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In Partial Fulfilment
Of the Course Requirements
In
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA:
A Case Study
Submitted to:
PROSECUTOR BLAIR M. DURA
Law Professor
Respectfully Submitted by:
MAY ANN SISON-TABUYOC
LLB 1
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Chapter One
Legal Process Roots
When one obeys the letter of the law but not the spirit, one is
obeying the literal interpretation of the words the "letter" of the law, but not
the intent of those who wrote the law. Conversely, when one obeys the spirit
of the law but not the letter, one is doing what the authors of the law
intended, though not necessarily adhering to the literal wording.
1
The letter of the law can be defined as any formal code, rule,
regulation, or principle that must be followed according to governmental
mandates or policies. In short, it is the law as it is written
2
. All these laws are
in place to serve, maintain, and protect the public welfare in various ways
3.
On the other hand, spirit of the law is defined as a social and moral
consensus of the interpretation of the letter of the law. Social norms
generally reflect social and moral consensus. In order to further expand on
the Spirit of the law, it is important to turn to the literature on social norms,
beliefs and policies adopted by the Courts
4
.
The case of Carlos Alonzo and Casimira Alonzo vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court and Tecla Padua is a clear illustration of why Philippine
Court is a court of law and a court of justice
5
and why the aforecited
provision on the construction of statute is important in understanding the
wisdom of the court ruling justifying exception to the rule on the said case.
This study aims to provide analysis of the courts reasoning and
decisions; interpretation of precedents; and comparison of rules of law
interpreted and applied to the case.
____________________
1
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Letter_and_spirit_of_the_law
2
Matthew T Gordon, University of Michigan, The letter versus the Spirit of the Law, pg. 4
3
Matthew T Gordon, University of Michigan, The letter versus the Spirit of the Law, pg. 7
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BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In order to fully understand the surroundings of the circumstances of
the case, it is essential to note some historical backdrop of where the case
occurred, the peoples common beliefs, practices and policies.
The province of Tarlac is situated in the heartland of Luzon, in what is
known as the Central Plain and which comprises the provinces of Region III
in the Philippines. It is bounded on the north by the province of Pangasinan,
Nueva Ecija on the east, Zambales on the west and Pampanga in the
southern part. Tarlac covers a total land area of 305,345 hectares. It has 17
towns and one city, Tarlac City, which is also the provincial capital.
6
Its location of being the link between Manila and the Northern
provinces has made Tarlac an important trading center since the earliest
times. This strategic locale caused the province to become the hub and
destination of the migrations of various people, especially during the 18th
19th centuries. For this, Tarlac is also known as the Melting Pot Province
for it is home to different cultures and ethno-linguistic groups.
Kapampangan, Ilocanos, Pangasinenses, Tagalogs, Visayans and Aetas live
together in harmony and in peace. Indeed, this amalgam of tongues and
cultures has given Tarlac its uniqueness and vibrancy
7
. A premier city rich in
human and natural resources, Tarlaqueos are characterized by its diverse
culture of dignified God-loving people living together in an atmosphere of
trust and unity, driven and emanating from the principles and ideals of
dynamic and great Tarlaqueo leaders.
8
In 1970, the City of Tarlac has a Population of 30,000. Industries
during the time include rice processing. The population also engages in
cottage industries.
9
_______________________________________
6,7
http://visit-tarlac.com/
8
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tarlac
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CASE FACTS
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel
of land registered in the name of their deceased parents under OCT No.
10977 of the Registry of Deed in Tarlac. On March 15, 1963, one of them,
Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share by way of absolute sale. A
year later, on April 22, 1964, his sister sold her share in a Con Pacto de
Retro Sale. By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the
said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing
the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with
a fence. With their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a
semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five co-heirs sought
to redeem the area sold to petitioners but was dismissed when it appeared
that he was an American citizen. Another coheir, Tecla Padua, filed her own
complaint invoking the same right of redemption of her brother. Trial court
dismissed the complaint, on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having
been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales. Although there
was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the
co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law.
The petitioners invoke Article 1088 of the Civil Code providing as
follows:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to
the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale,
provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were
notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
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Chapter Two.
Legal Sources Roots
PREVIOUS JURISPRUDENCE
DE CONEJERO V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-21812 April 29, 1966
The court with regard to the written notice as provided in Article 1623,
agreed with petitioners that written notice is indispensable, and that, in view
of the terms in which Article of the Philippine Civil Code is couched, mere
knowledge of the sale, acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner,
does not satisfy the statute. The written notice was obviously exacted by the
Code to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to
quiet any doubts that the alienation is not definitive. The statute not having
provided for any alternative, the method of notification prescribed remains
exclusive. However, the following reasons that petitioners were denied for
their motion for reconsideration were explicitly rendered by the court:
a. The petitioners' right of redemption was lost because they failed to
make a valid tender of the entire redemption money within the
period allotted by law;
b. The court stressed that there is no cogent reason for requiring the
vendee to accept payment by installments from a redemptioner, as
it would ultimately result in an indefinite extension of the 30-day
redemption period. The buyer of the co-owner's share can not be
compelled, nor is he obligated, to accept payment in installments.
Otherwise, the 30-day limitation fixed by law for the exercise of
the right to redeem would be nullified, or be indefinitely evaded;
c. Redemption by the co-owners of the vendor within 30 days is not a
matter of intent, but is effectuated only by payment, or valid
tender, of the price within said period. How the redemptioners
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raise the money is immaterial; timeliness and completeness of
payment or tender are the things that matter.
d. The only way to exercise the right of redemption is through a valid
payment or tender within the 30 days prefixed by the Civil Code.
10
ANGELA M. BUTTE VS MANUEL UY AND SONS, INC
G.R. No. L-15499 February 28, 1962
In Butte Vs. Uy, the Court emphasized the reasons for requiring that
the notice should be given by the seller, and not by the buyer. The seller of
an undivided interest is in the best position to know who are his co-owners
that under the law must be notified of the sale. Such notice by the seller
removes all doubts as to the fact of the sale, its perfection; and its validity,
the notice being a reaffirmation thereof, so that the party need not entertain
doubt that the seller may still contest the alienation. This assurance would
not exist if the notice should be given by the buyer notwithstanding under
the old law (Civ. Code of 1889, Art. 1524), which provides that it was
immaterial who gave the notice; so long as the redeeming co-owner learned
of the alienation in favor of the stranger, the redemption period began to run.
It is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623 deliberately
selected a particular method of giving notice, and that method must be
deemed exclusive.
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SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCE
The two cases mentioned in the preceding page are analogous to the
subject case but somewhat different; hence it cannot be applied in the case of
Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court based on the following premise:
a. De Conjero vs Court of Appeals focuses on ways to exercise the right
of redemption which is through a valid payment or tender within the
30 days prefixed by the Civil Code and not merely on the written
notice that was assailed in Alonzo;
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b. An installment, as an alternative mode of redemption of the lot in
question, was also an issue in De Conejero. The buyer of the co-
owner's share can not be compelled, nor is he obligated to accept
payment in such mode of payment as this would nullify or indefinitely
evaded the 30-day limitation fixed by law for the exercise of the right
to redeem. The mode of payment was not an issue in the case of
Alonzo vs. AIC;
c. Article 1620 of the New Civil Code was also raised in De Conejero,
wherein the right of a redemptioner to pay at a reasonable price was
invoked, however, such provision does not excuse the redemptioner
from the duty to make proper tender of the price that can be honestly
deemed reasonable under the circumstances.
d. The court also stressed in Conejero that a buyer can not be expected to
entertain an offer of redemption without attendant evidence that the
redemptioner can, and is willing to accomplish the repurchase
immediately.
e. In the case of Butte vs. Uy, the court emphasizes Article 1623 of the
Civil Code which explicitly provides a particular method of giving
notice, and that method must be deemed exclusive. Hence, the notice
given by the vendees and not the vendor would not toll the running of
the 30-day period. Under the circumstances, it is apparent that issues
in this case differ from that of Alonzo vs. AIC. Though, it was
assailed in Alonzo vs. AIC that the 30-day redemption had not begun
to run, much less expired due to the fact that written notice was not
given. The co-heirs of the Alonzo case were undeniably informed of
the sales although no notice in writing was given them. And there is
no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14
years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for
redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of
redemption. The laws invoked are analogous but clearly the
circumstances differ.
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f. In Alonzo vs. AIC, the court pronounced that the disregard of the
mandatory written rule was an exception due to the peculiar
circumstance of the case. Thus, In the face of the established facts,
the court cannot accept the redemptioners pretense that they were
unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and
1964. Clearly disregarding the written notice requirement applied in
the case of De Conejero vs. Court of Appeals.
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Chapter Three
Observation and Recommendation
In Statutory Construction, it is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the
meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its
provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never
be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the
legislative intent.
The Court, in analyzing a statutes wordings, is guided by the basic
principle that a statute should be interpreted and construed in accordance
with the canons of statutory construction such as Verba legis (Plain meaning
rule); Ratio legis est anima legis (The reason of the law is its soul) and Ut
res magis valeat quam pareat (That construction is to be sought which gives
effect to the whole of the statute its every word). The various canons of
interpretation and presumptions as to substantive results are subordinated to
interpretations that further a clearly expressed legislative purpose.
The cases of De Conejero vs. CA and Butte vs. Manuel Uy were both
ruled in accordance with the plain meaning rule. Art 1088 was plainly
interpreted said statute that requiring a one month written notice from the
time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor is indispensible.
It is worth noting that under Article 1067 of the Old Civil Code, the written
notice requirement was not expressly stated. The legislature must have their
reasons and purpose in including the written notice requirement in its
amendment. This provision also argued in the case of Castillo v. Samonte ,
wherein both the letter and spirit of the new Civil Code argue against any
attempt to widen the scope of the notice specified in Article 1088 by
including therein any other kind of notice, such as verbal or by registration.
If the intention of the law had been to include verbal notice or any other
means of information as sufficient to give the effect of this notice, then there
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would have been no necessity or reasons to specify in Article 1088 of the
New Civil Code that the said notice be made in writing for, under the old
law, a verbal notice or information was sufficient (Castillo v. Samonte).
However, even when the courts deviated from the strict letter of the
law, the court tries to ascertain the intent of the legislature in enacting the
law. By looking to legislative intent, the court attempts to carry out the will
of the lawmaking branch of the government. They have presumed that in
rendering such deviation of the letter of the law carries with it good motives
such as to render justice where justice is due. Thus, the court defers not to
"the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the
lawmakers will.
In totality, it may be unfair to think that Courts violate the letter of the
law, but in rendering justice, such may be breached. Had the case have a
different circumstance of events, the court may not have rendered
judgement against the letter of the law. In order to understand the legislative
intent and the courts decision, it may also help to turn to the literature of
social norms, beliefs and policies adopted during the time the court rendered
judgement.
