Magno vs.

CA (Crim1)
Facts:
Oriel Magno, lacking fund in acquiring complete
set of equipment to make his car repair shop
operational, approached Corazon Teng, Vice
President of Mancor Industries.VP Teng referred
Magno to LS Finance and Management
Corporation, advising its Vice President, Joey
Gomez, that Mancor was willing to supply the
pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could
accommodate Magno and and provide him
credit facilities.
The arrangement went on requiring Magno to
pay 30% of the total amount of the equipment as
warranty deposit but Magno couldn't afford to
pay so he requested VP Gomez to look for third
party who could lend him that amount.Without
Magno's knowledge, Corazon was the one who
provided that amount. As payment to the
equipment, Magno issued six checks, two of
them were cleared and the rest had no sufficient
fund. Because of the unsuccessful venture,
Magno failed to pay LS Finance which then
pulled out the equipment. Magno was charged of
violation of BP Blg. 2 (The Bouncing Checks
Law) and found guilty.
Issue:
Whether or not Magno should be punished for
the issuance of the checks in question.
Held:
No, To charge Magno for the refund of a
warranty deposit which he did not withdraw as it
was not his own account, it having remained
with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an
unjust debt since he did not receive the amount
in question. All the while, said amount was in
the safekeeping of the financing company which
is managed by the officials and employees of LS
Finance.
ROGELIO ROQUE vs. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Petitioner Rogelio Roque was charged with the
crime of frustrated homicide. When arraigned
on March 23, 2003, petitioner pleaded not
guilty.The prosecution averred that day while
brothers Reynaldo Marquez (Reynaldo) and
Rodolfo Marquez (Rodolfo) were in the house of
Bella Salvador-Santos (Bella) in Pandi, Bulacan,
Rodolfo spotted Rogelio dela Cruz and shouted
to him to join them. At that instant, petitioner
and his wife were passing-by on board a tricycle.
Believing that Rodolfos shout was directed at
him, petitioner stopped the vehicle and cursed
the former. Reynaldo apologized for the

misunderstanding but petitioner was unyielding.

Before leaving, he warned the Marquez brothers
that something bad would happen to them if
they continue to perturb him. Bothered, Rodolfo
went to the house of Barangay Chairman Pablo
Tayao to ask for assistance in settling the
misunderstanding.
Then
Reynaldo
just
proceeded to petitioners house to follow Tayao
and Rodolfo who had already gone ahead. Upon
arriving at petitioners residence, Reynaldo
again apologized to petitioner but the latter did
not reply. Instead, petitioner entered the house
and when he came out, he was already holding a
gun which he suddenly fired at Reynaldo who
was hit in his right ear. Petitioner then shot
Reynaldo who fell to the ground after being hit
in the nape. Fortunately, Reynaldos parents
arrived and took him to a local hospital for
emergency medical treatment. He was later
transferred to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital in
Manila. Presenting a totally different version,
the defense claimed that day, the petitioner went
to the house of Bella on board a tricycle to fetch
his child. While driving, he was cursed by
brothers Reynaldo and Rodolfo who were visibly
intoxicated. Petitioner ignored the two and just
went home. Later, however, the brothers
appeared in front of his house still shouting
invectives against him. Petitioner requested
Tayao tos top and pacify them but Reynaldo
refused to calm down and instead fired his gun.
Hence, as an act of self-defense, petitioner fired
back twice. On March 12, 2007, the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch
84, rendered its Decision2 finding petitioner
guilty as charged
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied in an Order4 dated August 16,
2007. Undaunted, petitioner appealed to the
Court of Appeals (CA). In its Decision dated
February 27, 2009, the CA affirmed in full the
RTCs Decision, Hence, the Petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration thereto was likewise denied
in a Resolution dated July 30, 2010. Hence, this
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Courtwhere petitioner imputes
upon the CA the following errors all pertain to
appreciation of evidence or factual errors.
ISSUE
Whether or not the SC can entertain petition
for certiorari wherein the issues imputed
pertains to appreciation of evidence or factual
errors?
HELD:

NO. Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 122, and

Section 9, Rule 45, of the Rules of Court, the
review on appeal of a decision in a criminal case,
wherein the CA imposes a penalty other than
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
is by petition for review on certiorari. A petition
for review on certiorari raises only questions of
law. Sec. 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court, explicitly so
provides
ALFREDO
DE
GUZMAN,
JR., Petitioner, v. PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
On December 24, 1997, at about ten oclock in
the evening, Alexander Flojo (hereafter
Alexander) was fetching water below his
rented house at 443 Aglipay Street, Old Zaniga
St., Mandaluyong City when suddenly Alfredo
De Guzman (hereafter Alfredo), the brother of
his land lady, Lucila Bautista (hereafter
Lucila), hit him on the nape. Alexander
informed Lucila about what Alfredo did to him.
Lucila apologized to Alexander by saying,
Pasensya ka na Mang Alex and told the latter
to just go up. Alexander obliged and went
upstairs. He took a rest for about two hours.
Thereafter, at around 12:00 to 12:15 A.M.,
Alexander went down and continued to fetch
water. While pouring water into a container,
Alfredo suddenly appeared in front of Alexander
and stabbed him on his left face and chest.
Cirilino Bantaya, a son-in-law of Alexander, saw
the latter bleeding on the left portion of his body
and begging for help. Alexander then told
Cirilino that Alfredo stabbed him. Cirilino
immediately loaded Alexander into his
motorcycle (backride) and brought him to the
Mandaluyong City Medical Center. Upon arrival
at the hospital, the doctors immediately
rendered medical assistance to Alexander.
Alexander stayed in the emergency room of said
hospital for about 30 to 40 minutes. Then, he
was brought to the second floor of the said
hospital where he was confined for two days.
Thereafter, Alexander was transferred to the
Polymedic General Hospital where he was
subjected for further medical examination.
Alexander sustained two stabbed wounds One of
which was on the zygoma, left side, and about
one (1) cm. long. The other is on his upper left
chest which penetrated the fourth intercostal
space at the proximal clavicular line measuring

about two (2) cm. The second stabbed (sic)

wound penetrated the thoracic wall and left lung
of the victim which resulted to blood air (sic) in
the thoracic cavity thus necessitating the
insertion of a thoracostomy tube to remove the
blood. According to Dr. Francisco Obmerga, the
physician who treated the victim at the
Mandaluyong City Medical Center, the second
wound was fatal and could have caused
Alexanders death without timely medical
intervention.
On the other hand, Alfredo denied having
stabbed Alexander. According to him, on
December 25, 1997 at around midnight, he
passed by Alexander who was, then, fixing a
motorcycle. At that point, he accidentally hit
Alexanders back, causing the latter to throw
invective words against him. He felt insulted,
thus, a fistfight ensued between them. They even
rolled on the ground. Alfredo hit Alexander on
the cheek causing blood to ooze from the latters
face.3
The RTC convicted the petitioner, decreeing
thusly:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
PRESCINDING (sic) FROM THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the court finds accused
Alfredo De Guzman y Agkis a.k.a., JUNIOR,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) the
crime of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE defined and
penalized in Article 250 of theRevised Penal
Code and in the absence of any modifying
circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Months and
One (1) day of PRISION CORR[R]ECCIONAL
as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years and One (1) day of
PRISION
MAYOR
as MAXIMUM .
The accused is further ordered to pay the private
complainant compensatory damages in the
amount of P14,170.35 representing the actual
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly
proven.
SO ORDERED.4
On appeal, the petitioner contended that his
guilt had not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt; that intent to kill, the critical element of
the crime charged, was not established; that the
injuries sustained by Alexander were mere
scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger during
the fistfight between them; that he did not inflict
the stab wounds, insisting that another person
could have inflicted such wounds; and that he
had caused only slight physical injuries on

Alexander, for which he should be accordingly

found
guilty.
Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the petitioners
conviction, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
instant appeal is DISMISSED

the

The CA denied the petitioners motion for

reconsideration
on
May
2,
2007.6
Issue
Was the petitioner properly found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide?
Ruling
The

appeal

lacks

merit.

The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the

accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested
by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2)
the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound but
did not die because of timely medical assistance;
and (3) none of the qualifying circumstances for
murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code , as amended, is present.7 Inasmuch as the
trial and appellate courts found none of the
qualifying circumstances in murder under
Article 248 to be present, we immediately
proceed to ascertain the presence of the two
other
elements.
The petitioner adamantly denies that intent to
kill was present during the fistfight between him
and Alexander. He claims that the heightened
emotions during the fistfight naturally
emboldened both of them, but he maintains that
he only inflicted minor abrasions on Alexander,
not the stab wounds that he appeared to have
sustained. Hence, he should be held liable only
for serious physical injuries because the intent to
kill, the necessary element to characterize the
crime as homicide, was not sufficiently
established. He avers that such intent to kill is
the main element that distinguishes the crime of
physical injuries from the crime of homicide;
and that the crime is homicide only if the intent
to
kill
is
competently
shown.
The essential element in frustrated or attempted
homicide is the intent of the offender to kill the
victim immediately before or simultaneously

with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a

specific intent that the State must allege in the
information, and then prove by either direct or
circumstantial evidence, as differentiated from a
general criminal intent, which is presumed from
the commission of a felony by dolo.8 Intent to
kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the
courts only through external manifestations, i.e.,
the acts and conduct of the accused at the time
of the assault and immediately thereafter.
Here, both the trial and the appellate court
agreed that intent to kill was present. We concur
with them. Contrary to the petitioners
submission, the wounds sustained by Alexander
were not mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of
anger or as the result of a fistfight between them.
The petitioner wielded and used a knife in his
assault on Alexander. The medical records
indicate, indeed, that Alexander sustained two
stab wounds, specifically, one on his upper left
chest and the other on the left side of his face.
The petitioners attack was unprovoked with the
knife used therein causing such wounds, thereby
belying his submission, and firmly proving the
presence of intent to kill. There is also to be no
doubt about the wound on Alexanders chest
being sufficient to result into his death were it
not for the timely medical intervention.
With the State having thereby shown that the
petitioner already performed all the acts of
execution that should produce the felony of
homicide as a consequence, but did not produce
it by reason of causes independent of his
will, i.e., the timely medical attention accorded
to Alexander, he was properly found guilty of
frustrated
homicide.
WHEREFORE,
the
Court AFFIRMS the
decision promulgated on September 27, 2006
finding petitioner Alfredo De Guzman,
Jr. GUILTY beyond
reasonable
doubt
of FRUSTRATED
HOMICIDE,
and SENTENCES him
to
suffer
the
indeterminate penalty of four years of prision
correccional, as the minimum, to eight years
and one day of prision mayor, as the
maximum; ORDERS the petitioner to pay to
Alexander Flojo civil indemnity of P30,000.00;
moral
damages
of
P30,000.00;
and
compensatory damages of P14,170.35, plus
interest of 6% per annum on all such awards
from the finality of this decision until full
payment; and DIRECTS the petitioner to pay
the
costs
of
suit.

Rivera vs. People

G.R. No. 166326. January 25, 2006
Petitioners: Esmeraldo Rivera, Ismael Rivera,
and Edgardo Rivera
Respondent: People of the Philippines
FACTS:
As the victim, Ruben Rodil, went to a nearby
store to buy food, accused Edgardo Rivera
mocked him for being jobless and dependent on
his wife for support. Ruben resented the rebuke
and thereafter, a heated exchange of words
ensued. In the evening of the following day,
when Ruben and his three-year-old daughter
went to the store to buy food, Edgardo, together
with his brother Esmeraldo Rivera and Ismael
Rivera, emerged from their house and ganged up
on him. Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled Ruben
with fist blows. And as he fell to the ground,
Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block
on the parietal area. Esmeraldo, Ismael and
Edgardo fled to their house only when the
policemen arrived. Ruben sustained injuries and
was brought to the hospital. The doctor declared
that the wounds were slight and superficial,
though the victim could have been killed had the
police not promptly intervened. The trial court
found the accused guilty of the crime of
frustrated murder. An appeal was made by the
accused, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial courts decision with modification, changing
the crime to attempted murder and imposed an
indeterminate penalty of 2 years of prision
correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of
prision mayor as maximum.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not there was intent to kill.
2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals was
correct in modifying the crime from frustrated to
attempted murder.
3) Whether or not the aggravating circumstance
of treachery was properly applied.
4) Whether or not the correct penalty was
imposed.
HELD:
1) Yes. The Court declared that evidence to prove
intent to kill in crimes against persons may
consist, inter alia, in the means used by the
malefactors, the nature, location and number of
wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of
the malefactors before, at the time, or

immediately after the killing of the victim, the

circumstances under which the crime was
committed and the motives of the accused. In
the present case, Esmeraldo and Ismael
pummeled the victim with fist blows, while
Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block.
Even though the wounds sustained by the victim
were merely superficial and could not have
produced his death, intent to kill was presumed.
2) Yes. Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that there is an attempt when the
offender commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all
the acts of execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance. Although
the wounds sustained by the victim were merely
superficial and could not have produced his
death, it does not negate criminal liability of the
accused for attempted murder. The intent to kill
was already presumed based on the overt acts of
the accused. In fact, victim could have been
killed had the police not promptly intervened.
3) Yes. The essence of treachery is the sudden
and unexpected attack, which gives no
opportunity for the victim to repel it or defend
himself. In the present case, the accused
attacked the victim in a sudden and unexpected
manner as he was walking with his three-yearold daughter, impervious of the imminent peril
to his life. He was overwhelmed with the assault
of the accused and had no chance to defend
himself and retaliate. Thus, there was treachery.
4) No. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the
penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to
death. Since the accused were guilty only of
attempted murder, the penalty should be
reduced by two degrees, in accordance to Article
51 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, under
Article 61 (2), in relation to Article 71 of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty should be
prision mayor. In the absence of any modifying
circumstance in the commission of the crime
other than the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, the maximum of the indeterminate
penalty shall be taken from the medium period
of prision mayor which has a range of from eight
(8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. To
determine the minimum of the indeterminate
penalty, the penalty of prision mayor should be
reduced by one degree, prision correccional,
which has a range of six (6) months and one (1)

day to six (6) years. Hence, the accused were

sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
from two (2) years of prision correccional in its
minimum period, as minimum, to nine (9) years
and four (4) months of prision mayor in its
medium period, as maximum.

2.nature,location and
sustained by the victim

number

of

wounds

3. conduct of the malefactor before, during and

after the commission of the crime,
4.circumstances under which the crime was
committed
5. motive of the accused.

FACTS:
Victim, Ruben went to a nearby store to buy
food. Accused Rivera was in the same vicinity.
When he saw Ruben, Rivera mocked Ruben for
being jobless and dependent on his wife. This
caused an exchange of heated words between the
two.
The next day when Ruben and his daughter were
once again buying food, Rivera and two other
men attacked Ruben. The two men punched and
mauled Ruben while Rivera, on the other hand,
got a hollowblock and hit Rubenss head with it
three times. Rivera and his companions left only
when the policemen arrived.
Ruben was brought to the hospital and it was
said that he suffered only slight and superficial
wounds but were it not for the arrival of the
policemen, Ruben would have died.
TC- the three are guilty of frustrated murder.
CA- affirmed the decision of the trial court, with
modifications.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was INTENT TO
KILL.
HELD: Yes. There is intent to kill in the case at
bar.
The pieces of evidence required to prove intent
to kill are as follows:
1.means used by the malefactors

Applying the elements to the case at bar, the

means or weapons used by RIVERA is a piece of
hollow block.
As to nature, location and number of wounds,
Rivera inflicted injuries on the head of Ruben
three times.
Conduct before during and after the commission
of the crime, Rivera was angry at Ruben because
of the circumstances that transpired between
Ruben and him

Villareal vs. People GR

February 1, 2012 664 scra

No.

151258

FACTS:
Seven Freshmen Law students of
Ateneo de Manila University School of Law have
been initiated by the Aquila Legis Juris
Fraternity on February 1991. The initiation rites
started when the neophytes were met by some
members of the mentioned fraternity at the
lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They were
consequently brought to a house and briefed on
what will be happening during the days when
they will be initiated. They were informed that
there will be physical beatings and that the
neophytes can quit anytime they want. They
were brought to another house to commence
their initiation.The neophytes were insulted and
threatened even before they got off the van.
Members of the fraternity delivered blows to the
neophytes as they alighted from the van. Several
initiation rites were experienced by the
neophytes like the Indian run, Bicol express and
rounds. They were asked to recite provisions and
principles of the fraternity and were hit
everytime they made a mistake. Accused
fraternity members, Dizon and Villareal, asked
the head of the initiation rites (Victorino) to

reopen the initiation. Fraternity members

subjected neophytes to paddling and additional
hours of physical pain. After the last session of
beatings, Lenny Villa could not walk. Later that
night, he was feeling cold and his condition
worsened. He was brought to the hospital but
was declared dead on arrival. Criminal case
was filed against 26 fraternity members
and was subsequently found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and
penalized with reclusion perpetua. On January
10 2002, CA modified the criminal liability
of each of the accused according to
individual participation. 19 of the the accused
were acquitted, 4 of the appellants were found
guilty of slight physical injuries, and 2 of the
accused-appellants (Dizon and Villareal) were
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of homicide. Accused Villareal petitioned
for review on Certriori under Rue 45 on the
grounds that the CA made 2 reversible errors:
first, denial of due process and second,
conviction absent proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Consequently, petitioner Villareal died on
13 March 2011 and filed a Notice of Death of
Party on 10 August 2011.
ISSUE: Whether or not criminal liability for
personal penalties of the accused is extinguished
by death

Doctrine: Yes, criminal liability of the accused is

extinguished by death. The Court took note of
counsel for petitioners Notice of Death when it
has been received while the petition was pending
resolution. Personal penalties refer to the service
of personal or imprisonment penalties, while
pecuniary penalties refer to fines, costs, civil
liability. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
states that the criminal liability of a convict for
personal penalties is totally extinguished by
death of the convict. His pecuniary penalty has
been extinguished since the death of the accused
happened before his final judgment. Therefore,
the death of the petitioner for both personal and
pecuniary penalties including his civil liability
has ended. His petition has also been dismissed
and the criminal case against him has been
closed and terminated

awakened by someone trying to force open the

door of his room. He thought that it was a
robber so he stabbed the person who entered the
room, who turned out to be his roommate.
Issue: Was Ah Chong liable for the death of his
roommate?
Ruling: Ah Chong was not held liable for the
death
of
his
roommate.
The Supreme
Court reversed the lower courts conviction of
homicide, saying that Ah Chong committed a
mistake of fact. He would not have stabbed his
roommate had he known the identity of the
person who entered the room. If the person who
opened the door had really been a robber instead
of his roommate, he would not be criminally
liable if he had stabbed that person in selfdefense.
John Eric
Philippines

Loney

vs

People

of

the

Marcopper Mining has been storing mine

tailings from its operations. At the base of the
pit, there is a drainage that leads to two rivers.
Marcopper was charged with violation of 3
special laws and reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property. It is the contention of
marcopper that the violations of the special laws
are absorbed in reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property.
ISSUE: Whether or not crimes mala inse are
absorbed in crimes mala prohibita.
HELD: No. crimes mala inse are not absorbed
in crimes mala prohibita.
Distinctions of mala inse (MI) vs mala prohibita
(MP):
*my mnemonics are PEGVIMC*
1.
AS
TO PERFORMANCE
TO EXECUTION

&

AS

US vs Ah Chong, 15 Phil 488

--MI-taken into consideration --MP- not taken

into consideration

Facts: Because of robberies happening at Fort

McKinley, Ah Chong, a Chinaman, slept with a
knife under his pillow. One night, he was

3. AS TO GOOD FAITH --MI-it is a valid

defense --MP-not a valid defense

4. AS TO VIOLATION --MI-it is a violation of

the RPC --MP-it is a violation of the special laws
5. AS TO INTENT --MI-intent is material --MPintent is not material
6. AS TO MORAL --MI- involves moral
turpitude--MP- does not involve moral
tupitude
7. AS TO CIRCUMSTANCES--MI- taken into
consideration
--MP-not
taken
into
consideration

Garcia v CA
In 1995, Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., ran for the
senatorial elections.
Meanwhile, in Alaminos, Pangasinan, Arsenia
Garcia was one of the designated election
officers. Garcia was accused by Pimentel of
violating the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987.
Pimentel alleged that Garcia decreased
Pimentels vote by 5,000 votes.
The trial court found Garcia guilty. On appeal,
Garcia invoked that the trial court erred in ruling
that her defense of good faith was not properly
appreciated. She averred that due to the
workload given to her during said elections, she
got fatigued and that caused the error in the
tabulation of Pimentels votes.
Pimentel argued that the Electoral Reforms Law
is a special law hence it is a malum prohibitum
law and therefore, good faith is not a defense.
ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged violation of
Garcia of the Electoral Reforms Law is a malum
prohibitum.
HELD: No. Generally, mala in se crimes refer to
those felonies in violation of the Revised Penal
Code. However, it must be noted that mala in se
are crimes which are inherently immoral. Hence,
even if the crime is punished by a special law, if
it is inherently immoral, then it is still a crime
mala in se.

In this case, the said violation of the Electoral

Reforms Law is a mala in se crime because it is
inherently immoral to decrease the vote of a
candidate. Note also that what is being punished
is the intentional decreasing of a candidates
votes and not those arising from errors and
mistakes. Since a violation of this special law is a
malum in se, good faith can be raised as a
defense.
However, Garcias defense of good faith was not
proven. Facts show that the decreasing of
Pimentels vote was not due to error or mistake.
It was shown that she willingly handled certain
duties which were not supposed to be hers to
perform. Thats a clear sign that she facilitated
the erroneous entry.

Case Digest: Amado Alvarado Garcia vs.

People of the Philippines G.R. No. 171951
28 August 2009
FACTS:
The Fozes were having a drinking spree at their
apartment when Chy asked them to quiet down
to which Garcia commented that Chy was being
arrogant and that one day he would lay a hand
on him. Two days later, the group decided to
drink at a store owned by Chys sister, Esquibel.
Chy was about to come out of his house and
upon being summoned, Garcia suddenly
punched him. Chy continued to parry the blows
and when he found an opportunity to escape, he
ran home and phoned his wife to call the police
regarding the mauling. He also complained of
difficulty in breathing. He was found later
unconscious on the kitchen floor, salivating.
Cause of death is heart attack to which Garcia
appeals that the injuries he caused were not as
violent in nature as to have caused the death of
Chy. Garcia pleaded not guilty to the crime of
homicide. The autopsy doctor confirms that the
boxing and the striking of the bottle beer on the
victim could not have caused any direct physical
effect to cause the heart attack if the victims
heart is healthy. What could have caused said
heart attack is the victims emotions concerning
the violence inflicted upon him.
ISSUE:

Whether the circumstance of having no

intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed should be appreciated

affidavit of the Barangay Captain who stated that

he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow
irrigation canals on November 5. The motion
was denied; hence, this petition.

RULING:
Issue:
The circumstance that the petitioner did not
intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim
does not exempt him from criminal liability.
Since he deliberately committed an act
prohibited by law, said condition simply
mitigates his guilt in accordance with Article
13(3) of the Revised Penal Code. Nevertheless,
said circumstance must be appreciated in favour
of the petitioner. The fact that the physical
injuries he inflicted on the victim could not have
naturally and logically caused the actual death of
the victim, if the latters heart is in good
condition.
Considering this mitigating circumstance,
imposable penalty should be in the minimum
period, that is, reclusion temporal in its
minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the trial court properly imposed
upon petitioner an indeterminate penalty of ten
(10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of
reclusion temporal as maximum.
Urbano v. IAC
Facts:
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno
Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He found
the place where he stored palay flooded with
water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano
went to the elevated portion to see what
happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier
and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted
that he was the one who opened the canal. A
quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the
right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg
with the back of the bolo. On October 27, 1980,
Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement.
Urbano paid P700 for the medical expenses of
Javier. On November 14, 1980, Urbano was
rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and
convulsions. The doctor found the condition to
be caused by tetanus toxin which infected the
healing wound in his palm. He died the
following day. Urbano was charged with
homicide and was found guilty both by the trial
court and on appeal by the Court of Appeals.
Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the

Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to

Javier was the proximate cause of the latters
death
Held:
A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is...
"that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred."And more
comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is
that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal
connection
with
its
immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom."
If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant
was already infected by tetanus germs at the
time, it is more medically probable that Javier
should have been infected with only a mild cause
of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus
appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking
incident or more than 14 days after the infliction
of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should
have been more than six days. Javier, however,
died on the second day from the onset time. The
more credible conclusion is that at the time
Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant,
the severe form of tetanus that killed him was
not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound
could have been infected with tetanus after the
hacking incident. Considering the circumstance
surrounding Javier's death, his wound could
have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but
not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be
the direct, natural, and logical consequence of

the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused.

And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the
victim's death must convince a rational mind
beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings,
however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the
infection of the wound by tetanus was an
efficient intervening cause later or between the
time Javier was wounded to the time of his
death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and
foreign to the crime.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the
remote cause and its subsequent infection, for
failure to take necessary precautions, with
tetanus may have been the proximate cause of
Javier's death with which the petitioner had
nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot
be made the be of an action if such remote cause
did nothing more than furnish the condition or
give rise to the occasion by which the injury was
made possible, if there intervened between such
prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the
injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If
no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such
condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition
sets into operation the instances which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition,
such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause."
People
vs.
Villacorta
September 7, 2011

GR

186412

657 SCRA 270 Criminal Law Criminal

Liability Proximate Cause Efficient
Intervening Cause
On January 22, 2002, Danilo Cruz went to a
sari-sari store to buy bread. Out of nowhere,
Orlito Villacorta appeared and thereafter
stabbed the left part of the body of Cruz with a
sharpened bamboo stick. After that, Villacorta
fled.
Cruz was helped by bystanders and he was
brought to a nearby hospital where he was
treated as out-patient. He was discharged on the
same day but on February 14, 2002, or 21 days
after the stabbing incident, he returned to the
same hospital where he was treated for severe
tetanus. The next day on February 15, 2002,

Cruz died. The medical report states that Cruz

died of tetanus infection secondary to stab
wound.
The trial court as well as the Court of Appeals
convicted Villacorta for murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villacorta is guilty of
murder.
HELD: No. In this case, the proximate cause of
the death is not the stabbing done by Villacorta
upon Cruz. There was an efficient intervening
cause which appeared between the time of the
stabbing and the time of the death of Cruz.
In explaining this, the Supreme Court took into
consideration the fact that severe tetanus (the
kind of tetanus which causes immediate death)
has an incubation period of 14 days or less. In
this case, the stabbing made by Vilalcorta could
not have caused the tetanus infection as 22 days
already lapsed from the time of the stabbing
until the date of death of Cruz. Something else
caused the tetanus other than the stabbing in
short, Cruz acquired the tetanus 14 days or less
before February 15, 2003 and not on the date of
stabbing.
The court explained further:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be
the direct, natural, and logical consequence of
the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused.
And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the
victims death must convince a rational mind
beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings,
however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the
infection of the wound by tetanus was an
efficient intervening cause later or between the
time [Cruz] was wounded to the time of his
death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and
foreign to the crime.
Villacorta is however guilty of slight physical
injuries based on the facts. Neither is he guilty of
attempted nor frustrated murder, his intent to
kill was not proven by the prosecution.

People vs. Adriano, et.al. G.R. No.205228

July 15, 2015
Adriano was charged with two (2) counts of
Murder. The two (2) sets of Information read:

Version of the Prosecution:

On 13 March 2007, at around 8:00 a.m., Police
Officer 1 Matthew Garabiles (POI Garabiles) and
P02 Alejandro Santos (P02 Santos), in civilian
clothes, were on their way to Camp Olivas,
Pampanga, riding a motorcycle along OlongapoGapan National Road.5
While they were at Barangay Malapit San Isidro,
Nueva Ecija, a speeding blue Toyota Corolla
(Corolla) with plate no. WHK 635, heading
towards the same direction, overtook them and
the car in front of them, a maroon Honda CRV
(CRY) with plate no. CTL 957.6

Garabiles as one of the four assailants who

alighted from the passenger's seat beside the
driver of the Corolla and shot Cabiedes. He was
immediately arrested and brought to the
Provincial Special Operations Group (PSOG)
headquarters in Cabanatuan City.8

In examining the crime scene, the Nueva Ecija

Provincial Crime Laboratory Office recovered
one (1) deformed fired bullet from a .45 caliber
firearm and five (5) cartridges from a .45 caliber
firearm.9
Version of the Defense

When the Corolla reached alongside the CRV,

the passenger on the front seat of the Corolla
shot the CRV and caused the CRV to swerve and
fall in the canal in the road embankment. Four
(4) armed men then suddenly alighted the
Corolla and started shooting at the driver of the
CRV, who was later identified as Cabiedes.
During the shooting, a bystander, Bulanan, who
was standing near the road embankment, was
hit by a stray bullet. The four armed men hurried
back to the Corolla and immediately left the
crime scene. PO 1 Garabiles and P02 Santos
followed the Corolla but lost track of the latter.7
Later, both Cabiedes and Bulanan died from
fatal gunshot wounds: Cabiedes was pronounced
dead on arrival (DOA) at the Good Samaritan
General Hospital due to three (3) gunshot
wounds on the left side of his chest while
Bulanan died on the spot after being shot in the
head.

During the investigation, the police learned that

the Corolla was registered under the name of
Antonio V. Rivera (Rivera). Upon inquiry, Rivera
admitted that he is the owner of the Corolla but
clarified that the Corolla is one of the several
cars he owns in his car rental business, which he
leased to Adriano. Later that day, Adriano
arrived at Rivera's shop with the Corolla, where
he was identified by P02 Santos and PO 1

Adriano testified that on 13 March 2007, at

about 6:00 a.m., at the time of the incident, he
was at his house in Dolores, Magalang,
Pampanga, washing the clothes of his child.
After doing the laundry, he took his motorcycle
to a repair shop and left it there.10
At about 8:00 a.m., Adriano went to the house of
his friend, Ruben Mallari (Mallari), to ask for a
lighter spring needed to repair his motorcycle.
After having coffee in Mallari' s house, Adriano
went home and brought his child to his mother.
On his way to his mother's house, he met his
brother-in-law, Felix Aguilar Sunga (Sunga).
After leaving his child at his mother's house,
Adriano went to the cockpit arena to watch
cockfights, where he saw his friend, Danilo
Dizon (Dizon). After the fights, he left the
cockpit at about 2:00 p.m. and went home and
took a rest.11
After resting, Adriano picked-up his motorcycle
and proceeded to a store and stayed there. At
around 5 :00 p.m., he went back home. After a
while, he received a call from a certain Boyet
Garcia (Garcia), who borrowed the Corolla from
him, which he rented from Rivera.12
At 8:00 p.m., he met with Garcia to get the
Corolla back. After dropping Garcia off, Adriano
went to Rivera to return the Corolla, where he
was arrested by police officers, thrown inside the
Corolla's trunk, and brought to a place where he
was tortured.13

The other defense's witnesses, Lucita Tapnio

(Tapnio),
Mallari,
Sunga,
and
Dizon
corroborated Adriano's testimony.14
When arraigned, Adriano pleaded not guilty.
The other accused, Lean Adriano alias "Denden,"
Abba Santiago y Adriano, John Doe, and Peter
Doe remained at large.
During trial, the prosecution presented eight (8)
witnesses: (1) PO1 Garabiles, (2) P02 Santos, (3)
Police Senior Inspector Roger V. Sebastian, (4)
SP02 Alejandro Eduardo, (5) P02 Jay Cabrera,
(6) P03 Antonio dela Cruz, (7) Adelaida
Cabiedes, widow of Cabiedes, and (8) Ricky
Flores.
On the other hand, the defense presented
Adriano, Tapnio, Sunga, Mallari, and Dizon as
witnesses.
Ruling of the Lower Courts
After trial, the RTC convicted Adriano. The RTC
rejected Adriano's defense of alibi on the ground
that it was not supported by clear and
convincing evidence. According to the RTC,
Adriano's alibi cannot prevail over the
testimonies of credible witnesses, who positively
identified Adriano as one of the perpetrators of
the crime. Also, contrary to the allegations of the
defense, the RTC gave full credence to the
testimony of prosecution witnesses, POI
Garabiles and P02 Santos. The RTC determined
that the defense failed to show proof that will
show or indicate that PO1 Garabiles and P02
Santos were impelled by improper motives to
testify against Adriano. The RTC found as
proven the assessment of damages against the
accused. Thus did the RTC order Adriano to pay
the
heirs
of
Cabiedes
the
amount
of P222,482.00 based on the following: (1) One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (Pl00,000.00) as
funeral expenses; (2) Sixty Thousand Pesos
(P60,000.00) as expenses for the food served
during the burial; (3) Twelve Thousand Four
Hundred Eighty Two Pesos (1!12,482.00) as
groceries used and served during the wake; and
Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) for the
parts and service repair of the CRV.15

The dispositive portion of the R TC Decision

dated 7 April 2009 reads:
WHEREFORE,
finding
accused
ROLLY
ADRIANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder, as charged, for the death of Danilo
Cabiedes, there being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance that attended the
commission of the crime, he is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Accused Rolly Adriano is also ordered to
indemnify the heirs of Danilo Cabiedes in the
amount of Php 50,000.00 and to pay the sum of
Php 222,482.00 as actual damages.
And finding ROLLY ADRIANO also guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide, as
charged, for the death of Ofelia Bulanan,
likewise, there being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance that attended the
commission of the offense, he is further
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from Eight (8) years and One (1)
day of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to
Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of
reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, and
to indemnify the heirs of Ofelia Bulanan in the
amount of Php 50,000.00.16
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Adriano
alleged that the R TC erred when it failed to
appreciate his defense of alibi, as well as the
testimonies of the other defense's witnesses.
Adriano contended that the RTC erred when it
gave credence to the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses which are inconsistent
and contradictory. In detail, Adriano referred to
the following particulars: 1) whether the culprits
started shooting when the victim's vehicle was
still in motion; 2) which side of the vehicle did
the shooters alight from; 3) the identity of the
culprit who triggered the fatal shot; 4) whether
the trip of PO1 Garabiles and P02 Santos going
to Camp Olivas, Pampanga was official business;
5) the precise distance of the assailants' vehicle
from that of the two (2) eyewitnesses; and 6) the
precise minutes of the shooting incident.
The Court of Appeals rejected Adriano's attempt
to becloud the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses. According to the Court of Appeals, the
prosecution witnesses' positive identification of

Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the crime

cannot be overcome by minor inconsistencies in
their testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that
these trivial differences in fact constitute signs of
veracity.
On the defense of alibi, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling of the R TC that Adriano's
claim that he was in Dolores, Magalang,
Pampanga at the time of the incident does not
convince because it was not impossible for
Adriano to be physically present at the crime
scene, in Barangay Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva
Ecija, which can be reached by car in less than
an hour.17 The dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan
City, Nueva Ecija, Br. 36, in Crim. Case Nos.
13159-07 and 13160-07 is AFFIRMED subject to
the Modification that the award of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) as civil
indemnity to the heirs of Danilo Cabiedes is
INCREASED to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(Php75,000.00). In addition, the AccusedAppellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of
Danilo Cabiedes the amount of Seventy-Five
Thousand Pesos (Php75,000.00) as moral
damages; and the heirs of Ofelia Bulanan the
amount
of
Fifty
Thousand
Pesos
(Php50,000.00) as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.18
Our Ruling
In cases of murder, the prosecution must
establish the presence of the following elements:
1. That a person was killed.
2. That the accused killed him.
3. That the killing was attended by any
of
the
qualifying
circumstances
mentioned in Art. 248.
4. The killing is not parricide or
infanticide.

In the case at bar, the prosecution has

established the concurrence of the elements of
murder: (1) the fact of death of Cabiedes and
Bulanan; (2) the positive identification of
Adriano as one of perpetrators of the crime; and
(3) the attendance of treachery as a qualifying
aggravating circumstance and use of firearms
and abuse of superior strength as generic
aggravating circumstances.
Death of Cabiedes
The present case is a case of murder by ambush.
In ambush, the crime is carried out to ensure
that the victim is killed and at the same time, to
eliminate any risk from any possible defenses or
retaliation
from
the
victim19ambush
exemplifies the nature of treachery.
Paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) defines treachery as the direct
employment of means, methods, or forms in the
execution of the crime against persons which
tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising
from the defense which the offended party might
make. In order for treachery to be properly
appreciated, two elements must be present: (1)
at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself; and (2) the accused
consciously and deliberately adopted the
particular means, methods or forms of attack
employed by him.20 The "essence of treachery is
the sudden and unexpected attack by an
aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving
the latter of any chance to defend himself and
thereby ensuring its commission without risk of
himself."21
Clearly, treachery is present in the case at bar as
the victims were indeed defenseless at the time
of the attack. Adriano, together with the other
accused, ambushed Cabiedes by following the
unsuspecting victim along the national highway
and by surprise, fired multiple shots at Cabiedes
and then immediately fled the crime scene,
causing Cabiedes to die of multiple gunshot
wounds. When the Corolla swerved into the
CRV's lane, Cabiedes was forced to swiftly turn
to the right and on to the road embankment,
finally falling into the canal where his CRY was
trapped, precluding all possible means of

defense. There is no other logical conclusion, but

that the orchestrated ambush committed by
Adriano, together with his co-accused, who are
still on the loose, was in conspiracy with each
other to ensure the death of Cabiedes and their
safety. The means of execution employed was
deliberately and consciously adopted by Adriano
so as to give Cabiedes no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate.22
All these circumstances indicate that the
orchestrated crime was committed with the
presence of the aggravating circumstances of
treachery, which absorbs the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength, and
use of firearms. Indeed, Cabiedes had no way of
escaping or defending himself.

commission of the crime of murder, a stray

bullet hit and killed Bulanan. Adriano is
responsible for the consequences of his act of
shooting Cabiedes. This is the import of Article 4
of the Revised Penal Code. As held in People v.
Herrera citing People v. Ural:
Criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing a felony although the wrongful act
be different from that which is intended. One
who commits an intentional felony is
responsible for all the consequences which may
naturally or logically result therefrom, whether
foreseen or intended or not. The rationale of the
rule is found in the doctrine, 'el que es causa de
la causa es causa del mal causado ', or he who is
the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil
caused.26

Death of Bulanan
We refer back to the settled facts of the case.
Bulanan, who was merely a bystander, was killed
by a stray bullet. He was at the wrong place at
the wrong time.
Stray bullets, obviously, kill indiscriminately and
often without warning, precluding the
unknowing victim from repelling the attack or
defending himself. At the outset, Adriano had no
intention to kill Bulanan, much less, employ any
particular means of attack. Logically, Bulanan's
death was random and unintentional and the
method used to kill her, as she was killed by a
stray a bullet, was, by no means, deliberate.
Nonetheless, Adriano is guilty of the death of
Bulanan under Article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code,23 pursuant to the doctrine of aberratio
ictus, which imposes criminal liability for the
acts committed in violation of law and for all the
natural and logical consequences resulting
therefrom. While it may not have been Adriano's
intention to shoot Bulanan, this fact will not
exculpate him. Bulanan' s death caused by the
bullet fired by Adriano was the natural and
direct consequence of Adriano's felonious deadly
assault against Cabiedes.
As we already held in People v. Herrera 24 citing
People v. Hilario,25 "[t]he fact that accused killed
a person other than their intended victim is of
no moment." Evidently, Adriano's original intent
was to kill Cabiedes. However, during the

As regards the crime(s) committed, we reiterate

our ruling in People v. Nelmida. 27 In the
aforesaid case, we ruled that accused-appellants
should be convicted not of a complex crime but
of separate crimes of two counts of murder and
seven counts of attempted murder as the killing
and wounding of the victims were not the result
of a single act but of several acts. 28 The doctrine
in Nelmida here is apt and applicable.
In Nelmida, we distinguished the two kinds of
complex crime: compound crime, when a single
act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, and complex crime proper, when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the
other. Moreover, we also made a distinction that
"when various victims expire from separate
shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct
crimes,"29 not a complex crime.
As borne by the records, the Nueva Ecija
Provincial Crime Laboratory Office recovered six
(6) cartridges of bullets from a .45 caliber
firearm. This does not indicate discharge by a
single burst. Rather, separate shots are
evidenced. One or more of which, though fired to
kill Cabiedes, killed Bulanan instead. There is
thus no complex crime. The felonious acts
resulted in two separate and distinct crimes.
Finally, we ask, may treachery be appreciated in
aberratio ictus?

Although Bulanan's death was by no means

deliberate, we shall adhere to the prevailing
jurisprudence pronounced in People v.
Flora,30 where the Court ruled that treachery
may be appreciated in aberratio ictus. In Flora,
the accused was convicted of two separate
counts of murder: for the killing of two victims,
Emerita, the intended victim, and Ireneo, the
victim killed by a stray bullet. The Court, due to
the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
treachery, qualified both killings to murder. The
material facts in Flora are similar in the case at
bar. Thus, we follow the Flora doctrine.
Also, contrary to the defense's allegation that
Bulanan' s death was not established, a perusal
of the records would reveal that Bulanan's fact of
death was duly established as the prosecution
offered in evidence Bulanan's death certificate.31
On the alibi as defense, time and again, we have
ruled alibis like denials, are inherently weak and
unreliable because they can easily be
fabricated.32 For alibi to prosper, the accused
must convincingly prove that he was somewhere
else at the time when the crime was committed
and that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the crime scene.33 In the case at bar,
Adriano claimed he was in Dolores, Magalang,
Pampanga at the time of incident. Adriano's
claim failed to persuade. As admitted, Dolores,
Magalang, Pampanga was only less than an hour
away from the crime scene, Barangay Malapit,
San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. Hence, it was not
physically impossible for Adriano to be at the
crime scene at the time of the incident.
It is likewise uniform holding that denial and
alibi will not prevail when corroborated not by
credible witnesses but by the accused's relatives
and friends.1wphi1 Therefore, the defense's
evidence which is composed of Adriano's
relatives and friends cannot prevail over the
prosecution's positive identification of Adriano
as one of the perpetrators of the crime.
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to
death. In the case at bar, as the circumstance of
abuse of superior strength concurs with
treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter.
There being no aggravating or mitigating

circumstance present, the lower penalty should

be imposed, which is reclusion perpetua, in
accordance with Article 63, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code.
To recover actual or compensatory damages,
basic is the rule that the claimant must establish
with a reasonable degree of certainty, the actual
amount of loss by means of competent proof or
the best evidence obtainable.34Documentary
evidence support the award of actual damages in
this case. The RTC computed the amount of
actual damages as P222,482.00. However, a
perusal of the records reveals that the amount of
award of actual damages should be P232,482.00
as
duly
supported
by
official
receipts.35 Therefore, we hereby increase the
award of actual damages from P222,482.00
to P232,482.00.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-HC No. 04028 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Appellant-appellant ROLL Y
ADRIANO y SAMSON is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of MURDER (Criminal Case
No. 13160-07) for the killing of DANILO
CABIEDES and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant
ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is ordered to pay
the heirs of DANILO CABIEDES the amount of
Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as
civil indemnity, Seventy Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00) as moral damages, Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary
damages, and Two Hundred Thirty Two
Thousand Four Hundred Eighty Two Pesos
{P232,482.00) as actual damages.
Accused-appellant
ROLLY
ADRIANO
y
SAMSON is also found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of MURDER (Criminal Case
No. 13159-07) for the killing of OFELIA
BULANAN and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant
ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is ordered to pay
the heirs of OFELIA BULANAN in the amount of
the amount of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Seventy Five
Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral
damages, Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00)
as exemplary damages, and Twenty Five

Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate

damages in lieu of actual damages.
All monetary awards shall earn interest at the
rate of 6o/o per annum from the date of finality
until fully paid.
People vs. Noel T. Sales GR. No 177218
Facts:
On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and
Junior, then nine and eight years old, respectively,
left their home to attend the fluvial procession of Our
Lady of Peafrancia without the permission of their
parents. They did not return home that night. When
their mother, Maria Litan Sales (Maria), looked for
them the next day, she found them in the
nearby Barangay of Magsaysay. Afraid of their
fathers rage, Noemar and Junior initially refused to
return home but their mother prevailed upon them.
When the two kids reached home a furious appellant
confronted them. Appellant then whipped them
with a stick which was later broken so that he
brought his kids outside their house. With Noemars
and Juniors hands and feet tied to a coconut tree,
appellant continued beating them with a thick piece
of wood.

When the beating finally stopped, the three walked

back to the house, Noemar collapsed and lost
consciousness. Maria then told appellant to call a
quack doctor. He left and returned with one, who
told them that they have to bring Noemar to a
hospital. Appellant thus proceeded to take the
unconscious Noemar to the junction and waited for a
vehicle to take them to a hospital. As there was no
vehicle and because another quack doctor they met at
the junction told them that Noemar is already dead,
appellant brought his son back to their house.

Appellant denied that his son died from his beating

since no parent could kill his or her child. He
claimed that Noemar died as a result of difficulty in
breathing. In fact, he never complained of the
whipping done to him. Besides, appellant recalled
that Noemar was brought to a hospital more than a
year before September 2002 and diagnosed with
having a weak heart.

On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar

suffered from epilepsy. Whenever he suffers from
epileptic seizures, Noemar froths and passes out. But
he would regain consciousness after 15 minutes. His
seizures normally occur whenever he gets hungry or
when scolded.

The trial court charged the accused guilty of parricide

and slight physical injuries.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crimes
charged.

Rulings:
Yes. All the elements of the crime of parricide is
present in this case.

Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed;

(2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the
deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate
spouse of accused.

In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence

to prove the first element, that is, a person was
killed. There is likewise no doubt as to the existence
of the second element that the appellant killed the
deceased. It is sufficiently established by the positive
testimonies of Maria and Junior. As to the third
element, appellant himself admitted that the
deceased is his child.

As to the charge of Physical injuries, the victim

himself, Junior testified that he, together with his
brother Noemar, were beaten by their father, herein
appellant, while they were tied to a coconut tree. He
recalled to have been hit on his right eye and right leg
and to have been examined by a physician
thereafter. Maria corroborated her sons testimony.
INTOD VS. CA

FACTS:
Ponente: Justice Campos, JR. 1992
Petitioner:
Sulpicio Intod
Respondent:
Court of Appeals
Victim:
Bernardina Palangpangan
Accessories:
Pangasian
Tubio
Daligdig
Mandaya
Events:
Intod, Pangasian, Tubio, and Daligdig
went to Mandayas house and asked the
latter to come with them in killing
Palangpangan or else he would also be
killed.
Intod wanted to kill Palangpangan
because of a land dispute between them.
10:00pm of that same day, Petitioner,
together
with
his
accessories,
commenced in performing their planned
crime. Mandaya pointed to the room of
Palangpangan and petitioner and
company fired at the said room.
It turned out that Palangpangan was in
another city, no one was in the room
when the accused fired shots, and no
one was hit by the gun fire.
Filling of the Case:
Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of
Attempted Murder.
The decision of RTC was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
ISSUES:
Intod filed a petition for review of the
affirmation made by the Court of
Appeals of the decision held by the
Regional Trial Court. Petitioner seeks
from this court a modification of
judgment by holding him liable only for
an impossible crime.
W/N the act committed by Intod and his
accomplices constitutes an Impossible
Crime.

RULING:
Intods petition was granted, the crime
committed by Intod was modified from
Attempted Murder to an Impossible
Crime.
Article 4 Section 2 of the Revised Penal
Code States:
Criminal Liability shall be incurred:
b. By a person committing an act which
would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment, or
on account of the employment of
inadequate or ineffectual means.
The case at far constitutes an inherent
impossibility to perform the act due to
factual or physical impossibility, that is,
extraneous circumstances unknown to
the actor beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime.
Impossible Crime is recognized and
punished here in the Philippines, as
compared to, United States, thus,
judgment rendered by the US in similar
nature with the case at bar should not
applied.
Impossible
Crimes
constitutes
a
criminal liability, in order to, punish the
criminal intent.
GEMMA JACINTO VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILPPINES, G.R. NO. 162540 JULY 13,
2009
FACTS:
Jacinto worked as a collector for Mega Foam
International Inc., she did not remit to her
employer the
Check issued by the latters customer and,
instead, deposited it to the bank account of her
brother-in-law. The check, however, bounced.
Jacinto was found guilty of the crime of qualified
theft.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jacinto was guilty of qualified
theft.
HELD:
No. What Jacinto committed was an impossible
crime defined and penalized under Article $

paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code which

provides, Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. Criminal responsibility shall be incurred: 2. By
any person performing an act which would be an
offense against persons or property, were it not
for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate to ineffectual means.
All the requisites are present in this case: (1.)
Jacinto performed all the acts to consummate
the crime of qualified theft, which is crime
against property; (2.) Jacintos evil intent cannot
be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking
the check meant for her employer showed her
intent to gain or be unjustly enriched; and (3.)
The crime of qualified theft was not produced
because of the extraneous circumstance that the
check was unfunded and was subsequently
dishonored

People v. Lizada (2003)

Lizada is being charged with 4 counts of raping
his stepdaughter (first rape occurred when she
was about 11 yrs old). TC and CA found him
guilty. On appeal to the SC, Lizada assails the
information against him for violating Rule 110,
Section 11 of the Revised Rules on CrimPro
because the phrase on or about August
1998"stated in the information is too indefinite.
SC says the failure to specify the exact date when
it was committed does not make the Information
defective because the gravamen of rape is not the
date and time of its commission, but the carnal
knowledge under any of the circumstances in
RPC 335.
Lizada is charged with 4 counts of qualified rape,
and meting on him the death penalty for each
count. (He is charged of raping a certain Analia
Agoo in August, September, October, and
November of 1998)
A couple in Bohol had 3 children, one of them
being Analia (born 1985). They separated and
the wife left to settle in Manila, took with her the
kids, and worked as a waitress. 1994: Wife met
Lizada and lived together. The wife put up a
video shop in the house and sold Avon products
door to door. When she was out, her kids tended
to the video shop.
1996: By this year, Analia was about 11 yrs old.
One night, Lizada entered Analias room and
removed her clothes, had intercourse with her,
and threatened to kill her if she told anyone
what happened. This happened in less than an
hour. This happened again the following year.
And from 1996-98, Lizada sexually abused
Analia twice a week.
1998: Lizada, wearing only shorts, entered
Analias room. Analia was not afraid because her
younger brother was just around the house.
However, Lizada was still able to have
intercourse with her.
The brother passed by Analias room and saw
Lizada on top of her. Lizada dismounted and
berated the brother, told him to go to his room
and sleep.
4 days later, Analia was in the video shop
when Lizada ordered her to go to the sala. She
refused bec no one would tend to the video shop.
They fought.
When the mother arrived, she sided with
Lizada which prompted Analia to shout Ayoko
na, ayoko na. Analia then left to retrieve
unreturned tapes. When she got home, the

mother asked her what she meant by ayoko na

so Analia told her that Lizada had been touching
her private parts.
They then went to the police and made a
report. She was examined by a doctor who
found her hymen intact. Later on, she also told
her mother of the rapes. Analia then executed a
Dagdag na Salaysay ng Paghahabla and
charged Lizada with rape.
Lizada denied the rapes, claimed that he loved
the children as if they were his own. He cooked
and prepared their food, ironed their school
uniforms, and bathed them, except Analia who
was already big. Analia was har headed and
often disobeyed him. This caused Lizada and the
mother to quarrel. The relatives of the husband
also frequently visited, which irritated him. He
says that the mother probably coached the
children so that she could manage the business
and take control of all the property (VHS, 2 TVs,
washing machine, scooter, sala set, CD player,
videoke). Also, the mother was exasperated bec
he was unemployed. ------- TC found him
guilty of 4 counts of rape in 7th par, no 1, RPC
335. Death penalty for each count.
Held:
In People v. Garcia, Court upheld a conviction
for 10 counts of rape based on an information
alleging multiple rape "from November 1990 up
to July 21, 1994," a time difference of almost
four years. Such was longer than that involved in
this case. o In any case, Lizada's failure to raise a
timely objection based on this ground
constitutes a waiver of his right to object.
SC does not agree with Lizada. The precise date
of the commission of the rape is not an essential
element of the crime. Failure to specify the
exact date when the rape was committed does
not make the Information defective. The
reason for this is that the gravamen rape is
carnal
knowledge
under
any
of
the
circumstances enumerated under RPC 335.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
REGIE LABIAGA, Appellant. CARPIO, J.:

The Case
Before the Court is an appeal assailing the
Decision1 dated 18 October 2011 of the Court of
Appeals-Cebu (CA-Cebu) in CA-G.R. CEB CRHC No. 01000. The CA-Cebu affirmed with
modification the Joint Decision2 dated 10 March
2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Barotac
Viejo, Iloilo, Branch 66 (RTC), in Criminal Case
No. 2001-155) convicting Regie Labiaga alias
"Banok" (appellant) of murder and Criminal
Case No. 2002-1777 convicting appellant of
frustrated murder.
The Facts
In Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, appellant,
together with a certain Alias Balatong Barcenas
and Cristy Demapanag (Demapanag), was
charged with Murder with the Use of Unlicensed
Firearm under an Information3which reads:
That on or about December 23, 2000 in the
Municipality of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and helping one
another, armed with unlicensed firearm, with
deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, by
means of treachery and with evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot JUDY CONDE alias JOJO with said
unlicensed firearm, hitting her and inflicting
gunshot wounds on the different parts of her
breast which caused her death thereafter.

means of treachery and with evident

premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot Gregorio Conde with said unlicensed
firearm, hitting him on the posterior aspect,
middle third right forearm 1 cm. In diameter;
thereby performing all the acts of execution
which would produce the crime of Murder as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it
by reason of causes independent of the will of
the accused; that is by the timely and able
medical assistance rendered to said Gregorio
Conde which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Alias Balatong Barcenas remained at large. Both
appellant and Demapanag pled not guilty in both
cases and joint trial ensued thereafter. The
prosecution presented four witnesses: Gregorio
Conde, the victim in Criminal Case No. 20021777; Glenelyn Conde, his daughter; and Dr.
Jeremiah Obaana and Dr. Edwin Jose Figura,
the physicians at the Sara District Hospital
where the victims were admitted. The defense,
on the other hand, presented appellant,
Demapanag, and the latters brother, Frederick.
Version of the prosecution
The prosecutions version of the facts is as
follows: At around 7:00 p.m. on 23 December
2000, Gregorio Conde, and his two daughters,
Judy and Glenelyn Conde, were in their home at
Barangay Malayu-an, Ajuy, Iloilo. Thereafter,
Gregorio stepped outside. Glenelyn was in their
store, which was part of their house.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
The same individuals were charged with
Frustrated Murder with the Use of Unlicensed
Firearm in Criminal Case No. 2002-1777, under
an Information4 which states:
That on or about December 23, 2000 in the
Municipality of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and helping one
another, armed with unlicensed firearm, with
deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, by

Shortly thereafter, appellant, who was

approximately five meters away from Gregorio,
shot the latter. Gregorio called Judy for help.
When Judy and Glenelyn rushed to Gregorios
aid, appellant shot Judy in the abdomen. The
two other accused were standing behind the
appellant. Appellant said, "she is already dead,"
and the three fled the crime scene.
Gregorio and Judy were rushed to the Sara
District Hospital. Judy was pronounced dead on
arrival while Gregorio made a full recovery after
treatment of his gunshot wound.

Dr. Jeremiah Obaana conducted the autopsy of

Judy. His report stated that her death was
caused by "cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to
Cardiac Tamponade due to gunshot wound."5
Dr. Jose Edwin Figura, on the other hand,
examined Gregorio after the incident. He found
that Gregorio sustained a gunshot wound
measuring one centimeter in diameter in his
right forearm and "abrasion wounds hematoma
formation" in his right shoulder.6
Version of the defense
Appellant admitted that he was present during
the shooting incident on 23 December 2000. He
claimed, however, that he acted in self-defense.
Gregorio, armed with a shotgun, challenged him
to a fight. He attempted to shoot appellant, but
the shotgun jammed. Appellant tried to wrest
the shotgun from Gregorio, and during the
struggle, the shotgun fired. He claimed that he
did not know if anyone was hit by that gunshot.
Demapanag claimed that at the time of the
shooting, he was in D&D Ricemill, which is
approximately 14 kilometers away from the
crime scene. This was corroborated by
Frederick, Demapanags brother.
The Ruling of the RTC
In its Joint Decision, the RTC acquitted
Demapanag due to insufficiency of evidence.
Appellant, however, was convicted of murder
and frustrated murder. The dispositive portion
of the Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the
court hereby finds the accused Regie Labiaga @
"Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the Crime of Murder in Crim. Case No. 20011555 and hereby sentences the said accused to
reclusion perpetua together with accessory
penalty provided by law, to pay the heirs of Judy
CondeP50,000.00 as civil indemnity, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay the costs.
In Crim. Case No. 2002-1777, the court finds
accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of

Frustrated Murder and hereby sentences the
said accused to a prison term ranging from six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal as maximum, together with
the necessary penalty provided by law and
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs.
Accuseds entire period of detention shall be
deducted from the penalty herein imposed when
the accused serves his sentence.
For lack of sufficient evidence, accused Cristy
Demapanag is acquitted of the crimes charged in
both cases. The Provincial Warden, Iloilo
Rehabilitation Center, Pototan, Iloilo is hereby
directed to release accused Cristy Demapanag
from custody unless he is being held for some
other valid or lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.7
The Ruling of the CA-Cebu
Appellant impugned the RTCs Joint Decision,
claiming that "the RTC gravely erred in
convicting the appellant of the crime charged
despite failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt."8 The CA-Cebu,
however, upheld the conviction for murder and
frustrated murder.
The CA-Cebu also modified the Joint Decision
by imposing the payment of moral and
exemplary damages in both criminal cases. The
CA-Cebu made a distinction between the civil
indemnity awarded by the RTC in Criminal Case
No. 2001-1555 and the moral damages. The CACebu pointed out that:
The trial court granted the amount
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity in Criminal
Case No. 2001-1555. It did not award moral
damages. Nonetheless, the trial court should
have awarded both, considering that they are
two different kinds of damages. For death
indemnity, the amount of P50,000.00 is fixed
"pursuant to the current judicial policy on the
matter, without need of any evidence or proof of

damages. Likewise, the mental anguish of the

surviving family should be assuaged by the
award of appropriate and reasonable moral
damages."9

from custody unless he is being held for some

other valid or lawful cause.

The dispositive portion of the Decision of the

CA-Cebu reads:

Our review of the records of Criminal Case No.

2002-1777 convinces us that appellant is guilty
of attempted murder and not frustrated murder.
We uphold appellants conviction in Criminal
Case No. 2001-1555 for murder, but modify the
civil indemnity awarded in Criminal Case No.
2001-1555, as well as the award of moral and
exemplary damages in both cases.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal

is DENIED. The Joint Decision dated March 10,
2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, in
Barotac Viejo, Iloilo is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. The dispositive portion of
the said Joint Decision should now read as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the
court hereby finds the accused Regie Labiaga @
"Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder in Crim. Case No. 20011555 and hereby sentences the said accused to
reclusion perpetua together with the accessory
penalty provided by law, to pay the heirs of Judy
Conde P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay the costs.
In Crim. Case No. 2002-1777 the court finds
accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Frustrated Murder and hereby sentences the
said accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, together with the accessory penalty
provided by law, to pay Gregorio
Conde P25,000.00 as moral damages
andP25,000.00 as exemplary damages, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay the costs Accused(s) entire period of
detention shall be deducted from the penalty
herein imposed when the accused serves his
sentence.
For lack of sufficient evidence, accused Cristy
Demapanag is acquitted of the crime(s) charged
in both cases. The Provincial Warden, Iloilo
Rehabilitation Center, Pototan, Iloilo is hereby
directed to release accused Cristy Demapanag

The Ruling of the Court

Justifying circumstance of self-defense

Appellants feeble attempt to invoke self-defense
in both cases was correctly rejected by the RTC
and the CA-Cebu. This Court, in People v.
Damitan,11 explained that:
When the accused admits killing a person but
pleads self-defense, the burden of evidence shifts
to him to prove by clear and convincing evidence
the elements of his defense. However,
appellants version of the incident was
uncorroborated. His bare and self-serving
assertions cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the two (2) principal witnesses
of the prosecution.12
Appellants failure to present any other
eyewitness to corroborate his testimony and his
unconvincing demonstration of the struggle
between him and Gregorio before the RTC lead
us to reject his claim of self-defense. Also, as
correctly pointed out by the CA-Cebu,
appellants theory of self-defense is belied by the
fact that:
x x x The appellant did not even bother to report
to the police Gregorios alleged unlawful
aggression and that it was Gregorio who owned
the gun, as appellant claimed. And, when
appellant was arrested the following morning, he
did not also inform the police that what
happened to Gregorio was merely accidental.13
Appellants claim that he did not know whether
Gregorio was hit when the shotgun accidentally
fired is also implausible.

In contrast, we find that the Condes account of

the incident is persuasive. Both the CA-Cebu and
the RTC found that the testimonies of the
Condes were credible and presented in a clear
and convincing manner. This Court has
consistently put much weight on the trial courts
assessment of the credibility of witnesses,
especially when affirmed by the appellate
court.14 In People v. Mangune,15 we stated that:
It is well settled that the evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a
matter best undertaken by the trial court
because of its unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses first hand and to note their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under grilling
examination. These are important in
determining the truthfulness of witnesses and in
unearthing the truth, especially in the face of
conflicting testimonies. For, indeed, the
emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice are
potent aids in ascertaining the witness
credibility, and the trial court has the
opportunity to take advantage of these aids.16
Since the conclusions made by the RTC
regarding the credibility of the witnesses were
not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight or
misapprehension of relevant facts, the same
must be sustained by this Court.
Attempted and Frustrated Murder
Treachery was correctly appreciated by the RTC
and CA-Cebu. A treacherous attack is one in
which the victim was not afforded any
opportunity to defend himself or resist the
attack.17 The existence of treachery is not solely
determined by the type of weapon used. If it
appears that the weapon was deliberately chosen
to insure the execution of the crime, and to
render the victim defenseless, then treachery
may be properly appreciated against the
accused.18
In the instant case, the Condes were unarmed
when they were shot by appellant. The use of a
12-gauge shotgun against two unarmed victims
is undoubtedly treacherous, as it denies the
victims the chance to fend off the offender.

We note, however, that appellant should be

convicted of attempted murder, and not
frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 20021777.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines the
stages in the commission of felonies:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted
felonies. Consummated felonies as well as
those which are frustrated and attempted, are
punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements
necessary for its execution and accomplishment
are present; and it is frustrated when the
offender performs all the acts of execution which
would produce the felony as a consequence but
which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason
of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender
commences the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts
of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance.
In Serrano v. People,19 we distinguished a
frustrated felony from an attempted felony in
this manner:
1.) In a frustrated felony, the offender
has performed all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony as a
consequence; whereas in an attempted
felony, the offender merely commences
the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts and does not perform all the
acts of execution.
2.) In a frustrated felony, the reason for
the non-accomplishment of the crime is
some cause independent of the will of
the perpetrator; on the other hand, in an
attempted felony, the reason for the
non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or
accident other than the offenders own
spontaneous desistance.20

In frustrated murder, there must be evidence

showing that the wound would have been fatal
were it not for timely medical intervention.21 If
the evidence fails to convince the court that the
wound sustained would have caused the victims
death without timely medical attention, the
accused should be convicted of attempted
murder and not frustrated murder.

the range of the penalty next lower to that

prescribed by the Code for the offense.1wphi1

In the instant case, it does not appear that the

wound sustained by Gregorio Conde was mortal.
This was admitted by Dr. Edwin Figura, who
examined Gregorio after the shooting incident:

Award of damages

Prosecutor Con-El:
Q: When you examined the person of Gregorio
Conde, can you tell the court what was the
situation of the patient when you examined him?
A: He has a gunshot wound, but the patient was
actually ambulatory and not in distress.
xxxx
Court (to the witness)
Q: The nature of these injuries, not serious?
A: Yes, Your Honor, not serious. He has also
abrasion wounds hematoma formation at the
anterior aspect right shoulder.22
Since Gregorios gunshot wound was not mortal,
we hold that appellant should be convicted of
attempted murder and not frustrated murder.
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the
corresponding penalty for attempted murder
shall be two degrees lower than that prescribed
for consummated murder under Article 248,
that is, prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its medium period.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
provides:
x x x the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of
which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal
Code, and the minimum which shall be within

Thus, appellant should serve an indeterminate

sentence ranging from two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional
in its medium period to eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor in its medium period.

In light of recent jurisprudence, we deem it

proper to increase the amount of damages
imposed by the lower court in both cases. In
Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, this Court hereby
awards P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity23 andP30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.24 The award of P50,000.00 as moral
damages in the foregoing case is sustained.
Appellant is also liable to pay P40,000.00 as
moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, in relation to Criminal Case No. 20021777.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 18 October 2011
Decision of the Court of Appeals-Cebu in CAG.R. CEB CR-HC No. 01000 with
MODIFICATIONS. In Criminal Case No. 20021777, we find that appellant Regie Labiaga is
GUILTY of Attempted Murder and shall suffer
an indeterminate sentence ranging from two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and
pay P40,000.00 as moral damages
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. In
Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, appellant shall
pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00
as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
Valenzuela v. People
G. R. No. 160188 June 21, 2007
Lessons Applicable: frustrated or consummated
theft
Laws Applicable: Art. 6
FACTS:
May 19, 1994 4:30 pm: Aristotel Valenzuela
and Jovy Calderon were sighted outside the

Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the

ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by
Lorenzo Lago, a security guard who was then
manning his post at the open parking area of the
supermarket. Lago saw Valenzuela, who was
wearing an ID with the mark Receiving
Dispatching Unit (RDU) who hauled a push
cart with cases of detergent of Tide brand and
unloaded them in an open parking space, where
Calderon was waiting. He then returned inside
the supermarket and emerged 5 minutes after
with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again
unloaded these boxes to the same area in the
open parking space. Thereafter, he left the
parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the
cab and directed it towards the parking space
where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded
the cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi,
then boarded the vehicle. As Lago watched, he
proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the
open parking area and asked Valenzuela for a
receipt of the merchandise but Valenzuela and
Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot. Lago fired a
warning shot to alert his fellow security guards.
Valenzuela and Calderon were apprehended at
the scene and the stolen merchandise recovered
worth P12,090.
Valenzuela, Calderon and 4 other persons were
first brought to the SM security office before
they were transferred to the Baler Station II of
the Philippine National Police but only
Valenzuela and Calderon were charged with
theft by the Assistant City Prosecutor.
They pleaded not guilty.
Calderons Alibi: On the afternoon of the
incident, he was at the Super Sale Club to
withdraw from his ATM account, accompanied
by his neighbor, Leoncio Rosulada. As the queue
for the ATM was long, he and Rosulada decided
to buy snacks inside the supermarket. While
they were eating, they heard the gunshot fired
by Lago, so they went out to check what was
transpiring and when they did, they were
suddenly grabbed by a security guard
Valenzuelas Alibi: He is employed as a
bundler of GMS Marketing and assigned at the
supermarket. He and his cousin, a Gregorio
Valenzuela, had been at the parking lot, walking
beside the nearby BLISS complex and headed to
ride a tricycle going to Pag-asa, when they saw
the security guard Lago fire a shot causing
evryon to start running. Then they were
apprehended by Lago.
RTC: guilty of consummated theft
CA: Confirmed RTC and rejected his

contention that it should only be frustrated theft

since at the time he was apprehended, he was
never placed in a position to freely dispose of the
articles stolen.
ISSUE: W/N Valenzuela should be guilty of
consummated theft.
HELD: YES. petition is DENIED
Article 6 defines those three stages, namely
the consummated, frustrated and attempted
felonies.
o A felony is consummated when all the
elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present.
o It is frustrated when the offender performs
all the acts of execution which would produce
the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
o It is attempted when the offender
commences the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts
of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance.
Each felony under the Revised Penal Code
has a:
o subjective phase - portion of the acts
constituting the crime included between the act
which begins the commission of the crime and
the last act performed by the offender which,
with prior acts, should result in the
consummated crime
if the offender never passes the subjective
phase of the offense, the crime is merely
attempted
o objective phase - After that point of
subjective phase has been breached
subjective phase is completely passed in case
of frustrated crimes
the determination of whether a crime is
frustrated or consummated necessitates an
initial concession that all of the acts of execution
have been performed by the offender
The determination of whether the felony was
produced after all the acts of execution had
been performed hinges on the particular
statutory definition of the felony.
actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an
unlawful act for there to be a crime or there can
be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting
In crimes mala in se, mens rea has been
defined before as a guilty mind, a guilty or

wrongful purpose or criminal intent and

essential for criminal liability.
Statutory definition of our mala in se crimes
must be able to supply what the mens rea of the
crime is and overt acts that constitute the crime
People vs. Quinanola
charging the two accused with the crime of
rape reads:
That on or about the 5th day of March, 1994, at
about 11:30 oclock in the evening, more or less,
at Barangay Tangil, Municipality of Dumanjug,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with lewd design
and by means of force and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie
and succeed in having carnal knowledge of the
offended party Catalina Carciller, fifteen (15)
years of age, against her will and consent.
Catalina Carciller, her cousin 15-year-old
Rufo Ginto and another male companion named
Richard Diaz, went to attend a dance at around
ten oclock in the evening of 05 March 1994 in
Sitio Bangag, Tangil, Dumanjug, Cebu. Catalina,
born on 09 November 1978,[4] was just then
fifteen (15) years and four (4) months old. She
was a student at the Bito-on National Vocational
School at Dumanjug, Cebu. About an hour later,
they left the party and were soon on their way
home. The three unsuspecting youngsters
stopped momentarily to rest at a waiting shed
beside the Tangil Elementary School. Accused
Agapito Quianola, a.k.a. Petoy, and accused
Eduardo Escuadro, a.k.a. Botiquil, who were
both armed with guns, suddenly turned
up. Quianola, beaming his flashlight at the trio
while Escuadro stood by, focused his attention
on Catalina. Quianola announced that he and
Escuadro were members of the New Peoples
Army ("NPA"). Quianola instructed Escuadro to
take care of the male companions of Catalina
while he (Quianola) held the latter at gunpoint.
Escuadro brought Diaz and Ginto outside
the waiting shed area. He ordered the duo to lie
face down on the ground and then urinated at
them. While Escuadro was fixing the zipper of

his pants, Diaz and Ginto were able to escape

and ran away. Meanwhile, Quianola, with his
gun pointed at Catalina, forcibly brought her
towards the nearby school. Catalina heard a
gunfire but Quianola assured her that it was only
an exploding firecracker. When Escuadro again
showed up, Catalina asked about her two
friends. Quianola replied that he had ordered
them to go home. Catalina begged that she
herself be allowed to leave. Pretending to agree,
they walked the path towards the road behind
the school. Then, unsuspectingly, Quianola
forced Catalina to sit on the ground. She resisted
but Quianola, pointing his gun at her, warned
her that if she would not accede to what he
wanted, he would kill her. Catalina started to
cry. Quianola told Escuadro to remove her
denim pants. Catalina struggled to free herself
from Escuadro's hold but to no avail. Escuadro
ultimately
succeeded
in
undressing
her. Quianola unzipped his pants and laid on top
of her while Escuadro held her legs. Quianola
started to pump, to push and pull[5] even as
Catalina still tried desperately to free herself
from him. She felt his organ "on the lips of (her)
genitalia.[6] When Quianola had satisfied his lust,
Escuadro took his turn by placing himself on top
of Catalina.Catalina could feel the sex organ of
Escuadro on the lips of (her) vulva[7] while he
made a push and pull movement. Quianola, who
stood by, kept on smoking a cigarette.
Escuadro
and
Quianola
scampered
immediately after Catalina's ordeal. Failing to
find her pair of pants and panty, Catalina was
left
wearing
only
her
T-shirt
and
brassieres. Catalina just then sat down, not
knowing what to do, until she finally started to
run home fearing that she might be
followed. Upon reaching home, Catalina went
upstairs and, afraid that the culprits would still
come after her, hid herself behind the
door. Baffled by Catalina's strange behavior, her
mother and her elder sister took turns in
interrogating her. Catalina finally said that she
was raped but she would not reveal the names of
the persons who had committed the dastardly
act because of their threat.
Guillermo Zozobrado learned from his wife,
Catalinas sister, that Catalina had been
raped. He promptly repaired to the municipal

hall of Dumanjug to report the crime. Policemen

were immediately dispatched to the Carcillers
residence.Still in a state of shock, Catalina
initially kept mum about it; later, when the
police officers returned at daytime, she was able
to respond to questions and to disclose that
Petoy, referring to Agapito Quianola, and
Botiquil, the other accused Eduardo Escuadro,
were the persons who ravished her. The officers
later invited her to the police station to identify a
suspect whom she positively identified to be
Botiquil or Eduardo Escuadro.
Living Case Report No. 94-MI-7,[8] prepared
by Dr. Tomas P. Refe, medico-legal officer of the
National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") of
Region 7, Central Visayas, who conducted the
physical examination of Catalina on 07 March
1994, showed that there was no evidence of
extragenital physical injury noted on the body of
the Subject.[9] The genital examination yielded
the following findings on the victim:
Pubic hairs, fully grown, moderately dense.
Labiae mejora and minora, both
coaptated. Fourchette, tense. Vestibular mucosa,
pinkish. Hymen, moderately thick, wide,
intact. Hymenal orifice, annular, admits a tube
1.8 cms. in diameter with moderate
resistance. Vaginal walls, tight and rogusities,
prominent.[10] (Italics supplied.)

helped Vidal Laojan and Nicasio Arnaiz in

cementing the kitchen floor of their house. The
work was finished at around 11:00 oclock in the
evening. After Vidal and Nicasio had gone home,
Quianola went to bed with his wife around
midnight until the following morning of 06
March 1994. He denied having been in the
company of his co-accused, Escuadro a.k.a.
Botiquil, at any time during the whole day and
night of 05 March 1994. According to him,
Guillermo Zozobrado, Catalinas brother-in-law,
concocted the rape charge to get even with him
because of an incident in August 1993 at a fiesta
dance in upper Tangil, Panla-an, when George
Camaso, the husband of his sister Jinga, got into
trouble with Samuel Escuadro.
Quianola tried to pacify George Camaso
who was then drunk but Camaso suddenly hit
him. He parried the blow and slapped Camaso
on the face. Zozobrado joined the fray and tried
to hit Quianola but because Zozobrado was
drunk, he stumbled when Quianola had pushed
him.[12] He admitted that he had no
misunderstanding of any kind with the
complainant and her parents themselves.

Against the evidence submitted by the

prosecution, the accused, in their defense,
interposed alibi, ill motive on the part of an
"uncle" of the complainant, and insufficient
identification.

Leticia Quianola, the wife of accused

Agapito Quianola, testified to attest to her
husband's good moral character and to
corroborate his testimony. Leticia said that after
the workers had left their house at around
midnight, she and appellant talked for a while
and then made love. Vidal Laojan, the carpenter,
was presented to state that Quianola was at
home helping the carpenters until past 11:00
oclock on the night of the incident. Nicasio
Arnaiz, a farmer and stone cutter, added that
work in the Quianola house had started late in
the morning of 05 March 1994 since they still
waited for Quianola and his wife Pritsy to
arrive. Work in the house, he said, had stopped
at about past 11:00 oclock that night.

Accused Agapito Quianola, a member of the

Philippine National Police stationed at Naga,
Cebu, testified that it was his day-off on 05
March 1994. At about 8:30 a.m., he and his wife,
Leticia, who had just arrived in Naga from Cebu
City, proceeded to the house of his parents in
Panla-an, Dumanjug, to attend to the
construction of their unfinished house. Quianola

Accused Eduardo Escuadro, a.k.a. Botiquil,

declared that at about seven oclock in the
evening of 05 March 1994, he and Pablito
Cuizon, Jr., went fishing in Tangil, Dumanjug,
Cebu, until about ten oclock that evening. After
partaking of supper at around 11:30 p.m., they
had a drinking spree and went to bed at 12:00
midnight, waking up at 6:30 a.m. the following

The report concluded that the hymenal orifice,

about 1.8 cms. in diameter, was so small as to
preclude complete penetration of an averagesize adult penis in erection without producing
laceration.[11]

day. He denied having been in the company of

Quianola and insisted that the rape charge had
been the result of a mere mistaken
identity. Pablito Cuizon, Jr., corroborated
Escuadros story about their being together up
until they parted company after a drinking
spree.
The defense also presented the two police
officers, PO2 William Beltran and SPO2 Liberato
Mascarinas, Jr., who took part in the
investigation of the crime, and Margarito
Villaluna, a suspect at the early stages of the
police investigation who was in the frequent
company of the accused. According to PO2
Beltran, barangay tanods Gilly and George
Zozobrado reported the rape incident to him at
midnight of 05 March 1994. He entered the
report in the temporary blotter because the
suspect was unknown then.[13] Accompanied by
the two tanods, he went to the residence of the
victim and when he asked Catalina if she was
able to recognize the malefactors, she kept silent
and
continued
crying. SPO2
Liberato
Mascarinas, Jr., asserted that, in the early
morning of 06 March 1994, Gilly and George
Zozobrado went to the police station and named
Pitoy Quianola, Margarito Villaluna and Batiquil
or Escuadro as being the suspects in the rape
incident.While on their way to the latter's
respective residences, the team met Catalina
Carciller and party who were themselves about
to repair to the police headquarters. Mascarinas
asked Catalina about the identities of the
rapists. She named "Pitoy Quianola but said she
did not know the names of the other persons
although she could recognize them by
face. Botiquil was later brought to the police
station. Pitoy Quianola by that time had already
gone to Naga. Margarito Villaluna declared that
he had been in Panla-an, Negros Oriental, from
05 March 1994 until 09 March 1994, harvesting
corn. His sister, Mercy Villaluna, testified that,
in the morning of 06 March 1994, policemen in
the company of barangay tanods, including Gilly
Zozobrado and his son Marcelo, came to their
house looking for her brother Margarito. Shortly
after the group had left, another policeman, in
the company of one Erwin Quirante also came
looking for her brother. The arrival of the
policemen prompted her to verify from the Coast
Guard whether her brother had indeed left for

Negros Oriental. She was told that her brother

was in the boat that departed for Negros in early
dawn of 02 March 1994. Still unsatisfied with
the result of her queries, Mercy went to
Guinholngan where she met Margarito.
Following the trial and submission of the
case for decision, the court a quo,[14] on 01 March
1996, found the two accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of "frustrated
rape" and sentenced them accordingly; thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
hereby finds guilty beyond reasonable doubt the
two accused Agapito `Petoy Quianola and
Eduardo Escuadro, alias `Batiquil, as principals
by direct participation and indispensable
cooperation of the frustrated rape of the
complaining witness Catalina 'Cathy' Carciller,
and considering the attendance in the
commission of the crime of the six (6)
aggravating circumstances aforementioned, not
offset by any mitigating circumstance, hereby
sentences these two accused individually to
Reclusion Perpetua of Forty (40) Years, plus all
the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to
pay the offended party civil indemnity in the
amount of P50,000.00 each.
"The Court also hereby recommends that under
no circumstance should the two accused be
granted parole or conditional or absolute
pardon, in view of the extreme moral turpitude
and perversity which they exhibited in the
commission of the crime not until they shall
have served at least thirty (30) years of the full
range of forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua
meted out against them in this case. They should
be interdicted for that length of time from the
usual and normal liasons (sic) and dealings with
their fellowmen and their community so as to
protect the latter from their pernicious and
insidious examples. This is the most generous
and charitable recommendation that the Court
can make for these two malefactors, short of
imposing upon them the supreme penalty of
death, which the Court in other times and
conditions might have been compelled, as a
matter of inexorable duty, to mete out against
them, in obedience to the implacable and
peremptory demands and dictates of retributive
justice.

"Costs shall also be taxed against the two

accused.
WHEREFORE, appellants Agapito Quianola y
Escuadro and Eduardo Escuadro y Floro are
each found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
two (2) counts of consummated rape and,
accordingly, sentenced to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua in each case. Said
appellants are ordered to pay, jointly and
severally, Catalina Carciller the sum
of P100,000.00 by way of indemnity ex
delictu for the two counts of consummated rape
plus P60,000.00 moral damages. Costs against
appellants.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs. ARNULFO
ORANDE
y
CHAVEZ, appellant.
CORONA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, in
Criminal Case Nos. 97-159184, 97-159185, 97159186 and 97-159187, convicting appellant for
two counts of simple rape, one count of statutory
rape and one count of frustrated rape, and
sentencing him to suffer three counts
of reclusion perpetua for
the
simple
and
statutory rapes, and an indeterminate penalty of
8 years to 14 years and 8 months of
imprisonment for the frustrated rape.
Complainant Jessica Castro charged
appellant with raping her four times between
January
1994
and
November
1996.
The informations filed against appellant by the
City Prosecutor read:That on or about January 14, 1996, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
by means of force and intimidation, that is, by
threatening to kill said Jessica Castro, had carnal
knowledge of the latter against her will.
Arraigned on September 5, 1997, appellant
pleaded not guilty.[3] Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued. However, the trial was
subsequently postponed for eight months as

Jessica was suffering from psychological and

emotional trauma from her horrifying ordeal.
[4]
The lower court ordered the suspension of the
trial to enable her to undergo psychological
therapy at the Child Protection Unit of the
Philippine General Hospital. Trial resumed in
November 1998 with the prosecution presenting
Jessica as its first witness.
Incidentally, prior to the filing of the
aforementioned cases, Jessica also filed a
criminal case against her mother, Girlie de la
Cruz Castro, and the appellant for child abuse.
The evidence of the prosecution showed
that appellant was the common law husband of
Jessicas
mother
Girlie. Appellant,
a pedicab driver, started living with Girlie and
her three children sometime in 1993 in a twostorey house in Paco, Manila owned by Girlies
mother. They occupied a room on the ground
floor which served as their bedroom, kitchen and
living room. The adjacent room was occupied by
Girlies brother and his family while the room on
the second floor was occupied by Girlies sister
and her family.
Girlie gave birth to two more children by
appellant. To earn a living, Girlie sold fish at
the Paco Market, buying her stock from
the Navotas fish market late at night and
sometimes in the early hours of the morning.
The first incident of rape, subject of
Criminal Case No. 97-159185, happened
sometime in April 1994 when Girlie was at the
fish market. Appellant was left in the house with
Jessica, her siblings and appellants two children
with Girlie. Jessica was then watching television
while her brothers and sisters were sleeping
beside her. Appellant grabbed Jessicas right
hand and lasciviously jabbed her palm with his
finger. He ordered her to undress which she
obeyed out of fear as appellant was armed with a
knife. Appellant then removed his pants, placed
himself on top of complainant and succeeded in
partially penetrating her. Jessica felt pain in her
vagina and saw it smeared with blood and
semen. She tried to leave the room but appellant
locked the door and threatened to kill her if she
told her mother what happened. Jessica was

then only nine years and four months old,

having been born on December 19, 1983.[5]
The second rape, subject of Criminal Case
No. 97-159186, occurred on March 14, 1995 at
around 11:00 a.m. when Jessica was 11 years and
3 months old. Girlie was in the market while
Jessica and her siblings were left in the house
watching television. Soon after, appellant
arrived and sent the children, except Jessica, to
play outside. Left alone with Jessica, appellant
removed his clothes, pulled out a balisong and
ordered Jessica to undress. He then held her by
the shoulder and made her lie down. Then he
mounted her. Appellant reached his orgasm
shortly after penetrating her slightly. He stood
up with semen still dripping from his penis.
Apparently still not satisfied, he knelt down,
kissed and fingered Jessicas vagina, then
mashed her breasts. He only stopped what he
was doing when someone knocked at the door.
Appellant and Jessica hurriedly put on their
clothes and, as appellant opened the door,
Jessica went to the bathroom to wash herself.
The third rape, subject of Criminal Case No.
97-159184, occurred on January 14, 1996, when
Jessica was 12 years and 6 months old. She
arrived from school at around 11:00 a.m. While
she was changing her clothes, appellant ordered
Jessicas brother and sister to visit their mother
at the Paco Market and sent his children to play
outside the house. When appellant and Jessica
were alone, he removed his pants, got his knife
and ordered her to undress. Since she was
afraid, Jessica was forced to remove her
clothes. Appellant then told her they would do
what they did before, pulled her towards him
and made her lie down on the floor. While
holding the knife, he kissed and fingered her
vagina, then mashed her breasts. Thereafter, he
placed himself on top of her, partially penetrated
her until he ejaculated. When Jessicas brother
and sister arrived, appellant hurriedly put on his
clothes. Jessica did the same. She then went to
the bathroom to wash herself and change her
bloodstained underwear.
The last rape, subject of Criminal Case No.
97-159187,
occurred
sometime
in
November 1996, at around 11:00 p.m. Girlie was
again in the public market while Jessica was at

home with her siblings who were all

asleep. Appellant told Jessica that they would
again do what they did before but she refused,
saying that she might get pregnant. Appellant
brandished his balisong and threatened to kill
her. He then covered himself and Jessica with a
blanket, removed his pants and her shorts, and
placed himself on top of her. His penis slightly
penetrated her vagina. He mashed her breasts,
inserted his finger into her vagina and kissed
it. Jessica pushed him away and told him she
wanted to sleep. Then she put on her
shorts. Appellant also put on his pants and told
Jessica not to tell her mother what he did to
her. He assured her that she would not get
pregnant because she was not yet menstruating.
Sometime in March 1997, a teacher of
Jessica, Mrs. Adoracion Mojica, noticed the
unusual treatment of Jessica by appellant. When
confronted by Mrs. Mojica, Jessica admitted that
appellant had raped her several times.
Mrs. Mojica called
up
Jessicas
aunt,
Mrs. Antonina de la Cruz, and narrated to her
what Jessica had confessed. Mrs. De la Cruz then
accompanied Jessica to the police station to file
a complaint and to the Philippine General
Hospital (PGH), Child Protection Unit, to be
examined. Dr. Bernadette J. Madrid, Director of
the Child Protection Unit, examined Jessica and
the findings revealed the following:
Genital Examination:
Hymen: Estrogenized,
Attenuated from 1
oclock position to 4 o
clock position
and from 6 o clock to 12
o clock position
Notch at 5 oclock
Healed hymenal tear at
the 6 o clock position
Anus: Normal rectal tone, no
pigmentation, no scars, normal rugae[6]

For his defense, appellant advanced denial

and alibi. He denied ever raping Jessica and
testified that, during the alleged second rape
incident, he was driving his pedicab. His live-in
partner Girlie testified that, during the
purported first and second incidents of rape,
appellant
was with
her
to
buy
fish
in Navotas and sell them in Paco market.
Appellant argued that since Jessica disapproved
of his relationship with her mother, she had the
motive to falsely accuse him of raping
her. Further, he pointed out the improbability of
the alleged first and fourth incidents of rape
inasmuch as the make-up of the room made it
impossible for Jessicas siblings not to wake up
during the commission of the crime. Appellant
further contended that Jessicas failure to cry out
for help, knowing that her mothers relatives
were in the same house, made her story of rape
unbelievable.
The trial court gave credence to the
testimony of Jessica and convicted the appellant:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 97-159184,
Accused Arnulfo Orande y Chavez is convicted of
simple rape under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code and sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory
penalties provided by law.
In Criminal Case No. 97-159185, the accused is
also convicted of simple rape under Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all
the accessory penalties provided by law.
In Criminal Case No. 97-159186, the accused is
likewise convicted of statutory rape under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with all the accessory
penalties provided by law.
In Criminal Case No. 97-159187, the accused is
convicted of frustrated rape under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of 8 years
of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years and 8
months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and
to pay the costs.

On the civil liability of the accused in the four

cases, he is ordered to pay the victim, Jessica
Castro, moral, nominal and exemplary damages
in the respective sums of P400,000.00,
P200,000.00 and P100,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[7]
In this appeal, appellant assigns the
following errors:
I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY
ERRED
IN
FINDING
THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF ONE COUNT OF STATUTORY
RAPE,
ONE
COUNT
OF
FRUSTRATED RAPE AND TWO
COUNTS OF SIMPLE RAPE.
II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY
ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT
OF
FRUSTRATED RAPE DESPITE
THE
FACT
THAT
UNDER
PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE
THERE IS NO SUCH CRIME.[8]
The Office of the Solicitor General argues
that appellants convictions should be upheld as
the prosecution was able to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
The appeal is partly meritorious. This Court
finds that the prosecution was able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt appellants guilt for two
counts of statutory rape and two counts of
simple rape, there being no such crime as
frustrated rape in this jurisdiction.
After a thorough review of the records, we
find no reason to deviate from the wellestablished rule that the credibility of witnesses
is a matter best assessed by the trial court
because of its unique opportunity to observe
them firsthand and to note their demeanor,
conduct and attitude.[9] In the present case, the
trial court found Jessicas testimony convincing,
logical and credible. Moreover, the court a quo:

xxx discerned from her demeanor the intense

mental torture, embarrassment, emotional pain
and bitterness she suffered whenever she was
asked to recall and narrate the humiliating
sexual ordeals she had gone through, and her ...
desire for justice and the punishment of her
defiler. She was continually in tears while
testifying and the proceeding was interrupted
several times to calm her down.[10]

Appellant makes much of the fact that two

incidents of rape happened inside the room
where the other children were sleeping. This
Court has repeatedly held that rape can be
committed in the same room where other
members of the family are also sleeping, in a
house where there are other occupants or even
in places which to many might appear unlikely
and high-risk venues for its commission.[14]

No young woman would allow an

examination of her private part and subject
herself to the humiliation and rigor of a public
trial if the accusations were not true, or if her
motive were other than a fervent desire to seek
justice.[11]

Also, the failure of Jessica to cry out for

help during the incidents in question, inspite of
the physical proximity of her relatives, or to
report to them what happened, did not at all
make her testimony improbable inasmuch as it
is not uncommon for a young girl of tender age
to be easily intimidated into silence and conceal
for sometime the violation of her honor, even by
the mildest threat to her life. [15] Besides, Girlie,
Jessicas mother, had a rift with her siblings who
lived in the same house and forbade Jessica to
socialize with them. It was likewise highly
probable that the strained relations between
Jessicas mother, uncle and aunt prevented
Jessica from confiding in them.

We do not subscribe to appellants theory

that the filing of the rape charges was motivated
by Jessicas dislike for him. To charge appellant
with rape for the sole purpose of exacting
revenge, as appellant implies in his brief, takes a
certain kind of psychiatric depravity which this
Court does not see in Jessica. The fact that
Jessica
had
to
undergo
psychological
[12]
treatment after her first testimony in February
1998 belies appellants defense. The need for
such counseling came about after the defilement
she suffered in the hands of appellant. In fact, it
was the incidents of rape that caused her
psychological and emotional imbalance which
required therapy at the Child Protection Unit of
the Philippine General Hospital.
The
alleged
inconsistencies
and
improbabilities in Jessicas testimony did not
discredit
her
nor
reveal
any
fabrication. Inconsistencies regarding minor
details were attributable to the fact that she was
recalling details of incidents that happened three
years before, not to mention the fact that these
details pertained to something she had very little
knowledge of, being then only nine years and
three months old when the first rape was
committed. We have consistently ruled that
errorless recollection of a harrowing experience
cannot be expected of a witness (a very young
one at that) specially when she is recounting
details of an occurrence so humiliating, so
painful and, in this case, so alien as rape.[13]

In a number of cases, this Court has

likewise ruled that delay, even of three years, in
reporting the crime does not necessarily detract
from the witness credibility as long as it is
satisfactorily
explained.[16] Jessica
was
threatened by appellant that he would kill her
mother and relatives if she reported the rape. A
young girl like Jessica can easily be mesmerized
by fear of bodily harm and, unlike a mature
woman, cannot be expected to have the courage
or confidence to immediately report a sexual
assault on her, specially when a death threat
hangs over her head.[17]
In view of the credible testimony of Jessica,
appellants defenses of denial and alibi deserve
no consideration. These weak defenses cannot
stand against the positive identification and
categorical testimony of a rape victim.[18]
The court a quo convicted appellant of one
count of frustrated rape in Criminal Case No. 97151987, the dispositive portion of which read:
xxx xxx xxx.

In Criminal Case No. 97-159187, the accused is

convicted of frustrated rape under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of 8 years
of prision mayor as minimum, and to pay the
costs.
xxx xxx xxx.
SO ORDERED.[19]
However, we agree with the observation of
the Solicitor General that the court a quo was
referring to Criminal Case No. 97-159185, and
not Criminal Case No. 97-159187, in convicting
appellant of frustrated rape:
The trial court convicted appellant of simple
rape in Criminal Case No. 97-159185. However,
the factual basis thereof in the body of the
decision reads:
With regard to Criminal Case No. 97-159185, the
Court has gathered that sometime in April, 1994,
at around 11:00 p.m., Jessica and her two
siblings together with the accused were in their
house, while their mother,
Girlie, was in Navotasbuying fish. Jessica was
watching TV in a lying position beside her two
sleeping siblings, when the accused held Jessicas
right hand and jabbed her palm with his
finger. Then he told her to remove her short
pants, panty and T-shirt, after which the accused
removed his pants and with a balisong in his
hand, he began kissing the sensitive parts of her
body. Then he placed himself on top of her and
tried to have sexual intercourse with her. He
succeeded in nudging her sex organ with the tip
of his penis, but was unable to accomplish
penetration, due to the resistance offered by her
by struggling and kicking him. Nonetheless, the
accused had orgasm and Jessicas sex organ was
smeared with his semen. (emphasis supplied, p.
2, Decision)
Such was the only rape incident where the trial
court concluded there was no penetration.
On the other hand, the factual basis for the
conviction in Criminal Case No. 97-159187 in the
body of the trial courts decision reads:

Anent Criminal Case No. 97-159187, the records

further show that in November, 1996, at
around 11:00 p.m., Jessica was watching TV
while the other siblings were asleep and her
mother was away, when accused again made
sexual advances to her. She resisted and told
accused she might become pregnant, but the
accused persisted and threatened to kill her at
that very moment if she would not submit to his
lust. As in the previous occasions, he again
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the
helpless and scared victim. After her defilement,
the victim continually cried and the accused
tried to calm her down by assuring her that she
would not be impregnated, because she has not
yet began to have menstruation (p. 3, Decision)
Consequently the conviction for frustrated rape
should pertain to the incident in April 1994
described in Criminal Case No. 97-159185 and
not Criminal Case No. 97-159187 since this case
refers to the November 1996 rape incident where
the findings of the trial court was that there was
carnal knowledge.[20]
Moreover, the oversight of the court a quo in
interchanging Criminal Case Nos. 97-159185 and
97-159187 is further evidenced by the following
paragraph found in page four of the trial court
decision:
In Criminal Case 97-159185 and 97-159184, the
acts of the accused in having carnal knowledge
of the victim by intimidation on two separate
occasions in [the] early or middle part [of]
1996, and in November of the same year,
constitute two separate crimes of qualified rape
under R.A. 7659 and the penalty prescribed
therefore is death by lethal injection.
[21]
(Emphasis Ours)
The rape incidents which occurred in 1996
were designated as Criminal Case Nos. 97159184 and 97-159187, as borne out by
the informations filed by the City Prosecutor.
[22]
Thus, the conviction for frustrated rape
should pertain to Criminal Case No. 97-159185
and not Criminal Case No. 97-159187.
Regarding Criminal Case No. 97-159185
(the April 1994 rape incident), the Court sustains
appellants contention that there is no such crime

as frustrated rape, as we have ruled in a long line

of cases.[23] Recently, inPeople vs. Quinanola,
[24]
we again reiterated the rule:
Let it be said once again that, as the Revised
Penal Code presently so stands, there is no such
crime as frustrated rape. In People vs. Orita, the
Court has explicitly pronounced:
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment
the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim,
he actually attains his purpose and, from that
moment also all the essential elements of the
offense have been accomplished. Nothing more
is left to be done by the offender, because he has
performed the last act necessary to produce the
crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. In a
long line of cases (People vs. Oscar, 48 Phil. 527;
People vs. Hernandez, 49 Phil. 980; People
vs. Royeras, G.R. No. L-31886, April 29, 1974, 56
SCRA 666; People vs. Amores, G.R. No. L32996, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 505), We have
set the uniform rule that for the consummation
of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any
penetration of the female organ by the male
organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of
the female organ, without rupture of the hymen
or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to
warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is
attempted if there is no penetration of the
female organ (People vs. Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559;
People vs. Rabadan, et al., 53 Phil. 694; United
States vs. Garcia, 9 Phil. 434) because not all
acts of execution was performed. The offender
merely commenced the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts. Taking into account the
nature, elements and manner of execution of the
crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it
is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in
rape can ever be committed.
Of course, We are aware of our earlier
pronouncement in the case of People vs. Eriia,
50 Phil. 998 [1927] where We found the offender
guilty of frustrated rape there being no
conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital
organ of the offended party. However, it appears
that this is a stray decision inasmuch as it has
not been reiterated in Our subsequent decisions.
Likewise, We are aware of Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 2632 (dated September 12, 1960) and

Republic Act No. 4111 (dated March 29, 1965)

which provides, in its penultimate paragraph, for
the penalty of death when the rape is attempted
or frustrated and a homicide is committed by
reason or on the occasion thereof. We are of the
opinion that this particular provision on
frustrated rape is a dead provision.
The Eriia case, supra, might have prompted the
law-making body to include the crime of
frustrated rape in the amendments introduced
by said laws.
The Court is not unaware that Republic Act No.
7659, amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, has retained the provision penalizing with
reclusion perpetua to death an accused who
commits homicide by reason or on the occasion
of an attempted or frustrated rape. Until
Congress sees it fit to define the term frustrated
rape and thereby penalize it, the Court will see
its continued usage in the statute book as being
merely a persistent lapse in
language. (emphasis ours)
Thus, it was error for the trial court to
convict appellant of frustrated rape. Besides,
after a careful review of the records, we find that
the rape was in fact consummated. Jessica
initially testified that, although appellant did not
succeed in inserting his penis in her vagina, she
felt his sex organ touch hers and she saw and felt
semen come out of his penis and smear her
vagina.[25] In
response
to
the clarificatory questions
asked
by
the
prosecutor, Jessica testified that the appellant
was able to slightly penetrate her because she
felt pain and her vagina bled. [26] It has been held
that, to be convicted of rape, there must be
convincing and sufficient proof that the penis
indeed touched the labia or slid into the female
organ, and not merely stroked the external
surface thereof.[27] Nevertheless, we have also
ruled in cases where penetration is not
established that the rape is deemed
consummated if the victim felt pain, or the
medico-legal examination finds discoloration in
the inner lips of the vagina, or the
labia minora is already gaping with redness, or
the hymenal tags are no longer visible. [28]In the
present case, the victim testified that she felt
pain and her vagina bled, indisputable
indications of slight penetration or, at the very

least, that the penis indeed touched the labia and

not merely stroked the external surface thereof.
Thus, the appellant should be found guilty of
(consummated) rape and not merely frustrated
or attempted rape.
Pursuant to Section 11 of RA 7659 or the
Heinous Crimes Law, the penalty of death is
imposed if rape is committed when the victim is
under 18 years of age and the offender is the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
However, the trial court was correct in not
imposing the death penalty in Criminal Case
Nos. 97-159184 and 97-159187 because the
qualifying circumstances of age and relationship
of the victim to the appellant were not alleged in
the information.[29] Thus, appellant can only be
convicted
of
simple
rape
punishable
by reclusion perpetua under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code. However, in Criminal Case
Nos. 97-159185 and 97-159186, the appellant can
be convicted of statutory rape also punishable
by reclusion perpetua under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code inasmuch as the age of
Jessica was alleged in the information [30] and
duly proven during the trial by the presentation
of her birth certificate.[31]
We award moral damages of P50,000 for
each count of rape as moral damages are
automatically awarded to rape victims without
need of pleading or proof.[32] We also award civil
indemnity ex delicto of P50,000 for each count
of rape in the light of the ruling that civil
indemnity, which is distinct from moral
damages, is mandatory upon the finding of the
fact of rape.[33] We likewise award exemplary
damages of P25,000 for each count of rape
consistent with the prevailing jurisprudence on
the matter.[34]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, in
Criminal Case Nos. 97-159 184 to 87 is
AFFIRMED
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs.CHRISTOPHER
PAREJA y VELASCO, Appellant.
BRION, J.:

This is an appeal from the June 15, 2009

decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CR HC No. 02759. TheCA affirmed the
February 22, 2007 decision2
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 209,
Mandaluyong
City,
finding
appellant
Christopher Pareja guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
THE CASE
The prosecution charged the appellant before
the RTC with the crime of rape under an
Amended Information that reads:
That on or about the 16th day of June 2003, in
the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have
carnal knowledge of AAA,3 13 years of age, sister
of the common law spouse of accused, against
her will and consent, thus debasing and/or
demeaning the intrinsic worth and dignity of the
victim thereby prejudicing her normal
development as a child.4
The evidence for the prosecution disclosed that
at around 3:30 a.m. of June 16, 2003, AAA was
sleeping beside her two-year old nephew, BBB,
on the floor of her sisters room, when the
appellant hugged her and kissed her nape and
neck.5 AAA cried, but the appellant covered her
and BBB with a blanket.6 The appellant removed
AAAs clothes, short pants, and underwear; he
then took off his short pants and briefs. 7 The
appellant went on top of AAA, and held her
hands. AAA resisted, but the appellant parted
her legs using his own legs, and then tried to
insert his penis into her vagina. 8 The appellant
stopped when AAAs cry got louder; AAA kicked
the appellants upper thigh as the latter was
about to stand up. The appellant put his clothes
back on, and threatened to kill AAA if she
disclosed the incident to anyone. Immediately
after, the appellant left the room.9 AAA covered
herself with a blanket and cried.10

At around 6:00 a.m. of the same day, AAAs

brother, CCC, went to her room and asked her
why she was lying on the floor and crying. AAA
did not answer, and instead hurled invectives at
CCC.11 AAA went to the house of her other
brother, but the latter was not in his house. AAA
proceeded to the house of her older sister, DDD,
at Block 19, Welfareville Compound, and
narrated to her what had happened. Afterwards,
AAA and her two (2) siblings went to the Women
and Childrens Desk of the Mandaluyong City
Police Station and reported the incident.12
For his defense, the appellant declared on the
witness stand that he hauled "filling materials"
at his house, located at Block 38, Fabella
Compound, on the evening of June 15, 2003. At
around 10:00 p.m., he went to his room and
slept.13 On the next day, the appellant,
accompanied by his mother and brother-in-law,
went to the municipal hall to ask for financial
assistance for his wife who was confined in the
hospital. Upon arrival at the hospital, the doctor
told him that his wife needed blood.
Immediately after, the appellant and his
companions went to Pasig City to find blood
donors.14
On the evening of June 16, 2003, and while the
appellant was folding the clothes of his son, two
policemen entered his house and informed him
that a complaint for attempted rape had been
filed against him. The police brought him to the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group,
forced him to admit the crime, mauled him, and
then placed him in a detention cell.15 The
appellant added that he filed a complaint before
the Office of the Ombudsman against the police
officers who beat him up.16
The RTC convicted the appellant of rape in its
decision of February 22, 2007, under the
following terms:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused
CHRISTOPHER PAREJA y VELASCO GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE
and hereby sentences him as he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua; and to indemnify the victim, AAA, the
amount of P 50,000.00 as moral damages
and P 50,000.00 as civil indemnity.17

The CA, in its decision dated June 15, 2009,

affirmed the RTC decision. It explained that a
slight penetration of the labia by the male organ
is sufficient to constitute rape, and held that a
slight penetration took place when the
appellants penis touched AAAs vagina as he
was trying to insert it.
The appellate court further ruled that the
presence of people in the other room did not
make it impossible for the appellant to have
raped the victim, because lust is no respecter of
time and place. It also held that the victims lack
of tenacity in resisting the appellants sexual
aggression did not amount to consent or
voluntary submission to the criminal act.18
In his brief,19 the appellant argued that the lower
courts erred in convicting him for the crime of
rape, as the prosecution failed to prove even the
slightest penetration of his penis into the
victims vagina. He added that the victims
testimony was incredible and contrary to human
experience.
THE COURTS RULING
We find that the prosecution failed to prove the
appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of consummated rape. We convict him
instead of attempted rape, as the evidence on
record shows the presence of all the elements of
this crime.
Carnal
Knowledge
Moral Certainty

Not

Proven

With

By definition, rape is committed by having

carnal knowledge of a woman with the use of
force, threat or intimidation, or when she is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or
when she is under 12 years of age or is
demented.20 "Carnal knowledge is defined as the
act of a man having sexual intercourse or sexual
bodily connections with a woman." 21 Carnal
knowledge of the victim by the accused must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt, considering
that it is the central element in the crime of
rape.22

In her testimony of February 9, 2004, AAA

recounted the alleged rape, as follows:

Q: What was your position while he was

kissing your neck?

FISCAL TRONCO:

A: I was on my side at that time and I was also

crying, maam.

Q: You said that the three of you then was (sic)

sleeping on the floor, what is it that happened on
that particular day and time that is unusual?
A: It was like somebody was embracing me or
hugging me, maam.
Q: When you felt that some (sic) is embracing
and hugging you, what did you do?
A: I didnt mind it because I thought that the
person beside me just moved and when he made
the movement, its like that I was embraced,
maam.

xxxx
Q: Why were you crying at that time while he
was kissing your neck?
A: I was afraid of what will happen next,
maam.
Q: Aside from that incident that he was kissing
your neck, was there any other previous incident
that happened?
A: Yes, maam.

Q: Whom are you referring to?

xxxx

A: My brother-in-law, maam.

Q: What incident was that?

Q: And after that, what else happened, if any,

AAA?

A: At that time, my brother-in-law covered me

and my nephew with a blanket and he tried to
get my clothes off, maam.

A: Before that happened, my nephew cried and

so I picked him up and put him on my chest and
after a while, I slept again and brought him
down again and then "dumapa po ako" and I felt
that somebody was kissing my nape, maam.
Q:
Were you able to see who was that
somebody kissing your nape?
A: When I tried to evade, I looked on my side
where the room was not that dark that I could
not see the person and so, I saw that it was my
brother-in-law, maam.
xxxx
Q: When you saw that it was your brother-inlaw kissing your nape while you were on a prone
position, what else happened, if any?
A: He kissed my neck, maam.

Q: When did this happen, AAA?

A: Also on said date, maam.
Q: You said that he covered you and your
nephew with a blanket and then taking (sic) off
your clothes?
A: Yes, maam.
xxxx
Q: Was he able to take off your clothes?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: What particular clothing was he able to take
off?
A: My short pants and underwear, maam.

Q: While he was taking off your short pants

and your underwear, what did you do, if any?

A: He tried to insert his sexual organ but he

was not able to do so, maam.

A: I tried to fight him off, maam.

Q: How did you know that he was trying to

insert his sexual organ?

xxxx
A: "Naidikit po niya sa ari ko."
Q: You said that he was trying to take off your
clothes and undergarments, what was your
position at that time?

Q: Which part of your body was he able to

touch his sexual organ? (sic)

A: I was lying down, maam.

A: On my sexual organ, maam.

Q: What about him?

xxxx

A: He was on my lap, maam.

Q: You mentioned earlier that he was not able

to penetrate your private part, AAA?

xxxx
A: Yes, maam.
Q: You said that you saw him take off his short
pants?
A: Yes, maam.

Q: So, what happened after that?

xxxx

A: I cried and then while I was resisting, I hit

my wrist on the wall and my wrist was
"nagasgas," maam.

Q: Did he also take off his brief?

xxxx

A: Yes, maam.

Q: And were you able to successfully resist?

xxxx

A: Yes, maam, I was able to kicked (sic) his

upper thigh, maam.23 (italics supplied; emphasis
ours)

Q: And after that what happened, AAA?

A:
After removing his undergarments, he
suddenly brought his body on top of me and he
held my hands. At that time I was crying and still
resisting and then he was trying to get my legs
apart. I was still resisting at that time, and at
some point in time I felt weak and he was able to
part my legs, maam.
Q: Could you please tell us how did (sic) he
able to part your legs?
A: He did that with his legs while he was
holding my hands, maam.
Q: And when he was able to part your legs,
what happened next?

From the foregoing, we find it clear that the

appellants penis did not penetrate, but merely
touched (i.e.,"naidikit"), AAAs private part. In
fact, the victim confirmed on crossexamination that the appellant did not
succeed in inserting his penis into her
vagina. Significantly, AAAs Sinumpaang
Salaysay24 also disclosed that the appellant was
holding the victims hand when he was trying to
insert his penis in her vagina. This circumstance
coupled with the victims declaration that she
was resisting the appellants attempt to insert his
penis into her vagina makes penile penetration
highly difficult, if not improbable. Significantly,
nothing in the records supports the CAs

conclusion that the appellants penis penetrated,

however slightly, the victims female organ.
Did the touching by the appellants penis of the
victims private part amount to carnal
knowledge such that the appellant should be
held guilty of consummated rape?

In People v. Campuhan, the Court laid down

the parameters of genital contact in rape cases,
thus:
25

Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does

not simply mean mere epidermal contact,
stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a
scrape of the penis on the external layer of the
victim's vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this
case. There must be sufficient and convincing
proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or
slid into the female organ, and not merely
stroked the external surface thereof, for an
accused to be convicted of consummated rape.
As the labias, which are required to be "touched"
by the penis, are by their natural situs or
location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal
surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain
some degree of penetration beneath the surface,
hence, the conclusion that touching the labia
majora or the labia minora of the pudendum
constitutes consummated rape.
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for
the female genital organs that are visible in the
perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora,
labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal
orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the rounded
eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and
is instantly visible within the surface. The next
layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the
female organ composed of the outer convex
surface and the inner surface. The skin of the
outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles
and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a
thin skin which does not have any hair but has
many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the
labia majora is the labia minora. Jurisprudence
dictates that the labia majora must be entered
for rape to be consummated, and not merely for
the penis to stroke the surface of the female
organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the

female organ or touching the mons pubis of the

pudendum is not sufficient to constitute
consummated rape. Absent any showing of the
slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e.,
touching of either labia of the pudendum by the
penis, there can be no consummated rape; at
most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of
lasciviousness.26 (italics supplied)
Simply put, "rape is consummated by the
slightest penile penetration of the labia majora
or pudendum of the female organ." 27 Without
any showing of such penetration, there can be no
consummated rape; at most, it can only be
attempted rape [or] acts of lasciviousness."28
As earlier discussed, the prosecution failed to
present sufficient and convincing evidence to
establish the required penile penetration. AAAs
testimony did not establish that the appellants
penis touched the labias or slid into her private
part. Aside from AAAs testimony, no other
evidence on record, such as a medico-legal
report, could confirm whether there indeed had
been penetration, however slight, of the victims
labias. In the absence of testimonial or physical
evidence to establish penile penetration, the
appellant cannot be convicted of consummated
rape.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
states that there is an attempt when the offender
commenced the commission of the crime
directly by overt acts but does not perform all
the acts of execution by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. In People v. Publico,29 we ruled
that when the "touching" of the vagina by
the penis is coupled with the intent to
penetrate,
attempted
rape
is
committed; otherwise, the crime committed is
merely acts of lasciviousness.
In the present case, the appellant commenced
the commission of rape by the following overt
acts: kissing AAAs nape and neck; undressing
her; removing his clothes and briefs; lying on top
of her; holding her hands and parting her legs;
and trying to insert his penis into her vagina.
The appellant, however, failed to perform all the
acts of execution which should produce the
crime of rape by reason of a cause other than his

own spontaneous desistance, i.e., the victim's

loud cries and resistance. The totality of the
appellants acts demonstrated the unmistakable
objective to insert his penis into the victims
private parts.
A review of jurisprudence reveals that the Court
has not hesitated to strike down convictions for
consummated rape when the evidence failed to
show that penetration, however slight, of the
victims vagina took place. In People v.
Bon,30 the Court found the appellant guilty of
attempted rape only, as there was no indication
that the appellants penis even touched the labia
of the pudendum of the victim. We further held
that the appellant could not be convicted of
consummated rape by presuming carnal
knowledge out of pain.
The Court had a similar ruling in People v.
Miranda,31 where the accused tried to insert his
penis into the victims private parts, but was
unsuccessful, so he inserted his fingers instead.
We convicted the accused of attempted rape only
due to lack of evidence to establish that there
was even a slight penile penetration. We noted,
however, that the appellants act of inserting his
fingers would have constituted rape through
sexual assault had the offense occurred after the
effectivity of the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
In People v. Alibuyog, the victim declared that
the accused placed his penis on her vagina; and
claimed that it touched her private parts. The
Court set aside the accuseds conviction for rape,
and convicted him of attempted rape only,
because we found the victims testimony too
ambiguous to prove the vital element of penile
penetration. We added that the victims
testimony was "replete with repeated denial of
penile insertion."33
32

Similarly, in People v. Quarre,34 the evidence for

the prosecution consisted only of the victims
testimony that the accused tried, but failed, to
insert his penis into her vagina, and she felt pain
in the process. No medico-legal examination
report was presented in evidence. Accordingly,
the Court reversed the accuseds conviction for
rape, and found him guilty of attempted rape
only.

In People v. Ocomen,35 the Court also set aside

the appellants conviction for rape because no
proof was adduced of even the slightest
penetration of the female organ, aside from a
general statement of the victim that she had
been "raped."
People v. Monteron36 is another noteworthy case
where the Court set aside the appellants
conviction for rape. In this case, the victim
testified that the accused placed his penis on top
of her vagina, and that she felt pain. In finding
the accused guilty of attempted rape only, we
held that there was no showing that the
accuseds penis entered the victims vagina. We
added that the pain that the victim felt might
have been caused by the accuseds failed
attempts to insert his organ into her vagina.
In People v. Mariano,37 the accused tried to
insert his penis into the victims vagina, but
failed to secure penetration. The Court set aside
the accuseds conviction for three (3) counts of
rape and found him guilty of attempted rape
only. We explained the necessity of carefully
ascertaining whether the penis of the accused in
reality entered the labial threshold of the female
organ to accurately conclude that rape had been
consummated.
In People v. Arce, Jr.,38 the Court found the
accused guilty of attempted rape only, because
the victim did not declare that there was the
slightest penetration, which was necessary to
consummate rape. On the contrary, she
categorically stated that the accused was not able
to insert his penis into her private parts because
she was moving her hips away. We further ruled
that the victims attempt to demonstrate what
she meant by "idinidikit ang ari" was unavailing
to prove that rape had been consummated.
In People v. Francisco,39 the victim testified that
the accused "poked" her vagina. The Court set
aside the accuseds conviction for qualified rape,
and convicted him instead only of attempted
rape after failing to discern from the victim's
testimony that the accused attained some degree
of penile penetration, which was necessary to
consummate rape.1wphi1

In People v. Dimapilis,40 the Court refused to

convict the accused for consummated rape on
the basis of the victim's testimony that she felt
the accused's penis pressed against her vagina as
he tried to insert it. We explained that in order
to constitute consummated rape, there must be
entry into the vagina of the victim, even if only in
the slightest degree.
Finally, in People v. Tolentino,41 the Court
reversed the accuseds conviction for rape and
convicted him of attempted rape only, as there
was paucity of evidence that the slightest
penetration ever took place. We reasoned out
that the victims statements that the accused was
"trying to force his sex organ into mine" and
"binundol-undol ang kanyang ari" did not prove
that the accuseds penis reached the labia of the
pudendum of the victims vagina.
"In rape cases, the prosecution bears the
primary duty to present its case with clarity and
persuasion, to the end that conviction becomes
the only logical and inevitable conclusion." 42 We
emphasize that a conviction cannot be made to
rest on possibilities; strongest suspicion must
not be permitted to sway judgment. In the
present case, the prosecution failed to discharge
its burden of proving all the elements of
consummated rape.
The Proper Penalty and Indemnities
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the
imposable penalty for attempted rape is two
degrees lower than the prescribed penalty of
reclusion perpetua for consummated rape. Two
degrees lower from reclusion perpetua is prision
mayor whose range is six (6) years and one (1)
day to 12 years. Without any attendant
aggravating or mitigating circumstances and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum of the penalty to be imposed upon the
appellant is prision mayor in its medium period,
while the minimum shall be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree, which is prision
correccional whose range is six (6) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years, in any of its periods.
Accordingly, we sentence the appellant to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of
prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of
prision mayor, as maximum.

In addition, we order the appellant to pay the

victim P 30,000.00
as
civil
indemnity, P 25,000.00 as moral damages
and P 10,000.00 as exemplary damages, in
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence on
attempted rape cases.43
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the June
15, 2009 decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR HC No. 02759 is MODIFIED, as
follows:
The appellant's conviction for the crime of rape
is VACATED, and
(1) we find appellant Christopher Pareja
y
Velasco GUILTY of
the
crime
of ATTEMPTED RAPE;
(2) we SENTENCE him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) years of
prision correccional, as minimum, to 10
years of prision mayor, as maximum;
and
(3) we ORDER him to PAY the victim
the amounts of P 30,000.00 as civil
indemnity; P 25,000.00
as
moral
damages; and P 10,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED.

Cruz v. People
Criminal Law. Distinctions between attempted
rape and acts of lasciviousness.
Norberto Cruz y Bartolome v. People of
the
Philippines
G.R.
No.
166441,
October
8,
2014
Bersamin,
J.:
FACTS:
The petitioner Norberto Cruz was charged with
attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness
involving different victims. The Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals found Cruz guilty
of both crimes charged, hence, this appeal.

Norberto and his wife employed AAA and BBB

to help them in selling their plastic wares and
glass wares in La Union. Upon reaching the
place, they set up their tents to have a place to
sleep. Petitioners wife and their driver went
back to Manila to get more goods. While
sleeping, AAA felt that somebody was on top of
her mashing her breast and touching her private
part. Norberto ordered her not to scream or she
will be killed. AAA fought back and Norberto
was not able to pursue his lustful desires. AA left
the tent to seek for help. When she returned to
their tent, she saw Norberto touching the private
parts of BBB. This prompted Norberto to leave
the
tent.
Norberto denies the commission of the crime
alleging that he could not possibly do the acts
imputed out in the open as there were many
people preparing for the simbang gabi. He
further assails the credibility AAA for the crime
of rape, alleging that the complaints were filed
only for the purpose of extorting money from
him.
ISSUE:
Is petitioner guilty of attempted rape against
AAA?
HELD:
NO, Cruz is guilty only of acts of lasciviousness.
The basic element of rape is carnal knowledge of
a female. Carnal knowledge is defined simply as
the act of a man having sexual bodily
connections with a woman, in other words, rape
is consummated once the penis capable of
consummating the sexual act touches the
external genitalia of the female. There must be
sufficient and convincing proof that the penis
indeed touched the labias or slid into the female
organ, and not merely stroked the external
surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of
consummated
rape.
Rape in its frustrated stage is a physical
impossibility. Nonetheless, rape admits of an
attempted stage. In attempted rape, the concrete

felony is rape, but the offender does not perform

all the acts of execution of having carnal
knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the
female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in
its attempted stage requires the commencement
of the commission of the felony directly by overt
acts without the offender performing all the acts
of execution that should produce the felony, the
only means by which the overt acts performed by
the accused can be shown to have a causal
relation to rape as the intended crime is to make
a clear showing of his intent to lie with the
female.
The petitioner climbed on top of the naked
victim, and was already touching her genitalia
with his hands and mashing her breasts when
she freed herself from his clutches and
effectively ended his designs on her. Yet,
inferring from such circumstances that rape, and
no other, was his intended felony would be
highly unwarranted. Such circumstances
remained equivocal, or susceptible of double
interpretation, such that it was not permissible
to directly infer from them the intention to cause
rape
as
the
particular
injury.
The intent to penetrate is manifest only through
the showing of the penis capable of
consummating the sexual act touching the
external genitalia of the female. Without such
showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness
is committed. Petitioners embracing and
touching the victims vagina and breasts did not
directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The
lack of evidence showing his erectile penis being
in the position to penetrate her when he was on
top of her deterred any inference about his
intent to lie with her. At most, his acts reflected
lewdness and lust for her. The intent to commit
rape should not easily be inferred against the
petitioner, even from his own declaration of it, if
any, unless he committed overt acts leading to
rape.
Hence, Cruz is guilty only of acts
lasciviousness and not attempted rape.

of