1953 Iranian coup d'tat

The 1953 Iranian coup d'tat, known in Iran as the 28 Mordad coup
1953 Iranian coup d'tat
d'tat (Persian: ), was the overthrow of the
democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in Part of the Abadan Crisis, and the Cold War
favour of strengthening the monarchical rule of Mohammad Reza
Pahlavi on 19 August 1953, orchestrated by the United Kingdom
(under the name "Operation Boot") and the United States (under the
name TPAJAX Project[5] or "Operation Ajax").[6][7][8][9]

Mossadegh had sought toaudit the documents of the Anglo-Iranian Oil

Company (AIOC), a British corporation (now part of BP) and to limit
the company's control over Iranian petroleum reserves. Upon the
refusal of the AIOC to co-operate with the Iranian government, the
parliament (Majlis) voted to nationalize Iran's oil industry and to expel
.[10][11][12] After this
foreign corporate representatives from the country Coup supporters celebrate victory in Tehran
vote, Britain instigated a worldwide boycott of Iranian oil to pressure Date 1519 August 1953
Iran economically.[13] Initially, Britain mobilized its military to seize
Location Iran
control of the British-builtAbadan oil refinery, then the world's largest,
Result Successful overthrow of Prime
but Prime Minister Clement Attlee opted instead to tighten the
economic boycott[14] while using Iranian agents to undermine Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh
Mosaddegh's government.[15] Winston Churchill and the Eisenhower
General Fazlollah Zahedi,
administration decided to overthrow Iran's government, though the
appointed as prime minister of
predecessor Truman administration had opposed a coup.[16] Classified
post-coup military
documents show that British intelligence officials played a pivotal role
government[1][2] by Mohammad
in initiating and planning the coup, and that the AIOC contributed
Reza Shah Pahlavi.
$25,000 towards the expense of bribing officials.[17] In August 2013,
Monarchy increased in power
60 years after, the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
relative to elected government.
admitted that it was in charge of both the planning and the execution of
the coup, including the bribing of Iranian politicians, security and army Pro-American anti-Communist
high-ranking officials, as well as pro-coup propaganda.[18][19] The regime established.
CIA is quoted acknowledging the coup was carried out "under CIA Period of discontent among
direction" and "as an act of U.S. foreign policy, conceived and Iranians, climaxing in Iranian
approved at the highest levels of government".[20] Revolution

Following the coup in 1953, a government under General Fazlollah Government-Insurgents

Zahedi was formed which allowed Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the last Government of House of Pahlavi
Shah of Iran (Persian for an Iranian king),[21] to rule more firmly as Iran United States[a]
monarch. He relied heavily on United States support to hold on to United Kingdom[a]
power.[10][11][12][22] According to the CIA's declassified documents
Commanders and leaders
and records, some of the most feared mobsters in Tehran were hired by
Mohammad Mohammad Reza
the CIA to stage pro-Shah riots on 19 August. Other CIA-paid men
Mosaddegh Pahlavi
were brought into Tehran in buses and trucks, and took over the streets
Gholam Hossein Fazlollah Zahedi
of the city.[23] Between 200[3] and 300[4] people were killed because of
Sadighi (POW) Nematollah
the conflict. Mosaddegh was arrested, tried and convicted of treason by
Hossein Fatemi Nassiri (POW)
the Shah's military court. On 21 December 1953, he was sentenced to
Shaban Jafari
three years in jail, then placed under house arrest for the remainder of
Taghi Riahi (POW) Dwight
his life.[24][25][26] Other Mosaddegh supporters were imprisoned, and Eisenhower
several received the death penalty.[12] After the coup, the Shah Allen Dulles
continued his rule as monarch for the next 26 years[11][12] until he was Kermit Roosevelt,
overthrown in the Iranian Revolution in 1979.[11][12][27] Jr.
Winston Churchill
Anthony Eden
John Alexander
Contents Sinclair
Shapoor Reporter
1 Background
Units involved
2 Oil nationalization crisis
2.1 Factions of the Iranian Central Intelligence
Assassination attempt on the Shah, and the Imperial Army Agency
appointment of Mossadegh as Prime Minister
2.2 Secret Intelligence
Oil nationalization, the Abadan crisis, and rising Service
tensions
2.3 Final months of Mossadegh's government Factions of the Iranian
Imperial Army
3 Execution of Operation Ajax
4 United States role Imperial Guard
4.1 Government Records
4.2 United States motives Casualties and losses
4.3 200300 killed[3][4]
News coverage in the United States and Great Britain
5 Aftermath a. Covertly
5.1 Blowback
5.2 Iran
5.3 Internationally
6 Legacy
6.1 Historical viewpoint in the Islamic Republic
7 In popular culture
8 See also
9 References
10 Bibliography
11 External links

Background
Throughout the 19th century, Iran was caught between two advancing imperial
powers, Russia and Britain. In 1892, the British diplomat George Curzon described
Mohammad Mosaddegh, The Prime
Iran as "pieces on a chessboard upon which is being played out a game for the Minister of Iran in 1951
dominion of the world."[28] During the latter half of the 19th century, the concession
policies of the monarchy faced increased opposition. In 1872, a representative of
British entrepreneur Paul Reuter met with the Iranian monarch Naser al-Din Shah Qajar and agreed to fund the monarch's upcoming
lavish visit to Europe in return for exclusive contracts for Iranian roads, telegraphs, mills, factories, extraction of resources, and other
public works, in which Reuter would receive stipulated sum for five years and 60% of all the net revenue for 20 years. However, the
so-called "Reuter concession" was never put into effect because of violent opposition at home and from Russia.[29] In 1892 the Shah
was forced to revoke a tobacco monopoly given to Major G.F aTlbot, following protests and a widespread tobacco boycott.
In 1901, Mozzafar al-Din Shah Qajar, granted a 60-year petroleum search
concession to William Knox D'Arcy.[30] D'Arcy paid 20,000 (equivalent to 12.4
million in 2016),[31] according to journalist-turned-historian Stephen Kinzer, and
promised equal ownership shares, with 16% of any future net profit, as calculated by
the company.[32] However, the historian L.P. Elwell-Sutton wrote, in 1955, that
"Persia's share was 'hardly spectacular' and no money changed hands."[33] On 31
July 1907, D'Arcy withdrew from his private holdings in Persia, and transferred
them to the British-owned Burmah Oil Company.[34] On 26 May 1908 the company
struck oil at a depth of 1,180 feet (360 m)[35] The company grew slowly until World
Prime minister Mohammad
War I, when Persia's strategic importance led the British government to buy a
Mosaddegh kisses the hand of
controlling share in the company, essentially nationalizing British oil production in
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
Iran.

The British angered the Persians by intervening in their domestic affairs including in
the Persian Constitutional Revolution.[36][37][38] Massive popular protests had forced Mozzafar al-Din Shah to allow for the
Constitution of 1906, which limited his powers. It allowed for a democratically elected parliament Majlis to make the laws, and a
prime minister to sign and carry them out. The Prime Minister would be appointed by the Shah after a vote of confidence from
Parliament. Nevertheless, the new constitution gave the shah many executive powers as well. It allowed for the shah to issue royal
decrees (Farman), gave him the power to appoint and dismiss prime ministers (upon votes of confidence from Parliament), appoint
half of the members of the Senate (which was not convened until 1949),[12] and introduce bills to and even dissolve
Parliament.[39][40] It abolished arbitrary rule, but the shah served as an executive, rather than in a ceremonial role; consequently
when a shah was weak, the government was more democratic, but when the shah acted on his own, the democratic aspects of the
government could be sidelined. The contradictory aspects of this constitution would cause conflicts in the future.[40] The
Constitutional Revolution was opposed by the British and Russians, who attempted to subvert it through the backing of Mohammad
Ali Shah Qajar (the son of Mozzafar-e-din Shah), who tried to break up the democratic government by force. A guerrilla movement
led by Sattar Khan deposed him in 1910.[39][40]

In the aftermath of World War I there was widespread political dissatisfaction with the royalty terms of the British petroleum
concession, under theAnglo-Persian Oil Company(APOC), whereby Persia received 16% of "net profits".[41] In 1921, after years of
severe mismanagement under the Qajar Dynasty, a coup d'tat (allegedly backed by the British) brought a general, Reza Khan, into
the government. By 1923, he had become prime minister, and gained a reputation as an effective politician with a lack of
corruption.[39] By 1925 under his influence, Parliament voted to remove Ahmad Shah Qajar from the throne, and Reza Khan was
crowned Reza Shah Pahlavi, of the Pahlavi Dynasty. Reza Shah began a rapid and successful modernization program in Persia, which
up until that point had been considered to be among the most impoverished countries in the world.[39] Nevertheless, Reza Shah was
also a very harsh ruler who did not tolerate dissent. By the 1930s, he had suppressed all opposition, and had sidelined the democratic
aspects of the constitution. Opponents were jailed and in some cases even executed. While some agreed with his policies,guing
ar that
it was necessary as Iran was in such turmoil, others argued that it was unjustified.[39] One such opponent was a politician named
Mohammad Mossadegh, who was jailed in 1940. The experience gave him a lasting dislike for authoritarian rule and monarchy, and
[11]
it helped make Mossadegh a dedicated advocate of complete oil nationalization in Iran.

Reza Shah attempted to attenuate the power of the colonial forces in Iran and was successful to a large extent. However, he also
needed them to help modernize the country. He did so by balancing the influence of various colonial powers, including that of Britain
and Germany.[39] In the 1930s, Reza Shah tried to terminate the APOC concession that the Qajar dynasty had granted, but Iran was
still weak and Britain would not allow it. The concession was renegotiated on terms again favorable to the British (although the
D'Arcy Concession was softened).[39] On 21 March 1935, Reza Shah changed the name of the country from Persia to Iran. The
Anglo-Persian Oil Company was then renamed theAnglo-Iranian Oil Company(AIOC).[42]

In 1941, after the Nazi invasion of the USSR, the British and Commonwealth of Nationsforces and the Red Army invaded Iran. Reza
Shah had declared neutrality in World War II and tried to balance between the two major powers, Britain and Nazi Germany.[12][39]
The primary reason for the invasion was in order to secure Iran's oil fields and the Trans-Iranian Railway in order to deliver supplies
to the USSR. Reza Shah was arrested, deposed, and exiled by the British, and some other prominent officials were jailed as well.[12]
Reza Shah's 22-year-old son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, became the Shah of Iran. The young new Shah, unlike his father, was
initially a mild leader and at times indecisive. During the 1940s he did not for most part take an independent role in the government,
and much of Reza Shah's authoritarian policies were rolled back. Iranian democracy effectively was restored during this period as a
result.[12][39]

The British soldiers withdrew from Iran after the end of the war. However, under Stalin, the Soviet Union partly remained by
sponsoring two "People's Democratic Republics" within Iran's borders. The related conflict was ended when the US lobbied for the
Iranian Army to reassert control over the two occupied territories. The earlier agreed upon Soviet-Iranian oil agreement would never
be honored.[12] Nationalist leaders in Iran became influential by seeking a reduction in long-term foreign interventions in their
countryespecially the oil concession which was very profitable for the West and not very profitable for Iran. The British-controlled
AIOC refused to allow its books to be audited to determine whether the Iranian government was being paid what had been promised.
British intransigence irked the Iranian population.

U.S. objectives in the Middle East remained the same between 1947 and 1952 but its strategy changed. Washington remained
"publicly in solidarity and privately at odds" with Britain, its World War II ally. Britain's empire was steadily weakening, and with an
eye on international crises, the U.S. re-appraised its interests and the risks of being identified with British colonial interests. "In Saudi
Arabia, to Britain's extreme disapproval, Washington endorsed the arrangement between ARAMCO and Saudi Arabia in the 50/50
[43]
accord that had reverberations throughout the region."

Iran's oil had been discovered and later controlled by the British-owned AIOC.[44] Popular discontent with the AIOC began in the
late 1940s: a large segment of Iran's public and a number of politicians saw the company as exploitative and a central tool of
continued British imperialism in Iran.[10][45]

Oil nationalization crisis

Assassination attempt on the Shah, and the

appointment of Mossadegh as Prime Minister
In 1949, an assassin attempted to kill the Shah. Shocked by the experience and
emboldened by public sympathy for his injury, the Shah began to take an increasingly
active role in politics. He quickly organized the Iran Constituent Assembly to amend
the constitution to increase his powers. He established the Senate of Iran which had
been a part of the Constitution of 1906 but had never been convened. The Shah had the
right to appoint half the senators and he chose men sympathetic to his aims.[12]
Mossadegh thought this increase in the Shah's political power was not democratic; he
believed that the Shah should "reign, but not rule" in a manner similar to Europe's Hossein Fatemi, Iran's Minister of
constitutional monarchies. Led by Mossadegh, political parties and opponents of the Foreign Affairs
Shah's policies banded together to form a coalition known as the National Front.[12]
Oil nationalization was a major policy goal for the party
.

By 1951, the National Front had won majority seats for the popularly elected Majlis (Parliament of Iran). According to Iran's
constitution, the majority elected party in the parliament would give a vote of confidence for its prime minister candidate, after which
the Shah would appoint the candidate to power. The Prime Minister Haj Ali Razmara, who opposed the oil nationalization on
technical grounds,[10] was assassinated by the hardlineFadaiyan e-Islam (whose spiritual leader theAyatollah Abol-Qassem Kashani,
a mentor to the future Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, had been appointed Speaker of the Parliament by the National Front).[10] After
a vote of confidence from the National Front dominated Parliament, Mossadegh was appointed prime minister of Iran by the Shah
(replacing Hossein Ala, who had replaced Razmara). Under heavy pressure by the National Front, the assassin of Razmara (Khalil
Tahmasebi) was released and pardoned, thus proving the movement's power in Iranian politics.[10] For the time being, Mossadegh
and Kashani were allies of convenience, as Mossadegh saw that Kashani could mobilize the "religious masses", while Kashani
wanted Mossadegh to create an Islamic state.[10][12] Kashani's Fadaiyan mobs often violently attacked the opponents of
nationalization and opponents of the National Front government, as well as "immoral objects", acting at times as unofficial
"enforcers" for the movement.[10] However, by 1953 Mossadegh was becoming increasingly opposed to Kashani, as the latter was
contributing to mass political instability in Iran. Kashani in turn, berated Mossadegh for not "Islamizing" Iran, as the latter was a firm
believer in the separation of religion and state.[10]

The Shah and his prime minister had an antagonistic relationship. Part of the problem stemmed from the fact that Mossadegh was
connected by blood to the former royalQajar dynasty, and saw the Pahlavi king as a usurper to the throne. But the real issue stemmed
from the fact that Mossadegh represented a pro-democratic force that wanted to temper the Shah's rule in Iranian politics. He wanted
the Shah to be a ceremonial monarch rather than a ruling monarch, thus giving the elected government power over the un-elected
Shah. While the constitution of Iran gave the Shah the power to rule directly, Mossadegh used the united National Front bloc and the
widespread popular support for the oil nationalization vote (the latter which the Shah supported as well) in order to block the Shah's
ability to act. As a result, the oil nationalization issue became increasingly intertwined with the Mossadegh's pro-democracy
movement. The dejected Shah was angered by Mossadegh's "insolence" (according to Abbas Milani, he angrily paced in the rooms of
his palace at the thought that he would be reduced to a figurehead). But Mossadegh and the oil nationalization's popularity prevented
the Shah from acting against his prime minister (which was allowed under Iran's constitution, something that Mossadegh felt a king
had no right to do). In 1952 the Shah dismissed Mossadegh, replacing him with Ahmad Qavam (a veteran prime minister). But
[12]
widespread protests by Mossadegh supporters resulted in the Shah immediately reinstating him.

Oil nationalization, the Abadan crisis, and rising tensions

In late 1951, Iran's Parliament in a near unanimous vote approved the oil nationalization agreement. The bill was widely popular
among most Iranians, and generated a huge wave of nationalism, and immediately put Iran at loggerheads with Britain (the handful of
MPs that disagreed with it voted for it as well in the face of overwhelming popular support, and the Fadaiyan's wrath).[10][46] The
nationalization made Mossadegh instantly popular among millions of Iranians, cementing him as a national hero, and placing him and
Iran at the center of worldwide attention.[10][12][46] Many Iranians felt that for the first time in centuries, they were taking control of
the affairs of their country. Many also expected that nationalization would result in a massive increase of wealth for Iranians.

Britain now faced the newly elected nationalist government in Iran where Mossadegh, with strong backing of the Iranian parliament
[43]
and people, demanded more favorable concessionary arrangements, which Britain vigorously opposed.

The U.S. State Department not only rejected Britain's demand that it continue to be the primary beneficiary of Iranian oil reserves but
[47]
"U.S. international oil interests were among the beneficiaries of the concessionary arrangements that followed nationalization."

Mohammad Mosaddegh attempted to negotiate with the AIOC, but the company rejected his proposed compromise. Mosaddegh's
plan, based on the 1948 compromise between the Venezuelan Government of Romulo Gallegos and Creole Petroleum,[48] would
divide the profits from oil 50/50 between Iran and Britain. Against the recommendation of the United States, Britain refused this
[49]
proposal and began planning to undermine and overthrow the Iranian government.

In July 1951, the American diplomat Averell Harriman went to Iran to negotiate an Anglo-Iranian compromise, asking the Shah's
help; his reply was that "in the face of public opinion, there was no way he could say a word against nationalisation".[50] Harriman
held a press conference in Tehran, calling for reason and enthusiasm in confronting the "nationalisation crisis". As soon as he spoke,
a journalist rose and shouted: "We and the Iranian people all support Premier Mosaddegh and oil nationalisation!" Everyone present
.[50]
began cheering and then marched out of the room; the abandoned Harriman shook his head in dismay

On a visit to the United States in October 1951, Mossadegh in spite of the popularity of nationalization in Iran agreed in talks
with George C. McGhee to a complex settlement of the crisis involving the sale of the Abadan Refinery to a non-British company
and Iranian control of the extraction of crude oil. The US waited until Winston Churchill became prime minister to present the deal,
[51]
believing he would be more flexible, but the deal was rejected by the British.

The National Iranian Oil Company suffered decreased production, because of Iranian inexperience and the AIOC's orders that British
technicians not work with them, thus provoking the Abadan Crisis that was aggravated by the Royal Navy's blockading its export
markets to pressure Iran to not nationalise its petroleum. The Iranian revenues were greater, because the profits went to Iran's national
treasury rather than to private, foreign oil companies.[52] By September 1951, the British had virtually ceased Abadan oil field
production, forbidden British export to Iran of key British commodities (including sugar and steel),[53] and had frozen Iran's hard
currency accounts in British banks.[54] British Prime Minister Clement Attlee considered seizing the Abadan Oil Refinery by force,
but instead settled on an embargo by the Royal Navy, stopping any ship transporting Iranian oil for carrying so-called "stolen
, Winston Churchill took an even harder stance against Iran. [10][55]
property". On his re-election as prime minister "

The United Kingdom took its anti-nationalisation case against Iran to the International Court of Justice at The Hague; PM
Mosaddegh said the world would learn of a "cruel and imperialistic country" stealing from a "needy and naked people". The court
ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the case. Nevertheless, the British continued to enforce the embargo of Iranian oil. In August
1952, Iranian Prime Minister Mosaddegh invited an American oil executive to visit Iran and theruman
T administration welcomed the
invitation. However, the suggestion upset Churchill who insisted that the U.S. not undermine his campaign to isolate Mosaddegh:
[55]
"Britain was supporting the Americans in Korea, he reminded rTuman, and had a right to expect Anglo-American unity on Iran."

In mid-1952, Britain's embargo of Iranian oil was devastatingly effective. British agents in Tehran "worked to subvert" the
government of Mosaddegh, who sought help from President Truman and then the World Bank but to no avail. "Iranians were
becoming poorer and unhappier by the day" and Mosaddegh's political coalition was fraying. To make matters worse, the Speaker of
the Parliament Ayatollah Kashani, Mossadegh's main clerical supporter, became increasingly opposed to the Prime Minister, because
Mossadegh was not turning Iran into an Islamic state. By 1953, he had completely turned on him, and supported the coup, depriving
[10]
Mossadegh of religious support, while giving it to the Shah.

In the Majlis election in the spring of 1952, Mosaddegh "had little to fear from a free vote, since despite the country's problems, he
was widely admired as a hero. A free vote, however, was not what others were planning. British agents had fanned out across the
country, bribing candidates, and the regional bosses who controlled them. They hoped to fill the Majlis with deputies who would vote
[56]
to depose Mosaddegh. It would be a coup carried out by seemingly legal means."

While the National Front, which often supported Mosaddegh won handily in the big cities, there was no one to monitor voting in the
rural areas. Violence broke out in Abadan and other parts of the country where elections were hotly contested. Faced with having to
leave Iran for The Hague where Britain was suing for control of Iranian oil, Mossadegh's cabinet voted to postpone the remainder of
[57]
the election until after the return of the Iranian delegation from The Hague.

"While Mosaddegh dealt with political challenge, he faced another that most Iranians considered far more urgent. The British
blockade of Iranian seaports meant that Iran was left without access to markets where it could sell its oil. The embargo had the effect
of causing Iran to spiral into bankruptcy. Tens of thousands had lost their jobs at the Abadan refinery, and although most understood
and passionately supported the idea of nationalisation, they naturally hoped that Mosaddegh would find a way to put them back to
[58]
work. The only way he could do that was to sell oil."

To make matters worse, the Communist Tudeh Party, which supported the Soviet Union and had attempted to kill the Shah only four
years earlier, began to infiltrate the military[59] and send mobs to "support Mossadegh" (but in reality to marginalize all non-
Communist opponents). Earlier, the Tudeh had denounced Mossadegh, but by 1953 they changed tack and decided to "support"
him.[60] The Tudeh violently attacked opponents under the guise of helping the prime minister (the cousin of the future queen of Iran,
Farah Pahlavi, was stabbed at the age of 13 in his school by Tudeh activists),[11] and unwittingly helped cause Mossadegh's
reputation to decline, despite the fact that he never officially endorsed them.[12] However, by 1953 he and the Tudeh had formed an
unofficial alliance of convenience with each other; the Tudeh were the "foot soldiers" for his government, effectively replacing the
Fadaiyan in that role, all the while secretly hoping that Mossadegh would institute communism.[10][12] Pro-Shah mobs also carried
[10]
out attacks on Mossadegh opponents, and there may have been some CIA coordination.

Worried about Britain's other interests in Iran, and (thanks to the Tudeh party)[12] believing that Iran's nationalism was really a
Soviet-backed plot, Britain persuaded US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that Iran was falling to the Sovietseffectively
exploiting the American Cold War mindset. Since President Harry S. Truman was busy fighting a war in Korea, he did not agree to
overthrow the government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. However, in 1953, when Dwight D. Eisenhower became
[41]
president, the UK convinced the U.S. to undertake a joint coup d'tat.
Final months of Mossadegh's government
By 1953, economic tensions caused by the British embargo and political turmoil
began to take a major toll upon Mossadegh's popularity and political power. The
people were increasingly blaming him for the economic and political crisis. Political
violence was becoming widespread in the form of street clashes between rival
political groups.[10][12] Mossadegh was losing popularity and support among the
working class which had been his strongest supporters. As he lost support, he
became more autocratic.[60][61] As early as August 1952, he began to rely on
emergency powers to rule, generating controversy among his supporters.[61] After Pro-Mosaddegh protests in Tehran,
16 August 1953
an assassination attempt upon one of his cabinet ministers and himself, he ordered
the jailing of dozens of his political opponents. This act created widespread anger
among much of the general public, and led to accusations that Mossadegh was becoming a dictator.[10][12] The Tudeh party's
unofficial alliance with Mossadegh led to fears of communism, and increasingly it was the communists who were taking part in pro-
Mossadegh rallies, and attacking opponents.[10][12]

By mid-1953 a mass of resignations by Mossadegh's parliamentary supporters reduced the National Front seats in Parliament. A
referendum to dissolve parliament and give the prime minister power to make law was submitted to voters, and it passed with 99.9
[62] The rigged referendum was widely seen by opponents as a dictatorial act,
percent approval, 2,043,300 votes to 1300 votes against.
and the Shah and the rest of the government were effectively stripped of their powers to rule. When Mossadegh dissolved the
Parliament, his opponents decried this act because he had effectively given himself "total power". Ironically, this un-democratic act
[10][12]
by a democratically elected prime minister would result in a chain of events leading to his downfall.

The Shah himself initially opposed the coup plans, and supported the oil nationalization, but he joined after being informed by the
CIA that he too would be "deposed" if he didn't play along (the experience left him with a lifelong awe of American power, and
would contribute to his pro-US policies, while generating a hatred of the British).[12] Mossadegh's decision to dissolve Parliament
also contributed to his decision.[12]

Execution of Operation Ajax

The official pretext for the start of the coup was Mossadegh's decree to dissolve
Parliament, giving himself and his cabinet complete power to rule, while effectively
stripping the Shah of his powers.[10][11][12] It resulted in him being accused of
giving himself "total and dictatorial powers." The Shah, who had been resisting the
CIA's demands for the coup, finally agreed to support it.[10][11][12] Having obtained
the Shah's concurrence, the CIA executed the coup.[63] Farmans (royal decrees)
dismissing Mosaddegh and appointing General Fazlollah Zahedi (a loyalist who had
helped Reza Shah reunify Iran decades earlier)[11] were drawn up by the coup
plotters and signed by the Shah. Having signed the decrees and delivered them to
General Zahedi, he and Queen Soraya departed for a week-long vacation in northern
Iran.[64] On Saturday 15 August, Colonel Nematollah Nassiri,[11] the commander of
the Imperial Guard, delivered to Mosaddegh a firman from the Shah dismissing him.
Mosaddegh, who had been warned of the plot, probably by the Communist Tudeh
Party, rejected the firman and had Nassiri arrested.[65][66][67] Mosaddegh argued at
his trial after the coup that under the Iranian constitutional monarchy, the Shah had
Mohammad Mosaddegh, the leader
no constitutional right to issue an order for the elected Prime Minister's dismissal of National Front (Iran) and the
without Parliament's consent. However, the constitution at the time did allow for democratic Prime Minister of Iran
such an action, which Mossadegh considered unfair.[12][68][69] The action was
publicized within Iran by the CIA and in the United States by The New York Times.
Mossadegh's supporters (millions of National Front supporters as well as members of the Tudeh Party) took to the streets in violent
protests.[10] Following the failed coup attempt, the Shah, accompanied by his second wife Soraya Esfandiary-Bakhtiari and Aboul
Fath Atabay[70] fled to Baghdad. Arriving unannounced, the Shah asked for permission for himself and his consort to stay in
Baghdad for a few days before continuing on to Europe.[64] After high-level Government consultations, they were escorted to the
Mohammad Khatami.[70]
White House, the Iraqi Government's guest house, before flying to Italy in a plane flown by

After the first coup attempt failed, General Zahedi, declaring that he was the rightful prime minister of Iran, shuttled between
multiple safe houses attempting to avoid arrest. Mossadegh ordered security forces to round up the coup plotters, and dozens were
imprisoned. Believing that he had succeeded, and that he was in full control of the government, Mossadegh erred. Assuming that the
coup had failed, he asked his supporters to return to their homes and to continue with their lives as normal. The Tudeh party members
also returned to their homes, no longer carrying out enforcement duties.[10][11][12] The CIA was ordered to leave Iran, although
Kermit Roosevelt was slow to receive the messageallegedly due to MI6 interferenceand eagerly continued to foment anti-
Mossadegh unrest. The Eisenhower administration considered changing its policy to support Mossadegh, with undersecretary of state
Walter Bedell Smith remarking on August 17: "Whatever his faults, Mossadegh had no love for the Russians and timely aid might
enable him to keep Communism in check."[71]

However, General Zahedi, who was still on the run, met with the pro-Shah Ayatollah
Mohammad Behbahani and other Shah supporters in secret. There (using CIA
money deridingly known as "Behbahani dollars"), they quickly created a new plan.
Already, much of the country was in shock from the Shah's flight from Iran, fears of
communism, and Mossadegh's arrests of opponents. They capitalized on this
sentiment in their plans. The Ayatollah Behbahani also used his influence to rally
religious demonstrators against Mossadegh.[10][11][12]

On 19 August, hired infiltrators posing as Tudeh party members began to organize a

"communist revolution". They came and encouraged real Tudeh members to join in.
Soon, the Tudeh members took to the streets attacking virtually any symbols of
capitalism, and looting private businesses and destroying shops. Much of southern
Tehran's business district, including the bazaars, were vandalized. With sudden mass
public revulsion against this act, the next part of Zahedi's plan came into action.
From the vandalized bazaars, a second group of paid infiltrators, this time posing as
Shah supporters, organized angry crowds of common Iranians who were terrified
[10][11][12]
about a "communist revolution" and sickened by the violence. Nematollah Nassiri

By the middle of the day, large crowds of regular citizens, armed with improvised
weapons, took to the streets in mass demonstrations, and beat back the Tudeh party members. Under Zahedi's authority, the army left
its barracks and drove off the communist Tudeh and then stormed all government buildings with the support of demonstrators.
Mossadegh fled after a tank fired a single shell into his house, but he later turned himself in to the army's custody. To prevent further
bloodshed, he refused a last attempt to organize his supporters.[72] By the end of the day, Zahedi and the army were in control of the
government.[10][11][12] Despite the CIA's role in creating the conditions for the coup, there is little evidence to suggest that Kermit
Roosevelt or other CIA officials were directly responsible for the actions of the demonstrators or the army on August 19. It has even
been suggested that Roosevelt's activities between August 1519 were primarily intended to organize "stay-behind networks as part
of the planned CIA evacuation of the country [73]
," although they allowed him to later "claim responsibility for the day's outcome."

The Shah stayed in a hotel in Italy until he learned what had transpired, upon which he "chokingly declared": "I knew they loved
me."[3] Allen Dulles, the director of the CIA, flew back with the Shah from Rome to Tehran.[74] Zahedi officially replaced
Mosaddegh. Mossadegh was arrested, tried, and originally sentenced to death. But on the Shah's personal orders, his sentence was
commuted[11][12][75][76] to three years' solitary confinement in a military prison, followed by house arrest until his death.
[77]

United States role

As a condition for restoring the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, in 1954 the U.S. required removal of the AIOC's monopoly; five
American petroleum companies, Royal Dutch Shell, and the Compagnie Franaise des Ptroles, were to draw Iran's petroleum after
the successful coup d'tatOperation Ajax. The Shah declared this to be a "victory" for Iranians, with the massive influx of money
from this agreement resolving the economic collapse from the last three years, and allowing him to carry out his planned
modernization projects.[12]

As part of that, the CIA organized anti-Communist guerrillas to fight the Tudeh Party if they seized power in the chaos of Operation
Ajax.[78] Released National Security Archive documents showed that Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith reported that the
CIA had agreed with Qashqai tribal leaders, in south Iran, to establish a clandestine safe haven from which U.S.-funded guerrillas and
spies could operate.[78][79]

Operation Ajax's formal leader was senior CIA officer Kermit Roosevelt, Jr., while career agent Donald Wilber was the operational
leader, planner, and executor of the deposition of Mosaddegh. The coup d'tat depended on the impotent Shah's dismissing the
popular and powerful Prime Minister and replacing him with General Fazlollah Zahedi, with help from Colonel Abbas Farzanegan
[79]
a man agreed upon by the British and Americans after determining his anti-Soviet politics.

The CIA sent Major General Norman Schwarzkopf Sr. to persuade the exiled Shah to return to rule Iran. Schwarzkopf trained the
security forces that would become known asSAVAK to secure the shah's hold on power.[80]

Government Records
The coup was carried out by the U.S. administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower in a covert action advocated by Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles, and implemented under the supervision of his brother Allen Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence.[81] The
coup was organized by the United States' CIA and the United Kingdom's MI6, two spy agencies that aided royalists and royalist
elements of the Iranian army.[82] Much of the money was channeled through the pro-Shah Ayatollah Mohammad Behbahani, who
drew many religious masses to the plot. Ayatollah Kashani had completely turned on Mossadegh and supported the Shah, by this
point.[10]

According to a heavily redacted CIA document[83] released to the National Security Archivein response to a Freedom of Information
request, "Available documents do not indicate who authorized CIA to begin planning the operation, but it almost certainly was
President Eisenhower himself. Eisenhower biographer Stephen Ambrose has written that the absence of documentation reflected the
President's style."

The CIA document then quotes from the Ambrose biography of Eisenhower:

Before going into the operation, Ajax had to have the approval of the President. Eisenhower participated in none of the
meetings that set up Ajax; he received only oral reports on the plan; and he did not discuss it with his Cabinet or the NSC.
Establishing a pattern he would hold to throughout his Presidency, he kept his distance and left no documents behind that
could implicate the President in any projected coup. But in the privacy of the Oval Office, over cocktails, he was kept
[84]
informed by Foster Dulles, and he maintained a tight control over the activities of the CIA.

CIA officer Kermit Roosevelt, Jr., the grandson of former President Theodore
Roosevelt, carried out the operation planned by CIA agent Donald Wilber. One
version of the CIA history, written by Wilber, referred to the operation as
TPAJAX.[85][86]

During the coup, Roosevelt and Wilber, representatives of the Eisenhower

administration, bribed Iranian government officials, reporters, and businessmen.
They also bribed street thugs to support the Shah and oppose Mosaddegh.[87] The Confirmation for execution of
deposed Iranian leader, Mosaddegh, was taken to jail and Iranian General Fazlollah Operation Ajax
Zahedi named himself prime minister in the new,pro-western government.
Another tactic Roosevelt admitted to using was bribing demonstrators into attacking symbols of the Shah, while chanting pro-
Mossadegh slogans. As king, the Shah was largely seen as a symbol of Iran at the time by many Iranians and monarchists. Roosevelt
declared that the more that these agents showed their hate for the Shah and attacked his symbols, the more it caused the average
Iranian citizen to dislike and distrust Mossadegh.[88]

Professor Masoud Kazemzadeh wrote that several "Iranian fascists and Nazi
sympathizers played prominent roles in the coup regime. General Fazlollah Zahedi,
who had been arrested and imprisoned by the British during World War II for his
attempt to establish a pro-Nazi government, was made Prime Minister on 19 August
1953. The CIA gave Zahedi about $100,000 before the coup and an additional
$5 million the day after the coup to help consolidate support for the coup."[89]
Kazemzadeh also said "Bahram Shahrokh, a trainee of Joseph Goebbels and Berlin
Radio's Persian-language program announcer during the Nazi rule, became director
Shaban Jafari, commonly known as
of propaganda. Mr. Sharif-Emami, who also had spent some time in jail for his pro-
Shaban the Brainless (Shaban
Nazi activities in the 1940s, assumed several positions after 1953 coup, including Bimokh), was a notable pro-Shah
Secretary General of the Oil Industry, President of the Senate, and Prime Minister strongman and thug. He led his men
(twice)."[89] The US government gave Zahedi a further $28 million a month later, and other bribed street thugs and
and that another $40 million was given in 1954 after the Iran government signed the was a prominent figure during the
coup.
oil consortium deal.[90]

The British and American spy agencies returned the monarchy to Iran by installing
the pro-western Mohammad Reza Pahlavi on the throne where his rule lasted 26 years. The Shah was overthrown in 1979.[41][91]
Masoud Kazemzadeh, associate professor of political science at the Sam Houston State University, wrote that the Shah was directed
by the CIA and MI6, and assisted by high-ranking Shia clerics.[89] He wrote that the coup employed mercenaries including
"prostitutes and thugs" from Tehran's red light district.[89]

The overthrow of Iran's elected government in 1953 ensured Western control of Iran's petroleum resources and prevented the Soviet
Union from competing for Iranian oil.[92][93][94][95] Some Iranian clerics cooperated with the western spy agencies because they
[87]
were dissatisfied with Mosaddegh's secular government.

While the broad outlines of the operation are known, "...the C.I.A.'s records were
widely thought by historians to have the potential to add depth and clarity to a
famous but little-documented intelligence operation," reporter Tim Weiner wrote in
The New York Times 29 May 1997.[96]

"The Central Intelligence Agency, which has repeatedly pledged for more than five
years to make public the files from its secret mission to overthrow the government of
Iran in 1953, said today that it had destroyed or lost almost all the documents
decades ago."[96][97][98]

"A historian who was a member of the C.I.A. staf

f in 1992 and 1993 said
in an interview today that the records were obliterated by 'a culture of
destruction' at the agency. The historian, Nick Cullather, said he believed
that records on other major cold war covert operations had been burned,
including those on secret missions in Indonesia in the 1950s and a
successful C.I.A.-sponsored coup in Guyana in the early 1960s. 'Iran Fazlollah Zahedi
there's nothing', Mr. Cullather said. 'Indonesiavery little. Guyana
that was burned.' "[96]
Donald Wilber, one of the CIA officers who planned the 1953 coup in Iran, wrote an account titled, Clandestine Service History
Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran: November 1952 August 1953. Wilber said one goal of the coup was to strengthen the
Shah.

In 2000, James Risen at The New York Times obtained the previously secret CIA version of the coup written by Wilber and
summarized[99] its contents, which includes the following.

In early August, the C.I.A. stepped up the pressure. Iranian operatives pretending to be Communists threatened Muslim
leaders with savage punishment if they opposed Mossadegh, seeking to stir anti-Communist sentiment in the religious
community.

In addition, the secret history says, the house of at least one prominent Muslim was bombed by C.I.A. agents posing as
Communists. It does not say whether anyone was hurt in this attack.

The agency was also intensifying its propaganda campaign. A leading newspaper owner was granted a personal loan of
about $45,000, in the belief that this would make his organ amenable to our purposes.

But the shah remained intransigent. In an 1 August meeting with General Norman Schwarzkopf,
he refused to sign the C.I.A.-written decrees firing Mr. Mossadegh and appointing General Zahedi.
He said he doubted that the army would support him in a showdown.

The National Security Archive at George Washington University contains the full account by Wilber, along with many other coup-
related documents and analysis.[100][101][102]

In a January 1973 telephone conversation made public in 2009, U.S. President Richard Nixon told CIA Director Richard Helms, who
was awaiting Senate confirmation to become the new U.S. Ambassador to Iran, that Nixon wanted Helms to be a "regional
Shah Reza Pahlavi.[103]
ambassador" to Persian Gulf oil states, and noted that Helms had been a schoolmate of

In August 2013, at the sixtieth anniversary of the coup, the CIA released documents showing they were involved in staging the coup.
The documents also describe the motivations behind the coup and the strategies used to stage it.[8] The documents also showed that
the UK tried to censor information regarding its role in the coup. The Foreign Office said "it could neither confirm nor deny Britain's
[19]
involvement in the coup". Nonetheless, many CIA documents about the coup still remain classified.

In June 2017, the United States State Department's Office of the Historian released its revised historical account of the event. The
volume of historical records "focuses on the evolution of U.S. thinking on Iran as well as the U.S. Government covert operation that
resulted in Mosadeqs overthrow on August 19, 1953".[104] Though some of the relevant records were destroyed long ago, the release
contains a collection of roughly 1,000 pages, only a small number of which remain classified.[105] One revalation is that the CIA
"attempted to call off the failing coup but was salvaged by an insubordinate spy."[106]

In August 2017, the National Security Archive released two more declassified documents which confirm the British solicitation of
the United States' assistance in ousting Mosaddeq.[107] According to these records, the British first approached the American
government about a plan for the coup in late 1952, claiming that the Mosaddeq government would be ineffective in preventing a
communist takeover, which they believed necessitated action.[108] At the time, the American government was already preparing to
aid Mosaddeq in his oil dealings with the British, and believed him to be anti-communist considerations which made the U.S.
government skeptical of the plot. Since President Truman's term was drawing to a close in January 1953, and there was too much
[109]
uncertainty and danger associated with the plot, the U.S. government decided not to take action against Mosaddeq at the time.

United States motives

Historians disagree on what motivated the United States to change its policy towards Iran and stage the coup. Middle East historian
Ervand Abrahamian identified the coup d'tat as "a classic case of nationalism clashing with imperialism in the Third World". He
states that Secretary of State Dean Acheson admitted the " 'Communist threat' was a smokescreen" in responding to President
Eisenhower's claim that the Tudeh party was about to assume power.[110]
 Throughout the crisis, the "communist danger" was more of a rhetorical device than a real issuei.e. it was part of the
cold-war discourse ...The Tudeh was no match for the armed tribes and the 129,000-man military. What is more, the
British and Americans had enough inside information to be confident that the party had no plans to initiate armed
insurrection. At the beginning of the crisis, when the Truman administration was under the impression a compromise was
possible, Acheson had stressed the communist danger, and warned if Mosaddegh was not helped, the Tudeh would take
over. The (British) Foreign Office had retorted that the Tudeh was no real threat. But, in August 1953, when the Foreign
Office echoed the Eisenhower administration's claim that the Tudeh was about to take over, Acheson now retorted that
there was no such communist danger. Acheson was honest enough to admit that the issue of the Tudeh was a
smokescreen.[110]

Abrahamian states that Iran's oil was the central focus of the coup, for both the British and the Americans, though "much of the
discourse at the time linked it to the Cold War".[111] Abrahamian wrote, "If Mosaddegh had succeeded in nationalizing the British oil
industry in Iran, that would have set an example and was seen at that time by the Americans as a threat to U.S. oil interests
throughout the world, because other countries would do the same."[111] Mosaddegh did not want any compromise solution that
[111]
allowed a degree of foreign control. Abrahamian said that Mosaddegh "wanted real nationalization, both in theory and practice".

Tirman points out that agricultural land owners were politically dominant in Iran,
well into the 1960s and the monarch, Reza Shah's aggressive land expropriation
policiesto the benefit of himself and his supportersresulted in the Iranian
government being Iran's largest land owner. "The landlords and oil producers had
new backing, moreover, as American interests were for the first time exerted in Iran.
The Cold War was starting, and Soviet challenges were seen in every leftist
movement. But the reformers were at root nationalists, not communists, and the
issue that galvanized them above all others was the control of oil."[112] The belief
that oil was the central motivator behind the coup has been echoed in the popular Pro-shah sympathizers
media by authors such as Robert Byrd,[113] Alan Greenspan,[114] and Ted
Koppel.[115]

However, Middle East political scientist Mark Gasiorowski states that while, on the face of it, there is considerable merit to the
argument that U.S. policymakers helped U.S. oil companies gain a share in Iranian oil production after the coup, "it seems more
plausible to argue that U.S. policymakers were motivated mainly by fears of a communist takeover in Iran, and that the involvement
of U.S. companies was sought mainly to prevent this from occurring. The Cold War was at its height in the early 1950s, and the
Soviet Union was viewed as an expansionist power seeking world domination. Eisenhower had made the Soviet threat a key issue in
the 1952 elections, accusing the Democrats of being soft on communism and of having 'lost China.' Once in power, the new
[49]
administration quickly sought to put its views into practice."

Gasiorowski further states "the major U.S. oil companies were not interested in Iran at this time. A glut existed in the world oil
market. The U.S. majors had increased their production in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 1951 in order to make up for the loss of
Iranian production; operating in Iran would force them to cut back production in these countries which would create tensions with
Saudi and Kuwaiti leaders. Furthermore, if nationalist sentiments remained high in Iran, production there would be risky. U.S. oil
companies had shown no interest in Iran in 1951 and 1952. By late 1952, the Truman administration had come to believe that
participation by U.S. companies in the production of Iranian oil was essential to maintain stability in Iran and keep Iran out of Soviet
hands. In order to gain the participation of the major U.S. oil companies, Truman offered to scale back a large anti-trust case then
being brought against them. The Eisenhower administration shared ruman's
T views on the participation of U.S. companies in Iran and
also agreed to scale back the anti-trust case. Thus, not only did U.S. majors not want to participate in Iran at this time, it took a major
effort by U.S. policymakers to persuade them to become involved."[49]

In 2004, Gasiorowski edited a book on the coup[116] arguing that "the climate of intense cold war rivalry between the superpowers,
together with Iran's strategic vital location between the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf oil fields, led U.S. officials to believe that
they had to take whatever steps were necessary to prevent Iran from falling into Soviet hands."[116] While "these concerns seem
vastly overblown today"[116] the pattern of "the 194546 Azerbaijan crisis, the consolidation of Soviet control in Eastern Europe, the
communist triumph in China, and the Korean Warand with the Red Scare at its height in the United States"[116] would not allow
U.S. officials to risk allowing the Tudeh Party to gain power in Iran.[116] Furthermore, "U.S. officials believed that resolving the oil
dispute was essential for restoring stability in Iran, and after March 1953 it appeared that the dispute could be resolved only at the
expense either of Britain or of Mosaddeq."[116] He concludes "it was geostrategic considerations, rather than a desire to destroy
Mosaddeq's movement, to establish a dictatorship in Iran or to gain control over Iran's oil, that persuaded U.S. officials to undertake
the coup."[116]

Faced with choosing between British interests and Iran, the U.S. chose Britain,
Gasiorowski said. "Britain was the closest ally of the United States, and the two
countries were working as partners on a wide range of vitally important matters
throughout the world at this time. Preserving this close relationship was more
important to U.S. officials than saving Mosaddeq's tottering regime." A year earlier,
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill used Britain's support for the U.S. in the
Cold War to insist the United States not undermine his campaign to isolate
Mosaddegh. "Britain was supporting the Americans in Korea, he reminded Truman, Mosaddegh's house after attack
and had a right to expect 'Anglo-American unity' on [117]
Iran."

The two main winners of World War II, who had been Allies during the war, became superpowers and competitors as soon as the war
ended, each with their own spheres of influence and client states. After the 1953 coup, Iran became one of the client states of the
United States. In his earlier book, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran, Gasiorowski identifies the client
states of the United States and of the Soviet Union during 19541977. Gasiorowski identified Cambodia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran,
Laos, Nicaragua, Panama, the Philippines, South Korea, South Vietnam, and Taiwan as strong client states of the United States and
identified those that were moderately important to the U.S. as Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Israel, Jordan, Liberia, Pakistan, Paraguay, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and Zaire. He named
Argentina, Chile, Ethiopia, Japan, and Peru as "weak" client states of the United States.[118]

Gasiorowski identified Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, North Vietnam, and Rumania as
"strong client states" of the Soviet Union, and Afghanistan, Egypt, Guinea, North Korea, Somalia, and Syria as moderately important
client states. Mali and South Yemen were classified as weak client states of the Soviet Union.

According to Kinzer, for most Americans, the crisis in Iran became just part of the conflict between Communism and "the Free
world".[119] "A great sense of fear, particularly the fear of encirclement, shaped American consciousness during this period. ... Soviet
power had already subdued Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Communist governments were imposed on Bulgaria and Romania in
1946, Hungary and Poland in 1947, and Czechoslovakia in 1948. Albania and Yugoslavia also turned to communism. Greek
communists made a violent bid for power. Soviet soldiers blocked land routes to Berlin for sixteen months. In 1949, the Soviet Union
successfully tested a nuclear weapon. That same year, pro-Western forces in China lost their Civil War to communists led by Mao
Zedong. From Washington, it seemed that enemies were on the march everywhere."[119] Consequently, "the United States,
challenged by what most Americans saw as a relentless communist advance, slowly ceased to view Iran as a country with a unique
history that faced a unique political challenge."[120] Some historians, including Douglas Little,[121] Abbas Milani[122] and George
Lenczowski[123] have echoed the view that fears of a communist takeover or Soviet influence motivated the U.S. to intervene.

On 11 May 1951, prior to the overthrow of Mossadegh, Adolf A. Berle warned the U.S. State Department that U.S. "control of the
[124]
Middle East was at stake, which, with its Persian Gulf oil, meant 'substantial control of the world.'"

News coverage in the United States and Great Britain

When Mossadegh called for the dissolution of the Majlis in August 1953, the editors of the New York Times gave the opinion that: "A
plebiscite more fantastic and farcical than any ever held under Hitler or Stalin is now being staged in Iran by Premier Mossadegh in
an effort to make himself unchallenged dictator of the country."[125]
A year after the coup, the New York Times wrote on 6 August 1954, that a new oil "agreement between Iran and a consortium of
foreign oil companies" was "good news indeed".[126]

"Costly as the dispute over Iranian oil has been to all concerned, the affair may yet be proved worthwhile if lessons are
learned from it: Underdeveloped countries with rich resources now have an object lesson in the heavy cost that must be
paid by one of their number which goes berserk with fanatical nationalism. It is perhaps too much to hope that Iran's
experience will prevent the rise of Mossadeghs in other countries, but that experience may at least strengthen the hands of
more reasonable and more far-seeing leaders. In some circles in Great Britain the charge will be pushed that American
'imperialism'in the shape of the American oil firms in the consortium!has once again elbowed Britain from a historic
stronghold."[126]

The British government used the BBC's Persian service for advancing its propaganda against Mosaddegh. Anti-Mosaddegh material
were repeatedly aired on the radio channel to the extent that Iranian staff at the BBC Persian radio went on strike to protest the
move.[127] The documentary Cinematograph aired on 18 August 2011 on the anniversary of the coup. In it, BBC admitted for the
first time to the role of BBC Persian radio as the propaganda arm of the British government in Iran. The Cinematograph narrator
said:

The British government used the BBC Persian radio for advancing its propaganda against Mosaddegh and anti-
Mosaddegh material were repeatedly aired on the radio channel to the extent that Iranian staff at the BBC Persian radio
went on strike to protest the move.

The documentary quoted a 21 July 1951 classified document in which a Foreign Office official thanked the British ambassador for
his proposals that were precisely followed by the BBC Persian radio to strengthen its propaganda against Mosaddegh:

The BBC had already made most of the points which you listed, but they were very glad to have an indication from you
of what was likely to be most effective and will arrange their programme accordingly... We should also avoid direct
attacks on the 'ruling classes' since it seems probable that we may want to deal with a government drawn from those
classes should Mosaddegh fall.

The document further stressed that the Foreign Office "shall be grateful for [the ambassador's] comments on the propaganda line we
have proposed".[128]

An early account of the CIA's role in the coup appeared in The Saturday Evening Post in late 1954, purporting to explain how "the
strategic little nation of Iran was rescued from the closing clutch of Moscow." The report was approved by the CIA, and its authors
may have been assisted byKermit Roosevelt Jr., who had written for thePost before.[129]

Aftermath
."[130][131]
The coup has been said to have "left a profound and long-lasting legacy

Blowback
According to the history based on documents released to the National Security Archive and reflected in the book Mohammad
Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran,the coup caused long-lasting damage to the U.S. reputation.

"The '28 Mordad' coup, as it is known by its Persian date [in the Solar Hijri calendar], was a watershed for Iran, for the
Middle East and for the standing of the United States in the region. The joint U.S.-British operation ended Iran's drive to
assert sovereign control over its own resources and helped put an end to a vibrant chapter in the history of the country's
nationalist and democratic movements. These consequences resonated with dramatic effect in later years. When the Shah
 finally fell in 1979, memories of the U.S. intervention in 1953, which made possible the monarch's subsequent, and
increasingly unpopular, 25-year reign intensified the anti-American character of the revolution in the minds of many
Iranians."[132]

The authoritarian monarch appreciated the coup, Kermit Roosevelt wrote in his account of the affair. "'I owe my throne to God, my
people, my army and to you!' By 'you' he [the shah] meant me and the two countriesGreat Britain and the United StatesI was
representing. We were all heroes."[88]

On 16 June 2000, The New York Times published the secret CIA report, "Clandestine Service History, Overthrow of Premier
Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952 August 1953," partly explaining the coup from CIA agent Wilber's perspective. In a related
story, The New York Times reporter James Risen penned a story revealing that Wilber's report, hidden for nearly five decades, had
recently come to light.

In the summer of 2001, Ervand Abrahamian writes in the journalScience & Society that Wilber's version of the coup was missing key
information some of which was available elsewhere.

The New York Times recently leaked a CIA report on the 1953 American-British overthrow of Mosaddeq, Iran's Prime
Minister. It billed the report as a secret history of the secret coup, and treated it as an invaluable substitute for the U.S.
files that remain inaccessible. But a reconstruction of the coup from other sources, especially from the archives of the
British Foreign Office, indicates that this report is highly sanitized. It glosses over such sensitive issues as the crucial
participation of the U.S. ambassador in the actual overthrow; the role of U.S. military advisers; the harnessing of local
Nazis and Muslim terrorists; and the use of assassinations to destabilize the government. What is more, it places the coup
in the context of the Cold War rather than that of the Anglo-Iranian oil crisisa classic case of nationalism clashing with
imperialism in the Third World.[133]

In a review of Tim Weiner's Legacy of Ashes, historian Michael Beschloss wrote, "Mr. Weiner argues that a bad C.I.A. track record
has encouraged many of our gravest contemporary problems... A generation of Iranians grew up knowing that the C.I.A. had installed
the shah," Mr. Weiner notes. "In time, the chaos that the agency had created in the streets of Tehran would return to haunt the United
States."[134]

The administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower considered the coup a success, but, given its blowback, that opinion is no longer
generally held, because of its "haunting and terrible legacy".[135] In 2000, Madeleine Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, said that
intervention by the U.S. in the internal affairs of Iran was a setback for democratic government.[136][137] The coup is widely believed
to have significantly contributed to the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which deposed the "pro-Western" Shah and replaced the monarchy
with an "anti-Western" Islamic republic.[138]

"For many Iranians, the coup demonstrated duplicity by the United States, which presented itself as a defender of freedom but did not
hesitate to use underhanded methods to overthrow a democratically elected government to suit its own economic and strategic
interests", the Agence France-Presse reported.[139]

United States Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, who visited Iran both before and after the coup, wrote that "When
Mossadegh and Persia started basic reforms, we became alarmed. We united with the British to destroy him; we succeeded; and ever
[140]
since, our name has not been an honored one in the Middle East."

Iran
When the Shah returned to Iran after the coup, he was greeted by a cheering crowd. He wrote in his memoirs that while he had been a
king for over a decade, for the first time he felt that the people had "elected" and "approved" of him, and that he had a "legitimate"
popular mandate in order to carry out his reforms (although some in the crowd may have been bribed). The Shah however, never was
able to remove the reputation of being a "foreign imposed" ruler among non-royalist Iranians. However the Shah throughout his rule
continued to assume that he was supported by virtually everybody in Iran, and sank into deep dejection when in 1978 massive mobs
demanded his ouster. The incident left him in awe of American power, while it also gave him a deep hatred of the British.[12] When
the Shah attempted during the 1970s to once again control the oil prices (through OPEC), and cancel the same oil consortium
agreement that caused the 1953 coup, it resulted in a massive decline in US support for the Shah, and ironically, hastened his
downfall.[141]

An immediate consequence of the coup d'tat was the suppression of all republicanist[12] political dissent, especially the liberal and
nationalist opposition umbrella groupNational Front as well as the (Communist) Tudeh party, and concentration of political power in
the Shah and his courtiers.[142]

The minister of Foreign Affairs and the closest associate of Mosaddegh,Hossein Fatemi, was executed by order of the Shah's military
court by firing squad on 10 November 1954.[143] According to Kinzer, "The triumphant Shah [Pahlavi] ordered the execution of
[144]
several dozen military officers and student leaders who had been closely associated with Mohammad Mossadegh"

As part of the post-coup d'tat political repression between 1953 and 1958, the Shah outlawed the National Front, and arrested most
of its leaders.[145] The Shah personally spared Mossadegh the death penalty, and he was given 3 years in prison, followed by house
arrest for life.[12]

Many supporters of Iran continued to fight against the new regime, yet they were
suppressed with some even being killed. The political party that Mossadegh
founded, the National Front of Iran, was later reorganized by Karim Sanjabi, and is
currently being led by the National Poet of Iran Adib Boroumand, who was a strong
Mossadegh supporter and helped spread pro-Mossadegh propaganda during the
Abadan Crisis and its aftermath.[146]

The Communist Tudeh, however, bore the main brunt of the crackdown.[147] The
Shah's security forces arrested 4,121 Tudeh political activists including 386 civil
servants, 201 college students, 165 teachers, 125 skilled workers, 80 textile workers,
and 60 cobblers.[148] Forty were executed (primarily for murder, such as Khosrow
Roozbeh),[11][12] another 14 died under torture and over 200 were sentenced to life
imprisonment.[145] The Shah's post-coup dragnet also captured 477 Tudeh members
("22 colonels, 69 majors, 100 captains, 193 lieutenants, 19 noncommissioned Mohammad Mosaddegh in court, 8
November 1953
officers, and 63 military cadets") who were in the Iranian armed forces.[149] After
their presence was revealed, some National Front supporters complained that this
Communist Tudeh military network could have saved Mosaddegh. However, few
Tudeh officers commanded powerful field units, especially tank divisions that might have countered the coup. Most of the captured
Tudeh officers came from the military academies, police and medical corps.[149][150] At least eleven of the captured army officers
were tortured to death between 1953 and 1958.[148] Nevertheless, the Shah's response was exceedingly mild compared to the typical
reaction that the future Islamic Republic would usually give to its opponents, or even other contemporary
autocracies.[12][151][152][153][154]

After the 1953 coup, the Shah's government formed the SAVAK (secret police), many of whose agents were trained in the United
States. The SAVAK monitored dissidents, and carried out censorship. After the 1971 Siahkal Incident, it was given a "loose leash" to
torture suspected dissidents with "brute force" that, over the years, "increased dramatically", and nearly 100 people were executed for
political reasons during the last 20 years of the Shah's rule.[152][155] Nevertheless, the Shah generally dealt with dissent in a
[12][151] After the revolution, SAVAK was officially abolished, but was in
relatively mild manner compared to most autocratic leaders.
reality "drastically expanded" into a new organization that killed over 8,00012,000 prisoners between 19811985 alone, and
20,00030,000 in total, with one prisoner who served time under both the Shah and the Islamic Republic declaring that "four months
under (Islamic Republic's) wardenAsadollah Lajevardi took the toll of four years under SAVAK".[152][153][154]
Another effect was sharp improvement of Iran's economy; the British-led oil embargo
against Iran ended, and oil revenue increased significantly beyond the pre-nationalisation
level. Despite Iran not controlling its national oil, the Shah agreed to replacing the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company with a consortiumBritish Petroleum and eight European and
American oil companies; in result, oil revenues increased from $34 million in 19541955
to $181 million in 19561957, and continued increasing,[156] and the United States sent
development aid and advisers. The Shah's government attempted to solve the issue of oil
nationalization through this method, and Iran began to develop rapidly under his rule. The
Shah later in his memoirs declared that Mossadegh was a "dictator" that was "damaging"
Iran through his "stubbornness", while he (the Shah) "followed" the smarter option.[12] By
the 1970s, Iran was wealthier than all of its surrounding neighbors, and economists
frequently predicted that it would become a major global economic power, and a developed
country.[12]
Hossein Fatemi after arrest

Internationally
Kinzer wrote that the 1953 coup d'tat was the first time the U.S. used the CIA to overthrow a democratically elected, civil
government.[157] The Eisenhower administration viewed Operation Ajax as a success, with "immediate and far-reaching effect.
Overnight, the CIA became a central part of the American foreign policy apparatus, and covert action came to be regarded as a cheap
and effective way to shape the course of world events"a coup engineered by the CIA called Operation PBSUCCESS toppling the
duly elected Guatemalan government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmn, which had nationalised farm land owned by the United Fruit
Company, followed the next year.[158]

A pro-American government in Iran doubled the United States' geographic and strategic advantage in the Middle East, as Turkey,
also bordering the USSR, was part ofNATO.[159]

In 2000, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, acknowledged the coup's pivotal role in the troubled relationship and "came
closer to apologizing than any American official ever has before".

The Eisenhower administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons. ... But the coup was clearly a
setback for Iran's political development. And it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention
by America in their internal affairs.[160][161][162]

In June 2009, the U.S. President Barack Obama in a speech in Cairo, Egypt, talked about the United States' relationship with Iran,
mentioning the role of the U.S. in 1953 Iranian coup saying:

This issue has been a source of tension between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. For many years, Iran
has defined itself in part by its opposition to my country, and there is indeed a tumultuous history between us. In the
middle of the Cold War, the United States played a role in the overthrow of a democratically elected Iranian government.
Since the Islamic Revolution, Iran has played a role in acts of hostage-taking and violence against U.S. troops and
civilians. This history is well known. Rather than remain trapped in the past, I have made it clear to Iran's leaders and
[163]
people that my country is prepared to move forward.

Legacy

Historical viewpoint in the Islamic Republic

Men associated with Mossadegh and his ideals dominated Iran's first post-revolutionary government. The first prime minister after
the Iranian revolution was Mehdi Bazargan, a close associate of Mossadegh. But with the subsequent rift between the conservative
Islamic establishment and the secular liberal forces, Mossadegh's work and legacy has been largely ignored by the Islamic Republic
establishment.[164] However, Mosaddegh remains a popular historical figure among Iranian opposition factions. Mosaddegh's image
is one of the symbols of Iran's opposition movement, also known as the Green Movement.[165] Kinzer writes that Mosaddegh "for
most Iranians" is "the most vivid symbol of Iran's long struggle for democracy" and that modern protesters carrying a picture of
e want democracy" and "No foreign intervention".[165]
Mosaddegh is the equivalent of saying "W

In the Islamic Republic, remembrance of the coup is quite different from that of history books published in the West, and follows the
precepts of Ayatollah Khomeini that Islamic jurists must guide the country to prevent "the influence of foreign powers".[166]
According to historian Ervand Abrahamian, the government tries to ignore Mosaddegh as much as possible and allocates him only
two pages in high school textbooks. "The mass media elevate Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani as the real leader of the oil
nationalization campaign, depicting Mosaddegh as merely the ayatollah's hanger-on." This is despite the fact that Kashani came out
against Mosaddegh by mid-1953 and "told a foreign correspondent that Mosaddegh had fallen because he had forgotten that the shah
enjoyed extensive popular support."[167] A month later, Kashani "went even further and declared that Mosaddegh deserved to be
executed because he had committed the ultimate offense: rebelling against the shah, 'betraying' the country, and repeatedly violating
the sacred law."[168]

In the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kinzer's book All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror has been
censored of descriptions of Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani's activities during the Anglo-American coup d'tat. Mahmood Kashani,
the son of Abol-Ghasem Kashani, "one of the top members of the current, ruling lite"[169] whom the Iranian Council of Guardians
has twice approved to run for the presidency, denies there was a coup d'tat in 1953, saying Mosaddegh was obeying British plans to
undermine the role ofShia clerics.[169]

This allegation also is posited in the bookKhaterat-e Arteshbod-e Baznesheshteh Hossein Far
doust (The Memoirs of Retired General
Hossein Fardoust), published in the Islamic Republic and allegedly written by Hossein Fardoust, a former SAVAK officer. It claims
that rather than being a mortal enemy of the British, Mohammad Mosaddegh always favored them, and his nationalisation campaign
of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was inspired by "the British themselves".[170] Scholar Ervand Abrahamian suggests that the fact
that Fardoust's death was announced before publication of the book may be significant, as the Islamic Republic authorities may have
[170]
forced him into writing such statements under duress.

In popular culture
Directed by Hasan Fathi and written jointly with playwright and university professor Naghmeh Samini, Shahrzad TV show is the
story of a love broken apart by events in the aftermath of the 1953 coup that overthrew the democratically elected prime minister,
Mohammad Mosaddeq.

Cognito Comics/Verso Books has published a nonfiction graphic novel of the history,[171] Operation AJAX: The Story of the CIA
Coup That Remade The Middle East,[172] that covers events leading to how the CIA hired rival mobs to create anarchy and
overthrow the country.

See also
Iranian revolution, the Islamist revolution, which occurred 25 years later
, deposing the Shah
1957 alleged Jordanian military coup attempt
1981 Bahraini coup d'tat attempt
CIA activities in Iran
Iran crisis of 1946
List of modern conflicts in the Middle East
Special Activities Division
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the plan was for the Imperial Guards to occupy the general staf f and Police headquarters, the radio station and other
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that was happening. Actually it was a counter-coup, as the Shah acted within his constitutional power in signing the
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involved that he could get his hands on. We now have to take a whole new look at the Iranian situation and probably
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fort replace him by General Zahedi. He said
on evening of 15th Col. Nasiri had approached his house apparently to arrest him. Col. Nasiri himself, however , had
been arrested and number other arrests followed. He had taken oath not try to oust Shah and would have lived up
this oath if Shah had not engaged in venture this kind. Clear Nasiri had been sent by Shah arrest him and Shah had
been prompted by British."
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Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton University Press, 1982)
Abrahamian, Ervand (2013).The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the roots of modern U.S.-Iranian relations . New York:
The New Press. ISBN 978-1-59558-826-5.
Dorril, Stephen, Mi6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service ISBN 978-0-7432-0379-1
(paperback is separately titled:MI6: Fifty Years of Special OperationsFourth Estate: London, a division of
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Dreyfuss, Robert, Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam (Henry Holt and
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Elm, Mostafa. Oil, Power and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath.(Syracuse University Press,
1994) ISBN 978-0-8156-2642-8 Documents competition between Britain and the United States for Iranian oil, both
before and after the coup.Publishers Weekly summary: "an impressive work of scholarship by an Iranian economist
and former diplomat [showing how] the CIA-orchestrated coup, followed by U.S. backing of the dictatorial Shah,
planted"
Elwell-Sutton, L. P. Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics(Lawrence and Wishart Ltd.: London) 1955. Reprinted by
Greenwood Press 1976. 978-0837171227
Farmanfarmaiyan, Manuchihr, Roxane Farmanfarmaian Blood and Oil: A Prince's Memoir of Iran, from the Shah to
the Ayatollah (Random House 2005.). A cousin of Mosaddeq, Farmanfarmaiyan was the Shah's oil adviser .
Sympathetic to the Shah and antagonistic to Khomeini, Farmanfarmaiyan fers of many insider details of the epic
battle for Iranian oil, both in Iran's historic relationship with Britain and then, after the coup, with the United States.
Gasiorowski, Mark J. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran(Cornell University Press:
1991). Traces the exact changes in U.S. foreign policy that led to the coup in Iran soon after the inauguration of
Dwight D. Eisenhower; describes "the consequences of the coup for Iran's domestic politics" including "an extensive
series of arrests and installation of a rigid authoritarian regime under which all forms of opposition political activity
were prohibited." Documents how U.S. oil industry benefited from the coup with, for the first time, 40 percent post-
coup share in Iran's oil revenue.
Gasiorowski, Mark J., Editor; Malcolm Byrne (Editor) (2004).Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran .
Syracuse University Press.ISBN 978-0-8156-3018-0.
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Sons. ISBN 0-471-26517-9.
Kinzer, Stephen, Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq(Henry Holt and Company
2006). ISBN /9780805082401 Assesses the influence ofJohn Foster Dulles on U.S. foreign policy. "Dulles was
tragically mistaken in his view that the Kremlin lay behind the emergence of nationalism in the developing world. He
could... claim consistency in his uncompromising opposition to every nationalist, leftist, or Marxist regime on earth."
McCoy, Alfred, A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, fromthe Cold War to the War on Terror (Metropolitan Books
2006)
Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (Yale University Press 2010)
ISBN 978-0-300-16368-1
Roosevelt, Kermit, Jr. (1979). Countercoup: The struggle for the control of Iran
. McGraw-Hill. ISBN 978-0-07-
053590-9.
Weiner, Tim. Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA(Doubleday 2007) ISBN 978-0-307-38900-8
Wilber "Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, Nov . 1952 1953" [CIA] CS Historial
Paper no. 208. March 1954.
Behrooz, Maziar (August 2001). "Tudeh Factionalism and the 1953 Coup in Iran".International Journal of Middle
East Studies. 33 (3): 363382. doi:10.1017/S0020743801003026. JSTOR 259456.
Wilford, Hugh (2013). America's Great Game: The CIA's Secret Arabists and the Making of the Modern Middle East .
Basic Books. ISBN 9780465019656.

External links
Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq: Symbol of IranianNationalism and Struggle Against Imperialism by the Iran Chamber
Society
" 'Clandestine Service HistoryOverthrow of Premier Mosaddeq of IranNovember 1952 August 1953 ' ". Archived
from the original on 9 June 2009. Retrieved 6 June 2009.
The 1953 Coup in Iran (Archived 2009-10-20), Science & Society, Vol. 65, No. 2, Summer 2001, pp 182215; and
analysis of the files revealed in 2017 on the CIA's role in the 1953 Iran coup
, both by Professor Ervand Abrahamian
1953 Iran Coup: New U.S. Documents Confirm British Approached U.S. in Late 1952 About Ousting Mosaddeq
Provided by the National Security Archive
The Secret CIA History of the Iran Coup, 1953 Provided by the National Security Archive
Review of All the Shah's Men by CIA staff historian David S. Robarge
Radio Free Europe. From The Archives: The 1953 Iranian Coup. Photos

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