FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 146779. January 23, 2006.]

RENATO S. GATBONTON , petitioner, vs . NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION, MAPUA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
and JOSE CALDERON , respondents.

Samson S. Alcantara for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Antonio H. Abad & Associates for private respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR RELATIONS; PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION;

DEFINED. — Preventive suspension is a disciplinary measure for the protection of the
company's property pending investigation of any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance
committed by the employee. The employer may place the worker concerned under
preventive suspension if his continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat
to the life or property of the employer or of his co-workers. However, when it is determined
that there is no sufficient basis to justify an employee's preventive suspension, the latter is
entitled to the payment of salaries during the time of preventive suspension.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONER'S PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION HAS NO LEGAL BASIS; THE
MAPUA RULES AND REGULATIONS WAS NOT YET LEGALLY EFFECTIVE AT THE TIME OF
IMPOSITION OF THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION. — R.A. No. 7877 imposed the duty on
educational or training institutions to "promulgate rules and regulations in consultation
with and jointly approved by the employees or students or trainees, through their duly
designated representatives, prescribing the procedures for the investigation of sexual
harassment cases and the administrative sanctions therefor." Petitioner's preventive
suspension was based on respondent MIT's Rules and Regulations for the Implementation
of the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, or R.A. No. 7877. Rule II, Section 1 of the MIT
Rules and Regulations provides. . . . It must be noted however, that respondent published
said rules and regulations only on February 23, 1999. In Tañada vs. Tuvera, it was ruled
that. . . . all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential
decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative
powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly
conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published
if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
. . . The Mapua Rules is one of those issuances that should be published for its effectivity,
since its purpose is to enforce and implement R.A. No. 7877, which is a law of general
application. In fact, the Mapua Rules itself explicitly required publication of the rules for its
effectivity, as provided in Section 3, Rule IV (Administrative Provisions), which states that "
[T]hese Rules and Regulations to implement the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 shall
take effect fifteen (15) days after publication by the Committee." Thus, at the time of the
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 imposition of petitioner's preventive suspension on January 11, 1999, the Mapua Rules
were not yet legally effective, and therefore the suspension had no legal basis.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO SUFFICIENT BASIS TO JUSTIFY PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION UNDER
THE MAPUA RULES AND REGULATIONS; CASE AT BAR. — Moreover, even assuming that
the Mapua Rules are applicable, the Court finds that there is no sufficient basis to justify
his preventive suspension. Under the Mapua Rules, an accused may be placed under
preventive suspension during pendency of the hearing under any of the following
circumstances: (a) if the evidence of his guilt is strong and the school head is morally
convinced that the continued stay of the accused during the period of investigation
constitutes a distraction to the normal operations of the institution; or (b) the accused
poses a risk or danger to the life or property of the other members of the educational
community. In petitioner's case, there is no indication that petitioner's preventive
suspension may be based on the foregoing circumstances. Committee Resolution No. 1
(Re: Preventive Suspension of Engr. Renato Gatbonton) passed by the Committee on
Decorum and Investigation states the reasons for petitioner's preventive suspension. Said
resolution does not show that evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong and that the school
head is morally convinced that petitioner's continued stay during the period of
investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal operations of the institution; or that
petitioner poses a risk or danger to the life or property of the other members of the
educational community.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION FINDS NO VALID JUSTIFICATION UNDER
THE LABOR CODE. — Even under the Labor Code, petitioner's preventive suspension finds
no valid justification. As provided in Section 8, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code. As previously stated, there is nothing on record which
shows that respondent MIT imposed the preventive suspension on petitioner as his
continued employment poses a serious threat to the life or property of the employer or of
his co-workers; therefore, his preventive suspension is not justified. Consequently, the
payment of wages during his 30-day preventive suspension, i.e., from January 11, 1999 to
February 10, 1999, is in order.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHILE PETITIONER'S PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION MAY HAVE BEEN
UNJUSTIFIED, IT DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MEAN THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO MORAL
OR OTHER DAMAGES; RECORDS OF THE CASE ARE BEREFT OF ANY EVIDENCE SHOWING
THAT RESPONDENT SCHOOL ACTED IN BAD FAITH OR IN WANTON OR FRAUDULENT
MANNER IN PREVENTIVELY SUSPENDING PETITIONER. — With regard to petitioner's
claim for damages, the Court finds the same to be without basis. While petitioner's
preventive suspension may have been unjustified, this does not automatically mean that he
is entitled to moral or other damages. In Cocoland Development Corp. vs. NLRC, the Court
ruled: In Primero vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court held that ". . . an award (of
moral damages) cannot be justified solely upon the premise (otherwise sufficient for
redress under the Labor Code) that the employer fired his employee without just cause or
due process. Additional facts must be pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of moral
damages under the Civil Code, these being, to repeat, that the act of dismissal was
attended by bad faith or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs, or public policy; and of course, that social humiliation, wounded
feelings, grave anxiety, etc., resulted therefrom." This was reiterated in Garcia vs. NLRC,
where the Court added that exemplary damages may be awarded only if the dismissal was
shown to have been effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. This the
private respondent failed to do. Because no evidence was adduced to show that petitioner
company acted in bad faith or in a wanton or fraudulent manner in dismissing the private
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 respondent, the labor arbiter did not award any moral and exemplary damages in his
decision. Respondent NLRC therefore had no factual or legal basis to award such
damages in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. . . . The records of this case are bereft
of any evidence showing that respondent MIT acted in bad faith or in a wanton or
fraudulent manner in preventively suspending petitioner, thus, the Labor Arbiter was
correct in not awarding any damages in favor of petitioner.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ , J : p

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
which seeks to set aside the Decision 1 dated November 10, 2000 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 57470, affirming the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC); and the CA Resolution dated January 16, 2001, denying the motion
for reconsideration. 2
Petitioner Renato S. Gatbonton is an associate professor of respondent Mapua Institute of
Technology (MIT), Faculty of Civil Engineering. Some time in November 1998, a civil
engineering student of respondent MIT filed a letter-complaint against petitioner for
unfair/unjust grading system, sexual harassment and conduct unbecoming of an
academician. Pending investigation of the complaint, respondent MIT, through its
Committee on Decorum and Investigation placed petitioner under a 30-day preventive
suspension effective January 11, 1999. The committee believed that petitioner's continued
stay during the investigation affects his performance as a faculty member, as well as the
students' learning; and that the suspension will allow petitioner to "prepare himself for the
investigation and will prevent his influences to other members of the community." 3
Thus, petitioner filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal suspension, damages and
attorney's fees, 4 docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 01-00388-99.
Petitioner questioned the validity of the administrative proceedings with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila in a petition for certiorari but the case was terminated on May 21, 1999
when the parties entered into a compromise agreement wherein respondent MIT agreed
to publish in the school organ the rules and regulations implementing Republic Act No.
7877 (R.A. No. 7877) or the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act; disregard the previous
administrative proceedings and conduct anew an investigation on the charges against
petitioner. Petitioner agreed to recognize the validity of the published rules and
regulations, as well as the authority of respondent to investigate, hear and decide the
administrative case against him. 5
On June 18, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
Wherefore, premises considered, the thirty day preventive suspension of
complainant is hereby declared to be illegal. Accordingly, respondents are directed
to pay his wages during the period of his preventive suspension.
The rest of complainant's claims are dismissed.
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 SO ORDERED. 6

Both respondents and petitioner filed their appeal from the Labor Arbiter's Decision, with
petitioner questioning the dismissal of his claim for damages. In a Decision dated
September 30, 1999, the NLRC granted respondents' appeal and set aside the Labor
Arbiter's decision. His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC on
December 13, 1999, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA.
On November 10, 2000, the CA promulgated the assailed decision affirming the NLRC
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE and ORDERED DISMISSED, and the challenged decision and order of
public respondent NLRC AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 7

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied in its Resolution dated
January 16, 2001.
Hence, the present petition based on the following grounds:
A

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE NLRC WAS
NOT GUILTY OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RENDERING BOTH THE
APPEAL DECISION AND THE NLRC RESOLUTION.
B
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE NLRC'S
DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER'S CLAIM FOR DAMAGES. 8

Petitioner finds fault in the CA's decision, arguing that his preventive suspension does not
find any justification in the Mapua Rules and Regulations considering that at the time of his
preventive suspension on January 11, 1999, the rules have not been promulgated yet as it
was published only on February 23, 1999. Petitioner also contests the lack of award of
damages in his favor. 9
The petition is partly meritorious. ScHAIT

Preventive suspension is a disciplinary measure for the protection of the company's

property pending investigation of any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by
the employee. The employer may place the worker concerned under preventive suspension
if his continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of
the employer or of his co-workers. 1 0 However, when it is determined that there is no
sufficient basis to justify an employee's preventive suspension, the latter is entitled to the
payment of salaries during the time of preventive suspension. 1 1
R.A. No. 7877 imposed the duty on educational or training institutions to "promulgate rules
and regulations in consultation with and jointly approved by the employees or students or
trainees, through their duly designated representatives, prescribing the procedures for the
investigation of sexual harassment cases and the administrative sanctions therefor." 1 2
Petitioner's preventive suspension was based on respondent MIT's Rules and Regulations
for the Implementation of the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, or R.A. No. 7877. Rule
II, Section 1 of the MIT Rules and Regulations provides:
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 Section 1. Preventive Suspension of Accused in Sexual Harassment Cases.
Any member of the educational community may be placed immediately under
preventive suspension during the pendency of the hearing of the charges of grave
sexual harassment against him if the evidence of his guilt is strong and the
school head is morally convinced that the continued stay of the accused during
the period of investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal operations of
the institution or poses a risk or danger to the life or property of the other
members of the educational community.

It must be noted however, that respondent published said rules and regulations only on
February 23, 1999. In Tañada vs. Tuvera, 1 3 it was ruled that:
. . . all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by
the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation .
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating
only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. (Emphasis supplied)

The Mapua Rules is one of those issuances that should be published for its effectivity,
since its purpose is to enforce and implement R.A. No. 7877, which is a law of general
application. 1 4 In fact, the Mapua Rules itself explicitly required publication of the rules for
its effectivity, as provided in Section 3, Rule IV (Administrative Provisions), which states
that "[ T]hese Rules and Regulations to implement the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995
shall take effect fifteen (15) days after publication by the Committee." Thus, at the time of
the imposition of petitioner's preventive suspension on January 11, 1999, the Mapua Rules
were not yet legally effective, and therefore the suspension had no legal basis.
Moreover, even assuming that the Mapua Rules are applicable, the Court finds that there is
no sufficient basis to justify his preventive suspension. Under the Mapua Rules, an accused
may be placed under preventive suspension during pendency of the hearing under any of
the following circumstances:
(a) if the evidence of his guilt is strong and the school head is morally
convinced that the continued stay of the accused during the period of
investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal operations of the
institution; or
(b) the accused poses a risk or danger to the life or property of the other
members of the educational community.

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 In petitioner's case, there is no indication that petitioner's preventive suspension may be
based on the foregoing circumstances. Committee Resolution No. 1 (Re: Preventive
Suspension of Engr. Renato Gatbonton) passed by the Committee on Decorum and
Investigation states the reasons for petitioner's preventive suspension, to wit:
Whereas, the committee believe[s] that the continued stay of the respondent
during the period of investigation,
1. Affects the respondent's performance as a faculty member and
laboratory head considering the psychological effects depression
and/or emotional stress during investigation;

2. Affects the student['s] learning and other members of the Mapua

Institute of Technology community.

Whereas, the committee believe[s] that this preventive suspension will allow the
respondent to prepare himself for the investigation and will prevent his influences
to other members of the community. 1 5

Said resolution does not show that evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong and that the
school head is morally convinced that petitioner's continued stay during the period of
investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal operations of the institution; or that
petitioner poses a risk or danger to the life or property of the other members of the
educational community.

Even under the Labor Code, petitioner's preventive suspension finds no valid justification.
As provided in Section 8, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code:
Sec. 8. Preventive Suspension. The employer may place the worker concerned
under preventive suspension if his continued employment poses a serious threat
to the life or property of the employer or of his co-workers.

As previously stated, there is nothing on record which shows that respondent MIT
imposed the preventive suspension on petitioner as his continued employment poses a
serious threat to the life or property of the employer or of his co-workers; therefore, his
preventive suspension is not justified. 1 6 Consequently, the payment of wages during his
30-day preventive suspension, i.e., from January 11, 1999 to February 10, 1999, is in order.
With regard to petitioner's claim for damages, the Court finds the same to be without
basis. While petitioner's preventive suspension may have been unjustified, this does not
automatically mean that he is entitled to moral or other damages. In Cocoland
Development Corp. vs. NLRC, 1 7 the Court ruled:
In Primero vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court held that ". . . an award (of
moral damages) cannot be justified solely upon the premise (otherwise sufficient
for redress under the Labor Code) that the employer fired his employee without
just cause or due process. Additional facts must be pleaded and proven to
warrant the grant of moral damages under the Civil Code, these being, to repeat,
that the act of dismissal was attended by bad faith or fraud, or was oppressive to
labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy; and
of course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety, etc., resulted
therefrom." This was reiterated in Garcia vs. NLRC, where the Court added that
exemplary damages may be awarded only if the dismissal was shown to have
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 been effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. HcDSaT

This the private respondent failed to do. Because no evidence was adduced to
show that petitioner company acted in bad faith or in a wanton or fraudulent
manner in dismissing the private respondent, the labor arbiter did not award any
moral and exemplary damages in his decision. Respondent NLRC therefore had
no factual or legal basis to award such damages in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. . . .

The records of this case are bereft of any evidence showing that respondent MIT acted in
bad faith or in a wanton or fraudulent manner in preventively suspending petitioner, thus,
the Labor Arbiter was correct in not awarding any damages in favor of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated November 10,
2000 and Resolution dated January 16, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
57470 as well as the NLRC Decision dated September 30, 1999 together with its
Resolution dated December 13, 1999, are hereby SET ASIDE and the Labor Arbiter's
Decision dated June 18, 1999 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, C.J., took no part. Former partner of a party's counsel.

Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices
Buenaventura J. Guerrero (ret.) and Eliezer R. De los Santos.
2. CA Rollo, pp. 223-224.

3. Rollo, p. 75.
4. Id., p. 49.
5. Id., p. 159.
6. Id., p. 113.
7. CA rollo, p. 202.

8. Rollo, pp. 17-18.

9. Id., pp. 18-21.
10. Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. NLRC, 354 Phil. 37, 43 (1998).
11. Valiao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146621, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 543, 554.
12. Section 4(a), R.A. No. 7877.

13. G.R. No. L-63915, December 29, 1986, 230 Phil. 528, 535-536 (1986).
14. Pilipinas Kao, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105014, December 18, 2001, 423 Phil.
834, 860 (2001); Philippine International Trading Corp. vs. Angeles, G.R. No. 108461,
October 21, 1996, 331 Phil. 723, 750-751 (1996).
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 15. Rollo, pp. 74-75.
16. Supra, Valiao case.
17. G.R. No. 98458, July 17, 1996, 328 Phil. 351, 365-366 (1996).

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