G.R. NO.

173150, JULY 28, 2010

7_GELIG VS PEOPLE

FACTS: The RTC Decision convicted Lydia for committing the complex crime of direct assault with
unintentional abortion but the CA found her guilty only of the crime of slight physical injuries.
That on the 17th day of July, 1981 at around 10:00 oclock in the morning, the above-named
accused, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assault, attack, employ force and
seriously intimidate one Gemma B. Micarsos a public classroom teacher of Nailon Elementary School
while in the performance of official duties and functions as such which acts consequently caused the
unintentional abortion upon the person of the said Gemma S. Micarsos.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On October 11, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Lydia of the complex crime
of direct assault with unintentional abortion. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused LYDIA GELIG, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of direct assault with unintentional abortion, and she is hereby sentenced to suffer an
Indeterminate Penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS OF ARRESTO MAYOR AS MINIMUM TO FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO
(2) MONTHS OF PRISION CORRECCIONAL AS MAXIMUM.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA vacated the trial courts judgment. It ruled that Lydia cannot be held liable for direct
assault since Gemma descended from being a person in authority to a private individual when, instead
of pacifying Lydia or informing the principal of the matter, she engaged in a fight with Lydia. Likewise,
Lydias purpose was not to defy the authorities but to confront Gemma on the alleged name-calling of
her son. The appellate court also ruled that Lydia cannot be held liable for unintentional abortion since
there was no evidence that she was aware of Gemmas pregnancy at the time of the incident.10*10+
However, it declared that Lydia can be held guilty of slight physical injuries.

ISSUE: 1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner is liable for Slight Physical
Injuries pursuant to Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of
arresto menor minimum of ten days. 2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the
petitioner can be convicted of Slight Physical Injuries under the information charging her for Direct
Assault with Unintentional Abortion.

HELD: When an accused appeals from the judgment of his conviction, he waives his constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy and throws the entire case open for appellate review. We are then
called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate in the exercise of our concomitant
authority to review and sift through the whole case to correct any error, even if unassigned.
The Information charged Lydia with committing the complex crime of direct assault with
unintentional abortion. Direct assault is defined and penalized under Article 148 of the Revised Penal
Code. It is clear from the foregoing provision that direct assault is an offense against public order that
may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall
employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the
crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising,
shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents,
while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance. The case of
Lydia falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of assault.

Its elements are:
1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious intimidation, or
(d) makes a serious resistance.
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.
3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged in the actual
performance of official duties, or [b] that he is assaulted by reason of the past performance of
official duties.
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his agent in
the exercise of his duties.
5. That there is no public uprising.

On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was engaged in the performance of her
official duties, that is, she was busy with paperwork while supervising and looking after the needs of
pupils who are taking their recess in the classroom to which she was assigned. Lydia was already angry
when she entered the classroom and accused Gemma of calling her son a sissy. Lydia refused to be
pacified despite the efforts of Gemma and instead initiated a verbal abuse that enraged the victim.
Gemma then proceeded towards the principals office but Lydia followed and resorted to the use of
force by slapping and pushing her against a wall divider. The violent act resulted in Gemmas fall to the
floor.
Gemma being a public school teacher belongs to the class of persons in authority expressly
mentioned in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In applying the provisions of articles
148 and 151 of this Code, teachers, professors, and persons charged with the supervision of public or
duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of their
professional duties or on the occasion of such performance shall be deemed persons in authority.
The prosecutions success in proving that Lydia committed the crime of direct assault does not
necessarily mean that the same physical force she employed on Gemma also resulted in the crime of
unintentional abortion. There is no evidence on record to prove that the slapping and pushing of
Gemma by Lydia that occurred on July 17, 1981 was the proximate cause of the abortion. While the
medical certificate of Gemmas attending physician, Dr. Susan Jaca (Dr. Jaca), was presented to the court
to prove that she suffered an abortion, there is no data in the document to prove that her medical
condition was a direct consequence of the July 17, 1981 incident.
It is worth stressing that Gemma was admitted and confined in a hospital for incomplete
abortion on August 28, 1981, which was 42 days after the July 17, 1981 incident. This interval of time is
too lengthy to prove that the discharge of the fetus from the womb of Gemma was a direct outcome of
the assault. Her bleeding and abdominal pain two days after the said incident were not substantiated by
proof other than her testimony. Thus, it is not unlikely that the abortion may have been the result of
other factors.
Judgment is hereby rendered finding Lydia Gelig guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
direct assault and is ordered to suffer an indeterminate prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day to
three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional.