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Meaning and Reference

This document discusses theories of meaning and reference. It introduces referents as objects picked out by terms, and reference as the relationship between words and corresponding properties. It then summarizes the Referential Theory, which says that words refer to things in the world and sentences represent states of affairs by combining individual word references. The document also discusses definite descriptions, how Frege viewed them as referring expressions, and Russell's theory that definite descriptions do not refer to particular objects but rather assert properties of things.

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126 views

Meaning and Reference

This document discusses theories of meaning and reference. It introduces referents as objects picked out by terms, and reference as the relationship between words and corresponding properties. It then summarizes the Referential Theory, which says that words refer to things in the world and sentences represent states of affairs by combining individual word references. The document also discusses definite descriptions, how Frege viewed them as referring expressions, and Russell's theory that definite descriptions do not refer to particular objects but rather assert properties of things.

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labukka
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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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INTRODUCTION: MEANING AND REFERENCE

A referent is an object that is picked out by reference to it as having the


property of satisfying the content of the given term. Denotion is any symbol,
word, or string of noises that should represent an object. It comprises: singular
terms and general terms: proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal
pronouns, demonstrative pronouns, etc. Reference is the relationship between the
word and a corresponding property.

The basic task for a theory of meaning is to identify the difference


between marks on a page or noises in the air that are just marks or noises, so
called “gibberish”, and marks or noises that are meaningful sentences. The
difference seems to be an ability of human beings to grasp those meanings though
understanding the marks and noises. Thus, a good theory of meaning should
explain how it is possible for people to understand and produce these meaningful
utterances.

The Referential Theory reacts to this by saying that sentences have


meaning in virtue of their parts words standing for things in reality. This is to say
that words are like labels on things, symbols denoting items in the world. For
example, the word “chair” means chair just because it possesses a conventionally-
recognised referential connection to the actual chair. This relationship is
technically called “reference”. Putting individual references of the components of
the sentence together produces a sentence as representing a particular state of
affairs. E.g. the sentence: “Today is Monday” means that today is Monday.
Moreover, this is so because “today” refers to the present day, “is” refers to the
action of being and “Monday” refers to the day which comes after Sunday.

Understanding is identifying the referential relation between the thing and


the word, between the sentence and the state of affairs. The same applies for
producing meaningful sentences. A competent speaker can produce a novel meaningful
sentence by using his knowledge of reference between a word and an object he is about to
pick out. Therefore, whenever he wants to express a particular state of affairs, he
is able to find the symbols whose sequence “resembles” his intended state of
affairs.

DEFINITE DESCRIPTION

Definite descriptions are sentences that contain the form “The F is G”


where a description of a particular thing is given. Examples of definite
descriptions include “the oldest bed” and “the heaviest snake” as they both allude
to a thing. These types of sentences should be seen in contrast to proper names
that denote a totally unique individual or object, such as “The King of Spain” or
“Madagascar”. These proper names are nothing more than referring expressions.
Frege however maintained that definite descriptions too are themselves nothing
more than referring expressions. Frege claimed that in order to determine whether
“The F is G” one simply had to (i) identify the particular object to which ‘F’ refers
and then (ii) determine whether that object is F.

Russell’s theory of definite descriptions aims at finding a solution to the


problem of empty reference. Importantly if there does not appear to be a referent
to which a definite description relates then on the Fregian view the sentence fails
to properly express anything at all. It will neither be true nor false. Although
intuitively we believe that one can use definite descriptions to express something
meaningful. To see where this can occur it is essential to take a look at the case of
negative existentials. These are sentences that make a negative statement about
the existence of some thing.

For example:
1. The winged horse does not exist.
2. The Golden Mountain does not exist.

If we were to adopt Frege’s position on these definite descriptions then


neither would have any meaning, as there is no direct, real referent. Surely it is the
case that the sentence “the golden mountain does not exist” is expressing
something true; that there is no golden mountain. How is it that this is the case?.

Russell’s solution to this problem is to claim that descriptive definitions


are not in fact referential descriptions. He claimed that definite descriptions such
as “The winged horse” and “the Golden Mountain” do contain some meaning
even though there is no real thing to which they refer. Accordingly it may appear
to be the case that the sentence “The F is G” is singular and that it furthermore
contains the expression “the F” which refers to a particular object. Rather Russell
postulated that definite descriptions have a deeper logical form that does not just
consist of the structure “F is G”. They instead involve the assertion that a certain
property ‘F’ is possessed by at least one thing and at most one thing. However
importantly this does not refer to any particular thing.

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