SECOND DIVISION transfer certificate of title to the lot was issued in the name of

petitioner.[3]
On January 31, 1985, private respondent Corazon Aranez
[G.R. No. 115101. March 2, 1998] brought this action below for specific performance against petitioner to
enforce a deed of sale covering the same lot allegedly entered into
between her and petitioner on March 22, 1960. The
contract[4] stipulated that title to the land shall be transferred to private
FIDELA MANANZALA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and respondent within 30 days after full payment of the purchase price by
CORAZON ARAEZ, respondents. petitioner to the PHHC.[5] The deed was notarized by Atty. Pio Lopez,
who was petitioners counsel in her case against the Mercado
DECISION spouses.[6] Private respondent alleged that petitioner refused, despite
repeated demands made by her, to comply with the stipulation in their
MENDOZA, J.: contract.She prayed that petitioner be ordered to transfer ownership
of the land to her.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 31546, reversing the decision of Petitioner denied selling the land to private respondent. She
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 106, Quezon City, dismissing the contended that the deed was a forgery and that her signature was
complaint for specific performance brought by private respondent. The secured through fraud by private respondent and by Atty. Pio
appellate court instead ordered petitioner to convey the property in Lopez. In the alternative, she averred that the deed of sale was void
question to private respondent. because it was made before the actual award of the land to her and
that it was made in violation of the prohibition in the rules and
The background of this case is as follows. regulations of the PHHC against the subsequent disposition of the
Petitioner Fidela Mananzala is the registered owner of a parcel of land within one year of the issuance of the title.
land located at Bagong Pagasa, Quezon City, under Transfer The trial court dismissed the complaint. Although finding
Certificate of Title No. 32314, issued on January 15, 1985. Petitioner petitioners signature on the deed to be genuine, it nevertheless ruled
had been in actual possession of the land since 1955 by virtue of a that there was no perfected contract of sale because petitioner never
conditional sale made in her favor by the Philippine Homesite and really intended to sell the land. Furthermore, the trial court also found
Housing Corporation (PHHC), now the National Housing Authority the alleged contract to be null and void because, at the time of the
(NHA). In 1960, however, the PHHC awarded the land to Nestor and sale, petitioner was not yet the owner thereof.[7]
Elisea Mercado who took possession of the land in that year.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed.[8] It held that there was
Petitioner contested the award in court. She claimed precedence a meeting of the minds between the parties as evidenced by the
not only in actual occupation of the land but also in application for its signature of the petitioner on the deed of sale which the National
purchase. Her right to the land was upheld by the Court of First Bureau of Investigation found to be genuine. The notarization of the
Instance of Quezon City, whose decision was later affirmed by the deed gave rise to the presumption of its regularity. [9] The Court of
Intermediate Appellate Court. Consequently, the PHHC cancelled the Appeals further held that petitioner could validly sell the land even
award made to the Mercado spouses. before the actual award to her pursuant to Art. 1461 of the Civil Code,
On December 14, 1984, petitioner paid in full the price of the land which provides that things having a potential existence may be the
under the deed of conditional sale. The NHA therefore executed a object of a contract of sale. Consequently, the court ordered petitioner
deed of sale in her favor on January 14, 1985. [2] The next day a to transfer ownership of the land to private respondent. Hence this
petition.
 Petitioner alleges two grounds for her petition, to wit: possession of the lot from him was upheld. In this case, however,
I.
there is no evidence that the sale to private respondent of the lot was
made in violation of any rule of the PHHC. This issue was never
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN passed upon by either the trial court or the Court of Appeals.
VALIDATING A CONTRACT EXECUTED IN VIOLATION OF
LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY. The above argument, as well as petitioners contention that the
sale to private respondent is void because it was made within one
II.
year after the title to the property was issued in the name of petitioner,
THE CHALLENGED NOTARIAL DOCUMENT, APART FROM while raised by petitioner in her answer in the trial court, was not
BEING CONTRARY TO LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY, DOES passed upon and she did not urge it anymore except now. As already
NOT SERVE THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY. noted, the trial court based its decision on its finding that the sale was
We shall deal with these questions in inverse order. void on the ground that there was no meeting of the minds of the
parties. When its decision was appealed, petitioner (as appellee) did
First. Petitioner avers that the appellate court erred in relying on not urge her original defenses to uphold the decision in her favor. She
the presumption of regularity accorded to notarial documents in merely relied on the ruling of the trial court. [15] The appellate court, in
holding the deed of sale between her and private respondent to be reversing the trial court, simply considered the issues raised by the
valid. trial courts decision, namely, whether petitioners signature on the
deed was a forgery, whether there was a meeting of the minds of the
This is not true. The decision of the appellate court shows that the
parties, and whether there could be a sale of future property. The
court also took into account the evidence of the parties. It relied on the
question whether the sale was void because it was made within the
report of the National Bureau of Investigation which found the
one-year period of prohibition to petitioner as awardee was never
signature of the petitioner on the questioned document to be genuine.
briefed or in any way argued below. For all intents and purposes,
[10]
The NBI report was based on a comparison of the signature on the
therefore, petitioner waived this ground and cannot now urge it as
deed and ten specimen signatures of petitioners. The trial court itself
ground for reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals.
arrived at the same conclusion as to the genuiness and due execution
of the deed.[11] Indeed, petitioners claim that her signature on the deed WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
had been procured through fraud is contradicted by her allegation in AFFIRMED.
court that the signature on the deed was not hers. As she claimed in
her testimony, That is not my signature.[12] If the signature on the deed SO ORDERED.
was not her signature, then it could not have been procured by fraud. Regalado (Chairman), Melo, Puno and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Anyway, that the signature of petitioner in the deed in question is
genuine is a factual finding of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals which, in the absence of very clear evidence to the contrary,
this Court will not revise.[13]
Second. The other question is whether the contract between
petitioner and private respondent is valid and binding. Petitioner
invokes the ruling in Ibay v. Intermediate Appellate Court.[14] In that
case the transfer of rights to petitioner was disapproved by the PHHC
in view of Resolution No. 82 providing that the sale of more than one
lot per person shall not be permitted. Petitioner was already the holder
of a land by reason of a previous award made to him by the
PHHC. Accordingly, the right of the awardee to recover the