EDWARDS v. LEWIS et al Doc.

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Case 1:06-cv-05044-RBK-AMD Document 4 Filed 03/30/2007 Page 1 of 16

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DALMA S. EDWARDS, :
: Civil Action No. 06-5044 (RBK)
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : OPINION
:
ALLIA J. LEWIS, et al., :
:
Defendants. :

APPEARANCES:

DALMA S. EDWARDS, Plaintiff pro se

KUGLER, District Judge

Plaintiff Dalma S. Edwards (“Edwards”), a federal prisoner

currently confined at the Federal Correctional Institution at

Fort Dix, New Jersey (“FCI Fort Dix”), at the time he filed his

Complaint, seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis.

Plaintiff initially submitted his Complaint without a complete

application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). On October 27,

2006, this Court issued an Order denying Edwards’ IFP application

without prejudice, and administratively terminating the action.

The Order also gave plaintiff thirty (30) days to submit a

complete IFP application with his prison account statement and

affidavit of indigency if he wished to re-open his case.

Dockets.Justia.com
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On November 30, 2006, Edwards submitted a motion to reopen

his case, providing a complete IFP application with his six-month

prison account statement. It appearing that plaintiff qualifies

to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court will grant plaintiff’s

application to proceed as an indigent and will direct the Clerk

of the Court to reopen this matter, and file the Complaint

without prepayment of fees.

Having reviewed the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A to determine whether it should be

dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief, the Court

concludes that this action should be dismissed for failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Edwards brings this civil action seeking monetary damages

under the Federal Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g), and Bivens v.

Six Unknown named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.

388 (1971). (Complaint, Preliminary Statement). In particular,

Edwards alleges that defendants have violated his rights under

the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. (Id.). The named

defendants are: Allia J. Lewis, Housing Unit Manager at FCI Fort

Dix; Leslie Harrell; Horace Thompson; and the Federal Bureau of

Prisons (“FBOP”). (Compl., Caption).

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Edwards alleges that the FBOP has failed to maintain an

accurate account of his prison record, namely, with respect to

plaintiff’s Financial Responsibility Program, which has adversely

affected plaintiff’s custody and classification status, and his

prison job and living quarters assignments. It also affects his

halfway house placement, and results in restrictions on his

commissary spending limit and other privileges.

Edwards relates that, on February 10, 2003, he was sentenced

by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

Virginia to serve a term of imprisonment and “to pay a fine of

$247,915.23, which was suspended in proportion to the amount of

plaintiff’s restitution payments and/or recovery by the U.S.

government of $247,915.23 in missing funds.” (Compl., Facts at ¶

2).

On December 8, 2003, plaintiff states that the Clerk of the

Court for the Eastern District of Virginia received $355,208.12

as restitution from funds seized from plaintiff. Edwards further

alleges that the district court issued an Order, on December 19,

2003, stating that the “fine is suspended and uncollectible and;

therefore, upon petition of the United States the fine imposed

along with any interest that has accrued is remitted.” (Compl.,

Facts at ¶ 5).

Edwards alleges that he brought the December 19, 2003 Order

to the attention of his Unit Team, giving them a copy and

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requesting that the FBOP correct his records. Plaintiff does not

attach a copy of the December 19, 2003 order to his Complaint.

Despite the December 19, 2003 Order, the FBOP has continued to

require Edwards to pay quarterly installments on the fine under

its Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (“IFRP”) policy.

Edwards was told that he had an outstanding restitution balance.

(Compl., Facts at ¶¶ 6-7).1

The Complaint further states that, over a period of time,

Edwards experienced financial hardship and was without any funds

except for his monthly $17.00 payment for prison employment.

Edwards explained to his Unit Team why he was unable to keep

paying the quarterly installments under the IFRP, and he was

placed in IFRP refusal status. Edwards kept questioning his Unit

Team as to why he was being denied commissary spending limits and

special housing assignments like other inmates. In particular,

1
The Court notes that Edwards has filed three habeas
petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in this district court,
challenging his sentence, the period of supervised release, and
more recently, the FBOP’s decision to limit his transitional
Community Corrections Center placement to one month. See Edwards
v. Samuels, Civil No. 06-485 (FLW)(dismissed); Edwards v.
Samuels, Civil No. 06-1483 (JBS)(dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction); and Edwards v. Samuels, Civil No. 06-5785
(RBK)(pending). None of these petitions allege any challenge to
the amount of restitution or fines as imposed, or the manner in
which they are to be paid. However, in the most recent petition,
the record provided by the Government shows that the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
imposed fines in the amount of $247,915.23 and restitution in the
amount of $593,892.99.

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Edwards questioned the denial of eligibility for halfway house

placement pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c).2

Edwards states that he has sought informal and formal

resolution of this matter through the Administrative Remedy

provisions (BP-8 through BP-11), but to no avail.3 Consequently,

on or about September 12, 2006, Edwards advised the Unit Team, in

writing, that his family will pay the quarterly sum due on his

court-ordered financial obligation directly to the district court

in the Eastern District of Virginia. He presented receipts as

proof of payment to his Unit Team. (Compl., Facts at 16-18).

Edwards attaches only one receipt, dated September 19, 2006, to

his Complaint.

2
In November 2005, Edwards wrote to his Housing Unit
Manager, defendant Allia J. Lewis, asking why his inability to
pay $25.00 quarterly under the IFRP made him ineligible for
halfway house placement. Lewis responded that “inmates who
refuse to participate in the IFRP shall not ordinarily
participate in CCC programs,” referring to FBOP Program Statement
(“PS”) 7310.04, Community Correction Center (CCC) utilization and
transfers. (Compl., Facts at ¶ 13). As noted above, Edwards has
filed a habeas petition under § 2241 challenging the decision to
deny him more than one month eligibility in a CCC. This petition
is currently pending.
3
Attachments to Edwards’ Complaint tend to dispute that
plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies. Edwards’
BP-9 was rejected because he did not attempt an informal
resolution before submitting his BP-9 Administrative Remedy Form.
Edwards filed an appeal, but he does not attach any further
notices or rejections with respect to his administrative appeal
process. Thus, there may be an issue as to whether Edwards has
in fact exhausted his administrative remedies before bringing
this action.

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On October 11, 2006, plaintiff’s Unit Team informed him

that, regardless of proof of payment by his family, Edwards would

be held in IFRP refusal status unless he agrees to enter and sign

an agreement to pay the $25.00 quarterly sum through the IFRP at

FCI Fort Dix. Edwards was told that if he refused to enter into

the contract, he would be recommended to receive only 30 days in

a halfway house. Edwards responded by providing the Unit Manager

with notice that the FBOP is in violation of the Privacy Act

pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5) and (6). (Compl., Facts at ¶¶

19-20).

On October 18, 2006, defendant Lewis responded to Edwards’

notice, advising plaintiff that he must enter into a financial

contract with the Unit Team even if payments are being made to

the court through community resources. Edwards contends that

this is contrary to PS 5380.08, which allows for payments to be

made from non-institution sources. (Compl., Facts at ¶¶ 21-22).

Edwards asserts that defendants’ actions violate his rights

under the Fifth Amendment, depriving him of due process and equal

protection of law. He claims that he has suffered mental and

emotional distress, and made to live in fear of acts of reprisal

by defendants.4 He further complains that his 10%/six month

4
Plaintiff does not articulate the alleged “reprisals”.
This Court finds that any punitive measures against Edwards are
related to his refusal to participate in the IFRP, and are thus
constitutional. Any limitations on Edwards’ privileges related
to IFRP refusal status cannot be considered adverse actions to

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transfer date to a halfway house was November 27, 2006, but the

IFRP refusal status has prevented his transfer. (Compl., Facts

at ¶¶ 23-25).

The Complaint seeks declaratory relief, namely, that the

quarterly payments by plaintiff’s family directly to the district

court be deemed to satisfy plaintiff’s IFRP requirement; and that

defendants be found to have violated federal law, 5 U.S.C. §§

552a(d), (e)(5) and (g)(1)(A), (C). Plaintiff also seeks

compensatory and punitive damages in excess of $400,000.00.

II. STANDARDS FOR A SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-

134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996),

requires a district court to review a complaint in a civil action

in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks

redress against a governmental employee or entity. The Court is

required to identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss

any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a

defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.

In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the

Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the

satisfy a constitutional retaliation claim, if plaintiff is

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plaintiff. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); United

States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). The Court must

“accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint and all

reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Morse v. Lower

Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). The Court

need not, however, credit a pro se plaintiff’s “bald assertions”

or “legal conclusions.” Id.

A complaint is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis

either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

325 (1989) (interpreting the predecessor of § 1915(e)(2), the

former § 1915(d)). The standard for evaluating whether a

complaint is “frivolous” is an objective one. Deutsch v. United

States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1086-87 (3d Cir. 1995).

A pro se complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a

claim only if it appears “‘beyond doubt that the plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle

him to relief.’” Haines, 404 U.S. at 521 (quoting Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d

371, 373 (3d Cir. 1981). However, where a complaint can be

remedied by an amendment, a district court may not dismiss the

complaint with prejudice, but must permit the amendment. Denton

v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992); Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d

229 (3d Cir. 2004)(complaint that satisfied notice pleading

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requirement that it contain short, plain statement of the claim

but lacked sufficient detail to function as a guide to discovery

was not required to be dismissed for failure to state a claim;

district court should permit a curative amendment before

dismissing a complaint, unless an amendment would be futile or

inequitable); Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103,

108 (3d Cir. 2002) (dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Inmate Financial Responsibility Program

The Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (“IFRP”) is a

work program instituted by the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to

encourage “each sentenced inmate to meet his or her legitimate

financial obligations.” 28 C.F.R. § 545.10. The program allows

for the development of a financial plan so that inmates may

satisfy enumerated obligations, such as restitution payments,

while incarcerated. 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(a). The refusal by an

inmate to comply with the provisions of his financial plan may

result in the loss of some privileges, including, inter alia,

limitations on inmate pay, work and housing restrictions, and

eligibility for community-based programs. 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(d).

B. Bivens Claim

Edwards brings this action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown

Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

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In Bivens, the Supreme Court held that one is entitled to recover

monetary damages for injuries suffered as a result of federal

officials’ violations of the Fourth Amendment. In doing so, the

Supreme Court created a new tort as it applied to federal

officers, and a federal counterpart to the remedy created by 42

U.S.C. § 1983.5 The Supreme Court has also implied Bivens

damages remedies directly under the Eighth Amendment, see Carlson

v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), and the Fifth Amendment, see Davis

v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).

In order to state a claim under Bivens, a claimant must show

(1) a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws

of the United States; and (2) that the deprivation of the right

was caused by an official acting under color of federal law. See

Mahoney v. Nat’l Org. For Women, 681 F. Supp. 129, 132 (D. Conn.

1987)(citing Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-56

(1978)).

The United States has sovereign immunity except where it

consents to be sued. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206,

212 (1983). In the absence of such a waiver of immunity, Edwards

5
Bivens actions are simply the federal counterpart to
§ 1983 actions brought against state officials who violate
federal constitutional or statutory rights. Egervary v. Young,
366 F.3d 238, 246 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1049
(2005). Both are designed to provide redress for constitutional
violations. Thus, while the two bodies of law are not “precisely
parallel”, there is a “general trend” to incorporate § 1983 law
into Bivens suits. Chin v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir.
1987).

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cannot proceed in an action for damages against the United States

or an agency of the federal government for alleged deprivation of

a constitutional right, see FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-87

(1994), or against any of the individual defendants in their

official capacities, see Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166

(1985) (a suit against a government officer in his or her

official capacity is a suit against the government). Therefore,

the Complaint is dismissed in its entirety against the named

defendant FBOP.

However, a Bivens-type action seeking damages from the

remaining defendants is an action against them in their

individual capacities only. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Sears, 33

F.3d 182, 185 (2d Cir. 1994); Johnston v. Horne, 875 F.2d 1415,

1424 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, Edwards is seeking to recover money

damages from federal officials acting in their individual

capacities.

Edwards alleges that the individual defendants have violated

his rights under the Fifth Amendment, depriving him of due

process and equal protection of law. Specifically, he claims

that the IFRP refusal status has adversely affected his custody

and classification status, his prison job and living quarters

assignments, and his commissary spending limit and other

privileges. More importantly, it has affected plaintiff’s

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halfway house placement, restricting Edwards to one month in a

halfway house before his release.

1. Due Process Claim

The Complaint does not articulate any facts to support a due

process violation. Consistently, due process challenges to the

IFRP have been rejected by most courts. See Weinberger v. United

States, 268 F.3d 346, 361, n. 6 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. dismissed,

535 U.S. 967 (2002); Dorman v. Thornburgh, 955 F.2d 57, 58-59

(D.C.Cir. 1992)(rejecting due process claim of inmate who was

removed from his work assignment for his refusal to participate

in the IFRP); Johnpoll v. Thornburgh, 898 F.2d 849, 851 (2d Cir.

1990)(participation in IFRP does not violate due process because

it is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective

of rehabilitation), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 819 (1990); James v.

Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627, 629 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 870

(1989). In particular, a federal prisoner, like Edwards, has no

cognizable liberty or property interest in any particular prison

job assignment, or in being placed or transferred to any

particular prison facility, and therefore, Edwards would not be

entitled to any due process protections against the threatened

loss of any prison job or placement for his failure to comply

with the provisions of the IFRP. See Williams v. Farrior, 334 F.

Supp.2d 898, 904 (E.D.Va. 2004), aff’d 122 Fed. Appx. 65 (4th

Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 260 (2005). Moreover, even

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assuming that Edwards does have some protected interest in his

placement in a halfway house, enforcement of the IFRP

requirements is reasonably related to legitimate penological

interests and, therefore, does not violate this interest. Id.

(citing James, 866 F.2d at 630). Therefore, this claim will be

dismissed for failure to state a claim.

2. Equal Protection Claim

Next, Edwards appears to be arguing that his right to equal

protection is being violated because his IFRP refusal status has

placed restrictions on his commissary spending limits, special

housing assignments, and other privileges, unlike other inmates.

In particular, Edwards states that his eligibility for halfway

house placement, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c), has been

limited to one month.

To state a claim for an equal protection violation in a

prison setting, the inmate must demonstrate “that he was treated

differently than others similarly situated as a result of

intentional or purposeful discrimination. ... He must also show

that the disparity in treatment cannot survive the appropriate

level of scrutiny, which, in a prison setting, means that [a

plaintiff] must demonstrate that his treatment was not reasonably

related to any legitimate penological interests.” Phillips v.

Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2005)(internal citation,

quotation marks, and alterations omitted); see also Wilson v.

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Schillinger, 761 F.2d 921, 929 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475

U.S. 1096 (1986). Courts have consistently held that in the

absence of a fundamental right or a protected class, equal

protection only requires that a regulation which results in

unequal treatment of an inmate bear some rational relationship to

a legitimate penological interest. See McGinnis v. Royster, 410

U.S. 263 (1973); Hodges v. Klein, 562 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1977).

Because Edwards has not shown that he has been treated

differently than other inmates who have refused to cooperate with

the IFRP, and because the IFRP serves the legitimate

rehabilitative purpose of promoting inmate financial

responsibility, James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d at 630, plaintiff’s

claim that the IFRP has caused him to be restricted to one-month

placement in a halfway house does not state a violation of his

right to equal protection. Accordingly, this claim will be

dismissed for failure to state a claim.

C. Privacy Act Claim

Edwards also asserts that defendants violated the Privacy

Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(d), (e)(5) and (g)(1)(A), (C). The Privacy

Act requires that an agency “maintain all records which are used

by the agency in making any determination about any individual

with such accuracy ... as is reasonably necessary to assure

fairness to the individual in the determination.” 5 U.S.C. §

552a(e)(5).

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An individual may bring a civil action against a government

agency under the Privacy Act if he can show that the agency used

erroneous records, in violation of § 552a(e)(5), to make a

determination adverse to the individual. 5 U.S.C.

§ 552a(g)(1)(C). However, the Privacy Act authorizes the head of

certain agencies to promulgate rules exempting any system of

records from the “accuracy” requirement of § 552a(e)(5). See 5

U.S.C. § 552a(j). Accordingly, the BOP has exempted IFRP records

from the “accuracy” requirement. See System of Records, 67

Fed.Reg. 31371-01 (2002); Implementation, 67 Fed.Reg. 51754-01

(2002)(codified at 28 C.F.R. §§ 16.97(j) and (k)(2003)). See

also Williams v. Farrior, 334 F. Supp.2d 898, 905 (E.D.Va. 2004),

aff’d 122 Fed. Appx. 65 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 260

(2005).

Therefore, under this rule, Edwards cannot assert any claim

under the Privacy Act against BOP officials regarding the

accuracy of his IFRP record. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim

under the Privacy Act will be dismissed for failure to state a

cognizable claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court will dismiss the

Complaint in its entirety against the Federal Bureau of Prisons,

based on sovereign immunity, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) and 1915A(b)(2), and against the remaining

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defendants, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and

1915A(b)(1), for failure to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted. An appropriate order follows.

s/Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge
Dated: March 30, 2007

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