Republic of the Philippines Felicidad Lara-Mateo had five children, namely: Laura,

Supreme Court respondent Renato, Cesar, Candido, Jr. and Leonardo.

Manila With the agreement of the entire Lara-Mateo family,
FIRST DIVISION a deed of salecovering the property was executed in
favor of Laura, who, in 1967, applied for land
registration. After the application was granted, Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 6386 was issued in Lauras
CASIMIRO DEVELOPMENT G.R. No. 175485 sole name.
CORPORATION,
Petitioner, Promulgated: In due course, the property now covered by
OCT No. 6386 was used as collateral to secure a
July 27, 2011 succession of loans. The first loan was obtained from
Bacoor Rural Bank (Bacoor Bank). To repay the loan to
Bacoor Bank and secure the release of the mortgage,
- versus - Laura borrowed funds from Parmenas Perez (Perez),
who, however, required that the title be meanwhile
transferred to his name. Thus, OCT No. 6386 was
cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
438959 was issued in the name of Perez.
RENATO L. MATEO, Subsequently, Laura recovered the property by
Respondent. repaying the obligation with the proceeds of another
loan obtained from Rodolfo Pe (Pe), resulting in the
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------
cancellation of TCT No. 438595, and in the issuance of
--------------x
TCT No. S-91595 in Lauras name. She later executed
a deed of sale in favor of Pe, leading to the issuance of
DECISION
TCT No. S-91738 in the name of Pe, who in turn
constituted a mortgage on the property in favor of
BERSAMIN, J.:
China Banking Corporation (China Bank) as security for
a loan. In the end, China Bank foreclosed the
mortgage, and consolidated its ownership of the
The focus of this appeal is the faith that should be
property in 1985 after Pe failed to redeem. Thus, TCT
accorded to the Torrens title that the seller holds at the
No. (99527) T-11749-A was issued in the name of China
time of the sale.
Bank.
In its decision promulgated on August 31,
In 1988, CDC and China Bank negotiated and
2006,[1] the Court of Appeals (CA) declared that the
eventually came to terms on the purchase of the
respondent and his three brothers were the rightful
property, with China Bank executing a deed of
owners of the land in litis, and directed the Office of
conditional sale for the purpose. On March 4, 1993,
the Register of Deeds of Las Pias City to cancel the
CDC and China Bank executed a deed of absolute
transfer certificate of title (TCT) registered under the
sale over the property. Resultantly, on March 29, 1993,
name of petitioner Casimiro Development Corporation
CDC was issued TCT No. T-34640 in its own name.
(CDC) and to issue in its place another TCT in favor of
In the meanwhile, on February 28, 1991, Felicidad died
the respondent and his three brothers. Thereby, the CA
intestate.
reversed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
rendered on May 9, 2000 (dismissing the respondents
On June 6, 1991, CDC brought an action for unlawful
complaint for quieting of title and reconveyance upon a
detainer in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in Las
finding that CDC had been a buyer in good faith of the
Pias City against the respondents siblings, namely:
land in litis and that the respondents suit had already
Cesar, Candido, Jr., and Leonardo, and the other
been time-barred).
occupants of the property. Therein, the defendants
maintained that the MeTC did not have jurisdiction over
Aggrieved, CDC brought its petition for review
the action because the land was classified as
on certiorari.
agricultural; that the jurisdiction belonged to the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
Antecedents
(DARAB); that they had been in continuous and open
possession of the land even before World War II and
The subject of this case is a registered parcel of land
had presumed themselves entitled to a government
(property) with an area of 6,693 square meters, more
grant of the land; and that CDCs title was invalid,
or less, located in Barrio Pulang Lupa, Las Pias City,
considering that the land had been registered before
that was originally owned by Isaias Lara, [2] the
its being declared alienable.[3]
respondents maternal grandfather. Upon the death of
Isaias Lara in 1930, the property passed on to his
children, namely: Miguela, Perfecta and Felicidad, and a
On October 19, 1992, the MeTC ruled in favor
grandson, Rosauro (son of Perfecta who had
of CDC, viz:
predeceased Isaias in 1920). In 1962, the co-heirs
effected the transfer of the full and exclusive
The Court, after careful
ownership to Felicidad (whose married surname was
consideration of the facts and the laws
Lara-Mateo) under an agreement denominated
applicable to this case[,] hereby
as Pagaayos Na Gawa Sa Labas Ng Hukuman.
resolves:
 1. On the issue of jurisdiction. SO ORDERED.[4]

The defendants alleged that the The decision of the MeTC was assailed in the
land in question is an agricultural land RTC via petition for certiorari and prohibition. The RTC
by presenting a Tax Declaration resolved against CDC, and held that the MeTC had
Certificate classifying the land as acted without jurisdiction because the land, being a
FISHPOND. The classification of the fishpond, was agricultural; hence, the dispute was
land in a tax declaration certificate as a within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB pursuant
fishpond merely refers to the use of the to Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian
land in question for the purpose of real Reform Law of 1988).[5]
property taxation. This alone would
not be sufficient to bring the land in CDC appealed to the CA, which, on January 25,
question under the operation of the 1996, found in favor of CDC, declaring that the MeTC
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. had jurisdiction. As a result, the CA reinstated the
decision of the MeTC.[6]
2. On the issue of open and
adverse possession by the defendants. On appeal (G.R. No. 128392), the Court
affirmed the CAs decision in favor of CDC, ruling thusly:
It should be noted that the
subject land is covered by a Transfer WHEREFORE, the petition is
Certificate of Title in the name of DENIED and the Court of Appeals
plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest China Decision and Resolution in CA- G.R. SP
Banking Corporation. Certificates of No. 34039, dated January 25, 1996 and
Title under the Torrens System is February 21, 1997 respectively, are
indefeasible and imprescriptible. As AFFIRMED. No costs.
between two persons claiming
possession, one having a [T]orrens title SO ORDERED.[7]
and the other has none, the former has
a better right. The decision in G.R. No. 128392 became final.

3. On the issue of the nullity of Nonetheless, on June 29, 1994, the respondent
the Certificate of Title. brought an action for quieting of title, reconveyance of
four-fifths of the land, and damages against CDC and
The defense of the defendants Laura in the RTC in Las Pias City entitled Renato L.
that the subject property was a forest Mateo v. Casimiro Development Corporation and Laura
land when the same was originally Mateo de Castro. In paragraph 4 of his complaint, he
registered in 1967 and hence, the stated that he was bringing this action to quiet title on
registration is void[,] is not for this behalf of himself and of his three (3) brothers Cesar,
Court to decide[,] for lack of Leonardo, and Candido, Jr., all surnamed MATEO in his
jurisdiction. The certificate of title over capacity as one of the co-owners of a parcel of land
the property must be respected by this situated at Barrio Pulang Lupa, Municipality of Las Pias,
Court until it has been nullified by a Metro Manila.
competent Court.
On May 9, 2001, the RTC held in favor of CDC,
WHEREFORE, premises disposing:
considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff[,] WHEREFORE, and by strong
ordering the defendants preponderance of evidence, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of the
1. [sic] and all persons claiming defendant Casimiro Development
right[s] under it to vacate the subject Corporation and against the plaintiff
premises located at Pulang Lupa I, Las Renato L. Mateo by (1) Dismissing the
Pias, Metro Manila and surrender the complaint, and upholding the validity
possession of the same to herein and indefeasibility of Transfer
plaintiff; Certificate of Title No. T-34640 in the
name of Casimiro Development
2. to pay the plaintiff reasonable Corporation; (2) Ordering the plaintiff
compensation for the use and Renato Mateo to pay defendant
occupation of the subject premises Casimiro Development Corporation the
hereby fixed at (P100.00) one hundred sum of [a] P200,000.00 as
pesos a month starting November 22, compensatory damages;
1990 (the time when the demand letter [b] P200,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
to vacate was given) until defendants [c] to pay the costs.
actually vacate the property;
SO ORDERED.[8]
No pronouncement as to costs
and attorneys fees.
On appeal (C.A.-G.R. CV No. 71696), the CA (E) xxx in ruling that the Subject
promulgated its decision on August 31, 2006, reversing Property must be reconveyed to
the RTC and declaring CDC to be not a buyer in good respondent because petitioner
faith due to its being charged with notice of the defects Casimiro Development Corporation
and flaws of the title at the time it acquired the is not a purchaser in good faith.
property from China Bank, and decreeing:
CDC argues that it was a buyer in good faith; and that
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated the CA did not rule on matters that fortified its title in
May 9, 2001 of Branch 225, Regional the property, namely: (a) the incontrovertibility of the
Trial Court, Las Pias City in Civil Case title of Laura; (b) the action being barred by laches
No. 94-2045 is and res judicata; and (c) the property having been
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and conveyed to third parties who had then claimed
a new one rendered: adverse title.

(1) Declaring appellant Renato The respondent counters that CDC acquired
Mateo and his brothers and co-owners the property from China Bank in bad faith, because it
Cesar, Candido, Jr., and Leonardo, all had actual knowledge of the possession of the property
surnamed Mateo as well as his sister, by the respondent and his siblings; that CDC did not
Laura Mateo de Castro as the rightful actually accept delivery of the possession of the
owners of the parcel of land, subject of property from China Bank; and that CDC ignored the
this case; and failure of China Bank to warrant its title.

(2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Ruling

Las Pias City, Metro-Manila to cancel Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-34640 under the name We grant the petition.
of appellee Casimiro Development Corporation,
and that a new one be issued in favor of the 1.
appellant and his co-heirs and siblings, Indefeasibility of title in
mentioned above as co-owners pro indiviso of the name of Laura
the said parcel.
As basis for recovering the possession of the property,
(3) No pronouncement as to cost. the respondent has assailed the title of Laura.

SO ORDERED.[9] We cannot sustain the respondent.

The CA denied CDCs motion for There is no doubt that the land in question,
reconsideration. although once a part of the public domain, has already
been placed under the Torrens system of land
Hence, this appeal, in which CDC urges that registration. The Government is required under the
the CA committed serious errors of law,[10] as follows: Torrens system of registration to issue an official
certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person
(A) xxx in failing to rule that the named in the certificate is the owner of the property
decree of registration over the therein described, subject to such liens and
Subject Property is incontrovertible encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law
and no longer open to review or warrants or reserves.[11] The objective is to obviate
attack after the lapse of one (1) possible conflicts of title by giving the public the right
year from entry of such decree of to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and to
registration in favor of Laura Mateo dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring
de Castro. further. The Torrens system gives the registered owner
complete peace of mind, in order that he will be
(B) xxx in failing to rule that the secured in his ownership as long as he has not
present action is likewise barred voluntarily disposed of any right over the covered land.
by res judicata. [12]

(C) xxx in failing to rule that the The Government has adopted the Torrens
instant action for quieting of title system due to its being the most effective measure to
and reconveyance under PD No. guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect
1529 cannot prosper because the their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is
Subject Property had already been established and recognized. If a person purchases a
conveyed and transferred to third piece of land on the assurance that the sellers title
parties who claimed adverse title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told
for themselves. later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all, which
will not only be unfair to him as the purchaser, but will
(D) xxx in failing to rule that the action also erode public confidence in the system and will
of respondent for quieting of title, force land transactions to be attended by complicated
reconveyance and damages is and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof
barred by laches. of ownership. The further consequence will be that land
conflicts can be even more abrasive, if not even
violent. The Government, recognizing the worthy grandfather to that of CDC.
purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to Furthermore, petitioners did not prove,
accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the but relied on mere allegation, that they
conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.[13] indeed had an agreement with their
grandfather to use the land.
Yet, registration under the Torrens system, not
being a mode of acquiring ownership, does not create As for the third element, there is
or vest title.[14] The Torrens certificate of title is merely apparently no consent between the
an evidence of ownership or title in the particular parties. Petitioners were unable to
property described therein.[15] In that sense, the show any proof of consent from CDC to
issuance of the certificate of title to a particular person work the land. For the sake of
does not preclude the possibility that persons not argument, if petitioners were able to
named in the certificate may be co-owners of the real prove that their grandfather owned the
property therein described with the person named land, they nonetheless failed to show
therein, or that the registered owner may be holding any proof of consent from their
the property in trust for another person.[16] grandfather to work the land. Since the
third element was not proven, the
Nonetheless, it is essential that title registered fourth element cannot be present since
under the Torrens system becomes indefeasible and there can be no purpose to a
incontrovertible.[17] relationship to which the parties have
not consented.[18]
The land in question has been covered by a
Torrens certificate of title (OCT No. 6386 in the name of The respondents attack against the title of CDC
Laura, and its derivative certificates) before CDC is likewise anchored on his assertion that the only
became the registered owner by purchase from China purpose for having OCT No. 6386 issued in the sole
Bank. In all that time, neither the respondent nor his name of Laura was for Laura to hold the title in trust for
siblings opposed the transactions causing the various their mother. This assertion cannot stand, however,
transfers. In fact, the respondent admitted in his inasmuch as Lauras title had long ago become
complaint that the registration of the land in the name indefeasible.
of Laura alone had been with the knowledge and upon
the agreement of the entire Lara-Mateo family. It is Moreover, the respondents suit is exposed as
unthinkable, therefore, that the respondent, fully aware being, in reality, a collateral attack on the title in the
of the exclusive registration in her sister Lauras name, name of Laura, and for that reason should not prosper.
allowed more than 20 years to pass before asserting Registration of land under the Torrens System, aside
his claim of ownership for the first time through this from perfecting the title and rendering it indefeasible
case in mid-1994. Making it worse for him is that he did after the lapse of the period allowed by law, also
so only after CDC had commenced the ejectment case renders the title immune from collateral attack. [19] A
against his own siblings. collateral attack occurs when, in another action to
obtain a different relief and as an incident of the
Worthy of mention is that Candido, Jr., present action, an attack is made against the judgment
Leonardo, and Cesars defense in the ejectment case granting the title. This manner of attack is to be
brought by CDC against them was not predicated on a distinguished from a direct attack against a judgment
claim of their ownership of the property, but on their granting the title, through an action whose main
being agricultural lessees or tenants of CDC. Even that objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the
defense was ultimately rejected by this Court by enforcement of such judgment if not yet implemented,
observing in G.R. No. 128392 as follows: or to seek recovery if the property titled under the
With regard to the first element, judgment had been disposed of.[20]
the petitioners have tried to prove that
they are tenants or agricultural lessees 2.
of the respondent corporation, CDC, by CDC was an innocent purchaser for value
showing that the land was originally
owned by their grandfather, Isaias The CA found that CDC acquired the property in bad
Lara, who gave them permission to faith because CDC had knowledge of defects in the title
work the land, and that CDC is merely of China Bank, including the adverse possession of the
a successor-in-interest of their respondents siblings and the supposed failure of China
grandfather. It must be noted that the Bank to warrant its title by inserting an as-is, where-
petitioners failed to adequately prove is clause in its contract of sale with CDC.
their grandfathers ownership of the
land. They merely showed six tax The CA plainly erred in so finding against CDC.
declarations. It has been held by this
Court that, as against a transfer To start with, one who deals with property
certificate of title, tax declarations or registered under the Torrens system need not go
receipts are not adequate proofs of beyond the certificate of title, but only has to rely on
ownership. Granting arguendo that the the certificate of title.[21]He is charged with notice only
land was really owned by the of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the
petitioners grandfather, petitioners did title.[22] The pertinent law on the matter of burdens and
not even attempt to show how the land claims is Section 44 of the Property Registration
went from the patrimony of their Decree,[23] which provides:
 complaint that the respondents own possession was not
Section 44. Statutory liens any different from that of his siblings, there was really
affecting title. Every registered nothing factually or legally speaking that ought to have
owner receiving a certificate of alerted CDC or, for that matter, China Bank and its
title in pursuance of a decree of predecessors-in-interest, about any defect or flaw in the
registration, and every subsequent title.
purchaser of registered land
taking a certificate of title for The vendees notice of a defect or flaw in the title of the
value and in good faith, shall hold vendor, in order for it to amount to bad faith, should
the same free from all encompass facts and circumstances that would impel a
encumbrances except those noted on reasonably cautious person to make further inquiry into
said certificate and any of the following the vendors title,[25] or facts and circumstances that
encumbrances which may be would induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into
subsisting, namely: the status of the title of the property in litigation. [26] In
other words, the presence of anything that excites or
First. Liens, claims or rights arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to
arising or existing under the laws and look beyond the certificate and to investigate the title
Constitution of the Philippines which of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate.
are not by law required to appear of [27]

record in the Registry of Deeds in order

to be valid against subsequent And, secondly, the CA grossly erred in
purchasers or encumbrances of record. construing the as-is, where-is clause contained in
the deed of sale between CDC (as vendee) and China
Second. Unpaid real estate taxes Bank (as vendor) as proof or manifestation of any bad
levied and assessed within two years faith on the part of CDC. On the contrary, the as-is,
immediately preceding the acquisition where-is clause did not affect the title of China Bank
of any right over the land by an because it related only to the physical condition of the
innocent purchaser for value, without property upon its purchase by CDC. The clause only
prejudice to the right of the placed on CDC the burden of having the occupants
government to collect taxes payable removed from the property. In a sale made on an as-is,
before that period from the delinquent where-isbasis, the buyer agrees to take possession of
taxpayer alone. the things sold in the condition where they are found
and from the place where they are located, because the
Third. Any public highway or phrase as-is, where-ispertains solely to the physical
private way established or recognized condition of the thing sold, not to its legal situation and
by law, or any government irrigation is merely descriptive of the state of the thing sold
canal or lateral thereof, if the without altering the sellers responsibility to deliver the
certificate of title does not state that property sold to the buyer.[28]
the boundaries of such highway or
irrigation canal or lateral thereof have What the foregoing circumstances ineluctably
been determined. indicate is that CDC, having paid the full and fair price
of the land, was an innocent purchaser for value, for,
Fourth. Any disposition of the according to Sandoval v. Court of Appeals:[29]
property or limitation on the use A purchaser in good faith is one
thereof by virtue of, or pursuant to, who buys property of another, without
Presidential Decree No. 27 or any other notice that some other person has a
law or regulations on agrarian reform. right to, or interest in, such property
and pays a full and fair price for the
In short, considering that China Banks TCT No. same, at the time of such purchase, or
99527 was a clean title, that is, it was free from any before he has notice of the claim or
lien or encumbrance, CDC had the right to rely, when it interest of some other persons in the
purchased the property, solely upon the face of the property. He buys the property with the
certificate of title in the name of China Bank.[24] belief that the person from whom he
receives the thing was the owner and
The CAs ascribing of bad faith to CDC based on could convey title to the property. A
its knowledge of the adverse possession of the purchaser cannot close his eyes to
respondents siblings at the time it acquired the facts which should put a reasonable
property from China Bank was absolutely unfounded man on his guard and still claim he
and unwarranted. That possession did not translate to acted in good faith.
an adverse claim of ownership that should have put
CDC on actual notice of a defect or flaw in the China WHEREFORE, we grant the petition for review
Banks title, for the respondents siblings themselves, far on certiorari; set aside the decision of the Court of
from asserting ownership in their own right, even Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 71696; dismiss the complaint
characterized their possession only as that of mere in Civil Case No. 94-2045; and declare Transfer
agricultural tenants. Under no law was possession Certificate of Title No. T-34640 in the name of Casimiro
grounded on tenancy a status that might create a Development Corporation valid and subsisting.
defect or inflict a flaw in the title of the owner.
Consequently, due to his own admission in his The respondent shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 180027 - July 18, 2012]
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MICHAEL C. SANTOS,
VANNESSA C. SANTOS, MICHELLE C. SANTOS and
DELFIN SANTOS, all represented by DELFIN C.
SANTOS, Attorney-in-Fact, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For review1 is the Decision2 dated 9 October 2007 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86300. In the
said decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
14 February 2005 ruling3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 15, of Naic, Cavite in LRC Case No. NC-
2002-1292. The dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals decision accordingly reads:rl
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The
assailed decision dated February 14, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 15) in Naic, Cavite, in LRC
Case No. NC-2002-1292 is AFFIRMED in toto. No
costs.4rll
The aforementioned ruling of the RTC granted the
respondents Application for Original Registration of a
parcel of land under Presidential Decree No. 1529.
The antecedents are as follows:
Prelude
In October 1997, the respondents purchased three (3)
parcels of unregistered land situated in Barangay
Carasuchi, Indang, Cavite.5 The 3 parcels of land were
previously owned by one Generosa Asuncion
(Generosa), one Teresita Sernal (Teresita) and by the
spouses Jimmy and Imelda Antona, respectively.6rll
Sometime after the said purchase, the respondents
caused the survey and consolidation of the parcels of
land. Hence, per the consolidation/subdivision plan
Ccs-04-003949-D, the 3 parcels were consolidated into
a single lot "Lot 3" with a determined total area of nine
thousand five hundred seventy-seven (9,577) square
meters.7rll
The Application for Land Registration
On 12 March 2002, the respondents filed with the RTC
an Application8 for Original Registration of Lot 3. Their
application was docketed as LRC Case No. NC-2002-
1292.
On the same day, the RTC issued an Order9 setting the
application for initial hearing and directing the
satisfaction of jurisdictional requirements pursuant to
Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. The same
Order, however, also required the Department of of herein applicants MICHAEL C. SANTOS, VANESSA C.
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to submit a SANTOS, MICHELLE C. SANTOS, and DELFIN C.
report on the status of Lot 3.10rll SANTOS, all residing at No. 60 Rockville Subdivision,
On 13 March 2002, the DENR Calabarzon Office Novaliches, Quezon City.
submitted its Report11 to the RTC. The Report relates Once this decision has become final, let the
that the area covered by Lot 3 "falls within the corresponding decree of registration be issued by the
Alienable and Disposable Land, Project No. 13 of Administrator, Land Registration Authority.26rll
Indang, Cavite per LC12 3013 certified on March 15, The government promptly appealed the ruling of the
1982." Later, the respondents submitted a RTC to the Court of Appeals.27 As already mentioned
Certification13 from the DENR-Community Environment earlier, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC s
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) attesting that, decision on appeal.
indeed, Lot 3 was classified as an "Alienable or Hence, this petition.28rll
Disposable Land" as of 15 March 1982. The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Court of
After fulfillment of the jurisdictional requirements, the Appeals erred in affirming the RTC ruling granting
government, through the Office of the Solicitor original registration of Lot 3 in favor of the
General, filed the lone opposition14 to the respondents respondents.
application on 13 May 2003. The government would have Us answer in the
The Claim, Evidence and Opposition affirmative. It argues that the respondents have failed
The respondents allege that their predecessors-in- to offer evidence sufficient to establish its title over Lot
interest i.e., the previous owners of the parcels of land 3 and, therefore, were unable to rebut the Regalian
making up Lot 3, have been in "continuous, presumption in favor of the State.29rll
uninterrupted, open, public and adverse" possession of The government urges this Court to consider the DENR
the said parcels "since time immemorial."15 It is by Calabarzon Office Report as well as the DENR-CENRO
virtue of such lengthy possession, tacked with their Certification, both of which clearly state that Lot 3 only
own, that respondents now hinge their claim of title became "Alienable or
over Lot 3. Disposable Land" on 15 March 1982.30 The government
During trial on the merits, the respondents presented, posits that since Lot 3 was only classified as alienable
among others, the testimonies of Generosa16and the and disposable on 15 March 1982, the period of
representatives of their two (2) other predecessors-in- prescription against the State should also commence
interest.17 The said witnesses testified that they have to run only from such date.31 Thus, the respondents 12
been in possession of their respective parcels of land March 2002 application filed nearly twenty (20) years
for over thirty (30) years prior to the purchase thereof after the said classification is still premature, as it does
by the respondents in 1997.18 The witnesses also not meet the statutory period required in order for
confirmed that neither they nor the interest they extraordinary prescription to set in.32rll
represent, have any objection to the registration of Lot OUR RULING
3 in favor of the respondents.19rll We grant the petition.
In addition, Generosa affirmed in open court a Joint Jura Regalia and the Property Registration Decree
Affidavit20 she executed with Teresita.21 In it, Generosa We start our analysis by applying the principle of Jura
revealed that the portions of Lot 3 previously Regalia or the Regalian Doctrine.33 Jura Regalia simply
pertaining to her and Teresita were once owned by her means that the State is the original proprietor of all
father, Mr. Valentin Sernal (Valentin) and that the latter lands and, as such, is the general source of all private
had "continuously, openly and peacefully occupied and titles.34 Thus, pursuant to this principle, all claims of
tilled as absolute owner" such lands even "before the private title to land, save those acquired from native
outbreak of World War 2."22rll title,35 must be traced from some grant, whether
To substantiate the above testimonies, the respondents express or implied, from the State.36 Absent a clear
also presented various Tax Declarations23covering showing that land had been let into private ownership
certain areas of Lot 3 the earliest of which dates back through the State s imprimatur, such land is presumed
to 1948 and covers the portions of the subject lot to belong to the State.37rll
previously belonging to Generosa and Teresita.24rll Being an unregistered land, Lot 3 is therefore
On the other hand, the government insists that Lot 3 presumed as land belonging to the State. It is basic
still forms part of the public domain and, hence, not that those who seek the entry of such land into the
subject to private acquisition and registration. The Torrens system of registration must first establish that
government, however, presented no further evidence it has acquired valid title thereto as against the State,
to controvert the claim of the respondents.25rll in accordance with law.
The Decision of the RTC and the Court of Appeals In this connection, original registration of title to land is
On 14 February 2005, the RTC rendered a ruling allowed by Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
granting the respondents Application for Original or otherwise known as the Property Registration
Registration of Lot 3. The RTC thus decreed:rl Decree. The said section provides:rl
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may
confirming its previous Order of general default, file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
decrees and adjudges Lot 3 (Lot 1755) Ccs-04-003949- for registration of title to land, whether personally or
D of Indang, Cadastre, with a total area of NINE through their duly authorized
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN (9,577) square representatives:rbl r l l
meters and its technical description as above- lbrr
described and situated in Brgy. [Carasuchi], Indang, (1) Those who by themselves or through their
Cavite, pursuant to the provisions of Act 496 as predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
amended by P.D. No. 1529, it is hereby decreed and continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
adjudged to be confirmed and registered in the name occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership conclusion of law" that is "unavailing and cannot
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. suffice:"
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private Moreover, Vicente Oco did not testify as to what
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing specific acts of dominion or ownership were performed
laws. by the respondent s predecessors-in-interest and if
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private indeed they did. He merely made a general claim that
lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or they came into possession before World War II, which is
accretion under the existing laws. a mere conclusion of law and not factual proof of
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any possession, and therefore unavailing and cannot
other manner provided for by law. (Emphasis suffice.42 Evidence of this nature should have been
supplied)cralawlibrary received with suspicion, if not dismissed as tenuous
chanrobles virtual law library and unreliable.
Basing from the allegations of the respondents in their Second. The supporting tax declarations presented by
application for land registration and subsequent the respondents also fall short of proving possession
pleadings, it appears that they seek the registration of since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest declaration
Lot 3 under either the first or the second paragraph of submitted by the respondents i.e., Tax Declaration No.
the quoted section. 9412,43 was issued only in 1948 and merely covers the
However, after perusing the records of this case, as portion of Lot 3 previously pertaining to Generosa and
well as the laws and jurisprudence relevant thereto, We Teresita. Much worse, Tax Declaration No. 9412 shows
find that neither justifies registration in favor of the no declared improvements on such portion of Lot 3 as
respondents. of 1948 posing an apparent contradiction to the claims
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 of Generosa and Teresita in their Joint Affidavit.
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 refers to Indeed, the evidence presented by the respondents
the original registration of "imperfect" titles to public does not qualify as the "well-nigh incontrovertible" kind
land acquired under Section 11(4) in relation to Section that is required to prove title thru possession and
48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, or the Public Land occupation of public land since 12 June 1945 or
Act, as amended.38 Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree earlier.44 Clearly, respondents are not entitled to
No. 1529 and Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. registration under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree
141 specify identical requirements for the judicial No. 1529.
confirmation of "imperfect" titles, to Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529
wit:39rbl r l l lbrr The respondents, however, make an alternative plea
1. That the subject land forms part of the alienable and for registration, this time, under Section 14(2) of
disposable lands of the public domain;. Presidential Decree No. 1529. Notwithstanding their
2. That the applicants, by themselves or through their inability to comply with Section 14(1) of Presidential
predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, Decree No. 1529, the respondents claim that they were
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and at least able to establish possession and occupation of
occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim Lot 3 for a sufficient number of years so as to acquire
of ownership, and; title over the same via prescription.45rll
3. That such possession and occupation must be since As earlier intimated, the government counters the
June 12, 1945 or earlier. respondents alternative plea by arguing that the
chanrobles virtual law library statutory period required in order for extraordinary
In this case, the respondents were not able to satisfy prescription to set in was not met in this case. 46The
the third requisite, i.e., that the respondents failed to government cites the DENR Calabarzon Office Report
establish that they or their predecessors-in-interest, as well as the DENR-CENRO Certification, both of which
have been in possession and occupation of Lot 3 "since state that Lot 3 only became "Alienable or Disposable
June 12, 1945 or earlier." An examination of the Land" on 15 March 1982.47 It posits that the period of
evidence on record reveals so:rl prescription against the State should also commence
First. The testimonies of respondents predecessors-in- to run only from such date.48 Hence, the government
interest and/or their representatives were patently concludes, the respondents 12 March 2002 application
deficient on this point. is still premature.49rll
None of them testified about possession and We find the contention of the government inaccurate
occupation of the subject parcels of land dating back to but nevertheless deny registration of Lot 3 under
12 June 1945 or earlier. Rather, the said witnesses Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
merely related that they have been in possession of Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 sanctions
their lands "for over thirty years" prior to the purchase the original registration of lands acquired by
thereof by respondents in 1997.40rll prescription "under the provisions of existing law." In
Neither can the affirmation of Generosa of the Joint the seminal case of Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Affidavit be considered as sufficient to prove Republic,50 this Court clarified that the "existing law"
compliance with the third requisite. The said Joint mentioned in the subject provision refers to no other
Affidavit merely contains a general claim that Valentin than Republic Act No. 386, or the Civil Code of the
had "continuously, openly and peacefully occupied and Philippines.
tilled as absolute owner" the parcels of Generosa and Malabanan acknowledged that only lands of the public
Teresita even "before the outbreak of World War 2" domain that are "patrimonial in character" are
which lacks specificity and is unsupported by any other "susceptible to acquisitive presecription" and, hence,
evidence. In Republic v. East Silverlane Realty eligible for registration under Section 14(2) of
Development Corporation,41 this Court dismissed a Presidential Decree No. 1529.51 Applying the pertinent
similar unsubstantiated claim of possession as a "mere provisions of the Civil Code,52 Malabanan further
elucidated that in order for public land to be considered
as patrimonial "there must be an express declaration
by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development
of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial."53 Until then, the period of
acquisitive prescription against the State will not
commence to run.54rll
The requirement of an "express declaration"
contemplated by Malabanan is separate and distinct
from the mere classification of public land as alienable
and disposable.55 On this point, Malabanan was
reiterated by the recent case of Republic v. Rizalvo,
Jr.56rll
In this case, the respondents were not able to present
any "express declaration" from the State, attesting to
the patrimonial character of Lot 3. To put it bluntly, the
respondents were not able to prove that acquisitive
prescription has begun to run against the State, much
less that they have acquired title to Lot 3 by virtue
thereof. As jurisprudence tells us, a mere certification
or report classifying the subject land as alienable and
disposable is not sufficient.57 We are, therefore, left
with the unfortunate but necessary verdict that the
respondent are not entitled to the registration under
Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
There being no compliance with either the first or
second paragraph of Section 14 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, the Regalian presumption stands and must
be enforced in this case. We accordingly overturn the
decisions of the RTC and the Court of Appeals for not
being supported by the evidence at hand.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 9
October 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 86300 affirming the 14 February 2005
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, of Naic,
Cavite in LRC Case No. NC-2002-1292 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondents application
for registration is, accordingly, DENIED.
Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
 x----------------------------------------
----------x

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court DECISION
Manila

EN BANC REYES, R.T., J.:

THE SECRETARY OF THE G.R. No. 167707 AT stake in these consolidated cases is the
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT right of the present occupants of Boracay Island to
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE secure titles over their occupied lands.
REGIONAL EXECUTIVE Present:
DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI, There are two consolidated petitions. The first
REGIONAL TECHNICAL PUNO, C.J., is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review on certiorari of
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, QUISUMBING, the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming
LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, YNARES-SANTIAGO, that[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan,
REGION VI PROVINCIAL CARPIO, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and
RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, CORONA,* ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The
AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, CARPIO MORALES, second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition,
DIRECTOR OF LAND AZCUNA, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No.
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, TINGA, 1064[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM CHICO-NAZARIO, classifying Boracay into reserved forest and
SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF VELASCO, JR., agricultural land.
PHILIPPINE TOURISM NACHURA,**
AUTHORITY, REYES, The Antecedents
Petitioners, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ. G.R. No. 167707
- versus -
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay,
Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches and warm
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine
TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and tourist destination.The island is also home to 12,003
ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and Promulgated: inhabitants[4] who live in the bone-shaped islands
in behalf of all those similarly situated, three barangays.[5]
Respondents. October
8, 2008 On April 14, 1976, the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
x---------------------------------------- approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay
----------x Island,[6] which identified several lots as being occupied
or claimed by named persons.[7]
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and G.R. No. 173775
WILFREDO GELITO, joined by On November 10, 1978, then President
THE LANDOWNERS OF Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation
BORACAY SIMILARLY No. 1801[8] declaring Boracay Island, among other
SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST, islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines,
ANNEX A OF THIS PETITION, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the
Petitioners, administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority
(PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance
of PTA Circular 3-82[9] dated September 3, 1982, to
- versus - implement Proclamation No. 1801.

THE SECRETARY OF THE Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or
REGIONAL TECHNICAL survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS claimants
MANAGEMENT BUREAU, Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y.
REGION VI, PROVINCIAL Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,
AKLAN, In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged
Respondents. that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82
raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their
occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or
through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in WHEREFORE, in view of the
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession foregoing, the Court declares that
and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular
earlier since time immemorial. They declared their No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the
lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. petitioners and those similarly situated
[10]
to acquire title to their lands in
Boracay, in accordance with the
Respondents-claimants posited that applicable laws and in the manner
Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular prescribed therein; and to have their
did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of lands surveyed and approved by
man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it respondent Regional Technical Director
was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section of Lands as the approved survey does
48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise not in itself constitute a title to the
known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to land.
have the lots registered in their names through judicial
confirmation of imperfect titles. SO ORDERED.[17]

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to
General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory have their occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled
relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No.
an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable
part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, or could not be the subject of disposition. [18] The
which was not available for disposition pursuant to Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands.
Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the [19]
The trial court cited Sections 87[20] and 53[21] of the
Revised Forestry Code,[11] as amended. Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private
ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those
The OSG maintained that respondents- forested areas in public lands were declared as part of
claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. the forest reserve.[22]
3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation
of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. The OSG moved for reconsideration but its
705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as motion was denied.[23] The Republic then appealed to
alienable and disposable, whatever possession they the CA.
had cannot ripen into ownership.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as follows:
the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1)
respondents-claimants were presently in possession of WHEREFORE, in view of the
parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
land were planted with coconut trees and other natural rendered by us DENYING the appeal
growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of filed in this case and AFFIRMING the
more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted decision of the lower court.[24]
more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-
claimants declared the land they were occupying for
tax purposes.[12] The CA held that respondents-claimants could
not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they
The parties also agreed that the principal issue occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest
for resolution was purely legal: whether Proclamation reserve.
No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to
the titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it
forego with the trial and to submit the case for was similarly denied.[25] Hence, the present petition
resolution upon submission of their respective under Rule 45.
memoranda.[13]
G.R. No. 173775
The RTC took judicial notice[14] that certain
parcels of land in Boracay Island, more particularly Lots On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No.
1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of Proclamation No. 1064[26] classifying Boracay Island
the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest
Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-
the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.[15]The titles were issued on eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land
August 7, 1933.[16] (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise
provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of
RTC and CA Dispositions the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-
way and which shall form part of the area reserved for
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision forest land protection purposes.
in favor of respondents-claimants, with a fallo reading:
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr.
Orlando Sacay,[27] Wilfredo Gelito,[28] and other
landowners[29] in Boracay filed with this Court an BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL
original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.[30] They TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED
allege that the Proclamation infringed on their prior BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?
vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have been
in continued possession of their respective lots in II.
Boracay since time immemorial. They have also HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS
invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF
building internationally renowned first class resorts on PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR
their lots.[31] OCCUPIED PORTIONS
OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL
no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?
agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral
nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural III.
pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF
926, known as the first Public Land Act. [32] Thus, their THEIR AREAS AS
possession in the concept of owner for the required ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER S
period entitled them to judicial confirmation of EC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-
imperfect title. REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO
OBTAIN TITLE UNDER
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that THE TORRENS SYSTEM?
petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over
their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an IV.
unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION
of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF
of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE
of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER
executive department, not the courts, which has THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED
authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION
positive government act in order to release the lots for 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141,
disposition. OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the V.

consolidation of the two petitions as they principally CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY
involve the same issues on the land classification MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE
of Boracay Island.[33] SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY
PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE
Issues APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE
LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?
G.R. No. 167707 [35]
(Underscoring supplied)

The OSG raises the lone issue of whether In capsule, the main issue is whether private
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707
any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a
similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied right to secure titles over their occupied portions in
lands in Boracay Island.[34] Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any,
to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No.
141, as amended. They do not involve their right to
secure title under other pertinent laws.
G.R. No. 173775
Our Ruling
Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues,
namely: Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain
I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and
POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN executive acts in their bid for judicial confirmation of
CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902 [36] in
RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or
TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141; [37] (b)
SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF Proclamation No. 1801[38] issued by then President
THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 1064[39] issued by
RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to
AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation
AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED of imperfect title under these laws and executive acts.
 of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and after the lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted
the power of the executive to reclassify lands of the possession which must be actual, public, and adverse,
public domain. [56]
from the date of its inscription. [57] However,
possessory information title had to be perfected one
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or
public domain into agricultural, forest or timber. until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert
[40]
Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the to the State.[58]
following divisions: agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber In sum, private ownership of land under the
or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as Spanish regime could only be founded on royal
may be provided by law,[41] giving the government concessions which took various forms,
great leeway for classification. [42] Then the 1987 namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion
Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el
classification with one addition: national parks. [43] Of estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title
these, onlyagricultural lands may be alienated. [44] Prior by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or
to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, possessory information title.[59]
2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and
administratively classified under any of these grand The first law governing the disposition of
divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public lands in the Philippines under American rule was
public domain. embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.[60] By this law,
lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit:
the public domain belong to the State, that the State is agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands. [61] The
the source of any asserted right to ownership of land act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral
and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. lands by means of absolute grant (freehold system)
[45]
The doctrine has been consistently adopted under and by lease (leasehold system).[62] It also provided the
the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.[46] definition by exclusion of agricultural public lands.
[63]
Interpreting the meaning of agricultural lands under
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the v. Insular Government:[64]
State.[47] Thus, all lands that have not been acquired
from the government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the State as part of the inalienable public x x x In other words, that the
domain.[48] Necessarily, it is up to the State to phrase agricultural land as used in
determine if lands of the public domain will be Act No. 926 means those public
disposed of for private ownership. The government, as lands acquired from Spain which
the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary are not timber or mineral lands. x x
power as the persona in law to determine who shall be x[65](Emphasis Ours)
the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under
what terms they may be granted such privilege, not On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature
excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of Registration Act. The act established a system of
ownership.[49] registration by which recorded title becomes absolute,
indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as
Our present land law traces its roots to the the Torrens system.[66]
Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of
the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the
possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, which was
Crown.[50] The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the
the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the homestead system and made provisions for judicial
Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation that all lands and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and
that were not acquired from the Government, either by for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.[51] corporations regardless of the nationality of persons
owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley of the public domain.[67] Under the Act, open,
Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10)
of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. [52] years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.[68]
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura
Law[53] partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926
the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known as
information as the method of legalizing possession of the second Public Land Act. This new, more
vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which comprehensive law limited the exploitation of
were set forth in said decree.[54] Under Section 393 of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and
the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the
information title,[55] when duly inscribed in the Registry same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title,
possession and occupation en concepto dueo since as a presidential proclamation or an executive order;
time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required. an administrative action; investigation reports of
[69]
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute.[85] The applicant may also secure a certification
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA from the government that the land claimed to have
No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on December 1, been possessed for the required number of years is
1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as alienable and disposable.[86]
amended, remains as the existing general law
governing the classification and disposition of lands of In the case at bar, no such proclamation,
the public domain other than timber and mineral lands, executive order, administrative action, report, statute,
[70]
and privately owned lands which reverted to the or certification was presented to the Court. The records
State.[71] are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the
portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the subject of a government proclamation that the land is
requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession and alienable and disposable.Absent such well-nigh
occupation of lands of the public domain since time incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the
immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this submission that lands occupied by private claimants
provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters
1942,[72] which provided for a simple thirty-year of land classification or reclassification cannot be
prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of assumed. They call for proof.[87]
imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD
No. 1073,[73] which now provides for possession and Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the
occupation of the land applied for since June 12, whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it,
1945, or earlier.[74] agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that
Boracay was already an agricultural land pursuant to
The issuance of PD No. 892[75] on February 16, the old cases Ankron v. Government of the
1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence Philippine Islands (1919)[88] and De Aldecoa v. The
in land registration proceedings. [76] Under the decree, Insular Government (1909).[89] These cases were
all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of
registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these
(6) months from the effectivity of the decree old cases that in the absence of evidence to the
on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural
all unregistered lands[77] shall be governed by Section lands until the contrary is shown.[90]
194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended
by Act No. 3344. Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De
Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not have the
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or
and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the Property portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be
Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No.
various laws relative to registration of property. [78] It 926 merely provided the manner through which land
governs registration of lands under the Torrens system registration courts would classify lands of the public
as well as unregistered lands, including chattel domain. Whether the land would be classified as
mortgages.[79] timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof
presented in each case.
A positive act declaring land as alienable
and disposable is required. In keeping with the Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time
presumption of State ownership, the Court has time when the President of the Philippines had no power to
and again emphasized that there must be a positive classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber,
act of the government, such as an official and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to
proclamation,[80] declassifying inalienable public land make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases,
into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending
[81]
In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or upon the preponderance of the evidence. [91] This was
disposable lands only to those lands which have been the Courts ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S.
officially delimited and classified.[82] Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v.
Republic,[92] in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo
The burden of proof in overcoming the Azcuna, viz.:
presumption of State ownership of the lands of the
public domain is on the person applying for registration x x x Petitioners furthermore
(or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land insist that a particular land need not be
subject of the application is alienable or disposable. formally released by an act of the
[83]
To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible Executive before it can be deemed
evidence must be established that the land subject of open to private ownership, citing the
the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. cases of Ramos v. Director of
[84]
There must still be a positive act declaring land of Lands and Ankron v. Government of
the public domain as alienable and disposable. To the Philippine Islands.
prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, the applicant must establish xxxx
the existence of a positive act of the government such
 Petitioners reliance In the case of Jocson vs.
upon Ramos v. Director of Director of Forestry (supra), the
Lands and Ankron v. Government is Attorney-General admitted in effect
misplaced. These cases were decided that whether the particular land in
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and question belongs to one class or
the first Public Land Act No. 926 another is a question of fact. The mere
enacted by the Philippine Commission fact that a tract of land has trees upon
on October 7, 1926, under which there it or has mineral within it is not of itself
was no legal provision vesting in the sufficient to declare that one is forestry
Chief Executive or President of the land and the other, mineral land. There
Philippines the power to classify lands must be some proof of the extent and
of the public domain into mineral, present or future value of the forestry
timber and agricultural so that the and of the minerals. While, as we have
courts then were free to make just said, many definitions have been
corresponding classifications in given for agriculture, forestry, and
justiciable cases, or were vested with mineral lands, and that in each case it
implicit power to do so, depending is a question of fact, we think it is safe
upon the preponderance of the to say that in order to be forestry or
evidence.[93] mineral land the proof must show that
it is more valuable for the forestry or
To aid the courts in resolving land registration the mineral which it contains than it is
cases under Act No. 926, it was then necessary to for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act
devise a presumption on land classification. Thus No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show
evolved the dictum in Ankron that the courts have a that there exists some trees upon the
right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the land or that it bears some mineral.
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural Land may be classified as forestry or
lands until the contrary is shown.[94] mineral today, and, by reason of the
exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be
classified as agricultural land
tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption the rapid growth of timber or the
in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument that all lands discovery of valuable minerals, lands
of the public domain had been automatically classified as agricultural today may be
reclassified as disposable and alienable agricultural differently classified tomorrow. Each
lands. By no stretch of imagination did the presumption case must be decided upon the
convert all lands of the public domain into agricultural proof in that particular
lands. case, having regard for its present
or future value for one or the other
If We accept the position of private claimants, purposes. We believe, however,
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would have considering the fact that it is a matter
automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except of public knowledge that a majority of
those already classified as timber or mineral land, the lands in the Philippine Islands are
alienable and disposable lands. That would take these agricultural lands that the courts have
lands out of State ownership and worse, would be a right to presume, in the absence of
utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the evidence to the contrary, that in each
long-entrenched Regalian doctrine. case the lands are agricultural lands
until the contrary is shown. Whatever
The presumption in Ankron and De the land involved in a particular
Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases land registration case is forestry
brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more or mineral land must, therefore, be
specifically those cases dealing with judicial and a matter of proof. Its superior
administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The value for one purpose or the other
presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or is a question of fact to be settled
administrative conformation of imperfect title under by the proof in each particular
Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, case. The fact that the land is a
such as private claimants or their predecessors-in- manglar [mangrove swamp] is not
interest, who failed to avail themselves of the benefits sufficient for the courts to decide
of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained whether it is agricultural, forestry, or
unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, mineral land. It may perchance belong
continued to be owned by the State. to one or the other of said classes of
land. The Government, in the first
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De instance, under the provisions of Act
Aldecoa was not absolute. Land classification was, in No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide
the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that for itself what portions of public land
the land was better suited for non-agricultural uses, shall be considered forestry land,
the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land unless private interests have
despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated: intervened before such reservation is
made. In the latter case, whether the
 land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or
is a question of proof. Until private mineral.
interests have intervened, the
Government, by virtue of the terms of Private claimants continued possession
said Act (No. 1148), may decide for under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption
itself what portions of the public that the land is alienable. Private claimants also
domain shall be set aside and reserved contend that their continued possession of portions
as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10)
Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson years under Act No. 926[106] ipso facto converted the
vs. Director of Forestry, supra) island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply
[95]
(Emphasis ours) for a title in their name.

Since 1919, courts were no longer free to A similar argument was squarely rejected by
determine the classification of lands from the facts of the Court in Collado v. Court of Appeals.
each case, except those that have already became [107]
Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief
private lands.[96] Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of
and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:
Executive Department, through the President,
the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify Act No. 926,
public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or the first Public Land
forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the Act, was passed in
authority, whether express or implied, to determine the pursuance of the
classification of lands of the public domain.[97] provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902.
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of The law governed the
Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in 1933, [98] did disposition of lands of
not present a justiciable case for determination by the the public domain. It
land registration court of the propertys land prescribed rules and
classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for regulations for the
the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay homesteading, selling
occupants are now claiming were agricultural and leasing of portions
lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. of the public domain of
2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial the Philippine Islands,
confirmation having been filed by private claimants or and prescribed the
their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no terms and conditions to
longer authorized to determine the propertys land enable persons to
classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on perfect their titles to
Act No. 926. public lands in
the Islands. It also
We note that the RTC decision[99] in G.R. No. provided for the
167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of issuance of patents to
Manila,[100] which was decided in 1947 when CA No. certain native settlers
141, vesting the Executive with the sole power to upon public lands, for
classify lands of the public domain was already in the establishment of
effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular town sites and sale of
Government,[101] De Aldecoa v. The Insular lots therein, for the
Government,[102] and Ankron v. Government of the completion of imperfect
Philippine Islands.[103] titles, and for the
cancellation or
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here confirmation of Spanish
because it involved a totally different issue. The concessions and grants
pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots in the Islands. In short,
were included in the general classification of the Public Land Act
agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could operated on the
acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an assumption that title to
alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935 public lands in the
Constitution[104] from acquiring agricultural land, which Philippine Islands
included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether remained in the
unclassified lands of the public domain are government; and that
automatically deemed agricultural. the governments title
to public land sprung
from the Treaty of Paris
Notably, the definition of agricultural public and other subsequent
lands mentioned in Krivenko relied on the old cases treaties between Spain
decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874, and the United States.
including Ankron and De Aldecoa.[105] As We have The term public land
already stated, those cases cannot apply here, since referred to all lands of
they were decided when the Executive did not have the the public domain
 whose title still not lose such classification simply
remained in the because loggers or settlers may have
government and are stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of
thrown open to private land classified as forest land may
appropriation and actually be covered with grass or
settlement, and planted to crops by kaingin cultivators
excluded the or other farmers. Forest lands do not
patrimonial property of have to be on mountains or in out of
the government and the way places. Swampy areas covered
the friar lands. by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and
other trees growing in brackish or sea
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners water may also be classified as forest
to argue that under the Philippine land. The classification is
Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act descriptive of its legal nature or
No. 926, mere possession by status and does not have to be
private individuals of lands creates descriptive of what the land
the legal presumption that the actually looks like. Unless and until
lands are alienable and disposable. the land classified as forest is released
[108]
(Emphasis Ours) in an official proclamation to that effect
so that it may form part of the
Except for lands already covered by disposable agricultural lands of the
existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land public domain, the rules on
of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. confirmation of imperfect title do not
1064. Such unclassified lands are considered apply.[115] (Emphasis supplied)
public forest under PD No. 705. The DENR[109] and
the National Mapping and Resource Information There is a big difference between forest as defined in a
Authority[110] certify that Boracay Island is an dictionary and forest or timber land as a classification
unclassified land of the public domain. of lands of the public domain as appearing in our
statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos land while the other is a legal status, a classification for
categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain legal purposes.[116] At any rate, the Court is tasked to
as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not
public forest as a mass of lands of the public domain look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest
which has not been the subject of the present system cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants
of classification for the determination of which lands and other commercial establishments, it has not been
are needed for forest purpose and which are automatically converted from public forest to alienable
not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, agricultural land.
including those in Boracay Island, are ipso
facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, Private claimants cannot rely on
respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity. Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation
The Court notes that the classification of did not convert Boracay into an agricultural
Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may seem land. However, private claimants argue that
to be out of touch with the present realities in the Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos
island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of in 1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of
its forest cover to pave the way for commercial imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay,
developments. As a premier tourist destination for local among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private
and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is
commercial island resort, rather than a forest land. susceptible of private ownership.

Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82
have built multi-million peso beach resorts on the did not convert the whole of Boracay into an
island;[111] that the island has already been stripped of agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the
its forest cover; or that the implementation of Circular which made Boracay Island an agricultural
Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the islands tourism land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to private
industry, do not negate its character as public forest. lands[117] and areas declared as alienable and
disposable[118] does not by itself classify the entire
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes
Act and the Constitution[112] classifying lands of the reference not only to private lands and areas but also
public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:
mineral lands, and national parks, do not necessarily
refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses No trees in forested private
covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes. lands may be cut without prior
[113]
The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of authority from the PTA. All forested
Forestry[114] is particularly instructive: areas in public lands are declared
forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)
A forested area classified as
forest land of the public domain does
 Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both
private and public lands merely recognizes that the Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into
island can be classified by the Executive department 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96
pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise
Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of the
Forest Developments authority to declare areas in the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for
island as alienable and disposable when it provides: right of way and which shall form part of the area
reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Subsistence farming, in areas Contrary to private claimants argument, there
declared as alienable and disposable was nothing invalid or irregular, much less
by the Bureau of Forest Development. unconstitutional, about the classification
of Boracay Island made by the President through
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to
deemed the positive act needed to make such classification, subject to existing vested
classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable rights.
land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island
as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate
have identified the specific limits of each, as President the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private
Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064
in Proclamation No. 1801. violates the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 of public forests into agricultural lands. They claim that
also explain the rationale behind the declaration of since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705,
Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an
peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a)
marine reserve to be administered by the PTA to of RA No. 6657, thus:
ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and
private sectors in the development of the areas SEC. 4. Scope. The
tourism potential with due regard for ecological Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial
proclamation is aimed at administering the islands arrangement and commodity
for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not produced, all public and private
address the areas alienability.[119] agricultural lands as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 Order No. 229, including other lands of
covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64) the public domain suitable for
other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, agriculture.
such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port
Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag More specifically, the following
Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and lands are covered by the
surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a Program:
few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone
makes it alienable and disposable by virtue of (a) All alienable and
Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned disposable lands
would likewise be declared wide open for private of the public
disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly domain devoted to
beyond, the intent of the proclamation. or suitable for
agriculture. No rec
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 lassification of
which positively declared part of Boracay as forest or mineral
alienable and opened the same to private lands to
ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141[120] provide agricultural lands
that it is only the President, upon the recommendation shall be
of the proper department head, who has the authority undertaken after
to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable the approval of
or disposable, timber and mineral lands.[121] this Act until
Congress, taking
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President into account
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the ecological,
authority granted to her to classify lands of the public developmental
domain, presumably subject to existing vested and equity
rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive considerations,
prerogative of the Executive Department, through the shall have
Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do determined by
so.[122] Absent such classification, the land remains law, the specific
unclassified until released and rendered open to limits of the public
disposition.[123] domain.
 namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
That Boracay Island was classified as a public possession and occupation of the subject land by
forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the Executive from himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under
later converting it into agricultural a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial
land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the
of the public domain despite PD No. 705. land as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.[128]
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca
and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,[124] the Court stated As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act
that unclassified lands are public forests. No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert
portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The
island remained an unclassified land of the public
While it is true that the domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is
land classification map does not considered State property.
categorically state that the islands
are public forests, the fact that Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of
they were unclassified lands leads imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902,
to the same result.In the absence of Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail
the classification as mineral or timber because of the absence of the second element of
land, the land remains unclassified land alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a
until released and rendered open to government grant under our present Public Land Act
disposition.[125] (Emphasis supplied) presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is
already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL wording of the law itself.[129] Where the land is not
applies only to a reclassification of land. If the land had alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no
never been previously classified, as in the case of matter how long, cannot confer ownership or
Boracay, there can be no prohibited reclassification possessory rights.[130]
under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of
the Department of Justice[126] on this point: Neither may private claimants apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No.
Indeed, the key word to the 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified
correct application of the prohibition in as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove
Section 4(a) is the word the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and
reclassification. Where there has been notorious possession of their lands in Boracay
no previous classification of public since June 12, 1945.
forest [referring, we repeat, to the
mass of the public domain which has We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion
not been the subject of the present in the petition for declaratory relief that private
system of classification for purposes of claimants complied with the requisite period of
determining which are needed for possession.
forest purposes and which are not] into
permanent forest or forest reserves or The tax declarations in the name of private
some other forest uses under the claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of
Revised Forestry Code, there can be no possession. We note that the earliest of the tax
reclassification of forest lands to speak declarations in the name of private claimants were
of within the meaning of Section 4(a). issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax
declarations are not sufficient to convince this
Thus, obviously, the prohibition Court that the period of possession and occupation
in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the commenced on June 12, 1945.
reclassification of forest lands to
agricultural lands without a prior law Private claimants insist that they have a vested
delimiting the limits of the public right in Boracay, having been in possession of the
domain, does not, and cannot, apply to island for a long time. They have invested millions of
those lands of the public domain, pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. They
denominated as public forest under the say their continued possession and investments give
Revised Forestry Code, which have not them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally
been previously determined, or rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
classified, as needed for forest
purposes in accordance with the The continued possession and considerable
provisions of the Revised Forestry investment of private claimants do not automatically
Code.[127] give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give
them a right to apply for a title to the land they are
Private claimants are not entitled to presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally
apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title bound to decide cases based on the evidence
under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested presented and the laws applicable. As the law and
rights over the occupied lands under the said jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to
law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their
of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141,
occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued pressing need for forest preservation,
possession and considerable investment in the island. conservation, protection, development
and reforestation. Not without
One Last Note justification. For, forests constitute a
vital segment of any country's natural
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have resources. It is of common knowledge
been invested for the development of Boracay Island, by now that absence of the necessary
making it a by-word in the local and international green cover on our lands produces a
tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a number of adverse or ill effects of
number of years, thousands of people have called the serious proportions. Without the trees,
island their home. While the Court commiserates with watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes
private claimants plight, We are bound to apply the law which they supply are emptied of their
strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it should contents. The fish disappear. Denuded
prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral. areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls
cease to function, so will hydroelectric
All is not lost, however, for private plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil
claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for is washed away; geological erosion
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section results. With erosion come the dreaded
48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote floods that wreak havoc and
their automatic ouster from the residential, destruction to property crops, livestock,
commercial, and other areas they possess now houses, and highways not to mention
classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss precious human lives. Indeed, the
of their substantial investments on their occupied foregoing observations should be
alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean written down in a lumbermans
lack of right to possess. decalogue.[135]

For one thing, those with lawful possession WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as
may claim good faith as builders of follows:
improvements. They can take steps to preserve or
protect their possession. For another, they may look 1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707
into other modes of applying for original registration of is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-
title, such as by homestead[131] or sales patent, G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
[132]
subject to the conditions imposed by law.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
entitle private claimants to acquire title to their
occupied lots or to exempt them from certain SO ORDERED.
requirements under the present land laws. There is one
such bill[133] now pending in the House of
Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will
become a law is for Congress to decide.

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the

government has taken the step necessary to open up
the island to private ownership. This gesture may not
be sufficient to appease some sectors which view the
classification of the island partially into a forest reserve
as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by
trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect
its remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy
balance between progress and ecology. Ecological
conservation is as important as economic progress.

To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our

nations survival. Their promotion and protection are
not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and
activists. These are needs that become more urgent as
destruction of our environment gets prevalent and
difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice
Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v.
Munoz:[134]

The view this Court takes of the

cases at bar is but in adherence to
public policy that should be followed
with respect to forest lands. Many have
written much, and many more have
spoken, and quite often, about the
 FELIX, J.:

This is a petition for mandamus filed by the Roman

Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao seeking the
reversal of a resolution by the Land Registration
Commissioner in L.R.C. Consulta No. 14. The facts of
the case are as follows:

On October 4, 1954, Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen

and resident of the City of Davao, executed a deed of
sale of a parcel of land located in the same city
covered by Transfer Certificate No. 2263, in favor of the
Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc., s
corporation sole organized and existing in accordance
with Philippine Laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a
Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent. When the deed
of sale was presented to Register of Deeds of Davao for
registration, the latter.

having in mind a previous resolution of the

Fourth Branch of the Court of First Instance of
Manila wherein the Carmelite Nuns of Davao
were made to prepare an affidavit to the effect
that 60 per cent of the members of their
corporation were Filipino citizens when they
sought to register in favor of their congregation
of deed of donation of a parcel of land

required said corporation sole to submit a similar

affidavit declaring that 60 per cent of the members
thereof were Filipino citizens.

The vendee in the letter dated June 28, 1954,

expressed willingness to submit an affidavit, both not
in the same tenor as that made the Progress of the
Carmelite Nuns because the two cases were not
similar, for whereas the congregation of the Carmelite
Nuns had five incorporators, the corporation sole has
Republic of the Philippines only one; that according to their articles of
SUPREME COURT incorporation, the organization of the Carmelite Nuns
Manila became the owner of properties donated to it, whereas
the case at bar, the totality of the Catholic population
EN BANC of Davao would become the owner of the property
bought to be registered.
G.R. No. L-8451 December 20, 1957
As the Register of Deeds entertained some doubts as
to the registerability if the document, the matter was
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC
referred to the Land Registration Commissioner en
ADMINISTRATOR OF DAVAO, INC., petitioner,
consulta for resolution in accordance with section 4 of
vs.
Republic Act No. 1151. Proper hearing on the matter
THE LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION and THE
was conducted by the Commissioner and after the
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAVAO CITY, respondents.
petitioner corporation had filed its memorandum, a
resolution was rendered on September 21, 1954,
Teodoro Padilla, for petitioner.
holding that in view of the provisions of Section 1 and 5
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla,
of Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution, the vendee
Assistant Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista and Troadio
was not qualified to acquire private lands in the
T. Quianzon, Jr., for respondents.
Philippines in the absence of proof that at least 60 per UNDER CONSTITUTION. Natural resources, with the
centum of the capital, property, or assets of the Roman exception of public agricultural land, shall not be
Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., was alienated, and no license, concession, or leases for the
actually owned or controlled by Filipino citizens, there exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the
being no question that the present incumbent of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
corporation sole was a Canadian citizen. It was also the exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another
opinion of the Land Registration Commissioner that twenty-five years, except as to water rights for
section 159 of the corporation Law relied upon by the irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses
vendee was rendered operative by the aforementioned other than the development of water power, in which
provisions of the Constitution with respect to real cases other than the development and limit of the
estate, unless the precise condition set therein that grant.
at least 60 per cent of its capital is owned by Filipino
citizens be present, and, therefore, ordered the In virtue of the foregoing mandates of the Constitution,
Registered Deeds of Davao to deny registration of the who are considered "qualified" to acquire and hold
deed of sale in the absence of proof of compliance with agricultural lands in the Philippines? What is the effect
such condition. of these constitutional prohibition of the right of a
religious corporation recognized by our Corporation
After the motion to reconsider said resolution was Law and registered as a corporation sole, to possess,
denied, an action for mandamus was instituted with acquire and register real estates in its name when the
this Court by said corporation sole, alleging that under Head, Manager, Administrator or actual incumbent is
the Corporation Law as well as the settled an alien?
jurisprudence on the matter, the deed of sale executed
by Mateo L. Rodis in favor of petitioner is actually a Petitioner consistently maintained that a corporation
deed of sale in favor of the Catholic Church which is sole, irrespective of the citizenship of its incumbent, is
qualified to acquire private agricultural lands for the not prohibited or disqualified to acquire and hold real
establishment and maintenance of places of worship, properties. The Corporation Law and the Canon Law
and prayed that judgment be rendered reserving and are explicit in their provisions that a corporation sole or
setting aside the resolution of the Land Registration "ordinary" is not the owner of the of the properties that
Commissioner in question. In its resolution of he may acquire but merely the administrator thereof.
November 15, 1954, this Court gave due course to this The Canon Law also specified that church temporalities
petition providing that the procedure prescribed for are owned by the Catholic Church as a "moral person"
appeals from the Public Service Commission of the or by the diocess as minor "moral persons" with the
Securities and Exchange Commissions (Rule 43), be ordinary or bishop as administrator.
followed.
And elaborating on the composition of the Catholic
Section 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution Church in the Philippines, petitioner explained that as a
reads as follows: religious society or organization, it is made up of 2
elements or divisions the clergy or religious
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary members and the faithful or lay members. The 1948
succession, no private agricultural land shall be figures of the Bureau of Census showed that there were
transferred or assigned except to individuals, 277,551 Catholics in Davao and aliens residing therein
corporations, or associations qualified to numbered 3,465. Ever granting that all these
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in foreigners are Catholics, petitioner contends that
the Philippines. Filipino citizens form more than 80 per cent of the
entire Catholics population of that area. As to its clergy
Section 1 of the same Article also provides the and religious composition, counsel for petitioner
following: presented the Catholic Directory of the Philippines for
1954 (Annex A) which revealed that as of that year,
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands Filipino clergy and women novices comprise already
of the public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, 60.5 per cent of the group. It was, therefore, allowed
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, that the constitutional requirement was fully met and
and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to satisfied.
the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to cititzens Respondents, on the other hand, averred that although
of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at it might be true that petitioner is not the owner of the
least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned land purchased, yet he has control over the same, with
by such citizens, SUBJECT TO ANY EXISTING RIGHT, full power to administer, take possession of, alienate,
grant, lease, or concession AT THE TIME OF THE transfer, encumber, sell or dispose of any or all lands
INAUGURATION OF THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED and their improvements registered in the name of the
corporation sole and can collect, receive, demand or SEC. 154. For the administration of the
sue for all money or values of any kind that may be temporalities of any religious denomination,
kind that may become due or owing to said society or church and the management of the
corporation, and vested with authority to enter into estates and the properties thereof, it shall be
agreements with any persons, concerns or entities in lawful for the bishop, chief priest, or presiding
connection with said real properties, or in other words, either of any such religious denomination,
actually exercising all rights of ownership over the society or church to become a corporation sole,
properties. It was their stand that the theory that unless inconsistent wit the rules, regulations or
properties registered in the name of the corporation discipline of his religious denomination, society
sole are held in true for the benefit of the Catholic or church or forbidden by competent authority
population of a place, as of Davao in the case at bar thereof.
should be sustained because a conglomeration of
persons cannot just be pointed out as the cestui que See also the pertinent provisions of the succeeding
trust or recipient of the benefits from the property sections of the same Corporation Law copied
allegedly administered in their behalf. Neither can it be hereunder:
said that the mass of people referred to as such
beneficiary exercise ant right of ownership over the SEC. 155. In order to become a corporation
same. This set-up, respondents argued, falls short of a sole the bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder
trust. The respondents instead tried to prove that in of any religious denomination, society or
reality, the beneficiary of ecclesiastical properties are church must file with the Securities and
not members or faithful of the church but someone Exchange Commissioner articles of
else, by quoting a portion a portion of the ought of incorporation setting forth the following facts:
fidelity subscribed by a bishop upon his elevation to
the episcopacy wherein he promises to render to the
xxx xxx xxx.
Pontificial Father or his successors an account of
his pastoral office and of all things appertaining to
the state of this church. (3) That as such bishop, chief priest, or
presiding elder he is charged with the
administration of the temporalities and the
Respondents likewise advanced the opinion that in
management of the estates and properties of
construing the constitutional provision calling for 60
his religious denomination, society, or church
per cent of Filipino citizenship, the criterion of the
within its territorial jurisdiction, describing it;
properties or assets thereof.

xxx xxx xxx.

In solving the problem thus submitted to our
consideration, We can say the following: A corporation
sole is a special form of corporation usually associated (As amended by Commonwealth Act No. 287).
with the clergy. Conceived and introduced into the
common law by sheer necessity, this legal creation SEC. 157. From and after the filing with the
which was referred to as "that unhappy freak of English Securities and Exchange Commissioner of the
law" was designed to facilitate the exercise of the said articles of incorporation, which verified by
functions of ownership carried on by the clerics for and affidavit or affirmation as aforesaid and
on behalf of the church which was regarded as the accompanied by the copy of the commission,
property owner (See I Couvier's Law Dictionary, p. 682- certificate of election, or letters of appointment
683). of the bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder,
duly certified as prescribed in the section
A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his immediately preceding such the bishop, chief
successors (who will always be one at a time), in some priest, or presiding elder, as the case may be,
particular station, who are incorporated by law in order shall become a corporation sole and all
to give them some legal capacities and advantages, temporalities, estates, and properties the
particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural religious denomination, society, or church
persons they could not have had. In this sense, the therefore administered or managed by him as
king is a sole corporation; so is a bishop, or dens, such bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder,
distinct from their several chapters (Reid vs. Barry, 93 shall be held in trust by him as a corporation
Fla. 849, 112 So. 846). sole, for the use, purpose, behalf, and sole
benefit of his religious denomination, society,
or church, including hospitals, schools,
The provisions of our Corporation law on religious
colleges, orphan, asylums, parsonages, and
corporations are illuminating and sustain the stand of
cemeteries thereof. For the filing of such
petitioner. Section 154 thereof provides:
articles of incorporation, the Securities and
 Exchange Commissioner shall collect twenty- In matters regarding property belonging to the
five pesos. (As amended by Commonwealth Universal Church and to the Apostolic See, the
Act. No. 287); and. Supreme Pontiff exercises his office of supreme
administrator through the Roman Curia; in
SEC. 163. The right to administer all matters regarding other church property,
temporalities and all property held or owned by through the administrators of the individual
a religious order or society, or by the diocese, moral persons in the Church according to that
synod, or district organization of any religious norms, laid down in the Code of Cannon
denomination or church shall, on its Law. This does not mean, however, that the
incorporation, pass to the corporation and shall Roman Pontiff is the owner of all the church
be held in trust for the use, purpose behalf, property; but merely that he is the supreme
and benefit of the religious society, or order so guardian (Bouscaren and Ellis, Cannon Law, A
incorporated or of the church of which the Text and Commentary, p. 764).
diocese, or district organization is an organized
and constituent part. and this Court, citing Campes y Pulido, Legislacion y
Jurisprudencia Canonica, ruled in the case of Trinidad
The Cannon Law contains similar provisions regarding vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 63 Phil. 881,
the duties of the corporation sole or ordinary as that:
administrator of the church properties, as follows:
The second question to be decided is in whom
Al Ordinario local pertenence vigilar the ownership of the properties constituting
diligentemente sobre la administracion de the endowment of the ecclesiastical or collative
todos los bienes eclesiasticos que se hallan en chaplaincies is vested.
su territorio y no estuvieren sustraidos de su
jurisdiccion, salvs las prescriciones legitimas Canonists entertain different opinions as to the
que le concedan mas aamplios derechos. persons in whom the ownership of the
ecclesiastical properties is vested, with respect
Teniendo en cuenta los derechos y las legitimas to which we shall, for our purpose, confine
costumbres y circunstancias, procuraran los ourselves to stating with Donoso that, while
Ordinarios regular todo lo concerniente a many doctors cited by Fagnano believe that it
la administracion de los bienes eclesciasticos, resides in the Roman Pontiff as Head of the
dando las oportunas instucciones particularles Universal Church, it is more probable that
dentro del narco del derecho comun. (Title ownership, strictly speaking, does not reside in
XXVIII, Codigo de Derecho Canonico, Lib. III, the latter, and, consequently, ecclesiastical
Canon 1519).1 properties are owned by the churches,
institutions and canonically established private
That leaves no room for doubt that the bishops or corporations to which said properties have
archbishops, as the case may be, as corporation's sole been donated.
are merely administrators of the church properties that
come to their possession, in which they hold in trust for Considering that nowhere can We find any provision
the church. It can also be said that while it is true that conferring ownership of church properties on the Pope
church properties could be administered by a natural although he appears to be the supreme administrator
persons, problems regarding succession to said or guardian of his flock, nor on the corporation sole or
properties can not be avoided to rise upon his death. heads of dioceses as they are admittedly
Through this legal fiction, however, church properties mere administrators of said properties, ownership of
acquired by the incumbent of a corporation sole pass, these temporalities logically fall and develop upon the
by operation of law, upon his death not his personal church, diocese or congregation acquiring the same.
heirs but to his successor in office. It could be seen, Although this question of ownership of ecclesiastical
therefore, that a corporation sole is created not only to properties has off and on been mentioned in several
administer the temporalities of the church or religious decisions of the Court yet in no instance was the
society where he belongs but also to hold and transmit subject of citizenship of this religious society been
the same to his successor in said office. If the passed upon.
ownership or title to the properties do not pass to the
administrators, who are the owners of church We are not unaware of the opinion expressed by the
properties?. late Justice Perfecto in his dissent in the case of
Agustines vs. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, 80 Phil.
Bouscaren and Elis, S.J., authorities on cannon law, on 565, to the effect that "the Roman Catholic Archbishop
their treatise comment: of Manila is only a branch of a universal church by the
Pope, with permanent residence in Rome, Italy". There
is no question that the Roman Catholic Church existing Churches all over the world follow the citizenship of
in the Philippines is a tributary and part of the their Supreme Head, the Pontifical Father, would lead
international religious organization, for the word to the absurdity of finding the citizens of a country who
"Roman" clearly expresses its unity with and embrace the Catholic faith and become members of
recognizes the authority of the Pope in Rome. However, that religious society, likewise citizens of the Vatican or
lest We become hasty in drawing conclusions, We have of Italy. And this is more so if We consider that the Pope
to analyze and take note of the nature of the himself may be an Italian or national of any other
government established in the Vatican City, of which it country of the world. The same thing be said with
was said: regard to the nationality or citizenship of the
corporation sole created under the laws of the
GOVERNMENT. In the Roman Catholic Church Philippines, which is not altered by the change of
supreme authority and jurisdiction over clergy citizenship of the incumbent bishops or head of said
and laity alike as held by the pope who (since corporation sole.
the Middle Ages) is elected by the cardinals
assembled in conclave, and holds office until We must therefore, declare that although a branch of
his death or legitimate abdication. . . While the the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, every
pope is obviously independent of the laws Roman Catholic Church in different countries, if it
made, and the officials appointed, by himself or exercises its mission and is lawfully incorporated in
his predecessors, he usually exercises his accordance with the laws of the country where it is
administrative authority according to the code located, is considered an entity or person with all the
of canon law and through the congregations, rights and privileges granted to such artificial being
tribunals and offices of the Curia Romana. In under the laws of that country, separate and distinct
their respective territories (called generally from the personality of the Roman Pontiff or the Holy
dioceses) and over their respective subjects, See, without prejudice to its religious relations with the
the patriarchs, metropolitans or archbishops latter which are governed by the Canon Law or their
and bishops exercise a jurisdiction which is rules and regulations.
called ordinary (as attached by law to an office
given to a person. . . (Collier's Encyclopedia, We certainly are conscious of the fact that whatever
Vol. 17, p. 93). conclusion We may draw on this matter will have a far
reaching influence, nor can We overlook the pages of
While it is true and We have to concede that in the history that arouse indignation and criticisms against
profession of their faith, the Roman Pontiff is the church landholdings. This nurtured feeling that
supreme head; that in the religious matters, in the snowbailed into a strong nationalistic sentiment
exercise of their belief, the Catholic congregation of the manifested itself when the provisions on natural to be
faithful throughout the world seeks the guidance and embodied in the Philippine Constitution were framed,
direction of their Spiritual Father in the Vatican, yet it but all that has been said on this regard referred more
cannot be said that there is a merger of personalities particularly to landholdings of religious corporations
resultant therein. Neither can it be said that the known as "Friar Estates" which have already bee
political and civil rights of the faithful, inherent or acquired by our government, and not to properties held
acquired under the laws of their country, are affected by corporations sole which, We repeat, are properties
by that relationship with the Pope. The fact that the held in trust for the benefit of the faithful residing
Roman Catholic Church in almost every country springs within its territorial jurisdiction. Though that same
from that society that saw its beginning in Europe and feeling probably precipitated and influenced to a large
the fact that the clergy of this faith derive their extent the doctrine laid down in the celebrated
authorities and receive orders from the Holy See do not Krivenco decision, We have to take this matter in the
give or bestow the citizenship of the Pope upon these light of legal provisions and jurisprudence actually
branches. Citizenship is a political right which cannot obtaining, irrespective of sentiments.
be acquired by a sort of "radiation". We have to realize
that although there is a fraternity among all the The question now left for our determination is whether
catholic countries and the dioceses therein all over the the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the
globe, the universality that the word "catholic" implies, Philippines, or better still, the corporation sole named
merely characterize their faith, a uniformity in the the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao,
practice and the interpretation of their dogma and in Inc., is qualified to acquire private agricultural lands in
the exercise of their belief, but certainly they are the Philippines pursuant to the provisions of Article XIII
separate and independent from one another in of the Constitution.
jurisdiction, governed by different laws under which
they are incorporated, and entirely independent on the We see from sections 1 and 5 of said Article quoted
others in the management and ownership of their before, that only persons or corporations qualified to
temporalities. To allow theory that the Roman Catholic acquire hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines may acquire or be assigned and hold the satisfaction of the Court that notice of the
private agricultural lands. Consequently, the decisive application for leave to mortgage or sell has
factor in the present controversy hinges on the been given by publication or otherwise in such
proposition or whether or not the petitioner in this case manner and for such time as said Court or the
can acquire agricultural lands of the public domain. Judge thereof may have directed, and that it is
to the interest of the corporation that leave to
From the data secured from the Securities and mortgage or sell must be made by petition,
Exchange Commission, We find that the Roman duly verified by the bishop, chief priest, or
Catholic Bishop of Zamboanga was incorporated (as a presiding elder acting as corporation sole, and
corporation sole) in September, 1912, principally to may be opposed by any member of the
administer its temporalities and manage its properties. religious denomination, society or church
Probably due to the ravages of the last war, its articles represented by the corporation sole: Provided,
of incorporation were reconstructed in the Securities however, That in cases where the rules,
and Exchange Commission on April 8, 1948. At first, regulations, and discipline of the religious
this corporation sole administered all the temporalities denomination, society or church concerned
of the church existing or located in the island of represented by such corporation sole regulate
Mindanao. Later on, however, new dioceses were the methods of acquiring, holding, selling and
formed and new corporations sole were created to mortgaging real estate and personal property,
correspond with the territorial jurisdiction of the new such rules, regulations, and discipline shall
dioceses, one of them being petitioner herein, the control and the intervention of the Courts shall
Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., not be necessary.
which was registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on September 12, 1950, and succeeded in It can, therefore, be noticed that the power of a
the administrative for all the "temporalities" of the corporation sole to purchase real property, like the
Roman Catholic Church existing in Davao. power exercised in the case at bar, it is not restricted
although the power to sell or mortgage sometimes is,
According to our Corporation Law, Public Act No. 1549, depending upon the rules, regulations, and discipline of
approved April 1, 1906, a corporation sole. the church concerned represented by said corporation
sole. If corporations sole can purchase and sell real
is organized and composed of a single estate for its church, charitable, benevolent, or
individual, the head of any religious society or educational purposes, can they register said real
church, for the ADMINISTRATION of the properties? As provided by law, lands held in trust for
temporalities of such society or church. By specific purposes me be subject of registration (section
"temporalities" is meant estate and properties 69, Act 496), and the capacity of a corporation sole,
not used exclusively for religious worship. The like petitioner herein, to register lands belonging to it is
successor in office of such religious head or acknowledged, and title thereto may be issued in its
chief priest incorporated as a corporation sole name (Bishop of Nueva Segovia vs. Insular
shall become the corporation sole on ascension Government, 26 Phil. 300-1913). Indeed it is absurd
to office, and shall be permitted to transact that while the corporations sole that might be in need
business as such on filing with the Securities of acquiring lands for the erection of temples where the
and Exchange Commission a copy of his faithful can pray, or schools and cemeteries which they
commission, certificate of election or letter of are expressly authorized by law to acquire in
appointment duly certified by any notary public connection with the propagation of the Roman Catholic
or clerk of court of record (Guevara's The Apostolic faith or in furtherance of their freedom of
Philippine Corporation Law, p. 223). religion they could not register said properties in their
name. As professor Javier J. Nepomuceno very well
says "Man in his search for the immortal and
The Corporation Law also contains the following
imponderable, has, even before the dawn of recorded
provisions:
history, erected temples to the Unknown God, and
there is no doubt that he will continue to do so for all
SECTION 159. Any corporation sole may time to come, as long as he continues 'imploring the
purchase and hold real estate and personal; aid of Divine Providence'" (Nepomuceno's Corporation
property for its church, charitable, benevolent, Sole, VI Ateneo Law Journal, No. 1, p. 41, September,
or educational purposes, and may receive 1956). Under the circumstances of this case, We might
bequests or gifts of such purposes. Such safely state that even before the establishment of the
corporation may mortgage or sell real property Philippine Commonwealth and of the Republic of the
held by it upon obtaining an order for that Philippines every corporation sole then organized and
purpose from the Court of First Instance of the registered had by express provision of law the
province in which the property is situated; but necessary power and qualification to purchase in its
before making the order proof must be made to
name private lands located in the territory in which it international conflicts with the consequent danger to
exercised its functions or ministry and for which it was its internal security and independence (See The
created, independently of the nationality of its Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Professor Jose
incumbent unique and single member and head, the M. Aruego, a Delegate to the Constitutional
bishop of the dioceses. It can be also maintained Convention, Vol. II. P. 592-604). In the same book
without fear of being gainsaid that the Roman Catholic Delegate Aruego, explaining the reason behind the first
Apostolic Church in the Philippines has no nationality consideration, wrote:
and that the framers of the Constitution, as will be
hereunder explained, did not have in mind the religious At the time of the framing of Philippine
corporations sole when they provided that 60 per Constitution, Filipino capital had been to be
centum of the capital thereof be owned by Filipino rather shy. Filipinos hesitated s a general rule
citizens. to invest a considerable sum of their capital for
the development, exploitation and utilization of
There could be no controversy as to the fact that a duly the natural resources of the country. They had
registered corporation sole is an artificial being having not as yet been so used to corporate as the
the right of succession and the power, attributes, and peoples of the west. This general apathy, the
properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its delegates knew, would mean the retardation of
existence (section 1, Corporation Law). In outlining the the development of the natural resources,
general powers of a corporation. Public Act. No. 1459 unless foreign capital would be encouraged to
provides among others: come and help in that development. They
knew that the naturalization of the natural
SEC. 13. Every corporation has the power: resources would certainly not encourage
the INVESTMENT OF FOREIGN CAPITAL into
(5) To purchase, hold, convey, sell, lease, lot, them. But there was a general feeling in the
mortgage, encumber, and otherwise deal with Convention that it was better to have such a
such real and personal property as the purpose development retarded or even postpone
for which the corporation was formed may together until such time when the Filipinos
permit, and the transaction of the lawful would be ready and willing to undertake it
business of the corporation may reasonably rather than permit the natural resources to be
and necessarily require, unless otherwise placed under the ownership or control of
prescribed in this Act: . . . foreigners in order that they might be
immediately be developed, with the Filipinos of
the future serving not as owners but utmost as
In implementation of the same and specially made
tenants or workers under foreign masters. By
applicable to a form of corporation recognized by the
all means, the delegates believed, the natural
same law, Section 159 aforequoted expressly allowed
resources should be conserved for Filipino
the corporation sole to purchase and hold real as well
posterity.
as personal properties necessary for the promotion of
the objects for which said corporation sole is created.
Respondent Land Registration Commissioner, however, It could be distilled from the foregoing that the farmers
maintained that since the Philippine Constitution is a of the Constitution intended said provisions as barrier
later enactment than public Act No. 1459, the for foreigners or corporations financed by such
provisions of Section 159 in amplification of Section 13 foreigners to acquire, exploit and develop our natural
thereof, as regard real properties, should be considered resources, saving these undeveloped wealth for our
repealed by the former. people to clear and enrich when they are already
prepared and capable of doing so. But that is not the
case of corporations sole in the Philippines, for, We
There is a reason to believe that when the specific
repeat, they are mere administrators of the
provision of the Constitution invoked by respondent
"temporalities" or properties titled in their name and
Commissioner was under consideration, the framers of
for the benefit of the members of their respective
the same did not have in mind or overlooked this
religion composed of an overwhelming majority of
particular form of corporation. It is undeniable that the
Filipinos. No mention nor allusion whatsoever is made
naturalization and conservation of our national
in the Constitution as to the prohibition against or the
resources was one of the dominating objectives of the
liability of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines
Convention and in drafting the present Article XII of the
to acquire and hold agricultural lands. Although there
Constitution, the delegates were goaded by the desire
were some discussions on landholdings, they were
(1) to insure their conservation for Filipino posterity; (2)
mostly confined in the inclusion of the provision
to serve as an instrument of national defense, helping
allowing the Government to break big landed estates
prevent the extension into the country of foreign
to put an end to absentee landlordism.
control through peaceful economic penetration; and (3)
to prevent making the Philippines a source of
But let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the either did not agree with the theory of the writer, or
above referred to inhibitory clause of Section 1 of were not ready to take a definite stand on the
Article XIII of the constitution does have bearing on the particular point I am now to discuss deferring our ruling
petitioner's case; even so the clause requiring that at on such debatable question for a better occasion,
least 60 per centum of the capital of the corporation be inasmuch as the determination thereof is not
owned by Filipinos is subordinated to the petitioner's absolutely necessary for the solution of the problem
aforesaid right already existing at the time of the involved in this case. In his desire to face the issues
inauguration of the Commonwealth and the Republic of squarely, the writer will endeavor, at least as a
the Philippines. In the language of Mr. Justice Jose P. disgression, to explain and develop his theory, not as a
Laurel (a delegate to the Constitutional Convention), in lucubration of the Court, but of his own, for he deems it
his concurring opinion of the case of Gold Creek mining better and convenient to go over the cycle of reasons
Corporation, petitioner vs. Eulogio Rodriguez, Secretary that are linked to one another and that step by step
of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico Abadilla, lead Us to conclude as We do in the dispositive part of
Director of the Bureau of Mines, respondent, 66 Phil. this decision.
259:
It will be noticed that Section 1 of Article XIII of the
The saving clause in the section involved of the Constitution provides, among other things, that "all
Constitution was originally embodied in the agricultural lands of the public domain and their
report submitted by the Committee on disposition shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines
Naturalization and Preservation of Land and or to corporations at least 60 per centum of the capital
Other Natural Resources to the Constitutional of which is owned by such citizens, SUBJECT TO ANY
Convention on September 17, 1954. It was EXISTING RIGHT AT THE TIME OF THE INAUGURATION
later inserted in the first draft of the OF THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED UNDER THIS
Constitution as section 13 of Article XIII thereof, CONSTITUTION."
and finally incorporated as we find it now.
Slight have been the changes undergone by As recounted by Mr. Justice Laurel in the
the proviso from the time when it comes out of aforementioned case of Gold Creek Mining Corporation
the committee until it was finally adopted. vs. Rodriguez et al., 66 Phil. 259, "this recognition (in
When first submitted and as inserted to the the clause already quoted), is not mere
first draft of the Constitution it reads: 'subject graciousness but springs from the just character of the
to any right, grant, lease, or concession government established. The farmers of the
existing in respect thereto on the date of the Constitution were not obscured by the rhetoric of
adoption of the Constitution'. As finally democracy or swayed to hostility by an intense spirit of
adopted, the proviso reads: 'subject to any nationalism. They well knew that conservation of our
existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the natural resources did not mean destruction or
time of the inauguration of the Government annihilation of ACQUIRED PROPERTY RIGHTS".
established under this Constitution'. This
recognition is not mere graciousness but But respondents' counsel may argue that the
springs form the just character of the preexisting right of acquisition of public or private
government established. The framers of the lands by a corporation which does not fulfill this 60 per
Constitution were not obscured by the rhetoric cent requisite, refers to purchases of the Constitution
of democracy or swayed to hostility by an and not to later transactions. This argument would
intense spirit of nationalism. They well knew imply that even assuming that petitioner had at the
that conservation of our natural resources did time of the enactment of the Constitution the right to
not mean destruction or annihilation of purchase real property or right could not be exercised
acquired property rights. Withal, they erected a after the effectivity of our Constitution, because said
government neither episodic nor stationary but power or right of corporations sole, like the herein
well-nigh conservative in the protection of petitioner, conferred in virtue of the aforequoted
property rights. This notwithstanding provisions of the Corporation Law, could no longer be
nationalistic and socialistic traits discoverable exercised in view of the requisite therein prescribed
upon even a sudden dip into a variety of the that at least 60 per centum of the capital of the
provisions embodied in the instrument. corporation had to be Filipino. It has been shown before
that: (1) the corporation sole, unlike the ordinary
The writer of this decision wishes to state at this corporations which are formed by no less than 5
juncture that during the deliberation of this case he incorporators, is composed of only one persons, usually
submitted to the consideration of the Court the the head or bishop of the diocese, a unit which is not
question that may be termed the "vested right saving subject to expansion for the purpose of determining
clause" contained in Section 1, Article XII of the any percentage whatsoever; (2) the corporation sole is
Constitution, but some of the members of this Court only the administrator and not the owner of the
temporalities located in the territory comprised by said grant, etc., at the same time of the inauguration of the
corporation sole; (3) such temporalities are Government established under this Constitution, yet
administered for and on behalf of the faithful residing We would have, under the evidence on record,
in the diocese or territory of the corporation sole; and sufficient grounds to uphold petitioner's contention on
(4) the latter, as such, has no nationality and the this matter.
citizenship of the incumbent Ordinary has nothing to
do with the operation, management or administration In this case of the Register of Deeds of Rizal vs. Ung
of the corporation sole, nor effects the citizenship of Sui Si Temple, 2 G.R. No. L-6776, promulgated May 21,
the faithful connected with their respective dioceses or 1955, wherein this question was considered from a
corporation sole. different angle, this Court through Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, said:
In view of these peculiarities of the corporation sole, it
would seem obvious that when the specific provision of The fact that the appellant religious
the Constitution invoked by respondent Commissioner organization has no capital stock does not
(section 1, Art. XIII), was under consideration, the suffice to escape the Constitutional inhibition,
framers of the same did not have in mind or since it is admitted that its members are of
overlooked this particular form of corporation. If this foreign nationality. The purpose of the sixty per
were so, as the facts and circumstances already centum requirement is obviously to ensure that
indicated tend to prove it to be so, then the corporation or associations allowed to acquire
inescapable conclusion would be that this requirement agricultural land or to exploit natural resources
of at least 60 per cent of Filipino capital was never shall be controlled by Filipinos; and the spirit of
intended to apply to corporations sole, and the the Constitution demands that in the absence
existence or not a vested right becomes of capital stock, the controlling membership
unquestionably immaterial. should be composed of Filipino citizens.

But let us assumed that the questioned proviso is In that case respondent-appellant Ung Siu Si Temple
material. yet We might say that a reading of said was not a corporation sole but a corporation
Section 1 will show that it does not refer to any actual aggregate, i.e., an unregistered organization operating
acquisition of land up to the right, qualification or through 3 trustees, all of Chinese nationality, and that
power to acquire and hold private real property. The is why this Court laid down the doctrine just quoted.
population of the Philippines, Catholic to a high With regard to petitioner, which likewise is a non-stock
percentage, is ever increasing. In the practice of corporation, the case is different, because it is a
religion of their faithful the corporation sole may be in registered corporation sole, evidently of no nationality
need of more temples where to pray, more schools and registered mainly to administer the temporalities
where the children of the congregation could be taught and manage the properties belonging to the faithful of
in the principles of their religion, more hospitals where said church residing in Davao. But even if we were to
their sick could be treated, more hallow or consecrated go over the record to inquire into the composing
grounds or cemeteries where Catholics could be membership to determine whether the citizenship
buried, many more than those actually existing at the requirement is satisfied or not, we would find
time of the enactment of our Constitution. This being undeniable proof that the members of the Roman
the case, could it be logically maintained that because Catholic Apostolic faith within the territory of Davao are
the corporation sole which, by express provision of law, predominantly Filipino citizens. As indicated before,
has the power to hold and acquire real estate and petitioner has presented evidence to establish that the
personal property of its churches, charitable clergy and lay members of this religion fully covers the
benevolent, or educational purposes (section 159, percentage of Filipino citizens required by the
Corporation Law) it has to stop its growth and restrain Constitution. These facts are not controverted by
its necessities just because the corporation sole is a respondents and our conclusion in this point is sensibly
non-stock corporation composed of only one person obvious.
who in his unity does not admit of any percentage,
especially when that person is not the owner but Dissenting OpinionDiscussed. After having
merely an administrator of the temporalities of the developed our theory in the case and arrived at the
corporation sole? The writer leaves the answer to findings and conclusions already expressed in this
whoever may read and consider this portion of the decision. We now deem it proper to analyze and delve
decision. into the basic foundation on which the dissenting
opinion stands up. Being aware of the transcendental
Anyway, as stated before, this question is not a and far-reaching effects that Our ruling on the matter
decisive factor in disposing the case, for even if We might have, this case was thoroughly considered from
were to disregard such saving clause of the all points of view, the Court sparing no effort to solve
Constitution, which reads: subject to any existing right, the delicate problems involved herein.
At the deliberations had to attain this end, two ways encumber and otherwise deal with real properties
were open to a prompt dispatch of the case: (1) the when it is pursuant to or in consonance with the
reversal of the doctrine We laid down in the celebrated purposes for which the corporation was formed, and
Krivenko case by excluding urban lots and properties when the transactions of the lawful business of the
from the group of the term "private agricultural lands" corporation reasonably and necessarily require such
use in this section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution; and dealing section 13-(5) of the Corporation Law, Public
(2) by driving Our reasons to a point that might Act No. 1459 and considering these provisions in
indirectly cause the appointment of Filipino bishops or conjunction with Section 159 of the same law which
Ordinary to head the corporations sole created to provides that a corporation sole may only "purchase
administer the temporalities of the Roman Catholic and hold real estate and personal properties for its
Church in the Philippines. With regard to the first way, church, charitable, benevolent or educational
a great majority of the members of this Court were not purposes", the above mentioned fear of revitalization
yet prepared nor agreeable to follow that course, for of religious landholdings in the Philippines is absolutely
reasons that are obvious. As to the second way, it dispelled. The fact that the law
seems to be misleading because the nationality of the thus expressly authorizes the corporations sole
head of a diocese constituted as a corporation sole has to receive bequests or gifts of real properties (which
no material bearing on the functions of the latter, were the main source that the friars had to acquire
which are limited to the administration of the their big haciendas during the Spanish regime), is a
temporalities of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in clear indication that the requisite that bequests or gifts
the Philippines. of real estate be for charitable, benevolent, or
educational purposes, was, in the opinion of the
Upon going over the grounds on which the dissenting legislators, considered sufficient and adequate
opinion is based, it may be noticed that its author protection against the revitalization of religious
lingered on the outskirts of the issues, thus throwing landholdings.
the main points in controversy out of focus. Of course
We fully agree, as stated by Professor Aruego, that the Finally, and as previously stated, We have reason to
framers of our Constitution had at heart to insure the believe that when the Delegates to the Constitutional
conservation of the natural resources of Our Convention drafted and approved Article XIII of the
motherland of Filipino posterity; to serve them as an Constitution they do not have in mind the corporation
instrument of national defense, helping prevent the sole. We come to this finding because the
extension into the country of foreign control through Constitutional Assembly, composed as it was by a
peaceful economic penetration; and to prevent making great number of eminent lawyers and jurists, was like
the Philippines a source of international conflicts with any other legislative body empowered to enact either
the consequent danger to its internal security and the Constitution of the country or any public statute,
independence. But all these precautions adopted by presumed to know the conditions existing as to
the Delegates to Our Constitutional Assembly could particular subject matter when it enacted a statute
have not been intended for or directed against cases (Board of Commerce of Orange Country vs. Bain, 92
like the one at bar. The emphasis and wonderings on S.E. 176; N. C. 377).
the statement that once the capacity of a corporation
sole to acquire private agricultural lands is admitted Immemorial customs are presumed to have
there will be no limit to the areas that it may hold and been always in the mind of the Legislature in
that this will pave the way for the "revival or enacting legislation. (In re Kruger's Estate, 121
revitalization of religious landholdings that proved so A. 109; 277 P. 326).
troublesome in our past", cannot even furnish the
"penumbra" of a threat to the future of the Filipino The Legislative is presumed to have a
people. In the first place, the right of Filipino citizens, knowledge of the state of the law on the
including those of foreign extraction, and Philippine subjects upon which it legislates. (Clover Valley
corporations, to acquire private lands is not subject to Land and Stock Co. vs. Lamb et al., 187, p.
any restriction or limit as to quantity or area, and We 723,726.)
certainly do not see any wrong in that. The right of
Filipino citizens and corporations to acquire public
The Court in construing a statute, will assume
agricultural lands is already limited by law. In the
that the legislature acted with full knowledge of
second place, corporations sole cannot be considered
the prior legislation on the subject and its
as aliens because they have no nationality at all.
construction by the courts. (Johns vs. Town of
Corporations sole are, under the law, mere
Sheridan, 89 N. E. 899, 44 Ind. App. 620.).
administrators of the temporalities of the Roman
Catholic Church in the Philippines. In the third place,
every corporation, be it aggregate or sole, is only The Legislature is presumed to have been
entitled to purchase, convey, sell, lease, let, mortgage, familiar with the subject with which it was
 dealing . . . . (Landers vs. Commonwealth, 101 population more places of worship, more
S. E. 778, 781.). schools where our youth could be taught and
trained; more hallow grounds where to bury
The Legislature is presumed to know principles our dead would be needed in the course of
of statutory construction. (People vs. Lowell, time.
230 N. W. 202, 250 Mich. 349, followed in P. vs.
Woodworth, 230 N.W. 211, 250 Mich. 436.). Long before the enactment of our Constitution the law
authorized the corporations sole even to receive
It is not to be presumed that a provision was bequests or gifts of real estates and this Court could
inserted in a constitution or statute without not, without any clear and specific provision of the
reason, or that a result was intended Constitution, declare that any real property donated,
inconsistent with the judgment of men of let as say this year, could no longer be registered in
common sense guided by reason" (Mitchell vs. the name of the corporation sole to which it was
Lawden, 123 N.E. 566, 288 Ill. 326.) See City of conveyed. That would be an absurdity that should not
Decatur vs. German, 142 N. E. 252, 310 Ill. receive our sanction on the pretext that corporations
591, and may other authorities that can be sole which have no nationality and are non-stock
cited in support hereof. corporations composed of only one person in the
capacity of administrator, have to establish first that at
Consequently, the Constitutional Assembly must have least sixty per centum of their capital belong to Filipino
known: citizens. The new Civil Code even provides:

1. That a corporation sole is organized by and ART. 10. In case of doubt in

composed of a single individual, the head of the interpretation or application of laws, it is
any religious society or church operating within presumed that the lawmaking body intended
the zone, area or jurisdiction covered by said right and justice to prevail.
corporation sole (Article 155, Public Act No.
1459); Moreover, under the laws of the Philippines, the
administrator of the properties of a Filipino can
2. That a corporation sole is a non-stock acquire, in the name of the latter, private lands without
corporation; any limitation whatsoever, and that is so because the
properties thus acquired are not for and would not
belong to the administrator but to the Filipino whom he
3. That the Ordinary ( the corporation sole
represents. But the dissenting Justice inquires: If the
proper) does not own the temporalities which
Ordinary is only the administrator, for whom does he
he merely administers;
administer? And who can alter or overrule his acts? We
will forthwith proceed to answer these questions. The
4. That under the law the nationality of said corporations sole by reason of their peculiar
Ordinary or of any administrator has absolutely constitution and form of operation have no designed
no bearing on the nationality of the person owner of its temporalities, although by the terms of the
desiring to acquire real property in the law it can be safely implied that the Ordinary holds
Philippines by purchase or other lawful means them in trust for the benefit of the Roman Catholic
other than by hereditary succession, who faithful to their respective locality or diocese.
according to the Constitution must be a Filipino Borrowing the very words of the law, We may say that
(sections 1 and 5, Article XIII). the temporalities of every corporation sole are held in
trust for the use, purpose, behalf and benefit of the
5. That section 159 of the Corporation religious society, or order so incorporated or of the
Law expressly authorized the corporation church to which the diocese, synod, or district
sole to purchase and hold real estate for its organization is an organized and constituent part
church, charitable, benevolent or educational (section 163 of the Corporation Law).
purposes, and to receive bequests or gifts for
such purposes; In connection with the powers of the Ordinary over the
temporalities of the corporation sole, let us see now
6. That in approving our Magna Carta the what is the meaning and scope of the word "control".
Delegates to the Constitutional Convention, According to the Merriam-Webster's New International
almost all of whom were Roman Catholics, Dictionary, 2nd ed., p. 580, on of the acceptations of
could not have intended to curtail the the word "control" is:
propagation of the Roman Catholic faith or the
expansion of the activities of their church, 4. To exercise restraining or directing influence
knowing pretty well that with the growth of our over; to dominate; regulate; hence, to hold
 from action; to curb; subject; also, Obs. to 428, 91 N.E. 344, 92 N.E. 164, 30 L.R.A. n.s.
overpower. 665; Hendryx vs. Peoples United
Church, supra.).
SYN: restrain, rule, govern, guide, direct;
check, subdue. Courts of the state do not interfere with the
administration of church rules or discipline
It is true that under section 159 of the Corporation unless civil rights become involved and which
Law, the intervention of the courts is not necessary, must be protected (Morris St., Baptist Church
to mortgage or sell real property held by the vs. Dart, 67 S.C. 338, 45 S.E. 753, and others).
corporation sole where the rules, regulations and (All cited in Vol. II, Cooley's Constitutional
discipline of the religious denomination, society or Limitations, p. 960-964.).
church concerned presented by such corporation sole
regulates the methods of acquiring, holding, selling If the Constitutional Assembly was aware of all the
and mortgaging real estate, and that the Roman facts above enumerated and of the provisions of law
Catholic faithful residing in the jurisdiction of the relative to existing conditions as to management and
corporation sole has no say either in the manner of operation of corporations sole in the Philippines, and if,
acquiring or of selling real property. It may be also on the other hand, almost all of the Delegates thereto
admitted that the faithful of the diocese cannot govern embraced the Roman Catholic faith, can it be imagined
or overrule the acts of the Ordinary, but all this does even for an instant that when Article XIII of the
not mean that the latter can administer the Constitution was approved the framers thereof
temporalities of the corporation sole without check or intended to prevent or curtail from then on the
restraint. We must not forget that when a corporation acquisition sole, either by purchase or donation, of real
sole is incorporated under Philippine laws, the head properties that they might need for the propagation of
and only member thereof subjects himself to the the faith and for there religious and Christian activities
jurisdiction of the Philippine courts of justice and these such as the moral education of the youth, the care,
tribunals can thus entertain grievances arising out of or attention and treatment of the sick and the burial of
with respect to the temporalities of the church which the dead of the Roman Catholic faithful residing in the
came into the possession of the corporation sole as jurisdiction of the respective corporations sole? The
administrator. It may be alleged that the courts cannot mere indulgence in said thought would impress upon
intervene as to the matters of doctrine or teachings of Us a feeling of apprehension and absurdity. And that is
the Roman Catholic Church. That is correct, but the precisely the leit motiv that permeates the whole fabric
courts may step in, at the instance of the faithful for of the dissenting opinion.
whom the temporalities are being held in trust, to
check undue exercise by the corporation sole of its It seems from the foregoing that the main problem We
power as administrator to insure that they are used for are confronted with in this appeal, hinges around the
the purpose or purposes for which the corporation sole necessity of a proper and adequate interpretation of
was created. sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution. Let
Us then be guided by the principles of statutory
American authorities have these to say: construction laid down by the authorities on the
matter:
It has been held that the courts have
jurisdiction over an action brought by persons The most important single factor in
claiming to be members of a church, who determining the intention of the people from
allege a wrongful and fraudulent diversion of whom the constitution emanated is the
the church property to uses foreign to the language in which it is expressed. The words
purposes of the church, since no ecclesiastical employed are to be taken in their natural
question is involved and equity will protect sense, except that legal or technical terms are
from wrongful diversion of the to be given their technical meaning. The
property (Hendryx vs. Peoples United Church, imperfections of language as a vehicle for
42 Wash. 336, 4 L.R.A. n.s. 1154). conveying meanings result in ambiguities that
must be resolved by result to extraneous aids
The courts of the State have no general for discovering the intent of the framers.
jurisdiction and control over the officers of such Among the more important of these are a
corporations in respect to the performance of consideration of the history of the times when
their official duties; but as in respect to the the provision was adopted and of the purposes
property which they hold for the corporation, aimed at in its adoption. The debates of
they stand in position of TRUSTEES and the constitutional convention, contemporaneous
courts may exercise the same supervision as in construction, and practical construction by the
other cases of trust (Ramsey vs. Hicks, 174 Ind. legislative and executive departments,
especially if long continued, may be resorted to purpose of a constitutional provision, is not
resolve, but not to create, only favored but will be adopted (State ex rel.
ambiguities. . . . Consideration of the Randolph Country vs. Walden, 206 S.W. 2d
consequences flowing from alternative 979).
constructions of doubtful provisions constitutes
an important interpretative device. . . . The It is quite generally held that in arriving at the
purposes of many of the broadly phrased intent and purpose the construction should be
constitutional limitations were the promotion of broad or liberal or equitable, as the better
policies that do not lend themselves to definite method of ascertaining that intent, rather than
and specific formulation. The courts have had technical (Great Southern Life Ins. Co. vs. City
to define those policies and have often drawn of Austin, 243 S.W. 778).
on natural law and natural rights theories in
doing so. The interpretation of constitutions All these authorities uphold our conviction that the
tends to respond to changing conceptions of framers of the Constitution had not in mind the
political and social values. The extent to which corporations sole, nor intended to apply them the
these extraneous aids affect the judicial provisions of section 1 and 5 of said Article XIII when
construction of constitutions cannot be they passed and approved the same. And if it were so
formulated in precise rules, but their influence as We think it is, herein petitioner, the Roman Catholic
cannot be ignored in describing the essentials Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., could not be
of the process (Rottschaeffer on Constitutional deprived of the right to acquire by purchase or
Law, 1939 ed., p. 18-19). donation real properties for charitable, benevolent and
educational purposes, nor of the right to register the
There are times that when even the literal same in its name with the Register of Deeds of Davao,
expression of legislation may be inconsistent an indispensable requisite prescribed by the Land
with the general objectives of policy behind it, Registration Act for lands covered by the Torrens
and on the basis of equity or spirit of the system.
statute the courts rationalize a restricted
meaning of the latter. A restricted We leave as the last theme for discussion the much
interpretation is usually applied where the debated question above referred to as "the vested
effect of literal interpretation will make for right saving clause" contained in section 1, Article XIII
injustice and absurdity or, in the words of one of the Constitution. The dissenting Justice hurls upon
court, the language must be so unreasonable the personal opinion expressed on the matter by the
'as to shock general common sense'. (Vol. 3, writer of the decision the most pointed darts of his
Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., severe criticism. We think, however, that this strong
150.). dissent should have been spared, because as clearly
indicated before, some members of this Court either
A constitution is not intended to be a limitation did not agree with the theory of the writer or were not
on the development of a country nor an ready to take a definite stand on that particular point,
obstruction to its progress and foreign relations so that there being no majority opinion thereon there
(Moscow Fire Ins. Co. of Moscow, Russia vs. was no need of any dissension therefrom. But as the
Bank of New York and Trust Co., 294 N. Y. criticism has been made the writer deems it necessary
S.648; 56 N.E. 2d. 745, 293 N.Y. 749). to say a few words of explanation.

Although the meaning or principles of a The writer fully agrees with the dissenting Justice that
constitution remain fixed and unchanged from ordinarily "a capacity to acquire (property) in futuro, is
the time of its adoption, a constitution must be not in itself a vested or existing property right that the
construed as if intended to stand for a great Constitution protects from impairment. For a property
length of time, and it is progressive and not right to be vested (or acquired) there must be a
static. Accordingly, it should not receive too transition from the potential or contingent to
narrow or literal an interpretation but rather the actual, and the proprietary interest must have
the meaning given it should be applied in such attached to a thing; it must have become 'fixed and
manner as to meet new or changed conditions established'" (Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498). But the
as they arise (U.S. vs. Lassic, 313 U.S. 299, 85 case at bar has to be considered as an exception to the
L. Ed., 1368). rule because among the rights granted by section 159
of the Corporation Law was the right to receive
Effect should be given to the purpose indicated bequests or gifts of real properties for charitable,
by a fair interpretation of the language used benevolent and educational purposes. And this right to
and that construction which effectuates, rather receive such bequests or gifts (which implies donations
than that which destroys a plain intent or in futuro), is not a mere potentiality that could be
impaired without any specific provision in the
Constitution to that effect, especially when the
impairment would disturbingly affect the propagation
of the religious faith of the immense majority of the
Filipino people and the curtailment of the activities of
their Church. That is why the writer gave us a basis of
his contention what Professor Aruego said in his book
"The Framing of the Philippine Constitution" and the
enlightening opinion of Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel,
another Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, in
his concurring opinion in the case of Goldcreek Mining
Co. vs. Eulogio Rodriguez et al., 66 Phil. 259. Anyway
the majority of the Court did not deem necessary to
pass upon said "vested right saving clause" for the
final determination of this case.

JUDGMENT
Republic of the Philippines
Wherefore, the resolution of the respondent Land SUPREME COURT
Registration Commission of September 21, 1954, Manila
holding that in view of the provisions of sections 1 and
5 of Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution the EN BANC
vendee (petitioner) is not qualified to acquire lands in
the Philippines in the absence of proof that at least 60 G.R. No. L-630 November 15, 1947
per centum of the capital, properties or assets of the
Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc.
ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant,
is actually owned or controlled by Filipino citizens, and
vs.
denying the registration of the deed of sale in the
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF
absence of proof of compliance with such requisite, is
MANILA, respondent and appellee.
hereby reversed. Consequently, the respondent
Register of Deeds of the City of Davao is ordered to
Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha of petitioner-
register the deed of sale executed by Mateo L. Rodis in
appellant.
favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor
Davao, Inc., which is the subject of the present
Carreon for respondent-appellee.
litigation. No pronouncement is made as to costs. It is
Marcelino Lontok appeared as amicus curies.
so ordered.

MORAN, C.J.:

Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot

from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of 1941,
the registration of which was interrupted by the war. In
May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said registration
but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on
the ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land
in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to
the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of
Manila by means of a consulta, and that court rendered
judgment sustaining the refusal of the register of
deeds, from which Krivenko appealed to this Court.

There is no dispute as to these facts. The real point in

issue is whether or not an alien under our Constitution
may acquire residential land.

It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is

unnecessary, there being a motion to withdraw the
appeal which should have been granted outright, and
reference is made to the ruling laid down by this Court
in another case to the effect that a court should not conviction in a future case may be remote, with the
pass upon a constitutional question if its judgment may result that our indifference of today might signify a
be made to rest upon other grounds. There is, we permanent offense to the Constitution.
believe, a confusion of ideas in this reasoning. It cannot
be denied that the constitutional question is All thse circumstances were thoroughly considered and
unavoidable if we choose to decide this case upon the weighted by this Court for a number of days and the
merits. Our judgment cannot to be made to rest upon legal result of the last vote was a denial of the motion
other grounds if we have to render any judgment at all. withdrawing the appeal. We are thus confronted, at this
And we cannot avoid our judgment simply because we stage of the proceedings, with our duty, the
have to avoid a constitutional question. We cannot, for constitutional question becomes unavoidable. We shall
instance, grant the motion withdrawing the appeal only then proceed to decide that question.
because we wish to evade the constitutional; issue.
Whether the motion should be, or should not be, Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows:
granted, is a question involving different considerations
now to be stated.
Article XIII. Conservation and utilization of
natural resources.
According to Rule 52, section 4, of the Rules of Court, it
is discretionary upon this Court to grant a withdrawal
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral
of appeal after the briefs have been presented. At the
lands of the public domain, water, minerals,
time the motion for withdrawal was filed in this case,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
not only had the briefs been prensented, but the case
forces of potential energy, and other natural
had already been voted and the majority decision was
resources of the Philippines belong to the
being prepared. The motion for withdrawal stated no
State, and their disposition, exploitation,
reason whatsoever, and the Solicitor General was
development, or utilization shall be limited to
agreeable to it. While the motion was pending in this
citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
Court, came the new circular of the Department of
associations at least sixty per centum of the
Justice, instructing all register of deeds to accept for
capital of which is owned by such citizens,
registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens.
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or
The herein respondent-appellee was naturally one of
concession at the time of the inaguration of the
the registers of deeds to obey the new circular, as
Government established uunder this
against his own stand in this case which had been
Constitution. Natural resources, with the
maintained by the trial court and firmly defended in
exception of public agricultural land, shall not
this Court by the Solicitor General. If we grant the
be alienated, and no licence, concession, or
withdrawal, the the result would be that petitioner-
lease for the exploitation, development, or
appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case, not by a
utilization of any of the natural resources shall
decision of this Court, but by the decision or circular of
be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five
the Department of Justice, issued while this case was
years, renewable for another twenty-five years,
pending before this Court. Whether or not this is the
except as to water rights for irrigation, water
reason why appellant seeks the withdrawal of his
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than
appeal and why the Solicitor General readily agrees to
the development of water "power" in which
that withdrawal, is now immaterial. What is material
cases beneficial use may be the measure and
and indeed very important, is whether or not we should
the limit of the grant.
allow interference with the regular and complete
exercise by this Court of its constitutional functions,
and whether or not after having held long deliberations The scope of this constitutional provision, according to
and after having reached a clear and positive its heading and its language, embraces all lands of any
conviction as to what the constitutional mandate is, we kind of the public domain, its purpose being to
may still allow our conviction to be silenced, and the establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the
constitutional mandate to be ignored or misconceived, conservation and utilization of all natural resources of
with all the harmful consequences that might be the Nation. When, therefore, this provision, with
brought upon the national patromony. For it is but reference to lands of the public domain, makes
natural that the new circular be taken full advantage of mention of only agricultural, timber and mineral lands,
by many, with the circumstance that perhaps the it means that all lands of the public domain are
constitutional question may never come up again classified into said three groups, namely, agricultural,
before this court, because both vendors and vendees timber and mineral. And this classification finds
will have no interest but to uphold the validity of their corroboration in the circumstance that at the time of
transactions, and very unlikely will the register of the adoption of the Constitution, that was the basic
deeds venture to disobey the orders of their superior. classification existing in the public laws and judicial
Thus, the possibility for this court to voice its decisions in the Philippines, and the term "public
agricultural lands" under said classification had then
acquired a technical meaning that was well-known to used such expressions in accordance with their
the members of the Constitutional Convention who technical meaning. (11 Am. Jur., sec. 66, p.
were mostly members of the legal profession. 683.) Also Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. [U.S.], 386; 1
Law. ed., 648; Bronson vs. Syverson, 88 Wash.,
As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular 264; 152 P., 1039.)
Government (10 Phil., 175, 182), this Court said that
the phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined in the It is a fundamental rule that, in construing
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which phrase is also to constitutions, terms employed therein shall be
be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. given the meaning which had been put upon
926), means "those public lands acquired from Spain them, and which they possessed, at the time of
which are neither mineral for timber lands." This the framing and adoption of the instrument. If
definition has been followed in long line of decisions of a word has acquired a fixed, technical meaning
this Court. (See Montano vs. Insular Government, 12 in legal and constitutional history, it will be
Phil., 593; Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, presumed to have been employed in that
13 Phil., 159; Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., sense in a written Constitution.
175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; (McKinney vs. Barker, 180 Ky., 526; 203 S.W.,
Ankron vs. Government of the Philippines, 40 Phil., 10.) 303; L.R.A., 1918 E, 581.)
And with respect to residential lands, it has been held
that since they are neither mineral nor timber lands, of Where words have been long used in a
necessity they must be classified as agricultural. In technical sense and have been judicially
Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government (13 Phil., construed to have a certain meaning, and have
159, 163), this Court said: been adopted by the legislature as having a
certain meaning prior to a particular statute in
Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is which they are used, the rule of construction
susceptible of cultivation, and may be requires that the words used in such statute
converted into a field, and planted with all should be construed according to the sense in
kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where land which they have been so previously used,
is not mining or forestal in its nature, it must although the sense may vary from strict literal
necessarily be included within the classification meaning of the words. (II Sutherland, Statutory
of agricultural land, not because it is actually Construction, p. 758.)
used for the purposes of agriculture, but
because it was originally agricultural and may Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands"
again become so under other circumstances; appearing in section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution
besides, the Act of Congress contains only must be construed as including residential lands, and
three classification, and makes no special this is in conformity with a legislative interpretation
provision with respect to building lots or urban given after the adoption of the Constitution. Well
lands that have ceased to be agricultural land. known is the rule that "where the Legislature has
revised a statute after a Constitution has been
In other words, the Court ruled that in determining adopted, such a revision is to be regarded as a
whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not legislative construction that the statute so revised
only whether it is actually agricultural, but also its conforms to the Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102.) Soon
susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes. after the Constitution was adopted, the National
But whatever the test might be, the fact remains that Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed
at the time the Constitution was adopted, lands of the Commonwealth Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and
public domain were classified in our laws and 60 thereof permit the sale of residential lots to Filipino
jurisprudence into agricultural, mineral, and timber, citizens or to associations or corporations controlled by
and that the term "public agricultural lands" was such citizens, which is equivalent to a solemn
construed as referring to those lands that were not declaration that residential lots are considered as
timber or mineral, and as including residential lands. It agricultural lands, for, under the Constitution, only
may safely be presumed, therefore, that what the agricultural lands may be alienated.
members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind
when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act
classification and its technical meaning then prevailing. No. 141, "alienable or disposable public lands" which
are the same "public agriculture lands" under the
Certain expressions which appear in Constitution, are classified into agricultural, residential,
Constitutions, . . . are obviously technical; and commercial, industrial and for other puposes. This
where such words have been in use prior to the simply means that the term "public agricultural lands"
adoption of a Constitution, it is presumed that has both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its
its framers and the people who ratified it have broad or general meaning, as used in the Constitution,
it embraces all lands that are neither timber nor lands acquired from Spain which are neither
mineral. This broad meaning is particularized in section timber nor mineral lands. This definition has
9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies been followed by our Supreme Court in many
"public agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or subsequent case. . . .
disposition, into lands that are stricly agricultural or
actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural puposes; Residential commercial, or industrial lots
lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or forming part of the public domain must have to
lands for other purposes. The fact that these lands are be included in one or more of these classes.
made alienable or disposable under Commonwealth Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of
Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino citizens, is a conclusive necessity, therefore, they must be classified as
indication of their character as public agricultural lands agricultural.
under said statute and under the Constitution.
Viewed from another angle, it has been held
It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the that in determining whether lands are
Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land Act No. agricultural or not, the character of the land is
2874, aliens could acquire public agricultural lands the test (Odell vs. Durant, 62 N.W., 524;
used for industrial or residential puposes, but after the Lorch vs. Missoula Brick and Tile Co., 123 p.25).
Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth In other words, it is the susceptibility of the
Act No. 141, the right of aliens to acquire such kind of land to cultivation for agricultural purposes by
lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in ordinary farming methods which determines
pursuance of the constitutional limitation. And, again, whether it is agricultural or not
prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of Public (State vs. Stewart, 190 p. 129).
Land Act No. 2874, land of the public domain suitable
for residence or industrial purposes could be sold or Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands,
leased to aliens, but after the Constitution and under no reason is seen why a piece of land, which
section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may be sold to a person if he is to devote it to
may only be leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the agricultural, cannot be sold to him if he intends
lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used to use it as a site for his home.
for the purposes referred to. The exclusion of sale in
the new Act is undoubtedly in pursuance of the
This opinion is important not alone because it comes
constitutional limitation, and this again is another
from a Secratary of Justice who later became the Chief
legislative construction that the term "public
Justice of this Court, but also because it was rendered
agricultural land" includes land for residence purposes.
by a member of the cabinet of the late President
Quezon who actively participated in the drafting of the
Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with constitutional provision under consideration. (2 Aruego,
the interpretation given by the Executive Department Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 598.) And the
of the Government. Way back in 1939, Secretary of opinion of the Quezon administration was reiterated by
Justice Jose Abad Santos, in answer to a query as to the Secretary of Justice under the Osmea
"whether or not the phrase 'public agricultural lands' in administration, and it was firmly maintained in this
section 1 of Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution Court by the Solicitor General of both administrations.
may be interpreted to include residential, commercial,
and industrial lands for purposes of their disposition,"
It is thus clear that the three great departments of the
rendered the following short, sharp and crystal-clear
Government judicial, legislative and executive
opinion:
have always maintained that lands of the public
domain are classified into agricultural, mineral and
Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the timber, and that agricultural lands include residential
Constitution classifies lands of the public lots.
domain in the Philippines into agricultural,
timber and mineral. This is the basic
Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution,
classification adopted since the enactment of
"natural resources, with the exception of public
the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as
agricultural land, shall not be aliented," and with
the Philippine Bill. At the time of the adoption
respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is
of the Constitution of the Philippines, the term
limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional
'agricultural public lands' and, therefore,
purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands
acquired a technical meaning in our public
of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the
laws. The Supreme Court of the Philippines in
Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their
the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular
agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to
Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the phrase
'agricultural public lands' means those public
prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article private residential lands will eventually become more
XIII, and it reads as follows: important, for time will come when, in view of the
constant disposition of public lands in favor of private
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, individuals, almost all, if not all, the residential lands of
no private agricultural land will be transferred the public domain shall have become private
or assigned except to individuals, corporations, residential lands.
or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines. It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5, the
words "no land of private ownership" were used and
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining later changed into "no agricultural land of private
avenue through which agricultural resources may leak ownership," and lastly into "no private agricultural
into aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to land" and from these changes it is argued that the
prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to word "agricultural" introduced in the second and final
aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon drafts was intended to limit the meaning of the word
their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands "land" to land actually used for agricultural purposes.
of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated, The implication is not accurate. The wording of the first
section 5 is intended to insure the policy of draft was amended for no other purpose than to clarify
nationalization contained in section 1. Both sections concepts and avoid uncertainties. The words "no land"
must, therefore, be read together for they have the of the first draft, unqualified by the word "agricultural,"
same purpose and the same subject matter. It must be may be mistaken to include timber and mineral lands,
noticed that the persons against whom the prohibition and since under section 1, this kind of lands can never
is directed in section 5 are the very same persons who be private, the prohibition to transfer the same would
under section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or hold be superfluous. Upon the other hand, section 5 had to
lands of the public domain in the Philippines." And the be drafted in harmony with section 1 to which it is
subject matter of both sections is the same, namely, supplementary, as above indicated. Inasmuch as under
the non-transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens. section 1, timber and mineral lands can never be
Since "agricultural land" under section 1 includes private, and the only lands that may become private
residential lots, the same technical meaning should be are agricultural lands, the words "no land of private
attached to "agricultural land under section 5. It is a ownership" of the first draft can have no other meaning
rule of statutory construction that "a word or phrase than "private agricultural land." And thus the change in
repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning the final draft is merely one of words in order to make
throughout the statute, unless a different intention its subject matter more specific with a view to avoiding
appears." (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. the possible confusion of ideas that could have arisen
758.) The only difference between "agricultural land" from the first draft.
under section 5, is that the former is public and the
latter private. But such difference refers to ownership If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be
and not to the class of land. The lands are the same in construed as not including residential lots or lands not
both sections, and, for the conservation of the national strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens
patrimony, what is important is the nature or class of may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots
the property regardless of whether it is owned by the and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and
State or by its citizens. whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly buy
and hold in their names lands of any area for building
Reference is made to an opinion rendered on homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries,
September 19, 1941, by the Hon. Teofilo Sison, then hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts,
Secretary of Justice, to the effect that residential lands markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a
of the public domain may be considered as agricultural host of other uses and purposes that are not, in
lands, whereas residential lands of private ownership appellant's words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor
cannot be so considered. No reason whatsoever is General's Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the
given in the opinion for such a distinction, and no valid conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond
reason can be adduced for such a discriminatory view, question.
particularly having in mind that the purpose of the
constitutional provision is the conservation of the One of the fundamental principles underlying the
national patrimony, and private residential lands are as provision of Article XIII of the Constitution and which
much an integral part of the national patrimony as the was embodied in the report of the Committee on
residential lands of the public domain. Specially is this Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other
so where, as indicated above, the prohibition as to the Natural Resources of the Constitutional Convention,
alienable of public residential lots would become is "that lands, minerals, forests, and other natural
superflous if the same prohibition is not equally applied resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the
to private residential lots. Indeed, the prohibition as to Filipino nation. They should, therefore, be preserved for
those under the sovereign authority of that nation and citizens of countries the laws of which grant to
for their posterity." (2 Aruego, Framing of the Filipino citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right
Constitution, p. 595.) Delegate Ledesma, Chairman of to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of,
the Committee on Agricultural Development of the or alienate land, or permanent improvements
Constitutional Convention, in a speech delivered in thereon, or any interest therein, as to their own
connection with the national policy on agricultural citizens, only in the manner and to the extent
lands, said: "The exclusion of aliens from the privilege specified in such laws, and while the same are
of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning in force but not thereafter.
real estate is a necessary part of the Public Land Laws
of the Philippines to keep pace with the idea of SEC. 121. No land originally acquired in any
preserving the Philippines for the Filipinos." (Emphasis manner under the provisions of the former
ours.) And, of the same tenor was the speech of Public Land Act or of any other Act, ordinance,
Delegate Montilla who said: "With the complete royal order, royal decree, or any other provision
nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is of law formerly in force in the Philippine Islands
to be understood that our God-given birthright should with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y
be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands . . .. Lands realengos, or lands of any other denomination
and natural resources are immovables and as such can that were actually or presumptively of the
be compared to the vital organs of a person's body, the public domain or by royal grant or in any other
lack of possession of which may cause instant death or form, nor any permanent improvement on such
the shortening of life. If we do not completely land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or
antionalize these two of our most important conveyed, except to persons, corporations, or
belongings, I am afraid that the time will come when associations who may acquire land of the
we shall be sorry for the time we were born. Our public domain under this Act; to corporate
independence will be just a mockery, for what kind of bodies organized in the Philippine Islands
independence are we going to have if a part of our whose charters may authorize them to do so,
country is not in our hands but in those of foreigners?" and, upon express authorization by the
(Emphasis ours.) Professor Aruego says that since the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of the
opening days of the Constitutional Convention one of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of
its fixed and dominating objectives was the the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire,
conservation and nationalization of the natural hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate
resources of the country. (2 Aruego, Framing of the land or pemanent improvements thereon or
Philippine Constitution, p 592.) This is ratified by the any interest therein, as to their own citizens,
members of the Constitutional Convention who are now and only in the manner and to the extent
members of this Court, namely, Mr. Justice Perfecto, Mr. specified in such laws, and while the same are
Justice Briones, and Mr. Justice Hontiveros. And, indeed, in force, but not thereafter: Provided, however,
if under Article XIV, section 8, of the Constitution, an That this prohibition shall not be applicable to
alien may not even operate a small jitney for hire, it is the conveyance or acquisition by reason of
certainly not hard to understand that neither is he hereditary succession duly acknowledged and
allowed to own a pieace of land. legalized by competent courts, nor to lands
and improvements acquired or held for
This constitutional intent is made more patent and is industrial or residence purposes, while used for
strongly implemented by an act of the National such purposes: Provided, further, That in the
Assembly passed soon after the Constitution was event of the ownership of the lands and
approved. We are referring again to Commonwealth Act improvements mentioned in this section and in
No. 141. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the the last preceding section being transferred by
Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121 which judicial decree to persons,corporations or
granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way associations not legally capacitated to acquire
of reciprocity. Said section reads as follows: the same under the provisions of this Act, such
persons, corporations, or associations shall be
SEC. 120. No land originally acquired in any obliged to alienate said lands or improvements
manner under the provisions of this Act, nor to others so capacitated within the precise
any permanent improvement on such land, period of five years, under the penalty of such
shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, property reverting to the Government in the
except to persons, corporations, associations, contrary case." (Public Land Act, No. 2874.)
or partnerships who may acquire lands of the
public domain under this Act; to corporations It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in
organized in the Philippine Islands authorized these section refers to all private lands, whether
therefor by their charters, and, upon express strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise, there
authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to being practically no private land which had not been
acquired by any of the means provided in said two contained in section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution
sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in these which, in prohibiting the alienation of private
two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could agricultural lands to aliens, grants them no right of
be transferred to aliens except "upon express reciprocity. This legislative construction carries
authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens exceptional weight, for prominent members of the
of Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, National Assembly who approved the new Act had
lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other been members of the Constitutional Convention.
words, aliens were granted the right to acquire private
land merely by way of reciprocity. Then came the It is said that the lot question does not come within the
Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 was purview of sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act
passed, sections 122 and 123 of which read as follows: No. 141, there being no proof that the same had been
acquired by one of the means provided in said
SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any provisions. We are not, however, diciding the instant
manner under the provisions of this Act, nor case under the provisions of the Public Land Act, which
any permanent improvement on such land, have to refer to land that had been formerly of the
shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, public domain, otherwise their constitutionality may be
except to persons, corporations, associations, doubtful. We are deciding the instant case under
or partnerships who may acquire lands of the section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which is
public domain under this Act or to corporations more comprehensive and more absolute in the sense
organized in the Philippines authorized thereof that it prohibits the transfer to alien of any private
by their charters. agricultural land including residential land whatever its
origin might have been.
SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any
manner under the provisions of any previous And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved
Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any Republic Act No. 133 which allows mortgage of "private
other provision of law formerly in force in the real property" of any kind in favor of aliens but with a
Philippines with regard to public lands terrenos qualification consisting of expressly prohibiting aliens
baldios y realengos, or lands of any other to bid or take part in any sale of such real property as a
denomination that were actually or consequence of the mortgage. This prohibition makes
presumptively of the public domain, or by royal no distinction between private lands that are strictly
grant or in any other form, nor any permanent agricultural and private lands that are residental or
improvement on such land, shall be commercial. The prohibition embraces the sale of
encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to private lands of any kind in favor of aliens, which is
persons, corporations or associations who may again a clear implementation and a legislative
acquire land of the public domain under this interpretation of the constitutional prohibition. Had the
Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Congress been of opinion that private residential lands
Philippines whose charters authorize them to may be sold to aliens under the Constitution, no
do so: Provided, however, That this prohibition legislative measure would have been found necessary
shall not be applicable to the conveyance or to authorize mortgage which would have been deemed
acquisition by reason of hereditary succession also permissible under the Constitution. But clearly it
duly acknowledged and legalized by competent was the opinion of the Congress that such sale is
courts: Provided, further, That in the event of forbidden by the Constitution and it was such opinion
the ownership of the lands and improvements that prompted the legislative measure intended to
mentioned in this section and in the last clarify that mortgage is not within the constitutional
preceding section being transferred by judicial prohibition.
decree to persons, corporations or associations
not legally capacitated to acquire the same It is well to note at this juncture that in the present
under the provisions of this Act, such persons, case we have no choice. We are construing the
corporations, or associations shall be obliged to Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be.
alienate said lands or improvements to others Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude
so capacitated within the precise period of five aliens, admitted freely into the Philippines from owning
years; otherwise, such property shall revert to sites where they may build their homes. But if this is
the Government. the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not
attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or
These two sections are almost literally the same as equity. We are satisfied, however, that aliens are not
sections 120 and 121 of Act No. 2874, the only completely excluded by the Constitution from the use
difference being that in the new provisions, the right to of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence
reciprocity granted to aliens is completely stricken out. in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted
This, undoubtedly, is to conform to the absolute policy temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not
forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to agricultural lands, including residential lands, and,
remain here forever and share our fortunes and accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs.
misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to
acquire. Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur.

For all the foregoing, we hold that under the

Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public