EDUC: 00587

a0005 Identity
M S Merry, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands; Nieuwe Prinsengracht 130, 1018 VZ,
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
ã 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

p0005 Published research and theory on identity far exceeds social or political particularities. While essentialists
reasonable expectation. Thousands of articles and books appreciate that circumstances and historical contexts
have been written on the subject, yet navigating this topic vary, they nevertheless insist that persons know, experi-

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continues to be something of a conceptual minefield. Like ence, and relate to something constant about themselves
diversity, the term identity has been used in so many beyond or beneath the linguistic constructions or cultural

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contexts, many of them polemical and political, that it is narratives to which these merely give expression. Essen-
difficult to find any common understanding on which tialist readings of identity, then, are reductionist inasmuch

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scholars agree. Culture typically has been the way that as some particular aspect of identity is believed to be
anthropologists have talked about identity, yet critics irrevocably and timelessly true. This interpretation of

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charge that anthropological models of identity too often identity assumes that there is something inalterable and
proffer essentialist interpretations of their object, mas- determined about who one is on the basis of genealogy,

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querading as objective description. Sociological models culture, race, gender, or sexual orientation; as such, this
of identity, notwithstanding their bold structural claims interpretation risks erring on the side of identity politics.

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and attention to environmental and institutional forces, Identity politics describes the fact that persons of various p0025

are thought by some to have a thin empirical basis. Doubt- minority groups may feel trapped within an identity con-
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less psychology has dominated the field of identity (and
self ) studies, yet psychological models, for all of their
structed by others, leading to the expectation that one must
represent a particular set of ideals, interests, and behaviors in
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personal and interpersonal promise, are believed by order to be authentic (see Merry and New, 2008). Essential-
many to have a weak theoretical foundation. ism is amply on display in the fields of psychology, sociology,
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p0010 Meanwhile, identity in the philosophical literature has and, perhaps most especially, in anthropology, which gave
until recently be confined mostly to ruminations on the birth to the notion of cultural identity and difference. Yet the
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self: as soul in Plato; rationality connected to, but not notion that one must identify exclusively with a specific
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coterminous with, the body in Descartes; uninterrupted identity marker (e.g., gender) – with all sorts of concomitant
consciousness in Locke; a stream of experiences which a purposes and meanings in tow – usually comes at the
thing has in relation to itself in Hume; an emotive life in expense of creating or exploring alternatives, or of critically
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Rousseau; as noumenal self about which we can know examining how one’s identity is both historically and contin-
little in Kant; as will in Schopenhauer; as an elusive but uously constructed. Here, Appiah (2005: 113) astutely
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nonspecific something in Wittgenstein; and as the contin- observes that while the ‘‘contours of identity are profoundly
uous, purposive struggle of creative power against an real, [they are] no more imperishable, unchanging, or tran-
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historically contingent concatenation of social, political, scendent than other things that men and women make.’’
and cultural forces in Nietzsche and Foucault (Glover, Conversely, postmodernists argue that no such thing as a p0030
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1988; Perry, 1975; Marshall, 2001). self exists; identity only describes indeterminate, mutable
p0015 Yet what follows is not a summary of metaphysics or narratives of persons located within the social or cultural
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philosophy of mind. There also is not sufficient space here roles they are called upon to play. Subjectivities (in the
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to examine identity in each of the separate disciplines. preferred parlance) are contingent, malleable, hybrid
Instead, what follows are some prefatory discursive remarks assemblages that never cease evolving and adapting to any
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about identity; then, owing to the dominance of psycholog- number of contexts. As Hall and du Gay (1997: 6) writes:
ical theories on identity, a brief overview of some of its
Identities are, as it were, the positions which the subject is
salient themes will be adumbrated; this will be followed
obliged to take up while always knowing (the language of
by a discussion on identity formation and maintenance both
consciousness here betrays us) that they are representa-
in political philosophy and philosophy of education.
tions, that representation is always constructed across a
p0020 Contemporary interpretations of identity run the
lack, across a division, from the place of the Other, and
gamut, ranging from essentialist readings found in the
thus can never be adequate – identical – to the subject
many varieties of culturalist discourse (e.g., aboriginal
processes which are invested in them.
and indigenous studies), to postmodern dismissals of the
term itself. Thus from the one end, essentialists ascribe For postmoderns, then, identity names little more than p0035

inherent, lucid meanings to identity which lay beneath ephemeral positions and attachments we assume within

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 EDUC: 00587
2 Identity

the various discourses that circumscribe who we are at any Of course, even describing these differences is a symptom of
given moment. On this view, all identities – whether essentialism, and increasingly these cultural dichotomies
historical or cultural – are manufactured, disseminated, are being challenged. It is likely that various levels of
and politically deployed (Anderson, 2006; Hollinger, 1994). individual, relational, and collective identity are to be
However, this approach renders insignificant the ways in found in most persons irrespective of where they were
which persons actually experience their identities, under- born and how they were raised. Yet whether one is an
neath it all, as substantive and real. That is, persons can independent or an interdependent self, Hogg (2003: 462)
sense that something about them exists beneath or outside observes that group membership plays a crucial role in
of their cultural or social narratives; that it is they who are identity development:
the authors of such stories; and that they can sense them-
Groups [influence] the type of people we are, the things
selves as being in time and social space.
we do, the attitudes and values we hold, and the way we

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p0040 Indeed, however socially constructed identities are,
perceive and react to people around us. Groups furnish us
one nevertheless feels herself to be Jewish, transsexual,

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with an identity, a way of locating ourselves in relation to
black, or whatever. Of course there are myriad ways in
other people. Indeed, our sense of self derives from the
which one is Jewish, transsexual, or black, and these

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groups and categories we belong to, and in many ways
markers of identity do not describe all that we are (the
individuality may merely be the unique combination of
blunder of identity politics), but this point is frequently

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distinct groups and categories that define who we are.
missed by critics of identity: how we see ourselves, and
how we are seen by others, matters, and perhaps espe-

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cially to those whose (constructed) identities enjoy little if Identity Defined s0005

any public recognition. The politics of recognition makes

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this very point: everyone should have the right to be Granting its manifold nuances, meanings, and applications, p0055

acknowledged publicly for the identities that matter to identity normally refers to the complex and ever-evolving
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them. Recognition is central to social anthropology in the
context of ascribed and assumed identity. One is what one
expressions of self-understanding that describe how persons
relate, and form attachments, to their historical–social–cultural
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is seen to be, and one is as one believes oneself to be. environment over a lifetime and consciously or uncon-
p0045 Both personal and social aspects shape identity but sciously arrange their priorities and commitments to reflect
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most theorists on the subject generally agree that identi- those, sometimes conflicting, attachments. Attachments are
ties do not evolve from pristine cultures; rather, identities formed with other persons as well as one’s environment
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are products of multiple, oftentimes conflicting, attach- (hence the attachment to one’s homeland, for instance).
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ments. Indeed, the stable and fixed identity so favorable Identity denotes an understanding of who we are, as p0060

to earlier psychologists is increasingly being challenged individuals, and not merely as products of history, culture,
by others who argue that our identities, far from being or caste. Josselson (1987: 12–13) describes identity as a
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fixed and secure, are constantly evolving, adopting new ‘‘dynamic fitting together of parts of the personality with
meanings, and appropriating habits, customs, and beliefs the realities of the social world so that a person has a sense
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according to contextual circumstance and need. Indeed, both of internal coherence and meaningful relatedness to
all persons possess hybrid identities that combine, mix, the real world.’’ One’s identity is invariably multifaceted
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and separate identity components to adapt to different and may involve tension; identities, too, may be ranked
environments. Hybrid identities – what Salman Rushdie (and reordered) in importance, some aspects being dis-
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called the mongrel self – reflect the plural cultures and carded or constructed in light of new and changing cir-
societies we live in, and we do not so much discard one cumstances and experience. Sen (2006: 19) concurs:
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identity for another so much as we interchange multiple,

Identities are robustly plural, and [one] identity need not
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not entirely consonant, identities (Benhabib, 2002; Holland

obliterate the importance of others [. . .] a person [also]
et al., 1998).
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has to make choices – explicitly and by implication –

p0050 In industrialized, Western societies, identities are
about what relative importance to attach, in a particular
understood as intensely personal and individual, stressing
context, to the divergent loyalties and priorities that may
uniqueness and the independent self. Accordingly, the
compete for precedence.
aim of exploring and questioning inherited values, opi-
nions, and habits generally is encouraged. Conversely, Some identities may be temporary, while others p0065

identity in more traditional cultures – including, in East endure. Any number of different selves may be salient
Asia, those which are highly industrialized – is typically depending on the persons or environment with whom/
circumscribed by one’s age, caste, gender, or status. which a person may be relating. Which aspects of identity
Accordingly, what some have called the interdependent one consciously or unconsciously summons will largely
self inclines toward similarity, conformity, and group har- be determined by her context and circumstances, but also
mony (Gross and Gore, 2003; Markus and Kitayama, 1991). her temperament and emotional needs.
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Identity 3

p0070 Yet, while identity is rarely settled or fixed, it vaguely developed through the integration of various identifications
describes how persons see themselves and how they with significant others and reference groups, and it is social
express what is important to them. However variable inasmuch as it is developed through the internalized roles
one’s self-concept is there remains a very particular and appraisals of others. Central components of identity
sense in which persons understand themselves, and include: (1) a sense of personal continuity over time and
others, as specific, historical persons in space and time. across situations; (2) a sense of inner agency; (3) a com-
Who one thinks she is, is unavoidably connected to the mitment to certain self-representations as self-defining;
self that she was, is becoming, and will be, however little (4) a commitment to certain roles as self-defining; (5) an
she remembers, understands, or is able to predict about acknowledgment of one’s role commitments and views of
those distinct phases of growth and development. This is self by significant others; (6) a commitment to a set of core
consistent with what some psychoanalysts believe to be values and ideal self-standards, and (7) a commitment to a

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true of a healthy ego identity, namely, there must be a worldview that gives life meaning (Erikson, 1959, 1968).
‘‘subjective sense of continuity of being the same person For Erikson, identity begins long before there is self- p0090

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over time and in different situations’’ (Côté and Levine, awareness, for it is in the nascent bonds of intimate rela-
2002: 121). This means that personal identity will mani- tions (primarily with one’s parents) that identity assumes

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fest characteristics of having a past, a present, and a future, its earliest expression. Intimate relationships, particularly
even if the present or future self no longer identifies as the maternal bond with children, supply the mutual trust

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the same person she once was. This, then, is one of the and recognition necessary for security and trust. Over
time, and with consistent care and attention, it is within

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great paradoxes of identity: experience changes who we
are, and thus how we see the world as well as how we are these trusting bonds that one comes to identify in a partic-
seen by others. ular way with a set of attachments, habits, and thought

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patterns. This also describes the manner in which persons
are enculturated, which is to say that most persons gradu-

s0010 Identity Formation

N ally come to identify with a way-of-being as natural, self-
evident, and correct. The foundations of trust give rise
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to greater possibilities for personal well-being; well-being
p0075 Identity formation has been studied from a number of in this sense describes the experience of being accepted
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perspectives. For example, there are models of racial by others as well as a sense of security, satisfaction, and
identity formation (Cross, 1971), sexual identity forma- confidence about one’s being-in-the-world. A healthy
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tion (Cass, 1979), and minority identity formation (Atkinson self-concept describes those who are comfortable with
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et al., 1983). Whatever the case, identity formation des- their self-image, with how others see them, with the roles
cribes the conscious process of (re)examining one’s feel- they have chosen for themselves, or even which others
ings, thoughts, behaviors, and ways of relating to others have chosen for them. (Erikson’s notions also supply the
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who may or may not share similar commitments and habits. foundations for many sociological and anthropological
It is to reflect upon ‘‘our place in the universe, the mean- understandings of what makes groups of individuals
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ing of life and death, and our purpose for being here’’ cohere.)
(Chickering and Reisser, 1993: 207). Identity formation Yet an absence, or shattering, of foundational trust, for p0095
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also describes the way in which individuals deal with Erikson, portends a looming identity crisis. This crisis
uncertainty and ambiguity. (which in late adolescence he describes as identity diffu-
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p0080 Notwithstanding a variety of disciplinary approaches, sion) frequently results from persistent doubts about
contemporary studies on identity formation continue to one’s ethnic, gender, religious, sexual, or racial identity,
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assume a psychological cast, and none has towered over and describes the inability to resolve a profound personal
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the field like Erik Erikson. Identity formation, for Erikson, challenge when faced with it. On the other hand, another
names a process at the core of the individual and at the type of crisis known as moratorium, is one that persons
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core of her communal culture, a process which establishes must navigate in order to achieve identity at each stage of
a single identity that links them together. ‘‘Identity grows development. Either way, identity crises arise when the
and is nurtured or frustrated in a complex bonding of self acceptance of one’s identity is questioned or rejected by
and society’’ (Hoover et al., 1997: 21). The formation of oneself or others. Young persons are particularly suscep-
identity involves both competence and integrity. Compe- tible to peer pressure; anxious to be accepted as a group
tence is achieved by one’s efforts and is validated by the member, intolerance may be expressed towards non-
recognition of others, while integrity is a state of mind members, that is, outsiders. In Erikson’s words:
about who one is in relation to oneself and others.
p0085 Identity for Erikson is both a personal and social con- It is difficult to be tolerant if deep down you are not quite
struction, for there is a strong interplay between the psychic sure that you are a man (or a woman), that you will ever
self and the social self. It is personal inasmuch as identity is [be] attractive, that you will be able to master your drives,
 EDUC: 00587
4 Identity

that you really know who you are, that you know what identity formation, some feminist critics (Gilligan, 1982)
you want to be, that you know what you look like to of Erikson – and moral development theorist Lawrence
others, and that you will know how to make the right Kohlberg – have objected to their purported androcentric
decisions without, once for all, committing yourself to the preference for autonomy and independence as signs of
wrong friend, sexual partner, leader, or career (Erikson, identity achievement.
1959: 93).
p0100 If the crisis proves too difficult to overcome, some kind
of identity pathology may set in (e.g., narcissistic person- Philosophical Trends s0015

ality disorder), these normally being the ‘‘result of

impaired ego functioning caused by a functional or In political philosophy, communitarians have long argued p0120

organic disorder’’ (Côté and Levine, 2002: 154). The that personal identity is entirely dependent on one’s

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result, for psychoanalysts, is that a failure to thrive at inherited cultural context. Parekh (2000: 159) expresses
this well:

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any level represents a failure to successfully navigate a
much earlier conflict (e.g., trust vs. mistrust, autonomy vs. [C]ulture gives coherence to our lives, gives us the

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doubt) so that a personality disorder is the result of a more resources to make sense of the world, stabilizes our per-
primary problem with attachment that is manifested in sonality, and so on. Its values and ideals inspire us, act as

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that period when intimacy is the primary demand for our moral compass, and guide us through life; its arts,
growth, that is, adolescence and early adulthood. rituals, songs, stories and literature fill us with joy and add

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p0105 Marcia (1966) extended the work of Erikson by exam- colour and beauty to our lives; and its moral and spiritual
ining the various ways in which identity formation wisdom comforts and helps us cope with the inevitable
occurred in adolescence. Marcia, however, was less certain tragedies of life.

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that identities were either resolved or confused. The crisis
that Erikson described was not, for Marcia, an emergency Some cultural identities are recognized and protected p0125

but rather a stimulus for overcoming challenges and N by dominant beliefs and practices and enjoy a level
of identity capital that those in minority groups do not.
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therefore leading to growth. The result would be greater
individualization and differentiation. Marcia also con- Identity capital describes the various investments that
persons make about who they are, but the term also
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curred with most psychologists on this point: identity

arises from any number of competing – and not necessar- expresses a series of transactions and exchanges with
others that validate or invalidate one’s personal or social
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ily conflicting – influences. Though not an exhaustive list

of identity-forming effects, birth order, peer group, gen- identity. Yet where identities appear to be under threat
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der assignment, sexual orientation, religion, occupation, owing to a weakened cultural base, well-being itself
and culture all influence, to one degree or another, how appears threatened to some, thus leading to efforts to
protect and maintain (fixed) cultural identities. Some
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one comes to understand her relationship to others,

including the way in which one shares a set of commu- have even argued that the state ought to underwrite the
protection of certain imperiled cultures in order that the
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nally based commitments or practices.

p0110 Needless to say, identities will not arise within, or map identities of their members may remain intact (Margalit
onto, neatly prescribed categories. Côté and Levine (2002: and Halbertal, 1994). Meanwhile, postmodern critics,
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46) observe: such as Appadurai (1996), argue that minorities in many

parts of the world are at least as artificial as the majorities
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[In] order to understand an individual’s personal identity, they seem to threaten, while liberal critics have noted that
the problem with cultural rights is that it seeks to uncriti-
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one needs to know more about a person than his or her

ego constructions and sociohistoric location and oppor- cally protect groups and not the individuals within them.
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tunities – one needs to know about the emergent inter- More will be said about this in the following text.
personal circumstances affecting his or her behavior, Kymlicka’s (1989) Liberalism, Community and Cul- p0130
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including others’ perceptions of past personal-identity ture marked a watershed. By far his most interesting and
displays, labels that might have been affixed to him or controversial claim has been that culture – and by exten-
her by others, prejudices faced, gossip relevant to the sion, cultural identity – is, in Rawlsian terms, a primary
person, multiple and contradictory pressures to conform, good. That is, like income, basic liberties, opportunities,
and so forth. and a social basis for self-respect, culture is necessary in
order to flourish as a human being. This is because cul-
p0115 Perhaps one truism seldom noted by psychological tures supply us with our most basic identities, facilitate
identity theorists is that many identities also are formed trust between ourselves and others, and promote general
in resistance to peer or parental expectations, as well as to well-being among others who share our way of life. Cul-
one’s inherited group identity or membership. Further, tures also supply persons with the context for choice, and
preferring an interdependent and relational model of thus enable freedom and autonomy.
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Identity 5

p0135 The implications for identity are clear: identities arise thus need assistance in order to weather the storm of
from within a given cultural context. To be sure, many cultural change. Indeed, Waldron suggests that there is
choices are already made for us, inasmuch as our cultures something very paternalistic about the assumption that
provide a limited range of options. Importantly, however, some are better able than others to acclimate to change.
while our cultural identities may be given, for Kymlicka Still others, notably Okin (1998), point to the problems p0155

it remains for persons to form, pursue, and revise their with defending minority group rights, however mistreated
conceptions of the good life, and this includes how we see these national or indigenous minorities may have been in
ourselves as individuals and in relation to others. Inter- the past, or continue to be. Her concern is with a cultural
estingly, Kymlicka argues that some groups, owing to past group’s most vulnerable members, women and children.
and present discrimination, are not effectively able to She points out that sexual discrimination is rarely overt
choose or to act unless corrective measures are taken by and states are rarely able or willing to patrol the private

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the state (e.g., affirmative action) to level the playing field. sphere. Finally, all liberal critics argue that cultural pro-
These corrective measures also may require considerable tection conflates the interests of the adult members

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cultural protection of indigenous (though not immigrant) with those of the children, and this portends difficulties
groups. Yet, as a philosophical liberal, Kymlicka is ulti- with the younger generation being able to decide for

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mately concerned with individual freedom and autonomy, themselves whether they wish to identify with the culture
and therefore argues that persons need to be free to revise of their parents.

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or even cast off their cultural identity if they are unable to In philosophy of education, identity formation and p0160

maintenance has been a theme most frequently taken up

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live it well from the inside. As such, one’s identity is not
fixed or determined by cultural membership. in debates over religious (and recently, home-) schooling.
p0140 Kymlicka’s views have been strongly criticized from An education that aims to strengthen identity and the

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several directions. First, communitarians argue that cul- commitments that derive from it can be described as a
ture provides such depth of meaning and direction that culturally coherent education (Merry, 2005). Cultural
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one’s identity is both circumscribed and bound by it. In
Sandel’s (1982) terms, the self is irrevocably encumbered.
coherence describes a continuity of commitments, values
and beliefs between the home and school which reinforces
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Additionally, there is resistance to what some interpret as a child’s cultural or religious identity and builds self-
a liberalizing agenda in Kymlicka’s insistence that persons confidence and trust with others who share these commit-
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ought to autonomously subscribe to their cultural identi- ments. While not without its critics, arguments for cultural
ties, that is, rationally and critically reflect upon who they coherence operate on the assumption that persons experi-
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are. Most cultural identities, they argue, are not open to ence emotional stability by identifying primarily (though
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revision, nor should they be. perhaps not exclusively) with a particular notion of the
p0145 Liberal critics of Kymlicka mostly target two areas. good life. Further, advocates of culturally coherent education
Some (e.g., Barry, 2001) argue that Kymlicka’s cultural recognize that limiting the range of identity choices/ options,
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defense assumes too unspoiled a notion of how cultures particularly for young children, helps to solidify identity
actually are formed and operate, and further, ignores the and enable agency to act upon the meanings one attaches
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fact that identities are unavoidably hybrid and complex. to those identities, including the capacity to pursue and
Arguing against the one person-one culture model, Waldron revise their self-understandings and attachments.
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(1996) insists that while a person needs cultural attach- One advocate of this approach, Burtt (1994), argues p0165

ments for a meaningful identity to develop, a homoge- that excepting for cases involving abuse or neglect (a con-
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neous, stable, or unaltered culture is not required, nor is tested terrain if there ever was one), parents ought to have
unchallenged prerogatives to raise children in ways spe-
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one likely to find it. Further, cultural characteristics do

not tell us all we need to know about individuals. Rather, cific to cultural or religious attachments. This is neces-
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positing the one person-many fragments substitute, Waldron sary, she argues, for equipping children with the necessary
argues that in this postmodern, post-Fordist, globalized psychological resources to make sense of their inherited
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world the idea of absorbing only one culture – let alone world and to live well. As a liberal, Burtt stresses the
the idea that any univocal culture exists – is implausible. importance of cultivating autonomy but argues that this
p0150 Concerning Kymlicka’s claim that some vulnerable can be done in a manner consonant with the parent’s
cultures may need state protection in order to help pre- beliefs or cultural and religious practices. She also
serve threatened identities, critics note that cultures are acknowledges that freedom to exit one’s community is
not static entities that can be preserved by state interven- important, but believes that the resources to do this will
tion except in the most artificial way. Indeed, state protec- come about either through exposure to outside influences
tion will only sanction contestable expressions favored by or, more likely, by engaging with counter narratives within
a minority group’s leadership. Further, state intervention one’s own tradition.
in order to protect the identity of a minority population With culturally coherent school models, there are p0170

suggests that persons are unable (or unlikely) to adapt, and worries that parents and teachers may not only discourage
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6 Identity

critical thinking and dissent, but also use coercion and fear Glover, J. (1988). The Philosophy and Psychology of Personal Identity.
London: Penguin Press.
to achieve conformity. The obligatory authority of certain Gross, S. E. and Gore, J. S. (2003). Cultural models of the self. In Leary,
religious texts, or the charismatic authority of community M. R. and Tangney, J. P. (eds.) Handbook of Self and Identity, pp
leaders often distinguishes acceptable (e.g., heterosexual) 536–564. New York: Guilford Press.
Hall, S. and du Gay, P. (eds.) (1997). Questions of Cultural Identity.
identities from unacceptable ones. Further, critics of this London: Sage.
approach to parenting and education insist that too little Hogg, M. A. (2003). Social identity. In Leary, M. R. and Tangney, J. P.
attention is given to the cultural construction and histori- (eds.) Handbook of Self and Identity, pp 462–479. New York:
Guilford Press.
cal development of any assumed identity. Thus, children Holland, D., Lachicotte, W. J. R., Skinner, D., and Cain, C. (1998).
must not only be exposed to views outside of one’s family Identity and Agency in Cultural Worlds. Cambridge: Harvard
and immediate community, but they must meaningfully University Press.
Hollinger, R. (1994). Postmodernism and the Social Sciences:
engage with others whose views are decidedly different A Thematic Approach. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

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before it can be said that they have an informed under- Hoover, K., Marcia, J., and Parris, K. (1997). The Power of Identity:
standing of what it means to live an identity from the Politics in a New Key. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.

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Josselson, R. (1987). Finding Herself: Pathways to Identity Development
inside. Finally, critics of culturally coherent parenting in Women. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
and education worry over the conflation of the interests,

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Kymlicka, W. (1989). Liberalism, Community and Culture. Oxford:
attachments and identities of children with those of their Oxford University Press.
MacMullen, I. (2007). Faith in Schools? Autonomy, Citizenship and
parents. Debates among philosophers of education con-

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Religious Education in the Liberal State. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
tinue over whether an upbringing to anchor identity dur- University Press.
ing the primary grades is desirable, even necessary, in Marcia, J. (1966). Development and validation of ego identity status.

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Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 3, 551–558.
order to provide children with a foundation upon which Margalit, A. and Halbertal, M. (1994). Liberalism and the right to culture.
to make comparative judgments about alternative identi- Social Research 61, 491–510.

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ties, or whether children ought to be instructed and Markus, H. R. and Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications
for cognition, emotion, and motivation. Psychological Review
acculturated in ways that depart more manifestly from 98, 224–253.
the opinions and habits of the parents (Feinberg, 2006;
MacMullen, 2007; Merry, 2007).
N Marshall, J. (2001). A critical theory of the self: Wittgenstein, Nietzsche,
Foucault. Studies in Philosophy and Education 20, 75–91.
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Merry, M. S. (2005). Cultural coherence and the schooling for identity
maintenance. Journal of Philosophy of Education 39, 377–497.
See also: Liberalism and liberal education (00562); Merry, M. S. (2007). Culture, Identity and Islamic Schooling:
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Postmodernism (00567). A Philosophical Approach. New York: Palgrave.

Merry, M. S. and New, W. (2008). Constructing an authentic self: The
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challenges and promise of African-centered pedagogy. American

Journal of Education 115, 35–64.
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Non-Print Items

Abstract:
In this article, Merry first offers some prefatory discursive remarks about identity; then, owing to the dominance of
psychological theories on identity, a brief overview of some of its salient themes will be adumbrated; this will be
followed by a discussion on identity formation and maintenance both in political philosophy and philosophy of
education, with consideration for both postmodern as well as liberal understandings.

Keywords: Culture; Essentialism; Hybridity; Identity formation; Identity politics

Author and Co-author Contact Information:

M Merry
Nieuwe Prinsengracht 130
1018 VZ, Amsterdam
The Netherlands

Biographical Sketch for Online Version

Michael S. Merry is professor of philosophy of education at the University of Amsterdam and the author of Culture, Identity and
Islamic Schooling: A Philosophical Approach (Palgrave, 2007).