+
David Hume,
Liberty and Necessity
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
Section VIII
+
Liberty and
Necessity
intractable dispute: Do we have free
will (liberty), or are choices
causally determined (necessity)?
Hume: Clear definitions of liberty
and necessity needed.
With definitions, dispute dissolves.
+
Introduction
Free will (liberty) and causal determinism (necessity)
The doctrine of liberty
Human beings have free will
The doctrine of necessity
aka, causal determinism
Pierre-Simon Laplace
n
Determinism: all events
causally determined by
antecedent conditions
Laplaces demon: knows laws
of nature and present state of
universe
n Laplace: Demon can predict
all future events.
Is a coin toss determined by
antecedent conditions?
The Clockwork Universe
Section VII, Part II quote (pg. 66 bottom)
Free will and determinism
n
Determinism: future events causally determined past events.
n
Coin tosses?
Compatibilism: Free will and determinism are compatible.
Incompatibilism: Free will and determinism are incompatible.
Compatibilism
Incompatibilism
Determinism
soft determinism
fatalism
Indeterminism
compatibilism
libertarianism
Randomness and freedom
n
Libertarianism: We are free
because determinism is false.
n But how do you know
determinism is false?
Quantum mechanics: 20th
century theory that allows
indeterminacy
Problem 1: Is randomness
freedom?
Problem 2: micro randomness
cancels out at macro level
n Casino example
+ Humes Enquiry,
The definition of necessity
Section VIII, Part I
Defining
determinism
Hume: It is obvious that decisions are
causally determined by antecedent
conditions. (p. 61)
The case for necessity
First argument: human nature
n
Humans share basic character.
n
Most of your actions would be performed by anyone in same
situation.
n
In-class experiment
So, there is a constant conjunction of antecedent conditions and
decisions.
Observer of human nature can predict these actions.
n
So, there is a habitual transition in the mind of an observer
between antecedent conditions and decisions.
+ Which is more likely to stay put in a public
square?
A bag full of money
A feather
Objection to first argument
Human nature doesnt account for everything.
n
People have different characters because of different:
n
n
upbringings and cultures
innate sentiments
In fact, even a single persons character changes throughout
her life.
So, human nature necessitates only certain actions.
The case for necessity
Second argument: peculiar character traits
n
If you know someones peculiar moral character, then their
actions become even more predictable.
n
Example: Humes honest and wealthy friend wont murder him
and steal stuff.
This shows:
n
If you include a deciders peculiar character in the antecedent
conditions, then even more actions are necessitated.
If you know the persons character, youll have a corresponding
habitual transition in your mind.
+ Which is more likely to give way?
The honest prison guard
The thick wall of your cell
Objection to second argument
Some decisions are unpredictable, even if you know
the decider.
n
Some decisions impossible to predict in advance, even
knowing the persons character.
Sometimes a person with an obliging disposition gives a
peevish answer.
n
Hume responds: Theres usually an obvious cause. E.g., he has
the toothache, or has not dined.
So, these actions at least arent necessitated by a persons
character and situation.
A digression about the weather
Questions: Could you have predicted where Hurricane Frances would hit
land? Why not?
The case for necessity
Third argument: a secret structure of parts
n
A coin toss is unpredictable, and so is the weather. But this is
due to the secret and complex arrangement of partsnot
lack of necessity.
When you account for every peculiarity of a persons
character, situation, fleeting motivations, etc., actions are
predictable and uniform.
n
Prediction is still impossible in practice, just like with coin tosses
and weather.
This shows:
n
When everything is accounted for, all actions are constantly
conjoined with antecedent conditions.
Someone who knew all the antecedent conditions would
habitually transition to an idea of the action.
Which is more predictable?
A person deciding what to wear
A tornado deciding on a path
+ Humes Enquiry,
The definition of liberty
Section VIII, Part I
What is meant by liberty?
n
Hypothetical liberty: a power
of acting or not acting,
according to the
determinations of the will; that
is, if we choose to remain at
rest, we may; if we choose to
move, we also may. (p. 63)
Does a prisoner in chains have
hypothetical liberty?
If your actions are causally
determined, do you?
Illustration: argument for
incompatibilism
1.
The laws of nature are not under your control.
2.
The conditions of the universe 1,000 years ago were not
under your control.
3.
If X is causally necessitated by factors outside of your
control, then X is not under your control.
4.
Therefore, if your action was causally determined by the
laws of nature and the conditions of the universe 1,000
years ago, then your action was not under your control.
Compatibilist response: reject
premise 3
n
Prisoner not leaving his cell: necessitated independently of
what he wants.
You not murdering your mother for profit, you not sticking
your hand in a fire: necessitated by affecting what you want.
Did you choose not to want to stab yourself in the eye? Did
you choose not to do it?
+ Humes Enquiry,
Necessity and Responsibility
Section VIII, Part II
Is necessity compatible with moral
responsibility?
n
You are responsible only for
what you can control. (?)
Humes critic: If your actions are
causally determined, then you
cannot control them.
Critic: If determinism is true,
then nobody is responsible.
Humes Response: Responsibility
is compatible with necessity.
n
If necessity is compatible with liberty, then it is compatible
with moral responsibility, too.
n
Drowning child example
Determinism is required for moral responsibility.
n
The more stable a persons disposition towards a bad deed, the
more harshly we judge.
If a persons actions dont reflect his character, then he isnt as
blameworthy.
p. 66 (top)
Is God morally responsible for Ted
Bundys actions?
n
Necessity seems to imply either:
1.
Bundy isnt to blame for his
actions.
2.
God is to blame for Bundys
actions.
Reply to 1: Even if Bundys actions
are part of Gods plan, Bundy
himself is still blameworthy.
Reply to 2: Its so boundless and
ocean of doubt, uncertainty, and
contradiction that it has been
hitherto to exceed all the power of
philosophy.
