United Nations S/2010/252

Security Council Distr.: General

25 May 2010

Original: English

Letter dated 21 May 2010 from the Chair of the Security Council
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004)
concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to
the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to

resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and in
accordance with paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1896 (2009), I have the
honour to submit herewith the interim report of the Group of Experts on the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
I would appreciate it if the present letter, together with its enclosure, were
brought to the attention of the members of the Council and issued as a document of
the Council.

(Signed) Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti

Chair

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Letter dated 29 April 2010 from the Group of Experts on

the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the Chair
of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1533 (2004)

The members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the

Congo have the honour to transmit herewith the interim report of the Group
prepared pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1896 (2009).

(Signed) Philip Lancaster

(Signed) Raymond Debelle
(Signed) Mouctar Kokouma Diallo

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Interim report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic

Republic of the Congo
I. Introduction
1. By its resolution 1493 (2003), the Security Council imposed an arms embargo
on all foreign and Congolese armed groups and militias operating in the territory of
North and South Kivu and Ituri, and on groups not parties to the Global and All-
Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. By
its resolution 1533 (2004), the Council established a sanctions Committee and a
Group of Experts to monitor the implementation of the arms embargo. The Council
further extended the embargo to any recipient on the territory of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, with exemptions including the Congolese army and police,
by resolution 1596 (2005).
2. By resolution 1596 (2005), the Security Council also established travel
restrictions and imposed a freeze on the assets of individuals and entities violating
the arms embargo, as designated by the Committee, and re-established the Group of
Experts, with the addition of an expert for financial issues. Following the
establishment of the consolidated assets freeze and travel ban list by the Committee
on 1 November 2005, the Council, by its resolution 1649 (2005), extended the
applicability of the travel and financial restrictions to political and military leaders
of foreign armed groups operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to
Congolese militias receiving support from abroad who impede the participation of
their combatants in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes.
3. In July 2006, by its resolution 1698 (2006), the Security Council renewed the
arms embargo and the travel and financial measures until 31 July 2007, further
broadening their applicability to political and military leaders recruiting or using
children in armed conflict and to individuals committing serious violations of
international law involving the targeting of children in situations of armed conflict.
The arms embargo and targeted sanctions were further renewed until 31 March 2008
by Council resolutions 1771 (2007) and 1799 (2008).
4. By its resolution 1807 (2008), the Security Council renewed the arms embargo
and the travel and financial measures until 31 December 2008 and limited the
applicability of the embargo to all non-governmental entities and individuals
operating in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Council
also clarified that the measures on arms and technical training no longer applied to
the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Council terminated
the requirement, originally established by resolution 1596 (2005), that authorized
shipments of arms and related materiel should be made only to sites designated by
the Government in consultation with the United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). At the same time, by paragraph 5 of
that resolution, the Council reiterated the obligation of supplier States to notify the
Committee of all shipments of arms and related materiel to the Democratic Republic
of the Congo and of any provision of assistance, advice or training related to
military activities in that country.
5. By subparagraph 13 (e) of resolution 1807 (2008), the Security Council
decided that the assets freeze and travel ban would also apply to individuals, as
designated by the Committee, operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

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and committing serious violations of international law involving the targeting of

women in situations of armed conflict, including killing and maiming, sexual
violence, abduction and forced displacement. By subparagraph 4 (f) of resolution
1857 (2008), the Council decided that the assets freeze and travel ban would also
apply to individuals obstructing the access to or the distribution of humanitarian
assistance in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as individuals
or entities supporting the illegal armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of
the Congo through the illicit trade of natural resources.
6. By resolution 1896 (2009), the Security Council decided to extend the
sanctions regime and the mandate of the Group of Experts as set out in resolution
1857 (2008) for a further period expiring on 30 November 2010, and requested the
Group of Experts to report to the Council in writing, through the Committee, by
21 May 2010 and again before 20 October 2010. In paragraph 7 of resolution 1896
(2009), it was decided that the mandate of the Group of Experts should include
recommendations to the Committee for guidelines for the exercise of due diligence
by importers, processing industries and consumers of mineral products from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
7. The Security Council, by paragraph 8 of resolution 1896 (2009), requested the
Group of Experts to focus its activities in North and South Kivu, Ituri and the
Orientale Province as well as on regional and international networks providing
support to armed groups operating in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.
8. By paragraph 8 of resolution 1857 (2008), the Security Council had requested
the Group of Experts to continue fulfilling its mandate as set out in paragraph 18 of
resolution 1807 (2008), as follows:
(a) To examine and analyse information gathered by MONUC in the context
of its monitoring mandate and share with MONUC, as appropriate, information that
might be of use in the fulfilment of the Mission’s monitoring mandate;
(b) To gather and analyse all relevant information in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, countries of the region and, as necessary, in other countries,
in cooperation with the Governments of those countries, on flows of arms and
related materiel, as well as networks operating in violation of the measures imposed
by paragraph 1 of resolution 1807 (2008) (the arms embargo);
(c) To consider and recommend, where appropriate, ways of improving the
capabilities of interested States, in particular those of the region, to ensure that the
measures imposed by paragraph 1 of resolution 1807 (2008) are effectively
implemented;
(d) To keep the Committee frequently updated on its activities;
(e) To provide the Committee, in its reports, with a list, with supporting
evidence, of those found to have violated the measures imposed under paragraph 1
of resolution 1807 (2008) and those found to have supported them in such activities,
for possible future measures by the Council.
9. In a letter dated 25 February 2010 addressed to the President of the Security
Council (S/2010/99), the Secretary-General informed the Council that he had
appointed three members of the Group of Experts, as follows: Raymond Debelle
(Belgium, arms), Kokouma Diallo (Guinea, customs and finance), and Philip
Lancaster (Canada, armed groups and Coordinator). In a letter dated 22 April 2010

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addressed to the President of the Council (S/2010/207), the Secretary-General

informed the Council that he had appointed a further two members, as follows: Fred
Robarts (United Kingdom, regional issues) and Pawel Tarnawski (Poland, logistics).
The Group was assisted by a consultant, Gregory Mthembu-Salter (United
Kingdom), to undertake the tasks described in paragraph 7 of resolution 1896 (2009)
including the drafting of due diligence guidelines. Claudio Gramizzi (Italy) also
served as a consultant during the initial part of the mandate. The Group was assisted
in its mandate by Francesca Jannotti Pecci, Political Affairs Officer in the
Department of Political Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat.
10. The Group notes that delays in the establishment of its full complement of
experts weakened its ability to conduct its mandate.
11. The Group wishes to express its thanks, in particular, to the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General and the staff of MONUC for their support
and continued collaboration. The Group also wishes to acknowledge, with
appreciation, the cooperation of the national authorities of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo.

II. Methodology
12. The Group commenced work on 26 February 2010, holding consultations with,
inter alia, government officials, diplomatic missions, non-governmental organizations,
mining industry representatives, ex-combatants and United Nations officials in
Kinshasa, Goma, Kigali, London, Brussels, Paris and New York.
13. During the course of its mandate to date, the Group has continued
investigations into possible sanctions violations by armed groups in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution 1896
(2009), the Group continues to adopt a case-study approach. The Group continued to
research the activities of the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda-Forces
combattantes Abacunguzi (FDLR-FOCA), as well as the activities of the
movement’s political leadership and members of the diaspora. The Group has also
continued to research the process of integration of the Congrès national pour la
défense du peuple (CNDP) and other Congolese armed groups into the Congolese
armed forces (Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo, FARDC).
14. The Group also began to monitor arms shipments to the Democratic Republic
of the Congo and the implementation by Member States of the targeted travel and
financial measures imposed against individuals and entities on the Committee’s
list. 1
15. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 1896 (2009), the Group conducted
consultations with officials from Member States and commercial entities involved in
the extraction, processing and shipping and purchasing of mineral resources from
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Group also consulted with concerned
non-governmental organizations.
16. In addition, the Group continued its investigations into the linkage between the
exploitation of natural resources and the financing of illegal armed groups.

__________________
1 www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/pdf/1533_list.pdf.

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17. The Group acknowledges an obligation to reply to a number of queries,

rebuttals and objections from some Member States and individuals arising from
information conveyed in previous reports. The Group intends to review and respond,
as appropriate, and will append an annex summarizing its actions in this regard in
the final report.
18. With respect to its investigation of political and military leaders recruiting or
using children in violation of international law, as well as targeting women and
children in situations of armed conflict, the Group maintained the same
methodological standards as those used during previous mandates, namely, the
collection of data on demobilization of children from local transitory care centres;
the review and analysis of reports of human rights and child protection
organizations; and interviews.
19. The Group used evidentiary standards recommended by the Informal Working
Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions in its 2006 report
(S/2006/997), relying on authentic documents and, wherever possible, first-hand,
on-site observations by the experts themselves. When this was not possible, the
Group corroborated information using at least three independent and reliable sources.

III. Political and military context

20. Political initiatives involving the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
regional States are continuing through regional forums, including the International
Conference on the Great Lakes Region, the Communauté economique des pays des
Grands Lacs (CEPGL) and the Tripartite Plus mechanism.
21. National elections are due in 2011, though preparations for these are running
behind schedule, prompting widespread concern that they will be delayed. Under the
Constitution, local elections were to be held during the current presidential term.
However, the Government’s latest proposal is that the elections will be held in 2012.
Moreover, several other issues associated with constitutionally mandated power-
sharing arrangements with provinces remain unresolved. Amendments proposed by
members of the President’s parliamentary coalition to certain key provisions of the
Constitution have contributed to a climate of political uncertainty. On 19 February
2010 President Kabila reshuffled the Government, reducing the number of Cabinet
posts and changing the country’s finance, budget and economy ministers. The
reshuffle did not result in Cabinet posts for CNDP or other signatories of the
Agreements of 23 March 2009, resulting in some protests from these groups.
22. In mid-2009, the President requested that the United Nations submit a plan for
the progressive drawdown of MONUC troops by June 2010. Since then, concerns
have been expressed regarding the potential impact of a reduction in MONUC troop
levels and the Mission’s logistical capacity to carry out its mandate to protect
civilians and ensure access of humanitarian organizations to affected populations, as
well as to protect its own civilian staff and assets. A technical assistance mission
was conducted by the United Nations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in
March 2010 to examine the modalities of withdrawal, but no decisions by the
Security Council have yet been announced.
23. There has been increased political turbulence in several provinces, including
Katanga and Equateur, over internal struggles and allegations of corruption in

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provincial assemblies. In North Kivu, the Governor faced a motion of no confidence

over allegations of embezzlement in the provincial assembly, resulting in the loss of
his majority there. The assembly itself was then suspended on 15 January 2010. The
Governor of South Kivu resigned in mid-April 2010 following a vote of no
confidence in the provincial assembly, while the position of the Governor of
Orientale is also under threat.
24. On 4 April 2010, a raid on Mbandaka, the capital of Equateur Province, by an
armed group, prima facie linked to the Enyele ethnic group, resulted in the
temporary capture of the airport and the deaths of one Ghanaian peacekeeper, two
MONUC contractors and, according to the Government spokesperson, seven
FARDC and three personnel of the Police nationale congolaise. The Group also
received several reports of civilian deaths ranging from 11 to 42 individuals.
Government forces subsequently regained control, with the support of MONUC.
The Government later accused MONUC of having failed to protect civilians in
imminent danger, a charge that MONUC has said it will investigate. The Provincial
Minister for Public Information subsequently declared that early warning of a
possible attack had reached FARDC in Mbandaka several days before the captured
river boat carrying the combatants arrived, but that no preparations to deal with it
were made. The Group has received credible reports that FARDC officers looted a
number of institutions during the attack in Mbandaka, including MONUC facilities.
Several FARDC officials have since been summarily convicted of looting by
military courts.
25. Foreign armed groups, notably the Forces démocratiques de libération du
Rwanda (FDLR), the Ralliement pour l’unité et la démocratie (RUD), the Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA) as well as Congolese armed groups, continue to pose
serious threats to the security of the populations of the Kivus, Maniema and
Orientale Province. Following the end of joint operations with MONUC, known as
Kimia II, in December 2009, FARDC continued to conduct unilateral operations
against FDLR and some Congolese armed groups in those provinces. Since January
2010, FARDC and MONUC have conducted joint planned operations, known as
Amani Leo, targeting FDLR strongholds. Many of these operations are still being
conducted in South Kivu, where FARDC has also faced resistance by ethnically
based armed groups such as the Forces républicaines fédéralistes (FRF) and Mai-
Mai Yakutumba. In April 2010, MONUC assessed the strength of FDLR to be
reduced to roughly half of what it was before Kimia II.
26. During Kimia II in 2009, a total of 1,564 FDLR combatants, including
42 children, and 2,187 dependants joined the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration
and resettlement or repatriation programme. From 1 January to 9 April 2010,
another 345 FDLR combatants (344 Rwandans and one Burundian), including some
children, were demobilized, while 814 repatriated persons (404 combatants and
410 dependants) were demobilized with MONUC support. According to MONUC
demobilization statistics, among the FDLR ex-combatants were 433 Congolese
citizens demobilized in 2009 and 156 additional cases from 1 January to 9 April
2010. These figures may demonstrate that FDLR has a capacity to recruit among the
Congolese population, and it is the Group’s understanding, drawn from a variety of
sources, that the recruitment is not coerced. The relatively high rate of repatriation,
as well as testimonies gathered from many of the returnees, suggest that some
among the rank-and-file FDLR elements have taken advantage of the confusion
created by military operations to flee.

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27. Efforts by the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and MONUC
to integrate and demobilize Congolese non-State armed groups have continued,
leading to the demobilization of nearly 1,000 combatants during the first quarter of
2010. Those demobilized came from armed groups including, inter alia, Mai-Mai
Kifuafua, the Patriotes résistants congolais (PARECO) and Mai-Mai Yakutumba.
28. There has been slow progress in implementing the Agreements of 23 March
2009, in particular in connection with political integration. Nonetheless, three former
armed groups, CNDP, PARECO and the Mouvement d’union pour le développement
national, have begun a process of transformation into political parties.
29. Data collected by humanitarian agencies and provincial population movement
commissions has suggested that in February 2010 there were approximately
600,000 internally displaced persons in North Kivu. The data refers to displacement
occurring from January to December 2009, and is attributed predominantly to
military operations, or “armed attacks”. The most affected territories in North Kivu
are Lubero (53 per cent), Masisi (20 per cent), and Walikale (17 per cent). At the
same time, in 2009, approximately 500,000 people returned to their respective areas
of origin, with the territories of Lubero, Masisi and Rutshuru totalling more than
90 per cent of returns.
30. In South Kivu approximately 730,000 people remained internally displaced at
the end of 2009, with a decreasing rate of return, and with approximately
50,000 displaced from October to December 2009 due to military operations and the
reprisal attacks of FDLR.
31. In the Ituri region of Orientale Province, there was renewed displacement
during 2009, together with a very low rate of return, particularly in the southern
Irumu territory caused by the fighting between FARDC and the Front populaire pour
la justice au Congo and the Front de résistance patriotique de l’Ituri.
32. In the Haut and Bas Uélé regions of Orientale Province, there are a total of
approximately 240,000 internally displaced persons. During the last quarter of 2009,
it appears that LRA attacks have resulted in a 32 per cent increase in the number of
internally displaced persons in the area of Niangara and a 62 per cent increase in the
area of Rungu.
33. In Equateur Province, fighting in and around Dongo, in Kingu territory, during
late 2009 caused the displacement of approximately 60,000 people, while reportedly
more than 80,000 sought refuge in the Republic of the Congo, and 15,000 in the
Central African Republic.

Integration of CNDP into FARDC

34. In its final report of 23 November 2009 (S/2009/603), the Group documented
the incomplete integration of CNDP into FARDC, and the rapid redeployment of
FARDC/CNDP units in North and South Kivu, particularly to areas with significant
mining deposits. In Masisi and some areas of Rutshuru, CNDP continues to exercise
military, political and administrative influence. The Group understands that formally
integrated CNDP units continue to respond to the parallel chain of command of
General Bosco Ntaganda, a sanctioned individual who is also under an International
Criminal Court indictment. The Group also received untested allegations that there
are substantial numbers of foreign nationals belonging to CNDP units currently
undergoing integration into FARDC. Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration

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and resettlement or repatriation statistics on repatriation of foreign CNDP

ex-combatants confirm findings contained in previous reports concerning CNDP
recruitment of foreign combatants.
35. As indicated in previous reports, including through testimonies collected from
FARDC officers, the Group continued to analyse the phenomenon of desertions
from newly integrated FARDC units, in particular of former PARECO and CNDP
elements.
36. CNDP issued a communiqué on 31 March 2010 by its new president, Philippe
Gafishi Ngango, announcing the lifting of all its illegal barriers and taxes. However,
the Group has received credible testimonies that CNDP taxation mechanisms
continue to operate along commercial routes in areas including Sake, Mushake,
Kilolirwe and Kitchanga and among the local population living in areas under their
control. According to MONUC, trucks transiting Kitchanga are charged US$ 100-150
at illegal roadblocks, while pedestrians are charged CGF (Congolese franc) 500. For
those who attempt to evade the tax and are caught doing so, the charge is tripled.
37. The continued de facto control of North Kivu, and to a lesser extent South
Kivu, by CNDP has occurred in the context of incomplete implementation of the
political and military Agreements of 23 March 2009 signed by the Government,
CNDP and other armed groups.
38. On 17 February 2010, the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and Rwanda and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees concluded two tripartite agreements. One concerned the return of
approximately 54,000 Congolese refugees from Rwanda, and a second agreement
dealt with the ongoing return of Rwandan refugees to Rwanda from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. However, there has been no implementation to date of the
return mechanisms agreed by the three parties. The refugee return agreements have
been concluded in the context of the ongoing rapprochement between the two
Governments, and the Agreements of 23 March 2009 between the Government of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and CNDP and other armed groups.
Subsequent to these tripartite agreements, CNDP has called for the return of over
150,000 Congolese refugees from Rwanda. During the last six months, there have
been several reports of undocumented returns to the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, while at the same time the Group has received information that there have
been very few returns from Congolese refugee camps in Rwanda.
39. The Group notes in this regard, and will investigate further, reports that
Rwandan citizens are among those said to be Congolese refugees currently returning
to the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo from Rwanda, in some cases
accompanied by cattle protected by armed herders. The Group has also received
information from credible sources, which it continues to investigate, that some
Hunde, Nande and Tembo communities have been displaced from areas under
CNDP control, which is leading to the remobilization of ethnically based armed
groups seeking to resist this displacement and apparent land-grabbing.

FDLR/RUD-Urunana
40. The Group has learned from interviews with former FDLR combatants that
recruitment and training of new combatants continues. However, operations Kimia II
and Amani Leo have disrupted FDLR communications and led to the dispersal of

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units and the armed group’s development of a more complicated command and
control system. According to information provided to the Group, the military
operations have also made it more difficult for FDLR leaders to maintain control
over economic activities, particularly mining. At the same time, the Group
understands that ongoing military operations have made it more dangerous for those
wishing to disarm and repatriate, suggesting that better coordination between
disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement or repatriation and
military efforts may be needed.
41. The Group has also learned from interviews with ex-combatants that the
arrests in Germany of FDLR President and Vice-President Ignace Murwanashyaka
and Straton Musoni have helped to exacerbate pre-existing rivalries and may have
increased friction between factions at the senior level within FDLR. The Group is
investigating this matter, and also whether a new organization or organizations
could be evolving from FDLR structures.
42. Interviews held by the Group with former combatants revealed that the
Rassemblement populaire rwandais (RPR), a small Tutsi faction bringing together
diaspora political dissidents and a small group of combatants, RPR-Inkeragutabara
(thought to have no more than a few dozen combatants), and RUD-Urunana leaders
decided to combine and form a new organization called the Congrès national pour la
démocratie (CND). From interviews with former combatants, the Group has
confirmed that Felicien Kanyamibwa (living in the United States of America),
executive secretary of RUD-Urunana, is the President of CND. The Group also
learned that that Yacinthe Nsengiyumva, alias John Muhindo, alias Rafiki, who was
also mentioned in the Group’s report of November 2009, is the executive Secretary
General of CND, and that General Jean-Damascene Ndibabje, alias Musare, is
commander of the military wing, still referred to as the Armée nationale (AN)-
Imboneza. Other political leaders formerly active in RUD have been changed or
replaced. AN-Imboneza has been displaced by military operations from some of its
former positions, but remains intact and in close communication with senior
political cadres, particularly with Kanyamibwa and Augustin Dukoze (living in
Canada), political spokesperson for both RUD and CND. The Group has collected
credible testimony indicating that the AN-Imboneza leadership imposes corporal
punishment for desertion, which its leadership seeks to apply to those attempting to
disarm and repatriate. Those in positions of responsibility who persuade others to
join them are charged with rebellion and are subject to receiving a death sentence.
The Group will continue investigating these and other incidents tying diaspora
political leaders to measures to prevent FDLR and RUD/CND/RPR/AN-Imboneza
combatants from laying down their weapons, in breach of paragraph 4 of resolution
1807 (2008) as well as paragraph 1 of resolution 1804 (2008).
43. The Group is aware of extensive local, regional and international support
networks providing political and material support to FDLR and RUD/CND in
violation of Security Council-imposed sanctions. The Group intends to confirm the
identities of key leaders during the course of its mandate. Credible testimonies from
various sources collected by the Group suggest that new political and military
organizations may soon emerge from the shifting alliances in the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo, creating renewed risk of regional political interference from
armed groups.

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44. Since 2008, the Group’s attempts to investigate suspected FDLR and RUD
leaders with the assistance of national authorities in Member States have been
complicated in some cases by those States’ laws pertaining, inter alia, to protection
of privacy and the separation of constitutional powers. Though Member States may
have been requested in Security Council resolutions to assist the Group to
investigate suspected breaches of sanctions, national privacy laws and laws
protecting individual citizens’ rights have prevented some national authorities from
replying to requests from the Group in this regard. Canadian, American and French
diplomats have all reported difficulties complying with requests for telephone logs
and banking information because of legal restrictions on what types of information
may be conveyed to the Group. The Group draws the Committee’s attention to the
inconsistency between some Member States’ national laws and their implementation
of mandatory obligations resulting from the adoption under Chapter VII of the
Charter of resolution 1896 (2009).

Other armed groups

45. According to multiple, credible testimonies, other armed groups remain active
in South Kivu, especially in Uvira and Fizi territories. The Group has received
information that FDLR combatants continue to enter into military operational
alliances with Congolese armed groups.
46. In North Kivu, these alliances include, for instance, the Alliance du peuple
pour un Congo libre et souverain of General Janvier Buingo Karairi in the Masisi
area, and the Forces patriotiques pour la libération du Congo of Ngabo Gad in
Rutshuru.
47. In South Kivu, according to reports received by the Group, FDLR has entered
into operational alliances with FRF and PARECO, and incorporated FARDC
members apparently discontented with the integration process. In December 2009,
FARDC units in Minembwe (Hauts Plateaux, Fizi territory) were, according to the
same reports, attacked by a coalition of FRF and FDLR elements (see S/2009/603,
paras. 47-55, for further details on the coalition). Despite an initial setback, FARDC
subsequently re-established authority in those territories. The Group has also
received information about military cooperation and profit-sharing from mining
activities between FDLR units and Mai-Mai Yakutumba, in Fizi territory. The leader
of the group, Amuri Yakutumba, has formed a politico-military movement named
Mouvement pour la reconstruction du Congo, more commonly known as Mai-Mai
Yakutumuba. Although this armed group signed the Agreements of 23 March 2009
with the Government, it only partially joined the integration process, maintaining
some troops and operational capacity.
48. According to MONUC reports, these alliances have resulted in several attacks
against the civilian population and FARDC units, which have resulted in massive
displacements of population in Masisi territory as well as in several areas of South
Kivu.
49. In Ituri, since its report of November 2009, the Group has noted attacks
launched against FARDC units by combatants of the Front de résistance patriotique
de l’Ituri and the Front populaire pour la justice au Congo, also resulting in civilian
casualties and displacements of population.

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Lord’s Resistance Army

50. Despite operations against LRA by FARDC and the Uganda People’s Defence
Forces named “Rudia II”, an LRA presence continues to be reported by various
credible sources in the Uélé districts of Orientale Province. Several attacks against
the civilian population have been reported by the same sources since the beginning
of 2010, especially in the area of Niangara. According to recent estimates,
approximately 100 LRA combatants are active in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, while other groups (up to 350 combatants in total) reportedly move between
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic and the Sudan,
confirming the subregional nature of the threat represented by this armed group.
51. During the remainder of its mandate, the Group intends to investigate the
current state of the structure of LRA and its possible supply and support networks,
and looks forward in this regard to close cooperation with the Government of
Uganda and other relevant Member States.

IV. Violations pursuant to subparagraphs 4 (c), (d) and (e) of

resolution 1807 (2008)
52. In conformity with its mandate, the Group continues to monitor potential
violations of subparagraphs 4 (d), (e) and (f) of resolution 1857 (2008). Consistent
with its methodology and investigations during previous mandates, the Group is
focusing on:
– Serious violations of international law targeting women and children
perpetrated by FARDC and non-State armed groups, in order to identify
command responsibility and provide relevant recommendations to the
sanctions Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004).
– Cases of obstruction to humanitarian assistance and attacks on humanitarian
personnel.
53. With respect to the use of child soldiers by armed groups and FARDC, the
Group confirmed its previous findings that rapid integration of armed groups into
FARDC has introduced significant numbers of children into Government forces, and
that no important progress has been made to disarm and demobilize those children.
54. In connection with its final report of November 2009 (S/2009/603), the Group
notes with appreciation the efforts made by MONUC in implementing and making
operational a conditionality policy for its support to FARDC military operations. As
noted in paragraph 4 of the thirty-first report of the Secretary-General on the
activities of MONUC (S/2010/164), in the context of Amani Leo MONUC and
FARDC have issued a joint operational directive according to which joint planning
and operations are to be conducted in line with the “zero tolerance” policy adopted
by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in March 2009, and
the conditionality policy of MONUC. In this connection, MONUC initially vetted
the commanders of 18 battalions designated by FARDC to participate in joint
operations. As a result, MONUC agreed to support only those commanders with no
known record of serious human rights violations, and supported only a limited
number of operations which had been adequately planned in cooperation with
FARDC.

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55. In the first quarter of 2010, eight FARDC combatants responsible for grave
human rights violations were sentenced by the military judiciary authorities of
North Kivu, while 14 others were sentenced by South Kivu authorities. The Group
considers that such initiatives, although relatively small in scale, are a positive sign
of the authorities’ commitment to prosecuting human rights crimes committed by
State agents. Nevertheless, significant efforts are still needed to build the capacity of
the Congolese judicial authorities to ensure the development of the criminal justice
chain from investigation to sentencing and compensation of victims for human
rights abuses. Only some 50 cases have been investigated and submitted to the
Congolese judicial authorities since the beginning of Kimia II operations early in
2009, and none of the cases concerned allegations involving senior FARDC
officials. In May 2009, the Security Council brought to the attention of the
authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo a request by MONUC to
investigate five FARDC officers concerning whom MONUC had received consistent
allegations of human rights abuses. The Group understands that no significant
progress has been made by the military justice authorities of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo in prosecuting those five cases.

Obstructions to humanitarian assistance

56. During the reporting period, attacks on humanitarian workers by armed
elements and bandits continued in the Kivus and Orientale Province. A recent
example occurred on 8 April 2010, when nine workers for the International
Committee of the Red Cross were abducted and held for a week by Mai-Mai
Yakutumba in Fizi territory, South Kivu. The hostages were released following the
intervention of MONUC.

V. Security sector reform and arms stockpile management

57. During 2009, the rapid integration of armed groups has created significant
additional challenges for the process of building a professional, well-trained
FARDC and national police force. The incorporation of new ex-combatants into the
already fragile FARDC ranks, and their rapid redeployment has, for instance, further
disrupted the chain of payments, which contributed to ill-disciplined behaviour,
looting and desertions. As repeatedly cited in the Group’s previous reports, the
FARDC and Congolese national police should be reformed through systematic and
coordinated efforts aiming at strengthening their capacity in the overall management
of the security sector, weapons stockpile management, operational response,
discipline and respect for human rights.
58. On 26 January 2010, the Ministry of Defence presented its security sector
reform plan, focused on improving FARDC capacity through the reorganization of
its chain of command and a three-phase plan for a complete overhaul of FARDC.
However, the estimated cost of phase 1 of these reforms (US$ 3.7 billion) is likely
to keep them beyond reach for the foreseeable future. Previously, on 26 October
2009, the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo adopted a 15-year
strategic plan and a three-year action plan to build the capacity of the national
police. The Group will continue to monitor those aspects of security sector reform
initiatives that are relevant to its mandate, including measures adopted to improve
arms stockpile management and prevent the illegal diversion of military equipment.

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VI. Arms flows

59. The Group has received a number of reports concerning arms and military
equipment transfers or supplies to armed groups operating in the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo, and is currently investigating the veracity of the
information. In conformity with its mandate, the Group has been monitoring the
deliveries of military equipment to the Congolese State authorities in order to verify
conformity with the provisions related to notification (resolution 1807 (2008),
para. 5).
60. As during previous mandates, the Group has conducted spot checks on
weapons and ammunition collected by the MONUC disarmament, demobilization,
reintegration and resettlement or repatriation programme in Goma, and by Paix et
reconciliation (PAREC), a Congolese non-governmental organization that has
launched a collection campaign among civilians, gathering small calibre arms and
ammunition, and several dozen 82-mm mortar bombs (mainly manufactured in
Bulgaria in 1999 and 2000), RPG-7 and 107-mm rockets. In both cases, no new or
recently manufactured equipment could be identified; as documented in previous
reports of the Group, the inspection of such samples indicates that Congolese
national security bodies, as well as small-scale trafficking resulting from other
existing stockpiles in the region, are the sources of the majority of the weapons and
ammunition.
61. With respect to notifications received pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution
1807 (2008), the Group notes that, from November 2009 to April 2010, a total of nine
notifications were conveyed to the Committee. In connection with paragraph 4 (c) of
resolution 1896 (2009), by which the Council decided to expand the mandate of the
Committee to “specify the necessary information that Member States should provide
in order to fulfil the notification requirement set out in paragraph 5 of resolution
1807 (2008) and to circulate this among Member States”, and pursuant to a request
from the Committee, the Group has included in annex I elements of possible
guidance in this regard.

Case study: export of Congolese-extracted gold with false certificates

62. The Group has obtained documented evidence showing that, from March 2009
to February 2010, several fraudulent “United Nations certificates” were forged by
persons unknown to facilitate the sale of Congolese gold to buyers located in
regional States. The Group has referred the matter to the Office of Internal
Oversight Services, and will continue to investigate the matter in cooperation with
the Customs authorities of concerned Member States. The Group has conducted a
preliminary investigation in collaboration with the Ministry of Mines of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and confirmed that all of the documents in
question were false.

VII. Due diligence and natural resources

63. In accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1896 (2009), the Group has been
reviewing existing relevant material on due diligence and natural resources, and has
been developing recommendations to the Committee for guidelines for the exercise
of due diligence by the importers, processing industries and consumers of mineral

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products regarding the purchase, sourcing (including the steps to be taken to

ascertain the origin of mineral products), acquisition and processing of mineral
products from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Group has largely
focused to date on the trade in cassiterite and tantalum, and will extend its work to
other minerals, including gold, over the remainder of its mandate.
64. The Group understands the term “due diligence” to mean “the diligence
reasonably expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a person or entity that seeks
to satisfy a legal requirement or discharge an obligation”. This definition, taken
from Black’s Legal Dictionary, is also being used to inform the work of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and
transnational corporations and other business enterprises. It is also the definition
employed by the working group hosted by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) which is developing due diligence guidance
for responsible supply chain management of minerals from conflict-affected and
high-risk areas.
65. Paragraph 4 of resolution 1857 (2008) provides a number of criteria according
to which the Committee may decide to sanction an individual or entity. Among those
criteria is the support to illegal armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of
the Congo through the illicit trade in natural resources. In view of this, the Group
considers that the principal due diligence requirement of importers, processing
industries and consumers of Congolese mineral products is that they do not provide
this indirect support.
66. The second requirement derived from resolution 1896 (2009) is that importers,
processors and consumers of Congolese mineral products do not violate the
sanctions imposed on individuals and entities by the Committee, by financing, via
their business dealings, either sanctioned individuals and entities or their associates.
67. In accordance with the requirement of the Council, as set out in paragraph 7 of
resolution 1896 (2009), that the Group take advantage of the work done in other
forums regarding due diligence, the Group has begun a process of consultation and
engagement with the other main organizations whose work relates to the due
diligence issue. The Group has in this regard held constructive discussions with the
OECD-hosted working group, and shares its methodology of a risk-based due
diligence approach, meaning the due diligence required to detect and manage actual,
potential or perceived risks, in order to prevent or mitigate adverse impacts and
avoid causing harm or being associated with harm caused by third parties.
68. The OECD-hosted working group has convened a multi-stakeholder process in
which the Group has participated, and looks forward to further engagement with the
OECD working group on the issue. The Group has also held useful discussions with
the European Union Task Force on the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and looks forward to further cooperation with
the Task Force over the course of the mandate.
69. The Group endorses the proposal of the OECD-hosted working group that due
diligence requires that importers, processing industries and consumers of Congolese
mineral products:
(a) Strengthen company management systems, including by establishing a
chain of custody tracking system and strengthening company engagement with
suppliers;

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(b) Identify facts and assess risk in the supply chain, by evaluating the facts
against applicable standards, including the requirement and obligation that they do
not provide indirect assistance to armed groups;
(c) Design and implement a strategy to respond to identified risks, by
establishing improvement plans with suppliers or discontinuing engagement with
them;
(d) Ensure independent third-party audits;
(e) Report on their supply chain due diligence and findings.
70. Payments to armed groups along mineral supply chains are illegal under the
law of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Group considers it important
that there is the full participation of Congolese State authorities in efforts to cease
those payments. The Group has to this end conducted consultations about natural
resource governance and due diligence with Government institutions at the national,
provincial and local levels, including the Prime Minister’s office and the Minister of
Mines, and intends to engage with other Government ministries over the remainder
of its mandate. In addition, the Group has held meetings with the Service
d’assistance et d’encadrement du Small-Scale Mining, a Government organization
intended to assist and empower artisanal miners. The discussions will continue and
intensify over the remainder of the Group’s mandate. Thus far, the Group has
ascertained the Government’s and the armed forces’ opposition to the militarization
of the country’s mines (see annex II), and that the Government supports the
principle that companies should take responsibility for their supply chains, not just
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo but all the way to the end-users. The
Group has learned that the Minister of Defence recently visited the Bise mining site
in North Kivu, to persuade military leaders to cease their involvement in illegal
mining or taxation of minerals. The Government has also indicated support for
efforts to boost the State capacity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to
combat minerals fraud and eliminate illegal payments from mineral supply chains to
armed groups.
71. In its report of 13 February 2008 (S/2008/43, para. 84), the Group
recommended that Congolese State institutions should be brought closer to mining
production sites in the country. Since then, MONUC has begun work in conjunction
with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on five pilot centres
de negoces, where it is intended that output from mineral deposits can be traded and
tagged in an environment free from illegal armed group taxation or interference. The
Group considers this project a useful and constructive response to the Group’s
earlier recommendation, which has the potential to boost Congolese State capacity
in the minerals sector and reduce the ability of armed groups to collect rents from
mineral supply chains.
72. The Group considers that this ability of armed groups to collect rents would be
further constrained by the carrying out of spot checks on minerals in transit by an
existing or, preferably, a specialized State agency, with international assistance.
73. The Group further considers that ongoing efforts by international agencies and
United Nations police to boost the capacity of Customs authorities and police could
be complemented by specific training to investigate and prevent mineral sector
fraud in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, such as illegal payments to armed
groups, through spot checks and other means. Such efforts could also have a

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positive impact on Congolese State capacity in the minerals sector. This in turn has
the potential to reduce the militarization of mines, and hence the ability of armed
groups to collect rents from mineral supply chains. The Group considers, however,
that the only way to ensure the sustained demilitarization of mines will be
continuing security sector reform.
74. The Group has been engaged in discussions with associations of mineral
creusers, négociants and comptoirs (diggers, buyers and dealers) in North Kivu
about natural resource governance and due diligence, and intends to deepen this
dialogue and widen it to South Kivu and other provinces during the course of the
mandate. The Group welcomes the stated commitment of those associations to play
a role in implementing effective traceability mechanisms for the minerals they work
with, which is in accordance with the requirement in paragraph 7 of resolution 1896
(2009) that importers, processing industries and consumers of mineral products take
steps to ascertain the origin of mineral products.
75. The Group is aware, however, that certain négociants and comptoirs continue
to purchase minerals from sites controlled by armed groups, and that this material is
being sold on to refineries or smelters and thence to end-users, all in violation of
United Nations sanctions. The Group is actively pursuing investigations in this
connection.
76. The Group considers traceability to be an important aspect of due diligence,
and accordingly welcomes the fact that schemes to improve the traceability of
Congolese minerals are currently being developed inter alia by the German Federal
Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources, ITRI (a United Kingdom-based tin
industry association), the United States-based Electronic Industry Citizenship
Coalition (EICC) and the Service d’assistance et d’encadrement du Small-Scale
Mining. The Group has initiated discussions with these institutions, and will
continue to do so during the course of its mandate. The Group will also engage with
other mining industry associations, particularly those in the gold and jewellery
industry, to explore ways in which they also might contribute to improving the
traceability of Congolese minerals.
77. The Group has noted the ongoing efforts by the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, MONUC and non-governmental organizations to identify
and map which Congolese mineral deposits are controlled by which armed groups.
The Group considers this identification and mapping to be an important exercise
with the potential to complement and inform traceability processes. Recent mapping
and identification exercises by MONUC show a continued high level of
militarization in mines across North and South Kivu, and to a lesser extent in
Katanga and Maniema. In the Kivu provinces, it appears, almost every mining
deposit is controlled by an armed group. The armed groups include regular FARDC
units, poorly integrated CNDP (and other Congolese armed group) units within
FARDC, Mai-Mai militia and FDLR.
78. The Group has received information from credible national and international
sources indicating a continued high level of illegal taxes being levied by State
agencies and both State and non-State armed groups at various stages of mineral
supply chains in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly in the east. The
information shows that taxes are levied inter alia at mine sites, roadblocks, airstrips,
airports, and borders. The Group is actively investigating these issues and will
continue to do so during the rest of the mandate.

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79. The Group considers that the continued collection by armed groups of illegal
taxes at various stages of mineral supply chains in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo demonstrates that, while measures to improve traceability are a necessary
component of due diligence for importers, processing industries and consumers of
the country’s mineral products, these measures are not sufficient. This is because
mineral traceability processes do not monitor and thus do not reveal the collection
of illegal taxes by armed groups.
80. Additional research is required to monitor and reveal the illegal tax collection
of mineral supply chains by armed groups, and the Group is of the view that it
should be a due diligence requirement of upstream participants in supply chains of
minerals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, from comptoirs to traders and
processing industries, that they conduct or commission this research. The research
should seek to answer whether or which armed groups are directly or indirectly
involved in the trading, transport or taxing of minerals, and whether and which
armed groups are benefiting in any way from the trading, transportation or taxing of
minerals being carried out by other parties.
81. The answers and information yielded by this research should then be evaluated
against the requirement of resolution 1896 (2009) that companies should not provide
indirect support for armed groups. In the Group’s view, any possible inconsistencies
between a factual circumstance and the resolution’s requirement regarding armed
groups should be considered as creating the risk of falling under the scope of
paragraph 4 of resolution 1857 (2008).
82. The Group further recommends that it should be a due diligence requirement
of the downstream supply chain, from processors to end-users and consumers of
mineral products from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, that they require and
evaluate information supplied to them by upstream supply chain participants about
the origins of Congolese minerals and the payments made to armed groups, which
those participants have obtained as part of their due diligence obligations. In this
way, importers, processing industries and consumers of the country’s mineral
products will be informed about what illegal taxes are being paid and to which
armed groups. This information should then be evaluated against the requirement of
resolution 1896 (2009) that companies should not provide indirect support for armed
groups. Possible inconsistencies between a factual circumstance and the resolution’s
requirement regarding armed groups should be considered a risk.
83. The Group is of the view that due diligence requirements related to Congolese
minerals should apply not just to importers, processors and consumers but also to
the financial institutions with which they work. Financial institutions are already
recommended by the Financial Action Task Force to conduct ongoing due diligence
on their business relationships, to ensure that the transactions being conducted are
consistent with the institutions’ knowledge of the customer, their business and risk
profile, including where necessary, the source of funds. The Group considers that
financial institutions should seek to verify that importers, processors and consumers
of Congolese mineral products with which they are associated are not providing
indirect support to armed groups. The Group will be investigating during the
remainder of its mandate the extent to which financial institutions are already doing
this, and exploring with them ways in which they might continue and strengthen
their efforts.

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84. The Group has begun, and intends to continue, its investigations into the
shareholdings of the mineral comptoirs of the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo and regional States, to establish which persons and entities provide them
with financing. The Group further intends to explore what due diligence obligations
might pertain to the shareholders.
85. A number of individuals and entities have been subject to an assets freeze and
travel ban by the Committee since 1 November 2005. The Group intends during the
course of its mandate to investigate to what extent illegal taxes levied on Congolese
minerals materially benefit those individuals and entities, in violation of the
sanctions. The Group will also explore ways with importers, processors and
consumers of Congolese mineral products how they might design strategies to
minimize the risk that their activities are indirectly benefiting sanctioned individuals
and entities.
86. The Group has initiated a process of discussion with neighbouring States
concerning their role in, and contribution to, improved natural resource governance
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but has not yet had the opportunity to
visit the States to take the discussion further. The Group will continue this process
during the remainder of the mandate. In accordance with paragraph 14 of resolution
1896 (2009), the Group intends to engage with regional States on what measures
they can take to ensure that importers, processing industries and consumers of
Congolese mineral products under their jurisdiction exercise due diligence on their
suppliers and on the origin of the minerals they purchase. To this end, the Group
reminds Member States, particularly those in the Great Lakes region, of the
recommendation of the Security Council in paragraph 17 of resolution 1896 (2009),
by which the Council recommended that Member States regularly publish full
import and export statistics for gold, cassiterite, coltan and wolframite.
87. The Group will also engage with traders and processors of Congolese minerals
in regional States, working to ensure that there is full consistency in their due
diligence requirements vis-à-vis those of traders and processors in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. The Group has received credible information indicating that
some purchasers in regional States continue to purchase Congolese minerals, despite
knowing that illegal taxes have been levied on them by armed groups, thus falling
under the scope of paragraph 4 (g) of resolution 1857 (2008) in violation of the
sanctions regime. The Group will investigate these matters further during the course
of its mandate.
88. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region is an important forum
for regional States to coordinate their policies regarding natural resource
governance, and for mutual cooperation. The Group welcomes the recent agreement
by the Conference secretariat to institute a regional mineral resource traceability
system, and has initiated dialogue with the secretariat concerning due diligence and
natural resource governance, which will continue during the course of its mandate.
89. As stated above, after identifying facts and assessing risks, the next stage in
due diligence, in the view of the Group, is for importers, processors and consumers
of Congolese minerals to design and implement a strategy to respond to identified
risks, by establishing improvement plans with suppliers or discontinuing engagement
with them.

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90. Resolution 1896 (2009) particularly targets foreign armed groups such as
FDLR-FOCA and, in this regard, it is the Group’s view that where importers,
processing industries and consumers of minerals from the Democratic Republic of
the Congo learn through their due diligence efforts that minerals have come from
sites controlled by these groups, or have subsequently been taxed by such groups,
they should take steps immediately to cease purchasing, processing or consuming
those minerals. The Group considers that the same approach of discontinuing
engagement should apply to all Congolese armed groups which remain outside the
integration process.
91. The Group is currently considering what appropriate responses should be taken
by importers, processing industries and consumers when their due diligence efforts
show that their minerals come from those deposits, and/or have been illegally taxed
by FARDC and armed groups in the process of integration into FARDC. These
responses may range from establishing improvement plans with suppliers to
discontinuing engagement with them.
92. The Group is of the view that the third component of due diligence must be
independent third party audit. Without independent, external verification of the due
diligence procedures of importers, processing industries and consumers of
Congolese minerals, there will be no way of knowing whether they have conducted
due diligence. This would erode public confidence in the process, leading to
continuing reputational risk for importers, processing industries and consumers of
Congolese minerals that have taken appropriate due diligence measures, and
continuing impunity for those that have not taken appropriate measures.
93. A credible audit mechanism would also, in the Group’s view, assist Member
States in implementing the call made by the Council in paragraph 14 of resolution
1896 (2009) that they take measures to ensure that importers, processing industries
and consumers of Congolese mineral products under their jurisdiction exercise due
diligence on their suppliers and on the origin of the minerals they purchase.
94. The Group is therefore actively considering various possible audit mechanisms
for the inspection and assessment of the due diligence practices of importers,
processing industries and consumers of Congolese mineral products, including the
ISO 19011: 2002 guidelines of the International Organization for Standardization,
with a view to making a recommendation to the Council in this regard.
95. The final component of due diligence is reporting obligations. The Group is
considering appropriate reporting requirements for importers, processors and
consumers of Congolese minerals and will convey its recommendations to the
Committee in its final report.
96. The Group has conducted discussions with several Member States about what
they consider the consequences should be for importers, processors and consumers
of Congolese mineral products that are found not to have conducted sufficient due
diligence, and/or are found to be indirectly supporting armed groups through their
activities. The Group is awaiting responses from those Member States in this regard,
and intends to continue the discussions over the remainder of its mandate.

Other natural resources

97. The Group has received credible information regarding the apparently
extensive illegal participation of FARDC elements in the export of timber products

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from the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, and will investigate this further
during the course of its mandate. The Group will seek to establish whether other
parties which trade in these products and other natural resources previously
identified in Group reports are, by doing so, indirectly supporting armed groups in
violation of resolution 1896 (2009).

VIII. Recommendations
98. The Group of Experts makes the following recommendations:
1. The Group recommends that the sanctions Committee consider issuing a
public statement clarifying that the scope of the sanctions regime on the Democratic
Republic of the Congo does not include any prohibition of export of minerals from
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or any formal mechanism to certify the
origin of such minerals. This may help to limit fraudulent attempts to sell fake
“clearance” certificates.
2. The Group reiterates its previous recommendation that Member States,
particularly those in the Great Lakes region, regularly publish full import and export
statistics for gold, cassiterite, coltan and wolframite, and explore ways to improve
their data-capturing in this matter.
3. The Group recommends that measures are taken to ensure that
development of the centres de negoces mechanism continues, regardless of the
possible drawdown of MONUC and the reconfiguration of the Mission’s mandate.

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Annex I
Information to be included in notifications by exporting States
to the sanctions Committee regarding provision of military
equipment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo *

A. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 1807 (2008), Member States are

requested to notify the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004)
prior to the shipment of military equipment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The Group recommends that such notifications include the following information:
1. Identity of the end-user (i.e., end-user certificate) of the equipment
(Congolese Ministry of Defence/Interior or relevant State institution).
2. Proposed date of the departure of the shipment.
3. Proposed date of the delivery of the shipment to the Democratic Republic
of the Congo.
4. Details of the itinerary of the shipment (place of departure, transit points
and place of delivery).
5. Identity of the cargo carrier:
– Registration number and serial number of the aircraft used to
deliver the equipment by air.
– Name and registration number of the ship for deliveries by sea.
– Name of the transport company and registration number of the
vehicles used for deliveries by road.
6. Number of containers and identification serial number or marking of
each container used to ship the equipment.
7. Exact quantity of the shipped equipment, including the exact number of
items and the total net weight.
8. Technical specifications of the shipped equipment, including a reference
on the state of the equipment including:
– Type of equipment.
– Name of the items according to the nomenclature used by the
manufacturing company.
– State of the equipment (newly manufactured or year of manufacture
if second-hand equipment).
9. Marking numbers or codes of each shipped item.
10. Marking numbers of each packaging element used to protect the
equipment during the shipment.
B. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 1807 (2008), Member States are
requested to notify the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004)
__________________
* Notifications pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 1807 (2008): www.un.org/sc/committees/
1533/resolutions.shtml.

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prior to the commencement of military training of military personnel of the

Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Group recommends that such notifications
include the following information:
1. Exact number of the trainers and proposed date of arrival in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
2. Exact location of the training to be delivered.
3. Proposed date of commencement of training.
4. Proposed date of conclusion of training.
5. Identity of the FARDC units to be trained.
6. Nature of the training performed.
Measures should be taken by the Member State delivering the training to ensure that
training is delivered only to vetted FARDC personnel.

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Annex II
Letter dated 22 March 2010 from FARDC Major General
Dieudonné Amuli Bahigwa, addressed to the Acting Eastern
Coordinator of MONUC

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