Operation Barbarossa

Operation Barbarossa (German: Unternehmen Bar- 1 Background

barossa) was the code name for Nazi Germany's invasion
of the Soviet Union during World War II, which began on
1.1 Racial policies of Nazi Germany
22 June 1941. The operation was driven by Adolf Hitler's
ideological desire to conquer the Soviet territories as outMain article: Racial policy of Nazi Germany
lined in his 1925 manifesto Mein Kampf (My Struggle).
In the two years leading up to the invasion, the two countries signed political and economic pacts for strategic purposes. Still, on 18 December 1940, Hitler authorized an
invasion of the Soviet Union for a start date of 15 May
1941, but this was not met; instead, the invasion began
on 22 June 1941. Over the course of the operation, about
four million soldiers of the Axis powers invaded the Soviet Union along a 2,900-kilometer (1,800 mi) front, the
largest invasion force in the history of warfare. In addition to troops, the Germans employed some 600,000 motor vehicles and between 600700,000 horses. It marked
the beginning of the rapid escalation of the war, both geographically and in the formation of the Allied coalition.

As early as 1925, Adolf Hitler vaguely declared in his

political manifesto and autobiography Mein Kampf (My
Struggle) that he would invade the Soviet Union, asserting that the German people needed to secure Lebensraum
(living space) to ensure the survival of Germany for
generations to come.[19] Nazism viewed the Soviet Union
(and all of Eastern Europe) as populated by non-Aryan
Untermenschen (sub-humans), ruled by "Jewish Bolshevik conspirators.[19] Mein Kampf said Germanys
destiny was to turn to the East as it did six hundred
years ago.[20] Accordingly, it was stated Nazi policy to
kill, deport, or enslave the majority of Russian and other
Slavic populations and repopulate the land with Germanic peoples.[19] The Germans belief in their ethnic
superiority is discernible in ocial German records and
by pseudoscientic articles in German periodicals at the
time, which covered topics such as how to deal with alien
populations.[21]

Operationally, the Germans won resounding victories and

occupied some of the most important economic areas
of the Soviet Union, mainly in Ukraine, both inicting and sustaining heavy casualties. Despite their successes, the German oensive stalled on the outskirts
of Moscow and was subsequently pushed back by a
Soviet counteroensive. The Red Army repelled the
Wehrmacht's strongest blows and forced Germany into
a war of attrition for which it was unprepared. The Germans would never again mount a simultaneous oensive
along the entire strategic Soviet-Axis front. The failure
of the operation drove Hitler to demand for further operations inside the USSR, all of which eventually failed,
such as Operation Nordlicht, Case Blue, and Operation
Citadel.
The failure of Operation Barbarossa was a turning point
in the fortunes of the Third Reich. Most importantly, the
operation opened up the Eastern Front, to which more
forces were committed than in any other theater of war
in world history. The Eastern Front became the site of
some of the largest battles, most horric atrocities, and
highest casualties for Soviets and Germans alike, all of
which inuenced the course of both World War II and
the subsequent history of the 20th century. The German
forces captured millions of Soviet prisoners who were not
granted protections stipulated in the Geneva Conventions.
Most of them never returned alive; Germany deliberately
starved the prisoners to death as part of a "Hunger Plan"
that aimed to reduce the population of Eastern Europe
and then re-populate it with ethnic Germans.

In their plan to create the Greater Germanic Reich the Nazi leadership aimed to conquer Eastern European territories, Germanise
those seen as part of the Aryan race, subjugate and exterminate
the Soviet populations, and colonise the territory with ethnic German settlers.

Before and during the invasion of the Soviet Union,

German troops were heavily indoctrinated with antiBolshevik, anti-Semitic and anti-Slavic ideology via
movies, radio, lectures, books and leaets.[22] Following
1

2
the invasion, Wehrmacht ocers told their soldiers to
target people who were described as Jewish Bolshevik
subhumans, the Mongol hordes, the Asiatic ood
and the Red beast.[23] Nazi propaganda portrayed the
war against the Soviet Union as both an ideological war
between German National Socialism and Jewish Bolshevism and a racial war between the Germans and the Jewish, Gypsies and Slavic Untermenschen.[24] German army
commanders cast the Jews as the major cause behind the
partisan struggle.[25] The main guideline policy for German troops was Where theres a partisan, theres a Jew,
and where theres a Jew, theres a partisan.[26] Many German troops did view the war in Nazi terms and regarded
their Soviet enemies as sub-human.[27]
After the war began, the Nazis issued a ban on sexual relations between Germans and foreign slave workers.[28]
There were regulations enacted against the Ost-Arbeiter
(Eastern Workers) that included the death penalty
for sexual relations with a German person.[29] Heinrich
Himmler, in his secret memorandum, Reections on the
Treatment of Peoples of Alien Races in the East, (dated 25
May 1940) outlined the future plans for the non-German
populations in the East.[30] Himmler believed the Germanization process in Eastern Europe would be complete
when in the East dwell only men with truly German, Germanic blood.[31]
The Nazi secret plan Generalplan Ost (General Plan for
the East), which was prepared in 1941 and conrmed
in 1942, called for a new order of ethnographical relations in the territories occupied by Nazi Germany in
Eastern Europe. The plan envisaged ethnic cleansing, executions and enslavement of the overwhelming majority
of the populations of conquered counties with very small
diering percentages of the various conquered nations
undergoing Germanisation, expulsion into the depths of
Russia and other fates. The net eect of this plan would
be to ensure that the conquered territories would be Germanized. It was divided into two parts: the Kleine Planung (Small Plan), which covered actions which were
to be taken during the war, and the Grosse Planung (Big
Plan), which covered actions to be undertaken after the
war was won, and to be implemented gradually over a period of 25 to 30 years.[32]

BACKGROUND

ther group in their ultimate struggle for Lebensraum.[34]

1.2 German-Soviet relations of 193940

Main article: GermanySoviet Union relations before
1941
In August 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a
non-aggression pact in Moscow known as the Molotov
Ribbentrop Pact shortly before the German invasion of
Poland that triggered the outbreak of World War II in
Europe. A secret protocol to the pact outlined an agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union on the division of the eastern European border states between their
respective "spheres of inuence": the Soviet Union and
Germany would partition Poland in the event of an invasion by Germany, and Russia would be allowed to overrun the Baltic states and Finland.[35][36] The conclusion
of this pact was indeed followed by a Soviet invasion of
Poland that led to the annexation of the eastern part of
the country.[19] The pact stunned the world because of
the parties earlier mutual hostility and their conicting
ideologies.[37] As a result of the pact, Germany and the
Soviet Union maintained reasonably strong diplomatic relations for two years and fostered an important economic
relationship. The countries entered a trade pact in 1940
by which the Soviets received German military equipment and trade goods in exchange for raw materials, such
as oil and wheat, to help Germany circumvent a British
blockade of Germany.[38]
Despite the parties ostensibly cordial relations, each side
was highly suspicious of the others intentions. After Germany entered the Axis Pact with Japan and Italy, it began negotiations about a potential Soviet entry into the
pact.[39] After two days of negotiations in Berlin from 12
to 14 November 1940, Germany presented a written proposal for a Soviet entry into the Axis. On 25 November 1940, the Soviet Union oered a written counterproposal to join the Axis if Germany would agree to refrain from interference in the Soviet Unions sphere of inuence, but Germany did not respond.[39] As both sides
began colliding with each other in Eastern Europe, conict appeared more likely, although they did sign a border
and commercial agreement addressing several open issues in January 1941. Some historians also believe that
Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, despite providing an amicable front to Hitler, did not wish to remain allies with Germany. Rather, Stalin might have had intentions to break
o from Germany and proceed with his own campaign
against Germany as well as the rest of Europe.[40]

Evidence from a speech given by General Erich Hoepner

indicates the disposition of Operation Barbarossa and the
Nazi racial plan, as he informed the 4th Panzer Group
that the war against Russia was an essential part of the
German peoples struggle for existence (Daseinkampf),
also referring to the imminent battle as the old struggle
of Germans against Slavs and even stated, the struggle must aim at the annihilation of todays Russia and
must therefore be waged with unparalleled harshness.[33]
Racial motivations were central to Nazi ideology and 1.3 German invasion plans
played a key role in planning for Operation Barbarossa
since both Jews and Communists were considered equiv- See also: A-A line, The Ural mountains in Nazi planning
alent enemies of the Nazi state. Nazi imperialist ambi- and Lossberg study
tions were exercised without moral consideration for ei- Stalins reputation as a brutal dictator contributed both

1.3

German invasion plans

3
Operation Otto. Hitler, however, was dissatised with
these plans and on 18 December issued Directive No. 21,
which called for a new battle plan, now codenamed Operation Barbarossa.[44] The operation was named after
medieval Emperor Frederick Barbarossa of the Holy Roman Empire, a leader of the Third Crusade in the 12th
century.[44] The invasion was set for 15 May 1941, but
this objective would not be met.[45]

According to a 1978 essay by German historian Andreas

Hillgruber, the invasion plans drawn up by the German
military elite were coloured by hubris stemming from
the rapid defeat of France at the hands of the invincible Wehrmacht and by ignorance tempered by traditional German stereotypes of Russia as a primitive, backward Asiatic country. Red Army soldiers were considered brave and tough, but the ocer corps was held
in contempt. The leadership of the Wehrmacht paid little attention to politics, culture and the considerable industrial capacity of the Soviet Union, in favour of a very
The geopolitical disposition of Europe in 1941, immediately be- narrow military view.[46] Hillgruber argued that because
fore the start of Operation Barbarossa. The grey area represents these assumptions were shared by the entire military elite,
Nazi Germany, its allies, and countries under its rm control.
Hitler was able to push through with a war of annihilation that would be waged in the most inhumane fashion
possible with the complicity of several military leaders,
to the Nazis justication of their assault and their faith even though it was quite clear that this would be in violain success; many competent and experienced military of- tion of all accepted norms of warfare.[46]
cers were killed in the Great Purge of the 1930s, leavIn autumn 1940, high-ranking German ocials drafted
ing the Red Army with a relatively inexperienced leada memorandum on the dangers of an invasion of the Soership compared to that of their German counterparts.
viet Union. They said Ukraine, Belorussia and the Baltic
The Nazis often emphasized the Soviet regimes brutality
States would end up as only a further economic burden
when targeting the Slavs with propaganda.[41] They also
for Germany.[47] It was argued that the Soviets in their
claimed that the Red Army was preparing to attack the
current bureaucratic form were harmless and that the ocGermans, and their own invasion was thus presented as a
cupation would not benet Germany.[47] Hitler disagreed
pre-emptive strike.[41]
with economists about the risks and told his right-hand
In the summer of 1940, following the rising tension be- man Hermann Gring, the chief of the Luftwae, that he
tween the Soviet Union and Germany over territories in would no longer listen to misgivings about the economic
the Balkans, an eventual invasion of the Soviet Union dangers of a war with Russia.[48] It is speculated that this
seemed to Hitler to be the only solution.[42] While no con- was passed on to General Georg Thomas, who had procrete plans were made yet, Hitler told one of his generals duced reports that predicted a net economic drain for
in June that the victories in Western Europe nally freed Germany in the event of an invasion of the Soviet Union
his hands for his important real task: the showdown with unless its economy was captured intact and the Caucasus
Bolshevism.[43]
oilelds seized in the rst blow, and he consequently re[48]
The Red
Although German generals warned Hitler that occupy- vised his future report to t Hitlers wishes.
Army's
ineptitude
in
the
Winter
War
against
Finland
in
ing Western Russia would create more of a drain than
193940
convinced
Hitler
of
a
quick
victory
within
a
few
a relief for Germanys economic situation, he anticipated compensatory benets, such as the demobilization months. He did not anticipate a long campaign lasting
of entire divisions to relieve the acute labor shortage in into the winter, and therefore adequate preparations, such
winterization of
German industry; the exploitation of Ukraine as a re- as the distribution of warm clothing and[44]
vehicles
and
lubricants,
were
not
made.
liable source of immense agricultural products; the use
of forced labor to stimulate Germanys overall economy;
and the expansion of territory to improve Germanys efforts to isolate Great Britain.[44] Hitler was convinced that
Britain would sue for peace once the Germans triumphed
in the Soviet Union.[44]

Beginning in March 1941, Grings Green Folder laid

out details for the disposal of the Soviet economy after conquest. The Hunger Plan outlined how the entire urban population of conquered territories was to be
starved to death, thus creating an agricultural surplus to
and urban space for the German upper
On 5 December 1940, Hitler received the nal military feed Germany
[49]
Nazi
policy
aimed to destroy the Soviet Union
class.
plans for the invasion the German High Command had
as
a
political
entity
in
accordance with the geopolitical
been working on since July 1940 under the codename

GERMAN PREPARATIONS

Lebensraum ideals for the benet of future generations

of the "Nordic master race".[41] In 1941, Nazi ideologue
Alfred Rosenberg, later appointed Reich Minister of the
Occupied Eastern Territories, suggested that conquered
Soviet territory should be administered in the following
Reichskommissariate (Reich Commissionerships):
German military planners also researched Napoleons
failed invasion of Russia. In their calculations, they concluded that there was little danger of a large-scale retreat
of the Red Army into the Russian interior, as it could
not aord to give up the Baltic states, Ukraine, or the
Moscow and Leningrad regions, all of which were vital to the Red Army for supply reasons and would thus
have to be defended.[52] Hitler and his generals disagreed
on where Germany should focus its energy.[44] Hitler,
in many discussions with his generals, repeated his order of Leningrad rst, the Donbass second, Moscow
third";[53] but he consistently emphasized the destruction
of the Red Army over the achievement of specic terrain objectives.[54] Hitler believed Moscow to be of no
great importance in the defeat of the Soviet Union and
instead believed victory would come with the destruction
of the Red Army west of the capital, especially west of the
Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers, and this pervaded the
plan for Barbarossa.[55][56] This belief later led to disputes
between Hitler and several German senior ocers, including Heinz Guderian, Gerhard Engel, Fedor von Bock
German soldiers (Flamethrower team) in the Soviet Union, June
and Franz Halder, who believed the decisive victory could 1941
only be delivered at Moscow.[57] Hitler had grown overcondent in his own military judgement from the rapid
successes in Western Europe.[44]
Adolf Hitler

German preparations

The postponement of Barbarossa from the initially

planned date of 15 May to the actual invasion date of 22
June 1941 (a 38-day delay) occurred for a number of reasons. Most importantly, the Balkans Campaign required a
diversion of troops and resources that hampered preparations, and an unusually wet winter kept rivers at full ood
until late spring. The full oods could have discouraged
an earlier attack, even if it was unlikely to have happened
before the end of the Balkans Campaign.[60]

The Germans had begun massing troops near the Soviet

border even before the campaign in the Balkans had nished. By the third week of February 1941, 680,000
German soldiers were gathered in assembly areas on the
Romanian-Soviet border.[58] In preparation for the attack,
Hitler moved more than 3.2 million German and about
500,000 Axis soldiers to the Soviet border, launched
The importance of the delay is still debated.[60] William
many aerial surveillance missions over Soviet territory, Shirer argued that Hitlers Balkans Campaign had deand stockpiled war materiel in the East.
layed the commencement of Barbarossa by several weeks
Although the Soviet High Command was alarmed by this, and thereby jeopardized it.[61] He cited the deputy chief
Stalins belief that the Third Reich was unlikely to at- of the German General Sta in 1941 Friedrich Paulus,
tack only two years after signing the MolotovRibbentrop who claimed the campaign resulted in a delay of about
Pact resulted in a slow Soviet preparation.[44] Since April ve weeks.[62] This gure is corroborated by both
1941, the Germans had begun setting up Operation the German Naval War Diary and Gerd von RundstHaisch to add substance to their claims that Britain was edt.[62] Antony Beevor names a variety of factors that
the real target. These simulated preparations in Norway delayed Barbarossa, including the delay in distributing
and the English Channel coast included activities such as motor transport, problems with fuel distribution, and
ship concentrations, reconnaissance ights and training the diculty in establishing forward airelds for the
exercises.[44]
Luftwae.[63]
We have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten The Germans deployed one independent regiment, one
structure will come crashing down.[19][59]
separate motorized training brigade and 153 divisions for

5
Barbarossa, which included 104 infantry, 19 panzer and
15 motorized infantry divisions in three army groups,
nine security divisions to operate in conquered territories, four divisions in Finland and two divisions as reserve under the direct control of OKH.[64] These were
equipped with about 3,350 tanks, 7,200 artillery pieces,
2,770 aircraft (that amounted to 65 percent of the Luftwae), about 600,000 motor vehicles and 625,000
700,000 horses.[65][66][44] Finland slated 14 divisions for
the invasion,[lower-alpha 1] and Romania oered 13 divisions and eight brigades over the course of Barbarossa.[3]
The entire Axis forces, 3.8 million personnel,[2] deployed
across a front extending from the Arctic Ocean southward to the Black Sea,[54] were all controlled by the OKH
and organized into Army Norway, Army Group North,
Army Group Center and Army Group South, alongside
three luftotten (air eets, the air force equivalent of
army groups) that supported the army groups: Luftotte
1 for North, Luftotte 2 for Center and Luftotte 4 for
South.[3]
Army Norway was to operate in far northern Scandinavia
and bordering Soviet territories.[3] Army Group North
was to march through the Baltic states into northern Russia, either take or destroy the city of Leningrad and link
up with Finnish forces.[67][68][53] Army Group Center,
the army group equipped with the most armour and air
power,[69] was to strike from Poland into Belorussia and
the west-central regions of Russia proper, and advance to
Smolensk and then Moscow.[68][53] Army Group South
was to strike the heavily populated and agricultural heartland of Ukraine, taking Kiev before continuing eastward
over the steppes of southern USSR to the Volga with
the aim of controlling the oil-rich Caucasus.[68][53] Army
Group South was deployed in two sections separated by
a 198-mile (319 km) gap. The northern section, which
contained the army groups only panzer group, was in
southern Poland right next to Army Group Center, and
the southern section was in Romania.[70]
The German forces in the rear (mostly Waen-SS and
Einsatzgruppen units) were to operate in conquered territories to counter any partisan activity in areas they controlled, as well as to execute captured Soviet political
commissars.[41] The ocial plan for Barbarossa assumed
that the army groups would be able to advance freely to
their primary objectives simultaneously, without spreading thin, once they had won the border battles and destroyed the Red Armys forces in the border area.[71]

Soviet preparations

In 1930, Mikhail Tukhachevsky, a prominent military theorist in tank warfare in the interwar period
and later Marshal of the Soviet Union, forwarded a
memo to the Kremlin that lobbied for colossal investment in the resources required for the mass production
of weapons, pressing the case for 40,000 aircraft and

50,000 tanks.[72] In the early 1930s, a very modern operational doctrine for the Red Army was developed and
promulgated in the 1936 Field Regulations in the form of
the Deep Battle Concept. Defense expenditure also grew
rapidly from just 12 percent of the gross national product
in 1933 to 18 percent by 1940.[73]
But during Stalins Great Purge in the late 1930s, which
was still lightly ongoing at the start of the war in June
1941, the ocer corps of the Red Army was decimated
and their replacements, appointed by Stalin for political reasons, often lacked military competence.[74][75][76]
Of the ve Marshals of the Soviet Union appointed in
1935, only two survived Stalins purge. 15 out of 16 army
commanders, 50 out of the 57 corps commanders, 154
out of the 186 divisional commanders and 401 out of
456 colonels were killed, and many other ocers were
dismissed.[74] In total, about 30,000 Red Army personnel were executed.[77] Stalin further underscored his control by reasserting the role of political commissars at the
divisional level and below to oversee the political loyalty
of the Army to the regime. The commissars held a position equal to that of the commander of the unit they were
overseeing.[74] But in spite of eorts to ensure the political subservience of the armed forces, in the wake of Red
Armys poor performance in Poland and in the Winter
War, about 80 percent of the ocers dismissed during
the Great Purge were reinstated by 1941. Also, between
January 1939 and May 1941, 161 new divisions were
activated.[78][79] Although about 75 percent of all the ocers had been in their position for less than one year at the
start of the German invasion of 1941, many of the short
tenures can be attributed not only to the purge, but also
to the rapid increase in creation of military units.[79][44]
In the Soviet Union, speaking to his generals in December 1940, Stalin mentioned Hitlers references to an attack on the Soviet Union in Mein Kampf and that Hitler
believed the Red Army would need four years to ready itself. Stalin declared we must be ready much earlier and
we will try to delay the war for another two years.[80] As
early as August 1940, British intelligence had received
hints of German plans to attack the Soviets only a week
after Hitler informally approved the plans for Barbarossa
and warned the Soviet Union accordingly.[81] But Stalins
distrust of the British led him to ignore their warnings
in the belief that they were a trick designed to bring the
Soviet Union into the war on their side.[81] He had an
ill-founded condence in the MolotovRibbentrop Pact
and suspected the British of trying to spread false rumours in order to trigger a war between Germany and
the USSR.[82] In early 1941, Stalins own intelligence
services and American intelligence gave regular and repeated warnings of an impending German attack.[83] Russian spy Richard Sorge also gave Stalin the exact German
launch date, but Sorge and other informers had previously
given dierent invasion dates that passed peacefully before the actual invasion.[84] Stalin acknowledged the possibility of an attack in general and therefore made sig-

SOVIET PREPARATIONS

nicant preparations, but decided not to run the risk of contained 57 divisions that were still mobilizing, most of
provoking Hitler.[85]
which were still seriously understrength.[90] The second
echelon was undetected by German intelligence until days
after the invasion commenced, in most cases only when
the German ground forces bumped into them.[90]
At the start of the invasion, the manpower of the Soviet military force that had been mobilized was 5.3
5.5 million,[2][91] and it was still increasing as the Soviet
reserve force of 14 million, with at least basic military
training, continued to mobilize.[92][93] The Red Army
was dispersed and still preparing when the invasion commenced. Their units were often separated and lacked adequate transportation.[94]

Marshal Zhukov speaking at a military conference in Moscow,

September 1941

Beginning in July 1940, the Red Army General Sta

developed war plans that identied the Wehrmacht as
the most dangerous threat to the Soviet Union, and that
in the case of a war with Germany, the Wehrmachts
main attack would come through the region north of the
Pripyat Marshes into Belorussia;[86][71] which later proved
to be correct.[86] But Stalin disagreed, and in October he
authorized the development of new plans that assumed
a German attack would focus on the region south of
Pripyat Marshes towards the economically vital regions
in Ukraine. This became the basis for all subsequent Soviet war plans and the deployment of their armed forces
in preparation for the German invasion.[86][87]
In early 1941 Stalin authorized the State Defense Plan
1941 (DP-41), which along with the Mobilization Plan
1941 (MP-41), called for the deployment of 186 divisions, as the rst strategic echelon, in the four military
districts[lower-alpha 2] of the western Soviet Union that faced
the Axis territories; and the deployment of another 51
divisions along the Dvina and Dnieper rivers as the second strategic echelon under Stavka control, which in the
case of a German invasion was tasked to spearhead a Soviet counteroensive along with the remaining forces of
the rst echelon.[87] But on 22 June 1941 the rst echelon only contained 171 divisions,[lower-alpha 3] numbering
2.62.9 million;[2][88][89] and the second strategic echelon

The Soviet Union had some 23,000 tanks in service,[44]

of which about 11,000 were in the western military districts that faced the German invasion force.[7] Hitler later
declared to some of his generals, If I had known about
the Russian tank strength in 1941 I would not have
attacked.[95] However, maintenance and readiness standards were very poor; ammunition and radios were in
short supply, and many armoured units lacked the trucks
for supplies.[44] The most advanced Soviet tank models
the KV-1 and T-34 which were superior to all current German tanks, as well as all designs still in development as of the summer 1941,[96] were not available in
large numbers at the time the invasion commenced.[84]
Furthermore, in the autumn of 1939, the Soviets disbanded their mechanized corps and partly dispersed their
tanks to infantry divisions;[97] but following their observation of the German campaign in France, in late 1940
they began to reorganize most of their armored assets
back into mechanized corps with a target strength of
1,031 tanks each.[78] But these large armoured formations were unwieldy, and moreover they were spread out
in scattered garrisons, with their subordinate divisions up
to 100 kilometres apart.[78] Furthermore, the reorganization was still in progress and incomplete when Barbarossa commenced.[98][97] Soviet tank units were rarely
well equipped, and they lacked training and logistical support. Units were sent into combat with no arrangements
in place for refueling, ammunition resupply, or personnel replacement. Often, after a single engagement, units
were destroyed or rendered ineective.[94] The Soviet numerical advantage in heavy equipment was thoroughly
oset by the superior training and organization of the
Wehrmacht.[77]
The Soviet Air Force (VVS) held the numerical advantage with a total of approximately 19,533 aircraft, which
made it the largest air force in the world in the summer
of 1941.[99] About 7,1339,100 of these were deployed in
the ve western military districts,[lower-alpha 2][99][7][8] and
an additional 1445 were under Naval control.[100]
Historians have debated whether Stalin was planning an
invasion of German territory in the summer of 1941. The
debate began in the late 1980s when Viktor Suvorov published a journal article and later the book Icebreaker in

7
which he stated that Stalin had seen the outbreak of war
in western Europe as an opportunity to spread communist
revolutions throughout the continent, and that the Soviet
military was being deployed for an imminent attack at
the time of the German invasion.[102] This view had also
been advanced by former German generals following the
war.[103] Suvorovs thesis was fully or partially accepted
by some historians, including Valeri Danilov, Joachim
Homann, Mikhail Meltyukhov and Vladimir Nevezhin,
and attracted public attention in Germany, Israel and
Russia.[104][105] However, it has been strongly rejected
by most historians of this period,[106] and Icebreaker is
generally considered to be an anti-Soviet tract in western countries.[107] David Glantz and Gabriel Gorodetsky
wrote books to rebut Suvorovs arguments,[108] and most
historians believe that Stalin was seeking to avoid war in
1941 as he believed that his military was not ready to ght
the German forces.[109]

Order of battle

Main article: Order of battle for Operation Barbarossa

Invasion

entire front.[120] The heavy air-raids stretched as far as

Kronstadt near Leningrad, Ismail in Bessarabia, to Sevastopol in the Crimea; meanwhile, troops on the ground
crossed through at numerous places accompanied in some
locales by members of Lithuanian and Ukrainian fth column.[123] Roughly three million soldiers of the Wehrmacht went into action and faced slightly fewer Soviet troops
at the border.[122]
At around noon, the news of the invasion was broadcast
to the population by Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav
Molotov: "... Without a declaration of war, German
forces fell on our country, attacked our frontiers in many
places... The Red Army and the whole nation will wage
a victorious Patriotic War for our beloved country, for
honour, for liberty ... Our cause is just. The enemy
will be beaten. Victory will be ours!"[124][125] By calling
upon the populations devotion to their nation rather than
the Party, Molotov struck a patriotic chord that helped
a stunned people absorb the shattering news.[124] Within
the rst few days of the invasion, the Soviet High Command and Red Army were extensively reorganized so as
to place them on the necessary war footing.[126] Stalin did
not address the nation about the German invasion until 3
July. Just like Molotov, he called for a Patriotic War ...
of the entire Soviet people.[127]
In Germany, on the morning of 22 June, Nazi propaganda
minister Joseph Goebbels announced the invasion to the
waking nation in a radio broadcast, At this moment a
march is taking place that, for its extent, compares with
the greatest the world has ever seen. I have decided today
to place the fate and future of the Reich and our people
in the hands of our soldiers. May God aid us, especially
in this ght!"[128] Later the same morning, Hitler proclaimed to colleagues, before three months have passed,
we shall witness a collapse of Russia, the like of which
has never been seen in history.[128]

6 Phase one
German infantryman in front of a dead Soviet soldier and a
burning BT-7 tank in Ukraine, June 1941

At around 1:00 am on 22 June 1941, the Soviet military districts in the border area[lower-alpha 2] were alerted
by NKO Directive No. 1, which was issued late on night
of 21 June.[120] It called on them to bring all forces to
combat readiness, but to avoid provocative actions of
any kind.[121] It took up to 2 hours for several of the
units subordinate to the Fronts to receive the order of the
directive,[121] and the majority did not receive it before
the invasion commenced.[120]
At around 3:15 am on 22 June 1941, the Axis Powers
commenced the invasion of the Soviet Union with the
bombing of major cities in Soviet-occupied Poland[122]
and an artillery barrage on Red Army defences on the German advances from June to August, 1941

The initial momentum of the German ground and air

attack completely destroyed the Soviet organizational
command and control within the rst few hours, paralyzing every level of command from the infantry platoon to the Soviet High Command in Moscow.[129] Therefore, Moscow failed to grasp the magnitude of the catastrophe that confronted the Soviet forces in the border
area.[44] At around 7:15 am, Stalin issued NKO Directive No. 2, which announced the invasion to the Soviet
Armed Forces, and called on them to attack Axis forces
wherever they had violated the borders and launch air
strikes into the border regions of German territory.[130]
At around 9:15 pm, Stalin issued NKO Directive No.
3, signed by Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, which now
called for a general counteroensive on the entire front
without any regards for borders that both men hoped
would sweep the enemy from Soviet territory.[131][121]
Timoshenkos order was not based on a realistic appraisal
of the military situation at hand, and it resulted in devastating casualties.[44]

6.1

Air war

Luftwae reconnaissance units worked frantically to plot

Soviet troop concentration, supply dumps, and airelds,
and mark them down for destruction.[44] In contrast, Soviet artillery observers based at the border area had been
under the strictest instructions not to open re on German
aircraft prior to the invasion.[44] The Luftwae reported
to have destroyed 1,489 aircraft on the rst day of the
invasion[132] and over 3100 over the rst three days.[133]
Hermann Gring, Minister of Aviation and Commanderin-Chief of the Luftwae, distrusted the reports and ordered the gure checked. Luftwae stas surveyed the
wreckage on Soviet airelds, and their original gure
proved conservative, as over 2,000 Soviet aircraft were
estimated to have been destroyed on the rst day of the
invasion.[132] In reality, Soviet losses were likely higher; a
Soviet archival document recorded the loss of 3,922 Soviet aircraft in the rst three days against an estimated loss
of 78 German aircraft.[133][134] The Luftwae reported
the loss of only 35 aircraft on the rst day of combat.[133]
A document from the German Federal Archives puts the
Luftwaes loss at 63 aircraft for the rst day.[135]
By the end of the rst week, the Luftwae had achieved
air supremacy over the battleelds of all the army
groups,[134] but was unable to eect this air dominance over the vast expanse of the western Soviet
Union.[136][137] According to the war diaries of the
German High Command, the Luftwae by 5 July had lost
491 aircraft with 316 more damaged, leaving it with only
about 70 percent of the strength it had at the start of the
invasion.[138]

PHASE ONE

6.2 Baltic states

Main article: Baltic Operation
On 22 June, Army Group North attacked the Soviet Northwestern Front and broke through its 8th and
11th Armies.[139] The Soviets immediately launched a
powerful counterattack against the German 4th Panzer
Group with the Soviet 3rd and 12th Mechanized Corps,
but the Soviet attack was defeated.[139] On 25 June, the
8th and 11th Armies were ordered to withdraw to the
Western Dvina River, where it was planned to meetup
with the 21st Mechanized Corps and the 22nd and 27th
Armies. However, on 26 June, Erich von Mansteins LVI
Panzer Corps reached the river rst and secured a bridgehead across it.[140] The Northwestern Front was forced to
abandon the river defenses, and on 29 June Stavka ordered the Front to withdraw to the Stalin Line on the
approaches to Leningrad.[140] On 2 July, Army Group
North began its attack on the Stalin Line with its 4th
Panzer Group, and on 8 July captured Pskov, devastating
the defenses of the Stalin Line and reaching Leningrad
oblast.[140] The 4th Panzer Group had advanced about
450 kilometres (280 mi) since the start of the invasion
and was now only about 250 kilometres (160 mi) from
its primary objective Leningrad. On 9 July it began its
attack towards the Soviet defenses along the Luga River
in Leningrad oblast.[141]

6.3 Ukraine and Moldavia

See also: Operation Mnchen and Battle of Brody (1941)
The northern section of Army Group South faced the
Southwestern Front, which had the largest concentration of Soviet forces, and the southern section faced
the Southern Front. In addition, the Pripyat Marshes
and the Carpathian Mountains posed a serious challenge to the army groups northern and southern sections
respectively.[142] On 22 June, only the northern section
of Army Group South attacked, but the terrain impeded
their assault, giving the Soviet defenders ample time to
react.[142] The German 1st Panzer Group and 6th Army
attacked and broke through the Soviet 5th Army.[143]
Starting on the night of 23 June, the Soviet 22nd and 15th
Mechanized Corps attacked the anks of the 1st Panzer
Group from north and south respectively. Although intended to be concerted, Soviet tank units were sent in
piecemeal due to poor coordination. The 22nd Mechanized Corp ran into the 1st Panzer Armys III Motorized Corps and was decimated, and its commander killed.
The 1st Panzer Group bypassed much of the 15th Mechanized Corps, which engaged the German 6th Armys
297th Infantry Division, where it was defeated by antitank re and Luftwae attacks.[144] On 26 June, the Soviets launched another counterattack on the 1st Panzer
Group from north and south simultaneously with the 9th,

9
19th and 8th Mechanized Corps, which altogether elded
1649 tanks, and supported by the remnants of the 15th
Mechanized Corps. The battle lasted for four days, ending in the defeat of the Soviet tank units.[145] On 30 June
Stavka ordered the remaining forces of the Southwestern
Front to withdraw to the Stalin Line, where it would defend the approaches to Kiev.[146]

tillery pieces.[151][152] On 30 June, Stalin relieved Pavlov

of his command, and on 22 July tried and executed him
along with many members of his sta on charges of cowardice and criminal incompetence.[153][154][84]
A Soviet directive was issued on 29 June to combat the
mass panic rampant among the civilians and the armed
forces personnel. The order stipulated swift, severe measures against anyone inciting panic or displaying cowardice. The NKVD worked with commissars and military
commanders to scour possible withdrawal routes of soldiers retreating without military authorization. Field expedient general courts were established to deal with civilians spreading rumours and military deserters.[155]

On 2 July, the southern section of Army Group South

the Romanian 3rd and 4th Armies, alongside the German 11th Army invaded Soviet Moldavia, which was
defended by the Southern Front.[147] Counterattacks by
the Fronts 2nd Mechanized Corps and 9th Army were
defeated, but on 9 July the Axis advance stalled along the
defenses of the Soviet 18th Army between the Prut and On 29 June, Hitler, through the Commander-in-Chief of
Dniester Rivers.[148]
the German Army Walther von Brauchitsch, instructed
the commander of Army Group Center Fedor von Bock
to halt the advance of his panzers until the infantry forma6.4 Belorussia
tions liquidating the pockets catch up.[156] But the commander of the 2nd Panzer Group Heinz Guderian, with
Main article: Battle of BiaystokMinsk
the tacit support of Fedor von Bock and the chief of OKH
Franz Halder, ignored the instruction and attacked on
In the opening hours of the invasion, the Luftwae de- eastward towards Bobruisk, albeit reporting the advance
stroyed the Western Fronts air force on the ground, as a reconnaissance-in-force. He also personally conand with the aid of Abwehr and their supporting anti- ducted an aerial inspection of the Minsk-Biaystok pocket
communist fth columns operating in the Soviet rear par- on 30 June and concluded that his panzer group was not
alyzed the Fronts communication lines, which particu- needed to contain it, since Hermann Hoths 3rd Panzer
larly cut o the Soviet 4th Army headquarters from head- Group was already involved in the Minsk pocket.[157] On
quarters above and below it.[149] On the same day, the 2nd the same day, some of the infantry corps of the 9th and
Panzer Group crossed the Bug River, broke through the 4th Armies, having suciently liquidated the Biaystok
4th Army, bypassed Brest Fortress, and pressed on to- pocket, resumed their march eastward to catch up with
wards Minsk, while the 3rd Panzer Group bypassed most the panzer groups.[157] On 1 July, Fedor von Bock ordered
of the 3rd Army and pressed on towards Vilnius.[149] Si- the panzer groups to resume their full oensive eastward
multaneously, the German 4th and 9th Armies engaged on the morning of 3 July. But Brauchitsch, upholding
the Western Front forces in the environs of Biaystok.[44] Hitlers instruction, and Halder, unwillingly going along
On the order of Dmitry Pavlov, the commander of the with it, opposed Bocks order. However, Bock insisted on
Western Front, the 6th and 11th Mechanized Corps and the order by stating that it would be atly irresponsible to
the 6th Cavalry Corps launched a strong counterstrike to- reverse orders already issued. The panzer groups, howwards Grodno on 2425 June in hopes of destroying the ever, resumed their oensive on 2 July before the infantry
3rd Panzer Group. However, the 3rd Panzer Group had formations had suciently caught up.[157]
already moved on, with its forward units reaching Vilnius on the evening of 23 June, and the Western Fronts
armoured counterattack instead ran into infantry and antitank re from the V Army Corps of the German 9th 7 Phase two
Army, supported by Luftwae air attacks.[149] By the
night of 25 June, the Soviet counterattack was defeated, Further information: Battle of Smolensk (1941) and
and the commander of the 6th Cavalry Corps was cap- Leningrad Operation (1941)
tured. The same night, Pavlov ordered all the remnants On 2 July and through the next six days, a rainstorm
of the Western Front to withdraw to Slonim towards typical of Russian summers slowed the progress of the
Minsk.[149] Subsequent counterattacks to buy time for panzers of Army Group Center, and Russian defenses
the withdrawal were launched against the German forces, stiened.[158][44] The delays gave the Soviets time to orbut all of them failed.[149] On 27 June, the 2nd and 3rd ganize a massive counterattack against Army Group CenPanzer Groups met near Minsk and captured the city the ter. The army groups ultimate objective was Smolensk,
next day, completing the encirclement of almost all of the which commanded the road to Moscow. Facing the
Western Front in two pockets: one around Biaystok and Germans was an old Soviet defensive line held by six
another west of Minsk.[150] The Germans destroyed the armies. On 6 July, the Soviets attacked the 3rd Panzer
Soviet 3rd and 10th Armies while inicting serious losses Group with 1000 tanks. The Germans defeated this
on the 4th, 11th and 13th Armies, and reported to have counterattack with overwhelming air superiority.[44] The
captured 324,000 Soviet troops, 3,300 tanks, 1,800 ar- 2nd Panzer Group crossed the Dnieper River and closed

10

8 PHASE THREE
ters tanks to the north and south, temporarily halting the
drive to Moscow.[159]

8 Phase three
Further information: Battle of Uman, Battle of Kiev
(1941) and Siege of Leningrad
By mid-July, the Germans had advanced within a few
kilometers of Kiev below the Pripyat Marshes. The
1st Panzer Group then went south while the 17th
Army struck east and trapped three Soviet armies near
[160]
As the Germans eliminated the pocket, the
German advances during the opening phases of Operation Bar- Uman.
tanks turned north and crossed the Dnieper. Meanwhile,
barossa, August 1941
the 2nd Panzer Group, diverted from Army Group Center, had crossed the Desna River with 2nd Army on its
right ank. The two Panzer armies now trapped four Soin on Smolensk from the south while the 3rd Panzer
viet armies and parts of two others.[161]
Group, after defeating the Soviet counterattack, closed
on Smolensk from the north.[44] Trapped between their By August, as the serviceability and the quantity of
pincers were three Soviet armies. On 18 July, the Panzer the Luftwaes inventory steadily reduced due to comGroups came to within sixteen kilometres of closing the bat, while demand for air support only increased as
gap, but the trap did not snap shut until 26 July.[44] the VVS stubbornly resurged, the Luftwae found itself
When the Panzer Groups nally closed the gap, 300,000 struggling to maintain local air superiority in the front
Red Army soldiers were captured,[159] but 200,000 Red lines.[162] Also with the onset of bad weather in OctoArmy soldiers escaped to stand between the Germans and ber, the Luftwae was on several occasions forced to halt
nearly all aerial operations. The VVS, although faced
Moscow.[44]
with the same weather diculties, had a clear advantage
Four weeks into the campaign, the Germans realized they
thanks to the prewar experience with cold-weather ying
had grossly underestimated Soviet strength. The Gertechniques.[163] By December, the VVS have matched the
man troops had used their initial supplies without attainLuftwae and was even pressing to achieve air supremacy
ing the expected strategic freedom of movement.[44] Opover the battleelds.[164]
erations were now slowed down to allow for resupply;
the delay was to be used to adapt strategy to the new For its nal attack on Leningrad, the 4th Panzer Group
situation.[44] Hitler by now had lost faith in battles of en- was reinforced by tanks from Army Group Center. On
circlement as large numbers of Soviet soldiers had es- 8 August, the Panzers broke through the Soviet defenses.
caped the pincers.[44] He now believed he could defeat By the end of August, 4th Panzer Group had penetrated to
the Soviets by economic damage, depriving them of the within 48 kilometers of Leningrad. The Finns had pushed
industrial capacity to continue the war. That meant seiz- southeast on both sides of Lake Ladoga to reach the old
ing the industrial center of Kharkov, the Donbass and the Finnish-Soviet frontier.[159]
oil elds of the Caucasus in the south and the speedy capture of Leningrad, a major center of military production,
in the north.[44][159]
Fedor von Bock, the commander of Army Group Center,
and almost all the German generals involved in Operation
Barbarossa argued vehemently in favor of continuing the
all-out drive toward Moscow. Besides the psychological
importance of capturing the enemys capital, the generals
pointed out that Moscow was a major center of arms production, the center of the Soviet communications system
and an important transportation hub. More signicantly,
intelligence reports indicated that the bulk of the Red
Army was deployed near Moscow under Semyon Timoshenko for an all-out defense of the capital.[44] But Hitler General Guderian at a forward command post of a Panzer regwas adamant, and he issued a direct order to the talented iment near Kiev, 1941
panzer ace Heinz Guderianbypassing Guderians commanding ocer, von Bockto send Army Group Cen- The Germans attacked Leningrad in August 1941 with

11
6,000 cannons, 4,500 trench mortars, 19,000 machine
guns, 1,000 planes, 1,000 tanks, and approximately
600,000 men in 40 divisions.[165] In the following three
black months of 1941, 400,000 residents of the city
worked to build the citys fortications as ghting continued, and 160,000 others joined the ranks of the Red
Army. On September 7, the German 20th Motorized
Division seized Shlisselburg, cutting o all land routes
to Leningrad. The Germans severed the railroads to
Moscow and captured the railroad to Murmansk with
Finnish assistance to inaugurate the start of a siege that
would last for over two years.[166][167]
At this stage, Hitler ordered the nal destruction of
Leningrad with no prisoners taken, and on 9 September, Army Group North began the nal push. Within ten
days it had advanced within 11 kilometers of the city.[159]
However, the push over the last 10 km (6.2 mi) proved
very slow and casualties mounted. Hitler, now out of patience, ordered that Leningrad should not be stormed,
but rather starved into submission.[159] Deprived of its
Panzer forces, Army Group Center remained static and
was subjected to numerous Soviet counterattacks, in particular the Yelnya Oensive, in which the Germans suffered their rst major tactical defeat since their invasion
began. These attacks prompted Hitler to concentrate his
attention back to Army Group Center and its drive on
Moscow. The Germans ordered the 3rd and 4th Panzer
Armies to break o their Siege of Leningrad and support
Army Group Center in its attack on Moscow.[159]
Before it could begin, operations in Kiev needed to be
nished. Half of Army Group Center had swung to the
south in the back of the Kiev position, while Army Group
South moved to the north from its Dniepr bridgehead.[168]
The encirclement of Soviet forces in Kiev was achieved
on 16 September. A savage battle ensued in which the
Soviets were hammered with tanks, artillery, and aerial
bombardment.[168] After ten days of vicious ghting, the
Germans claimed over 600,000 Soviet soldiers captured.
Actual losses were 452,720 men, 3,867 artillery pieces
and mortars from 43 divisions of the 5th, 21st, 26th, and
37th Soviet Armies.[168]

Phase four

Main article: Battle of Moscow

After Kiev, the Red Army no longer outnumbered the
Germans and there were no more trained reserves directly
available. To defend Moscow, Stalin could eld 800,000
men in 83 divisions, but no more than 25 divisions were
fully eective. Operation Typhoon, the drive to Moscow,
began on 2 October.[161] In front of Army Group Center
was a series of elaborate defense lines, the rst centered
on Vyazma and the second on Mozhaysk.[161]

Soviet planes ying over German positions near Moscow

took Oryol, just 121 km (75 mi) south of the Soviet

rst main defense line.[161] Three days later, the Panzers
pushed on to Bryansk, while the 2nd Army attacked from
the west.[161] The Soviet 3rd and 13th Armies were now
encircled. To the north, the 3rd and 4th Panzer Armies
attacked Vyazma, trapping the 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd
Armies.[161] Moscows rst line of defense had been shattered. The pocket eventually yielded 673,000 Soviet prisoners, bringing the tally since the start of the invasion to
three million. The Soviets had now only 90,000 men and
150 tanks left for the defense of Moscow.[169]
The German government now publicly predicted the imminent capture of Moscow and convinced foreign correspondents of a pending Soviet collapse.[170] On 13 October, the 3rd Panzer Group penetrated to within 140 km
(87 mi) of the capital.[161] Martial law was declared in
Moscow. Almost from the beginning of Operation Typhoon, however, the weather worsened. Temperatures
fell while there was a continued rainfall. This turned the
unpaved road network into mud and steadily slowed the
German advance on Moscow to as little as 3.2 km (2.0
mi) a day.[159] At the same time, the supply situation for
the Germans rapidly deteriorated. On 31 October, the
German Army High Command ordered a halt to Operation Typhoon while the armies were reorganized. The
pause gave the Soviets, who were in a far better supply
situation, time to consolidate their positions and organize
formations of newly activated reservists.[159] In little over
a month, the Soviets organized eleven new armies that included 30 divisions of Siberian troops. These had been
freed from the Soviet Far East after Soviet intelligence
assured Stalin that there was no longer a threat from the
Japanese.[159] Over 1,000 tanks and 1,000 aircraft arrived
along with the Siberian forces.[159]

On 15 November, with the ground hardening due to the

cold weather, the Germans once again began the attack on
Moscow.[159] Although the troops themselves were now
able to advance again, there had been no delay allowed to
improve the supply situation. Facing the Germans were
the 5th, 16th, 30th, 43rd, 49th, and 50th Soviet armies.
The rst blow took the Soviets completely by surprise The Germans intended to let the 3rd and 4th Panzer
when the 2nd Panzer Group, returning from the south, Armies cross the Moscow Canal and envelop Moscow

12

11

from the northeast. The 2nd Panzer Group would attack

Tula and then close in on Moscow from the south.[84] As
the Soviets reacted to the anks, the 4th Army would attack the center. In two weeks of desperate ghting, lacking sucient fuel and ammunition, the Germans slowly
crept towards Moscow.[84] However, in the south, the 2nd
Panzer Group was being blocked. On 22 November, Soviet Siberian units, augmented with the 49th and 50th
Soviet Armies, attacked the 2nd Panzer Group and inicted a shocking defeat on the Germans. The 4th Panzer
Group pushed the Soviet 16th Army back, however, and
succeeded in crossing the Moscow canal to begin the attempted encirclement of Moscow.[84]

WAR CRIMES

revised. The Soviet counteroensives in December 1941

caused heavy casualties on both sides, but ultimately eliminated the German threat to Moscow.[84]
In spite of this devastating setback for the Germans, the
Soviet Union also suered heavily from the conict. It
lost so much of its army and industry that the Germans
were able to mount another large-scale oensive in July
1942. Hitler, having realized that Germanys oil supply was severely depleted,[173] aimed to capture the oil
elds of Baku in an oensive, codenamed Case Blue.[174]
Once again, the Germans quickly conquered great expanses of Soviet territory, but they failed to achieve their
ultimate goals in the wake of their decisive defeat at the
Battle of Stalingrad.[159]
By 1943, the Soviet war economy was fully operational
and able to outproduce the German war economy, which
had not been prepared for a long war of attrition.[44] The
war ended with the total defeat and occupation of Nazi
Germany in May 1945.[44]

11 War crimes
Main articles: German mistreatment of Soviet prisoners
of war and The Holocaust in Russia
The German position of advances before the start of Operation
Typhoon, September 1941

On 2 December, part of the 258th Infantry Division advanced to within 24 km (15 mi) of Moscow and could see
the spires of the Kremlin, but by then the rst blizzards
of the Russian Winter had already begun.[171][84] A reconnaissance battalion also managed to reach the town of
Khimki, only about 8 km (5.0 mi) away from the Soviet
capital. It captured the bridge over the Moscow-Volga
Canal as well as the railway station, which marked the farthest eastern advance of German forces.[172] But in spite
of the progress made, the Wehrmacht was not equipped
for winter warfare, and the bitter cold caused severe problems for their guns and equipment. Furthermore, weather
conditions grounded the Luftwae from conducting any
large-scale operations.[84] Newly created Soviet units near
Moscow now numbered over 500,000 men, and on 5 December, they launched a massive counterattack as part
of the Battle of Moscow that pushed the Germans back
over 320 km (200 mi). By late December 1941, the Germans had lost the Battle for Moscow, and the invasion had
cost the German army over 830,000 casualties in killed,
wounded, captured or missing in action.[84]

10

The Soviet Union had not participated in the Geneva

Conventions and therefore their troops could not rely on
the protection the Conventions guaranteed soldiers during times of war.[175] Hitler called for the battle against
the Soviet Union to be a struggle for existence and accordingly authorized crimes against Soviet prisoners of
war. A Nazi memorandum from 16 July 1941, recorded
by Martin Bormann, quotes Hitler saying, The giant [occupied] area must naturally be pacied as quickly as possible; this will happen at best if anyone who just looks
funny should be shot.[176][177]

Aftermath

With the failure of the Battle of Moscow, all German

plans for a quick defeat of the Soviet Union had to be Himmler inspecting a prisoner of war camp

13
Hitler issued the notorious Commissar Order, which
called for all Soviet political commissars taken prisoner
at the front to be shot immediately without trial.[175] German soldiers both willingly and unwillingly participated
in these mass killings.[175] An estimated two million Soviet POWs died of starvation during Barbarossa alone;
nothing was done for their survival.[175] The famished
POWs were hardly able to walk by themselves.[178] By
the end of the war, 58 percent of all Soviet POWs died
in German captivity.[179][180]
Organized crimes against civilians, including women and
children, were also carried out on a huge scale by the Germans and local supporters.[175] Under the command of
the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Security Head Ofce), the Einsatzgruppen killing squads conducted largescale massacres of Jews and communists in conquered
Soviet territories. Holocaust historian Raul Hilberg puts
the number of Jews murdered by mobile killing operations at 1,400,000.[181] The original instructions to kill
Jews in party and state positions was broadened to include all male Jews of military age and was expanded
once more to all male Jews regardless of age. By the
end of July, the Germans were regularly killing women
and children.[178]
Burning houses suspected of being partisan meeting
places and poisoning water wells became common practice for soldiers of the German 9th Army.[84] At Kharkov,
the fourth largest city in the Soviet Union, the Germans
were instructed to only give food to the small number of
people who worked for them, with the rest designated to
slowly starve.[84] Thousands of Soviets were shipped to
Germany to be used as slave labor.[175]
The citizens of Leningrad were subjected to heavy bombardment and a siege that would last 872 days and starve
more than a million people to death, of whom approximately 400,000 were children below the age of 14.[182]
The German-Finnish blockade cut o access to food, fuel
and raw materials, and rations reached a low, for the nonworking population, of four ounces (ve thin slices) of
bread and a little watery soup per day.[165] Starving Soviet civilians began to eat their domestic animals, along
with hair tonic and Vaseline. An estimated one million
Leningrad residents died during the siege, mostly due to
starvation, the intense cold, and stress.[183][184] Some desperate citizens resorted to cannibalism; Soviet records
list 2,000 people arrested for the use of human meat
as food during the siege, 886 of them during the rst
winter of 194142.[184] The Germans planned to seal o
Leningrad, starve out the population, and then demolish
the city entirely.[167]

tanks, guns and aircraft were committed than had ever

been deployed before in a single oensive.[84] A total of
75 percent of the entire German military participated.[44]
The invasion opened up the Eastern Front of World War
II, the largest theater of war during that conict, and it
witnessed titanic clashes of unprecedented violence and
destruction for four years that resulted in the deaths of
more than 26 million people.[185] More people died ghting on the Eastern Front than in all other ghting across
the globe during World War II.[186]

13 See also
Operation Silver Fox
Timeline of the Eastern Front of World War II
Black Sea campaigns

14 Notes
[1] Finland was not ocially a member of the Axis, but coordinated its invasion of the Soviet Union with the Axis
powers.
[2] The four Soviet military districts facing the Axis, the
Baltic Military District, the Western Special Military District, the Kiev Special Military District and the Odessa
Military District, at the outbreak of the war were renamed the Northwestern Front, the Western Front, the
Southwestern Front and the Southern Front, respectively.
A fth military district, the Leningrad military district,
became the Northern Front.(Glantz 2012, pp. 11, 16,
208)
[3] 170 divisions and 2 independent brigades, along with 12
airborne brigades.(Glantz 2012, pp. 16, 219)

15 References
[1] Clark 2012, p. 73.
[2] Glantz 2001, p. 9.
[3] Glantz 2010a, p. 20.
[4] Glantz 2001, p. 9, 2.68 million.
[5] Glantz 1998, p. 1011, 101,293, 2.9 million.
[6] Taylor 1974, p. 98, 2.6 million.
[7] Mercatante 2012, p. 64.
[8] Clark 2012, p. 76.

12

Historical signicance

[9] Glantz 2010a, p. 28, 7,133 aircraft.

[10] Mercatante 2012, p. 64, 9,100 aircraft.

Operation Barbarossa was the largest and one of the

swiftest military operations in human history; more men, [11] Clark 2012, p. 76, 9,100 aircraft.

14

[12] Heeresarzt 10-Day Casualty Reports per Theater of War,

1941.
[13] Red Army and NKVD gures, 19411945.
[14] Bergstrm 2007, p. 117.
[15] Graham Royde-Smith.
[16] Krivosheev 1997, pp. 9598.
[17] AOK POW Reports.
[18] Sharp 2010, p. 89.
[19] The Fatal Attraction of Adolf Hitler, 1989.
[20] Shirer 1990, p. 716.
[21] Fahlbusch 1999, pp. 241264.
[22] Evans 1989, p. 59.
[23] Evans 1989, pp. 5960.
[24] Burleigh 2001, p. 512.
[25] Kershaw 2000, p. 466.
[26] Kershaw 2000, p. 467.

15

REFERENCES

[49] Patterson 2003, p. 562.

[50] Handrack 1981, p. 40.
[51] Klemann & Kudryashov 2013, p. 33.
[52] Rich 1973, p. 212.
[53] Higgins 1966, pp. 1159.
[54] Glantz 2010a, pp. 18.
[55] Glantz 2010b, pp. 19, 60.
[56] Clark 2012, p. 72.
[57] Glantz 2010b, pp. 5560.
[58] Shirer 1990, p. 822.
[59] Hardesty 2012, p. 6.
[60] Bradley & Buell 2002, pp. 3540.
[61] Shirer 1990, p. 829.
[62] Shirer 1990, p. 830.
[63] Beevor 2012, p. 163.
[64] Glantz 2010a, pp. 20, 34.

[27] Frster 2005, p. 127.

[65] Glantz 2010a, pp. 20, 25.

[28] Majer 2003, p. 180.

[66] Clark 2012, pp. 7374.

[29] Gellately 1990, p. 224.

[67] Glantz 2012, p. 36.

[30] Himmler 1940, pp. 147150.

[68] Baker 2013, pp. 2627.

[31] Mazower 2009, p. 181.

[69] Glantz 2012, p. 14.

[32] Rssler & Schleiermacher 1996, pp. 270274.

[70] Glantz 2012, p. 40.

[33] Ingrao 2013, p. 140.

[71] Glantz 2010a, p. 21.

[34] Ingrao 2013, pp. 138142.

[72] Clark 2012, p. 56.

[35] Kirby 1980, p. 120.

[73] Clark 2012, p. 55.

[36] Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, 1939.

[74] Clark 2012, p. 57.

[37] Roberts 2006, p. 30.

[75] Glantz 1998, p. 26.

[38] Shirer 1990, pp. 668669.

[76] Glantz 2012, p. 55.

[39] Roberts 2006, p. 57.

[77] Rayeld 2004, p. 315.

[40] Weeks 2002, p. 98.

[78] Glantz 2012, p. 22.

[41] Hartmann 2013, pp. 924.

[79] Clark 2012, p. 58.

[42] Ericson 1999, p. 127.

[80] Berthon & Potts 2007, p. 47.

[43] Ericson 1999, pp. 129130.

[81] Waller 1996, p. 192.

[44] Battle for Russia, 1996.

[82] Roberts 1995, p. 1293.

[45] Brackman 2001, p. 344.

[83] Waller 1996, pp. 196198.

[46] Wette 2007, pp. 2122.

[84] Soviet Storm: Operation Barbarossa 2011.

[47] Gorodetsky 2001, pp. 6970.

[85] Waller 1996, p. 202.

[48] Ericson 1999, p. 162.

[86] Glantz 2012, p. 15.

15

[87] Glantz 2010a, p. 21-22.

[125] Braithwaite 2010, p. 74.

[88] Glantz 1998, p. 1011, 101, 293.

[126] Seaton 1972, p. 99.

[89] Taylor 1974, p. 98.

[127] Clark 2012, p. 92.

[90] Glantz 2010a, pp. 2223, 51.

[128] Clark 2012, p. 82.

[91] Glantz 1998, p. 293.

[129] Glantz 2012, p. 31, 33.

[92] Glantz 1998, p. 107.

[130] Clark 2012, p. 83.

[93] Glantz & House 1995, p. 68.

[131] Glantz 2010a, p. 31.

[94] Sakwa 2005, pp. 225227.

[132] Bergstrm 2007, p. 20.

[95] Macksey 1989, p. 456.

[133] Bergstrm 2007, p. 23.

[96] Glantz 2012, p. 23.

[134] Hardesty 2012, p. 9.

[97] Glantz 1998, p. 109.

[135] Hardesty 2012, p. 8, 390.

[98] Dunnigan 1978, p. 82.

[136] Glantz 2012, p. 19.

[99] Glantz 2010a, p. 28.

[137] Hardesty 2012, p. 54.

[100] Glantz 1998, p. 13.

[138] Glantz 2010a, p. 54.

[101] Russian Military Library.

[139] Glantz 2012, p. 37.

[102] Uldricks 1999, pp. 626627.

[140] Glantz 2012, p. 38.

[103] Smelser & Davies 2008, p. 243.

[141] Glantz 2012, p. 93.

[104] Uldricks 1999, pp. 631, 633, 636.

[142] Fritz 2011, p. 89, 140.

[105] Bar-Joseph & Levy 2009, p. 476.

[143] Glantz 2012, p. 41.

[106] Uldricks 1999, p. 630.

[144] Glantz 2012, p. 42.

[107] Roberts 1995, p. 1326.

[145] Glantz 2012, pp. 4344, 225.

[108] Mawdsley 2003, pp. 819820.

[146] Glantz 2012, pp. 21, 4344.

[109] Bar-Joseph & Levy 2009, p. 477.

[147] Glantz 2012, p. 45.

[110] Kirchubel 2005, p. 26,29.

[148] Glantz 2012, p. 45, 112.

[111] Kirchubel 2003, p. 31.

[149] Glantz 2010a, pp. 2933.

[112] Kirchubel 2007, p. 31.

[150] Glantz 2010a, pp. 2933, 56.

[113] Glantz 2012, pp. 290303.

[151] Murray & Millett 2000, pp. 122123.

[114] Kirchubel 2005, p. 26.

[152] Fritz 2011, p. 88, 509.

[115] Glantz 2012, p. 290-303.

[153] Glantz 2010a, pp. 5657.

[116] Kirchubel 2005, p. 29.

[154] Forczyk 2014, pp. 253.

[117] Kirchubel 2007, p. 30.

[155] Seaton 1972, p. 111.

[118] Kirchubel 2005, p. 31.

[156] Glantz 2010a, pp. 5456.

[119] Glantz 2012, pp. 302303.

[157] Glantz 2010a, pp. 6062.

[120] Clark 2012, p. 81.

[158] Glantz 2010a, p. 63.

[121] Glantz 2012, p. 287.

[159] Hitler Strikes East, 2009.

[122] Kirchubel 2007, pp. 3334.

[160] Thomas 2012, p. 13.

[123] Seaton 1972, p. 98.

[161] Thomas 2012, pp. 1214.

[124] Clark 2012, p. 70.

[162] Hardesty 2012, p. 84.

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17 External links
Marking 70 Years to Operation Barbarossa on the
Yad Vashem website
Over 270 original private German color photos from
Operation Barbarossa on Pixpast website
Operation Barbarossa original reports and pictures
from The Times

20

18

18
18.1

TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

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Ko Soi IX, Boothferry, Tanaats, MisterBee1966, KylieTastic, Bogdan~enwiki, Listerz, The Spanish Inquisitor, Xyl 54, Wikimandia, Sherbet lemon, RjCan, TehNomad, Xiahou, RJASE1, Idioma-bot, Spellcast, BigBobcool, Ripberger, Malik Shabazz, Xelous, Bacquesne,
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Timeastor, Urgedover1234, Existenjoy, Alertwhile~enwiki, DaddyWarlock, MorganJoel, Muhends, ImageRemovalBot, Atif.t2, Sfan00
IMG, De728631, Ecjmartin, ClueBot, Atomicspamer, Binksternet, Clivemacd, Noorkhanuk85, Hutcher, Lastdingo, The Thing That Should
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Images

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ternet, Ave Caesar, Banksmotor55, Atethnekos, Magus732, Russian Power, Groundsquirrel13, Lt.Specht, Download, BepBot, 37ophiuchi,
Glane23, Ferroequus, Mosedschurte, Schmausschmaus, AndersBot, Favonian, Getmoreatp, LinkFA-Bot, Brufnus, Tassedethe, Lightbot,
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Kingpin13, Ulric1313, Qwertzy, Materialscientist, A123a, Citation bot, OllieFury, Rodina38, Maxis ftw, ArthurBot, Xqbot, J G
Campbell, B. Franken, TracyMcClark, Lizisbearycute, Estlandia~enwiki, Wombert, Nasnema, ITSENJOYABLE, Wiki-gcu, GrouchoBot,
Foreverprovence, Anotherclown, TimDeCink, Mcjoshio, AustralianRupert, Cod1337, Teamdot, Kurlandlegionar, Shadowjams, Jsp722,
HROThomas, H. Jonat~enwiki, Vlastimil Svoboda, StoneProphet, Egern~enwiki, FrescoBot, Cypherx82, Surv1v4l1st, CaptainFugu, Doggyman100, Bob maverick, LucienBOT, Tobby72, Lothar von Richthofen, Recognizance, Hbus, MathFacts, Aristeiakorps, Haeinous,
Chaim Shel, Trust Is All You Need, SISPCM, Citation bot 1, Winterst, Witt E Pseudonym, La Fre-Champenoise, Jonesey95, Rushbugled13, Dosinovsky, RedBot, LegendFPS, Edurcastro28, Jandalhandler, SaturdayNightSpecial, Plasticspork, Bgpaulus, Fartherred, White
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T16T17T12345, SiegerFlieger, Bertdrunk, Get History UK and Anonymous: 1188

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File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-020-1268-36,_Russland,_russischer_Gefallener,_Panzer_BT_7,.jpg
Source:
https:
//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ab/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-020-1268-36%2C_Russland%2C_russischer_Gefallener%
2C_Panzer_BT_7%2C.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German
Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as part of a cooperation project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic
representation only using the originals (negative and/or positive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image
Archive. Original artist: Johannes Hhle
File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-209-0090-28,_Russland-Nord,_Infanterie_und_Panzer_35t.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.
org/wikipedia/commons/0/03/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-209-0090-28%2C_Russland-Nord%2C_Infanterie_und_Panzer_35t.jpg
License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches
Bundesarchiv) as part of a cooperation project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic representation only using the
originals (negative and/or positive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Zoll
File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_146-1974-099-19,_Russland,_Angriff_auf_ein_Dorf.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/
commons/b/b9/Bundesarchiv_Bild_146-1974-099-19%2C_Russland%2C_Angriff_auf_ein_Dorf.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as part of a
cooperation project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic representation only using the originals (negative and/or positive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Kempe
File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-L19885,_Russland,_Heinz_Guderian_vor_Gefechtsstand.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/
wikipedia/commons/5/51/Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-L19885%2C_Russland%2C_Heinz_Guderian_vor_Gefechtsstand.jpg License: CC
BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv)
as part of a cooperation project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic representation only using the originals (negative
and/or positive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Huschke
File:Bundeswehr_Kreuz_Black.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/62/Bundeswehr_Kreuz_Black.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Online-Redaktion Heer (16.12.10). Das Eiserne Kreuz. Bundeswehr. Retrieved on 19 January 2012.
Original artist: See source
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artist: ?
File:Eastern_Front_1941-06_to_1941-09.png Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/15/Eastern_Front_
1941-06_to_1941-09.png License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Gdr
File:Europe_before_Operation_Barbarossa,_1941_(in_German).png Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/
30/Europe_before_Operation_Barbarossa%2C_1941_%28in_German%29.png License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: Transferred from
en.wikipedia to Commons. Original artist: The original uploader was MaGioZal at English Wikipedia. Later version(s) were uploaded by
DIREKTOR at en.wikipedia.

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TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

File:Flag_of_Finland.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/bc/Flag_of_Finland.svg License: Public domain

Contributors: http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/ajantasa/1978/19780380 Original artist: Drawn by User:SKopp
File:Flag_of_First_Slovak_Republic_1939-1945.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7e/Flag_of_First_
Slovak_Republic_1939-1945.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Based on DarkEvil's Image:Flag of First Slovak Republic 19391945 bordered.svg, modied by PhiLiP. Original artist: DarkEvil, PhiLiP
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Reich_%281935%E2%80%931945%29.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work Original artist: Fornax
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%281920%E2%80%931946%29.svg License: Public domain Contributors: [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9] Original artist:
User:Zscout370, colour correction: User:R-41, current version: Thommy
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%281861-1946%29_crowned.svg License: CC BY-SA 2.5 Contributors:
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Original artist: F l a n k e r
File:Flag_of_Romania.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/73/Flag_of_Romania.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work Original artist: AdiJapan
File:Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a9/Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union.svg License: Public domain Contributors: http://pravo.levonevsky.org/ Original artist:
File:Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union_(1923-1955).svg Source:
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Soviet_Union_%281923-1955%29.svg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: ? Original artist: created by rotemliss from Image:Flag of
the Soviet Union.svg.
File:Greater_Germanic_Reich.png Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0b/Greater_Germanic_Reich.png
License:
CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors:
<a data-x-rel='nofollow' class='external text' href='http://www.obersalzberg.de/
utopie-grossgermanisches-reich.html?,<span>,&,</span>,L=1'>"Utopia: The 'Greater Germanic Reich of the German Nation'".
Institut fr Zeitgeschichte. Mnchen - Berlin. 1999.</a> Original artist: Hayden120
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He_111_during_the_Battle_of_Britain.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: This is photograph MH6547 from the collections of the
Imperial War Museums (collection no. 4700-05) Original artist: Unknown
File:Himmler_besichtigt_die_Gefangenenlager_in_Russland._Heinrich_Himmler_inspects_a_prisoner_of_war_camp_in_
Russia,_circa..._-_NARA_-_540164.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/13/Himmler_besichtigt_die_
Gefangenenlager_in_Russland._Heinrich_Himmler_inspects_a_prisoner_of_war_camp_in_Russia%2C_circa..._-_NARA_-_540164.
jpg License: Public domain Contributors: U.S. National Archives and Records Administration Original artist: Unknown or not provided
File:Invasion1941.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/15/Invasion1941.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: The Department of History, United States Military Academy [1] Original artist: Unknown US Army Cartographer
File:OperationBarbarossa.PNG Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3e/OperationBarbarossa.PNG License:
Public domain Contributors: http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/ww2%20europe/EuropeanTheaterGIF/WWIIEurope19.gif
Original artist: The History Department of the United States Military Academy
File:RIAN_archive_2410_Marshal_Zhukov_speaking.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0f/RIAN_
archive_2410_Marshal_Zhukov_speaking.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: RIA Novosti archive, image #2410, http://visualrian.
ru/ru/site/gallery/#2410 35 mm lm / 35 Original artist: P. Bernstein / .
File:RIAN_archive_2564_Soviet_planes_flying_over_Nazi_positions_near_Moscow.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/
wikipedia/commons/8/8f/RIAN_archive_2564_Soviet_planes_flying_over_Nazi_positions_near_Moscow.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0
Contributors: RIA Novosti archive, image #2564, http://visualrian.ru/ru/site/gallery/#2564 35 mm lm / 35 Original artist:
Samaryi Guraryi /
File:Reichskommissariat_Ostland_(1942).svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/dd/Reichskommissariat_
Ostland_%281942%29.svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: This vector image includes elements that have been taken or
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src='https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/93/Europe_1942.svg/20px-Europe_1942.svg.png'
width='20'
height='20' srcset='https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/93/Europe_1942.svg/30px-Europe_1942.svg.png 1.5x,
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data-le-height='456' /></a> Europe 1942.svg (by Alphathon). Original artist: TRAJAN 117
File:Reichskommissariat_Ukraine_(1942).svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c8/Reichskommissariat_
Ukraine_%281942%29.svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: This vector image includes elements that have been taken
or adapted from this: <a href='//commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Europe_1942.svg' class='image'><img alt='Europe 1942.svg'
src='https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/93/Europe_1942.svg/20px-Europe_1942.svg.png'
width='20'
height='20' srcset='https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/93/Europe_1942.svg/30px-Europe_1942.svg.png 1.5x,
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/93/Europe_1942.svg/39px-Europe_1942.svg.png 2x' data-le-width='450'
data-le-height='456' /></a> Europe 1942.svg (by Alphathon). Original artist: TRAJAN 117
File:Skull_and_crossbones.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/53/Skull_and_crossbones.svg License:
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Contributors: Own work Original artist: User:Bastique, User:Ramac et al.
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Contributors: This is a cropped version of Image:Wikinews-logo-en.png. Original artist: Vectorized by Simon 01:05, 2 August 2006 (UTC)
Updated by Time3000 17 April 2007 to use ocial Wikinews colours and appear correctly on dark backgrounds. Originally uploaded by
Simon.

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Content license

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