540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals

*
G.R. No. 152766. June 20, 2003.

LILIA SANCHEZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

HON. VICTORINO S. ALVARO as Presiding Judge, RTC-
Br. 120, Caloocan City, and VIRGINIA TERIA,
respondents.

Civil Procedure; Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Certiorari;

Grounds; Where the issuance of the extraordinary writ is also
within the competence of the Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial
Court, it is either of these courts that the specific action for the
procurement of the writ must be presented.Where the issuance of
the extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of
Appeals or the Regional Trial Court, it is either of these courts that
the specific action for the procurement of the writ must be
presented. However, this Court must be convinced thor-

_______________

* EN BANC.

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VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 541

Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals

oughly that two (2) grounds exist before it gives due course to a
certiorari petition under Rule 65: (a) The tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction; and (b) There is no appeal nor any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Rules of Procedure; Liberal
Construction; Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided
on their merits and not on mere technicalities.The rules of
procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to aid the courts
in the speedy, just and inexpensive determination of the cases
before them. Liberal construction of the rules and the pleadings is
the controlling principle to effect substantial justice. Litigations
should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on
mere technicalities.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Rules must not be
applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.The
emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party
litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that
rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial
justice.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Aside from matters of
life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the suspension
of the Rules of the most mandatory character, other elements should
be considered. Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or
property which would warrant the suspension of the Rules of the
most mandatory character and an examination and review by the
appellate court of the lower courts findings of fact, the other
elements that should be considered are the following: (a) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the
case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence
of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (d) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory,
and (e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Attorneys; Duties; Negligence; There should be no dispute
regarding the doctrine that normally notice to counsel is notice to
parties. There should be no dispute regarding the doctrine that
normally notice to counsel is notice to parties, and that such doctrine
has beneficent effects upon the prompt dispensation of justice. Its
application to a given case, however, should be looked into and
adopted, according to the surrounding circumstances; otherwise, in
the courts desire to make a short-cut of the proceedings, it might
foster, wittingly or unwittingly, dangerous collusions to the
detriment of justice. It would then be easy for one lawyer to sell
ones rights down the river, by just alleging that he just forgot every
pro-

542

542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals

cess of the court affecting his clients, because he was so busy. Under
this circumstance, one should not insist that a notice to such
irresponsible lawyer is also a notice to his clients.
Civil Law; Co-ownership; Definition.Sanchez Roman defines
co-ownership as the right of common dominion which two or more
persons have in a spiritual part of a thing, not materially or
physically divided. Manresa defines it as the manifestation of the
private right of ownership, which instead of being exercised by the
owner in an exclusive manner over the things subject to it, is
exercised by two or more owners and the undivided thing or right to
which it refers is one and the same.
Same; Same; Characteristics; Co-ownership has the following
characteristics.The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a)
plurality of subjects, who are the co-owners, (b) unity of or material
indivision, which means that there is a single object which is not
materially divided, and which is the element which binds the
subjects, and, (c) the recognition of ideal shares, which determines
the rights and obligations of the co-owners.
Same; Same; Nature; In co-ownership, the relationship of such
co-owner to the other co-owners is fiduciary in character and
attribute.In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the
other co-owners is fiduciary in character and attribute. Whether
established by law or by agreement of the co-owners, the property
or thing held pro-indiviso is impressed with a fiducial nature so that
each co-owner becomes a trustee for the benefit of his co-owners and
he may not do any act prejudicial to the interest of his co-owners.
Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties in
co-ownership is to create an express trust among the heirs as co-
owners of the properties. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every
co-owner is a trustee for the others.
Same; Same; Co-owners; Rights; He may validly lease his
undivided interest to a third party independently of the other co-
owners.Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an
undivided interest in the property the right to freely sell and dispose
of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He may validly lease his undivided
interest to a third party independently of the other co-owners. But
he has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate
part of the thing owned in common because his right over the thing
is represented by a quota or ideal portion without any physical
adjudication.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Noel S. Sorreda for petitioner.
 543

VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 543

Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals

Felizardo M. Mercado for respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of

the Rules of Court to annul and set aside the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 23 May 2001 as well as its
Resolution dated 8 January 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59182.
Lilia Sanchez, petitioner, constructed a house on a 76-
square meter lot owned by her parents-in-law. The lot was
registered under TCT No. 263624 with the following co-
owners: Eliseo Sanchez married to Celia Sanchez, Marilyn
Sanchez married to Nicanor Montalban, Lilian Sanchez,
widow, Nenita Sanchez, single, Susana Sanchez
1
married to
Fernando Ramos, and Felipe Sanchez. On 20 February
1995, the lot was registered under TCT No. 289216 in the
name of private respondent Virginia Teria by virtue of a
Deed of Absolute
2
Sale supposed to have been executed
3
on 23
June 1995 by all six (6) co-owners in her favor. Petitioner
claimed that she did not affix her signature on the
document and subsequently refused to vacate the lot, thus
prompting private respondent Virginia Teria to file an
action for recovery of possession of the aforesaid lot with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City
sometime in September 1995, subsequently raffled to Br. 49
of that court.
On 12 February 1998, the MeTC-Br. 49 of Caloocan City
ruled in favor of private respondent declaring that the sale
was valid only to the extent of 5/6 of the lot and the other 1/6
remaining as the property of petitioner, on account of her
signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale having been
established as a forgery.
Petitioner then elevated her appeal to the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City, subsequently assigned to Br. 120,
which ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda
of appeal. Counsel for petitioner did not comply with this
order, nor even inform her of the developments in her case.
Petitioner not having filed any pleading with the RTC of
Caloocan City, the trial court affirmed the 27 July 1998
decision of the MeTC.

_______________
 1 Rollo, p. 19.
2 Id., at p. 21.
3 Id., at p. 23.

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544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals

On 4 November 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the

issuance of a writ of execution in favor of private respondent
Virginia Teria, buyer of the property. On 4 November 1999
or a year later, a Notice to Vacate was served by the sheriff
upon petitioner who however refused to heed the Notice.
On 28 April 1999 private respondent started demolishing
petitioners house without any special permit of demolition
from the court.
Due to the demolition of her house which continued until
24 May 1999 petitioner was forced to inhabit the portion of
the premises that used to serve as the houses toilet and
laundry area.
On 29 October 1999 petitioner filed her Petition for Relief
from Judgment with the RTC on the ground that she was
not bound by the inaction of her counsel who failed to
submit petitioners appeal memorandum. However the RTC
denied the Petition and the subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration.
On 14 June 2000 petitioner filed her Petition for
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the court a quo.
On 23 May 2001 the appellate court dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. On 18 June 2001 petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied
the motion in its Resolution of 8 January 2002.
The only issue in this case is whether the Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the challenged case before it.
As a matter of policy, the original jurisdiction of this
Court to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should
generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings
before the Court of Appeals or before constitutional or other
tribunals or agencies the acts of which for some reason or
other are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where
the issuance of the extraordinary writ is also within the
competence of the Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial
Court, it is either of these courts that the specific action for
the procurement of the writ must be presented. However,
this Court must be convinced thoroughly that two (2)
grounds exist before it gives due course to a certiorari
petition under Rule 65: (a) The tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction;
545

VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 545

Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals

and (b) There is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Despite the procedural lapses present in this case, we are
giving due course to this petition as there are matters that
require immediate resolution on the merits to effect
substantial justice.
The Rules of Court should be liberally construed in order
to promote their object of securing a just, speedy 4
and
inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding.
The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools
designed to aid the courts in the speedy, just and
inexpensive determination of the cases before them. Liberal
construction of the rules and the pleadings
5
is the controlling
principle to effect substantial justice. Litigations should, as
much as possible, be 6
decided on their merits and not on
mere technicalities.
Verily, the negligence of petitioners counsel cannot be
deemed as negligence of petitioner herself in the case at bar.
A notice to a lawyer who appears to have been
unconscionably 7
irresponsible cannot be considered as notice
to his client. Under the peculiar circumstances of this case,
it appears from the records that counsel was negligent in not
adequately protecting his clients interest, which necessarily
calls for a liberal construction of the Rules.
The rationale for 8
this approach is explained in Ginete v.
Court of Appeals

This Court may suspend its own rules or exempt a particular case
from its operation where the appellate court failed to obtain
jurisdiction over the case owing to appellants failure to perfect an
appeal. Hence, with more reason would this Court suspend its own
rules in cases where the appellate court has already obtained
jurisdiction over the appealed case. This prerogative to relax
procedural rules of the most mandatory charac-

_______________

4 See 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1, par. 6.

 5 Herrera, Comments on the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as Amended (1st
ed., 1997) at 22, citing Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 76595, 6 May 1988, 161 SCRA 122;
International Corporate Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 69560,
30 June 1988, 163 SCRA 296.
6 Ibid.
7 Bayog v. Natino, G.R. No. 118691, 5 July 1996, 258 SCRA 378, 398.
8 G.R. No. 127596, 24 September 1998, 296 SCRA 38, 49, 51, 52.

546

546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals

ter in terms of compliance, such as the period to appeal has been

invoked and granted in a considerable number of cases x x x x
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be
viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.
Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect
this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be
so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court
itself has already declared to be final, as we are now constrained to
do in the instant case x x x x
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every
party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that
rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial
justice.

Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which

would warrant the suspension of the Rules of the most
mandatory character and an examination and review by the
appellate court of the lower courts findings of fact, the other
elements that should be considered are the following: (a) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances, (b) the
merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the
fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of
the rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory, and9 (e) the other party will
not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case
since the procedural infirmity was not entirely attributable
to the fault or negligence of petitioner. Besides, substantial
justice requires that we go into the merits of the case to
resolve the present controversy that was brought about by
the absence of any partition agreement among the parties
who were co-owners of the subject lot in question. Hence,
giving due course to the instant petition shall put an end to
the dispute on the property held in common.
In Peoples
10
Homesite and Housing Corporation v.
Tiongco we held:

_______________

9 Id., at p. 53 citing Paulino v. Court of Appeals, No. L-46723, 28

October 1977, 80 SCRA 257.
10 No. L-18891, 28 November 1964, 12 SCRA 471, 476.

547

VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 547

Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals

There should be no dispute regarding the doctrine that normally

notice to counsel is notice to parties, and that such doctrine has
beneficent effects upon the prompt dispensation of justice. Its
application to a given case, however, should be looked into and
adopted, according to the surrounding circumstances; otherwise, in
the courts desire to make a shortcut of the proceedings, it might
foster, wittingly or unwittingly, dangerous collusions to the
detriment of justice. It would then be easy for one lawyer to sell
ones rights down the river, by just alleging that he just forgot every
process of the court affecting his clients, because he was so busy.
Under this circumstance, one should not insist that a notice to such
irresponsible lawyer is also a notice to his clients.

Thus, we now look into the merits of the petition.

This case overlooks a basic yet significant principle of
civil law: co-ownership. Throughout the proceedings from
the MeTC11 to the Court of Appeals, the notion of co-
ownership was not sufficiently dealt with. We attempt to
address this controversy in the interest of substantial
justice. Certiorari should therefore be granted to cure this
grave abuse of discretion.
Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as the right of
common dominion which two or more persons have in a
spiritual12 part of a thing, not materially or physically
divided. Manresa defines it as the manifestation of the
private right of ownership, which instead of being exercised
by the owner in an exclusive manner over the things subject
to it, is exercised by two or more owners and the undivided
13
thing or right to which it refers is one and the same.
 The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of
subjects, who are the co-owners, (b) unity of or material
indivision, which means that there is a single object which is
not materially divided, and which is the element which
binds the subjects, and, (c) the recognition of ideal shares,
which determines
14
the rights and obligations of the co-
owners.

_______________

11 Under Art. 484 of the Civil Code, [t]here is co-ownership whenever

the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons.
In default of contracts, or of special provisions, co-ownership shall be
governed by the provisions of this Title.
12 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of
the Philippines, Vol. II (4th Ed., 1994) at 161 citing 3 Sanchez Roman
162.
13 Id., at p. 161 citing 3 Manresa 401.
14 Id., at p. 161 citing 1 Camus 377 and 2 Castan 194.

548

548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals

In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the

other co-owners is fiduciary in character and attribute.
Whether established by law or by agreement of the co-
owners, the property or thing held pro-indiviso is impressed
with a fiducial nature so that each co-owner becomes a
trustee for the benefit of his co-owners and he may 15
not do
any act prejudicial to the interest of his co-owners.
Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the
properties in co-ownership is to create an express trust
among the heirs as co-owners of the properties. Co-
ownership is a16 form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee
for the others.
Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no
individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite portion
thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract17
quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing.
Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an
undivided interest in the property the right to freely sell
and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He may validly
lease his undivided interest18
to a third party independently
of the other co-owners. But he has no right to sell or
alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing
owned in common because his right over the thing is
represented by
19
a quota or ideal portion without any physical
adjudication.
Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the
property, the metes and bounds of petitioners lot has not
been designated. As she was not a party to the Deed of
Absolute Sale voluntarily entered into by the other co-
owners, her right to 1/6 of the property must be respected.
Partition needs to be effected to protect her right to her
definite share and determine the boundaries of her
property. Such partition must be done without prejudice to
the

_______________

15 Id., at pp. 161-162.

16 Id., at p. 162 citing Sotto v. Teves, No. L-38018, 31 October 1978,
86 SCRA 154.
17 Id., at pp. 200-201 citing Oliveras v. Lopez, No. L-29727, 14
December 1988, 168 SCRA 431; See Civil Code, Art. 493.
18 Id., at p. 201 citing Vda. de Castro v. Atienza, No. L-25014, 17
October 1973, 53 SCRA 264.
19 Id., at p. 201 citing 2 Oyuelos 161 and cases.

549

VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 549

Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals

rights of private respondent Virginia Teria as buyer of the

5/6 portion of the lot under dispute.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated 23 May 2001 as well as its
Resolution dated 8 January 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59182
is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. A survey of the questioned
lot with TCT No. 289216 (formerly TCT No. 263624) by a
duly licensed geodetic engineer and the PARTITION of the
aforesaid lot are ORDERED.
Let the records of this case be REMANDED to MeTC-Br.
49, Caloocan City to effect the aforementioned survey and
partition, as well as segregate the 1/6 portion appertaining
to petitioner Lilia Sanchez.
The Deed of Absolute Sale by the other co-owners to
Virginia Teria shall be RESPECTED insofar as the other
undivided 5/6 portion of the property is concerned.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Vitug, Panganiban,

Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
 Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., On official leave.

Petition granted, judgment annulled and set aside.

Partition ordered.

Note.A co-owner has full ownership of his pro indiviso

share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and substitute another person in its enjoyment. (Del Campo
vs. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 1 [2001])

o0o

550

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