NOTES ON THE PALAMITE CONTROVERSY

AND RELATED TOPICS.

PART I
(http://www.romanity.org)
The Greek Orthodox Theological Review
Volume VI, Number 2
Winter, 1960-61
Published by the
Holy Cross Greek Orthodox Theological School Press
Brookline, Massachusetts

John S. Romanides
Note about the name Latin. The Romans gave the name Latin to those Italian tribes who revolted demanding
Roman citizenship. Instead they were given the Latin name in 85 BC. The name Latin had belonged to the
ancient Greek-speaking Latins who had been absorbed into the Roman nation along with the Greek-speaking
Sabines. The Italian Latins of 85 BC were given the Roman name in 212. Finally various Germano-Frankish
tribes took or were given the name Latin. We use the name Franco-Latins for these Germano-Frankish tribes in
order to distinguish them from the Greek speaking and Italian speaking Latins of Roman history.

The occasion of this paper is the recent publication (I) of the book entitled Introduction l Etude de Gregoire
Palamas,1 and (II) of the Greek texts with French translation of St. Gregory Palamas
(Dfense des Saints Hsychastes),2 both by Father John Meyendorff, Professor of Church
History at St. Vladimirs Orthodox Seminary, and Lecturer in Byzantine Theology at Dumbarton Oaks Research
Library. Almost a decade was spent preparing this work for a doctorate. Father John makes an admirable
attempt to describe an extremely important segment of the religious intellectual history of the Byzantine Empire.
The primary purpose of this article is not to describe the contents of these publications, but to discuss the
authors presentation of the Palamite Controversy and theology in relation to Franco-Latin and East Roman
theology generally. The translation of the texts in question will be dealt with only in so far as it reflects the
success or failure of the author to understand the issues at hand. An evaluation of Father Meyendorffs
contribution to the history of Byzantine theology will follow this discussion.
For several years Father Meyendorff has been contending, in various articles, that the debate between St.
Gregory Palamas and Barlaam the Calabrian does not represent a clash between Franco-Latin and East Roman
theology, as has been generally believed, but rather a domestic quarrel between certain Byzantine humanists and
a large segment of Byzantine monastics and their adherents. 3 Meyendorff frequently refers to Barlaam as a
humanist, a Platonist, and a nominalist 4 and seems to think that the Neo-Platonism of the Areopagite is the basis
of his nomilalism.5 He claims that an Occamistic kind of thinking was somehow in the Byzantine atmosphere, 6
and that in the person of Barlaam such thinking represented a kind of naturalistic theology with an overemphasis

1 Vol. III of Patristica Sorbonensia, edited by H. I. Marrou and published by Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1959.
Hereinafter cited as Introduction.
2 Vols. xxx and xxxi of Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense: Etudes et Documents, Louvain, 1959. Hereinafter
cited as Dfense.
3 Les debuts de la controverse hsychaste, in Byzantion, xxiii, 1953. Un mauvais thologien de l unit, in L
Eglise et les Eglises, II, Chevetogne, 1955. Introduction, pp. 74, 282. Humanisme nominaliste et mystique
chrtienne Byzance au xiv sicle, in Nouvelle Revue Thologique, Vol. LXXIX, 1957.
4 Introduction, pp. 67, 70, 84, 85, 173, 195, 201, 205, 212, 216, 221 n. 115, 223, 224, 252, 253, 259, 261, 269,
281, 282, 286, 288, 289, 290, 323, 347, 348, 350, 356, 357.
5 Introduction, pp. 193, 323.
6 Introduction, pp. 173, 175, 323-324. Since Occam is the only nominalist mentioned by Meyendorff, it seems
clear that by nominalism he means Occamistic nominalism.

John S. Romanides

on natural revelation7 and on mans share in the soteriological process. 8 Father John contends that the
controversy revolved around the interpretation of Pseudo-Dionysius, and claims that Palamas applied
correctives to the Neo-Platonism of the Areopagite, with the implication, as it seems, that Barlaam was not far
wrong in his reading of the texts. In accordance with this kind of analysis, Palamas is represented as a thinker
with originality, as opposed to the theology of formal repetition which characterized such persons as
Akindynos and Gregoras.
These and other topics will be dealt with in two parts: (I) the theology of Barlaam, 9 and (II) the theology of St.
Gregory Palamas.
I
Perhaps the most amazing and most revolutionary claim of Father Meyendorff is that Barlaam was both a
nominalist and a Neo-Platonist or Platonist. Until now the histories of philosophy and theology have been
presenting these traditions as mutually exclusive. It was commonly agreed that William of Occam destroyed the
Platonic basis of mediaeval scholasticism by his denial of the objective existence of universals both in the
essence of God and in creation, undercutting thereby the very basis of analogia entis and its natural theology
and law, and preparing the way for an exclusive emphasis on analogia fidei characteristic of a large bulk of the
Protestant tradition. Had Father Meyendorff explained how it is possible for one and the same person to be both
a nominalist and a Platonist he would have revolutionized our knowledge of the intellectual history of Europe.
Unfortunately, he never attempts to do so, and leaves one bewildered with the question of how and why he could
make such an extraordinary (and certainly original) claim.10
That Barlaam was indeed a Christian Platonist and not a nominalist is obvious from a reading of the quotations
from his works to be found in the condemnation of 1341 and in the texts of Palamas translated by Meyendorff.
Barlaam claims that in the divine and creative mind there are logoi of which images () exist within
the human soul.11 Elsewhere he speaks of universals placed by God within the soul from its creation. 12 He also
speaks clearly of an analogical knowledge of the divine ideas or forms ().13 Both the existence
of the uncreated divine ideas in the essence of God reflected in created images, and the analogical method of
arriving at a knowledge of God based on the existence of these ideas and their reflections, are exactly what
William of Occam rejected in favor of an exclusive emphasis on revelation as the proper source of knowledge of
God. In direct contrast to Occam, Barlaam insists on the place of universals in constructing an adequate
theology about God. He claims that knowledge of universals is superior to knowledge of individuals. 14
Although Palamas does not reject natural theology in principle, he firmly attacks the Calabrian on this point by
insisting that the use of universals in the quest for knowledge about God is the very source of Greek
philosophical errors.15 He further claims that any dialectical method derived from such principles is forbidden
by the Fathers in matters concerning God. 16 It is, therefore, very strange that Meyendorff, who published texts
of this debate, can make Barlaam out to be a nominalist and Palamas an Aristotelian on the question of
demonstrative knowledge concerning God.17 Had he said the reverse he would have been closer to the truth.

7 Introduction, pp. 186, 223, 258, 259.

8 Ibid., p.186.
9 For a recent discussion on Barlaams philosophy see G. Shiro,
, Thessalonica, 1959.
10 Prof. P. Christou of the University of Thessalonica, in his article
, in , 1956, admirably develops his reasons why he believes Gregoras and
possibly Barlaam should be considered nominalists. Apart from a bibliographical notice, Meyendorff avoids
any reference to the view of this important article.
11 Dfense, Tr. I, quest. I, pp. 5-7.
12 Dfense, Tr. II, 1, 27, p. 279.
13 Within a text condemned by the Council of 1341. J. Karmiris, Dogmatic and Symbolic Monuments, Athens,
1952, p. 302.
14 Dfense, Tr. II, 3, 34, p. 445.
15 Text edited by Meyendorff, La premire lettre de Palamas Akindynos, in , Vol. , Athens,
1955, p. 85. See also First letter of Palamas to Barlaam ed. G. Papamichael, in ,
Vol. XIII, 1914, pp. 249 ff.
16 Ibid.
17 Introduction, p. 174. We will return to this important question in Part II.

John S. Romanides

At least in their common rejection of a knowledge of God based on a Platonic intuition of static divine ideas or
universals, there is much more similarity between Occam and Palamas than between Occam and Barlaam. In
the common refusal of Occam and Palamas to identify any universal ideas with the essence of God, the intent is
partly the same to protect the divine nature from all forms of determinism. Both agree that creatures are not
copies of uncreated universal ideas, since the latter do not exist, and since for both only individuals are real; nor
are creatures copies of any proper single ideas which are either identical with the divine essence or different
from the will of God. The fundamental difference between Occam and Palamas is that Occam identifies the
divine will with the divine essence, and simply rejects the very existence of uncreated ideas; whereas Palamas
goes a step further than the Scotistic formal distinction and makes the patristic real distinction between the
essence and attributes or energies of God, insisting on the volitional and formless character of the uncreated
energies by calling them (an obvious attack on Plato), , and .
In this connection, Meyendorff has neglected to mention that Palamas further rejects the existence of uncreated
universal ideas by insisting that each creature, and not each species or genus, has its corresponding uncreated,
divine energy or will.18 Another important difference is that Occam follows the common Western principle of
not generally admitting a prophetic knowledge of God, in this life, to be in terms of an immediate vision of
anything uncreated.
A further proof that Barlaam cannot be classified as a nominalist is the fact that he criticizes the Latins and
Thomas Aquinas for identifying all things in God with the divine essence. 19 This criticism, plus Barlaams
rejection of Palamas real distinction between essence and energy in God, means that the Calabrian is most
probably making the Scotistic formal distinction. If he were a nominalist, he would not criticize the Latins for
identifying all things in God with the divine essence, but would take them to task for making even a Thomistic
virtual distinction, since the Occamists refused to make any distinction whatever. That Barlaam is making the
Scotistic formal distinction is strongly indicated by Cardinal Bessarions claim that the Calabrian introduced
Scotistic anti-Thomistic arguments into Byzantine theology. 20 This fact does not mean, however, that Barlaam
was a strict Scotist, since he accepts the doctrine of innate ideas in the human soul another indication that he is
no nominalist.
Meyendorff seems to be under the impression that what he takes to be Barlaams nominalism is due to one-sided
adherence to the principles of Neo-Platonic Areopagite apophaticism. 21 This adherence is presented as the
general philosophical background which Barlaam applied to the Filioque question and by means of which he
concluded that both East Romans and Latins are wrong in believing that they can demonstrate their own
positions.22 However, Father Johns starting point is incorrect.
What Barlaam is actually saying is that there are two ways of arriving at a knowledge of God through
(the philosophical sciences) and through revelation. Both are gifts of God. 23 What it is not given
in the one or the other, transcends the powers of human reason and cannot, therefore, be known, at least
decisively. However, when a truth is given in either the one or the other, then the soul is sufficient for it. 24
Therefore, when given in revelation, even the spiritual things do not transcend human reason
.25 This is not the apophaticism which
Father John reads into the Calabrians thinking.
The Filioque question, for Barlaam, cannot be settled by demonstration, because the arguments of both sides
cannot be deduced from any principle given by God either in philosophy or revelation. Therefore such a
question as the Procession of the Holy Spirit transcends human reason and cannot be demonstrated. If it were
revealed, there would be no need of demonstration, since it would be a first principle, and it would not transcend

18 Dfense, Tr. III, 2, 25, p. 687.

19 Quoted by Meyendorff (La premire lettre de Palamas Akindynos, in , Vol. , Athens,
1954, p. 607) without the realization that this criticism indicates that Aquinas himself is much closer to the
nominalist position than Barlaam could ever be.
20 Ibid., p. 605 n. 1.
21 See note 5 above.
22 Introduction, pp. 67, 173 ff. For a development of approximately the same ideas see G. Shiro, op. cit.
23 Dfense, Tr. II, 1, 27, p. 279; II, 1, 26, p. 277.
24 ,
, , , ,
. Dfense, Tr. II, 1, 26, p. 277.
25 Dfense, Tr. II, 1, 28, . 279.

http://www.romanity.org

human reason. Father John makes the mistake of deducing from Barlaams specific skepticism regarding
demonstrative proof on the question of Filioque a universal skepticism concerning the Knowability of God.26
Barlaams starting-point makes it possible for him to contend that in the patristic tradition there is a third
position on the Filioque question which is not that of the mediaeval Franco-Latins or East Romans. He
maintains that this third position, which puts the issue beyond the reaches of reason and therefore of
demonstrative proof, is the key to union. Barlaams starting-point also explains why Palamas accuses him of
reducing what in Patristic theology are the suprarational experiences of faith to the level of rational inquiry. For
Barlaam, knowledge of God is rational, and only things not known of God are suprarational. For Palamas,
knowledge of God is based on the suprarational experience of the prophets, apostles, and saints; it transcends all
rational knowledge and cannot, therefore, be understood or defined in rational categories, or dealt with
dialectically and syllogistically, taking non-existent universals as a starting-point. These observations indicate
strongly that in the persons of Barlaam and Palamas one is confronted with a real clash between the credo ut
intelligam tradition of the post-Augustinian West and the apophatic theology of the East Roman Fathers. One
cannot doubt the sincerity with which Barlaam believed himself to be Orthodox. Yet this sincerity in no way
proves that upon coming East he left his Franco-Latin presuppositions in the West, or simply came, as Father
John contends, as a non-Latin Byzantine theologian and philosopher.
These preliminary observations raise serious questions concerning Father Meyendorffs success in dealing with
and understanding Barlaams philosophical and theological background certainly a most important key to
understanding not only St. Gregorys reaction to the Calabrian, but also that his friend Akindynos, his enemy
Gregoras, and the Patriarch Calecas. The fact that these three last-mentioned opposed St. Gregorys version of
Orthodox doctrine undoubtedly speaks of a definite division within the Byzantine theological camp; but the fact
that they also at first publicly either opposed or avoided open support of Barlaam especially on the question of
the createdness/uncreatedness of the revealed glory of God is a strong indication that the Italo-Greek from
Calabria did not belong, as Father John thinks, to any well-established theological or philosophical tradition in
Byzantium. This fact explains why he could not easily be defended by those who in substance agreed with him
theologically. Had there been an East Roman tradition in his favor, he would have been openly supported from
the very outset. East Roman philosophers and theologians were not such as to shy away from a good debate.
As it was, it took some time for those who finally agreed with Barlaams theology to speak up and be counted.
The mere fact that much of the debate revolved around the interpretation of Pseudo-Dionysius does not prove
the Byzantine character of Barlaams thought, especially when one realizes the Areopagites place of authority
in the Franco-Latin West. That Barlaam attacks Aquinas is also no proof that the Calabrian is anti-scholastic,
since Thomas was still under strong attack from even non-nominalist quarters. On the contrary, the Calabrians
intimacy with the thought of Aquinas (who had not as yet been translated into Greek), Duns Scotus, and
Augustine (who had been partially translated) points strongly to his being chez lui with Franco-Latin scholastic
categories. The very fact that he went East to study Aristotle further in the original, even though he was already
a master of the Aristotelian Categories and Physics (having studied them in Latin translation), 27 points strongly
in this direction. Father Johns assumption that Barlaam is a Byzantine rather than a Western Platonist and
humanist is only stated and never demonstrated. Perhaps Father John will eventually produce a monograph
demonstrating Barlaams Byzantine humanism by tracing his lineage. Such a work would render a tremendous
service to the current East-West dialogue, since it would prove that certain peculiarities of Franco-Latin
theology have deep roots in the Eastern tradition. That this is the only possible road to making Barlaam out to
be a Byzantine rather than a Latin Platonist and humanist, is necessitated by the fact that he has definite Latin
peculiarities in his theology quite unknown to the Eastern Patristic tradition; and these peculiarities partly
explain why even those in Constantinople who wished to support him found it impossible to do so. Later, when
some did speak out, certain of them did so by insisting that they complied with the Calabrians condemnation,
and that it was Palamas who had betrayed the decisions of 1341.
In the course of this paper it will become clear that Father John was over-impressed by Barlaams anti-Latin
works and did not take seriously the fact that the Calabrian was aiming at a pre-scholastic position especially
on the Filioque question, which he believed was the key to union, and which he heroically maintained in spite of
all opposition until his condemnation and subsequent return to the Franco-Latin Church, where he became a
bishop. On the other hand, it seems never to have occurred to Father John that Barlaam at first shared the

26 G. Shiro ably describes Barlaams syllogistic method at arriving at these conclusions, but makes the same
mistake as Meyendorff in generalizing his Filioque skepticism into a universal principle for all theological
matters. Op. cit., p. 14.
27 G. Shiro, op. cit., p. 8.

John S. Romanides

sentiments of other Latin writers of his time on the question of papal authority vs. the Imperium and Ecumenical
Synods, a question which was not finally settled for almost a century after Barlaams statement on the case.
Perhaps he was not the mauvais thologien that he is made out to be. He may rather have been a good
conciliar Latin who got involved in cross-talk with people whose theology he did not really understand and
who could not comprehend the basic position from which he spoke. Father John never adequately answers the
question why Barlaam came East and then worked for union with the West, especially in view of Barlaams
acting as though the Christians of Byzantium were plunged in ignorance. At first the Calabrian gave the
impression that he came East convinced that the Greek speaking East Romans possessed the true faith; but then
he worked hard and passionately for union by way of compromise. An explanation of these two facts, either in
terms of the traditional Byzantine suspicion that Barlaam was a Latin spy, or in some other terms, is certainly to
be expected in such a study. His failure to explore these facts casts some doubt on the historicity of Father
Johns interpretation of the events he undertakes to describe, and explains his inability to separate Barlaams
teachings from Palamas accusations against, and evaluation of, his position. If one takes Barlaams Latin
theological background seriously, one can see that on certain issues Palamas simply argued past the point,
exactly because he did not fully understand the Calabrians Latin point-of-departure. As we shall see, this last
contention is clearly demonstrated by Palamas initial arguments against Barlaam concerning the uncreatedness
of that glory of God revealed to the patriarchs, prophets, apostles, and saints while they were still on this side of
death.
Following the Augustinian tradition of the West, Barlaam took it for granted and passionately argued that the
glory of God revealed in this life to the patriarchs, prophets, and apostles was a created glory, and that in each
separate case of revelation this glory came into existence and passed out of existence, being of only a short
duration. Having been theologically formed by such works as Augustines De Trinitate,28 the Calabrian knew
quite well that it was not the uncreated Divinity itself which was revealed in the Old and New Testaments, but
temporarily-existing creatures which symbolized divinity, and thereby elevated the minds of those who were the
objects of revelation to various levels of the comprehension of ultimate truth. Only later in his life did St.
Augustine make what became the classical Latin exception of an ecstatic vision of the divine essence in this life
in the cases of Moses and St. Paul. The fact that Barlaam was shocked when he realized that heretics similar to
those fought by Augustine were tolerated by the Byzantine Church, points directly to his Latin formation. It was
quite to be expected that, being ignorant of East Roman Church life, he very confidently accused the monks of
heresy and of having not divine, but satanic, visions and experiences.29
Palamas believed that the Old and New Testament visions of the glory of God were real visions of the uncreated
God, in which visions the body participated; whereas Barlaam excluded not only the body, but also the intellect
itself from any such vision, and claimed that this glory revealed was in each case a creature which only
symbolized divinity. In this view, the whole question of Macarian and Evagrian anthropologies is not so
fundamental to the issues in question as Meyendorff thinks. 30 Allowing, for a moment, this distinction within
the East Roman Patristic tradition, - Which of the Platonising Roman Fathers agrees with Barlaam in denying
the reality of the vision of the uncreated glory of God not only to be body, but to the intellect also? Which of the
Platonising Fathers ever says that there is any such thing as a created glory of God? This writer knows of
none. However, the whole Franco-Latin, post-Augustinian scholastic tradition agrees with Barlaam.
This is the historical setting within which the beginnings of the so-called Palamite Controversy must be studied
and appreciated.. Only when one realizes the zeal with which St. Augustine argued against the Hesychasts of
his own age can one appreciate Barlaams explosion and hysteria on learning about the Byzantine Churchs
toleration of claims to visions of the uncreated glory of God in this life. His passionate self-confidence and zeal
cannot be explained otherwise than in terms of the fact that he was Latin in his formation, and never suspected
that the Eastern Church differed from the Augustinian West on this point. Why did a supposedly humanist

28 For a primitive form of Barlaams views, see Augustines De Trinitate, II, v, 10; vi, 11; viii, 14; ix, 16; x, 17,
18; xiii, 23; xiv, 24; xv, 25, 26; xvi, 26; xvii, 32; xviii, 35; III, pref., 3; iv, 10; x, 21-xi, 22, 24, 26, 27. For
remarks on Barlaams Augustinian Latin background see my article Debate Over Theodore of Mopsuestias
Christology, in Greek Orthodox Theological Review, Vol. V, No. 2, 1959-60, p. 180 ff., especially notes 144 and
145. As is to be expected, Barlaam does not quote St. Augustine on this question, and perhaps this explains
Father Meyendorffs failure to look into a possible connection between the two. After so many years of debate
over the Filioque question a reference to the authority of St. Augustine could not be decisive for the Greeks,
unless supported by the Greek Patristic tradition.
29 Palamas reports that Barlaam changed his former accusation of satanic to natural upon the publication of
his work. Dfense, Tr. II, 1, 3, p. 231. See note 46 below.
30 Introduction, pp. 196 ff. One gets the impression that this distinction is the crux of Meyendorffs approach.

http://www.romanity.org

Barlaam, who was willing to compromise in the Filioque, become so hysterical over claims to visions of the
Uncreated?31 If, as Father John contends, Barlaam was a Pelagianizing Neo-Platonist, why did he go heresyhunting over such a question? Meyendorffs contention that Barlaams dualistic anthropology was the basis of
his objection to the Hesychasts prayer-practices 32 certainly cannot explain the fanaticism and persistence with
which he attacked the monks. Furthermore, it is one thing to say that Barlaams understanding of the bodys
place in salvation was for Palamas no salvation at all, and it is quite another thing to claim that the Calabrian
himself believed the body to be outside the soteriological process. Actually, in view of the Hesychasts
insistence that the body participates by grace in the vision of the uncreated glory of God which for them is an
integral part of the prophetic and apostolic experience, and of the final salvation and deification of the body it
is obvious that most Franco-Latin theologians, and especially those of the highest repute, would have reacted
exactly as Barlaam did, and would have been accused by Palamas of excluding the body from salvation. Thus
one can appreciate the reason why the Calabrian believed with a passion that he was defending, like Augustine
before him, the purity of the Christian faith now plunged in a sea of monastic ignorance. One can understand
his amazement when even the enlightened humanists of Byzantium not only failed at first to comprehend and
appreciate his hysterical insistence on defending what he took to be Christendoms common heritage, but even
lost patience with him and finally abandoned him.
In view of the obvious similarities which have been and will be indicated between Barlaam and the Augustinian
tradition, Father Meyendorffs repeated mention of the alleged Augustinianism of Palamas on certain doctrines
is indeed very strange. As a key to understanding the principles involved in the controversy over the ways to
knowledge about God, Father Meyendorff discusses Palamas understanding of fallen man deprived of grace,
and thus demonstrates how and why Palamas could not accept Barlaams alleged natural way to knowledge
and salvation.33 St. Gregory is pessimistic about mans natural ability to know and to reach God, and this
pessimism is very correctly attributed to his understanding of creatureliness and sin. On this point he is
supposed to be l un des auteurs les plus augustiniens de l Orient chrtien. 34
Actually, Father John is making a basic confusion. Exactly in contrast to Palamas, Augustine is quite optimistic
about mans natural ability to come (intellectually) to a knowledge of God through the study of creatures, and
never abandoned the opinion that the Platonists believed in the Holy Trinity. 35 Augustinian pessimism does not
manifest itself primarily in the realm of mans natural ability (or inability) to know the truth, but rather in the
realm of the human will: Man without grace can know God, but cannot love God, and therefore cannot
overcome pride and be saved. Without grace man cannot even have the initial desire to do the will of God.
However, once captured by irresistible prevenient grace, he is led, if predestined, by habitus and persevering
grace irresistibly. In contrast to this, Palamas is relatively pessimistic on the philosophical level as well as in
regard to mans doing good; but he is not pessimistic in regard to mans desire to do the will of God. Father
John very ably describes Palamas attack on Barlaams philosophical optimism, without, however, appreciating
this optimisms connection with the general Augustinian tradition; and this lack of appreciation is no doubt due
to his failure to notice the Calabrians Augustinian definition of habitus grace and his Latin understanding of the
lumen gloria... Having initially confused philosophical optimism with Pelagian tendencies, Father Johns
oversight is at least partly understandable.
In reconstructing the elements of Barlaams thought from his debate with Palamas, one is at a double
disadvantage. Not merely do we possess for this purpose only those fragments of the Calabrians lost works
quoted by Palamas, but we have them already interpreted by their very selection, since they have been placed
out of their own context into the polemical thought-structure of St. Gregory. In this situation, every single
fragment becomes immensely important, especially isolated phrases which may indicate a whole series of
theological presuppositions perhaps misunderstood or underestimated by the writer who is doing the quoting.
Palamas is primarily interested in pointing out the irreconcilability of Barlaams position with the patristic
tradition, and only guesses at the total position from which the Calabrian speaks. Father Meyendorff correctly
points out that for Palamas all talk of created saving and deifying grace is a denial of graces supernatural
character, since for him the supernatural can only be uncreated.36 One can, therefore, appreciate why Palamas

31 For description of Barlaams frenzy () over claims to vision see Dfense, Tr. II, 3, 58, p. 509.
32 Introduction, pp. 70 ff., 195-222.
33 Introduction, pp. 175 ff.
34 Ibid.
35 Confessions, VII, 9. Compare this to St. John Chrysostom, quoted in J. S. Romanides,
, Athens, 1957, p. 99.
36 Introduction, p. 230.

John S. Romanides

accuses Barlaam of teaching a natural way to salvation. This fact does not mean, however, that grace is really
natural for Barlaam, as Father John thinks, since in the Latin tradition participated supernatural grace is
something created, there being no direct or real participation in the uncreated divine essence.
Another good example of the cross-talk between Palamas and Barlaam is the debate over the created/uncreated
glory of God. Arguing against Barlaams Augustinian position, Palamas goes to much trouble to prove that the
glory revealed to the patriarchs, prophets, apostles, and saint in this life is identical with the eternal light of the
future glory in which the saints will participate. 37 Thus it is not the glory which ceases to exist with each
revelation; it is, rather, the visionary experience had by those who are the objects of revelation which is
temporarily terminated. Palamas takes it for granted that the glory of God in which the saints will participate in
the future age is uncreated. Therefore he thinks that to demonstrate the identity of the glory of God that is
revealed in the Old and New Testaments with the glory of the future age, is automatically to prove this glorys
uncreatedness. But for Barlaam this is no argument at all, because for him there are two glories, the created
lumen gloria of Latin theology by which or in which the elect will see the divine essence, and the uncreated
glory which is the very same divine essence. Palamas quotes Barlaam as having written, the incommunicable
glory of God, being eternal, is none other than the essence of God; but the communicable [glory] is other than
the essence of God, and indeed is not eternal, for the cause of this [glory] is the cause of all things. 38 That
Barlaam is here referring to the Latin created lumen gloria is obvious from his refusal to call that glory which
is revealed to the prophets and apostles a deifying gift, .39 Actually, for Barlaam the
knowledge derived from seeing the Old and New Testament glory of God is inferior to intellection. Being Latin
in his formation, Barlaam could never speak of any deifying or communicable glory or grace in the Old
Testament, or, for that matter, of any deifying glory or grace at any time before the Crucifixion. There can be no
doubt that Barlaam pointed out two glories in order to refute Palamas argument, already mentioned, which was
based on the assumption that the future glory can only be uncreated. This fact is strongly indicated by Palamas
exasperation on realizing that for Barlaam all the energies and powers of God distinct from the divine essence
are created; and it is in trying to show this realization to his readers that he quotes Barlaams statement about
two glories. At this stage Palamas meets the new challenge by proving that the uncreated glory of God is not the
divine essence and is participated in by the elect.
Barlaams teaching concerning the double glory of God is not only a very strong indication of his Latin
provenance, but is also proof that he did not believe in any natural process of salvation at least as far as the
Latin Church was concerned, since without the supernatural gift of the created lumen gloria it is impossible for
the human intellect to see the divine essence. If Barlaam did believe in a natural salvation, there would be no
need of any communicable created glory. That this is his actual position on grace is further indicated by his
definition of ceaseless prayer. Barlaam rejects outright the very idea that a monk should pray uninterruptedly,
and ridicules the claim that during such prayer one may have a vision of the uncreated glory of God, since in
this life God may be experienced only in ecstasy which leaves no room for any discursive thought, even the
short Jesus-prayer. Faced by the need to interpret I Thess. v. 17, the Calabrian came up with the answer that St.
Paul here means the habitus () of prayer: This habitus of prayer is to be able to do, think, and bring to pass
nothing which God does not will. He, therefore, who has this habitus prays incessantly.40 Since Barlaam
defines the term habitus () as grace the other times Palamas quotes him using it, it is quite obvious that the
Calabrian is using the Augustinian definition of irresistible habitus grace for purposes of defining St. Pauls
mind on prayer. This rejection of actual uninterrupted prayer in favor of a ceaseless prayer conceived as a
state-of-grace activism expressed in good works, is typical of post-Augustinian Latin theology. In this passage
Barlaam is not speaking of prayer as a passive state opposed to conscious activity, as Father John thinks. 41
Barlaam is not saying that in this state man can simply do nothing, but that he can do nothing which God does
not will. Actually, Barlaam is going to much trouble to prove that discursive prayer is far from ecstasy, which is
for him the only true form of mystical contemplation. From Barlaams own definition of ecstasy in terms of a
denudation of sense and discursive thought, there could be no question of doing, thinking, and bringing to
pass.

37 Dfense, Tr. I, 3, 43 ff., p. 203 ff.; II, 3, 20:50, p. 429, 489.

38 Dfense, Tr. III, 2, 13, p. 667. This text is quoted by Meyendorff without notice of its possible Latin
derivation. Introduction, p. 283.
39 Dfense, Tr. III, 1, 31, p. 617.
40 Dfense, Tr. II, 1, 30, p. 283.
41 Introduction, p. 204.

http://www.romanity.org

A further proof of Barlaams Latin provenance is his claim that one definition of a contemplative man is a
person who thinks he has visions of the divine essence. 42 He goes to much trouble to explain why such people
believe they see the divine essence, and to interpret the possible alternative experiences they do have, whereby
they actually see created reflections of the uncreated. 43 Palamas ridicules the very idea that a contemplative
could be defined as a man who has any kind of visions of the divine essence. 44 One must bear in mind that
whereas in the Latin West there is a strong mystical tradition which claims visions of the divine essence in this
life (e.g..., the Eckhartians), there is certainly no such tradition in the Patristic and Byzantine literature of the
Orthodox East. The Fathers are emphatic in denying the possibility of any vision of the divine essence not only
in this life but also in the next. The East Roman Fathers deny vision of the divine essence even to angels. This
denial of course means that the Latin notion of beatific vision is rejected outright. 45 It is clear that Barlaam had
in mind certain Western mystics and at first took it for granted that he was faced with a similar tradition among
the Hesychasts, who claimed visions of the uncreated. Here again we are faced with a good example of crosstalk... In arguing against an Eckhartian kind of mysticism, Barlaam thought at first that he was adequately
answering the Hesychasts claims; and, of course, Palamas is amazed at the idea that the Hesychasts claims to
visions of the uncreated glory of God should in any way be distorted into immediate or mediated visions of the
divine essence.
One of the clearest indications of Barlaams Latin theological provenance in his claim that the prophetic visions
by way of symbolic creatures and imaginary visions are inferior to intellection ( ).46 The
vision of the Old and New Testament glory of God being for Barlaam, as for the Latin West generally, a
creature which symbolizes a truth being revealed is inferior to the revelation of truth which comes directly to
the intellect. In view of Barlaams insistence, wherever else he is quoted by Palamas, that there can be no
knowledge of God which does not come through knowledge of creatures, there seems to be here a contradiction.
If all knowledge of God comes through the media of creatures, why is a revelation by means of such creatures
as the glory of God inferior to intellection? If one were to remain faithfull to the basic epistemological principle
set forth by Barlaam, how can there be intellection apart from the senses and the imagination? Either Barlaam is
contadicting his basic epistemological principle of knowledge of God by means of creatures, or else he is
making an exception.
For background material on Barlaams opinions, one may turn to Thomas Aquinas discussion of the Division
of Prophecy in his Summa Theologica, pt. II-ii, q. 174, art. 1-6. In art. 2 he quotes a gloss from the beginning

42 Dfense, Tr. II, 3, 7:12, pp. 399, 409.

43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 It is interesting to note that about the tome Barlaam went to Avignon (1339) on a mission for unity on behalf
of the Emperor, Benedict XII, the Pope who received him, was not very far from issuing his Condemnation of
Armenian Errors, among which was the Greek Patristic teaching that in the next life the saints do not see and
will not see the divine essence, but rather the uncreated glory of God. A study of the bearing this may have on
Barlaams may help in understanding the Calabrians renewed zeal against the
Hesychasts, in spite of the fervent appeals of his friends and Palamas to drop the matter and his promises to do
so.
46 Dfense, Tr. II, 3, 58:59, pp. 509, 511; III, 1, 23 ff., p. 601; III, 3, 2, p. 697. In this last passage Palamas is
attempting to prove that for Barlaam the prophetic visions of the Old Testament are demonic. This attempt can
be understood only in the light of Palamas claim that in the original text shown to him by Barlaam the
Hesychasts religious experiences were described as demonic and the Hesychasts prayer practices as
. Tr. II, 1, 3. On the basis of the original text Palamas wrote his First Triad. Evidently
Palamas was embarrassed upon the circulation of Barlaams work, since not only the caricature of
, was missing, but also the accusation of demonic experiences. Hence his attempt in Tr. III,
3, 2. Palamas is at a loss to explain the change. A clue to Barlaams conduct, however, may be seen in Palamas
claim that in the Calabrians original work there were no references to the prophetic revelations or to the essence
of God. Tr. II, 3, 13, p. 413. At first Barlaam obviously did not associate the Hesychasts tradition with the
prophetic experiences and, therefore, felt free to describe them as demonic. When he was forced, however, by
Palamas and the Hesychasts to make this association, he evidently then realized that he could best argue by
refuting his opponents with what he believed to be the universal teaching of Christendom concerning prophetic
revelations. Hence his shift from caricature to serious theological debate. This explains why he dropped the
term and exchanged the term for that of . That the change in
Barlaams tactics began with his personal contact with Palamas is evident from the fact that St. Gregory already
refers to the Calabrians teaching about the prophetic experience in Tr. !, 3, quest. (pp. 103-105), in spite of the
fact that he informs us that Barlaams original manuscript contained nothing on this topic.

John S. Romanides

of the Psalter which says that the most excellent manner of prophecy is when a man prophesies by the mere
inspiration of the Holy Ghost, apart from any outward assistance of deed, word, vision, or dream. He goes on
to say, it is evident that the manifestation of divine truth by means of the bare contemplation of the truth itself,
is more effective than that which is conveyed under the similitude of corporeal things, for it approaches neare to
the heavenly vision whereby the truth is seen in Gods essence. Hence it follows that the prophecy whereby a
supernatural truth is seen by intellectual vision, is more excellent than that in which a supernatural truth is
manifested by means of the similitudes of corporeal things in the vision of the imagination. It is obvious that
Barlaam holds similar opinions concerning prophecy and revelation. Father John is therefore wrong in accusing
Barlaam of teaching natural revelation to the detriment of a supernatural knowledge of God. 47 The very fact that
Barlaam accepts revelation by means of momentarily-existing creatures, such as the Old and New Testament
glory of God, should itself have convinced Meyendorff of this point. That Barlaam believes revelation by
intellection to be superior to that be means of creatures and imagination is proof (I) the high Latin regard he has
for revelation through means transcending the order of those natural laws he and other Latins set concerning the
knowledge of God, and (II) his Latin theology.
In view of Father Johns articles on the Filioque, one would take it for granted that he has studied St.
Augustines De Trinitate and is, therefore, familiar with the first four books, which devote so much space to a
refutation of what seems clearly to be a IVth-Vth century hesychast tradition in North Africa. 48 Yet Father
Meyendorff avoids discussing any possible connection between Barlaam and the Augustinian Latin tradition on
this point. Instead he goes to much trouble to invent a special Byzantine Areopagite tradition in which to place
Barlaam. However, to trace Barlaams symbolism to St. Dionysious the Areopagite by way of a Byzantine
interpretive tradition is not a matter of simply comparing the two. One must prove that Barlaams interpretation
of Dionysius is similar in nature to that of other theologians of the Roman East, beginning from the age of the
Areopagite himself, and ending before Franco-Latin influences began penetrating certain Byzantine circles. The
question is not, as Father John thinks, to determine what one thinks the Areopagite is realy saying, and then to
compare this interpretation to Barlaams. What one imagines to be the real teaching of the Areopagite is not
important in this case. What is alone important here is to find out whether there actually is in the East an
interpretive tradition in regard to the Areopagite which is essentially that of Barlaam. Besides not doing so,
Father John dismisses with a wave of the hand the possibility that Barlaams interpretation of the Areopagite is
essentially conditioned by Latin presuppositions. Also he never once asks what influence Augustine himself
may have had on certain Byzantine cirles, especially after the translation into Greek of part of his De Trinitate
by Maximus Planudes in the second half of the XIIIth century. In view of these definite possibilities, it is
impossible simply to quote Barlaamite principles concerning revelation by means of created symbols from
Akindynos and Gregoras, and take it for granted that they represent an old and well-established Byzantine
school of thought, based on formal repetition or stemming from an Evagrian Platonic or some such tradition.
Father John makes much ado about the Platonic symbolism of Pseudo-Dionysius as represented within a
Byzantine tradition as the key to Barlaams nominalistic thought, 49 and thus makes a fundamental mistake
similar to that concerning the Evagrian and Macarian antropologies and their importance to the controversy in
question. At this point one may ask again: Is there an Eastern patristic tradition which interprets Dionysius as
saying (or which simply claims, as Barlaam does) that the glory of God revealed in the Old and New
Testastaments is created and merely symbolizes the uncreated divinity? And that vision of this glory is inferior
to revelation by intellection? Or that in the future age there are two glories, one created and communicable and
the other uncreated and incommunicable? Or that in Old Testament revelations, angels symbolized divinity? Or
that divine grace is a created ? Or that this habitus operates irresistibly? Or that a contemplative is one
who somehow has visions of the divine essence? Hypothetically admitting for a moment that the Areopagite
does agree with Barlaam on any of these points, is there any East Roman Father or even East Roman humanist,
before Franco-Latin theological infiltration into the East, who interprets St. Dionysius as the Calabrian does?
After describing Le symbolisme Barlaamite, 50 which in reality is that of Augustine and every last scholastic of
the West, and after quoting passages demonstrating an identity of opinion on this point between Barlaam on the
one hand and Akindynos and Gregoras on the other, Father John expects the reader to appreciate from such
symbolism le danger que faisait courir au christianism byzantin la thologie nominaliste. 51 Then, by claiming

47 See note 7 above.

48 See note 28 above.
49 Introduction, pp. 257 ff.
50 Introduction, pp. 259 ff.
51 Introduction, p. 261.
9

http://www.romanity.org

that this revelation through created symbols reduces the Eucharist to something purement symbolique, 52 he
sees a danger which has never occurred to and has never worried the Latins, since for them there was no
communicable sacramental grace before the Crucifixion, and since for them the light of the Transfiguration has
never been associated with the sacraments. And after describing this revelation by created symbols which
became common to the whole Latin West after Augustine prevailed, Father John concludes, Il s agissait donc
d un mouvement fort semblable a celui que suscita en Occident la pense de Guillaume d Okham et dont lun
des aboutissements fut la rforme protestante. 53 For some reason Father John seems to think that William of
Occam invented the Augustinian explanation of revelation by created symbols such as the Old and New
Testament glory of God, and in his struggle against this Platonic-nominalistic symbolism Palamas would seem
to have saved the Orthodox East from Protestantism. Basing himself on such observations, Father John goes on,
a few pages later, to an amazing conclusion which makes Palamas and the Latin anti-nominalistic Scholastics
defenders of essentially the same truths. Sur beaucoup de points, l enjeu de la controverse que l opposait ses
adversaires tait au fond identique celui qui, depuis le XVI sicle, oppose en Occident Rformateurs et ContreRformateurs. La diffrence ssentielle est quen Orient les dfenseurs du sacramentalisme raliste ignoraient
les catgories philosophiques, hrites de la Scholastique, et n opposaient aux nominalistes que des formules
bibliques et patristiques traditionnelles.54 It seems that for Father John the Orthodox insistence on the
uncreatedness of sacramental sanctifying grace and the Roman insistence on the createdness of infused
sacramental grace are essentially the same, and that both doctrines are of equal value against the general
Protestant position. He comes to this conclusion partly by thinking that the Latin West generally, and
scholasticism particularly, are of one accord with Palamas in rejecting Barlaams and Protestantisms general
denial of the vision of God to the viator. And this denial, according to Father John, reduces the sacraments to
mere symbols. So he would have it that Palamas and the Latin scholastics were struggling against a common
enemy, nominalism, which prepared the way for a future common enemy, Protestantism.
[To be continued]

52 Ibid.
53 Ibid. See also p. 350.
54 Introduction, p. 269.
10