POLICE POWER

Prepared by: Atty. Judiel M. Pareja

A. Nature of Police Power
1. Jacobson vs. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)
Topic: Nature of Police Power
Case: JACOBSON vs. MASSACHUSETTS
Parties: Henning Jacobson, a Swedish US immigrant, a minister, and a resident of Cambridge, Massachusetts
petitioner
Commonwealth of Massachusetts respondent
Facts: During the early years of the 20th century, Massachusetts witnessed a large increase in the number of smallpox
deaths. In response, many communities there required vaccinations of their residents to try to stop the spread of the
disease. In 1903, because the plaintiff believed that the smallpox vaccination was unsound for his health, he refused to
have the vaccination that the city of Cambridge required of all of its residents. Pursuant to applicable law of the
commonwealth, Jacobson was fined $5 for his refusal to be inoculated.

Petitioners Contention: Jacobson believed that the scientific basis for vaccination was unsound and that he would
suffer if he was vaccinated. He argued before the U.S. Supreme Court that the law violated his Fourteenth Amendment
right to liberty, because it took away his right to care for his own body in the way that he deemed best.

Respondents Contention: The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that the local statute was consistent
with the commonwealths constitution.
Issue: W/N the involuntary vaccination violated Jacobson's inherent right (of every freeman) to care for his own body and
health in such way as seems to him best
Ruling: The Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute, stating the basic bargain of civilization: an individual must
give up some personal freedom in exchange for the benefits of being in a civilized society . The Courts decision
hinged on the fact that Jacobson would enjoy the fact that he would be protected from smallpox because his neighbors
had been inoculated, while he would not personally have had to accept the risk that was inherent in the vaccination. The
whole point is that, should a few suffer from one of the maladies that had spread throughout vast numbers of children and
adults, then they could potentially begin another epidemic, especially if they were intermingled with those who received
vaccinations and those who opted not to do so. The Court viewed his rejection as an attempt to get a free ride from
society, which cannot be countenanced because no one is allowed a free ride at the risk of others.
Jacobsons right to contest the scientific basis of the vaccinations was legitimate. Although conceding that some
people still doubted the efficacy of the vaccination, the Court determined that the legislature was within its prerogative in
adopting one of many views based on its own study of the alternatives. The Court thus ruled that commonwealth
officials engaged in a legitimate use of their police power in exercising the right to protect the public health and
safety of citizens. The Court concluded that because local boards of health determined when mandatory vaccinations
were necessary, such a requirement satisfied the Fourteenth Amendment, because it was neither unreasonable nor
arbitrary. Then if it would benefit the public welfare, the American people could be required to be inoculated, even against
their will. It is maintained that the law grants state governors a great deal of power to react in the event of medical
emergencies.

Relevant Doctrine: It is a fundamental principle that persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints
and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect right of the
legislature to do which no question ever was, or upon acknowledged general principles ever can be made, so far
as natural persons are concerned. Essentially, part of being in a civilization meant giving up some personal freedom in
exchange for belonging to that society.

2. Phil. Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Hon. Drilon, June 30, 1988
Topic: Nature of Police Power
Case: PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. vs. DRILON
Parties:

PHILIPPINE

ASSOCIATION

OF

SERVICE

EXPORTERS,

INC.

(PASEI)

petitioner

HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator of
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration respondents
Facts: The petitioner, PASEI, is a firm engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for
overseas placement. It challenged the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY
SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS".

Petitioners Contention: The measure is assailed for discrimination against males or females; that it does not apply to all
Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is
held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in
character.
Petitioner invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. D. O. No. 1 is claimed, finally, to
be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members
face should the Order be further enforced.

Respondents Contention: The Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents, in submitting the validity of the
challenged guidelines, invoked the police power of the Philippine State. The SG filed a Comment informing the Court that
the respondents have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines
and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.
Issues: W/N D. O. No. 1 is valid under the Constitution as an exercise of the states police power
Ruling: The court ruled in favor of the respondents and dismissed the petition thereby sustaining D. O. No. 1 of DOLE
and its constitutional validity. The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be
nullified. As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the

contrary, the presumption logically stands. As a co-equal body, the judiciary has great respect for determinations of the
Chief Executive or his subalterns, especially when the legislature itself has specifically given them enough room on
how the law should be effectively enforced. In the case at bar, D. O. No. 1 implements the rule-making powers
granted by the Labor Code.
There is no question that D. O. No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an
undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not
import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that:
(1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) they are germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and
(4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.
As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that
duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts. That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers" is not an argument for
unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary.
For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a
select person or group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an
unfair advantage to another person or group of persons. In the case at bar, the assailed Order clearly accords protection
to certain women workers, and not the contrary.

The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is
subject, among other things, to the requirements of public safety, as may be provided by law. D. O. No. 1 is a valid
implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to afford protection to labor, pursuant to DOLE's rulemaking authority vested in it by the Labor Code. The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its
impact on the right to travel, but the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.

Neither is there merit in the contention that D. O. No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is
true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be
lawfully delegated. The Labor Code itself vests DOLE with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof.
As for Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, "protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of
employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent,
just, and humane. The Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection,
personally and economically, while away from home. In this case, the Government has evidence of the lack or inadequacy
of such protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.
Above all, it is admitted that D. O. No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure. The concept of police
power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It is the inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to
prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society. It finds no specific Constitutional grant for

the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it
is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has
enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance.

It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. It is rooted in the conception that men in organizing the
state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to
enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare. Significantly, the Bill of Rights
itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties. Even liberty itself, the greatest of all
rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will. It is subject to the far more overriding demands and
requirements of the greater number.

Relevant Doctrine/Concept: POLICE POWER is the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." It consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or
property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in
general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
The police power of the State is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is not inaptly termed the "law of
overwhelming necessity. Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus
assuring the greatest benefits. Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all
its awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats
the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further private
interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power.

3. Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Hon. Factoran, January 16, 1995

FACTS
Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the exercise of her
legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of
applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution. EO No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-venture, coproduction, or production- sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral
resources.

The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 which
declares that all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitutionshall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of
these guidelines. and Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit Letter of Intent and
Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the Department Administrative
Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand and gravel claims, after their
respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., an organization
composed of mining prospectors and claim owners and claim holders, to file the instant petition assailing their
validity and constitutionality before this Court.
ISSUE
WON the two Department Administrative Orders are valid
HELD
Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, as the governing
law on the acceptance and approval of declarations of location and all other kinds of applications for the
exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is
erroneous. Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system of exploration, development
and utilization of natural resources through "license, concession or lease" which, however, has been
disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the said constitutional mandate and its
implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing
on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and
other existing mining laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate as the governing law. In
other words, in all other areas of administration and management of mineral lands, the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of Executive
Order No. 279 provides, thus:
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and their
implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Executive
Order,
shall
continue
in
force
and
effect.
Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements
granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition, are
subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State.
Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the
constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the mining
leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order
No. 211. Police Power, being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public interest;
extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive
Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of Article XII,
Section
2
of
the
1987
Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

4. Gancayno vs. City Government of Quezon City, October 11, 2011

FACTS
In the early 1950s, retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcel of land in (EDSA), Quezon City.
Sometime in 1956, the Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904, entitled An Ordinance Requiring the
Construction of Arcades, for Commercial Buildings to be Constructed in Zones Designated as Business Zones
in the Zoning Plan of Quezon City, and Providing Penalties in Violation Thereof.
An arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the first floor projecting over the sidewalk
beyond the first storey wall used as protection for pedestrians against rain or sun.
Ordinance No. 2904 required the relevant property owner to construct an arcade with a width of 4.50 meters
and height of 5.00
Under this particular ordinance, the building owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of
the property line, thereby creating a space or shelter under the first floor. In effect, property owners relinquish
the use of the space for use as an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for their own purposes.
The ordinance was amended several times and as a result some properties were exempted from the
construction of arcades. The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, sometime in
1965, Justice Gancayco sought the exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from
the application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing an arcade on his property.
On 2 February 1966, the City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancaycos request and issued a
Resolution subject to the condition that upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner shall, within reasonable
time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at his own expense when public interest so demands.
Decades after, in March 2003, MMDA conducted operations to clear obstructions along the sidewalk of
EDSA in Quezon City pursuant to Metro Manila Councils Resolution. The resolution authorized the MMDA
and local government units to clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public
places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions.[8]
On 28 April 2003, the MMDA sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of
his building violated the Building Code in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. The MMDA gave Justice Gancayco
fifteen (15) days to clear the portion of the building that was supposed to be an arcade along EDSA.
Justice Gancayco did not comply with the notice. Soon after the lapse of the fifteen (15) days, the
MMDA proceeded to demolish the party wall, or what was referred to as the wing walls, of the ground floor
structure. At the time of the demolition, the affected portion of the building was being used as a restaurant.
On 29 May 2003, Justice Gancayco filed a Petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, seeking to prohibit the
MMDA and the City Government of Quezon City from demolishing his property.
In his Petition he alleged that the ordinance authorized the taking of private property without due
process of law and just compensation, because the construction of an arcade will require 67.5 square meters
from the 375 square meter property. In addition, he claimed that the ordinance was selective and
discriminatory in its scope and application when it allowed the owners of the buildings located in the Quezon
City-San Juan boundary to Cubao Rotonda, and Balete to Seattle Streets to construct arcades at their option.
He thus sought the declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 2904 and the payment of damages. Alternately, he
prayed for the payment of just compensation should the court hold the ordinance valid.
The City Government of Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power,
regulating the use of property in a business zone. In addition, it pointed out that Justice Gancayco was already
barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.

Similarly, the MMDA alleged that Justice Gancayco could not seek the nullification of an ordinance that
he had already violated, and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality. It further stated
that the questioned property was a public nuisance impeding the safe passage of pedestrians. Finally, the
MMDA claimed that it was merely implementing the legal easement established by Ordinance No. 2904.
The RTC rendered tis decision in favor of Gancayo by holding the assailed ordinance as
unconstitutional. Upon appeal, The CA, partly granting the appeal, upheld the validity of Ordinance No. 2904
and lifted the injunction against the enforcement and implementation of the ordinance. In so doing, it held that
the ordinance was a valid exercise of the right of the local government unit to promote the general welfare of its
constituents pursuant to its police powers. The CA also ruled that the ordinance established a valid
classification of property owners with regard to the construction of arcades in their respective properties
depending on the location. The CA further stated that there was no taking of private property, since the owner
still enjoyed the beneficial ownership of the property. Nevertheless, the CA held that the MMDA went beyond
its powers when it demolished the subject property. It further found that Resolution No. 02-28 only refers to
sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila, thus excluding
Justice Gancaycos private property. Lastly, the CA stated that the MMDA is not clothed with the authority to
declare, prevent or abate nuisances.
ISSUES
(1) WON the issuance of Ordinance No. 2904 is a valid exercise of police power.
(2) WON the wing wall of justice Gancaycos Building is a public nuisance.
(3) WON MMDA legally demolished the property of justice Gancayco
HELD:
1.

Ordinance no. 2904 is a valid exercise of Police power. It is clear that Congress expressly granted the
city government, through the city council, police power by virtue of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 537, or the
Revised Charter of Quezon City,[24] which states:
To make such further ordinances and regulations not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry
into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and
proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order,
comfort, and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein; and
enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe under the
provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.
Specifically, on the powers of the city government to regulate the construction of buildings, the Charter
also expressly provided that the city government had the power to regulate the kinds of buildings and
structures that may be erected within fire limits and the manner of constructing and repairing them, it is clear
that the primary objectives of the city council of Quezon City when it issued the questioned ordinance ordering
the construction of arcades were the health and safety of the city and its inhabitants; the promotion of their
prosperity; and the improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort, and the convenience. These
arcades provide safe and convenient passage along the sidewalk for commuters and pedestrians, not just the
residents of Quezon City. More especially so because the contested portion of the building is located on a busy
segment of the city, in a business zone along EDSA.

2.

The wing walls of the building are not nuisances per se. The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave
Justice Gancayco an exemption from constructing an arcade is an indication that the wing walls of the building
are not nuisances per se. The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely affect the safety of persons

and property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make that
structure a nuisance. Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city
council or the city engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety
of persons and property. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing the
structure.
Neither does the MMDA have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only courts of law have the power to
determine whether a thing is a nuisance.
3.

MMDA illegally demolished the property of Justice Gancayco. MMDA alleges that by virtue of MMDA
Resolution No. 02-28, Series of 2002, it is empowered to demolish Justice Gancaycos property. It insists that
the Metro Manila Council authorized the MMDA and the local government units to clear the sidewalks, streets,
avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and
obstructions. It further alleges that it demolished the property pursuant to the Building Code in relation to
Ordinance No. 2904 as amended.
However, the Building Code clearly provides the process by which a building may be demolished. The
authority to order the demolition of any structure lies with the Building Official.
Additionally, the penalty prescribed by Ordinance No. 2904 itself does not include the demolition of
illegally constructed buildings in case of violations. Instead, it merely prescribes a punishment. The ordinance
itself also clearly states that it is the regular courts that will determine whether there was a violation of the
ordinance.
5. MMDA vs. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., August 15, 2007

G.R. No. 170656

August 15, 2007

Topic: Nature of Police Power

Parties: MMDA (Bayani Fernando as Chairman) v. Viron Transpo Co. Inc. & Hon. Albert Romulo as Exec. Secretary, MMDA
and BF v. Mencorp Transpo System Inc.
Note: RTC case, petitioners are Viron and Mencorp against MMDA and Exec Sec. Sa SC na for certiorari, pets are MMDA and Exec
Sec and respos are Viron and Mencorp
Background: (generally, ang traffic condition sa MM. actually, flowery kayo ang wordings sa case, so ang gist ra on traffic congestion
inyong i-supply ani if in case i-ask mo) ---Following conditions have been observed by the court in 1969: Constant increase of the
number of vehicles in Metro Manila (MM) has cause traffic congestion from bad to worse. More traffic jams clogging road arteries
esp. during rush hour.
Root issue: The EO 179 signed by Pres. Gloria Arroyo, whereby granting the recommendation made by MMDA to close provincial
bus terminals along EDSA and other main roads and giving it authority. Thus, Viron and Mencorp questioned the authority of MMDA
is it was a proper exercise of police power.
EO 179 in a nutshell - issued on 2-10-2003 "Providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transport System"
-

MM continues to be the center of employment opportunities, trade and commerce of the Greater Metro Manila area, and the
traffic situation in the metro also affected the provinces of Bulacan, Cavite, Laguna, and Rizal. MMDA is tasked to take
measures to ease the traffic problems and ensure convenience in travel. The primary cause of traffic are the buses in the
streets. MMDA recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro
Manila thoroughfares and access to mass transport (buses, LRT, MRT, PNR) to ensure efficient travel. National govt to
provide funding for these projects. Sec2 of the EO provides that 4 mass transport terminals are to be constructed to integrate
diff transport modes, concentrating on making terminals for the north and south commuters. Sec3 gives the MMDA the
power as the implementing agency to undertake the development work until it be turned-over to appropriate agencies.

Pursuant to the E.O., the Metro Manila Council (MMC), the governing board and policymaking body of the MMDA, issued
Resolution No. 03-07 series of 2003 expressing full support of the Project and it recognized the need to provide integrated transport
modes by establishing common bus parking areas, and the removal of bus terminals along major roads in MM.
Contention of Viron Corp (one of the respondents in the SC case, pet in the RTC case): On February 24, 2003, Viron Transport
engaged in the business of public transportation with a provincial bus operation filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC of
Manila, stating htat the MMDA trhu Chairman Fernando was poised to issue a circular, or memorandum which is tantamount to
closing all provincial bus terminals along EDSA and in the whole metro, thus leading to the closure of its terminals in Sampaloc, and
in QC under the guise of traffic regulation. Viron therefore questioned the authority of MMDA to direct provincial bus operators to
close their bus terminals which is tantamount to depriving them of their own property and Viron asked the court to set the limits of the
power of MMDA under RA 7924 o the law creating MMDA. They also asked the court (RTC) if the closing of the bus terminals is in
violation of the Public Service Act (which mandates public utilities to provide and maintain their own terminals for the privilege of
operating as common carriers).
Contention of Mencorp (one of the respondents in the SC case, pet in the RTC case): Mencorp,a nother bus company, also filed
the petition for declaratory relief against MMDA and Exec. Sec, asking the court to declare the EO unconstitutional and illegal for
transgressing the possessory rights of owners and operators of public land transportation units over their respective terminals.
Mencorp also prayed that a temporary restraining order be issued or writ of prelim injunction on the impending closure of their bus
terminals. --- Mencorps prayer for a TRO and/or writ of injunction was denied as was its application for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction.
The RTC Orders questioned in this petition for certiorari (as in the present petitioners, MMDA, et. al) are the orders by Judge Silvino
T. Pampilo, Jr. (RTC) of Manila, Branch 26 in Civil Case Nos. 03-105850 (this resolved the motion for recon by Viron and Mencorp ,
which declared EO179 as unconstitutional as it constitutes an unreasonable exercise of police power" ) and 03-106224 (the second
order which denied the petitioners MMDA et.al for their motion for recon).
RTC Decision: Sustained the legality of EO179, pursuant to RA7924 empowering MMDA to administer transport and traffic mgt. EO
was a valid exercise of police power of the state, and it also satisfied the two tests of lawful subject matter and lawful means, hence,
Viron and Mencorps property rights must yield to the power of the state.
Viron and Mencorp filed for a motion for recon.
2nd RTC decision: RTC reversed its decision on 8-8-05, this time holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable exercise of police
power"; that the authority of the MMDA under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not include the power to order the closure of
Virons and Mencorps existing bus terminals; and that the E.O. is inconsistent with the provisions of the Public Service Act.
Petitioners MMDA and Exec. Sec filed for a motion for recon and was denied in 11-23-05
Contention of the petitioners (MMDA and exec. sec) in this case: That the RTC failed to rule that (1) the requisites of declaratory
relief are not present, there being no justiciable controversy in Civil Case Nos. 03-105850 and 03-106224; and (2) the President has
the authority to undertake or cause the implementation of the Project. They contend that there was no mention in the EO for the
closure of the bus terminals and that Viron and Mencorp failed to produce any letter or communication on the plan of the Exec Dept to
close bus terminals along EDSA. Further, they contend that the EO was a coomunication for govt agencies to coordinate with MMDA
for the proper use of the road along EDSA and that the EO was a directive between the Pres and the implementing officials, not with
3rd persons.
Issues:
WON the requirement of justiciability is met
WON MMDA has the authority to exercise police power
WON the exercise of police power was legitimate
WON the closure violates other laws, i.e. Public Service Act
SC ruling: The petition fails.
1.

Requirement of justiciability

The following are the essential requisites for a declaratory relief petition: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in
the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination.
The requirement of the presence of a justiciable controversy is satisfied when an actual controversy or the ripening seeds thereof exist
between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and the declaration sought will help in ending the controversy. A
question becomes justiciable when it is translated into a claim of right which is actually contested.
In this case, the action of the respondents was prompted by the issuance of the EO, which contains that:
-

4th Whereas clause: MMDAs plan to "decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro
Manila thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through
the provision of mass transport terminal facilities
Section 2 of the E.O. immediate establishment of common bus terminals for north- and south-bound commuters.
Section 8 directs the Department of Budget and Management to allocate funds of not more than one hundred million pesos
(P100,000,000)
E.O. was made effective immediately.
MMC, the policy making body of MMDA, supported its immediate implementation.

Virons petition that the construction of the terminal is in progress, which was answered by MMDA in its position paper that, yes, the
govt had begun the implementation of the project.
Given this, the issue is not merely anticipatory. The action for declaratory relief must be brought before there is breach of rights under
rule 63 of Rules of Court. Precisely, respondents claim a deprivation of their constitutional right to property without due process of
law. Respondents have thus amply demonstrated a "personal and substantial interest in the case such that [they have] sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of [the E.O.s] enforcement." Consequently, the established rule that the constitutionality of a law or
administrative issuance can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement has been satisfied by
respondents.
2.

No. MMDA is not the proper authority to exercise/ implement this project

Under EO 125 signed by Pres Cory, the Dept of Transportation and Communication is the proper authority since it is the primary
policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing and admin agency of the Executive branch in the promotion, development
and regulation of dependable and coordinated networks of transpo --- Sec 4
The power of the president to issue such EO is within its residual powers vested by the Admin Code (EO 292) and in Sec 17 of the
Constitution. Thus, whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate, the President may act directly or
merely direct the performance of a duty.
Respecting the Presidents authority to order the implementation of the Project in the exercise of the police power of the State, suffice
it to stress that the powers vested in the DOTC Secretary to establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for
transportation and communications and to issue orders, rules and regulations to implement such mandate (which, as previously
discussed, may also be exercised by the President) have been so delegated for the good and welfare of the people. Hence, these powers
partake of the nature of police power.
Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, not repugnant to the Constitution, for the good and welfare of the people. This power to prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people flows from the recognition that salus populi est
suprema lex the welfare of the people is the supreme law.
While police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may be delegated, as it is in fact increasingly being delegated. By
virtue of a valid delegation, the power may be exercised by the President and administrative boards as well as by the lawmaking
bodies of municipal corporations or local governments under an express delegation by the Local Government Code of 1991.
The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project notwithstanding, the designation of the MMDA as the
implementing agency for the Project is ultra vires, there being no legal basis therefor.

In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project as
envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows that the
MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents terminals.
3.

No. It was not a valid exercise of police power

Its exercise of such power does not satisfy the two tests of a valid police power measure, viz: (1) the interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Stated differently, the police power legislation must be
firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes and the means.
Cited jurisprudence:
Calalang v. Williams: traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private, concern. Public welfare is affected by rules and regulations
to regulate and control traffic on national roads.
Luque v. Villegas: public welfare lies at the bottom of any regulatory measure designed "to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to
say the least, a menace to public safety." Rregulation of vehicular traffic present a proper subject for the exercise of police power.
Although the purpose of the EO is public welfare in general, its implementation would compel common carriers along major roads in
MM to close down their terminals and instead use MMDA designated parking areas.
Lucena Ruling: ordinances passed by City of Lucena directing common loading and unloading area to Grand Central Terminal, thus
an exclusive franchise for a single terminal and declaring all other terminals inoperable. Ordinances were challenged for their
constitutionality that the measures constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation
of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies. Court found out that the compulsory use of the Lucena Grand Terminal was
unduly oppressive because it would subject its users to fees, rentals and charges. It further ruled that the denying operation to other
terminals is not an answer to the traffic problem.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the
framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. A due deference to the rights of the individual thus
requires a more careful formulation of solutions to societal problems.
As in Lucena, this Court fails to see how the prohibition against the existence of respondents terminals can be considered a reasonable
necessity to ease traffic congestion in the metropolis. On the contrary, the elimination of respondents bus terminals brings forth the
distinct possibility and the equally harrowing reality of traffic congestion in the common parking areas, a case of transference from
one site to another.
*As to the alleged confiscatory character of the E.O., it need only to be stated that respondents certificates of public convenience
confer no property right, and are mere licenses or privileges. As such, these must yield to legislation safeguarding the interest of the
people. Even then, for reasons which bear reiteration, the MMDA cannot order the closure of respondents terminals not only because
no authority to implement the Project has been granted nor legislative or police power been delegated to it, but also because the
elimination of the terminals does not satisfy the standards of a valid police power measure.
4.

Closure of respondents terminals is not in line with the provisions of the Public Service Act.

Paragraph (a), Section 13 of Chapter II of the Public Service Act (now Section 5 of Executive Order No. 202, creating the Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board or LFTRB) vested the Public Service Commission (PSC, now the LTFRB) with "x x
x jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public services and their franchises, equipment and other properties x x x."
The establishment, as well as the maintenance of vehicle parking areas or passenger terminals, is generally considered a necessary
service to be provided by provincial bus operators like respondents, hence, the investments they have poured into the acquisition or
lease of suitable terminal sites. Eliminating the terminals would thus run counter to the provisions of the Public Service Act.
This Court commiserates with the MMDA for the roadblocks thrown in the way of its efforts at solving the pestering problem of
traffic congestion in Metro Manila. These efforts are commendable, to say the least, in the face of the abominable traffic situation of
our roads day in and day out. This Court can only interpret, not change, the law, however. It needs only to be reiterated that it is the
DOTC as the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote,

develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications which has the power to establish and administer a
transportation project like the Project subject of the case at bar.
No matter how noble the intentions of the MMDA may be then, any plan, strategy or project which it is not authorized to
implement cannot pass muster.

COURT RULING: Petition is DENIED. E.O. No. 179 is declared NULL and VOID for being ultra vires.

B. Tests of the Police Power

1. Hon. Fernando vs. St. Scholasticas College, March 12, 2013

TOPIC: Tests of the Police Power

CASE: HON. FERNANDO VS. ST. SCHOLASTICAS COLLEGE (March 12, 2013 / G.R. No. 161107)
PARTIES:
Petitioners: HON. MA. LOURDES C. FERNANDO, in her capacity as City Mayor of Marikina City,
JOSEPHINE C. EVANGELIST A, in her capacity as Chief, Permit Division, Office of the City Engineer,
and ALFONSO ESPIRITU, in his capacity as City Engineer of Marikina City
Respondents: ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE and ST. SCHOLASTICA'S ACADEMY -MARIKINA, INC.,
Ponente: Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

The Facts
Respondents St. Scholasticas College (SSC) and St. Scholasticas Academy-Marikina, Inc. (SSA-Marikina) are
educational institutions organized under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, with principal offices and
business addresses at Leon Guinto Street, Malate, Manila, and at West Drive, Marikina Heights, Marikina City,
respectively.
Respondent SSC is the owner of four (4) parcels of land measuring a total of 56,306.80 square meters, located in
Marikina Heights and covered by Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. 91537. Located within the property are SSAMarikina, the residence of the sisters of the Benedictine Order, the formation house of the novices, and the
retirement house for the elderly sisters. The property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence built some thirty
(30) years ago. Abutting the fence along the West Drive are buildings, facilities, and other improvements.
The petitioners are the officials of the City Government of Marikina. On September 30, 1994, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Marikina City enacted Ordinance No. 192, entitled Regulating the Construction of Fences and Walls
in the Municipality of Marikina. In 1995 and 1998, Ordinance Nos. 2175 and 2006 were enacted to amend Sections
7 and 5, respectively.
Section 3.1 and 5 of the assailed ordinance are pertinent to the issue at hand, to wit:
Section 3. The standard height of fences of walls allowed under this ordinance are as follows:
(1) Fences on the front yard shall be no more than one (1) meter in height. Fences in
excess of one (1) meter shall be an open fence type, at least eighty percent (80%) see-thru;
xxxxxxxxx

Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the five (5) meter parking area allowance
located between the front monument line and the building line of commercial and industrial
establishments and educational and religious institutions.
On April 2, 2000, the City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to demolish and
replace the fence of their Marikina property to make it 80% see-thru, and, at the same time, to move it back about
six (6) meters to provide parking space for vehicles to park.9 On April 26, 2000, the respondents requested for an
extension of time to comply with the directive.10 In response, the petitioners, through then City Mayor Bayani F.
Fernando, insisted on the enforcement of the subject ordinance.
Not in conformity, the respondents filed a petition for prohibition with an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court, Marikina, Branch 273 (RTC),
docketed as SCA Case No. 2000-381-MK.11 .

The respondents argued

that the petitioners were acting in excess of jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance No. 192, asserting that such
contravenes Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
The respondents, thus, asserted that the implementation of the ordinance on their property would be
tantamount to an appropriation of property without due process of law; and that the petitioners could only
appropriate a portion of their property through eminent domain.

The petitioners, on the other hand, countered

the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power, by virtue of which, they could restrain property rights for
the protection of public safety, health, morals, or the promotion of public convenience and general prosperity.
The petitioners argue that while Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 may be invalid, Section 3.1 limiting the
height of fences to one meter and requiring fences in excess of one meter to be at least 80% see-thru,
should remain valid and enforceable against the respondents.
Ordinance No. 192 is a curative statute as it aims to correct or cure a defect in the National Building Code,
namely, its failure to provide for adequate guidelines for the construction of fences. They ultimately seek to
remedy an insufficiency in the law.

ISSUES
1. WON (a) Sections 3.1 and (b) 5 of ORDINANCE NO. 192 ARE VALID EXERCISES OF POLICE POWER BY THE
CITY GOVERNMENT OF MARIKINA;
2. WON THE ABOVE-MENTIONED ORDINANCE CANNOT BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE APPLICATION

RULING OF THE COURT

1. (a) Section 3.1 of Ordinance No. 192 is invalid and cannot be enforced against the respondents.
Compelling the respondents to construct their fence in accordance with the assailed ordinance is, thus, a clear
encroachment on their right to property, which necessarily includes their right to decide how best to protect their
property. It also appears that requiring the exposure of their property via a see- thru fence is violative of their right
to privacy, considering that the residence of the Benedictine nuns is also located within the property. The
enforcement of Section 3.1 would, therefore, result in an undue interference with the respondents rights to
property and privacy.

For Section 3.1 to pass the rational relationship test, the petitioners must show the reasonable relation between the purpose of
the police power measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public
interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

(b) Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 is invalid. Regarding the beautification purpose of the setback requirement, it
has long been settled that the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of
the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance of the
community. The Court is of the view that the implementation of the setback requirement would be tantamount to a
taking of a total of 3,762.36 square meters of the respondents private property for public use without just
compensation, in contravention to the Constitution. The Court, thus, finds Section 5 to be unreasonable and
oppressive as it will substantially divest the respondents of the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic
purposes.

2. The petitioners argument that Ordinance No. 192 was a remedial or curative statute is untenable. It ruled
that the assailed ordinance was neither remedial nor curative in nature, considering that at the time the respondents
perimeter wall was built, the same was valid and legal, and the ordinance did not refer to any previous legislation
that it sought to correct. The petitioners fail to point out any irregular or invalid provisions of the National
Building Code that required correction or cure. As such, the assailed ordinance cannot qualify as curative
and retroactive in nature. It noted that any correction in the Code should be properly undertaken by the Congress
and not by the City Council of Marikina through an ordinance.

Separability
Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192, as amended, are, thus, invalid and cannot be enforced against the
respondents. Nonetheless, "the general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the
Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if susceptible to being separated from the invalid,
may stand and be enforced."42 Thus, the other sections of the assailed ordinance remain valid and
enforceable.
Conclusion
Considering the invalidity of Sections 3.1 and 5, it is clear that the petitioners were acting in excess of their
jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance No. 192 against the respondents. The CA was correct in affirming the
decision of the RTC in issuing the writ of prohibition. The petitioners must permanently desist from enforcing
Sections 3.1 and 5 of the assailed ordinance on the respondents' property in Marikina City.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

NOTES
Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.
The State, through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of police power to LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS,
as agencies of the State. This delegation of police power is embodied in Section 1622 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), known as the General Welfare Clause, which has two branches.
1. General legislative power- authorizes the municipal council to enact ordinances and make regulations
not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred upon the municipal council by law.

2. Police power proper- authorizes the municipality to enact ordinances as may be necessary and proper
for the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the
municipality and its inhabitants, and for the protection of their property.
White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, discusses the test of a valid ordinance:
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to
enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following SUBSTANTIVE
REQUIREMENTS:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of an ordinance and to free it
from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, TWO TESTS have been used by the Court
1. rational relationship test - is often applied mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges. Using the
rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental
interest.
2. strict scrutiny test - the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental
interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.
Even without going to a discussion of the strict scrutiny test, Ordinance No. 192, series of 1994 must be struck down
for not being reasonably necessary to accomplish the Citys purpose. More importantly, it is oppressive of private
rights.

Under the rational relationship test, an ordinance must pass the following requisites as discussed in Social
Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr.:
(1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise; and
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.
LACKING A CONCURRENCE OF THESE TWO REQUISITES, THE POLICE POWER MEASURE SHALL BE
STRUCK DOWN AS AN ARBITRARY INTRUSION INTO PRIVATE RIGHTS AND A VIOLATION OF THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE.

The right to privacy has long been considered a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution that must be
protected from intrusion or constraint. The right to privacy is essentially the right to be let alone,37 as governmental
powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of its citizens.38 It is inherent in the concept of
liberty, enshrined in the Bill of Rights (Article III) in Sections 1, 2, 3(1), 6, 8, and 17, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.

Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which would otherwise
be void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements. They are intended to supply defects, abridge
superfluities and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable persons to carry into effect that which they have

designed or intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by reason of some statutory disability or
irregularity in their own action. They make valid that which, before the enactment of the statute was invalid. Their
purpose is to give validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have
been complied with. Curative statutes, therefore, by their very essence, are retroactive.
2. Planters Products, Inc. vs. FERTIPHIL Corporation, March 14, 2008

Planters Products Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation

Subject:
Locus Standi, Direct Injury Test, Transcendental Importance and Far Reaching Implications, Lis Mota,
Police Power, Power of Taxation, Doctrine of Operative Fact
Facts:
PPI and Fertiphil are both engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural
chemicals. Then President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued LOI No. 1465 which
provided : The Administrator of the Fertilizer Pesticide Authority to include in its fertilizer pricing formula a
capital contribution component of not less than P10 per bag. This capital contribution shall be collected until
adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable. Such capital contribution shall be applied by FPA to all domestic
sales of fertilizers in the Philippines.
After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. With the return of
democracy, Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI No. 1465, but PPI refused
to accede to the demand. Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages against FPA and PPI with the
RTC in Makati. It questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being oppressive and an unlawful
imposition that amounted to a denial of due process of law. Fertiphil alleged that the LOI solely favored PPI, a
privately owned corporation, which used the proceeds to maintain its monopoly of the fertilizer industry. In its
Answer, FPA countered that the issuance of LOI No. 1465 was a valid exercise of the police power of the State
in ensuring the stability of the fertilizer industry in the country. It also averred that Fertiphildid not sustain any
damage from the LOI because the burden imposed by the levy fell on the ultimate consumer, not the seller.
Held:
Police power and Power of Taxation
1. Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the State. These powers are distinct and
have different tests for validity.
2. Police power is the power of the State to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property
in order to promote the general welfare, while the Power of taxation is the power to levy taxes to be used for
public purpose.
3. The main purpose of police power is the regulation of a behavior or conduct, while taxation is revenue
generation.
4. The lawful subjects and lawful means tests are used to determine the validity of a law enacted under the
police power. Taxation power is constrained by constitutional limitations.
Levy was an exercise of taxation power
5. The imposition of the P10 levy under LOI No. 1465 was an exercise of taxation power. While it is true that
the power of taxation can be used as an implement of police power, the primary purpose of the levy is revenue
generation. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of the real and substantial
purposes, then the exaction is properly called a tax.
Taxes are exacted only for a public purpose.

6. An inherent limitation on the power of taxation is that it must be exacted only for a public purpose. They
cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons. The power to tax
exists for the general welfare.
7. The term public purpose is not defined. It is an elastic concept that can be hammered to fit modern
standards. Jurisprudence states that public purpose should be given a broad interpretation. It does not only
pertain to those purposes which are traditionally viewed as essentially government functions, such as building
roads and delivery of basic services, but also includes those purposes designed to promote social justice.
Thus, public money may now be used for the relocation of illegal settlers, low-cost housing and urban or
agrarian reform.
8. The P10 levy is unconstitutional because it was not for a public purpose.
First, the levy was imposed in order to raise capital for PPI, a private company.
Second, the imposition of the P10 levy was conditional and dependent upon PPI becoming financially
viable. Third, the levies paid under the LOI were directly remitted and deposited by FPA to the
depositary bank of PPI. Fourth, the levy was used to pay the corporate debts of PPI. The government
guaranteed payment of PPIs debts to its foreigncreditors. To fund the payment, President Marcos
issued LOI No. 1465.
Police Power Lawful Subjects and Lawful Means
9. Even if we consider LOI No. 1695 as enacted under the police power of the State, it would still be invalid for
failing to comply with the test of (1) lawful subject -- the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) lawful means -- the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
10. LOI No. 1695 is invalid because it did not promote public interest. The law was enacted to give undue
advantage to a private corporation.
3. City of Manila vs. Hon. Laguio, Jr., April 12, 2005

CITY OF MANILA vs LAGUIO

PARTIES:
PETITIONERS - CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON. JOSELITO L.
ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, et.al
RESPONDENTS - HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

FACTS:
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of
operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a
motel although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief
with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court impleading as
defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the

City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among
its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said Ordinance is entitled
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN
FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA,
PRESCRIBING
PENALTIES
FOR
VIOLATION
THEREOF,
AND
FOR
OTHER
PURPOSES.
Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favor of respondent).
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were committed by the lower
court in its ruling:
1. It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive
exercise of police power;
2. It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows operators of all kinds of
commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and
3. It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.

RULING:
The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires
and therefore null and void. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
1. must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
2. must not be unfair or oppressive;
3. must not be partial or discriminatory;
4. must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
5. must be general and consistent with public policy; and
6. must not be unreasonable.

The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the City Council acting
as agent of Congress. This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare
clause. The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from
the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations and
is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment
of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
The Classification of Hotels, motels, Hostel, and lodging house are different from sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke
bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls. The Supreme Court said that it is baseless
and insupportable.
The assailed ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property
that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond the regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the
property without just compensation. It is an exercise of police power that is violative of the private property rights of
individuals.
4. Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. vs. Jac Liner Inc., February 23, 2005

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL Inc. vs. Jac Liner Inc., February 23, 2005
Facts: The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which provides, inter alia, that: all buses, mini-buses and outof-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the city and are hereby directed to proceed to
the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their passengers; and (b) all temporary terminals in the
City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of this ordinance. It also provides
that all jeepneys, mini-buses, and buses shall use the grand central terminal of the city. JAC Liner, Inc.
assailed the city ordinance as unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an invalid
exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition
against monopolies.
Issue: Whether or not the ordinance satisfies the requisite of valid exercise of police power, i.e. lawful subject
and lawful means.
Held:
The local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the following
requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment
of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there
must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method
The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of
Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper
exercise of police power is thus present. This leaves for determination the issue of whether the means
employed by the LucenaSangguniangPanlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth.
They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally, since the compulsory
use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such
measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court. What should have been done was to
determine exactly where the problem lies and then to stop it right there.

The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are
exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. It is its
reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law
were measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they happen to be
effective.
5. DECS vs. San Diego, December 21, 1989

Petitioner:

Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), and Director of Center for Educational
Measurement

Respondents: Roberto Rey C. San Diego, and Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, in her Capacity as Presiding
Judge of the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172
Facts:
The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science
in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) three times and
flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of
the rule, that
h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive
failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.
In an amended petition filed with leave of court, the respondent squarely challenged the constitutionality
of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972 for the mentioned rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test. Invoking his constitutional rights to academic
freedom and quality education, due process, and equal protection, the parties agreed that the private respondent
was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition.
After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged order
invalid and granting the petition of the respondent. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner, now
then respondent had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of
the police power.
Issue:
1. Whether the State arbitrarily exercise its police power over the three-flunk rule in the admission test.
Ruling:
The court ruled that the decision of the respondent Judge cannot be sustained and must be reversed.
1. The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right
and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by
incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.

2. There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is
validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In other
words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful
method.
3. The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it
arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately
the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
6. Ynot vs. IAC, March 20, 1987

FACTS
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo
when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of
E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the
recovery of the carabaos.
After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule
on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it
also upheld the ruling of RTC.
In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the constitutionality of the E.O. due to the outright
confiscation without giving the owner the right to heard before an impartial court as guaranteed by due
process. He also challenged the improper exercise of legislative power by the former president under
Amendment 6 of the 1973 constitution wherein Marcos was given emergency powers to issue letters of
instruction that had the force of law.
ISSUE
WON EO 626-A is constitutional and a valid exercise of police power
HELD
No. The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted
the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not
properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a
supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving
him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.
The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in
asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court said that
The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the
questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial
transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere,
with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not

prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them
there
Police
power
as
used
by
the
government
to
justify
E.O.
626-A
- Test: 1. Compelling state interest 2. Lawful method (as used in the case, but this is the same with the fit
between
means
and
objective
test)
- 1 = present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small
farmers
who
rely
on
them
for
energy
needs.
- Failed to comply with #2; there is no reasonable connection between conservation of carabaos (not having
them slaughtered) and the means: non-transportation of carabaos.
C. Comparison with the other Inherent Powers
1. Gerochi vs. DOE, July 17, 2007

ROMEO P. GEROCHI vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE)

G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007
Law in dispute:
RA 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), which sought to impose a
universal charge on all end-users of electricity for the purpose of funding NAPOCORs projects (2001).
Petitioner contentions:
The universal charge is a tax which is to be collected from all electric end-users and self-generating entities.
The Universal Charge has the characteristics of a tax and is collected to fund the operations of the NPC.
The power to tax is strictly a legislative function and as such, the delegation of said power to any executive
or administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional, giving the same unlimited authority.
The imposition of the universal charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to
taxation without representation for not giving the consumers a chance to be heard and be represented.
Respondents contentions:
The Universal Charge is not a tax because it is levied for a specific regulatory purpose, which is to ensure
the viability of the country's electric power industry, and is, therefore, an exaction in the exercise of the
State's police power.
The said Universal Charge does not possess the essential characteristics of a tax, that its imposition would
redound to the benefit of the electric power industry and not to the public, and that its rate is uniformly levied
on electricity end-users, unlike a tax which is imposed based on the individual taxpayer's ability to pay.
There is undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC since the EPIRA sets forth sufficient determinable
standards which would guide the ERC in the exercise of the powers granted to it.
The imposition of the Universal Charge is not oppressive and confiscatory since it is an exercise of the
police power of the State and it complies with the requirements of due process.
Issues:
1)
Whether or not, the Universal Charge imposed under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is a tax; and
2)
Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC.
Ruling:
1. NO. The assailed universal charge is not a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the States police power.
That public welfare is promoted may be gleaned from Sec. 2 of the EPIRA, which enumerates the policies of
the State regarding electrification invoking particularly its regulatory dimension. Thus, public welfare is surely
promoted.
Moreover, the Special Trust Fund feature of the universal charge reasonably serves and assures the
attainment and perpetuity of the purposes for which the universal charge is imposed (e.g. to ensure the
viability of the countrys electric power industry), further boosting the position that the same is an exaction
primarily in pursuit of the States police objectives.

2. The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is
complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards.
Court: Considering the intent of Congress in enacting the EPIRA and reading the statute in its entirety, it
is plain to see that the law has expanded the jurisdiction of the regulatory body, the ERC in this case, to
enable the latter to implement the reforms sought to be accomplished by the EPIRA.
Justice Reynato S. Puno: The State thru the ERC should be able to exercise its police power with great
flexibility, when the need arises.
DOCTRINE: Taxing power may be used as an implement of police power

NOTES:
Power of Taxation
Principle: Taxes are the lifeblood of the government, and their prompt and certain availability is an imperious need.
Theory: Necessity (without taxes, government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the general welfare and wellbeing of the people.)
Police Power
Principle: The welfare of the people is the supreme law
Distinctions:
If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if
regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax.
2. Commonwealth vs. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush) 53 (1851)

COMMONWEALTH vs CYRUS ALGER

7 Cush. 53, 61 Mass. 53

March, 1851

Law in dispute:
Colony Ordinance of 1647 which stated that owners of waterfront property also owned the adjoining land above the
low water mark and within 100 rods of the land, with power to erect wharves and other buildings thereon; subject to
the reasonable use of other individuals and of the public's ability to navigate. Construction was also subject to the
restraints and limitations as the legislature may see fit to impose for the preservation and protection of public and
private rights.
Massachusetts legislature enacted a subsequent statute pursuant to the Colony Ordinance of 1647 which
established lines in the Boston harbor limiting how far out wharves may extend. The said statute stated that if a
wharf extended beyond an established line, then it will be considered a public nuisance; and statutes establishing
such lines take away the right of the proprietors of flats in the harbor beyond the lines to build wharves thereon,
even when they would be no actual injury to navigation; and such statutes, although they provide for no
compensation to such proprietors, are not unconstitutional.
FACTS:
That the defendant was owner of land where built the wharf complained of, on the flats before his said land,
between high and low water mark, and within one hundred rods of his upland, but below the commissioners' line as
fixed by one of these statutes; although it was so built as not to obstruct or impede navigation.
ISSUE: WON the construction of wharf is within the prohibited limit as promulgated in the statute.
HELD:
The act of fixing a line within the harbor of Boston, beyond which no riparian proprietor should erect a wharf or other
permanent structure, although to some extent it prohibited him from building such structure on flats of which he

owned the fee, was constitutional, and one which it was competent for the legislature to make; that it was binding on
the defendant, and rendered him obnoxious to its penalties, if he violated its provisions.
The court's decision demonstrated an expanded interpretation of the new term "police power" with Shaw holding,
"that state authority to enact police regulations includes, but is not limited to, such doctrines as" use your own as
not to injure another's property, "and that the legislature has broad authority to exercise this power."
Justice Shaw reasoned the Massachusetts statute was, "not an appropriation of the property to a public use, but the
restraint of an injurious private use by the owner, and is therefore not within the principle of property taken under the
right of eminent domain." Further, Justice Shaw states that even though these prohibitions and restraints resulting
from the Massachusetts statute may diminish the profits of the owner, the owners are not entitled to compensation
because they are exercises of police power.
"The law challenged in Alger thus legitimately established a point beyond which wharves could not be built, and
Alger's wharf was subject to such regulation even though it was not intrinsically harmful. Whether an erection within
tide water is a nuisance or not, does not depend on the question whether the party erecting it owns the soil or not,
by a grant directly or immediately from the crown, but whether it is injurious to a port or harbor, or injurious to
navigation, and to the common right and liberty of all subjects, and other persons, using the navigation.
The power we allude to is rather the police power, the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to make,
ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties
or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.
Considering, therefore, that all real estate derived from the government is subject to some restraint for the general
good, whether such restraint be regarded as a police regulation on of any other character; considering that seashore estate though held in fee by the riparian proprietor, both on account of the qualified reservation under which
the grant was made, and the peculiar nature and character, position and relations of the estate, and the great public
interests associated with it, is more especially subject to some reasonable restraints, in order that the exercise of full
dominion over it, by the proprietor, may not be noxious to others, and injurious to the public, the court are of opinion
that the legislature has power, by a general law affecting all riparian proprietors on the same line of shore equally
and alike, to make reasonable regulations, declaring the public right, and providing for its preservation by
reasonable restraints, and to enforce these restraints by suitable penalties.
3. Manila Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Secretary of Social Welfare and Development, December 03, 2013

FACTS
On April 23, 1992, RA 7432 was passed into law, granting senior citizens the following privileges: a) the grant
of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to utilization of transportation services, hotels
and similar lodging establishment[s], restaurants and recreation centers and purchase of medicine anywhere in
the country: Provided, That private establishments may claim the cost as tax credit;
b) a minimum of twenty percent (20%) discount on admission fees charged by theaters, cinema houses and
concert halls, circuses, carnivals and other similar places of culture, leisure, and amusement;
c) exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: Provided, That their annual taxable income does
not exceed the property level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for
that year;
d) exemption from training fees for socioeconomic programs undertaken by the OSCA as part of its work;
e) free medical and dental services in government establishment[s] anywhere in the country, subject to
guidelines to be issued by the Department of Health, the Government Service Insurance System and the
Social Security System;

f) to the extent practicable and feasible, the continuance of the same benefits and privileges given by the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Social Security System (SSS) and PAG-IBIG, as the case may
be, as are enjoyed by those in actual service.
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioners emphasize that they are not questioning the 20% discount granted to senior citizens but are
only assailing the constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme prescribed under RA 9257 and the
implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF.
Petitioners posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution,
which provides that: "[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."
In support of their position, petitioners cite Central Luzon Drug Corporation,where it was ruled that the
20% discount privilege constitutes taking of private property for public use which requires the payment of just
compensation,and Carlos Superdrug Corporation v. Department of Social Welfare and Development,where it
was acknowledged that the tax deduction scheme does not meet the definition of just compensation.
Petitioners likewise seek a reversal of the ruling in Carlos Superdrug Corporation that the tax deduction
scheme adopted by the government is justified by police power.
They assert that "[a]lthough both police power and the power of eminent domain have the general
welfare for their object, there are still traditional distinctions between the two"and that "eminent domain cannot
be made less supreme than police power."
Petitioners further claim that the legislature, in amending RA 7432, relied on an erroneous
contemporaneous construction that prior payment of taxes is required for tax credit.
Petitioners also contend that the tax deduction scheme violates Article XV, Section 42 and Article XIII,
Section 11of the Constitution because it shifts the States constitutional mandate or duty of improving the
welfare of the elderly to the private sector.
Under the tax deduction scheme, the private sector shoulders 65% of the discount because only 35%
of it is actually returned by the government.
Consequently, the implementation of the tax deduction scheme prescribed under Section 4 of RA 9257
affects the businesses of petitioners.
Thus, there exists an actual case or controversy of transcendental importance which deserves judicious
disposition on the merits by the highest court of the land.
Respondents Arguments
Respondents, on the other hand, question the filing of the instant Petition directly with the Supreme
Court as this disregards the hierarchy of courts.
They likewise assert that there is no justiciable controversy as petitioners failed to prove that the tax
deduction treatment is not a "fair and full equivalent of the loss sustained" by them.

As to the constitutionality of RA 9257 and its implementing rules and regulations, respondents contend
that petitioners failed to overturn its presumption of constitutionality.
More important, respondents maintain that the tax deduction scheme is a legitimate exercise of the
States police power.
ISSUE
WON SECTION 4 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9257 AND X X X ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS, INSOFAR AS THEY PROVIDE THAT THE TWENTY PERCENT (20%) DISCOUNT TO
SENIOR CITIZENS MAY BE CLAIMED AS A TAX DEDUCTION BY THE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, ARE
INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
HELD
The validity of the 20% senior citizen discount and tax deduction scheme under RA 9257, as an
exercise of police power of the State, has already been settled in Carlos Superdrug Corporation.
Petitioners posit that the resolution of this case lies in the determination of whether the legally mandated 20%
senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power or eminent domain. If it is police power, no just
compensation is warranted. But if it is eminent domain, the tax deduction scheme is unconstitutional because it
is not a peso for peso reimbursement of the 20% discount given to senior citizens. Thus, it constitutes taking of
private property without payment of just compensation. At the outset, we note that this question has been
settled in Carlos Superdrug Corporation.
The 20% discount as well as the tax deduction scheme is a valid exercise of the police power of the
State. Police power versus eminent domain.
Police power is the inherent power of the State to regulate or to restrain the use of liberty and property
for public welfare.
The only limitation is that the restriction imposed should be reasonable, not oppressive.
In other words, to be a valid exercise of police power, it must have a lawful subject or objective and a
lawful method of accomplishing the goal.
Under the police power of the State, "property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government."
The State "may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote
the general welfare [as long as] the interference [is] reasonable and not arbitrary."
Eminent domain, on the other hand, is the inherent power of the State to take or appropriate private property
for public use.
The Constitution, however, requires that private property shall not be taken without due process of law and the
payment of just compensation.
The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at their age, are less likely to be
gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing

basic commodities. It may not be amiss to mention also that the discount serves to honor senior citizens who
presumably spent the productive years of their lives on contributing to the development and progress of the
nation. This distinct cultural Filipino practice of honoring the elderly is an integral part of this law. As to its
nature and effects, the 20% discount is a regulation affecting the ability of private establishments to price their
products and services relative to a special class of individuals, senior citizens, for which the Constitution
affords preferential concern.