Working Paper Series

State Over Society: Science and

TechnologyPolicyinNorthKorea

AUGUST 2009
WP 09-04

RIAN JENSEN
JohnsHopkinsUniversitySAIS

1740 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036

Tel: (202) 663-5830 Fax: (202) 663-5736 www.uskoreainstitute.org

Rian Jensen received an M.A. (with honors) in International Relations from The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in May 2009. His areas of interest are U.S. foreign policy and international relations in East Asia. Prior to SAIS, Rian managed
U.S. government-funded democracy promotion programs in Asia, including North Korea, and edited a policy journal on Chinese strategic
and political economy issues. Mr. Jensen holds a B.A. from the University of Washington (Seattle).
Note: This paper was prepared exclusively for the U.S.-Korea Institutes Working Paper Series.
The U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS (USKI) is part of an extensive program which began in 2006 to make SAIS a hub of Korea-related
activities in the Washington, D.C. area. USKIs mission is to increase information and understanding of Korea and Korean affairs in the
United States through innovative research, educational and policy forums, and interaction with leading U.S. and Korean policymakers.
To find out more about USKI, visit www.uskoreainstitute.org.
Copyright 2008 by the U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any
means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

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STATE OVER SOCIETY: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY IN NORTH KOREA

Speaking at North Koreas General Satellite Control and Command Center in April 2009, Kim Jong Il called the launch of
the kangmyongsong-2 (Lodestar-2) rocket a striking demonstration of the might of our Juche-oriented science and technology.1
To be sure, the rocket launch derived from various political and strategic reasons both international and domestic. Yet Kims
phrasing is indicative and hints at another underlying theme, one that persists despite the technical failure of the launch. In
praising the patriotic devotion of the scientists and technicians who are playing a vanguard role in the drive to open the gate
to a great prosperous and powerful nation,2 Kim laid an explicit emphasis on the role of science and technology (S&T) as an
instrument of national power.
Indeed, scientific and technological development has emerged as a distinct national strategy for North Korea over the last
decade. Facing external security challenges, domestic economic stagnation, and rising political uncertainty stemming from the
succession issue, North Korea seems to have singled out science and technology as an instrument for national revival. It is
celebrated in official publications as a means to achieve core national goals. In 2000, the joint New Years editorial of North
Koreas major government newspapers established science and technology, along with ideology and arms, as the three pillars for the building of a powerful nation.3 S&T became an important focus of the 2002 reforms and North Korea has more
recently articulated a seemingly more ambitious desire to become a strong science and technology nation by 2022.4
Yet S&T policy strikes at the heart of manifold dilemmas facing the North Korean leadership. Considered a means of modernization, technology also poses formidable challenges to the maintenance of political control, introducing new pressures on
the balance of power between state and society. Moreover, decades of economic decline have degraded North Koreas infrastructural backbone, constraining the countrys capacity to effectively absorb and leverage technology for social and economic development. Navigating these often countervailing imperatives places significant demands on the ruling elite. Nevertheless, the North Korean leadership seems to have embarked on a policy of active promotion of S&T, but one that seeks to
maintain, if not enhance the power of the state over society. North Koreas S&T policy is essentially a gambit to maximize
the strategic benefits of science and technology while minimizing its political costs.
The next section traces out the historical antecedents of North Koreas science and technology policy. Section II uncovers
the policy goals of S&T policy as articulated through official discourse, while Section III attempts to identify three modalities
of policy implementation. Given the usual caveats about the lack and unreliability of information about North Korea, Section
IV is a first-cut assessment about how science and technology is recalibrating North Korean state-society relations. The final
two sections discuss policy implications and conclusions.

I. HISTORY OF S&T POLICY IN NORTH KOREA

The emergence of a serious North Korean S&T policy in the early 2000s builds on a two-decade legacy of scientific and technological development. The first attempt to enhance the countrys scientific and technological base was undertaken by Kim Il

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Sung in the early 1980s.5 He initiated an exploratory policy foray into then-emerging computer technologies and later in the
decade developed a broader policy strategy for the information technology (IT) sector.6 North Korea first asked the UNDP,
based on a similar project undertaken by the international body in Romania, to build a pilot plant for the production of integrated-circuits (precursor to modern computers) for the Electronics Institute of North Koreas Academy of Sciences.7 An IT
training program was established for institute personnel in 1983 and in 1986, an Indian firm under contract to the UNDP
finished construction of the plant.8 Kims more developed S&T policy strategy emerged after his trip to Europe in 1984, during which he negotiated technology cooperation agreements that, inter alia, allowed for privileged North Koreans to undertake advanced S&T study in various European countries.9 Part of this effort focused on building a domestic research base
and the North Korean government established numerous indigenous research institutes to stimulate the S&T industry, including the Pyongyang Information Center (PIC). Established in 1986, PIC focused on the development of computer-based
modern management techniques to help technologize the states administrative apparatus.10 In 1988, North Korea announced a formal three-year strategy to guide North Korean investment in science and technology.11
Analysts have identified a more concentrated second phase of science and technology policy beginning in the mid- to late1990s. Consolidating political control after the challenges posed by the fall of communism, the death of Kim Il Sung, and the
famine of the mid-1990s, Kim Jong Il in 1998 began to focus more prominently on S&T policy, in part stimulated by worldwide attention to the IT revolution.12 He recognized the possibilities of leveraging S&T as a means of industrial economic
revival and issued a policy directive mandating increased attention and resources to the development of science and technology.13 Computer science colleges were established at the elite Kim Il Sung and Kim Chaek Universities in 1999, and in the
same year, the Ministry of Electronic Industry was formed to help coordinate and oversee government sponsorship of S&T
research.14 In 2001 the North Korean government allowed for the establishment of the English-language Pyongyang University of Science and Technology, a $150 million venture to train the next generation of scientists and technicians.15 Completed
in 2007, its opening has been delayed for unknown reasons.16

II. THE DISCOURSE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Policy pronouncements by Kim Jong Il and official discourse in newspapers and journals characterize science and technology
policy as a matter of high politics and as an instrument to achieve various national goals. Foremost are the classical objectives
of socialist revolution and self-reliance (juche). In 2008, Kim Jong Il declared: At the present period, rapid science and
technology development is the most pressing and most indispensable demand of our revolution and construction.17 Without
science and technology, according to Rodong Sinmun in 2007, North Koreans would not be able to enjoy political independence, self-defensive military capabilities, or self-supporting industry.18
This discursive linkage of science and technology to classical objectives is complemented by a parallel strategy of elevating
scientists and technicians to more prominent levels within the national hagiography. Official publications have begun to extol
their virtues with effusive descriptions such as the vanguard flagmen in the construction of a socialist powerful state.19 An

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economics journal article in 2006 discussed their historical rise to prominence:

The scientists and technicians in our county have always contributed greatly to the party, the revolution, the
fatherland, and the people, but never before in our revolution and construction had science and technology
been emphasized as such an important state affair or had scientists and technicians been faced with such a
heavy yet honorable task as today.20
Other official sources have developed a more ambitious discourse, emphasizing the importance of S&T development in not
only the current period but as a paramount feature throughout modern North Korean history. In what appears to be a posthoc justification for the currently enhanced S&T focus, some publications have argued that S&T has always been a leading
force in the drive toward socialism and self-reliance. A 2008 article in Rodong Sinmun, for example, centralizes the role of S&T
over the last 60 years by detailing various technological achievements integral to the socialist revolution, and then builds continuity with this legacy by declaring the 21st century as an era of science and technology.
Importantly, recent S&T discourse has revealed an evolution in the conceptualization of juche. In 2005, while conducting a
sight inspection of a machinery enterprise in Sinuiju, Kim Jong Il noted that there is a critical difference, in terms of content,
between the self-reliance policy pursued in the past and the one that is being pursued and promoted now.21 Characterizing
past policy as one of non-reliance on foreign assistance, Kim regards the new S&T-based juche as more willing to openly acknowledge the contribution of foreign technological innovation to the development of North Korean S&T.22 This view is
exemplified in a 2006 article in the journal Kyongje Yongu, which notes that the content of self-reliance is never set the same
in different periods and that the thinking [of] accepting other countries advanced technology was against the principles of
self-reliancerevealed deficienc[ies] of slowing down the country's economic development in some part.23
Todays reality is different from the time when everything had to be carried out from scratch atop the rubble,
and arising before us is the task to establish an economically powerful state based on the solid foundation of
the self-dependent economy. If each person uses the method of following the things of the past in the name
of self-reliance, it is impossible to guarantee actual profits and vitalize the economy. If (people) think that
bringing in other countries modern plants is inconsistent with the principle of self-reliance, it is impossible to
further enhance self-dependence of the national economy by making the world-class advanced technology as
our own as soon as possible.24
Carrying out a policy of self-reliance based on S&T thus means a more pragmatic and profit-oriented approach, which
while never explicitly linked to an open endorsement of foreign investment at least hints at the benefits of leveraging foreign
technologies.
This important reformulation of self-reliance reflects in part a trend of linking S&T discourse with newer political concepts
of military-first politics (songun chongchi) and a strong and prosperous country (kangsong taeguk). These terms emerged in
national discourse in 1998 and 1999 respectively, just as the policy emphasis on science and technology was assuming strateRianJensen

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gic form under Kim Jong Il. The highest-priority S&T policy area is the military, the effective development of which is regarded as imperative for national survival and political control. S&T is described as an important element that enables our
country to build its military strength in all aspects,25 and core capabilities upon which North Korea addresses the threat
from US imperialists [who] are frantically trying to suffocate our republic by means of high-tech weapons.26
The concept of kangsong taegukthe strategic objective of the North Korean leadership to be realized in 2012embodies not
only military but also economic pre-eminence, and science and technology are often regarded as critical instruments toward
economic development as well. Military strength will be solidified even more firmly when great innovations are made in the
economic field by combining the revolutionary soldier spirit with the Chollima spirit of the period of the great Chollima upswing in the 1950s. Harnessing the Chollima spirit, the article argues, requires developing the economy on the basis of science and technology.27
While maintaining continuity with the past, much of the discourse linking S&T to economic development is premised on the
new single leap theory28 in which North Korea achieves socialist economic growth by leapfrogging to the information
era.29 Rodong Sinmun described S&T as the most straight[forward] shortcut to elevate the countrys economy to the status of
that of a powerful state in accordance with the demands of a new era in a short period of time.30 Science and technology,
for the North Korean government, will help stimulate rational production techniques, improve production quality, and lay
the groundwork for revitalized economic activity in advanced industrial and information sectors. S&T is thus an instrument
of national development. As part of this process, S&T is also seen as a mechanism to overcome the debilitating constraints
on North Korean economic growth. Rodong Sinmun, in a rather frank admission of the economic reality of the country, wrote
that reliance on science and technology will help surpass the numerous difficulties and obstacles, which include the lack
of raw materials, fuel, resources, currently laid before us.31 Science and technology, another paper noted, should be developed quickly to resolve issues related to peoples standard of living improvement at a high level consistent with the demands
of the construction of a powerful socialist state, including the food problem, the eating problem, and the clothing problem.32

III. PATRIOTISM IN PRACTICE:33 S&T POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

The scientific community in North Korea is estimated to number 1.9 million people,34 with about 100,000 IT-specific experts.35 Most of this workforce is presumably concentrated in high-level strategic parts of the military and party bureaucracies.
Yet a number of research institutes and implementing partners of the government are responsible for S&T research and development, including the Academy of Sciences, Pyongyang Informatics Center, the Korea Computer Center, and Kim Il
Sung and Kim Chaek Universities.36 Little is publicly known about the manner and processes in which science and technology are integrated into the economy and less so for the defense industries, although some specific S&T development strategies can be identified.37

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Prioritized Implementation
State investment in science and technology, which the government claims increased 8 percent in 2009,38 is prioritized by the
type of technology and by potential sectoral application. Official documents often cite the precedence of three core technologies: information technology, nanotechnology, and bio-engineering.39 IT is the most widely mentioned in the press, and
fairly extensive technical discussions of North Korean advances in nanotechnology and bio-engineering can be found in state
newspapers and trade journals, although it is difficult to identify implementing strategies for them.40 Generally North Koreas
emphasis on these three reflects a belief in their potential for positive economic spillovers and a desire to maintain parity with
global research trends.
In order to rapidly develop state-of-the-art science and technology, it is necessary to put priority efforts into
the development of basic core technologies. Today, the rapid development of up-to-date science and technology and the scientific and technological changes in the socio-economic life are all taking place on the basis of
the development of information technology, nanotechnology, and bioengineering, which serve as the basic
core technologies in the scientific and technological development of the present age.41
These three technologies are then ranked across various economic sectors according to the prerogatives of military-first
politics. The defense industry thus receives the lions share of technological resources and products, with special emphasis
on the strategy bureaus of the Korean Workers Party and the Ministry of National Defense, particularly the WMD programs.42
The direction of S&T resources to the military reflects in part the KPAs concern about deterring the advanced US military,
whose technology-intensive campaigns in the Persian Gulf and Kosovo were the subjects of careful KPA study.43 One lesson
reportedly learned by Kim Jong Il is that [t]he basic key to victory in modern warfare is to do well in electronic warfare.44
Accordingly, the KPA has administered special programs for computer hackers and developed core competencies in electronic warfare and electronic intelligence capabilities.45 South Koreas intelligence agency reported in May 2009 that the KPA
operates a 100-person team dedicated to the monitoring and disruption of US and ROK computer networks,46 and experts
have cast suspicions on North Koreas role in hacker attacks against US and South Korean national security computer grids
in July 2009.
The second priority areas after the military are the energy, agriculture, and metal industries.47 Some reports also add the transportation and construction sectors to this category. For agriculture in particular, bio-engineering is attempting to generate
more hearty and productive food stocks to mitigate food supply concerns. For IT, a recently released North Korean Cabinet
paper helps provide clues to technology application strategies in this second tier. Building on Kim Jong Ils injunction to
informatize all sectors of the peoples economy, the paper first urges technology adoption in existing factories and enterprises:
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culture, construction, transportation, and communications, among others, we should undertake social production on the basis of information science and technology, (rather than) from the basis of machine technology.
All sectors and units should deeply study and analyze the current technical level of their own units and the
worldwide trend of development, the level reached by the pertinent technical and economic indexes, and the
scientific and technological successes accomplished in various sectors of the peoples economy, so that they
will boldly adopt information facilities and latest information technology in our style.48
After leveraging technology for production, new applications should lead to the informatization of business activities and
economic management in these sectors.49 Such a process should aim specifically at:
collecting, processing, and treating all management information, including all sequential links in business
activities, from the preparation of plans to production preparation and organization, and the sales of products; all per-object links from the management of labor to the management of facilities, resources, and funds;
and (everything else) from the links of reproduction to the phases of expanded reproduction and the activities
in regions and units and their connection.50
Toward that end, in what appears as a concerted government effort, North Korea particularly sponsors and promotes IT
software development. Applications are geared toward improving management and administrative process of firms in specific second-tier industries. This includes planning systems for light industrial firms, management and operational control
programs for SMEs (particularly in the water-powered electricity industry), design programs for apparel-makers, and various
administrative programs to improve capacity in government ministries (Education, Light Industry, and Agriculture, Forestry,
and Fisheries).51
The focus on the software sector is for two reasons. Lacking investment capital, the government finds it cheaper to promote
labor-intensive software rather than relatively more capital-intensive hardware production.52 Moreover, North Korea is unable to import the necessary inputs to develop a hardware sector because of existing sanctions regimes banning the purchase
of items with potential military application (dual-use).

Patterns of Domestic and Foreign Investment

Although the government prefers to undertake indigenous S&T research and development, the lack of domestic investment
capital and the countrys low technological base necessitate openness to foreign investment. While the ideological scaffolding
of self-reliance seems to have been modified to accommodate foreign outreach, the governmentand foreign investors
for that matterhave demonstrated only a limited tolerance for engagement. This reflects the central dilemma facing North
Koreas leadership today: balancing the need for S&T and economic development on the one hand, and the imperatives of
maintaining political and economic control on the other. This dilemma is doubly important in the context of science and
technology, particularly IT, as it challenges the regimes monopoly on information and serves as a facilitator of economic
modernization that may also undermine political control.
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Domestic investments have focused on establishing a rudimentary IT infrastructure. A nationwide intranet was established in
2002 offering most amenities of the internetemail, access to digitized documents, electronic commercesave for an actual
outside connection.53 Electronic libraries have been established throughout the country and have recently been connected to
the holdings at the main electronic library at Kim Chaek University in Pyongyang.54 North Korea in 2007 became the last
country in the world to register its national domain name on the internet (.kp), to which only two addresses are permitted
use.55
Hardware investments have been relatively modest, however, compared to an emphasis on software. Most software applications, as discussed in the previous section, focus on management process improvement for selected enterprises. Mainly administered through the Korea Computer Center, the government sponsors research, development and production of software for domestic consumption and export, the most well-known of which includes the award-winning computer version of
the popular Asian chess game, baduk.56 North Korean programmers routinely competeand winin international competitions in computer animation and the design of open-source computer operating systems.57
Given limitations on domestic investmentlack of capital, factor endowment impediments, and sanctionsNorth Korea
has turned tentatively to outside assistance. In June, at the most recent yearly gathering of North Korean and Chinese S&T
officials, the two countries pledged closer scientific and technological cooperation and China donated computers and printers
to the DPRKs National Academy of Sciences.58 The most well-known foreign investment was the announcement in early
2008 by the Egyptian telecommunications firm, Orascom, of its willingness to invest up to $400 million in North Korea to
develop and operate a nationwide mobile phone network.59 By March 2009, Orascom had reportedly sold 6,500 3G mobile
phones despite the high cost and operating fees for users relative to average monthly wages.60
Orascoms operations in North Korea are through its 75 percent ownership in a joint venture with the North Korean government, the main investment structure through which North Korea allows foreign operations. A series of small joint ventures with limited foreign stakes have been established in recent years, primarily between the North Korean government, private Chinese or South Korean firms, and Japanese business interests via the North Korea-linked Chosen Soren. In 2002, Pyongyang teamed up with a Chinese firm to create the Morning Panda Joint Venture Company to produce personal computers for domestic consumption and export.61 In 2004 South Korean investors and the North Korean government established Hana 21, a PDA production company in Dandong, China.62 Another inter-Korean joint venture was established to
research virtual reality technologies between the Pyongyang Information Center and South Koreas Pohang University of
Science and Technology.63
As evidence of North Koreas interests in foreign investment and IT-focused development, the government has undertaken
modest efforts in establishing a legal framework to regulate investment and activity in IT. The government established a
Computer Software Protection Law in 2003 as well as the Software Industry Law in 2004, a law guiding IT sector development.

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State Direction and Government Centralization

Science and technology policy in North Korea is subject to high degrees of central government direction and control. This
accords with existing North Korean practices of continuing heavy state involvement in the realization of a socialist economy
and a proto-industrial policy of helping direct technology investment to priority sectors.64 It also reflects the regimes concerns about information control and political stability.
Tracing out the relationship between the government, research institutes, and state-owned firms is difficult. The Ministry of
Electronic Industry seems the central player in helping set the research agenda and policies for S&T and particularly the IT
sector, but other agencies undoubtedly play a role, both according to the nature of the technological development and the
prerogatives of state security and control65 The strategic bureaus in the KWP and the intelligence agencies in the defense apparatus, specifically the Department of National Security and the Ministry of Peoples Security, assume important roles in
formulating and implementing S&T policy.66 Research centers, largely directed by the state, are reportedly now allowed
greater independence from the government to identify new areas of potentially economically productive research, although
their applications remain under tight government scrutiny.67
Despite the overwhelming policy rhetoric about the need to adopt science and technology in pursuit of a socialist economy, it
is likely that a certain degree of malleability or uncertainty surrounds the governments S&T policy. One possible indication is
the publication of a number of long articles in North Korean reference journals putting forth various policy recommendations
in this area. Notwithstanding the obvious questions about the role of outside actors in policy formulation in North Korea, the
articles outline in broad form how S&T policy should be formulated. A December 2006 article states:
An orderly system of overseeing and managing science and technology and production on a systematic basis
should be established at all levels from the Cabinet, ministries, and central organs to factories, enterprises, and
crop and cattle farms to organize and mobilize science and technology capabilities in areas of national interests and resolve science and technology issues arising from modernizing the peoples economy and expediently and smoothly improving socialist economic management methods.68
Another article makes a similar recommendation about integrated state direction down to the firm level. The Cabinet and
provincial economic guidance organizations and committees should place the top priority on scientific and technological development over all other economic development projects and thoroughly establish a work system and order of planning, operating, organizing, and carrying out all economic work on the basis of meticulous scientific and technological calculations
and firm scientific and technological guarantees.69
One way to achieve this, the article continues, is to foster closer geographic and structural proximity between research institutes and economic firms. Productive enterprises should be established in science districts and at scientific research organizations where science and technology capabilities are concentrated for the strengthening of direct tie-ups between science and
technology and production.70 The potential benefits include information-sharing among economic and research units and,
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more importantly, the foundation for a more sustainable mode of scientific-economic production akin to a proto-scientificindustrial complex.71
Moving down from the policy level, the main concern is the establishment of mechanisms that integrate technology into the
production process. The North Korean government exhorts firm managers to realize Kim Jong Ils observationwe live in
an age in which S&T and production, one may say, form the two sides of the same coin72 by striving to integrate new
technological practices to meet socialist production targets. This technological adoption generates substantial amounts of
savings in labor, raw materials, and supplies during production processes and makes decisive improvements in product quality.73
Yet the primary means of achieving this integration is not left to managers themselvesindeed, the most common policy of
technology implementation seems a government-based supply-side promotion effort. Specialized government units called
science and technician shock brigades do what official documents define as mass-oriented activities that allow scientists
and technicians to go out into the field of production, sort out pending science and technology issues in collective discussions with the masses of producers, and forge more active tie-ups between science and technology and production.74 Shock
brigades were reportedly established by Kim Il Sung in 1975 as an organized mass technical innovation movement of scientist and technician teams to help upgrade the technology level of various firms and agencies throughout North Korea.75
Key sites often visited by shock brigades include party organizations at all levels, economic agencies of the state, public organizations, and scientific research units.76 Two shock brigades receive explicit mention in official news reports: the 17 February Shock Brigade and the 15 April Technology Renovation Shock Brigade (the dates represent the respective birth dates
of Kim Jong Il and Kim Il Sung).
A January 2009 media report provides insight into how shock brigades promote technological adoption. The 17 February
brigade, according to North Korean radio, introduced 15 technology-improvement programs in the Kaechon Railway Bureau related to the computerization of business management activities.77 The shock brigade in this case consisted of a crosscutting membership of researchers and experts from the State Academy of Sciences railway science sector, Ministry of Railways Computer Center, and the Pyongyang University of Railways.78
The same radio report described a similar effort by the 17 February brigade in the agricultural sector. This activity, to develop
soil-less sod, involved a multi-functional team across various levels of government and ostensibly non-governmental research sectors: the Ministry of City Management, Ministry of Light Industry, and the State Academy of Sciences light industrial science department alongside researchers from the Textile Research Center (the Ministry of City Management's City
Management Science Institute) and the Central Tree Nursery.79

IV. TECHNO-STATE OVER SOCIETY?

North Koreas science and technology policy strikes at the heart of the national development dilemmas confronting the re-

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gime. S&T itself poses unique challenges to the governmentboth in terms of realizing stated objectives of a strong and
prosperous socialist state as well as in maintaining the states dominance over society. Balancing between conflicting imperatives of political control and economic development is key. While a genuine albeit cautious openness to S&T development
cannot be ruled out, the balance of discreet and fragmentary evidence suggests that the North Korean leadership seems to
have embarked on a gambit to maximize the strategic and economic benefits of S&T while minimizing political costs.
Toward that end, North Korean S&T policies appear to strengthen the capacity of the state apparatus while limiting societal
mobilization. In short, S&T reinforces vertical control mechanisms while restricting the emergence of horizontal linkages.
This implies, but by no means confirms that a strong state dominates a weak society, for other outside factors may be increasing societal capabilities that challenge state control. Indeed, the net effect on the general balance of power between state
and society is difficult to ascertain and beyond the scope of this paper. In the narrower focus on S&T policy, however, a
common pattern of vertical consolidation and horizontal restriction seems apparent across the military, information and
economic domains.

Figure 1: Posited Effects of S&T

Vertical Consolidation
S&T and Military

Consolidating top-down command-

Horizontal Restriction

and-control mechanisms
S&T and Information

Strengthening state propaganda

No integrated battlespace across

units

Correct use monitoring

Disabling environment

Apparatus
S&T and Economy

Rent extraction

State-firm links as pillar of control

S&T and the Military

The imperative of military-first politics ensures that the military receives the predominant share of state investment for
S&T research and developmentwhich the military uses to deter external aggression, maintain its political position domestically, and suppress internal threats. Thus the distribution of S&T resources per se can be regarded as a means of strengthening
the repressive apparatus of the state. Moreover, the pattern of technology adoption in the military suggests that within the
KPA the focus on integrating new technologies is to reinforce top-down command-and-control hierarchies rather than to
facilitate horizontal information-centered networks.80 Mansourov notes that instead of fostering common battlespace awareness among various KPA services and military units at the operational and tactical levels, IT is likely to be used to advance
one-man real-time battlespace knowledge and assessment resulting in single-handed action.81 Such a process, while perhaps
detrimental to warfighting capabilities, strengthens state authority over the military while minimizing the lateral linkages that
could potentially facilitate organized action independent from (or even against) interests of the top leadership.
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S&T and Information

Technology also facilitates greater state capacity to control information by consolidating vertical mechanisms of information
dissemination while limiting horizontal distribution. Indeed, the US intelligence community assesses that Pyongyang is
channeling information to regime goals and harnessing IT for domestic indoctrination and foreign propaganda.82 Owing
to the development of the national intranet and electronic libraries, technology is enabling the dissemination of propaganda
by making a wider range of materials available to the populace through more accessible mediums.
At the same time, the government is monitoring potential spillovers by limiting horizontal information flow that could potentially undermine state control. This security concern was first realized in 2004 after the Ranchyon railway train explosion.
Allegedly an assassination attempt on Kim Jong Il triggered remotely by a mobile phone, the government banned and confiscated mobile phones to prevent follow-on attacks and limit the spread of information that could galvanize wider social unrest.83 More common are concerted government attempts, in recognition of the potentially deleterious effects of widespread
IT dissemination on political control, to make technology itself an object of propaganda. The government routinely stresses
the need for correct use of technology. Official newspapers remind people of the importance of integrating S&T in a way
that ensures accurate viewpoints and attitudes.84 This task is carried out by the KWP and various party organs, which
vigorously conduct the ideological indoctrination work and political work to firmly arm functionaries and workers with the
partys line of attaching importance to science and technology and to instill in them a solid viewpoint on science and technology.85 By not only leveraging technology for greater control of information but also exerting control over technological use,
the government is keen to strengthen its role over society to prevent the erosion of political control.

S&T and Economics

The introduction of technology into the economic domain poses the most complex challenge for the government. The government is committed to leveraging technology to stimulate economic modernization but also eager to limit any antigovernment pressures that might emerge as a side effect of economic reforms. The government seems unsure of how best to
integrate technology into the economic process in a manner that is least disruptive to political priorities. Shock brigades are
the most widely publicized government mechanism of technology adoption in state firms, but new policy strategies are likely
to be developed as the government comes to better understand the inter-relationship between technology, economic growth,
and political control. At this point, however, some discreet evidence suggests that technological investment is focused on
strengthening the states vertical power while limiting horizontal spillovers to society. Through technology, North Korea
seems to be building an economic foundation of state power while controlling for the potentially negative side-effects of economic growth.
First, North Korea attempts to capture disproportionate benefits of S&T while bearing little cost. This is most evident in the
states behavior in the IT sector. In assessing Orascoms investment activity in North Korea, Noland concludes that the introduction of new technologies has been less a means to boost productivity, efficiency and competitiveness than an easy

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way to extract hard currency rents for the central government, without significantly altering existing practices.86 This may
indicate a broader, more systemic tendency to treat technology as an instrument for elite revenue-generation rather than an
engine of broad-based economic growth.
Second, the tight links between the state, S&T research and development activities, and economic firms suggests that technology is being leveraged to build an economic base of state power. North Korean leaders realize that technological improvements are necessary for economic revitalization that, in turn, is crucial for maintaining political legitimacy and stability. Moreover, the process through which the state administers technological research and its integration in the economy helps to
strengthen state power. Maintaining firm control over the entire life cycle of technology, the government effectively establishes a state-scientific-industrial complex that ensures the alignment of the twin goals of economic growth and political stability.
Yet the process of integrating technology into the economy is hampered by two deficiencies in North Koreas S&T policy,
which reveal the governments unwillingness to allow technology to strengthen horizontal linkages in the economy. First,
technology is seen as a substitute for markets in generating economic growth. North Korea seems to regard technology as a
deus ex machina that can stimulate economic improvement without the corresponding reliance on free markets that could generate wealthand political stability. Technology appears as a means to provide the state with modest economic support
through rent extraction and low-level productivity gainswhile insulating it from the political pressures of genuine marketbased economic reform. This accounts for North Koreas active promotion of technology and simultaneous delegitimization
of market activities.
Second, North Korea is seemingly unwilling to establish the secondary conditions necessary to fully unlock the benefits of
S&T, curtailing the multiplier effect of relying on S&T as a catalyst for economic growth. The lack of attention to establishing an effective enabling environment suggests that the government wants to capture partial economic gains while controlling for political side effects. The government achieves this result by frustrating the development of horizontal linkages
through society and the economy. The countrys IT infrastructure is woefully inadequate to serve as the base of a technologically-intensive society and economy, despite improvements in recent years.87 Mobile phone access is difficult outside Pyongyang and land-lines in use number just over 1 million out of a total population of 23 million.88 Private internet access is restricted. The state retains the sole proprietorship over the research, development, and implementation of new technologies.
Various internal and external constraints on foreign investment remain and, when foreign joint ventures are permitted, most
are domiciled in China to avoid direct socio-economic impact in North Korea. This disabling environment is reinforced by
the continued primacy of international politics, in which North Koreas calculated external belligerency distorts and disrupts
the S&T policy environment by giving cover for foreign countries to maintain sanctions on dual-use technology items. In
short, the government is attempting to control the effects and spillovers of technology.

V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

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Policy trends for North Korean S&T have important implications for the US government. Despite Pyongyangs best efforts,
technology effects are difficult to control, as displayed by the recent experience of the Chinese government in censoring
internet use. There are already numerous anecdotes about North Koreans working around government controls and it is reasonable to expect that such trends will continue despite the governments declared intention to mandate accurate and
proper application of new innovations.89 Moreover, as technology is increasingly developed and integrated into economic
practices, spilloversmany of which are often unpredictablewill help set off second order effects that will recalibrate the
relationship between state and society.
Hence greater engagement by external actors in the scientific and technical fields seems like an important long-term policy
measure to help lay the crucial foundations for the resuscitation of political and economic life in North Koreaunder Kim
Jong Il or otherwise under his successor. Engagement should proceed despite the possibleindeed likelyprospect that
such assistance may benefit the elite in the short-term; the long-term benefits are greater.90
Yet the current political environment complicates engagement strategies. To be sure, North Koreas missile launch and subsequent reconstitution of its nuclear reactor have badly damaged the environment in which to recommend greater engagement
between the US and North Korea. Political difficulties on long-standing security issues, however, paradoxically raise the importance of engagement on unconventional issues, such as science and technology. After a reasonable cooling off period, the
new Obama Administration should indicate a willingness to encourage various measures to engage North Korea in issue-areas
outside the dominant domain of geopolitics, such as science and technology. Such science diplomacy should be undertaken
with a view toward enhancing scientific understanding and establishing working bilateral relationships in the epistemic communities that can help undergird more durable bilateral state relations.

Academic Exchanges
At the track two level, US scientific institutions can help facilitate US-DPRK scientific and technical cooperation. This effort builds on near decade-long cooperation between Syracuse University and Kim Chaek University in Pyongyang,91 and
even more broadly on US academic engagement with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The program administered by
Syracuse University has helped to establish digital libraries in North Korea and provide various forms of technical assistance
in computer software development.92 The program has enabled nine exchanges of US and North Korean scientists between
countries or to third-countries, many of which have occurred at sensitive times in the overall bilateral relationship and may
reflect a North Korean desire to maintain some albeit unofficial contact with the US.93
Engaging with North Korea in S&T during times of political difficulty is not without precedent, and thus important S&T
linkages should be strengthened. The Obama Administration should provide the necessary support to help enable greater
cooperation among US and North Korean scientific communities. The State Department should remain willing to issue visas
to North Korean scientists for study visits to the US and export licenses should be granted for the transfer of genuine scientific equipment to North Korea in support of such programs. Moreover, relevant enabling administrative actions should be

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taken to ensure the US-DPRK Scientific Engagement Consortium, led by the US Civilian Research and Development Foundation (CRDF) is allowed to visit North Korea in 2009 as planned.94

Wassenaar Arrangement
At the official level, the US can explore the possibility of ceasing or revising application to North Korea of the Wassenaar
Arrangement (WA), the international regime of export controls for dual-use goods. Established in 1996, the arrangement is a
voluntary system for coordinating national export controls on sensitive civilian technologies that could be diverted to potential military use. The WA has been applied to North Korea in excessively narrow terms. Modern computers, routers, and
servers, for example, are unable to be exported to North Korea.95
The alleged benefits of narrowly applying the WA have been marginal for military advantage: not only does North Korea
smuggle in this IT equipment from China, but easing restrictions on common electronic equipment may have important
spillovers for unthawing official relations. Balancing engagement with security is undoubtedly a tenuous balance, but the
broader effects of integrating technology more widely in the North Korean economy override narrow military concerns. The
US should work with the private organizations involved in S&T collaboration with North Korea, especially Syracuse University, CRDF, and AAAS, to draw up a new list of allowable technologies for export to North Korea. Revising WA provisions
should not, however, impact the potential to prohibit export of genuine sensitive technologies to North Korea, which are
already covered under controls of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

DPRK-ROK Scientific Exchanges

S&T cooperation between the two Koreas leverages natural complementaritiesNorth Korean software proficiency with
South Korean manufacturing and hardware expertise. Yet owing to the North-South rivalry and dueling claims for legitimacy,
North Korea is reluctant to participate in inter-Korean technology cooperation projects. A 2008 ROK government audit
showed that of the 18 IT exchange project proposed by the government, North Korea participated in only 4.96 The deterioration in inter-Korean relations under the Lee Myung-bak Administration has complicated, if not rendered infeasible, greater
S&T cooperation.
The US has limited space to encourage greater inter-Korean cooperation in this matter. Nevertheless, the US should work
quietly with its South Korean ally to maintain the possibility for good-faith technical S&T cooperation between the two Koreas, despite prevailing political tension. Toward North Korea, the US should encourage where possible greater engagement
with South Korea, but should avoid calls to explicitly link greater inter-Korean cooperation to other improvements on the
broader policy menu. The utility of scientific and technical engagement is its ostensible autonomy from the arena of high
politics, and thus any linkage unhelpfully insinuates S&T into much larger aspects of the bilateral relationship.

VI. CONCLUSION

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Science and technology has emerged as a new and important aspect of national strategy in North Korea. Garnering legitimacy through linkage to classical national objectives of socialist revolution and self reliance, S&T is now also regarded as a
key instrument of national development, enabling military and economic modernization in line with the immediate imperatives of realizing a strong and prosperous country. Yet without more detailed understanding of the process through which
North Korea administers S&T policy, it is difficult to assess the governments efforts relative to stated objectives. This paper
has attempted to address that gap, preliminarily identifying three themes that govern North Korean S&T policymaking: the
prioritization of technology and sectoral application, cautious domestic and foreign investment, and state-directed supplydriven adoption practices.
This paper has then ventured a tentative analysis of the effects of S&T policymaking, particularly relating to the balance of
power between state and society. Within the core national domains of military, information, and economy, the administration
of North Korean S&T policy seems to be strengthening the vertical apparatus of the state while weakening horizontal spillovers in society. The overall effect is to strengthen state over society, although the overall net effect is difficult to ascertain
without a more comprehensive investigation outside the realm of S&T policymaking.
Given the trajectory of North Korean S&T policymaking as well as the broader context of technology and national development, three policy recommendations can be identified. Owing to positive externalities and knowledge spillovers, external actors should encourage greater technological adoption in North Korea, even if the short-term benefits accrue disproportionately to the elite. The long-run implications are more valuable. Notwithstanding current political tensions, greater S&T engagement should be promoted at the track two level and the US should ease restrictions on the export of common technological equipment for ostensible, if not genuine, scientific use. Greater inter-Korean cooperation should also be strengthened.
The benefits accrue in the long-run, as North Koreans develop the technological facility and common base of ideas on which
to interact with the wider world. Perhaps, too, they will be empowered to foster the changes necessary for durable political
and economic modernization.

Kim Jong Il Observes Launch of Kwangmyongsong-2 Satellite, KCNA, April 5, 2009, OSC translated text via World News Connection.
Ibid.
3 Joint New Year Editorial Published, Korea Central News Agency, January 1, 2000, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2000/200001/news01/01.htm#1.
4 Byun, Sang Jung, DPRKs 2022 Strong Science and Technology State Construction and Inter-Korean Scientific and Technological Exchange and
Cooperation, NK Technology Column, Kyungnam University, 2008, http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr/eng/m05/s40/content.asp?
spcReportNO=2&GoP=%201.
5 This timeline ignores the early attempts at securing nuclear and other military-relevant technologies beginning in the late 1950s.
6 Hayes, Peter, DPRK Information StrategyDoes it Exist? in Mansourov, Alexander, ed., Bytes and Bullets: Information Technology Revolution and National
Security on the Korean Peninsula, (Honolulu, HI): Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2005.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Bae, Seong In, North Koreas Policy Shift Toward the IT Industry and Inter-Korean Cooperation, East Asian Review (13.4), 2001. See also Hwee
Moon Sung, The Origins of Science Education and First Senior Middle Schools, DailyNK, July 15, 2009, http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?
cataId=nk00400&num=5173.
10 Hayes.
1
2

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Bae.
Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 McNeill, David, International University Will Open in North Korea, Chronicle of Higher Education, September 7, 2007.
16 Some outside experts speculate that the government has had no real intention to open it and has used it as a political tool. Personal Interview, Mark
Suh, April 8, 2009.
17 Science and Technology Development Is an Indispensable Demand of the Construction of a Powerful State, Minju Choson (via KPM Internet), October 15, 2008, OSC translated text via World News Connection.
18 Chuche Science and Technology That Has Solidly Consolidated the Countrys National Power Under the Republics Banner, Rodong Sinmun, August
28, 2008, OSC translated text via World News Connection.
19 Let Us Positively Resolve Pressing Issues of Science and Technology Arising in Construction of Powerful State With Extraordinary Patriotic Ardor
and Creative Spirit, Punsok, December 13, 2008, OCS translated text via World News Connection.
20 Developing the Economy on the Basis of Science and Technology Is an Important Task for Bringing About a Great Upswing in the Military-First
Revolution, Kyongje Yongu, January 6, 2006, OSC translated text via World News Connection.
21 Quoted in Kim Jong Il Stresses a New Self-Reliance Policy Based on Advanced Science and Technology, NK Brief No. 05-5-24-1, Kyungnam University, 2005, http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr/admin/upload_file/nk_brief/NK_Brief_050524.pdf.
22 Ibid.
23 The Immortal Feat the Respected and Beloved Comrade Kim Jong Il [Kim Chong-il] Performed by Illuminating the Path to Building an Economically Powerful State Based on Advanced Science and Technology, Kyongje Yongu, October 14, 2006, OSC translated text via World News Connection.
24 Ibid.
25 Science and Technology is Synonymous with National Strength, Rodong Sinmun, November 9, 2008, OSC translated text via World News Connection.
26 Science and Technology Development Is an Indispensable Demand of the Construction of a Powerful State, Minju Choson, October 15, 2008, OSC
translated text via World News Connection.
27 Developing the Economy on the Basis of Science and Technology Is an Important Task for Bringing About a Great Upswing in the Military-First
Revolution, Kyongje Yongu, January 6, 2006, OCS translated text via World News Connection.
28 Bae.
29 Ko, Kyungmin, Seungkwon Jang, and Heejin Lee, .kp North Korea, in Digital Review of Asia Pacific 2007-08, International Development and Research
Center (Canada), http://www.idrc.ca/fr/ev-127149-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html.
30 Let Us Thoroughly Embody the Line of Attaching Importance to Science and Technology in the Partys Economic Building, Rodong Sinmun, November 22, 2008, OSC translated via World News Connection.
31 Ibid.
32 Science and Technology Development Is an Indispensable Demand of the Construction of a Powerful State.
33 Rodong Sinmun, September 19, 2004.
34 Neureiter, Norman, Talking with North Korea, Science, September 17, 2004.
35 Lee, Hyung Seog, Information Technology Progress in North Korea and its Prospects, in Mansourov, Alexander, ed., Bytes and Bullets: Information
Technology Revolution and National Security on the Korean Peninsula, (Honolulu, HI): Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2005.
36 Bae; Ko, et al.
37 A report released on March 6, 2009 summarizing a meeting between KWP and Chinese officials identifies three major ideas and five major tasks
that guide North Koreas science and technology policy, but the specific terms are left undefined. Roundup on WPK Delegations Visit to Ministry of
Science, Technology, Suzhou City, China-OSC roundup, OSC translated text via World News Connection.
38 Report on Implementation of State Budget for 2008 and State Budget for 2009, KCNA, April 9, 2009, OSC translated text via World News Connection.
39 Chuche Science and Technology That Has Solidly Consolidated the Countrys National Power under the Republics Banner; Basic Demand of the
Partys Line of Attaching Importance to Science and Technology, Rodong Sinmun, September 21, 2007, OCS translated text via World News Connection;
Encouraging and Promoting the Building of a Powerful Economic State Through Scientific and Technical Results; At the Kim Chaek University of
Technology, Rodong Sinmun, February 6, 2009, OCS translated text via World News Connection; Let Us Thoroughly Embody the Line of Attaching
Importance to Science and Technology in the Partys Economic Building, Rodong Sinmun, November 22, 2008, OCS translated text via World News
Connection.
11
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40 For examples, see: Preparation of Rutile Phase Nano TiO2 by Homogeneous Precipitation Method, Hwahak-kwa Hwahak Konghak, OSC translated
text via World News Connection; Carrying Out Big Work Without Much AdoAt the Revolutionary Historical Relics Preservation Institute of the
Hamhung Branch of the State Academy of Sciences, Rodong Sinmun, July 31, 2008, OSC translated text via World News Connection.
41 Basic Demand of the Partys Line of Attaching Importance to Science and Technology, Rodong Sinmun, September 21, 2007, OSC translated text via
World News Connection.
42 Byun.
43 Mansourov, Alexander, Role of Information Technology Revolution in Economic Development and Military Competition on the Korean Peninsula,
in Mansourov, Alexander, ed. Bytes and Bullets: Information Technology Revolution and National Security on the Korean Peninsula, (Honolulu, HI): Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2005.
44 Quoted in Bermudez, Joseph, Jr, SIGINT, EW, and EIW in the Korean Peoples Army: An Overview of Development and Organization, in Mansourov, Alexander, ed. Bytes and Bullets: Information Technology Revolution and National Security on the Korean Peninsula, (Honolulu, HI): Asia-Pacific Center for
Security Studies, 2005.
45 Lee.
46 S. Korea and N. Korea Engaging in Cyber-war, United Press International, May 5, 2009.
47 Bae.
48 Informatization of Peoples Economy, Minju Choson, April 8, 2009, OSC translated text via World News Connection.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Lee.
52 Bae.
53 Ko, et al.
54 DPRK Electronic Libraries, NK Tech No. 09-2-17-1, Kyungnam University, February 17, 2009, http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr/eng/m05/s40/
content.asp?spcReportNO=4&GoP=%201.
55 The two available sites are a copy of North Koreas main government portal (http://www.naenara.kp/en/) and a restricted site of the Korean Computer Center (http://kcce.kp/).
56 Ko, et al.
57 Ibid.
58 China, DPRK to Further Strengthen Scientific-Technological Ties, Xinhua News, June 3, 2009.
59 Noland, Marcus, Telecommunications in North Korea: Has Orascom Made the Connection, September 8, 2008.
60 Park, Ju-min, North Korea Allows Cell Phone Network, The Los Angeles Times, March 22, 2009.
61 Ko, et al.
62 Bae. See also: http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/191th_issue/2003041201.htm.
63 North Korea: Channeling Foreign Information Technology, Information to Regime Goals, Director of National Intelligence, Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive: December 2003 Archive, http://www.ncix.gov/archives/docs/NORTH_KOREA_AND_FOREIGN_IT.pdf
64 Even in capitalist economies technology production is often subsidized or sponsored by the state because private firms are unable to reap the full
benefits of R&D owing to positive externalities.
65 Ko, et al.
66 Ibid.
67 North Korea Economy Focusing on Technological Development to Revive Economy, Nautilus Policy Forum Online 06-61A, 2006.
68 Integration of Science and Technology and Production Serves as a Strong Basis for Economic Development.
69 Developing the Economy on the Basis of Science and Technology Is an Important Task for Bringing About a Great Upswing in the Military-First
Revolution.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 The Movement of the Shock Brigade of Scientists and Technicians, a Driving Force for the Implementation of Science-and-Technology Policies
Rodong Sinmun, October 30, 2005, OSC translated text via World News Connection.
73 Integration of Science and Technology and Production Serves as a Strong Basis for Economic Development, Kyongje Yongu, December 13, 2006.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.

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77 DPRK Radio Details Work of 17 Feb Shock Brigade of Scientists, Technicians, Korean Central Broadcasting Station, January 2, 2009, OSC translated radio broadcast via World News Connection.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Lee. Mansurouv, Role of Information Technology Revolution in Economic Development and Military Competition on the Korean Peninsula. Also
Oh, Kongdan and Ralph Hassig, Guesses About the Role of Information Technology in North Koreas Defense Modernization, in Mansourov, Alexander, ed. Bytes and Bullets: Information Technology Revolution and National Security on the Korean Peninsula, (Honolulu, HI): Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2005.
81 Mansourov, Role of Information Technology Revolution in Economic Development and Military Competition on the Korean Peninsula, 15.
82 North Korea: Channeling Foreign Information Technology, Information to Regime Goals.
83 Noland.
84 Integration of Science and Technology and Production Serves as a Strong Basis for Economic Development, Kyongje Yongu, December 13, 2006.
85 Let Us Thoroughly Embody the Line of Attaching Importance to Science and Technology in the Partys Economic Building, Rodong Sinmun, November 22, 2008, OSC translated text via World News Connection.
86 Noland.
87 Ko, et al.
88 US Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, 2008.
89 Erosion in information control has enabled high officials and other selected North Koreans to secretly obtain South Korean TV in North Korea:
South Korean News on Broadcast in Pyongyang, DailyNK, September 19, 2007.
90 For an assessment of short- and long-term effects of alternative forms of engagement such developed aid, scholarship for North Korean students, and
other types of international exchanges, see Lankov, Andrei, How to Topple Kim Jong Il, Newsweek, April 27, 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/
id/194602/output/print.
91 Seo, Hyunjin and Stuart Thompson, Academic Science Engagement with North Korea, Academic Paper Series, Korea Economic Institute, April
2009, http://www.keia.org/Publications/AcademicPaperSeries/2009/APS-ThorsonSeo.pdf
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 US-DPRK Scientific Engagement Consortium Panel Held at AAAS Meeting, CRDF, February 19, 2009, available at: http://www.crdf.org/
newsroom/newsroom_show.htm?doc_id=832270.
95 Ko, et al, and North Korea Dropped from Terror List, IT Industry Given Green Light, NK Technology Column, Kyungyam University, December
26, 2008.
96 North Korea Dropped from Terror List, IT Industry Given Green Light.

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