINA SEEKING TO SUPPLANT US AS THE LEADER IN SOFT POWER Joseph Nye, Harvard, 2005, The Wall Street Journal Asia, December 29, http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/ksgnews/Features/opeds/122905_nye.htm The United States was noticeably absent from the guest list when countries from Australia to India gathered recently in Malaysia for the first East Asian Summit. It was a meeting which some fear marks the first step in China's long-term ambition to build a new regional power structure, known as the East Asian Community, that excludes Washington. Couple that with a recent BBC poll of 22 countries, which found that nearly half the respondents saw Beijing's influence as positive compared to 38% who said the same for the U.S., and it is clear that the rise of China's soft power -- at America's expense -- is an issue that needs to be urgently addressed. CHINA USING SOFT POWER TO SUPPLANT US INFLUENCE Program on International Policy Attitudes, 2005, 22-Nation Poll Shows China Viewed Positively by Most Countries Including its Asian Neighbors, March 25, http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/China/China_Mar05/China_Mar05_rpt.pdf A new BBC World Service Poll of 22 countries finds that China is viewed as playing a significantly more positive role in the world than either the US or Russia, a role more on par with Britain. Asked about possible future trends, most are positive about China significantly increasing its economic power in the world but most are negative about China significantly increasing its military power. CHINA GARNERING SOFT POWER TO CHALLENGE US INTERESTS IN THE FUTURE Evan Medeiros & M. Taylor Fravel, Rand, 2003, Asian Wall Street Journal, The Changing Face of Chinese Diplomacy, http://www.rand.org/commentary/112503AWSJ.html
However, policy makers should remember that even as China becomes more engaged, it is also growing more adept at using its foreign policy and foreign relations to serve Chinese interests. Today's China is certainly smarter and more sophisticated -- but not necessarily kinder or gentler. Beijing's new skills may at times frustrate Washington's objectives, as China is potentially becoming better equipped to challenge the policies of the U.S. and its allies. China's ability to consistently outmaneuver the U.S. at the U.N. Human Rights Commission in recent years should serve as a wake-up call. China is dissatisfied with some aspects of the international system, such as U.S. preponderance and especially the status of Taiwan. Washington should remain aware of these frustrations and shape its ties with Asian nations in a way that recognizes the reality of China's expanding regional role. China is rapidly emerging as the engine of growth in Asia, which affords it increasing influence and leverage. Washington needs to pay consistent attention to managing relations with regional friends and allies, if it hopes to maintain its pull.
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Soft Power Good: China Scenario China Challenging US For Soft Power Lead
CHINA BUILDING SOFT POWER TO CHALLENGE US SINCE IT CANT WIN A HARD POWER COMPETITION Joshua Kurlantzick, Visiting Scholar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006 , Policy Brief, Chinas Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PB_47_FINAL.pdf, p. 2-3 At roughly the same time, the Chinese leadership seems to have made a decision that its hard power was still limited. Even as they saw that China could not match Americas military might, scholars like Wang Jisi of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences noted that as postCold War America retreated from the world, the United States long-term weakness could be its soft power, not its hard power. Average Chinese, too, were becoming more confident in their nations place in the world, creating domestic pressure for regional engagement. In 2003 the Horizon Group polled Chinese citizens again. This time, nearly 40 percent picked China as the most prominent country in the world. Since 1997, then, it is possible to identify Chinese soft power strategies. First, Beijing enunciates a doctrine of win-win relations. China implicitly contrasts its win-win philosophy with that of the United States, which Beijing portrays as disrespectful of sovereignty and punitive toward Southeast Asia. By contrast, Chinese leaders emphasize that Beijing is willing to listen to other nations. China has backstopped this win-win rhetoric with real initiatives, signing Southeast Asias Treaty of Amity and Cooperationwhich the United States has not signedand committing itself to creating a code of conduct on the South China Sea. Meanwhile the United States maintains more sanctions on Southeast Asia than on any other region, and Washingtons focus on counterterrorism has alienated some Southeast Asian states. This idea of Chinese noninterference also coincides with an era when, at least since the mid-1990s, interventionists on both the left and the right have become more influential in U.S. foreign policy making. Chinas strategy has other components. It includes focusing on nations whose bilateral relationships with the United States are faltering. This is noticeable in the Philippines or in Cambodia, where Beijing bolstered relations with Phnom Penh as Prime Minister Hun Sens relationship with Washington deteriorated. (This strategy extends outside of Southeast Asia to Sudan, Venezuela, or Uzbekistan.) And even as Chinese leaders suggest that China will not interfere in internal affairs, they portray China as a potential ideal for the developing world, a nation that controls development from the top. In places like Indonesia, still suffering the socioeconomic effects of a financial crisis blamed partly on a too-open economy, the success of Chinas developmental model holds significant appeal. CHINA INCREASINGLY CHALLENGING US FOR SOFT POWER LEAD IN ASIA AND OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD Larry M. Wortzel, Heritage Foundation, 2006, Risks and Opportunities of a Rising China, Heritage Lecture #948, http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/hl948.cfm In the international arena, China poses a challenge to the United States from a diplomatic, economic, and military standpoint. Beijing has adopted a strategy that focuses on the accumulation of strategic resources and the development of a productive capacity that attracts vast amounts of foreign capital, modernizes its industry, leaps China's technological base forward, and strengthens its military. China's diplomacy, especially around Asia, but also in Africa, Latin America, and Europe, has been a counterweight to American influence. Being a member of the Permanent Five of the United Nations Security Council gives China's economic and diplomatic efforts extra leverage.
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Soft Power Good: China Scenario Chinese Soft Power Increasing Now
CHINA IS WORKING TO INCREASE ITS SOFT POWER ACROSS A BROAD SPECTRUM Joseph Nye, Harvard, 2005, The Wall Street Journal Asia, December 29, http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/ksgnews/Features/opeds/122905_nye.htm China has always had an attractive traditional culture, but now it is entering the realm of global popular culture as well. Chinese novelist Gao Xingjian won China's first Nobel Prize for Literature in 2000, and the Chinese film "Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon" became the highest grossing non-English film. Yao Ming, the Chinese star of the U.S. National Basketball Association's Houston Rockets, is rapidly becoming a household name, and China is set to host the 2008 Summer Olympics. The enrollment of foreign students in China has tripled to 110,000 from 36,000 over the past decade, and the number of foreign tourists has also increased dramatically to 17 million last year. China has created 26 Confucius Institutes around the world to teach its language and culture, and while the Voice of America was cutting its Chinese broadcasts to 14 from 19 hours a day, China Radio International was increasing its broadcasts in English to 24 hours a day. In terms of political values, the era of Maoism (and Mao jackets) is long past. Although China remains authoritarian, the success of its political economy in tripling gross domestic product over the past three decades has made it attractive to many developing countries. In parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the so-called "Beijing consensus" on authoritarian government plus a market economy has become more popular than the previously dominant "Washington consensus" of market economics with democratic government. China has reinforced this attraction by economic aid and access to its growing market. China has also adjusted its diplomacy. A decade ago, it was wary of multilateral arrangements and at cross purposes with many of its neighbors. Since then, it has joined the World Trade Organization, contributed more than 3,000 troops to serve in United Nations peacekeeping operations, become more helpful on nonproliferation issues (including hosting the six-party talks on North Korea), settled territorial disputes with its neighbors, and joined a variety of regional organizations. This new diplomacy, coupled with the slogan of "China's peaceful rise," helps to alleviate fears and reduce the likelihood of other countries allying to balance a rising power. CHINA HAS BEEN BUILDING ITS SOFT POWER SINCE 1997 Joshua Kurlantzick, Visiting Scholar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006 , Policy Brief, Chinas Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PB_47_FINAL.pdf, p. 2 The year 1997 provides a convenient date to mark Chinas soft power emergence. Beijing refused to devalue its currency during the financial crisis, portraying its decision as standing up for Asia. After the crisis, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Secretary General Rodolfo Severino announced, China is really emerging from this smelling good. With Southeast Asian opinions of Washington falling, and with Taiwans 1990s investment push into Southeast Asia faltering, a window was open for Chinese soft power. CHINA VIEWED MORE POSITIVELY IN THE WORLD THAN THE US Program on International Policy Attitudes, 2005, 22-Nation Poll Shows China Viewed Positively by Most Countries Including its Asian Neighbors, March 25, http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/China/China_Mar05/China_Mar05_rpt.pdf China is viewed much more positively than two other major powers, the US and Russia, which are viewed quite negatively. Russia is viewed as having a negative influence in the world by citizens of fourteen countries and a positive influence in just five, with an average across all countries of 36 percent viewing it positively and 40 percent negatively. The US is also viewed negatively in fifteen countries and positively in just six, with an average of 37 percent viewing it positively and 47% percent negatively. Indeed, China is viewed as positively as Britain by citizens polled worldwide on average 50 percent view Britain as having a positive influence as compared to 48 percent for China.
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Soft Power Good: China Scenario Chinese Soft Power Increasing Now
CHINAS DOMESTIC REFORM POLICIES ARE INCREASING ITS SOFT POWER Bates Gill & Yanzhong Huang, CSIS & Seton Hall University, 2006, Survival, Volume 48, No. 2, Summer, p. 19-20 Chinas soft power also depends on how it implements its values and policies domestically.17 Since the late 1970s, Chinas reform process has steadily moved the country away from its inefficient, Soviet-style planned economy to a more dynamic market-oriented system. Within a quarter-century, this process has transformed China into an economic powerhouse. The growing economic clout has increasingly conjured up images of prosperity and affluence. Fuelled by rapid income growth, outbound tourism has become popular in China. In 2003, the 20.22m outbound Chinese tourists for the first time outnumbered tourists from Japan, which formerly had the greatest number of outbound tourists in Asia.18 The new Chinese tourists tend to cast a more positive image of a wealthier, more confident Chinese elite.19 CHINAS GROWING ECONOMIC POWER IS A SOFT POWER ASSET Program on International Policy Attitudes, 2005, 22-Nation Poll Shows China Viewed Positively by Most Countries Including its Asian Neighbors, March 25, http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/China/China_Mar05/China_Mar05_rpt.pdf Though there has been much focus on the competitive threat from Chinas economic potential, Chinas growing economic power is seen as positive in most countries. Asked if they think it would be positive or negative if China were to become significantly more powerful economically than it is today, in sixteen countries a majority (11 countries) or a plurality (5 countries) see it is as positive. Strikingly, this positive view is found in some countries, such as Mexico (54%) whose manufacturing sectors face significant competition with China. On average 49 percent view it as positive and 33 percent as negative. In only four countries to a plurality see it as a negative Italy (47 %), Spain (47%), Turkey (42%) and Argentina (41%). Views are evenly divided in two countries the US and Germany.
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Soft Power Good: China Scenario Chinese Soft Power Increasing Everywhere
CHINAS SOFT POWER INFLUENCE FELT THROUGHOUT THE WORLD Bates Gill & Yanzhong Huang, CSIS & Seton Hall University, 2006, Survival, Volume 48, No. 2, Summer, p. 24-5
Farther abroad, Beijings soft-power influence is felt in the Middle East, Latin America and Africa. The BBC poll found that of seven countries in these regions, six have either a majority (Lebanon, South Africa, Chile and Brazil) or a plurality (Argentina and Mexico) favouring Chinese influence in the world. It is particularly interesting that China receives favourable ratings from countries in Latin America whose manufacturing sectors face significant competition from China. When asked about Chinas economic influence, 54% of Mexicans surveyed see it as positive, and only 18% have a negative view. The existence of like-minded states in these regions and the attractiveness of Chinas development model have facilitated Beijings quest for market, natural resources and political influence. Under President Lula, Brazil has agreed to recognise China as a market economy, which would make it harder to impose penalties on China for dumping exports. Ideological sympathies were reported to play an important role in forging Brazils policy toward China.55 In Iran, two of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameneis foreign-policy advisers are big champions of the Chinese model former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati and his former deputy, Abbas Maleki.56 With their blessings, Iran looks to steadily increase its linkages with countries to its east, such as China and India. In Africa, the Ethiopian case is illustrative. Until the mid-1990s, Chinas ties with this country were limited. When Ethiopia went to war against neighbouring Eritrea in the late 1990s, the United States responded by reducing its diplomatic presence. Yet China reacted by dispatching even more diplomats, engineers, businessmen and teachers to Ethiopia. Today, China is able to exercise increasing influence in Addis Ababa: its embassy hosts more high-level visits than any Western mission, and its companies have become a dominant force in the country. Similar stories are found in other parts of Africa, such as in Zimbabwe and Sudan. Chinas soft power is also felt in Western democracies. None of the Western countries in the BBC survey has a majority of the public holding a negative view of Chinas influence. Australia (56%) and France (49%) lead the liberal democracies in favouring Chinese influence. Even in the United States, where 47% (the highest among
all surveyed nations) have negative view of Chinas influence, 39% express positive views. The improvement of Chinas image in part explains why some Western democracies seem less willing to get mixed up in USChina tensions, such as over Taiwan. An extensive poll taken by the Sydney-based Lowy Institute in February 2005 found that in identifying the greatest potential threats to Australia on the international scene, 32% and 25% of Australians were very worried or fairly worried, respectively a total of 57% of those polled about US foreign policy, while only 16% were very worried and 19% were fairly worried about Chinas growing power. When asked if Australias commitment to the ANZUS pact should mean following the United States into war with China over Taiwan, 79% of respondents answered no. On trade issues, the Lowy poll found that 34% support the free trade agreement with the United States, while 51% believe it would be a good idea to pursue such an agreement with China. When asked to rate countries or groups based on either positive or negative
One senior Australian scholar observed, the Chinese have proved better than the US at using the soft power of trade and diplomacy, which was supposed to be a strong point for the latter.
feelings toward them, China received a positive rating from 69% of the respondents; the United States garnered a positive rating from 58%.
CHINA SUCCESSFUL IN EXERCISING SOFT POWER IN RELATIONS WITH THE US Bates Gill & Yanzhong Huang, CSIS & Seton Hall University, 2006, Survival, Volume 48, No. 2, Summer, p. 25 Even in its relations with Washington, China has been able to exercise soft power for diplomatic gains. By playing a pivotal role in the Six-Party Talks over North Korea, Beijing has garnered credit for being a responsible and cooperative power in the international system.
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Soft Power Good: China Scenario China Challenging US For Soft Power Lead in Asia
CHINA SEEKING TO SUPPLANT US SOFT-POWER LEADERSHIP ROLE IN ASIA Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 191 Chinas increasing cooperation with regional multilateral institutions (such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, which signed a free-trade agreement with China in November 2004) and other Asian governments aims primarily to enhance Chinas assured access to vital resources (especially energy and other raw materials) and to promote its regional ascendancy. A disturbing feature of Chinas growing economic weight in Asia, however, is its push for policies that would exclude or diminish the role of the United States in this important regiona practice Beijing has already employed with some success vis-a-vis Taiwan. Chinas successful drive for the convocation of the December 2005 East Asia Summit in Malaysia suggests a long term ambition to build a new regional power structure that does not include Washington. The developing ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), which excludes the United States, will cover a region that is home to almost 2 billion people, with a forecasted aggregate GDP of $2 trillion, when it becomes fully operational by 2010 for the original six ASEAN members. Some Chinese have called for an even more comprehensive East Asia Free Trade Area that would encompass, China, ASEAN, Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Koreaan exclusionary combination that could deprive the United States of $25 billion in exports. In the interim, Beijing has sought to expand the agenda of the ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan, and South Korea) mechanism to address important regional economic and security issues without American participation. CHINA BEGINNING TO CHALLENGE THE US FOR SOFT POWER LEADERSHIP Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 187 While Chinas growing prosperity has helped free hundreds of millions of its citizens from abject poverty, one could argue that the policy of engagement has succeeded too well. Or, perhaps more accurately, engagement plus Americas increasing national fixation on challenges on the other side of the globe have created a dangerous combination. China is now beginning to get the better of the United States in open political and commercial contests. This trend promotes a host of values antithetical to those Americans cherish, including disrespect for civil rights, captive labor unions, unfriendly environmental policies and autocratic governments. In addition, Chinas growing military power arouses justifiable unease, especially given its authoritarian political system and its tense relations with Taiwan. CHINA IS INCREASINGLY CHALLENGING US SOFT POWER LEAD IN ASIA Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 195-6 Chinas rising military might warrants attention and concern, but it should not obscure the larger power accumulation underway in Beijing. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, a nation is challenging US Soft powerthe summation of economic leverage, cultural pull, and intellectual clout that has made the United States the preeminent force in the world. Professor Joseph Nye, former US foreign-policy official and intellectual engineer of the soft power concept, warns that the rise of Chinas soft powerat Americas expenseis an issue that needs to be urgently addressed. A recent BBC poll of people in twenty-two countries highlighted the magnitude of this challenge. The survey found that nearly half the respondents saw Beijings influence as positive; only 38 percent said the same for the United States. Chinese representation also have successfully modernized their diplomacy; for example, they have placed dozens of official policy papers on the Foreign Ministrys Web site and developed an effective approach toward media relations. Beijings hosting of the Summer Olympic Games in 208 will reinforce Chinas status as a center of international culture and sport.
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Soft Power Good: China Scenario China Challenging US For Soft Power Lead in Asia
CHINA SEEKING TO ESTABLISH SOFT POWER DOMINANCE IN ASIA Greg Mastel, New America Foundation, 2005, The International Economy, Spring, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2633/is_2_19/ai_n15787112, p. 43 And China's plan does not end with ASEAN. China aspires to be the center of what it calls the East Asia Free Trade Area, which includes ASEAN, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. Obviously, there are various diplomatic constraints and internal political forces that may slow the development of such an East Asian bloc, but with the ASEAN FTA already a reality most of the countries on the list are already exploring FTAs with China. In a decade, it is possible that most of China's planned East Asian bloc will be a reality. CHINA EXPANDING SOFT POWER TO CHALLENGE US LEADERSHIP IN ASIA Joshua Kurlantzick, Visiting Scholar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005 , Current History, December, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Kurlantzick.pdf, p. 422-3 In Asia, China has emerged as a potential rival to American soft power as the Chinese economy continues to grow and Beijing begins to enunciate its values and market its institutions and culture. To their Asian neighbors, Chinese officials and diplomats advertise the idea that China is growing into a preeminent power but supports a multipolar world in which nations do not aggressively interfere in other nations affairs. This message is communicated in various ways. China Radio International now broadcasts to Southeast Asia 24 hours per day; Beijing has drastically boosted its aid budget in many parts of Asia; and China has attracted growing numbers of students and officials from across the region for study trips. Through this public diplomacy, development assistance, increased interaction with multilateral institutions such as ASEAN, and other efforts, Beijing emphasizes mutual interests and promotes the idea of multipolarity, downplaying any Chinese desire to dominate the region. This is contrasted with an implicit portrayal of the United States as a unilateralist, non-Asian nation pushing an agenda that ignores Asian interests. Beijing has had some success. Partly because of Chinas willingness to participate, Asian multilateral institutions ranging from the Chiang Mai currency initiative (a network of bilateral currency swap agreements) to the East Asian summit (a gathering of both Southeast and Northeast Asian leaders) have gained prominence. Public sentiment across Asia has become more favorable toward China, and Chinese companies have begun to venture abroad and build their brand names. In the Lowy Institute poll, some 70 percent of Australians viewed China positively. In a recent survey in Thailand, 76 percent of respondents considered China to be Thailands closest friend. CHINA EXPANDING ITS INFLUENCE IN ASIA THROUGH SOFT POWER Thomas J. Christensen, Professor International Affairs Princeton, 2006, International Security, Summer, p. 81 China has improved its relations with Southeast Asian states in part by playing up its generally stabilizing regional role in the 1997 Asian financial crisis. In 1997, Beijing played a major role in the creation of ASEAN plus Three (ASEAN plus China, Japan, and South Korea), a forum that discusses both economic and security affairs. n32 From the perspective of reducing both security dilemmas and misperceptions, such cooperative behavior and the creation of inclusive multilateral organizations should be applauded not only because the organization links Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, but also because it includes the three major actors in the former, among which nationalist tensions and unresolved historical issues are plentiful.
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Soft Power Good: China Scenario China Challenging US For Soft Power Lead in Asia
CHINA IS RAPIDLY CLOSING THE GAP WITH THE US FOR REGIONAL LEADERSHIP IN ASIA Thomas J. Christensen, Professor International Affairs Princeton, 2006, International Security, Summer, p. 81 The second view of international politics portrays international relations, especially between existing and rising great powers, as largely a zero-sum struggle for leadership. Advocates of this view draw easy analogies between contemporary U.S.-China relations and the historical examples of relations among rising challengers and incumbent leading great powers, which have often been tense, highly competitive, and conflict prone. n44 From this perspective, even if conflict is avoidable in the near term, eventual Sino-American competition for primacy in the East Asia region (or, perhaps, around the globe) will likely lead the two states into a cold war, if not a shooting war. In such a competitive worldview, one great power actor's gains are by definition the other actor's loss. Although the United States maintains a healthy overall lead in the competition for influence in Asia, China has closed the gap faster than most analysts could have expected in the early 1990s. n45 One basic point underscores the sometimes stark differences between the zero-sum and positive-sum perspectives. Since the early 1990s, almost all of the changes in the region that reduced the dangers of mistrust and spirals of tension from a positive-sum point of view also increased China's relative economic and political role in the region. From a zerosum perspective, those changes should be seen as unwelcome in Washington because they reduce the relative power of the United States and its regional allies. CHINA INCREASING ITS SOFT POWER AND IMAGE IN ASIA Joshua Kurlantzick, Visiting Scholar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006 , Policy Brief, Chinas Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PB_47_FINAL.pdf, p. 1-2 Thaksins actions were remarkable. For decades Thailands policy making had been based partly on fears of China, and Sino-Thais rarely became involved in politics. Yet Thaksin was only reflecting public sentiment: polls showed that more than 70 percent of Thais now considered China Thailands most important external influence. Thailand is hardly unique. Since 1997, perceptions of China in Southeast Asia have shifted significantly; many elites and publics now see China as potentially the preeminent regional power. The transformation of Chinas image and influence is due to a range of factors. China has benefited from missteps by the United States, including its slow reaction to the Asian financial crisis and post9/11 counterterrorism myopia. But the transformation is also due to a growth in Chinas soft powerChinas ability to influence by persuasion rather than coercion. This attractiveness can be conveyed through various means, including culture, diplomacy, participation in multinational organizations, businesses actions abroad, and the gravitational pull of a nations economic strength. When Joseph Nye coined the term soft power, he originally used a more limited definition, excluding investment and aid and formal diplomacymore traditional, harder forms of influence. In the context of Asia today, both China and its neighbors enunciate a broader idea of soft power, the idea that soft power implies all elements outside of the security realm, including investment and aid. Because the idea of soft power has been broadened in the Asian context, I, too, examine soft power in this broader manner. Soft power can be high, targeted at elites, or low, targeted at the broader public. And though soft power stems from both governments and nongovernmental actors, one can identify strategies and policy tools Beijing has consciously used to boost its soft power. These strategies and tools make it easier for Chinese actors, from language schools to businesspeople, to have an effect on the ground.
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Soft Power Good: China Scenario China Challenging US Soft Power Leadership in Africa
CHINA SEEKING TO SUPPLANT US INFLUENCE IN AFRICA Peter Brookes & Ji Hye Shin, Heritage Foundation, 2006, Chinas Influence in Africa: implications for the United States, February, 22, http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1916.cfm Amid growing concerns about the Peoples Republic of Chinas burgeoning influence around the globe, Beijing has now set its sights on Africa. Chinas interest in Africa is not new. In the 1960s and 1970s, Beijings interest centered on building ideological solidarity with other underdeveloped nations to advance Chinese-style communism and on repelling Western imperialism. Following the Cold War, Chinese interests evolved into more pragmatic pursuits such as trade, investment, and energy. In recent years, Beijing has identified the African continent as an area of significant economic and strategic interest. America and its allies and friends are finding that their vision of a prosperous Africa governed by democracies that respect human rights and the rule of law and that embrace free markets is being challenged by the escalating Chinese influence in Africa. CHINA USING ITS EXPANDED SOFT POWER IN AFRICA TO UNDERMINE US INFLUENCE AND POLICY CONCERNS Joshua Kurlantzick, Visiting Scholar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006 , Policy Outlook, Beijings Safari: Chinas Move into Africa and its Implications for Aid, Development and Governance, November, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/kurlantzick_outlook_africa2.pdf, p. 1 During three decades of civil war, a tiny elite in Luanda, Angolas capital, siphoned revenues from the countrys oil deposits, the second largest in Africa. Meanwhile, most of Angolas 12 million citizens lived in dire poverty, surviving in shacks across Luandas shantytown sprawl. In 2002, Angolas government and rebels finally laid down their arms; peace offered an opportunity for the country, and for foreign aid organizations, to rebuild shattered social services and decrepit oil infrastructure. To ensure Angola used the money wiselyTransparency International ranks Angola one of the most corrupt nations on the continentthe International Monetary Fund (IMF) decided to convince the government to adopt provisions to slash graft and ensure that oil revenues went to social programs. Angolan ministers at first seemed receptive to IMF loans linked to intensive monitoring. By the beginning of 2005, IMF officials believed they stood on the verge of a landmark financing agreement with the country. But at the last moment, the Angolan government broke off talks. Angola announced it would instead be receiving loans and credits for oil reconstruction from a different source: China. Beijing offered Angola loans and credits worth as much as $5 billion, and the Chinese money came with none of the IMFs conditions. Angola offers a window into Chinas rapidly expanding relations with Africa. As in Angola, China has become a major donor and investor across Africa. It has begun to insert itself into local politics, and it has savvily used multilateral forums, like Novembers inaugural China-Africa summit in Beijing, to cultivate African elites. In fact, China has so quickly created a positive image of itself in Africa that it now rivals the United States, France, and international financial institutions for influence. CHINA USES GROWING SOFT POWER IN GENERAL TO INCREASE ITS INFLUENCE IN AFRICA Peter Brookes & Ji Hye Shin, Heritage Foundation, 2006, Chinas Influence in Africa: implications for the United States, February, 22, http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1916.cfm As Chinas power and influence grows, Beijing is becoming more willing to challenge the United States, EU nations, and others in international arenas to protect its interests in Africa. Over time, differences between China and democracies over human rights and basic political and civil rights will sharpen. For example, in September 2004, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1564, which
condemned the mass killing of civilians in the Darfur region, but stopped short of imposing oil sanctions if Khartoum did not act to stop the killing. China abstained from the vote and threatened to veto any further move to impose sanctions. In July 2005, Britain, backed by the United States and seven other countries, led a Security Council briefing on Zimbabwes slum demolition campaign in an effort to organize a formal debate in the General Assembly and possibly generate a punitive Security Council resolution. [35] Meanwhile, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe visited Beijing, seeking financial assistance for his failing
. Because of Beijings strong support for Mugabe and opposition to Security Council action, the U.N. was unable to reach a consensus on further formal discussions of the issue.
economy
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Soft Power Good: China: China Challenging US Soft Power Leadership in Latin America
CHINA IMPROVING ITS INFLUENCE WITH LATIN AMERICA Jorge I. Dominguez, Harvard, 2006, Chinas relations with Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes Inter-American Dialogue Paper: China, June, http://www.iadialog.org/publications/2006/summer/china.pdf The relations between the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and nearly all Latin American countries blossomed during the first half of the first decade of the twenty-first century. China fever gripped the region. Latin American presidents, ministers, business executives and journalists discovered China and its rapidly growing impact on the worlds economy and on Latin America itself. The principal explanation for this boom in China fever was Chinas own economic boom and its widening and deepening worldwide spread. In the current decade, Sino-Latin American trade, and economic relations more generally, have grown at a spectacular pace. Improved political relations were a necessary part of the expansion in economic relations because intergovernmental agreements facilitate economic relations, but the exuberance of the economic boom outpaced the improvement in political relations. Military or militarily-sensitive relations changed little, notwithstanding the fears of some in the United States and elsewhere over this question. CHINAS GROWING INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA USED TO SUPPLANT US INFLUENCE Jorge I. Dominguez, Harvard, 2006, Chinas relations with Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes Inter-American Dialogue Paper: China, June, http://www.iadialog.org/publications/2006/summer/china.pdf On the other hand, the fact that politicians from all ideological currents and authoritarian anti-communist regimesnot just left-wingerssince the 1970s supported the development of relations with the Peoples Republic and saw such relations in many cases as one means to counter U.S. influence facilitated the great leap forward in Sino-Latin American relations at the start of this century. CHINA POSITIONING ITSELF TO BALANCE US POWER AND INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA THROUGH GROWING SOFT POWER Jorge I. Dominguez, Harvard, 2006, Chinas relations with Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes Inter-American Dialogue Paper: China, June, http://www.iadialog.org/publications/2006/summer/china.pdf In short, China has developed an impressive systematic long-term strategy to engage with Latin American countries. It has invested the time of its top leaders and the resources of its government. It has formulated symbolically productive discourses to characterize its relations with Latin American countries, and to assess the quality of relations between countries across time and signal the scope of likely trends. It has a nuanced understanding of the interest in some quarters in Latin America that China should help to balance U.S. power but shies away from embracing that hope. It acknowledges possible future difficulties but confidently asserts its belief that all key actors will perceive Chinas role in Latin America to be non-threatening and peaceful.
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Soft Power Good: China: China Challenging US Soft Power Leadership in Latin America
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES INCREASINGLY LOOKING TO CHINA TO BALANCE US INFLUENCE IN THE REGION Jorge I. Dominguez, Harvard, 2006, Chinas relations with Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes Inter-American Dialogue Paper: China, June, http://www.iadialog.org/publications/2006/summer/china.pdf Several Latin American governments want China to balance U.S. influence in the region, but they differ in their expectations. Brazil and Argentina hope that China will be a soft balancer of the United States in Latin America. This is evident for Brazil in the context of the Group of 20s negotiations regarding the WTO Doha Round. In effect, Brazil and Argentina want China to provide new political-economic options, without expecting it to confront the United States. Cuba and Venezuela eagerly search for a political alliance with China to provide a hard balance to U.S. power. Cuba and Venezuela are confronting the U.S. government on their own and look for support wherever it can be found. In contrast, neither Chile nor Mexico looks to relations with China as a means to balance U.S. influence. CHINA SEEKING TO CAPITALIZE ON NEGATIVE IMAGES OF US POWER TO GAIN SOFT POWER IN LATIN AMERICA Willy Lam, Asian Journalist, 2004, China Brief: Chinas Encroachment on Americas Backyard, November 24, http://www.jamestown.org/images/pdf/cb_004_023.pdf In his tightly packed tour, Hu also flashed the solidarity with the developing world card. In addresses to the parliaments of Brazil and Argentina, the Chinese President stressed that his country would forever stay on the side of developing countries. Hu noted that China would spare no effort to help build a multi-polar world order - a democratic international order as well as a multiple [approach] to development models. This seemed a not-so-subtle dig at the unilateralism, if not neo-imperialism, supposedly pursued by the Bush administration.
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Soft Power Good: China: China Has Not Taken the Lead the Yet
CHINA STILL HAS A WAY TO GO BEFORE SUPPLANTING US SOFT POWER LEAD Joseph Nye, Harvard, 2005, The Wall Street Journal Asia, December 29, http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/ksgnews/Features/opeds/122905_nye.htm But just as China's economic and military power is far from matching that of the U.S., China's soft power still has a long way to go. China does not have cultural industries like Hollywood, and its universities are far from the equal of America's. It lacks the many non-governmental organizations that generate much of America's soft power. Politically, China suffers from corruption, inequality, and a lack of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. While that may make the "Beijing consensus" attractive in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian developing countries, it undercuts China's soft power in the West. Although China's new diplomacy has enhanced its attractiveness to its neighbors in Southeast Asia, the continuing belligerence of its hard power stance toward Taiwan hurt it in Europe in early 2005. China's efforts to persuade the Europeans to relax an embargo on the sale of arms imposed in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre foundered after its enactment of an anti-secession law mandating the use of force against Taiwan.
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Soft Power Good: China: Zero Sum Trade Off China Fills in as US Soft Power Declines
FAILURE TO NURTURE AND EXERCISE US SOFT POWER LEAVES VACUUM TO BE FILLED BY COUNTRIES LIKE CHINA Carolyn Barholomew, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2006, Federal News Service, Heritage Foundation Discussion: Beijings Failing Grades: The US-China Economic and Security Review Commissions 2006 Annual Report, November 21, p. Lexis Yeah, I'll start. And here is where you might see some of the political differences among us as commissioners start showing, because we agree on many things and we don't agree on everything. But I think you've put your finger on a very important issue, which is this issue of soft power. Some of us have been very concerned that with the U.S. putting so much of its focus on Iraq, the U.S. role in Asia and the U.S. role elsewhere in the world has not been getting the kind of attention that it should be getting, providing opportunities for the Chinese government to move in specifically, of course, in Asia but also in Africa. We are also concerned about the public diplomacy aspect of how the U.S. is viewed in the world. I think that Tom put his finger on something very important earlier, which is to say that I think that there are countries that are looking to China as an alternative model, you know, a model of economic growth and lack of political freedom, and that's not a model that I would like to see replicated in the world. And I think that we need to be increasing the U.S. presence in the world, again, playing the role that we have played in the past in Asia, playing a positive role in development in Africa. CHINAS SOFT POWER IS RISING AS THE US IS DECLINING Bates Gill & Yanzhong Huang, CSIS & Seton Hall University, 2006, Survival, Volume 48, No. 2, Summer, p. 19 As China ramps up its cultural and language presence, the United States may be facing some challenges. During the 2003/04 academic year, foreign enrolment in the United States fell 2.4%, the first decline in three decades.12 In 2003, 2,563 Indonesian students received visas to study in China, a 51% increase over the previous year. By contrast, only 1,333 Indonesian students entered the United States for study in the same year, a precipitous drop from the 6,250 student visas issued in 2000.13 The decline can probably be attributed to the nations more stringent visa requirements after 11 September 2001, and the resulting perception of America as a suddenly unwelcoming place.
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Soft Power Good: China: US Shunning Developing Countries Allows China Opportunity to Increase its Soft Power
CHINA SOFT POWER PARTICULARLY ATTRACTIVE TO DEVELOPING WORLD AND COUNTRIES SHUNNED BY THE US Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 199-200 Chinese officials seem to be using their value-neutral approach to other countries political systems and practices to gain leverage in competition with American policymakers firmly committed to supporting democracy and human results. As a result, China is forging a string of alliances across the globe with nations shunned by the United Statesincluding Venezuela, Iran, Sudan, Burma, and Zimbabwe. Chinas strong-state approach to development has also earned it the respect of more reputable developing nationsfrom democracies such as India and Brazil to pseudo-authoritarian states such as Russia and Malaysia. Although competing more effectively with China should not lead US policymakers to retreat from their promotion of democracy, they should bear in mind that Chinese laissez-faire attitude toward foreign political systems gives it certain inherent advantages in seeking supporters in the developing world.
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Soft Power Good: China: Soft Power Good: China: Institutions
CHINA INCREASING SOFT POWER BY EMBRACING INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND INSTITUTIONS TO CHALLENGE US INFLUENCE Evan Medeiros & M. Taylor Fravel, Rand, 2003, Asian Wall Street Journal, The Changing Face of Chinese Diplomacy, http://www.rand.org/commentary/112503AWSJ.html For many previous decades until the mid-1990s, China regularly criticized the structure of the international system and complained that other powers colluded against its interests. Beijing now increasingly appears to be embracing the current constellation of international institutions, rules and norms as a means through which to promote and pursue its national interests. China is now working within the international system as opposed to criticizing and challenging it. Evidence of the changes in Chinese diplomacy abound. China has expanded the breadth and depth of its bilateral relations, joined numerous regional and international agreements and increased the quality of its participation in multilateral organizations. Beijing's embrace of multilateral institutions represents one of the most dramatic shifts in its foreign relations. In the early 1990s, China was wary of such forums as venues that would criticize and constrain China. Beijing now views participation as a means to shape international rules, improve relations with neighboring countries (especially in Southeast Asia) and limit what it perceives as undue U.S. global influence. CHINA INCREASING ITS SOFT POWER BY INCREASING ITS COMMITMENT TO INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND INSTITUTIONS Bates Gill & Yanzhong Huang, CSIS & Seton Hall University, 2006, Survival, Volume 48, No. 2, Summer, p. 23-4 Growing evidence suggests that China seeks to play a more responsible and cooperative role in international affairs. It has made a more serious effort to conform to international norms on some sensitive issues like free trade, nuclear nonproliferation and even environmental protection. More and more, China is seen as a country that does not need massive aid and can pay its own bills. Thanks to its economic growth, China increasingly transitions from aid recipient to donor: its 2006 budget will expand Chinas outbound foreign aid by 14% to $1.1 billion.43 In 2002, Beijing pledged $150m in aid to Afghanistan for its reconstruction efforts, and in 2005 offered $83m to the countries hit by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. After Hurricane Katrina hit the southern United States, the Chinese government offered $5.1m in aid to the United States. Beijings more pragmatic and proactive foreign policy has often been complemented by diplomatic savvy and finesse. The Chinese embassy is reaching out to major think tanks to solicit policy suggestions, while its diplomats are working hard to win friends and influence people, not just on Capitol Hill, but also in the US hinterlands. In July 2005, the Chinese embassy in Washington signed a $22,000-a-month contract with one of Washingtons biggest lobbying firms, Patton Boggs, to open doors and smooth relations with US lawmakers. CHINA INCREASINGLY TURNING TO MULTILATERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW Joshua Kurlantzick, Visiting Scholar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006 , The Washington Post October 15, Lexis On core issues such as regime survival or vital oil and gas fields, change is unlikely. But there has been some positive movement on other fronts. Though China once disdained treaties, it has lately proved increasingly willing to work with multilateral institutions. Its image improved significantly in Asia after it signed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the landmark agreement in the region.
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Soft Power Good: China: China Increasing Soft Power Through Commitment to International Norms and Institutions
CHINA INCREASINGLY INTEGRATED IN INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS Alastair Iain Johnston, Laine Professor of China in World Affairs, Harvard University, 2003 , International Security, Vol 27, No. 4, p. 12 Chinas membership in international institutions and organizations has increased dramatically in the post-Maoist period. Figure 1 shows the relative number of cross-region international governmental organizations in which China belongs compared across time with a number of industrialized powers and with India, one of the most diplomatically active developing states. From the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s, China moved from virtual isolation from international organizations to membership numbers approaching about 80 percent of the comparison states.23 CHINA INCREASING SUPPORT FOR MULTILATERALISM AND SOFT POWER David Shambaugh, professor of political science and international affairs, George Washington University, 2004/5, International Security, p. 77-8 Chinas expanded engagement with ASEAN and the SCO reveals a key element in Beijings enhanced regional profile: it has both multilateral and normative dimensions and reflects the convergence of views among states in these organizations about the importance of cooperative security and conflict management. It also reflects an increased appreciation by the Chinese government of the importance of norms and soft power in diplomacy.48 Chinese print media, television, music, food, and popular culture are spreading around Asia as never before.49 So too are Chinese tourists fanning out across the region: 800,000 Chinese toured Thailand in 2002, while more than 600,000 visited Singapore in 2004.50 Beijings growing appreciation of soft power diplomacy is also evident in Chinas efforts to popularize Chinese culture throughout the region and to train future generations of intellectuals, technicians, and political elites in its universities and technical colleges. China increasingly sees higher education as an instrument of statecraft (as well a source of foreign exchange). During the 2003 academic year, 77,628 foreign students were seeking advanced degrees in Chinas universitiesapproximately 80 percent of whom came from other Asian countries. South Korea sent by far the most students (35,363), while Japan sent 12,765, Vietnam 3,487, Indonesia 2,563, Thailand 1,554, and Nepal 1,199.51 In the same year, only 3,693 students from the United States attended Chinese colleges and universities. Calculating the influence of this academic training on future generations of Asian elites will be difficult to measure with any precision, but their experiences while in China will certainly sensitize them to Chinese viewpoints and interests. In addition, they will possess knowledge of the Chinese language, as well as Chinese society, culture, history, and politics. Those who enter officialdom may be more accommodating of Chinese interests and demands. They will also share personal connections with former classmates and will move up through professional hierarchies simultaneously.
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Soft Power Good: China: Iraq has Allowed China to Increase Its Soft Power
US DISTRACTION WITH IRAQ HAS ALLOWED CHINA TO INCREASE ITS SOFT POWER CHALLENGE Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 189-90 Blindsided by the events of 9/11 and fearing further attacks, US policymakers justifiably launched a limited military counterattack against the agents of violent jihadism. The many unforeseen demands and avoidable complications that have since arisen in the US-led global war on terror, however, have generated unintended consequences far beyond their immediate battlefields. As a result of its military operations in the Middle East, the United States is dangerously distracted from the rapidly changing strategic landscape of Asia at a time when China is making enormous strides in its military modernization, commercial conquests, diplomatic inroads, and application of soft power. Americans often speak of managing Chinas emergence as a dominant power, but this term understates Chinas increasing ability to manage American perceptions and actions while seeking to consolidate its newfound global gains. Rather than seeking to weaken or confront the United States directly, Chinese leaders are pursuing a subtle, multifaceted, long-term grand strategy that aims to derive as many benefits as possible within the existing international, system while accumulating the economic wherewithal, military strength, and other resources to reinforce Chinas continuing emergence as at least a regional great power. American officials have devoted insufficient attention to developing an effective response to this challenge. Too often, analysts of US Chinese relations focus on mechanisms, such as the number of high-level Chinese-Americans exchanges, rather than substance, such as the content of these meetings. Managing the China challenge requires both a comprehensive understanding of Chinas economic, political, and military assets and policies, and an evaluation of how other countries are responding to them.
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Soft Power Good: China: Chinese Soft Power Lead BadSeeks to Replace US Leadership Role in Asia
CHINA SEEKING TO SUPPLANT US SOFT POWER AND EXCLUDE US FROM ASIA Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 207 Third, American policymakers must become much more diplomatically active in the region to compare favorably with increasing Chinese diplomatic activism. In the economic realm, they need a strategy beyond the simple promulgation of bilateral trade accords. China has achieved substantial success recently in promoting a pan-Asian economic vision that excludes the United States. In previous decades, the United States pursued a more effective trans-Pacific vision of economic cooperation with Asia. During the second Reagan administration, for instance, the United States spearheaded the formation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) project, which includes twenty-one nations from North and South America as well as from Asia. CHINA USING ITS GROWING SOFT POWER TO ASSERT DOMINANCE IN REGIONAL POLITICS Joshua Kurlantzick, Visiting Scholar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006 , Policy Brief, Chinas Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PB_47_FINAL.pdf, p. 4-5 Another way to measure Chinas growing soft power is by looking at the position of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia, which has been radically transformed. While Southeast Asian Chinese once avoided politics, Thaksin and other politicians now avow their Chinese heritage. Ultimately the measure of influence is whether other nations can be persuaded to do things they otherwise might not choose to do. At a high level, soft power boosts Beijings influence over leaders in less democratic nations. At a lower level, Beijings soft power allows democratically elected leaders in places like the Philippines to move closer to China, since public sentiment supports warming relations. Measured this way Chinas influence has increased. Southeast Asian diplomats say that decisions at regional meetings now are delayed as member nations quietly analyze Beijings potential reactions. Although many Southeast Asian nations desire a continued role in the region for Taiwan and Japan, Beijing has succeeded in pushing Taiwan out of regional politics and increasingly marginalizing Japan, which roused limited regional support in its drive for a permanent UN Security Council seat. EMERGING CHINESE SOFT POWER THREATENS US INTERESTS IN ASIA Joshua Kurlantzick, Visiting Scholar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006 , Policy Brief, Chinas Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PB_47_FINAL.pdf, p. 6-7 A decline in Southeast Asian affinity for Taiwan and Japan would make it harder for the United States to mobilize support should a conflict arise over Taiwan and could lead to a decisive break in the United States alliance with Thailand and close relations with the Philippines and Singapore. If Southeast Asian nations develop a habit of broadly succumbing to Chinese influence, U.S. influence could be curtailed on other contentious issues as well, such as U.S. force presence in Singapore. (Whats more, as Taiwan becomes even less of a player in the region, average Taiwanese might feel so isolated that theyd have nothing more to lose by pursuing clearer statements of Taiwanese identity.) And if Beijings influence undermines democratization, environmental protection, and good governance, this could damage longstanding U.S. initiatives and bolster antidemocratic leaders in the region, like Burmas Than Shwe and others the United States has tried to isolate. Ultimately the United States should be concerned that Beijing may use its soft influence to push Asian nations to make a more explicit choice between external powers. After all it was only five years ago that many U.S. scholars dismissed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a talk shop, insisting China could not convert it into a challenge to U.S. influence in Central Asia. Within a short time, Beijingwith the support of Moscowdid just that.
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Soft Power Good: China: Chinese Soft Power Lead BadSeeks to Replace US Leadership Role in Asia
CHINA SEEKING TO SUPPLANT US INFLUENCE AND SECURITY ROLE IN ASIA Aaron Friedberg, Professor Politics & International Affairs, Princeton, 2006, Press Conference: US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, September 14, Federal News Service, p. Lexis Since the end of the Cold War, certainly since the mid-1990s, China appears to have been pursuing an overall strategy which I think can be summed up in three axioms: first, a desire to avoid conflict, especially with the United States; second, a desire to focus on the development of what Chinese analysts refer to as comprehensive national power, including military, economic, technological, diplomatic, soft power; and third, an inclination to advance incrementally towards wider objectives. I believe -- although I can't prove -- that China's current leaders hope eventually to emerge as the preponderant power in East Asia, and in this process to displace or at least to diminish the role of the United States -constricting America's influence and its presence over time, while increasing their own. And they see this, I believe, as a gradual process -- one that will likely take several decades to unfold. Chinese strategists recognize that the United States is an Asian power largely by invitation. In other words, its physical presence -- and to a considerable degree its ability to project and to sustain military power in the region -- are heavily dependent on a handful of political relationships, of which America's alliances with Japan and South Korea are clearly the most important.
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Soft Power Good: China: Chinese Soft Power Lead BadGenerally Challenges US Security
CHINA INCREASINGLY RELYING ON SOFT POWERTHREATENS US POSITION IN THE WORLD Joshua Kurlantzick, Visiting Scholar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006 , The Washington Post October 15, Lexis
North Korea may have conducted a nuclear test last week, but it was China that went a little ballistic. Beijing condemned its longtime ally, denouncing North Korean leader Kim Jong Il's "flagrant and brazen" violation of global norms. Pyongyang, China declared, had "defied the universal opposition of international society." Other nations joined the chorus of concern over North Korea's apparent entry into the nuclear club. But China remains the one country that can do more than fume and condemn. It now has the chance to wield the diplomatic influence it has carefully been amassing in recent years as it pursues a new strategy in Asia and elsewhere in the world. Call it Chinese power, 21st-century-style. While Washington has focused on the fight against terrorism, China has quietly reoriented its foreign policy to emerge as a new advocate of "soft power " -- a combination of diplomatic outreach, cultural attractiveness and economic might that helps a nation persuade other countries to follow its lead. North Korea is a case in point. China has lately become Pyongyang's major trading partner and source of aid. Chinese leaders have taken Kim on tours of their booming south to suggest how he might boost his backward economy, and they have trained North Korean officials in economic management. It was Beijing that helped persuade Pyongyang to come to the negotiating table for the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear program. It's all part of an international charm offensive that could threaten U.S. interests abroad, but could also -- if properly exploited by other nations -- transform the Asian giant into a more responsible member of the world community. Beijing has embraced the concept of soft power with vigor. In recent years, it has dispatched more than 2,000 volunteer language instructors all over the world to teach Mandarin; upgraded its diplomatic corps (half of the country's 4,000 diplomats are reportedly younger than 35); boosted its foreign aid to match the United States as a donor in some countries; increased overseas investment; promoted the study of Chinese culture worldwide; and launched a frenzy of trade initiatives, developing more than 10 free-trade deals in the past five years. China has even created its own version of the Peace Corps -- the China Association for Youth Volunteers. Like its U.S. counterpart, it sends young people to developing countries such as Burma, Ethiopia and Laos to work on long-term community-assistance projects -- and to polish China's global image in the process. While it initially concentrated on the immediate neighborhood of Southeast Asia, China has lately expanded its soft power play into Latin America, Central Asia and Africa. Thousands of young professionals
from sub-Saharan Africa now travel to China on scholarships provided by Beijing. Trade between the continent and China grew by more than 260 percent between 2001 and 2005. China offers Africa about $2.7 billion annually in loans and grants. Beijing has also been busy planning Confucius Institutes -- Chinese language and culture schools attached to universities -- in key African nations such as Kenya, as well as countries such as Uzbekistan and the Philippines. And Chinese officials shrewdly advertise these initiatives at new summits such as the China-Africa Cooperation Forum, which was established in 2000, and the
. The Chinese leadership's decision to go soft was a conscious one, a reaction to Western shunning after the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989 and the failure of China's attempts in the 1990s to use its growing military force to intimidate its neighbors into choosing Beijing over Washington. And it has yielded some dazzling success. A BBC poll last year of 22 nations found that nearly all believed that China played a more positive role in the world than the United States. Today, Southeast Asian officials compete for junkets and training in China. "We have no money, and this is the only training we can get," a top official in Laos's Foreign Ministry told me. Chinese aid funds roads
upcoming China-Africa summit next month and hospitals across Asia, and neighboring countries orient their commerce toward Beijing: Growing trade with China has transformed Chiang Saen, a formerly sleepy Thai village on the Mekong River. Today,
China's newfound popularity could raise a host of problems internationally. Its emergence as a donor country may allow aid recipients to play Beijing off against organizations such as the World Bank. Just this summer, Chad moved toward evicting two oil companies, Chevron Corp. and Malaysia's Petronas, from a project backed by the bank, which had insisted that some of the oil profits be spent on improving social welfare. There's a chance that Chad may replace the oil firms with Chinese companies; at the same time that it was kicking out Chevron and Petronas, it was breaking relations with Taiwan and establishing ties with China. China's growing foreign investment could also contribute to environmental destruction, because Chinese firms have little experience with green policies at home. Worse, as Beijing charms the world, it could persuade other developing nations to choose a Chinese growth model -- promoting gradual economic change but clamping down on any political opening. Many foreign leaders, even in democracies, undeniably want to emulate China's breakneck development. "
container vessels arrive with crates of Chinese apples that are unloaded into trucks lined up at the town's port, while Chinese traders gather at flashy massage parlors to barter with importers.
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Soft Power Good: China: Chinese Soft Power Lead BadGenerally Challenges US Security
RISE OF CHINA PROVIDES A SERIOUS SECURITY CHALLENGE TO THE US Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 185-6 The United States will confront two overriding national security challenges for at least the next generation. First, Americans must effectively wage a long, twilight struggle against violent Islamic fundamentalists. Second, we must simultaneously cope with Chinas almost certain rise to great-power status. Perhaps no country in history, including the purposeful increase in global significance of the United States at the turn of the last century, has risen as rapidly as China. Chinas ascent has been, to date, a mostly positive development, given the alternativea huge country mired in poverty. Nonetheless, the rapidity of Chinas rise, and the fact that it is occurring while China is still run by an autocratic government with outstanding territorial claims against American friends (Taiwan in particular), make the situation complexand potentially hazardous for American interests. The manner in which the United States addresses these challenges will largely determine its continued ability to promote international security in the early twenty-first century. CHINESE SOFT POWER COMPETITION PRESENTS SERIOUS IDEOLOGICAL CHALLENGE TO THE WEST Bates Gill & Yanzhong Huang, CSIS & Seton Hall University, 2006, Survival, Volume 48, No. 2, Summer, p. 21 Keenly aware of the Chinese economic success story, since 2002 North Korea has cautiously adopted certain reforms to introduce market-style incentives into its planned economy. But so far, the most loyal disciples of the Beijing Consensus are its two southern communist neighbours, Laos and Vietnam. While Laos moves toward the Chinese model of market-based authoritarianism, Vietnam insists on placing stability before political reform after its adoption of Chinese-style economic reform. The ability of Beijing to present an alternative politicaleconomic model is seen by one prominent foreign-policy specialist in Britain as the biggest ideological threat the West has felt since the end of the Cold War. SOFT POWER COMPETITION WITH CHINA MATTERS Joseph Nye, Harvard, 2005, The Wall Street Journal Asia, December 29, http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/ksgnews/Features/opeds/122905_nye.htm While recent U.S. Congressional reports have focused on the rise of China's economic and military power, far less attention has been paid to the rise of China's soft power. Yet in a global information age, soft sources of power such as culture, political values, and diplomacy are part of what makes a great power. Success depends not only on whose army wins, but also on whose story wins.
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Soft Power Good: China: Chinese Soft Power Lead BadThreatens US Global Hegemony
CHINAS GROWING SOFT POWER IS A CHALLENGE TO US GLOBAL HEGEMONY Thomas J. Christensen, Professor International Affairs Princeton, 2006, International Security, Summer, p. 81 Joshua Kurlantzick emphasizes the dangers of China's newfound diplomatic "soft power" for the United States. He sees China vying with the United States for hegemony not just regionally, but globally. Pointing to how Chinese soft power appears to be spreading quickly to such disparate places as Latin America and Australia, he writes, "China may become the first nation since the fall of the Soviet Union that could seriously challenge the United States for control of the international system." In the fall of 2005, the U.S. commentator Charles Krauthammer adopted a similar zero-sum perspective by viewing even the prospect of China's diplomatic success in promoting North Korean denuclearization as potentially bad for the United States. The perceived danger is that China would gain significant prestige in tackling a knotty problem that the United States could not solve and, therefore, Beijing would gain in relative power terms vis-a-vis the United States. Some observers have also expressed concern that by asserting its influence in the inaugural meeting of the East Asia Summit (EAS) in December 2005, China has attempted to maximize its power at the expense of the United States and U.S. allies. China's official government position is that it does not favor the exclusion of the United States or other actors from the EAS or from the region more generally. But during the early discussions of the EAS's composition, various signs suggested that China was at least comfortable with, if not fully supportive of, Malaysia's position that actors from outside East Asia should be excluded. ASEAN eventually decided to extend EAS membership to any outside power that has significant regional interests and is willing to sign the association's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, thus opening the door for Australia, India, and New Zealand. Japan apparently had pushed hard for such an "open" summit and initially seemed to have won the day. According to knowledgeable Chinese and Japanese experts, however, in the period leading up to the December meeting, China successfully lobbied to place ASEAN plus Three at the core of the process that will eventually create an East Asian Community (EAC), relegating the more diffuse East Asia Summit to a secondary role. In fact, such a two-tiered arrangement for EAC creation was one of the few clear conclusions reached at the inaugural EAS. China's apparent strategy before and during the summit suggests to some inside and outside of China that Beijing prefers a relatively closed process for creation of the EAC, a process in which China can maximize its own influence and minimize the role of states more friendly to the United States.
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Soft Power Good: China: Loss of U.S. Asian Leadership Causes War
COLLAPSE OF US SOFT POWER AND LEADERSHIP IN ASIA RISKS NUCLEARIZATION BY OUR ALLIES The Business Times Singapore, 2006, October 11, p. Lexis Unfortunately, diplomatic boldness and creativity is something that is missing in Washington these days as the Bush Administration is also continuing to pursue what seems to be an ineffective policy to prevent Iran - another member of the Axis of Evil - from pursuing the nuclear military path after it invaded Iraq, the third member of the 'Axis', in order to dismantle its nonexistent nuclear military capability. The main danger is that this same US diplomatic ineffectiveness - talking loudly and carrying a short stick - could end up encouraging other states in the region, including Japan and Taiwan that they cannot count on US leadership and need to join the nuclear club in order to protect their interests. US DIPLOMATIC LEADERSHIP IN ASIA IN RESPONSE TO NORTH KOREAN THREAT NEEDED TO PREVENT REGIONAL NUCLEARIZATION Global American Discourse, 2006, October 10, p. Lexis Perkovich insists on prompt action by the United States to stop nuclear arms race in the Far East, and prevent Iran's nuclear ambition. For this purpose, he argues that the United States take leadership to involve Japan, South Korea, and China in intensive diplomacy to prevent nuclear arms race in this region. It is understandable that he is somewhat concerned with Japan's potential quest for nuclear weapon, in face of North Korean threat. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe suggested it in the past. I agree with him that it is vitally important that the United States lead an intense and sustained effort with Japan, South Korea and China to clarify each other's intentions and policies in ways that avoid any nuclear competition. SHIFTING FROM US TO CHINESE LEADERSHIP IN ASIA RISKS JAPANESE NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT Robert S. Ross, Professor Political Science Boston College, 2006, The Nikkei Weekly (Japan), November 20, p. Lexis Over the past decade Japan has developed a large and modern navy, become an active participant in U.N. peacekeeping activities, deployed military forces overseas in support of U.S. forces at war, developed missile systems to defend its claims to disputed islands, cooperated with the Pentagon's strategic flexibility strategy (in contrast to South Korea), and granted the U.S. expanded access to its military facilities. Meanwhile, the Japanese debate over revising the constitution has created a consensus in favor of revision and the debate over possession of nuclear weapons has grown. The primary impetus for the changes in Japanese defense policy and public opinion has been the rise of China. Just as this been the case for U.S. leadership on the Korean Peninsula and for Sino-South Korean relations, it has also been the case for Japanese policy. But whereas the rise of China has encouraged South Korean accommodation of China, it has encouraged Japan to adopt a more proactive defense policy. North Korea's nuclear and missile programs have accelerated this trend in Japanese policy by promoting public support for the underlying Japanese strategic response to the rise of China. This was the case in 1994-1995 following the first North Korea nuclear crisis, in 1998 following the North Korean missile test, and now following the North Korean nuclear test. But just as North Korea has not caused the changes in Japanese defense policy, it will not drive Japan's decisions to acquire an independent nuclear deterrent. Whether Japan ultimately develops such a capability will depend on underlying trends in great power relations in East Asia, including the rise of China, Sino-Japanese relations, and ultimately the U.S.Japan alliance.
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Soft Power Good: China: China Uses Soft Power to Present Alternate Development Model
CHINA PRESENTING NEW MODEL FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO EMULATE Bates Gill & Yanzhong Huang, CSIS & Seton Hall University, 2006, Survival, Volume 48, No. 2, Summer, p. 20 A fast-growing China is also a conspicuous exemplar for many. Former journalist Joshua Cooper Ramo claimed that Chinas economic miracle presents the developing world a recipe for success: the Beijing Consensus. According to Ramo, the Beijing Consensus can be seen as the antithesis of the Washington Consensus: it does not believe in uniform solutions for every situation, nor does it favour one big, shock-therapy leap. Instead, it emphasises development based on a countrys own characteristics, with ruthless willingness to innovate and experiment. While no systematic information is available to assess the popularity of this model, and Beijing has never officially used this term, it is clear that Chinas astonishing progress in the past decades is leading to a rethinking of both development economics and the relationship between economic and political freedoms. After comparing the reform experiences in China and Russia, the prominent journalist Robert Kaplan drew the conclusion that sometimes, Autocracy breeds freedom. This was echoed in an Australian opinion piece entitled Chinese Model Passes the Test, which stated that China shows you can have [economic freedom] without [political freedom], where we used to think they were indivisibleSimilarly, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman confessed that he has cast an envious eye on the authoritarian Chinese political system, where leaders can, and do, just order that problems be solved. This soul-searching appears to be influencing the development paths of many countries. Russian President Putin seems to be following the Chinese path by restricting democracy while giving greater emphasis to getting his economic house in order. Other former Soviet republics, such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, have looked to China rather than the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for new economic thinking. In South Asia, this Chinese model has its appeal as well. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said that India should look to China as a role model for economic growth and global trade. Policymakers in Latin America have also shown tremendous interest in the Chinese model. The leftist union leader turned Brazilian President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva reportedly sent study teams to Beijing to learn from the Chinese experience. In Africa, authoritarian leaders seek to maintain their control through market mechanisms to alleviate poverty. In the Middle East, the Chinese model has been embraced by Iranian conservative leaders. Indeed, the Chinese model has been so influential in Iran that it became one of the main themes of a major candidate, former president Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, in the 2005 presidential elections.
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Soft Power Good: China: Chinese Soft Power Lead BadLaundry List Reasons why Development Model is Bad
EXPANDING CHINESE SOFT POWER UNDERMINES POLICIES THAT PROMOTE GOOD GOVERNANCE, DEMOCRACY, THE ENVIRONMENT AND COUNTER GENOCIDE Joshua Kurlantzick, Visiting Scholar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006 , Policy Outlook, Beijings Safari: Chinas Move into Africa and its Implications for Aid, Development and Governance, November, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/kurlantzick_outlook_africa2.pdf, p. 4-5 But in some respects, Chinas engagement with Africa is qualitatively different from the engagement of other powers and financial institutions. Western powers are hardly blameless in relations with Africathey have backed dictators from Mobutu Sese Seko to Yoweri Museveni. Yet today, most traditional donors have agreed that governance is vital to development, and the United States has created the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which rewards wellgoverned poor nations. The MCC thus far has a mixed track record, but it at least creates a model that other donors can build upon. At the same moment, for the first time in decades Africa has entered the radar screen of international corporations and Western governments. In a world facing a potential peak in production from major Middle Eastern oil fields, Africas oil and gas prove even more attractive. Much of Africa is posting its strongest growth rates since independence. The continent seems ready to settle long-running civil conflicts in countries like Congo, and has begun to climb the rankings of the World Banks index of environments for doing business. Chinas involvement could threaten this African renaissance. Growing Chinese loans to Africa, especially at high commercial rates, could threaten billions in recent forgiveness by the World Bank and IMFs Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, since China also loans to these nations. If China uses aid tied to investment to win major oil and gas deals, it could convince other emerging powers in Africa, like India, to follow suit, potentially undermining governance and sparking conflict for resources. Chinese arms sales continue to fuel conflict in Africa; China publishes no information about its arms transfers overseas, and a recent Amnesty International report found 17 percent of small arms collected by peacekeepers in the Congo were of Chinese design. Chinese investment could contribute to unchecked environmental destruction and poor labor standards, since Chinese firms have little experience with green policies and unions at home, and some African nations have powerful union movements. In Gabon, illegal timber exports to China comprise roughly 70 percent of all timber exports. In Zambia, workers in a Chinese-run mine have erupted in violent protest against safety standards and low wages, which they believe led to an accident last year in which 49 miners died. In the recent Zambian election, opposition candidate Michael Sata played on this anger, accusing Chinese companies of exploiting local workers. Though Sata lost, his supporters then rioted in the Zambian capital, targeting Chinese businesses. More generally, the state-led business model China offers could prove problematic. Chinese firms with state links often have poor standards of corporate governance within China. Still, in China, the rule of law is weak but does exist; the Chinese government has managed to prosecute the most corrupt officials. In Africas weakest states, where the rule of law often simply does not exist and economic policy makers do not enjoy the same kind of independence from politicians as in China, this state-led business model could simply be a disasteran invitation for rapacious governments. Worse, if China offers aid without any conditions, it will allow itself to serve as a wedge between it and other donors. This has already begun to occur, and not only in Angola. In recent weeks, Chad has announced that it may evict two oil companies, Chevron Corp and Malaysias Petronas, from a project backed by the World Bank, which had insisted that some oil profits in Chad be spent on improving social welfare. Eventually, Chad may replace the oil firms with Chinese companies, since while it was considering kicking out Chevron and Petronas it was breaking relations with Taiwan and establishing relations with China, which already had explored oil investments in Chad. Similarly, in Kenya Chinese aid has helped the government avoid IMF and World Bank criticism of its failure to implement a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy. In Zimbabwe and Sudan, Chinese backing has allowed governments to resist pressure from democratic African states to open a dialogue with the Zimbabwean opposition and to halt the genocide in Darfur.
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Soft Power Good: China: Chinese Soft Power Lead BadUndermines Democratization and Good Governance Efforts
CHINA BUILDING ITS SOFT POWER TO CHALLENGE US UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY Joshua Kurlantzick, Visiting Scholar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006 , Policy Brief, Chinas Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PB_47_FINAL.pdf, p. 1-2 Chinas soft power may be only natural in Southeast Asia, its nearest neighborhood. As nations emerge into great powers, they inevitably exert growing influence. But the values and models China projects to Southeast Asiaand eventually to other developing nationscould be disastrous for a region of nascent democracies and weak civil societies. Whats more, China appears to be using its soft power to incrementally push Japan, Taiwan, and even the United States out of regional influence. CHINESE SOFT POWER DANGEROUS UNDERMINES DEMOCRATIZATION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE EFFORTS, APPEALS TO DICTATORS Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 197-8 A growing number of authoritarian governments see China as an attractive ideological partner. Beijings twin commitments to defending countries national sovereignty and not interfering in other states internal affairs appeal to dictators uneasy about the Bush administrations newfound dedication to spreading liberal democracy throughout the world. Chinas emerging status as a patron of the worlds dictators club is particularly evident in Africa. Beijings willingness to ignore human rights and related matters when disbursing aid earns it favor among several African dictators whose poor governance, opaque political systems, and refusal to implement the painful brand of economic or political reforms demanded by the United States make them unpopular in Washington. Because Africa also supplies an estimated quarter of Beijings imported oil, it has been a breeding ground for convenient marriage between China and leaders of rogue statesnot only Sudans al-Bashir, but also Zimbabwes Robert Mugabe and Angolas Jose Santos. For example, Chinas extensive energy and military cooperation with Sudan has repeatedly led Chinese leaders to stymie efforts in the UN Security Council to coerce the Sudanese government into improving the human rights situation in Darfur. Finally, China has made inroads into Latin America, long considered Americas backyard because of the 1832 Monroe Doctrine. In April 2001, then-president Jiang Zemin spent almost two weeks in the region, visiting Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In November 2004, Chinese president Hu Jintao visited Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba, signing business deals worth billions of dollars. With half of Chinas FDI flowing to Latin America, Chinese officials predict that their FDI in the region could amount to $100 billion by the end of the decade. Chinas investment already accounts for one-third of Latin Americas total FDI. Predictably, Chinese officials have cultivated relationships with the anti-American stalwarts Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez to strengthen ties with Cuba and oil-rich Venezuela. In March 2006, General Bantz J. Craddock, commander of USSOUTHCOM, warned the House Armed Services Committee that increasing presence of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) in the region is an emerging dynamic that must not be ignored. Although many of Washingtons traditional allies in developing countries feel somewhat neglected by the Bush administrations current preoccupation with terrorism, Latin Americas leftist leaders go further and blame the USsupported international economic system for their countries economic difficulties. Under the rubric of a Global South movement, these regimes have anointed Chinas Hu Jintao as their unofficial leader. President Hu has embraced this informal post. In 2004, he told an audience in Sao Paolo that China would spare no effort to help build a democratic international order as well as multiple [approaches] to development models. These were welcome words for leaders like Brazils Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva, who during an earlier trip to China said his government wanted a partnership with China that integrates our economies and serves as a paradigm for South-South cooperation.
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Soft Power Good: China: Chinese Soft Power Lead BadUndermines Democratization and Good Governance Efforts
CHINESE INFLUENCE IN AFRICA SUPPORTS TYRANTS UNDERMINES HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRATIZATION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE Peter Brookes & Ji Hye Shin, Heritage Foundation, 2006, Chinas Influence in Africa: implications for the United States, February, 22, http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1916.cfm Chinas ideological support of African despots lends them international legitimacy and influence in the United Nations and other international arenas that help to blunt pressure from the Western democracies on human rights, economic openness, and political freedoms. At the same time, when it serves Chinese interests, Beijing succors would-be junta leaders and illiberal rebels who want power and would roll back political reforms in immature democracies. These rebels seem to believe that if they want to overthrow a legitimate government, China will work to bolster their international legitimacy in the United Nations and other international fora. CHINESE SOFT POWER IN AFRICA UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE Joshua Kurlantzick, Visiting Scholar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006 , Policy Outlook, Beijings Safari: Chinas Move into Africa and its Implications for Aid, Development and Governance, November, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/kurlantzick_outlook_africa2.pdf, p. 1-2 Chinas new safari may prove positive for Africa. Beijing offers African nations an alternate consumer for resources, a model of successful development, and trade policies that can be more benign than Western initiatives. Yet today Africa is beginning to recover from its long economic and political stagnation, and foreign countries and international donor agencies generally have agreed to use assistance to promote better governance on the continent. Chinas expanding presence could undermine this donor coherence and strengthen some of the continents worst regimes. Indeed, Africa today offers a testa test of whether China, as it begins to develop a global foreign policy, will prove willing to work with donors and traditional powers. Before China becomes more powerful in Africa, other actors must develop strategies to help ensure Beijing becomes a collaborative actorstrategies that could be replicated in other parts of the developing world. CHINA CHALLENGING US FOR INFLUENCE IN AFRICA THREATENS TO UNDERMINE HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRATIZATION AND PROGRESS Peter Brookes & Ji Hye Shin, Heritage Foundation, 2006, Chinas Influence in Africa: implications for the United States, February, 22, http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1916.cfm China is actively expanding its influence in Africa to secure supplies of natural resources, to counter Western political and economic influence while expanding Chinas global influence, and to further isolate Taiwan. As a result, Chinese support for political and economic repression in Africa is countering the liberalizing influences of Africas traditional European and American partners. It is in the U.S. national interest to address these developments in Africa by deftly encouraging democratic processes, economic freedom, and respect for human rights across the African continent.
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Soft Power Good: China: Chinese Soft Power Lead BadWorsens Ethnic conflicts, genocide and refugee crises
CHINESE LEADERSHIP IN AFRICA EXACERBATES CONFLICTS AND REFUGEE CRISES Peter Brookes & Ji Hye Shin, Heritage Foundation, 2006, Chinas Influence in Africa: implications for the United States, February, 22, http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1916.cfm Moreover, China rewards its African friends with diplomatic attention and financial and military assistance, exacerbating existing forced dislocations of populations and abetting massive human rights abuses in troubled countries such as Sudan and Zimbabwe. As a consequence, Chinese support for political and economic repression in Africa counters the liberalizing influences of Africas traditional European and American partners. Chinas vigorous campaign to develop close ties with individual African nations also reflects Beijings global quest to isolate Taiwan diplomatically (seven of the 26 countries that have full diplomatic relations with Taiwan are African). The most pernicious effect of the renewed Chinese interest in Africa is that China is legitimizing and encouraging Africas most repressive regimes, thereby increasing the likelihood of weak and failed states. The United States must also be alert to the potential long-term disruption of American access to important raw materials and energy sources as these resources are locked up by Chinese firms for the PRCs domestic market to maintain Chinas economic growth. CHINESE INFLUENCE IN AFRICA PROMOTE GENOCIDE -- SUDAN Peter Brookes & Ji Hye Shin, Heritage Foundation, 2006, Chinas Influence in Africa: implications for the United States, February, 22, http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1916.cfm The Chinese government has combined its efforts to secure exclusive access to African natural resources with an aggressive political campaign to ingratiate itself with Africas tyrants and despots. For example, Sudans government has long abetted and perpetrated genocide against large non-Muslim populations in its Darfur region. While the United States, the European Union, Japan, and other Western democracies have sought to impose U.N. sanctions against the Sudanese regime over the issue, China has opposed U.N. actions against Khartoum. Over the past several years, the Khartoum government has forced hundreds of thousands of people to flee their homes in southern oil fields largely owned by the CNPC.[12] In fact, Sudanese government troops and government-aligned militias have used Chinese-made helicopter gunships, based at airstrips maintained by Chinese oil companies, in raids that devastated hundreds of towns and villages around the oil installations.
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Soft Power Good: China: Chinese Soft Power Lead BadChinese Development Model Flawed
CHINESE DEVELOPMENT MODEL BAD FOR AFRICA Peter Brookes & Ji Hye Shin, Heritage Foundation, 2006, Chinas Influence in Africa: implications for the United States, February, 22, http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1916.cfm Moreover, the Chinese government has actively advocated a Chinese-style economic development model to African countries, based on a restricted market system constrained by the overarching priority of maintaining a single-party, totalitarian government. Many authoritarian African regimes, desperate to invigorate their fraying economies while maintaining a strong grip on political power, seem to find the Chinese economic development and reform model preferable to the free-market and representative-government.
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Soft Power Good: China: Chinese Soft Power Lead BadChinese Development Model Bad for the Environment
GROWTH OF CHINESE SOFT POWER DISASTROUS FOR DEMOCRATIZATION AND ENVIRONMENT Joshua Kurlantzick, Visiting Scholar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006 , Policy Brief, Chinas Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PB_47_FINAL.pdf, p. 5-6 Chinas rising soft power could prove benign or even beneficial in some respects. Why should Washington mind if Beijing organizes summits of ethnic Chinese or promotes Chinese language? And as it emerges into great power status, China has used its appeal to influence Southeast Asia to take steps Washington desires. The ASEAN-China free trade agreement, possible only because of the appeal of China as an economic model, has forced Southeast Asia leaders to think of the region as one economic bloc, an idea U.S. companies prefer. China has proven influential in nontraditional security issues, working with its neighbors to address trafficking in drugs and people. But in some ways Chinas soft power could prove disastrous for Southeast Asiafor democratization, for anticorruption initiatives, and for good governance. China has already begun to export its own poor labor, political, and environmental policies. In northern Burma, Chinese government-linked companies contribute to widespread deforestation, and China has shown little interest in Southeast Asian nations concerns about the environmental impact of dams on Chinas upper portion of the Mekong River. Instead China has refused to join the Mekong River Commission, the organization monitoring the river. Meanwhile Chinas support for authoritarian regimes in Cambodia and Burma forestalls democratization or at least better governance in those nations. In Cambodia opposition politicians complain of Chinese support for the ruling party, and journalists report that when they write about subjects displeasing to Chinalike Taiwanthe embassy harasses them. In Burma Chinas aid packages and frequent state visits have undermined U.S. and Southeast Asian efforts to push the ruling junta into a dialogue with the democratic opposition; instead, Chinas actions have encouraged other powers, like India, to move closer to Rangoon. In the Philippines, where international watchdogs have long highlighted government corruption, China has offered some $400 million in aid to a major infrastructure project, the Northrail rail line. Local activists warn that the Chinese aid was provided with no transparency in bidding and with no significant environmental impact assessment. In the worst possible case, Chinas success in delivering strong economic growth while retaining political control could serve as an example to some of the more authoritarian-minded leaders in the region, like Cambodias Hun Sen, who admires Chinas economic and political system. In controlling development from the top, of course, Beijings model rejects the idea that ordinary citizens should control countries destinies. And as Chinas power grows around the world, the influence it projects, as in Southeast Asia, could be similarly bad for a range of developing nations. As Elizabeth Economy of the Council on Foreign Relations has noted, the Chinese firm Shougang International Trade and Engineering reportedly has done little to upgrade safety at the Hierro de Peru mine it purchased in Peru in the early 1990s. Perus Labor Ministry recorded 170 accidents, including two fatal ones, at the mine in one year alone. When labor unions in Peru protested, Beijing allowed Shougang to bring imported laborers from China to work at the mine. Similarly, in Africa Chinese assistance to authoritarian states like Zimbabwe and Angola has raised concerns. International corruption watchdogs warn that Chinas aid package to Angola, reportedly as large as $6 billion and given without pressure for poverty reduction or coordination with international financial organizations, will allow the Angolan government to revert to its old habits, skimming the aid for itself.
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Soft Power Good: China: Chinese Soft Power Lead BadThreatens US Access to Critical Resources
GROWING CHINESE SOFT POWER IN LATIN AMERICA RISKS US ACCESS TO CRITICAL NATURAL RESOURCES Willy Lam, Asian Journalist, 2004, China Brief: Chinas Encroachment on Americas Backyard, November 24, http://www.jamestown.org/images/pdf/cb_004_023.pdf In return for its largesse, Beijing will have assured supplies of oil and gas, minerals ranging from gold to nickel, as well as agricultural produce. This is despite the much longer distance involved in shipping over the goods to China. Moreover, Latin American countries including Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Peru last week agreed to recognize Chinas full market economy status (FMES). So far, some two dozen countries have accepted the Middle Kingdoms FMES, and Beijing is poised to put more pressure on the European Union to do the same. Recognition of this status would enable China to better defend itself against charges of dumping that may be raised by its trading partners. CHINAS GROWING INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA THREATENS US POLICY INTERESTS AND ACCESS TO RESOURCES Willy Lam, Asian Journalist, 2004, China Brief: Chinas Encroachment on Americas Backyard, November 24, http://www.jamestown.org/images/pdf/cb_004_023.pdf Over the long term, Chinas Latin-American offensive could have a negative impact on Sino-U.S. relations. This is despite the fact that the Bush-Hu tte--tte last week was generally successful. Hu said after the brief meeting that he appreciated Washingtons one-China stance - and vowed to work closer with the Bush White House in the coming four years to promote a constructive, cooperative relationship with the U.S. And Bush praised Chinese cooperation in the global war against terrorism, particularly Beijings contribution to a possible resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis. Hus whirlwind tour of Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Cuba the past week or so, however, has illustrated the extent to which Beijing can exploit the less-than-cozy relations between the U.S. and Latin America to establish major economic and energy footholds in Washingtons backyard. The Bush White House certainly does not want to see Beijing boosting its influence in countries such as Venezuela and Cuba, whose leaderships have thumbed their nose at Washington. Beijings apparent success in securing oil supplies from Venezuela could undercut that countrys crude exports to the U.S. And ever more intimate economic cooperation between China and Cuba will hurt the ability of the Bush administration to put pressure on the Fidel Castro regime through the imposition of sanctions. Indeed, in his meeting with a wheelchair-bound Castro earlier this week, Hu rhapsodized over the fact that China and Cuba were not only friends, but brothers. The Chinese president then vowed to boost economic and technological aid to the pariah state.
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Soft Power Good: China: Increasing US Soft Power Best Way to Respond to Growing Chinese Soft Power
SHOULD RESPOND TO GROWING CHINESE SOFT POWER BY STRENGTHENING OUR SOFT POWER NOT BASHING CHINA Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 187 Yet, in the end, some form of an engagement policy is our only viable choice. Most of the above problems would likely get worse, at least inside the PRC, if China were somehow deprived of global markets. Moreover, if the United States dared try to ostracize China at this point, it would almost surely fail because of resistance abroadnot to mention among many pro-trade groups at home. The key is not to bash China, but to have a sufficiently sophisticated understanding of the relationship that we can be encouraging and work together in some areas while standing firm and pushing for reforms in others. Doing this is an effective fashion should ensure that the United States will retain its strong alliance relationships in the Asia Pacific region and beyond, rather than see China increasingly displace it as the most influential great power in the East. REBUILDING US SOFT POWER IN ASIA NECESSARY TO CHECK GROWING CHINESE INFLUENCE Joshua Kurlantzick, Visiting Scholar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006 , Policy Brief, Chinas Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PB_47_FINAL.pdf, p. 7 To protect its core interests, the United States must focus its Southeast Asia policy. A focused policy would include obtaining a more nuanced understanding of how Beijings soft power is growing. As during the Cold War, when Washington had at least one person in each embassy who studied what the Soviets were doing on the ground in that country, today the United States should have one person in each embassy examining that nations bilateral relations with China. A focused policy would include rebuilding the United States own soft power in the region, including expanding one-person consulates to allow missions in large nations like Indonesia to cover their vast territory; rethinking U.S. sanctions on Southeast Asia (see box on page 5); revamping the Foreign Service so that regionalists and language specialists are better rewarded for their skills; reconsidering cutting regional broadcasting like Voice of Americas Thai service; rethinking stringent student visa policies; and copying Chinese-style blending of political trips and business delegations. A focused policy also would include understanding when Chinas soft power is used in pursuit of objectives, including hard objectives, which threaten U.S. interests, and balancing against that soft power when necessary. If Chinas influence clearly undermines the regions democratization and good governance, the United States must act, publicly exposing Beijings links to autocratic governments and privately trying to convince China that support for Southeast Asian authoritarians imperils Beijings own interest in long-term stability. If the appeal of trade with China is allowing Beijing to isolate Taiwan entirely from the region, the United States must use its appeal, and its authority on issues like health, to push countries to include Taiwan in forums on issues related to disease or the environment or trade. If China is using its appeal to build popular and elite support for closer military relationships with longtime friends of the United States like the Philippines, the United States must recognize this and commit to rebuilding relations with Manila to forestall China-Philippine military ties. And if China drops its rhetoric of win-win diplomacy and uses memberships in Southeast Asian multilateral institutions to try to exclude the United States, Washington must respond, as it has started to do with the recent U.S.-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership, an effort by the United States to re-engage with Asias regional organizations.
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Soft Power Good: China: Increasing US Soft Power Best Way to Respond to Growing Chinese Soft Power
BEST WAY TO BALANCE GROWING CHINESE SOFT POWER IN ASIA IS TO BOOST OUR OWN Thomas J. Christensen, Professor International Affairs Princeton, 2006, International Security, Summer, p. 81 The two approaches also occupy common ground in the realm of U.S. diplomacy. China has advanced very quickly in its diplomatic push in Southeast Asia and South Korea in particular. Even if one accepts the position that regional multilateralism and economic interdependence are forces for regional stability, there is no reason from either a zero-sum or a positive-sum perspective that the United States should want to see such developments occur while the United States stands on the sidelines. So there is nothing inconsistent with celebrating long-term U.S. successes since the early 1990s in helping to channel China's competitive energies in a positive diplomatic direction and away from direct military rivalry with its southern neighbors, on the one hand, and asserting that the United States should be active and constructive in its own diplomacy in Southeast Asia, on the other. However unfairly, since September 11 many in the region have received the impression that the United States' only interest in the region is fighting terrorism. It is, of course, understandable that the United States has emphasized counterterrorism in its relations with Southeast Asian nations since September 11, but from almost any strategic point of view, Washington should convince Southeast Asian states that it has a more balanced diplomatic portfolio. The tsunami disaster in December 2004 and the robust response to it by the United States and its allies may have repaired some of the United States' image problems in the region. Visits to Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia in 2005 and early 2006 by top administration officials, including President Bush, should also help alleviate regional concerns. In its second term, the Bush administration also seems to have made some important inroads with Vietnam, as evidenced by Prime Minister Pham Van Khai's visit to Washington in mid-June 2005. Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick's trip to ASEAN states in May 2005 seemed particularly notable given its emphasis on bringing economics back to the top of the U.S.-ASEAN agenda. Zoellick, a former U.S. trade representative who has tremendous experience in the region working on free trade agreements, emphasized economic cooperation on his trip. n98 He summed up the logic of such an approach in a press conference in Singapore: "No, we've never had the concept of containing China . . . . I think there is recognition in the region that China is a growing influence. And this is natural as China becomes a growing and larger economy and interconnects with this region as other parts of the world. I think the Chinese have tried to signal their multiple interests in Southeast Asia through their discussions of a free trade accord, which on the one hand shows the region that others can benefit from China's growth, but also signals the rising influence of China in the region. From the U.S. perspective, the key message is that we believe we should have our own activist engagement with Southeast Asia and that a policy to try to limit or restrict China would be both foolish and ineffective." One can believe that such positive U.S. efforts should be enhanced in the future regardless of whether one subscribes to a zero-sum logic, a positive-sum logic or, as most analysts do, a mix of both.
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Soft Power Good: China: Increasing US Soft Power Best Way to Respond to Growing Chinese Soft Power
BEST WAY TO BALANCE GROWING CHINESE SOFT POWER IN ASIA IS TO EXPAND ROBUST US PRESENCE AND SOFT POWER Thomas J. Christensen, Professor International Affairs Princeton, 2006, International Security, Summer, p. 81 An intelligent moderate position in a world of both zero-sum and positive-sum relations would be for the United States to maintain a robust presence in the region and a set of strong alliances without attempting to undercut China's diplomatic relationships with other regional actors, even with U.S. allies. In fact, the United States should foster China's engagement with the United States and its allies on issues of common concern. Observers who believe that these policies would weaken U.S. alliances have too little faith in U.S. power and diplomacy. A healthy degree of Japanese wariness about the rise of China may indeed be good for the United States, especially as Washington hopes to encourage Tokyo to adopt a more active regional and global role in the alliance. China's bullying behavior toward Taiwan and its often hamfisted diplomacy toward Japan have helped Washington in that process. But high degrees of Sino-Japanese tensions, as witnessed in 2004-06, are not in Washington's interest, because they could lead to unwanted conflict and hamper multilateral coordination on issues of common concern. Not only would a conflict between Japan and China be costly for the region as a whole, but it is still unclear how the U.S.-Japan alliance and other U.S. security relationships in the region would fare in such a conflict. Given Japan's existing political trajectory on security issues under Prime Minister Koizumi, such a high degree of tension is not really necessary for the United States to foster Japan's moves toward a more active international security role. Since U.S.-Japan alliance relations seem strong and are getting stronger, why should the prospect of greater tensions in Sino-Japanese relations, which carry real strategic risks for the United States, be seen as a prerequisite for continued improvement in U.S.-Japan relations? Such tensions are both unnecessary and potentially dangerous, and efforts to reduce them through encouraging Sino-Japanese dialogue seem in order.
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Soft Power Good: China: Increasing US Soft Power Best Way to Respond to Growing Chinese Soft Power
US CAN DEFEAT CHINA IN THE SOFT POWER BATTLE BY INCREASING ITS TIES WITH INDONESIA Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 209 Fifth, recognize that a more promising and equally important battlefield for the hearts and minds struggle within Islam today lies in Southeast Asia, not for the Middle East. The United States must launch a major diplomatic engagement strategy in the region, starting with Indonesia, the worlds most populous Islamic nation. We should build on the opening provided by the successful US-led post-tsunami relief effort in that country, an episode that throughout the region highlighted the economic and military strengths of the United States in comparison with China, whose stingy assistance did not warrant membership in the core group of leading aid-donating countries that took charge of the relief effort for a short period. In the aftermath of their shared experiences in this endeavor, the American and Indonesian governments agree that they have the potential to forge a long-term partnership. Achieving further progress will require expanding our recently renewed contacts with the Indonesian military, a key local ally against Islamic extremism. The global education initiative outlined in the last chapter, designed with countries such as Indonesia in mind, will provide more of a basis for partnershipand more of a contrast with China, should it remain withholding in its foreign assistance. In improving ties with Indonesia, the United States would simultaneously counter the twin problems of spreading Chinese influence and Islamist extremism in Southeast Asia.
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Soft Power Good: China: Careful US Response Key to Ensure that Chinese Soft Power Is Used in a Positive Manner
US MUST CAREFULLY RESPOND TO CHINAS GROWING SOFT POWER TO ENSURE THAT IT IS USED TO PROMOTE RATHER THAN THREATEN GLOBAL STABILITY Bates Gill & Yanzhong Huang, CSIS & Seton Hall University, 2006, Survival, Volume 48, No. 2, Summer, p. 30-1 Despite an expansion and successful use of soft power, China has not yet developed an ideal mix of soft-power resources to achieve desired foreign-policy objectives. The gap between an increasingly cosmopolitan and confident foreign policy and a closed and rigid domestic political system is responsible for the imbalance between three pillars of soft power: cultural attractiveness, examples set by domestic values and policies, and values expressed through foreign policy. This lack of balanced soft-power resources also accounts for Beijings legitimacy and coherence problems in the exercise of soft power. Given the constant tensions between its foreign-policy objectives and the still-nascent soft-power resources, China still has a long way to go before becoming a true global leader. Nevertheless, we should expect Chinas soft-power resources to grow in the coming years. As Chinas soft power grows, it presents the international community with an interesting dilemma. On the one hand, China is shepherding its resources for the long-term goal of being a dominant player in East Asia and beyond. As and if Beijing achieves success in this pursuit, it will have enormous, and potentially negative, implications for the current balance of power in the region, and especially for the United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific. On the other hand, many aspects of Chinas foreign policy which substantiate its soft power greater acceptance of norms governing international relations, peaceful settlement of disputes, mutually beneficial economic ties, recognition of the need to address non-traditional and transnational security problems such as terrorism, international crime and proliferation are increasingly convergent with approaches advocated by the vast majority of the international community. How the major powers, and especially Washington, respond to this dilemma in the near to medium future will be a major factor shaping the stability of East Asia and the world. A neo-containment policy to prevent Chinas rise is not realistic, and in light of Beijings continued and nuanced use of its hard and soft power is unlikely to be acceptable to many in the region and beyond. In addition, dwelling narrowly on countering the hard aspects of Chinese power not only overlooks important Chinese soft-power gains, but could become a self-fulfilling prophecy by provoking Beijing to step away from the favourable aspects of its soft power and focus instead on throwing around its growing military and economic weight. MUST KEEP CHINESE SOFT POWER IN CHECK Joshua Kurlantzick, Visiting Scholar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006 , The Washington Post October 15, Lexis But China's growing soft power most needs checking as Beijing begins using its leverage to meddle in other countries' domestic politics. Before Sata lost, China's ambassador to Zambia had warned that Beijing might cut off diplomatic ties to the country depending upon whom Zambians chose for president. In interviews across Asia, Africa and Latin America, activists, politicians, writers and other opinion leaders expressed to me their fears that growing Chinese influence in their countries could stifle political change, though they simultaneously hope that Beijing can use its diplomatic influence to restrain Asia's most dangerous actors, such as North Korea. China has amassed impressive soft power -- now it has to prove that it's willing to use it wisely.
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Soft Power Good: EU Tradeoff Scenario: EU Competes with the US for Soft Power Lead
EUROPE IS THE MAJOR COMPETITOR TO THE US LEAD IN SOFT POWER Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 75-6 Currently, the closest competitor to the United States in soft power resources is Europe. European art, literature, music, design, fashion, and food have long served as global cultural magnets. Taken individually, many European states have a strong cultural attractiveness: half of the ten most widely spoken languages in the world are European. Spanish and Portuguese link Iberia to Latin America, English is the language of the United States and the far-flung Commonwealth, and there are nearly 50 Francophone countries who meet at a biannual summit at which they discuss policies and celebrate their status as countries have French in common. France spends close to $1 billion a year to spread French civilization around the world. As seen from distant Singapore, Frances soft power has been clearly maintained or even increased in the past fifty years, although Paris may no longer be the prime intellectual, cultural and philosophical capital of the world. But the soft power does not rest only on language use. One advocate of Asian values, former Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia, refers to the new concerns about environment and human rights as European values. EU SUPLANTING THE US AS THE SOFT POWER LEADER Joshua Kurlantzick, Visiting Scholar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005 , Current History, December, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Kurlantzick.pdf, p. 422 Unlike in the 1990s, foreigners now have alternative social and economic models to consider; the American Dream is not the only vision in town. As the European Union has expanded, it now has a larger population than America and a gross domestic product equivalent to that of the United States. In banking, mobile telephony, aerospace, and other cutting-edge industries, European corporations like Nokia have begun to challenge, if not surpass, American companies. European expansion has made the EU seem accessible, and attractive, to a wide range of potential member-states in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the former Soviet Union. Brussels has used this desire to join the union to persuade Turkey to make drastic political changes, to push the Balkans away from its recent bloody past, and to convince former Soviet states to reform their economies and political systemsjust the kind of persuasion and leverage that defines soft power. The EU also has devoted more resources to public diplomacy and overseas aid, becoming the worlds largest provider of development assistance. This diplomacy, combined with foreign nations desire to emulate the European social and political modelwhich is perceived as more humane than Americasmay be why emerging democracies now favor European parliamentary states, constitutions, and legal systems when they are designing their institutions. Recent attention to immigration woes, costly welfare budgets, and the rejection of an EU constitution has not erased Europes attractiveness.
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Soft Power Good: EU Tradeoff Scenario: High US Soft Power Key to Ensuring that EU Soft Power Will Complement US Goals
HOW THE US IS PERCEIVED BY EUROPE DETERMINES WHETHER EU SOFT POWER COMPETES WITH OR COMPLEMENTS US POLICY GOALS Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 83 French political leaders have often talked about creating a multipolar balance of power, but many Europeans see such dreams as unrealistic in the current world situation. Most Europeans realize that multilateral diplomacy is possible even without a multipolar military balance, and they would be happy to share their soft power with the United States if we would be more consultative in our approach. As a sympathetic British observer put the point during the Iraq war, Maddening contradictions have all along been at the heart of the willful destruction of the international security system during the past few months. The US quest for untrammeled primacy is doomed. Americas security and prosperity depend on its political influence as much as its military might. In other words, the extent to which the growth of European soft power is an asset or a liability for the United States depends upon American policies and rests very much on Americas own choices. European soft power can be used to help or hurt the United States, depending on how America behaves.
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Soft Power Good: US Can Rebuild Its Soft Power
US CAN RECAPTURE ITS SOFT POWER KEY TO MAKE HARD POWER MORE EFFECTIVE IF IT PROVES NECESSARY Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 248-9 We argue for a comprehensive strategy to better position the United States in a long struggle against fundamentalist radicals. It should include a broad education effort here at home to increase Arabic-language competence, not only to improve cross-cultural awareness and sensitivity but also to create the basis for a much stronger generation of intelligence specialists, language-competent military officers, and hardheaded American diplomats. The United States also should work with other major countries to promote a vigorous educational-reform agenda for developing countries couched in the language of multilateralism and development but motivated in part by the need to help Islamic states strengthen their societies and engage the populations with the realities, the challenges, and the opportunities of the modern world. Without such a strategy, we will continue to lose the long-term war on terror despite whatever fleeting progress we may make in the short terman idea that Secretary Rumsfeld himself advanced in 2003 and 2004, but which the Bush administration has failed to deliver upon. The United States also needs a major new national commitment to boosting the ethanol-fuel system to relieve some pressures on foreign energy supplies from unstable parts of the Middle East. Energy policy has become popular in the United States, but there is a chance that our national focus in dealing with it will fade if and when gas prices decline. There is also a strong likelihood that the market itself will not catalyze the major shift in policy that we now needand that technology now promises. Among other measures, the country needs a national energy economics board to help calibrate tax policy and other incentives to spur supply as well as demand of alternative fuels. Taken together, these polices and others can help repair Americas tattered image in the world and rebuild its soft power in the process. In refocusing on hard power, it would be a mistake to forget its essential complement. By getting the former right, Democrats and internationalist Republicans create opportunities to promote the latter too.
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Soft Power Generally Important to National Security
US NATIONAL SECURITY RELIES ON NURTURING OUR SOFT POWER G. John Ikenberry & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Princeton Project on National Security, 2006, Forging A World of Liberty Under the Law: US national security in the 21st century, September 27, Final Paper, PPNS, http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/report/FinalReport.pdf, p. 17 U.S. strategy must integrate our hard power with what Joseph Nye has called our soft power, allowing us to use all of our assets in pursuit of our objectives. This effort requires devoting as much attention to bolstering the civilian components of our national security infrastructure as to strengthening the military. Our soft power is our power to get what we want by attracting others to the same goals, rather than bending them to our will. It requires careful attention to how others may perceive us differently than we perceive ourselves, no matter how good our intentions. It also requires regular communication and engagement among U.S. officials and their foreign counterparts in formal and informal networks, listening as well as talking. Finally, it means drawing not only on government, but also on the assets and initiative of both the private and non-profit sectors. To create maximum points of engagement and leverage, a successful strategy must begin by identifying and pursuing common interests with other states rather than insisting that they accept our prioritization of common threats. Even where other nations agree, for instance, on the need to fight terrorism, they may rank the rise of a neighboring power, environmental dangers, disease, disruption of their energy supply, or other threats as higher priorities. Finding ways to develop frameworks of cooperation based on common interests with individual nations or groups of nations minimizes frictions, maximizes common assets, and increases the likelihood of cooperative deployment of those assets to achieve common objectives. SOFT POWER IS NOT WEAKNESS CRITICAL TO NATIONAL SECURITY Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. ix That is part of our problem. Some of our leaders do not understand the crucial importance of soft power in our reordered post-September 11 world. As former House Speaker Newt Gingrich observed about the Bush administrations approach in Iraq, The real key is not how many enemy do I kill. The real key is how many allies do I grow. And that is a very important metric that they just dont get. One of Rumsfelds rules is that weakness is provocative. He is correct up to a point, and as a former assistant secretary of defense, I would be the last person to deny the importance of maintaining our military strength. As Osama bin Laden observed, people like a strong horse. But power comes in many guises, and soft power is not weakness. It is a form of power, and the failure to incorporate it in our national strategy is a serious mistake. SOFT POWER WILL GROW INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 31-2 This political game in a global information age suggests that the relative importance of soft power will increase. The countries that are likely to be more attractive and gain soft power in the information age are those with multiple channels of communication that help to frame issues; whose dominant culture and ideas are closer to prevailing global norms (which now emphasize liberalism, pluralism, and autonomy); and whose credibility is enhanced by their domestic and international values and policies. These conditions suggest opportunities for the United States, but also for Europe and others, as we shall see in Chapter 3.
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Soft Power Generally Important to National Security
SOFT POWER AND HARD POWER WERE BOTH INSTRUMENTAL IN WINNING THE COLD WAR Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 129 But it would be a mistake to dismiss the recent decline in our attractiveness so lightly. It is true that the United States has recovered from its unpopular policies in the past, but that was against the backdrop of the Cold War, in which other countries still feared the Soviet Union as the greater evil. Moreover, as we saw in chapter 2, while the United States size and association with disruptive modernity is real and unavoidable, smart policies can soften the sharp edges of that reality and reduce the resentments they engender. That is what the US did after World War II. We used our soft power resources and co-opted others into a set of alliances and institutions that lasted for 60 years. We won the Cold War against the Soviet Union with a strategy of containment that used our soft power as well as our hard power.
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Soft Power Generally Important to National Security
LOSS OF SOFT POWER THREATENS US INTERESTS Joshua Kurlantzick, Visiting Scholar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005 , Current History, December, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Kurlantzick.pdf, p. 423 A broad decline in soft power has many practical implications. These include the drain in foreign talent coming to the United States, the potential backlash against American companies, the growing attractiveness of China and Europe, and the possibility that anti-US sentiment will make it easier for terrorist groups to recruit. In addition, with a decline in soft power, Washington is simply less able to persuade others. In the run-up to the Iraq War, the Bush administration could not convince Turkey, a longtime US ally, to play a major staging role, in part because Americas image in Turkey was so poor. During the war itself, the United States has failed to obtain significant participation from all but a handful of major nations, again in part because of Americas negative image in countries ranging from India to Germany. In attempts to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons, Washington has had to allow China to play a central role, partly because few Asian states view the United States as a neutral, legitimate broker in the talks.
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Soft Power Stops Militarism
LOSS OF SOFT POWER MEANS FAILED FORCE AND MILITARY RESPONSES ARE OUR ONLY ALTERNATIVE Joshua Kurlantzick, Visiting Scholar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005 , Current History, December, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Kurlantzick.pdf, p. 423-4 Instead, Washington must increasingly resort to the other option Nye discussesforce, or the threat of force. With foreign governments and publics suspicious of American policy, the White House has been unable to lead a multinational effort to halt Irans nuclear program, and instead has had to resort to threatening sanctions at the United Nations or even the possibility of strikes against Iran. With Americas image declining in nations like Thailand and Pakistan, it is harder for leaders in these countries to openly embrace counterterrorism cooperation with the United States, so Washington resorts to quiet arm-twisting and blandishments to obtain counterterror concessions. Force is not a long-term solution. Newer, nontraditional security threats such as disease, human trafficking, and drug trafficking can only be managed through forms of multilateral cooperation that depend on Americas ability to persuade other nations. Terrorism itself cannot be defeated by force alone, a fact that even the White House recognizes. The 2002 National Security Strategy emphasizes that winning the war on terror requires the United States to lead a battle of ideas against the ideological roots of terrorism, in addition to rooting out and destroying individual militant cells.
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Soft Power Most Effective Way to Achieve Foreign Policy Goals
US SOFT POWER ENHANCES OUR ABILITY TO SHAPE GLOBAL POLICIES DEPENDS ON OTHERS ADMIRING OUR VALUES AND POLICIES Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. x What is soft power? It is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a countrys culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced. America has long had a great deal of soft power. Think of the impact of Franklin Roosevelts Four Freedoms in Europe at the end of World War II; of young people behind the Iron Curtain listening to American music and news on Radio Free Europe; of Chinese students symbolizing their protests in Tiananmen Square by creating a replica of the Statue of Liberty; of newly liberated Afghans in 2001 asking for a copy of the Bill of Rights; of young Iranians today surreptitiously watching banned American videos and satellite television broadcasts in the privacy of their homes. These are all examples of Americas soft power. When you can get others to admire your ideals and to want what you want, you do not have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to move them in your direction. Seduction is always more effective than coercion, and many values like democracy, human rights, and individual opportunities are deeply seductive. As General Wesley Clark put it, soft power gave us an influence far beyond the hard edge of traditional balance-of-power politics. But attraction can turn to repulsion if we act in an arrogant manner and destroy the real message of our deeper values. SOFT POWER CAN BE MORE EFFECTIVE THAN HARD POWER Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 5-6 Everyone is familiar with hard power. We know that military and economic might often get others to change their position. Hard power can rest on inducements (carrots) or threats (sticks). But sometimes you can get the outcomes you want without tangible threats of payoffs. The indirect way to get what you want has sometimes been called the second face of power. A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and opennesswant to follow it. In this sense, it is also important to set the agenda and attract others in world politics, and not only to force them to change by threatening military force or economic sanctions. This soft powergetting others to want the outcomes that you want co-opts people rather than coerces them. Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. At the personal level, we are all familiar with the power of attraction and seduction. In a relationship or a marriage, power does not necessarily reside with the larger partner, but in the mysterious chemistry of attraction. And in the business world, smart executives know that leadership is not just a matter of issuing commands, but also involves leading by example and attracting others to do what you want. You also need to get others to buy in to your values. Similarly, contemporary practices of community-based policing rely on making the police sufficiently friendly and attractive that a community wants to help them achieve shared objectives. Political leaders have long understood the power that comes from attraction. If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to use carrots or sticks to make you do it. Whereas leaders in authoritarian countries can use coercion and issue commands, politicians in democracies have to rely more on a combination of inducement and attraction. Soft power is a staple of daily democratic politics. The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible assets such as an attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority. If a leader represents values that others want to follow, it will cost less to lead.
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Soft Power Good Most Effective Way to Achieve Foreign Policy Goals
ATTRACTIVENESS OF THE US TO OTHER POPULATIONS BEST PROMOTES STABILITY AND ACHIEVEMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY GOALS Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 133-4 In the global information age, the attractiveness of the United States will be crucial to our ability to achieve the outcomes we want. Rather than having to put together pick-up coalitions of the willing for each new game, we will benefit if we are able to attract others into institutional alliances and eschew weakening those we have already created. NATO, for example, not only aggregates the capabilities of advanced nations, but its interminable committees, procedures, and exercises also allow them to train together and quickly become interoperable when a crisis occurs. As for alliances, if the United States is an attractive source of security and reassurance, other countries will set their expectations in directions that are conducive to our interests. For example, initially the US-Japan security treaty, signed in 1951, was not very popular in Japan, but over the decades, polls show that it became more attractive to the Japanese public. Once that happened, Japanese politicians began to build it into their approaches to foreign policy. The United States benefits when it is regarded as a constant and trusted source of attraction, so that other countries are not obliged continually to reexamine their options in an atmosphere of uncertain coalitions. In the Japan case, broad acceptance of the US by the Japanese public contributed to the maintenance of US hegemony and served as political constraints compelling the ruling elites to continue cooperation with the United States. Popularity can contribute to stability. SOFT POWER KEY TO COOPERATION NECESSARY TO MEET US FOREIGN POLICY GOALS Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 132-3 According to the national security strategy, the greatest threats that the American people face are transnational terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and particularly their combination. Yet meeting the challenge posed by transnational military organizations that could acquire weapons of mass destruction requires the cooperation of other countriesand cooperation is strengthened by soft power. Similarly, efforts to promote democracy in Iraq and elsewhere will require the help of others. Reconstruction in Iraq and peacekeeping in failed states are far more likely to succeed and to be less costly if shared with others rather than appearing to be American imperial occupation. The fact that the United States squandered its soft power in the way it went to war meant that the aftermath turned out to be much costly than it need have been.
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Soft Power Most Effective Way to Achieve Foreign Policy Goals
SOFT POWER IS AN IMPORTANT SOURCE OF POWER Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 8 In international politics, the resources that produce soft power arise in large part from the values an organization or country expresses in its culture, in the examples it sets by its internal practices and policies, and in the way it handles its relations with others. Governments sometimes find it difficult to control and employ soft power, but that does not diminish its importance. It was a former French foreign minister who observed that the Americans are powerful because they can inspire the dreams and desires of others, thanks to the mastery of global images through film and television and because, for these same reasons, large numbers of students from other countries come to the United States to finish their studies. Soft power is an important reality. Even the great British realist E.H. Carr, writing in 1939, described soft power over opinion. Those who deny the importance of soft power are like people who do not understand the power of seduction. SOFT POWER INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT IN ACHIEVING FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES IN THE INFORMATION AGE Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 134 Finally, as the RAND Corporations John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt argue, power in the global information age will come not just from strong defenses, but from strong sharing. A traditional realpolitik mind-set makes it difficult to share with others. But in the information age, such sharing not only enhances the ability of others to cooperate with us but also increases their inclination to do so. As we share intelligence and capabilities with others, we develop common outlooks and approaches that improve our ability to deal with the new challenges. Power flows from that attraction. Dismissing the importance of attraction as merely ephemeral popularity ignores key insights from new theories of leadership as well as the new realities of the information age. We cannot afford that. AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE EMPIRICALLY EFFECTIVE AT PROMOTING MULTIPLE FOREIGN POLICY GOALS Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 50-1 Not only was popular culture relevant to the achievement of American policy goals in Western Europe but it also has been important for a number of other policy goals, including the undercutting of the apartheid regime in South Africa, the increase in the number of democratic governments in Latin America and parts of East Asia, the overthrow of the Milosevic regime in Serbia, pressure for liberalization in Iran, and the consolidation of an open international economic system, to name just a few. Indeed, when South Africa in 1971 was debating whether to allow television into the country, Albert Hertzog, a conservative former minister of Posts and Telegraphs, rejected it as a symbol of Western degeneracy that would lead to the demoralization of South African civilization and the destruction of apartheid. He turned out to be right.
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Answers to: Soft Power Cant Be Wielded as an Effective Policy Tool
AT: NON-GOVERNMENTAL SOURCES OF SOFT POWER MEAN ITS NOT A USEFUL CONSTRUCT FOR GOVERNMENTS THEY CANT CONTROL IT Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 32 The soft power that is becoming more important in the information age is in part a social and economic by-product rather than solely as a result of official government action. Nonprofit institutions with soft power of their own can complicate and obstruct government efforts, and commercial purveyors of popular culture can hinder as well as help the government achieve its objectives. But the larger long-term trends can help the United States if it learns to use them well. To the extent that official policies at home and abroad are consistent with democracy, human rights, openness, and respect for the opinions of others, America will benefit from the trends of this global information age. But there is a danger that the United States may obscure the deeper message of its values through arrogance. As we shall see in the next chapter, American culture high and low still helps produce soft power in the information age, but government actions also matter, not only through programs like the Voice of America and Fulbright scholarships, but, even more important, when policies avoid arrogance and stand for values that others admire. The larger trends of the information age are in Americas favor, but only if we learn to stop stepping on our best message. Smart power means learning better how to combine our hard and soft power.
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Answers to: Doesnt Work With Populations That Dont Share Our Values
SOFT POWER VITAL TO ENSURING THAT THE MODERATES WIN OUT OVER THE EXTREMISTS Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 130-1 Some hard-line skeptics might say that whatever the merits of soft power, it has little role to play in the current war on terrorism. Osama bin Laden and his followers are repelled, not attracted, by American culture, values, and policies. Military power was essential in defeating the Taliban government of Afghanistan, and soft power will never convert fanatics. Charles Krauthammer, for example, argued soon after our swift military victory in Afghanistan that it proved that the new unilateralism worked. That is true up to a point, but the skeptics mistake half the answer for the whole solution. Look again at Afghanistan. Precision bombing and Special Forces defeated the Taliban government, but the US forces in Afghanistan wrapped up less than a quarter of Al Qaeda, a transnational network with cells in 60 countries. The United States cannot bomb Al Qaeda cells in Hamburg, Kuala Lampur, or Detroit. Success against them depends on close civilian cooperation, whether sharing intelligence, coordinating police work across borders, or tracing global financial flows. Americas partners work with us partly out of self-interest, but the inherent attractiveness of US policies can and does influence their degree of cooperation. Equally important, the current struggle against Islamist terrorism is not a clash of civilizations but a contest whose outcome is closely tied to a civil war between moderates and extremists within Islamic civilization. The United States and other advanced democracies will win only if moderate Muslims win, and the ability to attract the moderates is critical to victory. We need to adopt policies that appeal to moderates, and to use public diplomacy more effectively to explain our common interests. We need a better strategy for wielding our soft power. We will have to learn better to combine hard and soft power if we wish to meet the new challenges. ADMIRATION OF US VALUES DOESNT MEAN OTHER COUNTRIES WANT TO MODEL EVERYTHING ABOUT US Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 56-7 As Figure 2.1 showed, half of the populations of the countries polled in 2002 liked American ideas about democracy, but only a third thought it good if American ideas and customs spread in their country. Although two-thirds of Africans liked American ideas about democracy, only one-third of the populations of Muslim countries like them. This is not entirely new. In the 1980s, public opinion in four major European countries rated the United States as performing well in economic opportunities, rule of law, religious freedom, and artistic diversity. But fewer than half of British, German, and Spanish respondents felt the United States was a desirable model for other countries. How America behaves at home can enhance its image and perceived legitimacy, and that in turn can help advance its foreign policy objectives. It does not mean that others need or want to become American clones.
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Soft Power Good Says Colin Gray (The Nutty Hard Power Professor)
GRAY AGREES THAT SOFT POWER IS IMPORTANT Colin Gray, political scientist specializing in national security policy, THE SHERIFF: AMERICAS DEFENSE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER, 2004, p. 98 Lest there be any misunderstanding, I must emphasize the primary, first-order importance of the strategic dimension to America's role in the world. This all but invites misunderstanding. To reduce, though probably , not eliminate, that possibility, everything that follows in this chapter about military matters is written in the context of appreciation of the merit in some extra- and even anti-military arguments. War should be threatened or waged only for political purposes. Military power is not self-validating. "Strategic nihilists," as Eliot Cohen perceptively calls root-and-branch skeptics of strategy,' challenge the Clausewitzian dictum that war must be an act of policy, or at least of politics. If politics is master, then the economic and social contexts that provide the surplus wealth to fund the military establishment are, in a sense, fundamental To the primacy of politics and the critical value of taxable wealth and public support (willing citizens), we must add the importance both of diplomacy in general and of taking necessary coercive actions with whatever substantive assistance and political protection allies can afford. Furthermore, to grant readily that America is a potent civilization, and is indeed potent as a civilization. Those who stress the importance of the "soft power" that is American culture are right to do so.
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*** Answers to Soft Power Bad Turns ***
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Answers to: Soft Power Causes Free Trade, Free Trade Bad
Turn: Collapse of the free trade system increases bilateral trade pressure, magnifying all of their trade bad arguments
Nancy Birdsall is President of the Center for Global Development in Washington, D.C. Dani Rodrik is Professor of International Political Economy at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government. Arvind Subramanian is Division Chief in the Research Department of the International Monetary Fund. Foreign Affairs, September-October 2005, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050701faessay84410/nancy-birdsall-dani-rodrikarvind-subramanian/how-to-help-poor-countries.html?mode=print Of course, if global trade and growth were to implode, as in the period between the world wars, international development would receive a serious blow. A healthy multilateral trading system is important to keep the possibility remote, and it can protect the poorest countries from unreasonable bilateral pressures. A successful Doha Round could stimulate trade among developing countries and would signal a political willingness on the part of the international community to keep the system purring and prevent an implosion -- even if the actual gains for the poorest countries from trade-barrier reductions would be. If developing countries attempt to withdraw from the global economy, that will trigger a global nuclear war
Christopher Lewis, THE COMING AGE OF SCARCITY, 1998, p. 129 Most critics would argue, probably correctly, that instead of allowing underdeveloped countries to withdraw from the global economy and undermine the economies of the developed world, the United States, Europe, and Japan and others
will fight neocolonial wars to force these countries to remain within this collapsing global economy. These neocolonial wars will result in mass death, suffering, and even regional nuclear wars . If First World countries choose military
confrontation and political repression to maintain the global economy, then we may see mass death and genocide on a global scale that will make the deaths of World War II pale in comparison.
However, these neocolonial wars, fought to maintain the developed nations economic and political hegemony, will cause the final collapse of our global industrial civilization . These wars will so damage the complex, economic and trading networks and squander material, biological, and energy resources that they will undermine the global economy and its ability to support the earths 6 to 8 billion people. This would be the worst-case scenario for the collapse of global civilization.
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Answers to: Soft Power Causes Free Trade, Free Trade Bad
There is no reason that countries will reverse their position on US ag subsidies because we have more soft power when our subsidies are destroying their economies. Subsidies are the key reason global free trade talks have collapse International Herald Tribune, June 21, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/06/21/business/wto.php A high-level meeting aimed at salvaging sputtering global trade talks collapsed on Thursday as the United States and the European Union fell out with India and Brazil over plans to slash agricultural subsidies and tariffs The four members of the World Trade Organization were trying to break a persistent deadlock that has bedeviled the Doha round of negotiations since 2001: How deeply rich countries will slash the domestic farm subsidies that have distorted trade in commodities like cotton, sugar and corn The failure of the talks appears to have defeated the strategy of bringing together the United States, Europe, Brazil and India - a grouping known as the G-4 - to resolve major differences before turning to the entire membership of the WTO, which comprises 150 countries. Brazil and India, two countries that have assumed a leadership role for much of the developing world, rejected American and European advances as insufficient to warrant opening their markets to more imports of the industrialized world's goods and services. The United States, in turn, charged that Brazil and India had arrived at the talks, being held in the German town of Potsdam, outside Berlin, with virtually no negotiating flexibility.
Kamal Nath, the Indian trade minister, said the United States had offered to cap its domestic agricultural subsidies at $17 billion, considerably lower than the $22 billion it had offered before, but still well above the roughly $11 billion that American farmers are currently receiving. Nath said that offer had "no logic or equity," a point his Brazilian counterpart, Celso Amorim, echoed. Free trade ends food shortages, and keeps prices stable Indur M. Goklany, Julian Simon Fellow at the Political Economy Research Center, August 22, 2002,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa447.pdf, accessed 5/3/03 Because it is always possible to have local food shortages in the midst of a worldwide glut, the importance of trade should not be underestimated. Currently, grain imports amount to 10 percent of production in developing countries and 20 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa. Without such imports, food prices in those countries would no doubt be higher and more people would be priced out of the market . In essence, globalization, through trade, has enhanced food security. And in doing so it has reduced the severe health burdens that accompany hunger and undernourishment.
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Answers to: Soft Power Causes Free Trade, Free Trade Bad
Blips in food prices kill billions Tampa Tribune, 1-20-96
On a global scale, food supplies - measured by stockpiles of grain - are not abundant. In 1995, world production failed to meet demand for the third consecutive year, said Per Pinstrup-Andersen, director of the International Food Policy Research Institute in Washington, D.C. As a result, grain stockpiles fell from an average of 17 percent of annual consumption in 1994-1995 to 13 percent at the end of the 1995-1996 season, he said. That's troubling, Pinstrup-Andersen noted, since 13 percent is well below the 17 percent the United Nations considers essential to provide a margin of safety in world food security. During the food crisis of the early 1970s, world grain stocks were at 15 percent. "Even if they are merely blips, higher international prices can hurt poor countries that import a significant portion of their food," he said. "Rising prices can also quickly put food out of reach of the 1.1 billion people in the developing world who live on a dollar a day or less." He also said many people in lowincome countries already spend more than half of their income on food.
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Answers to: Soft Power Causes North Korea Sanctions, North Korea Sanctions Bad
No link the U.S. is no longer pushing for North Korean sanctions. In the status quo, the U.S. is pushing a deal that reduces sanctions Bloomberg 8-3-07, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601101&sid=abLv9VlrLga8&refer=japan
Aug. 30 (Bloomberg) -- The U.S. government said it wants a six-nation agreement to be reached next month for North Korea to declare and disable its nuclear weapons program by the end of this year. ``We are really going to try to get to this in early September,'' Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill told reporters in Washington yesterday. North Korea agreed on Feb. 13 with the U.S., South Korea, China, Japan and Russia to close its Yongbyon reactor, which produced weapons-grade plutonium, and to eventually declare and disable all of its atomic programs in exchange for 1 million metric tons of fuel oil or the equivalent in economic aid. The communist nation tested its first nuclear bomb on Oct. 9 last year, drawing international condemnation and United Nations Security Council sanctions. Hill is scheduled to travel to Geneva for Sept. 1-2 talks on normalizing U.S.-North Korean ties, one of five working groups meeting under the six-nation nuclear talks process. The six nations are planning to hold the next full plenary session next month to discuss North Korea declaring and disabling its nuclear program. Hill said the meeting will probably be held in Beijing, following a meeting of the leaders of the Asia- Pacific Economic Cooperation group in Sydney Sept. 8-9. The six nations will start implementing the expected agreement ``in the fall with a hope that we can get through this by the end of calendar year '07,'' Hill told reporters, according to a government transcript. The six nations will then, early next year, focus on ``having North Korea abandon its fissile material and explosive devices,'' he said. Fuel Delivery North Korea has asked for a monthly fuel delivery of 50,000 tons, as well as machinery and materials to repair its power plants. South Korea last month sent North Korea the initial shipment of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil, which is used to generate heat or power. Hill said he will discuss in Geneva removing North Korea from the U.S. State Department's list of nations sponsoring terrorism. The communist nation has been on the list since 1988 after North Korean agents were implicated in the bombing of a South Korean passenger airliner a year earlier that killed all 115 people on board. ``It's in our interest that countries be removed from that list because it means they're no longer state sponsors of terrorism,'' Hill said. ``But we're not going to cup our eyes and pretend that a country is not a state sponsor of terrorism if they are a state sponsor. So we have to work through this and make sure that when and if the decision's taken it's a decision that can stand the light of day.''
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Answers to: Soft power undermines hard power
1.
Cards dont apply. These cards assume that the U.S. commits to multilateral constraints on its powers, such as the International Criminal Court. The plan doesnt do that and there is no prospect of the Bush administration doing it as a result of the plan. Non-unique collapse now Dilip Hiro, 8-23-07, is the author of Secrets and Lies: Operation "Iraqi Freedom" and, most recently, Blood of the Earth: The Battle for the World's Vanishing Oil Resources, The Worlds Sole Superpower in Fast Decline,
http://www.alternet.org/audits/60489/
2.
Yet, with not even a decade of this century behind us, we are already witnessing the rise of a multipolar world in which new powers are challenging different aspects of American supremacy -- Russia and China in the forefront, with regional powers Venezuela and Iran forming the second rank. These emergent powers are primed to erode American hegemony, not confront it, singly or jointly.
3.
Our military stinks now Dilip Hiro, 8-23-07, is the author of Secrets and Lies: Operation "Iraqi Freedom" and, most recently, Blood of the Earth: The Battle for the World's Vanishing Oil Resources, The Worlds Sole Superpower in Fast Decline,
http://www.alternet.org/audits/60489/
How and why has the world evolved in this way so soon? The Bush administration's debacle in Iraq is certainly a major factor in this transformation, a classic example of an imperialist power, brimming with hubris, over-extending itself. To the relief of many -- in the U. S. and elsewhere -the Iraq fiasco has demonstrated the striking limitations of power for the globe's highest-tech, most destructive military machine. In Iraq, Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to two U.S. presidents, concedes in a recent op-ed, "We are being wrestled to a draw by opponents who are not even an organized state adversary."
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Answers to: Soft power undermines hard power
4.
Turn soft power boosts hard power
Joseph Nye, Harvard, 2003, Foreign Affairs, July, Volume 82, Issue 4, EBSCO The effective demonstration of military power in the second Gulf War, as in the first, might have a deterrent as well as a transformative effect in the Middle East. But the first Gulf War, which led to the Oslo peace process, was widely regarded as legitimate, whereas the legitimacy of the more recent war was contested. Unable to balance American military power, France, Germany, Russia, and China created a coalition to balance American soft power by depriving the United States of the legitimacy that might have been bestowed by a second UN resolution. Although such balancing did not avert the war in Iraq, it did significantly raise its price. When Turkish parliamentarians regarded U.S. policy as illegitimate, they refused Pentagon requests to allow the Fourth Infantry Division to enter Iraq from the north. Inadequate attention to soft power was detrimental to the hard power the United States could bring to bear in the early days of the war. Hard and soft power may sometimes conflict, but they can also reinforce each other. And when the Jacksonians mistake soft power for weakness, they do so at their own risk.
One of Rumsfeld's "rules" is that "weakness is provocative." In this, he is correct. As Osama bin Laden observed, it is best to bet on the strong horse.
Their internal link evidence criticizes as foreign policy approach of appeasement. There is no evidence or reason as to why the U.S. will pursue a policy of appeasement if we had more soft power Multilateral restrictions on U.S. hegemony are critical cement in U.S. primacy for the long-term
Edelstein & Krebs, 5 (David M. Edelstein is an Assistant Professor in the Security Studies Program of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and the Government Department at Georgetown University and Ronald R. Krebs is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, Survival, Spring 2005, vol. 47, no. 1, pp.89-104, www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/dme7/documents/public%20diplomacy.pdf, JMP) The United States has concerns that require multilateral solutions: combating terrorism, stemming the flow of illegal drugs, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and fostering sustainable development and good governance across the globe. Institutions designed to encourage collaboration and coordination among the worlds most powerful countries would undoubtedly be in everybodys interest. Strict adherence would limit Americas freedom of action: the United States might feel compelled to involve itself in military interventions and political disputes in which it did not perceive any national interest, and it might find its hands tied when it did wish to act. But these costly restrictions on American autonomy would be precisely the point, reassuring both allies and former adversaries that US power had been tamed while nonetheless leaving the United States in a position of primacy for decades to come.The practical barriers to creating such an institutional environment are imposing. While the United States sat
alone atop the international (especially the Western) hierarchy during the Cold War, the unifying Soviet threat was the lock on the cage of the proverbial eight-hundredpound US gorilla: it allowed the United States to commit credibly to abide by the decisions of these institutions. The dissolution of the USSR broke that lock, and many understandably fear that the gorilla could and would escape from any cage the world could construct. In the absence of a comparable threat and none, including terrorism, is on the horizon and given the disparities in material power resources, building a stable international institutional order is no
building an unstable institutional order would be worse than building no order at all: were the United States to go it alone whenever it so desired, it would add a reputation for capriciousness to the fear of its unrestrainable power. Even if the United States were far-sighted enough to collaborate in the construction of strong institutions, making them sufficiently strong to allay the fears of its industrialised allies and rivals may simply not be possible. But the Bush administration has not even tried. Just the opposite: it has sought to loosen the existing bonds, not create new sturdier ones.
small task. And
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Answers to: Soft Power Doesnt Solve a Backlash
1)
This card is irrelevant a) we have a specific cards that says increasing health care costs boosts U.S. global leadership and global ties, b) it just says multilateralism doesnt solve terrorism we didnt claim that They wrong
2)
Josephy Nye, Political Science Quarterly, Winter 2002/3, www.psqonline.org/cgi-bin/99_article.cgi?
byear=2002&bmonth=winter&a=01free&format=down
Nonetheless, if American diplomacy is unilateral and arrogant, our preponderance would not prevent other states and nonstate actors from taking actions that complicate American calculations and constrain its freedom of action. For example, some allies may follow the American bandwagon on the largest\ security issues but form coalitions to balance American behavior in other areas such as trade or the environment. And diplomatic maneuvering short of alliance can have political effects. As William Safire observed when Presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush first met, Well aware of the weakness of his hand, Putin is emulating Nixons strategy by playing the China card. Pointedly, just before meeting with Bush, Putin traveled to Shanghai to set up a regional cooperation semi-alliance with Jiang Zemin and some of his Asian fellow travelers.46 Putins tactics, according to one reporter, put Mr. Bush on the defensive, and Mr. Bush was at pains to assert that America is not about to go it alone in international affairs.47 Pax Americana is likely to last not only because of unmatched American hard power but also to the extent that the United States is uniquely capable of engaging in strategic restraint, reassuring partners and facilitating cooperation. 48 The open and pluralistic way in which U.S, foreign policy is made can often reduce surprises, allow others to have a voice, and contribute to soft power. Moreover, the impact of American preponderance is softened when it is embodied in a web of multilateral institutions that allow others to participate in decisions and that act as a sort of world constitution to limit the capriciousness of American power. That was the lesson the United States learned as it struggled to create an antiterrorist coalition in the wake of the September 2001 attacks. When the society and culture of the hegemon are attractive, the sense of threat and need to balance it are reduced .49 Whether other countries will unite to balance American power will depend on how the United States behaves as well as the power resources of potential challengers.
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Answers to: Soft Power Leads to Iran sanctions
1.
The alternative to sanctions is war - -their impact is inevitable if we dont try sanctions Wall Street Journal, 8-29, http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?
id=110010535
n his speech this week to the diplomats, Mr. Sarkozy warned of the need for tough diplomacy, including "growing sanctions," to avoid the "catastrophic alternative: the Iranian bomb or the bombing of Iran." That doesn't sound far from Senator John McCain's useful formulation that "There's only one thing worse than the United States exercising the military option; that is a nuclear-armed Iran." The important point is that Mr. Sarkozy has put on record that he won't let Iran develop a bomb under cover of feckless Western diplomacy.\ Radio Free Europe, 8-28-07
"And I underline France's full determination to support the alliance's current policy of increasing sanctions, but also to remain open if Iran makes the choice to fulfill its obligations. This policy is the only one that will allow us to escape an alternative, which I consider to be catastrophic. Which alternative? An Iranian bomb or the bombing of Iran." The internal link card is terrible. It doesnt say that Russia and China will reverse their positions on sanctions as a result of increased soft power. Their uniqueness evidence says that it is these countries that oppose sanctions in the status quo. Both have heavy oil investments in Iran USA Today 3-26-07, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-03-26-iran_N.htm Russia and China have significant trade ties with Iran and have used their veto power to push for less stringent sanctions against their ally.
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Answers to: Soft power leads to Iran sanctions
Nu War in the status quo Alternet, 9-3-07, http://www.alternet.org/audits/61328/ Why do I feel like the proverbial skunk at a Labor Day picnic? Sorry, but I thought you might want to know that this time next year there will probably be more skunks than we can handle. I fear our country is likely to be at war with Iran -- and with the thousands of real terrorists Iran can field around the globe. It is going to happen, folks, unless we put our lawn chairs away on Tuesday, take part in some serious grassroots organizing and take action to prevent a wider war -- while we still can. President George W. Bush's speech Tuesday lays out the Bush/Cheney plan to attack Iran and how the intelligence is being "fixed around the policy," as was the case before the attack on Iraq. It's not about putative Iranian "weapons of mass destruction," not even ostensibly. It is about the requirement for a scapegoat for U.S. reverses in Iraq and the White House's felt need to create a casus belli by provoking Iran in such a way as to "justify" armed retaliation, eventually including air strikes on its nuclear-related facilities. Bush's Aug. 28 speech to the American Legion comes five years after a very similar presentation by Vice President Dick Cheney. Addressing the Veterans of Foreign Wars on Aug. 26, 2002, Cheney set the meretricious terms of reference for war on Iraq. Sitting on the same stage that evening was former CENTCOM commander Marine Gen. Anthony Zinni, who was being honored at the VFW convention. Zinni later said he was shocked to hear a depiction of intelligence (Iraq has WMD and is amassing them to use against us) that did not square with what he knew. Although Zinni had retired two years before, his role as consultant had enabled him to stay up to date on key intelligence findings.
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1AR Russia and China will never agree to Iran sanctions
CHINA AND RUSSIA BLOCK MEANINGFUL SANCTIONS ON IRAN Flynt Leverett, New America Foundation , with Pierre Nol, Research Fellow, French Institute of International Relations, NATIONAL INTEREST, Summer 2006, p. http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2006/the_new_axis_of_oil For its part, China's approach to the Iranian nuclear issue is directly linked to its assessment of its requirements for energy security. Beijing has already put down a marker, in the form of its opposition to UN sanctions against Sudan, that it will oppose the imposition of multilateral sanctions on an energy-producing state in which Chinese companies operate. In private conversations, senior Chinese diplomats and party officials describe Beijing's policy on the Iranian nuclear issue as seeking to balance a range of interests: a secure supply of oil, nonproliferation and regional stability, the defense of important international norms (including the peaceful resolution of disputes and the sovereign right of states to develop civil nuclear capabilities), securing China's northwest border (meaning Xinjiang province, where there is a significant Muslim population), the development of Chinese-Iranian relations, the development of U.S.-Chinese relations, and the positions of the European Union and Russia. It seems increasingly clear that, in their efforts to balance this set of interests, Chinese officials will remain deeply resistant to the imposition of sanctions on Iran. And as long as Russian opposition provides China with political cover, Chinese officials seem to calculate that they will not have to choose between relations with Iran and relations with the United States. China's willingness to protect Iran from international pressure would also complicate Western efforts to impose meaningful sanctions on Iran through a "coalition of the willing." Without Chinese participation, a voluntary ban on investment in Iran's energy sector by Western powers would, at this point, be little more than a symbolic gesture, as U.S. companies are already barred from doing business in Iran by U.S. law, and most European IOCs have put potential projects on hold because of the political uncertainties. In recent years, though, Chinese NOCs have committed themselves, at least in principle, to substantial investments in Iran's energy sector, thereby mitigating the impact of restrictions on Western investment. Russia will never back sanctions for economic reasons Sanam Vakil , Assistant Professor of Middle East Studies. ran: Balancing East against West, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Fall 2006, http://www.twq.com/06autumn/docs/06autumn_vakil.pdf Ultimately, Russian-Iranian interests are most intimately tied to regional and geostrategic issues. Putin has remained steadfast in his relations with Iran, sending clear signals to Tehran and Washington that, despite Iran's nuclear ambitions, Moscow will not endanger its strategic relationship with Tehran. Iran has been able to exploit the regional, commercial, and strategic linkages with its old nemesis, knowing full well that Russia will favor its domestic and regional priorities over those of the international community.
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Answers to: Soft Power Increases Arms Sales
1.
The link card is totally irrelevant. It assumes that the U.S. would go to the U.N. to get support for preemptive wars, resulting in increases in arms sales. There is no reason that the plan would do that or that Bush would ever agree to it Non-unique and no link
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Straight, 8-16-07, http://www.visionofhumanity.com/GPI_inTheNews/The_United_States_a_leader_in_world_peace.php And the EIU's analysts must recognize that a significant portion of weapons sales occur between
the U.S. and militaries in the developing wor ld, where many nations are already engaged in conflict. The U.S. supplies nearly halfof these weapons, a practice that has little to do with its role as policeman and everything to do with boosting the already obscene profitsof the U.S. military-industrial complex.
3.
Soft power solves the impacts extend our Thayer evidence from the 1AC soft power solves great power conflicts. They have no terminal impact to answer this Non-unique: new sales Demoines Register, 9-23-7, http://desmoinesregister.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article? AID=/20070823/OPINION04/708230367/1035/OPINION President Bush has proposed sending tens of billions of dollars worth of advanced weapons to Saudi Arabia, Israel, Egypt and five other states in the Persian Gulf. More weapons are the last thing needed in this particularly combustible region.
4.
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Answers to: Democracy Promotion Bad
1.
No internal link they dont have a single card that says democracy promotion increases democracy Turn democracy promotion causes a backlash and undermines democracy
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Carothers. 2006. - Director of the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Thomas, Foreign Affairs 85 no2 55-68 Mr/Ap 2006. The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion. http://www.foreignrelations.org/public/) \ THE BACKLASH against democracy aid can be understood as a reaction by nondemocratic governments to the increasingly assertive provision of such aid. But it is also linked to and gains force from another source: the broader public unease with the very idea of democracy promotion, a feeling that has spread widely in the past several years throughout the former Soviet Union, western Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and elsewhere. President Bush, by embracing democracy promotion in the way he has, is largely responsible for this discomfort. Washington's use of the term "democracy promotion" has come to be seen overseas not as the expression of a principled American aspiration but as a code word for "regime change"--namely, the replacement of bothersome governments by military force or other means. Moreover, the Bush administration has also caused the term to be closely associated with U.S. military intervention and occupation by adopting democracy promotion as the principal rationale for the invasion of Iraq. The fact that the administration has also given the impression that it is interested in toppling other governments hostile to U.S. security interests, such as in Iran and Syria, has made the president's "freedom agenda" seem even more menacing and hostile. This is especially so since when Bush and his top advisers single out "outposts of tyranny," the governments they invariably list are those that also happen to be unfriendly to the United States. Meanwhile, friendly but equally repressive regimes, such as that in Saudi Arabia, escape mention. This behavior has made many states, nondemocratic and democratic alike, uneasy with the whole body of U.S. democracybuilding programs, no matter how routine or uncontroversial the programs once were. It also makes it easier for those governments eager to push back against democracy aid for their own reasons to portray their actions as noble resistance to aggressive U.S. interventionism. And the more President Bush talks of democracy promotion as his personal cause, the easier he makes it for tyrannical leaders to play on his extraordinarily high level of unpopularity abroad to disparage the idea.
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Answers to: Soft Power Leads to British Support for Missile Defense
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The uniqueness takes-out the internal link. It says they oppose our military policies because we start preemptive wars. There is no reason to think that theyll switch their position on missile defense a military policy because we provide environmental leadership
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The internal link is terrible it says that if Britain doesnt participate our missile defense would be impaired meaning that it wouldnt work properly! It doesnt say that we wouldnt deploy it or that we wouldnt attach a military space component. Non-unique the U.S. will deploy missile defense in Asia
3.
McClatchy Newspapers, 7-13-07 http://www.mcclatchydc.com/staff/tim_johnson/story/17956.html Even as efforts to erect a missile-defense system in Europe roil U.S. relations with Russia, Washington has quietly worked with Japan to deploy a costly defense network to protect major Japanese cities from a ballistic-missile barrage. 4. Turn multilateralism restrains space militarization Globe & Mail, 7-31-01, http://www.commondreams.org/views01/0731-04.htm
Canada, where possible, has always tried to engage the United States multilaterally. Find like-minded
countries, and join with them to influence the U.S. This has been a mantra of Canadian foreign policy for a very long time. But what happens when, as now, the U.S. not only lacks interest in things multilateral, it positively scorns them? Canada, like other countries, is left frustrated and even annoyed, except that, as the junior cousin in the relationship, it can't come right out and say how peeved it feels. Just after George W. Bush won the U.S. election, but before he took office, lots of foreign-policy observers wondered whether his administration would make good on vague mutterings during the campaign about the perils of multilateralism. Surely, soothing voices contended, the new administration would learn the virtues of working with others through treaties and multilateral agencies. Experience on the job would be the great teacher No such luck. What we have now in Washington are not only military hawks but diplomatic unilateralists who reflect a mixture of Republican muscularity, American triumphalism and deep-seated U.S. exceptionalism. The list of treaties or international agreements threatened, rescinded or scorned by the Bush administration grows every month. Just recently in Bonn, the U.S. reiterated its rejection of the revamped Kyoto protocol on global warming. That protocol was weakened in negotiations to allow countries such as Canada to sign on, but the Bush administration had already signaled its refusal to have anything to do with Kyoto. Instead, it promises its own policies in due course. Earlier this month, the U.S. insisted on diluting a United Nations agreement on small-arms trafficking, ostensibly being concerned, among other worries, about the impact on Americans' cherished ownership of guns. Last week, the Bush administration rejected proposed new enforcement measures for the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, arguing that its provisions were too weak to stop states from developing germ weapons but too intrusive to protect secrets of U.S. biotechnology firms. To this list can be added the Bush administration's refusal to send to the Senate for
The granddaddy of U.S. unilateralism, of course, is the looming abrogation of the 1972 AntiBallistic Missile Treaty, signed with the former Soviet Union and designed to limit anti-missile defenses. The Bush administration is hell-bent to develop and deploy a multi-phased, hugely expensive system of missile defenses. in the face of opposition from friends around the world. No ally, including Canada, likes the American idea, but all have been cowed into silence since they understand that nothing they can say will dissuade the Americans.
ratification the treaty establishing an international criminal court and both the 1996 nuclear test ban treaty and the 1993 nuclear reduction treaty with Russia.
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Answers to: Soft Power Leads to British Support for Missile Defense
5. Collapse of the alliance destroys global free trade Nile Gardner, Heritage, 6-28-07, http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed062807b.cfm The end of the special relationship would ultimately strengthen the hand of isolationist U.S. politicians who advocate a less forceful foreign policy. The U.S.-U.K. alliance is an important anchor that helps tie the United States to a more global-oriented outlook. Its demise would encourage a greater "fortress America" mentality on Capitol Hill, with calls for increased protectionist barriers, and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe and other parts of the world. The end result would be a United States with a more limited role on the world stage, and a reduced projection of power -- a recipe for long-term decline. Collapse of the free trade system increases bilateral trade pressure, magnifying all of their trade bad arguments
Nancy Birdsall is President of the Center for Global Development in Washington, D.C. Dani Rodrik is Professor of International Political Economy at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government. Arvind Subramanian is Division Chief in the Research Department of the International Monetary Fund. Foreign Affairs, September-October 2005, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050701faessay84410/nancy-birdsall-dani-rodrikarvind-subramanian/how-to-help-poor-countries.html?mode=print Of course, if global trade and growth were to implode, as in the period between the world wars, international development would receive a serious blow. A healthy multilateral trading system is important to keep the possibility remote, and it can protect the poorest countries from unreasonable bilateral pressures. A successful Doha Round could stimulate trade among developing countries and would signal a political willingness on the part of the international community to keep the system purring and prevent an implosion -- even if the actual gains for the poorest countries from trade-barrier reductions would be. If developing countries attempt to withdraw from the global economy, that will trigger a global nuclear war
Christopher Lewis, THE COMING AGE OF SCARCITY, 1998, p. 129 Most critics would argue, probably correctly, that instead of allowing underdeveloped countries to withdraw from the global economy and undermine the economies of the developed world, the United States, Europe, and Japan and others
will fight neocolonial wars to force these countries to remain within this collapsing global economy. These neocolonial wars will result in mass death, suffering, and even regional nuclear wars . If First World countries choose military
confrontation and political repression to maintain the global economy, then we may see mass death and genocide on a global scale that will make the deaths of World War II pale in comparison.
However, these neocolonial wars, fought to maintain the developed nations economic and political hegemony, will cause the final collapse of our global industrial civilization . These wars will so damage the complex, economic and trading networks and squander material, biological, and energy resources that they will undermine the global economy and its ability to support the earths 6 to 8 billion people. This would be the worst-case scenario for the collapse of global civilization.
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Answers to: War on Drugs Bad Turn
The internal link is terrible it just says that it would enhance international cooperation in the war on drugs. It does not say that it would lead to the eradication of the drug trade from the planet. They have zero internal link from increasing cooperation in the war on drugs to stopping drug use. Turn improving the war on drugs raises prices & profits, and the higher prices do not slow use Gary Becker, law professor, 2005, http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2005/03/the_failure_of.html
Every American president since Nixon has engaged in a war on illegal drugs : cocaine, heroin, hashish, and the like. And every president without exception has lost this war. The explanation lies not in a lack of effort- indeed, I believe there has been too much effort- but rather in a basic property of the demand for drugs, and the effects of trying to reduce consumption of a good like drugs by punishing persons involved in its trade. The war on drugs is fought by trying to apprehend producers and distributors of drugs, and then to punish them rather severely if convicted. The expected punishment raises the price that suppliers of drugs need to receive in order for them to be willing to take the considerable risks involved in the drug trade. The higher price discourages purchase and consumption of illegal drugs, as with legal goods and services. The harder the war is fought, the greater the expected punishment, the higher is the street price of drugs, and generally the smaller is the consumption of drugs. Those suppliers who are caught and punished do not do very well, which is the typical result for the many small fry involved in distributing drugs. On the other hand, those who manage to avoid punishment- sometimes through bribes and other corrupting behavior-often make large profits because the price is raised so high. This approach can be effective if say every 10% increase in drug prices has a large negative effect on the use of drugs. This is called an elastic demand. However, the evidence from more than a dozen studies strongly indicates that the demand for drugs is generally quite inelastic; that is, a 10% rise in their prices reduces demand only by about 5%, which means an elasticity of about This implies that as drug prices
rise, real spending on drugs increases, in this case, by about 5% for every 10% increase in price. So if the war on drugs increased the price of drugs
by at least 200%- estimates suggest this increase is about right- spending on drugs would have increased enormously, which it did. This increased spending is related to increased real costs of suppliers in the form of avoidance of detection, bribery payments, murder of competitors and drug agents, primitive and dnagerous production methods, and the like. In addition, the country pays directly in the form of the many police shifted toward fighting drugs, court time and effort spent on drug offenders, and the cost of imprisonment. The US spends about $40,000 per year per prisoner, and in recent years a sizeable fraction of both federal and state prisoners have been convicted on drug-related charges.
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Soft Power Does Not Promote Empire/Imperialism
SOFT POWER IS NOT A TOOL OF EMPIRE Alexander J. Motyl, Director Harriman Institute, Columbia University, 2006, Foreign Affairs, July/August, Volume 85, No. 4, p. 190 The United States and its institutions, political and cultural, certainly have an overbearing influence on the world today, but why should that influence be termed "imperial," as opposed to "hegemonic" or just "exceptionally powerful"? McDonald's may offend people, but it is unclear how a fast-food chain sustains U.S. control of peripheral territories. U.S. military bases dot the world and may facilitate Washington's bullying, but they would be indicative of empire only if they were imposed and maintained without the consent of local governments. Hollywood may promote Americanization -- or anti-Americanism -- but its cultural influence is surely no more imperial than the vaunted " soft power " of the European Union.
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*** Soft Power & Hard Power ***
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Soft Power More Important to Leadership Than Hard Power
SOFT POWER IS MORE CRITICAL TO US LEADERSHIP THAN HARDPOWER Suzanne Nossel, 2002 The National interest. Winter In a world of competing power centers, the United States cannot rely on a strategy of curbing international organizations at its pleasure. Rather, we must learn how to translate our global military and economic clout into effective and specific diplomatic influence. American strength lies ultimately not in the ability to steamroll the world community, but in the power to turn delegations around one-by-one through persuasion and bilateral leverage. Put another way, we need to focus more on the art of retail diplomacy as a tool for multilateral advocacy. HARD POWER LACKS RELEVANCE IN TODAYS INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE Nye, Dean of the JFK school of govt at Harvard, Political Science Quarterly, Winter 2002/20 03 Today the foundations of power have been moving away from the emphasis on military force and conquest. Paradoxically, nuclear weapons were one of the causes. As we know from the history of the cold war, nuclear weapons proved so awesome and destructive that they became muscle bound-too costly to use except, theoretically, in the most extreme circumstances. A second important change was the rise of nationalism, which has made it more difficult for empires to rule over awakened populations. In the nineteenth century, a few adventurers conquered most of Africa with a handful of soldiers, and Britain ruled India with a colonial force that was a tiny fraction of the indigenous population. Today, colonial rule is not only widely condemned but far too costly, as both cold war superpowers discovered in Vietnam and Afghanistan. The collapse of the Soviet empire followed the end of European empires by a matter of decades. A third important cause is societal change inside great powers. Postindustrial societies are focused on welfare rather than glory, and they loathe high casualties except when survival is at stake. This does not mean that they will not use force, even when casualties are expected-witness the 1991 Gulf War or Afghanistan today. But the absence of a warrior ethic in modern democracies means that the use of force requires an elaborate moral justification to ensure popular support (except in cases where survival is at stake). Roughly speaking, there are three types of countries in the world today: poor, weak preindustrial states, which are often the chaotic remnants of collapsed empires; modernizing industrial states such as India or China; and the postindustrial societies that prevail in Europe, North America, and Japan. The use of force is common in the first type of country, still accepted in the second, but less tolerated in the third. In the words of British diplomat Robert Cooper, "A large number of the most powerful states no longer want to fight or to conquer." War remains possible, but it is much less acceptable now than it was a century or even half a century ago Finally, for most of today's great powers, the use of force would jeopardize their economic objectives. Even nondemocratic countries that feel fewer popular moral constraints on the use of force have to consider its effects on their economic objectives. As Thomas Friedman has put it, countries are disciplined by an "electronic herd" of investors who control their access to capital in a globalized economy. And Richard Rosecrance writes, "In the past, it was cheaper to seize another state's territory by force than to develop the sophisticated economic and trading apparatus needed to derive benefit from commercial exchange with it." Imperial Japan used the former approach when it created the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere in the 1930s, but Japan's post-World War II role as a trading state turned out to be far more successful, leading it to become the second largest national economy in the world. It is difficult now to imagine a scenario in which Japan would try to colonize its neighbors, or succeed in doing so.
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Soft Power Key to Hard Power
SOFT POWER KEY TO EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF HARD POWER Joseph Nye, Harvard, 2003, Foreign Affairs, July, Volume 82, Issue 4, EBSCO One of Rumsfeld's "rules" is that "weakness is provocative." In this, he is correct. As Osama bin Laden observed, it is best to bet on the strong horse. The effective demonstration of military power in the second Gulf War, as in the first, might have a deterrent as well as a transformative effect in the Middle East. But the first Gulf War, which led to the Oslo peace process, was widely regarded as legitimate, whereas the legitimacy of the more recent war was contested. Unable to balance American military power, France, Germany, Russia, and China created a coalition to balance American soft power by depriving the United States of the legitimacy that might have been bestowed by a second UN resolution. Although such balancing did not avert the war in Iraq, it did significantly raise its price. When Turkish parliamentarians regarded U.S. policy as illegitimate, they refused Pentagon requests to allow the Fourth Infantry Division to enter Iraq from the north. Inadequate attention to soft power was detrimental to the hard power the United States could bring to bear in the early days of the war. Hard and soft power may sometimes conflict, but they can also reinforce each other. And when the Jacksonians mistake soft power for weakness, they do so at their own risk. SOFT POWER NECESSARY FOR EFFECTIVE HARD POWER Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 212-3 In one sense, tackling specific proliferation challenges can create the most need for American hard power. That has certainly been seen in Iraq and could prove true elsewhere as well. However, it is also important to underscore, as we do in our treatments of the North Korean and Iran cases below, that hard power must be applied well, and in combination with what might be called soft power, to be constructive and useful must have international legitimacy (except in cases of extreme direct threat to the homeland, where Americas self-defense right necessitates no consultation with others though in such circumstances, support will usually be easily attainable). Creating this legitimacy is to a large extent a task for American soft powerthat is, widespread international trust in US leadership, which is obtained in turn largely by Americas own support for a web of values, treaties, and international standards of good behavior that most other countries accept and that proliferators can therefore be punished for violating. SOFT POWER IMPORTANT TO EFFECTIVE HARD POWER Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 29-30 Skeptics argue that because countries cooperate out of self-interest, the loss of soft power does not matter much. But the skeptics miss the point that cooperation is matter of degree, and that degree is affected by attraction or repulsion. They also miss the point that the effects of nonstate actors and recruitment to terrorist organization do not depend on government attitudes. Already in 2002, well before the Iraq War, reactions against heavy-handed American policies on the Korean peninsula had led to a dramatic drop over the past three years in the percentage of the Korean population favoring an American alliance, from 89 to 56 percent. That will complicate dealing with the dangerous case of North Korea. Whether in the Middle East or in East Asia, hard and soft power are inextricably intertwined in todays world.
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Soft Power Key to Hard Power
SOFT POWER KEY COMPONENT OF US HEGEMONY The Business Times Singapore, 2006, October 19, http://www.antiwar.com/hadar/?articleid=9894 But it's incomplete. Even in the heyday of the post-Cold War era - during America's so-called Unilateral Moment Washington's political-military power was never invincible. The notion that the US was the global hegemon reflected it success in asserting its ' soft power' in the aftermath of the collapse of the communist bloc and the subsequent process of globalisation which has been driven by American economic and cultural power. SOFT POWER KEY TO MAINTAINING US PRIMACY Bradley A. Thayer, Professor Defense & Strategic Studies, Missouri State University, 2006, The National Interest, November/December, p. Lexis There are two critical issues in any discussion of America's grand strategy: Can America remain the dominant state? Should it strive to do this? America can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and soft power capabilities. The totality of that equation of power answers the first issue. The United States has overwhelming military capabilities and wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential alliances. Barring some disaster or tremendous folly, that will remain the case for the foreseeable future. With few exceptions, even those who advocate retrenchment acknowledge this.
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Military Power Alone Inadequate
MILITARY FORCE WITHOUT GLOBAL LEGITIMACY IS USELESS Walden Bellow, Director of Focus on the Global South, DILEMMAS OF DOMINATION: THE UNMAKING OF AMERICAN POWER, 2005, p. 76 At the global level, sheer military force without legitimacy and without political alliances is a hollow reed for the empire to rest on. The debacles in Iraq and Afghanistan have proved that coalition building and consensus are more critical than military force in holding an empire together. When Washington launched two demonstration wars, it ended up teaching two valuable lessons to the global South: that it is possible to stand up to empire, and that effective resistance in one part of the empire weakens the empire as a whole. One thing is certain: if the Romans were around today, they would say that this is no way to run an empire. MILITARY POWER ALONE IS INADEQUATE NEED STRONG SOFT POWER Vassilis K. Fouskas , Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Stirling, The New AMERICAN IMPERIALISM: BUSHS WAR ON TERROR AND BLOOD FOR OIL, 2005, p. 28 U.S. global control cannot be understood in military terms alone. As William Wallace observes, real "hegemony rests upon a range of resources, of hard military power, economic weight, financial commitments, and the soft currency of hegemonic values, cultural influence and prestige." It is not just the scale and power of its military might; it is more complicated than this. U.S. hegemony from 1945 onward has rested equally on its ability to homogenize the political cultures of its allies around sets of ideological values and on cultural perceptions constructed to reshape the world system along the lines designed by U.S. policy makers.
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Iraq Proves Limits of Hard Power
IRAQ DEMONSTRATES THE LIMITS OF HARD POWER ALONE IN ACHIEVING FOREIGN POLICY GOALS Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 51 The Iraq experience also constitutes a warning about how to understand and employ hard power. It is not enough to invoke kinetic military instruments when undertaking a campaign as ambitious as the overthrow of an enemy regime. US technology, revolutions in military affairs, and a neoconservative confidence about the value and effectiveness of the American armed forces do not by themselves a foreign policy make. Hard power is effective only when used legitimately and comprehensively. The United States needs substantial international support for major military operations, especially wars of choice. Together with the rest of the international community, it also needs the full range of stabilization and reconstruction capabilities that are so critical to ensuring a sustainable peace after conflict. IRAQ IS A GLARING FAILURE FOR US HARD POWER Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 59 To put it differently, and starkly: After failing to maintain the invading coalitions monopoly on the use of force in the weeks and months after Saddam fell, the Bush administration also failed to develop or implement a viable political strategy for rebuilding Iraq. Confusing the mechanics of holding elections with the development of true democracy, it compounded its initial errors and largely squandered three critical years. Because it did not combine its initial application of military force with an integrated civilian plan for transition, it botched one of the most fundamental tests of wielding hard power in the twenty-first century.
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Soft Power Necessary for Effective Hard PowerStops Counterbalancing
SOFT POWER HELPS ENSURE BANDWAGONING INSTEAD OF BALANCING Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 25-6 Throughout history, weaker states have often joined together to balance and limit the power of a stronger state that threatens. But not always. Sometimes the weak are attracted to jumping on the bandwagon led by a strong country, particularly when they have little choice or when the large countrys military power is accompanied by soft power. Moreover, as we saw earlier, hard power can sometimes have an attractive or soft side. As Osama bin Laden put it in one of his videos, When people see a strong horse and a weak horse, by nature, they will like the strong horse. And to deliberately mix the metaphor, people are more likely to be sympathetic to underdogs than to bet on them. OTHER COUNTRIES ENGAGED IN SOFT BALANCING TO COUNTER US POLICY IN IRAQ Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 26-7 Part of the contest about going to war in Iraq became a struggle over the legitimacy of the war. Even when a military balance of power is impossible (as at present, with America the only superpower), other countries can still band together to deprive the US policy of legitimacy and thus weaken American soft power. France, Russia, and China chafed at American military unipolarity and urged a more multipolar world. In Charles Krauthammers view, Iraq provided France an opportunity to create the first coherent challenge to that dominance. Even without directly countering the superpowers military power, the weaker states hoped to deter the US by making it more costly for us to use our hard power. They were not able to prevent the United States from going to war, but by depriving the United States of the legitimacy of a second Security Council resolution, they certainly made it more expensive. SOFT BALANCING UNDERMINES EFFECTIVE HARD POWER IRAQ PROVES Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 27 Soft balancing was not limited to the UN arena. Outside the UN, diplomacy and peace movements helped transform the global debate from the sins of Saddam to the threat of American empire. That made it difficult for allied countries to provide bases and support and thus cut into American hard power. As noted earlier, the Turkish parliaments refusal to allow transport of ground troops and Saudi Arabias reluctance to allow American use of air bases that had been available in 1991 are cases in point. Since the global projection of American military forces in the future will require access and overflight rights from other countries, such soft balancing can have real effects on hard power. When support for America becomes a serious vote loser, even friendly leaders are less likely to accede to our requests. In addition, bypassing the UN raised the economic costs to the United States after the war, leading the columnist Fareed Zakaria to observe, The imperial style of foreign policy is backfiring. At the end of the Iraq war the administration spurned any kind of genuine partnership with the world. It pounded away at the United Nations.
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Answers to: Turn -- Hard Power Increases Soft Power
DESIPTE OVERLAPSOFT POWER DOES NOT DEPEND ON HARD POWER Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 9 As mentioned above, sometimes the same power resources can affect the entire spectrum of behavior from coercion to attraction. A country that suffers economic and military decline is likely to lose not only its hard-power resources but also some of its ability to shape the international agenda and some of its attractiveness. Some countries may be attracted to others with hard power by the myth of invincibility or inevitability. Both Hitler and Stalin tried to develop such myths. Hard power can also be used to establish empires and institutions that set the agenda for smaller stateswitness Soviet rule over the countries of Eastern Europe. President Kennedy was properly concerned that although polls showed a Soviet lead in perceptions of its space program and the strength of its nuclear arsenal. But soft power does not depend on hard power. The Vatican has soft power despite Stalins mocking question How many divisions does the Pope have? The Soviet Union once had a good deal of soft power, but it lost much of it after the invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Soviet soft power declined even as its hard economic and military resources continued to grow. Because of its brutal policies, the Soviet Unions hard power actually undercut its soft power. In contrast, the Soviet sphere of influence in Finland was reinforced by a degree of soft power. Similarly, the United States sphere of influence in Latin America in the 1930s was reinforced when Franklin Roosevelt added the soft power of his good neighborhood policy.
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Soft Power Not Distinct from Hard Power
NO CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN HARD AND SOFT POWER OVERLAP POSSIBLE Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 7-8 Hard and soft power are related because they are both aspects of the ability to achieve ones purpose by affecting the behavior of others. The distinction between them is one of degree, both in the nature of the behavior and in the tangibility of the resources. Command powerthe ability to change what others docan rest on coercion or inducement. Co-optive powerthe ability to shape what others wantcan rest on the attractiveness of ones culture and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes others fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic. The types of behavior between command and co-option range along a spectrum from coercion to economic inducement to agenda setting to pure attraction. Soft-power resources tend to be associated with the co-optive end of the spectrum of behavior, whereas hard-power resources are usually associated with command behavior. But the relationship is imperfect. For example, sometimes countries may be attracted to others with command power by myths of invincibility, and command power may sometimes be used to establish institutions that later become regarded as legitimate. A strong economy not only provides resources for sanctions and payments, but can also be a source of attractiveness. On the whole, however, the general association between the types of behavior and certain resources is strong enough to allow us to employ the useful shorthand reference to hard- and soft-power resources.
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Need to Combine Hard & Soft Power
US NEEDS COMBINATION OF HARD AND SOFT POWER TO RETAIN LEADERSHIP AND PROMOTE ITS SOLUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 136-7 We also saw that power depends on context, and the distribution of power differs greatly in different domains. We saw that in the global information age, power is distributed among countries in a pattern that resembles a complex threedimensional chess game. On the top chessboard of political-military issues, military power is largely unipolar, but on the economic board, in the middle, the United States is not a hegemon or an empire, and it must bargain as an equal when Europe acts in a unified way. And on the bottom chessboard of transnational relations, power is chaotically dispersed, and it makes no sense to use traditional terms such as unipolarity, hegemony, or American empire. Those who recommend an imperial American foreign policy based on traditional military descriptions of American power are relying on a woefully inadequate analysis. If you are in a three-dimensional game, you will lose if you focus only on one board and fail to notice the other boards and the vertical connections among themwitness the connections in the war on terrorism between military actions on the top board, where we removed a dangerous tyrant in Iraq, but simultaneously increased the ability of the Al Qaeda network to gain new recruits on the bottom, transnational, board. Because of its leading edge in the information revolution and its past investment in military power, the United States will likely remain the worlds single most powerful country well into the twenty-first century. French dreams of a multipolar military world are unlikely to be realized anytime soon, and the German foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, has explicitly eschewed such a goal. But not all the important types of power come out of the barrel of a gun. Hard power is relevant to getting the outcomes we want on all three chessboards, but many of the transnational issues such as climate change, the spread of infectious diseases, international crime, and terrorism cannot be resolved by military force alone. Representing the dark side of globalization, these issues are inherently multilateral and require cooperation for their solution. Soft power is particularly important in dealing with the issue that arise from the bottom chessboard, transnational relations. To describe such a three dimensional world as an American empire fails to capture the real nature of the foreign policy tasks that we face. COLD WAR EXPERIENCE PROVES NECESSITY OF COMBINING HARD AND SOFT POWER TO ACHIEVE FOREIGN POLICY GOALS Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 144-5 As for the sword, the United States will continue to need it from time to time in the struggle against terrorism and in our efforts to create stability. Maintaining our hard power is essential to security. But we will not succeed by the sword alone. Our doctrine of containment led to success in the Cold War not just because of military deterrence but because, as the famous diplomat George Kennan designed the policy, our soft power would help to transform the Soviet Bloc from within. Containment was not a static military doctrine but a transformational strategy, albeit one that took decades to accomplish. Indeed, Kennan frequently warned against what he regarded as the overmilitarization of containment and was a strong supporter of cultural contacts and exchanges. Those lessons about patience and the mixture of hard and soft power still stand us in good stead today.
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*** Solvency Extensions ***
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US Can Rebuild Its Soft Power
US CAN RECOVER LOST SOFT POWER Joshua Kurlantzick, Visiting Scholar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005 , Current History, December, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Kurlantzick.pdf, p. 424 The game is not lost. As Nye himself notes, the United States recovered from a previous decline in soft power after the Vietnam War. Other recent examples suggest the samein the wake of a concerted American response to the December 2004 Asian tsunami, complemented by solid public diplomacy, the image of the United States in Indonesia this year has improved. And the United States still clearly possesses a soft power lead over its nearest rivals. It remains the worlds most powerful economic actor, and it retains hard power credentials that will augment its soft power for years to come. Still, the administration must realize that it is doing long-term damage to American soft power, and that it can reverse its losses. Doing so would require a multifaceted initiative. First, it would involve a clear and concrete public diplomacy strategy. Hughes or another czar needs to create a public diplomacy structure within the State Department that makes sense, better integrating public diplomacy officers into embassies around the world and placing a specialist on the National Security Council to help coordinate public diplomacy efforts with broader US policy. In the field, public diplomacy should cater to host countries and emphasize cultural ties by reopening American centers and boosting academic and cultural exchange programs. It should highlight US development assistance, support for political reform, and willingness to listen to locals on what kinds of aid to provide. A study of public perceptions of the United States in Morocco found that informing people about aid in the areas in which Americas strengths are acknowledgedin Morocco, primarily democracy assistancehad a significant positive effect on the attitudes of focus group members. All of this requires money. Currently, US spending per capita on public diplomacy pales when compared to that of France or Canada. But there are encouraging signs, including several congressional bills that would fund major increases in international education and cultural exchanges. There are other parts of a soft power strategy. Comprehensive immigration reform, which would balance security with regulated and open borders, could help assure foreigners that America remains a welcoming and vital society. More effective broadcasting abroad, absent the partisan meddling that may have injured VOAs image, could help promote the idea that America is committed to a free press and even allows criticism; the Voice of America and other US-government funded broadcasters might consider more regularly featuring critics of US policies. It is just such unbiased, stellar reporting, including criticism of the British government, that has earned the BBC worldwide trusttrust that reflects back on the United Kingdom. Closer coordination between government public diplomacy and efforts by nongovernmental organizations, arts and culture foundations, and the private sector, such as Business for Diplomatic Action, also could prove fruitful. In what could be most painful for the White House, an effective strategy to rejuvenate soft power would require at least reconsidering opposition to some multilateral institutions. It would also mean allowing other major powers, such as the EU or China, freedom to take the lead on important regional issues, like drug trafficking or weapons proliferation, without automatically assuming that this leadership threatens American interests. It is probably too much to expect a change of course regarding Kyoto or the International Criminal Court, which have become almost iconic among conservatives opposed to joining multinational groupings. But participating in the UNESCO cultural treaty, the treaty banning land mines, and other less vital institutions could help rehabilitate Americas image, at a limited cost to US sovereignty. The alternative? One day soon, perhaps, even Australia might refuse to send its troops to fight alongside American soldiers.
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Soft Power Good: Now Key Time To Rebuild US Soft Power
POST MID-TERM ELECTION IS A KEY WINDOW FOR BUSH TO REASSESS POLICY AND WORK TO RESTORE DAMAGED SOFT POWER Chicago Tribune, 2006, November 16, Pg. 13 Bush has promoted the spread of democracy, with an avowed goal of eliminating tyranny worldwide voiced in his reelection inaugural ceremony nearly three years ago. Critics of American policy in Iraq and the Middle East, however, have interpreted U.S. motives as a policy of unrestrained intervention in other nations' affairs. Yet in its approach to the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran, the Bush administration faces criticism for not engaging more directly in nation-to-nation negotiations. Where the U.S. stands The president's audience here will "welcome a frank presentation about where the U.S. stands now--and I emphasize the word 'now,"' said Donald Emmerson, director of the South Asia Forum at Stanford University. The elections could serve as a "reality check" on the president's "evangelical approach to democracy," he said. "The president should recognize that, for various reasons--not the least of them Iraq--America's soft power has been dramatically squandered, not just in the Islamic world but more broadly than that. . . . The audience at the National University of Singapore is going to want to know what his response is. The president met Wednesday with Russian President Vladimir Putin during an airport stopover outside Moscow before continuing on to Singapore, where he arrived early Thursday local time. Message of cooperation Bush's speech in Singapore will offer a cooperative message. He will highlight the importance of an Asian-Pacific region that accounts for two-thirds of all U.S. foreign trade. At the same time, Bush cannot travel in Asia without acknowledging the threat that North Korea's nuclear ambitions pose in the northern reaches of the region or the threat from terrorist cells in Southeast Asia. Bush "will discuss the ways in which the United States and Asian nations are partnering together to face the challenges of poverty, disease, terrorism and energy security," National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley said of the Singapore speech. "He will lay out his vision for building a hopeful, peaceful set of societies in Asia that can meet these various challenges."
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*** Advantage Answers ***
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Soft Power Advantage Answers -- Frontline
U.S. SOFT POWER AND DOMINANT CULTURAL IMPACT ARE HIGH Julia Sweigh, Council on Foreign Relations, FRIENDLY FIRE, 2006, pp. 37-8 Another key advantage for the United States is its ability to shape the preferences of others to make them what America wants -- through the inherent attractiveness of U.S. culture, ideology, and institutions. This "soft power" remains hard to define or measure, but there is little doubt that the United States casts a long cultural and ideological shadow over the rest of the world." Not only is English increasingly the lingua franca of diplomacy, science, and international business, but the American university system is a potent mechanism for socializing foreign elites. 2' There were nearly 600,000 foreign students studying at U.S. universities in 2002-3, for example, roughly double the total from two decades earlier In addition to becoming familiar with U.S. norms, foreign students in the United States absorb prevailing U.S. attitudes about politics and economics, especially the emphasis on competitive markets, democratic institutions, and the rule of law." As Die Zeit editor Josef Joffe puts it, "If there is a global civilization, it is American. Nor is it just McDonald's and Hollywood, it is also Microsoft and Harvard. Wealthy Romans used to send their children to Greek universities; today's Greeks, that is, the Europeans, send their kids to Roman, that is, American, universities."" Even in the Arab world, where the United States is presently unpopular, America's educational institutions continue to attract students and continue to serve as an inspirational model." This sort of influence can have unexpected payoffs: for example, Libya's decision to end its prolonged isolation and to abandon its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction was due in part to the influence of reform-minded Prime Minister Shurki Ghanamen, who received a Phd in economics from the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy in Medford, Massachusetts. ALLIES COOPERATE WITH US OUT OF THEIR OWN INTEREST, NOT BECAUSE OF SOFT POWER Ramesh Ponnuru, columnist at national review, national review, December 31, 2001, p.
Http://www.nationalreview.com/31dec01/ponnuru123101.shtml, accessed 5/21/05.
Among our useful allies, not one has been moved by any wispy notion of international community. Britain and australia are with us because of a cultural affinity that underlies an ideological one. Our local allies are motivated by a combination of fear of our wrath, fear of our enemies' success, greed for our money, and a craven desire to back the winner. The president has not needed to give an inch on the global-warming accord, the international criminal court, or missile defense to win their support. SOFT POWER ALONE IS NOT ENOUGH Hirsh, Newsweek senior editor, 03 Michael, AT WAR WITH OURSELVES, Oxford, p. 7 What it means, I will argue in the pages ahead, is that America must make use of the full panoply of its tools of "hard" and `soft" power to secure itself. It is clear that the demonstration of U.S. might is needed, both to wipe out the terrorist threat and to send a message to the world. The use of overwhelming force in Afghanistan destroyed al-Qaeda's base and helped to restore U.S. credibility after a decade of irresolution, halfhearted interventions, and flaccid responses to previous attacks.
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Soft Power Advantage Answers Frontline
NYE IS WRONG SOFT POWER IS IRRELEVANT Tysha Bohorquez, Member of the UCLA International Institute, 2005 [Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics REVIEW, UCLA International Institute, Dec. 1st, http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=34734] Nyes view is, of course, not held by all. His critiques include David Frum, a former speechwriter to President George W. Bush and a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Frum co-authors An End Evil to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror with Richard Perle . They consider themselves realists and fully reject Nyes concept of soft power. While some argue that the U.S. government has overstepped its boundaries in the international arena, Perle and Frum claim that overthrowing the governments of Afghanistan and Iraq was not enough. Perle and Frum support the use of military action against North Korea, Iran, Syria, Libya and Saudi Arabia. To them, soft power is irrelevant for a country without military rivals. However, this rejection of soft power is not limited to Perle and Frum. Bushs recent appointment of Bolton as the U.S. ambassador to the UN surprised many because he had been criticized for stating that, "there is no such thing as the United Nations. . . If the U.N. secretary building in New York lost 10 stories, it wouldn't make a bit of difference. These are not the remarks of someone convinced of the importance of soft power. Frum and Perles vision of the world is too black and white, defined by an us against them mentality. In their book, An Evil to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror, both authors state that, "there is no middle way for Americans. It is either victory of holocaust." There is no room negotiation within a framework that is so rigid. This philosophy disregards the possibility of the co-existence of hard and soft power, where states not only rely on military force but also negotiate collaboration with allies, however difficult that may be. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is another skeptic of soft power, in fact, he admits to not even understanding the term, claiming that popularity is ephemeral and should not guide U.S. foreign policy. Rumsfeld asserts that America is strong enough to do as it wishes with or without the world's approval and should simply accept that others will envy and resent it. According to him, the world's only superpower does not need permanent allies; the issues should determine the coalitions, not vice-versa. Rumsfeld and Nye appear to present dramatically divergent approaches to international relations. Nye claims that soft power is necessary, thus, providing a balanced approach. Nye, however, does not view hard and soft power as mutually exclusive. He recognizes that there is a need for hard power but that it has limitations. Perle and Frum on the other hand, miss diplomacys nuanced approach and the importance of building consensus among allies. Nyes analysis, conversely, is useful in that it provides a framework for understanding the nuances necessary to achieve this consensus.
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Soft Power Advantage Answers -- Frontline
COUNTER-TERRORISM ALLIANCES STRONG NOW DEFENSE NEWS, February 28, 2005, p. 21 More importantly, even as Washington and Paris have lobbed spitballs at each other, the web of security commitments the United States has cultivated for the past 50 years has, far from contracting, expanded radically. With the eastward growth of NATO, new relationships with once-hostile states like Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Libya, and partnerships with other countries under threat by radical Islam, the U.S. alliance system is transforming in ways the White House itself may not fully appreciate. Since the Sept. 11, attacks, the United States has been quietly working to develop new and stronger alliances where they matter most: with the governments and societies of the greater Middle East. In essence, just as al-Qaida has been said to "franchise" jihad - outsourcing the grunt work of suicide bombings to angry young locals from Turkey to Indonesia - the Pentagon is building a rival franchise in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, mobilizing and supporting locals willing to join the fight against radical Islam. GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION WILL NOT HELP THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM Steven E. Miller is director of the International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2002 (THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter, http://www.twq.com/02winter/miller.pdf) No one can dispute that the campaign against terrorism will profit from the accumulation of relevant information from as many useful sources as are available. In the aftermath of September 11, additional information from additional sources will likely contribute to operations against terrorism. Nevertheless, for several reasons, this factor may have been exaggerated as a motivation for fundamental change in U.S. policy. For one thing, the barriers to intensive intelligence collaboration are considerable. U.S. agencies are reluctant to share information with each other, much less with foreign governments and foreign intelligence bureaucracies. When sensitive information is involved, the police are out of the loop, Congress is eyed warily, and other federal agencies are not routinely on the distribution list. Assessing the intimacy of information-sharing arrangements between governments is impossible for outsiders, but intelligence professionals suggest that the United States does not share everything even with its closest allies and that even states with close ties to the United States may not be enthusiastic or generous about turning over information to their U.S. counterparts. Washington was deeply frustrated, for example, that the government of Saudi Arabia was not more forthcoming in assisting the investigation of the 1996 terrorist attack on U.S. military personnel at Khobar Towers. Moreover, the current loose coalition that has formed in support of the U.S. battle with terrorism includes a motley collection of states-some that are close to the United States but many that are not. Indeed, many of the states that might be in the best position to possess and provide information about terrorist activities in the Middle East or South Asia-such as Iran, Libya, and Syriaare states that have uneasy, or even hostile, relations with the United States. The barriers to collaboration must be enormous in
such cases, with reluctance likely in both directions to forging the most sensitive sorts of ties between unfriendly states. In circumstances where deep trust between governments does not exist, concerns will inevitably arise that information is being manipulated, withheld, parceled out to maximize the price, shaded to advance the interests of the providing state, or even falsely manufactured . When genuine and useful
information is provided, it may reflect only partial truths or be misleading and self-serving in some way. In its quest to crush the global terrorist threat, the United States will probably seek information from whatever sources can provide it, but will the United States truly be prepared to pay a high price in terms of its foreign policy in order to gain problematic information from dubious sources?
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Soft Power Advantage Answers -- Frontline
MANY EXAMPLES OF UNILATERALISM THE PLAN DOESNT SOLVE Julia Sweigh, Council on Foreign Relations, FRIENDLY FIRE, 2006, pp. 57-8 The Bush administration revealed its unilateralist impulse soon after the 2000 elections when it signaled a departure from international norms and disdain for collective approaches to global (and once decidedly U.S.) concerns like the environment, human rights, and arms control. Kyoto, the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: The signal achievements perceived by opinion outside and many within the United States to collectively address environmental degradation, human rights, and weapons proliferation met with chilling derision from the Bush II White House. Even as the administration championed its support for women's education and franchise in Afghanistan, for example, the repeal of U.S. support for reproductive health and HIV/AIDS initiatives that include family planning and abortion risked adding women to the growing coalition of those offended by the United States. Well before the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration signaled a belief that U.S. power alone was adequate to the task of addressing what many at home and in the international community regarded as the critical global challenges of the twenty-first century.
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Uniqueness: U.S. Unilateralist
BUSH HAS BEEN STRIDENTLY UNILATERALIST THROUGHOUT HIS PRESIDENCY Phyllis Bennis, Institute for Policy Studies, 2006, Challenging Empire, p. 114-5 From the start Bush asserted a boldly unilateralist voice, one that catered to both the far-right social conservatives and the most belligerent military hawks of the Republican Party. After the election, one of the first decisions of the new administration was to reimpose an international gag order, known colloquially as the global gag rule, withholding US aid to any family planning service provider anywhere in the would if its staff (with separate, non-US funds) provided, lobbied for, or even mentioned abortion or abortion rights to its patients. Many in the US, women in particular, and many in UN and other international health agencies, were outraged. Bush has inveighed against Clinton-style nationbuilding during his campaign, condemning US participation in Balkan peacekeeping and hinting at a unilateral withdrawal from Bosnia and/or Kosovo. Europe, in particular, was not pleased. Some of the new administrations earliest foreign policy prescriptions further antagonized alliesespecially its high-handed withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and its announced intention to abandon the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty (ABM), long viewed as the linchpin of the global, especially US-Russian, arms control regime. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), for which the Clinton administration has failed to win Senate ratification, was taken completely off the agenda. In March 2001 the US suspended missile talks with North Korea. And from the first moments of his presidency, George Bush took on the role of cheerleader for the so-called missle defense shield, a science fiction-based effort to protect against mythical figure missiles that might be fired some day from North Korea future missiles that might be fired some day from North Korea of Iran or Iraq. The plan was rooted in the long-discredited Star Wars of Ronald Reagan, and soon became emblematic of Bush administration extremism and militarism.
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*** Solvency Answers/Soft Power Not Good ***
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Cant Boost Soft Power
Too late to boost soft power we cant overcome existing policies
Charleston Gazette, 1-27, 8 One of the great ironies of this Davos year is that the opening address will be given by Condoleezza Rice. In the early years of the Bush administration, the Davos themes of global cooperation were anathema, and the White House never used the Davos platform to project an image of leadership, on global environmental issues, or reform of international institutions, or even Middle East peace. Late in the day, the Bush team is trying to soften its unilateralist image, and Rice is the frontwoman. But this shift, which might have made a big difference to America's image abroad, comes too late in the day to remake brand Bush.
MANY FACTORS DETERMINE A COUNTRYS SOFT POWER Joshua Kurlantzick, Visiting Scholar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005, Current History, December, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Kurlantzick.pdf, p. 420 The idea of soft power can be traced to a 1990 essay by Harvard political scientist Joseph Nye. Soft power, essentially, is the ability of a nation to persuade and influence other countries not with threats or coercion, but through the attractiveness of its society, its values, its culture, and its institutions. This attractiveness can be conveyed through various means, including popular culture, public and private diplomacy, how a nations leaders participate in multinational organizations and other forums, businesses actions abroad, and the gravitational pull of a nations economic strength. Ultimately, nations with the greatest soft power find that citizens of other countries aspire to share their values and institutions, and leaders of foreign countries view their policies as legitimate and want to follow their lead. As Nye put it: If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to force you. MULTIPLE FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR DECLINE IN US SOFT POWER Joshua Kurlantzick, Visiting Scholar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005, Current History, December, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Kurlantzick.pdf, p. 420-1 Other factors, too, presaged a soft power decline. The Soviet collapse had left America the sole superpower, a position likely to provoke resentment. Factions of both the Republican and Democratic parties in the 1990s began to express concerns about growing legal and illegal immigration into the United States. America failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on global warming or the International Criminal Court (ICC). US intransigence on many bilateral and multilateral trade initiatives fostered ill will abroad. Meanwhile, citizens of some countries were linking globalization with unwelcome elements of the American social model, including limited social welfare protection and laissez-faire capitalism. Meetings of the World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank met with harsh anti-globalization and anti-US protests. The spread of American culture, combined with insensitivity by some US business leaders and politicians to fears that American film and media would overwhelm local industries, also fostered resentment.
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Cant Boost Soft Power
MANY DOMESTIC POLICIES THE PLAN DOESNT CHANGE UNDERMINE OUR SOFT POWER Joseph Nye, JFK School of Government, Harvard, Political Science Quarterly, Summer 2004 v119 i2 p255(16) Some domestic policies, such as capital punishment and the absence of gun controls, reduce the attractiveness of the United States to other countries but are the results of differences in values that may persist for some time. Other policies, such as the refusal to limit gas-guzzling vehicles, damage the American reputation because they appear self-indulgent and demonstrate an unwillingness to consider the effects we are having on global climate change and other countries. Similarly, domestic agricultural subsidies that are structured in a way that protects wealthy farmers while we preach the virtue of free markets to poor countries appear hypocritical in the eyes of others. In a democracy, the "dog" of domestic politics is often too large to be wagged by the tail of foreign policy, but when we ignore the connections, our apparent hypocrisy is costly to our soft power. CTBT REJECTION CRUSHES SOFT POWER Joseph Nye, dean of the Harvard School of government, New York Times, January 3, 2000, p.
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2000/nye_nyt.htm, accessed 5/21/05.
Whatever the balance of costs and benefits of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, there was a significant cost to our soft power in the Senate's rejection of it and the manner of the rejection. Similarly, when we are seen as a bully that extends our laws (for example, on trade with Iran or Cuba) into the jurisdiction of our allies, we also diminish our soft power. The German journalist Josef Joffe points out that historically, when one country is preponderant, the desire of others to balance its power leads them to team up against it. He asks why this has not yet happened to the United States. One reason he cites is American soft power. Others do not see us as a threat, but rather as an attraction. Recently, however, comments from Europe have begun to echo the French line that an American "hyperpower" is a threat that must be checked and balanced. TREATY REJECTION CRUSHES SOFT POWER BOSTON GLOBE, November 5, 2004, p.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/editorials/articles/200 4/11/05/a_second_chance_abroad/, accessed 5/21/05.
For the sake of national security, Bush needs to correct the unilateralist impulses he indulged in his first term. There is a lot to correct. Bush squandered some of America's precious soft power when he and his advisers showed disdain for international treaties such as the Kyoto Protocol on global climate change. With Russia's signing of the protocol, it may now enter into force. And with European acceptance of the American preference for emissions trading, there is room for a compromise that would allow the United States to join an international accord that is in everybody's interest. Apart from his stance toward particular treaties and international organizations, Bush would also do well to cultivate the kind of consultative relations with allies that his father and Clinton practiced.
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Cant Boost Soft Power
FAILURE TO RATIFY HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES UNDERMINES OUR SOFT POWER Joseph Nye, Dean, JFK School of Government, Harvard, 2002 (THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER, p. 153) How we behave at home also matters. Amnesty International is overly harsh in its declaration that "today the United States is as frequently an impediment to human rights as it is an advocate;' but by ignoring or refusing to ratify human rights treaties (such as those concerning economic, social, and cultural rights and discrimination against ',.women), the United States under-cuts our soft power on these issues. FAILURE TO RATIFY KYOTO UNDERMINED U.S. SOFT POWER Joseph Dye, Dean, Harvard JFK School, 2003 (HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, Winter, pp. 46 The Power of Persuasion) Let me give you two examples from the current US administration. When President Bush announced peremptorily that the Kyoto Protocol on global climate change was dead because it was not in US interests, he essentially squandered US soft power and increased resentment in many parts of the world, particularly in Europe. It led to the United States being voted off the UN Human Rights Commission. If the United States had said instead that Kyoto was a flawed instrument and had worked for better means of addressing global climate change, it would not have wasted.
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Soft Power Not Beneficial
SOFT POWER EFFECTIVENESS UNCERTAIN Robert J. Lieber, Georgetown University, 2005, The American Era: power and strategy for the 21st century, p. 33 Few authors write more knowledgably and thoughtfully than Nye, but he leaves unclear just how to apply soft power, especially because of the very broad nature of a term that encompasses culture, values, and civil society as a whole. And there remains the question of whether any mix of US policies, let alone soft power, can significantly influence the wider struggle that is taking place within Arab and Muslim civilization in circumstances where Western democratic values are abhorrent to the jihadists. Nonetheless, his criticism of the dangerous decline in American public diplomacy during the Clinton and Bush presidencies is very much on target. Indeed, an alarming sign is that especially in Europe the diatribes of Michael Moore (whose books have topped the best-seller lists in Germany) and Noam Chomsky, and even the rantings of conspiracy theorists, are commonly read and cited as explanations of US policy. US MISUSES SOFT POWER UNDERCUTS ANY ADVANTAGE FROM IT John Brady Kiesling, State Department Diplomat who resigned over 2003 Iraq War, 2006, Diplomacy Lessons: realism for an unloved superpower, p. 51 Foreigners will actively and competently carry out what Americans ask without a threat of violence to back up the request, once the United States finds a way to make that request legitimate in the foreign countrys own national terms. The term coined by international relations scholar Joseph Nye to apply to legitimacy in international relations is soft power. America indeed has soft power, the ability to use its image and values to convince others that its requests and even demands must be respected. It often, however, confuses soft power with its ideological fad of the moment, or else with self-congratulatory moralizing. This is a deadly error. Soft power isnt key to leadership it does nothing to prevent backlash Niall Ferguson, Professor of History @ New York University, January/February 2003 (Power Foreign Policy) p. 21 But the trouble with soft power is that its, well, soft. All over the Islamic world kids enjoy (or would like to enjoy) bottles of Coke, Big Macs, CDs by Britney Spears and DVDs starring Tom Cruise. Do any of these things make them love the United States more? Strangely not.
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Soft Power Not Beneficial
HARD POWER RESOURCES EASIER TO WIELD THAN SOFT POWER Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 99-100 Of course, these differences are matters of degree. Not all wars or economic actions promptly produce desired outcomes witness the length and ultimate failure of the Vietnam War, or the fact that economic sanctions have historically produced their intended outcomes in only about a third of the cases where they were tried. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein survived sanctions for more than a decade, and although the four-week American military campaign broke his regime, it was only a first step toward achieving American objectives in Iraq. As one former military officer has observed, the mark of a great campaign is not what it destroys, but what it creates, and on that question the jury will remain out for a number of years on the Iraq War. Moreover, sometimes dissemination of information can quickly produce or prevent a desired outcome. Generally, however, soft-power resources are slower, more diffuse, and more cumbersome to wield than hard-power resources. SOFT POWER NOT VERY EFFECTIVE WITH PEOPLE FROM DIFFERENT CULTURES, AND NONDEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 15-6 At the same time, it is important to specify the conditions under which attraction is more likely to lead to desired outcomes, and under which it will not. As we have seen, popular culture is more likely to attract people and produce soft power in the sense of preferred outcomes in situations where cultures are somewhat similar rather than widely dissimilar. All power depends on contextwho relates to whom under what circumstancesbut soft power depends more than hard power upon the existence of willing interpreters and receivers. Moreover, attraction often has a diffuse effect, creating general influence rather than producing an easily observable specific action. Just as money can be invested, politicians speak of storing up political capital to be drawn on in future circumstances. Of course, such goodwill may not ultimately be honored, and diffuse reciprocity is less tangible than an immediate exchange. Nonetheless, the indirect effects of attraction and a diffuse influence can make a significant different in obtaining favorable outcomes in bargaining and specific reciprocity, and we know that is not always the way they behave. Social psychologists have developed a substantial body of empirical research exploring the relationship between attractiveness and power. Soft power is also likely to be more important when power is dispersed in another country rather than concentrated. A dictator cannot be totally indifferent to the views of the people in his country, but he can often ignore whether another country is popular or not when he calculates whether it is in his interests to be helpful. In democracies where public opinion and parliaments matter, political leaders have less leeway to adopt tactics and strike deals than in autocracies. Thus it was impossible for the Turkish government to permit the transport of American troops across the country in 2003 because American policies had greatly reduced our popularity in public opinion and in the parliament. In contrast, it was far easier for the United States to obtain the use of bases in authoritarian Uzbekistan for operations in Afghanistan.
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Soft Power Not Beneficial
SOFT POWER USELESS IF THE TARGET GROUP DOESNT SHARE OR ADMIRE OUR VALUES Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 55-6 Even when honestly applied, American values can repel some people at the same time that they attract others. Individualism and liberties are attractive to many people, but repulsive to some, particularly fundamentalists. For example, American feminism, open sexuality, and individual choices are profoundly subversive in patriarchal societies. One of the terrorist pilots who spent time in the United States before the attack on September 11 is reported to have said he did not like the United States because it is too lax. I can go anywhere I want and they cant stop me. Some religious fundamentalists hate the United States precisely because of our values of openness, and opportunity. More typical, however, is the reaction of a Chinese writer who disagreed with his governments criticism of the United States in 2003: Amid this fog of nationalist emotion, it is all the more remarkable that so many Chinese have managed to keep their faith in American-style democracy. They yearn for a deeper change in their own countrys political system.
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Soft Power Doesnt Boost Democracy
NO DEMOCRACY ADVANTAGE -- US HAS NOT SHIFTED ITS MIDDLE EAST POLICY TO RELY MORE ON SOFT POWER YET The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 2006, October 22, Pg. 1E Critics of the Bush administration's foreign policy argue that it's too early to say whether Washington has shifted diplomatic gears. In the Middle East, a growing number of experts are calling for Washington to talk directly with Syria to help stabilize conflicts on its borders with Lebanon, Iraq and Israel. But while Syrian President Bashar Assad made public offers over the summer to restart peace talks with Israel, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert last Monday specifically rejected any change in his government's policy to engage Syria, a stance interpreted by some former Israeli politicians and analysts as being backed by the White House. While Israel has a "vested strategic interest" in talking with the Syrian government, "President Bush and Secretary of State Rice are vehemently opposed to Israeli-Syrian negotiations," said Uri Savir, president of the Peres Center think tank in Tel Aviv.
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Soft Power Alone Wont Solve Hedge
Soft power wont offset declines in U.S. military power need to combine Hard and soft power to solve hegemony
Joseph Nye, Harvard, university distinguished-service professor , July 27, 2007, American Foreign Policy After Iraq. By:
Nye Jr., Joseph S., Chronicle of Higher Education, 00095982, 7/27/2007, Vol. 53, Issue 47, http://chronicle.com/subscribe/login?url=https%3A%2F%2Fsiteproxy.ruqli.workers.dev%3A443%2Fhttp%2Fchronicle.com%2Fweekly %2Fv53%2Fi47%2F47b00601.htm The only way to grapple with these new problems is through cooperation with others, and that requires smart power -- a strategy that combines the soft power of attraction with the hard power of coercion. For example, American and British intelligence agencies report that our use of hard power without sufficient attention to soft power has increased rather than reduced the number of Islamist terrorists over the past five years. The soft power of attraction will not win over the hard-core terrorists, but it is essential in winning the hearts and minds of mainstream Muslims without whose support success will be impossible in the long term. Yet all the polling evidence suggests that American soft power has declined dramatically in the Muslim world. There is no simple military solution that will produce the outcomes we want. The nature of these transnational problems means that the United States does not have the luxury of turning inward, no matter what the outcome in Iraq. These are not problems that stop at the water's edge.
DIPLOMACY WITHOUT MILITARY POWER IS USELESS Peter Huessy is President of GeoStrategic Analysis, a Maryland defense consulting firm. He is Senior Defense Associate at NDUF. He specializes in nuclear weapons, missile defense, terrorism and rogue states, IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST, December 24, 2003, http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol2Issue50/Vol2Issue50Huessy.html Senator Wallop once said that diplomacy without effective US military power is prayer. The international communitys failure to effectively deal with the emerging nuclear rogue states in Iran, Iraq and North Korea was not the result of US unilateralism and US power. It was that the pursuit of economic deals and trade trumped security. We are now paying the price of that greed. Chamberlain once argued with Churchill on the floor of Parliament that stopping Mr. Hitler would harm trade with Germany. To which Churchill replied, Well, that is the idea.
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Soft Power Wont Solve Counterbalancing
Boosting hegemony causes a backlash against the U.S., soft power cannot overcome
Soeren Kern is Senior Fellow for Transatlantic Relations at the Madrid-based Grupo de Estudios Estratgicos / Strategic Studies Group, Spero News, January 10, 2008,
http://www.speroforum.com/site/article.asp?idarticle=13519 Take Spain, for example, where anti-Americanism goes back to the Spanish-American War, which in 1898 drove the final nail into the coffin of the Spanish empire and ended its colonial exploitation of Cuba. Many Spaniards also resent Americas support for General Francisco Franco (1892-1975), who in his day was popular with the Americans because of his strong anti-Communist credentials. In Germany, anti-Americanism is an exercise in moral relativism. Germans desperately want their country to be perceived as a normal country, and its elites are using anti-Americanism as a political tool to absolve themselves and their parents of the crimes of World War II. They routinely equate the US invasion of Iraq with the Holocaust, for example, as a psychological ruse to make themselves feel better about their sordid past. In France, anti-Americanism is an inferiority complex masquerading as a superiority complex. France is the birthplace of anti-Americanism (the first act of which has been traced to a French lawyer in the late 1700s), and bashing the United States is an inexpensive way to indulge Frances fantasies of past greatness and splendor. As political realists like Thucydides (c 460-395 BC) might have predicted, anti-Americanism is also a visceral reaction against the current distribution of global power. America commands a level of economic, military and cultural influence that leaves many around the world envious, resentful and even angry and afraid. Indeed, most purveyors of anti-Americanism will continue to bash America until the United States is balanced or replaced (by those same anti-Americans, of course) as the dominant actor on the global stage In Europe, for example, where self-referential elites are pathologically obsessed with their perceived need to counter-balance the United States, anti-Americanism is now the dominant ideology of public life. In fact, it is no coincidence that the spectacular rise in anti-Americanism in Europe has come at precisely the same time that the European Union, which often struggles to speak with one voice, has been trying to make its political weight felt both at home and abroad.
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Soft Power Wont Boost Middle East Influence
Soft power wont boost U.S. influence in the Middle East
Huffington Post, 1-24, 8, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lionel-beehner/how-foreign-policy-hurts-_b_83074.html I doubt it. I have not seen a serious strategy on how to repair America's image abroad. Everyone kneels now before the altar of diplomacy but that only gets us so far. Apply more soft power? Trouble is that U.S. public diplomacy has an abysmal record in the Muslim world (Hi Magazine, anyone???). Go on a listening tour? If it didn't work for Karen Hughes, it won't work for Hillary Clinton. The Middle East is not upstate New York.
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Changing Policies Wont Improve Relations With Europe
Changing U.S. policies wont improve relations with Europe
Soeren Kern is Senior Fellow for Transatlantic Relations at the Madrid-based Grupo de Estudios Estratgicos / Strategic Studies Group, Spero News, January 10, 2008, http://www.speroforum.com/site/article.asp?idarticle=13519 Case in point is a new report on smart power recently released by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The document proffers policy advice based on the fiction that the blame for anti-Americanism lies entirely with the United States. It calls on the next president to fix the problem of anti-Americanism by pursuing a neo-liberal norm-based internationalist foreign policy ; it argues, predictably, that America can restore its standing in the world by working through the United Nations and by signing the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court. But the report says not a word about the gratuitous antiAmerican bigotry of Europes sophisticated elites. Nor does it acknowledge that most European purveyors of anti-Americanism are far more opposed to what America is than to what America does. It is not primarily US foreign policy they seek to change: What Europeans (and many of their American converts) want is a wholesale re-creation of America in the post-modern European pacifist image.
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Soft Power Wont Solve Iranian Proliferation
IRANIAN NUCLEAR CHALLENGE PROVES FAILURE OF SOFT POWER
Amitai Etzioni, Professor of International Relations, George Washington University, 2006, UPI, February 7, p. Lexis Iran's unilaterally breaking of the seals on its uranium enrichment facilities casts grave doubts on the European attempt to show the world that major conflicts can be ended through multilateral negotiations and subtle diplomacy, without threatening, let alone exercising, the use of force. Ever since the invasion of Iraq, numerous European public intellectuals and elected officials have severely criticized the Bush Administration for its unilateral and bullying approach to the world. The use of " soft power " has been all the rage. It was to be a foreign policy based on legitimate moves and the "power of attraction" -- as Joe Nye, Jr. the celebrated advocate of the term has defined it. Nations were to be convinced or given incentives to act in line with established international norms, rather than coerced. Iran for a while played along; it suggested more negotiations, floated new proposals, and won time for its nuclear development (possibly including a clandestine program) -- while giving the Europeans the run around. Finally, in January 2006, even Iran seemed to have tired of the game and it moved ahead in open defiance of its previous international commitments. One may say that breaking the seals is merely an attempt to up the ante before a final settlement is reached. However, there is no indication that Iran is even willing to limit its nuclear program by relying on fuel to be provided by an international consortium. (The idea calls for Iran to receive enriched uranium from abroad instead of manufacturing it, so it will be able to produce all the energy it wishes -- which Iran claims is its only goal -- and still be unable to siphon off the material required for bomb making. The international suppliers of enriched uranium would ensure that it is used only for peaceful purposes and expatriate the spent fuel, another bomb making material). The limits of soft power have further been highlighted by the fact that the Europeans, which took the lead in dealing with Iran, are at loss as to what next to do. Economic sanctions -- unlike economic incentives such as credits and favorable trade terms -- are punitive and do not qualify as soft power. Moreover, they are difficult to impose, make stick, and render effective. To initiate economic sanctions the IAEA must refer the matter to the U.N.; however, its 35-member board is reluctant to proceed. If it does, China may still veto the needed Security Council resolutions or water them down. Were sanctions to be imposed, experience in the Middle East shows that they often enrich the smugglers rather then cramp the styles of the governments involved, and that the population suffers rather than the elites. Iran, which is flooded with petro dollars, is in a strong position to resist sanctions as well as impose some of its own by withholding oil. Ergo, down the road, either military force will have to be employed or -- if this is impractical -- Iran will become a full-fledged nuclear power. In either case, soft power will be shown up for what it is: by itself a very insufficient instrument of international relations. It turns out that just as hard power does best when preceded and accompanied by soft power, so the other way around: soft power works much better when it is known that if all else fails, hard power might well follow. There is room to rely much more on legitimate international institutions, allies, and diplomacy than the Bush Administration has done. However, there is a much greater need for hard power back up than the Europeans have been willing to acknowledge Iran is hardly the first case in point. The U.N. has passed hundreds of resolutions censuring nations but many have been wantonly ignored with lmost no consequences, because the U.N. has so little hard power of its own. Indeed the massive slaughter in East Timor did not stop until Australian troops intervened and likewise until British troops marched into Sierra Leone and Americans into Liberia and so on In short, the humbling of the Europeans by Iran shows that soft power by itself will not do; it must be combined with a hard backing. The time has come for the Europeans to swallow their sense of superiority and recognize that they must work with the U.S. if a nuclear Iran is to be stopped and the numerous other international challenges that do not yield to soft power alone are to be met.
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Soft Power Wont Solve Iranian Proliferation
IRANIAN NUCLEAR CRISIS PROVES LIMITS OF SOFT POWER The Guardian (London), 2006, January 28, p. 29 Speak softly, and carry a big carrot. For decades, even Europe's friends chuckled at this parody of its timid approach to foreign policy adventures. In its negotiations with Iran over its nuclear ambitions, however, Europe has been promoting the embrace of " soft power " as an exciting new tool for diplomacy. Soft power is to the American military machine what the idea of the new man is to traditional masculinity. It is,
according to the new European catechism, a more civilised way of doing things - one based on rational argument, proper procedure and bureaucratic haggling. In an only partly light-hearted article for the journal Foreign Policy in 2004, one analyst identified Europe as the world's first "soft" or "metrosexual" superpower. "Metrosexuals", he argued, "always know how to dress for the occasion (or mission). Spreading
The idea of " soft power ", however, is not a European but an American invention, and it is not just about wearing Armani suits but about winning hearts and minds through cultural influence. For over a decade, Joseph Nye, a professor of international relations at Harvard and one of America's leading foreign policy thinkers, has been arguing that America should devote more time to exporting its culture - its language, values and brands - and promoting the country as a beacon of prosperity and openness. Watching the progress of the war on terror, Nye has argued that America's military belligerence after 9/11 was beginning to suffocate the soft power that traditionally made it attractive to foreigners. A funny thing has happened to Nye's idea, however, on its way into the contemporary political vocabulary. In the past few years, Europe has quietly been rebranding itself to make political capital out of global antiAmericanism. Where America is deemed to have reverted to an evangelical Protestantism underwritten by George Bush, Europe offers itself as a secular oasis. Where America's armies strut around the world in search of a Pax Americana, Europe has borrowed Nye's idea to present itself as a connoisseur in the art of soft power. For the past few years, bogged down in an intractable war in Iraq, America has been happy to let Europe have its way over Iran. It has politely exited the ring, occasionally cheering on the efforts of Britain, France and Germany to find a diplomatic solution. The problem is that there is little in the way of common culture and identity to which Europe can encourage others to aspire. Europe's "softness", for what it is worth, derives from its skills as a negotiator. And, so far, its negotiations with Iran have not been going too well. A cynic might conclude that, rather than skilfully massaging the situation with its soft power, Europe is merely a softy, whose whispered overtures to the Iranians depend on having America's bad cop in the background. Stick with us, European leaders have seemed to be saying to the Iranians for the past two years - you wouldn't want to be left alone with my hot-headed friend across the water. But, very soon, it looks like they might.
peace across Eurasia serves US interests, but it's best done by donning Armani pinstripes rather than US army fatigues."
IRAN NOT WILLING TO LIVE IN ISOLATION FROM THE REST OF THE WORLD THE WAY THAT NORTH KOREA IS Mark Fitzpatrick, IISS Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation, 2006, Survival, Vol. 48, No.1, Spring, p. 68 Some Iranians believe North Korea has other lessons to teach in its historical attachment to self-sufficiency, or Juche in Pyongyangs vocabulary. Juche did not work well for North Korea, except to minimise regime-threatening foreign influences, and the concept travels poorly the further the distance from Pyongyang. Nevertheless, North Koreas determination to march to its own drummer seems to hold some allure for Iranian hardliners who wish to reduce Irans economic dependence on the rest of the world. Exiled Iranian journalist Amir Taheri characterizes President Ahmadinejad as representing an Islamic version of North Korea, seeking greater self-sufficiency and detachment from the global economy as a means of survival.28 The analogy is far overdrawn: in contrast to the North Korean hermit kingdom, Irans restive population has widespread Internet, e-mail, satellite dish and migr links to the rest of the world. Taheri readily acknowledges as much. Iran has seven land-border neighbours and regional if not global ambitions. Its national income is massively dependent on world oil prices, and many sectors of the economy are dependent on foreign trade, technology and investment. The North Korean model is perhaps more of a matter of relative emphasis for the Iranian hardliners. Ahmadinejad wants more investment in areas that do not depend on foreign trade; he described the economic policy paper that he presented to the Majlis last summer as a strategy for selfsufficiency. This is a contrast to the worldview of Tehrans pragmatic conservatives, who have recognised, as Robert Einhorn put it, that their hopes for regime legitimacy and survival rest heavily on their ability to deliver material benefits to their increasingly disenchanted population, benefits that can only be achieved through integration economically and politically with the international community.
Soft Power Not Critical to Fighting Terrorism
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ALLIES COOPERATE WITH US OUT OF THEIR OWN INTEREST, NOT BECAUSE OF SOFT POWER Ramesh Ponnuru, columnist at national review, national review, December 31, 2001, p.
Http://www.nationalreview.com/31dec01/ponnuru123101.shtml, accessed 5/21/05.
Among our useful allies, not one has been moved by any wispy notion of international community. Britain and australia are with us because of a cultural affinity that underlies an ideological one. Our local allies are motivated by a combination of fear of our wrath, fear of our enemies' success, greed for our money, and a craven desire to back the winner. The president has not needed to give an inch on the global-warming accord, the international criminal court, or missile defense to win their support. SOFT POWER ALONE IS NOT ENOUGH Hirsh, Newsweek senior editor, 03 Michael, AT WAR WITH OURSELVES, Oxford, p. 7 What it means, I will argue in the pages ahead, is that America must make use of the full panoply of its tools of "hard" and `soft" power to secure itself. It is clear that the demonstration of U.S. might is needed, both to wipe out the terrorist threat and to send a message to the world. The use of overwhelming force in Afghanistan destroyed al-Qaeda's base and helped to restore U.S. credibility after a decade of irresolution, halfhearted interventions, and flaccid responses to previous attacks.
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Soft Power Doesnt Solve Terrorism
Terrorists see soft power as a symbol of weakness
National Post, April 17, 2008, p. A20 When former Liberal foreign affairs minister Lloyd Axworthy was peddling our advocacy for soft power in the 1990s, I sincerely doubt he considered that the Taliban and transnational terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda were diligently implementing the orthodoxies of hard power through the use of terrorism, repression and ideological indoctrination. Soft power in the modern age is seen by our foes as a byword for weakness. It is a disingenuous excuse for not providing our fighting forces with the equipment they require to do their crucial job.
COUNTER-TERRORISM ALLIANCES STRONG NOW DEFENSE NEWS, February 28, 2005, pg. 21 More importantly, even as Washington and Paris have lobbed spitballs at each other, the web of security commitments the United States has cultivated for the past 50 years has, far from contracting, expanded radically. With the eastward growth of NATO, new relationships with once-hostile states like Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Libya, and partnerships with other countries under threat by radical Islam, the U.S. alliance system is transforming in ways the White House itself may not fully appreciate. Since the Sept. 11, attacks, the United States has been quietly working to develop new and stronger alliances where they matter most: with the governments and societies of the greater Middle East. In essence, just as al-Qaida has been said to "franchise" jihad - outsourcing the grunt work of suicide bombings to angry young locals from Turkey to Indonesia - the Pentagon is building a rival franchise in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, mobilizing and supporting locals willing to join the fight against radical Islam. THE WORLD IS UNITED WITH THE U.S. AGAINST AL QAEDA DEFENSE NEWS, February 28, 2005, pg. 21 Even as critics have deplored Bush's "with-us-or-against-us" rhetoric as simplistic and alienating, the fact remains that in grand strategic terms, almost the entire planet has chosen to be with us. Moscow, despite some grumbling, has acceded to U.S. counterterrorism alliances with former satellite states like Georgia; Washington has been able, miraculously, to strengthen its strategic partnerships with archrivals India and Pakistan simultaneously.
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Soft Power Doesnt Solve Terrorism
GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION WILL NOT HELP THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM Steven E. Miller is director of the International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2002 (THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter, http://www.twq.com/02winter/miller.pdf) No one can dispute that the campaign against terrorism will profit from the accumulation of relevant information from as many useful sources as are available. In the aftermath of September 11, additional information from additional sources will likely contribute to operations against terrorism. Nevertheless, for several reasons, this factor may have been exaggerated as a motivation for fundamental change in U.S. policy. For one thing, the barriers to intensive intelligence collaboration are considerable. U.S. agencies are reluctant to share information with each other, much less with foreign governments and foreign intelligence bureaucracies. When sensitive information is involved, the police are out of the loop, Congress is eyed warily, and other federal agencies are not routinely on the distribution list. Assessing the intimacy of information-sharing arrangements between governments is impossible for outsiders, but intelligence professionals suggest that the United States does not share everything even with its closest allies and that even states with close ties to the United States may not be enthusiastic or generous about turning over information to their U.S. counterparts. Washington was deeply frustrated, for example, that the government of Saudi Arabia was not more forthcoming in assisting the investigation of the 1996 terrorist attack on U.S. military personnel at Khobar Towers. Moreover, the current loose coalition that has formed in support of the U.S. battle with terrorism includes a motley collection of states-some that are close to the United States but many that are not. Indeed, many of the states that might be in the best position to possess and provide information about terrorist activities in the Middle East or South Asia-such as Iran, Libya, and Syriaare states that have uneasy, or even hostile, relations with the United States. The barriers to collaboration must be enormous in such cases, with reluctance likely in both directions to forging the most sensitive sorts of ties between unfriendly states. In circumstances where deep trust between governments does not exist, concerns will inevitably arise that information is being manipulated, withheld, parceled out to maximize the price, shaded to advance the interests of the providing state, or even falsely manufactured. When genuine and useful information is provided, it may reflect only partial truths or be misleading and self-serving in some way. In its quest to crush the global terrorist threat, the United States will probably seek information from whatever sources can provide it, but will the United States truly be prepared to pay a high price in terms of its foreign policy in order to gain problematic information from dubious sources?
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Soft Power Doesnt Solve Terrorism
NYE AGREES WE CANT WIN THE WAR ON TERROR WITHOUT HARD POWER Joseph Nye, JFK School of Government, BOSTON REVIEW, March 10, 2005, p. 21 If the United States is going to win the struggle against terrorism, it will need learn again to combine soft power with hard power. Stephen Walt recognizes this, but he does not dwell on it, perhaps because his realist paradigm does not stress soft power. But better an intelligent, moderate, and mature realism than a truncated neoconservative Wilsonianism that stresses ideas but loses touch with reality.
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Soft Power Wont Solve Counterbalancing
Boosting hegemony causes a backlash against the U.S., soft power cannot overcome
Soeren Kern is Senior Fellow for Transatlantic Relations at the Madrid-based Grupo de Estudios Estratgicos / Strategic Studies Group, Spero News, January 10, 2008,
http://www.speroforum.com/site/article.asp?idarticle=13519 Take Spain, for example, where anti-Americanism goes back to the Spanish-American War, which in 1898 drove the final nail into the coffin of the Spanish empire and ended its colonial exploitation of Cuba. Many Spaniards also resent Americas support for General Francisco Franco (1892-1975), who in his day was popular with the Americans because of his strong anti-Communist credentials. In Germany, anti-Americanism is an exercise in moral relativism. Germans desperately want their country to be perceived as a normal country, and its elites are using anti-Americanism as a political tool to absolve themselves and their parents of the crimes of World War II. They routinely equate the US invasion of Iraq with the Holocaust, for example, as a psychological ruse to make themselves feel better about their sordid past. In France, anti-Americanism is an inferiority complex masquerading as a superiority complex. France is the birthplace of anti-Americanism (the first act of which has been traced to a French lawyer in the late 1700s), and bashing the United States is an inexpensive way to indulge Frances fantasies of past greatness and splendor. As political realists like Thucydides (c 460-395 BC) might have predicted, anti-Americanism is also a visceral reaction against the current distribution of global power. America commands a level of economic, military and cultural influence that leaves many around the world envious, resentful and even angry and afraid. Indeed, most purveyors of anti-Americanism will continue to bash America until the United States is balanced or replaced (by those same anti-Americans, of course) as the dominant actor on the global stage In Europe, for example, where self-referential elites are pathologically obsessed with their perceived need to counter-balance the United States, anti-Americanism is now the dominant ideology of public life. In fact, it is no coincidence that the spectacular rise in anti-Americanism in Europe has come at precisely the same time that the European Union, which often struggles to speak with one voice, has been trying to make its political weight felt both at home and abroad.
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Soft Power Wont Boost Middle East Influence
Soft power wont boost U.S. influence in the Middle East
Huffington Post, 1-24, 8, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lionel-beehner/how-foreign-policy-hurts-_b_83074.html I doubt it. I have not seen a serious strategy on how to repair America's image abroad. Everyone kneels now before the altar of diplomacy but that only gets us so far. Apply more soft power? Trouble is that U.S. public diplomacy has an abysmal record in the Muslim world (Hi Magazine, anyone???). Go on a listening tour? If it didn't work for Karen Hughes, it won't work for Hillary Clinton. The Middle East is not upstate New York.
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Soft Power Not Critical to Basing
THE U.S. HAS AN EXTENSIVE GLOBAL NETWORK OF MILITARY BASES NOW Chalmers Johnson, Japan Institute, author, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE, 2004, p. 1 As distinct from other peoples on this earth, most Americans do not recognize--or do not want to recognize-that the United States dominates the world through its military power. Due to government secrecy, they are often ignorant of the fact that their government garrisons the globe. They do not realize that a vast network of American military bases on every continent except America actually constitutes a new form of empire. THE U.S HAS EXTENSIVE FORMAL AND INFORMAL BASING ARRANGEMENTS ALL OF THE WORLD Chalmers Johnson, Japan Institute, author, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE, 2004, pp. 4-5 This book is a guide to the American empire as it begins openly to spread its imperial wings. Its reach is global: as of September 2001, the Department of Defense acknowledged at least 725 American military bases existed outside the United States. Actually, there are many more, since some bases exist under leaseholds, informal agreements, or disguises of various kinds. And more have been created since the announcement was made. The landscape of this military empire is as unfamiliar and fantastic to most. Americans today as Tibet or Timbuktu were to nineteenth-century Europeans. Among its recent additions are the al-Udeid air base in the ,desert of Qatar, where several thousand American military men and women live in air-conditioned tents, and the al- Masirah Island naval air station in the Gulf of Oman, where the only diversion is "wadi ball:' a cross between volleyball and football. It includes expensive, permanent garrisons built between 1999 and 2001 in such unlikely places as Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. America's modem empire of bases also has its entertainment and getaway spots, much like those north Indian hill towns tile administrators of the Eiritish Raj used for rest and recreation in the summer heat. The modern equivalents of Darjeeling, Kalimpong, and Srulagar are the armed force ski and vacation center at Garmisch in the Bavarian Alps, its resort hotel in downtown Tokyo, and the 234 military golf courses it operates worldwide, not to mention the seventy-one Lea jets, thirteen Gulfstreanl Ills, and seventeen Cessna Citation luxury jets used to fly admirals and generals to such spots.
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Soft Power Not Critical to Basing
U.S. ALLIANCES ARE INCREASING, NOT DECREASING Kurt M. Campbell is senior vice president and director of the International Security Program as well as the Henry A. Kissinger Chair in International Security at CSIS, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Spring 2004, pp. 152-3 Although recent trends undoubtedly suggest departures from previous U.S. practices, all these schools of thought assume that a clear, uniform trend has emerged that will determine the fundamental fate and future of alliances in U.S. strategic planning. Yet, one has not; rather, the nature of the U.S. alliance system remains largely in flux. Some traditional alliances, notably bilateral ones, are thriving and continue to be central to the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign and security policy, while other bilateral ties appear to be languishing in the face of either neglect or strategic drift by either or both alliance partners. In addition, increased interaction with and utilization of new alliance partners, notably in central Europe, are evident in operations used to conduct the global war on terrorism. Although some larger multilateral alliances, such as NATO, have even demonstrated some high-profile signs of drift, such as the fracas over Iraq, this trend is by no means uniform. Other instances, such as NATOs role to facilitate essential transatlantic cooperation in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and elsewhere, may reveal a broader, sustained, and continuing pattern of cooperation. Conclusions of the demise or indisputable relevance of alliances are premature . THE U.S. HAS DEVELOPED IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH COUNTRIES IN CRITICAL REGIONS Bruno Tertrais is a senior research fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratgique and an associate researcher at the Centre dEtudes et de Recherches Internationales, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Spring, 2004, pp. 159-60 The United States has also developed closer relations with a diverse set of global actors that might be termed new friends. These states may have had preexisting relations with the United States but now find themselves drawn more closely to the United States largely because of the new strategic conditions of the war on terrorism. These new friends include India, the Philippines, Uzbekistan, Bahrain, Jordan, and Singapore. A few of these states have been designated as non-NATO strategic allies (Bahrain and the Philippines, for example) as a testament to their newly found significance for the United States. All of them represent critical regional access points for the U.S. military and other forms of presencesometimes in a strictly geographical sensein areas of potential instability and lawlessness, as well as sites that might be breeding grounds for terrorism. Military-to-military interactions with each of these countries have increased sharply in the last few years, and the U.S. government has used several of these states as staging areas for operations against local terrorist groups.
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Soft Power Not Critical to Basing
THE U.S. HAS DEVELOPED IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH COUNTRIES IN CRITICAL REGIONS Bruno Tertrais is a senior research fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratgique and an associate researcher at the Centre dEtudes et de Recherches Internationales, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Spring, 2004, pp. 159-60 The United States has also developed closer relations with a diverse set of global actors that might be termed new friends. These states may have had preexisting relations with the United States but now find themselves drawn more closely to the United States largely because of the new strategic conditions of the war on terrorism. These new friends include India, the Philip pines, Uzbekistan, Bahrain, Jordan, and Singapore. A few of these states have been designated as non-NATO strategic allies (Bahrain and the Philippines, for example) as a testament to their newly found significance for the United States. All of them represent critical regional access points for the U.S. military and other forms of presencesometimes in a strictly geographical sensein areas of potential instability and lawlessness, as well as sites that might be breeding grounds for terrorism. Military-to-military interactions with each of these countries have increased sharply in the last few years, and the U.S. government has used several of these states as staging areas for operations against local terrorist groups.
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Soft Power Not Critical to Basing
THE U.S. DOESNT EVEN NEED OVERSEAS BASES IT CAN FIGHT FROM HOME Chalmers Johnson, Japan Institute, author, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE, 2004, p. 24 During the second Iraq war, for example, the United States did not use its Persian Gulf and Central Asian bases except to launch bombers against Iraqi cities-an activity more akin to a training exercise, given American air superiority, than to anything that might be called combat. Virtually all of the actual fighting forces came from the homeland"-the Third Infantry Division from Fort Stewart, Georgia; the Fourth Infantry Division from Fort Hood, Texas; the First Marine Division from Camp Pendleton, California; and the l0lst Airborne Division from Fort Campbell, Kentucky. THE U.S. HAS AN EXTENSIVE COLLECTION OF MILITARY BASES IN THE GULF Chalmers Johnson, Japan Institute, author, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE, 2004, pp. 252-3 This compilation of American military bases in the Persian Gulf region is by no means complete. Since December 2002, the United States has been building a new base for its Special Forces in the former French colony of Djibouti, separated by only a twenty mile strip of water from the port of Aden, at the entrance to the Red Sea. We have long deployed several thousand personnel at Incir lik Air Base in Turkey, as well as around fifty F-15 and F-126 fighters and A-10 tanker busters, although in the Wake of Turkeys refusal to let the United States use its territory for the 2003 assault on Iraq, the Pentagon quickly withdrew most of them. We have also stationed dozens of aircraft at two bases close to the Iraqi border in Jordan and have often used Cairo West air base in Egypt for refueling and airlift operations. Most of the Middle Eastern military bases were hardened and outfitted specifically for the second war with Iraq and then sued during that war. Iraq, however, is but part of a larger picture. Over the past half century the United States has been inexorably acquiring permanent military enclaves whose sole purpose appears to be the domination of one of the most strategically important areas of the world.
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Answers to: Need Soft Power to Stop Chinese Global Leadership
EVEN IF US SOFT POWER DECLINES CHINA LACKS THE LEGITIMACY TO SUPPLANT OUR ROLE Bates Gill & Yanzhong Huang, CSIS & Seton Hall University, 2006, Survival, Volume 48, No. 2, Summer, p. 29 Moreover, legitimacy concerns undermine Chinas claim to moral high ground even at a time of overall decline in US soft power. In a Pew Global Attitudes Survey in 2005, more than 12% of the people queried in West European countries see the United States as the major power most likely to come to the aid of people threatened by genocide. No more than 3% said they would turn to China. The legitimacy of Chinas diplomacy can be further weakened by dynamics of globalisation, which allow many non-state actors to attract coalitions that cut across national borders but operate at very lost cost. Even though Chinese soft power will generate closer relationships with governments, democratic and otherwise, there will continue to be nongovernmental groups (for example, human rights groups, labour unions, the Falun Gong movement, the Tibetan migr community, Chinese political dissidents) that sabotage this effort by focusing world attention on the China threat or human rights abuses. CHINA HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO CAPITALIZE ON US DECLINES IN SOFT POWER Bates Gill & Yanzhong Huang, CSIS & Seton Hall University, 2006, Survival, Volume 48, No. 2, Summer, p. 30 Problems with internal consistency in foreign policy also explain why China has not been able to reap significant gains in liberal democracies, even at a time of waning US prestige in many quarters. The 16-Nation Pew Survey suggests that, while there is substantial support in most countries for a military rival to challenge Americas global dominance, opposition to China playing that role ranges from 71% in the United Kingdom, France and Russia, to 82% in Germany US WAY AHEAD OF CHINA ON CULTURAL ATTRACTIVENESS Bates Gill & Yanzhong Huang, CSIS & Seton Hall University, 2006, Survival, Volume 48, No. 2, Summer, p. 27 Development of an ideal mix of soft-power resources to serve its foreign-policy agenda remains a daunting challenge for Beijing. As far as cultural attractiveness is concerned, China has great resources, but admits it is not strong in marketing its cultural products. While products with Made in China labels appear to be everywhere, China is still no match for the United States in cultural attractiveness few Chinese companies, cultural icons, movies or brand names have the ubiquity of Microsoft, MTV, Mickey Mouse or Big Macs. According to the National Information Security Report, only 4% of global information resources are carried in Chinese, although China accounts for one-fifth of the world population. A true expansion of contemporary Chinese culture requires a politically relaxed environment that encourages freedom of expression and a free exchange of ideas among Chinese and the world at large, which the monistic political system remains loath to offer.
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Answers to: Need Soft Power to Stop Chinese Global Leadership
CHINESE SOFT POWER LIMITED LACKS LEGITIMACY Bates Gill & Yanzhong Huang, CSIS & Seton Hall University, 2006, Survival, Volume 48, No. 2, Summer, p. 28-9 The lack of meaningful political reform, coupled with Beijings friendship with dictators in the developing world, creates a legitimacy problem. As Nye has pointed out, states most likely to project soft power in an information age are those whose dominant ideas are closer to global norms, which now emphasise liberalism, pluralism and autonomy. Beijing seems to express few qualms about cutting political and economic deals with corrupt and even brutal, dictators. In July 2005, Beijing lavished honours on Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe (a disciple of the Beijing Consensus), at a time when UN Secretary General Kofi Annan spoke of Mugabes catastrophic injustice in implementing his urban eviction programme. Beijings close economic and political ties with such regimes help keep dictatorships afloat and blunt international pressures for any meaningful economic and political change. In 2004, China also helped deflect US and other Western efforts to take tougher steps against Sudan, which supplies nearly 5% of Chinas oil but has a notorious human-rights record, especially in its Darfur region. Chinas close economic and political relations with Iran will also come under greater scrutiny as the international community seeks to stem Tehrans nuclear ambitions. In justifying its activities in Africa, the Chinese government insists business is business. Yet coddling dictators can antagonise democratic oppositions and may bode ill for sustaining Beijings influence in those countries. The opposition Movement for Democratic Change in Zimbabwe, for example, has made it clear that if it came to power it would not honour any loan repayments or deals signed by Mugabe. To the extent that soft power rests on legitimacy, China must also take growing international commitment to human rights into account or else undermine its international standing at a time it is trying to portray a more benign image. Not coincidentally, the only three countries with a plurality viewing Chinese influence as negative (Germany, the United States and Poland) are liberal democracies. CHINA NOT CLOSE TO COMPETING WITH THE US FOR SOFT POWER LEAD Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 83-4 In the last two decades of the twentieth century, China, Asias largest country, had high annual growth rates of 7 to 9 percent that led to a remarkable tripling of its GNP and enhanced its reputation and soft power. Nevertheless, even China has a long way to go, and faces many obstacles to its development. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the American economy was more than twice the size of Chinas. And, as a Singapore columnist observed, When it comes to soft power, it will take much longer before it can make an impact close to what the US now enjoys.
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Answers to: Need Soft Power to Stop Chinese Global Leadership
NEITHER CHINA NOR INDIA LIKELY TO CHALLENGE US OR EU FOR SOFT POWER LEADERSHIP ANY TIME SOON Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 88-9 But the real promise for China and India still lies in the future. Rapid economic growth is likely to increase both countries hard and soft power, but at this point, neither country ranks high on the various indices of potential soft-power resources that are possessed by the United States, Europe, and Japan. While culture provides some soft power, domestic politics and values set limits, particularly in China, where the Communist Party fears allowing too much intellectual freedom and resists outside influence. Both countries have a reputation for major corruption in government, India benefits from democratic politics, but still suffers from overly bureaucratized government. And the recent revival of Hindu extremism and the killing of Muslims in Gujarat has tarnished its democratic reputation. In foreign policy as well, both countries reputations are burdened with the problems of longstanding conflicts, over Taiwan and Kashmir, respectively. Moreover, in the United States the attraction of an authoritarian China is limited by the concern that it could become a threat sometime in the future. The soft power of Asian countries is likely to increase in the future, but at this stage they lag in soft-power resources behind the United States and Europe. CHINESE SOFT POWER LIMITED MORE ABOUT MONEY THAN ATTRACTIVENESS Greg Sheridan, Contributing Editor, National Interest, 2006, The National Interest, November/December, p. Lexis America and China, meanwhile, are rightly seen to be in a contest for influence, especially in northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. China does enjoy a species of soft power, but it lacks the soft power of idealism or cultural attractiveness. It does have the soft power of money. China has learned to astutely use business communities throughout Asia to leverage financial interest of those communities in China. And Chinese diplomacy has become more professional and effective. The Chinese are exceptionally good at flattery, as any "old friend of China" who has ever been a guest at Beijing's Great Hall of the People can attest. But no one is seriously attracted to the Chinese system on idealistic grounds. So Chinese soft power, based on money, is strong but limited. CHINA HAS VERY LITTLE SOFT POWERCANT LAUNCH IDEOLOGICAL CHALLENGE TO US Robert Sutter, visiting professor of Asian Studies at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, 2003-4, The Washington Quarterly, Winter, 27:1, p. 86 China has only limited amounts of what social scientists call normative power and influence. Following the collapse of international communism, the world appeal of Chinese ideology has continued to decline as observers try to discern the relevance of the many Chinese treatises extolling Jiangs theories. In 2003 the governments initial handling of the SARS epidemic and the massive demonstration in Hong Kong in July 2003 against government policies seen as too accommodating to the Communist regime in Beijing underlined international skepticism about official Chinese values.
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Answers to: Need Soft Power to Stop Chinese Global Leadership
NO ZERO SUM SOFT POWER COMPETITION WITH CHINA Robert D. Hormats, 2006, The National Interest, Fall, p. Lexis We are not engaged in a zero-sum game with China. It is highly unlikely that there is a central grand plan where the Chinese state is coordinating the activities of all state-owned companies. The State Council did not sit down and dictate that Lenovo should purchase IBM's personal computer and laptop unit. Chinese state-owned firms make decisions based on what is good for the company, and managers have a good deal of discretionary authority; the government has far less control than many Americans assume. This is not like the challenge posed by Japan during the 1970s: with an economy expanding outward yet relatively closed at home to foreign investment and imposing limitations to foreign penetration of its domestic markets. China may be "going global" but it is open for business at home. American businesses can invest in China and can benefit from access to the Chinese domestic market. One potentially divisive issue is energy. Here the Chinese government has been making decisions that are frequently based on strategic rather than market calculations, a preference for acquiring equity stakes in oil rather than trusting market mechanisms. This is because the Chinese believe that in a crisis international oil companies might not be able to provide deliveries of energy to China. We also need to put things into perspective. Americans tend to panic because China seeks to buy a company that produces the equivalent of 1 percent of the U.S. oil supply and portray this as a threat to national security. The vastly bigger national security issue is that the United States continues to rely on imports for 60 percent of its oil needs. That is where our strategic focus should be. There are overlapping interests between Washington and Beijing. Both countries want a stable supply of oil in global markets. The task is getting China to think of itself as a global consumer, who shares interests with other consumers, and to trust the markets, rather than try to lock up resources using equity arrangements. And we can help China with clean coal technology. Energy could be a contentious issue in the Sino-American relationship, but it is also a good prospect for cooperation. Here, a more creative institutional framework, perhaps a highlevel cabinet committee, could be created to deal with questions such as the sale of clean coal technology to China as well as ways to ensure supply stability in both oil and natural gas markets. Otherwise, we will have dispute after dispute on energy issues. The crux of the matter is this: We need to create a dialogue about how Beijing plans to use its growing economic and political power and to encourage it to do so in a way that creates a more stable and prosperous global economy. In the end, I do not think we need to worry very much about China's increased global economic presence. But we do need to see it as a challenge to us to boost our competitive capabilities and improve our education system. Beijing is still inclined to participate in the international system. Washington, and specifically the Congress, however, must be more patient; we will need a more sophisticated diplomacy. It will take time for China to follow the path to becoming a stakeholder. Our watchword should be engagement, not containment.
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Answers to: Need Soft Power to Stop Russian-China Alliance
NO RISK OF A RUSSIA-CHINA ALLIANCE OR GLOBAL ALLIANCES DIRECTED AT THE U.S. Zbigniew Brzezinski, famous geostrategist, former diplomat, Johns Hopkins & CSIS, THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, 2004, 149 The contemporary world may not like American preeminence may distrust it, resent it, even at times others conspire against it. But as a practical matter, it cannot oppose it directly. The last decade has seen occasional attempts at such opposition, but to no avail. The Chinese and the Russians flirted with a strategic partnership to promote global "multipolarity," a term easily decoded as "anti-hegemony:' Not much Came of that, given Russia's relative weakness visi-vis China, as well as China's pragmatic recognition that right now, most of all, it needs foreign capital and technology. Neither of these would be forthcoming if China's relations with the United States were antagonistic. In the last year of the twentieth century, the Europeans, and especially the French, grandly announced that Europe would shortly acquire "an autonomous global security capability:' The war in Afghanistan quickly revealed this commitment to be reminiscent of the once famous Soviet assertion that the historical victory of Communism "is on the horizon;' an imaginary line that recedes as one walks toward it. MANY OBSTACLES TO RUSSIA AND CHINA FORMING AN ANTI-AMERICAN BLOC Dr. Weitz is a senior staff member of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Washington, D.C. In recent years he has published on international security issues in Parameters, Strategic Review, and the Journal of Strategic Studies, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Autumn, 2003, http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2003/Autumn/art3-a03.htm Since the Cold Wars end, many analysts have expected China and Russia to cooperate vigorously to counter U.S. geopolitical superiority. Although Chinese and Russian leaders have collaborated on some issues, substantial obstacles have impeded their forming an anti-American bloc. This failure of the two strongest countries with both the capacity and (arguably) incentives to counterbalance U.S. power and influence in world affairs suggests why the United States continues to enjoy unprecedented global preeminence. This article analyzes why Russia and China have not allied against the United States and offers policy recommendations on how to avert such an anti-U.S. bloc in the future.
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Answers to: Need Soft Power to Stop Russian-China Alliance
RUSSIAS ARMS SALES TO CHINA ARE MOTIVATED BY ECONOMIC, NOT STRATEGIC, GOALS Dr. Weitz is a senior staff member of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Washington, D.C. In recent years he has published on international security issues in Parameters, Strategic Review, and the Journal of Strategic Studies, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Autumn, 2003, http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2003/Autumn/art3-a03.htm Economic rather than strategic considerations largely explain Russias decision to sell advanced conventional weapons systems to China. Russia has both surplus arms stocks and excess defense production capacity. This combination has resulted in widespread insolvency among Russian defense firms, and high unemployment and low wages in regions that had heavy concentrations of defense enterprises in Soviet times.24 From 1991 to 1995, Russian government orders for products of a military character fell by more than 90 percent.25 In 1998, the Russian armed forces did not buy a single tank, aircraft, or nuclear submarine.26 Russias leaders believe, however, that if it is to remain a great military power, their country needs to maintain a healthy defense industry. They appreciate that many Russian companies require increased investment to develop the advanced systems that proved so effective for Western militaries in the Persian Gulf, the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. They also have proven susceptible to defense managers arguments that a revived Russian military-industrial complex would help promote recovery in other economic sectors.27 Since the impoverished Russian government cannot place enough orders to keep its defense enterprises healthy, Russian officials have encouraged the firms to sell their wares abroad. By the end of the decade, Russian defense firms exported approximately four-fifths of their armaments production. NO RISK OF A RUSSIA-CHINA AXIS Stephen G. Brooks is an Assistant Professor and William C. Wohlforth an Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, 2002 (FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July-August, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/articles/brooks0702.html) Consider the Sino-Russian "strategic partnership," the most prominent instance of apparent balancing to date. The easy retort to overheated rhetoric about a Moscow-Beijing "axis" would involve pointing out how it failed to slow, much less stop, President Vladimir Putin's geopolitical sprint toward Washington in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. More telling, however, is just how tenuous the shift was even before it was thrown off track. At no point did the partnership entail any costly commitment or policy coordination against Washington that might have risked a genuine confrontation. The keystone of the partnership -- Russia's arms sales to China -- reflects a symmetry of weaknesses, rather than the potential of combined strengths. The sales partially offset China's backward military technology while helping to slow the decline of Russia's defense industries. Most of the arms in question are legacies of the R&D efforts of the Soviet military -industrial complex, and given Moscow's paltry R&D budget today, few of these systems will long remain competitive with their U.S. or NATO analogues.
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Answers to: Need Soft Power to Stop Russian-China Alliance
NOTHING WILL GALVANIZE RUSSIA AND CHINA INTO AN ALLIANCE Dr. Weitz is a senior staff member of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Washington, D.C. In recent years he has published on international security issues in Parameters, Strategic Review, and the Journal of Strategic Studies, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Autumn, 2003, http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2003/Autumn/art3-a03.htm Russia and China will continue to work together to pursue common goals, but if the events of the last few years especially the U.S. military interventions in Serbia, Afghanistan, and Iraqhave not galvanized them to form an antiAmerican alliance, it is hard to envisage what will. The global war on terrorism should if anything improve relations among China, Russia, and the United States because their governments all consider radical Islamic terrorism their most pressing security threat. Just as fears of a revanchist Russia or an expansionist China have faded in official Washington during the past year, so policy makers in Moscow and Beijing have become preoccupied with problems other than potential American hegemony. If a new great power alliance emerges in Eurasia, the United States will more likely be its member than its target.
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Answers to: Need Soft Power to Stop Russian-China Alliance
RUSSIA-CHINA COOPERATION IS SHALLOW AT BEST Dr. Weitz is a senior staff member of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Washington, D.C. In recent years he has published on international security issues in Parameters, Strategic Review, and the Journal of Strategic Studies, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Autumn, 2003, http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2003/Autumn/art3-a03.htm Foreign policy cooperation between Russia and China has been much more visible in their joint approach to Central Asia than in other important areasdespite their leaders calls for foreign-policy coordination. Their genuine desire to counter what both consider excessive American power and influence in the postCold War era manifests itself mostly rhetorically. Since the early 1990s, the two governments have issued numerous joint communiqus in which they have denounced various U.S. policies and called for a multilateral rather than a unilateral (i.e., American-led) world. They also jointly sponsored resolutions in the United Nations urging respect for the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which limited the U.S. ability to deploy defenses against Russian (and, by extension, Chinese) ballistic missiles. Most recently, they urged the United States and its allies not to intervene militarily in Iraq without UN (e.g., their) approval. Despite their common rhetoric, the two governments have taken no substantive, joint steps to counter American power or influence. For example, they have not pooled their military resources or expertise to overcome U.S. ballistic-missile defense programs. One Chinese official threatened such anti-BMD cooperation shortly after Yeltsins December 1999 visit to Beijing. The Director General for Arms Control of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Sha Zukang, repeated the warning in May 2000. But such threats ended after Putin, on his July 2000 visit to Italy, proposed that Russia and NATO cooperate to defend Europe against missile strikesdespite prior acknowledgment that Chinese officials were suspicious about Russian initiatives to create a nonstrategic missile defence system in Europe. When asked about the prospects of a joint Chinese-Russian response after the December 2001 U.S. decision to withdraw formally from the ABM Treaty, President Putin told journalists, Russia is strong enough to respond on its own to any changes in the sphere of strategic stability. An important indicator of the shallowness of Sino-Russian ties has been their failure, despite the Russia -China partnership, to adopt a mutual defense agreement such as the treaty of friendship, alliance, and mutual assistance that Moscow and Beijing signed in February 1950. Representatives of both governments have consistently dismissed the suggestions of such Russian analysts and politicians as Roman Popkovich, chairman of the Duma Committee for Defense, and A. V. Mitrofanov, chairman of the Duma Committee on Geopolitics, that a genuine military alliance be established. Although both governments agreed in July 2000 to begin drafting a Sino-Russian Treaty of Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation, and signed it in July 2001, they made clear that neither party had sought a military component in the accord.60 In addition, the Chinese and Russian militaries have neither trained together nor taken other steps that would allow them to conduct joint combat operationseven if their governments wanted them.
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Answers to: Need Soft Power to Stop Russian-China Alliance
COOPERATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA IS LIMITED Dr. Weitz is a senior staff member of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Washington, D.C. In recent years he has published on international security issues in Parameters, Strategic Review, and the Journal of Strategic Studies, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Autumn, 2003, http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2003/Autumn/art3-a03.htm Cooperation between China and Russia has remained limited, episodic, and tenuous. The two countries support each other on some issues but differ on others. Thus far, their fitfully improving relationship has not presented a major policy challenge to the United States or its allies. Russian arms sales have not been of sufficient quantity or quality by themselves to enable China to defeat the more technologically advanced militaries of Taiwan or Japan. In fact, China has imported less military equipment in dollar terms than either of those countries. The PLA typically buys small quantities of advanced weapons in order to learn about their technologie s and how to counter them. As a result of this practice of selective modernization, only a few pockets of excellence exist within the PLA. Most of the Chinese military still relies on pre-1970s Soviet defense technology. Chinas ability even to maintain its complex, imported weapons systems or make the doctrinal and organizational changes necessary to employ modern military technology optimally in combined arms operations remains questionable. The expected increase in the quality of Chinas defense industries, the continued decline of Russias military-industrial complex, and Russias stated refusal to sell its most advanced weapon systems to a modernizing PLA could decrease the importance of the Sino-Russian arms trade in the future.
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Answers to: Soft Power Key to Stop European Counterbalancing
THE IMPACT TIME-FRAME IS HUGE EUROPE WONT CHALLENGE US FOR AT LEAST A DECADE Zbigniew Brzezinski, famous geostrategist, former diplomat, Johns Hopkins & CSIS, THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, 2004, p. 95 For the time being, neither the dreams nor the nightmares of either side are likely to come to pass. Neither side will satisfy the hopes of the other, but neither will justify the others worst fears. For at least a decade and probably longer, Europe will not attain sufficient political unity and motivation to undertake the financial sacrifices necessary to become a globally significant military power. Europe will not threaten America's primacy for the basic reason that European political unity will be achieved, at best, very slowly and grudgingly. The forthcoming expansion of the EU to twentyseven members will further complicate the already overly complex and highly bureaucratized structures of European integration, which are reminiscent of a giant economic conglomerate. EUROPE WILL NEVER TOTALLY UNITE BEHIND THE U.S. Zbigniew Brzezinski, famous geostrategist, former diplomat, Johns Hopkins & CSIS, THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, 2004, p. 216 Without Europe, America is still preponderant but not globally omnipotent, while without America, Europe is rich but impotent. Some European leaders and nations may be tempted to pursue unity through an anti-American (or, rather, an anti-Atlanticist self-definition, but both America and Europe itself would be the ultimate losers in the effort. As a Superpower Minus, America would find the costs of exercising its global leadership considerably higher, while Europe would then be even less likely to unite, because an anti-Atlanticist platform would not attract a majority of the EU members and prospective members. NO UNIQUENESS/TURN: THE EUROPEAN UNION IS MILITARILY WEAK AND DEPENDS ON NATO TO GENERATE ITS MILITARY CAPABILITIES Posen, European Policy Centre, December 11, 2002 [Barry, Trans-Atlantic differences:: a clash of values or a failure to face reality? http://www.euractiv.com/cgi-bin/cgint.exe/4005620-853? targ=1&204&OIDN=250747&-tt=td, July 14, 2003] There is no obvious threat lurking on the European periphery, and it is difficult to see where one would emerge in the next several decades. Even as the EU expands its functional hold on European life, and admits new members, NATO remains the favored security institution. The EU struggles to develop some military capability, but it depends largely on the NATO alliance to generate that capability. Even liberal projects depend on a certain order, and many Europeans understand that that order is maintained by power.
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Answers to: Need Soft Power to Limit EU Soft Power
US AND EU SOFT POWER DO NOT TRADE OFF INCREASING EU POWER BENEFITS THE US Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 82 Not only can European soft power be used to counter American soft power and raise the price of unilateral actions, but it can also be a source of assistance and reinforcement for American soft power and increase the likelihood of the United States achieving its objectives. Soft power can be shared and used in a cooperative fashion. European promotion of democracy and human rights helps advance shared values that are consistent with American objectives. The Islamist extremists of Al Qaeda are fighting against Western values, not just American values, and European public diplomacy that counters their appeal is beneficial to the United States. EU PERCEIVED TO BE BETTER THAN THE US AT GLOBAL PROBLEM SOLVING Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 78 A measure of the EUs emerging soft power is the view that it is a positive force for solving global problems. In the wake of the Iraq War, Eastern Europeans and Turks gave the EU higher marks than the United States for playing a positive role on a variety of issues ranging from fighting terrorism to reducing poverty to protecting the environment. Despite the fact that many Eastern European leaders supported the US-led war, their citizens felt that the EU plays a more positive role than the US on a variety of transnational issues. Shirley Williams, a British political leader, has concluded Europes military strength, its hard power, may be derisory as Donald Rumsfeld implied. Its soft power is formidable indeed. The vast majority of Americans recognize this as well: nearly nine in ten agree that the EU can help solve world problems through diplomacy, trade, and development aid even though it is not as militarily powerful as the US.
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Answers to: Need Soft Power to Limit EU Soft Power
EUROPE MORE EFFECTIVE IN APPLYING SOFT POWER TO RESOLVE GLOBAL PROBLEMS THAN THE US Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 80-1 In addition to its attractive culture and domestic policies, Europe also derives soft power from its foreign policies, which often contribute to global public goods. Of course, not all European policies are far-sighted witness its protectionist common agricultural policy, which damages farmers in poor countriesbut Europe gains credibility from its positions on global climate change, international law, and human rights treaties. Moreover, Europeans provide 70 percent of overseas development assistance to poor countriesfour times more than the United States. Europe also has ten times as many troops as the United States involved in peacekeeping operations under multilateral organizations such as the UN and NATO. France took the lead recently in sending a mission to the Congo. In 2003, France and Germany had more than twice as many troops in Kosovo as the United States, and Europeans working through NATO took charge of the International Security Force in Afghanistan. Europeans have been less likely to shrink form the hard tasks of nation building that America initially eschewed under the Bush administration. In many ways, Europeans are more adept and comfortable than the United States in deploying civilian resources that enhance soft power. British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw has argued, Europes experience in the exercise of the subtle art of soft power could prove indispensable to the reconstruction of Iraq. The EU tends to exert its influence overseas via the promotion of democracy and development through trade and aid. The results have been impressive in central and Eastern Europe. EUROPEAN SUCCESS AT COOPERATING TO FORM THE EU HAS INCREASED ITS SUCCESSFUL USE OF SOFT POWER FOR ECONOMIC GAINS Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 81-2 In recent years Europeans have also been more comfortable with and adept at using multilateral institutions than Americans. This is in part a reflection of their experiences in the development of the European Union and in part a reflection of their self-interest in seeking multilateral constraints on the worlds only superpower. But whatever the reasons, in a world where unilateralism is heavily criticized, the European propensity toward multilateralism makes European countries policies attractive to many other countries. Europeans have used their soft power in multilateral institutions to deprive the United States of the legitimizing effects of such support. As we saw in Chapter 1, France was able to create a coalition that countered American soft power by preventing a second Security Council resolution before the Iraq War. As the political analyst Andrew Moravscik points out, In country after country, polls have shown that a second United Nations Security Council resolution would have given public opinion a 30-40 percent swing towards military action. Instead, the United States had to pay a higher price than necessary for the war both in soft power and in the subsequent costs of policing and reconstructing Iraq. The European preference for multilateral cooperation has generated a few successes that have increased Europes soft power as well as its economic power. After a bumpy start, the Airbus consortium surpassed Boeing as the worlds leading manufacturer of commercial jetliners. In the mobile phone industry, European governments agreed on a single regulatory standard, GSM, as early as 1987, while Americans used a market-driven approach to allow a standard to emerge and dominate. The result was that Europe developed a stronger infrastructure than the United States and was able to dominate the wireless market in the 1990s. A future test of the European approach will be the Galileo global navigation satellite system, Europes answer to the US-based Global Positioning System (GPS). While excessive bureaucracy can hamper the European approach, the ability to work cooperatively on large information infrastructure projects that serve as global public goods can increase Europes soft power as well as its economic power.
Answers to: Need Soft Power to Limit Japan Soft Power
JAPANESE SOFT POWER LIMITED IN ASIA - SUSPICIONS FROM PAST AGRESSION REMAIN
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Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 86-7 But there are also limits to Japans soft power. Unlike Germany, which repudiated its past aggression and reconciled with its neighbors in the framework of the European Union, Japan has never fully come to terms with its record of foreign aggression in the 1930s. The residual suspicion that lingers in countries such as China and Korea sets limits on Japans soft power. Japan does not have the full admiration of its Asian neighbors. A 1996 Japanese poll that asked which features of Japanese culture were attractive found that 72 percent of Chinese were interested in Japanese home appliances and 61 percent in its style of business management, but only 11 percent in the Japanese lifestyle. Similarly, a 2001 Newsweek poll found that where 65 percent of Americans found Japan admirable and only 27 percent thought the Japanese arrogant, a mere 34 percent of South Koreans found Japan admirable and 59 percent considered the Japanese arrogant. MANY OBSTACLES TO INCREASING JAPANESE SOFT POWER Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 87 Like Europe, Japan faces serious demographic challenges. By the middle of the twenty-first century Japans population could shrink by 30 percent unless it attracts 17 million immigrants, a difficult task in a country that has been historically resistant to immigration. Moreover, the Japanese language is not widely spoken, and Japans English language skills, according to one journalist, rank among the worst in Asia, making it difficult to attract international talent to its universities. A recent Japanese prime ministers commission on the nations goals in the twenty-first century called for a new reinvention of Japan. Given the weakness of the political process, the need for further deregulation, the aging of the population, and the resistance to immigration, such change will not be easy to make and may take more than a decade to complete. But given Japans past record of twice reinventing itselfafter the Meiji revolution in the nineteenth century and after World War II plus the undiminished skills of Japans people, the stability of its society, areas of technological leadership (for instance, mobile Internet applications), and manufacturing skills, it is not impossible.
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*** Soft Power Links ****
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Unpopular US Policies Undermines Soft Power
OPPOSITION TO US POLICIES CUTTING INTO THE ADMIRATION OTHERS HAVE OF OUR VALUES Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004 , p. 14 Government policies can reinforce or squander a countrys soft power. Domestic or foreign policies that appear to be hypocritical, arrogant, indifferent to the opinion of others, or based on a narrow approach to national interests can undermine soft power. For example, in the steep decline in the attractiveness of the United States as measured by polls taken after the Iraq War in 2003, people with unfavorable views for the most part said they were reacting to the Bush administration and its policies rather than the United States generally. So far, they distinguish American people and culture from American policies. The publics in most nations continued to admire the United States for its technology, music, movies, and television. But large majorities in most countries said they disliked the growing influence of America in their country.
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American Exceptionalism Undermines Soft Power
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM UNDERMINES SOFT POWER Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2006, America Against the World, http://pewglobal.org/americaagainsttheworld/ Where does this anti-Americanism come from? Kohut and Stokes find that what pushed the world away is American exceptionalism--our individualism and our go-it-alone attitude. And it doesn't help that Americans' pervasive religiosity and deep patriotism are often exaggerated by America's critics. SUBSTANCE AND STYLE OF FOREIGN POLICY KEY TO SOFT POWER PERCEPTION OF ARROGANCE UNDERMINES LEGITIMACY Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004 , p. 66-7 Regardless of what tactics are used, style also matters, and humility is an important aspect of foreign-policy style. During the 2000 political campaign, George W. Bush described American power well: Our nation stands alone right now in the world in terms of power. And thats why weve got to be humble and yet project strength in a way that promotes freedomIf we are an arrogant nation, theyll view us that way, but it were a humble nation, theyll respect us. His statement was perceptive, yet polls show that foreign nations consider his administration arrogant. Within a few months of Bush address, for the first time Americas European allies joined other countries in refusing to reelect the United States to the UN Human Rights Commission. One observer noted that at the start of his administration, President Bush contrived to prove his own theory that arrogance provokes resentment for a country that, long before his arrival, was already the worlds most conspicuous and convenient target. A sampling of public opinion in 11 countries by the BBC in 2003 found that many people saw the United States as an arrogant superpower that poses a greater danger to world peace than North Korea does. Sixty-five percent overalland a majority in every country, including the United Statessaid that America was arrogant. Writing in Britains Financial Times, Philip Stephens stated, This shift in world opinion has much to do with the rhetoric and tone of voice. Time after time the quiet diplomacy of Colin Powells State Department and the cautious deliberations of George W. Bush himself have been undercut by the bellicose statements of Mr. Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney, the Vice President. The loud-hailer rhetoric often turns out to be at odds with the pragmatic policy choices. After the Iraq War, Irwin Stelzer, an American conservative living in London, reported an erosion of support for the US from British friends who cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered antiAmerican. The swagger of the US Defense Department inclines them to give credence to charges that unconstrained American power exists, and is likely to be deployed in a manner that threatens the security of Americas allies. One reporter observed about a meeting with Europeans that Undersecretary of State John Bolton seemed to enjoy unsuccessfully insulting other countries. Yet former President George H. W. Bush had advised after the Iraq War, Youve got to reach out to the other person. Youve got to convince them that long-term friendship should trump shortterm adversity. Brent Scowcroft, his national security adviser, warned that ad hoc coalitions of the willing can give us the image of arrogance, and if you get to the point where everyone hopes that the US gets a black eye because were so obnoxious, then well be totally hamstrung. A century ago Teddy Roosevelt noted, when you have a big stick, it is wise to speak softly. Otherwise you undercut your soft power. In short, though it is true that Americas size creates a necessity to lead and makes it a target for resentment as well as admiration, both the substance and style of our foreign policy can make a difference to our image of legitimacy, and thus to our soft power.
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Perceived Hypocrisy in Policies Undermines Soft Power
HYPOCRISY BETWEEN VALUES AND POLICIES UNDERMINES US SOFT POWER Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 55 The United States, like other countries, expresses its values in what it does as well as what it says. Political values like democracy and human rights can be powerful sources of attraction, but it is not enough just to proclaim them. During the Cold War, President Eisenhower worried that the practice of racial segregation in the American South was alienating the newly independent countries in Africa. Others watch how Americans implement our values at home as well as abroad. A Swedish diplomat recently told me, All countries want to promote the values we believe in. I think the most criticized part of the USs (and possibly most rich countries) soft-power packaging is the perceived double standard and inconsistencies. Perceived hypocrisy is particularly corrosive of power that is based on proclaimed values. Those who scorn or despise us for hypocrisy are less likely to want to help us achieve our policy objectives. US SOFT POWER HURT WHEN OUR POLICIES APPEAR HYPOCRITICAL NOT BY SOCIAL PROBLEMS THAT ALL SOCIETIES FACE Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 143-4 As we saw in Chapter 2, many of the social and political problems the United States has at home are shared with other postmodern societies, and so invidious comparisons do not seriously undercut our soft power. Moreover, we maintain strengths of openness, civil liberties, and democracy that appeal to others. Problems arise for our soft power when we do not live up to our own standards. As we struggle to find the right balance between freedom and security in the fight against terrorism, it is important to remember that others are watching as well. The Bush administration deserves credit for responding to human rights groups accusations that it was torturing suspects by unequivocally rejecting the use of any techniques to interrogate suspects that would constitute cruel treatment prohibited by the Constitution. Some domestic policies, such as capital punishment and the absence of gun controls, reduce the attractiveness of the United States in other countries, but are the results of differences in values that may persist for some time. Other policies, such as the refusal to discourage the production of gas-guzzling vehicles, damage the American reputation because they appear self-indulgent and demonstrate an unwillingness to consider the effects we are having on global climate change and other countries. Similarly, domestic agricultural subsidies that are structured to protect wealthy farmers while we preach the virtue of free markets to poor countries appear hypocritical in the eyes of others. In a democracy, the dog of domestic politics is often too large to be wagged by the tail of foreign policy, but when we ignore the connections between the two, our apparent hypocrisy is costly to our soft power.
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War on Terror Excesses Undermines Soft Power
EXCESSES IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM UNDERMINE US SOFT POWER APPEAR HYPOCRITICAL Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 59-60 Also damaging to American attractiveness is the perception that the United States has not lived up to its own profession of values in its response to terrorism. It is perhaps predictable when Amnesty International referred to the Guantanamo Bay detentions as a human rights scandal, and Human Rights Watch charged the United States with hypocrisy that undercuts its own policies and puts itself in a weak position to insist on compliance from others. More damaging perhaps is when such criticism came from conservative pro-American sources. The Financial Times worried that the very character of American democracy has been altered. Most countries have chosen to adjust the balance between liberty and security since September 11. But in America, the adjustment has gone beyond mere tinkering to the point where fundamental values may be jeopardized. Meanwhile The Economist argued that President Bush is setting up a shadow court system outside the reach of either Congress or Americas judiciary, and answerable only to himselfMr. Bush rightly noted that American ideals have been a beacon of hope to others around the world. In compromising those ideals in this matter, Mr. Bush is not only dismaying Americas friends, but also blunting one of Americas most powerful weapons against terrorism. It remains to be seen how real or lasting such damage will be to Americas ability to obtain the outcome it wants from other countries. At a minimum, it tends to make our preaching on human rights policies appear hypocritical to some people.
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Bush Doctrine/Unilateralism Undermines Soft Power
BUSH DOCTRINE HAS INCREASED TERRORISM RISK UNILATERALIST TILT PROJECTS IMAGE OF ARROGANCE Kurt M. Campbell & Michael E. OHanlon, CSIS & Brookings, 2006, HARD POWER: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITYp. 137 Under the Bush administration, Americas progress in winning the long-term war on terror has been mediocre. While we have been killing terrorists abroad and reinforcing cockpit doors at home, we have not made progress in reducing the next generation of radical jihadists. In fact, indicators suggest that the radical-jihadist diaspora may have grown in size since 9/11. Our reformist allies are not prevailing in the struggle for hearts and minds between reformers and violent reactionaries within the Islamic world. Given the seriousness of the problem at hand, and the newness of the types of responses required to address it, no single presidency could be expected to strike a decisive blow against global violent jihadism. However, the image of American unilateralism and arrogance that the Bush administration has often projected to the world has complicated our efforts to prevail in this titanic struggle. Moreover, despite its good initiatives toward the Islamic world on matters such as trade, the Bush administration has not seized the historic moment to develop a wideranging policy for addressing the full breadth of the challenge. Most importantly of all, it has done little to help the Islamic world strengthen and moderate itself.
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Bush Doctrine/Unilateralism Undermines Soft Power
BUSH DOCTRINE AND UNILATERALISM UNDERMINES AMERICAN SOFT POWER Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004 , p. 62-4 During the 2000 election campaign, when George W. Bush frequently expressed traditional realist warnings that the United State should not become overextended, leading neoconservatives urged him to make human rights, religious freedom, and democracy priorities for American foreign policy and not to adopt a narrow view of US national interests. After 9/11, Bushs policy changed and he spoke of the need to use American power to bring democracy to the Middle East. As Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol put it, When it comes to dealing with tyrannical regimes like Iraq, Iran, and yes, North Korea, the US should seek transformation, not co-existence, as a primary aim of US foreign policy. As such, it commits the US to the task of maintaining and enforcing a decent world order. The neoconservatives are correct that such a world order could be a global public good, but they are mistaken to assume that their vision will be shared by all those affected by it. Whether the neoconservative approach creates rather than consumes American soft power depends not only on the results but also on who is consulted and who decides. The neoconservatives pay less heed than traditional Wilsonians to consultation through international institutions. But because the currency of soft power is attraction, it is often easier to generate and wield in a multilateral context. In recent years, other countries have increasingly complained about the unilateralism of American foreign policy. Of course such differences are a matter of degree, and there are few countries that are pure unilateralists or multilateralists. International concerns about unilateralism began well before George W. Bush became president, and involved Congress as well as the executive branch. The president has disclaimed the label but most observers describe his administration as divided between traditional pragmatists and a more ideological school that the columnist Charles Krauthammer celebrated as the new unilateralism. The new unilateralists advocate an assertive approach to promoting American values. They worry about a flagging of internal will and a reluctance to turn a unipolar moment into a unipolar era. American intentions are good, American hegemony is benevolent, and that should end the discussion. To them, multilateralism means submerging American will in a mush of collective decision-makingyou have sentenced yourself to reacting to events or passing the buck to multilingual committees with fancy acronyms. They deny that American arrogance is a problem. Rather, the problem is the inescapable reality of American power in its many forms. Policy is legitimized by it origins in a democracy and by the outcomewhether it results in an advance of freedom and democracy. That post hoc legitimization will more than compensate for any loss of legitimacy through unilateralism. Unfortunately, the approach of the new unilateralists is not very convincing to other countries whose citizens observe that Americans are not immune from hubris and self-interest. Americans do not always have all the answers. As one realist put it, If we were truly acting in the interests of others as well as our own, we would presumably accord to others a substantive role and, by doing so, end up embracing some form of multilateralism. Others, after all, must be supposed to know their interests better than we can know them. Since the currency of soft power is attraction based on shared values and the justness and duty of others to contribute to policies consistent with those shared values, multilateral consultations are more likely to generate soft power than mere unilateral assertion of the values. There is increasing evidence that the policies and tone of the new unilateralists were directly responsible for the decline of Americas attractiveness abroad. A survey conducted a month before September 11, 2001, found that Western Europeans already described the Bush administrations approach to foreign policy as unilateralist. Nearly two years later, the Iraq war hardened these perceptions: pluralities of respondents said that American foreign policy had a turnabout from the Cold War, strong majorities in Europe now see US unilateralism as an important international threat to Europe in the next ten years. Nearly nine in ten French and Germans share this point of view, perceiving the threat of US unilateralism as comparable to the threats represented by North Koreas or Irans developing weapons of mass destruction. Even among the Iraq coalition allies, Britain and Poland, two-thirds of these countries populations agree that US unilateralism is an important threat.
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Bush Doctrine/Unilateralism Undermines Soft Power
UNILATERALISM AS THE RULE HURTS SOFT AND HARD POWER EVEN IF IT CAN BE EFFECTIVE OCCASIONALLY Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 66 Of course, not all multilateral arrangements are good, and a general presumption in favor of multilateralism need not be a straightjacket. When the United States occasionally goes it alone in pursuit of public goods, the nature of the broadly shared value of the ends can sometimes compensate for the means in legitimizing the action and preserving soft power. But the new unilateralists efforts in recent years to elevate unilateralism from an occasional tactic to a full-fledged strategy has been costly to American soft power. That loss of soft power can be costly for hard power. For example, in July 2003, when the United States encountered more resistance in Iraq than it had planned for, it had half the Armys 33 active-duty combat brigades tied down there. It sought peacekeeping and policing forces from India, Pakistan, France, and other countries, but India, France, Germany and others responded that they would send forces only under UN auspices. UNILATERALIST FOREIGN POLICY UNDERMINES OUR SOFT POWER AND HARD POWER G. John Ikenberry & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Princeton Project on National Security, 2006, Forging A World of Liberty Under the Law: US national security in the 21st century, September 27, Final Paper, PPNS, http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/report/FinalReport.pdf, p. 13 Complicating matters further, we have repeatedly fallen into a security trap whereby Americas response to threats and dangers exacerbates our predicament. By periodically using our status as the sole superpower to flex our military might, to disdain multilateral institutions, and particularly to try to unilaterally transform the domestic politics of other states, we have triggered a backlash that increases extreme anti-Americanism, discourages key actors from fully cooperating with us, and weakens our global authority. The result undermines our hard power the power to coerce and destroys our soft power the power to attract. As the United States feels increasingly alone in the world, our perception of threats increases and domestic support for unilateral action to address those threats grows, creating a vicious circle. In other words, no matter how well-intentioned our strategy, it can at times contain within it the seeds of its own destruction.
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Bush Doctrine/Unilateralism Undermines Soft Power
UNILATERALISM UNDERMINES US SOFT POWER IN ASIA Cox News Service, 2006, October 20, http://www.coxwashington.com/hp/content/reporters/stories/2006/10/22/BC_NKOREA_US22_COX.html Increasingly, "the unilateralist approach is seen as the wrong way to go in Washington," said Jia Qingguo, vice dean of Peking University's School of International Studies. "It's undermining U.S. soft power and influence in the Asia region and around the world." "It's more and more necessary for the U.S. to cooperate with other countries," Jia added. As more than 140,000 American soldiers in Iraq to try to quell the ongoing insurgency, Washington is searching for a new way forward, or a way out. Like North Korea, Iran continues to pursue its nuclear ambitions, despite U.S. efforts to push the U.N. Security Council to enact punishing sanctions. The difficulty of going it alone in the world has convinced some administration policymakers that it is time to shift course. BUSH POLICIES IRAQ, HOMELAND SECURITY, UNILATERALISM HAVE DESTROYED US SOFT POWER Joshua Kurlantzick, Visiting Scholar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005, Current History, December, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Kurlantzick.pdf, p. 420-1 The past four years have transformed this resentment into outright anger. The Iraq War in particular has sharply reduced global acceptance of the legitimacy of Americas role in the worldand a number of US actions have aggravated this decline. For example, poorly conceived security measures launched in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks have made it much harder for many foreigners to obtain American student, work, and tourist visas, or to apply for political asylum in the United States. These changes have prompted questions about the idea of America as a land of opportunity and refuge. The number of foreign visa applications to the United States, mostly for scholars, that were sent for extensive security review grew twenty-fold between 2000 and 2003, even though the resources to conduct these reviews were not yet in place. Despite these problems, the Republican leadership of Congress and the White House have been unable to agree on a comprehensive strategy to manage immigration and balance visa policies with homeland security. The White House also has made further mistakes in public diplomacy, such as the growing politicization of Voice of America under an increasingly partisan board of governors. Politicization has led to reports of VOA staffers being prodded to promote rosy stories on the war in Iraq,
stories that could compromise VOAs position as a beacon of accuracy and affect foreigners perceptions of American freedoms and rule of law. The Bush administration has reportedly imposed tighter restrictions on Foreign Service officers contacts with journalists abroad, has struggled to complement the VOA with newer broadcasting in the Middle East (the White House slashed VOAs Arabic service), and has failed to develop a broader public diplomacy strategy to communicate Americas values, beyond short-term political campaign-style responses to global events. In fact, the Bush administration is already on its third public diplomacy czar, White House confidante Karen Hughes, who recently embarked on a listening tour of the Middle East during which she drew extensive and often critical coverage in the American media but
, the White Houses near-exclusive focus on terrorism, its entry into the Iraq War, and its disavowal of multilateral norms and institutionsincluding accepted global prohibitions on torturehave added to this alienation overseas. Compared with the Clinton administration, which featured economic heavyweights like Robert Rubin and Lawrence Summers, the
only a limited response from locals. More broadly
Bush administrations economic team has consisted largely of minor figures, such as Treasury Secretary John Snow, who seem to wield little power in a cabinet dominated by powerhouses like Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice . In contrast to the Clinton
administrations emphasis on globalization, the Bush White Houses enunciation of its worldview in the 2002 National Security Strategy focused little on economic power, a major factor in a nations attractiveness. In a small number of foreign
countries seriously threatened by terrorism, such as Singapore or Israel, this focus on terror makes sense, and studies show populations in these nations retain relatively favorable impressions of the United States. But in many other countries, an exclusive focus on counterterrorism seems
strange, if not unwise. At meetings of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation council in October 2003, President Bush concentrated almost exclusively on security issues, even though most participants had come to hammer out trade deals. The presidents focus befuddled many Asian leaders. Worse, the excesses of the war on terrorincluding abuse of prisoners in Guantnamo Bay and Abu Ghraibhave devalued the attractiveness of American values, since that attractiveness rests in part on foreign perceptions of the United States as a humane and lawful actor on the global stage.
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Bush Doctrine/Unilateralism Undermines Soft Power
REJECTION OF MULTILATERALISM HURTS SOFT POWER MORE THAN THE WAR IN IRAQ DIFFERENCE IN VIEWS ON UK AND US PROVE Joshua Kurlantzick, Visiting Scholar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005, Current History, December, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Kurlantzick.pdf, p. 422 In battling terrorism, the Bush administration has chosen either bilateral or unilateral strategies, while punishing nations that back multilateral institutions. The Clinton administration did not always use its political leverage to promote multilateral institutions, but it at least openly praised multilateralism while trying to publicly soothe fears of American unilateralism. The Bush administration does not even offer such praise or reassurance. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell, who traveled less than many of his predecessors, often skipped European and Asian multilateral forums; Rice has continued this trend, failing to attend a key meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) this summer, for which she was chastised by leaders in the region. The White House disdains multinational institutions such as the UNESCO treaty to promote cultural diversity, which has strong support around the world, particularly in nations proud of their local film and music industries. To take one of the saddest examples, Washington is considering cutting off aid to impoverished nations such as Nigera relatively pro-US Muslim countryif they support the ICC. By comparison, the United Kingdoms government, which also backed the unpopular war in Iraq, continues to support European engagement and global institutions ranging from the Kyoto Protocol to the ICC. Britains public image, in surveys, has remained strong.
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Transnational Jurisprudence Undermines US Soft Power
TRANSNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE DEMONSTRATES A DECLINE IN US SOFT POWER LEADERSHIP Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004 , p. 79 At the same time, many European domestic policies appeal to young populations in modern democracies. For example, European policies on capital punishment, gun control, climate change, and the rights of homosexuals are probably closer to the views of many younger people in rich countries around the world than are American government policies. The new constitution of South Africa bears more resemblance to the European Convention on Human Rights than to the American Bill of Rights. The First Amendment expert Fred Schauer points out, On issues of freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and equality, for example, the United States is seen as representing an extreme position, whether it be the degree of its legal protection of press misbehavior and of racist and other forms of hateful speech or in its unwillingness to treat race-based affirmative action as explicitly constitutionally permissible. It is also interesting that European precedents are now being cited in American law. When the American Supreme Court decided the case of Lawrence v Texas regarding sexual privacy in 2003, the majority opinion cited a 1981 decision of the European Court of Human Rights for the first time.
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Working Through Multilateral Institutions Increases US Soft Power
US ENHANCES ITS SOFT POWER BY WORKING THROUGH MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 10-1 Institutions can enhance a countrys soft power. For example, Britain in the nineteenth century and the United States in the second half of the twentieth century advanced their values by creating a structure of international rules and institutions that were consistent with the liberal and democratic nature of the British and American economic systems: free trade and the gold standard in the case of Britain: the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations in the case of the United States. When countries make their power legitimate in the eyes of others, they encounter less resistance to their wishes. If a countrys culture and ideology are attractive, others more willingly follow. If a country can shape international rules that are consistent with its interests and values, its actions will more likely appear legitimate in the eyes of others. If it uses institutions and follows rules that encourage other countries to channel or limit their activities in ways it prefers, it will not need as many costly carrots and sticks.
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Development Assistance Increases US Soft Power
US FOREIGN POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROMOTES SOFT POWER Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 61-2 In the twenty-first century the United States has an interest in maintaining a degree of international order. It needs to influence distant governments and organizations on a variety of issues such as proliferation and weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, drugs, trade, resources and ecological damage that affect Americans as well as others. The United States, like nineteenth-century Britain, also has an interest in keeping international markets and global commons, such as the oceans, open to all. To a large extent, international order is a public goodsomething everyone can consume without diminishing its availability to others. Of course, pure public goods are rare. And sometimes things that look good to Americans may not look good to everyone else, and that is why consultation is important. A large country like the United States gains doubly when it promotes public goods: from the goods themselves, and from the way that being a major provider legitimizes and increases its soft power. Thus when the Bush administration announced that it would increase its development assistance and take the lead in combating HIV/AIDS, it meant the United States would not only benefit from the markets and stability that might be produced, but also by enhancing its attractiveness or soft-power resources. International development is also an important global public good. Nonetheless, American foreign aid was .1 percent of GDP, roughly one-third of the European levels, and protectionist trade measures, particularly in agriculture and textiles, hurt poor countries more than the value of the aid provided. According to one index that tries to evaluate how well rich countries help the poor by including trade, environment, investment, migration, and peacekeeping along with actual aid, the United States ranks twentieth out of 21 (just ahead of Japan). Despite the Bush administrations efforts, the United States has a distance to go to gain soft-power resources in the development area.
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Human Rights/Democracy Promotion Increases US Soft Power
PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY INCREASE US SOFT POWER Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 62 Foreign policies also produce soft power when they promote broadly shared values such as democracy and human rights. Americans have wrestled with how to integrate our values with other interests since the early days of the republic, and the main views cut across party lines. Realists like John Quincy Adams warned that the United States goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy, and we should not involve ourselves beyond the power of extrication in all the wars of interest and intrigue. Others follow the tradition of Woodrow Wilson and emphasize democracy and human rights to foreign policy objectives. As we shall see in chapter 5, todays neoconservatives are, in effect, right-wing Wilsonians, and they are interested in the soft power that can be generated by the promotion of democracy.
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Multilateralism Increases US Soft Power
MULTILATERALISM INCREASES SOFT POWER AND DECREASES INCENTIVE TO COUNTERBALANCE US PRIMACY Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004 , p. 65 Ever since Athens transformed the Delian League into an empire in the fifth century BC, smaller allies have been torn between anxieties over abandonment or entrapment. The fact that American allies have been able to voice their concerns helps to explain why American alliances persisted so long after Cold War threats receded. Membership in a web of multilateral institutions ranging from the UN to NATO has been called a constitutional bargain. Seen in the light of a constitutional bargain, the multilateralism of American preeminence was a key to its longevity, because it reduced the incentives for constructing countervailing alliances. But giving others a voice also tempered American objectives and made them more acceptable to others. Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, one of the architects of the Vietnam War, subsequently concluded, If we cant persuade nations with comparable values of the merit of our cause, wed better re-examine our reasoning. If wed followed that rule in Vietnam, we wouldnt have been there. None of our allies supported us. Multilateralism helps to legitimate American power, but paying attention to allies also shapes our policies, and the new unilateralists felt that those costs outweighed the soft-power benefits. Vice President Dick Cheney warned, Strength, and resolve and decisive action defeat attacks before they can arrive on our shore. It is dangerous to rely too heavily on reaching international consensus, asserted Cheney, because that approach amounts to a policy of doing exactly nothing.
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Domestic and Foreign Policy Influences US Soft Power
DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY BOTH INFLUENCE SOFT POWER Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004 , p. 13-4 Government policies at home and abroad are another potential source of soft power. For example, in the 1950s racial segregation at home undercut American soft power in Africa, and today the practice of capital punishment and weak gun control laws undercut American soft power in Europe. Similarly, foreign policies strongly affect soft power. Jimmy Carters human rights policies are a case in point, as were government efforts to promote democracy in the Reagan and Clinton administrations. In Argentina, American human rights policies that were rejected by the military government of the 1970s produced considerable soft power for the United States two decades later, when the Peronists who were earlier imprisoned subsequently came to power. Policies can have long-term as well as short-term effects that vary as the context changes. The popularity of the United States in Argentina in the early 1990s reflected Carters policies of the 1970s, and it led the Argentine government to support American policies in the UN and in the Balkans. Nonetheless, American soft power eroded significantly after the context changed again later in the decade when the United States failed to rescue the Argentine economy from its collapse.
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Policies More Important than Culture
POLICIES TRUMP CULTURE IN DETERMINING US SOFT POWER Joseph Nye, Harvard, 2003, Foreign Affairs, July, Volume 82, Issue 4, http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2003/nye_usiraq_foraffairs_070103.htm There is considerable evidence that the new unilateralists' policies tend to squander U.S. soft power. Before the war, a Pew Charitable Trust poll found that U.S. policies (not American culture) led to less favorable attitudes toward the United States over the past two years in 19 of 27 countries, including the Islamic countries so crucial to the prosecution of the war on terrorism. Other polls showed an average drop of 30 points in the popularity of the United States in major European countries. OPPOSITION TO US POLICIES HURTS SOFT POWER IN A WAY THAT CANT BE COMPENSATED FOR BY CULTURAL ATTRACTIVENESS Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 121 Soon after 9/11, many Americans were transfixed by the question, Why do they hate us? But the answer was that many Arabs feared, misunderstood, and opposed American policies, but nonetheless admired some aspects of American culture. Moreover, they share many values such as family, religious belief, and desire for democracy. The grounds for soft power exist, but the worlds leading communications country has proved surprisingly maladroit in exploiting these opportunities. For example, a major effort to produce television advertisements that showed American Muslims being well treated at home had little effect. According to critics, the ground had not been well prepared by polls and focus groups, and many people in the region were more concerned with what they saw as deficiencies of American policies rather than American domestic conditions. The problematic result has been a public diplomacy that accentuates image over substance. As Danielle Pletka of the American Enterprise Institute put it, We are seen as propping up these lousy governments. No amount of Britney Spears will counter the anti-Western teachings that many youths in closed societies grow up with. OPPOSITION TO US POLICIES CANCELING OUT THE CULTURAL ATTRACTIVENESS ADVANTAGES FOR US SOFT POWER Joseph Nye, Harvard, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, 2004, p. 127-8 A Eurobarometer poll found that a majority of Europeans believe that the United States tends to play a negative role in fighting global poverty, protecting the environment, and maintaining peace in the world. When asked in a Pew poll to what extent they thought the United States takes your interests into account, a majority in 20 out or 42 countries surveyed said Not too much or Not at all. In many countries, unfavorable ratings were highest among younger people. American pop culture may be widely admired among young people, but the unpopularity of our foreign policies is making the next generation question American power. American music and films are more popular in Britain, France, and Germany than they were 20 years ago, another period when American policies were unpopular in Europe, but the attraction of our policies is even lower than it was then. There are also hints that unpopular foreign policies might be spilling over and undercutting the attractiveness of some other aspects of American popular culture. A 2003 Roper study showed that for the first time since 1998, consumers in 30 countries signaled their disenchantment with America by being less likely to buy Nike products or eat at McDonalds At the same time, 9 of the top 12 Asian and European firms, including Sony, BMW, and Panasonic, saw their scores rise.
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*** Soft Power Bad ***
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Soft Power Against North Korea Bad Risks War
UNIQUENESS: CHINA OPPOSES INCREASING ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON NORTH KOREA Aaron Friedberg, Professor Politics & International Affairs, Princeton, 2006, Press Conference: US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, September 14, Federal News Service, p. Lexis Aside from the possibility of direct military action, the Chinese were, and are still worried, that what they would view as excessive external pressures might cause the North Korean regime to collapse, which could send a flood of refugees across its northern border and leave a mess, and potentially a power vacuum, on China's doorstep. And to prevent this, Beijing has inserted itself, effectively, as a buffer between North Korea and those led by the United States and Japan, who are trying to squeeze it even harder. Since the crisis began, not only has China refused to ratchet up economic pressure in a significant way on North Korea, it's actually increased its assistance to the North. CHINA HAS SUPPLANTED US LEAD IN MANAGING THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR SITUATION Robert S. Ross, Professor Political Science Boston College, 2006, The Nikkei Weekly (Japan), November 20, p. Lexis Despite the enactment of United Nations Security Council sanctions, Washington does not expect either military coercion or multilateral trade sanctions to punish North Korea. Rather, it has relied on the one coercive instrument that the U.S. can wield unilaterally - financial sanctions imposed on any bank that cooperates with North Korean international financial transactions. Washington's North Korea policy amounts to implicit acceptance of the North Korean nuclear program and unilateral containment of North Korean proliferation. The failure of U.S. policy toward North Korea underscores the decline of U.S. leadership on the Korean Peninsula. It is now clear that China has the lead role in managing stability on the Peninsula. Indeed, this has been the case since the beginning of the six-party talks. Successful diplomacy has depended on Beijing's "shuttle diplomacy" to bring the parties to the table, to determine the agenda, and to reach agreements. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice's recent visit to Beijing underscores that Washington's management of North Korean nuclear program depends on Chinese cooperation.
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Soft Power Against North Korea Bad Risks War
US SOFT POWER APPROACH TO NORTH KOREA PRESSURES CHINA -- COUNTERPRODUCTIVE The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 2006, October 22, Pg. 1E But during his second term in office, Bush has toned down his rhetoric, said Peking University professor Jia. "The Bush administration has become more sophisticated," he said. "They understand the situation in China better than before." Now, the emphasis inWashington's approach to North Korea is to shore up support from China, North Korea's closest ally. China is North Korea's top supplier of food aid and its top trading partner, accounting for roughly half of its foreign trade and some 70 percent of its fuel. "I think the United States has decided to take a more pragmatic approach [to North Korea]," said Nobumasa Akiyama, a senior research fellow at the Tokyo-based Japan Institute of International Affairs. "They especially want China to take a stronger role in resolving the situation." Rice's stop in Beijing on Friday and Saturday was considered by analysts as the most important on her six-day trip, which took her to Tokyo, Seoul, Beijing and Moscow and was scheduled to end today. For Washington, however, persuading Beijing and other states to step up pressure beyond what is in their own national interests is increasingly difficult --- another reason that the Bush administration has adopted a conciliatory approach. Chinese leaders fear that too hard a line against North Korea could destroy decades of goodwill between the nations and possibly lead to the collapse of the North Korean government, creating an exodus of refugees into China's poor northeastern provinces, said Jin Canrong, a foreign policy expert at People's University in Beijing.
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*** Politics ***
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Soft Power Popular
STRONG PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR SOFT POWER OVER HARD MILITARY BASED BUSH FOREIGN POLICY Steven Kull, Program on International Policy Attitudes, 2006, What Kind of Foreign Policy Does the American Public Want?, October 20, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/oct06/SecurityFP_Oct06_rpt.pdf, p. 4 Americans favor shifting the U.S. governments foreign policy priorities. A large majority feels that the Bush administration has put too much emphasis on military force. Majorities want their Congressional representatives to place a higher priority on reducing oil dependence, strengthening homeland security and a variety of soft power approaches (such as intelligence cooperation, improving intercultural understanding, and building goodwill through aid). Given the opportunity to redistribute the foreign policy budget, Americans increase spending on these approaches while cutting defense spending sharply. PUBLIC SUPPORTS SOFT POWER APPROACHES TO INCREASE GLOBAL SECURITY Steven Kull, Program on International Policy Attitudes, 2006, What Kind of Foreign Policy Does the American Public Want?, October 20, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/oct06/SecurityFP_Oct06_rpt.pdf, p. 7-8 Respondents were also presented a list of 17 approaches for improving U.S. and global security and asked whether they would like to see their member of Congress place more or less emphasis on each approach. The highest level of support (84%) is for placing higher priority on reducing dependence on oil. Putting greater emphasis on homeland security by increasing port security (83%) and airport security (64%) also receives very high levels of support. Most of the approaches that majorities want to emphasize fall within the category of soft power. Expanding security cooperation with other countries receives especially high levels of support, with very large majorities favoring increased emphasis on: - Coordinating with the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of other countries to track and capture members of terrorist groups (83%) - Working through the U. N. to strengthen international laws against terrorism and make sure U.N. members cooperate in enforcing them (71%) - Programs to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons by securing nuclear materials in countries of the former Soviet Union (68%) Majorities also want to place greater emphasis on efforts to address humanitarian problems and promote economic development: - Fighting the global spread of HIV/AIDS (68%) - Programs to stabilize countries at risk of conflict by helping them develop economically (58%) - Building goodwill toward the U.S. by providing food and medical assistance to people in poor countries (57%). Also popular were public diplomacy programs to promote international understanding: - Programs to promote dialogue and intercultural understanding between the United States and the Muslim world (59%) - Programs to increase other countries understanding of U.S. policies and the American people (58%). All of the methods that receive less than 50 percent support fall in the general category of hard power.
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Public Supports Soft Power Approach Toward North Korea
VOTERS SUPPORT SOFT POWER AND DIRECT TALKS WITH NORTH KOREA THE KOREA HERALD, October 25, 2006 lexis A majority of American voters support direct talks with North Korea and Iran to deal with those countries' nuclear ambitions, according to a survey by the Program on International Policy Attitudes. About 55 percent of respondents said the United States should enter into talks without preconditions, PIPA, as the organization is known, said on its website. North Korea, which said on Oct. 9 it detonated a nuclear device, has refused to return to stalled six-nation talks with the United States, China, Japan, Russia and South Korea until the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush removes financial sanctions imposed last year. U.S. officials have rejected direct talks with North Korea. The nationwide survey, conducted ahead of the Nov. 7 midterm elections, showed growing dissatisfaction with Bush's foreign policy. Some 68 percent of the poll's respondents said they were "dissatisfied with the position of the U.S. in the world today." "It is rare that foreign policy takes center stage in congressional elections," Steven Kull, director of PIPA, said in a statement. "Voters are calling for a sea change in U.S. foreign policy. They want less emphasis on military force, and more on soft power. " U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said during her visit to Asian countries last week that North Korea must return to six-nation talks on ending its nuclear -weapons program without any conditions. She rejected bilateral discussions. Seven out of 10 Americans prefer congressional candidates who will pursue a new approach to U.S. foreign policy. PUBLIC SUPPORTS MULTILATERAL FOREIGN POLICY AND ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAN AND NORTH KOREA Steven Kull, Program on International Policy Attitudes, 2006, What Kind of Foreign Policy Does the American Public Want?, October 20, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/oct06/SecurityFP_Oct06_rpt.pdf, p. 4 Americans prefer Congressional candidates who say that the United States should cooperate in multilateral efforts to solve international problems rather than either remaining the dominant world power or disengaging. Large majorities say the United States would best serve the national interest by thinking in terms of being a good neighbor and doing what is best for the world as a whole. Large majorities say that the United States should work through the United Nations and reject the argument that international institutions are too slow and bureaucratic. A majority favor entering into talks with North Korea and Iran without preconditions.
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Public Supports Soft Power Approach to Counter Terrorism
PUBLIC SUPPORTS SOFT POWER APPROACHES TO COUNTER TERRORISM Steven Kull, Program on International Policy Attitudes, 2006, What Kind of Foreign Policy Does the American Public Want?, October 20, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/oct06/SecurityFP_Oct06_rpt.pdf, p. 7 Similarly, 67 percent agree with the idea that In the effort to fight terrorism [the Bush administration] should put more emphasis on diplomatic and economic methods (up from 58 percent in a September 2003 PIPA poll). This is a majority view among Republicans (52%, up from 41% in 2003) as well as Democrats (77%) and Independents (74%). Twentyeight percent feel that the administration should put more emphasis on military methods.
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