Week 3 Summaries

Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics.

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.

In Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Jervis investigates how

international political decision-makers perceive themselves, other actors, and the
environment; how perceptions and misperceptions can influence their decisions;
and how such decisions can influence outcomes in international politics. Focusing
on cognitive psychological mechanisms, Jervis does not present a theory per se.
Instead, he offers rich observations concerning the role of these mechanisms in
perception and decision-making, and suggests that understanding them can lead to
better explanations of international politics.

The book is structured in four parts. The first part (chapters 1-3) introduces the
topic and discusses background issues, including theoretical levels of analysis, the
notion of actors intentions, and the failure of dominant theoretical models to
explain states behavior with regard to deterrence. The second section (chapters 4-
6) analyzes how decision-makers process information and form beliefs about
images of other actors and international situations. The third section (chapters 8-
11) discusses common causes of misperceptions. The last part (chapter 12)
discusses the policy implications of misperceptions and suggests how decision-
makers might reduce misperceptions.

Jervis outlines four levels of analysis applicable to theories of international

politics: individual decision-making, the government bureaucracy, the nation-state
(and domestic politics), and the international environment. Theories that focus on
government bureaucracies presume that preferences are determined by
bureaucracies roles in the institutional structure. Foreign policy decisions are the
output of routines or bargaining within this structure. Theories focusing on the
state and domestic politics explain variations in behavior by accounting for
differences in states social, economic, or political structures. Theories that focus
on the international system posit that the system imposes common constraints on
states, thereby causing states to react in similar ways to similar situations.

Jervis emphasizes the importance of the individual level of analysis and contrasts it
with approaches invoking other levels. According to Jervis, a theory that assumes a
level of analysis other than the individual level attempts to generalize about the
impact of certain aspects of the setting (the independent variables) on actors
behavior (the dependent variable). However, such generalization may be difficult,
since the importance of a certain level may vary with the particular issue, and the
value of variables at one level may be coupled to variables in others. Moreover,
such an approach ignores decision-makers beliefs and intentions, since the
situational context is assumed to determine action entirely. Accounting for the
individual decision-maker as an intervening variable accounts for context while
also opening the black box of the decision-making process.

The three main factors involved in perception are beliefs, images, and intentions.
Perception involves a process of inference in which actors develop understandings
(beliefs) about other actors (images) and what the others will do in given
circumstances (intentions).

An observer has several difficulties in attempting to divine others intentions. From

this perspective, intentions are the actions the observer expects the actor will take
under given circumstancesas opposed to the actions the actor himself plans or
hopes to take. For an observer to predict an actors intentions, he first must
distinguish between internal and external influences on the actors behaviorthat
is, the degrees to which his behavior is driven by situational constraints and by
internal decision processes; and second, must try to understand the actors internal
decision process. Applied to states intentions, Jervis hints at a framework much
like prospect theory in arguing that states may be willing to pay higher costs and
take greater risks depending on how they value the status quo or value changing
the status quo. Applied to individual decision-makers, various factors can alter an
actors intended actions, including unexpected events, incorrect assessments of
cause and effect, revised goals or values, and contexts for events that differ from
those expected.

Jervis claims that models commonly invoked to explain the Cold War
competitionthe Deterrence Model and Spiral Model fail to adequately explain
state behavior. He analyzes the underlying assumptions and logic of these models
and suggests that certain psychological mechanisms better explain states behavior
in the situations modeled.

The discussion of the Deterrence Model draws a parallel with the game of
Chicken. This model argues that if an aggressor believes a status quo power is
weak, the aggressor will be tempted to challenge the other state to test its resolve.
To avoid the dangers inherent in such a challenge, status quo states therefore must
display an ability and willingness to wage war. The fear that concessions might be
interpreted as weakness prevents both sides from resolving the struggle.

The discussion of the Spiral Model draws parallels with the Security Dilemma
and the Prisoners Dilemma game. States tend to be moved by mistrust and fear,
and thus tend to act on worst-case assumptions. Hence, if a security-minded state
acquires marginal improvements in its defenses, other states tend to perceive that
their security has become threatened. These states then will act to improve their
own security, resulting in a spiral. Such spirals can lead to arms races and other
forms of inter-state competition, which in turn can lead to war or other inadvertent
consequences.

Whereas the Deterrence Model centers on revisionist states, the Spiral Model
assumes states are security-seeking and centers on mutual fear and misperception.
According to these models, the central theme of international relations is either
evil or tragedy.

Since the Deterrence and Spiral Models contradict each other, evidence that
supports one disconfirms the other. Jervis presents empirical evidence that
disconfirms each to establish grounds for his psychological explanations. As
evidence against the Deterrence Model, Jervis cites cases where mutual threats
failed to deter and led to increased competition (Anglo-German relations before
World War I). Disconfirming the Spiral Model, Jervis notes cases in which an
aggressive power interpreted concessions or conciliation as evidence of weakness,
leading to exploitation and expansion rather than mutual concessions (the Munich
Pact). Jervis summarizes, If neither theory covers all cases, if force is sometimes
effective and sometimes self-defeating, we are now faced with two questions. First,
what explains the differences between the spiral and deterrence theories? What are
they arguing about? Second, more important but much harder to answer, what are
the conditions under which one model rather than the other is appropriate? When
will force work and when will it create a spiral of hostility? When will concessions
lead to reciprocation, and when will they lead the other side to expect further
retreats?

Jervis posits psychological dynamics as an alternative to the prevailing

conceptions. He argues that psychological determinants can reinforce
misunderstandings and limit decision-makers rationality. To introduce this
framework, Jervis refers to contemporary spiral theories and the process of
developing images about self and other. If a state takes steps to defend itself, it
tends to assume that its intentions are obvious and that other states will perceive its
actions in the same way. However, other states tend not to see the intentions
behind such acts as obvious, and thus react. The reaction of these states will be
perceived by the first state as aggressive. Since all states act according to similar
logic, this dynamic of perception and reaction can explain how dangerous
competitions are reinforced. This fog of foreign policy-making is more than a
theoretical concern since decision-makers face it all the time. Jervis proposes that
the perception of intentions is the missing link that can lead to a fuller explanation
of these dynamics. The rest of the book addresses these issues: how states perceive
others and their intentions, and when and why these perceptions might be
incorrect.

To explore perceptions, Jervis employs four basic steps. First, he presents several
propositions. Second, he explains their logic, relying for support on studies in
cognitive psychology and findings from various studies and experiments. Third, he
tests the propositions against historical examples; and fourth, he uses the examples
to show the implications of his propositions for decision-making processes and
political outcomes. In some sections he supplements his arguments with alternative
explanations.

The second section of the book opens (in chapter 4) with a discussion of cognitive
consistency and the interaction between theory and data. Humans tend toward
cognitive consistency in that they see what they expect to see and assimilate new
information into pre-existing images. This can be accomplished in both rational
and irrational ways. In the rational process, people tend to simplify their
understanding of complex environments by assuming others have constant patterns
of behavior. Irrational consistency refers to the tendency to avoid conflicts of
interest or value trade-offs, and in so doing, force cognitive desires for consistency
onto the environment.

Jervis next discusses the impact of expectations on perceptions. He notes,

Expectations create predispositions that lead actors to notice certain things and to
neglect others, to immediately and often unconsciously draw certain inferences
from what is noticed, and to find it difficult to consider alternatives. New
information will be perceived through a prism formed from assumptions about
other actors and about cause and effect in the international environment. The
information will be categorized and understood accordingly. This can lead to
premature cognitive closure, in which limited or incomplete images of others
intentions lead to mistaken perceptions.

In chapter 5, Jervis points out the tendency of decision-makers to perceive events

and interpret incoming information in light of the actors immediate concerns
(evoked sets). This can be reinforced by factors such as the institutional division of
labor within governments, which causes an uneven distribution of information and
of attention assigned to it. A consequence of this tendency is that decision-makers
may come to assume that they are constantly responding to short-fused issues
while other actors have the luxury of sustained focus on long-term goals.

Chapter 6 addresses how decision-makers learn from history, and especially how
historical analogies shape decision-makers understanding of events and influence
their actions. Jervis points out that the learning process often is not entirely
conscious. Moreover, lessons divined form history tend to be characterized by
over-generalization. Hence, in applying such lessons decision-makers tend to
simplify the outcomes as merely success or failure; place undue weight on
dramatic outcomes; and ignore dissimilarities between previous and current
situations as well as differences in their specific causes. Jervis argues that certain
types of events will be most salient in affecting later perceptual predispositions.
These include events in which a person participated firsthand, events that occur in
a formative part of a persons life, experiences that affected a large number of
people (such as a national or generational experience), and events that
occurred during a short period of experience (this magnifying the influential power
of those events).

In discussing learning, Jervis points to peoples tendency to cling to perceptions of

constant conditions, making it harder to recognize change when it occurs. This can
have several effects. People tend to retain earlier images about others behavior
even in the face of disconfirming information. Decision-makers tend to misapply
policies that were successful in the past and avoid policies that failedeven if the
current situation is different that the situations in which the policies succeeded or
failed.

Chapter 7 addresses attitude changethe mechanisms at work when a decision-

maker is forced to confront new, discrepant information. A decision-maker's initial
tendency will be to preserve his original attitude by ignoring such information or
by dismissing it as unreliable, unimportant, or invalid. If new information cannot
be ignored, there are ways to rationalize or suppress it. Only when these strategies
are insufficient will the decision-maker change his attitude. Afterward, attitudes
will continue to be resistant to significant change, such that decision-makers will
tend to preserve their central beliefs and initially only invoke minor or peripheral
changes. (For example, if another actors behavior begins to differ from what is
expected, decision-makers will regard the new behavior as a temporary deviation).
Whether ones attitude changes depends on the rate at which discrepant
information is received. Dramatic changes tend to alter images more profoundly
than gradual change.

In chapter 8, Jervis addresses the perception of centralization. Decision-makers

often see others behavior as more purposeful, planned, and coordinated than it
actually is, and also more so than their own. They tend to dismiss the possibility of
coincidence or chance in affecting others actions, and see coherence in others
actions as if they were planned or are part of hidden manipulation even when they
are not. A similar mechanism causes one to view others as monolithic actors, even
when one is aware that of internal divisions. Thus, decision-makers see their rivals
actions as direct reflections of intentions, ignoring the possibility that these actions
may be the outcome of internal politics, rogue actors, or mistakes.

Chapter 9 argues that actors tend to exaggerate the role they play in others
policies, and thus overestimate their importance as an influence on others policies
or as a target of their actions. Decision-makers tend to assume undue credit when a
state issues a policy favorable to them, but view unfavorable policies as an
intentional act of aggression. Jervis argument follows the logic, Since the other
states understands that I am not a threat, and since I am the center of his concern,
his undesirable actions cannot be a by-product of other processes and thus must
reflect his intentions to harm me.).
Chapter 10 claims that studies show that desires and fears have an indeterminate
effect on ones perceptions of others intentions. This contrasts with conventional
wisdomespecially the claim that decision-makers sometimes construct beliefs
according to their desires (wishful thinking).

In chapter 11, Jervis discusses the notion of cognitive dissonance, which occurs
when one set of beliefs clashes with another. When dissonance is present, a person
usually tries to minimize it while avoiding information and situations that likely
will make it worse. For example, to justify ones actions and attempt to minimize a
clash of beliefs, a person can find new reasons or rearrange his beliefs so as to
support the original actions. This psychological mechanism can support continuing
a policy even in light of evidence that should induce a policy change. This
tendency is further reinforced if there is a need to justify high costs related to the
policy, thus leading one to hold a stronger view in favor of the policy. A major
consequence of dissonance is anti-learningin which failure leads an actor to
hold more strongly to his policy rather than learn.

Jervis concludes in chapter 12 by suggesting measures to decrease misperception.

His main theme is that decision-makers should confront reality with an awareness
of the cognitive mechanisms that tend to yield misperception. Jervis recommends
that decision-makers make beliefs and values (and therefore assumptions and
predictions about international outcomes) more explicit. To achieve this, an
organization can create a Devils Advocate to suggest alternative explanations
and strategies.

Robert Jervis, Political Implications of Prospect Theory, in Barbara

Farnham, ed. Avoiding Losses/ Taking Risks: Prospect Theory and
International Conflict (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1994), pp. 23-40.

Motivation for Prospect Theory (PT): An alternative to maximizing expected

utility
To explain instances of apparently subobtimal behavior: when states cling to
policies that are evidently failing, or continue to invest resources in pursuit of goals
that seem increasingly unattainable, or they are willing to take risks and spend
blood and treasure on objectives that seem far from worth the cost.

Definition of PT
An alternative account of choice under risk concerned with the intellectual
limitations of the decisionmaker. It claims to explain decisionmaking processes
and also links those processes directly to specific violations of rational norms. It
predicts that people will respond to certain kinds of situations in ways that yield
distinct and identifiable suboptimal outcomes.
Key Concepts of PT
Loss aversion: Losses have a greater impact than gainspeople mind incurring a
loss considerably more than they are pleased by an equivalent gain

Problem representation on choice: The way alternatives are presented have great
influence on choices a person will make, even if there is no effect on the expected
value of the alternatives: i.e., people will take risk to avoid an outcome framed as
a loss that they refuse to take when the outcome is presented as a gain.

Two phases in the Choice Process

Editing phase involving identification of options, the possible outcomes or
consequences of each, the values and probabilities associated with each of these
outcomes, and the organization and reformulation of perceived options so as to
simplify subsequent evaluation and choice. Mental operation involved in editing
include coding, simplification, detection of dominance, etc.

Evaluation phase involves evaluating the edited prospects and selecting the
preferred prospects.

There is a formal model to explain the evaluation of prospects, but the theory of
editing or framing is less well-developed. In complex choice situations, exactly
how choice problems are edited is difficult to predict because the process is
influenced by the norms, habits and expectancies of the decisionmaker.
Sequencing of the editing process may matter as well. Kahneman and Tversky are
the seminal scholars in the field. Kahneman won a Nobel Prize in Economics in
2002, though he is not an economist.

Political Implications of PT: The Specter of Losses as a Catalyst for Risky

Behavior
Evidence of the theorys validity is far from conclusive, but there is reason to think
its claims are real.
Loss aversion in the political context is salient when thinking of leaders who fear
domestic political punishment for national loss, if popular opinion operates as PT
predicts.
PT can explain why leaders believe in domino effects from even small losses:
because humans focus more on losses than on gains.

A few of the many historical illustrations: In the 1970s, the US was concerned
about the contagion effect of lost influence in Ethiopia, but cared little about the
simultaneous gain of influence in Somalia. During the Cold War, great powers
would intervene to help client states deal with risk of loss, but not provide gains.
Also, if losses matter a lot, people will be willing to risk a cover-up to hide their
loss (Richard Nixon).
PT suggests people will persevere in losing ventures more than standard rationality
implies. Still, perseverance is not always dysfunctional; it may be useful in the end
(Vietnam notwithstanding).

Implications for Bargaining, Deterrence and Causes of War

Given PT, coercion can more easily maintain the status quo than alter it; i.e.,
deterrence is easier than compellence, assuming that the actors can identify the
defender and the challenger. If the other side is driven by fear of losses, threats and
coercion may backfire and deterrence may fail. If both sides self-identify as
defenders, and contemplate war as a means to avoid suffering losses, then wars
will be more likely. Cognitive biases may compound these notions (desperate
states are biased to believe risky policies can succeed). Experiments have revealed
an endowment effect: owning something automatically increases its valuation,
implying difficulty making concessions and that trades that are rational from an
expected-utility standpoint will be rejected. The certainty effectthe tendency for
actors to over-weight outcomes whose likelihood is 1 or 0implies that actors will
pay more to reduce uncertainty to close to zero than they will pay to reduce
uncertainty the same amount in the middle range.

If PT is true, states should more often be pushed into war by the fear that the
alternative to fighting is a deterioration in their position rather than pulled in by the
belief that war can improve a situation that is already satisfactory. Fear is more
potent than the desire for expansion. The historical record is consistent with PT, in
that the appetite (for war and conquest) does not seem to grow with the eating. So,
given the historical record, how about the counterfactual: that states should push to
alter the status quo in their favor as often as they exert themselves to maintain it.
Are Hitlerian conquests as frequent as they would be if opportunity were as strong
a motivation as fear of loss? [Jervis poses this query, but does not answer it!!]

Loss aversion supports stability by giving an advantage to the side that fears
losses. Yet, when considering the case of nuclear deterrence, PT also implies that
leaders in crisis situations may choose to up the ante rather than cut their losses. If
the decisionmaker thinks a small war (therefore enormous loss) is certain if he does
not strike and that attacking provides a chance of escaping unscathed even if it
risks a much larger war, he may decide to strike. Framing is important here: it
depends on whether the decisionmakers baseline is the status quo, or the casualties
suffered in a war. It may be worthwhile to investigate how actors (pro and anti-
war activists, diplomats, or leaders, for example) try to manipulate frames.

There are a few potential pitfalls associated with analyzing IR through a PT lens.
The big one is identifying the reference point, which may be the status quo, an
earlier status quo, and aspiration level, or something else depending on cognitive
and social contextual factors. PT assumes the reference point is reset over time by
a process called renormalization; and there is an idea that we renormalize for gains
more quickly than for losses. An ex-ante theoretically grounded identification of
the reference point is necessary to avoid tautologyotherwise anything can be
explained ex-post if one chooses the right reference point. Also, showing that
people are loss-averse means demonstrating much more than that they do not like
losses. It is crucial to demonstrate that differences in risk-taking vary according to
direction of expected changes from a reference point. Even if data showed that a
decisionmaker took risks when the alternative was to accept a smaller but certain
loss, we need to also show that in other situations he preferred the status quo to
accepting a similar gamble that might have resulted in improvement equal to the
unacceptable loss. Without good measures of the magnitude of gain or loss (which
are subjective), greater risk-taking in the latter cases can be attributed to
differences in the utilities in the cases.

*This informal summary is entirely derivative of the source text, and includes
direct quotes and paraphrases not explicitly cited with page numbers or identified
with quote marks.

Stephen P. Rosen, "Emotions, Memory, and Decision-Making" unpublished

manuscript. (63 pp.).

Emotions and defining memories determine many decisions that cannot be

explained by rational analysis that multiplies outcome probabilities by costs and
benefits. Acting from emotions rather than rationality can be explained by the fact
that humans absorb and store more information than they can compute rationally.
"The number of sensory impulses that our body sends to the brain is on the order of
10^7 bits/second but the ability of the brain to handle such information appears to
be . . . on the order of 16-50 bits/second" (15-16). "What happens to all the
information that we take in but do not process? Is it lost? The answer is most
certainly not . . . we process information in ways in which we are not conscious"
(15-16). This subconscious store of information is used in emotional processes, as
are defining memories (such as the World Trade Center Bombing, Kennedy's
assassination, or for Californians, the Loma Prieta Earthquake in 1989).

To operationalize emotions for the hypotheses, Rosen notes observable behaviors

that suggest actions taken from emotions rather than rationality: 1) early decisions,
2) new information ignored, 3) bias in attention to evidence supporting the
emotionally-preferred decision, 4) straightforward link to negative emotional
experience in the past. Emotion-driven behavior can include group behavior when
the decision maker causes group emotional behavior, and when the group has been
collectively affected by an emotionally formative or traumatic event. Several
pieces of evidence in the form of short cases studies suggest the plausibility
(though do not prove) the hypotheses:
1) Roosevelt and his cabinet reacted emotionally (many cried) upon hearing the
difference between Chamberlin's "quiet, beautiful" speech compared to the "Krieg!
Krieg!" of Hitler's speech, and "immediately" decided to support the allies against
their previous protocols;

2) Stalin reminded Truman of his first political patron, Tom Pendergast (a positive
emotional memory), and despite abundant evidence of Stalin's ruthless and
complete power, Truman persisted in viewing Stalin as good man that was captive
of the politburo;

3) Kennedy had difficult meetings with Khruschev which his brother later
described as the first time that Kennedy had met someone with whom he could not
find any common ground for discussion, a negative emotional response that was
compounded by Khruschev's statements to the press that compared the US to an
impotent old man and the USSR to a boy that had grown up, could no longer be
spanked, and could now "swat the ass" of the US (53) These negative emotional
experiences with Khruschev led Kennedy to respond to the Soviet attempts to
place missiles in Cuba with force rather than diplomacy, and this irrational
decision to use force (given the high cost of nuclear war) can only be explained by
the emotional reaction;

4) Lyndon Johnson's decision to remain in Vietnam in 1965 was likely caused by

the emotional experience of his 1948 electoral race in which one of the main issues
was both candidates accusing the other of being soft on communism, suggested by
the extreme discounting of the negative utility from, and probabilities of, failed
military action.

Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy
in Chinese History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), Ch. 2
(pp. 32-60)

Johnston starts by asserting a need to develop a notion of strategic culture that is

falsifiable, whose formation and development can be traced empirically, and
whose effects on strategic choice can be weighed against the effects of other
nonideational influences. (p. ix) He stresses two preconditions should be met:
Firstly, strategic culture must exist across time and across actors within a society,
and must be able to constitute a dominant variable in decision-making. Secondly, it
should actually influence the behavior of decision makers.

Johnston defines strategic culture focusing on what culture actually does in a

behavioral sense: Strategic culture is an integrated system of symbols (i.e.,
argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors, etc.) that acts to
establish pervasive and long-lasting grand strategic preferences by formulating
concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and
by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic
preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.(p. 36) And the term grand
strategy is understood as the coordination of all elements of national power
(economic, political, and military) to accomplish national goals, primarily
security against external threats. It consists of two parts: (1) a central paradigm
that supplies answers to three basic, related questions about the nature of conflict
in human affairs, the nature of the enemy (and its threat), and the efficacy of
violence; (2) a ranked set of strategic preferences logically derived from these
central assumptions. (p. ix-x) And it is the second part that impact directly on
behavioral choices.

Object and Method of Analysis

Johnston chose the Seven Military Classics (wujing qishu : The seven
books are: Sun Zi Bing Fa, Wu Zi Bing Fa, Si Ma Fa, Wei Liao Zi, Tai Gong Liu
Tao, Huang Shi Gong San Lue, and Tang Tai Zong Li Wei Gong Wen Dui) as the
source that contains the essence of Chinese strategic culture. In detailed text
critique, Johnston argued that the Seven Military Classics are the most extensive
compilation on Chinese statecraft, grand strategy, and military tactics with mixed
elements from various Chinese traditional thoughts such as Confucianism,
Legalism, and Daoism. The Seven Military Classics are compiled into a single
body of strategic work in 1083 which comes prior to the Ming dynasty. The
books were not read only by military officials but also by high officials, and played
a great role in the socialization of scholars-officials and military officers.

To see what kind of policy argument the Seven Military Classics poses, Johnston
used (1) a modified form of cognitive mapping to show linkages between causal
axioms and their estimated behavioral effects and (2) symbolic analysis to find
culture about the role of force in human affairs, efficacy of strategies, and the
efficacy of certain strategies.

Empirical Analysis

Johnston suggests three steps to test the effects of strategic culture on strategic
behavior: (1) test for the presence of and congruence between the strategic
preference rankings across the Seven Military Classics (2) test for the presence of
and congruence between preference rankings found in a sample of documents
taken from the decision process using the content-analysis (3) test for effects of
decision makers preference rankings on politico-military behavior, and this
requires (i) conceptualization of the relationship between strategic culture and
behavior; and (ii) case selection.
In conceptualizing the relationships between strategic culture and other exogenous
independent variables, Johnston conceive strategic culture as a consistent set of
ranked preferences that persist across time and across strategic contexts so
decision makers are sensitive to structural or exogenous conditions (i.e., relative
capabilities) in a culturally unique way. In this way, we can combine strategic
culture (a unit level, ideational variable) with changes in relative capabilities (a
system-level structural variable) on the assumption that if behavior is more
consistent with this combined independent variable than with behaviors predicted
by a purely structural model, we can attribute this difference to strategic culture.

In case selection, Johnston chose to look at a lengthy historical period (the Ming
dynasty) so competing models of strategic behavior (such as a realpolitik-dynastic
cycle model, which is a nonstrategic-culture ahistorical model) can be tested
against a strategic culture-derived model, The two models share a dependent
variable changes in mixes of grand strategic policies along a spectrum of
coerciveness but have different independent variables. And the models represent
different levels of analysis: a cognitive and societal unit-level (strategic culture)
and a structural/systemic level (realpolitik). With such research design, Johnstons
study focuses on both a detailed textual analysis of the strategic arguments behind
Ming policies towards the Mongols and on aggregate changes in Ming strategy
across the entire 270 plus years of the dynasty.

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and

Political Change

A norm is defined as a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given

identity. It embodies a quality of oughtness and shared moral assessment. A
common distinction is made between regulative norms, which order and constrain
behavior, and constitutive norms which create new actors, interests or categories
for action.
The article discusses international or regional norms that set standards for
appropriate behavior of states. Many international norms began as domestic norms
and became international through the efforts of various entrepreneurs (e.g.
womens suffrage began as a demand for domestic change and became am
international norm).
For constructivists, international structure is determined by the international
distribution of ideas. Shared ideas, expectations and beliefs give the world
structure, order and stability. Idea and norm shifts are the main vehicles for system
transformation (like changes in balance of power for realists).

The Norm Life Cycle

Norm influence may be understood as a three-stage process: 1. norm emergence. 2.
broad norm acceptance norm cascade. 3. internalization. The first two stages
are divided by a threshold or tipping point at which a critical mass of relevant
states adopt the norm. The mechanism of the first stage, norm emergence, is
persuasion by norm entrepreneurs, who attempt to convince a critical mass of
states (norm leaders) to embrace new norms. The second stage includes dynamics
of imitation as the norm leaders attempt to socialize other states to become norm
followers. Internalization means that a norm acquires a taken-for-granted quality
and are no longer a matter of public debate. Internalized or cascading norms may
become prevailing standards of appropriateness against which new norms emerge
and compete for support.

Stage 1: Origins of Norms

Norm Entrepreneurs Norms are actively built by agents having strong notions
about appropriate or desirable behavior in their community. Norm promoters at the
international level need some kind of organizational platform through which they
promote their norms. Sometimes these platforms are constructed specifically for
the purpose of promoting the norm (e.g. NGOs). Often entrepreneurs work from
IOs that have other purposes than promoting a specific norm (e.g. the structure of
the World Bank effects the kind of development norms promulgated from that
institution). Whatever their platform, norm entrepreneurs usually need to secure
the support of state actors to endorse their norms and make norm socialization a
part of their agenda.

In most cases, for an emergent norm to reach a threshold and move toward the
second stage it must become institutionalized is specific rules and organizations.
Institutionalization in International law or rules of IOs contributes to the possibility
of norm cascade by clarifying what the norm is and what constitutes violation and
by spelling out specific procedures by which norm leaders coordinate disapproval
for norm breaking. However, institutionalization may also follow, rather than
precede, a norm cascade.

After norm entrepreneurs have persuaded a critical mass of states to become norm
leaders and adopt new norms, the norm reaches a threshold or tipping point.
Empirical studies suggest that norm-tipping rarely occurs before one-third of the
states in the system adopt the norm.

Stage 2: Norm Cascades

The primary mechanism for norm cascades is a process of international
socialization which involves diplomatic praise or censure reinforced by material
sanctions and incentives. In addition to states, networks of norm entrepreneurs and
IOs also act as agents of socialization by pressuring actors to adopt new policies
and laws and by monitoring compliance.

At the tipping point enough states endorse the new norm to redefine appropriate
behavior for the identity called state. The effect of many countries in a region
adopting new norms creates peer pressure. States respond to this peer pressure
since they want: A. legitimation Loss of legitimation means loss of reputation,
trust and credibility. In addition, international legitimation contributes to
perceptions of domestic legitimacy held by a state owns citizens (since citizens
make judgments about their government by looking at the international
alternatives). B. conformity - National leaders follow norms because they want
others to think well of them and they want to think well of themselves. C. esteem
State leaders want to enhance national esteem (and, as a result, their own esteem).

Stage 3: Internalization
Norms may become so widely accepted that they are internalized by actors and
achieve a taken-for-granted quality that makes conformance with the norm
almost automatic.

What determines the influence of a norm? Some argue that clear and specific
norms and those that have been around for a while and survived numerous
challenges are more likely to be effective. Some stress the content of the norm. For
instance, Keck and Sikkink argue that norms involving bodily integrity and legal
equality of opportunity are particularly effective. Another argument is that norms
held by states widely viewed as successful models are likely to become more
prominent and diffuse.

The Norms-Rationality Divide

The fault line between norms and rationality is untenable both empirically and
theoretically. Norm entrepreneurs are rational actors who engage in strategic
social construction: they make detailed ends-means calculations to maximize
their utilities, but the utilities they want to maximize involve changing the other
players utility function in ways that reflect the normative commitments of the
norm entrepreneurs. Processes of social construction and strategic bargaining are
thus deeply intertwined. The disagreement is not whether rationality plays a role in
norm-based behavior. Its about the nature of the link. For instance, for rational
choice scholars actors conform to norms out of choice. Others focus on the way
norms are internalized in actors, which no longer choose to conform to them.
It should be emphasized that IR scholars applying a logic of appropriateness in
their analysis do not argue that other logics of action do not ever drive behavior;
they just argue that appropriateness is a powerful and important motor of political
behavior. They also leave substantial room for agents choice. Actors must choose
which rules or norms to follow in a given situation, but their reasoning is not that
of utility maximization. They may ask What am I supposed to do now rather
than How do I get what I want?.