Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No.
122156, February 3, 1997
DECISION
(En Banc)
BELLOSILLO, J.:
I. THE FACTS
Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the GSIS sold in public auction its stake in
Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share,
or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to allow it to match the bid of Renong
Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined in 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
II. THE ISSUES
1. Whether 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not need
implementing legislation to carry it into effect;
2. Assuming 10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing, whether the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
form part of our patrimony as a nation;
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term State, hence, mandated to implement 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the
Constitution; and
4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give preference to the petitioner, a Filipino corporation, over Renong
Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.
III. THE RULING
[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]
1. YES, 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not
need implementing legislation to carry it into effect.
Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but
simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the
constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the
legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.
Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the
tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument is
flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage
the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs
legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third
paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its
language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part
and non-self-executing in another.
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates
that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution
declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to
enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all
legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks
of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well
used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and
frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle
for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and
patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises
the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management
of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel
edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not
applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the
land upon which the building stands.
3. YES, GSIS is included in the term State, hence, it is mandated to implement 10, paragraph 2,
Article XII of the Constitution.
It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State
acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. [T]his fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents
GSIS and MHC a state action. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are
considered state action covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when the
government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and,
(3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling
51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of state action. Without doubt
therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore
subject to the constitutional command.
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as elements
of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative, executive and
judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches
of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the
Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
4. YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The
bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated
and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the
Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the
highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are
they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to
abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and
other interested parties. xxx xxx xxx
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the
Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these
Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. Certainly, the constitutional mandate
itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission
of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction
itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is
no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the
bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino
First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the
bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous
skirting of the basic law.
DECISION
(En Banc)
The U.S (paintiff-appelle) vs. Ang tang ho (defendant-appellant)feb. 1922
43 Phil. 1 Political Law Delegation of Power Administrative Bodies
In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act
Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act, under extraordinary circumstances,
authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such
products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the GG issued Executive Order No. 53 which was published on August 20,
1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a
ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by
the EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the said EO. He
was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the
sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.
HELD: First of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the publication of the
EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of
an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt.
Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy
should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the
determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that
could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its
terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of
the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in
presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or
event.
SARMIENTO V. MISON, G. R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I CASE DIGEST
POLITICAL LAW
POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE
Ulpiano P. Sarmiento III and Juanito G. Arcilla v. Salvador Mison in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU
OF CUSTOMS and Guillermo Carague in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
G.R. No. 79974, December 17, 1987
Padilla, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then President (Corazon)
Aquino. The said appointment made by the President is being questioned by petitioner Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito
Arcilla who are both taxpayers, members of the bar, and both Constitutional law professors, stating that the said
appointment is not valid since the appointment was not submitted to the Commission On Appointment (COA) for approval.
Under the Constitution, the appointments made for the "Heads of Bureau" requires the confirmation from COA.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the appointment made by the President without the confirmation from COA is valid.
HELD: Yes, under the 1987 Constitution, Heads of Bureau are removed from the list of officers that needed confirmation
from the Commission On Appointment. It enumerated the four (4) groups whom the President shall appoint:
Heads of the Executive Departments, Ambassadors, other public minister or consuls, Officers of the Armed Forces from
the rank of Colonel or Naval Captain, and Other officers whose appointments are vested in him in him in this Constitution;
The above-mentioned circumstance is the only instance where the appointment made by the President that requires
approval from the COA and the following instances are those which does not require approval from COA:
All other Officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;
Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.
Fact:
The case at bar is a petition questioning the constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings being held by the House of
Representatives against Chief Justice Davide.
The first impeachment proceeding brought against the Chief Justice, together with other associate justices, is by Joseph
Estrada, for the alleged culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust, and other high crimes. It proceeded
due to good form but was later on dismissed due to lack of substance.
Another impeachment proceeding was being brought against the Chief Justice, in a period less than the one-year bar
provided by the Constitution and the rules of the House of Representatives. This was initiated by 2 representatives and
was endorsed by many other representatives.
This resulted to many petitions by many individuals as well as associations questioning the constitutionality of such move
by Congress. The petitions were consolidated having raised similar issues. The petitions contend that the second
impeachment proceeding was in culpable violation of the Constitution wherein there is a one-year bar before one can
initiate impeachment proceedings against the same individual. The first proceeding was less than a year away from the
filing of the second proceeding.
Congress mainly contended that the Supreme Court had no power to inquire about the impeachment proceedings as it is
the former which has the power to facilitate or administer impeachment proceedings, as provided by the Constitution. If
the Supreme Court interrupts and inquires about the proceedings, it will disturb the doctrine of separation of powers as
well as the doctrine of checks and balances. The impeachment proceeding is in itself under the power of the Congress
and is a political question.
Issue:
1. w/n the second impeachment proceeding against Davide is constitutional?
2. w/n the impeachment proceeding was a political question wherein the SC cannot disturb it?
Held:
1. It is prevalent that the second impeachment proceeding against the Chief Justice is unconstitutional. Under Article XI of
our present Constitution, it is provided that with regard to the impeachment of public officials such as the Chief Justice,
there is a one-year bar provided. No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official within a period of
one year. The term initiate refers to the filing of the case against the official. It starts when a complaint is filed with the
Committee of Justice of the House of Representatives. It is not initiated during the time when it is verified by the other
members of the House or when it is given to Senate for hearing.
2. It is said that the SC cannot question or inquire about the impeachment proceedings since it will disturb the separation
of power, check and balance between the branches of government, and that the SC has vested interest in the issue.
The Constitution was equivocal in granting the judiciary, moreover the SC, the duty to settle controversies that are legally
demandable and enforceable. It has been vested the duty to check if there is any grave abuse of discretion on the part of
any branch or office of government. In this petition wherein the constitutionality of the impeachment proceeding is
questioned, no one has the power to interpret the fundamental law of the land and answer the issue of constitutionality
other than the SC. Given such, even if the legislative that commences and administers impeachment proceedings, it is not
a bar for the SC to inquire about their actions especially if constitutionality is involved.
