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Polito, Rabindranath S.
Legal Research
LLB I
EH 409
Anti-Political Dynasty Law Enactment
Introduction
Section 26, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides: The State shall guarantee equal
access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by
law. It is hoped that with such provision the citizens are given political opportunities with equal
conditions to hold public offices.
Santiago (2015) explained that the term prohibit is not to be understood as prohibitory but
regulatory. The prohibition is against political dynasty to avoid circumvention of the provision
limiting reelection of public officers to give chance to others in a position for public office. For
example, a governor is allowed two reelections. After being reelected twice, he is barred from
running for the same position by operation of law. However, he can ask his son, wife, brother or
relatives to run for the same position without violating any law. If the son wins, the province
continues to be governed by the same family. The election of a family member of that politician
negates the purpose of prohibiting reelection. That is a political dynasty.
Bernas (2009) discussed that the establishment of political dynasties is an effective way of
monopolizing and perpetuating power. Hence, the state is commanded to prohibit political
dynasties. Commissioner Sarmiento explained the rationale of the provision as widening
opportunities of competent, young and promising poor candidates to occupy important positions
in the government.
The phrase as may be defined by law makes the provision non-self-executing. In other words,
it requires a law to be passed and enacted by the Congress. However, since the ratification of the
Philippine Constitution on February 2, 1987, despite few attempts, no bill has been enacted or
signed into law defining and prohibiting political dynasties in the Philippines.
In this view, this paper discussed the importance of enacting a bill on anti-political dynasty.
Specifically, it aimed to answer the following issues:
1. How should political dynasty be defined in the Philippines?
2. Who are candidates that should be prohibited?
3. How should political dynasty be prohibited?
Political Dynasty
Generally, a political dynasty is a family that has successfully retained political power
through maintaining control over at least one elective position over successive generations (Dal
Bo et al. 2009). A study by Albert et al. (2015) presents two main patterns that typically emerge
in a political dynasty. First, relatives that occupy the same elective position over time or an
individual succeeding to an elective position previously occupied by a relative. Second, relatives
that occupy multiple elective positions simultaneously. Thus, there is an existence of political
dynasty when a family retains at least one elective position over successive election cycles
and/or when a family expands its number of family members in elective office. This definition is
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similar to Mendoza et al. (2013) defining political dynasty as members of the same family
occupying elected positions either in sequence for the same position, or simultaneously across
different positions.
Further, a more definite definition is posited by Hess (1966) saying: a political dynasty is
any family that has had at least four members, in the same name, elected to federal office. In
his definition, Hess limits the idea of family to those who have the same name. Also, he restricts
the number of family members to four. The definition may be definite but this may not cover
political dysnasties involving relatives by affinity and those involving two or three members.
Dal Bo, Albert and Mendoza all cover the elements of succession and expansion of political
dynasties. However, Dal Bo only considers one elective position held by a family. It is good to
note that Albert and Mendoza include multiple positions or across different positions held by a
family to show that political dynasties do not only monopolize political power through
succession but also through expansion.
Regulating Political Dynasty
Political dynasty should be regulated because it exemplifies a particular form of elite
persistence in which a single or few family groups monopolize political power (Querubin, 2011).
Regulating political dynasty is found in the Constitution as the basic and paramount law of the
land. The Philippines, in the spirit of democracy, allows fair play and guarantees equal access to
opportunities for public service which can be realized when the State is able to prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law (Sec. 26, Art. III).
There are a few and compelling reasons for regulating political dynasties in the Philippines.
First, according to Albert et al. (2015), political dynasties are pervasive in the 10 poorest
provinces that are afflicted by low levels of human development, bad governance, violence, and
poor business climates. These provinces are Lanao del Sur, Eastern Samar, Apayao,
Maguindanao, Zamboanga del Norte, Sarangani, North Cotabato, Negros Oriental, Northern
Samar and Western Samar. In these provinces, either poverty results in the creation of political
dynasties or political dynasties exacerbate bad governance failing to reduce, if not actually
worsen, poverty conditions.
Second, Mendoza et al. (2013) found that poverty contributes to the expansion of the largest
and strongest political dynasties. Given that the poor are most vulnerable to political patronage
and manipulation as well as practical to sell their votes, a worsening, if not unchanging, poverty
would be beneficial to political dynasties. Since the largest political dynasties would, in most
situations, be the families that have cultivated the most extensive networks of patronage,
accumulated the most political and financial capital, and have the access to the largest political
machineries, they would also be in the best position to take advantage of vulnerable
economically disadvantaged voters.
Third, Mendoza et al. (2013) found that political dynasties employ education to cultivate
patronage relationships through scholarship grants and infrastructure expenditure support. The
dominant political dynasty can thus channel resources into education projects and programs that
identify their members as politicians with only the interest of the locals in their hearts. Given
strong norms for reciprocity and personal indebtedness, the increased investments in the local
public education system would help strengthen further the dominant political dynasties. Indeed,
this view runs counter to the position that improved education among the electorate would lead
to more informed choices and less political dynasties elected into office.
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Fourth, Albert et al. (2015) found that political dynasties, particularly the fat kind where
there are many family members simultaneously occupying elective positions, weaken the
checks-and-balances in government. Familial ties within the context of public finance breed
conflicts of interest and weaken accountability and auditing mechanisms that are supposed to
police the behavior of public officials, particularly in the way they manage public resources. In
situations where the provincial governor, district representative, and several municipal mayors
are related, for example, flows of internal revenue allotments, national budget insertions and
appropriations, and locally generated revenues will be strongly influenced or, at worst, controlled
by a single family.
Finally, Albert et al. (2015) found that political dynasties accrue political capital over time
and benefit from incumbency advantages during elections. Dynasties weaken the competition in
the political system, resulting in less access for alternative leaders and youth leaders to be part of
the political system. In many jurisdictions, political dynasties run uncontested or contested only
by other dynasties. Any monopoly of political power is harmful to society and may cause
violence.
Anti-Dynasty Bills
In the studies presented above, political dynasties have been linked to poverty, monopoly,
violence, bad governance, among others. In this view, at least two bills have been passed in the
Congress. During the First Regular Session of the Fifteenth Congress of the Philippines, a bill
entitled An Act to Prohibit the Establishment of Political Dynasties (2011) was introduced by
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago. Then, during the First Regular Session of the Sixteenth
Congress of the Philippines, Senator Joseph Victor G. Ejercito introduced a similar bill entitled
An Act Prohibiting the Establishment of Political Dynasties (2013). For some reasons, both bills
were not approved and enacted.
Defining Political Dynasty
In the bill passed by Senator Santiago in 2011, an explanatory note was provided, as follows:
To give force and effect to this [Art. 2, Sec 26] provision, the playing field of the
political arena should be levelled and opened to persons who are equally qualified to aspire on
even terms with those from ruling politically dominant families.
Philippine society, many sociologists note, revolves around the system of extended
families. However, this extended family system, an otherwise beneficial concept when
applied to the social aspects of human behavior, finds its pernicious effects in the political
arena where public office becomes the exclusive domain of influencial families and clans that
are well-entrenched in Philippine politics. The monopoly of political power and public
resources by such families affects the citizenry at the local and national levels.
The socio-economic and political inequities prevalent in the Philippine society limit
public office to members of ruling families. In many instances, voters, for convenience and
out of cultural mindset, look up to these ruling families as dispensers of favors, and thus elect
relatives of these politically dominant families.
From the explanatory note, political dynasty implies that having an extended family may be
beneficial to the social aspects of Filipinos but it has adverse effects to Philippine politics. This
should be enough to motivate the Congress to eventually define political dynasty. Senator
Miriam defined political dynasty in Section 3, paragraph (a) of the said bill which reads:
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Political Dynasty shall exist when a person who is the spouse of an incumbent elective
official or relative within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of an incumbent
elective official holds or runs for an elective office simultaneously with the incumbent
elective official within the same province or occupies the same office immediately after the
term of office of the incumbent elective official. It shall be deemed to exist where two (2) or
more persons who are spouses or are related within the second civil degree of consanguinity
or affinity run simustaneously for elective public office within the same province, even if
neither is so related to an incumbent elective official.
The definition is complete in the sense that it includes: (a) the degree of relationship; (b) the
position; (c) the location; and (d) the stage in the political arena.
First, this definition of Santiago specifies the degree of relationship or the extent of
connection between the official and the candidate or other official. Dal Bo (2009), Albert (2015)
and Mendoza (2013), in their definition, only used terms such as family members and
relatives which failed to qualify to what extent is the offical related or connected to the
candidate or other official. The problem with their definition is its vagueness. Should ones
cousin, nephew, grandson or in-laws be included in the definition of family or relatives
remains unanswered by their definition. However, Santiago qualified the terms family
members and relatives by within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. Thus,
a governor succeeded by his son or brother-in-law constitutes political dynasty, but when
succeeded by his cousin or uncle does not constitute political dynasty. Santiago successfully
qualified political dynasty to relationships within the second civil degree by consanguinity or
affinity. Considering such qualification, one may suggest to extend from second civil degree to
fourth civil degree. In a study by Dal Bo et al. (2009), the Philippines has 75% total legislators
coming from political dynasties, which ranked first followed by Thailand with 42% and Mexico
with 40%. Defining political dynasty with second civil degree by consanguinity or affinity may
not solve power monopolization. The relationship must be extended to fourth civil degree by
consanguinity or affinity.
Second, Santiagos definition included what position is sought or held to constitute political
dynasty: An incumbent elective official holds or runs for an elective office simultaneously with
the incumbent elective official within the same province or occupies the same office immediately
after the term of office of the incumbent elective official. Dal Bo (2009), Albert (2015) and
Mendoza (2013) also included this in their definition. Dal Bos one elective position over
successive generations, Alberts same elective position over time or an individual succeeding to
an elective position previously occupied by a relative and multiple elective positions
simultaneously, and Mendozas elected positions either in sequence for the same position, or
simultaneously across different positions all agree with the definition of Santiago. There are two
types of positions described in the above definitions: (a) offices within the same province and (b)
same office occupied by a relative successor. The inclusion of position finds meaning in a study
conducted by Albert et al. (2015) showing that in the local government positions in the
Philippines, Vice-Mayor (50.29%), Mayor (66.33%), Representative (74.26%), Vice-Governor
(75%) and Governor (85%) are shared by political dynasties. In these positions, either incumbent
officials within the same province hold office with relatives or incumbent officials succeeded the
positions occupied by their relatives.
Third, Santiagos definition qualified the location where political dynasties rule in the
country: within the same province. Dal Bo (2009), Albert (2015) and Mendoza (2013) are silent
about the location in their definition. Santiagos inclusion of the location is significant since the
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presence of political dynasties in the provinces in the Philippines is linked with poverty
incidence. Albert et al. (2015) found that the incidence of political dynasties is prevalent in 10
poorest provinces of the country in 2012. For example, Lanao del Sur with 67.31% Povery
Incidence (PI) was ruled by 59.47% of political dynasties, Eastern Samar with 55.43% PI by
54.17 political dynasties, Apayao with 54.69% PI by 55.56% political dynasties and
Maguindanao with 54.51% PI by 64.45% political dynasties. Mendoza et al. (2013) had a similar
finding with Albert as he explained that political dynasties contribute to the expansion of the
largest and strongest political dynasties. Given that the poor are most vulnerable to political
patronage and manipulation as well as practical to sell their votes, a worsening, if not unchanging,
poverty would be beneficial to political dynasties. Since the largest political dynasties would, in
most situations, be the families that have cultivated the most extensive networks of patronage,
accumulated the most political and financial capital, and have the access to the largest political
machineries, they would also be in the best position to take advantage of vulnerable
economically disadvantaged voters.
Fourth, Santiagos definition added a stage in the political arena when political dynasty is
deemed existing: where two (2) or more persons who are spouses or are related within the
second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity run simustaneously for elective public office
within the same province, even if neither is so related to an incumbent elective official. This
provision means that political dynasty already exists when family members run simultaneously
for elective public office within the same province even if they are not related to the incumbent
official. There are four essential elements in this provision: (a) two or more persons related, (b)
running simutaneously for elective public office, (c) within the same province, and (d) even if
not related to the incumbent official. This implies that as early as the stage of candidacy, political
dynasty is already deemed to have existed. Thus, winning or not is immaterial pursuant to this
provision. Dal Bo (2009), Albert (2015) and Mendoza (2013) are also silent about stage.
Candidates Prohibited
Section 4, paragraph 1 of Santiagos proposed bill provides for Persons Covered or
Prohibited Candidates, as follows:
No spouse, or person related within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity
whether legitimate or illegitimate, to an incumbent elective official seeking reelection shall be
allowed to hold or run for any elective office in the same province in the same election. In
case the constituency of the incumbent elective official is national in character, the above
relatives shall be disqualified from running within the same province where the former is a
registered voter.
The prohibition in Section 4, paragraph 1 of Santiagos bill is based on the definition of
political dynasty in Section 3, paragraph (a) as discussed earlier in this paper. Faithful to the
definition, the prohibition includes: (a) the degree of relationship; (b) the position; (c) the
location; and (d) the stage in the political arena. The degree of relationship is within second civil
degree by consanguinity or affinity. It is forwarded in this paper that such degree should be
extended from second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity to address the growing population of political dynasty in the country as
shown in Mendoza et al. (2013) and Albert et al. (2015). A study by Albert et al. (2015) showed
that candidates from political dynasties usually win in the elections. In their study, a data from
the winning candidates in the 2013 Gubernatorial Elections showed that 9% were from
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uncontested dynasties, 19% from dynasties winning over non-dynasties, and 40% from dynasties
beating other dynasties. From the data, it is shown that a total of 68% Gubernatorial winners
were from political dynasties.
A significant prohibition in the above prohibition is where an incumbent official is national
in character, his relatives shall be disqualified from running within the same province where the
incumbent official is a registered voter. The purpose of the provision, most likely, is to diminish
the national officials undue influence over the province where he is a registered voter.
Section 4, paragraph 2 of the Prohibited Candidates states:
In case where none of the candidates is related to an incumbent elective official within
the second degree or consanguinity or affinity, but are related to one another within the said
prohited degree, they, including their spouses, shall be disqualified from holding or running
for any local elective office within the same province in the same election.
This provision finds its meaning in the last part of the definition on the stage of political
arena. There are four elements here: (1) candidates are not related to an incumbent official, (2)
they are running for any elective office, (3) within the same province, and (4) in the same
election. The effect of the above provision can eliminate the growth of developing or budding
political dynasties that as early as the stage of candidacy, candidates are disqualified, even if they
are not related to any incumbent official, as long as they are seeking any elective office within
the same province in the same election. According to Albert et al. (2015), during the 2013
elections, 80% of the running candidates in election parties were from political dynasties. Bernas
(2009) said the state is commanded to prohibit political dynasties to guarantee equal access to
public service. With the presence of 80% members of political dynasties in election parties, only
very few new, promising and poor candidates are given that equal opportunity.
Section 4, paragraph 3 of the Prohibited Candidates provides:
In all cases, no person within the prohibited civil degree of relationship to the
incumbent shall immediately succeed to the position of the latter; Provided, however, this
section shall not apply to Punong Barangays or members of the Sangguniang Barangay.
The above provision is consistent with the definition of Santiago in Section 3, paragpraph (a)
as included in the definitions of Dal Bo (2009), Albert (2015) and Mendoza (2013). Section 1,
Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution on Declaration of Principles and Stare Policies could not be
any clearer that The Philippines is a democratic and republican state. As such, public officials
are not supposed to be succeeded by their relatives. Sovereignty resides in the people not in
political dynasties. In 1991, Huntington found that there are a number of anti-dynasty legal
statutes across democratic countries with presidents, vice-presidents and congressional seats:
Handuras in 1982, El Salvador in 1983, Guatemala in 1985, Nicaragua in 1987, Brazil in 1990,
Colombia in 1991, and Paraguay in 1992. Feinstein (2011) found that regulations on dynasties
and anti-dynasty statutes suggest that there is growing evidence of improvements in the
democratic process of countries that introduced these types of reforms. For 29 years, after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, the Philippines as a democratic country remains to be a
country without regulations or statutes prohibiting political dynasties.
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Prohibiting Political Dynasty
This paper is not to criminalize but to prohibit political dynasty as provided in Section 26,
Art. 2 of the Constitution. One way to prohibit political dynasty is to disqualify candidates from
running and holding elective offices. Section 5 of Santiagos bill on the Effect of Violation of
Prohibition states:
The COMELEC shall motu proprio or upon verified petition of any interested party
deny due course to any certificate of candidacy filed in violation of this act.
Under Article IX, C, Section 2, paragraph 1 states that the COMELEC shall have the
function to Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. Further, pursuant to Section 69 of the Omnibus
Election Code, the COMELEC may moto proprio or upon verified petition of an interested party,
refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. Hence, these provisions validate
Santiagos means of prohibiting political dynasties through COMELECs refusal to give due
course to or cancel certificates of candidacy.
In Munder vs. COMELEC, the Supreme Court ruled that under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code, a candidate may be disqualified if he commits any of the election offenses or
prohibited acts specified therein. In Aguam vs. COMELEC, the Court ruled that the
COMELEC can even oust the candidate proclaimed not withstanding that he has already
assumed office. Further, in the cases of Salcedo II vs. COMELEC and Justimbaste vs.
COMELEC, the Court ruled that the COMELEC can refuse to give due course to or cancel
certificates of candidacy and can even disqualify candidates.
Section 6 on the Period for Filing Petition for Disqualification of Santiagos bill provides:
Any citizen of voting age, candidate or duly-registered political party, organization, or
coalition of political parties may file with the COMELEC, after the last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy and before proclamation, a petition to disqualify a candidate on
grounds provided for under Section 4 of this Act.
The above provision is consistent with Section 28 of the Omnibus Election Code that a
petition for disqualification may be filed at any time after the last day for filing of the certificates
of candidacy but not later than the candidates proclamation should he win the elections.
In De la Cruz vs COMELEC, the Court ruled that a person who is disqualified under Section
68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate but the person whose certificate is cancelled or
denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all. In Cayat vs. COMELEC, it
was ruled that if a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day,
of the election, all votes for that candidates are stray votes. In Jalosjos vs. COMELEC, if the
certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes
should also be stray votes because the certificate is void from the beginning. With the above
provisions and jurisprudence, when the Anti-Dynasty Bill is enacted, political dynasties will be
gradually eliminated from the political arena.
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Summary and Conclusion
During the course of the study, it is found that:
1. Political dynasty should be defined including (a) the degree of relationship; (b) the
position; (c) the location; and (d) the stage in the political arena. It is forwarded in this study that
the degree of relationship be extended from second civil degree by consanguinity or affinity to
fourth civil degree by consanguinity or affinity to address the link between poverty and political
dynasty.
2. Persons prohibited should include those who succeed the positions occupied by their
relatives and those who, even not related to incumbent officials, are seeking any elective
positions with their relatives within the same province in the same election; and
3. Prohibition process shall be under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to Article
IX, C of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.
After 29 years from the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Section 26 of Article II remains
a provision that requires legislation for its implemention. By far, two Anti-Dynasty Bills by
Santiago in 2011 and Ejercito in 2013 have been rejected by the Congress.
Commissioner Sarmiento of the Philippine Constitutional Commission of 1986 hoped that
By including this provision [Sec. 26, Art. II], we widen the opportunities of competent, young
and promising poor candidates to occupy important positions in the government. If the
Congress continues to reject Anti-Dynasty Bills, Filipinos will be deprived of the equal
opportunity for public service. This has to stop.
References
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society. Policy Notes. Philippine Institute for Development Studies.
Bernas, Joaquin G. S.J. (2009). The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
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Dal B, E., Dal B, P., & Snyder, J. (2009). Political dynasties. The Review of Economic Studies,
76(1), 115-142.
Feinstein, B. (2011). The dynasty advantage: Family ties in congressional elections. Legislative
Studies Quarterly 35 (4): 571-598.
Huntington, S. (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century. Norman,
OK: University of Oklahoma Press.
Hess, S. (1966). America's political dynasties from Adams to Kennedy. Doubleday.
Mendoza, Ronald U. et al. (2013). Political Dynasties and Poverty: Evidence from the
Philippines. Asian Institute of Management (AIM) Policy Center.
Santiago, Miriam Defensor (2015). Constitutional Law Annotated. Volume 1. Philippines: Rex
Bookstore.
Querubin, Pablo (2011). Political Reform and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and Political
Dynasties in the Philippines. Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies.
