Accidental limit state design of

offshore structures

Design of Offshore Structures 1

Relevant Accidental Actions and their
Measure of Magnitude
1Explosion loads
(pressure, duration - impulse)
scenarios
explosion mechanics
probabilistic issues
characteristic loads for design
2 Fire loads
(thermal action, duration, size)
3 Ship impact loads
(impact energy, -geometry)
4 Dropped objects
5 Accidental ballast
6 Unintended pressure
7 Abnormal Environmental loads
8 Environmental loads on platform
in abnormal floating position
Design of Offshore Structures 2
 Disasters do occur
Ocean ranger 1982

Alexander Kielland 1980

P-36 2001

Piper Alpha 1988 Mumbai High North 2005

Design of Offshore Structures 3

 Fortunately, accidents are not always fatal
- refer recent severe ship collision incidents in Norway

Far Symphony/West venture 2004 Big Orange Ekofisk 2/4W 2009

Collision energy 40 60 MJ - ALS design energy 11- 40 MJ

Design of Offshore Structures 4
 Important with dual view of accidents
- Fatalities
- Environmental
Critical damage Technical-physical
event - Property
damage
point of view
Fault tree Event tree - Capsizing or total loss of
structural integrity
commonly develops in a
sequence of events

Human and
organizational
point of view
- All decisions and actions
made or not made during
the life cycle are the
responsibility of
individuals and organizations

Design of Offshore Structures 5

 The Alexander Kielland Accident
Semi-submersible,
Brace converted to accommodation
purposes
D-6
Total loss on March 28 1980

Fatigue/ fracture in
brace D-6
Column D
with brace D-6 Overload failure of other 5
braces

Loss of column D
Fatigue failure surface
Listing
Flooding

Capsizing
Design of Offshore Structures 6
 The causes of the accident
Technical cause Human and organizational
factors

fatigue failure of fabrication gross defect

one brace due to
- bad welding
- inadequate inspection
Hydro-
phone
support no fatigue design check
Plate of carried out
Hydrophone support
the brace

ultimate failure codes did not require

of braces robustness
(damage - tolerance)
progressive
flooding damage stability rules did not
account for this multi compartment loss
of buoyancy( > 2000 t )
failure to shut doors, ventilators
etc. contributed to the rapid flooding
and capsizing
Design of Offshore Structures 7
 Piper Alpha accident - 1988

Technical - Physical causes

Gas leak from blind flange
1st Explosion +
failure of fire water system
Piper Alpha Crude oil fire
2nd Explosion
Massive fire >Total loss

Design of Offshore Structures 8

 The Piper Alpha accident 1988
Technical-physical events Human and organizational factors

use of partly the condition of the pump was not

demounted pump reported to the control room

leakage fire pumps/sprinkler system were not

automatically initiated - because they
gas explosion were put on manual operation

damage to high inadequate arrangement of

pressure gas pipe equipment

escalating fire/explosion

no evacuation the order to evacuate was not given

rescue vessel was not alarmed

Design of Offshore Structures 9

 Summary of physical causes of
accident cases considered
Platform Initial damage Global failure mode
Ranger I Fatigue Structural
Alex. Kielland Fatigue Structural
Sleipner A Structural Buoyancy loss
Ocean Ranger Structural/ Buoyancy loss
operational
Piper Alpha Fire/explosion Structural
P-36 Explosion Buoyancy loss

Other initiating events are envisaged

Design of Offshore Structures 10
 Causes of structural failures and
risk reduction measures
Cause Risk Reduction Measure
Less than adequate safety - Increase safety factors or margins in
margin to cover normal ULS, FLS;
inherent uncertainties. - Improve inspection of the structure(FLS)
Gross error or - Improve skills, competence, self-checking
omission during (for d, f, o)
- design (d) - QA/QC of engineering process (for d)
- fabrication (f)
- operation (o) and provide adequate damage condition
(for f, o)
- Inspection/repair of the structure (for f, o)
Unknown phenomena - Research & Development (e.g. Ringing)

Design of Offshore Structures 11

 Safety management
The design of offshore structures in Norway is
based on the following general safety principles:

Ship impacts? Structural integrity to withstand

The pessimists view
environmental and operational loading
throughout its lifecycle.
Prevent occurrence of - and protect against
accidental events
Tolerate at least one failure or operational
The optimists view
error without resulting in a major hazard or
damage to structure
Provide measures to detect control and
mitigate hazards at an early time to avoid
accident escalation.

Design of Offshore Structures 12

 Accidental Collapse Limit State Check
With respect to capsizing/sinking due to
(progressive) flooding

With respect to failure of

Generally mooring system due to
applied premature failure (weld
defect/wear/fatigue)
Flooded
volume

With respect to structural failure e.g.

due to impact damage,
Explosion
damage

Applied in Norwegian req. and

Damage due generally for catenary mooring
to dropped
object

Applied in Norwegian req.

Design of Offshore Structures 13

ALS relating to structural strength (NORSOK S-001)
Estimate the damage due to accidental loads (A)
P, F at an annual probability of 10-4
- apply risk analysis to establish
A
A
design accidental loads

Critical
event
Fault tree Event tree
End events
Accidental load
P, F
Survival check of the damaged structure as a
whole, considering P, F and environmental loads
( E ) at a probability of 10-2

Target annual probability of total loss:

E 10-5 for each type of hazard

Design of Offshore Structures 14

 Event tree for the event leakage of hydrocarbons from a process module, with
explosion presssure as final event.
Determination of design accidental load Idealized example

Events omitted Leakage of hydrocarbons

from further
consideration

End event:
Overpressures 1.8 2.0 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.05 0.01
Probabilities 0.1 0.05 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.3 10 50

Pressure: 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.8 2.0 (104)

Prob.(104) 50 10 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.05

pressure corresponding to a probability: ~ 0.95 10-4 0.3 barg
Design of Offshore Structures 15
Pressure exceedance diagram for idealized example

2.5

2
Pressure

1.5

0.5

0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
Probability of exceedance

[10-4
]

Design of Offshore Structures 16

 Typical Explosion Loads for Design

Explosion Structural Overpressure Duration Impulse

scenario component (barg) (kPa s)
Process area Dick girder (30%) 0.3-0.5 0.1 <1.4-2.0
Process roof 0.2 0.3 1;3
Export riser 0.5
area
Wellbay area Central blast wall 0.3-0.7 0.2-0.4 1.5-2.5
Upper deck 0.2 0.3 1.7

Note: Overpressures are controlled by ventilation

Design of Offshore Structures 17

 Structural analysis of accidental
loads effects
qIn practice accidental actions have to be resisted by significant
nonlinear behavior; extensive yielding, severe plastic straining,
buckling of members etc.
qConventional linear elastic analysis of load effects and ULS
design code checking can not be used to solve these problems
(structural stresses will reach yield)
qSimplified methods based on plastic analysis (ref NORSOK
N-004 App. A) are often applicable and useful for checking
results from advanced methods
qAnalysis with advanced methods, i.e. with nonlinear finite
element programs, is often needed ( USFOS, ABAQUS, LS_DYNA)
qAcceptance criteria for ALS design are performance based
qSound engineering judgment in assessment of results is essential
Design of Offshore Structures 18
Performance based acceptance criteria
e.g. Norsok Standard

qMain safety functions shall not be impaired

usability of escape-ways
integrity of shelter areas
global load bearing capacity
qIntegrity normally for et least 1 hour
qDeformation of decks leading to unacceptable
damage to equipment. e.g. rupture of HC inventories

Design of Offshore Structures 19

 Ship collisions
The accidental action is impact energy of vessel
given by displaced mass + hydrodynamic mass and
impact speed
1
Ekinetic = (M + A)V 2
2
1
= 7 2 2 14 MJ for 5000 tons vessel at 2 m/s
2
Energy to be dissipated by mainly plastic
deformation of platform and/or the ship

Design of Offshore Structures 20

 Energy dissipation modes
in jackets
Predominant
dissipation mode
Plastic

Elastic

Plastic

Design of Offshore Structures 21

Example: Damage to four leg jacket
High energy impact > 14 MJ

Brace in deck
buckles

Leg impact Brace impact

Typical observations
Ship collision force typically < extreme wave loads
Global overturning not a problem
Jacket structures often redundant legs may unload
Most damage to hit - and adjacent members
Braces subjected to impact may fracture
Risk of impact on risers to be considered if fracture occurs
Design of Offshore Structures 22
The significance of relative strength bow/installation
Illustrated for FPSO/ship collision

Ductil e Shared-energy Strength

Energy dissipation design design design

ship

installation

Relative strength - installation/ship

Strength design - FPSO crushes bow of vessel

(ref. ULS design)
Ductility design - Bow of vessel penetrates
FPSO side/stern
Shared energy design - Both vessels deform
Fairly moderate modification of relative strength may change the design from
ductile to strength or vice verse
Design of Offshore Structures 23
 Deformation of leg for broad side supply
vessel impact

t= 30 mm t= 70 mm
LS_DYNA

How does the damage distribute for supply vessel broad side impact?
Collision against a jacket leg with Diameter = 1.5 m and thickness t
= 30 mm and t =70 mm, simulated with LS_DYNA
Ship side and leg modeled with shell elements
Design of Offshore Structures 24
NTNU Deformation of leg for broad side impact
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Department of Marine Technology
M A S T E R T H E S I S 2012
Figure 7-10 M aximum Deformations - 30 mm Column

t = 30 mm t = 70 mm
LS_DYNA
F igure 7-10 M aximum Defor mations - 30 mm Column Figure 7-11 M aximum Deformations - 70 mm Column

Deformation of jacket leg and ship side heavily dependent on

relative strength Kjetil Hatlestad Qvale
NTNU, Spring 2012! Page!51

Severe denting for leg thickness t = 30 mm, but little for t =70
mm ( leg diameter D= 1.5 m)
Energy dissipation by the ship is beneficial
Rigid ship or prescribed ship energy dissipation may be wrong
Design of Offshore Structures 25
 SHIP COLLISION
Force-deformation curves for supply vessel
(TNA 202, DnV 1981 and NORSOK N-004)

Are present design guidelines relevant?

50

Broad side
D = 10 m
Present force curves
D
40 = 1.5 m
for 5000 displacements
raked bow
Impact force (MN)

30

20 Stern corner Stern end

D = 10 m
= 1.5 m

Now supply vessels > 10

7 500 tons and bulbous
D

Bow bows
0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
Note: Bow impact against large diameter columns only
Indentation (m)

Design of Offshore Structures 26

 Present trend for supply vessels:
Increased size and bulbous bows

Before: Raked stem or small bulb Now: Bows of different shapes and bulbous

Design of Offshore Structures 2727

 Strength vs. ductility design
Supply vessel bow collision with FPSO side

Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 LS_DYNA

Distribution of damage depends on impact scenario

Tearing of outer shell may cause flooding and loss of
stability for floating platforms, e.g. column stabilized
Increased compartmentalization may be necessary
Design of Offshore Structures 28
 Strength vs. ductility design
Column in floating production platform

Max strain 12%

LS_DYNA

qBow is crushed relatively small deformations in column

qMax. shell plate strain is 12% at bulb location rupture may occur
qStrain level close to rupture
qColumn strain at superstructure location is 7%
qExtra watertight bulkhead inserted to comply with 2-comp. criterion
Design of Offshore Structures 29
It is also possible to hit the conductors from the three other sides. Hence, two South impact scena-
rios and two West impact scenarios were investigated. The West impact scenarios are slightly

Ship impact against a jacket

worse than East impact scenarios, which were not analysed.

Is it possible to
(a)
design the jacket strong enough
(b)
to crush the bow?

EL. +10000 EL. +10000

DET. 1
(c) (d)
DET. 1 EL. 13000
DET. 2 DET. 2 EL. 13000

East frame
West frame

South frame

North frame

Figure 2: (a) and (b) are isometric views of the Valemon jacket; (c) and (d) are details of the South, the North, the
East and the West frames between the elevations of +10000 and -13000.

Design of Offshore Structures 30

 B,C!
Bow collision against jacket
X-braces
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!
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!
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-0!%.-!-)-=(%&*0'!*4!L"MMMM!(01!;"NMMM6!

LS_DYNA

! Design of Offshore Structures 31

 B,C!
Bow collision against
jacket X-braces
"'$ (%))))

!
"#$ & !
"'$ %*)))

B1C!
!"#$ &
Yes, the braces may be designed to
A('%!43(5-!

crush the bow, but the bulb may

:*2%.!43(5-!

penetrate between the braces and hit

K*3%.!43(5-! ! risers
!
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LS_DYNA

! Design of Offshore Structures 32

 Accidental Fires
West Atlas - Timor Sea 2009
Piper Alpha 1988

The fire

at was left Mumbai High North 2005

Deepwater Horizon 2010

Design of Offshore Structures 33

Fire and Explosion

Accidental fires governing

phenomena
q Combustion Process
- Supply of combustibles/oxygen

q Transient temperature development in

structure
- Passive fire protection

q Mechanical degradation of structural

resistance

Design of Offshore Structures 34

 Example traditional - prescriptive fire
scenario year ~ 2000

Pool fire from process inventories on cellar deck

Heat fluxes uniformly distributed and constant for 55 minutes

Design of Offshore Structures 35

 Example: Advanced, scenario based fire

q HC gas release at riser balcony from production riser. Initial release,

30 kg/s, constant for 5 min., then linearly reducing to 0 at 20 min.
Wind: 2 m/s.
q Emergency shut down systems reduce fire duration

Design of Offshore Structures 36

 Example: Advanced fire scenario
CFD simulation of internal fire - KFEX/FAHTS

Temperature field
Trusswork needs
protection

Heat exposure and temperature profile is far from uniform

Case 1:Leakage from north side of HP knockout drum at lower deck. HC gas release, 3 kg/s
for 20 min. Pool fire from oil release of 12 kg/s constant for 60 min. Wind: 7 m/s from south

Design of Offshore Structures 37

 Topsides response to fire on riser balcony
- east wall unprotected

Temperatures up to 960 oC

Deformations x 5
USFOS

Strength degrades as process area is heated while functional

loads remain constant
The process area does not collapse completely - deck survives
Are deformations acceptable for HC piping/pressure vessels?
Design of Offshore Structures 38
 Collapse process during extreme fires

USFOS

qFor long duration fires any PFP may burn off (ref Deep water Horizon)
qCollapse of major load-carrying members may result
qWill the deck survive the (soft?) impact of the module?

Design of Offshore Structures 39

Alternative fire acceptance criteria

Passive fire protection is applied on one side of drill

tower to direct fall into the sea - not towards utility and
accommodation unit

Design of Offshore Structures 40

 What has been achieved by use
of advanced fire design methods?
q Performance based fire design with todays knowledge
and tools gives simpler, cheaper and more dedicated use
of passive fire protection with the same safety level
(e.g. gaps in PFP for joint inspection)

Heat Flux Gap in PFP Temperature after 1 hour

q Performance based design has encouraged development

of emergency shut-down systems
q Reanalysis sometimes shows that old, deficient PFP may
be completely removed
q Other safety measures (e.g. shut down systems) can be
more cost efficient
Design of Offshore Structures 41
 Accidental explosions
Simple (SDOF) vs. advanced methods
11

Impulsive asymptote
10

SDOF methods Biggs (1964)

9

Pressure F/R
7

(Elastic-plastic/rigid plastic methods, component analysis)

5

Early Design
4

Iso-damage curve for ymax /yelastic = 10

3
Elastic-perfectly plastic resistance
2

Screening of scenarios USFOS

1
Pressure asymptote
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Impulse I/(RT)

Codes (NORSOK,
Non-linear static and dynamic
IGN(UK) analysis
Iso-damage
blast loading
curve for

Advanced Methods NLFEA

Large-scale simulations feasible
Detail Engineering
Critical Scenarios
Quality of analysis?
Design of Offshore Structures 42
Explosion pressure area and temporal
dependence FLACS simulation

Design of Offshore Structures 43

Dynamic simulation of blast wall response
Stiffened panel

Challenges:
What are acceptable
strain levels?
Critical strain levels
stress state and FE
USFOS mesh size dependent

Design of Offshore Structures 44

Global explosion response of drilling/wellhead module
- maximum strain levels
USFOS
q Maximum deformation ~ 0.6 m
in girders
q Maximum strain in main deck
girders ~ 15%, BOP deck
~10%
q Large shear stresses in webs of
(not fully penetrated) welded I-
girders
q Stress levels OK?
q What about HC-piping through
girders?

Uniform pressure
assumed - conservative
Design of Offshore Structures 45
 Abnormal environmental loads
Wave in deck (soil subsidence)
Ductility level earthquakes
Displacement histories of soil
layers recommended

USFOS

Design of Offshore Structures 46

 Challenge wrt quality of ALS design
Knowledge of nonlinear finite element modeling and analysis is
limited in engineering community

Analysis models for NLFEA must

reflect reality

First requirement: The model

shall be able to carry its own
weight!

Common errors:
Insignificant elements modeled
Equivalent members modeled
Too detailed models
FE mesh is a mess!

Design of Offshore Structures 47

 Role of universities
Skills in plastic and NLFEA often missing among
practicing engineers
Universities to provide adequate education in use of
simple, plastic analysis methods (mechanism analysis,
yield line analysis) in addition to conventional linear
analysis
Simple, back-of-the envelope methods useful for early
design and checking of results from advanced methods
Adequate knowledge of nonlinear finite element
analysis
Design of Offshore Structures 48
 Concluding remarks
Adequate design against accidental action to be based
based on a combination of measures
Advanced analysis tools are available for direct design,
however good competence is a prerequisite
ALS structural response analysis is fundamentally
different from linear analysis
ALS design is not prescriptive - fundamental
understanding of the governing mechanisms and sound
engineering judgment are essential
Very simple principles and assessment methods may
often be used with good accuracy
Design of Offshore Structures 49