EN BANC

[G.R. No. 119311. October 7, 1998]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO

DIANOS, accused-appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:

Romeo Dianos has taken an appeal to this Court questioning the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6, which has found him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Murder, Frustrated and Attempted
Murder, after being indicted and tried in Criminal Cases Numbered 8524-R to
8528-R, inclusive. The five separate informations against him read:
Criminal Case No. 8524-R
"The undersigned accuses ROMEO DIANOS and JOHN DOE' of the
crime of MURDER, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 31st day of December, 1990, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation,
conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding with each other, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and fire at TERESITA
ORTIZ y PABLO, with an armalite rifle, causing upon the latter, acute
respiratory failure due to a complete transection of the spinal cord at the level of
the 2nd cervical vertebra due to a gunshot wound through the neck, which
directly caused her death.
"ALL CONTRARY TO LAW, and with the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime and use of motor vehicle."i[1]
Criminal Case No. 8525-R
"The undersigned accuses ROMEO DIANOS and JOHN DOE' of the crime
of ATTEMPTED MURDER, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 31st day of December, 1990, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation,
conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding with each other, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attempt to kill ZALDY ORTIZ, by firing
an armalite rifle, causing injuries on his right leg, thus commencing the
commission of the crime directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of
execution which should have produced the crime of Murder, by reason of
causes other than their own spontaneous desistance.
"ALL CONTRARY TO LAW, and with the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime and use of motor vehicle."ii[2]
Criminal Case No. 8526-R
"The undersigned accuses ROMEO DIANOS and `JOHN DOE' of the
crime of ATTEMPTED MURDER, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 31st day of December, 1990, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation,

conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding with each other, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attempt to kill VIRGILIO ORTIZ Y
PINLAC, by firing an armalite rifle, causing injuries on his thigh, thus
commencing the commission of the crime directly by overt acts, but did not
perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of
Murder, by reason of causes other than their own spontaneous desistance, that
is, by the timely arrival of people from the neighborhood who extended
assistance to the complainant.
"ALL CONTRARY TO LAW, and with the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime and use of motor vehicle."iii[3]
Criminal Case No. 8527-R
"The undersigned accuses ROMEO DIANOS and `JOHN DOE' of the
crime of FRUSTRATED MURDER, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 31st day of December, 1990, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation,
conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding with each other, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and fire at LIZETTE
ORTIZ, with an armalite rifle, thereby inflicting upon the latter, penetrating
gunshot wound in her abdomen, which wound would have caused or led to the
death of the said LIZETTE ORTIZ, were it not for the timely and able medical
assistance extended to her, thus performing all the acts of execution which
should have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence, but nevertheless
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused,
that is, by the timely medical assistance rendered to said LIZETTE ORTIZ,
which prevented her death.
"ALL CONTRARY TO LAW, and with the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime and use of motor vehicle."iv[4]
Criminal Case No. 8528-R
"The undersigned accuses ROMEO DIANOS and `JOHN DOE' of the
crime of MURDER, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 31st day of December, 1990, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation,
conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding with each other, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and fire at RICARDO
PABLO y PALUA, with an armalite rifle, causing upon the latter, hypovolemic
shock secondary to massive hemorrhage due to penetrating wounds of the
heart, lungs, aorta and pulmonary vessels due to multiple gunshot wounds on
the chest, which directly caused his death.
"ALL CONTRARY TO LAW, and with the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime and use of motor vehicle."v[5]

At his arraignment, accused Dianos entered a plea of not guilty to all the
charges. His co-accused remained at large.
The witnesses for the prosecution came up during the trial with accounts of
the incidents brought up in the various accusations.
Involved in the unfortunate saga were all residents of Cypress Point Village,
Irisan, in Baguio City. The otherwise friendly relationship among them was
marred by a transaction apparently gone awry between Teresita Ortiz (Teresita)
and Josie Ortiz Santos (Josie), on the one hand, and accused Romeo Dianos, on
the other hand, over a piece of land occupied by the latter. The ensuing "bad
blood" led to the fatal denouement.
On 31 December 1990, at about five o'clock in the morning, Nancy Ortiz
Dasudas (Nancy) saw the accused throw a hand grenade near the house of her

parents. Josie, who was standing near the site of the explosion was hit with a
shrapnel on the left leg. A grenade pin and several shrapnels were recovered
from the scene.
Later that day, at around 9:30 in the evening, the accused, donned in military
camouflage uniform and armed with an M-16 armalite rifle, was seen traversing
the Cypress Point Road. Following closely behind was his passenger jeepney
with three unidentified men on board.
Meanwhile, that same evening, Teresita, together with her husband, Virgilio
Ortiz (Virgilio), her daughter, Corazon Ortiz Ihanda (Corazon), her brother,
Ricardo Pablo (Ricardo), and her son, Zaldy Ortiz (Zaldy), were on the terrace of
their new house waiting for the other Ortiz children to arrive in time for the New
Year's eve celebration. The three men, Virgilio, Ricardo and Zaldy, momentarily
left the terrace, Virgilio to relieve himself by the side of the house, Zaldy to repair
home and Ricardo to go to the house of Nancy Ortiz Dasudas (Nancy) across the
street. Ricardo met the accused near the waiting shed. Without any warning,
the latter suddenly struck Ricardo on the face with the butt of an armalite causing
him to fall to the ground. The accused then fired at Ricardo, hitting him on the
chest and left arm. The accused then directed his armalite at Virgilio. The latter
was hit on the buttocks. The accused thereupon fired indiscriminately at the
house of Zaldy. Zaldy received a bullet injury in his right thigh, while his
daughter, Lizette Ortiz (Lizette), was hit in her abdomen and wrist. The accused
moved towards the direction of the new house and fired at the terrace. Teresita
took a bullet wound on the neck from the volley of shots, while Corazon escaped
unscathed.
The accused, right after the shooting, boarded his jeep and sped towards
Baguio City.
In the aftermath, two were found dead, namely, Teresita and Ricardo, while
three others, Virgilio, Zaldy and Lizette, sustained injuries. The latter were all
rushed to the Baguio General Hospital where they were treated for gunshot
wounds.
P/Sgt. Albert Gaydowen of Sub-station 1, upon receiving the report on the
incident, immediately dispatched Pat. Ruben Forte (Pat. Forte), Pfc. Marianito
Cosape (Pfc. Cosape) and Pat. Robert Credo (Pat. Credo) to the crime scene.
Pfc. Cosape was able to gather several pieces of spent cartridges from the
waiting shed and surrounding areas. At the police station, Sgt. Danilo Santos
(Josie's husband) who tagged along with the investigating team from the crime
scene, requested P/Sgt. Gaydowen to contact Camp Bado Dangwa to intercept
the passenger jeepney of the accused. P/Sgt. Gaydowen was yet searching for
the telephone number of Camp Dangwa when the accused's jeepney was seen
near the sub-station coming in from Baguio City. It was promptly met with a burst
of gunfire. Somehow, the accused was able to escape.
Meanwhile, Zaldy and Virgilio were discharged from the hospital shortly after
treatment. Having sustained lacerations on her liver and large intestines, as well
as multiple pilferages on her small intestines, Lizette had to be confined. The
doctors who attended to her testified that the gunshot wounds she had sustained
were serious enough to cause her death had it not been for the immediate
surgical and medical attention given to her. She also sustained a fractured wrist
which would leave her left hand permanently disabled. She was treated for a
total of thirty-three days in the hospital.
The post mortem report on the bodies of Teresita and Ricardo readily
disclosed that their death were due to the gunshot wounds they had sustained.
Teresita had gunshot wounds on her neck and right side of the face that caused
an acute respiratory failure. Ricardo sustained gunshot wounds on his left chest

and left upper arm. He died from hypovolemic shock secondary to massive
hemorrhage due to penetrating wounds in the heart, lungs, aorta and pulmonary
vessels.
Anent the damages incurred by private complainants: Virgilio testified that
he had spent P1,000 for medications for his thigh injury. A riprap contractor, he
was not able to work for seven months depriving him of his monthly income of
P2,000 for the period or the total amount of P14,000. He asserted that he had
incurred P110,000.00 for funeral services for his wife Teresita. Nenita Pablo
(Nenita) said in her testimony that she had spent P15,000.00 for the autopsy and
coffin of Ricardo, P3,000.00, by way of doctor's fee and P8,000.00 for the wake.
Zaldy testified that he had spent P500 for the treatment of his injury.
The accused proffered the jaded apologia of denial. He disclaimed any
knowledge of, or participation in, the grenade throwing and shooting incidents.
He recounted that while he was getting his passenger jeepney out from the
carport, an unidentified man poked a gun at his back and instructed him to
proceed to Cypress Point Road to fetch a companion. When they were near the
waiting shed area, he saw the unidentified man's companion, a "military man,"
clad in military camouflage uniform and armed with an M-16 armalite rifle,
altercating with Ricardo. Moments later, he saw the gun-wielding man shoot
Ricardo and spray bullets at Zaldy's house and the "new" house before boarding
the passenger jeepney. The accused was ordered to proceed to La Trinidad,
Benguet, where the "military man" alighted from the vehicle. The other fellow got
down from the vehicle in Puliwes Camp 7, Kennon Road. The accused
proceeded to Sub-station 1 to report the incident but he was met with a burst of
gunfire. Sustaining an injury in his thigh, he then drove to Sub-station 2 to seek
police assistance. Sgt. Giovanni Gallardo (Sgt. Gallardo) and Pat. Edward
Ayochok (Pat. Ayochok) took him to the St. Louis Hospital. On the way, the
accused had the chance to narrate to the two police officers the shooting incident
in Irisan.
The RTC rendered its decision on 10 May 1994 finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes with which he was charged; the trial court
adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
"1.
In Criminal case No. 8524-R, the Court finds accused
Romeo Dianos Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
sentences him to Reclusion Perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of
deceased Teresita Ortiz the sum of P50,000.00 for her death and the
sum of P110,000.00 as Actual Damages for expenses incurred for the
wake, funeral and burial services, both indemnifications being without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
"The accused being a detention prisoner is entitled to a full credit
of his preventive imprisonment in the service of his sentence.
"2.
In Criminal case No. 8525-R, the Court finds accused
Romeo Dianos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Attempted Murder
defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article 6 and
Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to an imprisonment of 1
Year 7 months and 11 days of prision correccional as Minimum to 6
years, 1 month and 11 days of prision mayor as Maximum, to
indemnify Zaldy Ortiz the sum of P 5,000.00 as Moral Damages for the
injuries sustained by him without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs.
"The accused being a detention prisoner is entitled to a full credit
of his preventive imprisonment in the service of his sentence.

"3.
In Criminal Case No. 8526-R, the Court finds accused
Romeo Dianos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Attempted Murder
defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Articles 6 and 51
of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, to an imprisonment of one year, 7
months and 11 days of prision correccional as Minimum to 6 years, 1
month and 11 days of prision mayor as Maximum, to indemnify Virgilio
Ortiz the sum of P1,000.00 as actual damages for the expenses
incurred for his medical treatment for the injuries sustained by him and
the sum of P14,000.00 as unearned income for 7 months at P2,000.00
a month for being unable to work as riprap contractor during the
treatment of his injuries and the sum of P5,000.00 as Moral Damages
for the injuries sustained by him, both indemnifications being without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
"The accused being a detention prisoner is entitled to a full credit
of his preventive imprisonment in the service of his sentence.
"4.
In Criminal case No. 8527-R, the Court finds accused
Romeo Dianos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Frustrated Murder
defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Articles 6 and 50
of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to an
imprisonment ranging from 6 years, 1 month and 11 days of prision
mayor as Minimum to 12 years, 5 months and 11 days of Reclusion
Temporal as maximum, to indemnify Lizette Ortiz the sum of
P20,000.00 as Moral Damages for the injuries sustained by her without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
"The accused being a detention prisoner is entitled to a full credit
of the preventive imprisonment in the service of his sentence.
"5.
In Criminal case No. 8528-R, the Court finds accused
Romeo Dianos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
sentences him to reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of
deceased Ricardo Pablo the sum of P50,000.00 for his death and the
sum of P23,000.00 as Actual Damages for expenses incurred for the
wake, funeral and burial services, both indemnifications being without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
"The accused being a detention (prisoner) is entitled to a full credit
of his preventive imprisonment in the service of his sentence."vi[6]

In the instant appeal, accused-appellant ascribes the following errors

supposedly committed by the trial court:
I

"... IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT `IF REALLY ACCUSED HAD NOTHING

TO DO WITH THE FIRINGS AND KILLINGS, THE ASSAILANTS COULD
VERY WELL USED OTHER VEHICLES' INSTEAD OF THE ACCUSED'S
VEHICLE;
II

"... [IN NOT TAKING] INTO CONSIDERATION THE VITAL AND VERY
IMPORTANT EVIDENCE FOR THE ACCUSED (not a single portion of the
testimonies of Police Officers Gallardo and Ayochok, as well as those of the
prosecution's witnesses showing his lack of motive to perpetrate the offenses
charged, were mentioned nor passed upon in the decision) WHICH IF
CONSIDERED IMPARTIALLY COULD HAVE RESULTED IN HIS ACQUITTAL;
"III

"... IN COMPLETELY IGNORING THE VERY CONVINCING EVIDENCE

PRESENTED BY THE ACCUSED AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE OTHER
PROSECUTION WITNESSES THAT HE HAD NO MOTIVE TO PERPETRATE

SUCH A DASTARDLY ACT AGAINST THE VICTIMS SINCE WHATEVER

DIFFERENCES HIS FAMILY HAD WITH THEM HAD LONG BEEN SETTLED
AND FORGOTTEN ACCORDING TO NO LESS THAN VIRGILIO ORTIZ, THE
FATHER OF JOSIE SANTOS AND HUSBAND OF THE LATE TERESITA
ORTIZ;
"IV

"... IN COMPLETELY ADHERING TO THE RULE THAT POSITIVE

IDENTIFICATION PREVAILS OVER EVIDENCE OF LACK OF MOTIVE
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THOSE WHO TESTIFIED AS HAVING
POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED THE ACCUSED ARE BIASED, HOSTILE AND
HIGHLY PREJUDICED TO HIM;
"V

"... IN HOLDING THAT THE PARAFFIN EXAMINATION RESULT IS NOT

IMPORTANT BECAUSE THE ACCUSED MIGHT HAVE USED GLOVES OR
KNOWS HOW TO REMOVE IT AND WASHED AWAY THE POWDER BURNS
AND THAT `THE EXAMINATION WAS DONE ONLY ON JANUARY 2, 1991 OR
TWO (2) DAYS AFTER THE INCIDENT; (AND)
"VI

"...IN HOLDING THAT IT IS `TOO MUCH TO BELIEVE' THAT ACCUSED

WAS REALLY GOING TO REPORT THE INCIDENT WITH THE PNP
SUBSTATION 1 OF BAGUIO CITY ALONG NAGUILIAN ROAD INSTEAD OF
REPORTING THE SAME TO THE PNP HEADQUARTERS NEAR CITY HALL
AND THAT SUCH ACT OF THE ACCUSED IS A MERE `PRETENSIONS' ON
HIS PART."vii[7]

Accused-appellant, verily, faults the court a quo for giving full faith and credit
to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, on the one hand, and, on the
other, for failing to accord any evidentiary value to the testimonies of Sgt.
Gallardo and Pat. Ayochok to whom he narrated the Irisan incident, and for
disregarding the negative results of the paraffin test on him.
It is doctrinally entrenched, at least in this jurisdiction, that the issue on the
credibility of witnesses is a question mainly addressed to the trial court for it to
gauge and to pass upon. Not only are its determination and findings accorded
with great respect, but also even often treated with finality. Accused-appellant
belabors the fact that all, but one, of the prosecution witnesses are related to the
victims.
He asserts that such relationship taints their credibility. Mere
relationship by a witness to the victim, however, does not necessarily impair
credibility. The annals of our criminal justice system could be filled with
countless unresolved cases if courts were to hold otherwise.
Not too
infrequently, crimes are committed with just the relatives of the victim being
around. Verily, too, it is natural for the immediate members of the family of the
victim to have a strong urge to see the real culprit, not just anyone, penalized for
a grave offense. Unless the Court is convinced that the witnesses are clearly
impelled by ulterior motives, it will not discard their testimony. No such strong illmotive has been shown here to make the Court conclude that the prosecution
witness would thereby wish to have the wrong man callously sent to jail.
viii[8]

ix[9]

Accused-appellant argues that his "utterances" made in the presence of, and
later testified to, by Sgt. Gallardo and Pat. Ayochok on their way to the hospital
should have been deemed constitutive of the res gestae and given due
evidentiary weight. Evidently, accused-appellant is under a misconception. Res
gestae rules relate to the admissibility of evidence and not to its weight or
sufficiency. By res gestae, exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime, immediately before, during or
immediately after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are
such that the statements constitute nothing but spontaneous reaction or
x[10]

utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion there being no opportunity

for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement
become
admissible in evidence against the otherwise hearsay rule of inadmissibility. In
order to admit such hearsay statements as part of res gestae, there must be a
confluence of the following essential conditions: (1) that the principal act, the
res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements are made before the
declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the
statement must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending
circumstances.
xi[11]

xii[12]

There is, of course, no hard and fast rule by which spontaneity may be
determined although a number of factors have been considered, including, but
not always confined to, (1) the time that has lapsed between the occurrence of
the act or transaction and the making of the statement, (2) the place where the
statement is made, (3) the condition of the declarant when the utterance is
given, (4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the
occurrence and the statement relative thereto, and (5) the nature and the
circumstances of the statement itself.
The Court, in People vs. Manhuyod,
has explained the import of the first four factors; thus:
xiii[13]

xiv[14]

"x x x (C)ases are not uniform as to the interval of time that should
separate the occurrence of the startling event and the making of the
declaration. What is important is that the declarations were voluntarily and
spontaneously made 'so nearly contemporaneous as to be in the presence of
the transaction which they illustrate or explain, and were made under such
circumstances as necessarily to exclude the ideas of design or deliberation.'
"As to the second factor, it may be stressed that 'a statement made, or an
act done, at a place some distance from the place where the principal
transaction occurred will not ordinarily possess such spontaneity as would
render it admissible.'
"Anent the third factor, '[a] statement will ordinarily be deemed
spontaneous if, at the time when it was made, the conditions of the declarant
was such as to raise an inference that the effect of the occurrence on his mind
still continued, as where he had just received a serious injury, was suffering
severe pain, or was under intense excitement. Conversely, a lack of
spontaneity may be inferred from the cool demeanor of declarant, his
consciousness of the absence of all danger, his delay in making a statement
until witnesses can be procured, or from the fact that he made a different
statement prior to the one which is offered in evidence.'
"With regard to the fourth factor, what is to be considered is whether there
intervened between the event or transaction and the making of the statement
relative thereto, any circumstance calculated to divert the mind of the declarant
which would thus restore his mental balance and afford opportunity for
deliberation."

The startling occurrence of consequence to this case is not when accusedappellant was fired upon at police substation 1 but the shooting at the Cypress
Point Village. If at all, what might be so considered as part of the res gestae
would be the statements of appellant when he was shot at near the police
station, but this incident is not at all the subject matter of the case against him.
Clearly, the fourth element, i.e., that there is no intervening event between the
startling occurrence concerned and the making of the statement relative thereto,
is not here extant.
Accused-appellant capitalizes on the negative results of the paraffin test
conducted on him. A paraffin test has never been considered to be foolproof. On
the contrary, it has been held to be highly unreliable. In People vs. Teehankee,
Jr., this Court has held:
xv[15]

"Appellant cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test showing he was

negative of nitrates. Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin
test has 'x x x proved extremely unreliable in use. The only thing that
it can definitely establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites
on the hand. It cannot be established from this test alone that the source
of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. The person may
have handled one or more of a number of substances which give the
same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives,
fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as
peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses tabacco may also have
nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these substances are
present in the products of combustion of tabacco.' In numerous rulings,
we have also recognized several factors which may bring about the
absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when the
assailant washes his hands after firing the gun, wears gloves at the time
of the shooting, or if the direction of a strong wind is against the gunman
at the time of the firing."
xvi[16]

Anent the actual damages, the uncorroborated testimonies of private

complainants cannot suffice. Such damages to be recoverable must not only be
capable of proof but must actually be proved with reasonable degree of
certainty. In Fuentes, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,
the Court has ruled:
xvii[17]

xviii[18]

"Petitioner maintains that assuming that he committed the crime it is error

to hold him answerable for P8,300.00 as actual damages on the basis of the
mere testimony of the victim's sister, Angelina Serrano, without any tangible
document to support such claim. This is a valid point. In crimes and quasidelicts, the defendant is liable for all damages which are the natural and
probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. To seek recovery
for actual damages it is essential that the injured party proves the actual
amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent
proof and on the best evidence available. Courts cannot simply rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of
damages.

"The award by the court a quo of P8,300.00 as actual damages is

not supported by the evidence on record. We have only the testimony of
the victim's elder sister stating that she incurred expenses of P8,300.00
in connection with the death of Malaspina. However, no proof of the
actual damages was ever presented in court. Of the expenses alleged to
have been incurred, the Court can only give credence to those supported
by receipts and which appear to have been genuinely expended in
connection with the death of the victim. Since the actual amount was not
substantiated, the same cannot be granted."
xix[19]

There is, however, no doubt that injury was sustained by private

complainants due to appellant's actions. In the absence of competent proof on
the specific amounts of actual damages suffered, private complainants are
entitled to nominal damages. The Court deems the amounts of P15,000.00 in
Criminal Case Nos. 8524-R and 8528-R, P10,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 8527R, and P5,000.00 in Criminal Case Nos. 8525-R and 8526-R to be reasonable
given the circumstances.
xx[20]

Finally, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence relative to Article 2206

of the Civil Code, the award of P50,000.00 indemnity for each of the death of
Teresita Ortiz and Ricardo Pablo must be affirmed. Moral damages, in addition
to the awards made by the trial court in favor of the injured victims, are also
recoverable under paragraph (3) of Article 2206, in relation to Article 2217
and
paragraph (1) of Article 2219,
of the Civil Code, which the Court hereby fixes
at P30,000.00 for each of the two deceased victims payable to their respective
heirs.

xxi[21]

xxii[22]

xxiii[23]

On this score, the Court finds it opportune to clarify certain notions dealing on
the recovery of these various damages.
There is a significant distinction, in the context of Book IV, Title XVIII, of the
Civil Code on "Damages," between the terms "damages" and "damage."
Damages refer to the sum of money which the law awards or imposes as
pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury done or a
wrong sustained as a consequence of either a breach of a contractual obligation
or a tortuous or illegal act, while damage pertains to the actionable loss, hurt or
harm which results from the unlawful act, omission or negligence of another.
In fine, damages are the amounts recoverable or that which can be awarded for
the damage done or sustained.

xxiv[24]

An award of actual or compensatory damages requires actual proof of

pecuniary loss. An exception from the rule, pursuant to Article 2206 of the Civil
Code, are "damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict" which can be
awarded forthwith to the heirs of the victim by proof alone of such fact of death.
No proof of pecuniary loss is likewise necessary in order that moral, nominal,
temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages may be adjudicated,
and it is
quite enough that proof of damage or injury is adduced. Being incapable of exact
pecuniary estimation, the assessment of such damages, except for liquidated
damages which the parties themselves fix, is left to the sound discretion of the
court.
xxv[25]

Akin to, but not exactly in the same category as actual or compensatory
damages, is the civil indemnity ex delicto particularly so referred to in paragraph
3 of Article 104, in relation to Article 100, of the Revised Penal Code as
"indemnification for consequential damages."
These two species of damages
differ basically in that civil indemnity ex delicto can be awarded without need of
further proof than the fact of commission of the felony itself while actual or
compensatory damages to be recoverable must additionally be established with
reasonable degree of certainty (except, as aforesaid, in the case of the indemnity
for death under Article 2206
of the Civil Code). In fine, the first species merely
requires proof of damage or injury (similar to that needed in an award of moral
damages) to be recoverable; the second kind requires, in addition, proof of
damages or pecuniary loss in order to warrant recovery.
xxvi[26]

xxvii[27]

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED with modifications in that

the actual damages awarded to Virgilio Ortiz, Nenita Pablo and Zaldy Ortiz are
deleted and in lieu thereof nominal damages in the following amounts are hereby
awarded: P15,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 8524-R and No. 8528-R; P10,000.00
in Criminal Case No. 8527-R; and P5,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 8525-R and
No. 8526-R. Moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00 are also hereby
awarded to the heirs of each of the two deceased victims.
The Court orders that copies of this decision be furnished the Department of
Justice and the Department of Interior and Local Governments which agencies
are enjoined to take the lead in apprehending and bringing to justice the other
accused who have remained at large.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, acting C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., on leave.

i[1]

Rollo, p. 19.
Ibid., p. 21.
iii [3]
Ibid., p. 23.
iv[4]
Ibid., p. 25.
v[5]
Ibid., p. 27.
vi[6]
Rollo, pp. 103-105.
vii[7]
Rollo, pp. 135-136.
viii [8]
People vs. So, 247 SCRA 708; People vs. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676.
ix[9]
People vs. Alban, 245 SCRA 549; People vs. So, 247 SCRA 708; People vs. Patamama, 250 SCRA 603.
x[10]
Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 224 SCRA 477.
xi[11]
People vs. Sanchez, 213 SCRA 70.
xii[12]
People vs. Manhuyod, Jr., G. R. No. 124676, 20 May 1998.
xiii [13]
Ibid.,
xiv[14]
Ibid.,
xv[15]
249 SCRA 54.
xvi[16]
At p. 103.
xvii[17]
Del Mundo vs. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 348.
xviii [18]
253 SCRA 430.
xix[19]
At pp. 438-439.
ii[2]

xx[20]

Sumalpong vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 764.

Art. 2222, New Civil Code. The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any
source enumerated in Article 1157, x x x.
Art. 1157, New Civil Code. Obligations arise from: (1) Law; (2) Contracts; (3) Quasi-contracts; (4) Acts or
omissions punished by law; and (5) Quasi-delicts.
And not to temperate or nominal damages since this kind of damages may be allowed only in certain
classes of cases, without proof of actual or special damages, where the wrong done must in fact have caused
actual damages to the plaintiff, though from the nature of the case, he cannot furnish independent, distinct proof
thereof (15 Am Jue. 400). As provided in Art. 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate or moderate damages, which
are more but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary
loss has been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be provided with certainty. For
instance, injury to one's commercial credit or to the goodwill of the business firm is often hard to show in terms of
money (Araneta vs. Bank of America, 40 SCRA 144, 152).
In People vs. Mario Padlan @ "Marcos," Romeo Magleo @ "Motmot," and Alfredo Magleo @ "Boy," G.
R. No. 111263, 21 May (1998), the Court held: "[t]he award of P 100,00.00 for actual and temperate damages
cannot be allowed. Damages cannot be both actual and temperate. Temperate or moderate damages are
allowed because, while some pecuniary loss has been suffered, from the nature of the case its amount cannot
be proved with certainty. This is not the case here. The trial court awarded the P 100,000.00 as temperate
damages apparently because the prosecution failed to adduce proof of expenses in connection with the death,
wake, or burial of Rodolfo and Mateo Manzon but not because from the nature of the case it was not possible to
show with certainty the amount of the damage done. For the same reason, no award of actual damages can be
made."
xxi[21]

Art. 2206, New Civil Code. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at
least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be
paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased
on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of
his death;
(2) If the accused was obliged to give support according to the provisions of article 291, the recipient who is not
an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support from
the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand
moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
xxii[22]
Art. 2217, New Civil Code. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant's wrongful act or omission.
xxiii [23]

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

Art. 2219, New Civil Code. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
Adultery or concubinage;
Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
Illegal search;
Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
Malicious prosecution;
Acts mentioned in article 309;
Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also
recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brother and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9
of this article, in the order named.
xxiv[24]
See Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil. 829; 22 Am Jur 2d 2, p. 33.
xxv[25]
Art. 2216. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or
exemplary damages may be adjudicated. The assessment of such damages, except liquidated ones, is left to
the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of each case.
xxvi[26]

ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. - Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.
ART. 104. What is included in civil liability. - The civil liability established in article 100, 101, 102 and 103 of
this Code includes:
1.
Restitution;
2.
Reparation of the damage caused;
3.
Indemnification for consequential damages.
xxvii [27]

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1)
The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the
indemnity shall be paid., to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded
by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had
no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2)
If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of article 291, the
recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession,
may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact
duration to be fixed by the court;
(3)
The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.