Inherent Safety Concept

Inherent Safety Concept

Reduce the risk at early stage of design

PROCESS/PLANT

PROJECT PHASE
Safety issues must be embedded within all project life-cycle

Conceptual

Process
development

Project
sanction

Design, engineering,
construction

Hand
over

operation

Relationship of six-stage process study system to project life-cycle

Stage 1

Stage 2

Stage 3

Concept

Process
design

Detailed
Engineering

Stage 4

Construction

Stage 5

Stage 6

PreCommis
sioning

Postcommis
sioning

Many hazard identification technique

can be used at appropriate cycle

Checklist

LOPA
HAZOP

RR
Method Used

PHR

What-if
FMEA
FTA

ETA

Inherent safety is to develop a process (chemistry and

physics) which is by nature a safer process.

Usually perform at the earliest stage of process

development/design.

Also cost effective (e.g. design at lower T and P operation

results in lower capital and operating cost)

More tolerant to operator errors

The application of inherent safety is based in the

following keywords (ISAS):

Intensification

Substitution

Attenuation

Simplification

Intensification (minimization)

Examples,
Use smaller continuous reactors instead of large batch
reactor.
In situ production and consumption of hazardous
chemical

Reduce storage inventory of raw materials

Reduce inventory of hazardous intermediate chemicals
Reduce process hold-up (delay)
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Substitution

Examples,
Avoid using hazardous material, but instead, use a safer one.

Use welded pipe instead of flanged/threaded pipe

Use solvents that are less toxic
Use chemical with higher flash point, boiling point and other less
hazardous properties
Use water as heat transfer fluid instead of hot oil

Attenuation (moderation and limitation of effects)

Examples,
Use vacuum to reduce boiling point
Use less severe temperature and process conditions
Liquefied gases can be stored as refrigerated instead
of under pressure.
Dissolve hazardous material in safe solvent
Operate at conditions where reactor runaway is not possible
Handling larger particle size solid to minimize dust
Use of hazardous materials under the least hazardous conditions.
An explosive powders are better in slurries forms rather than
dry to avoid dust explosion.

Simplify (simplification and error tolerance)

Examples,
Keep piping systems neat and visually easy to follow (label, colour
coding)
Design control panel that are easy to comprehend

Design plant for easy and safe maintenance

Use equipment that require less maintenance
Label vessels

10

Example: Choice of process

Choose process which is less hazardous - this includes intermediate

products, reagent, compatibility of materials, catalysts and also
solvents used.
Production of ketone-aldehyde (KA) at Flixborough
It is an intermediate for nylon production.
Before accident, KA produced by air oxidation of
cyclohexane.
After accident and plant rebuilt, alternative route (substitution)
of process by hydrogenation of phenol was chosen. This is
vapor phase process and less hazardous than oxidation of
cyclohexane.

11

Example: Reactor Design

Reactors are usually large because reactions are slow and
conversion is often low.
To improve mixing try reduce reaction volume
(intensification)
Speed up the reaction by using a proper catalyst.
Selection a proper type of reactor.
For example, with oxidation of liquid cyclohexane the
reaction of KA mixture was carried out in reactor fitted
with external cooler, pump as well as stirrer. Instead, the
gas phase hydrogenation of phenol uses with internally
cooled plug flow reactor.
12

Example: Distillation Column Design

Distillation column usually held up large inventory of boiling liquid.

So, try to reduce inventory through :

- minimize size of column, use many small column instead of one big
one (intensification)

- use special design which can reduce inventories and also residence
time.

For example, ICI Higee Distillation column - distillation takes place in

rotating packed drum.

13

Example: Storage Installation

Avoid storage by plant relocation - i.e. relocate producing
and consuming plant near each other so that to avoid
storing and transporting hazardous materials.
Storage in safer form - for example,
Some dyestuffs can be supplied as pastes instead of
powders to avoid dust explosion.
Liquid NH3 stored refrigerated at atmospheric pressure
instead of stored as compressed liquid at ambient
temperature.
14

Good concept, but some cases not feasible due to many

reasons. (cost, time , technology, location)

Layers of protection

Layers of Protection in
Process Plant

Key Concept in Process Safety:

Redundancy!!!!!!

6 Layers of Protection for High

Reliability
Strength in Reserve
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
CONTAINMENT
RELIEF
SIS
ALARMS
BPCS

BPCS - Basic process control

A
U
T
O
M
A
T
I
O
N

Alarms - draw attention

SIS* - Safety interlock system to
stop/start equipment
Relief - Prevent excessive
pressure
Containment - Prevent materials
from reaching, workers,
community or environment
Emergency Response evacuation, fire fighting, health
care, etc.

20

Four independent layers of protections IPL, (automation)

Seriousness of event
4. Relief system

Divert material safely

3. SIS

Stop the operation of part of the process

2. Alarm System

Bring unusual situation to attention of

a person in the plant

1.BPCS

Maintaining process within acceptable

operating region

Objectives of Process Control

1. Safety
2. Environmental Protection

3. Equipment Protection
4. Smooth Operation &
Production Rate
5. Product Quality
6. Profit

7. Monitoring & Diagnosis

We are emphasizing
these topics

1. BPCS
The Basic Process Control System (BPCS) is responsible for
normal operation of the plant.
Normally use in the first layer of protection against unsafe
conditions.
If the BPCS fails to maintain control, alarms will notify
operations that human intervention is needed to reestablish
control within the specified limits.
If the operator is unsuccessful then other layers of protection,
e.g. pressure safety valves and SIS need to be in place to bring
the process to a safe state and mitigate any hazards.
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2. Alarm System

Alarm has an annunciator (visual indication)

- No action is automated!
- Require analysis by a person
- A plant operator must decide.

Digital computer stores a record of recent alarms

Alarms should catch sensor failures

Common error is to design too many alarms

- Easy to include; simple (perhaps, incorrect) fix to prevent

repeat of safety incident
- One plant had 17 alarms but operator acted on only 8%

Establish and observe clear priority ranking

- HIGH

= Hazard to people or equip., action required

- MEDIUM

= Loss of RM, close monitoring required

- LOW

= investigate when time available

3. Safety Interlock System

Also known as,
Safety Intrumented Functions,
Safety Intrumented Systems, or
Emergency shutdown system (ESS)
An additional safety layer designed to achieve specific
Safety Integrity Levels (SILs)
according to standard in IEC 61508 and IEC 61511

IEC:International Electrotechnical Commission

26

Automatic action usually stops part of plant operation to

achieve safe conditions

- Can divert flow to containment or disposal

- Can stop potentially hazardous process, e.g., combustion

SIS prevents unusual situations

- We must be able to start up and shut down

SIS should respond properly to instrumentation failures

Extreme corrective action is required and automated

- More aggressive than process control (BPCS)

Alarm to operator when a SIS takes action

4. Safety Relief System

Entirely self-contained, no external power required

The action is automatic - does not require a person

Usually, goal is to achieve reasonable pressure

- Prevent high (over-) pressure

- Prevent low (under-) pressure

The capacity should be for the worst case scenario

RELIEF SYSTEMS IN PROCESS

PLANTS
Increase in pressure can lead to rupture of vessel or pipe
and release of toxic or flammable material
- Also, we must protect against unexpected vacuum!
- large disturbances, equipment failure, human error, power
failure,

Relief systems provide an exit path for fluid

Benefits: safety, environmental protection, equipment protection,
reduced insurance, compliance with governmental code

Location of Relief System

Identify potential for damage due to high (or low) pressure
(HAZOP Study)
In general, closed volume (vessel) with ANY potential for
pressure increase
- may have exit path such as hand valve, control valve
(even fail open)
Remember, this is the last resort, when all other safety
systems have not been adequate and a fast response is
required!

Standard Relief Method:

Relief Valves
BASIC PRINCIPLE: No external power required self acting - pressure of process provides needed force!
VALVES - close when pressure returns to acceptable value
- Relief Valve - liquid systems
- Safety Valve - gas and vapor systems including steam
- Safety Relief Valve - liquid and/or vapor systems
Pressure of protected
system can exceed
the set pressure.

Standard Relief Method:

Rupture Disk
BASIC PRINCIPLE: No external power required self acting

RUPTURE DISKS OR BURST DIAPHRAGMS must be replaced after rupture(use only once)
.

Relief Valves
Two types of designs determine influence of pressure immediately after
the valve
- Conventional Valve -pressure after the valve affects the valve lift and
opening
- Balanced Valve - pressure after the valve does not affect the valve lift
and opening
Conventional

Balanced

Some Information about Relief Valves

ADVANTAGES
- simple, low cost and many commercial designs available
- regain normal process operation rapidly because the valve
closes when pressure decreases below set value
DISADVANTAGES
- can leak after once being open (O-ring reduces)
- not for very high pressures (20,000 psi)
- if oversized, can lead to damage and failure (do not be too
conservative; the very large valve is not the safest!)

There are 3 different application of spring operated pressure reliefs,

(1) Relief valve - Primarily for liquid service. Relief valve begins to open at set P.
Valve reaches full capacity when P reaches 25% overpressure. Valve closes as
P returns to set P.

(2) Safety valve - For steam, gas and vapor service. Safety valves pop open when
P exceeds set P. This accomplished by using discharge nozzle that directs
high velocity material towards the valve seat. After blowdown of excess P,

valve reseats at ~4% below set P; hence valve has 4% blow down.
(3) Safety relief valve - Used for liquid and vapor service. Safety relief valves
function as relief valves for liquids and as safety valves for vapor

Spring operated safety relief valve

Rupture Disk/Burst Diaphragm

ADVANTAGES
- no leakage until the burst
- rapid release of potentially large volumes
- high pressure applications
- corrosion leads to failure, which is fail safe
- materials can be slurries, viscous, and sticky

DISADVANTAGES
- must shutdown the process to replace
- greater loss of material through relief
- poorer accuracy of relief pressure
- the valve have to be replaced once triggered

Rupture Disc

Rupture disc relief valve in series

with spring operated relief valve
Rupture disc valve with
pressure gauge

Relief valve test rig

Symbols used in P&I D

Spring-loaded safety relief valve

To effluent handling

Process

Rupture disc

Process

To effluent handling

Exercise
You need to specify types of relief devices needed for polymerization reactor
(Figure 8.6).

Figure 8.6: Polymerization reactor with reliefs

Solution
Each relief is reviewed in relationship to the relief system and the
properties of the relieved materials.
(a) PSV-1a is a rupture disc to protect PSV-1b from reactive
monomers (plugging via polymerization)
b) PSV-1b is a safety relief valve because runaway rxn will give 2phase flow, both liquid and vapor.
(c) PSV-2 is a relief valve because this line contains liquid. A
conventional valve is satisfactory.

(d) PSV-3 is a relief valve because it is for liquid only. A

conventional valve is satisfactory.
(e) PSV-4 is a safety relief valve since liquid or vapor service is
possible. Since this vent will go to a scrubber with possibly
backpressure, balanced bellows should be
specified.
(g) PSV-5 is a relief valve for liquid service only.
This relief provides protection for the following scenario : liquid
blocked in by closing all valves; heat of rxn increases T of the
surrounding reactor fluid; P increased inside the coil due to
thermal expansion.

Materials from relief must be process or

dispose safely
To environment

Vent steam, air

Holding for later processing

Waste water treating

From
relief

Recycle to process

Fuel gas, fuel oil, solvent

Recover part to process

Immediate neutralization

Flare, toxic materials

5. Containment

Use to moderate the impact of spill or an escape

Example
Bund/dike containment for storage tanks
Location of relief valves and vents
Diversion to temporary storage /drain system (following
breakage of rupture disk)
Safety management in containment areas.
Containment building (if applicable)

6. Emergency Response Management

Also used to moderate impact on incidents

All plants should have ERP (emergency response plan)
Assembly, head-counts, evacuation etc