UNISOURCE COMMERCIAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.
JOSEPH CHUNG, KIAT CHUNG and KLETO
CHUNG
G.R. No. 173252
July 17, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). The title contains a memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary easement
which has been carried over from the Original Certificate of Title of Encarnacion S. Sandico.
As Sandicos property was transferred to several owners, the memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary
easement in favor of Francisco M. Hidalgo was consistently annotated at the back of every title covering Sandicos
property until a TCT was issued in petitioners favor. On the other hand, Hidalgos property was eventually
transferred to respondents Joseph Chung, Kiat Chung and Cleto Chung.
Petitioner filed a Petition to Cancel the Encumbrance of Voluntary Easement of Right of Way on the ground that the
dominant estate has an adequate access to a public road which is Matienza Street. The trial court dismissed the
petition on the ground that it is a land registration case. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Thereafter, the trial
court conducted an ocular inspection of the property.
It is therefore found that the dominant estate has an egress to Matienza St. and does not have to use the servient
estate.
In their Answer, respondents countered that the extinguishment of the easement will be of great prejudice to the
locality and that petitioner is guilty of laches since it took petitioner 15 years from acquisition of the property to
file the petition.
In a Decision, the trial court ordered the cancellation of the encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of way in
favor of the dominant estate owned by respondents. It found that the dominant estate has no more use for the
easement since it has another adequate outlet to a public road which is Matienza Street.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court and
dismissed the petition to cancel the encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of way.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not Court of Appeals erred in brushing aside petitioners contention that the easement is personal since the annotation did not
provide that it is binding on the Heirs or Assigns of Sandico.
RULING:
Having made an admission that a voluntary easement of right of way exists in favor of respondents, petitioner
cannot now claim that what exists is a legal easement and that the same should be cancelled since the dominant
estate is not an enclosed estate as it has an adequate access to a public road which is Callejon Matienza Street. As
we have said, the opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory easements,
not voluntary easements like in the case at bar. The fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified as an
easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as a property right, which survives the termination of
the necessity. A voluntary easement of right of way, like any other contract, could be extinguished only by mutual
agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.
Neither can petitioner claim that the easement is personal only to Hidalgo since the annotation merely mentioned
Sandico and Hidalgo without equally binding their heirs or assigns. That the heirs or assigns of the parties were not
mentioned in the annotation does not mean that it is not binding on them. Again, a voluntary easement of right of
way is like any other contract. As such, it is generally effective between the parties, their heirs and assigns, except
in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law. Petitioner cites City of Manila v. Entote in justifying that the easement should
bind only the parties mentioned therein and exclude those not so mentioned. However, that case is inapplicable
since the issue therein was whether the easement was intended not only for the benefit of the owners of the
dominant estate but of the community and the public at large. In interpreting the easement, the Court ruled that
the clause "any and all other persons whomsoever" in the easement embraces only "those who are privy to the
owners of the dominant estate, Lots 1 and 2 Plan Pcs-2672" and excludes "the indiscriminate public from the
enjoyment of the right-of-way easement."
The Court also holds that although the easement does not appear in respondents title over the dominant estate,
the same subsists. It is settled that the registration of the dominant estate under the Torrens system without the
annotation of the voluntary easement in its favor does not extinguish the easement. On the contrary, it is the
registration of the servient estate as free, that is, without the annotation of the voluntary easement, which
extinguishes the easement.
Finally, the mere fact that respondents subdivided the property does not extinguish the easement. Article 618 of
the Civil Code provides that if the dominant estate is divided between two or more persons, each of them may use
the easement in its entirety, without changing the place of its use, or making it more burdensome in any other
way.
