YU VS.

RTC JUDGE

DOCTRINE:

Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6981 provides that the issuance of a certification of
admission into the program shall be given full faith by the provincial or city
prosecutor who is required not to include the witness in the criminal complaint or
information, and if included, to petition for his discharge in order that he can be
utilized as a state witness.

The rule prevailing in this jurisdiction is that the discharge of an accused to be

utilized as a state witness because he does not appear to be the most guilty, is
highly factual in nature. The discretionary judgment of the trial court on this
factual issue is seldom interfered with by the appellate courts except in case of
grave abuse of discretion, which we find not present in the case at bar.

FACTS:

In the evening of 14 November 1994, Atty. Eugene Tan, former President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and his driver Eduardo Constantinowere
abducted by several persons in Alabang, Muntinlupa, and brought somewhere
in Cavite where they were both shot to death. At about 5:00 oclock in the
afternoon of 17 November 1994, the bodies of the two victims were dug up in a
shallow grave at Barangay Malinta, Sampaloc 2, Dasmarias Cavite. Charged to
investigate the abduction and killing was the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission
(PACC). After having conducted a thorough investigation of the case, the PACC
filed charges before the Department of Justice (DOJ) entitled, Task
Force Cabakid v. Pedro Lim, Bonifacio Roxas, Sgt. Edgar Allan Abalon,
Mariano Hizon, EugenioHizon and John Does.

On December 13, 1994, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a Resolution in the
preliminary investigation of the case, docketed as I.S. No. 94-557 finding probable
cause against Messrs. Pedro Lim, Bonifacio Rojas, Capt. Alfredo Abad, Toto Mirasol,
Venerando Ozores, Mariano Hizon, Eugenio Hizon and private respondents de los
Santos and Ochoa for the kidnapping and murder of the late Atty. Eugene Tan and
his driver, Eduardo Constantino. Petitioner and his wife, Patricia Lim-Yu, were also
named respondents in I.S. No. 94-557. The charges against them however were
dropped for lack of evidence to establish probable cause. Thereafter, an
information was filed against several accused, namely private respondents
Rodolfo Ochoa and Reynaldo de los Santos among others, before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18, of Tagaytay City presided by respondent judge. On December
16 and 17, 1994 after the information was filed and while under custody of the
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC), private respondents Ochoa and
de los Santos executed separate sworn statements implicating
petitioner in the abduction and killing of Atty. Eugene Tan and Eduardo
Constantino. The PACC re-filed the complaint docketed as I.S. No. 94-614 for
murder and kidnapping against petitioner. During the preliminary investigation,
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the charges, citing that the sworn statements
of private respondents were not only inadmissible in evidence but also failed to
establish probable cause against him. On January 30, 1995, the DOJ investigating
panel composed of Senior State Prosecutors Henrick Guingoyon and Ferdinand
Abesamis denied petitioners motion to dismiss (Annex F, ibid.). Thereafter, three
(3) separate informations were filed against petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18, of Tagaytay City. Simultaneously, petitioner filed with the
aforesaid court an omnibus motion to determine probable cause, to deny issuance
of warrant of arrest and to quash information.
The respondent Judge issued a resolution finding that there exist a probable cause
against accused Eugene Yu as an accomplice in the case.

In the meantime, the prosecution filed a Petition to Discharge as State Witnesses

and Exclude from the Information accused Ochoa and de los Santos on April 17,
1996 (Annex J).Petitioner opposed the motion.

Petitioner, who is one of the accused in the aforementioned criminal cases, claims
that the orders were issued by public respondent judge with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, claiming that there is no
legal basis or justification to discharge as state witnesses accused Rodolfo Ochoa
and Reynaldo de los Santos.

CA Ruling: Dismissed the petition for Certiorari and Prohibition of Yu for lack of
merit.

Petitioners Contention: Petitioner maintains that since the private

respondents were already charged along with the other accused including him
(petitioner) before they were admitted to the WPSBP, their admission is a judicial
prerogative which requires prior determination by the trial court of their
qualification as state witnesses, in accordance with Section 17, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. On the other hand, petitioner contends in
this case that the private respondents were already charged along with the other
accused, including him, before they were admitted to the WPSBP and discharged
as an accused to be utilized as a state witness. Petitioner argues that if this were
to be allowed, the same is tantamount to permitting the prosecution to supplant
with its own the courts exercise of discretion on how a case over which it has
acquired jurisdiction, will proceed.

ISSUE/S:

A. Whether or not the discharged of an accused as a State Witness is a judicial

function?
B. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in discharging the accused
despite the failure of the prosecution to present evidence to show that the
private respondents are entitled to be discharged as State Witness.

RULING:

A.
Pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 6981 employed by the prosecution in the
discharge of the private respondents reads:

SEC. 3. Admission into the Program. Any person who has witnessed or has
knowledge or information on the commission of a crime and has testified or is
testifying or about to testify before any judicial or quasi-judicial body, or before
any investigating authority, may be admitted into the Program:

Provided, That:

a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined
under the Revised Penal Code, or its equivalent under special laws;

b) his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points;

c) he or any member of his family within the second civil degree of consanguinity
or affinity is subjected to threats to his life or bodily injury or there is a likelihood
that he will be killed, forced, intimidated, harassed or corrupted to prevent him
from testifying, or to testify falsely, or evasively, because or on account of his
testimony; and

d) he is not a law enforcement officer, even if he would be testifying against other

law enforcement officers. In such a case, only the immediate members of his
family may avail themselves of the protection provided for under this Act.

If the Department, after examination of said applicant and other relevant facts, is
convinced that the requirements of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations have been complied with, it shall admit said applicant to the Program,
require said witness to execute a sworn statement detailing his knowledge or
information on the commission of the crime, and thereafter issue the proper
certification. For purposes of this Act, any such person admitted to the Program
shall be known as the Witness.

xxxx

SEC. 10. State Witness. Any person who has participated in the commission of
a crime and desires to be a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as
determined in this Act and by the Department, shall be admitted into the Program
whenever the following circumstances are present:

a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined
under the Revised Penal Code or its equivalent under special laws;

b) there is absolute necessity for his testimony;

c) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed;

d) his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;

e) he does not appear to be most guilty; and

f) he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in

order that he may be a State Witness pursuant to Sections 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of
the Revised Rules of Court may upon his petition be admitted to the Program if he
complies with the other requirements of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall prevent
the discharge of an accused, so that he can be used as a State Witness under
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.

On the other hand, Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, upon which petitioner relies reads:
Section 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. When two or more persons
are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the
prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the
accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the
state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge, the court is satisfied that:

(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge
is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;

(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material
points;

(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and

(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.

Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form

part of the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the
accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in
evidence.

The discharge of an accused under Republic Act No. 6981 as availed of by the
prosecution in favor of the private respondents, is distinct and separate from the
discharge of an accused under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.

Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, contemplates a
situation where the information has been filed and the accused had been
arraigned and the case is undergoing trial. The discharge of an accused under this
rule may be ordered upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, that
is, at any stage of the proceedings, from the filing of the information to the time
the defense starts to offer any evidence.

On the other hand, in the discharge of an accused under Republic Act No. 6981,
only compliance with the requirement of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure is required but not the requirement of Rule 119, Section 17.

Soberano v. People:

An amendment of the information made before plea which excludes some or one
of the accused must be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to
the offended party and with leave of court in compliance with Section 14, Rule
110. Section 14, Rule 110 does not qualify the grounds for the exclusion
of the accused. Thus, said provision applies in equal force when the
exclusion is sought on the usual ground of lack of probable cause, or
when it is for utilization of the accused as state witness, as in this case,
or on some other ground.

At this level, the procedural requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 on the need for
the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each state
witness at a hearing in support of the discharge do not yet come into play. This is
because, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the
determination of who should be criminally charged in court is essentially
an executive function, not a judicial one. x x x. (Underscoring supplied.)

In this connection, Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6981 provides that the issuance
of a certification of admission into the program shall be given full faith by the
provincial or city prosecutor who is required not to include the witness in the
criminal complaint or information, and if included, to petition for his discharge in
order that he can be utilized as a state witness. This provision justifies the
regularity of the procedure adopted by the prosecution for the discharge of the
private respondents.

B.
As found by the DOJ, based on the extrajudicial statements executed by the
private respondents regarding their participation in the abduction and killing of
Atty. Eugene Tan and his driver, it appears that they were included in an alleged
military operation and unaware that the persons they abducted were innocent
civilians because they were misled by their military superiors into believing that
these individuals were unnamed communist rebels. From their account, private
respondents claim to have been oblivious that the persons subject of their
surveillance were to be abducted and subsequently killed.
The rule prevailing in this jurisdiction is that the discharge of an accused to be
utilized as a state witness because he does not appear to be the most guilty, is
highly factual in nature. The discretionary judgment of the trial court on this
factual issue is seldom interfered with by the appellate courts except in case of
grave abuse of discretion, which we find not present in the case at bar.