Criminal Procedure Case Midterm, 2018

Digests

DIGESTED CASES FOR CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE
Midterm Cases, 2018

Submitted by:
Mula, Iane Gem M. , JD 2-2

Submitted to:
Professor: Prosecutor Jedrek Ng

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Tickler: This case talks about how the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue
of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.

Doctrine: Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information and once
shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case;

How jurisdiction attaches; The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the
action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.

Case Title:
ANA LOU B. NAVAJA v. MANUEL A. DE CASTRO +
GR No. 182926, Jun 22, 2015
PERALTA, J.

Facts:

The case arose from a complaint filed by private respondent DKT Philippines, Inc. Represented by
Atty. Edgar Borje against petitioner Ana Lou Narvaja, alleging that while she was still its Regional Sales
Manager, she falsified a receipt by making it appear that she incurred meal expenses for P1,810.00 instead
of the actual amount of P810.00 at Garden Café, Jagna, Bohol, and claimed reimbursement for it. She was
charged with falsification of private document before the MCTC of Jagna Bohol.

Narvaja filed a motion to quash/defer arraignment on the ground that none of the essential
elements of the crime of falsification of private document occurred in Jagna, Bohol, hence, MCTC had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case due to improper venue. MCTC denied the motion to quash. She
then filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied.

She then filed a petition for certiorari before RTC for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion. The court denied it for lack of legal basis or merit and that there were sufficient evidences
indicating that the falsification took place in Jagna Bohol. If the court were to follow the logic of the petition,
her claim that her request for reimbursement was made in Cebu City not in Jagna, Bohol would likewise
give no showing or indication that the falsification was done in Cebu. It would result to a “neither here nor
there” situation.

Narvaja elevated the case on appeal to the CA and was also dismissed, affirming in toto the decision
of the RTC. Her motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: WON the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol does not have jurisdiction over the criminal case and WON there was
an improper venue

Ruling:

No. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. Under the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or territory
where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. Based on the
allegations of the complaint, the falsification of private document was actually committed in Jagna, Bohol.

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Guided by the settled ruled that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or information and not by the result of proof, the court holds that Narvaja’s case falls within the
territorial jurisdiction of Jagna, Bohol.

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Tickler: This case is about how jurisdiction in a criminal action is conferred, particularly criminal actions
arising from violations of P.D. 957 otherwise known as The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective
Decree.

Doctrine: Jurisdiction of the Court in Criminal Cases; Jurisdiction is conferred by law; Jurisdiction over
criminal actions arising from violations of PD 957 is vested in the regular courts.

Case Title:
MA. LUISA G. DAZON, PETITIONER, VS. KENNETH Y. YAP AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS
GR No. 157095, Jan 15, 2010
DEL CASTILLO, J.

Facts:

Respondent Kenneth Yap was the president of Primetown Property Group, developer of Kiener
Hills Mactan Condominium, a low-rise condominium project. Petitioner made a down payment with
Primetown for purchase of a unit as well as several installments payments totalling to P1Million plus.
Primetown however failed to finish the condominium project. Dazon demanded the refund of her
payments from Primetown, pursuant to P.D. 957 otherwise known as the Subdivision and Condominium
Buyers' Protective Decree.

She then filed a criminal complaint with the office of the City Prosecutor of Lapu-Lapu City for
violation of P.D. 957. Subsequently, after finding probabble cause, an information was filed with RTC of
Lapu-Lapu. Meanwhile, Yap filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice wherein the trial
prosecutor ordered to cause the withdrawal of the information. Hence, the prosecutor file a motion to
withdraw information with the RTC. It was granted by the court and Dazon’s motion for reconsideration
was denied.

Issue: WON RTC has jurisdiction over a criminal action arising from P.D. 957 and not HLURB

Ruling:

Yes. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and that there is no law expressly vesting on the Housing and
Land Regulatory Board exclusive jurisdiction over criminal actions arising from violations under P.D. 957.
Not having been specifically conferred with power to hear and decide cases which are criminal in nature,
as well as to impose penalties, HLURB had no jurisdiction over the case.

Sec. 20 of B.P. 129 vests to RTC exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body except those falling under the exclusive and concurrent
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Hence, it is the RTC of Lapu-Lapu that has jurisdiction to hear and decide on the case.

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Tickler: This case talks about how criminal actions are instituted, particularly those cases referred to in Rule
110 (b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Doctrine: As a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by a complaint or information, both of which
are filed in court. If a complaint is filed directly in court, the same must be filed by the offended party and in
case of an information, the same must be filed by the fiscal. However, a complaint filed with the fiscal prior
to a judicial action may be filed by any person.

Case Title:
JORGE SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent

G.R. No. 149472. October 15, 2002

PUNO, J.

Facts:

The accused received from Olivier Philippines and Skiva International, Inc. the amount of
$41,300.00 for the sole purpose of meeting the cost of textile and labor in the manufacture of seven
hundred dozen stretch twill jeans which he (accused) is duty bound to deliver to said complainant, and the
accused once in possession of the same, far from complying from his obligation, with unfaithfulness and
abuse of confidence and to defraud said complainant, did, then and there willfully and unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the same for his own personal use and benefit despite
repeated demands to return the said amount, failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the
damage and prejudice of said complainant, in the aforementioned amount of $41,300.00or its equivalent
in Philippine currency.

Issue: WON it is necessary that the proper offended party file a complaint for purposes of preliminary
investigation by the fiscal

Ruling:

No. It is not necessary that the proper “offended party” file a complaint for purposes of preliminary
investigation by the fiscal—a “complaint” filed with the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed by any
person; If a complaint is filed directly in court, the same must be filed by the offended party and in case of
an information, the same must be filed by the fiscal.—The “complaint” referred to in Rule 110 contemplates
one that is filed in court to commence a criminal action in those cases where a complaint of the offended
party is required by law, instead of an information which is generally filed by a fiscal. It is not necessary that
the proper “offended party” file a complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal. The rule
is that unless the offense subject of the complaint is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, any
competent person may file a complaint for preliminary investigation. Thus, as a general rule, a criminal
action is commenced by a complaint or information, both of which are filed in court. If a complaint is filed
directly in court, the same must be filed by the offended party and in case of an information, the same
must be filed by the fiscal. However, a “complaint” filed with the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed
by any person. Thus, in the case at bar, the complaint was validly filed by Skiva despite the finding of the
lower court that petitioner had no obligation to account to Skiva.

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Tickler: This case covers the effects of the institution of a criminal action particularly stated in Rule 110,
Section 1 (b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and that there is no more distinction between
cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of
prescription.

Doctrine: The institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of prescription of the
offense charged unless otherwise provided in special laws.

It is the institution of criminal actions, whether filed with the court or with the Office of the City Prosecutor,
that interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged.

Case Title:
PEOPLE v. MA. THERESA PANGILINAN +
GR No. 152662, Jun 13, 2012
PEREZ, J.

Facts:

On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City. The complaint alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount
of Nine Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos (P9,658,592.00) in favor
of private complainant which were dishonored upon presentment for payment.

Consequently, the case was modified, and only on February 3, 2000 that two counts for violation of BP Blg.
22 were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. On
17 June 2000, respondent filed an “Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance
of Warrant of Arrest” before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been
extinguished by reason of prescription.

In defense of her claim, Pangilinan said that the prevailing law that governs the prescription of special penal
law, B.P. 22, is Section 2 of Act No. 3326 (An Act To Establish Periods Of Prescription For Violations Penalized
By Special Acts) where the right to file an action to a “proper court” and not to merely to prosecution office
for B.P. 22, prescribes four (4) years from the commission of the crime. The imputed violation occurred
sometime in 1995, and only on February 3, 2000 that a case was formally filed in the Metropolitan Trial
Court, therefore the action already prescribes. RTC granted the motion.

On the other hand, the complainant argued that the filing with the office of city prosecutor constitutes an
interruption to the prescription.

Issue: Is filing complaint to city prosecutor office considered a “judicial proceeding” that can interrupt
prescription of crime under B.P. 22, a special law?

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Ruling:

YES. Following a catena of cases, the court held that, there is no more distinction between cases under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of the period
of prescription; that the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation in the office of prosecutor
against accused interrupts the period of prescription.

Following the factual finding the crime was committed sometime in 1995, the filing of complaint on
September 1997, two (2) years from the commission of the crime validly interrupts the running of
prescription. Therefore, the action against the respondent Pangilinan did not prescribe.

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Tickler: This case speaks about the definition of information as stated in Rule 110 Section 2 and its being the
same with or considered as a pleading.

Doctrine: Rule 110, an information is defined as an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense,
subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court.

In accordance with the above definition, it is clear that an information is a pleading since the allegations
therein, which charge a person with an offense, is basically the same as a complaint in a civil action which
alleges a plaintiff's cause or cause of action.

Case Title:
PEOPLE v. JESUS A. ARROJADO +
GR No. 207041, Nov 09, 2015
PERALTA, J.

Facts:

Jesus Arrojado, charged with Murder in an Information filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Roxas
City, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information against him on the ground that the investigating prosecutor
who filed the Information did not indicate therein the number and date of issue of her Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliace, as required by Bar Matter No. 1922 promulgated by
the Court on June 3, 2008. The Office of the City Prosecutor opposed the Motion to Dismiss, contending
that 1) the Information sought to be dismissed is sufficient in form and substance; (2) the lack of proof of
MCLE compliance by the prosecutor who prepared and signed the Information should not prejudice the
interest of the State in filing charges against persons who have violated the law; and (3) and administrative
edict cannot prevail over substantive or procedural law, by imposing additional requirements for the
sufficiency of a criminal information.

The RTC dismissed the Information without prejudice. The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration was
also denied, hence the People of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari and/or mandamus before the
Court of Appeals. The CA, however, dismissed the petition. It held that the prosecution was not without
any recourse other than a petition for certiorari/mandamus as it may simply re-file the Information as the
dismissal thereof was without prejudice. Thus, the People of the Philippines represented by the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Roxas City filed the instant petition for review on certiorari to assail the CA decision.

Issue: Whether or not the Motion to Dismiss the Information was proper for failure of the Investigating
Prosecutor to vindicate her MCLE Certificate of Compliance as required under Bar Matter No. 1922.

Ruling:

The petition lacks merit.

Pertinent portions of B.M. No. 1922, provide as follows:

The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Committee on Legal Education and Bar
Matters, to REQUIRE practicing members of the bar to INDICATE in all pleadings filed before the courts or
quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate

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of Exemption, as may be applicable, for the immediately preceding compliance period. Failure to disclose
the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from
the records.

xxxx

Under Section 4, Rule 110 of the same Rules, an information is defined as an accusation in writing charging
a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court. In accordance with the
above definitions, it is clear that an information is a pleading since the allegations therein, which charge a
person with an offense, is basically the same as a complaint in a civil action which alleges a plaintiffs cause
or cause of action

As to petitioner’s contention that the failure of the investigating prosecutor to indicate in the subject
Information the number and date of issue of her MCLE Certificate of Compliance is a mere formal defect
and is not a valid ground to dismiss such Information, suffice it to state that B.M. No. 1922 categorically
provides that “[f]ailure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the
expunction of the pleadings from the records.”

The Court agrees with the CA that the dismissal of the Information, without prejudice, did not leave the
prosecution without any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. To avoid undue delay in the disposition
of the subject criminal case and to uphold the parties’ respective rights to a speedy disposition of their
case, the prosecution, mindful of its duty not only to prosecute offenders but more importantly to do
justice, could have simply re-filed the Information containing the required number and date of issue of the
investigating prosecutor’s MCLE Certificate of Compliance, instead of resorting to the filing of various
petitions in court to stubbornly insist on its position and question the trial court’s dismissal of the subject
Information, thereby wasting its time and effort and the State’s resources.

Even when the motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order dismissing the subject Information was filed,
the required number and date of issue of the investigating prosecutor’s MCLE Certificate of Compliance
was still not included nor indicated. Thus, in the instant case, absent valid and compelling reasons, the
requested leniency and liberality in the observance of procedural rules appear to be an afterthought,
hence, cannot be granted.

In any event, to avoid inordinate delays in the disposition of cases brought about by a counsel’s failure to
indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance,
this Court issued an En Bane Resolution, dated January 14, 2014 which amended B.M. No. 1922 by
repealing the phrase “Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case
and the expunction of the pleadings from the records” and replacing it with “Failure to disclose the required
information would subject the counsel to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action.” Thus, under the
amendatory Resolution, the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of
issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in the dismissal of the case and
expunction of the pleadings from the records. Nonetheless, such failure will subject the lawyer to the
prescribed fine and/or disciplinary action.

In light of the above amendment, while the same was not yet in effect at the time that the subject
Information was filed, the more prudent and practical thing that the trial court should have done in the

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first place, so as to avoid delay in the disposition of the case, was not to dismiss the Information but to
simply require the investigating prosecutor to indicate therein the number and date of issue of her MCLE
Certificate of Compliance.

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Tickler: This case talks about how criminal cases should be consolidated so as not to defeat the purpose of
promoting a more expeditious and less expensive resolution of the controversy of cases involving the same
business transaction.

Doctrine: Sec. 22, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court stating: Sec. 22.Consolidation of trials of related offenses.
– Charges for offenses founded on the same facts or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character
may be tried jointly at the discretion of the court.

Case Title:
ROMULO L. NERI v. SANDIGANBAYAN +
GR No. 202243, Aug 07, 2013
VELASCO JR., J.

Facts:

Petitioner Romulo L. Neri (Neri) served as Director General of the National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA) during the administration of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. In connection
with the botched Philippine-ZTE National Broadband Network (NBN) Project, the Ombudsman filed two
criminal information, the first against Abalos, and the second against Neri. The Office of the Special
Prosecutor then moved for the two cases’ consolidation, to promote a more expeditious and less expensive
resolution of the controversy of cases involving the same business transaction.

Issue: WON Consolidation of the two cases is proper.

Ruling:

NO. Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its docket
are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously while providing justice to
the parties. Toward this end, consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the court's docket or
consolidation of issues within those cases are permitted by the rules. The term "consolidation" is used in
three (3) different senses or concepts, thus: a (1)Where all except one of several actions are stayed until
one is tried, in which case the judgment [in one] trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not actually
consolidation but is referred to as such. (quasi consolidation) (2)Where several actions are combined into
one, lose their separate identity, and become a single action in which a single judgment is rendered. This is
illustrated by a situation where several actions are pending between the same parties stating claims which
might have been set out originally in one complaint. (actual consolidation) (3)Where several actions are
ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character and requires the entry of a separate
judgment. This type of consolidation does not merge the suits into a single action, or cause the parties to
one action to be parties to the other. (consolidation for trial).

To be sure, consolidation, as taken in the above senses, is allowed, as Rule 31 of the Rules of Court is
entitled "Consolidation or Severance." And Sec. 1 of Rule 31 provides: Section 1.Consolidation. – When
actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint
hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all actions consolidated; and it
may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.

The counterpart, but narrowed, rule for criminal cases is found in Sec. 22, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
stating: Sec. 22.Consolidation of trials of related offenses. – Charges for offenses founded on the same facts

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or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character may be tried jointly at the discretion of the court.
As complemented by Rule XII, Sec. 2 of the Sandiganbayan Revised Internal Rules which states: Section
2.Consolidation of Cases. – Cases arising from the same incident or series of incidents, or involving common
questions of fact and law, may be consolidated in the Division to which the case bearing the lowest docket
number is raffled. The prosecution anchored its motion for consolidation partly on the aforequoted Sec. 22
of Rule 119 which indubitably speaks of a joint trial.||| Joint trial is permissible "where the [actions] arise
from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially
on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and that
a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the
parties."

More elaborately, joint trial is proper where the offenses charged are similar, related, or connected, or are
of the same or similar character or class, or involve or arose out of the same or related or connected acts,
occurrences, transactions, series of events, or chain of circumstances, or are based on acts or transactions
constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, or are of the same pattern and committed in the same
manner, or where there is a common element of substantial importance in their commission, or where the
same, or much the same, evidence will be competent and admissible or required in their prosecution, and
if not joined for trial the repetition or reproduction of substantially the same testimony will be required on
each trial.

Criminal prosecutions primarily revolve around proving beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the
elements of the crime charged. As such, they mainly involve questions of fact. There is a question of fact
when the doubt or difference arises from the truth or the falsity of the allegations of facts. Put a bit
differently, it exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the
inquiry invites calibration of the whole gamut of evidence considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to
each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.

A consolidation of the Neri case to that of Abalos would expose petitioner Neri to testimonies which have
no relation whatsoever in the case against him and the lengthening of the legal dispute thereby delaying
the resolution of his case. Consolidation here would force petitioner to await the conclusion of testimonies
against Abalos, however irrelevant or immaterial as to him (Neri) before the case against the latter may be
resolved – a needless, hence, oppressive delay in the resolution of the criminal case against him.

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Tickler: This case discusses that an amendment or change of the time of the commission of the crime, when
the disparity is not so great, is only a formal amendment in the information. A formal amendment does not
require a subsequent arraignment as the purpose of which is to INFORM THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE
ACCUSATION.

Doctrine: Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that, “[a] complaint or an
Information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused
enters his plea. After the plea and during trial, a formal amendment may only be done with leave of court
and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.”

Case Title:
LETICIA I. KUMMER v. PEOPLE +
GR No. 174461, Sep 11, 2013
BRION, J.

Facts:

On one fateful night, the evidence of the prosecution reveals, Johan Kummer, a minor, the son of Leticia
Kummer, shot a certain Jesus Mallo, Jr. According to the eyewitness, Amiel Malana, he and Jesus Mallo
went to the house of Kummer's. Jesus knocked on the door of the Kummer’s house, declaring that he is
“Boy Mallo”. Then, according to the testimonies of Malana, Johan shot Mallo dead with a shotgun. Being a
minor, Johan was released at the cognizance of his father. Then he left the country without notifying the
court. In defense, Leticia Kummer produced another version of the story which shows that they were
sleeping innocently in their house on that fateful night, when there was a commotion outside their house,
admitting however that, when they were practically disturbed by the said commotion, Johan got a shotgun
and fired outside their house, without intention to kill or injure anybody, especially Jesus. An Information
was filed with the Court on January 12, 1989, which was later on modified. This modification was about the
date of the commission of the crime. The modification, however, happened after she was arraigned. The
RTC convicted her and Johan, who was out of the Philippine Legal System’s reach. She appealed the case
to the CA, which was denied and affirmed the RTC's decision, arguing, among others, that by virtue of the
amendment of the Information, she should have been arraigned again; and, since she was not, there was
a blatant violation of her right to be informed of the nature of her case, since an amended Information is a
new Information. Hence, all proceedings which the case had undergone were void

Issue: Does she have to be arraigned again?

Ruling:

No. She does not have to be arraigned again. Note that only the date was amended. Sec. 14, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that, “[a] complaint or an Information may be amended,
in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the
plea and during trial, a formal amendment may only be done with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.” Accordingly, a change in time in the commission of
the crime, when the disparity is not so great, is only a formal amendment. In view of the foregoing, the
amendment was from “July” to “June” can only be regarded as formal amendment. Moreover, it does not
and could not prejudice the rights of the accused, because (1) it does not change the nature of the crime,
and (2) it does not render the defenses prepared for the former Information as it stood invalid. Having said

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all these, a formal amendment does not require a subsequent arraignment as the purpose of which is to
INFORM THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION. Since the nature and cause of the accusation are
not changed by a formal amendment, a re-arraignment is not necessary, as she was already informed of
these things. Hence, there has been no violation of her rights as accused.

Hence, she does not have to be arraigned again.

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Tickler: This case talks about how criminal actions are enjoined subject to certain exceptions as provided by
the Rules of Court.

Doctrine: Criminal prosecutions may not be restrained, either through a preliminary or final injunction or a
writ of prohibition, except in the following instances: (1) To afford adequate protection to the constitutional
rights of the accused; (2) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions; (3) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice; (4) When the acts of the
officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or
regulation; (6) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) Where the Court has no jurisdiction over the
offense; (8) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (9) Where the charges are manifestly
false and motivated by lust for vengeance; (10) When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused
and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied; (11) Preliminary injunction has been issued by the
Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners.”

Case Title:
DIRECTOR GUILLERMO T. DOMONDON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 129904. March 16, 2000

BUENA, J.

Facts:

On February and May 1994, four separate information were filed at the Sandiganbayan against certain
officials of the Philippine National Police due to the discovery of a chain of irregularities within the PNP
Commands. The petitioner was included as an accused on account of his approval of the Advice Allotment
in the amount of P5M and P15M respectively which amounts to a violation of the AntiGraft Law under Sec
3 of RA 3019.

On May 17, 1994, the Sandiganbayan issued 2 orders, the first was ordering the prosecution to
demonstrate probable complicity in the transaction described in the information and the second order was
deferring action on the motion for consolidation considering the uncertainty of the Court in proceeding the
case at this time and considering that only one of the 15 accused filed a motion for consolidation. A Motion
to Admit Amended Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan on August 26, 1997 and included
petitioner as they were recommended for further prosecution by the Ombudsman. Petitioner alleges that
respondents Desierto, Villa and Tamayo acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion for
consolidation, claiming that since all of the pertinent cases have been remanded by the Sandiganbayan to
the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman for reinvestigation, "jurisdiction
has reverted" in the latter and "…it is grave abuse of discretion to refuse to perform the duty of
consolidating these cases.

Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan should be enjoined from proceeding with the hearing and other
incidents of Criminal Case No. 20574 against the petitioner during the pendency of the petition.

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court held that the contentions of the petitioner are untenable. The Court explained :
“Well settled is the rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained, either through a preliminary or
final injunction or a writ of prohibition, except in the following instances: (1) To afford adequate protection

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to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or
to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice;
(4) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) Where the prosecution is under
an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (6) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) Where the Court
has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (9) Where
the charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust for vengeance; (10) When there is clearly no prima
facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied; ella (11) Preliminary
injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners.”

Corollary to the rule, the courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the fiscal or Ombudsman to
determine the specificity and adequacy of the averments of the offense charged. He may dismiss the
complaint forthwith if he finds it to be insufficient in form or substance or if he otherwise finds no ground
to continue with the inquiry; or he may proceed with the investigation if the complaint is, in his view, in
due and proper form.

However, while the Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should
be filed, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action when there is an abuse of
discretion, by way of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, we proceed to determine whether the
respondents Ombudsman Desierto and Overall Deputy Ombudsman Villa acted with grave abuse of
discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Such arbitrariness or despotism does not obtain here. With regard to
respondents’ denial of petitioner’s motion for consolidation of Crim. Case No. 20574 with Crim. Case Nos.
20185, 20191, 20192, 20576 and 22098, we find the same to be well-founded. While the Ombudsman has
full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the
case has been filed with said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full
control of the case so much so that the information may not be dismissed, or in the instant case, may not
be consolidated with other pending cases, without the approval of the said court. Thus, the Court dismissed
the petition for prohibition and prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction to nullify the order of the
Ombudsman.

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Tickler: This case clearly explains that Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be
conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred by
the sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed
by law.

Doctrine: In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged
with an offense committed outside its limited territory.

In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that the offense was committed, it must also prove
the identity of the accused and the fact that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court.

Case Title:
HECTOR TREAS, Petitioner, versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G. R. No. 195002

SERENO, J.

Facts:

A house-and-lot in Iloilo City covered by TCT No. 109266 and availed the services of herein petitioner, Atty.
Hector Treas (Hector) regarding the transfer of the title in the Former’s name. Hector informed Elizabeth
that for the titling of the property in the name of her aunt Margarita, the following expenses would be
incurred: 1)P20,000.00- Attorneys fees; 2) P90,000.00-Capital Gains Tax; 3) P24,000.00- Documentary
Stamp, and 4) P10,000.00- Miscellaneous Expenses. Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who
issued a corresponding receipt dated December 22, 1999 and prepared [a] Deed of Sale with Assumption
of Mortgage. Subsequently, Hector gave Elizabeth Revenue Official Receipts with official receipt nos.
covering P96,000.00 and P24,000.00. However, she was informed by the BIR that the receipts were fake.

Hector admitted to her that the receipts were fake and that he used the P120,000.00 for his other
transactions. To settle his accounts, Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank of Commerce check dated
November 10, 2000 in the amount of P120,000.00, deducting from P150,000.00 the P30,000.00 as
attorneys fees. When the check was deposited with the PCIBank, Makati Branch, the same was dishonored
for the reason that the account was closed. Notwithstanding, repeated formal and verbal demands,
appellant failed to pay. Thus, the instant case of Estafa was filed against him.

An information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor before the RTC, both of Makati which reads:
“That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH
LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00” During arraignment, petitioner, entered a plea of Not Guilty. And due
to old age and poor health, and the fact that he lives in Iloilo City, petitioner was unable to attend the pre-
trial and trial of the case. On 8 January 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty of the
crime of Estafa.

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Hector appealed before the CA but the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. Aggrieved, Hector appealed before
the Supreme Court and asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show
that ₱150,000 was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City. Instead, the evidence shows that the
Receipt issued by petitioner for the money indicates only date, without any indication of the place where
it was issued. Petitioner claims that the only logical conclusion is that the money was actually delivered to
him in Iloilo City, especially since his residence and office were situated there as well. Thus, the trial court
failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.

Issue: Can the Regional Trial Court of Makati acquire jurisdiction over the crime of estafa which the
prosecution failed to allege any of the acts material to such crime had occurred in Makati City?

Ruling:

No. The accused is correct in his argument that he is not required to present evidence to prove lack of
jurisdiction when such lack is already indicated in the prosecution evidence. As a settled principle in criminal
cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense
committed outside its limited territory.

As explained in the case of Isip v. People, the place where the crime was committed determines not only
the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for
jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one
of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the
offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged
with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.

Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. And once it is shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However,
if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court
should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. Moreover, Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted
and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred. Hence, jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority that organized
the court and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law.

This Court consistently rules that it is unfair to require a defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and
expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of
proper venue. In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that the offense was committed, it
must also prove the identity of the accused and the fact that the offense was committed within the
jurisdiction of the court.

There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution that points to where the offense,
or any of its elements, was committed. A review of the testimony of Elizabeth also shows that there was
no mention of the place where the offense was allegedly committed. Although the prosecution alleged that

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the check issued by petitioner was dishonored in a bank in Makati, such dishonor is not an element of the
offense of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC. There being no showing that the offense was
committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case.

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Tickler: The case discusses how jurisdiction of the court is acquired over criminal cases involving continuing
or transitory crimes, particularly B.P. 22 cases.

Doctrine: A person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or
territory where the offense was in part committed. Applying these principles, a criminal case for violation of
BP 22 may be filed in any of the places where any of its elements occurred – in particular, the place where
the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored.

Case Title:
ARMILYN MORILLO v. PEOPLE +
GR No. 198270, Dec 09, 2015
PERALTA, J.

Facts:

Sometime in July 2003, respondent Richard Natividad, Milo Malong and Bing Nanquil, introducing
themselves as contractors doing business in Pampanga City under the name and style of RB Custodio
Construction, purchased construction materials for their project inside the Subic Freeport Zone from
petitioner Armilyn Morillo, owner of Amasea General Merchandize and Construction Supplies. The parties
agreed that twenty percent (20%) of the purchases shall be paid within seven (7) days after the first delivery
and the remaining eighty percent (80%) to be paid within thirty-five (35) days after the last delivery, all of
which shall be via postdated checks.

Pursuant to the agreement, petitioner delivered construction materials amounting to a total of

P500,054.00 at the construction site where respondent and his partners were undertaking their project.
After the last delivery, respondent paid P20,000.00 in cash and issued two (2) post-dated checks, drawn
from Metrobank, Pampanga branch, in the amounts of P393,000.00 and P87,054.00. Upon maturity,
petitioner attempted to deposit the checks in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, San Lorenzo,
Makati City. They were, however, dishonored by the drawee bank.

Immediately thereafter, petitioner communicated the dishonor to respondent and his partners and
demanded for payment. Again, respondent issued two (2) post-dated Metrobank checks and assured
petitioner that they will be honored upon maturity. Upon deposit in her savings account at Equitable PCI
Bank, Makati Branch, the checks were once again dishonored for the reason that the account from which
they were drawn was already a closed account. Consequently, petitioner made several demands from
respondent and his partners, but to no avail, prompting her to file a complaint with the City Prosecution
Office, Makati City. Thus, on August 12, 2004, two (2) Informations were filed against respondent and Milo
Malong.

Issue: Whether or not MeTC of Makati City has jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling:

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Yes. It is well settled that violation of BP 22 cases is categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, which
means that the acts material and essential thereto occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur
in another. Accordingly, the court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been
committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance
of the same excludes the other. Stated differently, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime
may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. Applying
these principles, a criminal case for violation of BP 22 may be filed in any of the places where any of its
elements occurred – in particular, the place where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored.

Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, there is no denying, therefore, that the court of the place where
the check was deposited or presented for encashment; can be vested with jurisdiction to try cases involving
violations of BP 22. Thus, the fact that the check subject of the instant case was drawn, issued, and delivered
in Pampanga does not strip off the Makati MeTC of its jurisdiction over the instant case for it is undisputed
that the subject check was deposited and presented for encashment at the Makati Branch of Equitable PC
IBank. The MeTC of Makati, therefore, correctly took cognizance of the instant case and rendered its
decision in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.

First of all, the Court stresses that the appellate court’s dismissal of the case is not an acquittal of
respondent. Basic is the rule that a dismissal of a case is different from an acquittal of the accused therein.
Except in a dismissal based on a Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused, or for violation of the right of
the accused to a speedy trial, the dismissal of a criminal case against the accused will not result in his
acquittal. In the oft-cited People v. Salico, the Court explained: This argument or reasoning is predicated
on a confusion of the legal concepts of dismissal and acquittal. Acquittal is always based on the merits, that
is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that defendant’s guilt is beyond a
reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty.
Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or
the evidence does not show that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court,
or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc.

The only case in which the word dismissal is commonly but not correctly used, instead of the proper term
acquittal, is when, after the prosecution has presented all its: evidence, the defendant moves for the
dismissal and the court dismisses the ease on the ground that the evidence fails to show beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal because
the case is decided on the merits. If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch
as if it were so the defendant could not be again prosecuted before the court of competent jurisdiction;
and it is elemental that in such case, the defendant may again be prosecuted for the same offense before
a court of competent jurisdiction.

Thus, when the appellate court herein dismissed the instant case on the ground that the MeTC lacked
jurisdiction over the offense charged, it did not decide the same on the merits, let alone resolve the issue
of respondent’s guilt or innocence based on the evidence proffered by the prosecution. The appellate court
merely dismissed the case on the erroneous reasoning that none of the elements of BP 22 was committed
within the lower court’s jurisdiction, and not because of any finding that the evidence failed to show
respondent’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, therefore, such dismissal did not operate as an
acquittal, which, as previously discussed, may be repudiated only by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65

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of the Rules of Court, showing a grave abuse of discretion. Thus, petitioner’s resort to Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court cannot be struck down as improper. In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the parties
raise only questions of law because the Court, in its exercise of its power of review, is not a trier of facts.
There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts
and which does not call for an existence of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-
litigants.

In the instant case; the lone issue invoked by petitioner is precisely “whether the Court of Appeals erred
when it ruled that the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City did not have jurisdiction over the case despite
clear showing that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of said court.” Evidently, therefore,
the instant petition was filed within the bounds of our procedural rules for the issue herein rests solely on
what the law provides on the given set of circumstances insofar as the commission of the crime of BP 22 is
concerned. In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint
or Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or Information,
and the penalty provided by law for the crime charged at the time of its commission. Thus, when a case
involves a proper interpretation of the rules and jurisprudence with respect to the jurisdiction of courts to
entertain complaints filed therewith, it deals with a question of law that can be properly brought to this
Court under Rule 45.

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Tickler: Though as a general rule, rules of procedures are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to
the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied and are only relaxed in very
exceptional circumstances on equitable considerations, which are not present in the instant case.

Doctrine: The perfection of an appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional
and noncompliance with such requirements is considered fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment
final and executory.

Case Title:
FELY Y. YALONG, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND LUCILA C. YLAGAN,Respondents.

G.R. No. 187174, August 28, 2013

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Facts:

Respondent Ylagan filed a criminal complaint against Petitioner Yalong for the crime of violation of BP 22.
Upon arraignment, Yalong pleaded not guilty to the said charge. The case was then set for pre-trial and
therafter, trial ensued. During the trial, Ylagan testifies that Yalong borrowed from her 450,000 with a
verbal agreement that the same would be paid back to her in cash, and as payment therof, issued to her a
postdated check in the similar amount. However, when Ylagan presented the subject check for payment, it
was dishonored and returned to her for the reason of “Account Closed”. After several demands from
Yalong, Ylagan filed the instant case.

Yalong averred that she already paid the said loan but did not require Ylagan to issue a receipt or
acknowledge the same. She also claimed that the subject check belonged to her husband and that while
she knew that the said check did not cover sufficient funds, it was already signed by her husband when she
handed it to Ylagan. The MTCC found Yalong guilty. A motion for reconsideration was denied. She then filed
a notice of appeal which was also denied on the ground that Yalong had lost the remedies available to her
under the law when she failed to appear without justifiable reason at the scheduled promulgation of the
MTCC Decision, she did not surrender within 15 days from the date of such promulgation, she did not file
a motion for leave of court to avail of the remedies under the law, and she remained at large.

She filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied. Aggrieved, Yalong filed a Petition for
Certiorari with Petition for Bail (certiorari petition) before the RTC which denied the petition. The CA
dismissed the subject petition for review on the ground that the order of the RTC was issued in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction – where appeal [by filing a notice of appeal with the RTC] – and not a petition for
review is the proper remedy. Yalong filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied. Hence,
this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the CA properly dismissed the subject petition for review on the ground of
improper appeal.

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Ruling:

No. While the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the inappropriate filing of a petition for review
instead of a required notice of appeal is dismissible, Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules nonetheless provides
that appeals to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken
by filing a notice of appeal with the latter court. It is fundamental that a petition for certiorari is an original
action and, as such, it cannot be gainsaid that the RTC took cognizance of and resolved the aforesaid
petition in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Hence, Yalong should have filed a notice of appeal with
the RTC instead of a petition for review with the CA.

As a consequence of Yalong’s failure to file a notice of appeal with the RTC within the proper reglementary
period, the RTC Decision had attained finality which thereby bars Yalong from further contesting the same.
Verily, jurisprudence dictates that the perfection of an appeal within the period and in the manner
prescribed by law is jurisdictional and noncompliance with such requirements is considered fatal and has
the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. To be sure, the rules on appeal must be strictly
followed as they are considered indispensable to forestall or avoid unreasonable delays in the
administration of justice, to ensure an orderly discharge of judicial business, and to put an end to
controversies.

Though as a general rule, rules of procedures are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the
rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied and are only relaxed in very
exceptional circumstances on equitable considerations, which are not present in the instant case. As it
stands, the subject petition for review was the wrong remedy and perforce was properly dismissed by the
CA.

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Tickler: This case talks about the proper venue of criminal actions, particularly where the crime is perjury
and the false declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping were made before a notary public in
Makati City, despite knowledge that the material statements subscribed and sworn to were untrue.

Doctrine: Rule 110, Sec. 15 of the Rules of Court; Criminal action shall be instituted where the offense was
committed or where any of its essential elements occurred.

Case Title:
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and DESI

TOMAS, versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 192565, February 28, 2012

BRION, J.

Facts:

Desi Tomas was charged with perjury for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping.
It was alleged that Tomas stated under oath that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced
any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency aside from that
which is filed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for the collection of sum of money with prayer
of writ of replevin filed against Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe.

Tomas filed a motion to quash arguing that the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City does not have
jurisdiction over the case as, though it was notarized in Makati, the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
used or submitted before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.

Issue: Whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City has jurisdiction over the case at bar.

Ruling:

Tomas’ deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made the false
declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her
knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to were not true. Thus, Makati City is
the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant
to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements
constituting the crime of perjury were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay
City.

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Tickler: In this case, respondent instituted a separate civil action for the recovery of the unfunded check
subsequent to the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 against petitioner, contending that the civil case is
one independent civil action. The court resolves whether the respondent is correct.

Doctrine: Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which provides: "The criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil
action separately shall be allowed."

Supreme Court Circular 57-97 provides that: "The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil
action separately shall be allowed or recognized."

Case Title:
HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON v. ELVIN CHAN.

G.R. No. 157547

February 23, 2011

BERSAMIN, J.

Facts:

On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
(MeTC) an information charging the late Eduardo Simon (Simon) with a violation of BP 22, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 275381 entitled People v. Eduardo Simon.

More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan commenced in the MeTC in Pasay
City a civil action for the collection of the principal amount of P336,000.00, coupled with an application for
a writ of preliminary attachment (docketed as Civil Case No. 915-00).

On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment, which was implemented
on August 17, 2000 through the sheriff attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon.

On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs
attachment bond for damages.

On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simon’s urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs
attachment bond for damages.

On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simon the urgent motion to dismiss with application
to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages. The MTC cites the grounds of litis pendentia and that
the case for sum of money is one based on fraud and hence falling under Article 33 of the Civil Code, still
prior reservation is required.

Chan’s motion for reconsideration was denied as well as his appeal with the RTC. On the CA, Chan's appeal
was granted.

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Issue: Whether or not Chan's civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check (Civil Case No.
915-00) was an independent civil action.

Ruling:

NO. There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the issuance of an unfunded
check prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22).

This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which relevantly provides: "The criminal action for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file
such civil action separately shall be allowed."

Supreme Court Circular 57-97 also provides that: "The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such
civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized."

---0---

Tickler: In this case, the petitioner assails that there is no private offended party in the crime of Perjury which
is a Crime Against Public Interests and that the private respondent’s intervention in the case through a
private prosecutor is only granted due to mere tolerance. The court resolves this issue in favor of respondent.

Doctrine: Where the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, that right
must be respected. The right reserved by the Rules to the offended party is that of intervening for the sole

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purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the
accused. Such intervention, moreover, is always subject to the direction and control of the public prosecutor.

Case Title:
LEE PUE LIONG v. CHUA PUE CHIN LEE

GR No. 181658

August 7, 2013

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

Facts:

Petitioner Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, is the President of Centillion Holdings, Inc. (CHI), a company
affiliated with the CKC Group of Companies (CKC Group) which includes the pioneer company Clothman
Knitting Corporation (CKC). The CKC Group is the subject of intra-corporate disputes between petitioner
and his siblings, including herein respondent Chua Pue Chin Lee, a majority stockholder and Treasurer of
CHI.

On July 19, 1999, petitioner's siblings including respondent and some unidentified persons took over and
barricaded themselves inside the premises of a factory owned by CKC. Petitioner and other factory
employees were unable to enter the factory premises. This incident led to the filing of criminal cases against
Nixon Lee and against Nixon Lee, Andy Lee, Chua Kipsi a.k.a. Jensen Chua and respondent, which are now
pending in different courts in Valenzuela City.

On June 14, 1999, petitioner on behalf of CHI issued by Virginia Lee caused the filing of a verified Petition
for the Issuance of an Owner's Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 232238 which covers
a property owned by CHI. The case was docketed as LRC Record No. 4004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branch 4. Petitioner submitted before the said court an Affidavit of Loss stating that: (1) by virtue
of his position as President of CHI, he had in his custody and possession the owner's duplicate copy of TCT
No. 232238 issued by the Register of Deeds for Manila; (2) that said owner's copy of TCT No. 232238 was
inadvertently lost or misplaced from his files and he discovered such loss in May 1999; (3) he exerted
diligent efforts in locating the said title but it had not been found and is already beyond recovery; and (4)
said title had not been the subject of mortgage or used as collateral for the payment of any obligation with
any person, credit or banking institution. Petitioner likewise testified in support of the foregoing averments
during an ex-parte proceeding. In its Order dated September 17, 1999, the RTC granted the petition and
directed the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue a new Owner's Duplicate Copy in lieu of the lost one.

Respondent, joined by her brother Nixon Lee, filed an Omnibus Motion praying, among others, that the
September 17, 1999 Order be set aside claiming that petitioner knew fully well that respondent was in
possession of the said Owner's Duplicate Copy, the latter being the Corporate Treasurer and custodian of
vital documents of CHI. Respondent added that petitioner merely needs to have another copy of the title
because he planned to mortgage the same with the Planters Development Bank. Respondent even
produced the Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 232238 in open court. Thus, on November 12, 1999, the
RTC recalled and set aside its September 17, 1999 Order.

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On June 7, 2000, respondent executed a Supplemental Affidavit to clarify that she was accusing petitioner
of perjury allegedly committed on the following occasions: (1) by declaring in the VERIFICATION the veracity
of the contents in his petition filed with the RTC of Manila concerning his claim that TCT No. 232238 was in
his possession but was lost; (2) by declaring under oath in his affidavit of loss that said TCT was lost; and (3)
by testifying under oath that the said TCT was inadvertently lost from his files.

Respondent posed that the presence and intervention of the private prosecutor in the perjury cases are
not prohibited by the rules, stressing that she is, in fact, an aggrieved party, being a stockholder, an officer
and the treasurer of CHI and the private complainant.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT
UPHELD THE RESOLUTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT THAT THERE IS A PRIVATE OFFENDED
PARTY IN THE CRIME OF PERJURY, A CRIME AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST.

Ruling:

The petition has no merit. Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence should
be allowed to establish the extent of injuries suffered.

There was neither a waiver nor a reservation made; nor did the offended party institute a separate civil
action. It follows that evidence should be allowed in the criminal proceedings to establish the civil liability
arising from the offense committed and the private offended party has the right to intervene through the
private prosecutors.

Such right to intervene exists even when no civil liability is involved as pronounced in the ruling in Lim Tek
Goan.

Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case being tried in the MeTC, this
Court declared in the early case of Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco cited by both MeTC and CA, that whether public
or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to consider the intervention of the offended
party by counsel as merely a matter of tolerance. Thus, where the private prosecution has asserted its right
to intervene in the proceedings, that right must be respected. The right reserved by the Rules to the
offended party is that of intervening for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal
act and not of demanding punishment of the accused. Such intervention, moreover, is always subject to
the direction and control of the public prosecutor.

Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it separately, nor
institute the civil action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, we find that the private
prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal action.

---0---

Tickler: The petitioner’s acquittal in this case was based on the findings that she was not the author or
perpetrator of the crime imputed to her. However, the appellate court ruled that she was still civilly liable.
The SC resolves this case in favor of the petitioner.

Doctrine: The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the
case where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required;

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(b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c) where the civil liability of the
accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted.

Case Title:
JOSEPHINE M. SANCHEZ v. FAR EAST BANK

GR No. 155309

November 15, 2005

PANGANIBAN, J.

Facts:

Kai J. Chin was the director and representative of Chemical Bank. Its subsidiary, the Chemical International
Finance Limited (CIFL), was an investor in [Respondent] Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC). In
representing the interest of CIFL in FEBTC, Chin was made a director and sr. vice president of FEBTC.

[Petitioner] Josephine Sanchez was, in turn, assigned as secretary of Chin. CIFL also maintained a checking
account in FEBTC's investment arm, Chin was one of the authorized signatories in the said current and
money market accounts.

According to respondent, petitioner made unauthorized withdrawals from the account of CIFL in FEBTC
through the use of forged or falsified applications for cashier's checks which were deposited to her personal
accounts. Once credited to her account, she withdrew the amounts and misappropriated, misapplied and
converted them to her personal benefit and advantage, to the damage of FEBTC.

The main defense of petitioner consisted of a denial of the forgeries. She asserted that she had deposited
the checks to her account, under the authority and instructions of Kai Chin. Afterwards, petitioner withdrew
the amounts and gave them to him.

Kai Chin denied that he had given that authority to her, and insisted that she had signed the subject
documents. However, he did not rebut her testimony that she had turned over the proceeds of the checks
to him.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) did not find Kai Chin to be a credible witness. According to the RTC, FEBTC's
records showed that, contrary to his testimony, he had expressly authorized petitioner to transact matters
concerning Chemical Bank's account.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

Granting respondent's appeal, the appellate court ruled that the trial court's judgment of acquittal did not
preclude recovery of civil indemnity based on a quasi-delict. The CA held that the outcome of the criminal
case, whether conviction or acquittal, was inconsequential in adjudging civil liability arising from the same
act that could also be considered a quasi-delict.

Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether an appeal on the civil aspect may be made from a decision in a criminal case acquitting
the accused for being not the author of the crime.

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Ruling:

The petition is meritorious.

Petitioner contends that her acquittal was not based merely on reasonable doubt, but on the determination
that she was not the author of the imputed felonies. She reiterates the trial court's ruling in its March 20,
1996 Order that she could not be held civilly liable because she was not responsible for the crimes charged.

In Salazar v. People, the Court further expounded thus:

"The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case where
(a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) where
the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c) where the civil liability of the accused
does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. Moreover, the
civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not
commit the acts or omission imputed to him.

As can be clearly gleaned from the above, petitioner consistently claimed that she had acted merely upon
the instructions and authority of her superior, Kai Chin. While admitting that she had deposited the
proceeds of some of the checks to her personal account, she firmly insisted that she subsequently withdrew
the cash proceeds and turned them over to him. She denied -- and the records do not show -- that she had
ever appropriated those moneys for her personal gain.

Thus, the trial court emphatically concluded that petitioner "was not the author of the frauds allegedly
perpetrated, if any.

In sum, we hold that petitioner's acquittal was based on the fact that she had not committed the offense
imputed to her. Consequently, she cannot be held civilly liable. In concluding that she, as well as her
testimony, was credible, the trial court cannot be faulted with arbitrariness or negligence. Tellingly, her
testimony that she turned over the proceeds of the subject checks to Kai Chin stands unrebutted.

---0---

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Tickler: In this case, the appeal by the petitioner was dismissed by the CA due to the fact that the People, as
the real party in interest was not impleaded. The Court rendered a decision adverse to that of petitoner.

Doctrine: If there is a dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court or if there is an acquittal of the accused,
it is only the OSG that may bring an appeal on the criminal aspect representing the People. The rationale
therefor is rooted in the principle that the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the People
and not the petitioners who are mere complaining witnesses.

Case Title:
JOSE BURGOS v. SPOUSES ELADIO SJ. NAVAL & ARLINA B. NAVAL

GR No. 219468

June 08, 2016

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Facts:

This case stemmed from a letter-complaint dated April 26, 2012 filed by Burgos, before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, Taytay, Rizal, charging respondents spouses Eladio and Arlina Naval (Sps. Naval) and
their daughter, Amalia Naval (Amalia; collectively respondents), of the crime of Estafa through Falsification
of Public Documents.

Burgos alleged that he and his wife, Rubie S. Garcia-Burgos, were the registered owners of a lot with an
area of 1,389 square meters, situated in the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal. On November 19, 1996, the
subject lot was purportedly mortgaged to a certain Antonio Assad, and subsequently, Burgos decided to
obtain a loan from Sps. Naval in order to avoid foreclosure. Respondents agreed and asked spouses Burgos
to sign some blank documents in return -to which they faithfully complied.

Sometime in February 2011, Burgos allegedly discovered that TCT No. 550579 was cancelled, and a new
one was issued in favor of Sps. Naval on April 1, 1998. He claimed that the blank documents which he and
his wife previously signed turned out to be a receipt and a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject lot
through the ploy and conspiracy of respondents.

Before arraignment, respondents filed a motion to quash based on the following grounds: (a) that their
criminal liability has been extinguished due to prescription; (b) that the information failed to charge Amalia
with an offense; and (c) that they were not afforded the opportunity of a preliminary investigation.
Respondents averred that since the information was filed on February 11, 2013, beyond the reglementary
period often (10) years from the registration of the title on April 1, 1998, the crime had already prescribed.
They also claimed that the information did not contain any specific charge against Amalia. Finally, they
maintained that they were deprived of their right to dispute the allegations of the complaint during the
preliminary investigation.

The RTC granted respondents' motion and consequently dismissed the case on the ground of prescription.
Since more than ten (10) years had elapsed when the information was filed on February 11, 2013, the
subject crime had prescribed.

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Issue: Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the certiorari petition on the ground that the People, as
represented by the OSG, was not impleaded as a party.

Ruling:

The Court finds for respondents.

Jurisprudence dictates that it is the OSG which possesses the requisite authority to represent the People in
an appeal on the criminal aspect of a case. The OSG is "the law office of the Government whose specific
powers and functions include that of representing the Republic and/or the People before any court in any
action which affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require."

In People v. Piccio (Piccio), this Court held that "if there is a dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court or
if there is an acquittal of the accused, it is only the OSG that may bring an appeal on the criminal aspect
representing the People. The rationale therefor is rooted in the principle that the party affected by the
dismissal of the criminal action is the People and not the petitioners who are mere complaining witnesses.

For this reason, the People are therefore deemed as the real parties in interest in the criminal case and,
therefore, only the OSG can represent them in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. He
may also file a special civil action for certiorari even without the intervention of the OSG, but only to the
end of preserving his interest in the civil aspect of the case.

It must, however, be clarified that the CA's dismissal of Burgos's certiorari petition is without prejudice to
his filing of the appropriate action to preserve his interest in the civil aspect of the Estafa through
Falsification of Public Documents case, provided that the parameters of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure are complied with.

It is noteworthy to point out that "[t]he extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction
of the civil action where[:] (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence
is required; (b) the court declares that the... liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of
the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. The
civil action based on delict may, however, be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment
in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist." In this
case, the RTC did not render any ruling that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did
not exist; instead, the RTC granted the motion to quash and thereby, dismissed the criminal case on the
sole ground of prescription. Any misgivings regarding the propriety of that disposition is for the People,
thru the OSG, and not for Burgos to argue. As earlier intimated, Burgos's remedy is to institute a civil case
under the parameters of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

---0---

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Tickler: The respondent was acquitted in the crime of libel because the remarks made were not libelous at
all. Petitioner is claiming civil indemnity from the alleged crime but the court ruled otherwise.

Doctrine: Without the crime, no civil liability ex delicto may be claimed by Co that can be pursued in the
present petition. There is no act from which civil liability may arise that exists.

Case Title:
ELIZALDE S. CO v. LUDOLFO P. MUÑOZ

GR No. 181986

December 04, 2013

BRION, J.

Facts:

The case springs from the statements made by the respondent against the petitioner, Elizalde S. Co (Co),
in several interviews with radio stations in Legaspi City. Muñoz, a contractor, was charged and arrested for
perjury. Suspecting that Co, a wealthy businessman, was behind the filing of the suit, Muñoz made the
following statements:

(a) Co influenced the Office of the City Prosecutor of Legaspi City to expedite the issuance of warrant of
arrest against Muñoz in connection with the perjury case;

(b) Co manipulated the results of the government bidding involving the Masarawag-San Francisco dredging
project, and;

(c) Co received P2,000,000.00 from Muñoz on the condition that Co will sub-contract the project to Muñoz,
which condition Co did not comply with.

Consequently, Co filed his complaint-affidavit which led to the filing of three criminal information for libel
before the RTC. Notably, Co did not waive, institute or reserve his right to file a separate civil action arising
from Muñoz's libelous remarks against him.

Muñoz countered that he revealed the anomalous government bidding as a call of public duty. In fact, he
filed cases against Co before the Ombudsman involving the anomalous dredging project. Although the
Ombudsman dismissed the cases, Muñoz claimed that the dismissal did not disprove the truth of his
statements.

He also emphasized that the imputations dealt with matters of public interest and are, thus, privileged.
Applying the rules on privileged communication to libel suits, the prosecution has the burden of proving
the existence of actual malice, which, Muñoz claimed, it failed to do.

RTC found Muñoz guilty of three counts of libel. The RTC ruled that the prosecution established the
elements of libel.

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In light of the Ombudsman's dismissal of Muñoz' charges against Co, the RTC also held that Muñoz'
statements were baseless accusations which are not protected as privileged communication. In addition to
imprisonment, Muñoz was ordered to pay P5,000,000.00 for each count of libel as moral damages,
P1,200,000.00 for expenses paid for legal services, and P297,699.00 for litigation expense. Muñoz appealed
his conviction with the CA.

The CA held that the subject matter of the interviews was impressed with public interest and Muñoz'
statements were protected as privileged communication under the first paragraph of Article 354 of the
RPC. As a public figure, Co is subject to criticisms on his acts that are imbued with public interest. Hence,
the CA reversed the RTC decision and acquitted Muñoz of the libel charges due to the prosecution's failure
to establish the existence of actual malice.

In the present petition, Co acknowledges that he may no longer appeal the criminal aspect of the libel suits
because that would violate Muñoz' right against double jeopardy. Hence, he claims damages only on the
basis of Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which states that the extinction of the penal action does
not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. He avers that this principle applies in general whether the
civil action is instituted with or separately from the criminal action. He also claims that the civil liability of
an accused may be appealed in case of acquittal.

The Respondent's Arguments:

Since Co did not reserve his right to separately institute a civil action arising from the offense, the dismissal
of the criminal action bars him from filing the present petition to enforce the civil liability.

Issue: Whether a private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he seeks to enforce the
accused's civil liability; and whether the respondent is liable for damages arising from the libelous
remarks despite his acquittal.

Ruling:

We do not find the petition meritorious.

The private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he seeks to enforce the accused's civil
liability. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. However,
the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the
criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.

In Ching v. Nicdao and CA, the Court ruled that an appeal is the proper remedy that a party whether the
accused or the offended party may avail with respect to the judgment:

If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the
criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused
in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal
from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.

From the foregoing, petitioner Ching correctly argued that he, as the offended party, may appeal the civil
aspect of the case notwithstanding respondent Nicdao's acquittal by the CA. The civil action was impliedly
instituted with the criminal action since he did not reserve his right to institute it separately nor did he
institute the civil action prior to the criminal action.

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To reiterate, the extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it the extinction of the civil
action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately from the criminal action. The offended party may
still claim civil liability ex delicto if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act
or omission from which the liability may arise exists.

Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances when, notwithstanding the accused's acquittal, the
offended party may still claim civil liability ex... delicto: (a) if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as
only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) if the court declared that the liability of the accused is only
civil; and (c) if the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the... crime of which
the accused is acquitted.

The respondent is not civilly liable because no libel was committed.

The CA has acquitted Muñoz of libel because his statement is a privileged communication. In libel, the
existence of malice is essential as it is an element of the crime. The law presumes that every imputation is
malicious; this is referred to as malice in law. The presumption relieves the prosecution of the burden of
proving that the imputations were made with malice. This presumption is rebutted if the accused proved
that the imputation is true and published with good intention and justifiable motive.

There are few circumstances wherein malice in law is inapplicable. For instance, Article 354 of the RPC
further states that malice is not presumed when:

(1)... a private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or
social duty;[33] and

(2)... a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative
or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech
delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their
functions.

In the present case, the CA declared that the libelous remarks are privileged. The legal conclusion was
arrived at from the fact that Co is a public figure, the subject matter of the libelous remarks was of public
interest, and the context of Muñoz' statements were fair comments.

Consequently, malice is no longer presumed and the prosecution has the burden of proving that Muñoz
acted with malice in fact. The CA found that the prosecution failed in this respect.

In light of the privileged nature of Muñoz' statements and the failure of the prosecution to prove malice in
fact, there was no libel that was committed by Muñoz. Without the crime, no civil liability ex delicto may
be claimed by Co that can be pursued in the present petition. There is no act from which civil liability may
arise that exists.

---0---

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Tickler: Petitioner seeks to press the civil liability of the private respondents, on the ground that the dismissal
of the criminal action did not abate the civil claim for the recovery of the amount. More to the point, ITI
argues that the evidence of the airway bills should not have been rejected and that it had sufficiently
established the indebtedness of the private respondents to it. The court resolves in favor of petitioner.

Doctrine: Rule 120, Section 2, of the Rules of Court: In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that
the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the judgment shall make a finding on the civil
liability of the accused in favor of the offended party.

Case Title:
INTERPACIFIC TRANSIT v. RUFO AVILES

GR No. 86062

Jun 06, 1990

CRUZ, J.

Facts:

In the information filed against Rufo and Josephine Aviles, the private respondents herein, it was alleged
that being then sub-agents of Interpacific Transit, Inc. and as such enjoying its trust and confidence, they
collected from its various client's payments for airway bills in the amount of P204,030.66 which, instead of
remitting it to their principal, they unlawfully converted to their own personal use and benefit.

In acquitting the accused, Judge Herminio I. Benito of the Regional Trial Court of Makati rejected the agency
theory of the prosecution and held that the relationship between the petitioner and Rufo Aviles was that
of creditor and debtor only. "Under such relationship," it declared, "the outstanding account, if any, of the
accused in favor of ITI would be in the nature of an indebtedness, the non-payment of which does not
constitute estafa."

In its order denying the motion for reconsideration, the trial court declared that it "had resolved the issue
of whether the accused has civil obligation to ITI on the basis of the admissibility in evidence of the xerox
copies of the airway bills.

Right or wrong, the acquittal on the merits of the accused can no longer be the subject of an appeal under
the double jeopardy rule. However, the petitioner seeks to press the civil liability of the private
respondents, on the ground that the dismissal of the criminal action did not abate the civil claim for the
recovery of the amount. More to the point, ITI argues that the evidence of the airway bills should not have
been rejected and that it had sufficiently established the indebtedness of the private respondents to it.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. Since no evidence of civil liability was
presented, no necessity existed on the part of the private respondents to present evidence of payment of
an obligation which was not shown to exist.

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Issue: The petitioner now asks this Court to annul that judgment as contrary to law and the facts
established at the trial. As in the courts below, it is insisting on the admissibility of its evidence to prove
the civil liability of the private respondents.

Ruling:

We agree with the petitioner.

The certified photocopies of the airway bills should have been considered.

There is no question that the photocopies were secondary evidence and as such were not admissible unless
there was ample proof of the loss of the originals; and neither were the other exceptions allowed by the
Rules applicable. The trouble is that in rejecting these copies under Rule 130, Section 2, the respondent
court disregarded an equally important principle long observed in our trial courts and amply supported by
jurisprudence. This is the rule that objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it is
formally offered as an exhibit and not before. Objection prior to that time is premature.

Objection to the documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered, not earlier.

In the case at bar, the photocopies of the airway bills were objected to by the private respondents as
secondary evidence only when they were being identified for marking by the prosecution. They were
nevertheless marked as exhibits upon the promise that the original airway bills would be submitted later.
It is true that the originals were never produced. Yet, notwithstanding this omission, the defense did not
object when the exhibits as previously marked were formally offered in evidence. And these were
subsequently admitted by the trial court.

The time for objecting the evidence is when the same is offered.

It) is universally accepted that when secondary or incompetent evidence is presented and accepted without
any objection on the part of the other party, the latter is bound thereby and the court is obliged to grant it
the probatory value it deserves.

We hold therefore that it was erroneous for the lower courts to reject the photocopies of the airway bills
to prove the liability of the private respondents to the petitioner. While we may agree that there was really
no criminal liability that could attach to them because they had no fiduciary relationship with ITI, the
rejected evidence sufficiently established their indebtedness to the petitioner. Hence, we must reverse
the ruling below that "on account of the inadmissibility of the prosecution's Exhibits 'B'... and 'OO,' coupled
with the denial made by the accused, there appears to be no concrete proof of such accountability."

According to Rule 120, Section 2, of the Rules of Court:

In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise did
not exist, the judgment shall make a finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor of the offended
party.

With the admission of such exhibits pursuant to the ruling above made, we find that there is concrete proof
of the defendant's accountability. More than this, we also disbelieve the evidence of the private
respondents that the said airway bills had been paid for. The evidence consists only of check stubs
corresponding to payments allegedly made by the accused to the ITI, and we find this insufficient.

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As it is Aviles who has alleged payment, it is for him to prove that allegation. He did not produce any receipt
of such payment. By the same token, we find that remand of this case to the trial court for further hearings
would be a needless waste of time and effort to the prejudice of the speedy administration of justice.
Applying the above ruling, we hereby declare therefore, on the basis of the evidence submitted at the trial
as reflected in the records before us, that the private respondents are liable to the petitioner in the sum of
P204,030.66, representing the cost of the airway bills.

---0---

Tickler: Morales died pending his appeal and the court resolves whether his civil liability is also extinguished.

Doctrine: Ordinarily, both the civil and criminal liabilities are extinguished upon the death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction by the lower courts.

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Case Title:
PEOPLE v. ALFREDO MORALES Y LAM

GR No. 206832

Jan 21, 2015

PEREZ, J.

Facts:

In the Criminal Case No. 7534, Morales was charged with illegal sale of shabu as follows:

In the Criminal Case No. 7535, Morales was charged with illegal possession of shabu as follows:

When arraigned, the accused pleaded not guilty of the crimes charged. The RTC held that the prosecution
successfully discharged the burden of proof in the cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous
drugs.

Upon appeal, the appellate court affirmed the findings of the trial court. It upheld the presence of all the
elements of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of drugs, and preservation of the corpus delicti
of the crime from the time they were seized and presented in court.

While this case is pending appeal, the accused-appellant Morales died while committed at the Bureau of
Corrections on 2 November 2013.

Issue: Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes his civil liability.

Ruling:

The death of accused-appellant Morales pending appeal of his conviction, extinguishes his civil and criminal
liabilities.

Under Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code: Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor
is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

Ordinarily, both the civil and criminal liabilities are extinguished upon the death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction by the lower courts.

However, a violation of Republic Act No. 9165 does not entail any civil liability. No civil liability needs
extinguishment.

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Tickler: Consorte died pending his appeal and the court resolves whether his civil liability is also extinguished.

Doctrine: Article 89' (1) of the Revised Penal Code is illuminating:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

(1) By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor
is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment

Case Title:
PEOPLE v. BENJIE CONSORTE Y FRANCO

GR No. 194068

Nov 26, 2014

PEREZ, J.

Facts:

For the resolution of the Court is the Motion for Reconsideration of our Decision dated 9 July 2014, which
affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant Benjie Consorte y Franco for the murder of Elizabeth Palmar,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 May 2010 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01806 is
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS (1) that the amount of civil indemnity is increased from
P50,000.00 to P75,000.00; and (2) that the amount... of exemplary damages is increased from P25,000.00
to P30,000.00. An interest, at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all the damages
awarded in this case from the date of finality of this judgment until they are fully paid.

Meanwhile, in a Letter dated 21 September 2014, the Officer-in-Charge of the New Bilibid Prison (NBP)
informed the Court that accused-appellant died on 14 July 2014 .

Issue: Court now addresses the effect of death pending accused-appellant's appeal with regard to his
criminal and civil liabilities.

Ruling:

Article 89' (1) of the Revised Penal Code is illuminating:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

(1) By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor
is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

In the case at bar, accused-appellant died before final judgment, as in fact, his motion for reconsideration
is still pending resolution by the Court. As such, it therefore becomes necessary for us to declare his criminal
liability as well as his civil liability ex delicto to have been extinguished by his death prior to final judgment.
WHEREFORE, the criminal and civil liability ex delicto of accused-appellant Benjie Consorte y Franco are
declared EXTINGUISHED by his death prior to final judgment. The judgment or conviction against him is
therefore SET ASIDE.

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Tickler: Respondent assails that the two intra-corporate cases pending in the SEC as bars for the continuance
of the criminal case of estafa filed against her. The court ruled partly in her favor.

Doctrine: A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of
the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.

It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that
it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear
not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would
be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence
of the accused would necessarily be determined.

Case Title:
PEOPLE v. VICTORIA R. ARAMBULO

GR No. 186597

Jun 17, 2015

PEREZ, J.

Facts:

Records show that respondent Victoria R. Arambulo (Victoria), Emerenciana R. Gungab, Reynaldo Reyes
(Reynaldo), Domingo Reyes (Domingo), Rodrigo Reyes and Oscar Reyes (Oscar) are the heirs of Spouses
Pedro C. Reyes and Anastacia Reyes. Anaped Estate Inc. (Anaped) was incorporated as part of the estate
planning or as conduit to hold the properties of the estate of Pedro Reyes for and in behalf of his heirs.

Jose Buban (Buban), as Vice-President and General Manager of Anaped Estate Inc. (Anaped), filed a
complaint for estafa against Victoria and her husband Miguel Arambulo, Jr. (Miguel) before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City. He alleged that Victoria failed to remit the rentals collected from the
time the ownership of the commercial apartments was transferred to Anaped.

On 14 April 2003, respondents filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial
question in view of the pendency of two intra-corporate cases pending before the RTC of Quezon City and
Makati City.

In their motion to suspend proceedings, respondents asserted that the resolution of the SEC cases in their
favor particularly the issues of whether of the group of Rodrigo and Buban are the lawful representatives
of the corporation and whether they are duly authorized to make a demand for remittance would
necessarily result in their acquittal in the criminal case.

the trial court, through Presiding Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, granted the motion for suspension of the
proceedings. The trial court reasoned that the issue in the SEC cases, i.e., who between the groups has the
right to act for and in behalf of the corporation, has a direct link to the issue of the culpability of the accused
for estafa.

The appellate court added that since respondents are challenging the authority of Buban, then the validity
of Buban’s demand to turn over or remit the rentals is put in question. The appellate court concluded that

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if the supposed authority of Buban is found to be defective, it is as if no demand was ever made, hence the
prosecution for estafa cannot prosper.

Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that there exists a prejudicial question which calls
for the suspension of the criminal proceedings before the trial court.

Ruling:

Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. – The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action, and (b) the resolution... of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.

As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals, SEC Case No. 05-97-5659 does not present a prejudicial
question to the criminal case for estafa. It is an action for accounting of all corporate funds and assets of
Anaped, annulment of sale, injunction, receivership and damages. Even if said case will be decided against
respondents, they will not be adjudged free from criminal liability. It also does not automatically follow that
an accounting of corporate funds and properties and annulment of fictitious sale of corporate assets would
result in the conviction of respondents in the estafa case.

With respect to SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, however, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ finding that a
prejudicial question exists. It prays for the nullification of the election of Anaped directors and officers,
including Buban. Essentially, the issue is the authority of the aforesaid officers to act for and behalf of the
corporation.

It is clear that, should respondents herein prevail in SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, then Buban, who does not
own either by himself or in behalf of Anaped which is the owner, the property heretofore managed by
Victoria, cannot demand remittance of the rentals on the property and Victoria does not have the
obligation to turn over the rentals to Buban.

Verily, the result of SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 will determine the innocence or guilt of respondents in the
criminal case for estafa.

---0---

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Tickler: The court resolves the issue of the validity of a seizure made pursuant to a search warrant issued by
a court questioned in another branch of the same court.

Doctrine: The basic principle that a judge who presides in one court cannot annul or modify the orders issued
by another branch of the same court because they are co-equal and independent bodies acting coordinately,
must always be adhered to.

Case Title:
ROMEO S. CHUA v. CA

GR No. 79021

May 17, 1993

BIDIN, J.

Facts:

On April 12, 1986, Judge Lauro V. Francisco of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch XIII, after
examining 2Lt. Dennis P. Canoy and two (2) other witnesses, issued a search warrant directing the
immediate search of the premises of R.R. Construction located at M.J. Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City, and the
seizure of an Isuzu dump truck with plate number GAP-175. At twelve noon of the same date, respondent
Canoy seized the aforesaid vehicle and took custody thereof.

On April 14, 1986, a civil action for Replevin/Sum of Money for the recovery of possession of the same Isuzu
dump truck was filed by petitioner against respondent Canoy and one "John Doe" in the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City alleging among other things, petitioner's lawful ownership and possession of the subject
vehicle; that he has not sold the subject vehicle to anyone; that he has not stolen nor carnapped it, and
that he has never been charged of the crime of carnapping or any other crime for that matter. Further,
petitioner questioned the validity of the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the subject vehicle
on the strength of the aforesaid search warrant.

On the same date, April 14, 1986, Judge Cañares of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch VIII directed
the issuance of a writ of replevin upon the posting of a bond in the amount of one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00). The writ of replevin was also issued on the same date, and the subject vehicle was seized
on 15 April 1986 by Deputy Sheriff Galicano V. Fuentes.

Issue:

Whether or not the validity of a seizure made pursuant to a search warrant issued by a court can be
questioned in another branch of the same court, where the criminal action filed in connection with which
the search warrant was issued had been dismissed provisionally.

Ruling:

At the outset, it must be pointed out that the ruling made by the Office of the City Fiscal in the complaint
for carnapping was erroneous.

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A criminal prosecution for carnapping need not establish the fact that complainant therein is the absolute
owner of the motor vehicle. What is material is the existence of evidence which would show that
respondent took the motor vehicle belonging to another.

Another aspect which needs to be stressed is the fact that since a preliminary investigation is not part of
the trial, the dismissal of a case by the fiscal will not constitute double jeopardy and hence there is no bar
to the filing of another complaint for the same offense

It is a basic tenet of civil procedure that replevin will not lie for property in custodia legis. A thing is in
custodia legis when it is shown that it has been and is subjected to the official custody of a judicial executive
officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ. The reason posited for this principle is that if it was
otherwise, there would be interference with the possession before the function of the law had been
performed as to the process under which the property was taken. Thus, a defendant in an execution or
attachment cannot replevy goods in the possession of an officer under a valid process, although after the
levy is discharged, an action to recover possession will lie.

Construing the Pagkalinawan case together with the Vlasons case, we rule that where personal property is
seized under a search warrant and there is reason to believe that the seizure will not anymore be followed
by the filing of a criminal action and there are conflicting claims over the seized property, the proper
remedy is the filing of an action for replevin, or an interpleader filed by the Government in the proper court,
not necessarily the same one which issued the search warrant; however, where there is still a probability
that the seizure will be followed by the filing of a criminal action, as in the case at bar where the case for
carnapping was "dismissed provisionally, without prejudice to its reopening once the issue of ownership is
resolved in favor of complainant", or the criminal information has actually been commenced, or filed, and
actually prosecuted, and there are conflicting claims over the property seized, the proper remedy is to
question the validity of the search warrant in the same court which issued it and not in any other branch
of the said court.

Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu Branch VIII erred when it ordered the transfer of possession of the
property seized to petitioner when the latter filed the action for replevin. It should have dismissed the case
since by virtue of the "provisional dismissal" of the carnapping case there is still a probability that a criminal
case would be filed, hence a conflict in jurisdiction could still arise. The basic principle that a judge who
presides in one court cannot annul or modify the orders issued by another branch of the same court
because they are co-equal and independent bodies acting coordinately, must always be adhered to.

---0---

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Tickler: Petitioner firmly assails that the administrative case pending before the HLURB cannot be
considered as a prejudicial question because under the Rules of Court, it should be one civil action and a
criminal action. The court says otherwise.

Doctrine: Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency, raises a
prejudicial question.

Case Title:
SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES v. SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ

GR No. 166836

Sep 04, 2013

BERSAMIN, J.

Facts:

Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel Properties), a domestic corporation engaged in the real
estate business, purchased in 1992, 1993 and April 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF Homes), then
represented by Atty. Florencio B. Orendain (Orendain) as its duly authorized rehabilitation receiver
appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 130 residential lots situated in its subdivision
BF Homes Parañaque, containing a total area of 44,345 square meters for the aggregate price of
P106,248,000.00.

The transactions were embodied in three separate deeds of sale but 20 TCTs covering 20 of the 41 parcels
of land with a total area of 15,565 square meters purchased under the third deed of sale, executed in April
1993 and for which San Miguel Properties paid the full price of P39,122,627.00, were not delivered to San
Miguel Properties.

BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for parcels of land purchased under the third
deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the
transactions after being meanwhile replaced as receiver by FBO Network Management, Inc. on May 17,
1989 pursuant to an order from the SEC. BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands.

San Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City (OCP
Las Piñas) charging respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in violation of
Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of Presidential Decree No. 957.

At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific performance in the HLURB praying to
compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor.

BF Homes refuted San Miguel Properties' assertions by contending that: (a) San Miguel Properties' claim
was not legally demandable because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to sell the 130 lots in 1992
and 1993 due to his having been replaced as BF Homes' rehabilitation receiver by the SEC on May 17, 1989;
(b) the deeds of sale conveying the lots were irregular for being undated and unnotarized; (c)... the claim
should have been brought to the SEC because BF Homes was under receivership; (d) in receivership cases,
it was essential to suspend all claims against a distressed corporation in order to enable the receiver to

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effectively exercise its powers free from judicial... and extra-judicial interference that could unduly hinder
the rescue of the distressed company; and (e) the lots involved were under custodia legis in view of the
pending receivership proceedings, necessarily stripping the OCP Las Piñas of the jurisdiction to proceed in
the action.

San Miguel Properties filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the OCP Las Piñas, citing the pendency of
BF Homes' receivership case in the SEC.

BF Homes opposed the motion to suspend. In the meantime, however, the SEC terminated BF Homes'
receivership on September 12, 2000, prompting San Miguel Properties to file on October 27, 2000 a reply
to BF Homes' comment/opposition coupled with a motion to withdraw the sought suspension of
proceedings due to the intervening termination of the receivership.

OCP Las Piñas rendered its resolution, dismissing San Miguel Properties' criminal complaint for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground that no action could be filed by or against a receiver without
leave from the SEC that had appointed him; that the implementation of the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 957 exclusively pertained under the jurisdiction of the HLURB; that there existed a prejudicial
question necessitating the suspension of the criminal action until after the issue on the liability of the
distressed BF Homes was first determined by the SEC en banc or by the HLURB; and that no prior resort to
administrative jurisdiction had been made; that there appeared to be no probable cause to indict
respondents for not being the actual signatories in the three deeds of sale.

OCP Las Piñas denied San Miguel Properties' motion for reconsideration filed on November 28, 2000,
holding that BF Homes' directors and officers could not be held liable for the non-delivery of the TCTs under
Presidential Decree No. 957 without a definite ruling on the legality of Atty. Orendain's actions; and that
the criminal liability would attach only after BF Homes did not comply with a directive of the HLURB
directing it to deliver the titles.

San Miguel Properties appealed the resolutions of the OCP Las Piñas to the Department of Justice (DOJ),
but the DOJ Secretary denied the appeal.

There is no dispute that aside from the instant complaint for violation of PD 957, there is still pending with
the Housing and Land Use Resulatory Board (HLURB, for short) a complaint for specific performance where
the HLURB is called upon to inquire into, and rule on, the validity of the sales transactions involving the lots
in question and entered into by Atty. Orendain for and in behalf of BF Homes.

In other words, complainant cannot invoke the penal provision of PD 957 until such time that the HLURB
shall have ruled and decided on the validity of the transactions involving the lots in question.

The DOJ eventually denied San Miguel Properties' motion for reconsideration.

San Miguel Properties elevated the DOJ's resolutions to the CA

However, an exception to this rule is provided in Quiambao vs. Osorio cited by the respondents. In this
case, an issue in an administrative case was considered a prejudicial question to the resolution of a civil
case which, consequently, warranted the suspension of the latter until after termination of the
administrative proceedings.

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Quiambao vs. Osorio is not the only instance when the Supreme Court relaxed the application of the rule
on prejudicial question.

All told, to sustain the petitioner's theory that the result of the HLURB proceedings is not determinative of
the criminal liability of private respondents under PD 957 would be to espouse an absurdity. If we were to
assume that the HLURB finds BFHI under no obligation to delve the subject titles, it would be highly irregular
and contrary to the ends of justice to pursue a criminal case against private respondents for the non-
delivery of certificates of title which they are not under any legal obligation to turn over in the first place.

The CA denied San Miguel Properties' motion for reconsideration on January 18, 2005.

HLURB Arbiter ruled that the HLURB was inclined to suspend the proceedings until the SEC resolved the
issue of Atty. Orendain's authority to enter into the transactions in BF Homes' behalf, because the final
resolution by the SEC was a logical antecedent to the determination of the issue involved in the complaint
before the HLURB.

Upon appeal, the HLURB Board of Commissioners (HLURB Board), citing the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
affirmed the HLURB Arbiter's decision, holding that although no prejudicial question could arise, strictly
speaking, if one case was civil and the other administrative, it nonetheless opted to suspend its action on
the cases pending the final outcome of the administrative proceeding in the interest of good order.

San Miguel Properties appealed to the Office of the President (OP), arguing that the HLURB erred in
suspending the proceedings. OP reversed the HLURB Board's ruling, holding thusly:

To us, it behooved the HLURB to adjudicate, with the usual dispatch, the right and obligation of the parties
in line with its own appreciation of the obtaining facts and applicable law. To borrow from Mabubha Textile
Mills Corporation vs. Ongpin, it does not have to rely on the finding of others to discharge this adjudicatory
function.

After its motion for reconsideration was denied, BF Homes appealed to the CA

The CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 83631, decreeing that the HLURB, not the SEC, had
jurisdiction over San Miguel Properties' complaint. It affirmed the OP's decision and ordered the remand
of the case to the HLURB for further proceedings on the ground that the case involved matters within the
HLURB's competence and expertise pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether the HLURB administrative case brought to compel the delivery of the TCTs could be a
reason to suspend the proceedings on the criminal complaint for the violation of Section 25 of
Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question.

Ruling:

Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency, raises a prejudicial
question.

BF Homes' posture that the administrative case for specific performance in the HLURB posed a prejudicial
question that must first be determined before the criminal case for violation of Section 25 of Presidential
Decree No. 957 could be resolved is correct.

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A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it is lodged
in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but is so intimately
connected with the crime that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions.

The essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,
to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil action... involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.

The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet, contrary to San Miguel
Properties' submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak of because no civil action where
the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for... specific performance in the HLURB raises a
prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge for the criminal
violation of Section 25[24] of Presidential Decree No. 957. This is true simply because the action for
specific... performance was an action civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the
HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original.

The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended because of a prejudicial question
rested on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the specific performance case were so
related with the issues raised in the criminal complaint for the violation of Presidential Decree No. 957,
such that the resolution of the issues in the former would be determinative of the question of guilt in the
criminal case. An examination of the nature of the two cases involved is thus necessary.

An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the exact performance of a contract in the
specific form in which it was made, or according to the precise terms agreed upon by a party bound to fulfill
it. Evidently, before the remedy of specific performance is availed of, there must first be a breach of the
contract.

Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors
should not comply with what is incumbent upon him. The injured party may choose between the fulfillment
and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek
rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.

The action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine whether or not San Miguel Properties
was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the criminal action would decide
whether or not BF Homes' directors and officers were criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The
resolution of the former must obviously precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel
Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have the
authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the
basis for the criminal liability for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 would evaporate,
thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal case.

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Worthy to note at this juncture is that a prejudicial question need not conclusively resolve the guilt or
innocence of the accused. It is enough for the prejudicial question to simply test the sufficiency of the
allegations in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case.

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Doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable.

That the action for specific performance was an administrative case pending in the HLURB, instead of in a
court of law, was of no consequence at all. As earlier mentioned, the action for specific performance,
although civil in nature, could be brought only in the HLURB. This situation conforms to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been increasingly called into play on matters demanding the special
competence of administrative agencies even if such matters are at the same time within the jurisdiction of
the courts.

A case that requires for its determination the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of some
administrative board or commission because it involves technical matters or intricate questions of fact,
relief must first be obtained in an appropriate administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied
by the courts although the matter comes within the jurisdiction of the courts. The application of the
doctrine does not call for the dismissal of the case in the court but only for its suspension until after the
matters within the competence of the administrative body are threshed out and determined.

San Miguel Properties further submits that respondents could not validly raise the prejudicial question as
a reason to suspend the criminal proceedings because respondents had not themselves initiated either the
action for specific performance or the criminal action. It contends that the defense of a prejudicial question
arising from the filing of a related case could only be raised by the party who filed or initiated said related
case.

The submission is unfounded. The rule on prejudicial question makes no distinction as to who is allowed to
raise the defense. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction,
we ought not to distinguish.

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Tickler: Respondent in this case assails that the civil case filed for unfair competition and cancellation of
trademark serves as a prejudicial question that will suspend the criminal case filed for unfair competition.
The court noted that between the two cases, there exist a common element of fraud, which under the Civil
Code, the civil case may be brought independently.

Doctrine: Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended
party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.

Case Title:
CATERPILLAR v. MANOLO P. SAMSON

GR No. 205972

Nov 09, 2016

BERSAMIN, J.

Facts:

Caterpillar is a foreign corporation engaged in the manufacture and distribution of footwear, clothing and
related items, among others. Its products are known for six core trademarks, namely, "CATERPILLAR",
"CAT", "CATERPILLAR & DESIGN", "CAT AND DESIGN", "WALKING MACHINES" and "TRACK-TYPE TRACTOR
& DESIGN (Core Marks) all of which are alleged as internationally known. On the other hand, Samson, doing
business under the names and styles of Itti Shoes Corporation, Kolm's Manufacturing Corporation and
Caterpillar Boutique and General Merchandise, is the proprietor of various retail outlets in the Philippines
selling footwear, bags, clothing, and related items under the trademark "CATERPILLAR", registered in 1997
under Trademark Registration No. 64705 issued by the Intellectual Property Office.

On July 26, 2000, upon application of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 56, in Makati City issued Search Warrants inclusive, all for unfair competition, to search the
establishments owned, controlled and operated by Samson. The implementation of the search warrants
on July 27, 2000 led to the seizure of various products bearing Caterpillar's Core Marks. Caterpillar filed
against Samson several criminal complaints for unfair competition in the Department of Justice.

Additionally, on July 31, 2000, Caterpillar commenced a civil action against Samson and his business
entities, with the IPO as a nominal party – for Unfair Competition, Damages and Cancellation of Trademark
with Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction RTC denied
Caterpillar's application for the issuance of the TRO.

Samson and his affiliate companies allegedly continued to sell and distribute products clothed with the
general appearance of its own products, Caterpillar again applied for another set of search warrants against
Samson and his businesses.

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The RTC, Branch 172, in Valenzuela City issued Search Warrants upon application of the NBI, by virtue of
the implementation of which several goods were seized and confiscated by the NBI agents.

As a consequence, Caterpillar filed 26 criminal complaints for unfair competition on January 31, 2001
against Samson and/or the occupants of his affiliate entities before the DOJ. Samson filed a petition for
review with the Office of the Secretary of Justice to appeal the joint resolutions.

Samson filed a Motion to Suspend Arraignment in Criminal Cases citing the following as grounds:

THERE EXISTS PREJUDICIAL QUESTIONS PENDING LITIGATION BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 90, IN CIVIL CASE.

In the meanwhile, on July 10, 2002, the DOJ, through Secretary Hernando B. Perez, issued a resolution
denying Samson's petition for review in. Samson's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

On September 23, 2002, Presiding Judge Lerma of the RTC granted Samson's Motion to Suspend
Arraignment, and suspended the arraignment and all other proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-240 to
02-243 until Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 was finally resolved.

From the foregoing, this Court believes that there exists a prejudicial question since the determination of
who is really the lawful or registered user of the trademark "CATERPILLAR" will ultimately determine
whether or not the instant criminal action shall proceed.

After the RTC denied its motion for reconsideration on December 5, 2002, Caterpillar elevated the matter
to the CA by petition for certiorari

Meanwhile, on January 13, 2003, Acting Justice Secretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez reversed and set
aside the resolution issued by State Prosecutor Lim in I.S. No. 2001-042 to 2001-067, and directed the Chief
State Prosecutor to cause the withdrawal of the criminal information filed against Samson in court.

Acting Justice Secretary Gutierrez based her resolution on the order dated June 26, 2001, whereby the RTC
of Valenzuela City, Branch 172, had quashed the 26 search warrants upon motion of Samson. Consequently,
the goods seized and confiscated by virtue of the quashed search warrants could no longer be admitted in
evidence.

Caterpillar posits that the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-238 to 02-243 was contrary
to Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, Article 33 of the Civil Code on independent civil actions, and Section 170
of the IP Code, which specifically provides that the criminal penalties for unfair competition were
independent of the civil and administrative sanctions imposed by law; that the determination of the lawful
owner of the "CATERPILLAR" trademark in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 would not be decisive of the guilt of
Samson for unfair competition in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-238 to 02-243 because registration was not an
element of the crime of unfair competition.

Issue: Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in ruling that the trial court a quo did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in suspending the criminal proceedings on account of a prejudicial
question.

Ruling:

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The civil case filed by Caterpillar in the RTC in Quezon City, was for unfair competition, damages and
cancellation of trademark, while Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-108043-44 were the criminal prosecution of
Samson for unfair competition. A common element of all such cases for unfair competition – civil and
criminal – was fraud. Under Article 33 of the Civil Code, a civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action may be brought by the injured party in cases of fraud, and such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution. In view of its being an independent civil action, Civil Case No.
Q-00-41446 did not operate as a prejudicial question that justified the suspension of the proceedings in
Criminal Cases .

At any rate, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other.

Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It
shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Hence, Civil Case No. Q-00-41446, which, as admitted by private respondent also relate to unfair
competition, is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as
a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal cases at bar.

---0---

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Tickler: In this case, the court clearly explained that since the institution of a criminal action involves the
exercise of sound discretion by the prosecutor and there being other plain, speedy and adequate remedies
available to petitioners, the resort to the extraordinary writ of mandamus must fail.

Doctrine: Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure state: Section 1. Preliminary
investigation defined; when required. – Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a wellfounded belief that a crime has been committed and
the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. x x x

Sec. 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations. – The following may conduct preliminary
investigations: (a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants; x x x Rule 65, ROC,

Sec. 3. Petition for Mandamus. – When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to
be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay
the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.

Case Title:
ERNESTO MARCELO v. RAFAEL R. VILLORDON
GR No. 173081
Dec 15, 2010
CARPIO, J.

Facts:

Marcelo and Llames, together with others, filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of QC a criminal
complaint against their former employers Eduardo R. Dee, Sr. This stemmed from Dee’s non-payment of
their wages as President and General Manager of New Sampaguita Builders Construction Incorporated. 2.
After several hearings for the preliminary investigation of the case, where Dee did not appear, Assistant
City Prosecutor of QC, Rafael R. Villordon declared the case submitted for resolution.

After three months, Dee showed up and filed a motion to reopen the case and simultaneously submitted
his counter-affidavit. Villordon’s superior approved the motion. On the first hearing, Dee did not appear
but Marcelo and Llames were present and signed the minutes of the hearing confirming that they would
appear and file a reply-affidavit to Dee’s counter-affidavit as directed by Villordon. On the second hearing,
Dee, as well as Marcelo and Llames failed to appear. The petitioners also failed to submit their reply-
affidavit. Since then, no other action was taken on the matter.

Due to the long delay, Marcelo and Llames filed an anti-graft and corruption case against Villordon with the
OMB for violation of Section 3(f) of RA No 3019. They also filed a petition for mandamus with the RTC. OMB

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dismissed the case and RTC denied the petition. RTC explained that they failed to exhaust available
administrative remedies before resorting to the court. They could have first referred the matter to
Villordon’s superior to correct his error, and they should have waited for the determination of the OMB
case before filing in the RTC. The RTC also pointed out that they appeared and signed the minutes giving
chance for the last time to Dee to show up on the next hearing.

However, none of the parties appeared on the second meeting hearing. Villordon also reasoned out that
he waited for a move from Marcelo and Llames to enable him to dispose of the cases accordingly. With the
following facts, he argues that the petitioners don’t have the legal right to compel him to perform the relief
they are suing for. 5. Petitioners now seek to reverse the RTC’s decision and grant the extraordinary writ of
mandamus to compel Villordon to resolve the preliminary investigation and file a criminal information
against Dee.

Issue:

Whether petitioners are entitled to the extraordinary writ of mandamus

Ruling:

In accordance with Sec 3, Rule 65 of ROC, mandamus will lie if 1) any tribunal, corporation, board, officer,
or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station; or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which such other is entitled; and (2) there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked.

In the present case, petitioners insist that mandamus is a proper remedy since Villordon committed grave
abuse of discretion by refusing to file a case despite of the strong evidence against Dee. However, as held
in Hipos v Judge Bay, remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not
a discretionary one. The function of determining whether there is sufficient ground for the filing of the
information is executive in nature and rests with the prosecutor (Sec 1 and 2, Rule 122 ROC). It is the
prosecutor alone who has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should
be filed in court.

Also, due to the non-appearance of Dee on several hearings and the non-submission of the reply-affidavit
by petitioners, Villordon cannot be faulted if he is still not convinced that a criminal information should be
filed against Dee. The assertion of petitioners that the evidence against Dee is strong, amounting to grave
abuse of discretion on Villordon’s part in not filing the criminal information, has not been clearly
established.

Petitioners were not able to sufficiently demonstrate that they had no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in order to be entitled to mandamus. The recourse could have been simply to submit their reply-
affidavit in order for Villordon to make the proper determination whether there was sufficient ground to
hold Dee for trial.

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Tickler: Petitioners in this case seek the re-investigation by the Office of the City Fiscal. However, the court
explained that the re-investigation sought by petitioners applies only instances where a case is cognizable
by the Court of First Instance but filed with the City Court for purposes of preliminary investigation only and
thereafter dismissed by the latter on the ground that no prima facie case exists. However, for cases
cognizable by inferior courts and filed with the same not only for purposes of preliminary investigation but
for trial on the merits, the Office of the City Fiscal has no authority to re-investigate.

Doctrine: There are two (2) stages in a preliminary investigation; first, the preliminary examination of the
complainant and his witnesses prior to the arrest of the accused to determine whether or not there is ground
to issue a warrant of arrest; second, preliminary investigation proper, wherein the accused, after his arrest,
is informed of the complaint filed against him and is given access to the testimonies and evidence presented,
and he is also permitted to introduce evidence in his favor. The purpose of this stage of investigation is to
determine whether or not the accused should be released or held before trial.

Case Title:
PEDRO TANDOC v. RICARDO P. RESULTAN
GR Nos. 59241-44,
Jul 05, 1989
PADILLA, J.

Facts:

This controversy arose from a heated altercation and physical assaults amongst neighbors. Based on the
collated complaints of both parties, in October 1980, at the house of Pacita Tandoc, respondents Cancino,
Arnulfo Payopay, Conrado Payopay, Sr. and several others intruded the sari-sari store and house of the
former and an altercation ensued. In the middle of the verbal joust, Arnulfo and Beda Acosta picked up
stones and hurled them unto Pacita, though, the projectiles instead hit the latter’s helpers who sustained
physical injuries.

Thereafter, Tandoc’s party filed complaints against the intruders with the City Fiscal of San Carlos City,
Pangasinan, which sometime November 1980 found probable cause that all the respondents committed
trespass to dwelling, Arnulfo serious physical injuries and Acosta slight physical injuries. Four days later,
respondents filed complaints against Tandoc’s party with the same fiscal’s office, however, the latter found
them merely as belated countercharges meriting dismissal, except the trespass to dwelling charged against
Pedro Tandoc.

Displeased with the fiscal’s resolution, in July 1981, Payopay’s party directly lodged their complaints with
City Court San Carlos (CCSC), where the criminal cases initiated by the Tandocs against them are pending.
Subsequently, the CCSC issued several Orders which are the subject of this Petition for Certiorari, whereby
the said court, after conducting preliminary examination of Payopay’s complaints found reasonable ground
to believe that the offenses charged may have been committed by the accused, herein petitioners. The
Tandocs moved for reconsideration and re-investigation of the complaints by the city fiscal, insisting that
the latter had already evaluated the same and found no prima facie case.

Issue:

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W/N the CCSC had the power and authority to conduct anew a preliminary examination of charges, which
already went thru a preliminary investigation (PI) by the city fiscal who ordered their dismissal.

Ruling:

Petition is denied, re-investigation is not allowed in this instance. The policy objective for the conduct of a
PI is to protect the accused from the inconvenience, expense and burden of defending himself in a formal
trial unless reasonable probability of his guilt shall have been first ascertained in a fairly summary
proceeding by a competent officer. It is also intended to protect the state from having to conduct useless
and expensive trials.

There are TWO (2) STAGES in a PI; FIRST, the PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION of the complainant and his
witnesses prior to the arrest of the accused to determine whether or not there is ground to issue a warrant
of arrest; SECOND, PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION PROPER, wherein the accused, after his arrest, is
informed of the complaint filed against him and is given access to the testimonies and evidence presented,
and he is also permitted to introduce evidence in his favor. The purpose of this stage of investigation is to
determine whether or not the accused should be released [and the complaint be dismissed or he should
be held for trial].

A PI is inquisitorial in nature and it is not a trial on the merits of the case and has no purpose except that of
determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy (as does not
constitute a trial on the merits). Under the Section 9, Rule 112, certain crimes require a different approach
in PI. The rationale for this is as follows. “xxx the withholding of the right of the PI from the accused in cases
triable by the inferior courts involving offenses with lower penalties than those exclusively cognizable by
CFIs, could not be termed an unjust or unfair distinction.

The loss of time entailed in the conduct of PIs, with the consequent extension of deprivation of the
accused's liberty, in case he fails to post bail, which at times outlasts the period of the penalty provided by
law for the offense, besides the mental anguish suffered in protracted litigations, are eliminated with the
assurance of a speedy and expeditious trial for the accused, upon his arraignment (without having to
undergo the second stage of the PI), and of a prompt verdict on his guilt or innocence.

On the other hand, the so-called first stage of PI or the preliminary examination, conducted by the duly
authorized officer, as borne out by the examination and sworn written statement of the complainants and
their witnesses, generally suffices to establish the existence of reasonable ground to charge the accused
with having committed the offense complained of.

In the case at bar, the offenses charged against petitioners for "Trespass to Dwelling", "Grave Threats" and
"Physical Injuries" were all within the jurisdiction of the CCSC. Under the circumstances, the complaints
could be filed directly with the City Court which is empowered to conduct a preliminary examination for
purposes of issuance of warrants of arrest, and thereafter to proceed with the trial of the cases on the
merits. The PI proper conducted by the Office of the City Fiscal could have been dispensed with. Neither
did the earlier order of dismissal of the complaints by the investigating fiscal bar the filing of said complaints
with the city court on the ground of double jeopardy.

As long as the offense charged has not prescribed, the city court has the power and authority to conduct a
preliminary examination and proceed with the trial of the case properly within its jurisdiction. The

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prescriptive period of a crime depends upon the penalty imposed by law. The prescriptive period of
offenses punishable by arresto mayor is five (5) years, while crimes punishable by correctional penalties
prescribe in ten (10) years.

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Tickler: Petitioner in this case remains entitled to a prelimi-nary investigation although trial on the merits
has already began. Trial on the merits should be suspended or held in abeyance and a preliminary
investigation forthwith accorded to petitioner. It is true that the Prosecutor might, in view of the evidence
that he may at this time have on hand, conclude that probable cause exists; upon the other hand, the
Prosecutor conceivably could reach the conclusion that the evidence on hand does not warrant a finding of
probable cause.

Doctrine:

While that right to Preliminary Investigation is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament since it
has in fact been established by statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. The right to
have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence
formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a
substantive right.

The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to
speak of expense; the right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to any one save, perhaps, to
hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to
deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process.

Case Title:
ROLITO GO Y TAMBUNTING v. CA
GR No. 101837
Feb 11, 1992
FELICIANO, J.

Facts:

Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost had a collision with another
vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the other vehicle, and drove off. An
eyewitness of the incident was able to take down petitioner’s plate number and reported the same to the
police, who subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner.

6 days after the shooting, petitioner presented himself in the police station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the
police detained him. Subsequently a criminal charge was brought against him. Petitioner posted bail, the
prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial without preliminary
investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as
bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully,
falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his
petition for certiorari assails such procedure and actions undertaken and files for a preliminary
investigation.

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Issue:

(1) Whether or Not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful.

(2) Whether or Not petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.

Ruling:

Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. Ramos, wherein the Court upheld the warrantless arrest
as valid effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of the offenses, which however constituted
“continuing crimes,” i.e. subversion, membership in an outlawed organization, etc. There was no lawful
warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113. This is because the arresting officers were not actually there
during the incident, thus they had no personal knowledge and their information regarding petitioner were
derived from other sources. Further, Section 7, Rule 112, does not apply.

Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the police station, he neither expressed surrender
nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime. When a complaint was filed to the prosecutor,
preliminary investigation should have been scheduled to determine probable cause. Prosecutor made a
substantive error, petitioner is entitled to preliminary investigation, necessarily in a criminal charge, where
the same is required appear thereat. Petition granted, prosecutor is ordered to conduct preliminary
investigation, trial for the criminal case is suspended pending result from preliminary investigation,
petitioner is ordered released upon posting a bail bond.

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Tickler: The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case nor
impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. The remedy of the accused in such
case is to call the attention of the court to the lack of a preliminary investigation and demand, as a matter
of right, that one be conducted.

Doctrine: The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.

Case Title:
ESMAEL ORQUINAZA v. PEOPLE
GR No. 165596
Nov 17, 2005
PUNO, J.

Facts:

In 2003, Arida, an employee of Calamba Model Makers factory, together with her witness Espinili, executed
a sworn statement before the Calamba City Police Station regarding the alleged act of Orquinaza, the
general manager of the said factory, of kissing her and touching her breasts while she was taking a nap
inside a room of the factory. The Calamba City Police designated the offense as sexual harassment and
referred the case to the Office of the Prosecutor.

The assistant city prosecutor issued a subpoena ordering respondent Arida and Orquinaza to appear for
preliminary investigation. Orquinaza filed a motion to dismiss before the Office of the City Prosecutor,
arguing that the affidavits of Arida and Espinili do not contain allegations to constitute the crime of sexual
harassment.

Soon, the assistant city prosecutor issued a resolution finding that there was no transgression of the anti-
sexual harassment law, but petitioner's act of grabbing complainant's breasts and kissing her constitute
acts of lasciviousness. Thus, he filed with the MTCC an information charging petitioner with acts of
lasciviousness.

A warrant of arrest was issued against Orquinaza. Orquinaza filed an omnibus motion praying that the
warrant be recalled, the information be quashed, the arraignment be invalidated and the case be dismissed.
He also claims that he was deprived of his right to due process since the information for acts of
lasciviousness was void as the preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor was for sexual
harassment and not for acts of lasciviousness. The MTCC denied the motion.

Issue:

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1. Is there a need for new preliminary investigation?

2. Should the case be dismissed on the ground of lack of preliminary investigation? Is lack of preliminary
investigation a ground for the quashal of the information?

Ruling:

1. No. Arida's statement contains all the allegations to support the charge of acts of lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., (1) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness,
(2) under any of the following circumstances: (a) using force or intimidation, (b) the offended party is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) offended party is under 12 years of age. Petitioner had
the opportunity to refute all the allegations made by Arida when the Assistant City Prosecutor required him
to submit his counter-affidavit. The conduct of another preliminary investigation for the offense of acts of
lasciviousness would be a futile exercise because the complainant would only be presenting the same facts
and evidence which have already been studied by the prosecutor. The Court frowns upon such superfluity
which only serves to delay the prosecution and disposition of the criminal complaint.

The designation by the police officer of the offense as sexual harassment when she referred the case to the
Office of the Prosecutor is not conclusive as it is within the competence of the prosecutor to assess the
evidence submitted and determine therefrom the appropriate offense to be charged. That is precisely the
purpose of the preliminary investigation. It is a means to allow the parties to present their affidavits and
counter-affidavits before the prosecutor to enable the latter to ascertain whether there is sufficient ground
to indict the accused and to help him prepare the information to be filed in court. Preliminary investigation
is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held
for trial.

2. Even if it were necessary to conduct another preliminary investigation for the charge of acts of
lasciviousness, the lack of such preliminary investigation would still not be a ground to quash the
information against the accused. The Court has often held that the lack of preliminary investigation is not
a ground to quash or dismiss a complaint or information. Much less does it affect the court's jurisdiction.
The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case nor impair
the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. The remedy of the accused in such case is
to call the attention of the court to the lack of a preliminary investigation and demand, as a matter of right,
that one be conducted. The court, instead of dismissing the information, should merely suspend the trial
and order the fiscal to conduct a preliminary investigation.

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