Crime, Law & Social Change (2005) 43: 149173

DOI: 10.1007/s10611-005-1717-8

C Springer

2005

Governance, risk and dataveillance in the war on terror

LOUISE AMOORE and MARIEKE DE GOEDE
University of Durham, UK and University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands;

author for correspondence (e-mail: [email protected])

Abstract. This paper critically analyses the importance of risk management techniques in the
war on terror. From the protection of borders to international financial flows, from airport
security to daily financial transactions, risk assessment is emerging as the most important way
in which terrorist danger is made measurable and manageable. However, we argue that the riskbased approach results in the displacement of risk onto marginal groups, while its effectiveness
in the war on terror remains questionable.

Mathematics provides a whole new set of tools in the war on terror.

(Gordon Woo, Risk Management Solutions, 2004)
Every day we must operate with the knowledge that our enemies are
changing based on how we change. That is why science and technology is
key to winning this new kind of war.
(Tom Ridge, US Secretary of Homeland Security, 2005)

Introduction: Terrorist risk

According to Gordon Woo of the London-based firm Risk Management
Solutions (RMS), mathematical risk assessment models are important policy tools in the war on terror, because they provide an understanding of, for
example, how terrorists select targets as well as the chances. . .of disrupting
a terrorist network. According to Woo, terrorists are being entirely rational in optimizing their own particular objectives. And their extremism, their
absolutism in reaching their goals, actually makes it easier to use these mathematical models. The risk models developed by RMS help allocate security
budgets by identifying vulnerable places and suspicious people. It is in this
sense, according to Woo, that mathematics provides a whole new set of tools
in the war on terror (quoted in Theil, 2004).
This article critically analyses the importance of risk management techniques in the war on terror. From the protection of borders to international
financial flows, from airport security to daily financial transactions, risk assessment is emerging as the most important way in which terrorist danger is made
measurable and manageable. For criminologists, this development is nothing

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new but takes place within a larger shift towards what Mariana Valverde and
Michael Mopas call targeted governance. The new penology, according to
Valverde and Mopas (2004: 240), involves a shifting away from discipline
to risk. Discipline. . .governs individuals individually while simultaneously
forming and normalizing populations. Risk management, by contrast, breaks
the individual up into a set of measurable risk factors (emphasis in original).
The new emphasis on risk in penology combines a neoliberal disappointment
in welfare-state objectives of totalizing transformations with an optimistic
belief in the ability of information and technology to produce a risk-free
society. Targeted governance entails a limited and risk-driven intervention
into society, based upon a dream of a smart, specific, side-effects-free,
information-driven utopia of governance (Valverde and Mopas, 2004: 239).
It should be clear that this paper does not suggest that post-9/11 risk management is entirely new, nor that it operates with full reach and consistency.
For example, there is a rich literature critically examining border policing prior
to 9/11 (for example Bigo, 2002; Doty, 2003; Andreas and Snyder, 2000). In
fact, we have written about the politics of risk management discourses in finance and consulting that were clearly visible before 9/11 (Amoore, 2004; de
Goede, 2005). Moreover, the risk management practices discussed here continue to face substantial bureaucratic and political resistance, and unevenness
of application. However, it is perhaps precisely because of the political resistance to targeted governance that the representation of 9/11 as a radical break
with the past was able to accelerate the risk management programs that predate the attacks. The idea that a radically new threat demands a radically new
response was able to generate political support for controversial data-mining
programmes (OHarrow, 2005). In addition, what is new about contemporary
terrorist risk management, as the article discusses, is its increasing reliance
on technology and computerised data-mining. Inside data-mining technology,
questionable data become hardened facts making critical political analysis
of these practices warranted.
Valverde and Mopas concept of targeted governance, then, is highly pertinent to analysing developments in the war on terror, for two reasons. First, it
offers an understanding of dispersed power, in which the state is not a necessary or logical centre (Larner and Walters, 2004: 4). In the war on terrorism,
it is important to understand how power is exercised through a complex policy constellation including regulatory state bodies, international institutions,
industry self-regulating bodies and private risk assessment firms. This does
not simply entail a shift from public to private authority, but entails more precisely the enduring and even enhanced power of particular state agencies, in
close cooperation with international institutions and private risk assessment
firms.

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Secondly, the concept of targeted governance focuses in some empirical

detail on the acts, tactics and practices of governing (Larner and Walters,
2004: 4). In other words, it becomes important to study the practical and
technical manifestations of targeted governance, and in particular the risk
assessment models designed by Gordon Woo and others. Perhaps the main
aspect of these risk assessment models is what Mike Levi and David Wall
(2004: 200), following Roger Clarke et al. (1994), call dataveillance, or the
proactive surveillance of what effectively become suspect populations, using new technologies to identify risky groups. The war on terror involves
the classification, compilation and analysis of data on, for example, passenger information and financial transactions on an unprecedented scale. These
techniques of governance rely heavily on sophisticated computer technology
and complex mathematical modelling to mine data and single out suspicious
behaviour.
It should not be forgotten that risk management in the war on terror is not
only a technique of governance, but also a profitable industry. As David Lyon
(2003a: 47) has put it, these places of high risk as danger [airports, borders]
are also places of high risk as economic adventure. This article analyses risk
as danger and economic opportunity in two distinct areas of the war on terror:
the policing of the movement of money, and the movement of people.1 In
both cases we are concerned to draw out the consequences of techniques of
dataveillance-driven risk management for vulnerable groups. The first part of
the paper examines the war on terrorist finance, and discusses how the scrutiny
of financial data has become inscribed with a preventative function in the fight
against terrorism.2 We assess the social consequences of the financial fight
against terrorism, that may include financial exclusion, especially of migrant
groups. In the second part we discuss the extension of risk management into
border controls via a focus on the US VISIT programme. We are concerned
with US VISIT as a set of techniques for regulating mobility, in which private
risk experts are authorised to identify and target risky persons. The conclusion
draws together these two areas in order to reflect upon the wider meaning of
risk, governance and dataveillance in the war on terror.

The risk of terrorist financing

In the war on terrorist financing the new risk-based approach that is currently
being developed by governments and international institutions, can be said to
constitute a practice of targeted governance. The war on terrorist financing
includes a bewildering amount of new regulation, directives and best practice guides from a diversity of institutions, including the US Treasury, the

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International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations (UN), and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). What is emerging at the heart of this policy
constellation is a risk-based approach, focused on the collection and analysis
of financial data in order to identify suspicious transactions that may indicate
terrorist behaviour. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCen) of
the US Treasury, for example, collects and analyses suspicious action reports
(SARs) filed by diverse financial institutions which may lead to criminal
prosecution. FinCen has existed since 1990 but its tasks have been significantly expanded under the Patriot Act, and the agency has subsequently pursued around 500 cases. Our approach to regulation is risk-based, declared
FinCens director William J. Fox (2004a) in a recent speech, we believe effective implementation of [anti-money laundering law] must be predicated
upon a financial institutions careful assessment of its own vulnerabilities to
money laundering and other financial crime. . ..It is not a rule-based approach, where the regulator gives the regulated a laundry list to be checked
off.
At the heart of FinCens strategies and policies is the (contestable) conviction that follow-the-money techniques are effective in identifying and comprehending not just the proceeds of crime but also in assessing the intentions of
terrorists, who may need to be apprehended before they commit their crimes.
In other words, money laundering regulation is evolving from a regulatory
tool designed to confiscate criminal money after the act (with a desired deterring effect) to a regulatory tool required to predict and apprehend potential
terrorists. In its preoccupation with risk assessment and prediction, the war
on terrorist finance represents a marked break with earlier regimes of money
laundering regulation, which focused on tracing criminal money associated
with narcotics or political corruption after the crime.3 If undermining crime
and amassing evidence were the objectives of pre-9/11 money laundering
policy, predicting possible terrorist attacks became the objective after 9/11
(Malkin and Elizur, 2002: 64). For example, in a recent Hearing before the
US House of Representatives, Fox (2004b) argued that financial intelligence
is actionable intelligence. It can...lead to effective strategic action that stops
or disrupts the flow of money to terrorist and their networks, which, in turn,
serves to halt or impede terrorist operations (emphasis added).
The risk-based approach to terrorist financing entails the two aspects that
according to Valverde and Mopas are particular to targeted governance. First,
it is designed to reconcile the need for new financial regulation with the
continuing operation of deregulated, neoliberal financial markets. This approach offers common ground to (inter)national public regulators and industry self-regulating bodies. It is designed, in part, to interfere minimally
with existing global capital markets and offers profit opportunities to private

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risk-assessment companies. As David Aufhauser (2003: 301302), Chairman

of the US National Security Council on Terrorist Financing, puts it: The
world economy is a deliberately open and porous one, designed to encourage
the free flow of capital, investment and economic development. To elect rules
that intrude on that dynamic is to hand victory to the enemy. . ..The measures
that we champion in the war on terrorist financing are targeted to visit injury
on the bankers of terror, not the engines of economic growth and prosperity.
Secondly, the risk-based approach shares with targeted governance the utopia
of smart, information-driven, financial risk management. The war on terrorist finance envisions the classification, compilation and analysis of financial
transactions data on an unprecedented scale. Aufhauser (2003: 304) presents
a vision of continuous computerised financial risk assessment capable of interrupting terrorist finance, through the real time production of electronic
commerce to a central storage facility.

Suspicious transactions
It is important to examine, however what precisely is deemed risky and suspicious in the emerging policy constellation that pursues the war on terrorist finance. For example, according to US Treasurys Terrorist Financing Rewards
Program, which offers rewards of up to US$ 5 Million for information leading to the dismantling of any system used to finance a terrorist organization,
suspicious transactions include: account transactions that are inconsistent
with past deposits or withdrawals, transactions involving a high volume of
incoming or outgoing wire transfers and wire transfers by charitable organizations to companies located in countries known to be bank or tax havens.4
This rewards program has distributed posters and flyers with classifications
of suspicious transactions accompanied by images of Osama bin Laden and
the falling World Trade Towers, in order to urge the public to report possible
illegal financial activity. It thus encourages what Lyon (2003a: 59) calls a
culture of suspicion, in which ordinary citizens are called upon as the eyes
and ears of police and intelligence. The Rewards program emphasises foreign wire transfers as a source of suspicion and identifies as illicit sources
welfare and food-stamp fraud, cigarette smuggling, counterfeit merchandise
and alternative remittance systems. But the representation of terrorist money
as a foreign problem, and the enumeration of a host of misdemeanours such
as welfare fraud and counterfeit merchandising under the terrorist banner is
very problematic (also Campbell, 2004).
However, even more significant than the Rewards Programme, because operating with further reach and consistency, is the move towards computerised

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financial data-mining that aims to reduce terrorist danger while presenting a

commercial opportunity. Private data mining companies, including the British
data mining companies Mantas and World-Check, develop software tools to
be used by financial institutions to single out suspicious transactions and
perhaps even more importantly ensure regulatory compliance. This software relies on modelling patterns of normality in order to identify deviations
from the norm. We know the profile of every dairy producer, every butcher,
every teacher, says one software developer for Mantas, and that becomes
important in money laundering as many businesses operate as a front for
money laundering and banks will need to [look] at how that type of business
normally behaves (Mantas, 2003).
The fact that risk-technology is computerised, moreover, is not incidental
to its power but at the heart of it. Unlike the Rewards programme which relies
on public tip-offs, Mantas classifications operate more consistently and more
powerfully by virtue of being institutionalised and computerised. Software,
according to Bowker and Star, is a frozen organisational discourse because
the arguments, decisions, uncertainties and processual nature of decisionmaking are hidden away inside a piece of technology. . ..Thus values, opinions and rhetoric are frozen (quoted in Leyshon and Thrift, 1999: 441). In
other words, all doubts and discussion concerning what constitutes terrorist
financing and how to track it a discussion which is ongoing (see for example
Passas, 2004a,b; Pieth, 2002) is silenced inside Mantass models. Software
installs relatively unchangeable, taken-for-granted protocols in the day-to-day
information practices of organizations, providing unified ways of interpreting
events, influencing the ways in which decisions are made and standardizing
such decisions over time and space, Leyshon and Thrift (1999:453) conclude.

Financial exclusion
In the risk classifications designed to trace terrorist financing, then, certain
suspicious people and suspicious places are identified. It stands out that those
without regular income and expenditure, as well as those who send international wire transfers in small amounts, are considered especially suspect. This
includes, most notably, migrant, students, and the unemployed. Perhaps this is
not odd, given that the September 11 hijackers pretended to be students while
living in the US prior to their attack. However, political criticism must raise the
question whether criminalising large groups at the margins of society can have
a preventative function in the war on terrorist finance. Here, we draw out three
areas of concern where the war on terrorist finance is transforming not just
the international financial architecture, but the everyday life of global finance

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(Langley, 2002). First, the war on terrorist finance is exacerbating financial

exclusion, through more stringent Know-Your-Customer (KYC) regulation
in retail finance. Second, the war on terrorist finance is affecting particularly
hard migrant communities and their possibilities to send remittances. Third,
cash itself is becoming increasingly suspect and an explicit objective of the
war on terrorist finance is the reduction of cash use.
First, there is evidence that increased KYC regulation in retail banking
may exacerbate financial exclusion. KYC, simply, requires banks to hold formal proof of identification and residency of their customers, and may also
include information on the purpose and reason for opening the account;
the anticipated level of activity in the account; and the clients sources of
wealth and income (FSA, 2003: 1011). KYC, clearly, is not a new regulatory directive, but what is new since the 9/11 attacks is its relevance for retail
finance. Before 9/11 money laundering risk was assumed to be associated
with certain transactions thresholds. However, the relatively small amounts
needed by Atta and his accomplices has refocused money laundering control
and terrorist financing measures on the daily life of retail finance. In Britain
for example, the Fighting Crime and Terrorism: We Need Your Help campaign launched in mid-2003, requires high-street banks to step up security
checks not just of new retail customers, but also of existing ones. The campaign leaflets compel banking clients to comply with the new identification
requirements under the banner You can make life harder for terrorists, and
lists the acceptable identification documents, including passport and proof of
residency.5 However, as a critical investigation in The Guardian points out, it
is not uncommon for poorer population groups to have neither passport nor
drivers license, while tenants do not always have proof of residency in the
form of utility or council tax bill. The Guardian concludes: All banks say
they can be flexible on identity requirements. But counter staff are often rigid
in interpreting rules, scared of disciplinary action if they make a mistake
(Levene, 2003: 3). While KYC rules make sense in an institutional setting
that has harboured the money of corrupt dictators like Abacha (Malkin and
Elizur, 2001: 2122) they are questionable in the context of high-street retail
finance.
In developing countries the problems surrounding KYC regulation may
be even more acute, as is demonstrated by a recent report of South Africas
FinMark Trust, which promotes financial inclusion of the poor. New KYC
rules required by Financial Action Task Force (FATF) are very difficult to
implement in a country where one third of the population live in informal
dwellings without formal address whilst up to half of the population lack the
documents to verify their residential address (Bester et al., 2004: ii). Postapartheid South Africa is keen to reintegrate in the international community,

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and regards implementing anti-money laundering regimes as part of this effort.

Moreover, effects of non-compliance can be serious, as Bester et al. (2004:
4) note, and can impact negatively on the economy of a country. However,
KYC regulation leaves South Africas banks in a double bind: either they contravene the law, or they are forced to exclude from banking facilities clients
from relatively poor and mobile constituencies who do not hold the necessary
documents thus contravening national policies which seek to increase financial inclusion. FinMark concludes that the international community needs to
allow a flexible interpretation of rules, particularly for developing countries.
However, South Africa has already come under FAFT criticism for allowing
exemptions to KYC requirements, and the case thus demonstrates the pressure
that countries are under to ensure compliance with new anti-terrorist financing
regulation.
Secondly, the war on terrorist finance is having a profound impact on the
opportunities that migrants have to send remittances. As one of us has argued
elsewhere, hawala, or informal money transfer networks, have received excessive scrutiny in the wake of September 11 for being a conduit for terrorist
financing and have been needlessly criminalised (de Goede, 2003). To be sure,
there is now increasing recognition of the developmental potential of remittances and increasing recognition of the important role that informal money
transfer networks play. Evidence of the positive role of informal transfer networks is growing, and it is pointed out that these offer relatively cheap and
reliable channels for remittances to (rural) areas where Western banks may
not be present (for example, Al-Suhaimi, 2002; Horst and van Hear, 2002;
Maimbo, 2003).
At the same time however, the criminalisation and suppression of informal
money transfer networks continues. The FATFs Eight Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing calls for the regulation and registration of
alternative remittance systems, and the implementation of KYC regulation.6
The Patriot Act, similarly, calls for routine record keeping and reporting
of informal money transfers, including verification of customer identity (US
Department of the Treasury, 2002: 78). These requirements seem reasonable.
But although informal remittance operators in all probability know their clients
on a more personal level than high street banks do, producing the official documents specified under KYC regulation may be problematic, especially, of
course, for undocumented migrants. While informal money transfer networks
have been widely vilified for leaving no paper trail, it is more accurate to
say that they do engage in extensive record keeping and KYC practices, but
in manners that are not recognised by Western regulatory requirements.
Informal remittance networks, moreover, continue to be singled out as
suspect and especially suitable for channelling terrorist money. For example,

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a paper published by the Harvard Law Schools Seminar on International Finance in April 2002 attributes the continuing existence of informal money
transfer networks to the benefits they offer for illicit finance, and links them
to narcotics, trafficking in human beings, terrorism, corruption, and smuggling (Gillespie, 2002: 89). Moreover, the US Treasurys National Money
Laundering Strategy identifies alternative remittance systems as particularly
vulnerable or attractive to terrorist financiers and money launderers (US
Department of the Treasury, 2003: 13).
Criminalisation in policy discourse has very real material effects, and it
is important to note that among the few actual convictions under the Patriot
Act are a number of imprisoned and fined unlicensed money remitters. The
2003 Money Laundering Strategy notes that the United States has succeeded
in disrupting the operations of several illegal money remitters potentially
implicated in terrorist financing (US Department of the Treasury, 2003: 15,
emphasis added). More specifically, FinCens 2002 report to Congress details
a number of cases where informal remittance networks have been prosecuted,
including two cases of unlicensed hawalas sending remittances to East Africa,
and the imprisonment of an unlicensed Boston hawaladar (US Department of
the Treasury, 2002: 30, 36, 38). However, the Patriot Act specifically provides
that a conviction for failure to comply with a state licensing requirement
does not need to require proof that the defendant knew of the state licensing
requirement. This means that hitherto condoned or invisible money remitters
found themselves prosecuted after September 11 for failing to have acquired
licenses of which they may not have known.
My point here is not that informal money remitters are never involved in
criminal activity, but more precisely to question the identification of hawala
as especially suspect and vulnerable to abuse. As Passas (1999: 67) concludes
in his report to the Dutch Ministry of Justice, informal value transfer systems do not represent a money laundering or crime threat in ways different
from conventional banking or other legitimate institutions (see also Passas,
2004a,b). This point is supported by the report of the 9/11 Commission, that
is especially harsh in its condemnation of the actions that the Bush administration took against the large Somali-based money remitter al-Barakaat.
Al-Barakaat was considered suspicious for remitting large amounts of cash
from the US-based Somali Diaspora back to Somalia and was closed down
by the Bush administration in November 2001 at which time Kenneth Dam
of US Treasury claimed to have disrupted millions of dollars destined for
terrorist organisations. However, the 9/11 Commission concludes that despite
unparalleled access and support from the central bank of the United Arab
Emirates, which made available thousands of pages of documents related to
al-Barakaat accounts, they found no evidence linking al-Barakaat to terrorist

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activity, and no evidence that closing the al-Barakaat network hurt al-Qaeda
financially (Roth et al., 2004: 81). The Commission suggests that poor understanding of remittances and prejudice against migrants may underlie the harsh
pursuit of al-Barakaat, because criminal authorities assumed fraud must be
at work when they discovered the amounts of money remitted by the Somali
migrant community of Minneapolis to their home country (Roth et al., 2004:
74). The report further notes the damage done to Somali migrants when their
remittances were frozen and not delivered to the intended recipients.
It is difficult not to conclude that pursuing unlicensed money remitters
offers FinCen an easy target and allows it to report success to Congress, while
its effect on preventing terrorist financing remains dubitable. Meanwhile,
migrants are deprived of relatively cheap and efficient ways of sending money
to their families, and are increasingly dependent on more expensive formal
channels like Western Union.
Thirdly, cash itself is becoming increasingly suspect, and the war on terrorist finance has an explicit goal to reduce the use of cash worldwide. The
objective of reducing cash use is not new, and the FATFs 40 Anti-Money
Laundering Recommendations, published in 1990, include the stipulation
that Countries should. . .encourage. . .the development of modern and secure techniques of money management, including increased use of checks,
payment cards, direct deposit of salary checks, and book entry recording of
securities, as a means to encourage the replacement of cash transfers.7 But the
political significance of reducing cash use increases in the context of dataveillance, as it expands further into the realm of everyday finance. Surveillance
technology in the risk society relies on the proposition that each movement or
transaction. . .leaves a trail of electronic traces, which means that individuals
cannot easily disappear (Levi and Wall, 2004: 206). In other words, money
in electronic form credit cards, account debits, ATM transactions is registered and traceable, and thus police-able. At the heart of the policy pursued in
the name of the war on terrorist finance is what Aufhauser (2003: 301) calls
the electronic footprint of the terrorists: People cannot plant themselves for
years at a time in a foreign land without establishing a footprint of the source
of their funding. . .. At some juncture be it collection, recruitment, training,
transport, housing, planning or execution terrorist financing will intersect
with the recorded financial system (original emphasis).
However, the electronic footprint theory criminalises cash use, and ignores the growth of the informal economy that is not associated with criminal
activity but with neo-liberal regimes of labour flexibility. If a sizeable informal economy was once seen as a sign of underdevelopment, it is now widely
acknowledged that neo-liberal practices of global competition and labour flexibility have caused the growth of the informal economy in the centres of global

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capitalism, and is inextricably connected to the exploitation of migrant labour

(Peterson, 2003: 8586; Sassen, 1991). A recent study on the US economy
estimates that in California around 8 million illegal migrants work in the cash
economy, and that in LA County about 28% of farm workers are paid in cash
(Campbell, 2003). Migrant labour and informal employment are at the core
not the margin of the contemporary global economy, and criminalising
the cash economy implicates migrant labour in money laundering and terrorist financing. The criminal image of filthy lucre obscures the fact that many
(migrant) workers have no choice but to depend on cash transactions in their
daily lives, and that to some, cash can be an anchor of materiality in a world
of invisible wealth (Appadurai, 2000: 643).
There is a fundamental contradiction at the heart of the war on terrorist
finance, then. On the one hand, it is intended to control the risk of terrorist
financing through hardening regulatory regimes such as KYC rules and the
financial exclusion of certain suspect populations. On the other hand, KYC
rules and the closing down of informal money transmitters may force undocumented migrants to turn to cash transfers and increases the informal
economy. In fact, it is possible to argue that the contradictory policies produced by dataveillance underestimate the complexities of the task of cutting
off terrorist financing. As Levi (2003: 118119) concludes: Instead of overly
ambitious global data and pattern estimates. . .it may be better to build up
from the ground more modest analyses of what we can plausibly know about
criminal money management. In addition, it is vital that migrant workers
even undocumented ones are offered cheap and reliable opportunities for
remitting money, and regulatory authorities would do well to require financial
institutions to provide these.

Risk at the Border: US Visit and the Smart Border Alliance

In testimony before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Technology and Procurement in February 2002, a panel of management consultants
and IT specialists argued that what had long been considered business problems were now posing a threat to US national security. In the discourses of
the business world, what is known as the stovepiping of data the isolation
of information in singular and separate systems is being highlighted as a
key risk factor in the war on terror. In this war, suggested the panel, our
enemies are hiding in open and available information (cited in Kestelyn,
2002: 8). In the immediate months following the events of September 11,
the dilemmas of the war on terror were being framed as problems of risk
management or, more specifically, as uncertainties than can be resolved via

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information technologies. As one CEO of a major management consultancy

put it: had information coordination technology been properly in place before September 11, there may have been a different outcome.8 In evidence
put to the House Subcommittee, management consultants and IT specialists
made the case that the preattack activities of the hijackers could have been
made visible to the authorities if they had not been hidden across a diverse
range of databases. Had the databases been integrated and programmed with
alertable suspicious patterns of behaviour, the experts argued, the threat could
have been identified and prevented (cited in Kestelyn, 2002: 8).
As we have seen in the discussion of the theory of the electronic footprint
left by terrorists in the financial system, at the heart of such programmes are
new ways of visualizing and governing deviant populations that juxtapose
and synthesize the risk profiles generated by different tests (Valverde and
Mopas, 2004: 240). The use of technologies to produce and measure such
risk profiles, a mainstay of corporate risk management strategies for over a
decade, has entered the public sphere, bringing with it untold opportunities for
profit in what is already being labelled a homeland security market that has hit
the big time (Stein, 2004: 11). Three years on from the House Subcommittee
hearing, the US Department for Homeland Security (DHS) named the Smart
Border Alliance, headed up by management consultancy Accenture, as the
primary contractor for a $ US 10 billion project, US VISIT.9 The concept of
US VISIT is to restructure and manage immigration systems at all US air,
land and sea ports of entry, rendering the movement of people governable
according to the logics of risk management. As Accenture itself defines the
project:
The end vision for the US VISIT solution is built around the concept of
the virtual border. The virtual border is designed to operate far beyond US
boundaries to help DHS assess the security risks of all US-bound travellers
and prevent potential threats from reaching US borders (Accenture digital
forum, 2004: 1).
Under the US VISIT programme the management of the border ceases to be a
matter purely of geopolitical policing and discipline, in the sense of governing
the entry and exit of peoples across mapped space, and becomes a matter of
biopolitical management (Walters, 2002: 562). That is, the border becomes a
virtual site through which the behaviours and daily practices of populations
can be made amenable to intervention and management. We explore the US
VISIT here as a further example of a bundle of risk management techniques
that are emerging under the rubric of the war on terror. It offers a number of
insights into the conjunction of targeted governance and dataveillance under
the war on terror, but also represents but one small element of a raft of risk

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management practices enabled by the US Patriot Act and making headway

into the policy agendas of other western governments (Lyon, 2003b; Beeson,
2003). In the discussion that follows we will draw out the significance of US
VISIT as: a) a system of risk management based on the social sorting of
legitimate from illegitimate mobile persons; b) a set of dataveillance techniques that link information technology to a biometric anchor in the human
body; and finally c) a programme that actively authorizes private authorities
and individuals to take part in policing the movement and conduct of people
in their everyday lives.

Governing mobilities
Announcing his plans for the US VISIT programme to the European policy
community, US Secretary of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, highlighted the
risks and rewards of living in a globalizing society. As the world community has become more connected through the globalization of technology,
transportation, commerce and communication, he explained, the benefits
of the global economy enjoyed by each of us are available to the terrorists as
well (Department of Homeland Security, 2005: 1). Framed in this way, the
problem becomes one of isolating the legitimate transborder activities of the
global economy, and segregating these from the illegitimate transnationalism
of those who exploit the possibilities of open borders. As we have argued
elsewhere, following Pat OMalley and others, the discursive deployment of
risk is closely allied to the representation of the risks and rewards of globalization (De Goede, 2004; Amoore, 2004; OMalley, 2000). Far from seeking
to minimize or limit the risks of a globalizing society, the new penology of targeted governance rests upon an embracing of risk made possible through the
global integration of information technologies (Baker, 2002). The US VISIT
system deploys just such an embracing risk approach, appearing to hold
out the possibility of reconciling the image of porous international borders
that are open for business, with the need for security at the border (Brisbin,
2004).
Accentures smart border solution to the policing of international mobilities rests upon an electronic information-based system of risk management that engages in the social sorting of people into categories of riskiness (Lyon, 2003b). As the US business press succinctly capture Accentures
task:
Half a billion foreign visitors cross Americas borders, land at her airports,
and dock at her harbors every year. Imagine trying to weed out the criminals

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and terrorists while keeping a track on everyone else as they vacation,

conduct business, enrol in college and try to drop out of sight once
theyve overstayed their visa. (Business Week, 2004a: 32).
The weeding out of criminals and terrorists from legitimate travellers is undertaken through the interfacing and integration of over 20 existing databases.
Among the most significant are: IDENT, an automatic fingerprint identification system storing biometric data on all foreign visitors, immigrants and
asylum seekers; ADIS, storing travellers entry and exit data; APIS, containing passenger manifest information; SEVIS, containing data on all foreign
and exchange students in the US; IBIS, a lookout watch list interfaced with
Interpol and national crime data; CLAIMS 3, holding information on foreign
nationals claiming benefits; and an array of links to local law enforcement,
financial systems and educational records. The integration of these searchable databases allows the authorities to profile and encode people according
to degrees of riskiness.
Accentures plans for computer assisted airline passenger profiling, for
example, reject past systems of risk management that they say can really
only check the single person who is walking out to the plane. By contrast
Accentures system will check your associates. It will ask if you have made
international phone calls to Afghanistan, taken flying lessons, or purchased
1000 pounds of fertilizer (cited in Business Week, 2001: 1). As in the case of
the surveillance of financial patterns of behaviour, the assumption is that encoded risk profiles can be used as a basis to predict future acts and behaviours.
As David Lyon has put it, the coded body or a person who attempts to cross
a national border may find that she is already welcome or already excluded
on the basis of an identity that is established by the codes (Lyon, 2003b: 24).
It is precisely this predetermining and fixing of identities that is of central concern to privacy advocates, civil liberties organizations, and human
rights groups. In April 2004 a coalition of such organizations, including the
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, National Immigration Law
Center, Electronic Privacy Information Center and American Civil Liberties Union, wrote to the Department of Homeland Security expressing their
concern at the enormous potential for error an violation of international human rights standards in the US VISIT system.10 Of particular concern was
the open question of what happens to people who come up as hits on the
various databases and how a false hit can be challenged. As one EPIC
representative put the problem: these technologies are assumed to provide
a complete picture of who someone is leaving people having to dispute
their own identity.11 In these terms the US VISIT system far exceeds Accentures recording of entry and exit of non-US citizens and matching

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of people to their travel documents and visas (Accenture digital forum 2004:
2). Rather, by encoding people with a pre-determined identity and assuming
that high-tech identification process to be indisputable, US VISIT engages in
what has been called the legitimation work of globalization, the everyday
work of issuing and denying documents, sealing and opening records, regulating and criminalizing transactions, and repudiating and claiming countries
and persons (Coutin et al., 2002: 804). The risk management system sold to
the US government, then, is more appropriately described as a risk displacement system. The virtual border envisaged by Smart Border Alliance and the
Department of Homeland Security becomes actual in the lives of migrants
who experience ever greater uncertainty in their lives. De Genovas reading
of the US-Mexico border, for example, describes the border as the exemplary
theatre for staging the spectacle of the illegal alien (2002: 436). US-VISIT
leaves open the possibility of entrance to the US for non-business/ non-global
economy travel, for example by Mexican workers, but with the proviso of the
ongoing surveillance of Accentures virtual border which will come into play
in spheres from money and banking, to medical care, insurance and housing.
The border thus becomes a mobile phenomenon that allows entry to the physical space of the US without offering open entrance to the social, political
and legal space of the US. In a very real sense, the mastery of border risks by
governments and their business and technology partners is undertaken on the
back of the intensification and reallocation of risk onto the most vulnerable
groups.

Biometrics and bodies

The deployment of electronic personal data in order to classify and govern
the movement of people across borders can be captured under the rubric of
dataveillance (Clarke et al., 1994). Yet the US VISIT programme extends the
use of integrated personal data into biometrics, a move that signals what Levi
and Wall have called a new politics of surveillance (2004: 194). The US
Patriot Act introduced a set of practices for the use of biometrics that have
become the technology standard for US VISIT. In effect the US VISIT system
converges integrated databases with biometric identifiers such as electronic
fingerprints, iris scans and facial recognition. Though the actual implementation of biometric identifiers has been beset with problems leading the DHS
to drop the requirement for biometric passports by October 2004, for example
the seductive allure of biometric data in the governance of mobility has
taken a strong hold on public and private authorities (Forbes.com, 2004). The
seduction comes from the human body being seen as an indisputable anchor

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to which data can be safely secured. What Irma van der Ploeg has observed
as a gradually extending intertwinement of individual physical characteristics with information systems (2003: 58), has served to deepen the faith in
data as a means of risk management. In a world of identity politics and risk
management, argues David Lyon, surveillance is turning decisively to the
body as a document for identification, and as a source for prediction (Lyon,
2001: 72).
In the US VISIT programme the use of biometric technologies as a source
of identification and prediction is taking two important turns. The first is
to seek to annex low risk travellers via the use of voluntary systems of
biometric submission. As the Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge
explains:
A fingerprint or iris scan is all that is needed for quick passenger identification and expedited processing through security. Ive enrolled in the
program myself, and I can tell you that it is a great tool that helps move
low risk travellers more efficiently so that resources can be focused elsewhere, where the need is greater (Department of Homeland Security,
2005: 1).
Tom Ridges participation in the US Air Transportation Associations
Registered Traveller project, which uses Unisys technology to link frequent
fliers to a biometric database, suggests that biometrics is being used in a
process of risk pooling (Heimer, 2002), whereby individuals classified in a
similar risk category are grouped together for common treatment in this case
for swift passage through security checks. However, in populations targeted
for higher risk pools the electronic connection of data to bodies is more invasive and the surveillance intensified. Regular commercial travellers across the
MexicoUS border, for example, can submit biometric information in order
to fast-track the security check point. Unlike Mr Ridges frequent traveller
card, however, the smart cards used at the USMexico border may be radio frequency identification enabled (RFID), making them, at least in theory,
trackable within the US.
Such faith in the ability of biometric data to secure identity is playing a
central role in the war on terror at the border. As exemplified by Mike Davis,
director of FBI criminal justice services, when he informed a European conference of technology companies that the only way to trace a terrorist is
through biometrics, reassuring them that we are obtaining DNA from terrorists around the world as we encounter them (cited in The Guardian, June
18, 2004: 17). Leaving aside the question of the somewhat improbable nature
of such a scenario, Mr Daviss belief that the war on terror has come to rely
on biometric technology raises a number of questions. The first concerns

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165

the purposes for which biometric data is collected and deployed. Despite
assurances by the DHS that the US VISIT system will not be in breech of
international privacy laws limiting access to personal data, it seems that biometric data systems are being traded precisely on the grounds that multiple
agencies can have networked access. Western police and intelligence agencies have drawn up plans to share biometric information, such that US VISIT
biometric requirements become a Trojan horse for their introduction elsewhere. As Accenture are keen to point out, the US VISIT contract is a key
win in a climate where other countries on the front line of terrorism are interested in similar programmes (Accenture press release, 2004: 1). Plans
in the UK to link a biometric ID card to US VISIT compliant passports,
for example, suggest that there is a trend towards linking the governance of
international mobility to national systems of biometric identification (Lyon,
2004).
Our second question concerns the representation of biometric technologies
as infallible and unchallengeable verifiers of the truth about a person. The
linking of biometrics to integrated databases not only appears to make the
identification of a person beyond question, but also lends authenticity and
credibility to all of the data that is connected to that identity. Treated as a
scientific, neutral and smart solution to the problem of establishing identity,
biometrics become discrete entities that can be parcelled up, contracted out,
integrated, applied and innovated. Yet, rather than being a secure anchor to
the human body, biometric technology represents an informatization of the
body, part of a process in which technologies are themselves incorporated
into the bodily experience (van der Ploeg, 2003; see also Thrift, 2004). It
is important, then, to challenge and destabilize the apparent security of the
biometrics-body link, to point to the fallibility of technologies, as well as to
the agency that is enacted as technologies tend to take on a life of their own
(Levi and Wall, 2004: 204).

Authority and authorization

In their seminal discussion of the governmentalization of modern societies,
Nikolas Rose and Mariana Valverde conclude that the authority of authority
has been established and defended through alliances between the different
legitimacies conferred by law and expertise (1998: 550). The US VISIT programme is just such a point of alliance between the law (embodied in the
US Patriot Act) and expertise (conferred by the contracts with a range of risk
management experts). On announcing Accentures contract, the Department
of Homeland Security argued that by harnessing the power of the best minds

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in the private sector it is possible to enhance the security of our country while
increasing efficiency at our borders (DHS, 2 June, 2004a). Similarly, Accentures Eric Stange, managing partner of the Homeland Security practice, talks
of the Smart Border Alliance as a strong team of highly qualified companies with significant border management expertise (Accenture press release,
2004: 2). For one of Accentures sub-contractors, Titan Corp., some of this
expertise was acquired through the supply of interrogators and interpreters to
the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.
Nonetheless, US VISIT represents a programme of authorization that actively decentres the state and blurs the boundaries of public and private domains of governance. By virtue of a system that disperses power throughout a network of agencies, the surveillance of migrant illegality (Coutin,
2000) takes a renewed twist that authorizes private authorities and individuals
to engage in the everyday policing of the movement of people. According
to reports of Accentures bid for the US VISIT contract, for example, the
consultants positioned immigrants at he heart of their proposals: Accenture
wowed government officials with a demo that included wireless tags that
tracked immigrants whereabouts (Business Week, 2004b: 74). Given US
VISITs status as a system designed to verify those who have visas (i.e. not
for immigrants), it is this targeting of immigrant groups under the guise of
efficient border management that is provoking widespread concern among
civil liberties groups. As one civil liberties representative explained: since
9/11 the public authorities have turned to the private authorities to design the
architecture of the systems, to make efficient systems.12 The concern is
that the authorization of groups such as the Smart Border Alliance to act to
govern the movement of people has, in effect, depoliticized the US VISIT
system and normalized its practices on the grounds of expertise and technical
know-how.
The extension of border control authority into the private sphere does not
end with private firms, however. As Accentures Eric Stange explained in an
interview following the award of the US VISIT contract, what is needed in
the war on terror is a cultural change, a shift that extends beyond governments and firms, and into individuals perceptions of their own responsibilities
(CIO Insight, 2004). Perhaps an example of such a shift towards a state of
constant vigilance can be found in Town Compass LLC, a Seattle data company, marketing personal products to fight the war on terror. Their Most
Wanted Terrorists database is available as a free download to pocket PCs and
smartphones as part of their Terrorism Survival bundle. As Town Compass
explain: people can have the photos and descriptions at their fingertips at all
times in case they spot a suspicious person, easily comparing the person to
the photo without endangering themselves (cited in Military and Aerospace

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167

Electronics, 2004: 4). Should the vigilant citizen succeed in identifying a

suspicious person, the package comes complete with one-touch dialling to
the FBI and full details of currently available rewards.
The growth of technologies of self-governance has had an important role
to play in the extension of risk management in the war on terror. At the
time of writing the exit technologies for US VISIT are undergoing pilot trials
at selected US airports. Ultimately, however, it will be the responsibility of
travellers to check-out by scanning their passport and their fingerprints at
individual kiosks in departure lounges. Airline passengers are warned during in-flight videos that their exit details are required in order to enable future
entry into the United States. In a similar manner to the technologies that establish credit ratings for individuals, the US VISIT system will, over time, have
risk entry and exit ratings for individuals. Amsterdams Schiphol airport
is already demonstrating future possibilities with its members only Privium programme. Open only to EU-passport holders, $ 145 annual fee and
a biometric submission entitles members to expedited security queues and
linked frequent flier benefits (Fox, 2004). Such programmes have the effect of inculcating a culture of responsible risk taking where the frequent
flier voluntarily engages in the governance of him/herself as well as that of
others.

Conclusions
The central issue in the politics of the risk society, according to Beck (2002:
41) is how to feign control over the uncontrollable (original emphasis). It is
possible to argue that targeted governance in the war on terror is one way in
which control over the uncertainties of globalization is feigned. As illustrated
by Secretary Ridge:
Its truly no coincidence that the threat to the stability and the peace of the
world has coincided with the globalization of technology, commerce, transportation and communication. The same benefits enjoyed by peace-loving,
freedom-loving people across the world are available not to terrorists, as
well. (Department of Homeland Security, 2004b: 2).
Risk management via targeted governance, then, rests upon the representation of two worlds of globalization: one populated by legitimate and civilized groups whose normalised patterns of financial, tourist and business
behaviour are to be secured; and another populated by illegitimate and uncivilized persons whose suspicious patterns of behaviour are to be targeted and
apprehended. In order that the legitimate world of profitable global financial

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transactions and business and leisure travel can remain an alluring and enduring prospect, control over the illicit world of terrorism, trafficking or illegal
immigration must be given credence. As we have argued, the impression
of policing the behaviour in the illegitimate sphere rests upon the categorization and risk pooling of normality and suspicion, as well as problematic
dichotomies between civil and uncivil everyday practices (Amoore and Langley, 2004: 108110).
Yet, as Coutin et al. argue (2002: 803), and as we have illustrated, the
legitimate and illegitimate spaces of globalization are more mutually constituting and interdependent than is normally assumed. In the field of money
laundering and terrorist finance, there is increasing evidence that the upper
worlds and underworlds are more closely linked and difficult to separate
than is assumed in much policy literature (van Duyne et al., 2002). Similarly,
the governmental practices of border control do not simply defend the inside
from the threats outside, but continually produce our sense of the insiders
and outsiders in the global political economy. We have sought here to problematize the techniques and technologies deployed to isolate and segregate the
underworld of outsiders from the upperworld of insiders. In a system where
verification by dataveillance becomes a condition of being, it is precisely the
most subordinate and marginalized groups who will find their identities most
difficult to authenticate. From downtown banking halls to city airport terminals, the techniques of dataveillance will continually inscribe and reinscribe
a manufactured border between the licit and illicit worlds.
Neglecting the mutuality and contingency of the legitimate/illegitimate
worlds of the movement of money and peoples, however, not only serves
to further marginalize the poor but also seriously underplays the extent to
which risk is deployed as a means of governing contemporary society. Of
course, it suits the various players in the homeland security market to talk
up the threats and risks of the covert world. As the US business press note,
terror may be your portfolios security (Business Week Online, 2004: 14).
But, our purpose here has been to challenge the discourse of risk multiplication and intensification that has played such a central role in both the war
on terror and the booming homeland security market. From our perspective, and following a tradition of critical thought on risk, it is not so much
that new risks have come into being, but that society has come to understand itself and its problems in terms of risk management (De Goede, 2004;
Amoore, 2004; Ewald, 1990). Among the implications of this risk-based
means of governing in the war on terror, as we have shown, is the ongoing
displacement and reallocation of risk that cannot be so easily calculated and
controlled.

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Notes
1. Though we focus explicitly on the deployment of risk profiling in the governing of the
movement of money and people, similar processes of classification and social sorting are
at work in the movement of commodities. See, for example, Josiah Heymans study of the
marking out of legitimate commodities at USMexico ports of entry (2001), and Brenda
Chalfins work on surveillance by customs agencies at Ghanaian ports (2004). Indeed, the
surveillance of commodities at key sites such as airports is tightly interwoven with the
classification of legitimate from illegitimate mobilities (Adey, 2004).
2. With the term the War on Terrorist Finance is meant all policy measures and regulatory
guidelines issued by governments, private bodies and international institutions designed
to detect and prevent the financing of terrorism. The war on terrorist finance is an important component of the war on terror, and some of the most important and far-reaching
provisions of the Patriot Act are in the field of financial regulation and prosecution for
money-laundering.
3. The debate about the logic and effectiveness of follow-the-money methods in crime policy
is ongoing, see for example, Levi (2002, 2003), Naylor (1999), and Nelen (2004).
4. Stopping Terrorism Starts with Stopping the Money poster, to be downloaded at:
http://www.ustreas.gov/rewards/.
5. Find the leaflet online at the British Banking Organisations website: http://www.bba.
org.uk/pdf/awareness2.pdf.
6. For the Eight Special Recommendations, see: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/TerFinance en.htm.
7. Recommendation 25, Forty Recommendations, FATF I, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pdf/
40Rec-1990 en.pdf.
8. Full text of the testimony is available at www.house.gov/reform/tapps/hearings.htm.
9. United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology.
10. Full text of the letter is available at www.epic.org/privacy/us-visit/redress letter.pdf.
11. Interview with representative of Electronic Privacy Information Center, Washington, DC,
November 9, 2004.
12. Interview with civil liberties organization, New York, November 7, 2004.

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