National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

NATIONAL GRID COMPANY PLC

(A wholly owned subsidiary of National Grid Transco plc)

Investigation Report into the Loss of Supply Incident affecting parts of South
London at 18:20 on Thursday, 28 August 2003

This report has been produced by National Grid Company plc (National Grid) to
record the investigation findings concerning the loss of supply in south London on 28
August 2003. The purpose of the investigation is to enable National Grid to identify
the cause or causes of the incident so it may seek to prevent a recurrence. The
purpose of the report is not, however, to identify legal liability; therefore the data and
information within it have not been compiled in accordance with rules of evidence
and cannot be treated as determining either National Grid’s nor any individual’s legal
liability.

Page 1
National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

Index page

Executive summary 3
Introduction
Transmission System in South London
Maintenance Activity in the Area
South London Transmission System (diagram)
The First Fault 4
The Second Fault
Restoration 5
Communication
Investigation 6-7
Actions being pursued 7

Investigation Report 9
Introduction
Overview of the incident
Background 10
Transmission system in south London
(Map of affected substations)
Investment programme in the area 11
(London area investment –graph)
Key policies and procedures relevant to the incident 12

Findings
Operating arrangements on the day 13-14
(Table of circuits out of service on 28 August)
Sequence of Events 14-18
Communication during the incident 18
Response to the Buchholz alarm 19
Disconnection of the transformer 20
Unexpected operation of the protection 20-21
Maintenance of assets 21
Other factors 22
Configuration of EDF Energy’s substation 22-23
Communications 23
Investigation 24-25
Actions being pursued 26

Appendices 27-43

Page 2
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

Investigation Report into the Loss of Supply Incident affecting parts of South
London at 18:20 on Thursday, 28 August 2003.

Executive Summary

Introduction

1 A combination of events led to an electricity power supply failure in south London that
occurred at 18.20 on 28 August. Restoration began at 18.26 and power supplies
from National Grid were fully restored at 18.57. This report describes the
circumstances leading to the loss of supply, the steps taken to restore supplies and
the measures in hand to minimise the risk of a recurrence.

Transmission System in South London

2 The transmission system in south London consists of four substations at Littlebrook,

Hurst, New Cross and Wimbledon. Normal demands of around 1,100MW are drawn
by EDF Energy to supply domestic customers and London Underground, together
with supplies for other large users including NetworkRail. Following the incident
supplies were lost from Hurst, New Cross and part of Wimbledon.

Maintenance Activity in the Area

3 On 28 August 2003, scheduled maintenance was underway on one circuit from

Wimbledon to New Cross and one from Littlebrook to Hurst. This level of
maintenance is usual during the summer months, when demand for electricity is
generally lower.

4 In line with normal practice, the arrangement of the transmission system to

accommodate the maintenance had been agreed with the operator of the distribution
system for the London region, EDF Energy, well in advance, during July 2002.
Routine weekly communication between EDF Energy and National Grid resulted in
the planned outage at Wimbledon proceeding on 1 July 2003. EDF Energy confirmed
that it could arrange its distribution system to accommodate this outage securely for
the maintenance period.

Figure 1: Schematic of the south London transmission system

Northfleet
Willesden 1 1 1 West
Beddington Wimbledon New Cross Hurst Littlebrook
Beddington 2 2 2 Beddington
& Kemsley
Out of service for
scheduled maintenance

Page 3
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

The First Fault

5 The sequence of events started at 18:11. Engineers at the Electricity National

Control Centre (National Control) received an alarm indicating that a transformer, or
its associated shunt reactor, at Hurst substation was in distress and could fail,
potentially with significant safety and environmental impacts. This “Buchholz alarm”,
told National Control that gas had accumulated within the oil inside the equipment,
which can lead to a major failure. National Grid has approximately 1,000
transformers with associated equipment connected to its transmission system and on
average only 13 Buchholz alarms are received each year.

6 National Control contacted EDF Energy to discuss the Buchholz alarm and asked
EDF Energy to disconnect the distribution system from the transformer. Then, as is
normal practice in this situation, National Control initiated a switching sequence to
disconnect the transformer from the transmission system. This switching sequence
temporarily left supplies dependent on a single transmission circuit from Wimbledon
that feeds New Cross and Hurst substations. Under National Grid operating
procedures a Buchholz alarm is sufficiently serious to warrant the isolation of
equipment and reduced security is acceptable for “switching time”. This is a period of
time, normally around five to ten minutes, during which the transmission system is
rearranged, by connecting and disconnecting circuits, so that the affected equipment
can be taken out of service.

7 The switching sequence to remove the transformer began at 18:20, disconnecting

Hurst substation from Littlebrook substation. This enabled a safe shutdown of the
transformer which had suffered the alarm, but left Hurst supplied only from
Wimbledon via New Cross.

The Second Fault

8 Unexpectedly, a few seconds after the switching, the automatic protection equipment
on the number two circuit from Wimbledon to New Cross operated, interpreting the
change of power flows, due to the switching, as a fault.

9 The transmission system is extensively fitted with many levels of automatic protection
equipment, aimed at isolating faults and preventing damage to equipment or even a
complete shutdown of the transmission system. They measure system
characteristics, such as voltage and current and, in the event of a fault, will
automatically disconnect affected equipment. On the National Grid transmission
system there are approximately 43,000 such pieces of equipment, each with its
individual settings to meet local requirements.

10 The automatic protection relay disconnected the circuit from Wimbledon to New
Cross. This disconnected New Cross, Hurst and part of Wimbledon from the rest of
the transmission system, causing the loss of supply. 724MW of supplies were lost,
amounting to around 20% of total London supplies at that time. This affected around
410,000 of EDF Energy’s customers, with supplies being lost to parts of London
Underground and NetworkRail.

Page 4
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

Restoration

11 Restoration actions began at 18:26, re-energising the Hurst substation from

Littlebrook and then isolating the Wimbledon to New Cross circuit, that had
automatically disconnected itself, to prevent a recurrence.

12 At 18:38 National Control offered to restore supplies to Wimbledon for EDF Energy.
EDF Energy requested restoration of that supply at 18:48 and restoration was
completed at 18:51. From this point onwards, London Underground could restore
electricity to the underground network, when they considered it was safe to do so.

13 At 18:41 EDF Energy restored supplies via National Grid’s Hurst substation to
approximately one third of the consumers.

14 Some 30 switching actions enabled National Grid to restore overall supplies to all
substations concluding with New Cross at 18:57 which restored the remaining
supplies for NetworkRail. The substations remained connected to the rest of the
transmission system via a single circuit until 23:00, the time at which the automatic
protection equipment that had operated at Wimbledon was successfully isolated.
The number two circuit from Wimbledon to New Cross was then safely returned to
service and normal levels of security were restored. A rapid check was made to
similar automatic protection equipment.

Communication

15 During the incident there was significant operational communication between

National Grid and EDF Energy. Communications were initiated at 18:17, following
the Buchholz alarm being reported, and EDF Energy were requested to remove the
demand from the transformer. At 18:21 EDF Energy called National Grid to confirm
that there was a problem on the transmission system.

16 Such operational communications continued throughout the restoration, with

continuous telephone conversations between control engineers at National Grid and
EDF Energy’s control centre, working together to reconnect the affected area. Some
17 minutes later National Grid offered to restore supplies to Wimbledon and New
Cross.

17 At 18:51 National Grid was called by New Scotland Yard and National Control
informed them that this was a system incident with no third party involvement.

18 The complex and rapidly changing chain of events affected a large number of
organisations. In the wider communication exercise through Thursday night and
Friday, in addition to briefing the media, National Grid was in contact with the
emergency services, the DTI, Ofgem, the London Mayor, energywatch and others.

Page 5
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

Investigation

19 The planning of maintenance works had been carried out in accordance with National
Grid’s policies and that the maintenance work could not be regarded as a cause of
the incident. The investigation confirmed that the transmission system arrangement
and the communication with the distribution system operator regarding this
maintenance complied with the relevant National Grid planning standards and
operating procedures.

20 All actions in configuring and switching the transmission system complied with
National Grid’s planning standards and operating procedures and that the restoration
process was carried out quickly and professionally without further incident. The
response by control engineers to re-secure the network and restore the balance of
generation and demand ensured that the disturbance was contained within the
affected substations.

21 The reason that the second fault occurred was that an incorrect protection relay was
installed when old equipment was replaced in 2001. This incorrect installation was
not discovered despite extensive quality control and commissioning procedures
followed by both supplier’s and National Grid’s specialist staff. This piece of
equipment has been replaced. Once the cause was known an extensive survey of
similar equipment was immediately initiated. To date 20% (9,000 items) of this type
of equipment on the National Grid system has been surveyed and there have been
no similar cases. The remaining equipment will be surveyed within four weeks.

22 The engineers involved in the commissioning of the automatic protection equipment

had the appropriate training, authorisation, experience and skills to undertake the
task. There is evidence that the detailed commissioning procedures were followed
correctly at all stages and that no part of the process had been omitted. However,
the rating of the automatic protection equipment that is included on the
documentation used for commissioning could have been more clearly visible to the
commissioning engineers.

23 The actions to remove the Hurst transformer did not directly contribute to the cause
of the incident. The consequential increase in flows on the Wimbledon to New Cross
circuit, which were within operational limits, initiated the operation of the protection
relay at Wimbledon. National Grid engineers would not expect their actions to
remove the equipment would have caused the loss of supply.

24 The impact of the incident on the areas of south London was exacerbated by the loss
of supplies to underground and railway transport services.

25 From the 20 July, EDF Energy’s distribution system was arranged such that a
significant supply to London Underground was dependent on a single transmission
circuit. This meant that in the event of a fault occurring on one of National Grid’s
transformers at Wimbledon the distribution system configuration would result in a loss
of supply. However, National Grid understands that EDF Energy had contingency
arrangements for immediate restoration of supplies to London Underground in such
an eventuality.

Page 6
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

26 Following normal practice, during the incident there was extensive communication
between National Control and the EDF Energy Control Centre, with both control
rooms working effectively together during the incident.

Actions being pursued

27 This is the largest loss of supply from National Grid for over ten years and the
company has expressed its deep regret. This incident involved a number of other
parties and National Grid will be working closely with them in the coming weeks to
examine the consequences and identify improvements in systems or procedures.
National Grid has reviewed its part in the incident and is committed to the following
steps:

· National Grid will work closely with other network operators to identify
any improvements in co-ordination to enhance the overall security of
electricity supplies, particularly to city centres and transport systems.

· National Grid will work closely with EDF Energy, the Mayor, London
Underground, NetworkRail and other London emergency and public
service agencies to establish improved and more responsive
communications in the event of major loss of supply.

· National Grid is urgently surveying all installations as a further check on

the integrity of the automatic protection equipment.

· National Grid will carry out a further comprehensive investigation

examining all aspects of the management of the protection systems so
as to eliminate, as far as possible, the risk of incorrect installation or
operation of automatic protection equipment.

· National Grid will work to review operational procedures, and control

room systems, including alarm presentation, in close consultation with
Ofgem, DTI and other associated parties, to ensure that there is the right
balance between safety risks and supply security.

Page 7
National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

NATIONAL GRID COMPANY PLC

(A wholly owned subsidiary of National Grid Transco plc)

Investigation Report into the Loss of Supply Incident affecting parts of South
London at 18:20 on Thursday, 28 August 2003

This report has been produced by National Grid Company plc (National Grid) to
record the investigation findings concerning the loss of supply in south London on 28
August 2003. The purpose of the investigation is to enable National Grid to identify
the cause or causes of the incident so it may seek to prevent a recurrence. The
purpose of the report is not, however, to identify legal liability; therefore the data and
information within it have not been compiled in accordance with rules of evidence
and cannot be treated as determining either National Grid’s nor any individual’s legal
liability.

Page 8
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

Investigation Report into the Loss of Supply Incident affecting parts of South
London at 18:20 on Thursday, 28 August 2003

INTRODUCTION

28 National Grid Company plc (National Grid), a wholly owned subsidiary of National
Grid Transco plc, transports electricity and balances the system on a second by
second basis. National Grid delivers electricity from generators and interconnectors
to 12 distribution network operators for local distribution to over 24 million consumers
and directly to a small number of large industrial users. National Grid is the sole
holder of an electricity transmission licence for England and Wales and has a
statutory duty under the Electricity Act 1989 (as amended by the Utilities Act 2000) to
develop and maintain an efficient, coordinated and economical system of electricity
transmission and to facilitate competition in the supply and generation of electricity.

OVERVIEW OF THE INCIDENT

29 On 28 August 2003, two events occurred on the National Grid electricity transmission
system in south London, resulting in an electricity supply failure on the transmission
system from 18.20 until 18.57.

30 The loss of supply occurred following a switching operation to remove a transformer

at Hurst 275kV substation from the transmission system in response to an indication
that a serious alarm had been activated on the transformer or its associated shunt
reactor. Actions were taken to remove the transformer from the system which
required a controlled disconnection of the circuit between Littlebrook and Hurst. For
a short period of 5 to 10 minutes (switching time) this resulted in the supply at New
Cross, Hurst and parts of Wimbledon being dependent on a single transmission
circuit. Within seconds of this operation the circuit between Wimbledon and New
Cross substations automatically disconnected itself. The combination of these two
events was to isolate Hurst, New Cross and a part of Wimbledon 275kV substations
from the main transmission system, disconnecting 724MW of supplies to EDF
Energy’s distribution network.

31 The loss of supply affected 410,000 of EDF Energy’s customers in an area of south
London approximately bounded by Bexley in the east, Kingston in the west, Bankside
in the north and Beckenham in the south, and led to significant disruption to London
Underground and NetworkRail. Supplies from the transmission system to EDF
Energy were restored within 37 minutes.

32 Roger Urwin, National Grid Transco’s Chief Executive Officer initiated a incident
investigation chaired by Nick Winser, Group Director Transmission and Chief
Executive of National Grid Company plc.

33 This is the outcome of the incident investigation into the events of the 28 August
2003.

Page 9
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

BACKGROUND

The transmission system in south London

34 The National Grid transmission system provides an integrated network for the bulk
transfer of power across England and Wales. The transmission system, which is
operated at 400,000 volts and 275,000 volts, connects major power stations and
delivers electricity to the regional distribution networks. The peak demand on the
England and Wales transmission system is around 54,400MW. The demand for
electricity in the Greater London area represents about 20% of the total transmission
system demand in England and Wales.

35 The transmission system has been designed and built for an expected life of between
15 years and 80 years, depending on the type of asset.

36 There are no large generation stations connected directly to the transmission system
in the Central London area, although large power stations exist close to London at
Barking, Grain, Littlebrook and Kingsnorth. The transmission system facilitates the
transmission of power from these and more remote generating stations to London.

Figure 2: Transmission system in south London

© Crown Copyright, National Grid Transco EL273384

37 The south London 275kV network between Wimbledon and Littlebrook is shown in
the above figure. The network is made up of substations, which include switchgear,
transformers, shunt reactors and protection and control equipment. These are
connected by circuits comprising overhead lines and cables. A description of the
assets that make up the south London network is provided in appendix 1.

Page 10
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

Investment Programme in the Area

38 Since 1990, around £3,600m has been invested in the National Grid transmission
system. Of this, approximately £700m has been invested in the transmission system
in the Greater London area.

39 Major elements of this work include connection works for new generation at Barking
and Kingsnorth, construction of two new substations at West Ham and St Johns
Wood, and major infrastructure reinforcement including the new 20km cable between
Elstree and St Johns Wood.

40 Since 1995/96 investment in the London area has been increasing and has been
around £100m per year for the last 2 years as the new Elstree-St Johns Wood tunnel
and cable circuit has been constructed.

Figure 3: Investment in the London area

London Area Investment

120

100

80
£m Outturn

60

40

20

0
95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00 00/01 01/02 02/03

41 Of the investment in the London area, around £75m has been invested in the
Littlebrook to Wimbledon 275kV system and the adjacent network in south London.
Specific projects have included:

· Supply point reinforcement works at Littlebrook and New Cross

· 275kV cable works on the circuits between between Hurst, New Cross and
Wimbledon over the period 1995 to 2002
· Works to provide a new tunnel under the River Thames at Dartford and new
275kV cables for the Littlebrook to West Thurrock 275kV circuits
· Switchgear replacement
· Automatic protection and control system replacement.
· Environmental improvement works at several sites, such as enhancing oil
containment works.

42 As part of National Grid’s planned asset replacement programme, future work in the
Littlebrook to Wimbledon 275kV system and the adjacent network in south London

Page 11
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

includes the replacement of shunt reactors, replacement of the Beddington-Rowdown

275kV cable, the extension of the supply point at New Cross and improvements to
cable cooling systems and joint bays.

43 The average expenditure in the London area is planned to be over £50m per year
over the next 5 years.

44 There has been a considerable investment programme in the transmission

system in and around London since 1990, and this programme is set to
continue at a high level in future years.

Key Policies and Procedures Relevant to the Incident

45 As part of National Grid’s responsibility to operate a safe, secure and reliable

transmission system it has a responsibility to ensure that the asset related safety,
environmental and operational risks are managed and acceptable. In addition, the
company has an obligation to carry out this duty in an efficient manner. To this end
National Grid has developed an asset management approach which uses a
combination of maintenance, refurbishment and replacement strategies. The
procedures, which provide a framework for the delivery of this approach, are well
established and defined and subject to external audit as part of National Grid’s ISO
9001 accreditation. Details on National Grid’s maintenance, asset replacement and
commissioning policy are included in appendix 2.

Page 12
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

FINDINGS

Operating Arrangements on the day

46 On the evening of Thursday 28 August 2003, the transmission system in the south of
London was secure and was operating in accordance with the relevant National Grid
planning standards and operating procedures (Appendix 3 provides details). The
substations were all configured in a secure manner supplying normal demands of
around 1,100MW.

47 The transmission system in the area was arranged with a number of circuits out of
service for scheduled maintenance.

Circuit Reason Dates

Installation of thermal monitoring on cables,
Number two circuit from 26 August to
maintenance of circuit breakers and other
Littlebrook to Hurst 19 September
planned maintenance at Hurst and Littlebrook
Major refurbishment of the cables and
Number one circuit from 1 July to
installation of new protection and control
Wimbledon to New Cross 28 September
systems

48 The Wimbledon, New Cross and Hurst substations, that were to be affected by the
incident, were connected to the rest of the transmission system by two circuits,
ensuring that a single transmission fault would not result in a loss of supply.

49 A simple diagram of the transmission network in this area of London is illustrated in

the figure below.

Figure 4: Schematic of the Transmission System in South London

Northfleet
Willesden 1 1 1 West
Beddington Wimbledon New Cross Hurst Littlebrook
Beddington 2 2 2 Beddington
& Kemsley
Out of service for
scheduled maintenance

50 If a fault did occur and left supplies dependent on a single transmission circuit, in
most cases, National Grid was able to restore security of supply within switching time
or by returning one of the circuits that was out on maintenance.

51 To maintain an efficient transmission system it is necessary to undertake planned

maintenance. The disconnection of circuits and network configuration is planned and
agreed following a rigorous process that involves studies to both optimise the
coordination of outages with parties connected to the system and to ensure the
network configuration is secure against all credible faults that may occur.

52 The planning process to agree these outages and the configuration of the system
began in July 2002. As part of the process regular liaison meetings were held and
exchanges of information undertaken with EDF Energy (on a daily basis in the last
two months). These discussions concluded in a formal agreement for the release of

Page 13
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

the circuits before the work was due to commence. As is normal, the maintenance
schedules of both EDF Energy and National Grid were subject to change during the
early part of the summer. EDF Energy were fully engaged in this process and fully
aware of the configuration of the transmission system and its impact on its system.
As part of this process the contingency plans for EDF Energy’s 132kV Wimbledon
substation were discussed, as the planned outage would entail a reduction in the
number of feeds from the National Grid transmission system from four to three.
National Grid understood that due to limitations on the EDF Energy’s system, some
distribution supplies from Wimbledon would be dependent on a single transmission
circuit. National Grid understands that in the event of the loss of this transformer
EDF Energy’s post fault action would be to immediately switch its Wimbledon Grid
132kV substation to reinstate supplies, from the remaining two National Grid
transformers.

53 If the circuits that were out for maintenance had been available, clearly there would
have been no loss of supply. However maintenance is an essential part of sustaining
an efficient transmission system and to increase security above the current standards
would require a huge investment in new transmission assets.

54 The investigation confirmed that the configuration of the transmission system

was not a contributory factor to the loss of supply.

Sequence of Events

55 The sequence of events commenced on Thursday 28 August at 18:11 when an alarm

was received at the Electricity National Control Centre (National Control) at
Wokingham. The system configuration at the start of the incident and the power
flows are illustrated below.

Figure 5: Transmission system configuration and power flows

486 MW
Northfleet
Willesden 1 1 1 West
Beddington Wimbledon New Cross Hurst Littlebrook
Beddington 2 2 2 Beddington
72 MW & Kemsley
Supplying EDF Supplying EDF Supplying EDF Supplying EDF
478 MW 359 MW 199 MW 84 MW

Out of service for

scheduled maintenance

56 The sequence of events during the incident is described below. The detailed switch
operations is attached in appendix 4.

57 At 18:11 staff at the National Control received an indication that a transformer or

shunt reactor at Hurst substation was in distress and could fail, with potentially
significant safety and environmental impacts. The indication, called a “Buchholz
alarm”, told National Control that gas had accumulated within the oil inside the
transformer or shunt reactor, which can lead to equipment failure.

Page 14
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

58 At 18:17 discussions were held with EDF Energy regarding the Hurst transformer or
shunt reactor. National Control informed EDF Energy that the transformer was to be
switched out of service. To achieve this the transmission system had to be
rearranged by switching equipment and circuits in and out, so the affected equipment
could be safely and securely taken out of service. During switching time (typically 5 –
10 minutes) one circuit would supply New Cross and Hurst substations.

59 EDF Energy confirmed that they had disconnected the transformer from the
distribution system. There was no impact on supplies to EDF Energy as these
remained connected to Hurst substation via two other transformers.

60 The immediate priority was security of supplies. At 18:19 the circuit from Littlebrook
to Beddington and Kemsley was switched in. This reconfiguration of the network
ensured power flows at Littlebrook substation would be secure once the number one
circuit from Hurst to Littlebrook was switched to take the Hurst transformer and
associated Hurst shunt reactor three out of service.

61 At 18:20 two circuit breakers were opened at Hurst to remove the transformer or
shunt reactor from service. At this point, the Hurst and New Cross substations were
supplied from Wimbledon 275kV substation and were dependent on the single,
number two circuit, from Wimbledon to New Cross.

Figure 6: Transmission system at 18.20

Northfleet
Willesden 1 1 1 West
Beddington Wimbledon New Cross Hurst Littlebrook
Beddington 2 2 2 Beddington
558 MW & Kemsley
Supplying EDF Supplying EDF Supplying EDF Supplying EDF
478 MW 359 MW 199 MW 84 MW

Out of service for

National Control action
scheduled maintenance

62 Immediately following the opening of the two circuit breakers at Hurst, the automatic
protection relay operated on the number two circuit from Wimbledon to New Cross
automatically opening two circuit breakers at Wimbledon and removing the number
two circuit from Wimbledon to New Cross from service. This isolated New Cross,
Hurst and part of Wimbledon substations from the rest of the system. All supplies
were lost at Hurst and New Cross substations and 35% of the supplies were also lost
to EDF Energy’s Wimbledon Grid 132kV substation. Two transformers at Wimbledon
continued to supply Wimbledon Grid 132kV substation.

63 The transmission network was now configured as in the diagram below.

Page 15
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

Figure 7: Transmission system immediately following the incident

Northfleet
Willesden 1 1 1 West
Beddington Wimbledon New Cross Hurst Littlebrook
Beddington 2 2 2 Beddington
& Kemsley
Supplying EDF Supplying EDF Supplying EDF Supplying EDF
166 MW lost 359 MW lost 199 MW lost 84 MW maintained
312 MW maintained

Out of service for

National Control action Automatic action
scheduled maintenance

64 Following the event EDF Energy transferred 72MW of demand supplied by

Wimbledon Grid 132kV substation to another supply point by reconfiguring the
distribution network.

65 Assessing the alarms received, National Control concluded that the automatic
protection equipment on the number two circuit from Wimbledon to New Cross had
most likely operated incorrectly.

66 At 18:21 National Control and EDF Energy discussed the loss of supply and the
substations affected.

67 At 18:22 standby engineers were called out to Wimbledon, New Cross and Hurst
substations to investigate and help restore supplies.

68 At 18:23 National Control commenced the sequence of operations to restore security

for the remaining transmission system and restore supplies. It was decided to keep
the number two circuit from Wimbledon to New Cross out of service until the cause of
the operation of the automatic protection relay was established, as it was highly
probable that if switched into service the automatic disconnection would recur.

69 At 18:25 the network was reconfigured to isolate the number two circuit from
Wimbledon to New Cross, while Wimbledon substation was fully energised by closing
the two circuit breakers which had automatically opened following the earlier
operation of the automatic protection equipment. These actions re-secured the
transmission system against further faults, minimising the chance of further losses of
supply. Due to uncertainty over the cause of the protection operation, the re-
energised transformer feeding Wimbledon Grid 132kV substation was not
immediately made available to EDF Energy, although two transformers at Wimbledon
capable of carrying the entire demand remained in service throughout the incident.

70 Having re-secured the system at 18:25 the restoration strategy was to configure the
network for a phased re-energisation starting at Littlebrook. A complex switching
sequence was required to prepare the transmission and distribution network and
ensure that the risk of further faults was minimised by carefully switching cable
circuits to control the voltage.

71 By 18:30 further reconfiguration of the network had taken place and the first sections
of Hurst and New Cross substations had been re-energised.

Page 16
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

72 At 18:31 National Control confirmed those developments to EDF Energy Control and
informed them that it would contact them soon to start restoring supplies.

73 At 18:38 National Control informed EDF Energy Control that supplies could be
restored to Wimbledon Grid 132kV substation. During the same conversation
National Control also informed EDF Energy Control that supplies at New Cross could
be restored. At this time EDF Energy Control requested time to assess the
distribution network and agreed to call back.

74 By 18:40 further reconfiguration of the network had taken place energising further
sections at New Cross and Hurst.

75 At 18:40 National Control contacted EDF Energy Control to offer restoration of

supplies at Hurst. EDF Energy reconfigured the distribution network and EDF
Energy’s Bromley supplies were restored at 18:44. This restored approximately a
third of the 410,000 customers lost at 18:20.

76 Between 18:44 and 18:50 further reconfiguration of the transmission system took
place.

77 At 18:48 EDF Energy Control contacted National Control to complete restoration of

supplies to the Wimbledon Grid 132kV substation. At 18:52 all remaining supplies to
Wimbledon Grid 132kV substation were restored.

78 At 18:51 a further Buchholz alarm was received relating to the transformer or shunt
reactor at Hurst. No indications were received that the transformer had been
disconnected by automatic protection, indicating that the shunt reactor was the faulty
equipment.

79 At 18:51 New Scotland Yard contacted the National Grid control room and it was
confirmed that the loss of supply was a system incident, with no third party
involvement.

80 At 18:52 National Control contacted EDF Energy Control to restore supplies at New
Cross. EDF Energy Control requested time to assess the distribution network prior to
restoring supplies and agreed to call back.

81 At this stage 29 switching operations had been planned and successfully executed in
26 minutes.

82 At 18:56 EDF Energy Control called National Control back and EDF Energy supplies
to New Cross were restored at 18:57. At this point all supplies from the transmission
system were available to the distribution network.

83 At 19:10 EDF Energy Control contacted National Control and asked for the Hurst
transformer to be returned to increase security on the distribution network. The
original Buchholz alarm was attributable to the shunt reactor at Hurst which was
isolated and the transformer was made available to EDF Energy Control.

Page 17
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

84 At 19:14 EDF Energy Control confirmed all supplies to consumers had been
restored.

85 During the period 19.00 to 19.45 standby site engineers arrived at the three sites. On
arrival each standby engineer checked protection relay indications and alarm logs
and confirmed the situation with National Control. To support the restoration process
and initial investigation, two further engineers were also called to attend site.

86 The network was now configured as follows:

Figure 8: Transmission system after restoration

437 MW
Northfleet
Willesden 1 1 1 West
Beddington Wimbledon New Cross Hurst Littlebrook
Beddington 2 2 2 Beddington
& Kemsley
Supplying EDF Supplying EDF Supplying EDF Supplying EDF
422 MW 262 MW 175 MW 84 MW

Out of service for

National Control action Automatic action
scheduled maintenance

87 At 20:02 restoration of all supplies was confirmed with New Scotland Yard.

88 At 20:55 EDF Energy Control requested a formal report on the incident.

89 After assessment by engineers on site at Wimbledon, it was confirmed the automatic

protection relay had been taken out of service and the number two Wimbledon to
New Cross circuit was returned to service at 23:00. This action further enhanced
security at Wimbledon and Hurst. No further switching was carried out to allow the
system to be re-assessed and minimise the risk of any further faults. Full security
was completed by reconfiguring the network overnight, with full security re-
established at 01:05 on 29 August.

90 The Standby engineers called to site remained on each site until restoration was
complete.

91 Following the initial loss of supply National Control engineers correctly

assessed the risks and restored transmission supplies within 37 minutes.

Communication during the incident

92 Throughout the incident close communication was maintained between National

Control and EDF Energy. Communications relating to this incident commenced at
18:17 following receipt of the initial alarm and were maintained throughout the
incident and well into the night. In addition, National Control received a call from New
Scotland Yard, and confirmed that this was a system incident.

Page 18
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

93 The incident generated substantial media interest, with National Grid handling some
300 media calls on Thursday evening.

94 A verbal statement was given to journalists within 25 minutes of the incident. Written
media statements were issued at 21.25 on Thursday evening and 13.30 on Friday
afternoon.

95 During a major incident, National Grid would normally communicate with bodies such
as Ofgem, DTI, energywatch and others with a direct interest, depending on the
incident. Contact was made with Ofgem, DTI and other parties as soon as possible
during the incident and communication continued through the evening and the
following days.

96 Following the event there were high-level contacts with Ofgem, the Energy Minister,
DTI officials, the Mayor of London, EDF Energy and energywatch, among others.

Response to the Buchholz Alarm

97 National Control actions were in line with National Grid procedures for responding to
an indication that a Buchholz alarm had been activated on a transformer or shunt
reactor at Hurst 275kV substation.

98 The causes and implications of a Buchholz alarm are set out in appendix 5, but in
summary, the alarm provides a warning of potential problems in the transformer or its
associated shunt reactor that could result in a major failure. Hence, due to the nature
of the consequences of such a failure, National Grid procedures specify the
equipment is to be disconnected from the transmission system, except in a limited
number of circumstances. These exceptions include any action that would result in a
loss of supply.

99 As is normal in the design of control room systems, to avoid “alarm flooding” in the
event of major system incidents, alarms are combined to reduce the total number
displayed in the control room. The investigation noted that the grouping and
nomenclature of the alarms for the transformer and shunt reactor did not clearly
indicate whether the transformer or the associated shunt reactor was the origin of the
gas alarm.

100 When the alarm was received, National Control took immediate action to begin the
process to remove the transformer by asking EDF Energy to disconnect it from the
distribution system.

Page 19
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

Disconnection of the Transformer

101 National Control undertook further switching actions in order to disconnect the
transformer from the transmission system. The specific design of the substation,
called a “mesh”, required the disconnection of the circuit from Littlebrook to Hurst.
The switching plan undertaken was in accordance with National Grid procedures on
operating mesh substations which, for the five to ten minutes taken to switch, left the
electricity supply at New Cross and Hurst substations dependent on a single circuit.

102 The disconnection of the Littlebrook to Hurst circuit re-routed power and as expected
increased the power flows on the number two circuit from Wimbledon to New Cross
from 72MW (213MVA) to 558MW (695 MVA). This is comfortably within the design
ratings of 815 MVA for the circuit.

103 The investigation confirmed that the operational decision to switch out the Littlebrook
to Hurst circuit and supply Hurst and New Cross from a single circuit from
Wimbledon, for the five to ten minutes required to complete the switching, was in
accordance with operating procedures and took account of the need to remove the
safety risk of a major failure of a transformer.

104 The investigation has also confirmed that the configuration and capability of the
system was in accordance with National Grid’s standards and procedures, and that
National Grid undertakes an average of 2,700 annual switching operations at mesh
corners without incident.

105 The investigation has found that National Grid engineers would not expect
their actions in removing the equipment to have caused a loss of supply.

Unexpected Operation of the Protection

106 At National Grid’s Wimbledon substation, the automatic protection equipment

associated with the number two circuit from Wimbledon to New Cross, detected the
change in power flows as a result of the switching at Hurst, as a fault. The protection
equipment disconnected the circuit to prevent damage to other equipment and/or the
propagation of the fault through the transmission system.

107 In this case the protection relay that operated was being used for backup protection.
Backup protection is fitted to the transmission network, in conjunction with the main
protection and is designed to disconnect faults not cleared by the main protection
equipment.

108 The protection equipment that operated was an Inverse Definite Minimum Time
(IDMT) relay, a commonly used type. It does not operate immediately, but starts to
operate when the electric current on the circuit exceeds a certain threshold. The
speed of operation depends on how far the measured current is above the threshold
level.

109 The protection relay had been correctly specified during the design process and the
settings sheet had been correctly produced. However the relay that had been
physically supplied and installed at Wimbledon was a 1 ampere rated relay, not the 5

Page 20
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

ampere relay specified on the settings sheet. In all other respects the settings on the
relay were correct and were confirmed during several check points in the
construction and commissioning process.

110 The effect of installing a 1 ampere relay instead of a 5 ampere, meant that the
current flow at which the protection would operate was five times lower than the
correct rating and below the rating of the circuit itself.

111 The 1 ampere protection relay was set to operate at a current of 1,020 amperes on
the transmission circuit and was triggered on the day by a current of 1,460 amperes.
This is significantly below the operating capability of the cable, at 4,450 amperes and
the original specification of the protection relay, at 5,100 amperes (see appendix 6).

112 The protection relay was commissioned in June 2001 as part of a replacement
scheme. Following a survey conducted as a result of the incident, all the automatic
protection equipment in the area was surveyed and found to be correctly installed. A
full survey of similar equipment at all substations in England and Wales has been
initiated, and to date, having completed 20% of the total, no further cases have been
revealed.

113 The incident investigation found that despite rigorous processes for commissioning
protection equipment, the wrong protection relay was installed and commissioned at
Wimbledon substation and this caused the number two circuit from Wimbledon to
New Cross to automatically disconnect unexpectedly, and caused the loss of supply.

114 The commissioning of the automatic protection equipment involved a number of

stages as set out in appendix 2. The investigation has found evidence to support
that the relay settings had been correctly calculated. The setting sheets were
correctly produced and signed by both the engineer who calculated the settings and
the engineer who confirmed the application of those settings to the protection
equipment. Furthermore the investigation confirmed the protection equipment had
been tested by the manufacturer in accordance with industry practice, and that pre-
energisation inspection tests were carried out. There is evidence that the rating of
the automatic protection equipment that is included on the documentation used for
commissioning could have been more clearly set out and hence visible to the
commissioning engineers. The investigation found no evidence that any part of the
commissioning process had been omitted.

115 The investigation has found that the direct cause of the loss of supply was the
incorrect operation of a backup protection relay on the number two circuit from
Wimbledon to New Cross.

Maintenance of Assets

116 National Grid has an established maintenance policy and the assets involved in the
incident have all been maintained according to that policy.

117 The following table summarises the maintenance undertaken on the assets involved
in the incident at Wimbledon and Hurst.

Page 21
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

Item Description Last Maintenance Next scheduled

undertaken maintenance
Number two circuit from
Wimbledon to New Cross, Commissioned 2001 2007
backup protection
Hurst Transformer 3 September 02 2006
Hurst Transformer 3 Shunt
March 03 2009
Reactor

118 The investigation found that an appropriate level of maintenance had been
carried out on the assets and poor asset condition was not a contributing
factor to this incident.

Other Factors

119 The investigation has determined that together with the above factors that are directly
attributable to the operation of the transmission system, there were a number of other
factors, external to the transmission system, that may have contributed to the
duration or scale of the incident.

Configuration of EDF Energy’s Wimbledon Grid 132kV Substation

120 EDF Energy own and operate the 132kV substation at Wimbledon, which is
physically located on different site to National Grid’s substation. Maintenance
outages were agreed between National Grid and EDF Energy as part of a well
defined process and significant information was exchanged on network configuration
and contingency plans for faults.

121 Four transformers from National Grid’s 275kV substation at Wimbledon supply EDF
Energy’s 132kV substation. Normally all four transformers are connected ensuring
that supplies can be maintained for the loss of any one transformer. National Grid
understands that EDF Energy splits its Wimbledon substation into two parts to
reduce fault currents and prevent over-stressing the equipment. Normally, with two
transformers supplying each part.

122 When National Grid requires one of the transformers to be taken out of service for
maintenance, EDF Energy configures its network with one transformer on one part
and two on the second (figure 9). Two transformers supply the majority of demand
for Wimbledon and Wandsworth. The remaining transformer supplies the remaining
demand at Wimbledon and Wandsworth, together with demand at Lots Road for
London Underground.

123 If one transformer is out of service for maintenance the Lots Road circuits will always
be dependent on a single transmission circuit, because they can only be connected
to the single transformer.

Page 22
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

Figure 9: Configuration of EDF Energy's distribution system

National Grid EDF Energy London

Underground
Wimbledon
275kV

Lots Road

Wimbledon
Grid 132kV

Out of Service for scheduled maintenance

124 The configuration of Wimbledon Grid 132kV substation on 28 August 2003 is

illustrated in the diagram above. National Grid maintained supplies to the section
connected to transformers two and four throughout the incident.

125 National Grid understands that when one of its transformers is out of service and in
the event of a fault on the remaining transformer, the normal arrangement would be
for EDF Energy to connect the two parts of the Wimbledon Grid 132kV substation.
However, National Grid does not know whether, in these particular circumstances,
EDF Energy would have been able to take such post-fault action.

126 The investigation found that the configuration of the EDF Energy’s distribution
system was not a contributory factor to the initiation of the incident. However,
a more rapid implementation of post-fault actions or an alternative
configuration could have mitigated the overall impact of the incident, reducing
the duration and perhaps the scale of the loss of supply.

Communications

127 Following normal practice, during the incident there was extensive communication
between National Control and the EDF Energy Control Centre. Communications
were initiated at 18:17, when the initial Buchholz alarm was reported, and EDF
Energy were requested to remove the demand from the transformer. At 18:21 EDF
Energy called National Control to confirm that there was a problem on the network,
and 17 minutes later National Control called back offering to restore supplies to
Wimbledon and New Cross.

128 Such operational communications continued throughout the restoration, with

numerous telephone conversations between National Control engineers and EDF
Energy’s control engineer, working together to reconnect the affected area.

129 Following the restoration of supply, communications with the control rooms continued
as further reconfiguration of the systems took place to ensure full security was
restored.

130 During the incident National Control managers were confident that this was a system
incident and this was confirmed to New Scotland Yard at 18.51.

Page 23
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

131 From Thursday evening and over the next day, National Grid gave working level and
senior level briefings to DTI (including the Energy Minister), Ofgem, the Mayor of
London, energywatch and many others with a direct interest.

132 National Grid began responding to the very large number of media calls within 25
minutes of the start of the incident through its communication procedures. Senior
executives from the company were available for media interview between late
Thursday evening and early Saturday morning.

133 The investigation has found a crucial factor in communications during the incident
was that, although National Grid was able to restore supplies to its network within 30
minutes, the various services to the public returned to normal in different timescales
and in different ways. For example, after re-configuring the distribution network EDF
Energy was able to restore supplies to some of its customers before supplies were
restored by National Grid, but some of its customers could only be restored a short
time afterwards. Disruption to rail services continued after power was restored due to
timetables being disrupted and the evacuation of trains.

134 The prime route for communications with the public is generally through the standard
channels of the providers of these services. For instance it would be through the
customer call centre of EDF Energy and through the railway companies’ passenger
information units. This was appropriate, as only these service providers could let the
public know how the incident had affected their operations.

135 The providers of key services to the public, such as the underground and railway
network operators, typically draw their electricity supplies from the local distribution
network. During an incident involving loss of electricity supplies, including on the
National Grid system, that would typically expect to communicate with the distribution
company.

136 The investigation has found that further work is required as to whether
enhanced communication between National Grid and the various organisations
providing key services to the public during such a major incident would help
them in making decisions on how to respond to the incident and communicate
about their services with the public.

Investigation

137 The planning of maintenance works had been carried out in accordance with National
Grid’s policies and that the maintenance work could not be regarded as a cause of
the incident. The investigation confirmed that the transmission system arrangement
and the communication with the distribution system operator regarding this
maintenance complied with the relevant National Grid planning standards and
operating procedures.

138 All actions in configuring and switching the transmission system complied with
National Grid’s planning standards and operating procedures and that the restoration
process was carried out quickly and professionally without further incident. The
response by control engineers to re-secure the network and restore the balance of

Page 24
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

generation and demand ensured that the disturbance was contained within the
affected substations.

139 The reason that the second fault occurred was that an incorrect protection relay was
installed when old equipment was replaced in 2001. This incorrect installation was
not discovered despite extensive quality control and commissioning procedures
followed by both supplier’s and National Grid’s specialist staff. This piece of
equipment has been replaced. Once the cause was known an extensive survey of
similar equipment was immediately initiated. To date 20% (9,000 items) of this type
of equipment on the National Grid system has been surveyed and there have been
no similar cases. The remaining equipment will be surveyed within four weeks.

140 The engineers involved in the commissioning of the automatic protection equipment
had the appropriate training, authorisation, experience and skills to undertake the
task. There is evidence that the detailed commissioning procedures were followed
correctly at all stages and that no part of the process had been omitted. However,
the rating of the automatic protection equipment that is included on the
documentation used for commissioning could have been more clearly visible to the
commissioning engineers.

141 The actions to remove the Hurst transformer did not directly contribute to the cause
of the incident. The consequential increase in flows on the Wimbledon to New Cross
circuit, which were within operational limits, initiated the operation of the protection
relay at Wimbledon. National Grid engineers would not expect their actions to
remove the equipment would have caused the loss of supply.

142 The impact of the incident on the areas of south London was exacerbated by the loss
of supplies to underground and railway transport services.

143 From the 20 July, EDF Energy’s distribution system was arranged such that a
significant supply to London Underground was dependent on a single transmission
circuit. This meant that in the event of a fault occurring on one of National Grid’s
transformers at Wimbledon the distribution system configuration would result in a loss
of supply. However, National Grid understands that EDF Energy had contingency
arrangements for immediate restoration of supplies to London Underground in such
an eventuality.

144 Following normal practice, during the incident there was extensive communication
between National Control and the EDF Energy Control Centre, with both control
rooms working effectively together during the incident.

Page 25
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

Actions being pursued

145 This is the largest loss of supply from National Grid for over ten years and the
company has expressed its deep regret. This incident involved a number of other
parties and National Grid will be working closely with them in the coming weeks to
examine the consequences and identify improvements in systems or procedures.
National Grid has reviewed its part in the incident and is committed to the following
steps:

· National Grid will work closely with other network operators to identify
any improvements in co-ordination to enhance the overall security of
electricity supplies, particularly to city centres and transport systems.

· National Grid will work closely with EDF Energy, the Mayor, London
Underground, NetworkRail and other London emergency and public
service agencies to establish improved and more responsive
communications in the event of major loss of supply.

· National Grid is urgently surveying all installations as a further check on

the integrity of the automatic protection equipment.

· National Grid will carry out a further comprehensive investigation

examining all aspects of the management of the protection systems so
as to eliminate, as far as possible, the risk of incorrect installation or
operation of automatic protection equipment.

· National Grid will work to review operational procedures, and control

room systems, including alarm presentation, in close consultation with
Ofgem, DTI and other associated parties, to ensure that there is the right
balance between safety risks and supply security.

Page 26
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

Appendix 1: Asset Condition and Replacement Planning

Substations

146 Hurst, New Cross and Wimbledon substations were commissioned in 1970, 1969
and 1967 respectively.

147 Experience has shown that a technical life of 45 years can be reasonably expected
for an outdoor substation, of design similar to Hurst, sited in a non-aggressive
environment. Therefore replacement prior to 2015 is likely to be required (subject to
confirmation by condition assessment). Investment is currently planned for 2011.

148 Wimbledon and New Cross are both indoor substations, and therefore the majority of
the equipment is subject to a much lower level of environmental attack, consequently
a longer technical life can be generally expected of these assets.

149 With the exception of the circuit breaker S40 at New Cross 275kV substation which is
SF6, all the mesh breakers are air-blast circuit breakers as originally installed. The
average age of the original circuit breakers is 34 years.

150 During the 1980’s SF6 switch disconnectors have been installed on four of the 275kV
shunt reactor circuits, while two 13kV shunt reactors at Hurst are connected via
original air blast circuit breakers. A summary of the relevant circuit breakers is
included in table 1.

Page 27
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

Substation Circuit Design type Voltage Year

Breaker (kV) Commissioned
WIMB2 S10 Air-blast circuit breaker 275 1967
WIMB2 S20 Air-blast circuit breaker 275 1967
WIMB2 S30 Air-blast circuit breaker 275 1967
WIMB2 S40 Air-blast circuit breaker 275 1967
WIMB2 K45 SF6 switch disconnector 275 1989
WIMB2 L30 SF6 switch disconnector 275 1986
WIMB2 L55 SF6 circuit breaker 275 1989
HURS2 S10 Air-blast circuit breaker 275 1970
HURS2 S20 Air-blast circuit breaker 275 1971
HURS2 S30 Air-blast circuit breaker 275 1970
HURS2 S40 Air-blast circuit breaker 275 1970
HURS2 K15 SF6 switch disconnector 275 1988
HURS2 K25A SF6 switch disconnector 275 1986
HURS2 L20 SF6 switch disconnector 275 1986
HURS2 K20B SF6 circuit breaker 275 2001
HURS2 2K0 Air-blast circuit breaker 13 1971
HURS2 3K0 Air-blast circuit breaker 13 1971
NEWX2 S10 Air-blast circuit breaker 275 1969
NEWX2 S20 Air-blast circuit breaker 275 1969
NEWX2 S30 Air-blast circuit breaker 275 1969
NEWX2 S40 SF6 circuit breaker 275 1986
NEWX2 L10 SF6 switch disconnector 275 1986
NEWX2 L20 SF6 switch disconnector 275 1986
NEWX2 K35 SF6 switch disconnector 275 1988

Table 1: Circuit breakers and switch disconnectors at Hurst, New Cross and
Wimbledon substations

Transformers

151 National Grid has conducted considerable research into the deterioration modes and
life-limiting processes associated with power transformers. As a result of this
improved understanding, transformers are generally expected to have an asset life in
excess of the associated substation assets, unless they belong to a design group
with a known defect.

152 Together at Hurst, New Cross and Wimbledon there are a total of 13 transformers
supplying the 132kV and 66kV distribution networks from the 275kV transmission
system. These 13 transformers are drawn from 9 different design groups and from 8
different manufacturers, giving high diversity and resilience against linked or common
mode failures.

153 The average age of these transformers is 33.5 years in the range 17 to 38 years, all
considerably below the age where replacement would be required under normal
circumstances.

Page 28
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

154 A summary of the transformer designs and installation dates at these sites is given in
the table below:
SGT Circuit Ref Year High Low MVA
Number Commissioned Voltage Voltage
(kV) (kV)
HURS2 SGT2 T5437 1971 275 132 240
HURS2 SGT3 T5438 1971 275 132 240
HURS2 SGT4 T5770 1970 275 132 240
WIMB2 SGT1A T4219 1967 275 132 240
WIMB2 SGT1B T3583 1965 275 132 180
WIMB2 SGT2 T4220 1967 275 132 240
WIMB2 SGT3A T4725 1967 275 132 240
WIMB2 SGT3B T3487 1976 275 132 180
WIMB2 SGT4 T4726 1968 275 132 240
NEWX2 SGT1 T6758 1986 275 66 180
NEWX2 SGT2 T4264 1970 275 66 180
NEWX2 SGT3 T4263 1970 275 66 180
NEWX2 SGT4 T6616 1978 275 66 180

Table 2: Summary of transformers

155 National Grid monitors the condition of all transformers through dissolved gas
analysis. In addition National Grid maintains a history of family performance, defects,
faults and design weaknesses to aid replacement planning. Routine monitoring gives
no cause for immediate concern with any of the above assets and none of the 13
belong to a family with a known design weakness. There are a number of
transformers where oil quality is an issue, National Grid prioritises oil replacement
and reclamation nationally and these transformers will be picked up when
appropriate by this programme.

Shunt Reactors

156 There are a total of 9 shunt reactors installed at Hurst, Littlebrook and Wimbledon
substations. Details are provided in table 3.

157 Some shunt reactors have been targeted for replacement due to a known
overheating problem. A proactive replacement programme has installed new units at
Wimbledon and New Cross substations. More recently, condition monitoring of some
275kV shunt reactors has indicated the need to replace a number of units, including
those indicated at Wimbledon and Hurst substation.

158 The nature of shunt reactor failures is such that the safety and environmental risks of
failure are not as great for those of transformers.

Page 29
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

Circuit Reference Year of Voltage MVAr

Number Commissioned (kV)
HURS2 R031 1970 275 100
Sh Reac 1
HURS2 R081 1999 275 100
Sh Reac 2
HURS2 R172 1964 275 100
Sh Reac 4
HURS2 SGT2 13kV R084 1966 13 60
Sh Reac
HURS2 SGT3 13kV R084 1970 13 60
Sh Reac
WIMB2 R153 2002 275 100
Sh Reac 2
WIMB2 R108 1970 275 100
Sh Reac 4
NEWX2 T148 2000 275 100
Sh Reac 1
NEWX2 R149 2000 275 100
Sh Reac 3
Table 3: summary of shunt reactors

Overhead Line Routes

159 The anticipated technical lives of overhead line conductor systems have been
defined by design and operating environment. Using historic information and
developed knowledge of deterioration mechanisms, National Grid anticipates a
reliable service life of 45-50 years. Sub-components of overhead line systems have a
shorter technical life and may require replacement at an earlier interval. This is
addressed through a combination of planned refurbishment (based on condition
assessment) and inspection based maintenance. The design and current status of
overhead lines in the south London area is summarised below.

Route Circuit Constructed Line type

name
ZBG Littlebrook- Barking 1965 L2
4TP Kemsley-Littlebrook- Rowdown 1976 L6
TP Littlebrook- Beddington 1961 L2/L8
VN Hurst-Littlebrook 1966 L2
ZBA Barking-Littlebrook 1962 L2
ZZT Littlebrook – Rowdown / Beddington – 1964 L2
Littlebrook
PM Hurst – Eltham 1955 PL1
Table 4 : Summary of overhead line routes

Page 30
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

Cable Routes

160 Technical lives for underground transmission cables are generally in excess of 50
years. Notable exceptions pertinent to the recent incident in London are gas filled or
gas compression cables where shorter asset lives are appropriate. In addition to this
design, National Grid has also experienced tape-corrosion problems on certain cable
designs which, left unchecked, result in reducing availability, increased oil leak rate
and the requirement to replace them. Of the major cable routes of interest in this
report (detailed in table 5), the Hurst-Littlebrook circuit had been identified as “at risk”
and a combination of replacement and pressure reduction work was completed in
1999 as a mitigation measure.

161 In order to ensure cable circuits achieve the anticipated life, a mid-life refurbishment
of routes is required to ensure the serviceability of ancillary systems, including
cooling, bonding and oil ancillary systems. To reduce the risk of an environmental
incident as a result of a cable oil leak, an on-going programme of joint bay
refurbishment is in place, which targets joints by environmental sensitivity of the
installed location.

Circuit Name Location Voltage Cable Length Year

(kV) Type (km) Commissioned
Littlebrook - West Dartford 275 PLGCC 1.653 1966
Thurrock 1 Tunnel
Littlebrook - West Dartford 275 PLGCC 1.639 1966
Thurrock 2 Tunnel
Hurst - Littlebrook 1 Hurst - 275 OF S/C 2.625 1967
Littlebrook
Hurst - Littlebrook 2 Hurst - 275 OF S/C 2.495 1967
Littlebrook
Hurst - New Cross 1 Hurst - New 275 OF S/C 21.404 1967
Cross
Hurst - New Cross 2 Hurst - New 275 OF S/C 21.752 1967
Cross
New Cross - New Cross - 275 OF S/C 13.415 1967
Wimbledon 1 Wimbledon
New Cross - New Cross - 275 OF S/C 13.479 1967
Wimbledon 2 Wimbledon
Wimbledon - Wimbledon - 275 OF S/C 20.793 1967
Willesden Willesden
Beddington - Wimbledon 275 OF S/C 0.172 1988
Wimbledon 1
Beddington - Beddington 275 OF S/C 0.372 1988
Wimbledon 1
Beddington - Beddington 275 OF S/C 0.484 1978
Wimbledon 2
Beddington - Wimbledon 275 OF S/C 0.213 1978
Wimbledon 2
Table 5: Summary of cable routes

Page 31
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

Feeder Protection Systems

162 The majority of the automatic protection systems at Wimbledon, Hurst and New
Cross are modern electronic relays that have replaced older electro-mechanical
devices. Most of the relays have been replaced since the mid 1990s and those that
have not are programmed for replacement over the next two years.

163 This equipment provides greater functionality than those that they replaced and also
contain a comprehensive self-supervision system. As a result, they ensure correct
clearance of system faults and minimise the risk of protection systems operating
incorrectly.

Page 32
National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

Circuit Type of Protection Equipment at Equipment at Year

given given Commissioned
substation substation
New Cross New Cross Wimbledon 1
– 1st Main Feeder Solkor – R Solkor – R Replacement
Wimbledon Protection due in 2003
1 2nd Main Feeder Microphase Microphase 1997
Protection FM FM
Back-up overcurrent MCGG22 MCGG22 1997
New Cross New Cross Wimbledon 2
– 1st Main Feeder LFCB 192 LFCB 192 2001
Wimbledon Protection
2 2nd Main Feeder Microphase Microphase 1996
Protection FM FM
Back-up overcurrent MCGG22 DCD314A 2001
New Cross New Cross Hurst 1
– Hurst 1 1st Main Feeder LFCB 192 LFCB 192 2002
Protection
2nd Main Feeder Microphase Microphase 1996
Protection FM FM
Back-up overcurrent MCGG62 MCGG62 1996
New Cross New Cross Hurst 2
- Hurst 2 1st Main Feeder LFCB 192 LFCB 192 2001
Protection
2nd Main Feeder Microphase Microphase 1995
Protection FM FM
Back-up overcurrent MCGG62 MCGG62 1995
Wimbledon Wimbledon Beddington 1
– 1st Main Feeder Microphase Microphase 1997
Beddington Protection FM FM
1 2nd Main Feeder SHNB SHNB Replacement
Protection due in 2003
Back-up overcurrent DCD114 CDG36 Replacement
due in 2004
Wimbledon Wimbledon Beddington 2
– 1st Main Feeder THR THR 1999
Beddington Protection
2 2nd Main Feeder Microphase Microphase 1999
Protection FM FM
Back-up overcurrent DCD314 DCD314 1999
Wimbledon Wimbledon Willesden
– Willesden 1st Main Feeder Solkor – R Solkor – R Replacement
Protection due in 2005
2nd Main Feeder Solkor – R Solkor – R Replacement
Protection due in 2005
Back-up overcurrent MCGG22 TJM10 Replacement
due in 2005

Page 33
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

Circuit Type of Protection Equipment at Equipment at Year

given given Commissioned
substation substation
Hurst – Hurst Littlebrook 1
Littlebrook 1 1st Main Feeder Translay S Translay S 1999
Protection
2nd Main Feeder LFZR (Plain) LFZR (Plain) 1999
Protection
Back-up overcurrent MCGG22 MCGG22 1999
Hurst – Hurst Littlebrook 2
Littlebrook 2 1st Main Feeder Microphase Microphase 2000
Protection FM FM
2nd Main Feeder LFZR111 LFZR111 2002
Protection
Back-up overcurrent MCGG22 TJM10 2000

Table 6: Summary of Feeder Protections

Control Systems

164 The Substation Control Systems (SCS) facilitate remote operation of substation
equipment from both National Control and the local substation. The SCS also
provides remote monitoring, operational metering, event logging and alarm handling
facilities. Substation automation functions (eg auto-reclose, automatic voltage
control or synchronisation) may be embedded in the SCS or facilitated by stand-
alone units linked to the SCS.

Substation Control System Year Commissioned

Hurst METRO Replacement due 2005
Wimbledon METRO 2003
New Cross INSTEM 1999

Table 7: Substation control systems

Page 34
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

Appendix 2: Details of National Grid’s Key Policies Relevant to the Incident

Maintenance Policy

165 National Grid operates a preventative maintenance policy that is based on the
inspection and maintenance of assets before they are expected to fail or experience
significant defects.

166 Effective delivery of inspection and maintenance is achieved through a single

national policy, national planning and a national workforce to deliver this. In addition
to ensuring compliance with legislation, the maintenance regime is designed to
manage safety, risks to the environment and the performance of all assets from
commissioning to replacement.

167 Inspection and maintenance policy is primarily based on routine maintenance at

specified intervals. In some cases duty based maintenance is undertaken. For
example transformer tap changers are maintained at a specified interval but this
would be brought forward if they experience a specified number of operations.

168 Manufacturers' recommendations are the basis for maintenance policy, however this
is enhanced by feedback derived through normal operation and maintenance
activities and following incident investigations.

169 There is flexibility in the maintenance intervals to allow assets associated with the
same circuit to be maintained at the same time. This “bundling” of work improves
system availability by optimising the amount of time circuits are out of service for
maintenance and construction works.

170 Maintenance and inspection is centrally planned and scheduled using a work
management system. Records are held to confirm completion of the maintenance,
and condition information and any abnormalities found on inspection are recorded
and repairs are scheduled where necessary. Information from each time equipment
is maintained is used to inform the maintenance policy.

Asset Replacement Policy

171 It is National Grid’s policy to use condition assessment and diagnostic techniques to
identify and replace assets in a timely manner before failure in service occurs. In
establishing an asset replacement programme the aim is to deliver a safe, secure
and economic transmission system, thereby meeting the statutory and licence duties.
Widespread failures in service are unacceptable and a sustainable asset
replacement programme is therefore necessary for assets that have long
replacement and repair times. National Grid uses a risk management approach to
determine the most appropriate asset replacement programme.

172 Knowledge of equipment deterioration mechanisms combined with operational

history and environmental exposure is used to develop an anticipated replacement
programme for each equipment design group. These programmes are used to aid
replacement planning.

Page 35
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

173 To ensure the replacement of assets at the most appropriate point within the
declared asset life range, condition assessment is undertaken. The condition
assessment processes take into account the operating environment, operational
duty, fault and defect history, various condition testing techniques, visual condition
assessment and engineering knowledge of site and specialist staff.

174 In establishing the asset replacement programme consideration is given to avoiding

outage congestion and thereby maintaining access to the transmission system
allocating internal resources effectively and optimising the management of our
suppliers.

Commissioning Policy on Automatic Protection Equipment

175 Prior to any assets being used operationally on the transmission system, National
Grid undertakes an extensive and rigorous commissioning process. This process
comprises of on-site inspections and tests to verify that the equipment is correctly
installed and performs as specified. Tests are carried out in two stages. First, prior to
the equipment being connected to the power system, operational conditions are
simulated, and checks undertaken to confirm the equipment operates as designed.
Secondly, with the equipment connected to the power system, its performance under
actual operational conditions is confirmed. It is only when both stages have been
completed successfully that the assets will be commissioned onto the system.

176 To ensure that the commissioning process is carried out to a high professional
standard, National Grid’s policy sets out both the need for a very clear process
framework, and the need to develop engineers with the requisite knowledge and
skills.

177 The process framework comprises:

a) Automatic protection relay settings must be calculated in accordance with
industry standards and manufacturers’ recommendations.

b) A protection relay settings sheet must be prepared which specifies both the
relay and its setting and this must be jointly signed by the engineer who
calculates the settings, and the engineer who confirms that the setting has
been correctly applied to the relay.

c) Commissioning tests must be carried out in accordance with an approved test

document which verifies that the setting applied to the protection relay is the
setting specified on the protection relay settings sheet.

d) Formal inspections of the settings must be carried out both immediately before
and after the in service commissioning tests, to confirm that the setting applied
to the protection relay accords with the setting specified on the protection relay
settings sheet.

178 The development of the requisite knowledge and skills is defined in a commissioning
authorisation programme. This requires the tutoring and assessing of those with
defined commissioning responsibilities, leading to a certificate of authorisation.
Confirmation of skills retention and development is through annual re-evaluation
which, if satisfactory, leads to certificate re-authorisation.

Page 36
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

Appendix 3: How National Grid plans and operates the transmission system

179 National Grid plans and operates the transmission system in accordance with the
Security and Quality of Supply Standard (SQSS), which is a requirement of the
Transmission Licence.

180 National Grid’s system performance against the SQSS is reported annually to Ofgem
in accordance with the Transmission Licence and is publicly available. Overall, an
improved level of system performance has been achieved since privatisation.
Performance is reported in terms of availability, system security and quality of
service. Average annual system availability and winter peak availability rose
significantly until 1999 and have remained at a high level. The annualised number of
losses of supply and unsupplied energy varies on a year by year basis with no
performance degradation. Quality of supply is reported to Ofgem each year in terms
of compliance with statutory limits and shows only five voltage and eleven frequency
excursions since 1990, with no frequency excursions for the last seven years.

181 In essence, the SQSS determines the degree of additional resilience that must be
built in to the transmission system so that the system is robust against credible
equipment failures and the need to maintain the assets. Typically, the main system
must be able to withstand the unplanned loss of a double circuit (two overhead lines
hanging on the same transmission towers), although smaller demand groups are
permitted to be dependent on a single circuit when circuit outages are required.

182 This is illustrated in the diagram below. When the double circuit is lost, the flow of
electricity on the remaining circuits will increase to compensate for the loss. The
transmission system is designed and operated to be able to accommodate these
additional flows.

Loss of a
double circuit

Ÿ Powerflow increases on
remaining circuits.
Ÿ Additional resilience ensures
that there is enough capacity to
accommodate the increase in
power flows.

Page 37
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

183 The SQSS was subject to a review in the mid 1990’s, and a revised standard was
approved by Ofgem following extensive consultation with the industry and customers.
The provisions of the SQSS bear comparison with standards applied elsewhere in
the world and are equivalent to those that existed before privatisation of the industry.

184 The level of additional resilience built in to the transmission system is a balance of
risk between cost and security. The existing standard has delivered an extremely
high level of security and reliability by international standards. It would require a very
high level of additional cost and investment to increase the current level of security
across the entire system.

185 Application of the security standard, supported by a sustained high level of

investment, has delivered an extremely low level of customer demand lost, as a
result of events on the transmission system. The average level of unsupplied energy
over the past five years has been 0.0001% of the total supplied. For comparison this
is 27 times lower than the average reported through a benchmarking exercise
involving 16 major transmission system operators in 1999/2000 and 2000/2001.

186 During winter months the system is usually operated with all circuits in service.
Where this is not possible, for example due to extensive construction works or
equipment failure, there is sufficient flexibility to ensure the security standard is met.
During the summer months, when demand for electricity is lower, circuits are taken
out of service for maintenance and construction works. These circuit outages are
carefully co-ordinated with each other, with distribution network operator outages,
generation outages, and with demand profiles to ensure that the system remains
compliant with the security standards.

187 As indicated above, the transmission system includes additional resilience to allow
for the unplanned loss of equipment. When such losses occur, remedial action is
taken as soon as possible to restore the level of security. In some circumstances, it
is necessary to switch circuits out of service for up to 5 to 10 minutes whilst other
equipment is being taken out of service for maintenance or repair. During these
switching operations a reduced level of security may apply, however the probability of
a second equipment failure during this time is extremely small.

Page 38
National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

Appendix 4: Switching Operations

Time Location Equipment Status

Initial event 18:11:37 Hurst Hurst SGT3 SR3 Buchholz Alarm Received
18:18:00 Hurst SGT3 LV Breaker Opened
Manual
18:19:40 Littlebrook X605 Closed
response to
18:20:17 Hurst S20 Opened
alarm
18:20:28 Hurst S30 Opened
18:20:36 Wimbledon 380B Opened
Mesh Corner
18:20:36 Wimbledon 380A Opened
3 Backup
18:20:37 Wimbledon S20 Opened
Protection
18:20:38 Wimbledon S30 Opened
18:23:47 Wimbledon L30 Opened
Restoring
18:25:06 Wimbledon S30 Closed
Security
18:25:46 Wimbledon S20 Closed
18:26:46 New Cross 2TO Opened
18:26:53 New Cross 1TO Opened
18:27:02 New Cross 4TO Opened
18:28:23 New Cross S40 Opened
18:29:25 Hurst S10 Opened
18:30:23 Hurst S30 Closed
18:30:24 New Cross S10 Opened
18:30:40 New Cross H13 Opened
18:30:40 New Cross H23 Opened
18:31:24 New Cross L10 Opened
Restoration 18:33:41 New Cross H13 Closed
Strategy 18:36:42 New Cross H13 Opened
18:39:02 New Cross L20 Opened
18:39:22 New Cross H23 Closed
18:40:14 New Cross S40 Closed
18:40:34 New Cross S10 Closed
18:43:56 Hurst L20 Opened
18:44:58 Hurst S20 Closed
18:48:15 New Cross S10 Opened
18:48:28 New Cross S40 Opened
18:48:58 New Cross H13 Closed
18:50:07 New Cross S40 Closed
18:50:59 Wimbledon 380A Closed
Demand 18:52:13 Wimbledon 380B Closed
restoration 18:57:03 New Cross 1TO Closed
18:57:21 New Cross 4TO Closed
19:24:46 New Cross S10 Closed
19:30:10 New Cross 2TO Closed
22:59:41 Wimbledon L30 Closed
Restoring
Security 23:00:04 New Cross L10 Closed
00:18:58 New Cross L20 Closed
00:19:19 Hurst L20 Closed
01:05:15 Hurst S10 Closed
These times relate to times received on control systems at National Control

Page 39
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

Appendix 5: Background on Buchholz Alarms and Potential Consequences of

Transformer Failure

188 The Buchholz relay is a protection device that has an alarm function for abnormal
gas levels or low oil in an oil filled transformer or shunt reactor. The device also
automatically initiates the disconnection of the equipment if the oil level falls further or
a major internal failure occurs.

189 All faults within a transformer tank result in localised heating and breakdown of the
oil. When the fault is of a very minor type, such as a hot joint, gas is released slowly,
but a major fault involving severe arcing causes rapid release of large volumes of gas
as well as oil vapour. This action can be violent with the gas and vapour not having
time to escape but instead building up pressure and displacing the oil.

190 A Buchholz alarm is a dependable indication of an active fault within the transformer.
The consequences of such a fault developing to failure are sufficiently severe to
warrant disconnection. While the majority of transformers are removed from service
before a major failure occurs, on occasions no warning is available. Approximately
20% of transformer failures result in a breach of the main tank. As shown below, the
potential safety and environmental consequences of failure are clear.

Figure 10: Failed Transformer

191 In view of the potentially serious consequences of a transformer failure, it is National

Grid’s policy that National Control will immediately take transformers out of service
when a Buchholz alarm is received. This policy takes into account the very low
probability of a second circuit fault during the 5 to 10 minutes it would take to perform
the switching operation, estimated to be less than 1:40,000. The exception to this is
when the removal of the transformer would lead to a direct loss of supply, in which
case the balance of risk favours a delay whilst further investigations take place.

Page 40
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

Appendix 6: Purpose of Automatic Protection Equipment and Operation of the

Backup Protection Relay

192 During normal operation the power system supplies load current. At times of peak
demand a 275kV circuit may be subject to load current which is as high as 5,200
amperes. However, when the 275kV power system is subject to a fault (short circuit)
the current increases significantly, and could rise as high as 40,000 amperes. These
very high fault currents are disruptive and potentially damaging to the power system
and must be quickly removed.

193 The purpose of ‘protection’ is to detect a fault on the power system and then instruct
the appropriate circuit breakers to automatically disconnect the faulty item of
equipment from the power system. This process needs to be accomplished as fast
as possible to prevent:

(a) unnecessary damage to faulty equipment

(b) potential damage to healthy equipment – that is required to carry the high fault
current until the fault is removed
(c) unstable operation of generating equipment – leading to loss of generation
(d) loss of supply to customers

194 Two types of protection are applied to the transmission system: main protection
which protects a specified item of equipment, e.g. a transformer, an overhead line
circuit, or a cable circuit; and backup protection which provides backup when the
main protection fails.

195 Main protection will not operate for either load current or fault current (other than a
fault on the equipment it is protecting). The same is not true for backup protection. It
will operate for any current, either load or fault current, that is above its setting.

196 The Inverse Definite Minimum Time (IDMT) relay used on the number 2 circuit from
Wimbledon to New Cross has two settings – an operate current setting (i.e. the
current at which the relay commences to operate) and a time delay setting – the
latter is known as the time multiplier (TM). Once the current flowing into the relay
exceeds the operate current settings of the relay, it commences to operate. For
example, if the operate current setting of the relay is equal to 1 ampere and the
current flow into the relay is below 1 ampere, the relay will not operate – but once the
current flow into the relay exceeds 1 ampere, it will commence to operate. The
speed of operation is dependent upon both how many times the current flowing into
the relay is greater than the operate setting current, and the setting of the TM.
However, for the purposes of the investigation it is only necessary to focus on the
operate current setting.

197 The operate current setting, IS, of the relay is related to its Rating, alternatively called
the Nominal Current, In. Relay ratings are usually 1 ampere or 5 ampere but others
are available. The relays are equipped with current setting multipliers, CS, which are
applied to In, to give a range of operate current settings so that

IS = CS * In

Page 41
 National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

198 On the relay installed on the number two circuit from Wimbledon to New Cross, CS
could be selected from 0.05 to 2.4 in increments of 0.05 and was, in fact, selected to
0.85, so

(a) with a 1 ampere Rating relay, IS = 0.85 x 1 ampere = 0.85 ampere

or

(b) with a 5 ampere Rating relay, IS = 0.85 x 5 ampere = 4.25 ampere

199 The current in the high voltage (HV) circuit is converted to the current into the relay
by a current transformer. On the number 2 circuit from Wimbledon to New Cross the
ratio of the current transformer was 1,200/1. This means that for every 1,200
amperes that flow in the high voltage circuit, 1 ampere will flow into the relay.

200 So with reference to (a) above, if the relay has a Rating of 1 ampere then a relay
current of 0.85 ampere will cause the relay to operate, and this corresponds to a high
voltage circuit current of 0.85 x 1,200 = 1,020 amperes. Alternatively, if a relay of
Rating 5 ampere was selected, a relay current of 4.25 ampere will cause the relay to
operate and this corresponds to a high voltage circuit current of 4.25 x 1,200 = 5,100
amperes.

201 To summarise:

A relay with a Rating of 1 ampere requires 1,020 amperes on the HV circuit to

cause operation
A relay with a Rating of 5 amperes requires 5,100 amperes on the HV circuit
to cause operation

202 At the time of the incident the HV circuit current on number two circuit from
Wimbledon to New Cross was 1,460 amperes and this caused the 1 ampere Rating
relay to operate. If the correct relay with a 5 ampere Rating had been installed then
operation would not have occurred.

203 Relay ratings are selected to accommodate the current rating of the HV circuit to
which the relay is connected. The number two circuit from Wimbledon to New Cross
has a current rating of 4,450 amperes. Consequently, a 5 ampere relay rating,
allows a HV circuit current of 5,100 amperes before operation.

Page 42
National Grid Company plc 10 September 2003

Appendix 7: References

Transmission Security and Quality of Supply Standard:

http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/library/documents/mn_license_standard.html

Grid Code
http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/indinfo/grid_code/index.html

System Performance Report 2002/03

http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/library/documents/pdfs/System_performance_
Report_2002_03.pdf

Transmission Licence
http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/library/documents/mn_transmission_licence.html

Page 43