10.1007/978 3 319 50343 1
10.1007/978 3 319 50343 1
Nuclear
Power Plant
Emergencies in
the USA
Managing Risks, Demographics and
Response
Nuclear Power Plant Emergencies
in the USA
Dean Kyne
123
Dean Kyne
Department of Sociology and Anthropology
The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley
Edinburg, TX
USA
vii
viii Preface
in its efforts to transform the inevitable risks. The last option presents opportunities
to minimize the negative impacts associated with the NPPs.
Managing the nuclear power emergencies is significantly different from
managing those of other disasters such as fire or flood emergencies. For example, in
the case of a fire emergency, as soon as the 911 call center alerts the fire department,
firemen are dispatched to the place the fire is taking place, usually within minutes
of the initial call. However, managing nuclear power emergencies requires certain
procedures and protocol to go through, prior to an initial announcement of evac-
uation could take place. To effectively manage nuclear power emergencies, it is
necessary to understand the problems in the previous nuclear power accidents, as
well as demographic data of the populations prone to high-level radiation doses,
living in areas surrounding the NPPs. Critically important in nuclear disaster
management plans are the places the radioactive plume will disperse, and the
individuals under the plume path at risks of exposure to the high-level radiation
dose, and the challenges faced in evacuating individuals living in the areas with
high-level radiation doses.
The development of commercial NPPs in the USA, the impacts of the three
historic nuclear power core meltdown accidents, and the problems associated with
response and evacuation are discussed in Chap. 1. The impacts of the three nuclear
core meltdown accidents are analyzed, coupled with addressing the problems with
response and evacuation, from a disaster and emergency management point of
view. Chapter 2 captures the geographical locations of the 61 nuclear power plants
within the USA and the communities exposed to the potential risks of core melt-
down accident associated with the NPPs. In an event of a nuclear emergency, it is
vital to carry out evacuation activities immediately so that the people living around
the NPPs could be protected from the potential high-level doses of radiation.
Chapter 3 examines the current radiological emergency plan and carefully inves-
tigates the process and potential problems that could lead to undermining the
effectiveness of immediate response and evacuation. To evacuate people, it is
imperative to know where the radioactive plume will go, given the weather con-
ditions on the day the event takes place. Chapter 4 demonstrates utilization of
powerful computer code, namely Radiological Assessment Systems for
Consequence Analysis (RASCAL) to estimate the places the radioactive plume
could be carried away by the given weather conditions during a nuclear core
meltdown accident. The chapter provides two simulation exercises at two NPPs,
namely the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station in Arizona, and the Indian Point
Nuclear Generating Station in New York. The simulation exercises utilizing the
RASCAL computer code with step-by-step procedures provides fundamental
understanding and special technical skills needed to carry out a part of the effective
nuclear power emergency management process. Chapter 5 examines the issues
related to the nuclear power emergency plan in place. The discussion focuses on
issues in terms of policy, priorities, process, participation, evacuation, and recovery.
Chapter 6 proposes the three options for minimizing the risks associated with NPPs,
suggesting the elimination of all NPPs in operation in USA, transforming inevitable
Preface ix
risks to evitable risks, and transforming the current radiological plan into an
effective emergency management plan.
This book would not have been made possible without the comments from my
former academic advisors, for whom I have the outmost respect for, including Prof.
Bob Bolin, Arizona State University; Prof. Christopher Boone, Arizona State
University; and Prof. Dawid Pijawaka, Arizona State University. All three have been
instrumental and extremely helpful in shaping my research skills and strengthening
my work in nuclear emergency management. I would also like to express immense
gratitude to two anonymous reviewers who provided me with very helpful com-
ments and feedback in my work. Additionally, many thanks go to the instructors
of the RASCAL course, Lou Brandon, PMT and RASCAL Program Manager,
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), George F. Athey, of Athey Consulting, and
James Van Ramsdell, of the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. My heartfelt
appreciation goes to Edlira Kuka, who edited my entire book manuscript, in multiple
editing phases and providing invaluable feedback from inception to completion.
Significant gratitude and appreciation is also extended to Dr. Robert Doe, Editor,
Springer International Publishing, and Ms. Naomi Portnoy, project production
coordinator, for their kind support throughout the publishing process. This book is
considered a first-of-its-kind in providing a comprehensive understating of how to
effectively manage nuclear power emergencies in the USA.
xi
xii Contents
1
He graduated with a Ph.D. in Environmental Social Science from Arizona State University.
xv
Chapter 1
The US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants
and Their Potential Risks
In the history of nuclear power development, there are three major events that
precede as the first commercial nuclear power plant was developed and it became
fully operational in USA (Table 1.1). The three development events are as follows:
discovery of fission, discovery of self-sustaining chain reaction, and the political
vision of peaceful applications of atoms.
The first preceding event before the birth of US commercial nuclear power plants
was the discovery of fission in 1993 (US DOE 1995). To understand fission, one
requires the knowledge of “atoms.” This can be traced back to about 2,400 years
ago when a pre-Socratic Greek philosopher claimed that the world is made up of
small and invisible substances called “atoms” (Ferguson 2011). Fission can be
defined as follows:
The splitting of an atom, which releases a considerable amount of energy (usually in the
form of heat) that can be used to produce electricity. Fission may be spontaneous, but is
usually caused by the nucleus of an atom becoming unstable (or “heavy”) after capturing or
absorbing a neutron. During fission, the heavy nucleus splits into roughly equal parts,
producing the nuclei of at least two lighter elements. In addition to energy, this reaction
usually releases gamma radiation and two or more daughter neutrons (US NRC 2016b).
barium (atomic number 56), in the leftover materials which weigh about half the
atomic mass of uranium. However, they faced a puzzle that when they added all
messes of fission products, the sum did not equal before the weights of messes
before. Their big question was where did the lost mass go? Another scientist, Lise
Meitner, who worked with Niels Bohr and his nephew, Otto R. Frisch in
Copenhagen, used Einstein’s theory to provide the answer to the big question of the
previous two scientists. Lise finally provided that the lost mass was due to occur-
rence of fission (US DOE 1995) which was a significant discovery leading to the
future of nuclear work.
1.1 U.S. Nuclear Power Development 5
The third development in nuclear energy was the study and examination for
peaceful applications of nuclear power (US DOE 1995). Prior to World War II,
there were many scientists who made great efforts to harness atoms in order to
produce nuclear weapons. Producing nuclear weapons was secretly under the code
name Manhattan Project at that time. On the other hand, there were many other
scientists who worked on developing breeder reactors. A turning point was reached
when the use of atomic bombs began. In August 1945, atomic bombs were dropped
in Japan, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. People from different walks of life including
politicians, journalists, scientists, and business leaders saw the horrific negative side
of using atomic power for destruction and war. The events changed the attitudes of
people around the world, and many began condemning the use of atoms for
destructive purposes. Meanwhile, in December 1945, Alvin M. Weinberg added
another excitement to the world through his claim on peaceful use of atoms. He
claimed the potentials of nuclear power to benefit all mankind in a report to the US
Senate’s Special Committee. His assertion was that “atomic power can cure as well
as kill. It can fertilize and enrich a region as well as devastate it. It can widen man’s
horizons as well as force him back into the cave (US NRC 2016c).” Based on
Alvin’s claim, in 1946, the US government encouraged the development of nuclear
energy for peaceful civilian purposes.
6 1 The US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants …
The official launch was made when the government established the Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC), under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. Under the act,
the AEC was responsible for regulating nuclear power. The government’s intention
to develop atomic energy became more intense when the President Eisenhower
made a popular public speech, in December 1953. In delivering his “Atoms for
Peace” speech, Eisenhower stated that “this greatest of all destructive forces can be
developed into a great boon, for the benefit of all mankind (US NRC 2016c).” He
highlighted his plan to transform nuclear fission materials—the subject of much
public fear—into a resource with a peaceful end use (Eisenhower 1953). 8 years
after the establishment of the AEC, Congress replaced the existing law with the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which allowed the agency to develop, for the first
time, a commercial nuclear power plant (US NRC 2016a). The new act authorized
the AEC to promote the use of nuclear power and to regulate its safety. One notion
was that the AEC was playing a dual role; on the one hand, the agency was required
to promote the nuclear energy sector, and on the other, it was responsible to regulate
the industry. 4 years after the famous Atoms for Peace speech, on December 18,
1957, the world’s first commercial nuclear power plant—built on the Ohio River 25
miles northeast of Pittsburgh—began generating nuclear power (US NRC 2011) out
of the Shippingport Atomic Power Station. The AEC received a lot of criticisms for
the competing dual roles it played as promoter and regulator of atomic power.
These dual roles were competing with each other, and the agency was criticized for
being unable to impose strict rules and regulations on the use of nuclear energy.
According to the NRC (US NRC 2016c), during the 1960s, the AEC was criticized
for its weak actions on several important areas, such as protecting the public from
radiation, establishing strong radiation protection standards, establishing guidelines
for reactor safety, siting plants, and protecting environments. Taking those criti-
cisms into account, in 1974, Congress decided to abolish the AEC and created the
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. Under the new act, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) was established (US NRC 2016c); the agency officially began
its operations on January 19, 1975. According to the NRC (US NRC 2016c), the
agency’s regulatory activities emphasized on the following:
(1) reactor safety oversight and reactor license renewal of existing plants;
(2) materials safety oversight and materials licensing for a variety of purposes;
(3) waste management of both high-level and low-level wastes; and
(4) evaluating new applications for nuclear plants.
Nuclear power plants are not different from other power plants that use heat to
produce electricity. Referring to US EIA (2015), a nuclear power plant could be
simply described as follows: Nuclear power reactors were developed after the
discoveries of the self-sustaining fission reactions because the fission reaction is
1.1 U.S. Nuclear Power Development 7
used as a source of the heat for nuclear power plants. In a nuclear fission reaction,
the atoms are split into smaller atoms that release energy. Nuclear fission takes
place in the uranium fuel which is placed in the reactor of a power plant to heat up
the water. The uranium fuel rod consists of ceramic pellets which are placed in
12-foot metal fuel. Each ceramic pellet could produce the similar energy amount
produced by 150 gallons of oil. A fuel assembly may include hundreds of fuel rods,
and a reactor core contains many fuel assemblies. When the water in the reactor is
heated by nuclear fission reactions, taking place in the fuel rods, the water is
transformed into steam, which rotates the turbine blades, making generators and
thus producing electricity. The water is cooled down and sent back to the reactor to
be reused. According to the NRC (US NRC 2010), there are two types of US
commercial nuclear reactors, namely boiling water reactors (BWR) (Fig. 1.1a) and
pressurized water reactors (PWR) (Fig. 1.1b).
Referring to the NRC (2010), both nuclear power reactors contain a core which
is placed inside the reactor where fuel assembles, and bundles of hundreds of fuel
rods are housed in order to produce heat. The heat is generated by using the nuclear
fission reactions in fuel rods. The core of the nuclear reactor is indicated “1” in both
reactor types. The reactor obtains heat energy from nuclear fission reactions, and the
next step is to transform the heat to steam. In the BWR type (Fig. 1.1a), the stream–
water mixture is generated by a flow of very pure water (reactor coolant), through
the core of the reactor where the heat is absorbed (indicated as “2”), then the
stream-water mixture passes through separators and dryers (indicated as “3”). In the
PWR type (Fig. 1.1b), the stream generation is achieved by two steps: First, reactor
coolant is pressurized, and then, the pressurized coolant carries the heat to the
stream generator (indicated as “2”). The heat vaporizes the water in a secondary
loop that generates steam (indicated as “3”). The differences between the PWR and
BWR types are that the steam is generated in the core of a reactor in the BWR,
whereas the steam is produced in a separate chamber of steam generator in PWR
Fig. 1.1 Types of US commercial nuclear power reactors. Source US NRC (2010)
8 1 The US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants …
type of reactor. The generated steam in both types of reactors is directed to turbine
generators, in order to drive electric generators to produce electricity (indicated as
“4”). In both reactors, unused steam is recycled by placing it back to the condenser
and then reheating it, by flowing through the reactor. The BWR type uses more fuel
rods than the PWR type does. The first one normally carries between 370 and 800
fuel assemblies, whereas the latter does between 150 and 200 fuel assemblies.
The most important and challenging task is to control the fission reaction in the
core in order to sustain the amount of heat that is appropriate to generate the steam.
If the fission reaction is out of control, the core containing nuclear fuel assemblies
could become overheated, leading to a core-meltdown. In the BWR-type reactor,
the fuel assemblies are cooled by water circulated using electrically powered
pumps, which receive electricity from the electrical grid. In the PWR, the fuel
assemblies are cooled by circulating water pumped with electrical pumps. A backup
pumping system is installed using electricity, produced by onsite diesel generators.
Another cooling system that further cools the containment is also installed. The
dome-shaped containment structure is built with iron and concrete walls of about 4
ft in thickness. In case of a core-meltdown accident, the radioactive materials are
contained inside, preventing from polluting the environment.
Currently, the USA has brought online a fleet of commercial nuclear reactors,
located at 61 sites scattered across 30 states. Before the current commercial reactors
could begin their operation, the owners of the nuclear power plants are required to
apply for a license, even before they begin to build a site. The following three
sections discuss why a license is required; when a license could be renewed; and the
current nuclear reactors currently in operation.
All owners of US commercial nuclear power plants are legally required to obtain a
license to operate or build from the US NRC. According to the US NRC (2016d),
the agency was authorized for licensing and regulating the operation of nuclear
power plants. As mentioned earlier, the AEC also authorizes issuance of nuclear
power plant licenses before the US NRC was formed in 1974. In the history of both
the AEC and the NRC, they are authorized to issue nuclear licenses.
The US NRC explains conditions that require those seeking licenses to submit an
application for a license to operate. There are three conditions that may warrant the
license requirement which are as follows:
1.2 U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in Operation 9
Fig. 1.2 US commercial nuclear power reactor operating licenses—issued by year, Data. Source
US NRC (2010), US NRC (2016a)
(1) to construct, operate, and decommission commercial reactors and fuel cycle
facilities.
(2) to possess, use, process, export and import nuclear materials and waste, and
handle certain aspects of their transportation.
(3) to site, design, construct, operate, and close waste disposal sites (US NRC
2016d)
As of August 2009, both the ACE and the NRC have issued a total of 104 US
commercial nuclear reactors which are located at 65 nuclear power plant sites in 31
states, to 26 various operating companies (Fig. 1.2). The reactors are produced by
four different reactor vendors, and there are 80 different designs (US NRC 2010). In
2013, three nuclear power plants with a total of four reactors were permanently shut
down. They are Crystal River Power Plant in Florida (one reactor) in February; the
Kewaunee Power Plant in Wisconsin (one reactor) in April; and the San Onofre
Power Plant in California (two reactors) in June. In 2014, the Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Plant in Vermont (one reactor) was also permanently shut down in
December (US EIA 2016). 1973 is seen as the year in which the USA has seen a
peak of construction and operating of nuclear power plants (Fig. 1.2). After 1973,
the demand for nuclear power plants slowed down until in the mid-1980s, where the
construction resumed gradually. However, there were no licenses related to nuclear
power plant facilities issued after 1996.
10 1 The US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants …
*A combined license application can reference an early site permit, a standard design certification,
both, or neither. If an application does not reference an early site permit and/or a standard design
certification, the applicant must provide an equivalent level of information in the combined license
application.
Fig. 1.3 Relationships between combined licenses, early site permits, and standard design
certifications. Source US NRC (2004)
In the past, nuclear power plants were licensed under a two-step licensing process.
This process required both a construction permit and an operating license sepa-
rately. In 1989, the NRC established an alternative licensing process that essentially
combines a construction permit and an operating license with certain conditions,
into a single license (Fig. 1.3). Under either process, before an applicant can build
and operate a nuclear power plant, it must obtain the approval from the NRC (US
NRC 2004).
During the licensing process, one of the key elements is “public involvement.”
One of the reasons to have a public process is to encourage the public to participate
in the environmental decision-making process and provide feedback. This key
element could be related to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). In
1970, NEPA went into effect and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was
established, with its mission to incorporate environmental protection policy into all
federally sponsored projects. According to the EPA, the NEPA could be summa-
rized as follows:
The NEPA is one of the first laws ever written that establishes the broad national frame-
work for protecting our environment. NEPA’s basic policy is to assure that all branches of
government give proper consideration to the environment prior to undertaking any major
federal action that significantly affects the environment (US EPA 2016).
federal activities (US EPA 2016). The US EPA is the agency which assures that all
federal activities incorporate the NEPA requirements by advocating environmental
justice, which could be defined as:
Fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national
origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of
environmental laws, regulations, and policies. Fair treatment means that no group of
people should bear a disproportionate share of the negative environmental consequences
resulting from industrial, governmental and commercial operations or policies. Meaningful
Involvement means that: people have an opportunity to participate in decisions about
activities that may affect their environment and/or health; the public’s contribution can
influence the regulatory agency’s decision; their concerns will be considered in the decision
making process; and the decision makers seek out and facilitate the involvement of those
potentially affected (US EPA 2016)
In the combined license process, there are opportunities for the public to par-
ticipate in environmental decision making (Fig. 1.4). At least two opportunities for
public involvement are mandatory, namely public meetings on environmental
review and mandatory hearings on the combined license application process.
The NRC conducts its licensing activities based on the current existing regulations.
The two existing regulations that are regarded as the most relevant to the design,
siting, construction, and operation of new commercial nuclear power facilities are
10 CFR Part 51, “Environmental Protection Regulations for Domestic Licensing
and Related Regulatory Functions,” and 10 CFR Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications,
and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.” The combined licenses have been
awarded to Fermi 3, South Texas Project Unit 3, South Texas Project Unit 4, V.C.
Summer Unit 2, V.C. Summer Unit 3, Vogtle Unit 3, and Vogtle Unit 4.
Fig. 1.4 Opportunities for public involvement during the review of combined licenses. Source
US NRC (2004)
12 1 The US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants …
After the amendment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the NRC was authorized to
issue a 40-year initial license for commercial nuclear power reactors. The act also
allows the NRC to renew the licenses for another 20 years at a time. After 40 years of
use, some of the essential parts of a reactor, which are engineered with an expected
use of 40 years, will expire and the license holders must replace and maintain the
parts in good condition, before renewing their existing licenses. As of June 2015, the
NRC has renewed the 74 currently operating reactors located at 43 plant sites to
another 20 years (US NRC 2015a). The regulations governing the renewal process
are specified in 10 CFR Part 54, “Requirements for Renewal of Operating Licenses
for Nuclear Power Plants,” while the NRC’s environmental review requirements for
license renewal are found in 10 CFR Part 51, “Environmental Protection Regulations
for Domestic Licensing and Related Regulatory Functions (US NRC 2015a).”
As of January 27, 2016, there are 99 US commercial nuclear reactors which are
currently in operation located at 61 power plant sites in 30 states (Fig. 1.5). Many
of the reactors are located in the east, northeast, and southwest of the nation.
Among the 61 nuclear power plant sites, 35 of these plants have two or more
reactors. The Palo Verde Power Plant in Arizona, the largest nuclear power plant,
which contains three reactors, has the largest combined net summer generating
capacity of 3,937 megawatts (MW) in 2014. The Fort Calhoun in Nebraska was the
smallest single reactor with the smallest net summer capacity of 479 megawatts
(MW) in 2014 (US EIA 2016). According to the EIA (2015), the USA is ranked as
the highest capacity for generation of nuclear energy, among 30 countries gener-
ating electricity with nuclear power plants.
Of the 30 countries in the world that have commercial nuclear power plants, the
USA has the most nuclear capacity and generation suppling 20% of its total energy
usage. France, the country with the second highest nuclear capacity, relies on
nuclear power for nearly 75% of its total electricity. Fourteen other countries
generate more than 20% of their electricity from nuclear power (US EIA 2015).
As noted earlier, as of June 2015, the NRC has renewed the 74 currently
operating reactors located at 43 plant sites to another 20 years (US NRC 2015a). It
could be implied that the current operators are aging. There are about 35 reactors
out of a total 99 (35%) that are over 40 years old (Fig. 1.6). The primary license
provided a 40-year operation span; many of them were initially designed to operate
for a 60-year span. The owners who would like to operate beyond the 40 years of
nuclear reactor life spans are required to replace parts that were expired from what
is their expected life of use, before they could renew their licenses. There are issues
associated with aging of reactors which can cause safety concerns. Copper (2013)
1.2 U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in Operation 13
Fig. 1.5 Locations of current US commercial nuclear power plants, Data. Source US NRC
(2016a)
14 1 The US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants …
Fig. 1.6 Age of currently operating US commercial reactors, Data. Source The US NRC (2016a)
made a one notion that the construction proposals make a projection of a nuclear
power plant life to be up to 60 years, but in reality, about one-sixth of the total US
reactors retired prior to their projected expectancy of 60 years. In other words, they
even retired before expiration of their initial license which was provided for up to
40 years.
There are at least three reasons why owners of current reactors made a decision
to abandon the aging reactors (Cooper 2013). The following reasons are evident:
(1) Expensive repairs;
(2) Uneconomic to keep running; and
(3) Some of them have permanent damages beyond repair.
Costly repairs became major reason for abandonment of two nuclear power
plants: Duke Energy’s Crystal River in Florida and Edison International’s San
Onofre in California. Both of the plants needed multibillion-dollar repairs (Crooks
2016). According to the NRC, the Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant
with a capacity of producing 2,609 MW and a pressurized water reactor was issued
a license to operate from December of 1976 to February 20, 2013. On September
26, 2009, when the plant was doing a refueling, the owner decided to replace the
stream generators. To do so, a large hole must be created in the concrete dome,
prior to replacing the generator. After replacing the generator, the hole must be
restored again. However, the owner could not fix the repair and finally decided to
permanently shut down the Crystal River Unit 3 reactor, after 33 years of operation.
Similarly, San Onofre, in California, retired after 30 years of operation, in 2013,
after observing steam tube degradation (US NRC 2015b). The repair needs were
complex especially for the replacement of 2000 tubes, and finally, the owner
decided to take the reactor down and end operations.
1.2 U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in Operation 15
Further, some reactors are simply not economical to operate. A good case study
to review is the Kewaunee Power Plant in Wisconsin, with a capacity of 556 MW,
which was closed on May 7, 2013, after 39 years of operation, solely for uneco-
nomic reasons (Dotson 2014). Dotson noted that the plant owner confirmed that the
decision for permanently shutting down the plant was due to economic reasons and
the cost of operation, which faced no regulatory reason or public opposition.
Dominion, a Virginia-based power company, owns three plants, namely North
Anna and Surry in Virginia and Millstone in Connecticut. In July 2005, the com-
pany acquired Kewaunee Power Plant, which was jointly owned by Wisconsin
Public Service Corporation and Alliant for $129 million. The Kewaunee acted as a
supplier for electricity to two companies in the past. The two companies did not
renew their contracts. The company could not buy another power plant to make up
the loss with Kewaunee and to make it economical to continue the plant running.
The company put the plant on sale in April 2011, but it could not find any buyers.
In October 2012, it decided to close the plant (Dotson 2014).
Some reactors received local opposition to discontinue their operations. On
March 29, 1979, the Three Mile Island Unit 2 reactor in Middletown, PA, expe-
rienced a partial core-meltdown experience (US NRC 2013c). It was regarded as
one of the most serious accidents in US commercial power plant history, and the
plant was permanently shut down after being in operation since December 30,
1978.
The current fleet of nuclear power plants which are aging provide lessons and
cautionary observations for the future of nuclear reactor maintenance and safe
operations. They demonstrate some hindrances that could limit their full potentials.
A study conducted by Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT 2003) found
that there are four major problems within the nuclear industry. These four problems
center on costs of operations, safety, proliferation, and risks.
Nuclear power plants are found to have higher overall lifetime costs than other
source of energy in the long term. For example, the study shows that when com-
pared to another source of energy, natural gas, with combined cycle turbine tech-
nology (CCGT) and coal, at least the nuclear power has an absence of a carbon tax
or an equivalent “cap and trade” mechanism for reducing carbon emissions.
Further, other issues exist, associated with safety, health, and environmental
impacts. Nuclear power is associated with the issues that receive attention and
concern from the public. In many cases, the public demonstrated their strong
opposition against the use of nuclear power for safety reasons. The nuclear power
accidents over time, Three Mile Island in 1979, Chernobyl reactor accidents in 1986
in Russia and Fukushima accident in 2011 in Japan, bring up safety issues asso-
ciated with nuclear power reactors. In addition, nuclear fuel waste also poses safety
concerns, especially while in the fuel pool, next to the nuclear reactor, which poses
additional safety risks. During transportation from the nuclear power plant to the
storage sites, fuel waste also poses risks and safety concerns. Nuclear power plants
16 1 The US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants …
also pose the concerns for nuclear proliferation. Currently, nuclear power tech-
nology has separated to various counties. With regard to national security, there is a
concern that nuclear power plants could be misused to produce uranium for nuclear
weapons. The production of uranium for nuclear weapons is possible in the fuel
cycles that include the reprocessing of spent fuel to separate plutonium and uranium
enrichment technologies. Lastly, nuclear power is naturally associated with the
management of nuclear waste as it involves high radioactive waste; thus, public
safety is a major concern. Nuclear waste must be systematically deposited in a way
that does not pose any danger to the environment and human health. Yucca
Mountain, Nevada, has been designated to have high-level nuclear waste deposal,
but there is no final decision reached yet with regard to this site. The project faced
strong local opposition to use the place for high-level nuclear permanent waste
deposal. In short, to prosper from nuclear power in the future, all key stakeholders
must address the four unresolved problems collectively in a way that responds to
the posed threats to the environment and exposure to communities.
Since May 26, 1958, when Shippingport came online, nuclear power plants in the
USA have been in operation for more than 59 years. Nuclear power plants house
dangerous materials of many assemblies of fuel rods in the core of a nuclear reactor,
which are always contained in an average of 4-ft-thick iron and concrete
dome-shaped structures. When the system that cools down the nuclear fuel rods is
disturbed, the fuel rods could melt down and containment might be breached.
Further, highly radioactive toxic materials could be carried away by the winds and
people living beneath the radioactive plume pathway might be exposed to it. In the
history of nuclear power, it has been demonstrated that a destructive potential could
go beyond the human capacity to manage and respond appropriately to such an
event.
1.3 U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants and Their Potential Risks 17
Preceding events: The first nuclear accident occurred at the Three Mile Island
(TMI) reactor Unit 2, just 26 years after Shippingport was in operation. The plant
experienced a major core-meltdown accident due to a disruption in the cooling
system of the fuel rods, causing the cooling system shutdown, resulting in
uncovering the fuel assemblies in the core and overheating and melting the fuel
rods. It is noted that failure of the cooling systems was not the only contributing
factor to the accident. The accident was caused by personnel error, deficiencies in
design, and failures of parts and components in the system (US NRC 2013c).
The following description demonstrates the accident-related elements, including
the sequence of events preceding the accident at the Unit 2 of the TMI power plant.
It was on Wednesday, March 28, 1979, the main feed-water pump that normally
sends water to the steam generators experienced a failure at about 4:00 am (Fig. 1.7,
Event 1). The cause of the failure was unknown, and it was speculated that the
failure could be due to shortage in power supply or a mechanical issue. In a
standard operation, the steam generators utilize steam from the nuclear reactor, and
thus, they reduce the heat inside the reactors. The major consequence of the
shutdown of the steam generators is that the heat increases in the nuclear reactor
causing an increase in pressure in the pressurizer. To reduce the pressure, the
pilot-operated relief valve (a valve located at the top of the pressurizer) was opened
(Fig. 1.7, Event 2). The valve was constructed to close by itself when the pressure
is released and it reaches to a proper level. However, the valve was stuck open,
resulting in cooling water in the reactor being released. In the control room, the
operators noticed the water being released from the core reactor for a couple of
Fig. 1.7 Event of sequences preceding the core-meltdown accident at Three Mile Island power
plant. Source US NRC (2013c)
18 1 The US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants …
reasons; the instruments did not provide sufficient information on water level in the
reactor, and there was no specific instrument that monitors the water level in the
reactor. At that time, the staff made a critical assumption; the high water level in the
pressurizer keeps the core covered with water. The flashing warning lights after
alarms running in the control room did not make the staff realize a loss-of-coolant
accident the plant was experiencing. To respond to the warning, the staff moved
their figures to push buttons on the control panel in order to carry out a series of
tasks to prevent from further damage. First, they turned off the reactor coolant
pumps in order to prevent vibration caused by escaping water through
pilot-operated relief valve which was stuck open. Second, they reduced the amount
of emergency cooling water being pumped into the primary system in order to
prevent the pressurizer from filling up completely. These actions worsen the con-
ditions causing reactor overheated. Overheating of the nuclear fuel caused zirco-
nium cladding, which are long metal tubes holding the fuel pellets inside the
nuclear reactor ruptured resulting in melting the fuel pellets (Fig. 1.7, Event 3) (US
NRC 2013c).
Managing the nuclear emergency: The following chronological events
(Table 1.2) in TMI nuclear power accident describe how the management of the
TMI and concerned authorities carried out activities to respond and manage the
nuclear power emergency, a core-meltdown accident which is regarded as the worst
kind of nuclear accident. About 4 h after the incident was initiated, the plant
management finally decided to inform the NRC’s regional office located in King of
Prussia, PA. A moment later, the NRC Headquarters in Washington, D.C., opened
the Operation Center in Bethesda in MD. An official notification was reached to the
White House, about 5 h the initiation of the accident took place. 7 h later after the
first initial incident, management evacuated non-essential workers off the premise
of the plant. The air sampling to monitor radioactivity took place after 8 h after the
initial incident, and the sampling was recorded above the plant (US NRC 2013c).
Impacts from the nuclear emergency: The NRC and other agencies including
the US Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (now Health and Human Services), the Department of Energy, and the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania conducted detailed studies of the accident’s
radiological consequences (US NRC 2013c). It was estimated that there were about
2 million people who lived around the troubled TMI Unit 2 that might have
received about 1 millirem above the usual background dose which was estimated to
be between 100 and 125 millirem per year for the area (US NRC 2013c). According
to the US NRC (2013c), the environmental samples taken from air, water, milk,
vegetation, soil, and foodstuffs collected revealed low levels of radionuclides.
A study conducted after 3 years the TMI accident took place shows that there is a
modest post-accident increase in cancer near TMI, but the increase could not be
explained by the radiation emissions form the accident (Hatch et al. 1991). 9 years
later after, another study was conducted and findings reveal that there were
higher-than-expected thyroid cancer incidences in two counties, namely Lancaster
and York with high exposure to radiation to TMI accident (Levin 2008). After
1.3 U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants and Their Potential Risks 19
30 years of the TMI accident, Levin and his colleagues conducted another study and
their findings revealed that thyroid cancer incident was higher, but the direct cor-
relations with the radiation exposure from the accident could not be validated
(Levin et al. 2013). They suggest that chronic low-level radiation exposure from
nuclear accidents and routine emissions from power plants should be examined in
the future studies.
20 1 The US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants …
Preceding events: On April 26, 1986, the second demonstration of NPPs’ powerful
destructive potential occurred at the Chernobyl NPP in Ukraine, 7 years after the
event at TMI. The Chernobyl plant experienced an accident that breached its reactor
containment vessel and released radioactive effluents into the environment (US
NRC 2013b). The accident took place at the reactor Unit 4 due to a sudden surge of
power during a safety system test related to a routine maintenance outage. On April
25, 1986, the Unit 4 reactor, the Soviet-designed RBMK (reaktor bolshoy
moshchnosty kanalny, high-power channel reactor), a pressurized water-cooled
reactor which includes individual fuel channels and uses graphite as its moderator
(Fig. 1.8), was scheduled for a routine maintenance shutdown. The plant intended
to take a test if pumps that cool down the core were supplied with sufficient
electricity generated by slowing operation management of the plant. This was
intended as a test to assure that in the event of power outage from the station power,
the pumps that cool down the core receive sufficient power supply from the slowing
turbine generators, prior to the pumps are supplied with the power generated from
the diesel emergency power supply (World Nuclear Association 2016a).
The test conducted last year showed unsatisfactory results due to a rapid decline
in the power supply from the slowing turbine engine. Therefore, before the
scheduled maintenance shutdown, management intended to undertake the test
again. The test was considered as non-nuclear-related and sufficient information
exchange with the in charge of nuclear safety of the nuclear reactor did not take
place. The test required preconditions for the reactor before it is shutdown. One of
them was to shut down the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) in order to
proceed with the planned test. However, there was a risk associated with the
1.3 U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants and Their Potential Risks 21
Fig. 1.8 Diagram of the RBMK-1000 reactor design. Source World Nuclear Association (2016a)
isolation of the ECCS because if the core experienced an incident, the system might
be able to reduce the impacts. In fact, the ECCS could not be shut down because the
reactor was operating at about half power. It was required to be switched off. Next,
the required condition for the reactor was to stabilize at 700–1000 MW, but it was
at 30 MW at 00:28 on April 26; but it could restore back to about 200 MW at
01:03 a.m. (Table 1.3). It was obvious that the operators underestimated that risks
are associated with setting the preconditions for the test. As planned, the power
needed to increase from 200 to 500 MW, but operational errors caused the power to
lower down to 30 MW at 00:28 on 26 April. At 01:03, the reactor came into
stabilized state at 200 MW and the test began. After 20 min, the signals of the
power excursion rate emergency protection system were displayed and the reactor
was operating at 530 MW. Since that time, there was a continued increase in the
power that leads to rupture in fuel elements which increased steam generation
resulting in increase in power. At 1:24, the fuel control rods were no longer
functional and reached their lower limit stop switches; it leads to power being
switched off for clutch mechanisms. Finally, the stem explosion took place first.
This event was followed by another event after a couple of seconds, another
explosion stemming from the buildup of hydrogen from zirconium–steam reaction
(World Nuclear Association 2016a).
Managing the nuclear emergency: When the explosions took place, the plume
that carries radioactive materials, smoke, debris from the core, and the building
went to up to 1 km high into the air. On that day, the northwesterly winds carried
the radioactive plume further away, leaving the heavier debris down near the plant.
22 1 The US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants …
About 4 min after the explosion, the very first task carried out by the 14 firemen at
the site was to put out the fire associated with the explosion on the roof of adjacent
turbine hall. Finally, a total of 69 firemen which consisted of the first group of 14
firemen who were joined by other firemen in nearby areas placed the fire under
control at 5:00 pm. While the explosion had taken place at the Unit 4 reactor, the
other reactor Units 1, 2, and 3 were still in operation. After two and a half hours of
24 1 The US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants …
the explosion taking place, the plant operators could successfully shut down at
5:00 a.m. The other two, Units 1 and 2, were shut down the next morning on April
27. The firemen used both water and foam spray for flammable materials such as
diesel oil, stored gas, and chemicals to put out the fire. There was one notable
human error in carrying out the response activities which were feeding the water
with emergency water pumps into the reactor core. After a day of injecting 200–300
tons per hour into the reactor core, the plant realized that the water was going into
Units 1 and 2, and then, the water feed was stopped (World Nuclear Association
2016a).
2 days after the accident (on April 28), the second task for a massive accident
management was carried out. The main purpose of the task was to combat the fire
and the radioactive releases. The task was performed by 1800 helicopter flights
which dumped about 5000 tons (40 tons of boron carbide, 2400 tons of lead, 1800
tons of sand and clay, and 800 tons of dolomite) over the troubled reactor. In
carrying out the task, there was another notion of human error and safety caution
taken into account of effective planning. At first time, the helicopters stabilized over
the reactor and dumped the materials, but the radiation level was very high. Thus,
the plan was changed to dump the materials while the helicopters travelled over the
reactor. When the compounds were not dumped over the reactor, they became
compounds that insulated heat and increased the temperature (World Nuclear
Association 2016a).
A week later (on May 5), another plan to cool down the reactor temperature was
implemented. The plan included to feed cold nitrogen to the areas surrounding the
reactor. A day after injecting the cold liquid to the reactor, the temperature was
noticeably decreased. It took about 15 days and required about 400 workers to
construct a built-in cooling system beneath the reactor underground (World Nuclear
Association 2016a). After 8 months the explosion took place (December 14), a
“sarcophagus,” a concrete roof, was constructed over the troubled reactor. That
sarcophagus was constructed with about 300,000 tons of concrete, and 6,000 tons of
metal was estimated to last for about 30 years (The Chernobyl Gallery 2016). The
sarcophagus contained about 5,500 tons of radioactive sand, lead, and boric acid and
about 220 tons of uranium and other unstable isotopes (Wendle 2016). The radiation
level was very high inside (10,000 roentgens per hour) (500 roentgens over 5 h is a
lethal dose). It is impossible to repair the sarcophagus due to high-level radiation
inside, and a new containment called “New Safe Containment” was constructed (The
Chernobyl Gallery 2016). The shape of the New Safety Containment looks like an
outsized aircraft hangar with measurements of 360 ft high, 540 ft long, and 850 ft
wide with a total estimated cost of $1.7 billion (Wendle 2016).
Impacts from the nuclear emergency: The Chernobyl nuclear power plant
accident caused an evaluation of about 116,000 people from areas surrounding the
nuclear power plant in the year the accident took place. In the following years, there
were about 220,000 people who were evacuated from three countries: Belarus, the
Russian Federation, and Ukraine (Fig. 1.9) (UNSCEAR 2008). The authorities
sealed off the areas within 18 miles of the nuclear power plant. However, indi-
viduals involved in continued investigations were allowed to continue their
1.3 U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants and Their Potential Risks 25
Fig. 1.9 Surface ground deposition of cesium 137 released in the Chernobyl accident. Source
UNSCEAR (2008)
businesses (US NRC 2013b). The radioactive materials and radionuclides from the
nuclear power accident were carried by the winds to far distances and they con-
taminated the larger areas in other countries in the northern hemisphere. People
living in the areas surrounding the nuclear power plants in Belarus, the Russian
Federation, and Ukraine included more than 6,000 individuals who were diagnosed
with thyroid cancer up to the year 2005 (UNSCEAR 2008). The individuals consist
of both children and adults. There were more than five million people who exposed
to radiation after the nuclear power accident. Most of them were exposed to the
radioactive materials during the evacuation. When the accident took place in the
early morning of April 26, 1986, there were about 600 workers who were working
on the site, 134 of them received high doses (0.8–1 Gy) and 28 of them died during
the first 3 months after the accident and 19 died between 1987 and 2004. In
addition, there were 530,000 individuals who were registered as recovery operation
workers and exposed to doses between 0.02 and 0.5 Gy between 1986 and 1990
(UNSCEAR 2008). Those individuals were anticipated to experience cancer or
other cancer-related diseases. However, in general, two decades after the accident,
the increase in cancer incidents and mortality rates did not provide any clues to
relate the cause of death to be radiation exposure after the nuclear power accident. It
was observed that the incidence of leukemia in the general population did not
increase to a cause of radiation exposure (UNSCEAR 2008).
Analysis of nuclear emergency management: The Chernobyl accident was
ranked as a level 7, the highest level classified as a major event, according to the
International Nuclear Event Scale. The accident was caused mainly by design
26 1 The US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants …
Preceding events: On March 11, 2011, an earthquake with a 9.0 magnitude which
was epic entered in about 231 miles northeast of Tokyo struck Japan’s Honshu
Island coast. There were a total of fourteen reactors, Mark I type reactors (Fig. 1.10)
Fig. 1.10 Diagram of the Fukushima Daiichi reactor: GE boiling water reactors (BWR). Source
World Nuclear Association (2012)
1.3 U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants and Their Potential Risks 27
the used fuels from the reactors at Fukushima Daiichi were stored in the central fuel
pool. There were 6375 fuel assemblies out of the total capacity of 6840 in the
central pool. The temperature increased to 73 °C, but later the temperature was
placed under control and there was no damage in the fuel pool (World Nuclear
Association 2016b).
Impacts from the nuclear emergency: The third and most recent NPP-related
accident occurred, 25 years after the Chernobyl accident, when an underwater
earthquake triggered a tsunami that hit the Japanese coastline, causing massive
damage at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP (US NRC 2013f). This catastrophe has been
regarded as a nuclear disaster of a degree humankind has never experienced
(Cosmic Convergence 2013). The accident has proven to be far worse in its effects
than the previous two nuclear power-related accidents. The Japanese government in
its initial response evacuated approximately 160,000 people living within a 12–19
mile radius of the Fukushima plant (Morris-Suzuki et al. 2012), but the impacted
areas have proven to be much wider than the evacuated areas. The earthquake was
coupled with tsunami wave. In mid-December 2011, the plant management
declared a cold shutdown condition after nitrogen was injected into all three con-
tainment vessels and pressure vessels leading to a minimal level of radioactive
releases (World Nuclear Association 2016b). After the reactor core-meltdown
accident, about 78,000 people living in areas within a 12 mile radius around the
nuclear power plant were evacuated (Fig. 1.10). Later, about 62,000 people living
in areas between 12 and 19 miles were evacuated by sheltering in their homes. In
April 2011, areas in the northwest part of the plant were designated as deliberate
evacuation areas because the high levels of radioactive materials were observed on
the ground and people living in the areas could expose to high-level radiation.
About 10,000 people living in the areas were evacuated because evacuation could
reduce radiation by up to a factor of 10. However, evacuation came with undesired
outcomes including evacuation-related deaths (World Nuclear Association 2016b).
It was estimated that there were about 300,000 people evacuated from their homes
in areas located surrounding the nuclear power plant according to Red Cross figures
(Smith 2013). According to the Mainichi Shimbun survey, the deaths related to
displacement amounted to about 1,600, whereas about 16,000 people were killed as
a result of earthquake and tsunami (Smith 2013). Among the 1,600 deaths, 1,599 of
these deaths were in the Fukushima Prefecture where the nuclear power plant
accident took place (Smith 2013). According to the United Nations Scientific
Committee of the Effects of Atomic Radiation report, a large portion of the
atmospheric releases were carried away by the winds to the Pacific Ocean and direct
radioactive liquid releases were discharged into surrounding sea until the reporting
was made in May 2013 (UNSCEAR 2008) (Fig. 1.11).
Analysis of nuclear emergency management: First, the failure to design the
plant to potential tsunami risk magnified the plant’s vulnerability to natural disas-
ters. The Fukushima Daiichi plant was built 10 meters above the sea level. When
the plant was flooded by the tsunami, the plant was below about 5 meters of
seawater. The Fukushima Daiichi plant was built under 13 meters above the sea
level, and the impact of tsunami was less than the Daiichi plant. Second, the plant
1.3 U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants and Their Potential Risks 29
Fig. 1.11 Evacuation areas surrounding the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Source
UNSCEAR (2014)
management did not follow the instruction by the Office of the Prime Minister to
not feed the seawater into the reactor cores. Third, 6 h after the plant accident
initiated, the government started the evacuation of people living in areas within 2
mile (3 km) radius from the plant. The evacuation took place after 3 h
core-meltdown started. This delay in evacuation could cause residents living near
by the plant unnecessarily expose to the radiation. Fourth, the next day, the gov-
ernment made an announcement for evacuation of people living within 6 mile
radius and 12 mile radius. Fifth, 4 days after the first accident initiated, a further
evacuation to shelter inside was advised to residents living in areas between 12 mile
(20 km) radius and 19 mile (30 km) radius surrounding the plant (Table 1.5).
These accidents at NPPs are normally preceded by an event or a series of events
that trigger or contribute to the damage done to the reactor core. When brought
under control, events with the potential to have escalated into major accidents—that
is, those of the type capable of causing reactor core damage—are described as
near-miss events. The NRC issues an annual report detailing all near-miss events
30 1 The US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants …
Table 1.5 Timeline of evacuation orders during the Fukushima Daiichi accident
Date Time Activity
March 11, 14:46 JST The earthquake occurred.
2011 15:42 TEPCO made the first emergency report to the government.
19:03 The government announced a nuclear emergency.
20:50 The Fukushima Prefecture Office ordered 2 km radius evacuation.
21:23 The government ordered 2-mile (3-km) evacuation and to keep
staying inside buildings in the area of 2–6 mile (3–10 km) radius.
March 12, 05:44 The government ordered 6-mile (10-km) radius evacuation.
2011 18:25 The government ordered 12-mile (20-km) evacuation.
March 15, 11:01 The government ordered to keep staying inside buildings in the area
2011 of 12–19 miles (20–30 km) from the plant.
March 25, The government requested voluntary evacuation in the area of 12–19
2011 miles (20–30 km).
April 21, The government set the 12-mile (20 km) radius no-go area.
2011
Source UNSCEAR (2014)
and classifying them according to the three categories defined by the type of team
sent out to inspect the event, which is in turn determined by the level or degree of
severity of the event. There are three such teams, namely the augmented inspection
team (AIT), the incident inspection team (IIT), and the special inspection team
(SIT). The AIT evaluates events that pose a 10-fold increase in risk, whereas the
SIT investigates events that pose a 1,000-fold increase in risk level (Lochbaum
2010, 2011, 2012). In 2010, there were a total of 14 near-miss events (13 SIT and 1
AIT); in 2011, 15 (14 SIT and 1 AIT); and, in 2012, 14 (11 SIT and 3 AIT), figures
that hint at the regularity with which such plants pose a risk to their surrounding
areas.
Another risk associated with NPPs is that of contamination of the sort caused by the
unmonitored and unplanned release of liquids. Commercial NPPs release radioac-
tive materials into the environment, in either liquid or gaseous or both, on a routine
basis. There have been incidents of unplanned and unmonitored leaks of liquids that
occurred at Braidwood, Indian Point, Byron, and Dresden NPPs. The Liquid
Radioactive Release Lessons Learned Task Force (LLTF) has been tasked with
identifying the causes of such leaks (Richards et al. 2011). Their findings included
the following: (1) The construction of plant components did not meet existing
safety standards; (2) the components that caused or contributed to said leaks
were not required to be monitored, nor were they subject to routine maintenance
activities according to the NRC regulations; (3) some components associated with
1.3 U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants and Their Potential Risks 31
subterranean leaks or with spent-fuel pools were not readily accessible or physically
visible; (4) liquid leaks can enter undetected into groundwater; (5) the contami-
nation of groundwater may go undetected because it is not required to be monitored
according to the existing NRC regulations; and (6) the contaminated groundwater
could flow off-site undetected. The communities that host NPPs therefore are at
perpetual risk due to the very presence of the NPPs.
Another potential risk associated with NPPs surrounds their spent fuel—the
highly radioactive used fuel rods that are removed from a nuclear reactor. Nuclear
fuel rods are made of fissionable materials and retain their inherent destructive
potential long after their initial use. Approximately 74% of all spent fuels are stored
at the reactor site, most often in spent-fuel pools, while the rest are stored in dry
storage casks distributed across 33 states (US GAO 2012). The US Government
Accountability Office (GAO) projects an annual 2,000-metric-ton increase in the
amount of spent fuel stored on site, with the current 70,000-metric-ton spent-fuel
stockpile growing to 140,000 metric tons within a decade. New storage facilities are
expected to be ready to begin accepting spent fuel in 15–40 years. The potential
risks associated with such facilities include (1) the release of radiation, which could
have severe negative impacts on human health and (2) a self-sustaining fire if and
when the water is drained and the fuel rods are exposed to air. The amount of
hazardous materials stored in each state varies from a maximum of approximately
2,000 metric tons in Illinois to a minimum of less than 100 metric tons at the
decommissioned St. Vrain NPP in Colorado (US NRC 2013a). Above all, the
threats that are inherent to the 70,000-metric-ton spent-fuel stockpile cannot and
must not be underestimated. To put into perspective the dire consequences of doing
so, we must bear in mind that only approximately 400 metric tons of spent fuel were
stored in the fuel pool at the Fukushima NPP, materials that are equivalent in their
destructive potential to 14,000 Hiroshima bombs (The Asahi Shimbun 2013).
The most hazardous human-made materials do not sit forever in the spent-fuel
pools or stay safely in the dry-storage casks housed at the reactor sites. When they
are transported, they pose great risk not only to the host communities but also to the
communities at large along the transit route. The purpose of transporting spent fuels
is to relocate them to storage space shared by multiple reactor sites operated by the
same owner (US NRC 2013d). According to Garrick (2003), between 1964 and
1997, a total of 3,025 shipments moved 829 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM)
by road and an additional 1,445 MTHM by rail. The transportation of such
materials is closely supervised by the NRC and the US Department of
Transportation (US NRC 2013d). Although regulated and supervised, the trans-
portation—whether by road or by rail—has not been accident-free. Between 1971
and 1995, there were four accidents on the highways and four on the rail lines; one
highway accident resulted in the death of a driver and detectable emissions of
radiation (Garrick 2003; US NRC 2013g). All of the approximately 70,000 metric
tons of spent fuels stored at reactor sites are in waiting to be transported to
high-level repositories, when such facilities are open and available to accept said
materials (US NRC 2013d). With the Obama administration’s 2009 decision to
32 1 The US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants …
withdraw funding for the Yucca Mountain High-Level Nuclear Waste Project, there
is at present no permanent storage facility under development (Wald 2009).
Another risk that NPPs pose is inherent to their design and serves to highlight
why it is critical that the design of a reactor that contains fissionable fuel rods
during its normal operation be centered on safety. The Mark 1 containment vessel,
first produced by GE in the 1960s and still in use at Fukushima NPP at the time of
the accident there, contributed to the catastrophic events of 2011 (Zeller 2011). As
early as 1975, it was known that there had not been sufficient testing of the con-
tainment design and that any flaws that might persist could compromise the safety
of the plant and its surroundings. However, the warning did not lead to a halt in the
operating of the design, given that by that time, it had been widely accepted
throughout the nuclear power industry. However, Harold Denton, a retired NRC
official, pointed out that the probability of a Mark 1-type reactor bursting if the fuel
rods were to enter into meltdown was approximately 90% (Denton 1987). In the
USA, there remain 23 Mark 1 reactors still in operation, located at 16 NPPs,
including Oyster Creek, New Jersey; Dresden, Illinois; and Monticello, Minnesota.
The host communities of NPPs that still operate Mark 1 reactors are at greater risk
of exposure to a Fukushima-like disaster than sites with safer reactor designs.
Nuclear power plants are also vulnerable to seismic events of the type that played a
role in triggering the catastrophe at Fukushima. The NPPs sited along the US
eastern seaboard, in particular, do not include in their designs any kind of measures
meant to shield against the aftereffects of a strong earthquake (Koch 2011).
Nuclear power plants, even under normal operating conditions, release limited
amounts of radioactive contaminants into the atmosphere. In the event of a nuclear
disaster, the quantities of radioactive materials can increase by orders of magnitude.
Ionizing radiation can quickly travel more than one hundred kilometers (62 miles),
carried on the wind in the form of a radioactive plume to outlying areas (Cyranoski
and Brumfiel 2011). In general, the routine emissions of ionizing radiation origi-
nating from NPPs are known to be associated with elevated incident rates of a
number of types of cancer, permanent damage to human vital organs, and death
(Astakhova et al. 1998; Canu et al. 2008; Cardis et al. 2005). Populations living
near an NPP, as well as those that may prove to be in the path of a radioactive
effluent plume in the case of an accident, are vulnerable to exposure of high levels
of radiation.
The communities that host such facilities shoulder the potential risks associated
with nuclear power from the time the plant begins operation until the time it is
decommissioned—for a typical reactor design, the use life is between 40 and
60 years (Green Peace 2010). After a plant is shut down, it takes under normal
conditions, 50 years for the reactor to cool; this is followed by a period of
decommissioning that normally takes another 40–60 years (Green Peace 2010).
1.3 U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants and Their Potential Risks 33
The NRC has advanced three strategies for dealing with end of use at of NPPs:
(1) DECON or decommissioning strategies; (2) SAFSTOR or deferred dismantling;
and (3) ENTOMB or the permanent encasing on site of radioactive contaminants
(US NRC 2013e). For example, Hallam Nuclear Power Plant, Nebraska, a NPP
with a short use life, was decommissioned in 1971. All potential containments were
at that time buried underground. Since then, the Department of Energy, working in
conjunction with the Nebraska Department of Health, has monitored the entomb-
ment site for possible groundwater contamination and radiation and will continue to
do so for a period of 119 years, until 2090 (Nebraska Energy Quarterly 1997).
Spent fuel, among the most hazardous material created by humans, is always
vulnerable to terrorist attack (Holt and Andrews 2007). The terrorist attack on the
World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C.,
on September 11, 2011—the so-called 9/11 attack—serves as reminder of the dire
consequences and very real threat of a potential attack on NPPs. Afterward, evi-
dence came to light that revealed Al Qaeda had considered targeting an NPP in their
initial plan of attack (Holt and Andrews 2007).
According to the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), a successful attack on a
spent-fuel storage facility would be difficult, but it is possible. In the event of such
an attack, the spent fuel could become the source of a self-sustaining zirconium
cladding fire and would release a massive amount of radioactive materials.
Communities that host NPPs therefore live with the unpredictable risk of exposure
to a massive release of radiation.
Despite their years of operation, NPPs have yet to prove themselves the peaceful
resource for the benefit of humankind that President Eisenhower first envisioned. In
fact, NPPs use a technology that seeks to harness nuclear fissionable materials to
produce heat, which is used to boil water, transforming it into steam that is then
used to power electric generators. These nuclear fissionable materials were initially
used in the manufacturing of nuclear weapons. Their powerful destructive potential
is beyond imagination, as was revealed by the Trinity test—the first detonation of
an atomic bomb, which occurred at 5:29:45 a.m., July 16, 1945, in the desert of
New Mexico (Masco 2006). The destructive potential of nuclear fission can escalate
beyond an NPP’s ability to control it, for instance when a plant experiences an
accident that damages its nuclear reactor, where the fuel rods made of fissionable
materials are housed.
34 1 The US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants …
Above all, the potential risks associated with NPPs can be explained by Perrow’s
“normal accidents theory.” As noted previously, NPPs are complex and tightly
coupled systems, and complexity produces unknown risks; according to the
Perrow’s theory:
Nothing is perfect, neither designs, equipment, procedures, operators, supplies, or the
environment. Because we know this, we load our complex systems with safety devices in
the form of buffers, redundancies, circuit breakers, alarms, bells, and whistles. Small
failures go on continuously in the system since nothing is perfect, but the safety devices and
the cunning of designers, and the wit and experience of the operating personnel, cope with
them. Occasionally, however, two or more failures, none of them devastating in themselves
in isolation, come together in unexpected ways and defeat the safety devices—the definition
of a “normal accident” or system accident. If the system is also tightly coupled, these
failures can cascade faster than any safety device or operator can cope with them… [I]f the
accident brings down a significant part of the system, and the system has catastrophic
potential, we will have a catastrophe. (Perrow 1999, pp. 356–357)
According to the Perrow’s analysis, the risks associated with NPPs therefore
should be seen as intrinsic to the system, normal, and as something that cannot be
avoided.
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References 37
Fig. 2.1 Communities hosting the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) within a
50-mile radius from the power plant
the controversial debate on the definition of impacted areas, this study uses the most
legal definition of an impacted area, defined as an area within a 50-mile radius of an
NPP. For example, a community living around a 50-mile radius from the Palo Verde
Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) is depicted in Fig. 2.1.
This session takes a closer look at the communities living around the nuclear power
plants, to enhance understanding on environmental justice issues and current
knowledge of consequences from constant exposure to low-level radiation.
Communities hosting the nuclear power plants are in fact embracing all different
types of potential risks. There are certain types of risks that simply cannot be
2.2 Invisible Risks and Unknown Consequences 41
avoided, as discussed earlier in Chap. 1. The potential and inevitable risks include:
core meltdown, contamination, nuclear radiation, and terrorist attack risks. NPPs
utilize nuclear fuel rods containing fissionable materials and their destructive
potentials are unpredictable in nature; their profound impacts on environments and
humankind cannot be underestimated (Kyne 2014). Due to the potential destructive
nature and unpredictable long-term impacts on environments and humankind, it is
necessary for the Federal Government authorities to regulate all NPPs in the U.S.
(Kyne 2014). Responsible regulatory authorities must monitor every step from
selecting a plant site, the granting of construction licenses, and the warranting of
operating a plant. Once an NPP is built within a community, that particular pop-
ulation in the area becomes the host community and begins to embrace the
above-mentioned potential risks (Kyne 2014).
Given the fact that such nuclear power facilities have the potential to cause
powerful destruction, governmental intervention plays a vital role in protecting
human life and the environment. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was
established under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1970, with a
mission to incorporate environmental protection policy into all federally sponsored
projects. The EPA established goal is “to provide an environment where all people
enjoy the same degree of protection from environmental and health hazards and
equal access to the decision-making process to maintain a healthy environment in
which to live, learn, and work (US EPA 2013).” To achieve this goal, the EPA
promotes one of the key elements which is “public involvement.” It is vital for
communities that are likely to host a nuclear power plant to actively participate and
engage in every step of environmental decision-making process, from site selection
to issuing operating licenses.
Previously, when issuing the construction and operation licenses to all previous
U.S. commercial nuclear power plants, environmental justice concepts were not
incorporated, and the AEC has issued 126 NPP operating licenses without taking
into account any environmental impacts or guidelines (US NRC 2004; Kyne 2014).
During the AEC administration era, the agency struggled dual conflicting roles—on
one hand, it was required to regulate the nuclear power industry; on the other hand,
it was required to promote the industry growth. After receiving criticism for its dual
roles and ineffectiveness, the AEC was dissolved in 1975. The NRC became its
successor under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (US NRC 2011; Kyne
2014). Since then, the NRC became the agency which has authority and respon-
sibility in administering the licensing process (US NRC 2004; Kyne 2014). The
licensing process in fact encourages public participation through adjudicatory, or
courtroom-style hearings. In public meetings, proposed NPP projects are presented
and their quality of design conform within the current existing environmental laws.
Participants have opportunities to make comments on any design flaws, raise any
environmental concerns and engage in debates on potential impacts (Mariottee
2006; Kyne 2014). There still remains the unanswered question with regard to
public participation in the licensing process: Does the licensing process encourage
public participation and if so, to what extend does the public participate; and to
42 2 Communities Hosting US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants
what extend the public concerns are taken into serious consideration by the NRC
and other concerned authorities? Systematic studies on evaluation of public par-
ticipation in nuclear power plant licensing processes are rarely found.
One notion is that there was a transformation taking place in the licensing
process after 1992. Previously, all prospective owners of NPPs were required to
seek the construction license first and then the operation license. The two steps were
combined into one-step process in which the prospective owners or operators of
NPPs could obtain both licenses. The one-step process was well received as it is
shorter and provides encouragement to the prospective owners and operators to
invest in NPPs. On the other hand, it also received criticism for placing increased
constraints on public participation. The main barriers to public participation was
observed as the creation of public contentions and its legitimate requirements to the
ASLB. In public hearings, any public contentions must be decided by the
three-person panel of NRC employees which consists of two technical experts and
one attorney. Any citizen who would like to content an objection must bear sub-
stantial costs which include expert and attorney fees (an estimated cost of $100,000
to $500,000) who normally testify in support of the objecting party (Mariottee
2006; Kyne 2014). The barriers to public participation could undermine promotion
of procedural equity which is essential for effective environmental decision-making
processes and outcomes; thus, in turn, it could negatively affect the people living
near NPPs (Kyne 2014).
In the history of US commercial nuclear power plant licensing, NPPs have not
been well received by communities. There were many objections and resistance by
the public who feared the unpredictable risks associated with nuclear power pro-
duction. When nuclear power energy was introduced, there was a tension between
two groups of scientists—those supporting the advantages of nuclear power and
those who foresaw the risks associated with fuel rods, spent fuels, and radiation.
During 1970s, the sentiments against nuclear power gained momentum and
received significant public attention. Collective public action placed a haul or a
delay of a number of the proposed NPPs at the time (Nuclear Heritage 2013; Kyne
2014). For example, there were more than 70,000 people who protested against
nuclear power to Washington, DC, in May of 1979. For nuclear power energy, the
protesters were not fully granted their constitutional rights of freedom of speech, but
there were more than 1,414 people who protested against the construction of
Seabrook NPP in New Hampshire, where they were arrested on May 2, 1997
(Nuclear Heritage 2013; Kyne 2014).
Fig. 2.2 Pathways for exposures to radiation from effluent releases from nuclear power plants.
Source Adapted from (National Research Council (USA) & Committee on the Analysis of Cancer
Risks in Populations near Nuclear Facilities 2012)
Many scientists have attempted to prove the casual relationships between low-level
radiation and impacts on health. They have specified some negative health con-
sequences that are related to permanent cellular damage and chronic illnesses,
44 2 Communities Hosting US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants
including various types of cancer, such as leukemia, thyroid, and other cancers
(Ramana 2009). Some individuals could even face the worst consequence of pre-
mature death due to radiation (Denton 1987). Many researchers face great chal-
lenges in attempting to establish a correlation between the exposure to low-level
radiation and the incidence of certain kinds of cancer (e.g., Bouges et al. 1999;
Canu et al. 2008; Cardis et al. 1995, 2005; Sexton and Adgate 1999). The primary
reason for this challenge is lack of data that could be used for investigations related
to the attempted establishment in their studies. Some critical data that are not readily
available for studies are data collected for the effects of prolonged exposure to
low-level radiation, varying radiation doses, and health conditions of individuals
prior to moving to the host communities (Kyne 2014).
In the existing studies, there was one study with a focus on cancer incident rates
in the host communities before and after the NPP closure, after decommissioning
(Mangano and Sherman 2013; US NRC 2013a). The two researchers focused their
subject of the study on the Rancho Seco NPP, in Sacramento County, California,
where they evaluated the population living in this particular host community. They
collected two types of cancer incident rates—one consists of incident rates data
collected during the last 2 years of the plant’s operation in 1988 and 1989. The
other included incident rates data of the communities two decades after decom-
missioning period. The study’s findings show that cancer incident rates decline in
18 out of 31 categories. The study concluded that people in the communities who
were exposed to prolonged low-level radiation were more likely to develop ill-
nesses related to cancer (Mangano and Sherman 2013; Kyne 2014). The scientific
study of the effects of exposure to radiation began with the injection of plutonium
into 18 men, women, and children—performed in a U.S. hospital ward in 1945, and
without informing the unwitting subjects of the potential risks and dangers—and
has continued with present-day studies that have attempted to better understand the
human body’s reaction to various radioisotopes (Welsome 1999).
It is surprising that nuclear power plants have been in existence and in operation for
more than six decades, but the NRC does not have a solid and complete knowledge
on negative health consequences for individuals exposed to low-level radiation for a
long period of time. The National Research Council (USA) and Committee on the
Analysis of Cancer Risks in Populations near Nuclear Facilities (2012) conducted a
study design that would allow for the accurate assessing of cancer incident rates
among populations living near NPPs. Their findings include that (1) many epi-
demiologic studies face challenges because of (a) lack of availability and quality of
2.2 Invisible Risks and Unknown Consequences 45
data on cancer mortality and incidence at geographic levels smaller than a county,
(b) lack of quality data on nuclear facility effluent releases, (c) lack of population
mobility risks factors, and (d) low expected statistical power; (2) different study
designs such as risk projection models, ecologic studies, as cohort studies have
strengths and limitations; and (3) effluent release, direct exposure, and meteorology
data are needed to better understand what effect radiation has, depending on dis-
tance and direction from a nuclear power plant. The committee recommends that
the NRC should carry out an epidemiologic study of cancer risks on two areas:
(1) an ecologic study of multiple cancer types and (2) case–control study of cancers
in children born near the nuclear facility.
In their second phase (National Research Council (USA) and Committee on the
Analysis of Cancer Risks in Populations near Nuclear Facilities 2014), seven
nuclear facilities were selected for the pilot study of cancer risks:
1. Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Morris, Illinois,
2. Millstone Power Station, Waterford, Connecticut,
3. Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Forked River, New Jersey,
4. Haddam Neck Plant, Haddam Neck, Connecticut,
5. Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant, Charlevoix, Michigan,
6. San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, San Clemente, California, and
7. Nuclear Fuel Services, Erwin, Tennessee.
As recommended in the Phase I study, the committee will carry out two studies:
a case–control and an ecologic study in Phase II (National Research Council
(USA) and Committee on the Analysis of Cancer Risks in Populations near Nuclear
Facilities 2014). The first study examines cancer types of all ages living within
30-mile radius from the nuclear power plant.
(1) “Do cancer incidence and mortality vary by proximity to nuclear facilities?
(2) Does cancer incidence or mortality reflect patterns of radiation exposure
associated with the nuclear facility? (National Research Council (USA) and
Committee on the Analysis of Cancer Risks in Populations near Nuclear
Facilities 2014).”
In the latter study, the subjects of the study are children younger than 15 years of
age and their mother lived in areas within a 30-mile radius. The study attempts to
hypothesize that children born by mothers living closer to the nuclear facilities are
more likely to develop cancer than their counterparts who live further away, from
the 30-mile radius. The study’s findings are expected to provide answers to the
following two research questions.
(1) “Is a mother’s residential proximity to a nuclear facility at time of delivery
associated with cancer in her children?
(2) Is estimated radiation exposure during pregnancy, early infancy, or childhood
associated with childhood cancer occurrence? (National Research Council
(USA) and Committee on the Analysis of Cancer Risks in Populations near
46 2 Communities Hosting US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants
Nuclear Facilities 2014)” The current estimated time frame to complete this
pilot study was 16 months, another 30 months to assess feasibility of
nationwide study, and another 30 months to estimate the risk in a nationwide
study; a total of 66 months is projected.
Above all, the agency who is responsible and accountable for regulating the
nuclear power industry does not have a compete knowledge on constant exposure to
low-level radiation. Without a complete knowledge, the authorities seem being
blindfolded and walking on the regulation pathway without any direction. As a
result, this has placed individuals living in the host communities at greater risk.
The longevity of a commercial NPP is about 120 years, which normally counts the
day operation began until the day its decommission is successfully completed, and
includes 60 years from inception to the decommission; 50 years to cool down the
reactor after its permanent shutdown; and 40 to 60 years to decommission the plant
(Green Peace 2010; Kyne 2014). In general, the existence of nuclear power plants
in host communities could be more than 120 years (Kyne 2014). Activities to
remove an NPP after it has been shut down requires regulated monitoring because
of the removal of several thousand tons of radioactive materials, such as spent fuel
rods. Thus, NRC has adopted three advanced strategies to decommission an NPP:
(1) DECON, or decommissioning strategies;
(2) SAFSTOR, or deferred dismantling; and,
(3) ENTOMB, or the permanent encasing on site of radioactive contaminants (US
NRC 2013a; Kyne 2014).
Among the three strategies, entombing includes permanently encasing the
radioactive materials. In some cases, it requires several years to monitor both
underground water and soil contamination. Hallam Nuclear Power Plant in Nebraska
operated for a short time period and later it was decommissioned in 1971. It was
entombed and the radioactive contaminated materials were buried underground. Due
to the risks for underground water contamination, the Nebraska Department of
Health has been monitoring possible underground water contamination and radia-
tion. The monitoring will last for a period of 119 years, until 2090 (Nebraska Energy
Quarterly 1997; Kyne 2014).
It is evident that after an NPP is introduced to the host communities, the indi-
viduals living in the area have to bear the risks of exposure to low-level radiation,
and face health risks and long-term negative impacts on their environment (Kyne
2014).
2.3 Data and Research Methods 47
The primary goal of this chapter is to understand the communities hosting nuclear
power plants. The understanding is necessary for effectively managing nuclear
emergency and response. To achieve the primary goal, the following research
questions are determined as follows:
(1) What are demographic characteristics of the individuals living in the com-
munities hosting nuclear power plants in 1990, 2000, and 2010?
(2) Do the demographic characteristics vary with proximity to the nuclear power
plants?
(3) Do the demographic characteristics vary from urban to non-urban areas?
(4) Do the demographic characteristics vary at individual nuclear power plants?
(5) Did the demographic characteristics change between 1900 and 2000, and
between 2000 and 2010?
To answer the research questions above, multiple datasets were obtained. First, for
demographic characteristics, the US Census Bureau and GeoLytics datasets are
acquired:
(1) US Census 1990, long form, normalized to 2010 census-tract boundaries
(GeoLytics 2012b);
(2) US Census 2000, long form, normalized to 2010 census-tract boundaries
(GeoLytics 2012a); and
(3) US Census 2010/American Community Survey, 5-year estimate (GeoLytics
2012c).
The 1990 and 2000 data containing census-tract level surveys are normalized to
those of 2010 census boundaries. This normalization allows for the comparison of
study variables across the study years. The geographical unit of analysis in this
study is the census tract. The selected datasets for 1990, 2000, and 2010 contain
racial and ethnic subgroups and socioeconomic data.
In order to conduct spatial analyses including tracking the changes in study
variables across the study years, this study used the TIGER/Line shapefiles and the
2010 US Census Summary File 1 Demographic Profile (DP1) for the USA and
Puerto Rico from the US Census Bureau’s Web site. (The US Census Bureau
2010b). The selected study variables were merged with the selected shapefiles in the
ArcGIS 10.2 program.
Geographical locations of the 99 nuclear reactors which are currently in oper-
ation were created in the shapefiles to conduct spatial analysis. Information was
obtained from the NRC’s Web site (NRC 2012) in order to create information on
the following: geographical locations of the reactors, data on reactor type and
containment type, design type, docket number, licensee, operating license issue
date, commercial operation start date, renewed operation license, issue date, and
operating license expiration date. However, since the September 11, 2011 event, the
NRC did not provide latitude and longitude information for safety reason. To obtain
latitude and longitude information for individual NPPs, individual planta was
located in the Google Earth program and the XY coordinates were obtained
manually.
2.3 Data and Research Methods 49
This study covers populations living within a 50-mile radius of an NPP and con-
siders this distance to define a host community. Those living at a distance greater
than a 50-mile radius from an NPP are thus not considered a host community, for
the purposes of this study. The selection of a 50-mile distance reflects the need to
consider two emergency zones, namely the plume exposure pathway zone, which
includes a radius of approximately 10 miles from the reactor site, and the ingestion
exposure pathway zone, which has a radius of approximately 50 miles from the
reactor site as defined by the NRC (US NRC 2013b).
However, the NRC’s use of the 50-mile distance is considered to be contro-
versial, given that more than 37 environmental and civic organizations argued that
the 50-mile distance is not adequate to allow for full emergency preparedness, in
reference to the Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi accidents (NIRS 2013). The
selection of a 50-mile distance reflects the legal definition and boundaries of
emergency zones. To determine the host communities surrounding an NPP, the
census tracts that are within a 50-mile distance from the power plant are included as
host communities (Fig. 2.3).
Fig. 2.3 Distance between census-tract centroid and Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
within 50-mile distance; Source (Kyne 2014)
50 2 Communities Hosting US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants
Kid (<5 years) 25,838 100,919 260,071 346,928 234,982 968,684 1,533,545
White (%) 83.21 79.94 73.56 68.21 63.27 71.08 75.16
Black (%) 10.65 12.18 16.83 18.67 20.91 17.30 10.55
Asian (%) 2.01 2.69 3.26 4.98 6.78 4.40 5.00
Native American (%) 0.26 0.30 0.29 0.38 0.34 0.33 1.01
Others (%) 3.87 4.89 6.07 7.77 8.70 6.89 8.27
Hispanic (%) 8.17 9.96 12.35 14.70 15.24 13.18 16.72
Color (%) 22.30 26.44 33.87 39.70 44.42 36.32 34.93
Female (%) 50.80 51.14 51.39 51.54 51.59 51.42 50.62
Old (65+ years) (%) 13.31 13.29 13.04 13.19 12.35 13.00 12.64
Kid (<5 years) (%) 6.41 6.41 6.44 6.32 6.49 6.40 6.71
(continued)
51
Table 2.1 (continued)
52
Kid (<5 years) 25,705 106,589 301,085 415,214 286,593 1,133,983 1,668,418
White (%) 85.69 82.46 75.54 69.87 65.09 72.89 76.03
Black (%) 9.57 11.40 16.45 18.45 20.95 17.05 10.19
Asian (%) 1.29 1.86 2.34 3.82 5.03 3.28 3.95
Native American (%) 0.31 0.34 0.33 0.42 0.37 0.37 1.08
Others (%) 3.14 3.94 5.34 7.43 8.55 6.41 8.76
Hispanic (%) 4.99 6.81 9.37 11.62 12.49 10.23 13.48
Color (%) 17.21 21.53 29.74 35.54 40.53 32.23 30.32
Female (%) 50.92 51.18 51.59 51.71 51.75 51.58 50.75
Old (65+ years) (%) 12.84 12.91 12.96 12.94 12.18 12.78 12.28
Kid (<5 years) (%) 8.09 7.93 8.05 7.93 8.19 8.02 8.25
(continued)
53
Table 2.2 (continued)
54
Kid (<5 years) 22,867 96,001 284,830 398,670 272,221 1,075,803 1,554,033
White (%) 88.68 86.55 80.15 75.80 71.26 78.06 81.34
Black (%) 9.10 10.70 15.73 17.87 20.97 16.58 10.05
Asian (%) 0.90 1.26 1.61 2.56 3.38 2.22 3.20
Native American (%) 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.37 0.31 0.32 1.02
Others (%) 1.00 1.20 2.22 3.41 4.08 2.82 4.38
Hispanic (%) 3.11 3.80 6.76 8.03 8.89 7.08 9.56
Color (%) 13.27 15.94 24.10 28.15 32.76 25.71 23.60
Female (%) 50.84 51.54 51.90 51.98 51.98 51.86 51.03
Old (65+ years) (%) 12.63 12.71 13.10 13.09 12.53 12.91 12.38
Kid (<5 years) (%) 8.75 8.62 8.66 8.53 8.53 8.59 8.93
(continued)
55
Table 2.3 (continued)
56
(3) are more likely to hold college degree or higher; (4) are less likely to be
employed; and (5) are less likely to be native-born citizens. However, findings do
not show any significant differences between the two areas in age or gender study
variables. Similar demographic patterns are observed in the years 2000 (Table 2.2)
and 1990 (Table 2.3).
Looking into proximity-based disparities in demographic characteristics, the
findings indicate that there is a negative association between the percent White and
the distance. In the 2010 data, the percent of White population was observed as
83.21, 79.94, 73.56, 68.21, and 63.27%, respectively, in the 0–10 miles, 11–20
miles, 21–30 miles, 31–40 miles, and 41–50 mile categories, respectively
(Table 2.1). In contrast, the positive association is observed between the percent in
other racial groups, namely Black, Asian, Hispanic, and Native American, and their
distance from the NPP. Similarly, the positive association is observed between the
percent of socio-demographic study variables, namely poverty, unemployment rate,
education attainment, and household income (Table 2.1, Fig. 2.4). Similar patterns
in the study variables are observed in the US Census data for the years 2000
(Table 2.2) and 1990 (Table 2.3).
Fig. 2.4 Demographic trends (race/ethnicity) in the areas surrounding any one of the 61 US-based
commercial NPPs, as sorted by distance
58 2 Communities Hosting US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants
To define the boundaries of metropolitan areas, this study used the Combined
Statistical Areas (CSAs) 2010 TIGER Shape file (The US Census Bureau 2010b).
The Shape file consists of metropolitan statistical areas which are created based on
urbanized areas (50,000 people or more) and micropolitan statistical areas, which
are based on urban clusters (between 10,000 and fewer than 50,000 people) (The
US Census Bureau 2010a).
In 2010, out of the 87 million people living within a 50-mile radius of an NPP,
77 million lived in a metropolitan area (Table 2.4). Within that same group, those
living within a 50-mile radius of an NPP, there was a higher percent Black, Asian,
and Hispanic in metropolitan areas as compared to non-metropolitan areas.
A higher percent of Color people, 37%, lived in metropolitan areas than that lived
in non-metropolitan areas, 31%. There was a pattern in the socioeconomic data,
such that metropolitan areas included more people with a college degree or who had
completed some other form of higher education, a greater percentage of unem-
ployed individuals, and fewer people living in poverty. Further, the mean household
income was higher than as compared to demographically similar households in
non-metropolitan areas. Similar patterns were observed in the US Census data for
the years 2000 (Table 2.5) and 1990 (Table 2.6), respectively.
Over the past three decades, in communities sited within a 50-mile radius of an
NPP, there has been a sharp decrease in the percent White among the population,
with a compensating dramatic increase in the percent Hispanic and percent Color
(Fig. 2.5), in both metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. This same pattern is
observed in non-metropolitan areas when considering the demographic data for the
outlying areas.
Table 2.5 Demographic composition in metropolitan areas within a 50-mile radius of any one of the 61 US commercial NPPs, based on 2000 American
community survey data
Urban Non-urban Urban outside Non-urban outside
Tract 19,222 2,403 35,148 16,284
Tract area (sq. mile) 173,650 113,064 764,061 2,745,968
Total population 73,925,584 9,004,636 138,833,968 59,657,720
White 53,513,884 6,934,410 103,039,168 47,866,268
Black 12,672,128 1,463,862 15,169,283 5,056,467
Asian 2,601,777 118,275 6,327,916 1,502,634
Native American 257,619 48,886 1,033,967 1,107,517
Others 4,880,127 439,167 13,263,712 4,124,844
Hispanic 7,868,239 614,737 20,485,020 6,270,484
Color 24,394,302 2,332,166 45,308,664 14,872,632
White (%) 72.39 77.01 74.22 80.23
Black (%) 17.14 16.26 10.93 8.48
Asian (%) 3.52 1.31 4.56 2.52
Native American (%) 0.35 0.54 0.74 1.86
Others (%) 6.60 4.88 9.55 6.91
Hispanic (%) 10.64 6.83 14.76 10.51
Color (%) 33.00 25.90 32.64 24.93
Female (%) 51.64 51.07 50.87 50.47
Old (65+ years) (%) 12.64 13.93 11.53 14.03
Kid (<5 years) (%) 8.04 7.89 8.43 7.83
Native-born (%) 86.80 95.32 87.55 93.91
Renter housing units (%) 33.52 25.66 32.07 25.64
College degree or higher (%) 26.69 19.29 25.87 18.92
Unemployment (%) 5.81 5.55 5.63 6.11
Poverty (%) 11.51 13.51 11.90 14.41
Mean household income ($) 76,287 60,094 73,621 58,173
2 Communities Hosting US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants
Table 2.6 Demographic composition in metropolitan areas within a 50-mile radius of any one of the 61 US commercial NPPs, based on 1990 American
community survey data
Urban Non-urban Urban outside Non-urban outside
Tract 19,222 2,403 35,148 16,284
Tract area (sq. mile) 173,650 113,064 764,061 2,745,968
Total population 67,602,272 7,958,464 120,016,720 53,131,904
White 52,568,548 6,413,805 96,121,016 44,723,232
Black 11,264,808 1,264,007 12,908,319 4,493,294
Asian 1,598,934 78,693 4,243,576 1,305,679
Native American 201,596 38,885 842,528 932,035
Others 1,968,337 163,043 5,901,096 1,677,621
Hispanic 5,051,194 299,755 12,640,686 3,908,466
Color 17,752,876 1,672,936 30,344,224 10,514,956
White (%) 77.76 80.59 80.09 84.17
Black (%) 16.66 15.88 10.76 8.46
Asian (%) 2.37 0.99 3.54 2.46
Native American (%) 0.30 0.49 0.70 1.75
Others (%) 2.91 2.05 4.92 3.16
Hispanic (%) 7.47 3.77 10.53 7.36
2.6 Hosting Communities at Individual Nuclear Power Plants
Fig. 2.5 Demographic trends (race/ethnicity) in the areas surrounding any one of the 61 US-based
commercial NPPs, as sorted by urban and non-urban areas
Index Plant name State No. of tract Tract area Total population (0–10 mile) 2010 Rank
(10-mile) (sq. mile) 1990 2000 2010
24 FermiFermi Michigan 24 268 78,888 82,873 85,991 15
25 Palisades Michigan 8 183 34,133 34,594 33,432 34
26 Monticello Minnesota 8 308 28,856 42,437 56,001 23
27 Prairie Island Minnesota 5 226 22,549 24,295 25,260 41
28 Grand Gulf Mississippi 4 662 13,756 14,443 12,168 53
29 Callaway Missouri 2 237 8,124 10,726 11,642 54
30 Cooper Nebraska 3 670 11,078 10,205 9,770 56
31 Fort Calhoun Nebraska 5 173 15,687 17,820 18,933 48
32 Seabrook New Hampshire 30 270 101,342 117,140 120,876 10
33 Hope Creek New Jersey 15 332 34,738 40,224 47,275 27
34 Oyster Creek New Jersey 29 287 91,665 114,293 128,893 9
35 Salem New Jersey 15 332 34,738 40,224 47,275 28
36 FitzPatrick New York 55 292 229,882 242,165 253,977 2
37 Ginna New York 9 374 30,260 29,878 29,580 36
38 Indian Point New York 9 374 30,260 29,878 29,580 37
39 Nine Mile Point New York 13 139 49,871 59,508 65,466 21
40 Brunswick North Carolina 11 160 13,649 18,639 28,812 39
41 McGuire North Carolina 47 322 61,535 117,264 188,937 6
42 Shearon Harris North Carolina 19 272 24,724 54,745 84,598 16
43 Davis-Besse Ohio 6 416 22,999 23,501 23,312 45
44 Perry Ohio 22 141 68,920 75,998 80,167 17
45 Beaver Valley Pennsylvania 33 279 119,111 115,882 108,656 12
46 Limerick Pennsylvania 62 350 184,712 222,564 257,462 1
(continued)
2 Communities Hosting US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants
Table 2.7 (continued)
Index Plant name State No. of tract Tract area Total population (0–10 mile) 2010 Rank
(10-mile) (sq. mile) 1990 2000 2010
47 Peach Bottom Pennsylvania 10 317 35,760 40,396 43,032 30
48 Susquehanna Pennsylvania 14 287 51,798 53,318 55,117 24
49 Three Mile Island Pennsylvania 41 297 156,537 177,279 191,325 5
50 Catawba South Carolina 46 309 101,221 137,392 200,869 4
51 Oconee South Carolina 8 309 30,342 32,295 33,936 33
52 Robinson South Carolina 15 281 51,644 58,346 64,579 22
53 Summer South Carolina 5 457 14,256 18,174 22,287 46
54 Sequoyah Tennessee 20 312 76,278 90,338 104,716 13
55 Watts Bar Tennessee 5 417 17,803 22,704 24,916 42
56 Comanche Peak Texas 6 356 16,383 23,844 28,892 38
57 South Texas Texas 1 25 3,233 2,848 2,654 61
58 North Anna Virginia 6 363 14,747 19,529 23,603 44
59 Surry Virginia 29 356 108,530 121,515 133,856 8
60 Columbia Washington 1 209 3,530 4,364 6,007 59
2.6 Hosting Communities at Individual Nuclear Power Plants
The percent change in population size within both a 10-mile radius and a 50-mile
radius during the periods 1990–2000 and 2000–2010 was tracked. Among commu-
nities within a 10-mile radius of an NPP from 2000 to 2010, there was an increase in
total population at 44 NPPs, while at the remaining 15 NPPs, the total such population
declined. The percent change ranged from a 61% increase, in the area surrounding
McGuire Nuclear Station, North Carolina (Fig. 2.6), to a 31% decrease among the
communities surrounding Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, California. Large
positive percent changes during the period 2000–2010 also occurred in the areas
immediately surrounding Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, North Carolina, 55%, and
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, North Carolina, 55%; a large negative percent
change also occurred in the area surrounding Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Mississippi
(−16%). From 1990 to 2000, the largest percent change in total population living
within a 10-mile radius of a NPP occurred at Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant,
North Carolina (121%); the communities surrounding McGuire Nuclear Station,
North Carolina, also experienced dramatic population growth (91%).
Fifty-six NPPs saw a positive percent change, or an increase in the population
living in communities within a 50-mile radius; the remaining 9 NPPs saw a decrease
in such populations from 2000 to 2010 (Fig. 2.7). The percent change range varied
between 51 and −7%. The largest percent change occurred among the communities
within a 50-mile radius of Palo Verde Nuclear Generation Station, Arizona (51%);
the same NPP also saw the largest percent change in the growth of its same such
population during the period 1990–2000 (53%). LaSalle County Station, Illinois
(28%), and Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, North Carolina (27%), also saw sig-
nificant growth in the population living within a 50-mile radius of each respective
Table 2.8 Total population living in census tracts within a 50-mile radius of a NPP as of 2010, as measured from census-tract centroid point to NPP
Index Plant name State Tract Tract area Total population (50 mile) 2010 Rank
(50-mile) (sq. mile) 1990 2000 2010
1 Browns Ferry Alabama 207 6,353 716,311 812,964 885,374 38
2 Farley Alabama 94 6,642 316,989 343,659 360,352 55
3 Palo Verde Arizona 534 6,942 1,295,802 1,799,929 2,207,889 17
4 Arkansas Nuclear Arkansas 45 6,046 154,290 182,869 194,963 59
5 Diablo Canyon California 90 3,048 361,432 409,562 448,292 51
6 Millstone Connecticut 395 5,103 1,522,087 1,589,650 1,667,925 24
7 Saint Lucie Florida 266 3,296 732,319 930,833 1,151,024 30
8 Turkey Point Florida 691 4,431 2,489,137 3,024,321 3,318,548 9
9 Hatch Georgia 72 6,586 243,782 284,616 304,217 56
10 Vogtle Georgia 139 6,248 517,981 587,317 628,353 46
11 Braidwood Illinois 660 5,806 2,367,196 2,718,397 3,018,399 11
12 Byron Illinois 199 5,627 706,621 773,547 821,645 40
13 Clinton Illinois 154 5,851 548,176 577,409 608,176 47
2.7 Demographic Changes in 1990–2000 and 2000–2010
Index Plant name State Tract Tract area Total population (50 mile) 2010 Rank
(50-mile) (sq. mile) 1990 2000 2010
24 Fermi Michigan 1312 4,552 4,489,966 4,542,979 4,368,235 5
25 Palisades Michigan 226 6,785 794,744 882,586 899,600 36
26 Monticello Minnesota 450 5,299 1,544,634 1,781,553 1,950,169 19
27 Prairie Island Minnesota 450 5,643 1,465,322 1,686,829 1,800,095 20
28 Grand Gulf Mississippi 56 6,076 214,616 218,887 210,536 58
29 Callaway Missouri 81 5,752 307,345 357,726 392,917 53
30 Cooper Nebraska 38 6,168 117,399 115,868 111,113 61
31 Fort Calhoun Nebraska 269 5,587 731,120 813,760 890,963 37
32 Seabrook New Hampshire 868 4,195 3,465,615 3,683,764 3,767,215 8
33 Hope Creek New Jersey 1097 5,684 4,052,631 4,189,795 4,372,701 4
34 Oyster Creek New Jersey 583 3,412 2,132,640 2,387,006 2,538,550 13
35 Salem New Jersey 1088 5,715 4,011,786 4,147,881 4,328,469 6
36 FitzPatrick New York 212 4,938 757,206 745,522 747,467 43
37 Ginna New York 264 4,515 987,092 1,020,186 1,035,214 33
38 Indian Point New York 3760 5,810 13,786,298 14,894,006 15,118,181 1
39 Nine Mile Point New York 211 4,908 754,261 742,377 744,267 44
40 Brunswick North Carolina 108 3,040 232,337 316,773 402,395 52
41 McGuire North Carolina 613 6,366 1,636,412 2,072,499 2,517,850 14
42 Shearon Harris North Carolina 486 6,217 1,393,352 1,829,822 2,222,038 16
43 Davis-Besse Ohio 363 4,476 1,343,578 1,354,016 1,349,593 27
44 Perry Ohio 531 4,905 1,766,037 1,788,572 1,699,459 23
45 Beaver Valley Pennsylvania 808 5,647 2,824,537 2,757,925 2,655,595 12
46 Limerick Pennsylvania 1609 5,759 5,986,390 6,282,721 6,559,209 2
(continued)
2 Communities Hosting US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants
Table 2.8 (continued)
Index Plant name State Tract Tract area Total population (50 mile) 2010 Rank
(50-mile) (sq. mile) 1990 2000 2010
47 Peach Bottom Pennsylvania 1008 5,794 3,569,625 3,845,576 4,124,024 7
48 Susquehanna Pennsylvania 303 5,863 1,102,337 1,116,488 1,136,292 32
49 Three Mile Island Pennsylvania 448 5,941 1,718,797 1,906,037 2,068,685 18
50 Catawba South Carolina 556 6,403 1,437,561 1,819,689 2,235,497 15
51 Oconee South Carolina 276 6,175 873,312 1,031,201 1,152,820 29
52 Robinson South Carolina 152 6,363 568,041 616,110 649,720 45
53 Summer South Carolina 251 6,436 749,396 865,550 971,019 34
54 Sequoyah Tennessee 205 6,227 747,693 855,343 937,320 35
55 Watts Bar Tennessee 178 6,455 616,648 731,267 812,206 42
56 Comanche Peak Texas 268 6,086 881,604 1,050,191 1,220,100 28
57 South Texas Texas 52 4,663 199,113 215,547 216,206 57
58 North Anna Virginia 364 6,181 1,085,119 1,322,489 1,553,358 26
59 Surry Virginia 450 5,599 1,523,998 1,645,196 1,741,096 21
2.7 Demographic Changes in 1990–2000 and 2000–2010
Fig. 2.6 Percent change of the total population living in census tracts within a 10-mile radius and
50-mile radius, as measured from census-tract centroid point to the nearest NPP, during the periods
1990–2000 and 2000–2010, sorted according to percent change within a 10-mile radius
2.7 Demographic Changes in 1990–2000 and 2000–2010 71
Fig. 2.7 Percent change of the total population living in census tracts within a 10-mile radius and
50-mile radius, as measured between the census-tract centroid point and the nearest NPP, during
the periods 1990–2000 and 2000–2010, sorted according to percent change within a 50-mile radius
72 2 Communities Hosting US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants
NPP. The largest negative percent change, −7%, occurred among the communities
within a 50-mile radius of Waterford Steam Electric Station, Louisiana.
Overall, the total population in areas within a 10-mile radius of one of the 61
US-based commercial NPPs increased 14% during the period 2000–2010 and 15%
during the period 1990–2000, while the total population in all other places outside of a
50-mile radius of any NPP saw increases of 38 and 23%, respectively, during the
periods 1990–2000 and 2000–2010, respectively (Figs. 2.6, 2.7). The total population
of communities sited within a 50-mile radius of any one of the 61 NPPs increased 6 and
10%, respectively, during the periods 2000–2010 and 1999–2000, respectively, while
the total population in all other areas of the country increased 9 and 14%, respectively,
during the periods 2000–2010 and 1990–2000, respectively (Figs. 2.6, 2.7).
2.8 Conclusion
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Chapter 3
Nuclear Power Emergencies and Their
Management Process
People in various parts of the world see disaster events that bring causalities,
injuries, deaths, and damages to property and environments, in many different
scales. Their encounters may vary from one person to another; some might have
direct experience in a disaster event, where others might have seen the events on
any media or live broadcast from news channels. Disaster events are so frequent
that people feel that they become a part of everyday life. For example, New York
City was hard hit by Hurricane Sandy, which is also known as Superstorm Sandy,
in October 29, 2012. The possibility for this event to take place was discovered on
October 22, 2012, 1 week before the event actually occurred. The hurricane pro-
duced 147 deaths in the northeast USA, Canada, and the Caribbean; the dead toll
was 48 in New York, 12 in New Jersey, 5 in Connecticut, 2 in Pennsylvania, and
five in other states. The surge level was measured as 13.88 ft. at Battery Park, and
the wave was measured at 32.5 ft. at New York Harbor; many important organi-
zations were shut down including The New York Stock Exchange, US federal
offices, schools, and United Nations headquarters in Manhattan. More than
11 million commuters were without access to transportation and about 7.9 million
businesses and households without electric power in 15 states; 1,400 guardsmen are
in Massachusetts, 6,700 National Guard are on active duty; and 110 homes burn in
the Breezy Point neighborhood of Queens, New York. Approximately, 9,000
people in 13 states stayed in 71 Red Cross operated shelters (CNN 2015). The
damage was estimated at $19 billion (Rosenzweig and Solecki 2014). According to
the National Hurricane Center, Sandy was ranked as the second costliest tropical
cyclone, after Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (CNN 2015). Hurricane Sandy demon-
strates the extent to which a disaster event could bring about causalities, injuries,
deaths, damages, and destruction. To have a closer look at managing natural dis-
asters, it is imperative to understand the three key terms, namely disasters, hazard,
and vulnerability.
Disasters are deadly, destructive, and disruptive events that occur when a hazard interacts
with human vulnerability. Disasters are significant societal events that injure and kill
people, damage infrastructure, and personal property, and complicate the routine activities
people undertake on a daily basis (e.g., bathing, cooking, travelling, going to school,
working, etc.). Hazard is the threat or trigger that initiates a disaster. Hazards include
natural, technological, or anthropogenic (human-induced) agents like earthquakes, indus-
trial explosions, and even terrorist attacks that negatively affect people or critical infras-
tructure. Vulnerability, on the other hand, refers to the proneness of people to disasters
based on factors such as their geographic location, exposure of property, and level of
income or other social variables. The ability of individuals, organizations, and communities
to deal with disaster also determines the degree of vulnerability. Vulnerability is therefore
closely related to the human element of disasters, while hazards may or may not always
have a direct social cause (McEntire 2007).
Fig. 3.1 An integrated approach to disaster management process. Source Adapted from Moe and
Pathranarakul (2006) “Reprinted from Disaster Prevention and Management: An International
Journal. Used with permission. All Rights Reserved.”
3.1 Disaster and Emergency Management Process 77
Referring to the Hurricane Sandy event, the likelihood of the superstorm landing in
New York was known a week before the event actually took place. Mitigation
activities included closing of metro and subway system, a day prior to the storm. In
addition, the National Guard was on standby, the preparing of shelters by Red Cross
began, and other predisaster measures. An effective disaster management system
requires the integration of both proactive approaches, which includes mitigation and
preparedness activities and reactive approach which consists of response and
recovery activities (Fig. 3.1).
As discussed in Chaps. 1 and 2, nuclear power plants are associated with inevitable
risks. Chapter 1 discusses three historic nuclear power accidents, whereas Chap. 2
identifies populations that are at risk for potential nuclear power emergencies
associated with 61 nuclear power plants in the USA. There are three nuclear
power-induced disasters in nuclear power history, demonstrated as severe and
unimaginable impacts that nuclear power plants might have on people living around
the plant and environment. The most recent nuclear power-induced disaster,
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, which occurred in March 2011, caused
severe damages, some irreversible and devastating. According to the Japanese
science ministry, the accident left 11,580 square miles of land contaminated with
the long-lived radioactive cesium and some 4,500 square miles (the size of
Connecticut) had radiation levels higher than allowable exposure rate of 1 mSV
(millisievert) per year (Starr 2016). In addition, some parts of the land are declared
as “exclusion” zones because of high-level radiation for human habitation. The
exclusion zones that were declared include 310 square miles of plant location and
nearby areas where more than 159,128 people were evacuated. People living in the
area received small amounts of moneys to cover their living costs, but they are
being forced to still pay mortgages for their houses in the exclusion zones; the value
of the exclusion zones could not be precisely estimated, but the rough estimated
value reached to between $250 and $500. Radioactive cesium entered in the
ecosystem, and it has been detected in various foods in Japan. While the chances to
decontaminate the exclusion zones are very slim, there are additional areas that are
contaminated, including homes and land due to rainwater flow. There are 733,000
curies of radioactive cesium, the largest discharge of radioactive materials pumped
into the Pacific Ocean, after 15 months of the disaster. Reactor 4 building holds a
spent fuel pool with 1,532 nuclear fuel assemblies, about 10 times more radioactive
cesium than that was released by the Chernobyl disaster, a common pool containing
6,000 fuel assemblies located 50 ft. from building 4 (Starr 2016).
Unlike other disasters, nuclear power-induced disasters cause severe and irre-
versible damages. To minimize the negative impacts, effective nuclear power
emergency management is essential. Like disaster management phases, nuclear
power plant-induced disaster management includes four phases, namely prediction,
78 3 Nuclear Power Emergencies and Their Management Process
Fig. 3.2 An integrated approach to nuclear power plant-induced disaster management process.
Source Kyne (2015) “Reprinted from Journal of Emergency Management. Used with permission.
All Rights Reserved.”
Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guides (PAGs), whereas the release resulting
from a GEm may. In either event, the nuclear power plant is required to provide a
protective action recommendation (PAR) to state, local, and tribal agencies within
15 min of the incident. To meet this requirement by EPA PAGs, the nuclear power
plant must, first and foremost, project the radioactive plume path dispersion under
the current and projected weather conditions, including wind speed and direction,
humidity, and precipitation.
To accurately project and assess the source term dose and release pathway, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission utilizes the Radiological Assessment System for
Consequence Analysis (RASCAL) Source Term to Dose (STDose) (RSICC 2013).
The computer program was preinstalled with information on the type of reactor, the
reactor’s power output capacity, peak rod burn in the reactor, the discharge burn-up
projected to occur in materials housed in spent fuel storage, and so on. However,
the meteorological information, such as that on wind direction and speed, stability
class, precipitation, and air temperature, must be entered manually. The RASCAL
4.3 program’s method of calculating the source term is based on the methods
documented in McKenna and Glitter (1988). The inhalation dose factors used in my
calculations are based on the recommendations of the International Commission on
Radiological Protection (ICRP 1977). Radiation dose was computed as a total
effective dose equivalent (TEDE), which is defined as “the sum of the deep-dose
equivalent (EDE) (for external exposures) and the committed effective dose
equivalent (CEDE) (for internal exposures)” (US NRC 2011).
Once, the projection of the plume path dispersion and radioactivity was com-
pleted, the protective action recommendation (PAR) was generated. Then, the
nuclear power plant sends the PAR to local radiological association, which con-
ducts similar plume path dispersion analysis and generates PAR based on the study
and recommendation done by the nuclear power plant. Then, the PAR is sent to
local authorities to make protective action decisions (PADs). Based on the pro-
tective action decisions, evacuation activities are carried out accordingly. After the
evaluation, activities to clean the radioactive contaminated areas will be followed.
Cleanup activities pose a great challenge, and it is a time-consuming process.
According to the NRC, there are four emergency events that could take place at a
nuclear power plant (US NRC 2014a). An emergency classification is defined as “a
set of names or titles established by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) for grouping off-normal events or conditions according to (1) potential or
actual effects or consequences, and (2) resulting on-site and off-site response actions
(US NRC 2014a).” The agency classified four levels of emergency in ascending
order of severity:
80 3 Nuclear Power Emergencies and Their Management Process
(4) General emergency: “Events are in progress or have occurred which involve
actual or imminent substantial core degradation, or melting with potential for loss of
containment integrity, in addition to possible hostile action that results in an actual
loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to
exceed the EPA’s PAG exposure levels off-site for more than the immediate site
area (US NRC 2014a).” A few situations that might lead to this type of emergency
are (1) fuel cladding, reactor coolant system failure, (2) electrical power system
failure on- and off-site, and (3) unauthorized personnel entering into restrictive
areas (Table 3.1) (US GAO 2001). The purpose of declaring this type of emergency
is “to initiate predetermined protective actions for the public, to provide continuous
assessment of information from the licensee and off-site organizational measure-
ments, to initiate additional measures as indicated by actual or potential releases, to
provide consultation with off-site authorities, and to provide updates for the public
through government authorities (US NRC 2014a).” During this type of emergency,
radioactive materials could be released and off-site response organizations are
expected to take response actions.
First and foremost, the projection of the plume path dispersion and radiation level
requires a computer code, namely the Radiological Assessment System for
Consequence Analysis (RASCAL) Source Term to Dose (STDose) (RSICC 2013).
The Radiation Protection Computer Code Analysis and Maintenance Program
(RAMP) NRC has developed the RASCAL code for dose and consequence pro-
jection tool for 25 years, with a primary purpose of making projection for inde-
pendent dose and consequence in case of radiological incidents and emergencies
(RAMP 2016a). The tool could be used by the Protective Measures Team in the US
Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) Operations Center and licensed facili-
ties. The RASCAL estimates radioactive effluents from various sources including
3.4 Projection of Plume Path Dispersion 83
nuclear power plants, spent fuel storage pools and casks, fuel cycle facilities, and
radioactive material handling facilities (RAMP 2016a).
The computer code could be obtained from the RAMP at a cost of $5000 per reactor
site and $1000 one-time free for documentation including RASCAL code docu-
ments (Fig. 3.3). Users will have to complete a “non-disclosure agreement” form,
including your payment information in order to request use of the computer code.
Users may send back the completed from via an email attachment to [email protected]
Fig. 3.4 File download for RASCAL 4.3.1 program. Source RAMP (2016a)
RAMP administrators process the application and will send a notification email when
user’s “user account” has been created. With the user account, users will have an
access to RASCAL’s most updated version and will be able to download (Fig. 3.4).
For the program installation, you will need at least three files to download:
(1) RASCAL431_Setup.exe
(2) MapWinGIS-only-v4.8SR-32bit-installer.zip
(3) RASCAL 4.3.1 Installation.pdf
The file with the name RASCAL431_Setup.exe is the program file user will
need to run “step up” with administrative right. When user runs “setup,” users will
see instruction with which location to install. The default location is predetermined
at C:\NRC\RASCAL43 (RAMP 2016b). The program requires Windows 7 or
higher, with a disk space of 70 MB (RAMP 2016b). Users will need to unzip the
file MapWinGIS-only-v4.8SR-32bit-installer.zip to install, and this file will help
users export the map to ArcGIS shapefile.
While the program files are downloaded for installation, other technical docu-
ment files (Fig. 3.5) should be downloaded for future reference. Among technical
documents, there are two groups, namely models and methods and technical
references.
Models and methods
1. NUREG-1940 Supplement 1—RASCAL 4.3 Description of Models and
Methods
2. NUREG-1940—RASCAL 4 Description of Models and Methods
3.4 Projection of Plume Path Dispersion 85
Fig. 3.5 RASCAL technical documents download page. Source RAMP (2016a)
Technical references
1. State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses Project Volume 2: Surry
Integrated Analysis
2. State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses Project Volume 1: Peach
Bottom Integrated Analysis
3. State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) Report Part 2
4. State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) Report Part 1
5. Source Term Estimation Using MENU-TACT
6. Spent Fuel Pool Study SECY-13-0112
86 3 Nuclear Power Emergencies and Their Management Process
The RASCAL constitutes two groups of tools, namely primary and additional
(Fig. 3.6). The primary tools include four tools:
3.4 Projection of Plume Path Dispersion 87
Fig. 3.6 Seven tools in the Radiological Assessment System for Consequence Analysis
(RASCAL). Source (RAMP (2016a)
Fig. 3.7 Plume dispersion phases in a nuclear emergency. Source RAMP (2016a)
88 3 Nuclear Power Emergencies and Their Management Process
When using STDose model, there are eight steps involving in projecting plume path
dispersion:
(1) Event type,
(2) Event location,
(3) Source term,
(4) Release path,
(5) Metrology,
(6) Calculate doses,
(7) Detailed results, and
(8) Save case
To demonstrate how to project plume path dispersion and radioactive release in
the plume downwind, a hypothetical core-meltdown accident at reactor Unit 1 at the
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNG) is used as an example.
(1) Event Type: First, user selects the type of event. There are four event types
preinstalled:
(1) Nuclear power plant,
(2) Spent fuel,
(3) Fuel cycle/UF6/criticality,
(4) Other radioactive material releases (Fig. 3.8).
In this case, nuclear power plant was selected.
(2) Event Location: Second, user determines the event location. In this exercise,
Plao Verde Unit 1 was selected (Fig. 3.9).
(3) Source Term: Third, user selects the appropriate source term. In the
RASCAL program, there are two groups of conditions, namely source term based
on reactor conditions and source term based on nuclide specific data. RASCAL has
two sequences for estimating releases from core-melt accidents. The long-term
station blackout (LTSBO) sequence due to gradual decay of the reactor coolant as
heat evaporates the coolant. The temperature increases in the core after the coolant
evaporates. The LOCA sequence is based on an assumption that the accident is due
to rapid loss of coolant due to a large break in the cooling system line. The
temperature rapidly increases the core. In this exercise, LTSBO is selected and the
user selects LTSBO and inputs the date and time of the accident with “No” to core
recovered (Fig. 3.10).
3.4 Projection of Plume Path Dispersion 89
Fig. 3.8 Event type selection in RASCAL STDose model. Source RAMP (2016a)
Fig. 3.9 Event location selection in RASCAL STDose model. Source RAMP (2016a)
90 3 Nuclear Power Emergencies and Their Management Process
Fig. 3.10 Source term selection in RASCAL STDose model. Source RAMP (2016a)
(4) Release Path: The next step involves selecting a release path out of prein-
stalled three pathways, namely containment leakage/failure, steam generator tube
rupture, and containment bypass. In this exercise, containment leakage/failure was
selected (Fig. 3.11).
Fig. 3.11 Release path selection in RASCAL STDose model. Source RAMP (2016a)
3.4 Projection of Plume Path Dispersion 91
Fig. 3.12 Meteorology data selection in RASCAL STDose model. Source RAMP (2016a)
(5) Meteorology: Fifth, user selects meteorology dataset options: create new,
edit existing, import, and delete. In this exercise, user selects create new and enters
data as shown in Fig. 3.12. The meteorological data were selected from the joint
frequency distribution (JFD) tables published in the 2010 Annual Radioactive
Effluent Release Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station: Units 1, 2, and
3 (Kutner 2010). Metrological information includes time, wind direction (degree),
wind speed (mph), stability class, precipitation, and air temperature (degree F).
(6) Calculate Doses: Sixth, calculations are carried out for “close-in + out to
100 miles,” and 24 h is set for “start of release to atmosphere plus.” ICRP 26/30
was used for inhabitation dose factors in the calculations (Fig. 3.13).
(7) Detailed Results: Seventh, detailed results can be viewed in two types of
display formats: from 100-mile calculation and from close-in calculation. Each of
them can be viewed in two formats: footprint and numeric table (Fig. 3.14).
The results of “from close-in calculation” are displayed in footprint form
(Fig. 3.15).
The results of “from 100-mile calculation” are displayed in footprint form
(Fig. 3.16).
The source term results are displayed in a tab source term (Fig. 3.17).
The maximum values can be viewed for both close-in calculation and 100-mile
calculation. Figure 3.18 shows a close-in dose. Underlined values exceed the rec-
ommended thresholds. TEDE refers “to the sum of inhalation dose and the external
doses from cloudshine and 4-days of groundshine (US NRC 2013).” “Although, the
PAG is expressed as a range of 1–5 REM, it is emphasized that, under normal
conditions and evacuation of members of the general population should be initiated
for most incidents at a projected dose of 1 REM (US EPA 2013).”
The maximum dose is viewed for 100-mile calculation (Fig. 3.19).
The case summary could be viewed in a case summary tab (Fig. 3.20).
92 3 Nuclear Power Emergencies and Their Management Process
Fig. 3.13 Calculating doses in RASCAL STDose model. Source RAMP (2016a)
Fig. 3.14 Detailed results for close-in calculation to be displayed in footprint format. Source
RAMP (2016a)
3.4 Projection of Plume Path Dispersion 93
Fig. 3.15 Detailed results for close-in displayed in footprint format. Source RAMP (2016a)
Fig. 3.16 Detailed results for 100-mile calculation to be displayed in footprint format. Source
RAMP (2016a)
94 3 Nuclear Power Emergencies and Their Management Process
Fig. 3.17 Detailed results for source term displayed in source term tab under detailed results.
Source RAMP (2016a)
Fig. 3.18 Detailed results for maximum dose values for close-in values displayed in maximum
dose value tab under detailed results tab. Source RAMP (2016a)
3.4 Projection of Plume Path Dispersion 95
Fig. 3.19 Detailed results for maximum dose values for dose to 100-mile values displayed in
maximum dose value tab under detailed results tab. Source RAMP (2016a)
Fig. 3.20 Detailed results for case summary displayed in case summary tab under detailed results
tab. Source RAMP (2016a)
96 3 Nuclear Power Emergencies and Their Management Process
Fig. 3.21 Saving a case file in.STD extension in a preferred location. Source RAMP (2016a)
(8) Save Case: The calculations could be saved in a file with an extension
“.STD” and could be recalled for future calculation or modification to compute
(Fig. 3.21).
The footprint files for close-in calculation and 100-mile calculation are exported to
GIS shapefile (Fig. 3.22).
The footprint results for a close-in calculation in shapefile format could be added to
ArcGIS map (ESRI 2011) and overlay on other map layer (Figs. 3.21, 3.22, 3.23
and 3.24).layer (Figs. 3.21, 3.22, 3.23 and 3.24).
The TEDE footprint overlaid on Google map is exported as a map in ArcGIS
program (Fig. 3.24)
The footprint results for 100-mile calculation in shapefile format could be added
to ArcGIS map (ESRI 2011) and overlay on other map layer (Fig. 3.25).
The TEDE footprint overlaid on Google map is exported as a map in ArcGIS
program (Fig. 3.26)
3.4 Projection of Plume Path Dispersion 97
Fig. 3.22 Exporting the footprints into GIS shapefile. Source RAMP (2016a)
Fig. 3.23 Over laying close-in dose footprint GIS shapefile on Google Base map in ArcGIS
program
98 3 Nuclear Power Emergencies and Their Management Process
Fig. 3.24 A GIS map displaying projected close-in plume pathway overlaid on the Google street
map
Fig. 3.25 Overlaying close-in dose footprint GIS shapefile on Google Base map in ArcGIS
program
3.5 Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) 99
Fig. 3.26 A GIS map displaying projected 100-mile plume pathway overlaid on the Google street
map
According to NRC (2014b), the requirement of the nuclear power plant personnel to
produce the protective action recommendation (PAR) to state and local government
agencies are stated clearly as follows:
Immediately upon becoming aware that an incident has occurred that may result in a
radiation dose that exceeds federal government protective action guides, responsible
nuclear power plant personnel evaluate plant conditions and then make protective action
recommendations (PARs) to the state and local government agencies on how to protect the
population. Nuclear power plant personnel are required to report the PARs to the state or
local government agencies (within 15 min) (US NRC 2014b).
As stated clearly, the plant personnel are required to produce PAR “immediately
upon becoming aware that an incident has occurred and that may result in a radi-
ation dose that exceeds federal government protective action guides (US NRC
2014b).” There are three key words: immediate action after becoming aware of the
incident, radiation dose exceeding the federal guidelines, and sending the PAR to
state and local authorities within 15 min. Regarding the radiation dose, the federal
guidelines by the EPA are listed below (US EPA 2013) (Table 3.2).
In this exercise, the detailed results of maximum dose for close-in calculation
(Fig. 3.18) show TEDE and thyroid CDE calculation indicate the need to evacuate
within a 3-mile radius. When pointing cursor over the cell or display in Fig. 3.15,
the data at individual model receptors are shown in (Fig. 3.27). This information
Fig. 3.27 A close-in dose calculation displayed in footprint map with data at individual model
receptors when mouse pointer hovering on a selected model receptor. Source RAMP (2016a)
3.5 Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) 101
provides a dose rate at the wind direction and distance from the release point. This
information could be incorporated within the maps overlaid on Google maps
(Figs. 3.24 and 3.26) to make protective action recommendation.
According to NRC, the state and local authorities must make a decision on the
protective action recommendation (PAR) submitted by the plant.
State and local officials make the final decision on what protective action is necessary to
protect public health and safety, and then relay these decisions to the public in a timely
manner (normally within approximately 15 min) (US NRC 2014b).
The 15-min time frame is another challenge for state and local agencies to make a
certain decision on the protective action decisions. In addition, the agencies must
generate a PADs, which must be signed by a State Governor. For example, in case
of such emergency in Arizona, the PADs is signed by the Governor of the State of
Arizona; in the absence of the Governor, it must be signed by a Maricopa County
Judge (Kyne 2015). Once the PADs has been signed, the joint information com-
mittee must be formed and disseminate the PADs information to the public and
emergency management agencies and responders.
3.7 Evacuation
The emergency agencies and personnel must carry out evacuation activities. The
PADs is based on PAR which was generated by the plant personnel. Thus, plant
personnel as well as state and local agencies must be aware of EPA’s protective
action guidelines. There are a few items that should be aware of before making
PAR and PADs which will have an impact on evacuation.
First, the TEDE’s range is between 1 REM and 5 REM, and the projected dose
of 1 REM is suggested to evacuate the general population. The EPA’s PAG states as
follows:
Although the PAG is expressed as a range of 1-5 REM, it is emphasized that, under normal
conditions, evacuation of members of the general population should be initiated for most
incidents at a projected dose of 1 REM (US EPA 2013). (pp. 2–5)
Second, the sheltering is more preferred for some group of general public. For
example, the elderly, disabled persons, children, and other vulnerable populations
may face difficulty in evacuating. It is justified that those groups of people may be
at the projected doses of up to 5 REM. In addition, under very hazardous condi-
tions, the group could even be sheltered at the projected dose rate of 10 REM.
102 3 Nuclear Power Emergencies and Their Management Process
Third, the specific situations that are not in favor for evacuation of the specific
population at the projected dose of 1 REM are severe weather conditions, competing
disasters, institutionalized persons, and local physical factors (US EPA 2013).
Illustrative examples of situations or groups for which evacuation may not be appropriate at
1 REM include: a) the presence of severe weather, b) competing disasters, c) institution-
alized persons who are not readily mobile, and d) local physical factors which impede
evacuation (US EPA 2013). (pp. 2–6)
Fourth, the EPA’s PAG highlighted that there is no minimum radiation level to
initiate the sheltering. The advantage of sheltering is that it is low-cost and low-risk
protective action to protect the general public (US EPA 2013).
No specific minimum level is established for initiation of sheltering. Sheltering in place is a
low-cost, low-risk protective action that can provide protection…(US EPA 2013) (pp. 2–7)
Fifth, the plant personnel and state and local agencies must be aware that the EPA’s
PAG radiation dose levels are projected for a four-day period, whereas the PAR and
PADs are based on early stages of prerelease and plume (early) (Fig. 3.7). Therefore,
the plant personnel must project the dose with FMDose to reevaluate the radiation
dose level. Based on the projected dose levels generated by the FMDose, PAR and
PADs should be updated and necessary changes in evacuation must be carried out.
The projected dose comparison to the early phase PAGs is normally calculated for exposure
during the first four days following the projected (or actual) start of a release. The objective
is to encompass the entire period of exposure to the plume and to deposited material prior to
implementation of any further, longer-term protective action, such as relocation. 4 days is
chosen here as the duration of exposure to deposited materials during the early phase
because, for planning purposes; it is a reasonable estimate of the time needed to make
measurements, reach decisions, and prepare to implement relocation (US EPA 2013).
(pp. 5–6)
Finally, the PAR, PADs, and evacuation activities must be carried by local and state
agencies. The NRC does not involve in any of the activities.
The NRC monitors the actions of nuclear power plants to ensure the protective actions
taken or recommended by the nuclear power plant personnel are appropriate. Additionally,
state and local agencies may independently assess the situation to ensure that the correct
protective action decisions are made. Independent assessments performed during an acci-
dental radiological release from a nuclear power plant ensure that the best possible action is
taken (US NRC 2014b).
3.8 Conclusions 103
3.8 Conclusions
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US NRC (2013) RASCAL 4.3 Workbook Washington, DC 20555-0001: US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. Retrieved from http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1328/ML13281A475.pdf
US NRC (2014a) Emergency classification U.S. nuclear regulatory commission. Retrieved from
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/emerg-preparedness/about-emerg-preparedness/emerg-classifica
tion.html
US NRC (2014b) Protective action recommendations. Retrieved from US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/emerg-preparedness/about-emerg-preparedness/
protective-action-recommendations.html
US NRC (2015) RASCAL 4.3: User’s Guide. Washington, DC 20555-0001: US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. Retrieved from http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1328/ML13281A475.pdf
Chapter 4
Simulation of Nuclear Power Plant
Core-Meltdown Accidents
Historically, there has only been one plant, Three Mile Island, in Pennsylvania, that
experienced a partial nuclear core-meltdown, in U.S. commercial nuclear power
operations, which occurred in 1997. As discussed in the previous chapters, the
impacts of the nuclear power core-meltdown accidents are unimaginable. The most
destructive power came from the tons of nuclear fuel assemblies containing many
hundreds of nuclear fuel rods, sitting inside the core of the nuclear reactor in the
containment building. When the fuel rods are uncovered and they enter into the
melting stage, there was high–level toxic radioactive plume released into the air.
Gradually, the fuel rods are melted to the bottom of the reactor or breach the
reactor. The entire containment room could quickly fill up with the radioactive
plume and accumulate pressure from it. When the 4-feet thick containment wall no
longer resists the enormous pressure, the dome-shaped containment building erupts.
Radiation from the toxic radioactive plume is considered to be the most immediate
threat from nuclear power core-meltdown accidents. The radioactive plume will
move from the source depending on the wind speed, wind direction, and other
weather conditions. People living near nuclear power plants need to be evacuated
immediately when an accident takes place. Therefore, the projection of the
radioactive plume dispersion is a necessary first step to evacuate the individuals
living around the nuclear power plant. This chapter will conduct a plume dispersion
projection at two nuclear power plants: Palo Verde Nuclear Power Generating
Station and Indian Point Nuclear Power Station.
The Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) is located 25 miles west of
Phoenix, Arizona and has three currently operating reactors. There are two reasons
for selecting this nuclear power plant as a hypothetical scenario for a core melt-
down: First, unlike other reactors in the U.S., the PVNGS is not located next to a
body of water, such as a river or ocean. The plant is located in the desert, next to a
pond, where the water is stored for cooling purposes. The risk associated with this
power plant is that in case of a core-meltdown accident, the power plant may face
challenges in cooling down the melting nuclear fuel rods with water. In Japan,
when the Fukushima four reactors experienced partial and full core-meltdown,
water must have been poured over the melted cores of unit 1, 2 and 3, to keep the
fuel from overheating and melting again. The water seeping into ground water and
some of the contaminated water are stored in 10-meter tall steel tanks holding
750,000 tons of water (Normile 2016). The nuclear power plant is located close by
the fifth largest city in the U.S., with a population of more than six million, and
more than 2.2 million living within a 50-mile radius from the nuclear power plant.
There are nearly 2.2 million people living in the host communities located within a
50-mile radius from the PVNGS, whereas about four million of their counterparts
live in the “outside areas” of the plant (Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3). Outside areas are
defined as areas that fall outside of a 50-mile radius from the nearest nuclear power
plant, in this case the PVNGS. The racial demographic characteristics in the
communities within a 50-mile radius are observed as 77% White, 6% Black, 37%
Hispanic, and 3% Asian. The demographic characteristics in the communities
located in what qualify as outside areas are observed as 78% White, 3% Black, 24%
Hispanic and 3% Asian (Kyne 2014). Overall, more People of Color (49%) live in
the host communities than their counterparts (36%) in the outside areas (Table 4.3,
Fig. 4.1).
Table 4.1 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Palo Verde
Nuclear Generating Station, Arizona in 1990; Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 1 8 39 192 294 534 992
Tract area (sq. 120 1,658 672 2,661 1,831 6,942 107,049
mile)
Total population 1,365 10,128 38,556 379,343 866,410 1,295,802 2,369,419
White 1,090 8,112 28,273 299,286 714,771 1,051,532 1,916,149
Black 0 328 2,073 15,153 42,671 60,225 49,833
Asian 0 44 563 5,254 14,728 20,589 33,539
Native American 72 209 496 6,985 18,992 26,754 177,831
Others 203 1,440 7,144 52,651 75,260 136,698 192,071
Hispanic 203 2,580 11,418 85,971 162,063 262,235 418,401
Color 275 3,137 14,272 112,206 234,538 364,428 668,883
White (%) 79.85 80.09 73.33 78.90 82.50 81.15 80.87
Black (%) 0.00 3.24 5.38 3.99 4.93 4.65 2.10
Asian (%) 0.00 0.43 1.46 1.39 1.70 1.59 1.42
Native American 5.27 2.06 1.29 1.84 2.19 2.06 7.51
(%)
Others (%) 14.87 14.22 18.53 13.88 8.69 10.55 8.11
Hispanic (%) 14.87 25.47 29.61 22.66 18.71 20.24 17.66
Color (%) 20.15 30.97 37.02 29.58 27.07 28.12 28.23
Female (%) 48.21 49.81 47.30 51.82 50.43 50.74 50.64
Old (65+ years) 9.23 8.18 7.12 19.38 10.08 12.70 13.19
(%)
Kid (<5 years) (%) 6.23 11.33 11.99 9.84 9.80 9.89 9.30
Native-born (%) 92.89 90.32 91.61 92.68 91.30 91.71 92.80
Renter housing 20.21 22.27 34.78 23.84 37.08 32.95 27.74
units (%)
Education (%) 14.12 8.44 12.64 13.97 20.77 18.45 21.31
Unemployment (%) 12.74 10.17 8.92 7.56 6.49 6.85 7.36
Poverty (%) 26.30 22.84 20.52 13.05 14.66 14.42 16.47
Mean household 38,481 48,753 54,608 54,603 60,623 58,632 57,882
income ($)
(STDose) model is used to project plume dispersion, in case of one of the three
reactors experiencing a core-meltdown accident (RSICC 2013). The results of the
dispersal projections were imported in shapefile format to ESRI’s ArcMap program
(US NRC 2013). The resulting TEDE is measured in Roentgen Equivalent Man
(REM) and is equal to the absorbed dose (in RADS) multiplied by the quality factor
of the type of radiation (US NRC 2011).
108 4 Simulation of Nuclear Power Plant Core-Meltdown Accidents
Table 4.2 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Palo Verde Nuclear
Generating StationPalo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Arizona in 2000; Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 2000
Total population 2,112 15,826 62,558 570,281 1,149,152 1,799,929 3,330,703
White 1,615 11,767 45,916 398,763 841,429 1,299,490 2,572,225
Black 15 583 2,661 26,280 55,123 84,662 69,654
Asian 10 99 922 8,189 28,148 37,368 60,021
Native American 49 309 703 9,584 25,715 36,360 217,182
Others 423 3,073 12,357 127,445 198,728 342,026 411,644
Hispanic 712 5,260 20,013 208,105 347,341 581,431 713,886
Color 779 6,310 24,968 258,156 469,773 759,986 1,098,581
White (%) 76.47 74.35 73.40 69.92 73.22 72.20 77.23
Black (%) 0.71 3.68 4.25 4.61 4.80 4.70 2.09
Asian (%) 0.47 0.63 1.47 1.44 2.45 2.08 1.80
Native American 2.32 1.95 1.12 1.68 2.24 2.02 6.52
(%)
Others (%) 20.03 19.42 19.75 22.35 17.29 19.00 12.36
Hispanic (%) 33.71 33.24 31.99 36.49 30.23 32.30 21.43
Color (%) 36.88 39.87 39.91 45.27 40.88 42.22 32.98
Female (%) 48.48 43.41 48.87 51.28 49.04 49.69 50.43
Old (65+ years) 10.18 7.92 8.98 17.07 8.55 11.26 13.96
(%)
Kid (<5 years) 9.14 8.72 9.78 10.24 9.79 9.92 8.34
(%)
Native-born (%) 81.53 86.71 87.52 83.72 81.68 82.57 89.72
Renter housing 23.38 26.40 24.29 23.10 38.25 32.89 25.37
units (%)
College degree or 7.02 8.83 17.09 15.40 23.71 20.68 25.00
higher (%)
Unemployment 6.13 5.84 4.55 5.80 5.62 5.64 5.63
(%)
Poverty (%) 21.02 17.93 12.74 13.00 15.61 14.70 13.48
Mean household 53,204 59,309 71,249 60,305 68,888 66,197 67,691
income ($)
The plume dispersion after the NPP encounters a core- meltdown accident is largely
dependent by the weather condition. To project the plume path, the actual and
forecast weather information on the day the event is taking place are required to
input into the RASCAL model. In this exercise, a typifying weather information for
quarter 1 (January to March) was based on the meteorological data, reported in the
4.3 A Scenario of a Core-Meltdown Accident at the Palo Verde Nuclear Power Plant 109
Table 4.3 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Palo Verde
Nuclear Generating Station, Arizona in 2010; Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 2010
Total population 3,090 41,543 164,444 805,703 1,193,109 2,207,889 4,038,927
White 2,446 32,437 132,810 612,665 929,449 1,709,807 3,173,799
Black 224 2,368 9,639 49,776 70,875 132,882 107,773
Asian 10 852 4,670 19,844 41,677 67,053 111,648
Native 0 761 1,769 13,084 26,470 42,084 236,252
American
Others 410 5,125 15,556 110,334 124,638 256,063 409,455
Hispanic 1,066 16,096 49,966 357,283 402,723 827,134 987,540
Color 1,319 20,479 67,230 446,487 555,346 1,090,861 1,488,924
White (%) 79.16 78.08 80.76 76.04 77.90 77.44 78.58
Black (%) 7.25 5.70 5.86 6.18 5.94 6.02 2.67
Asian (%) 0.32 2.05 2.84 2.46 3.49 3.04 2.76
Native 0.00 1.83 1.08 1.62 2.22 1.91 5.85
American (%)
Others (%) 13.27 12.34 9.46 13.69 10.45 11.60 10.14
Hispanic (%) 34.50 38.75 30.38 44.34 33.75 37.46 24.45
Color (%) 42.69 49.30 40.88 55.42 46.55 49.41 36.86
Female (%) 49.94 47.17 51.24 51.15 49.38 50.13 50.31
Old (65+ years) 9.00 5.97 8.00 14.46 8.65 10.67 14.80
(%)
Kid (<5 years) 6.89 11.41 9.96 9.04 7.76 8.46 6.84
(%)
Native-born (%) 87.57 88.74 88.10 79.95 80.63 81.10 88.43
Renter housing 21.78 22.18 20.49 27.12 36.01 31.61 25.23
units (%)
College degree 7.27 15.58 24.73 18.38 26.31 23.13 27.96
or higher (%)
Unemployment 10.90 7.32 7.31 8.89 7.15 7.75 7.60
(%)
Poverty (%) 21.23 12.79 9.81 16.41 18.84 17.18 14.21
Mean household 66,449 67,996 79,633 58,958 67,297 65,194 68,577
income ($)
2011 Radioactive Effluents Report by the PVNGS. With a prevailing wind direction
of west-northwest, at a speed of 6.2 miles per hour, the model provides a projected
plume path which dispersed to the east-south, travelling a distance greater than
100 miles in a 24-h period (Fig. 4.2). The plume path covers an area of approxi-
mately 3,477 square miles, dispersing over an estimated population of 663,543
(Kyne 2015). Under the plume pathway, different groups of individuals are exposed
to different levels of TEDE ranging from 0.000 to 0.095 REM, grouped
110 4 Simulation of Nuclear Power Plant Core-Meltdown Accidents
Fig. 4.1 Spatial distribution of percent Color among the populations surrounding Palo Verde
Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Fig. 4.2 The projected plume path emanating from Palo Verde NPP after a simulated
core-damage accident conducted under meteorological conditions typifying Quarter 1; Source
Adapted from (Kyne 2014)
4.3 A Scenario of a Core-Meltdown Accident at the Palo Verde Nuclear Power Plant 111
Table 4.4 Demographic composition in areas around Palo Verde NPP located beneath the
projected plume path with meteorological conditions typifying Quarter 1, Source (Kyne 2015)
“Reprinted from Journal of Emergency Management. Used with permission. All Rights Reserved”;
Source (Kyne 2014)
Demographics/ (0.000– (0.0003– (0.002– (0.005– (0.01– Total Outside
(TEDE) rem) 0.0003) 0.002) 0.005) 0.01) 0.4)
Tracts 213 145 50 73 68 549 977
Tract area (sq. 1,201 726 425 475 650 3,477 110,513
miles)
Total population 305,529 207,069 41,606 75,125 34,214 663,543 5,583,273
White 235,302 157,724 31,010 57,221 21,834 503,090 4,380,516
Black 16,143 9,151 2,337 3,266 1,574 32,471 208,184
Asian 16,948 12,539 1,094 2,214 581 33,375 145,326
Native American 6,267 4,629 1,855 4,149 7,049 23,949 254,387
Others 30,870 23,025 5,310 8,276 3,177 70,658 594,860
Hispanic 66,773 45,665 10,932 18,591 6,745 148,705 1,665,969
Color 110,872 75,803 16,869 29,130 16,337 249,011 2,330,774
White (%) 77.01 76.17 74.53 76.17 63.82 75.82 78.46
Black (%) 5.28 4.42 5.62 4.35 4.60 4.89 3.73
Asian (%) 5.55 6.06 2.63 2.95 1.70 5.03 2.60
Native American 2.05 2.24 4.46 5.52 20.60 3.61 4.56
(%)
Others (%) 10.10 11.12 12.76 11.02 9.29 10.65 10.65
Hispanic (%) 21.85 22.05 26.27 24.75 19.71 22.41 29.84
Color (%) 36.29 36.61 40.55 38.77 47.75 37.53 41.75
Renter-occupied 26.70 20.73 15.66 16.42 18.38 22.57 27.81
housing units (%)
College degree or 37.20 34.26 19.32 23.37 18.08 32.43 25.60
higher (%)
Unemployed (%) 6.18 6.25 6.28 8.07 8.08 6.47 7.80
Below poverty line 8.95 7.00 8.90 10.68 15.65 8.86 16.01
(%)
Mean household 86,360 85,695 80,214 69,205 59,475 82,421 65,767
income ($)
Source (Kyne 2015)
in Table 4.4. EPA recommends evacuation when the dose level reaches 1 REM
(US EPA 2013; Kyne 2015). In short, in the event under the typifying Quarter 1
weather conditions, minority populations—including People of Color, Black and
Asian populations who live in owner-occupied housing units and who live under
the poverty line, are likely to be exposed to high doses of radiation.
112 4 Simulation of Nuclear Power Plant Core-Meltdown Accidents
Table 4.5 Demographic composition in areas around Palo Verde NPP located beneath the
projected plume path with meteorological conditions typifying Quarter 2; Source (Kyne 2014)
Demographics/ (0.000– (0.0003– (0.002– (0.005– (0.01– Total Outside
(TEDE) rem) 0.0003) 0.002) 0.005) 0.01) 0.4)
Tracts 421 185 131 55 12 804 722
Tract area (sq. 2,276 1,801 1,251 525 150 6,004 107,987
miles)
Total population 643,380 189,204 97,495 30,819 3,876 964,774 5,282,042
White 547,531 156,891 86,769 27,471 3,124 821,787 4,061,819
Black 21,935 6,386 3,131 786 78 32,316 208,339
Asian 21,031 4,340 2,210 762 129 28,472 150,229
Native American 6,682 2,352 683 239 11 9,967 268,369
Others 46,201 19,235 4,701 1,561 534 72,232 593,286
Hispanic 122,483 35,082 10,238 2,987 832 171,623 1,643,052
Color 180,171 50,293 17,322 5,090 1,190 254,066 2,325,719
White (%) 85.10 82.92 89.00 89.14 80.60 85.18 76.90
Black (%) 3.41 3.38 3.21 2.55 2.01 3.35 3.94
Asian (%) 3.27 2.29 2.27 2.47 3.32 2.95 2.84
Native American 1.04 1.24 0.70 0.78 0.28 1.03 5.08
(%)
Others (%) 7.18 10.17 4.82 5.06 13.79 7.49 11.23
Hispanic (%) 19.04 18.54 10.50 9.69 21.48 17.79 31.11
Color (%) 28.00 26.58 17.77 16.51 30.71 26.33 44.03
Renter-occupied 22.65 17.10 11.54 8.98 12.47 19.75 28.70
housing units (%)
College degree or 27.26 27.77 29.40 32.87 18.33 27.77 26.04
higher (%)
Unemployed (%) 6.31 6.65 6.38 7.32 7.25 6.41 7.88
Below poverty line 9.21 9.25 5.87 5.70 10.69 8.77 16.47
(%)
Mean household 74,049 77,654 71,533 76,691 68,980 74,527 66,108
income ($)
4.3 A Scenario of a Core-Meltdown Accident at the Palo Verde Nuclear Power Plant 113
Fig. 4.3 The projected plume path emanating from Palo Verde NPP after a simulated
core-damage accident conducted under meteorological conditions typifying Quarter 2; Source:
Adapted from (Kyne 2014)
In this exercise, the projection of the radioactive plume was carried out with the
meteorological conditions typifying Quarter 3 (July to September)—prevailing
winds toward west-southwest (248°) and an average speed of 7.3 miles per hour.
The findings show that the west-southwest wind pushed the radioactive plume to
the east-northeast of the NNP (Fig. 4.4) covering an area of more than 3,702 square
miles (Table 4.6). Approximately 3.5 million people are observed to live beneath
the plume pathway (Kyne 2014). The populations exposed include a racial
demographic makeup of a higher percentages of Black, Hispanic, Asian and People
114 4 Simulation of Nuclear Power Plant Core-Meltdown Accidents
Fig. 4.4 The projected plume path emanating from Palo Verde NPP after a simulated
core-damage accident conducted under meteorological conditions typifying Quarter 3; Source
Adapted from (Kyne 2014)
Table 4.6 Demographic composition in areas around Palo Verde NPP located beneath the
projected plume path with meteorological conditions typifying Quarter 3; Source (Kyne 2014)
Demographics/ (0.000– (0.0003– (0.002– (0.005– (0.01– Total Outside
(TEDE) rem) 0.0003) 0.002) 0.005) 0.01) 0.4)
Tracts 484 168 97 172 589 1,510 16
Tract area (sq. 1,426 550 325 575 826 3,702 110,288
miles)
Total population 1,024,487 335,466 162,860 344,957 1,601,288 3,469,058 2,777,758
White 856,746 261,947 131,867 278,370 1,195,778 2,724,708 2,158,899
Black 33,563 17,001 7,129 13,314 107,419 178,427 62,228
Asian 29,532 9,657 6,904 11,525 62,536 120,154 58,547
Native American 16,039 9,150 2,425 13,270 35,586 76,470 201,866
Others 88,608 37,711 14,534 28,478 199,968 369,299 296,219
Hispanic 207,529 93,733 25,983 92,706 685,726 1,105,677 708,997
Color 300,148 133,971 44,709 134,774 907,417 1,521,017 1,058,768
White (%) 83.63 78.08 80.97 80.70 74.68 78.54 77.72
Black (%) 3.28 5.07 4.38 3.86 6.71 5.14 2.24
Asian (%) 2.88 2.88 4.24 3.34 3.91 3.46 2.11
Native American 1.57 2.73 1.49 3.85 2.22 2.20 7.27
(%)
Others (%) 8.65 11.24 8.92 8.26 12.49 10.65 10.66
Hispanic (%) 20.26 27.94 15.95 26.87 42.82 31.87 25.52
Color (%) 29.30 39.94 27.45 39.07 56.67 43.85 38.12
Renter-occupied 23.29 24.85 19.24 34.99 37.84 30.84 23.41
housing units
(%)
College degree 27.30 23.11 37.66 31.16 24.13 26.39 26.23
or higher (%)
Unemployed (%) 6.58 6.80 5.90 7.11 8.20 7.37 8.03
Below poverty 10.22 11.92 6.28 13.17 20.34 15.16 15.41
line (%)
Mean household 73,210 68,029 102,708 68,579 62,674 68,917 65,685
income ($)
This projection which was conducted with the meteorological conditions typifying
Quarter 4—a prevailing wind direction to the west (270°) and a wind speed of 5.6
miles per hour provides an estimated plume pathway moving to the east of the Palo
Verde NNP (Fig. 4.5), covering an area of 3,327 square miles (Table 4.7) (Kyne
2014). There are about 2.3 million people living beneath the radioactive plume
pathway and they are estimated to be exposed to radiation levels ranging from 0.00
and 0.371 REM (1 REM is a threshold to call for either an evacuation or
shelter-in-place order) (Kyne 2014). The presence of minority groups, including
People of Color, Black, Hispanic and Asian (estimated in percentages) is greater
116 4 Simulation of Nuclear Power Plant Core-Meltdown Accidents
Fig. 4.5 The projected plume path emanating from Palo Verde NPP after a simulated
core-damage accident conducted under meteorological conditions typifying Quarter 4; Source
Adapted from (Kyne 2014)
than the populations living outside of the projected plume path (Kyne 2014). The
cities which are observed to be beneath the plume pathway are: Buckeye,
Goodyear, Guadalupe, Chandler, Queen Creek, Florence, Coolidge, Litchfield Park,
Tolleson, Avondale, Gilbert, Tempe, Apache Junction, and Paradise Valley
(Fig. 4.5); while the cities exposed to the higher TEDEs, shown in red (Fig. 4.5)
include: Buckeye, Guadalupe, Chandler, Queen Creek, Litchfield Park, Tolleson,
Avondale, Gilbert, Tempe, Apache Junction, and Paradise Valley (Kyne 2014).
The findings from the four projections for the four different quarters in a calendar
year provide an understanding that the impacted areas could be between 3,327 and
6,004 square miles, while the impacted population size could be between 0.66
million (11% of the total 6.25 million Arizonians) and 3.5 million (55% of the total
6.25 million Arizonians). The differences in weather conditions including wind
direction and wind speed are mainly accountable for the variations in affected areas
and populations. The 10-mile emergency planning zone is not sufficient for the
radiological emergency planning because the radioactive plume could travel a
4.3 A Scenario of a Core-Meltdown Accident at the Palo Verde Nuclear Power Plant 117
Table 4.7 Demographic composition in areas around Palo Verde NPP located beneath the
projected plume path with meteorological conditions typifying Quarter 4; Source (Kyne 2014)
Demographics/ (0.000– (0.0003– (0.002– (0.005– (0.01– Total Outside
(TEDE rem) 0.0003) 0.002) 0.005) 0.01) 0.4)
Tracts 142 159 199 229 356 1,085 441
Tract area (sq. 1,126 525 400 550 725 3,327 110,663
miles)
Total population 158,798 336,474 461,824 580,558 798,994 2,336,649 3,910,167
White 131,442 281,968 368,090 442,544 603,861 1,827,905 3,055,701
Black 4,680 11,963 19,428 32,461 58,381 126,912 113,743
Asian 4,034 6,342 10,642 20,528 41,548 83,094 95,607
Native American 7,414 9,795 13,343 11,251 15,471 57,273 221,063
Others 11,228 26,406 50,322 73,774 79,734 241,465 424,053
Hispanic 27,843 90,260 163,568 260,908 251,684 794,263 1,020,411
Color 46,200 122,338 211,141 331,486 378,173 1,089,338 1,490,448
White (%) 82.77 83.80 79.70 76.23 75.58 78.23 78.15
Black (%) 2.95 3.56 4.21 5.59 7.31 5.43 2.91
Asian (%) 2.54 1.88 2.30 3.54 5.20 3.56 2.45
Native American 4.67 2.91 2.89 1.94 1.94 2.45 5.65
(%)
Others (%) 7.07 7.85 10.90 12.71 9.98 10.33 10.84
Hispanic (%) 17.53 26.83 35.42 44.94 31.50 33.99 26.10
Color (%) 29.09 36.36 45.72 57.10 47.33 46.62 38.12
Renter-occupied 17.55 29.99 35.66 36.67 27.17 30.85 25.45
housing units (%)
College degree or 27.40 24.34 21.51 22.42 31.96 26.12 26.43
higher (%)
Unemployed (%) 5.63 6.66 7.86 8.59 6.64 7.29 7.88
Below poverty line 9.12 17.57 18.80 18.99 11.58 15.51 15.13
(%)
Mean household 80,123 58,299 57,641 63,297 80,402 68,100 67,071
income ($)
distance longer than 100 miles within a 24-hour period. The findings from the
projections do not provide an alarming radiation level measured by TEDE, but it
must be verified with the filed data collected in the day of the event. In addition, this
projection is assumed that one out of three reactors will encounter a core-meltdown
accident. The four projections of plume dispersion demonstrate that nuclear power
emergencies such as nuclear power plant core-meltdown accident, are different
from other emergencies because of its potential severity and impacts and funda-
mental requirements for mass evacuations and timely responses.
118 4 Simulation of Nuclear Power Plant Core-Meltdown Accidents
There are close to 15 million people living in the host communities located within a
50-mile radius from the IPNG, whereas nearly 16 million of their counterparts live in
the “outside areas” (Tables 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10) (Kyne 2014). In other words, more
than five out of every ten people (15 million out of 31.7 million total population in
New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey) live within a 50-mile radius of an NPP,
according to the 2010 U.S. Census. The racial demographic composition in the
communities within a 50-mile radius are observed as 65% White, 22% Black, 18%
Hispanic and 5% Asian, whereas the demographic characteristics in the communities
located in the outside areas are observed as 88% White, 8% Black, 4% Hispanic and
2% Asian (Kyne 2014). Overall, more People of Color (43%) live in the host
communities than their counterparts (14%) in the outside areas (Table 4.10).
The spatial distribution of higher percent of Color living around the IPNG was
depicted in Fig. 4.2. It is evident that many of the census tracts that consist of below
20% were mainly scattered in the north, the east and the west, whereas census tracts
with greater than 20% were located in the south (Fig. 4.6).
Assuming that one of the two reactor units at the IPNG experience a core-meltdown
accident, under the meteorological conditions typifying Quarter 1 (January to
March), with a prevailing wind direction of north-east (23°), at a wind speed of 3
miles per hour, the projection results show a plume path traveling toward a
south-west direction, more than 100 miles, within 48-h after the core-meltdown
accident took place (Kyne 2016). The plume footprint is estimated to cover an area
as large as 9,612 square miles, dispersing above an estimated population of 20
million (19,855,006) likely to be exposed to radiation level ranging from 0.000 to
1.103 REM, which is above the recommended evaluation dose level of 1 REM
(Table 4.11) (Kyne 2016). Interestingly, there are about 4.25 out of 20 million
people who are likely to be exposed to a high level of radiation, exceeding the
threshold required for an evacuation (Table 4.11). Among the populations living
beneath the projected radioactive plume footprint, Blacks and Asians were living in
the pathway area at higher percentages than other races. While fewer of them live
below the federal poverty line than compared with the counterpart population living
outside of the plume’s footprint (Kyne 2016).
Table 4.8 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Indian Point Nuclear Generating, New York, in 1990; Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0-50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 55 187 596 1,252 1,670 3,760 4,002
Tract area (sq. miles) 292 1,005 1,487 1,919 1,107 5,810 63,011
Total population 229,882 749,366 2,453,297 4,911,005 5,442,748 13,786,298 15,221,250
White 201,501 647,849 1,855,732 3,162,924 3,096,381 8,964,387 13,431,768
Black 16,429 64,693 368,460 861,202 1,657,783 2,968,567 1,200,971
Asian 5,847 23,174 91,373 317,468 303,274 741,136 266,893
Native American 425 1,661 4,420 12,869 13,867 33,242 47,283
Others 5,669 11,994 133,340 556,475 371,457 1,078,935 274,366
Hispanic 18,731 43,014 324,710 1,214,297 825,975 2,426,727 648,859
Color 39,637 129,807 757,725 2,266,527 2,700,268 5,893,964 2,127,483
White (%) 87.65 86.45 75.64 64.40 56.89 65.02 88.24
Black (%) 7.15 8.63 15.02 17.54 30.46 21.53 7.89
Asian (%) 2.54 3.09 3.72 6.46 5.57 5.38 1.75
Native American (%) 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.31
Others (%) 2.47 1.60 5.44 11.33 6.82 7.83 1.80
Hispanic (%) 8.15 5.74 13.24 24.73 15.18 17.60 4.26
Color (%) 17.24 17.32 30.89 46.15 49.61 42.75 13.98
Female (%) 49.70 51.09 52.43 52.56 52.72 52.48 51.44
Old (65+ years) (%) 10.37 11.00 13.76 13.15 13.02 13.04 13.40
Kid (<5 years) (%) 8.35 8.53 8.11 7.60 8.36 8.05 8.44
Native-born (%) 89.09 87.42 81.67 74.57 76.13 77.39 93.56
4.4 A Scenario of Core-Meltdown Accident at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant
Renter housing units (%) 25.75 26.01 41.22 60.66 53.40 52.34 28.04
Education (%) 32.51 34.60 29.01 28.94 20.61 26.10 22.16
(continued)
119
Table 4.8 (continued)
120
Fig. 4.6 Spatial distribution of percent Color among the populations surrounding Indian Point
Nuclear Generating
Fig. 4.7 The projected plume path emanating from Indian Point Nuclear Generating after a
simulated core-damage accident conducted under meteorological conditions typifying Quarter 1;
Source (Kyne 2016)
124 4 Simulation of Nuclear Power Plant Core-Meltdown Accidents
Table 4.11 Demographic composition in areas around Indian Point Nuclear Generating located
beneath the projected plume path with meteorological conditions typifying Quarter 1; Source
(Kyne 2016)
Demographics/ (0.000– (0.0003– (0.002– (0.005– (0.01– Total
(TEDE) rem) 0.0003) 0.002) 0.005) 0.01) 2.00)
Plume pathway 4,633 2,252 951 650 1,126 9,612
area (sq. miles)
Total population 6,406,282 4,043,251 3,798,295 1,350,646 4,256,533 19,855,006
White 3,931,013 2,688,114 2,087,612 916,557 2,664,943 12,288,238
Black 1,199,355 753,589 793,762 137,920 694,945 3,579,571
Asian 486,509 319,271 336,838 201,967 397,238 1,741,823
Native American 16,001 8,610 12,024 3,481 8,674 48,789
Others 773,403 273,667 568,060 90,721 490,733 2,196,585
Hispanic 1,241,120 444,956 950,273 197,915 1,001,888 3,836,151
Color 2,977,345 1,556,422 2,075,321 551,010 2,129,061 9,289,159
White (%) 61.36 66.48 54.96 67.86 62.61 61.89
Black (%) 18.72 18.64 20.90 10.21 16.33 18.03
Asian (%) 7.59 7.90 8.87 14.95 9.33 8.77
Native American 0.25 0.21 0.32 0.26 0.20 0.25
(%)
Others (%) 12.07 6.77 14.96 6.72 11.53 11.06
Hispanic (%) 19.37 11.00 25.02 14.65 23.54 19.32
Color (%) 46.48 38.49 54.64 40.80 50.02 46.78
Female (%) 51.91 51.80 52.46 51.67 51.30 51.85
Old (65+ years) 13.18 13.78 11.78 12.93 12.37 12.84
(%)
Kid (<5 years) 6.29 6.54 5.86 6.04 6.65 6.32
(%)
Native-born (%) 79.48 79.82 72.16 74.25 72.42 76.28
Renter housing 38.60 34.65 60.10 35.06 38.35 42.16
units (%)
College degree or 28.83 29.77 44.22 43.17 35.39 34.44
higher (%)
Unemployment 8.29 8.33 8.26 6.66 7.64 8.04
(%)
Poverty (%) 14.95 13.53 18.04 8.78 10.55 13.89
Mean household 72,709 75,906 98,518 105,781 94,536 85,420
income ($)
The projection exercise was conducted with the meteorological conditions typifying
Quarter 2 (April to June) with a prevailing wind direction to the South (180°) and a
wind speed of 3 miles per hour (Kyne 2016). The resulting projected radioactive
4.4 A Scenario of Core-Meltdown Accident at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant 125
Fig. 4.8 The projected plume path emanating from Indian Point Nuclear Generating after a
simulated core-damage accident conducted under meteorological conditions typifying Quarter 2;
Source (Kyne 2016)
plume dispersion footprint shows that the radioactive plume was pushed toward the
northerly direction covering an estimated area of 6,654 square miles and there was
an estimated population of 1.4 million people (1,390,699) exposing to the radiation
level ranging from between 0.00 and 0.97 REM, which is about the 1 REM that
requires either evacuation or sheltering by the NRC’s protection action guidelines
(Fig. 4.8, Table 4.12) (Kyne 2016). Among the populations exposing to the radi-
ation underneath the plume footprint, the presence of White (83%) is observed as
predominant, whereas minorities consist of Black (8%) and Hispanic (8%); about
10% of the total impacted people are estimated to live under the poverty
(Table 4.12) (Kyne 2016).
Table 4.12 Demographic composition in areas around indian point nuclear generating located
beneath the projected plume path with meteorological conditions typifying Quarter 2; Source
(Kyne 2016)
Demographics/ (0.000– (0.0003– (0.002– (0.005– (0.01– Total
(TEDE) rem) 0.0003) 0.002) 0.005) 0.01) 2.00)
Plume pathway 2,276 1,176 825 1,126 1,251 6,654
area (sq. miles)
Total population 205,832 172,200 76,904 414,501 521,261 1,390,699
White 186,572 156,525 71,071 337,736 410,013 1,161,917
Black 6,656 6,315 2,219 42,175 56,533 113,899
Asian 3,322 2,445 1,058 15,974 14,175 36,974
Native American 425 320 88 908 897 2,639
Others 8,857 6,595 2,468 17,709 39,642 75,270
Hispanic 15,235 8,822 3,716 18,931 65,882 112,586
Color 27,459 20,457 8,383 86,031 143,661 285,990
White (%) 90.64 90.90 92.42 81.48 78.66 83.55
Black (%) 3.23 3.67 2.89 10.17 10.85 8.19
Asian (%) 1.61 1.42 1.38 3.85 2.72 2.66
Native American 0.21 0.19 0.11 0.22 0.17 0.19
(%)
Others (%) 4.30 3.83 3.21 4.27 7.61 5.41
Hispanic (%) 7.40 5.12 4.83 4.57 12.64 8.10
Color (%) 13.34 11.88 10.90 20.76 27.56 20.56
Female (%) 49.36 51.25 49.36 51.29 50.61 50.64
Old (65+ years) 13.65 17.10 14.78 13.98 13.54 14.20
(%)
Kid (<5 years) 4.97 4.90 4.35 5.24 5.59 5.24
(%)
Native-born (%) 93.11 94.33 94.20 91.80 88.63 91.25
Renter housing 15.21 23.84 17.07 34.12 30.59 27.63
units (%)
College degree or 30.86 29.20 35.30 35.28 28.94 31.49
higher (%)
Unemployment 6.55 7.19 5.64 6.58 6.98 6.75
(%)
Poverty (%) 7.19 10.62 7.20 12.44 10.55 10.44
Mean household 85,701 70,260 82,767 73,346 77,576 76,703
income ($)
approximately 12.4 million people living beneath the projected plume dispersed
areas (Kyne 2016). The impacted population is anticipated to be exposed to radi-
ation levels ranging from 0.00 and 1.565 REM, which is above the 1 REM TEDE
required to initiate either an evacuation or shelter-in-place order (Table 4.13) (Kyne
2016). The projected radioactive plume would cover areas in three states: New
York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, placing the cities and their surrounding areas,
4.4 A Scenario of Core-Meltdown Accident at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant 127
Table 4.13 Demographic composition in areas around Indian Point Nuclear Generating located
beneath the projected plume path with meteorological conditions typifying Quarter 3; Source
(Kyne 2016)
Demographics/ (0.000– (0.0003– (0.002– (0.005– (0.01– Total
(TEDE) rem) 0.0003) 0.002) 0.005) 0.01) 2.00)
Plume pathway 3,603 2,527 1,151 651 1,026 8,957
area (sq. miles)
Total population 3,454,294 5,215,402 1,482,878 1,047,547 1,236,696 12,436,816
White 2,594,096 3,437,311 974,204 622,578 1,016,798 8,644,986
Black 414,021 1,050,103 208,426 249,870 62,291 1,984,710
Asian 223,345 318,739 170,130 55,775 97,536 865,525
Native American 6,541 10,406 2,319 2,021 2,378 23,666
Others 216,292 398,843 127,799 117,302 57,692 917,928
Hispanic 459,556 697,099 229,760 213,461 121,487 1,721,363
Color 1,132,178 2,120,398 626,265 529,505 294,388 4,702,735
White (%) 75.10 65.91 65.70 59.43 82.22 69.51
Black (%) 11.99 20.13 14.06 23.85 5.04 15.96
Asian (%) 6.47 6.11 11.47 5.32 7.89 6.96
Native American 0.19 0.20 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.19
(%)
Others (%) 6.26 7.65 8.62 11.20 4.67 7.38
Hispanic (%) 13.30 13.37 15.49 20.38 9.82 13.84
Color (%) 32.78 40.66 42.23 50.55 23.80 37.81
Female (%) 51.40 51.67 51.25 51.62 51.22 51.50
Old (65+ years) 13.26 13.38 12.14 11.57 13.66 13.08
(%)
Kid (<5 years) 6.31 6.13 6.54 6.67 6.27 6.29
(%)
Native-born (%) 84.46 85.45 76.71 77.30 82.03 83.11
Renter housing 29.62 32.14 31.05 35.24 20.71 30.51
units (%)
College degree or 33.17 30.89 38.11 34.21 48.92 34.46
higher (%)
Unemployment 7.53 8.40 7.21 8.16 5.69 7.72
(%)
Poverty (%) 9.96 12.87 8.38 10.74 5.37 10.59
Mean household 87,696 77,504 95,126 95,031 133,381 89,125
income ($)
Fig. 4.9 The projected plume path emanating from Indian Point Nuclear Generating after a
simulated core-damage accident conducted under meteorological conditions typifying Quarter 3;
Source (Kyne 2016)
Fig. 4.10 The projected plume path emanating from Indian Point Nuclear Generating after a
simulated core-damage accident conducted under meteorological conditions typifying Quarter 4;
Source (Kyne 2016)
Table 4.14 Demographic composition in areas around Indian Point Nuclear Generating located
beneath the projected plume path with meteorological conditions typifying Quarter 4; Source
(Kyne 2016)
Demographics/ (0.000– (0.0003– (0.002– (0.005– (0.01– Total
(TEDE) rem) 0.0003) 0.002) 0.005) 0.01) 2.00)
Plume pathway 1,926 901 676 701 851 5,054
area (sq. miles)
Total population 2,866,750 2,831,498 1,171,610 1,015,330 3,029,595 10,914,783
White 2,117,502 1,755,476 852,117 722,686 1,789,422 7,237,203
Black 396,992 635,352 162,029 142,431 588,037 1,924,840
Asian 226,263 196,489 79,354 70,270 300,291 872,667
Native American 4,572 6,976 2,674 1,816 5,751 21,790
Others 121,422 237,204 75,438 78,126 346,093 858,283
Hispanic 242,294 461,169 123,837 159,521 642,261 1,629,084
Color 895,341 1,316,486 381,473 385,785 1,560,135 4,539,219
White (%) 73.86 62.00 72.73 71.18 59.06 66.31
Black (%) 13.85 22.44 13.83 14.03 19.41 17.64
Asian (%) 7.89 6.94 6.77 6.92 9.91 8.00
Native American 0.16 0.25 0.23 0.18 0.19 0.20
(%)
Others (%) 4.24 8.38 6.44 7.69 11.42 7.86
Hispanic (%) 8.45 16.29 10.57 15.71 21.20 14.93
Color (%) 31.23 46.49 32.56 38.00 51.50 41.59
Female (%) 51.79 51.90 51.64 50.75 51.47 51.62
Old (65+ years) 14.71 12.71 13.05 13.01 12.24 13.17
(%)
Kid (<5 years) 5.98 6.42 6.10 6.05 6.79 6.34
(%)
Native-born (%) 85.01 83.31 86.06 79.83 73.42 80.98
Renter housing 28.70 35.48 26.68 30.34 36.70 32.55
units (%)
College degree or 42.45 28.91 32.55 33.45 35.16 35.07
higher (%)
Unemployment 6.46 9.72 7.63 7.16 7.91 7.88
(%)
Poverty (%) 8.75 16.77 8.45 8.62 10.50 11.27
Mean household 101,091 73,630 90,017 92,233 93,212 89,745
income ($)
The RASCAL computer code is not free from limitations in carrying out estimating
radioactive plume dispersion (Kyne 2014). The projection is highly dependent on
prevailing weather conditions on the day the event takes place (Ramsdell et al.
4.5 Projection Limitations 131
Fig. 4.11 A summary of total populations in areas around Indian Point Nuclear Generating
located beneath the projected plume path with meteorological conditions typifying four quarters;
Source (Kyne 2016)
2013). It should be noted that the eight projections conducted in this chapter may
not provide the actual plume footprint that would occur in the event actual accident,
on any given day, during any calendar quarter because the assumed typifying
weather conditions could be different from those of the actual conditions on the day
the event takes place (Kyne 2014). Second, it is not advisable to use the this
stimulation data in briefings delivered to decision markers making critical decisions
for evacuation during an actual emergency (Ramsdell et al. 2013). The resulting
projected stimulation data must be incorporated with the current meteorological
data for a few hours prior to the event (Kyne 2014). Third, extreme caution must be
taken when using the radiation level of TEDE estimated by the STDose model in
the RASCAL computer code (Kyne 2014). During the emergency, the actual
radiation does must be recomputed with the data collected on site by the EPA’s
Radiological Emergency Response Team (RERT); the verification and computation
of the TEDE could be done using the Field Measurement to Dose model in the
RASCAL computer code (RASCAL Class Training July 11 and 12, 2013). In the
beginning, the projection provides estimated TEDE levels, and either evacuation or
shelter-in-place suggestions are provided based on the EPA’s Manual of protective
action guides and protective actions for nuclear incidents (US EPA 1992) while a
does of 1 REM is recommended by the NRC to evacuate in most incidents and the
agency did not specify minimum level for a shelter-in-place order (Ramsdell et al.
2013; Kyne 2014).
132 4 Simulation of Nuclear Power Plant Core-Meltdown Accidents
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter demonstrates the significant potential and scale of a nuclear power
emergency and its impacts, providing tools necessary to understand where the
plume path will disperse if a nuclear core-melt down accident occurs. The imme-
diate threat after the nuclear core-melt down accident is the release of radioactive
toxic waste to the environment. Radiation doses could be lethal. During the
Fukushima accident, the radiation dose was measured to be nearly 12,000 µSv h−1
near the main gate of the plant (Thielen 2012). The main radionuclide releases were
Iodine-131 which has a half-life of 8 days, Caseium-137 which has a 30-year
half-life, and Caesium-134 which has a two-year half-life (World Nuclear
Association 2016). One of the four activities that needs to be carried out in the
response stage of the response management process is to project radioactive plume
path dispersion in order to estimate the radiation does level and to determine the
evacuation zones. This chapter also demonstrates the two simulation exercises to
project radiative plume path dispersion at two nuclear power plants: Palo Verde
Nuclear Generating Station (PVNG) in Arizona and Indian Point Nuclear
Generation (IPNG) in New York. The impact of a nuclear power accident depends
on weather conditions on the day the event takes place. In the simulation exercise
for PVNG, the estimated population underneath the radioactive plume path could
be 0.66, 0.96, 3.5, and 2.3 million in typifying weather conditions, in quarters one
through four, respectively. (Tables 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7). In the similar simulation
for IPNG, the estimated population underneath the radioactive plume path could be
19.86, 1.39, 12.49, and 10.91 million, in typifying weather conditions in quarters
one through four respectively (Tables 4.11, 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14). With such
population sizes being vulnerable to exposure of the radioactive plume pathway,
carrying out emergency management process effectively is critical for the lives of
nearly 3.5 million people, and 19.86 million people in the simulated worst case
scenarios at PVNG and IPNG respectively. Any delay in the four activities in
response stage, namely projection of radioactive plume dispersion, protective action
recommendation, protective action decision, and evacuation will place people living
near the power plant in danger of exposure to the high level radioactive material
releases. The previous nuclear power accidents including Three Mile Island,
Chernobyl, and Fukushima Daiichi power plants share a common issue, which is
that of a delay in evacuation of people living close to the nuclear power plants. The
delayed evacuation might have caused an increase in the unnecessary exposure to
the radioactive materials for populations that were not able to evacuate in a timely
manner. To save millions of people from unnecessary and dangerous exposure to
radiation, addressing the problem with the delay in evacuation is imperative. To
solve this issue, two preventive actions are necessary: administering potassium
(KI) pills and informing the emergency alert to the residents before the nuclear
core-melt down accident takes place.
References 133
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plants/fukushima-accident.aspx
Chapter 5
Issues Associated with the Nuclear Power
Emergency
The nature of the nuclear emergency management process requires urgency and
timeliness in carrying out activities. Why does the process require “urgency” and
“timeliness” actions? The powerful destructive nuclear fuel assemblies containing
hundreds of fuel rods may uncover and may enter into a meltdown state. In this
stage, high-level radioactive plume is released from the reactor and could disperse
into the environment. Soon after a nuclear power plant encounters the core-
meltdown accident, the immediate threat is the emission of radioactive plume. How
fast the highly toxic radioactive plume could disperse or travel will depend on the
wind speed, wind direction, precipitation, temperature, and weather conditions on
that particular day. For example, if the wind is at 10 miles per hour, then the
radioactive plume could travel a distance of 10 miles per hour. Thus, this requires
urgency and timeliness in carrying out the activities related to the emergency
management process. If there is a delay, the plume path could even travel longer
distances, placing more people at risk of exposure to high levels of radioactive
plume.
Understanding the nature of the nuclear power emergency management response
system, the NRC has set rigorous steps to follow in carrying out the response
activities. The NRC sets the policy to reflect the urgency and timeliness nature of
the nuclear emergency management by allocating 15 min each for the first three
activities (US NRC 2014). The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
also plays an important role in assuring that the emergency planning in EPZ is in
order. The facility owners must follow the NRC guidelines in preparing the
emergency plan for EPZ while they need approval by FEMA, which also has the
authority to set the minimum time required to alert and notify in order to completely
cover 100% of the plume path exposure zone within a recommended goal of 45 min
(US FEMA 2016).
Fig. 5.1 A tentative timeline for preparing a protective action decision (PAD) in the case of a
GEm at PVNGS, Source (Kyne 2015) “Reprinted from Journal of Emergency Management. Used
with permission. All Rights Reserved”
5.1 Policy Issues Associated with Nuclear Power Emergency Response 137
radiation dose. The radiation dose was computed as a total effective dose equivalent
(TEDE), which is defined as “the sum of the deep-dose equivalent (EDE) (for
external exposures) and the committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE) (for
internal exposures)” (US NRC 2011). How long will it take to conduct a plume
projection?
(1) To start, the plant personnel must switch on the computer and open the
RASCAL code program. This will take about 5 min.
(2) There is preinstalled information in the computer code about the meteorology
data such as wind speed, wind direction, temperature, precipitation, and sta-
bility condition at the plant and other stations. The plant meteorology data
could be available, but the plant personnel may need to type them in. Other
weather information at other weather stations that were included in the pro-
jection could be available to download directly from online systems, using
direct download function in the RASCAL program. This step may require at
least 30 min to project a radioactive plume dispersion and estimated dose.
(3) Once the projected plume dispersion pathway and the estimated radioactive
dose are ready, it is necessary to call for a meeting with team members who
are responsible for making decisions for certain conclusions to be included in
the PAR. Then, a PAR must be formally prepared, which is a process that
could require an additional 15 min.
(4) When the PAR is ready, it could be transmitted via a fax or email to the
ARRA. In addition, a telephone call must be made in order to let the agency
officials know that the PAR is transmitted and to assure they received the
documents successfully. In some cases, the radioactive plume projection file
must be saved as “case file” with an extension “.STD.” This file will also help
ARRA in checking the input information, including meteorology data, and
reuse this information for projection at their end. These steps may also require
at least another 5 min of time.
In practice, the process of generating PAR at the PVNGS would require at least
55 min. This 55-min period excludes the time the incident may have gone unno-
ticed. If there is a period of time when the incident goes unnoticed, the process
would take even longer than 55 min. However, the completion of generating and
delivering the PAR does not stop PVNGS’s activities to an end and PVNGS has to
carry out other activities. It has to deploy staff or its team members to collect the air
sample beneath the radioactive plume pathway. The weather conditions could be
very fluid depending on the day and month of the year. It is also necessary to
monitor the conditions by collecting the up-to-date meteorology data and updating
the plume path dispersion with the changes in weather conditions. As discussed in
Chap. 3, there are four phases in nuclear emergency: prerelease, plume (early),
intermediate, and ingestion. The projection of plume dispersion for the first two
phases must be done with the Source Term to Dose (STDose) , whereas the latter
two phases must be computed with the Field Measurement to Dose. To project the
5.1 Policy Issues Associated with Nuclear Power Emergency Response 139
plume dispersion in the latter two phases, the PVNGS must collect air sample data
beneath the plume pathway after the radioactive plume has started dispersion.
Collection of field data at 10-min intervals along the central axis requires a certain
amount of time. The latter two phases require the use the Field Measurement to
Dose model to project plume dispersion. Therefore, the PVNGS must deploy its
team member to collect air samples. Next, the PVNGS personnel must standby to
answer any questions the other agencies may have after they have sent out their
PAR especially from the ARRA agency. In addition, the plant personnel must
coordinate with other agencies in carrying out other activities.
Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency (ARRA): After ARRA receives PAR
information, this step requires ARRA to project a plume dispersion based on the
PAR prepared by the plant personnel at PVNGS (Kyne 2015). The preceding step is
preparing PAR by PVNGS. In other words, ARRA could begin this step only after
the agency receives the PAR report from the plant personnel at the PVNGS. How
could ARRA prepare a PAR at their end? The answer to this question is to follow
certain steps:
(1) receive a PAR prepared by the PVNGS,
(2) gather meteorology information for projection,
(3) conduct a projection of radioactive plume path,
(4) have a team meeting to generate a PAR based on the projection results,
(5) deploy staff to collect air samples beneath the radioactive plume pathway,
(6) update the projection with the changes in weather conditions,
(7) validate the projection using the collected air sample data,
(8) standby to answer to any questions other agencies may arise, and
(9) coordinate with other agencies for further actions.
In order to begin with the response activities at the ARRA end, the first step is to
receive the PAR prepared by the PVNGS. ARRA’s primary goal in this exercise is
to validate the PAR and the projection of radioactive plume dispersion generated by
the PVNGS. ARRA will use the same computer code RASCAL that PVNGS used
in projecting plume dispersion. Therefore, ARRA might find it useful to use the
case file saved in a file with an extension “.STD.” How long will it take to conduct a
plume projection?
(1) First, ARRA personnel must switch on the computer and open the RASCAL
code program. This will take about 5 min.
(2) There is preinstalled information in the computer code, about the meteorology
data such as wind speed, wind direction, temperature, precipitation, and sta-
bility condition at the plant and other stations. The plant meteorology data
could be available, but the plant personnel may need to type them in. Other
weather information at other weather stations that were included in the pro-
jection could be available to download directly from online using direct
download function in the RASCAL program. This step may require at least
30 min to project a radioactive plume dispersion and estimated dose.
140 5 Issues Associated with the Nuclear Power Emergency
(3) Once the projected plume dispersion pathway and the estimated radioactive
dose are ready, it is necessary to call for a meeting with team members who
are responsible for making decisions for certain authorizations to be included
in the PAR. In the decision-making process, ARRA must make a comparison
between their results and the results obtained by the PVNGS. Then, a PAR
must be formally prepared. The PAR of ARRA and PVNGS may or may not
be the same. This process could require another 20 min.
(4) When the PAR is ready, it could be transmitted via a fax or an email to the
state, local, and tribal offices. In addition, a telephone call must be made in
order to let the agency officials know that the PAR is transmitted and they
received them successfully. This informing process many also require at least
another 15 min.
In practice, the process of generating PAR and validating the PAR of PVNGS at
the ARRA office would require at least 70 min. However, upon completion of the
tasks of generating, validating, and delivering the PAR to the state, local, and tribal
offices does not bring ARRA activities to an end. ARRA has to carry out other
activities as well. ARRA is responsible to lead a group of volunteers to collect field
data, including radiation surveys, and environmental and foodstuff samples, at the
PVNG plant site. ARRA must provide training courses, including a week-long
training and day-long annual refresher course, to a group of volunteers. In addition,
ARRA is also responsible for collecting up-to-date meteorology data in order to
update the projection of plume path dispersion. It must also project the plume dis-
persion using the Field Measurement to Dose model in order to estimate the radiation
level, in the radioactive plume dispersed in the intermediate, and ingestion phases,
utilizing the up-to-date meteorology data, and air and food sample data collected by its
volunteers. ARRA officials must prepare and remain on standby to answer any
questions from the state, federal, local, and tribal agencies on the PAR provided.
Finally, ARRA officials are responsible for coordinating with other federal, local,
state, and tribal agencies in order to carry out other related activities (Kyne 2014).
Step (3) Making a protective action decision (PAD)
State, local, and tribal agencies: In this step, the state, local, and tribal agencies
have been provided with the PAR. Their goal is that the state, local, and tribal
agencies review the PAR provided by ARRA in order to prepare a protection action
decision (PAD).
(1) receive a PAR prepared by the ARRA,
(2) meet responsible parties to generate a PAD including instructions for evacu-
ation, sheltering-in-place, and the administering of potassium iodide (KI),
(3) sign the PAD by the Governor or the County Judge,
(4) send the PAD to all concerned agencies,
(5) standby to answer any questions or concerns that may arise, and
(6) coordinate with other agencies for further actions.
5.1 Policy Issues Associated with Nuclear Power Emergency Response 141
The PAD must be prepared based on the information contained in the PAR
provided by ARRA. Therefore, the concerned agencies at the state, local, and tribal
levels must wait for the PAR from ARRA. Once the agencies receive the PAR, then
responsible parties must be called for an urgent meeting to generate a PAD.
The PAD must pertain information instructions for evacuation, sheltering-in-place,
and the administering of potassium iodide (KI). Once a PAD is prepared, it must be
signed by either the Governor of the State of Arizona or by a Maricopa County
Judge and is then sent out to all concerned agencies. This entire process with the
final product of signed PAD could take at least 45 min. Then, the agencies must
send the PAD to all other concerned agencies (Kyne 2015).
Step (4) Evacuation
As soon as the PAD has been signed, the next step is to form a joint information
committee (JIC) near the incident site. The exact location is not clearly described,
however, it is indicated that the JIC would be near the incident site. A total of 48
outdoor warning sirens, located within the 10-mile radius of PVNGS’s emergency
planning zone are to be turned on as soon as the event is initiated (Maricopa County
Emergency Management 2013; Kyne 2014).
The findings reveal that it could take at least 170 min for this to take place. The
ARRA office would require at least 70 min, and the PVNGS would require at least
55 min, thus producing signed PAD could take at least 45 min. The NRC’s policy
is to complete the three steps within 45 min. The highly radioactive toxic plume
might have traveled at least about 30 miles at a wind speed of 10 miles per hour.
This does not include the possibility of unnoticing the initiation of the incident at
the PVNGS. As discussed earlier, the nuclear power plant encountered several
experiences in which the initiation of the incident went unnoticed. If this possibility
is not ruled out, the radioactive plume might have traveled even a longer distance
than 30 miles.
The lessons learned from this PVNGS case study are as follows:
(1) The population in the EPZ zone within a 10-mile radius is likely to be
evacuated after they have unnecessarily been exposed to the radioactive
plume, dispersed from the accident at the PVNGS.
(2) It would be too late to take KI pills which could protect their thyroid gland
because evaluation information could reach them after they have been exposed
to the radioactive plume or they have been beneath the radioactive plume
pathway.
(3) During the 170 min, under the changing weather conditions the radioactive
plume might have traveled various locations within the 10-mile-radius areas or
in the EPZ zone. With these possibilities, many people might have become
exposed to the high-level radioactive plume before the evacuation efforts take
place.
142 5 Issues Associated with the Nuclear Power Emergency
The nuclear emergency management process constitutes the four stages, namely
mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. The nuclear emergency man-
agement and the disaster management processes are similar, but the response stage
is different between the two (Fig. 3.2, Chap. 3). Unlike the response stage in the
disaster management process, the response stage in the nuclear emergency man-
agement process includes four activities that are namely projection of plume path
dispersion, protective action recommendation (PAR), protective action decision
(PAD), and evacuation. These activities are very specific and technical in nature
and require special training and specific skills in order to carry out the activities. For
instance, projection of plume path requires a special training to use the RASCAL
computer code and special knowledge about nuclear reactors and radiation. In
disaster management, this response stage does not require much specialized skill.
For example, to respond to a storm-hit area, almost anyone could carry out response
activities, searching people who are displaced, assisting in accounting for those who
have survived or may be injured.
In the nuclear emergency management process, the NRC is aware of the urgency
and timeliness nature of response stage. With the awareness, the NRC has set clear
policy guidelines on the flow of activities and the time allocated for each activities.
A delay in one activity may cause another delay in the subsequent activity.
However, as discussed earlier in this chapter, it is evident that the time allocated is
not sufficient to carry out specified activities. In every step, there is a high likeli-
hood of encountering a delay rather than accomplishing the specified tasks. In other
words, the allocated time of 15 min does not relate to the practical aspects of
accomplishing the tasks within an allocated time frame. According to Perry and
Lindell (2003), to formulate an effective emergency preparedness plan, planning,
training, and existing written plans must relate to one another. The degree of
effectiveness always depends on the degree of relation among the plan, prepared-
ness, training, and existing written plans. What is evident here is that the NRC’s
policy and guidelines provided for the response stage are not related to executing
the specified activities.
One issue associated with the nuclear power emergency process is that there is a
redundant work performed by two different parties in response activities. As dis-
cussed in the activities, projection of radioactive plume dispersion was done by the
two parties, the personnel at PVNGS and the officials at ARRA. They used the
same computer code, namely RASCAL to conduct the same study, a projection of
plume dispersion. To solve redundancy issue, taking the advantage of the
state-of-the-art technology, a virtual coordination system could be established
between the two parties. The system will provide opportunity to work together
without a requirement of traveling. In case of emergency at the nuclear power plant,
both parties could be connected through the virtual system. Then, projection of the
5.2 Issues Associated with the Process 143
plume dispersion could be carried out by both parties at the same time. Both parties
could discuss and make certain decisions on generating a PAR.
Another issue related to the nuclear power emergency management process is
the lengthy process which could take up to an estimated 170 min prior to the PAD
being officially signed and evacuation activities starting. The negative consequence
of this delay is the individuals living near the nuclear power plant exposed to the
radioactive plume before they could be evacuated. The prevention such as taking KI
pills could not be done before the individuals are exposed to the high-level
radioactive plume. There are some alternatives to reduce the processing time before
evaluation. One possible alternative is that immediately after the incident is initiated
at the nuclear power plant, the JIC should be established and notify the information
to the public living within 50 miles. The center should provide instructions and
guidelines such as taking KI pills and proper shelter placements. The JIC could also
inform the public that there are further instructions and guidelines to be provided,
including the detailed information on plume path dispersion, direction, and esti-
mated dose level, once the PAD has been officially signed. In taking these steps, the
public does not need to wait the estimated processing time for projecting plume
dispersion and radiation levels.
In short, the findings uncover the potential issues in relation to the nuclear
emergency management process and policy, the redundancy, and a lengthy process
of nuclear power emergency management. These three issues need urgent attention
from the NRC policy makers.
This section looks into priorities specified in the radiological emergency planning.
In the discussion above, it is evident that there are issues with the nuclear power
emergency management process. This section intends to search for and identify any
issues associated with such priorities. There are certain priorities that are specified
in the national emergency planning guidelines for all hazards. On December 17,
2003, the President signed a directive, namely Homeland Security Presidential
Directive-8 (HSPD-8) of “National Preparedness Guidelines” to the Secretary of
Homeland Security to develop a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal.
The Homeland Security Agency (US FEMA 2007) has set priorities in developing
emergency planning for all hazards.
The agency’s priorities for emergency planning include the following:
• Expand regional collaboration,
• Implement the National Incident Management System and National Response
Plan,
• Implement the National Infrastructure Protection Plan,
• Strengthen Information Sharing and Collaboration Capabilities,
• Strengthen Interoperable and Operable Communications Capabilities,
144 5 Issues Associated with the Nuclear Power Emergency
radius. As shown in the case study of the Palo Verde, the distance the radioactive
plume could travel is far beyond the 50-mile-radius zones. Therefore, the infor-
mation sharing must be regularly carried out with all residents at large, including
those who live further than the 10-mile radius.
Third, another issue could be planning for a radiological emergency. The National
Preparedness Guidelines highlight the importance of planning, in the priorities list.
One issue associated with nuclear power emergency planning is lack of focus on
mitigation before an incident takes place, but it rather focuses on the response to
emergency events. An emergency management plan consists of four phases: miti-
gation, preparedness, response and recovery (Choi 2008). The first two phases take
place before an emergency has occurred, whereas, the latter two phases focus on
activities carried out after the emergency has already occurred. To formulate any
effective emergency management plan, it is vital that every effort must be made for
both mitigation and preparedness. The overall goal for the two phases is to minimize
negative impacts from the emergency event. To do so, optimizing lead time is very
important in the two phases of mitigation and preparedness. As an example, in case
of a tsunami event, an early-warning could be issued anywhere from a few minutes
to hours before the actual tsunami would hit the impacted areas. Such warning
provides local people ample lead time to mitigate the risks and relocate themselves to
a designated safe haven. However, a nuclear power emergency plan does not seem to
embrace the preciousness of the lead time. The emergency plan clearly states that
only after PDA has been signed and the JIC has been formed, the evacuation could
begin. At this evacuation stage, it is highly likely that the individuals in the affected
areas might have been exposed to the radiative plume (Kyne 2014).
Fourth, another issue associated with radiological emergency planning is lack of
sound preparedness, which deserves to be included in the list of priorities. Planning,
training, and existing written plans, and their relatedness to one another contribute
to the effectiveness of any emergency plan (Perry and Lindell 2003). The ultimate
goal of emergency management is to minimize the potential negative impacts and
save lives of individuals in the impacted areas. Before any evacuation activities
could be initiated, there are certain detailed and technically oriented steps and
procedure to follow. These steps include projecting the plume dispersion pathway,
estimated radiation dose level, generating PAR, and generating the PAD, which
precede the official notification. Carefully and exactly following the steps, and
obtaining the desired outcomes from radioactive plume projection, in addition to
correctly estimating population size could take a certain amount of time; it is highly
likely that the radioactive plume might have dispersed and traveled more than
10-miles from the PVNGS when the notification has been completed by the JIC. It
is vital to initiate evacuation activities as soon as the incident has begun at the NPP
because any delay might have unsurmountable negative impacts (Kyne 2014).
Fifth, citizen participation is another priority in formulating an emergency plan.
The potentially effected population size is enormous. It could be as big as more than
three million of people depending on the weather conditions including wind speed
and wind direction on that particular day. When it is time to evacuate, citizens must
evacuate themselves. It is impossible for the responders go to every residence and
146 5 Issues Associated with the Nuclear Power Emergency
evacuate the individuals who are in the affected areas. To do so, it is necessary that
the emergency plan emphasizes citizen participation in the emergency planning and
exercises. The plume exposure pathway EPZ, when drills are exercised every 2
years, the individuals living in those areas should participate in the exercise. As
suggested, the citizen participation should also be expended into radiation ingestion
zone: EPZ within a 50-mile radius.
In short, emergency planning clearly lacks defined priorities that are vital to
achieve the ultimate goal of saving lives and minimizing impacts. The priorities
must be clearly related to the ultimate goal, and they deserve attention by key
stakeholders who are concerned with the radiological emergency planning.
into the incident areas, according to the EPA’s PAGs (US FEMA 2011). This kind
of issue with poor and ineffective preparedness related to radiological emergency
planning is shared by 26 of the 31 states that host an NPP (Watkins et al. 2011). In
particular, the emergency planning lacks effective preparedness in other activities
including exposure assessment, environmental sampling, human specimen collec-
tion and analysis, and human health assessments, which were poorly prepared to
meet their responsibilities as laid out in the written response plans (Kyne 2014).
In short, getting a PAD done in a timely manner is very important in any
emergency planning process, in order to begin evacuation activities. It is entirely
dependent on how quickly PVNGS and ARRA’s work is performed in assessing
radiation doses and producing PARs. It is evident that the previous training and
drills did not embrace the other elements, focusing on risk assessment, field data
collection, radiation dose estimation, and on compiling a PAR. Most important, the
missing element of risk-communication could hinder other efforts in preparedness.
Trainings are meant to facilitate communication between at-risk populations and
other federal, state, and local agencies with no active role to play in emergency
planning (Perry and Lindell 2003). The radiological emergency plan should include
a training focusing on the important element of risk-communication with the
individuals living the impacted areas near NPPs; such populations should be pro-
vided with KI tablets and clear and detailed instructions on when and how to
properly use them to protect any potential exposure to radiation in case of a nuclear
power emergency (Perry and Lindell 2003; Kyne 2014).
According to FEMA (US FEMA 2016), the minimum acceptable design objectives
for coverage by the system are:
(1) “the capability to provide both an alert signal and an informational or
instructional message to the population on an area wide basis throughout the
10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ), within 15 min;
(2) that the initial notification system will assure direct coverage of essentially
100% of the population within 5 miles of the site;
(3) notification methods will be established to assure coverage within 45 min of
essentially 100% of the population within the entire plume exposure EPZ who
may not have received the initial notification. The basis for any special
requirement exceptions (e.g., large water areas with transient boats or remote
hiking trails) must be documented; and
(4) utility operators identify and develop, in conjunction with state, local, and tribal
governmental officials, the administrative and physical means for a backup public
alert and notification system capable of covering essentially 100% of the popu-
lation within the entire plume exposure EPZ in the event that the primary method
is unavailable. The backup means that alert and notification will be conducted
within a reasonable time, with a recommended goal of 45 min (US FEMA 2016).”
148 5 Issues Associated with the Nuclear Power Emergency
There are several issues in evacuation: First, the findings of this study revealed
that there are about 1.39–19.85 million population that could possibly be exposed to
the radioactive plume pathway in case of a nuclear core-meltdown accident at the
IPNG. This is a very significant finding as this would drastically impact a very large
population and would have long-term negative consequences for many years after
the initial incident. The projection conducted in this study has the following two
limitations: First, the findings related to the radiation dose and plume path dis-
persion are based on an assumption that they are included in one of the two reactors
as a core-meltdown accident. However, the Indian Point Nuclear Generating hosts
two nuclear power reactors, namely Indian Point Unit 2 and Indian Point Unit 3 that
are currently located and are in operation at the plant site. If both are to experience
the core-meltdown accident scenario, then the impacts and radioactivity from that
extreme event could be magnified in multiples of two, given the issue at hand and
that would be twice as big as the numbers. Second, the computer code provides a
maximum of 100-mile radius for projected plume pathway. In reality, the
radioactive plume could travel more than 100 miles from the nuclear power plant.
For example, the plume traveled more than 160 miles when the Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Plant encountered the core-meltdown accident. In addition, there are
estimated 253,977 individuals and 15,118,181 individuals live in areas within a
10-mile radius surrounding the plant and areas within a 50-mile radius surrounding
the plant, respectively, which are officially designated as emergency planning zones
(EPZs) by the NRC. In counting those individuals, this constitutes higher per-
centage of minority racial and ethnic groups than their counterparts living in areas
outside of the EPZs. Thus, minority groups are again significantly more impacted
and face greater consequences in such events. Having said this, the potential
extreme event stemming from the IPNG’s core-meltdown accident and the esti-
mated negative impacts, the key stakeholders who are involved in the emergency
management process could face tremendous issues in carrying out activities in the
process. Among the issues they could potentially face, I would like to highlight the
following emergency event-related issues below:
When the evacuation has been announced, the population living in the EPZ zone
within a 10-mile radius around the IPNG will have been completely exposed to the
radioactive plume. The well-documented emergency planning and preparedness
including the EPA’s Manual of protective action guides and protective action for
nuclear incidents (US EPA 1992) and FEMA’s action guide (US EPA 1992;
US FEMA 2013) do not reflect the time required for actions in practice.
Another anticipated issue is shadow evacuation which is defined as “evacuations
by persons outside of any officially declared evacuation zone” (Dotson and Jones
2008). The current emergency plan focuses on areas within a 10-mile radius and
show evacuations beyond a 10-mile distance, which could become a serious
problem in case of a nuclear power emergency. When individuals living beyond the
10-mile distance engage in shadow evacuations, they could have a negative impact
on traffic flows especially in some large-scale evacuations. The risk awareness,
personalization of that risks, and evaluation of alternative actions of those indi-
viduals would have impacts on the behavior of evacuation (Sorenson 1987). It is a
5.5 Issues Associated with the Evacuation 149
concern that individuals living outside a 10-mile radius did not receive regular
information on emergency planning (US GAO 2012) and their risk awareness, risks
personalization, evaluation of alternative actions could be different from those of
their counterpart living in the areas within the 10-mile radius zone. Therefore, to
overcome issues associated with the shadow evacuation, the NRC must incorporate
this important element of shadow evacuation in the emergency plan, drills, and
evacuation exercises (Kyne 2016).
Another issue associated with evacuation is the important element of coordi-
nation among key stakeholders. In a nuclear emergency, to effectively carry out
evacuation activities, the coordination among various federal, state, tribal, and local
agencies is critical. The evacuation tasks become more complex when the emer-
gency takes place in a mega city such as New York. Many years ago, a small
number of organizations predominantly participated in the evacuation efforts in
response to 911 attacks in New York (Schweinberger et al. 2014). It was evident
that there was a direct communication among US NRC, FEMA and state author-
ities, but they lacked direct communication with county officials who are respon-
sible to develop a radiological emergency plan (US GAO 2001). The importance of
coordination among federal agencies was highlighted in case of weapon of mass
destruction (WMD) response in mega cities, including New York (Bell and Dallas
2007). Thus, the element of coordination is essential among various key stake-
holders at all levels (Kyne 2016).
The other issue is that the evacuation plan lacks the element of educating the
public. In the context of mega cities, there are many high-rise buildings and
evacuation from individuals living in those buildings needs special procedures.
There is a continued need for educating the public from evacuating from such
high-rises buildings after the 911 attacks (Zmud 2008). Emergency responders
could face great challenges when evacuating the individuals living in high-rise
buildings who lack education or training on special instruction and procedures
required for evacuation. Thus educating the public living in the host communities is
a vital element to include in emergency planning for a successful and effective
evacuation (Kyne 2016).
the 12-mile radius from the plant were declared as permanent “exclusion” zones
(Starr 2016). There are nearly 160,000 Japanese who are still displaced because
they cannot return to their lands which were contaminated with radioactive mate-
rials or declared as permanent “exclusion” zones (Glinsky 2011). Therefore, it is
essential to incorporate factors of radioactive contamination on lands nearby NPPs
and situate displaced individuals into an effective recovery plan (Kyne 2016).
Another issue is associated with the loss of land due to contamination with
radioactive materials after a nuclear power core-meltdown accident. Quantifying the
economic and monetary values of land, which poses great challenges in carrying out
recovery activities. Radioactive contamination is very complex to manage and
sometime contamination leaves land permanently uninhabitable. For example, it was
roughly estimated that the values of contaminated lands and property within the 310
square miles after the Fukushima disaster were between $250 and $500 billion US. In
addition, there was a cost for small compensation provided to 160,000 people with no
place to live (Starr 2016). The costs for radioactive contamination in some places in
the U.S. would be even greater than those of Fukushima. If the IPNG NPP encounters
a core-meltdown accident, the radioactive contamination of land and water could
cause $1.702 trillion for taxable property in the New York City area (based on the
estimated total market value of taxable property in New York City as of July 1, 2016)
(Barbanel 2016). In addition to the estimated values, residents could face similar
problems to Japanese victims who were forced to pay their mortgage for the houses
they could no longer live in, located in the “exclusion” zones (Kyne 2016).
Third, the other issue associated with recovery is the economic loss of businesses
which were located in the radioactive contaminated areas. For example, Wall Street,
a world international financial hub is located only 25 miles away from the
IPNG NNP in New York. In addition, the world’s biggest economy is located in the
U.S.; 2013 US gross domestic product (GDP) of $16.80 trillion, comprising 22.4%
of global economic output (Picardo 2014). The business firms located on Wall
Street control trillions of dollars in financial assets. Furthermore, the New York
Foreign Exchange Market is ranked as the second-largest trading center in the
world, with a daily volume exceeding $5 trillion (Picardo 2014). It should be noted
that economic loss could vary with different geographical areas where the NPP is
located. However, if the core-meltdown accident takes place in an area like New
York, it is hard to deny the potential tremendous impacts on the nation’s economy
as well as the world’s economy, in addition to impacts to the local community with
regard to contamination and radiation exposure (Kyne 2016).
5.7 Conclusion
This chapter provides discussions on issues associated with the nuclear emergency
management process. First, this chapter identifies issues associated with the four
response activities in nuclear emergency process, namely projection of radioactive
plume path dispersion, protective action recommendations, protective action
5.7 Conclusion 151
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
The previous chapters discussed the risks associated with the US commercial
nuclear power plants. The catastrophic nature of nuclear power plants is evident in
the three historic nuclear power disasters, namely the Three Mile Island (TMI) in
USA, Chernobyl in Ukraine, and Fukushima Daiichi in Japan. This powerful and
destructive nature of power plants is regarded as inevitable. The inevitability of the
risks means that as long as nuclear power plants exist, individuals living in close
proximity to these facilities must burden the risks and must embrace the catas-
trophic nature of a possible powerful destruction. As long as our country places
nuclear power plants in operation, it has to find ways to deal with the risks and
pitfalls that come with nuclear facilities. There are many possible ways to better
deal with the nature of powerful destruction of nuclear power plants. This chapter
addresses three such possible ways to address these potential disasters:
(1) Complete elimination of inevitable risks
(2) Transforming the inevitable risks into evitable risks
(3) Minimizing the inevitable risks (Fig. 6.1).
One possible way is to completely eliminate inevitable risks of nuclear power
plants by getting rid of the source of the risks. In other words, a complete shutdown
of the fleet of nuclear power plants could be one possible way to completely
eliminate the inevitable risks. This also requires consensus agreement of key
stakeholders.
Second, another possible way to deal with the inevitable risks of nuclear power
plants is to transform the inevitable risks into evitable risks. This requires a close
monitoring system and making great efforts in transforming the risks.
Finally, another possible way to deal with inevitable risks is to minimize them,
so that the inevitable risks become minimal, which could lead to reduced impacts.
Fig. 6.1 Dealing with the inevitable risks of nuclear power plants
Because the risks are inevitable, a possible intervention to minimize these risks is to
create an effective radiological emergency plan, which could possibly lead to
minimizing the negative impacts.
To completely eliminate the inevitable risks requires the shutting down permanently of
all existing US commercial nuclear power plants. To do so, all stakeholders must have
a common consensus to discontinue nuclear power as an energy source. The feasibility
of the discontinuation of nuclear energy depends on key stakeholders and their per-
spectives on the issue. This section enhances the understanding of key stakeholders’
perspectives toward the future of nuclear energy. The government, regulators, NPP
owners, nuclear safety advocates, pro-nuclear power advocates, scientists, and the
public are identified as key stakeholders in such projects (Kyne 2014).
Dr. Gregory B. Jaczko, who was a regulator and former chairman of the NRC
(2009–2012), saw some weaknesses and limitations of nuclear technology. He
asserted that the current NPPs in operation were not designed to withstand severe
accidents (Jaczko 2013; Kyne 2014). His suggestion was that the U.S. take a pause
6.2 Eliminating the Inevitable Risks 157
for now and spend some time to collect more information about the current tech-
nology and their limitations; then find solutions to cover such limitations. In his
view, ideal technology should not have such limitations to withstand accidents, to
safely operate, and to dispose spent fuel. He provided a question to the key
stakeholders: “Why do we continue to move forward with the technology that
presents all of these weaknesses and pursue it without stopping?” (Jaczko 2013;
Kyne 2014). In fact, Dr. Jaczko might not expect the answers from the stakeholders;
his intention might have been to encourage them to reflect the current limitations
with the existing nuclear technology (Kyne 2014).
Another key stakeholder, namely Arnie Gundersen, who is a nuclear safety
advocate with 40 years of experience in nuclear power engineering asked all key
stakeholders including federal- and state-level governments, business interest
groups and the nuclear power industry at large to watch the video footage of the at
Japan’s Fukushima NPP (Gundersen 2013; Kyne 2014). His intention was to
increase the awareness of the key stakeholders, especially policy makers that such a
nuclear power accident could occur in the U.S. and they should discontinue their
beliefs that such accident could occur only outside of the U.S. (Kyne 2014).
There are climate-change scientists who think that nuclear power energy is the
only viable source of energy to counter climate change issues from other forms of
energy. Among them, James Hansen, Ken Caldeira, Kerry Emanuel and Tom
Wigley are a group of four climate-change scientists who sent an open letter in
which they called world leaders to support nuclear power energy (CNN 2013; Kyne
2014). They raised concerns with the current energy supply and consumption rates
exceeding the planet’s ability to reverse the effects of carbon dioxide pollution;
nuclear power energy is seen as solution to the pollution problem (Kyne 2014).
However, in my view, when taking into account of potential harms from nuclear
power core-meltdown accidents, radioactive pollution from day-to-day operations,
irreversible effects of radioactive contamination, risks associated with transport and
storage of radioactive waste could easily far outweigh solving the carbon dioxide
pollution (Kyne 2014).
Like the climate-change scientists, there are some key stakeholders who have
thoughts on nuclear renaissance. However, one important key stakeholder, namely
Peter Bradford, a former member of the NRC and former chair of the Maine and
New York Utility Regulatory Commission has negative views on the possibility of
“nuclear renaissance” taking place (Kyne 2014). He argued that “there is no coming
nuclear renaissance—instead, the nuclear renaissance bubble will soon burst
(Bradford 2013; Kyne 2014).” His notion was that the requirement of immerse
financial commitments caused nuclear power energy to be a less acceptable and
competent form of energy and his prediction was that the NPPs in current operation
will shut down of their own accord, due to economic considerations (Kyne 2014).
Another key stakeholder is Naoto Kan, the former prime minister of Japan and
leader of the administration who managed the nuclear emergency during the
Fukushima nuclear catastrophe. He mentioned that nuclear power core-meltdown
accidents are the only events that could negatively impact 50 million people, short
of a global war (Kan 2013; Kyne 2014). After the aftermath of the Fukushima
158 6 Conclusions
nuclear accident, Mr. Kan admitted that his belief of safe nuclear power energy has
gone a 180° change and now he believes that the risks associated with nuclear
power plants are not inevitable; his suggestion in eliminating the risks is to get rid
of nuclear power itself (Kyne 2014).
Another key stakeholder, President Barack Obama presented his vision on
nuclear energy. He asserted that nuclear energy could become part of the “global
energy mix” in his “Sustainable Energy for All Initiative” (Gerhardt 2013; Kyne
2014). He stated the following:
The United States will continue to promote the safe and secure use of nuclear power
worldwide, through a variety of bilateral and multilateral engagements. For example, the U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission advises international partners on safety and regulatory
best practices, and the Department of Energy works with international partners on research
and development, nuclear waste and storage, training, regulations, quality control, and
comprehensive fuel leasing options. Going forward, we will expand these efforts to pro-
mote nuclear energy generation consistent with maximizing safety and nonproliferation
goals (Barack Obama, as cited in (Gerhardt 2013).
My notion is that the President’s remarks share the vision of President Eisenhower,
who launched the Atoms for Peace program some 60 years prior (Kyne 2014):
The more important responsibility of this Atomic Energy Agency would be to devise
methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits
of mankind. Experts would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs of agriculture,
medicine, and other peaceful activities. A special purpose would be to provide abundant
electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world. Thus the contributing powers
would be dedicating some of their strength to serve the needs rather than the fears of
mankind (Eisenhower 1953).
Other key stakeholders include the U.S. general public. There was a poll conducted
by CBS, the American broadcast-television station, which measure U.S. public
opinion of nuclear power just after the event of the nuclear disaster in Japan. The
survey results showed that 50% of Americans were opposed to building new nuclear
plants, an increase from 34% in 2008; and 62% of Americans objected to the con-
struction of an NPP anywhere near their communities (Madrigal 2011; Kyne 2014). In
my view, the public does not benefit from the current nuclear power plants. One reason
is that they have to bare the costs in the event of a core-meltdown accident with their
tax-payer money under the Price-Anderson Act of 1957 (Huffington Post 2013; Kyne
2014). In addition, nuclear power poses potential safety issues to the public as
unnecessary, uneconomic, uninsurable, and unsafe (Kyne 2014). Moreover, the public
appears concerned with the ageing of the existing fleet of U.S.-based commercial
NPPs and they are even called “zombie nukes” (Gerhardt 2013; Kyne 2014).
In short, one notion is that there is an on-going tension between two groups of
the key stakeholders with pro- and anti-nuclear views. It is unlikely that the two
groups could have a common consensus to discontinue the use of nuclear power
energy in the near future. As a result, it is very likely that the use of nuclear power
energy will go on, given the fact that political and economic factors outweigh the
risks individuals living around the nuclear power plants are faced with, including
the potential for powerful destruction scenarios.
6.3 Transforming the Inevitable Risks 159
The NRC has initiated reactor oversight framework which emphasizes on three
performance areas, namely reactor, radiation, and safeguards. These three areas
consist of seven cornerstones that reflect the essential safety aspects of facility
operation: (1) initiating events, (2) mitigating systems, (3) barrier integrity,
(4) emergency preparedness, (5) public radiation safety, (6) occupational radiation
safety, and (7) physical protection (Fig. 6.2) (US NRC 2015).
The NRC claimed that it utilizes the well-defined reactor oversight process
(ROP) in order to monitor the performance of reactors and their adherence to the
NRC’s rules, regulations, and license requirements (US NRC 2014). With this ROP
in place, the NRC expects to transform the inevitable risks into evitable risks. In
fact, no matter how much ROP benefited from the past 30 years of experience that
NRC has, it is unlikely that the regulatory agency could realize its overall objective
for two reasons: The powerful destructive nature of nuclear fuels could be changed
as long as the nuclear fuel rods are used in the nuclear core reactor, and the nuclear
power plants consist of very complex and tightly coupled systems and accidents in
the system are normal (Perrow 1999).
The reasons for focusing the three areas reveal that each goal in each of the three
areas share a common goal which is to “avoid” accidents or risks associated with
the nuclear power plants (US NRC 2014). The focus on reactor safety area calls for
an avoidance of accidents and reducing their impacts. Radiation safety aims to
avoid unnecessary radiation exposure for plant workers and the public. It also aims
to avoid risks of sabotage and other security threats (US NRC 2014).
Another notion in carrying out the reactor oversight framework is that the seven
cornerstones are impacted by human interactions with the technology. Human
interactions could be classified into three areas which are named as “cross-cutting”
by the NRC. They are human performance, problem identification and resolution,
and safety-conscious work environment. Human errors in human interactions with
the complex and tightly coupled system could not be completely avoided.
Above all, the transformation of the inevitable risks associated with nuclear power
plants could not be feasible for the reason provided by Perrow (1999), who explained
that nuclear power plants are complex and tightly coupled systems and accidents are
normal and unavoidable. Therefore, the option of transforming the inevitable risks
associated with nuclear power plants is less likely to be a feasible option.
There are two options with regard to minimizing of inevitable risks: to completely
eliminate the inevitable risks associated with nuclear power plants, and to transform
the inevitable risks associated with such facilities, which are discussed in the pre-
vious sections, and they are highly unlikely to be the feasible options. This section
focuses on the option of minimizing the inevitable risks.
Avoiding the inevitable risks associated with a nuclear power plant is not a vital
element in this option to minimize the risks. Rather this option embraces the
avoidance of the risks associated with the nuclear power plants, and unlike the
previous two options to deal with the inevitable risks, this minimizing option does
not attempt to avoid the inevitable risks by eliminating or transforming them. It
rather provides preparedness options to accept the inevitable risks and attempts to
minimize the inevitable risks and their negative impacts.
Embracing the inevitability of the risks can mean several key points that require
further explanation. First, when this option embraces the inevitable risks, it assumes
that there is no way to transform the risks into evitable or avoidable. Second, it also
assumes that the inevitable risks associated with the nuclear power plants are
catastrophic and powerful in destruction. What are the immediate risks from nuclear
power plants after an incident? The immediate risks are ironizing radiation which
normally comes from meltdown of nuclear fuels, from the reactor, and other
cooling system structures. The US EPA has, for the past 30 years, provided
guidelines to protect from radiation (Fig. 6.3) (US EPA 2013). There are various
thresholds of radiation does for different scenarios.
Are the EPA’s protective action guidelines acceptable? There were two studies
conducted by two organizations that invalidate the radiation dose levels described
in the US EPA protective action manual. The first organization is the US National
Academy of Sciences (US NRC 2008; Royal 2008) which publishes reports on
Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR) VII. This is the most recent pub-
lication from the NAS’s series. The recent report, the last report BEIR V, being
published 16 years ago, reveals the findings that show statistically significant
relationship between any levels of radiation exposure, including exposure to nat-
urally occurring background radiation and the increased risks of cancer it can
create. Similarly, the second organization, namely International Commission on
Radiological Protection (ICRP 2007), concluded in its study of The 2007
Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection
Publication 103 that any low-level radiation including naturally occurring
6.4 Minimizing the Inevitable Risks 161
Fig. 6.3 Planning guidance and protective action guides for radiological incidents, Source (US
EPA 2013)
background radiation is not safe and it causes cancer. Specifically, the LNT model
assumes that, in the low-dose range, radiation doses greater than zero will increase
the risk of excess cancer and/or heritable disease in a simple proportionate manner.
While further research is needed to undoubtedly prove this as true, current findings
support this model, and it has been adopted in standards and regulations worldwide.
Regardless of whether or not the source of radiation is human-made, as in the case
of NPPs, or natural, and as exposure increases so does risk.
When any low-level radiation dose is not safe for public to be exposed to, the
high-level radiation dose from a radiological emergency could certainly be unsafe. To
minimize the impacts from the inevitable risks, the best way is to mitigate from the
high-level radiation. This kind of mitigation must be incorporated into the radiological
emergency planning. The most important element in the radiological emergency
planning is to ensure that there is a lead time to mitigate from the ironizing radiation.
162 6 Conclusions
The two options proposed above, elimination and transformation of the inevitable
risks associated with NPPs, are not feasible. It would not be possible to immediately
shut down all 61 US commercial NPPs. Similarly, the US NRC efforts to transform
the inevitable risks into manageable risks are not practical because the risks asso-
ciated with the NPPs are inevitable in nature. As a result, the only practical and
feasible option is to minimize the inevitable risks.
As discussed earlier, minimizing the inevitable risks requires an effective radi-
ological emergency plan, with a priority on lead time to mitigate before the public is
exposed to the high-level radiation during a nuclear power emergency event. This
study identified issues associated with the nuclear power emergency management
process. To transform the current emergency plan into an effective one, this section
revisits the current radiological emergency planning.
Transforming the current emergency plan into an effective one is vital for at
least two primary reasons. There are more than 87.5 million people who are living
within a 50-mile radius surrounding the 62 US commercial nuclear power plants
(Table 2.1, Chap. 2). In addition, the population living within the 50-mile radius
includes 45 million women, 8 million elders who are 65 years old or older, and
1 million children who are younger than five years (Table 2.1, Chap. 2). All of the
mentioned population groups are placed in danger of exposure to high levels of
radioactive materials from the NPPs when a core-meltdown accident takes place.
Another reason is that the effective plan could save the lives of 87.5 million people.
The vulnerable population groups mentioned above could be saved from exposure
to radiation, and they could be prevented from evacuation-related deaths.
The issues identified (in Chap. 5) in the current radiological emergency man-
agement plan are (Fig. 6.4) as follows:
Fig. 6.4 Issues associated with the radiological emergency management process
6.5 Revisiting Radiological Emergency Planning 163
participated. In case of a nuclear power accident event taking place, the radioactive
plume could be dispersed to a longer distance than the 10-mile radius. Therefore, it
is recommended that all fire and emergency departments within the 10-mile radius
should be participating in drills. Their participation will increase the key stake-
holders’ awareness of nuclear power accidents. In addition, they will become aware
of the need to use radiation dosimeters to measure the radiation while they evacuate
the victims at the nuclear power plant site as well as effected areas.
It is evident that in the event of a nuclear power accident, the radioactive
materials could be carried away by the winds and its direction. The previous three
nuclear power accidents show that wind could carry radioactive materials more than
a 50-mile distance. As a result, the individuals living in areas within 10–50 mile
radius from the nuclear power plants are exposed to potential nuclear power plants.
The emergency plan was developed for the 10-mile radius zone which was des-
ignated as an EPZ zone. However, there is no emergency planning for the people
who live between 10- and 50-mile radii. Because they are also equally exposed to
the radiation risk as those living within 10-mile radius from NPPs, a nuclear
emergency plan should be developed for the areas within 10–50 mile radius from
the NPPs.
It is not practical or feasible to conduct a projection of radioactive plume path
dispersion within a 15-min time frame. In fact, the projection requires use of
RASCAL computer code and special training. Turning on a computer and opening
the RASCAL computer code alone might need at least 15 min. A required time
frame should be revised to reflect sufficient amount of time to carry out the pro-
jection. Under the estimation of the required time for projection of plume dispersion
could contribute to under estimation of actual required time frame for entire nuclear
power emergency plan. Similarly, allocated time frames for PAR and PAD—a
15-min time frame for each of PAR and PAD—are not realistic.
There is no lead time for mitigation from the nuclear power accident before the
residents expose to the radioactive materials. The critical issue is that there is no
lead time to evaluate the people beneath the high-level ironizing plume in the
response stage. As soon after an incident has been initiated at the plant facility, the
authorities could not notify the public about the incident, before completing the four
tasks, namely projection of plume path dispersion, protective action recommen-
dation (PAR), protective action decision (PAD), and evacuation. To minimize the
impacts, it is necessary to find a lead time to evacuate the public before they are
being exposed to the radioactive plume path. As soon as the incident is initiated, the
public should be notified to evacuate. Spending longer than 45 min to find out
estimated radiation doses is not worthwhile and keeping individuals and families
waiting could be lethal or dramatically increase their exposure to radiation. As
noted previously, any dose level is not safe and the public should be notified as
soon as the incident is initiated.
The JIC formation could be seen as the last step before the evacuation activities
could be carried out. In fact, as discussed earlier in the Chaps. 3–5, the JIC’s
notification is likely to occur after individuals in 50-mile radius zones are exposed
6.5 Revisiting Radiological Emergency Planning 165
to the high-level radioactive plume. In that case, the nuclear power plant accident
took place on a day with a wind speed of 10 miles, then radioactive plume might
have carried out by winds to about 9-mile distance. Therefore, in any case, the
evacuation activities are likely to take place after the individuals who lived in the
50-mile radius have exposed to the radiation. FEMA has set guidelines to complete
the tasks within a recommended 45-min time frame. In fact, the four tasks require
great efforts and technological skills. In practice, it is unlikely to complete the tasks
within the recommended 45 min. The purpose of carrying out the tasks is to know
the radiation dose level and plume pathway. While the concerned key stakeholders
are carrying out the tasks to know the radiation dose and plume pathway, the
individuals living around the nuclear power plants would be exposed to the radi-
ation in the meantime. Upon the completion of the procedure and obtaining the
results of estimated dose and plume pathway with PAD, the JIC notified the public
for evacuation. When the public receives notification, they would have been
exposed to radiation. It is too late to administer the KI pills after exposing radiation
exposure.
Another challenge in the nuclear power emergency management is cleaning
radiation contaminated areas. In the Chernobyl nuclear power accident, there were
more than 5000 tons of sand, nuclear fuels, and other radioactive dusts at the plant
site, which could not be easily removed. After eight months of the explosion taking
place (December 14), a “sarcophagus,” a concrete roof was constructed over the
troubled reactor (Chap. 1). That sarcophagus lasted only 30 years, and a new
containment structure which costs $ 1.7 billion was recently replaced to entomb the
entire plant site. This structure is anticipated to last for 100 years. Therefore, a
detailed plan on how to clean the radiation-contaminated materials should be
developed for each plant. In addition, an emergency plan should include how to
cool down the melted fuel rods and types of materials such as sand to be used. For
example, PVNG is not located next to water sources such as river or sea. In case of
nuclear core-meltdown accident, it is necessary to develop an emergency plan that
describes the types of materials to be used to cool down the temperature of melted
fuel rods.
Emergency plans should include relocating people in the excluding zones.
Looking at the previous nuclear core-meltdown accidents at Chernobyl and
Fukushima Daiichi, the governments determined the excluding zones which were
areas contaminated with high level of radioactive materials and it was not safe for
people to live. In case of nuclear core-meltdown accident at a NPP, there could
expect an excluding zone. However, it is difficult to estimate how large the
excluding zones would be and how many people live in the excluding zones before
the event takes place. With the limitation of estimation, an emergency planning
should include a plan for relocating people living in the excluding zones.
Nuclear emergency plans lack specific preparations and recommendations for
relocating the individuals living in the permanent excluding zones and how to
compensate the home owners. In case of a nuclear core-meltdown accident at IPNG
in New York, the relocation of the residents could be very costly because the
property values in the New York area are very high, relative to other areas in the
166 6 Conclusions
country that face similar risks of exposure. In addition, the relocation could be very
complex and difficult to handle. If the accident required to designate permanent
excluding zones, then the costs will be much higher because of the high property
values in the areas.
In short, revisiting the radiological emergency plan is vital for minimizing the
inevitable risks associated with NPPs. The above-mentioned issues associated with
the plan must be well addressed as soon as possible. There are 23 Mark I reactors,
similar to the reactors used at Fukushima Daiichi plant site in current operation. In
addition, the nuclear reactors in the USA are called zombie reactors because of their
aging properties. The only option available to save lives of more than 87 million
people living in the areas within 50-mile radius from the NPPs is to transform
current radiological emergency plan into an effective one. The clock is ticking, and
any delay in actions against transformation of the plan cannot be afforded and will
have significant impacts on lives, in addition to the increased costs of managing the
aftermath of such events.
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Appendix A
Table A.2 Study variables of US demographic characteristics in 1990, 2000, and 2010. Source
(Kyne 2014)
US_1990 US_2000 US_2010
Tract 73,057 73,057 73,057
Tract area (sq. mile) 3,796,743 3,796,743 3,796,743
Total population 248,709,360 281,421,920 303,965,280
White 199,826,608 211,353,728 224,895,696
Black 29,930,428 34,361,740 37,978,752
Asian 7,226,882 10,550,602 14,677,166
Native American 2,015,044 2,447,989 2,480,465
Others 9,710,097 22,707,850 23,933,188
Hispanic 21,900,100 35,238,480 47,727,532
(continued)
Appendix A 171
Fig. B.1 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Browns Ferry
Nuclear Plant in Alabama in 2010
Table B.1 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Browns Ferry
Nuclear Plant, Alabama, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 10 35 71 64 27 207 2,471
Tract area (sq. mile) 302 964 1,607 1,877 1,603 6,353 88,211
Total population 36,259 118,087 240,080 219,938 101,947 716,311 8,201,456
White 24,454 105,244 186,051 200,891 97,148 613,788 6,409,774
Black 11,481 10,323 49,527 15,824 4,342 91,497 1,705,299
Asian 92 545 2,328 2,038 181 5,184 47,166
Native American 194 1,856 1,640 945 247 4,882 25,891
Others 38 115 544 243 27 967 13,340
Hispanic 119 686 2,090 1,285 343 4,523 50,135
Color 11,881 13,371 55,147 20,054 5,094 105,547 1,824,165
White (%) 67.44 89.12 77.50 91.34 95.29 85.69 78.15
Black (%) 31.66 8.74 20.63 7.19 4.26 12.77 20.79
Asian (%) 0.25 0.46 0.97 0.93 0.18 0.72 0.58
Native American (%) 0.54 1.57 0.68 0.43 0.24 0.68 0.32
Others (%) 0.10 0.10 0.23 0.11 0.03 0.13 0.16
Hispanic (%) 0.33 0.58 0.87 0.58 0.34 0.63 0.61
Color (%) 32.77 11.32 22.97 9.12 5.00 14.73 22.24
Female (%) 51.78 50.77 50.89 51.75 51.60 51.28 52.03
Old (65+ years) (%) 13.05 10.88 10.26 13.07 14.78 12.01 12.86
Kid (<5 years) (%) 8.92 8.28 8.38 8.01 8.43 8.28 8.29
Native-born (%) 99.70 99.07 97.86 98.52 99.64 98.61 98.87
Renter housing units 26.48 25.52 32.30 22.05 23.74 26.52 28.20
(%)
Education (%) 12.45 16.74 20.59 21.38 7.96 18.00 15.64
Unemployment (%) 7.55 5.46 5.96 5.12 6.59 5.78 6.69
Poverty (%) 17.47 12.53 13.71 11.72 17.50 13.63 17.19
Mean household 49,881 56,000 54,512 59,278 42,778 54,307 51,020
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 38,640 143,349 263,503 251,145 116,327 812,964 9,323,419
White 25,495 120,917 189,607 223,740 109,114 668,873 7,055,252
Black 11,681 15,402 61,373 18,372 4,733 111,561 1,971,347
Asian 113 1,261 2,976 2,145 328 6,823 80,563
Native American 329 1,829 2,334 1,403 399 6,294 32,144
Others 1,022 3,930 7,221 5,495 1,743 19,411 184,115
Hispanic 1,283 3,916 4,416 5,369 1,919 16,903 175,149
Color 13,776 24,724 75,857 30,103 8,107 152,567 2,348,154
White (%) 65.98 84.35 71.96 89.09 93.80 82.28 75.67
Black (%) 30.23 10.74 23.29 7.32 4.07 13.72 21.14
Asian (%) 0.29 0.88 1.13 0.85 0.28 0.84 0.86
(continued)
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 175
Fig. B.2 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Joseph M.
Farley Nuclear Plant in Alabama in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 177
Table B.2 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Joseph M. Farley
Nuclear Plant, Alabama, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 5 22 21 28 18 94 7,301
Tract area (sq. mile) 358 885 1,745 2,026 1,629 6,642 170,960
Total population 15,104 76,597 60,730 101,613 62,945 316,989 23,139,704
White 11,933 53,836 44,653 72,411 43,971 226,804 18,107,526
Black 3,096 22,242 15,579 27,185 18,101 86,203 4,434,358
Asian 2 317 154 898 325 1,696 244,015
Native American 62 157 239 534 335 1,327 74,867
Others 12 44 106 583 218 963 278,930
Hispanic 57 373 1,336 1,796 791 4,353 1,675,669
Color 3,212 22,963 17,149 30,155 19,461 92,940 6,365,508
White (%) 79.01 70.28 73.53 71.26 69.86 71.55 78.25
Black (%) 20.50 29.04 25.65 26.75 28.76 27.19 19.16
Asian (%) 0.01 0.41 0.25 0.88 0.52 0.54 1.05
Native American (%) 0.41 0.20 0.39 0.53 0.53 0.42 0.32
Others (%) 0.08 0.06 0.17 0.57 0.35 0.30 1.21
Hispanic (%) 0.38 0.49 2.20 1.77 1.26 1.37 7.24
Color (%) 21.27 29.98 28.24 29.68 30.92 29.32 27.51
Female (%) 51.60 52.97 51.31 50.38 52.70 51.70 51.69
Old (65+ years) (%) 14.04 13.41 14.09 12.41 14.17 13.40 15.13
Kid (<5 years) (%) 8.58 8.68 8.11 9.16 7.89 8.56 8.28
Native-born (%) 99.69 99.32 97.58 98.05 98.38 98.41 91.90
Renter housing units 19.63 31.89 18.76 28.94 26.46 26.73 28.42
(%)
Education (%) 6.81 15.19 8.88 12.05 11.78 11.87 18.20
Unemployment (%) 4.75 5.21 5.29 6.20 6.29 5.70 5.95
Poverty (%) 18.22 19.50 20.77 19.73 22.73 20.38 14.12
Mean household 43,205 50,080 44,969 42,653 41,130 44,687 58,591
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 15,882 80,324 70,181 107,605 69,667 343,659 28,272,272
White 12,428 52,701 50,919 73,826 45,531 235,405 20,716,744
Black 3,283 25,867 17,510 29,538 21,878 98,076 5,709,183
Asian 20 383 261 737 437 1,838 475,775
Native American 32 361 246 612 284 1,535 99,478
Others 120 1,011 1,248 2,887 1,552 6,818 1,271,080
Hispanic 151 921 1,342 2,810 1,944 7,168 3,175,749
Color 3,516 28,030 19,912 34,956 25,075 111,489 9,791,218
White (%) 78.25 65.61 72.55 68.61 65.36 68.50 73.28
Black (%) 20.67 32.20 24.95 27.45 31.40 28.54 20.19
(continued)
178 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Fig. B.3 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Palo Verde
Nuclear Generating Station, Arizona, in 2010
180 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Table B.3 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Palo Verde
Nuclear Generating Station, Arizona, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 1 8 39 192 294 534 992
Tract area (sq. mile) 120 1,658 672 2,661 1,831 6,942 107,049
Total population 1,365 10,128 38,556 379,343 866,410 1,295,802 2,369,419
White 1,090 8,112 28,273 299,286 714,771 1,051,532 1,916,149
Black 0 328 2,073 15,153 42,671 60,225 49,833
Asian 0 44 563 5,254 14,728 20,589 33,539
Native American 72 209 496 6,985 18,992 26,754 177,831
Others 203 1,440 7,144 52,651 75,260 136,698 192,071
Hispanic 203 2,580 11,418 85,971 162,063 262,235 418,401
Color 275 3,137 14,272 112,206 234,538 364,428 668,883
White (%) 79.85 80.09 73.33 78.90 82.50 81.15 80.87
Black (%) 0.00 3.24 5.38 3.99 4.93 4.65 2.10
Asian (%) 0.00 0.43 1.46 1.39 1.70 1.59 1.42
Native American (%) 5.27 2.06 1.29 1.84 2.19 2.06 7.51
Others (%) 14.87 14.22 18.53 13.88 8.69 10.55 8.11
Hispanic (%) 14.87 25.47 29.61 22.66 18.71 20.24 17.66
Color (%) 20.15 30.97 37.02 29.58 27.07 28.12 28.23
Female (%) 48.21 49.81 47.30 51.82 50.43 50.74 50.64
Old (65+ years) (%) 9.23 8.18 7.12 19.38 10.08 12.70 13.19
Kid (<5 years) (%) 6.23 11.33 11.99 9.84 9.80 9.89 9.30
Native-born (%) 92.89 90.32 91.61 92.68 91.30 91.71 92.80
Renter housing units 20.21 22.27 34.78 23.84 37.08 32.95 27.74
(%)
Education (%) 14.12 8.44 12.64 13.97 20.77 18.45 21.31
Unemployment (%) 12.74 10.17 8.92 7.56 6.49 6.85 7.36
Poverty (%) 26.30 22.84 20.52 13.05 14.66 14.42 16.47
Mean household 38,481 48,753 54,608 54,603 60,623 58,632 57,882
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 2,112 15,826 62,558 570,281 1,149,152 1,799,929 3,330,703
White 1,615 11,767 45,916 398,763 841,429 1,299,490 2,572,225
Black 15 583 2,661 26,280 55,123 84,662 69,654
Asian 10 99 922 8,189 28,148 37,368 60,021
Native American 49 309 703 9,584 25,715 36,360 217,182
Others 423 3,073 12,357 127,445 198,728 342,026 411,644
Hispanic 712 5,260 20,013 208,105 347,341 581,431 713,886
Color 779 6,310 24,968 258,156 469,773 759,986 1,098,581
(continued)
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 181
Fig. B.4 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Arkansas
Nuclear One, Arkansas, in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 183
Table B.4 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Arkansas Nuclear
One, Arkansas, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 8 10 12 11 4 45 641
Tract area (sq. mile) 196 851 1,943 2,258 799 6,046 47,133
Total population 32,038 34,024 38,439 38,745 11,044 154,290 2,196,442
White 30,524 32,899 36,164 36,706 10,898 147,191 1,797,202
Black 1,070 624 1,766 1,666 62 5,188 368,268
Asian 134 167 178 84 19 582 11,513
Native American 223 221 245 224 66 979 13,339
Others 93 106 87 63 0 349 6,109
Hispanic 292 315 273 279 53 1,212 18,372
Color 1,700 1,335 2,432 2,219 193 7,879 410,211
White (%) 95.27 96.69 94.08 94.74 98.68 95.40 81.82
Black (%) 3.34 1.83 4.59 4.30 0.56 3.36 16.77
Asian (%) 0.42 0.49 0.46 0.22 0.17 0.38 0.52
Native American (%) 0.70 0.65 0.64 0.58 0.60 0.63 0.61
Others (%) 0.29 0.31 0.23 0.16 0.00 0.23 0.28
Hispanic (%) 0.91 0.93 0.71 0.72 0.48 0.79 0.84
Color (%) 5.31 3.92 6.33 5.73 1.75 5.11 18.68
Female (%) 51.26 51.17 51.10 51.27 49.09 51.05 51.89
Old (65+ years) (%) 12.93 14.50 16.97 17.38 33.51 16.88 14.74
Kid (<5 years) (%) 8.62 8.25 8.09 8.11 4.62 7.99 8.50
Native-born (%) 99.37 98.86 99.20 99.48 99.19 99.23 98.92
Renter housing units 32.26 20.41 20.44 18.02 13.20 21.51 27.49
(%)
Education (%) 17.43 10.09 8.78 7.39 19.45 11.31 13.46
Unemployment (%) 6.33 6.03 7.60 7.77 5.48 6.88 6.75
Poverty (%) 14.10 17.28 18.65 21.98 13.54 17.89 19.15
Mean household 47,160 39,906 38,991 35,133 53,826 41,096 45,209
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 37,734 41,883 42,616 44,654 15,982 182,869 2,490,531
White 34,594 39,037 38,594 41,468 15,478 169,171 1,967,995
Black 1,240 384 1,727 1,540 233 5,124 412,757
Asian 255 114 193 188 23 773 19,842
Native American 309 271 151 271 27 1,029 17,463
Others 1,341 2,072 1,951 1,186 225 6,775 72,471
Hispanic 1,167 2,331 2,090 692 184 6,464 79,112
Color 3,445 3,806 4,717 3,460 622 16,050 557,285
(continued)
184 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Fig. B.5 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Diablo Canyon
Nuclear Power Plant, California, in 2010
186 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Table B.5 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Diablo Canyon
Nuclear Power Plant, California, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 7 23 27 22 11 90 7,967
Tract area (sq. mile) 358 181 1,051 1,352 106 3,048 160,647
Total population 39,157 89,483 107,194 80,430 45,168 361,432 29,398,594
White 36,325 77,343 77,687 68,790 33,571 293,716 20,261,924
Black 398 3,568 1,570 2,624 3,016 11,176 2,187,592
Asian 1,374 3,678 4,372 2,466 2,244 14,134 2,833,691
Native American 328 860 1,308 833 712 4,041 244,866
Others 768 4,011 22,240 5,714 5,618 38,351 3,870,512
Hispanic 3,136 11,985 36,995 12,530 9,663 74,309 7,483,224
Color 5,001 19,405 43,312 17,898 15,241 100,857 12,565,203
White (%) 92.77 86.43 72.47 85.53 74.32 81.26 68.92
Black (%) 1.02 3.99 1.46 3.26 6.68 3.09 7.44
Asian (%) 3.51 4.11 4.08 3.07 4.97 3.91 9.64
Native American (%) 0.84 0.96 1.22 1.04 1.58 1.12 0.83
Others (%) 1.96 4.48 20.75 7.10 12.44 10.61 13.17
Hispanic (%) 8.01 13.39 34.51 15.58 21.39 20.56 25.45
Color (%) 12.77 21.69 40.41 22.25 33.74 27.90 42.74
Female (%) 51.30 45.82 49.80 49.58 49.50 48.89 50.01
Old (65+ years) (%) 17.81 13.99 11.49 12.98 9.21 12.84 10.46
Kid (<5 years) (%) 7.23 5.73 10.92 9.66 11.44 9.02 9.56
Native-born (%) 92.81 91.18 83.17 92.44 88.41 88.92 78.17
Renter housing units 32.46 44.19 37.18 28.39 41.51 36.90 41.25
(%)
Education (%) 31.11 22.73 14.37 18.84 17.49 19.81 23.40
Unemployment (%) 3.76 6.14 6.93 5.65 6.95 6.09 6.65
Poverty (%) 9.40 18.65 14.44 7.20 13.02 13.00 12.50
Mean household 72,435 58,966 62,857 70,037 62,859 64,682 76,051
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 40,444 97,522 130,641 92,047 48,908 409,562 33,462,086
White 35,637 81,088 89,862 74,754 33,562 314,903 19,808,056
Black 376 2,814 1,774 1,807 3,177 9,948 2,209,242
Asian 1,417 3,865 4,099 3,000 1,981 14,362 3,782,471
Native American 247 693 1,584 830 817 4,171 308,044
Others 2,810 9,033 33,303 11,656 9,359 66,161 7,354,290
Hispanic 4,324 16,140 57,347 19,507 15,974 113,292 10,855,840
Color 7,169 25,603 66,358 27,243 22,890 149,263 17,951,222
White (%) 88.11 83.15 68.79 81.21 68.62 76.89 59.20
(continued)
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 187
Fig. B.6 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Millstone Power
Station, Connecticut, in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 189
Table B.6 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Millstone Power
Station, Connecticut, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 32 47 56 161 99 395 5,601
Tract area (sq. 266 1,698 1,112 1,375 651 5,103 56,540
mile)
Total population 118,811 177,020 230,951 629,978 365,327 1,522,087 20,758,812
White 104,298 169,316 221,012 588,085 269,809 1,352,520 15,827,065
Black 8,990 4,061 5,988 22,550 56,558 98,147 3,073,983
Asian 2,059 1,908 1,434 8,264 6,058 19,723 736,121
Native American 604 752 813 2,186 1,062 5,417 64,730
Others 2,863 978 1,715 8,896 31,835 46,287 1,056,919
Hispanic 5,706 3,328 4,360 23,402 52,940 89,736 2,309,453
Color 17,009 10,018 12,513 56,031 113,106 208,677 5,922,545
White (%) 87.78 95.65 95.70 93.35 73.85 88.86 76.24
Black (%) 7.57 2.29 2.59 3.58 15.48 6.45 14.81
Asian (%) 1.73 1.08 0.62 1.31 1.66 1.30 3.55
Native American 0.51 0.42 0.35 0.35 0.29 0.36 0.31
(%)
Others (%) 2.41 0.55 0.74 1.41 8.71 3.04 5.09
Hispanic (%) 4.80 1.88 1.89 3.71 14.49 5.90 11.13
Color (%) 14.32 5.66 5.42 8.89 30.96 13.71 28.53
Female (%) 48.26 50.85 50.79 51.88 51.88 51.31 52.08
Old (65+ years) 12.72 13.90 12.49 14.80 12.15 13.55 13.26
(%)
Kid (<5 years) (%) 8.79 8.37 8.39 7.61 9.00 8.24 8.29
Native-born (%) 95.35 95.72 95.83 92.94 89.25 93.00 84.97
Renter housing 35.27 24.61 17.99 28.65 45.72 30.88 42.70
units (%)
Education (%) 23.61 23.75 27.76 24.41 20.54 23.89 23.64
Unemployment (%) 6.05 5.42 4.95 4.56 6.79 5.35 6.73
Poverty (%) 6.33 5.37 5.19 5.34 14.03 7.50 12.28
Mean household 70,684 77,408 86,104 77,147 64,401 74,916 74,244
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 115,203 188,366 257,325 666,051 362,705 1,589,650 21,840,692
White 95,049 172,513 239,689 580,046 244,041 1,331,338 15,228,340
Black 8,948 5,042 5,792 34,218 56,329 110,329 3,227,051
Asian 3,031 2,475 2,820 14,919 9,431 32,676 1,127,550
Native American 740 1,619 836 2,520 1,042 6,757 87,100
Others 7,456 6,702 8,199 34,364 51,848 108,569 2,170,631
Hispanic 8,583 6,851 10,193 50,324 65,674 141,625 3,132,790
Color 23,862 19,475 23,021 109,403 137,811 313,572 7,858,900
White (%) 82.51 91.58 93.15 87.09 67.28 83.75 69.72
(continued)
190 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Fig. B.7 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Saint Lucie,
Florida, in 2010
192 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Table B.7 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Saint Lucie,
Florida, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 35 41 34 60 96 266 3,979
Tract area (sq. 234 623 759 1,130 548 3,296 62,462
mile)
Total population 132,150 108,530 102,822 126,571 262,246 732,319 12,205,582
White 111,476 96,285 90,925 118,866 195,351 612,903 10,142,813
Black 18,060 10,615 9,469 3,328 58,913 100,385 1,655,553
Asian 778 592 609 1,026 2,977 5,982 144,219
Native American 341 187 199 375 570 1,672 40,941
Others 1,489 863 1,611 2,969 4,449 11,381 222,066
Hispanic 4,855 2,983 3,965 6,965 22,856 41,624 1,513,424
Color 23,803 14,237 14,140 11,732 83,969 147,881 3,301,312
White (%) 84.36 88.72 88.43 93.91 74.49 83.69 83.10
Black (%) 13.67 9.78 9.21 2.63 22.46 13.71 13.56
Asian (%) 0.59 0.55 0.59 0.81 1.14 0.82 1.18
Native American 0.26 0.17 0.19 0.30 0.22 0.23 0.34
(%)
Others (%) 1.13 0.80 1.57 2.35 1.70 1.55 1.82
Hispanic (%) 3.67 2.75 3.86 5.50 8.72 5.68 12.40
Color (%) 18.01 13.12 13.75 9.27 32.02 20.19 27.05
Female (%) 51.67 51.51 50.47 50.73 51.49 51.25 51.68
Old (65+ years) 23.04 25.28 23.59 18.57 18.34 20.99 18.15
(%)
Kid (<5 years) (%) 7.97 6.90 6.74 7.70 8.78 7.88 7.81
Native-born (%) 93.06 94.66 93.80 93.37 87.41 91.43 86.89
Renter housing 22.10 18.62 18.89 20.20 28.65 23.07 27.86
units (%)
Education (%) 14.27 18.77 21.85 21.99 18.07 18.71 18.25
Unemployment (%) 7.20 5.33 5.39 4.08 6.04 5.70 5.79
Poverty (%) 12.32 8.99 9.02 9.14 12.41 10.85 12.80
Mean household 57,422 73,203 76,239 73,685 66,000 68,322 59,432
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 157,349 147,427 124,539 179,907 321,611 930,833 15,051,545
White 126,970 128,081 109,638 160,956 213,372 739,017 11,724,285
Black 21,221 13,421 8,984 6,928 80,707 131,261 2,180,844
Asian 1,436 1,157 921 2,703 5,504 11,721 259,468
Native American 413 451 330 366 1,040 2,600 51,828
Others 7,302 4,331 4,653 8,921 21,014 46,221 835,133
Hispanic 13,508 8,159 8,239 18,018 47,076 95,000 2,585,314
(continued)
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 193
Fig. B.8 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Turkey Point
Nuclear Generating, Florida, in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 195
Table B.8 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Turkey Point
Nuclear Generating, Florida, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 26 97 236 193 139 691 3,554
Tract area (sq. 208 599 588 2,794 242 4,431 61,326
mile)
Total population 89,348 362,555 847,153 721,636 468,445 2,489,137 10,448,764
White 58,339 294,607 658,329 475,188 389,620 1,876,083 8,879,633
Black 22,707 46,829 129,598 208,634 64,701 472,469 1,283,469
Asian 1,251 9,012 6,571 9,146 6,461 32,441 117,760
Native American 355 552 976 1,185 1,397 4,465 38,148
Others 6,704 11,544 51,705 27,477 6,252 103,682 129,765
Hispanic 27,217 127,347 557,806 249,329 48,145 1,009,844 545,204
Color 50,859 181,670 681,481 457,442 118,755 1,490,207 1,958,986
White (%) 65.29 81.26 77.71 65.85 83.17 75.37 84.98
Black (%) 25.41 12.92 15.30 28.91 13.81 18.98 12.28
Asian (%) 1.40 2.49 0.78 1.27 1.38 1.30 1.13
Native American 0.40 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.30 0.18 0.37
(%)
Others (%) 7.50 3.18 6.10 3.81 1.33 4.17 1.24
Hispanic (%) 30.46 35.12 65.84 34.55 10.28 40.57 5.22
Color (%) 56.92 50.11 80.44 63.39 25.35 59.87 18.75
Female (%) 50.02 51.65 52.05 52.91 51.65 52.09 51.55
Old (65+ years) 9.31 8.66 16.14 15.00 16.87 14.61 19.19
(%)
Kid (<5 years) 11.87 9.21 7.83 8.71 7.59 8.38 7.68
(%)
Native-born (%) 81.77 69.11 42.53 62.01 84.47 61.35 93.29
Renter housing 39.97 29.04 49.39 34.49 27.42 37.28 25.58
units (%)
Education (%) 10.72 31.65 16.61 15.57 18.96 18.70 18.18
Unemployment 7.53 4.86 8.65 7.70 5.49 7.14 5.43
(%)
Poverty (%) 21.95 8.97 22.76 15.35 10.76 16.29 11.83
Mean household 49,888 88,232 54,126 60,719 66,146 63,151 59,246
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 99,529 461,953 920,354 913,887 628,598 3,024,321 12,958,057
White 55,125 356,258 722,966 520,497 476,049 2,130,895 10,332,407
Black 30,816 55,493 110,717 297,104 96,481 590,611 1,721,494
Asian 1,187 11,351 8,006 14,613 15,638 50,795 220,394
Native American 137 1,389 1,634 1,984 1,976 7,120 47,308
Others 12,273 37,454 77,017 79,689 38,437 244,870 636,484
Hispanic 45,524 240,853 651,320 391,989 128,148 1,457,834 1,222,480
(continued)
196 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Fig. B.9 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Edwin I. Hatch
Nuclear Plant, Georgia, in 2010
198 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Table B.9 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Edwin I. Hatch
Nuclear Plant, Georgia, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 3 10 16 23 20 72 1,897
Tract area (sq. mile) 333 842 1,516 2,060 1,835 6,586 52,839
Total population 9,459 39,605 45,207 82,460 67,051 243,782 6,234,427
White 6,608 31,273 33,461 57,591 50,374 179,307 4,424,063
Black 2,595 7,488 11,279 23,146 16,157 60,665 1,684,207
Asian 1 64 76 534 269 944 72,812
Native American 22 118 39 186 104 469 14,813
Others 237 663 344 1,000 158 2,402 38,495
Hispanic 264 861 592 1,839 400 3,956 97,435
Color 2,878 8,518 11,952 25,591 16,887 65,826 1,862,637
White (%) 69.86 78.96 74.02 69.84 75.13 73.55 70.96
Black (%) 27.43 18.91 24.95 28.07 24.10 24.88 27.01
Asian (%) 0.01 0.16 0.17 0.65 0.40 0.39 1.17
Native American (%) 0.23 0.30 0.09 0.23 0.16 0.19 0.24
Others (%) 2.51 1.67 0.76 1.21 0.24 0.99 0.62
Hispanic (%) 2.79 2.17 1.31 2.23 0.60 1.62 1.56
Color (%) 30.43 21.51 26.44 31.03 25.19 27.00 29.88
Female (%) 50.66 49.44 52.17 49.57 52.49 50.88 51.53
Old (65+ years) (%) 10.97 11.30 14.20 11.14 12.04 11.97 10.00
Kid (<5 years) (%) 8.30 8.55 8.45 10.10 9.61 9.34 9.14
Native-born (%) 99.03 98.79 99.09 98.74 99.33 98.99 97.26
Renter housing units 18.48 27.00 25.12 29.62 25.02 26.56 31.63
(%)
Education (%) 5.79 9.11 9.54 9.41 10.07 9.43 19.69
Unemployment (%) 6.68 5.76 5.61 6.23 6.29 6.06 5.73
Poverty (%) 22.77 19.83 23.72 23.56 20.18 22.01 14.37
Mean household 40,800 43,952 44,102 41,438 44,229 43,121 61,069
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 10,524 45,652 51,136 96,476 80,828 284,616 7,901,837
White 7,454 33,027 35,664 63,657 55,714 195,516 5,131,659
Black 2,465 9,230 13,406 27,346 21,630 74,077 2,268,033
Asian 11 309 184 699 562 1,765 173,564
Native American 0 93 187 304 140 724 22,964
Others 597 3,002 1,676 4,475 2,795 12,545 305,606
Hispanic 663 3,992 1,886 5,908 2,838 15,287 414,689
(continued)
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 199
Fig. B.10 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Vogtle Electric
Generating Plant, Georgia, in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 201
Table B.10 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Vogtle Electric
Generating Plant, Georgia, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 2 11 62 50 14 139 2,933
Tract area (sq. mile) 325 1,146 1,365 1,978 1,434 6,248 85,198
Total population 6,629 36,043 245,643 180,329 49,337 517,981 9,446,914
White 3,583 21,485 141,389 129,742 25,072 321,271 6,689,779
Black 3,009 14,313 98,548 47,408 24,121 187,399 2,597,474
Asian 0 67 3,180 2,481 31 5,759 89,294
Native American 6 102 679 311 64 1,162 23,053
Others 31 78 1,846 378 49 2,382 47,291
Hispanic 38 189 3,876 1,738 160 6,001 123,720
Color 3,055 14,671 105,948 51,775 24,350 199,799 2,823,437
White (%) 54.05 59.61 57.56 71.95 50.82 62.02 70.81
Black (%) 45.39 39.71 40.12 26.29 48.89 36.18 27.50
Asian (%) 0.00 0.19 1.29 1.38 0.06 1.11 0.95
Native American 0.09 0.28 0.28 0.17 0.13 0.22 0.24
(%)
Others (%) 0.47 0.22 0.75 0.21 0.10 0.46 0.50
Hispanic (%) 0.57 0.52 1.58 0.96 0.32 1.16 1.31
Color (%) 46.09 40.70 43.13 28.71 49.35 38.57 29.89
Female (%) 50.20 52.51 51.69 51.40 52.07 51.66 51.55
Old (65+ years) (%) 9.49 10.47 10.83 9.45 12.38 10.46 10.53
Kid (<5 years) (%) 10.42 10.18 9.57 9.50 9.90 9.63 8.99
Native-born (%) 99.70 99.31 97.74 97.82 99.70 98.09 97.74
Renter housing 16.76 22.45 34.44 24.41 23.61 28.97 29.80
units (%)
Education (%) 5.62 10.53 15.24 20.52 9.46 16.11 18.50
Unemployment (%) 7.39 7.50 6.87 5.24 6.36 6.27 5.65
Poverty (%) 28.92 20.85 18.86 13.99 25.33 18.06 14.73
Mean household 40,703 48,701 49,739 62,449 41,184 53,117 58,054
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 7,929 43,024 264,222 213,861 58,281 587,317 11,611,148
White 4,311 24,830 134,664 148,505 30,561 342,871 7,679,982
Black 3,560 17,122 118,375 56,432 26,662 222,151 3,302,686
Asian 6 181 3,122 4,016 187 7,512 205,706
Native American 0 158 801 731 208 1,898 36,478
Others 52 739 7,256 4,171 660 12,878 386,303
Hispanic 110 981 7,174 3,824 1,062 13,151 509,653
Color 3,672 18,751 132,525 67,414 28,316 250,678 4,163,659
(continued)
202 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Fig. B.11 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Braidwood
Station, Illinois, in 2010
204 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Fig. B.12 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Byron Station,
Illinois, in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 207
Table B.12 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Byron Station,
Illinois, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 5 60 66 38 30 199 4,333
Tract area (sq. mile) 300 945 1,657 1,443 1,283 5,627 117,783
Total population 19,736 206,595 243,810 125,999 110,481 706,621 15,615,730
White 19,556 176,787 229,393 116,345 108,690 650,771 12,821,452
Black 9 22,840 6,733 6,699 396 36,677 1,898,484
Asian 74 2,364 3,500 603 539 7,080 330,908
Native American 66 593 543 312 371 1,885 61,900
Others 29 4,006 3,647 2,044 484 10,210 502,957
Hispanic 161 7,220 7,513 3,985 1,495 20,374 945,920
Color 314 33,108 18,181 11,627 2,793 66,023 3,216,509
White (%) 99.09 85.57 94.09 92.34 98.38 92.10 82.11
Black (%) 0.05 11.06 2.76 5.32 0.36 5.19 12.16
Asian (%) 0.37 1.14 1.44 0.48 0.49 1.00 2.12
Native American (%) 0.33 0.29 0.22 0.25 0.34 0.27 0.40
Others (%) 0.15 1.94 1.50 1.62 0.44 1.44 3.22
Hispanic (%) 0.82 3.49 3.08 3.16 1.35 2.88 6.06
Color (%) 1.59 16.03 7.46 9.23 2.53 9.34 20.60
Female (%) 50.78 51.49 51.66 51.16 51.15 51.41 51.35
Old (65+ years) (%) 15.13 13.75 12.33 13.27 13.40 13.16 12.76
Kid (<5 years) (%) 8.72 9.24 8.19 9.13 9.15 8.83 8.91
Native-born (%) 98.97 96.32 96.75 97.96 98.43 97.17 93.25
Renter housing units 24.78 34.11 29.13 28.33 29.60 30.46 32.23
(%)
Education (%) 15.36 14.27 18.65 11.75 13.05 15.13 20.28
Unemployment (%) 5.27 5.84 4.85 5.46 5.14 5.30 6.24
Poverty (%) 5.90 11.95 9.59 10.43 8.55 10.17 11.61
Mean household 59,673 54,360 62,984 56,810 58,473 58,488 64,540
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 22,901 212,942 281,564 136,609 119,531 773,547 17,009,420
White 22,342 168,157 252,652 122,351 114,697 680,199 13,216,918
Black 74 27,743 11,306 6,562 879 46,564 2,118,410
Asian 50 2,824 4,622 984 591 9,071 502,834
Native American 37 816 620 493 447 2,413 77,655
Others 398 13,398 12,369 6,218 2,914 35,297 1,093,607
Hispanic 415 19,204 15,692 9,248 3,596 48,155 1,672,035
Color 724 53,299 35,945 18,634 6,525 115,127 4,556,784
(continued)
208 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Fig. B.13 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Clinton Power
Station, Illinois, in 2010
210 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Table B.13 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Clinton Power
Station, Illinois, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 4 10 90 37 13 154 2,969
Tract area (sq. mile) 254 823 1,713 1,783 1,278 5,851 52,063
Total population 13,021 35,172 303,709 147,650 48,624 548,176 10,882,407
White 12,902 34,568 272,592 128,355 48,287 496,704 8,461,209
Black 58 428 26,241 10,690 27 37,444 1,653,413
Asian 32 32 3,518 6,753 98 10,433 274,495
Native American 23 76 560 331 91 1,081 22,987
Others 6 65 800 1,522 121 2,514 470,291
Hispanic 74 157 2,410 3,242 505 6,388 872,300
Color 187 705 32,694 20,989 722 55,297 2,804,560
White (%) 99.09 98.28 89.75 86.93 99.31 90.61 77.75
Black (%) 0.45 1.22 8.64 7.24 0.06 6.83 15.19
Asian (%) 0.25 0.09 1.16 4.57 0.20 1.90 2.52
Native American 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.21
(%)
Others (%) 0.05 0.18 0.26 1.03 0.25 0.46 4.32
Hispanic (%) 0.57 0.45 0.79 2.20 1.04 1.17 8.02
Color (%) 1.44 2.00 10.76 14.22 1.48 10.09 25.77
Female (%) 51.10 50.73 52.37 48.68 51.86 51.20 51.49
Old (65+ years) (%) 17.16 11.98 12.50 9.60 17.29 12.22 12.57
Kid (<5 years) (%) 8.47 8.58 8.22 7.51 8.48 8.08 8.92
Native-born (%) 99.52 99.42 98.21 94.04 99.03 97.27 91.39
Renter housing 29.21 18.49 32.93 42.39 24.29 33.57 33.35
units (%)
Education (%) 11.75 16.89 24.90 25.90 11.40 22.95 20.95
Unemployment (%) 6.19 4.54 5.01 4.53 4.21 4.81 6.73
Poverty (%) 10.30 5.76 12.27 16.59 9.31 12.59 11.87
Mean household 52,091 64,651 59,178 51,492 54,360 57,000 67,629
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 13,049 39,455 325,882 148,972 50,051 577,409 11,841,884
White 12,783 38,295 276,875 123,571 48,937 500,461 8,623,103
Black 38 597 33,812 12,609 130 47,186 1,817,433
Asian 42 151 7,211 8,633 140 16,177 411,074
Native American 16 82 523 337 53 1,011 29,396
Others 170 328 7,460 3,821 791 12,570 960,882
Hispanic 197 330 6,547 3,481 994 11,549 1,517,592
Color 426 1,363 52,396 27,178 1,621 82,984 3,912,901
White (%) 97.96 97.06 84.96 82.95 97.77 86.67 72.82
(continued)
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 211
Fig. B.14 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Dresden
Nuclear Power Station, Illinois, in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 213
Table B.14 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Dresden Nuclear
Power Station, Illinois, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 17 85 212 413 310 1,037 2,086
Tract area (sq. 251 952 1,729 1,820 1,085 5,838 52,075
mile)
Total population 44,647 200,027 726,503 1,677,784 1,252,112 3,901,073 7,529,510
White 43,455 165,920 629,535 1,293,755 882,651 3,015,316 5,942,597
Black 520 24,232 59,011 318,961 227,662 630,386 1,060,471
Asian 216 1,291 17,344 31,150 39,954 89,955 194,973
Native 96 516 1,171 2,577 1,965 6,325 17,743
American
Others 363 8,076 19,417 31,348 99,874 159,078 313,727
Hispanic 957 13,800 40,275 74,537 173,573 303,142 575,546
Color 1,736 39,486 116,706 425,491 441,282 1,024,701 1,835,156
White (%) 97.33 82.95 86.65 77.11 70.49 77.29 78.92
Black (%) 1.16 12.11 8.12 19.01 18.18 16.16 14.08
Asian (%) 0.48 0.65 2.39 1.86 3.19 2.31 2.59
Native 0.22 0.26 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.24
American (%)
Others (%) 0.81 4.04 2.67 1.87 7.98 4.08 4.17
Hispanic (%) 2.14 6.90 5.54 4.44 13.86 7.77 7.64
Color (%) 3.89 19.74 16.06 25.36 35.24 26.27 24.37
Female (%) 49.54 50.14 50.91 51.88 51.23 51.37 51.52
Old (65+ years) 9.79 11.21 8.70 12.78 10.48 11.16 13.27
(%)
Kid (<5 years) 9.45 9.21 10.10 8.88 9.52 9.34 8.65
(%)
Native-born (%) 98.27 95.86 94.17 93.58 86.33 91.53 91.74
Renter housing 23.06 26.18 23.93 24.58 34.79 27.80 35.93
units (%)
Education (%) 14.00 14.24 24.78 22.52 18.44 21.12 21.00
Unemployment 5.00 6.31 4.38 6.01 6.97 6.02 6.97
(%)
Poverty (%) 5.18 8.27 5.23 7.30 9.55 7.67 14.13
Mean household 70,896 65,575 80,845 76,836 68,798 74,364 63,637
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 54,839 265,028 922,960 1,773,233 1,416,976 4,433,036 7,986,257
White 52,169 215,458 739,064 1,227,569 867,821 3,102,081 6,021,483
Black 957 28,127 94,872 387,663 255,674 767,293 1,097,326
Asian 222 3,269 35,311 47,345 66,231 152,378 274,873
Native 64 691 1,861 3,553 4,621 10,790 19,617
American
Others 1,430 17,485 51,847 107,099 222,622 400,483 572,969
Hispanic 2,211 29,986 87,602 172,023 374,398 666,220 862,921
(continued)
214 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Fig. B.15 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding LaSalle
County Station, Illinois, in 2010
216 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Table B.15 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from LaSalle County
Station, Illinois, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 3 25 36 93 78 235 2,888
Tract area (sq. mile) 188 1,133 1,545 1,931 978 5,775 52,139
Total population 10,831 94,231 110,499 244,400 223,305 683,266 10,747,317
White 10,725 91,717 106,268 207,604 191,201 607,515 8,350,398
Black 23 1,048 2,243 25,300 14,318 42,932 1,647,925
Asian 41 208 499 1,737 3,508 5,993 278,935
Native American 39 263 213 509 419 1,443 22,625
Others 3 996 1,276 9,272 13,844 25,391 447,414
Hispanic 95 2,607 2,535 16,504 26,543 48,284 830,404
Color 190 4,144 5,476 43,685 44,387 97,882 2,761,975
White (%) 99.02 97.33 96.17 84.94 85.62 88.91 77.70
Black (%) 0.21 1.11 2.03 10.35 6.41 6.28 15.33
Asian (%) 0.38 0.22 0.45 0.71 1.57 0.88 2.60
Native American 0.36 0.28 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.21
(%)
Others (%) 0.03 1.06 1.15 3.79 6.20 3.72 4.16
Hispanic (%) 0.88 2.77 2.29 6.75 11.89 7.07 7.73
Color (%) 1.75 4.40 4.96 17.87 19.88 14.33 25.70
Female (%) 50.08 50.89 50.44 50.26 50.43 50.43 51.54
Old (65+ years) (%) 14.63 16.04 13.80 12.27 8.73 11.92 12.59
Kid (<5 years) (%) 8.20 8.41 8.68 9.09 11.34 9.65 8.84
Native-born (%) 99.34 98.37 98.23 95.85 92.61 95.58 91.42
Renter housing units 21.94 26.92 24.16 26.20 27.94 26.45 33.77
(%)
Education (%) 8.43 10.72 11.30 14.14 24.83 16.46 21.33
Unemployment (%) 9.15 6.92 5.78 5.61 4.55 5.49 6.71
Poverty (%) 9.59 10.36 8.02 8.04 6.66 7.93 12.16
Mean household 52,577 55,557 58,868 64,361 75,609 65,522 67,207
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 11,165 99,235 125,264 318,005 333,166 886,835 11,532,458
White 10,930 94,847 118,096 261,283 265,495 750,651 8,372,913
Black 11 1,763 2,616 30,533 22,255 57,178 1,807,441
Asian 57 372 525 4,327 12,869 18,150 409,101
Native American 17 131 257 917 782 2,104 28,303
Others 150 2,125 3,775 20,992 31,724 58,766 914,686
Hispanic 110 4,512 5,403 35,981 57,740 103,746 1,425,395
Color 312 7,297 9,867 74,183 97,297 188,956 3,806,929
(continued)
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 217
Fig. B.16 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Quad Cities
Nuclear Power Station, Illinois, in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 219
Table B.16 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Quad Cities
Nuclear Power Station, Illinois, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 7 63 51 22 11 154 3,794
Tract area (sq. mile) 272 909 1,628 2,047 968 5,824 108,363
Total population 33,742 226,327 169,415 72,924 37,153 539,561 13,667,777
White 33,015 209,709 156,924 70,767 36,474 506,889 11,136,128
Black 438 10,299 8,520 485 406 20,148 1,717,967
Asian 68 1,568 985 233 82 2,936 306,319
Native American 131 723 526 126 57 1,563 30,316
Others 88 4,030 2,460 1,318 129 8,025 477,042
Hispanic 322 8,889 5,783 2,342 298 17,634 891,696
Color 967 21,410 15,555 3,191 910 42,033 2,927,212
White (%) 97.85 92.66 92.63 97.04 98.17 93.94 81.48
Black (%) 1.30 4.55 5.03 0.67 1.09 3.73 12.57
Asian (%) 0.20 0.69 0.58 0.32 0.22 0.54 2.24
Native American 0.39 0.32 0.31 0.17 0.15 0.29 0.22
(%)
Others (%) 0.26 1.78 1.45 1.81 0.35 1.49 3.49
Hispanic (%) 0.95 3.93 3.41 3.21 0.80 3.27 6.52
Color (%) 2.87 9.46 9.18 4.38 2.45 7.79 21.42
Female (%) 51.39 51.71 51.57 51.37 52.25 51.64 51.49
Old (65+ years) (%) 14.19 12.95 14.99 16.09 19.39 14.54 13.04
Kid (<5 years) (%) 8.30 8.98 8.53 8.19 7.60 8.59 8.80
Native-born (%) 99.26 97.77 98.16 98.80 99.05 98.21 92.79
Renter housing 23.73 31.72 27.53 24.88 22.96 28.35 32.41
units (%)
Education (%) 14.43 19.45 12.39 10.91 11.04 15.14 20.43
Unemployment (%) 6.74 5.82 6.35 5.15 6.23 5.98 6.23
Poverty (%) 9.75 11.78 13.14 10.25 11.54 11.85 11.82
Mean household 54,959 56,525 51,892 52,878 47,269 53,843 64,541
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 32,764 234,762 169,147 74,209 36,753 547,635 14,797,982
White 31,489 209,459 151,031 70,901 35,260 498,140 11,375,161
Black 518 11,027 9,844 426 372 22,187 1,902,190
Asian 128 3,049 1,040 318 89 4,624 458,605
Native American 127 967 620 158 31 1,903 37,767
Others 500 10,261 6,613 2,408 999 20,781 1,024,259
Hispanic 641 14,572 8,323 3,413 805 27,754 1,582,888
Color 1,666 32,245 21,690 4,776 1,809 62,186 4,146,997
(continued)
220 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Fig. B.17 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Duane Arnold
Energy Center, Iowa, in 2010
222 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Table B.17 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Duane Arnold
Energy Center, Iowa, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 22 27 16 50 14 129 696
Tract area (sq. mile) 291 973 1,505 1,955 1,071 5,795 50,478
Total population 77,265 102,461 63,200 176,101 43,929 462,956 2,313,799
White 75,417 98,804 62,432 164,558 40,575 441,786 2,243,318
Black 824 2,413 408 6,638 2,978 13,261 33,997
Asian 734 762 160 4,094 165 5,915 18,412
Native American 86 230 91 214 111 732 7,079
Others 202 253 112 596 98 1,261 11,001
Hispanic 608 749 253 1,645 368 3,623 27,019
Color 2,266 4,164 887 12,611 3,604 23,532 85,856
White (%) 97.61 96.43 98.78 93.45 92.36 95.43 96.95
Black (%) 1.07 2.36 0.65 3.77 6.78 2.86 1.47
Asian (%) 0.95 0.74 0.25 2.32 0.38 1.28 0.80
Native American (%) 0.11 0.22 0.14 0.12 0.25 0.16 0.31
Others (%) 0.26 0.25 0.18 0.34 0.22 0.27 0.48
Hispanic (%) 0.79 0.73 0.40 0.93 0.84 0.78 1.17
Color (%) 2.93 4.06 1.40 7.16 8.20 5.08 3.71
Female (%) 51.08 51.68 50.13 51.19 52.49 51.26 51.64
Old (65+ years) (%) 10.29 14.19 13.74 12.00 16.72 12.88 15.83
Kid (<5 years) (%) 8.79 8.56 8.74 8.29 8.86 8.55 8.41
Native-born (%) 98.32 98.51 99.31 96.73 99.37 97.99 98.53
Renter housing units 27.88 28.05 21.76 38.08 26.53 30.86 27.31
(%)
Education (%) 24.31 17.43 15.93 27.42 10.30 21.33 15.98
Unemployment (%) 4.77 6.26 4.56 4.34 5.73 4.99 4.44
Poverty (%) 6.15 11.26 8.76 16.43 16.17 12.45 11.29
Mean household 64,629 59,144 56,997 54,324 43,093 56,429 51,501
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 90,277 114,979 72,354 186,824 46,027 510,461 2,415,863
White 85,844 107,818 70,570 168,664 41,008 473,904 2,275,833
Black 1,314 3,197 579 8,230 3,678 16,998 42,760
Asian 1,439 1,308 413 4,945 222 8,327 27,651
Native American 154 268 148 281 99 950 8,313
Others 1,520 2,392 649 4,701 1,020 10,282 61,306
Hispanic 1,414 1,461 708 4,204 1,076 8,863 72,638
Color 5,260 7,901 2,253 20,135 5,477 41,026 172,272
(continued)
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 223
Fig. B.18 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Wolf Creek
Generating Station, Kansas, in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 225
Table B.18 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Wolf Creek
Generating Station, Kansas, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 3 1 14 11 10 39 731
Tract area (sq. mile) 654 452 1,774 1,996 1,096 5,973 76,306
Total population 8,404 3,028 51,599 39,484 31,274 133,789 2,343,798
White 8,330 2,999 48,322 38,212 30,382 128,245 2,105,651
Black 11 7 894 369 236 1,517 140,440
Asian 2 0 728 215 51 996 30,120
Native American 59 21 342 323 300 1,045 22,208
Others 2 0 1,319 361 303 1,985 45,371
Hispanic 38 9 1,976 827 563 3,413 86,881
Color 110 34 3,904 1,670 1,142 6,860 276,841
White (%) 99.12 99.04 93.65 96.78 97.15 95.86 89.84
Black (%) 0.13 0.23 1.73 0.93 0.75 1.13 5.99
Asian (%) 0.02 0.00 1.41 0.54 0.16 0.74 1.29
Native American (%) 0.70 0.69 0.66 0.82 0.96 0.78 0.95
Others (%) 0.02 0.00 2.56 0.91 0.97 1.48 1.94
Hispanic (%) 0.45 0.30 3.83 2.09 1.80 2.55 3.71
Color (%) 1.31 1.12 7.57 4.23 3.65 5.13 11.81
Female (%) 50.51 50.59 51.28 51.56 51.67 51.39 50.94
Old (65+ years) (%) 19.61 16.88 15.79 17.35 17.87 17.00 13.64
Kid (<5 years) (%) 8.67 8.72 8.99 9.20 7.79 8.75 9.18
Native-born (%) 99.80 99.60 97.70 98.82 99.41 98.61 97.40
Renter housing units 20.26 11.69 29.62 23.62 19.84 24.57 29.28
(%)
Education (%) 13.46 6.07 14.00 16.39 12.25 14.07 21.50
Unemployment (%) 5.29 4.64 5.55 4.63 4.78 5.06 4.68
Poverty (%) 8.94 16.69 15.22 10.29 11.45 12.49 11.42
Mean household 47,226 46,237 42,044 50,760 48,175 46,456 56,668
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 8,865 3,072 53,774 42,012 33,274 140,997 2,547,421
White 8,521 3,002 47,328 40,169 31,879 130,899 2,181,220
Black 22 5 975 361 237 1,600 148,984
Asian 70 0 444 153 120 787 45,193
Native American 80 27 377 301 185 970 23,753
Others 172 35 4,656 1,024 847 6,734 148,278
Hispanic 122 32 5,967 1,240 686 8,047 178,252
Color 398 90 8,620 2,568 1,783 13,459 440,471
(continued)
226 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Fig. B.19 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding River Bend
Station, Louisiana, in 2010
228 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Table B.19 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from River Bend
Station, Louisiana, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 5 20 79 38 19 161 1,651
Tract area (sq. mile) 239 810 1,545 2,308 1,966 6,869 93,941
Total population 16,273 88,612 319,426 156,491 75,780 656,582 6,136,605
White 8,767 45,501 202,277 118,508 57,002 432,055 4,040,847
Black 7,455 42,749 111,543 36,150 17,981 215,878 1,998,642
Asian 13 151 4,004 1,219 313 5,700 46,681
Native American 32 172 544 313 91 1,152 27,777
Others 5 41 1,058 298 385 1,787 22,669
Hispanic 106 378 4,552 2,522 952 8,510 96,837
Color 7,594 43,373 120,438 40,155 19,451 231,011 2,162,469
White (%) 53.87 51.35 63.33 75.73 75.22 65.80 65.85
Black (%) 45.81 48.24 34.92 23.10 23.73 32.88 32.57
Asian (%) 0.08 0.17 1.25 0.78 0.41 0.87 0.76
Native American 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.20 0.12 0.18 0.45
(%)
Others (%) 0.03 0.05 0.33 0.19 0.51 0.27 0.37
Hispanic (%) 0.65 0.43 1.43 1.61 1.26 1.30 1.58
Color (%) 46.67 48.95 37.70 25.66 25.67 35.18 35.24
Female (%) 51.88 50.64 51.42 50.80 51.04 51.13 52.12
Old (65+ years) (%) 12.70 8.83 10.48 7.56 9.43 9.50 11.84
Kid (<5 years) (%) 9.78 9.52 9.00 10.40 10.30 9.57 9.45
Native-born (%) 99.25 99.47 97.70 98.35 99.16 98.30 98.43
Renter housing 21.57 22.69 35.18 22.75 16.08 28.33 28.27
units (%)
Education (%) 14.43 13.21 23.71 20.13 6.78 19.33 15.21
Unemployment (%) 10.11 10.78 8.67 7.16 9.50 8.69 9.24
Poverty (%) 31.64 21.85 22.06 18.63 22.07 21.44 24.49
Mean household 43,827 49,517 53,801 57,401 44,976 52,902 46,170
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 18,311 92,984 340,810 195,870 89,839 737,814 6,575,820
White 10,720 43,256 194,414 145,696 69,082 463,168 4,138,149
Black 7,377 48,128 133,868 44,762 18,486 252,621 2,225,382
Asian 39 447 6,596 2,276 599 9,957 65,300
Native American 32 218 917 684 247 2,098 35,571
Others 139 939 5,012 2,457 1,398 9,945 111,443
Hispanic 184 706 5,708 3,566 1,966 12,130 133,514
Color 7,672 50,016 149,958 52,517 21,789 281,952 2,508,726
White (%) 58.54 46.52 57.04 74.38 76.90 62.78 62.93
(continued)
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 229
Fig. B.20 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Waterford
Steam Electric Station, Louisiana, in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 231
Table B.20 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Waterford Steam
Electric Station, Louisiana, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 18 100 242 80 47 487 661
Tract area (sq. mile) 285 1,096 1,177 1,766 1,944 6,269 46,109
Total population 61,978 333,717 763,682 298,467 197,977 1,655,821 2,564,155
White 40,357 274,614 386,278 226,292 170,125 1,097,666 1,742,354
Black 20,849 48,108 357,404 62,343 24,157 512,861 785,800
Asian 296 5,475 9,836 6,254 1,524 23,385 16,289
Native American 136 749 2,853 2,733 1,459 7,930 12,144
Others 349 4,766 7,301 860 729 14,005 7,539
Hispanic 1,396 19,558 26,034 6,628 3,396 57,012 33,593
Color 22,566 73,483 393,883 77,755 30,459 598,146 845,481
White (%) 65.12 82.29 50.58 75.82 85.93 66.29 67.95
Black (%) 33.64 14.42 46.80 20.89 12.20 30.97 30.65
Asian (%) 0.48 1.64 1.29 2.10 0.77 1.41 0.64
Native American (%) 0.22 0.22 0.37 0.92 0.74 0.48 0.47
Others (%) 0.56 1.43 0.96 0.29 0.37 0.85 0.29
Hispanic (%) 2.25 5.86 3.41 2.22 1.72 3.44 1.31
Color (%) 36.41 22.02 51.58 26.05 15.39 36.12 32.97
Female (%) 51.74 52.18 52.85 51.61 50.68 52.19 51.72
Old (65+ years) (%) 7.31 11.17 11.61 8.56 7.57 10.33 11.56
Kid (<5 years) (%) 11.75 8.46 9.54 10.40 10.08 9.62 9.64
Native-born (%) 98.36 94.57 96.42 97.67 98.23 96.56 98.81
Renter housing units 19.18 33.05 40.95 23.78 24.57 33.90 27.11
(%)
Education (%) 13.01 20.94 18.23 14.47 20.85 18.29 14.70
Unemployment (%) 8.76 6.24 11.10 8.58 6.25 8.89 10.18
Poverty (%) 17.11 12.82 26.88 20.48 15.63 21.13 25.18
Mean household 55,028 58,954 48,406 51,604 57,855 52,518 45,751
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 67,869 332,732 773,325 361,234 243,092 1,778,252 2,690,724
White 38,815 256,157 345,306 272,187 198,830 1,111,295 1,744,669
Black 27,092 55,593 392,160 71,744 33,852 580,441 864,125
Asian 487 7,807 13,364 7,014 3,393 32,065 24,806
Native American 190 929 3,404 3,386 2,407 10,316 15,517
Others 1,298 12,241 19,082 6,921 4,629 44,171 41,571
Hispanic 1,917 23,706 27,164 8,274 4,915 65,976 41,878
Color 30,064 91,533 442,258 94,042 47,430 705,327 969,301
(continued)
232 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Fig. B.21 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Calvert Cliffs
Nuclear Power Plant, Maryland, in 2010
234 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Table B.21 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Calvert Cliffs
Nuclear Power Plant, Maryland, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 10 26 45 152 205 438 3,054
Tract area (sq. mile) 258 907 1,720 2,244 953 6,082 49,167
Total population 33,438 83,023 146,292 507,912 689,904 1,460,569 10,115,140
White 28,854 67,156 116,513 263,709 316,745 792,977 7,576,252
Black 4,261 14,418 27,106 229,112 351,427 626,324 2,125,403
Asian 123 781 1,406 10,206 13,885 26,401 281,292
Native American 134 329 766 2,079 2,023 5,331 26,866
Others 73 312 510 2,824 5,831 9,550 105,271
Hispanic 369 965 2,030 8,148 14,457 25,969 280,745
Color 4,892 16,452 30,948 248,204 379,863 680,359 2,696,288
White (%) 86.29 80.89 79.64 51.92 45.91 54.29 74.90
Black (%) 12.74 17.37 18.53 45.11 50.94 42.88 21.01
Asian (%) 0.37 0.94 0.96 2.01 2.01 1.81 2.78
Native American 0.40 0.40 0.52 0.41 0.29 0.36 0.27
(%)
Others (%) 0.22 0.38 0.35 0.56 0.85 0.65 1.04
Hispanic (%) 1.10 1.16 1.39 1.60 2.10 1.78 2.78
Color (%) 14.63 19.82 21.15 48.87 55.06 46.58 26.66
Female (%) 50.31 49.89 50.62 51.92 51.85 51.61 51.30
Old (65+ years) (%) 10.21 8.65 10.18 8.96 9.04 9.13 11.11
Kid (<5 years) (%) 10.24 10.46 9.19 8.78 9.12 9.11 8.56
Native-born (%) 98.31 98.02 98.15 96.05 95.12 95.99 93.82
Renter housing units 15.45 25.21 22.50 29.94 40.72 33.78 32.80
(%)
Education (%) 19.08 15.68 17.18 23.79 25.58 23.43 26.12
Unemployment (%) 3.46 3.80 3.45 3.92 5.85 4.75 4.52
Poverty (%) 5.13 7.55 6.40 5.59 11.14 8.38 9.96
Mean household 79,006 71,759 77,800 82,773 74,909 77,867 72,122
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 48,206 100,590 168,160 576,295 712,341 1,605,592 11,341,468
White 40,685 79,046 121,814 238,569 307,224 787,338 7,895,918
Black 5,858 16,935 39,155 308,555 359,421 729,924 2,465,540
Asian 335 1,854 2,379 11,437 16,471 32,476 454,384
Native American 123 404 933 2,017 2,090 5,567 34,484
Others 1,215 2,317 3,891 15,744 27,149 50,316 491,113
Hispanic 858 1,622 3,182 13,528 28,757 47,947 551,446
Color 7,931 22,428 48,137 343,484 417,201 839,181 3,698,281
White (%) 84.40 78.58 72.44 41.40 43.13 49.04 69.62
(continued)
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 235
Fig. B.22 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Pilgrim
Nuclear Power Station, Massachusetts, in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 237
Table B.22 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Pilgrim Nuclear
Power Station, Massachusetts, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 15 50 187 332 163 747 975
Tract area (sq. mile) 453 539 1,710 1,222 470 4,394 7,705
Total population 59,169 208,525 750,365 1,188,509 701,079 2,907,647 4,112,244
White 57,619 201,256 698,882 943,095 632,029 2,532,881 3,797,948
Black 811 2,846 25,199 156,125 31,051 216,032 118,952
Asian 274 1,191 7,875 44,492 24,456 78,288 80,075
Native American 104 511 2,124 3,011 1,387 7,137 9,710
Others 359 2,710 16,291 41,801 12,138 73,299 105,539
Hispanic 626 2,506 17,890 75,151 30,322 126,495 193,291
Color 1,996 8,929 62,260 275,155 84,735 433,075 396,824
White (%) 97.38 96.51 93.14 79.35 90.15 87.11 92.36
Black (%) 1.37 1.36 3.36 13.14 4.43 7.43 2.89
Asian (%) 0.46 0.57 1.05 3.74 3.49 2.69 1.95
Native American 0.18 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.20 0.25 0.24
(%)
Others (%) 0.61 1.30 2.17 3.52 1.73 2.52 2.57
Hispanic (%) 1.06 1.20 2.38 6.32 4.33 4.35 4.70
Color (%) 3.37 4.28 8.30 23.15 12.09 14.89 9.65
Female (%) 51.08 50.53 52.38 52.32 52.75 52.29 51.84
Old (65+ years) (%) 12.51 11.12 15.39 13.82 14.45 14.16 13.60
Kid (<5 years) (%) 8.57 9.23 8.27 7.60 7.06 7.78 8.38
Native-born (%) 97.01 97.06 91.29 84.78 86.08 87.90 92.29
Renter housing 21.03 17.10 28.72 47.90 49.74 40.59 34.25
units (%)
Education (%) 26.33 22.91 20.77 28.34 29.29 26.20 26.51
Unemployment (%) 6.43 6.59 7.67 7.41 6.30 7.12 6.41
Poverty (%) 5.06 4.65 8.32 12.37 9.78 9.99 8.35
Mean household 81,690 78,555 68,836 69,897 70,109 70,453 75,141
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 66,086 240,422 797,241 1,245,095 729,608 3,078,452 4,318,964
White 62,913 228,761 695,065 900,117 597,650 2,484,506 3,771,399
Black 1,216 3,360 36,136 164,871 37,894 243,477 138,916
Asian 511 1,103 14,892 73,288 42,926 132,720 131,627
Native American 170 575 2,548 3,986 1,991 9,270 11,159
Others 1,270 6,622 48,596 102,868 49,122 208,478 265,864
Hispanic 1,052 2,640 26,337 114,589 51,723 196,341 321,451
Color 3,714 12,982 114,602 388,475 153,948 673,721 667,906
White (%) 95.20 95.15 87.18 72.29 81.91 80.71 87.32
(continued)
238 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Fig. B.23 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Michigan, in 2010
240 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Table B.23 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Donald C. Cook
Nuclear Power Plant, Michigan, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 16 29 99 58 25 227 4,097
Tract area (sq. mile) 183 1,396 1,350 1,322 1,602 5,853 127,280
Total population 51,729 92,894 336,028 234,769 94,097 809,517 14,029,827
White 47,625 69,660 291,514 218,719 92,300 719,818 12,061,910
Black 3,217 21,282 36,324 12,332 349 73,504 1,645,230
Asian 415 911 2,654 1,351 405 5,736 133,729
Native American 228 484 1,675 1,055 284 3,726 69,686
Others 242 558 3,864 1,305 767 6,736 119,247
Hispanic 715 1,481 7,428 3,360 1,945 14,929 270,349
Color 4,567 24,109 48,082 18,102 2,988 97,848 2,111,729
White (%) 92.07 74.99 86.75 93.16 98.09 88.92 85.97
Black (%) 6.22 22.91 10.81 5.25 0.37 9.08 11.73
Asian (%) 0.80 0.98 0.79 0.58 0.43 0.71 0.95
Native American (%) 0.44 0.52 0.50 0.45 0.30 0.46 0.50
Others (%) 0.47 0.60 1.15 0.56 0.82 0.83 0.85
Hispanic (%) 1.38 1.59 2.21 1.43 2.07 1.84 1.93
Color (%) 8.83 25.95 14.31 7.71 3.18 12.09 15.05
Female (%) 51.53 52.32 51.44 50.68 51.16 51.29 51.49
Old (65+ years) (%) 14.59 13.27 13.95 12.38 11.66 13.19 12.09
Kid (<5 years) (%) 8.00 9.47 8.64 8.92 8.33 8.74 8.92
Native-born (%) 95.96 96.72 97.26 98.04 98.13 97.44 96.94
Renter housing units 20.07 32.12 25.73 22.87 24.93 25.18 26.43
(%)
Education (%) 23.07 14.44 16.07 14.79 15.23 15.89 16.73
Unemployment (%) 4.51 8.99 6.69 5.50 4.18 6.14 7.36
Poverty (%) 6.53 20.40 11.42 8.89 7.10 10.90 12.29
Mean household 65,530 48,129 55,111 59,657 61,153 56,980 60,707
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 53,837 91,502 352,593 260,465 103,421 861,818 15,157,111
White 47,338 65,745 288,402 230,900 98,274 730,659 12,547,017
Black 4,383 21,303 41,933 14,403 888 82,910 1,823,262
Asian 726 825 3,897 1,717 751 7,916 228,532
Native American 232 468 1,478 1,060 178 3,416 74,594
Others 1,154 3,164 16,885 12,377 3,339 36,919 483,704
Hispanic 968 3,191 18,086 13,997 5,227 41,469 491,229
Color 6,979 27,345 71,825 34,868 7,995 149,012 2,843,870
(continued)
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 241
Fig. B.24 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Fermi,
Michigan, in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 243
Fig. B.25 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Palisades
Nuclear Plant, Michigan, in 2010
246 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Fig. B.26 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Monticello
Nuclear Generating Plant, Minnesota, in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 249
Fig. B.27 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Prairie Island
Nuclear Generating Plant, Minnesota, in 2010
252 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Table B.27 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Prairie Island
Nuclear Generating Plant, Minnesota, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 5 22 107 260 56 450 2,297
Tract area (sq. mile) 226 1,126 1,319 2,217 756 5,643 146,789
Total population 22,549 81,536 306,309 877,923 177,005 1,465,322 7,801,560
White 22,086 80,351 295,746 772,878 170,339 1,341,400 7,306,105
Black 58 274 3,477 47,572 1,163 52,544 286,553
Asian 83 534 4,878 36,398 4,569 46,462 83,347
Native American 261 162 877 13,085 533 14,918 74,299
Others 61 221 1,325 7,978 399 9,984 51,206
Hispanic 165 544 4,003 18,221 1,505 24,438 112,824
Color 557 1,526 13,167 114,195 7,742 137,187 554,420
White (%) 97.95 98.55 96.55 88.03 96.23 91.54 93.65
Black (%) 0.26 0.34 1.14 5.42 0.66 3.59 3.67
Asian (%) 0.37 0.65 1.59 4.15 2.58 3.17 1.07
Native American (%) 1.16 0.20 0.29 1.49 0.30 1.02 0.95
Others (%) 0.27 0.27 0.43 0.91 0.23 0.68 0.66
Hispanic (%) 0.73 0.67 1.31 2.08 0.85 1.67 1.45
Color (%) 2.47 1.87 4.30 13.01 4.37 9.36 7.11
Female (%) 50.66 50.01 50.79 51.50 51.46 51.25 50.99
Old (65+ years) (%) 13.81 9.28 7.62 11.91 10.24 10.69 13.34
Kid (<5 years) (%) 8.85 9.84 10.75 9.37 9.93 9.74 8.99
Native-born (%) 99.28 98.84 97.90 94.95 96.42 96.02 97.74
Renter housing units 24.76 21.14 22.60 35.53 23.94 30.80 26.84
(%)
Education (%) 13.88 18.20 25.73 27.04 30.90 26.58 18.38
Unemployment (%) 4.20 4.53 3.90 5.00 3.72 4.57 5.29
Poverty (%) 8.19 6.51 5.10 11.59 6.29 9.25 10.70
Mean household 57,921 67,105 74,654 62,450 75,699 66,560 58,426
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 24,295 96,933 412,332 946,237 207,032 1,686,829 8,596,325
White 23,302 93,933 378,717 744,661 189,405 1,430,018 7,745,659
Black 189 645 9,394 73,590 4,404 88,222 379,990
Asian 87 717 10,698 60,980 7,255 79,737 145,886
Native American 563 360 1,681 10,828 689 14,121 90,108
Others 153 1,284 11,850 56,168 5,274 74,729 234,684
Hispanic 243 1,036 11,383 51,412 4,356 68,430 264,405
Color 1,141 3,574 39,255 220,614 19,805 284,389 970,444
(continued)
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 253
Fig. B.28 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Grand Gulf
Nuclear Station, Mississippi, in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 255
Table B.28 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Grand Gulf
Nuclear Station, Mississippi, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 4 4 14 25 9 56 1,756
Tract area (sq. mile) 662 1,150 763 2,442 1,059 6,076 94,733
Total population 13,756 15,718 48,711 96,720 39,711 214,616 6,578,571
White 3,256 6,666 25,633 50,723 24,195 110,473 4,362,429
Black 10,469 8,994 22,648 45,635 15,440 103,186 2,111,334
Asian 8 45 227 158 15 453 51,928
Native American 24 13 105 104 37 283 28,646
Others 0 0 95 103 26 224 24,232
Hispanic 72 30 224 529 204 1,059 104,288
Color 10,518 9,075 23,128 46,308 15,685 104,714 2,288,766
White (%) 23.67 42.41 52.62 52.44 60.93 51.47 66.31
Black (%) 76.10 57.22 46.49 47.18 38.88 48.08 32.09
Asian (%) 0.06 0.29 0.47 0.16 0.04 0.21 0.79
Native American (%) 0.17 0.08 0.22 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.44
Others (%) 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.37
Hispanic (%) 0.52 0.19 0.46 0.55 0.51 0.49 1.59
Color (%) 76.46 57.74 47.48 47.88 39.50 48.79 34.79
Female (%) 53.61 52.33 53.40 52.87 52.58 52.94 51.99
Old (65+ years) (%) 12.63 11.79 15.02 13.15 14.85 13.75 11.54
Kid (<5 years) (%) 9.02 10.13 8.99 8.86 9.51 9.11 9.47
Native-born (%) 99.32 99.15 99.31 99.66 99.79 99.55 98.38
Renter housing units 21.23 19.14 27.89 22.99 21.65 23.49 28.43
(%)
Education (%) 16.33 9.97 17.11 13.12 9.99 13.42 15.68
Unemployment (%) 18.18 16.81 8.62 11.04 11.56 11.36 9.12
Poverty (%) 43.18 37.24 26.62 30.76 35.34 31.84 23.95
Mean household 34,522 35,052 44,723 40,505 34,894 39,738 47,036
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 14,443 16,522 49,879 99,218 38,825 218,887 7,094,747
White 3,120 6,426 23,774 50,055 22,303 105,678 4,495,639
Black 11,183 9,801 25,198 47,955 15,904 110,041 2,367,962
Asian 12 106 223 347 246 934 74,323
Native American 7 75 60 187 164 493 37,176
Others 121 114 623 676 207 1,741 119,647
Hispanic 154 142 655 711 334 1,996 143,648
Color 11,338 10,138 26,371 49,479 16,768 114,094 2,676,584
(continued)
256 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Fig. B.29 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Callaway
Plant, Missouri, in 2010
258 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Table B.29 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Callaway Plant,
Missouri, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 2 9 26 39 5 81 1,312
Tract area (sq. mile) 237 1,093 1,412 2,286 724 5,752 63,955
Total population 8,124 32,061 101,712 148,640 16,808 307,345 4,809,724
White 7,439 30,918 94,401 136,270 16,279 285,307 4,201,530
Black 612 910 6,188 8,558 410 16,678 530,170
Asian 33 68 552 2,966 50 3,669 35,912
Native American 31 113 360 446 22 972 21,349
Others 6 59 209 401 45 720 20,729
Hispanic 67 138 803 1,259 77 2,344 58,089
Color 746 1,231 7,858 13,200 574 23,609 643,604
White (%) 91.57 96.43 92.81 91.68 96.85 92.83 87.35
Black (%) 7.53 2.84 6.08 5.76 2.44 5.43 11.02
Asian (%) 0.41 0.21 0.54 2.00 0.30 1.19 0.75
Native American (%) 0.38 0.35 0.35 0.30 0.13 0.32 0.44
Others (%) 0.07 0.18 0.21 0.27 0.27 0.23 0.43
Hispanic (%) 0.82 0.43 0.79 0.85 0.46 0.76 1.21
Color (%) 9.18 3.84 7.73 8.88 3.42 7.68 13.38
Female (%) 49.80 51.20 50.43 50.88 50.40 50.71 51.91
Old (65+ years) (%) 17.68 14.44 13.14 11.06 15.97 12.55 14.12
Kid (<5 years) (%) 7.40 8.97 8.23 8.44 8.64 8.41 8.67
Native-born (%) 98.89 99.45 98.72 97.05 99.20 98.02 98.39
Renter housing units 25.95 16.96 29.42 32.79 12.97 28.63 27.80
(%)
Education (%) 11.90 12.72 22.83 24.24 7.51 21.20 17.59
Unemployment (%) 5.00 3.76 4.82 4.50 6.66 4.65 6.26
Poverty (%) 11.68 9.69 10.61 14.59 14.00 12.63 13.38
Mean household 44,564 50,121 56,184 51,029 43,086 52,107 55,064
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 10,726 37,518 118,776 171,258 19,448 357,726 5,237,485
White 9,210 35,677 106,388 152,475 18,223 321,973 4,424,979
Black 1,219 969 8,427 11,200 737 22,552 599,535
Asian 125 92 1,256 3,584 10 5,067 58,433
Native American 25 200 400 700 91 1,416 24,784
Others 144 585 2,306 3,299 384 6,718 129,754
Hispanic 73 284 1,467 2,364 127 4,315 112,058
Color 1,550 1,994 13,199 20,214 1,344 38,301 869,073
(continued)
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 259
Fig. B.30 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Cooper
Nuclear Station, Nebraska, in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 261
Table B.30 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Cooper Nuclear
Station, Nebraska, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 3 2 10 14 9 38 3,482
Tract area (sq. mile) 670 554 1,395 2,259 1,290 6,168 279,438
Total population 11,078 6,798 28,334 40,875 30,314 117,399 11,832,396
White 10,993 6,521 28,042 39,923 29,763 115,242 10,771,594
Black 36 121 8 191 107 463 792,724
Asian 4 23 94 87 67 275 107,311
Native American 45 91 100 607 285 1,128 64,822
Others 0 42 90 66 91 289 95,907
Hispanic 26 47 281 341 187 882 215,579
Color 111 291 483 1,198 637 2,720 1,174,239
White (%) 99.23 95.93 98.97 97.67 98.18 98.16 91.03
Black (%) 0.32 1.78 0.03 0.47 0.35 0.39 6.70
Asian (%) 0.04 0.34 0.33 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.91
Native American (%) 0.41 1.34 0.35 1.49 0.94 0.96 0.55
Others (%) 0.00 0.62 0.32 0.16 0.30 0.25 0.81
Hispanic (%) 0.23 0.69 0.99 0.83 0.62 0.75 1.82
Color (%) 1.00 4.28 1.70 2.93 2.10 2.32 9.92
Female (%) 50.41 51.21 52.66 51.81 50.12 51.41 51.52
Old (65+ years) (%) 20.05 18.05 22.90 22.09 16.21 20.34 14.24
Kid (<5 years) (%) 7.10 8.68 7.85 7.71 8.95 8.06 8.78
Native-born (%) 99.58 99.35 99.34 99.31 99.15 99.30 98.16
Renter housing units 28.30 28.07 25.15 23.16 23.77 24.59 28.50
(%)
Education (%) 16.66 14.17 11.89 12.85 12.15 12.87 18.46
Unemployment (%) 2.82 3.46 5.06 3.72 3.87 3.98 5.15
Poverty (%) 13.18 18.28 12.73 14.12 12.91 13.62 12.22
Mean household 45,263 39,940 42,655 43,994 45,163 43,834 54,371
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 10,205 6,117 27,836 40,863 30,847 115,868 12,805,348
White 10,040 5,854 26,739 39,308 29,413 111,354 11,231,241
Black 24 138 46 236 319 763 899,101
Asian 58 4 248 103 194 607 166,650
Native American 27 50 220 730 546 1,573 74,034
Others 56 71 583 486 373 1,569 434,324
Hispanic 50 25 578 408 566 1,627 476,418
Color 201 273 1,399 1,792 1,733 5,398 1,784,914
(continued)
262 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Fig. B.31 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Fort Calhoun
Station, Nebraska, in 2010
264 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Table B.31 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Fort Calhoun
Station, Nebraska, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 5 91 142 24 7 269 1,088
Tract area (sq. mile) 173 1,121 1,468 1,809 1,015 5,587 128,033
Total population 15,687 243,551 385,024 67,593 19,265 731,120 3,624,019
White 15,520 197,208 365,490 65,201 19,059 662,478 3,503,625
Black 57 40,882 8,879 1,314 14 51,146 53,236
Asian 14 2,585 4,064 551 77 7,291 29,598
Native American 50 1,411 1,855 281 66 3,663 16,713
Others 46 1,469 4,735 239 49 6,538 20,853
Hispanic 101 3,404 11,444 772 77 15,798 49,936
Color 203 48,090 25,988 2,847 233 77,361 148,684
White (%) 98.94 80.97 94.93 96.46 98.93 90.61 96.68
Black (%) 0.36 16.79 2.31 1.94 0.07 7.00 1.47
Asian (%) 0.09 1.06 1.06 0.82 0.40 1.00 0.82
Native American (%) 0.32 0.58 0.48 0.42 0.34 0.50 0.46
Others (%) 0.29 0.60 1.23 0.35 0.25 0.89 0.58
Hispanic (%) 0.64 1.40 2.97 1.14 0.40 2.16 1.38
Color (%) 1.29 19.75 6.75 4.21 1.21 10.58 4.10
Female (%) 52.09 52.19 51.25 50.24 49.94 51.45 51.46
Old (65+ years) (%) 14.94 11.82 10.76 14.22 14.82 11.63 15.56
Kid (<5 years) (%) 7.93 9.77 9.53 9.20 9.15 9.53 8.52
Native-born (%) 99.18 98.00 97.56 98.55 99.16 97.87 98.45
Renter housing units 23.19 33.51 33.46 25.47 18.76 32.13 28.23
(%)
Education (%) 15.67 24.03 20.98 16.33 11.87 21.20 16.89
Unemployment (%) 3.45 4.78 3.80 3.61 4.57 4.13 4.23
Poverty (%) 7.06 12.19 8.33 7.98 11.99 9.65 11.71
Mean household 57,733 60,822 58,746 51,719 47,843 58,519 51,287
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 17,820 273,372 428,422 73,370 20,776 813,760 3,823,827
White 17,428 212,241 385,082 69,991 20,304 705,046 3,578,478
Black 66 45,594 11,847 1,090 15 58,612 68,581
Asian 77 4,722 5,996 477 76 11,348 46,429
Native American 38 1,945 2,326 310 107 4,726 19,958
Others 211 8,868 23,181 1,488 274 34,022 110,387
Hispanic 215 8,080 31,824 1,619 429 42,167 133,206
Color 451 64,820 56,609 4,233 724 126,837 302,171
(continued)
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 265
Fig. B.32 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Seabrook
Station, New Hampshire, in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 267
Fig. B.33 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Hope Creek
Generating Station, New Jersey, in 2010
270 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Table B.33 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Hope Creek
Generating Station, New Jersey, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 15 99 188 398 397 1,097 5,755
Tract area (sq. 332 848 1,870 1,653 982 5,684 63,987
mile)
Total population 34,738 325,339 650,001 1,509,343 1,533,210 4,052,631 21,006,748
White 26,049 267,177 518,830 1,150,923 916,694 2,879,673 17,710,736
Black 7,987 48,281 106,188 313,228 501,262 976,946 2,447,042
Asian 84 4,030 7,329 32,446 36,439 80,328 470,992
Native American 195 1,590 1,675 2,893 3,206 9,559 37,510
Others 436 4,250 15,972 9,857 75,608 106,123 340,396
Hispanic 745 8,137 29,376 26,399 104,396 169,053 906,894
Color 8,919 61,688 143,035 372,107 639,329 1,225,078 3,809,682
White (%) 74.99 82.12 79.82 76.25 59.79 71.06 84.31
Black (%) 22.99 14.84 16.34 20.75 32.69 24.11 11.65
Asian (%) 0.24 1.24 1.13 2.15 2.38 1.98 2.24
Native American 0.56 0.49 0.26 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.18
(%)
Others (%) 1.26 1.31 2.46 0.65 4.93 2.62 1.62
Hispanic (%) 2.14 2.50 4.52 1.75 6.81 4.17 4.32
Color (%) 25.68 18.96 22.01 24.65 41.70 30.23 18.14
Female (%) 49.36 51.39 51.77 51.98 53.18 52.33 51.74
Old (65+ years) 11.86 10.72 12.32 13.60 13.69 13.18 13.91
(%)
Kid (<5 years) 8.96 8.88 8.91 8.54 9.02 8.81 8.14
(%)
Native-born (%) 98.26 96.87 96.30 95.35 94.63 95.38 92.93
Renter housing 30.02 29.00 27.68 29.50 31.40 29.92 29.17
units (%)
Education (%) 10.36 15.11 22.28 20.25 23.75 21.41 21.86
Unemployment 5.87 4.49 4.87 6.05 7.66 6.31 5.36
(%)
Poverty (%) 12.17 9.15 9.07 11.24 16.74 12.82 8.76
Mean household 58,742 63,687 73,575 65,371 69,621 68,084 71,689
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 40,224 383,484 709,421 1,525,610 1,531,056 4,189,795 22,585,696
White 29,785 282,207 543,558 1,073,697 840,955 2,770,202 17,791,120
Black 8,705 72,859 117,520 349,576 513,013 1,061,673 2,894,328
Asian 485 7,311 13,372 54,540 54,175 129,883 803,103
Native American 196 1,703 2,536 3,194 4,365 11,994 44,266
Others 1,067 19,398 32,414 44,612 118,557 216,048 1,052,874
Hispanic 1,085 24,730 45,000 43,697 151,190 265,702 1,506,994
(continued)
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 271
Fig. B.34 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Oyster Creek
Nuclear Generating Station, New Jersey, in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 273
Table B.34 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Oyster Creek
Nuclear Generating Station, New Jersey, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 29 70 86 237 161 583 9,564
Tract area (sq. 287 760 787 1,008 570 3,412 105,920
mile)
Total population 91,665 237,253 335,439 843,941 624,342 2,132,640 35,469,420
White 89,171 227,599 299,980 684,923 523,233 1,824,906 28,231,784
Black 1,310 5,490 23,686 120,560 64,692 215,738 4,767,806
Asian 445 2,221 5,296 21,250 25,462 54,674 1,039,475
Native American 284 304 659 1,703 918 3,868 85,823
Others 457 1,635 5,821 15,501 10,020 33,434 1,344,511
Hispanic 2,092 5,849 16,672 37,725 29,157 91,495 3,001,051
Color 4,095 13,689 45,483 177,475 118,250 358,992 8,587,946
White (%) 97.28 95.93 89.43 81.16 83.81 85.57 79.59
Black (%) 1.43 2.31 7.06 14.29 10.36 10.12 13.44
Asian (%) 0.49 0.94 1.58 2.52 4.08 2.56 2.93
Native American 0.31 0.13 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.18 0.24
(%)
Others (%) 0.50 0.69 1.74 1.84 1.60 1.57 3.79
Hispanic (%) 2.28 2.47 4.97 4.47 4.67 4.29 8.46
Color (%) 4.47 5.77 13.56 21.03 18.94 16.83 24.21
Female (%) 51.88 53.44 50.94 51.63 51.24 51.62 52.04
Old (65+ years) 16.81 29.28 12.64 13.18 11.48 14.54 13.85
(%)
Kid (<5 years) 8.67 6.41 9.40 8.30 8.48 8.33 8.17
(%)
Native-born (%) 95.46 93.69 94.47 93.14 90.67 92.78 88.63
Renter housing 11.29 10.34 23.21 26.06 27.70 23.05 36.72
units (%)
Education (%) 13.55 15.09 20.12 24.41 27.90 23.18 21.76
Unemployment 6.25 5.84 5.12 4.90 5.08 5.13 6.43
(%)
Poverty (%) 6.02 5.03 5.90 6.13 5.57 5.80 11.63
Mean household 65,149 63,752 76,608 82,080 89,603 80,406 70,261
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 114,293 263,512 378,078 954,033 677,090 2,387,006 37,284,856
White 109,595 245,123 332,045 718,669 518,696 1,924,128 27,552,606
Black 1,773 7,186 22,581 137,758 72,571 241,869 5,083,308
Asian 799 4,201 7,574 41,148 54,148 107,870 1,649,311
Native American 198 562 603 1,874 821 4,058 112,754
Others 1,935 6,437 15,286 54,589 30,827 109,074 2,886,883
Hispanic 3,834 11,064 25,065 77,961 45,460 163,384 4,209,902
(continued)
274 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Fig. B.35 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Salem Nuclear
Generating Station, New Jersey, in 2010
276 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Table B.35 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Salem Nuclear
Generating Station, New Jersey, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 15 93 189 386 405 1,088 5,764
Tract area (sq. 332 845 1,857 1,673 1,008 5,715 63,957
mile)
Total population 34,738 307,326 653,350 1,471,049 1,545,323 4,011,786 21,047,592
White 26,049 254,777 519,515 1,137,890 903,351 2,841,582 17,748,828
Black 7,987 43,400 108,578 289,691 525,204 974,860 2,449,128
Asian 84 3,827 7,438 30,921 37,360 79,630 471,690
Native American 195 1,568 1,685 2,720 3,433 9,601 37,468
Others 436 3,746 16,128 9,828 75,967 106,105 340,414
Hispanic 745 7,385 29,586 26,039 105,050 168,805 907,142
Color 8,919 55,876 145,738 346,588 664,996 1,222,117 3,812,643
White (%) 74.99 82.90 79.52 77.35 58.46 70.83 84.33
Black (%) 22.99 14.12 16.62 19.69 33.99 24.30 11.64
Asian (%) 0.24 1.25 1.14 2.10 2.42 1.98 2.24
Native American 0.56 0.51 0.26 0.18 0.22 0.24 0.18
(%)
Others (%) 1.26 1.22 2.47 0.67 4.92 2.64 1.62
Hispanic (%) 2.14 2.40 4.53 1.77 6.80 4.21 4.31
Color (%) 25.68 18.18 22.31 23.56 43.03 30.46 18.11
Female (%) 49.36 51.29 51.83 51.85 53.26 52.33 51.74
Old (65+ years) 11.86 10.38 12.47 13.42 13.68 13.12 13.93
(%)
Kid (<5 years) 8.96 8.87 8.90 8.60 8.96 8.82 8.14
(%)
Native-born (%) 98.26 96.88 96.27 95.43 94.59 95.38 92.94
Renter housing 30.02 28.72 28.10 28.48 32.31 29.98 29.16
units (%)
Education (%) 10.36 15.61 22.02 19.62 24.22 21.40 21.86
Unemployment 5.87 4.37 4.90 5.96 7.81 6.34 5.35
(%)
Poverty (%) 12.17 8.83 9.27 10.90 17.16 12.91 8.75
Mean household 58,742 64,718 72,905 65,050 69,536 67,979 71,701
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 40,224 364,904 710,302 1,492,038 1,540,413 4,147,881 22,627,608
White 29,785 271,716 539,851 1,064,490 831,336 2,737,178 17,824,144
Black 8,705 66,465 121,708 328,162 531,243 1,056,283 2,899,718
Asian 485 7,095 13,450 51,940 55,473 128,443 804,543
Native American 196 1,639 2,535 3,059 4,446 11,875 44,385
Others 1,067 17,987 32,735 44,397 117,908 214,094 1,054,828
Hispanic 1,085 22,527 46,285 43,337 150,064 263,298 1,509,398
Color 10,870 102,797 190,551 446,616 754,453 1,505,287 5,532,300
White (%) 74.05 74.46 76.00 71.34 53.97 65.99 78.77
(continued)
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 277
Fig. B.36 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Indian Point
Nuclear Generating, New York, in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 279
Table B.36 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Indian Point
Nuclear Generating, New York, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 55 187 596 1,252 1,670 3,760 4,002
Tract area (sq. 292 1,005 1,487 1,919 1,107 5,810 63,011
mile)
Total population 229,882 749,366 2,453,297 4,911,005 5,442,748 13,786,298 15,221,250
White 201,501 647,849 1,855,732 3,162,924 3,096,381 8,964,387 13,431,768
Black 16,429 64,693 368,460 861,202 1,657,783 2,968,567 1,200,971
Asian 5,847 23,174 91,373 317,468 303,274 741,136 266,893
Native American 425 1,661 4,420 12,869 13,867 33,242 47,283
Others 5,669 11,994 133,340 556,475 371,457 1,078,935 274,366
Hispanic 18,731 43,014 324,710 1,214,297 825,975 2,426,727 648,859
Color 39,637 129,807 757,725 2,266,527 2,700,268 5,893,964 2,127,483
White (%) 87.65 86.45 75.64 64.40 56.89 65.02 88.24
Black (%) 7.15 8.63 15.02 17.54 30.46 21.53 7.89
Asian (%) 2.54 3.09 3.72 6.46 5.57 5.38 1.75
Native American 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.31
(%)
Others (%) 2.47 1.60 5.44 11.33 6.82 7.83 1.80
Hispanic (%) 8.15 5.74 13.24 24.73 15.18 17.60 4.26
Color (%) 17.24 17.32 30.89 46.15 49.61 42.75 13.98
Female (%) 49.70 51.09 52.43 52.56 52.72 52.48 51.44
Old (65+ years) 10.37 11.00 13.76 13.15 13.02 13.04 13.40
(%)
Kid (<5 years) 8.35 8.53 8.11 7.60 8.36 8.05 8.44
(%)
Native-born (%) 89.09 87.42 81.67 74.57 76.13 77.39 93.56
Renter housing 25.75 26.01 41.22 60.66 53.40 52.34 28.04
units (%)
Education (%) 32.51 34.60 29.01 28.94 20.61 26.10 22.16
Unemployment 3.96 4.35 5.61 7.72 8.14 7.23 5.62
(%)
Poverty (%) 5.02 6.38 7.89 16.16 15.07 13.55 8.41
Mean household 103,352 113,938 97,399 82,528 70,724 82,538 72,323
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 242,165 826,902 2,627,286 5,352,294 5,845,359 14,894,006 15,902,366
White 196,235 673,908 1,759,588 3,040,855 2,825,575 8,496,161 13,272,190
Black 17,902 70,385 410,274 800,710 1,750,064 3,049,335 1,370,075
Asian 8,780 34,826 130,263 500,998 486,427 1,161,294 459,169
Native American 431 2,370 7,084 23,711 18,208 51,804 54,916
Others 18,804 45,422 320,086 985,956 765,109 2,135,377 746,051
Hispanic 30,788 77,568 495,739 1,592,978 1,054,119 3,251,192 1,048,920
Color 61,284 195,385 1,073,881 2,944,270 3,443,913 7,718,733 3,123,957
White (%) 81.03 81.50 66.97 56.81 48.34 57.04 83.46
(continued)
280 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Fig. B.37 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding James A.
FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, New York, in 2010
282 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Fig. B.38 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Nine Mile
Point Nuclear Station, New York, in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 285
Table B.38 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Nine Mile Point
Nuclear Station, New York, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 9 16 32 112 42 211 4,708
Tract area (sq. 374 658 1,480 1,810 585 4,908 49,647
mile)
Total population 30,260 66,188 125,097 383,940 148,776 754,261 17,236,052
White 29,760 65,244 121,632 336,899 141,450 694,985 12,702,892
Black 182 324 1,758 36,190 4,561 43,015 2,817,577
Asian 173 284 745 5,433 1,287 7,922 681,344
Native American 98 223 697 2,852 857 4,727 54,352
Others 47 116 274 2,563 621 3,621 979,897
Hispanic 320 437 1,138 5,810 1,636 9,341 2,142,401
Color 752 1,244 4,353 49,941 8,224 64,514 5,436,307
White (%) 98.35 98.57 97.23 87.75 95.08 92.14 73.70
Black (%) 0.60 0.49 1.41 9.43 3.07 5.70 16.35
Asian (%) 0.57 0.43 0.60 1.42 0.87 1.05 3.95
Native American 0.32 0.34 0.56 0.74 0.58 0.63 0.32
(%)
Others (%) 0.16 0.18 0.22 0.67 0.42 0.48 5.69
Hispanic (%) 1.06 0.66 0.91 1.51 1.10 1.24 12.43
Color (%) 2.49 1.88 3.48 13.01 5.53 8.55 31.54
Female (%) 51.89 50.95 50.37 52.06 51.75 51.61 52.13
Old (65+ years) 13.44 10.16 8.16 13.72 15.16 12.76 13.15
(%)
Kid (<5 years) (%) 9.02 9.31 10.32 8.67 9.08 9.10 8.27
Native-born (%) 98.06 98.16 97.68 95.34 96.48 96.31 83.62
Renter housing 32.65 22.43 16.15 36.40 30.91 30.64 44.51
units (%)
Education (%) 18.41 11.65 19.06 20.20 23.75 19.99 23.26
Unemployment 7.87 8.75 4.94 6.24 6.37 6.30 6.91
(%)
Poverty (%) 15.38 11.02 6.15 12.68 8.91 10.78 13.12
Mean household 53,774 55,410 65,848 55,736 65,074 59,090 73,009
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 29,878 66,826 134,215 362,647 148,811 742,377 18,234,080
White 28,683 64,949 128,308 300,729 135,610 658,279 12,232,839
Black 113 435 2,081 39,364 5,499 47,492 2,938,750
Asian 304 157 965 7,501 2,426 11,353 1,040,973
Native American 102 216 657 2,536 1,661 5,172 74,142
Others 676 1,076 2,217 12,512 3,615 20,096 1,947,361
Hispanic 620 655 1,460 10,141 2,620 15,496 2,849,520
Color 1,461 2,211 6,714 66,060 14,444 90,890 7,123,888
(continued)
286 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Fig. B.39 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding R.E. Ginna
Nuclear Power Plant, New York, in 2010
288 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Table B.39 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from R.E. Ginna
Nuclear Power Plant, New York, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 13 155 56 32 8 264 4,655
Tract area (sq. 139 1,264 1,527 1,098 487 4,515 50,040
mile)
Total population 49,871 556,467 228,991 118,552 33,211 987,092 17,003,222
White 48,507 453,285 217,993 114,729 32,176 866,690 12,531,187
Black 775 79,475 6,728 2,424 580 89,982 2,770,610
Asian 427 9,263 2,686 545 233 13,154 676,112
Native American 58 1,487 559 333 100 2,537 56,542
Others 100 12,965 1,019 528 125 14,737 968,781
Hispanic 495 22,563 3,434 1,245 380 28,117 2,123,625
Color 1,761 111,830 13,313 4,547 1,281 132,732 5,368,089
White (%) 97.26 81.46 95.20 96.78 96.88 87.80 73.70
Black (%) 1.55 14.28 2.94 2.04 1.75 9.12 16.29
Asian (%) 0.86 1.66 1.17 0.46 0.70 1.33 3.98
Native American 0.12 0.27 0.24 0.28 0.30 0.26 0.33
(%)
Others (%) 0.20 2.33 0.44 0.45 0.38 1.49 5.70
Hispanic (%) 0.99 4.05 1.50 1.05 1.14 2.85 12.49
Color (%) 3.53 20.10 5.81 3.84 3.86 13.45 31.57
Female (%) 50.81 52.53 50.40 50.91 52.35 51.75 52.13
Old (65+ years) 9.49 13.58 10.38 11.99 11.45 12.37 13.18
(%)
Kid (<5 years) 9.31 9.32 8.71 9.03 8.11 9.11 8.26
(%)
Native-born (%) 96.40 93.56 95.59 97.64 98.22 94.82 83.53
Renter housing 19.90 35.84 22.77 22.21 23.47 30.26 44.70
units (%)
Education (%) 25.81 26.05 20.54 18.58 18.29 23.68 23.10
Unemployment 3.98 5.60 4.02 5.28 5.91 5.11 6.99
(%)
Poverty (%) 3.47 12.09 6.03 8.52 13.64 9.86 13.21
Mean household 79,631 65,307 71,841 61,174 54,589 66,637 72,765
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 59,508 555,306 250,746 121,854 32,772 1,020,186 17,956,272
White 56,473 416,290 231,935 115,490 31,269 851,457 12,039,661
Black 1,037 92,335 8,160 2,772 475 104,779 2,881,463
Asian 823 13,036 4,799 758 468 19,884 1,032,442
Native American 98 1,940 632 361 20 3,051 76,263
Others 1,068 31,716 5,215 2,462 545 41,006 1,926,451
Hispanic 849 35,111 5,051 2,534 507 44,052 2,820,964
Color 3,449 151,307 21,474 7,684 1,751 185,665 7,029,113
White (%) 94.90 74.97 92.50 94.78 95.41 83.46 67.05
(continued)
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 289
Fig. B.40 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Brunswick
Steam Electric Plant, North Carolina, in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 291
Fig. B.41 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding McGuire
Nuclear Station, North Carolina, in 2010
294 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Fig. B.42 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Shearon Harris
Nuclear Power Plant, North Carolina, in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 297
Table B.42 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Shearon Harris
Nuclear Power Plant, North Carolina, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 19 111 176 102 78 486 1,709
Tract area (sq. mile) 272 954 1,727 1,866 1,399 6,217 47,602
Total population 24,724 249,080 499,206 346,954 273,388 1,393,352 5,235,264
White 18,076 195,649 357,131 244,455 188,777 1,004,088 4,007,155
Black 6,338 46,154 129,542 91,404 74,580 348,018 1,107,321
Asian 137 4,971 8,639 3,861 2,972 20,580 29,811
Native American 64 871 1,691 2,114 4,317 9,057 73,549
Others 116 1,394 2,228 5,122 2,743 11,603 17,442
Hispanic 344 3,538 5,872 9,573 5,928 25,255 43,763
Color 6,832 55,329 145,225 105,925 87,170 400,481 1,250,842
White (%) 73.11 78.55 71.54 70.46 69.05 72.06 76.54
Black (%) 25.64 18.53 25.95 26.34 27.28 24.98 21.15
Asian (%) 0.55 2.00 1.73 1.11 1.09 1.48 0.57
Native American (%) 0.26 0.35 0.34 0.61 1.58 0.65 1.40
Others (%) 0.47 0.56 0.45 1.48 1.00 0.83 0.33
Hispanic (%) 1.39 1.42 1.18 2.76 2.17 1.81 0.84
Color (%) 27.63 22.21 29.09 30.53 31.89 28.74 23.89
Female (%) 51.80 50.51 52.42 49.17 51.82 51.14 51.66
Old (65+ years) (%) 10.86 8.60 9.71 9.54 11.24 9.79 12.72
Kid (<5 years) (%) 9.54 7.98 8.30 9.19 9.14 8.65 8.11
Native-born (%) 98.41 95.86 96.36 97.74 97.45 96.86 98.64
Renter housing units 24.64 36.58 38.68 31.79 30.25 34.82 26.99
(%)
Education (%) 20.10 33.01 33.55 16.53 16.11 25.66 15.24
Unemployment (%) 3.26 3.74 3.94 5.42 5.82 4.55 4.86
Poverty (%) 9.70 11.29 11.18 11.46 13.11 11.63 13.32
Mean household 60,506 63,876 64,641 54,434 53,679 59,938 53,138
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 54,745 364,328 656,183 421,566 333,000 1,829,822 6,219,491
White 43,286 274,941 426,252 285,718 210,313 1,240,510 4,561,655
Black 8,362 56,852 172,471 106,660 95,130 439,475 1,294,679
Asian 1,113 14,102 17,636 4,849 5,512 43,212 71,779
Native American 258 1,532 3,128 2,988 4,718 12,624 88,332
Others 1,742 16,830 36,745 21,364 17,311 93,992 203,055
Hispanic 2,056 21,836 46,593 25,944 20,476 116,905 256,059
Color 12,396 98,885 248,860 146,147 130,529 636,817 1,763,543
White (%) 79.07 75.47 64.96 67.78 63.16 67.79 73.34
(continued)
298 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Fig. B.43 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Davis-Besse
Nuclear Power Station, Ohio, in 2010
300 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Fig. B.44 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Perry Nuclear
Power Plant, Ohio, in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 303
Table B.44 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Perry Nuclear
Power Plant, Ohio, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 22 51 120 254 84 531 5,639
Tract area (sq. mile) 141 1,212 2,142 931 479 4,905 85,975
Total population 68,920 199,578 407,025 761,604 328,910 1,766,037 20,962,608
White 66,129 194,305 304,537 487,990 307,495 1,360,456 18,687,648
Black 2,212 3,015 96,726 250,079 16,988 369,020 1,870,760
Asian 143 1,339 4,312 8,066 3,183 17,043 207,277
Native American 198 356 544 1,762 556 3,416 34,879
Others 242 563 910 13,696 693 16,104 162,001
Hispanic 962 1,724 2,813 23,082 2,374 30,955 321,504
Color 3,471 6,511 104,206 282,413 23,219 419,820 2,425,832
White (%) 95.95 97.36 74.82 64.07 93.49 77.03 89.15
Black (%) 3.21 1.51 23.76 32.84 5.16 20.90 8.92
Asian (%) 0.21 0.67 1.06 1.06 0.97 0.97 0.99
Native American 0.29 0.18 0.13 0.23 0.17 0.19 0.17
(%)
Others (%) 0.35 0.28 0.22 1.80 0.21 0.91 0.77
Hispanic (%) 1.40 0.86 0.69 3.03 0.72 1.75 1.53
Color (%) 5.04 3.26 25.60 37.08 7.06 23.77 11.57
Female (%) 50.92 51.52 53.46 52.74 52.01 52.56 51.91
Old (65+ years) (%) 11.25 12.35 16.91 14.04 13.22 14.25 14.24
Kid (<5 years) (%) 9.48 8.54 8.13 9.16 7.96 8.64 8.32
Native-born (%) 98.02 97.35 94.02 95.72 95.95 95.64 97.37
Renter housing units 25.14 23.46 32.05 38.98 25.85 32.90 28.07
(%)
Education (%) 13.03 17.24 23.04 15.23 20.23 18.16 17.43
Unemployment (%) 5.80 5.42 6.67 9.75 5.95 7.61 6.16
Poverty (%) 8.58 7.18 10.74 19.59 9.48 13.84 11.63
Mean household 58,729 65,223 67,983 51,882 64,978 59,780 59,105
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 75,998 209,426 400,393 759,545 343,210 1,788,572 21,845,622
White 70,583 201,024 275,267 450,578 313,076 1,310,528 18,816,172
Black 2,332 3,524 112,698 262,807 19,756 401,117 2,098,911
Asian 384 1,570 5,609 12,817 4,551 24,931 330,193
Native American 123 241 420 1,754 546 3,084 43,426
Others 2,583 3,068 6,397 31,578 5,287 48,913 556,919
Hispanic 3,116 2,979 3,923 35,423 3,735 49,176 556,834
Color 6,970 10,121 127,497 322,959 32,580 500,127 3,268,987
White (%) 92.87 95.99 68.75 59.32 91.22 73.27 86.13
(continued)
304 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Fig. B.45 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Beaver Valley
Power Station, Pennsylvania, in 2010
306 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Table B.45 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Beaver Valley
Power Station, Pennsylvania, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 33 97 313 269 96 808 5,846
Tract area (sq. 279 963 1,639 1,747 1,019 5,647 109,463
mile)
Total population 119,111 341,379 1,060,141 954,382 349,524 2,824,537 21,697,584
White 111,021 330,728 935,988 853,255 328,368 2,559,360 19,214,768
Black 7,439 8,428 110,586 92,163 18,478 237,094 2,058,081
Asian 226 1,523 10,299 3,687 1,492 17,227 214,602
Native American 203 383 1,490 1,171 484 3,731 37,662
Others 234 279 1,782 4,133 696 7,124 172,432
Hispanic 604 1,485 6,729 8,240 1,658 18,716 341,636
Color 8,506 11,898 128,961 105,646 22,322 277,333 2,641,997
White (%) 93.21 96.88 88.29 89.40 93.95 90.61 88.56
Black (%) 6.25 2.47 10.43 9.66 5.29 8.39 9.49
Asian (%) 0.19 0.45 0.97 0.39 0.43 0.61 0.99
Native American 0.17 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.17
(%)
Others (%) 0.20 0.08 0.17 0.43 0.20 0.25 0.79
Hispanic (%) 0.51 0.44 0.63 0.86 0.47 0.66 1.57
Color (%) 7.14 3.49 12.16 11.07 6.39 9.82 12.18
Female (%) 52.76 51.82 52.86 52.94 52.38 52.70 51.86
Old (65+ years) 16.96 15.06 17.16 17.59 17.65 17.10 13.93
(%)
Kid (<5 years) 7.82 7.76 7.45 7.54 7.45 7.53 8.36
(%)
Native-born (%) 97.90 97.95 96.89 97.84 98.08 97.53 97.35
Renter housing 26.42 22.30 31.20 27.65 25.13 28.01 28.02
units (%)
Education (%) 10.95 18.01 21.14 15.52 13.11 17.44 17.07
Unemployment 8.83 6.38 6.50 7.56 7.79 7.08 6.40
(%)
Poverty (%) 16.37 9.55 12.72 13.08 13.58 12.72 12.33
Mean household 48,114 60,829 59,438 51,531 50,431 55,351 58,440
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 115,882 360,292 1,022,100 923,557 336,094 2,757,925 22,684,612
White 106,422 342,247 881,207 797,390 309,290 2,436,556 19,407,626
Black 7,671 9,982 108,182 102,859 19,560 248,254 2,307,773
Asian 292 3,036 16,336 5,864 1,996 27,524 337,450
Native American 139 450 1,294 1,517 541 3,941 46,339
Others 1,369 4,529 15,105 15,928 4,703 41,634 585,441
Hispanic 1,014 3,300 9,403 11,710 2,758 28,185 589,599
Color 10,179 20,125 146,362 132,175 28,564 337,405 3,530,736
White (%) 91.84 94.99 86.22 86.34 92.02 88.35 85.55
(continued)
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 307
Fig. B.46 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Limerick
Generating Station, Pennsylvania, in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 309
Fig. B.47 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Peach Bottom
Atomic Power Station, Pennsylvania, in 2010
312 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Table B.47 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Peach Bottom
Atomic Power Station, Pennsylvania, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 10 81 228 485 204 1,008 3,834
Tract area (sq. 317 966 1,579 1,909 1,023 5,794 55,155
mile)
Total population 35,760 291,208 821,840 1,702,769 718,048 3,569,625 13,759,639
White 34,789 269,850 747,917 1,171,446 610,100 2,834,102 11,620,667
Black 693 14,051 46,719 499,072 85,484 646,019 1,742,575
Asian 171 2,703 14,232 18,641 10,491 46,238 235,281
Native American 56 462 1,526 4,181 1,517 7,742 24,682
Others 61 4,126 11,433 9,443 10,447 35,510 136,391
Hispanic 226 7,205 21,130 23,351 21,951 73,863 281,754
Color 1,108 23,956 82,927 542,986 118,188 769,165 2,269,976
White (%) 97.28 92.67 91.01 68.80 84.97 79.39 84.45
Black (%) 1.94 4.83 5.68 29.31 11.91 18.10 12.66
Asian (%) 0.48 0.93 1.73 1.09 1.46 1.30 1.71
Native American 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.25 0.21 0.22 0.18
(%)
Others (%) 0.17 1.42 1.39 0.55 1.45 0.99 0.99
Hispanic (%) 0.63 2.47 2.57 1.37 3.06 2.07 2.05
Color (%) 3.10 8.23 10.09 31.89 16.46 21.55 16.50
Female (%) 49.56 50.81 51.12 52.31 51.99 51.82 51.93
Old (65+ years) 10.65 11.11 11.60 13.24 14.25 12.87 14.30
(%)
Kid (<5 years) 9.69 9.45 8.81 8.77 8.45 8.78 8.17
(%)
Native-born (%) 99.32 97.96 96.67 96.69 97.00 96.88 95.69
Renter housing 16.57 24.15 29.20 35.88 31.19 32.36 27.12
units (%)
Education (%) 9.30 17.33 23.32 19.70 16.21 19.52 20.63
Unemployment 4.22 3.50 3.29 5.59 4.47 4.63 5.60
(%)
Poverty (%) 7.41 6.55 6.86 12.08 8.56 9.68 10.39
Mean household 63,748 69,715 73,801 66,101 63,128 67,489 65,008
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 40,396 344,798 931,445 1,759,116 769,821 3,845,576 14,515,564
White 39,286 314,594 807,708 1,138,072 596,443 2,896,103 11,565,779
Black 531 16,111 62,687 542,850 114,133 736,312 2,092,423
Asian 202 3,514 22,303 30,882 17,572 74,473 374,010
Native American 30 563 1,915 4,504 2,250 9,262 29,011
Others 354 10,020 36,825 42,800 39,428 129,427 454,340
Hispanic 297 12,121 44,816 44,060 48,682 149,976 506,571
Color 1,310 35,048 143,047 642,036 190,731 1,012,172 3,165,543
(continued)
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 313
Fig. B.48 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Susquehanna
Steam Electric Station, Pennsylvania, in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 315
Fig. B.49 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Three Mile
Island Nuclear Station, Pennsylvania, in 2010
318 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Table B.49 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Three Mile
Island Nuclear Station, Pennsylvania, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 41 150 118 74 65 448 4,176
Tract area (sq. 297 933 1,520 2,098 1,093 5,941 52,519
mile)
Total population 156,537 568,626 476,325 293,340 223,969 1,718,797 14,944,296
White 145,102 516,219 450,334 289,009 218,524 1,619,188 12,300,242
Black 8,529 40,264 10,337 2,013 3,254 64,397 2,212,075
Asian 1,367 6,012 4,606 1,081 1,448 14,514 258,234
Native American 313 794 571 220 314 2,212 28,012
Others 1,238 5,309 10,466 1,022 425 18,460 145,702
Hispanic 2,409 9,714 16,221 2,384 1,198 31,926 308,538
Color 12,590 56,304 31,016 5,666 6,257 111,833 2,790,162
White (%) 92.70 90.78 94.54 98.52 97.57 94.20 82.31
Black (%) 5.45 7.08 2.17 0.69 1.45 3.75 14.80
Asian (%) 0.87 1.06 0.97 0.37 0.65 0.84 1.73
Native American 0.20 0.14 0.12 0.07 0.14 0.13 0.19
(%)
Others (%) 0.79 0.93 2.20 0.35 0.19 1.07 0.97
Hispanic (%) 1.54 1.71 3.41 0.81 0.53 1.86 2.06
Color (%) 8.04 9.90 6.51 1.93 2.79 6.51 18.67
Female (%) 51.73 51.68 51.36 50.42 51.51 51.36 51.99
Old (65+ years) 13.52 13.87 13.67 12.21 13.68 13.47 14.15
(%)
Kid (<5 years) (%) 8.05 8.08 8.54 9.07 8.57 8.44 8.26
Native-born (%) 98.01 97.95 98.02 98.93 98.29 98.18 95.64
Renter housing 27.73 29.62 28.82 19.57 20.02 26.37 28.48
units (%)
Education (%) 17.02 19.25 14.93 11.85 19.73 16.70 20.78
Unemployment (%) 3.76 3.82 3.42 3.16 3.88 3.60 5.68
Poverty (%) 7.03 7.04 7.60 6.74 7.02 7.14 10.67
Mean household 62,567 64,844 60,486 61,943 71,398 63,803 65,556
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 177,279 618,682 521,514 329,596 258,966 1,906,037 15,671,503
White 159,236 539,121 479,171 319,472 247,414 1,744,414 12,132,784
Black 10,592 48,334 13,859 2,961 5,955 81,701 2,598,211
Asian 2,777 9,539 6,197 2,432 2,630 23,575 408,520
Native American 235 917 675 442 472 2,741 32,421
Others 4,454 20,735 21,585 4,313 2,509 53,596 499,577
Hispanic 4,874 21,767 30,131 5,181 2,444 64,397 554,829
Color 20,286 87,669 54,181 12,808 13,151 188,095 3,774,376
White (%) 89.82 87.14 91.88 96.93 95.54 91.52 77.42
(continued)
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 319
Fig. B.50 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Catawba
Nuclear Station, South Carolina, in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 321
Fig. B.51 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding H.B. Robinson
Steam Electric Plant, South Carolina, in 2010
324 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Table B.51 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from H.B. Robinson
Steam Electric Plant, South Carolina, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 8 16 38 55 35 152 3,146
Tract area (sq. 309 1,060 1,346 2,225 1,423 6,363 79,477
mile)
Total population 30,342 53,517 142,372 207,559 134,251 568,041 9,547,261
White 20,650 30,268 82,578 128,638 85,691 347,825 7,071,098
Black 9,607 23,051 58,902 76,615 46,752 214,927 2,280,413
Asian 19 32 475 1,058 379 1,963 69,725
Native American 50 74 301 926 1,101 2,452 89,087
Others 16 93 114 308 341 872 36,949
Hispanic 77 239 459 1,126 971 2,872 94,476
Color 9,751 23,269 60,035 79,568 49,014 221,637 2,524,459
White (%) 68.06 56.56 58.00 61.98 63.83 61.23 74.06
Black (%) 31.66 43.07 41.37 36.91 34.82 37.84 23.89
Asian (%) 0.06 0.06 0.33 0.51 0.28 0.35 0.73
Native American 0.16 0.14 0.21 0.45 0.82 0.43 0.93
(%)
Others (%) 0.05 0.17 0.08 0.15 0.25 0.15 0.39
Hispanic (%) 0.25 0.45 0.32 0.54 0.72 0.51 0.99
Color (%) 32.14 43.48 42.17 38.34 36.51 39.02 26.44
Female (%) 53.37 52.44 53.06 51.15 52.22 52.12 51.55
Old (65+ years) 12.03 12.75 12.47 10.56 11.98 11.66 11.86
(%)
Kid (<5 years) (%) 8.30 8.33 8.61 9.21 9.17 8.92 8.39
Native-born (%) 99.70 99.66 99.03 99.03 99.38 99.21 98.32
Renter housing 23.34 21.68 26.60 26.65 26.46 25.94 28.02
units (%)
Education (%) 13.58 8.13 15.01 11.40 9.84 11.76 17.44
Unemployment 5.10 6.86 6.03 6.62 5.92 6.24 4.99
(%)
Poverty (%) 17.68 22.42 19.66 18.52 18.18 19.05 13.49
Mean household 52,591 40,920 50,421 46,014 45,461 46,892 54,396
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 32,295 59,414 155,000 222,116 147,285 616,110 11,445,215
White 21,100 32,655 86,903 130,786 89,174 360,618 8,137,225
Black 10,516 25,967 64,492 84,828 51,884 237,687 2,679,194
Asian 134 220 1,207 1,231 704 3,496 149,384
Native American 142 129 286 1,665 1,661 3,883 111,761
Others 403 442 2,112 3,593 3,875 10,425 367,652
Hispanic 410 554 1,980 2,879 6,002 11,825 453,967
Color 11,273 26,985 68,670 92,437 61,184 260,549 3,497,422
(continued)
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 325
Fig. B.52 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Oconee
Nuclear Station, South Carolina, in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 327
Table B.52 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Oconee Nuclear
Station, South Carolina, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 15 29 103 91 38 276 4,991
Tract area (sq. mile) 281 1,020 1,522 2,107 1,246 6,175 139,090
Total population 51,644 108,245 320,112 285,328 107,983 873,312 15,720,199
White 46,636 97,024 254,169 255,012 100,817 753,658 11,268,635
Black 4,251 10,517 63,798 27,548 6,182 112,296 4,127,916
Asian 600 320 910 1,852 371 4,053 141,391
Native American 98 217 531 594 440 1,880 104,941
Others 59 166 702 328 177 1,432 77,286
Hispanic 429 553 2,271 2,087 780 6,120 192,619
Color 5,375 11,609 67,316 31,991 7,707 123,998 4,550,561
White (%) 90.30 89.63 79.40 89.38 93.36 86.30 71.68
Black (%) 8.23 9.72 19.93 9.65 5.72 12.86 26.26
Asian (%) 1.16 0.30 0.28 0.65 0.34 0.46 0.90
Native American 0.19 0.20 0.17 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.67
(%)
Others (%) 0.11 0.15 0.22 0.11 0.16 0.16 0.49
Hispanic (%) 0.83 0.51 0.71 0.73 0.72 0.70 1.23
Color (%) 10.41 10.72 21.03 11.21 7.14 14.20 28.95
Female (%) 49.79 51.22 52.65 51.24 52.17 51.79 51.54
Old (65+ years) (%) 12.44 12.23 14.21 12.55 19.85 14.02 10.99
Kid (<5 years) (%) 6.85 7.42 8.12 7.96 6.60 7.72 8.76
Native-born (%) 97.51 99.26 98.95 98.17 98.53 98.59 97.93
Renter housing units 28.97 19.39 27.90 22.67 18.98 24.08 29.58
(%)
Education (%) 22.72 12.49 14.31 20.70 16.20 16.92 18.03
Unemployment (%) 5.61 4.60 5.55 3.75 4.82 4.75 5.35
Poverty (%) 14.89 10.97 13.73 9.74 11.88 11.93 14.26
Mean household 50,519 51,741 50,654 58,351 49,849 53,158 56,668
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 58,346 127,350 348,172 366,349 130,984 1,031,201 19,216,576
White 51,022 113,699 266,220 315,714 119,497 866,152 12,958,866
Black 4,744 11,143 70,882 37,340 7,169 131,278 5,127,713
Asian 1,107 492 2,382 4,898 419 9,298 318,911
Native American 105 238 738 696 710 2,487 136,845
Others 1,371 1,774 7,954 7,715 3,182 21,996 674,232
Hispanic 1,585 1,711 9,423 10,319 4,316 27,354 868,414
Color 8,081 14,385 86,578 55,909 13,588 178,541 6,636,156
(continued)
328 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Fig. B.53 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Virgil C.
Summer Nuclear Station, South Carolina, in 2010
330 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Fig. B.54 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Sequoyah
Nuclear Plant, Tennessee, in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 333
Fig. B.55 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Watts Bar
Nuclear Plant, Tennessee, in 2010
336 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Table B.55 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Watts Bar
Nuclear Plant, Tennessee, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 5 16 37 68 52 178 3,288
Tract area (sq. mile) 417 772 1,533 2,545 1,188 6,455 95,115
Total population 17,803 61,485 135,601 210,773 190,986 616,648 10,738,744
White 17,358 58,597 130,706 204,156 162,222 573,039 8,078,649
Black 348 2,431 4,030 4,538 25,951 37,298 2,484,619
Asian 21 114 179 998 1,827 3,139 101,213
Native American 41 210 495 687 561 1,994 25,762
Others 32 134 191 388 449 1,194 48,461
Hispanic 99 220 802 1,160 1,640 3,921 128,545
Color 527 2,993 5,514 7,412 29,899 46,345 2,731,038
White (%) 97.50 95.30 96.39 96.86 84.94 92.93 75.23
Black (%) 1.95 3.95 2.97 2.15 13.59 6.05 23.14
Asian (%) 0.12 0.19 0.13 0.47 0.96 0.51 0.94
Native American (%) 0.23 0.34 0.37 0.33 0.29 0.32 0.24
Others (%) 0.18 0.22 0.14 0.18 0.24 0.19 0.45
Hispanic (%) 0.56 0.36 0.59 0.55 0.86 0.64 1.20
Color (%) 2.96 4.87 4.07 3.52 15.66 7.52 25.43
Female (%) 50.29 52.15 51.09 50.91 52.34 51.50 51.67
Old (65+ years) (%) 12.42 14.66 13.91 11.52 13.18 12.90 11.09
Kid (<5 years) (%) 6.41 7.48 7.27 7.77 7.76 7.59 8.81
Native-born (%) 99.43 99.53 99.38 98.99 98.17 98.89 97.90
Renter housing units 15.80 22.71 20.52 20.82 28.32 23.18 30.92
(%)
Education (%) 6.29 10.84 10.33 14.24 21.23 14.99 18.02
Unemployment (%) 7.23 7.72 7.47 6.26 5.36 6.40 6.00
Poverty (%) 16.02 18.81 14.98 13.33 11.26 13.67 15.19
Mean household 43,804 43,813 47,294 54,053 58,609 52,697 57,100
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 22,704 72,749 165,453 258,187 212,174 731,267 13,144,469
White 22,107 68,044 158,188 245,418 171,712 665,469 9,224,160
Black 323 2,868 3,782 5,971 32,436 45,380 3,226,594
Asian 9 272 686 1,516 3,024 5,507 226,113
Native American 71 233 444 681 755 2,184 37,045
Others 189 1,333 2,347 4,605 4,275 12,749 430,535
Hispanic 137 938 2,508 3,887 3,909 11,379 538,022
Color 644 5,116 8,852 14,852 42,370 71,834 4,165,552
White (%) 97.37 93.53 95.61 95.05 80.93 91.00 70.18
(continued)
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 337
Fig. B.56 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Comanche
Peak Steam Electric Station, Texas, in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 339
Table B.56 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Comanche Peak
Steam Electric Station, Texas, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 6 10 28 120 104 268 4,997
Tract area (sq. mile) 356 1,003 1,427 2,308 992 6,086 262,510
Total population 16,383 27,568 87,665 413,835 336,153 881,604 16,104,907
White 15,526 26,606 81,737 335,381 232,870 692,120 12,095,405
Black 0 33 1,968 45,809 60,741 108,551 1,909,988
Asian 62 155 395 6,408 4,734 11,754 303,301
Native American 94 157 376 1,694 1,649 3,970 65,902
Others 703 615 3,197 24,539 36,153 65,207 1,730,315
Hispanic 1,275 1,614 6,661 44,466 59,795 113,811 4,180,319
Color 1,429 1,952 9,307 97,969 126,073 236,730 6,428,898
White (%) 94.77 96.51 93.24 81.04 69.28 78.51 75.10
Black (%) 0.00 0.12 2.24 11.07 18.07 12.31 11.86
Asian (%) 0.38 0.56 0.45 1.55 1.41 1.33 1.88
Native American (%) 0.57 0.57 0.43 0.41 0.49 0.45 0.41
Others (%) 4.29 2.23 3.65 5.93 10.75 7.40 10.74
Hispanic (%) 7.78 5.85 7.60 10.74 17.79 12.91 25.96
Color (%) 8.72 7.08 10.62 23.67 37.50 26.85 39.92
Female (%) 49.36 50.00 51.21 50.96 50.69 50.82 50.76
Old (65+ years) (%) 12.26 17.08 13.02 11.43 11.39 11.77 9.96
Kid (<5 years) (%) 9.85 8.24 8.81 9.37 10.41 9.68 9.80
Native-born (%) 96.67 96.92 97.15 94.59 92.17 94.03 90.86
Renter housing units 15.94 17.71 25.30 32.17 29.23 29.53 34.14
(%)
Education (%) 16.77 13.24 14.91 22.89 13.38 18.12 20.44
Unemployment (%) 10.40 8.64 6.78 5.70 8.55 7.02 7.12
Poverty (%) 11.08 12.02 14.33 11.57 18.42 14.46 18.30
Mean household 63,899 57,368 54,192 63,538 53,324 58,706 58,452
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 23,844 36,129 108,363 486,385 395,470 1,050,191 19,801,628
White 22,535 33,701 98,149 367,184 267,745 789,314 14,008,671
Black 20 53 2,036 53,905 57,331 113,345 2,272,209
Asian 45 218 808 8,460 8,021 17,552 550,840
Native American 261 380 666 2,873 2,598 6,778 106,977
Others 985 1,773 6,715 53,973 59,748 123,194 2,862,940
Hispanic 2,005 3,146 12,939 89,719 109,199 217,008 6,453,114
Color 2,470 4,094 17,582 161,044 179,682 364,872 9,559,410
(continued)
340 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Fig. B.57 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding South Texas
Project, Texas, in 2010
342 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Table B.57 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from South Texas
Project, Texas, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 1 9 7 23 12 52 5,213
Tract area (sq. mile) 25 1,484 1,003 1,428 725 4,663 263,933
Total population 3,233 25,996 28,373 98,056 43,455 199,113 16,787,398
White 1,171 19,716 22,227 77,477 32,043 152,634 12,634,891
Black 1,783 2,641 2,999 9,481 5,330 22,234 1,996,305
Asian 16 596 117 901 262 1,892 313,163
Native American 8 83 51 268 176 586 69,286
Others 251 2,967 2,977 9,932 5,646 21,773 1,773,749
Hispanic 347 6,735 6,038 21,018 9,892 44,030 4,250,100
Color 2,140 9,990 9,198 31,624 15,645 68,597 6,597,031
White (%) 36.22 75.84 78.34 79.01 73.74 76.66 75.26
Black (%) 55.15 10.16 10.57 9.67 12.27 11.17 11.89
Asian (%) 0.49 2.29 0.41 0.92 0.60 0.95 1.87
Native American (%) 0.25 0.32 0.18 0.27 0.41 0.29 0.41
Others (%) 7.76 11.41 10.49 10.13 12.99 10.93 10.57
Hispanic (%) 10.73 25.91 21.28 21.43 22.76 22.11 25.32
Color (%) 66.19 38.43 32.42 32.25 36.00 34.45 39.30
Female (%) 52.77 50.06 50.94 49.42 49.97 49.89 50.78
Old (65+ years) (%) 14.57 11.30 12.60 10.74 9.72 10.92 10.05
Kid (<5 years) (%) 9.90 10.39 9.42 9.73 10.49 9.94 9.79
Native-born (%) 97.03 94.66 95.98 95.97 94.21 95.43 90.97
Renter housing units 29.45 23.79 22.79 27.00 27.57 26.04 33.99
(%)
Education (%) 13.40 12.41 10.02 15.17 14.14 13.82 20.40
Unemployment (%) 8.90 7.72 6.78 6.23 5.91 6.46 7.12
Poverty (%) 26.65 20.76 19.75 14.02 14.60 16.07 18.12
Mean household 46,372 52,637 50,393 59,729 59,121 57,074 58,481
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 2,848 27,821 29,037 104,589 51,252 215,547 20,636,272
White 976 19,377 21,892 80,249 36,629 159,123 14,638,862
Black 1,489 2,718 2,655 9,230 5,561 21,653 2,363,901
Asian 0 867 123 1,372 482 2,844 565,548
Native American 7 122 210 442 173 954 112,801
Others 373 4,748 4,152 13,296 8,411 30,980 2,955,154
Hispanic 511 8,826 8,119 27,797 15,488 60,741 6,609,381
Color 2,049 12,727 11,180 39,626 22,160 87,742 9,836,540
White (%) 34.27 69.65 75.39 76.73 71.47 73.82 70.94
Black (%) 52.28 9.77 9.14 8.83 10.85 10.05 11.46
(continued)
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 343
Fig. B.58 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding North Anna
Power Station, Virginia, in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 345
Table B.58 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from North Anna
Power Station, Virginia, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 6 26 55 134 143 364 2,949
Tract area (sq. mile) 363 1,037 1,730 1,502 1,549 6,181 49,000
Total population 14,747 64,514 147,361 402,522 455,975 1,085,119 9,883,689
White 11,623 51,398 120,330 335,257 292,911 811,519 7,378,020
Black 2,928 12,457 24,930 58,353 153,511 252,179 2,099,796
Asian 101 250 961 6,986 6,554 14,852 281,608
Native American 80 184 563 806 1,265 2,898 27,740
Others 21 237 561 1,128 1,726 3,673 96,481
Hispanic 70 563 1,567 4,522 5,427 12,149 263,207
Color 3,172 13,545 28,005 70,370 166,449 281,541 2,654,430
White (%) 78.82 79.67 81.66 83.29 64.24 74.79 74.65
Black (%) 19.85 19.31 16.92 14.50 33.67 23.24 21.25
Asian (%) 0.68 0.39 0.65 1.74 1.44 1.37 2.85
Native American 0.54 0.29 0.38 0.20 0.28 0.27 0.28
(%)
Others (%) 0.14 0.37 0.38 0.28 0.38 0.34 0.98
Hispanic (%) 0.47 0.87 1.06 1.12 1.19 1.12 2.66
Color (%) 21.51 21.00 19.00 17.48 36.50 25.95 26.86
Female (%) 49.91 50.55 51.33 52.09 51.82 51.75 51.16
Old (65+ years) (%) 11.76 9.23 12.34 11.56 9.46 10.65 10.76
Kid (<5 years) (%) 8.79 9.75 8.43 8.21 9.56 8.91 8.69
Native-born (%) 98.69 98.92 98.22 96.64 97.55 97.40 93.96
Renter housing units 11.23 16.68 26.57 33.05 34.61 31.63 31.53
(%)
Education (%) 7.51 14.42 19.05 31.19 23.46 25.03 25.38
Unemployment (%) 5.77 3.72 3.34 3.04 4.39 3.71 4.48
Poverty (%) 13.37 7.29 7.15 7.31 11.67 9.22 9.40
Mean household 57,543 65,484 67,508 74,276 65,708 69,120 73,231
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 19,529 92,932 194,575 505,701 509,752 1,322,489 11,052,512
White 16,115 73,360 156,391 397,440 301,023 944,329 7,563,621
Black 2,964 16,117 30,418 78,514 181,818 309,831 2,542,420
Asian 118 837 2,224 14,738 9,363 27,280 444,435
Native American 30 357 681 1,602 1,819 4,489 33,556
Others 317 2,275 4,836 13,408 15,737 36,573 468,467
Hispanic 85 1,747 4,128 12,180 15,592 33,732 520,646
Color 3,471 20,635 40,365 114,911 215,072 394,454 3,729,566
White (%) 82.52 78.94 80.38 78.59 59.05 71.41 68.43
Black (%) 15.18 17.34 15.63 15.53 35.67 23.43 23.00
(continued)
346 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Fig. B.59 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Surry Nuclear
Power Station, Virginia, in 2010
348 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Table B.59 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Surry Nuclear
Power Station, Virginia, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 29 73 93 212 43 450 3,652
Tract area (sq. 356 892 1,551 1,797 1,003 5,599 90,995
mile)
Total population 108,530 252,904 321,598 700,649 140,317 1,523,998 11,291,965
White 77,393 175,672 214,999 434,235 108,717 1,011,016 8,793,509
Black 25,781 71,447 96,457 243,662 24,512 461,859 2,156,541
Asian 3,475 3,897 5,852 15,862 5,379 34,465 174,720
Native American 318 799 1,686 2,601 634 6,038 92,949
Others 1,575 1,078 2,622 4,287 1,069 10,631 74,215
Hispanic 3,403 3,822 7,214 13,015 3,484 30,938 193,446
Color 32,483 79,362 109,808 273,258 33,323 528,234 2,607,563
White (%) 71.31 69.46 66.85 61.98 77.48 66.34 77.87
Black (%) 23.75 28.25 29.99 34.78 17.47 30.31 19.10
Asian (%) 3.20 1.54 1.82 2.26 3.83 2.26 1.55
Native American 0.29 0.32 0.52 0.37 0.45 0.40 0.82
(%)
Others (%) 1.45 0.43 0.82 0.61 0.76 0.70 0.66
Hispanic (%) 3.14 1.51 2.24 1.86 2.48 2.03 1.71
Color (%) 29.93 31.38 34.14 39.00 23.75 34.66 23.09
Female (%) 50.04 51.19 47.25 51.54 50.14 50.34 51.40
Old (65+ years) 7.19 10.46 10.24 10.66 6.49 9.91 11.63
(%)
Kid (<5 years) (%) 9.81 9.40 8.93 9.76 10.71 9.61 8.21
Native-born (%) 94.86 97.19 97.09 96.91 95.73 96.74 96.66
Renter housing 38.79 36.15 36.33 36.41 24.77 35.51 28.95
units (%)
Education (%) 26.08 20.02 18.38 16.82 18.71 18.48 21.10
Unemployment (%) 5.10 5.75 6.33 6.39 4.61 6.00 4.48
Poverty (%) 8.95 10.79 12.58 13.27 6.94 11.81 11.64
Mean household 64,169 59,585 56,975 57,769 66,543 59,126 61,416
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 121,515 297,971 331,503 724,082 170,125 1,645,196 13,482,632
White 78,854 192,505 199,550 406,629 119,672 997,210 9,921,884
Black 33,064 89,683 111,240 273,671 34,826 542,484 2,575,678
Asian 3,586 5,976 6,728 18,159 8,417 42,866 332,097
Native American 604 1,157 2,032 3,293 619 7,705 115,645
Others 5,412 8,639 11,986 22,295 6,610 54,942 537,317
Hispanic 5,287 7,587 10,008 18,109 6,164 47,155 653,082
Color 44,981 108,939 135,586 325,179 53,621 668,306 3,846,659
White (%) 64.89 64.61 60.20 56.16 70.34 60.61 73.59
(continued)
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 349
Fig. B.60 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Columbia
Generating Station, Washington, in 2010
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 351
Fig. B.61 Spatial distribution of percent color among the populations surrounding Point Beach
Nuclear Plant, Wisconsin, in 2010
354 Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses
Table B.61 Demographic composition of population, as sorted by distance from Point Beach
Nuclear Plant, Wisconsin, in 1990, 2000, and 2010 Source (Kyne 2014)
0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 0–50 Outside
Year 1990
Tract 5 13 48 30 18 114 1,295
Tract area (sq. mile) 192 1,154 1,689 712 1,403 5,150 60,346
Total population 20,905 51,500 173,433 109,702 62,752 418,292 4,473,476
White 20,582 50,155 167,146 106,176 61,258 405,317 4,108,993
Black 32 75 949 215 93 1,364 242,940
Asian 139 928 2,549 1,380 714 5,710 47,350
Native American 106 256 2,313 1,617 288 4,580 35,137
Others 45 88 473 315 397 1,318 39,044
Hispanic 86 314 1,341 870 938 3,549 84,057
Color 358 1,570 7,038 3,983 1,973 14,922 407,753
White (%) 98.45 97.39 96.37 96.79 97.62 96.90 91.85
Black (%) 0.15 0.15 0.55 0.20 0.15 0.33 5.43
Asian (%) 0.66 1.80 1.47 1.26 1.14 1.37 1.06
Native American (%) 0.51 0.50 1.33 1.47 0.46 1.09 0.79
Others (%) 0.22 0.17 0.27 0.29 0.63 0.32 0.87
Hispanic (%) 0.41 0.61 0.77 0.79 1.49 0.85 1.88
Color (%) 1.71 3.05 4.06 3.63 3.14 3.57 9.11
Female (%) 50.23 51.65 51.09 50.84 50.95 51.03 51.08
Old (65+ years) (%) 15.71 17.03 12.23 11.60 15.58 13.33 13.31
Kid (<5 years) (%) 8.89 8.55 9.36 9.31 8.65 9.12 8.93
Native-born (%) 99.15 98.05 98.40 98.08 97.86 98.23 97.45
Renter housing units 21.80 27.10 32.07 28.36 23.84 28.65 29.59
(%)
Education (%) 11.08 12.78 16.20 15.88 12.64 14.87 18.01
Unemployment (%) 4.30 5.41 4.57 4.00 4.87 4.54 5.26
Poverty (%) 8.18 9.67 9.69 6.06 7.97 8.40 10.91
Mean household 53,475 51,709 57,095 64,344 53,847 57,584 57,762
income ($)
Year 2000
Total population 20,819 53,856 194,781 124,182 68,085 461,723 4,901,952
White 20,468 51,106 178,340 115,725 64,232 429,871 4,343,682
Black 2 123 2,339 603 416 3,483 296,872
Asian 103 1,276 4,066 2,924 1,470 9,839 74,815
Native American 43 387 3,205 2,213 283 6,131 43,530
Others 201 967 6,822 2,722 1,680 12,392 143,060
Hispanic 175 1,111 8,246 2,736 1,838 14,106 176,943
Color 444 3,251 19,591 9,649 4,611 37,546 638,480
(continued)
Appendix B: Descriptive Analyses 355
Reference
Kyne D (2014) Environmental justice issues in communities hosting US nuclear power plants
(Order No. 3617964). Available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global. (1528556250).
Retrieved from http://ezhost.utrgv.edu:2048/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.ezhost.utrgv.
edu:2048/docview/1528556250?accountid=7119
Index
A D
Alert, 78, 80, 103, 133, 135, 147, 148, 151 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, 301, 302
Alvin M. Weinberg, 5 Decommissioning strategies, 33, 46
Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency Deep-dose equivalent (EDE), 79, 138
(ARRA), 136, 138–142, 144, 146, 170, 181 Deferred dismantling, 33, 46
Arkansas Nuclear One, 65, 72, 170, 184 Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, 69, 170,
Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 6 187, 188
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 6 Disasters, 28, 75, 77, 102, 144, 155
Augmented inspection team (AIT), 30 Disaster and emergency management process,
75
B Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, 241, 242
Beaver Valley Power Station, 65, 307 Dresden Nuclear Power Station, 45, 65, 214
Beryllium, 1 Duane Arnold Energy Center, 223, 224
Braidwood Station, 205, 206
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, 170, 175, 176 E
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, 69, 172, 292 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, 199, 200
Byron Station, 171, 208, 209 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), 20,
27
C Emergency planning zones (EPZs), 39, 148
Cadmium, 5 Enrico Fermi, 1
Callaway Plant, 172, 259, 260 Entombing, 33, 46, 165
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, 171, 235, Environmental Assessments (EAs), 10
236 Environmental Impact Statements (EISs), 10
Catawba Nuclear Station, 61, 322, 323 Environmental justice, 11, 39–41
Chernobyl Accident, 20, 25, 28 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 10,
Clinton Power Station, 211, 212 41, 79, 80
Columbia Generating Station, 65, 72, 352, 353 Evacuation, 20, 25, 28, 29, 39, 72, 75, 78, 79,
Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, 340, 82, 91, 101–103, 112, 114, 116, 125, 126,
341 129, 131, 140, 141, 144, 145, 148, 149,
Combined Statistical Areas (CSAs), 58 151, 164, 165
Committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE),
79, 138 F
Committee on the Analysis of Cancer Risks, Fair treatment, 11
43, 44 Fermi, 4, 5, 11, 65, 171, 244, 245
Contamination Risks, 16, 30 Field Measurement to Dose (FMDose), 87, 88,
Cooper Nuclear Station, 65, 72, 262, 263 102
Core-meltdown accident, 8, 17, 18, 28, 39, 72, Fission, 1, 6, 8, 33, 86
88, 105–107, 135–137, 148, 149, 163, 165 Fission Technology, 6
Core-meltdown Risks, 16 Fort Calhoun Station, 265, 266
Fuel assembly, 7 M
Fukushima Daiichi Accident, 26, 27, 30, 49 McGuire Nuclear Station, 65, 69, 172, 294,
295, 296
G Meaningful involvement, 11
Gaseous effluents, 43, 86 Millstone Power Station, 45, 65, 190, 191
GE boiling water reactors (BWR), 26 Mitigation, 76, 78, 103, 142, 145, 161, 164
General Emergency (GE), 26, 32, 78, 80, 81, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, 250, 251
82, 103
GeoLytics, 48 N
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, 69, 172, 252, 256, Nagasaki, 5
257 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),
Graphite, 5, 20 10, 41
National Research Council (U.S.), 44
H National Research Council (USA), 43
Hazards, 41, 76, 143 Near-miss events, 29
H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, 325, 326 New Safe Containment, 24
High-power channel reactor, 20 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, 172, 286, 287
Hiroshima, 5, 31 Non-urban areas, 47, 61
Hope Creek Generating Station, 65, 171, 271, Normal accident, 34
272 Normal Accident Theory, 34
Host communities, 31, 39, 41, 44, 46, 49, 50, North Anna Power Station, 346, 347
61, 106, 118 Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE), 78, 80,
Hurricane Sandy, 75, 77, 78 103
Nuclear Power Emergencies, 39, 75, 77, 78,
I 103
Incident inspection team (IIT), 30 Nuclear power emergency and response, 79
Indian Point Nuclear Generating, 65, 72, 123, Nuclear power emergency management
125, 128, 129, 131, 148, 280, 281 process, 77–79
Inevitable Risks, 1, 33, 39, 41, 77 Nuclear Power Reactor, 6, 7, 9, 12, 15, 148
Ingestion Exposure Zone (IEZ), 39 Nuclear Radiation Risks, 32
Internal radiation pathway, 43 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), 6
Internal radiation pathway, 43
Invisible Risks, 40 O
Oconee Nuclear Station, 328, 329
J Operating License, 10, 41, 42, 48
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, 172, Operating License Process, 10
283, 284 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, 45,
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, 170, 178, 179 65, 274, 275
L P
LaSalle County Station, 69, 217, 218 Palisades Nuclear Plant, 247, 248
Leo Szilard, 5 Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, 40, 49,
License Renewal, 6, 12 65, 88, 91, 106, 110, 132, 137, 170, 181,
Limerick Generating Station, 61, 65, 72, 310, 182
311 Peaceful Applications of Atoms Act, 1, 5
Liquid effluents, 43, 86 Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, 65, 313,
Liquid Radioactive Release Lessons Learned 314
Task Force (LLTF), 30 Perry Nuclear Power Plant, 304, 305
Lise Meitner, 4 Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, 65, 238, 239
Low-level radiation, 19, 42–44, 46 Point Beach Nuclear Plant, 174, 355, 356
Index 359
Potassium (KI) pills, 133, 141, 143, 163, 165 Soviet-designed RBMK, 20
Potential Risks, 16, 31, 32, 34, 40, 44, 46, 72, Special inspection team (SIT), 30
144 St. Lucie Plant, 61, 171
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, 253, Stakeholder participation, 146, 163
254 Stream-water mixture, 7
Prediction, 76, 77 Superstorm Sandy, 75
Protective Action Decisions (PADs), 79, 101 Surry Nuclear Power Station, 65, 349, 350
Projecting Source to Term Dose, 88 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, 316, 317
Projection of Plume Path Dispersion, 75, 78,
82, 142, 164 T
Protective Action Recommendation (PAR), 78, Terrorist Attack Risks, 33, 41
79, 101, 103, 137, 142 Three Mile Island (TMI) Accident, 17
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, 65, 319,
Q 320
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, 220, 221 Thyroid CDE, 100
2010 TIGER Shape file, 58
R Total effective dose equivalent (TEDE), 79, 91,
Radioactive plume dispersion, 105, 132, 138, 96, 100, 101, 107, 111, 112, 114–116, 118,
139, 142, 144 124–127, 129–131, 138
Radiological Assessment System for Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, 65, 196
Consequence Analysis (RASCAL), 79, 82, Typical Boiling-Water Reactor, 7
107, 138 Typical Pressurized-Water Reactor, 7
Radium, 1 Typifying weather conditions, 105, 129, 132,
reaktor bolshoy moshchnosty kanalny, 20 151
Recovery, 25, 76, 103, 142, 145, 149, 151
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, 289, 290 U
Release Path, 88, 90 United Nations Scientific Committee of the
Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system, 27 Effects of Atomic Radiation, 28
Response, 24, 28, 47, 72, 75, 76, 78, 79, 82, Unknown Consequences, 40
86, 103, 132, 135, 139, 142, 146, 149, 164 Uranium, 3, 4, 7, 16, 24, 80
River Bend Station, 171, 268, 269 Urban areas, 58
US Census Bureau, 48
S
Salem Nuclear Generating Station, 65 V
Sarcophagus, 24, 165 Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, 331, 332
Seabrook Station, 65, 72 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, 202, 203
Self-sustaining Chain Reaction, 1, 5 Vulnerability, 28, 75
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, 334, 335
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, 69, 298, W
299 Warning, 18, 32, 76, 78, 80, 141, 145
Shippingport Atomic Power Station, 6 Waterford Steam Electric Station, 69, 171, 232,
Site Area Emergency (SAE), 78, 80, 103 233
Source Term to Dose (STDose), 79, 82, 87, 89, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, 337, 338
90, 92, 107, 131, 138 Wolf Creek Generating Station, 65, 226
South Texas Project, 11, 61, 72, 173, 343